USCA1 Opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 96-2190

ERIC DELGADO-BIAGGI, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

AIR TRANSPORT LOCAL 501, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]

___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

___________
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

John Ward Llambias for appellants.

__________________
Malcolm A. Goldstein,
____________________
Vizcarra,
________

with whom Joel C. Glanstein, Manuel Por

_________________ ___________

O'Donnell, Schwartz, Glanstein & Rosen,

__________________________________________

Vizcarra & Porro, were on brief for appellees.

________________

and

Lopez______

____________________

May 5, 1997
____________________

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

STAHL, Circuit Judge.
_____________

Plaintiff-appellant

Eric

Delgado-Biaggi1

appellees

Air

Transport

brought

Reporting and

action

Transport Local

Workers

(collectively,

an

"the

Union

501

of

Union")

against

("Local

America,

under

the

Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29

seq., claiming the

____

denial of due

defendants-

501") and

AFL-CIO

the

("TWU")

Labor-Management

U.S.C.

process and the

401 et
__

arbitrary

and discriminatory removal of his shop steward position.

The

district

the

court

Union, from

granted summary

which Delgado-Biaggi

judgment

in

favor of

now appeals.

Because the

district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure

56(c)

denied

Delgado-Biaggi

meaningful

opportunity to oppose the Union's summary judgment motion, we

vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.
I.
__

Background and Prior Proceedings

Background and Prior Proceedings
________________________________

We

recite the

favorable

to

judgment.

See Hachikian
___ _________

pertinent facts

Delgado-Biaggi,

the

party

in the

light most

opposing

v. F.D.I.C., 96 F.3d 502,

________

summary

504 (1st

Cir. 1996).

Delgado-Biaggi joined the Local

TWU in 1991 when he began

baggage handler.

One

501 chapter of the

working for American Airlines as a

year later, Delgado-Biaggi was elected

____________________

1.

Delgado-Biaggi's wife, Nilda

Fernandez-Zayas, and

conjugal partnership are also plaintiffs.

their

For simplicity, we

refer only to Eric Delgado-Biaggi and his claims.

-22

to a union

shift.2

shop-steward position

In September

for the

bag room,

1993, Delgado-Biaggi bid

second

for a first

shift position, which he obtained because of his seniority.

In

October

1993,

changed work shifts, the

shortly

after

Delgado-Biaggi

chairman of Local 501 handed

him a

letter

Tlasek,

from Local

which

501's

purported

"resignation" of

Executive Vice-President,

to

his shop

acknowledge

William

Delgado-Biaggi's

steward's position.

In November

1993, Delgado-Biaggi responded to Tlasek by letter, asserting

that he

had not resigned as

shop steward and that

he had a

right to remain in office unless he was duly removed pursuant

to

Local 501's

Delgado-Biaggi's

resignation under

bylaws.

Tlasek,

shift-change

in

turn, responded

automatically

Article VII(a) of the

that

effected

his

union bylaws, which

provides: "A Shop Steward who leaves the unit or shift he was

elected by, will continue

to serve at the discretion

of the

Executive Board."

Dissatisfied

with

that

complained again to Tlasek by letter

response,

Delgado-Biaggi

dated January 14, 1994,

also to

no avail.

retained

Local

Not willing to concede the issue, he then

an attorney who, in

501 claiming denial of

Delgado-Biaggi

as

steward.

March 1994, wrote

due process in

The

leadership

a letter to

the removal of

of Local

501

____________________

2.

Shop

stewards are

union representatives

who personally

handle problems that their fellow employees raise

management.

-33

concerning

remained unmoved.

attempted

to

In April

appeal

Executive Council.

the

appeal was

the letter.

by

1994, Delgado-Biaggi's

letter

to

TWU's

counsel

International

The Council's stated reason for rejecting

Delgado-Biaggi's failure to

Delgado-Biaggi did

personally file

not resubmit his appeal, but

instead commenced this litigation in June 1994.

On June

the

13, 1996,

after a desultory

beginning to

prosecution of this case, the district court set a trial

date of July 1, 1996.

setting

of the

judgment.3

district

On

court

On June 17, the Union responded to the

trial date

Friday, June

judge

in

by filing

28, the

chambers

a motion

for summary

parties met

for

with the

non-scheduled

conference.

his

During

intention

to

this meeting,

oppose

judgment with oral and

Delgado-Biaggi announced

the Union's

motion

for

summary

documentary evidence on the following

Monday, July 1, the scheduled first day of trial.

The following Monday morning, before Delgado-Biaggi

had

an opportunity

to

present his

opposing evidence,

the

parties were handed an opinion and order granting the Union's

____________________

3.

We note

that

the

Union submitted

summary judgment motion well

the

June

17,

1996

after the court's November 1995

deadline for the filing of the dispositive motion.

The court

allowed the untimely motion although, as the record reflects,

the Union did
motion out

not first

of time.

seek and obtain

See
___

leave to file

the

In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel

__________________________________

Fire Litigation, 45 F.3d 564, 566 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining

_______________
that

summary judgment

proponent must

obtain permission

to

file motion out of time where filing deadline "had long since
passed").

-44

motion for summary judgment.

The terse opinion

"[t]he union's actions in [construing

change as a resignation

stated that

Delgado-Biaggi's shift

of shop stewardship] were authorized

by its by-laws, which make perfect sense, since, of course, a

shop steward is of little

he represents."

The

use if he does not work

order

concluded that

the shift

"none

of

the

union's conduct violates the rights protected under 29 U.S.C.

411."

The

court did

not entertain oral

argument on

the

motion.

Thereafter,

reconsider

along

Brignoni, a

stated

Delgado-Biaggi

with

sworn

former Chairman of

that

union

filed

declaration

Local 501.

stewardships are

motion

from

has

never

been

the

"never"

withdrawn

practice

in

Puerto Rico to consider a change of shift

as an automatic
only
has

case
been

resignation . . . .

where such
attempted

The

an interpretation
is

Delgado was unilaterally

when

Mr.

removed by

then Chairman Mr. Rafael Perez.

Jorge

The declaration

deemed resigned as a result of a shift change, and that

[i]t

to

Eric
the

or

Delgado-Biaggi

deposition of

that

further

an

Jose Rodriguez, a Board

the Executive

from his shop

submitted

Board had

steward position.

the motion to reconsider.

excerpt

never removed

Delgado-Biaggi

The district court

II.
II.
___

Discussion
Discussion
__________

the

member, who testified

This appeal followed.

-55

from

denied

On

court

appeal, Delgado-Biaggi argues that the district

prematurely granted summary

the proper opportunity

would have produced

judgment.

to respond to the

evidence sufficient to

The Union offers a

upholding the

judgment and

that, given

Union's motion, he

preclude summary

host of arguments in favor

court's disposition of the

of

action and insists

that "the district court handled the case properly."

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that

a summary judgment motion

before

the time

fixed for

"shall be served at least

the hearing."

Fed. R.

10 days

Civ. P.

56(c).

party at

We have interpreted

least ten days

judgment.

See
___

Rule 56(c) to

to respond to a

allow an adverse

motion for summary

Stella v. Town of Tewksbury, 4

______
__________________

F.3d 53, 55

(1st Cir. 1993) ("[S]ummary judgment targets should be secure

in the knowledge

that they will

which to

formulate

Melanson
________

v. Caribou Reefers, Ltd., 667

______________________

Cir. 1981).

and prepare

have at least

their

best

ten days

in

opposition.");

F.2d 213,

214 (1st

Indeed, "the purpose of Rule 56(c) is to allow a

party to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge a summary

judgment

motion."

Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc.

_____________________________

Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404,

_______________

v.

Arco
____

409 (1st Cir. 1985) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).4

____________________

4.

We note that, while

relation

to the ten day

oral argument

in

Rule 56(c) refers to a

proviso, the rule

connection

with

"hearing" in

does not require

the motion.

See
___

Cia.
____

Petrolera Caribe, 754 F.2d at 411 (explaining that the motion

________________
may be "heard" on the papers).

-66

The Union filed its

Monday, June 17, 1996.

motion for summary judgment on

Excluding the day on which the motion

was filed as well as the intervening Saturday and Sunday, see

___

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

6(a), the

ten-day

requirement

afforded

Delgado-Biaggi until the end of the business day Monday, July

1, to submit

July

his opposition.

1, before

evidence,

the

opportunity

window

Delgado-Biaggi

district

to contest

admonished, the

at 55.

summary

present his

denied

the motion.

and

the

weed out

rather than simply

F.3d

court

could

on the morning

him

As we

judgment

before

requisite

previously have

is not merely

province"

claims that do

to clear

We find that

"proper

of

summary

not warrant

a court's docket."

the court erred

Delgado-Biaggi

of

opposing

the

"[ten day] notice requirement

dressing"

judgment is "to

By ruling

trial

Stella,
______

when it granted

exhausted

his

opportunity to challenge the Union's motion.5

The

Union

accompanying the

persuade

us

overlooks

action"

that,

in any

the substantive

because

procedural

entry of summary judgment

event,

genuine issue of material fact.

delve into

the

the

flaws

and endeavors to

record reflects

no

In Stella, we "decline[d] to
______

aspects of plaintiffs'

"leapfrogging to

the merits

cause of

would display

____________________

5.

The error

is somewhat

that, during the June

amplified by the

undisputed fact

28 chambers conference, Delgado-Biaggi

notified the district court that he would submit his opposing

evidence the following Monday, July 1.

-77

much the same disregard

for established protocol that marred

the district court's performance."

harmless error jurisprudence applied

that

the

peculiar

procedural

4 F.3d at 55.

Assuming

in such cases, we noted

regime

the

district

employed in that case thwarted any such analysis.

court

See id. at
___ ___

56 n.4.

We acknowledge that this

case does not present the

extreme procedural shortcomings involved

at 54

(reversing summary

in Stella.
______

judgment where,

on

See id.
___ ___

first day

of

trial, judge directed defendants to move for summary judgment

and

afforded

argument).6

plaintiffs

thirty

minutes

to

prepare

for

The district court's failure to comply with Rule

56(c),

however, necessitates

"every

latitude to show that [the Union] was not entitled to

summary

judgment."

arguendo that
________

infirmities,

that we

Melanson,
________

afford Delgado-Biaggi

667 F.2d

at 214.

harmless error analysis applies

we cannot

say

that the

Assuming

to Rule 56(c)

court's noncompliance

with the ten-day notice requirement was harmless.

The

Biaggi's motion

sworn

statements

to reconsider

submitted

with

comprise evidence

Delgado-

that Local

501 never

previously considered a shift-change

an automatic

____________________

6.

Although we construed the district court's proceedings in

Stella as involving
______
our

observations concerning

not limited
55;

a sua sponte grant

___ ______

of summary judgment,

Rule 56(c)'s

requirements were

to that summary judgment subset.

See 4 F.3d at
___

see also Berkovitz v. Home Box Office, Inc., 89 F.3d 24,

___ ____ _________
_____________________

29-30 (1st Cir. 1996).

-88

resignation of a

shop steward's

event, the

Executive

within the

meaning of

Biaggi's

Board never

stewardship.

establish

discretion.7

crucial

Indeed, the

the

sufficiently

material fact.

Board

This

undisputed fact

in

raises

Thus,

its

the

met

to

exercise

judgment

of a

we cannot view the

at oral

the record

undermines the

summary

question

discretion

Union conceded

had

any

terminate Delgado-

there was no evidence in

that

findings

that, in

exercised its

Article VII(a) to

argument before us that

to

position and

genuine

its

court's

order

issue

and

of

flawed proceedings

below as involving harmless error.

Furthermore,

by

the

Union's own

reasoning,

its

contention that

the

LMRDA

depends

ultimately, the

exercise its

Delgado-Biaggi fails to state

on

the Executive

disputed question

discretion.

a claim under

Board's

powers

whether the Board

The Union's other

and,

met to

arguments also

raise significant issues neither fully presented nor squarely

addressed below.8

See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire

___ ______________________________________

____________________

7.

Without deciding the issue, we note

Article

VII(a)

service of

appears

a shop

to

that the language of

contemplate

steward who changes

the

uninterrupted

shifts, absent

some

action by the Executive Board.

8.

For example, the Union

argues that Delgado-Biaggi failed

"to exhaust reasonable hearing

procedures (but not to exceed

a four-month lapse of time) within [the union]" before filing

his

action.

29

U.S.C.

potentially requires factbound

"reasonableness" of
event that

the hearing

triggered the

411(a)(4).

This

argument

determinations regarding
procedures and

four month period.

the

the precise
The

district

court

never reached

this issue

and, given

the undeveloped

-99

Litigation, 45 F.3d
__________

harmful

error

certain that

been fully

significant

564, 567, 568

where

appellate

the merits

presented to

legal

issue,

of the

the

not

(1st Cir. 1995)

court

was not

"completely

summary judgment

district court"

squarely

(finding

issue had

and where

addressed

by

"a

the

district

court"

abbreviated summary

endorse

the

remained

unresolved

due

judgment proceedings).

district

court's

disregard

to

We

court's

are loath to

for

Rule

56(c)

protocol by reaching the merits of these undeveloped matters.

See Stella, 4 F.3d at 55.

___ ______

We conclude that, largely because of the absence of

evidence establishing Executive Board

procedural failure

the

action, as well as the

below, remand for further

appropriate solution.

See
___

proceedings is

In re San Juan Dupont Plaza

____________________________

Hotel Fire Litigation, 45 F.3d at 568.

_____________________

III.
III.
____

Conclusion
Conclusion

__________

For the foregoing

of the district

court and

reasons, we vacate
______

remand the
______

consistent with this opinion.

case for

the judgment

proceedings

Costs to appellants.
___________________

____________________

record, we decline to reach it at this time.

-1010