Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
No. 13-1225
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CARLOS DVILA-FLIX, a/k/a Carlos Mona,
Defendant, Appellant.
Before
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Gelp,* District Judge.
The district
court found that the evidence established that Dvila was a career
offender, and the court enhanced Dvila's Guidelines sentence
accordingly. As a result, Dvila received a sentence of 300 months
for Count One and 120 months for Count Two, for a total of 420
months' imprisonment.
-2-
affirm.
I.
The
details
of
Background
Dvila's
offense
conduct
and
first
sentencing were described thoroughly in United States v. DvilaFlix, 667 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Dvila I"), so we provide only
a brief recitation of those facts here.
In 2003, beginning in May and ending in November, Dvila
participated in a string of six bank robberies in Puerto Rico. The
Commonwealth arrested Dvila and charged him with armed robbery and
related weapons offenses arising out of five of the six robberies.
The fourth robbery that took place on September 8, 2003, however,
was not included in the charges.
a six-year sentence.
In April 2008, Dvila was again indicted, this time for
violations of federal law stemming from the previously uncharged
September 8, 2003, robbery.
The
for
second-degree
conviction
for
violations
of
murder;
Article
(2)
401
of
June
the
25,
1993,
Controlled
Substances Act of Puerto Rico; (3) a July 20, 2000, conviction for
a violation of Article 404 of the Controlled Substances Act of
Puerto Rico; and (4) the April 5, 2004, conviction for bank robbery
and weapons violations.
After a four-day trial, the jury convicted Dvila on both
the
robbery
and
firearm
counts,
and
he
was
sentenced
on
The sentencing
In
Dvila I, this court agreed, holding that the April 2004 conviction
did not qualify as a prior conviction for "three strikes" or career
offender purposes because the April 2004 conviction occurred after
-- not prior to -- Dvila's commission of the September 8, 2003,
offenses.
motion
--
to
prove
that
the
June
25,
1993,
conviction
that
this
court's
opinion
in
Dvila objected,
Dvila
foreclosed
Analysis
724 F.3d 150, 161 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Wallace, 573
F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2009).
-7-
United
States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
citations omitted).
The so-called "mandate rule" is a branch of the law of
the case doctrine that "prevents relitigation in the trial court of
matters that were explicitly or implicitly decided by an earlier
appellate decision in the same case."
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004).
requires that the trial court conform with the directions of the
appellate court on remand.
A district
into
account
the
appellate
-8-
court's
opinion
and
the
As
we
did
not
foreclose
the
possibility
that
Dvila's
us,
the
information
presented
regarding
these
drug
substance
4B1.2(b).").
offenses'
as
defined
by
U.S.S.G.
Id. at 57-58.
-9-
In
the absence of any such prohibition, the government posits that the
district court was free to consider additional evidence introduced
for the first time at resentencing.
Unlike
some of our sister circuits, the First Circuit does not generally
allow de novo resentencing on remand.
McFalls, 675 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The presumption in
favor of a general remand is necessarily strong in the context of
a resentencing because the calculation of a sentence under the
Guidelines requires a balancing of many related variables, and
these variables do not always become fixed independently of one
another." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), and
United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2002)
("On remand, the district court generally should be free to
consider any matters relevant to sentencing, even those that may
not have been raised at the first sentencing hearing, as if it were
sentencing de novo."), with United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 527
F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Although some circuits do generally
-10-
the evidence regarding Dvila's June 1993 conviction was made newly
relevant by either the reasoning or result of Dvila I.
Dvila contends that the career offender enhancement was
not made newly relevant by Dvila I, which found the record
evidence of his 1993 conviction insufficient to support the career
offender enhancement under the long-since-established modified
categorical approach.5
In addition,
we
held
that
our
mandate
did
not
In
preclude
We explained
that where our mandate does not expressly preclude it, "the
district court may consider . . . such new arguments or new facts
as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals' decision." Id.
at 32 (quoting Whren, 111 F.3d at 960).
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
As a
679, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the government could
articulate new grounds for a departure at resentencing where the
defendant's sentence had initially been automatically set at the
statutory maximum for reasons that were no longer applicable after
the appellate court's decision in an earlier appeal)).
In Dvila's case, the district court applied Ticchiarelli
and found that the government had no incentive to delve into the
June 1993 conviction at Dvila's first sentencing, and thus there
-13-
was no waiver.
We agree.
However, this
should not have been able to argue that Dvila was a career
offender for the first time at his second sentencing.
He also
had
already
final
ruling
against
the
33.
Ultimately, we find none of these distinctions persuasive
given the particular facts of this case.
Bell is readily distinguishable.
As an initial matter,
argued successfully during his first appeal that the nature of his
prior convictions called for sentencing under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (the "ACCA") and not the career offender guideline.
Bell, 988 F.2d at 249. At his resentencing, however, the defendant
attempted to reverse his position, arguing for the first time that
the ACCA should not apply.
Id. at 249-50.
the
district
relitigation
court's
of
finding
the
issue
that
where
the
no
mandate
rule
exceptional
circumstances applied and the issue had been previously agreed upon
-15-
Id. at 252.
that
the
government
could
introduce
new
argument
at
any
Guidelines
arguments
served
as
the
functional
-16-
Id.
As we
Id.
determined
sua
sponte
that
special
skills
adjustment
Id.
was
In those
Id.
with
the
"three
strikes"
statute.
Applying
the
to
do
so.
Our
reversal
of
the
district
court's
-17-
on
the
subject
of
the
enhancement
at
Dvila's
resentencing.
As a final matter, we consider Dvila's argument that we
ought to follow the lead of our sister circuits and find that the
interests of fairness and judicial economy prevent the government
from obtaining too many bites at the sentencing apple. Our failure
to do so, he contends, will provide the government with a blank
check to take as many passes at sentencing as necessary to produce
the desired result.8
In support of this view, Dvila directs us to opinions
from our sister circuits, pointing out instances in which an
appellate court expressly limited the scope of remand on the basis
of the government's failure to meet its burden at the initial
sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779
(8th Cir. 2009) ("Because the government was clearly on notice that
it was required to prove up [the defendant's] convictions before he
would be subject to the enhancement at issue, we direct the
district court on remand to resentence [the defendant] based on the
record already before it.").
818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[W]here the government has the burden of
production and persuasion . . . its case should ordinarily have to
stand or fall on the record it makes the first time around.
It
for
[an]
enhancement
but
failed
to
adduce
-19-
would
have
constituted
second
bite
at
the
apple
in
violation of the mandate rule. See Whren, 111 F.3d at 959 ("[U]pon
remand the Government could not offer new evidence in support of
the sentencing level for which it had unsuccessfully argued at the
original sentencing hearing.").
life
sentence.
Cf.
Atehortva,
69
F.3d
at
684-85
-20-
It
Conclusion
consideration.
-21-
Accordingly,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.