USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 96-1823

ERNEST P. O'CONNOR, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEBORAH HUARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

____________________

No. 96-1824

ERNEST P. O'CONNOR, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DEBORAH HUARD,

Defendant - Appellee.

____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Eugene W. Beaulieu, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

_____________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge,

___________

Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,

_____________________

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

_____________

_____________________

William R. Fisher, with whom Ivy L. Frignoca and Monaghan,

__________________
________________
_________
Leahy, Hochadel & Libby were on brief for Deborah Huard.
_______________________
William C. Knowles,
____________________

with

whom Jacqueline W. Rider

_____________________

and

Verrill & Dana were on brief for Ernest P. O'Connor, Jr.

______________

____________________

June 27, 1997

____________________

-2-

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
___________

Appellee-Cross-Appellant

who was a

Ernest

pretrial detainee

Jail") during

all

Section

suit for

1983

times

declaratory

relief

physician's

assistant

On March 15, 1994, Plaintiff-

P. O'Connor,

at the Kennebec

relevant to

compensatory

against

at

Jr. ("O'Connor"),

the

Alfred

Jail,

the

and

County Jail

case,

brought

punitive damages

Cichon

and

("the

("Cichon"),

Catherine

this

and

Mesaric

("Mesaric") and Appellant-Cross-Appellee Deborah Huard ("Huard"),

Corrections

Sergeants at

while he was being

him of

the

O'Connor contended

held as a pretrial detainee,

medical attention,

punishment,

Jail.

and that

process rights under

which amounted

he was

and unusual

violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment.

1996, summary judgment was

Cichon deprived

to cruel

punished in

that,

his due

On January

granted in Cichon's favor.

20,

Prior to

trial, Mesaric was dismissed from the suit.

The

1996.

directed

At

case against Huard was tried before a jury in June

the

close of

verdict.

advisement.

At

motion, which the

The

O'Connor's

case,

district court

the close

of all

district court

Huard moved

took

the motion

evidence, Huard

denied.

The

for

under

renewed her

jury returned

verdict in O'Connor's favor, finding that Huard had

violated his

Fourteenth

dollar

jury

Amendment due

process rights,

in compensatory damages.

on punitive

declined

to

damages, which

award.

Huard

notwithstanding the verdict and

and awarding

him one

The court

then instructed the

the jury,

after deliberating,

filed

motion

a motion for a new

for

judgment

trial, which

-3-

the district court

denied.

Huard

appeals the district

court's

jury

instructions,

the

denial

of

her

motion

for

judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, and the award of attorney's

O'Connor.

fees to

O'Connor cross-appeals the jury's refusal to grant him

actual compensatory and punitive damages.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

On review of a jury verdict, we recite the facts in the

light most favorable

Life Ins. Co., 94

_____________

Corrections

to that

the Jail during

Huard that "he

out

Ferragamo v.
_________

all times

Chubb
_____

Huard was a

relevant to

O'Connor was initially incarcerated in the Jail for a

brief period in January 1993.

fill

See
___

F.3d 26, 27 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996).

Sergeant at

this case.

verdict.

needed his

Medical

On January 18, 1993, O'Connor told

medication."

Request form,

and

She

when

instructed him

he

did

to

so, she

forwarded

request,

Cichon,

the form to the

O'Connor met

for a

with

Medical Department.

the

medical evaluation.

Xanax or Valium to

treat anxiety.

Pursuant to his

Jail's physician's

assistant,

O'Connor asked

Cichon for

Cichon diagnosed

O'Connor as

suffering from "anxiety disorder," for which he prescribed Xanax.

Soon thereafter, O'Connor was released from the Jail.

On October

detention at the

months.

30, 1993,

O'Connor was placed

Jail, where he

in pretrial

remained for approximately

six

O'Connor again submitted a request for medication, which

Cichon now denied, because he could not verify O'Connor's medical

history, believed that

O'Connor did not

suffer from an

anxiety

disorder, and wasconcerned about O'Connor's history ofdrug abuse.

-4-

During this detention,

Huard

and

O'Connor,

confrontations.

O'Connor's

orientation.

eventually

O'Connor

disdain

for

an animosity developed

called

what

leading

Huard names

he believed

was

daily

that

verbal

evidenced

Huard's

sexual

Huard, in turn, called O'Connor "a scumbag, a low-

life, a dirtbag, a

drug addict, creep."

about

to

his failure

inability

to

between

to cope

get the

without it.

Huard

taunted O'Connor

medication

he desired

O'Connor

would react

and

his

to these

taunts by kicking

hurling verbal

O'Connor

doors and banging the bars of

abuse at

would

be

Huard.

removed

administrative lockdown.

lockdowns,

the

other

As

from

a result of

his

cell

his cell and by

these actions,

and

placed

in

Frequently, during these administrative

inmates

restricted to their cells.

on

the

cell

block

would

By the time he was transferred

be

from

the Jail, O'Connor had spent 33 days in lockdown.

DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION

I.
I.

Jury instructions
Jury instructions

Huard argues that the magistrate's instructions

jury did not properly reflect the elements O'Connor was

to prove in order

to succeed on his Fourteenth

to the

required

Amendment claim.

In reviewing assertions of error in the jury charge, we determine

whether the instructions adequately reflect the law applicable to

the controlling issues without tending to confuse

jury.

or mislead the

See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1494 (1st Cir.
___ _____________
______

1997).

The instructions to the jury were as follows:

-5-

Plaintiff
rights

claims

were

that his

violated

deliberately provoked him

and

then disciplined

outbursts.

constitutional
when

into rage

him for

Specifically,

that he was punished

defendant
attacks

his resulting

his allegation

is

without due process

of

law, in violation of his rights under the 5th

and

14th

Amendments

to the

United

States

Constitution.

At the

time of

his

incarceration at

the

Kennebec County Jail plaintiff was a pretrial

detainee.

In other

convicted of
pending

crime, but

trial.

plaintiff

words, he had
was

Under such

could only

be

so long

being

held

circumstances,

subjected

restrictions and conditions of

facilities

not been

as those

to

the

the detention
conditions and

restrictions did not amount to punishment.

Not all restrictions and

pretrial

detention

amount to

the constitutional sense,

government
detain

obviously

has
person

conditions during

however.

exercised
pending

impose conditions

necessary to effectuate the

punishment in
Once the

its authority
trial,

it

to
may

or restrictions
legitimate goals

of

maintaining

ensuring

the

institutional

security

detained person's

and

presence at

trial.

The question for

you to decide

defendant imposed

conditions or restrictions

upon plaintiff that

to

is whether

were reasonably

those legitimate

goals

related

or whether

they

were arbitrary or without purpose.

Absent a showing of
defendant's

part

an expressed intent on

to punish

question will generally

conditions
used for
they

are

or
a

plaintiff, that

turn on whether

restrictions could

legitimate purpose
excessive

in

and

relation

the

have been
whether
to

that

legitimate purpose.

If
were

you find the conditions or restrictions

arbitrary or

without purpose,

infer that the purpose

restrictions was

you may

of the conditions

or

punishment, and, therefore,

unconstitutional.

Trial Transcript, vol. III, at 440-41.

-6-

These

instructions accurately

reflect the

law as

it

relates to a pretrial detainee's claim of punishment in violation

of the Due Process Clause.

of

a crime

trial.

an

prior to trial

See Bell v.
___ ____

adjudication of

punish a

The government may detain one accused

in order

to ensure

his presence at

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979).

_______

guilt, however,

pretrial detainee

Prior to

a state government

without contravening the

may not

Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause.

may, however,

upon a

The government

impose administrative restrictions

and conditions

that maintain

facility, see
___

id. at 536.
___

decide

When confronted

whether the

it is but

restriction

particular
of

pretrial

detention

with a charge

disability is

other legitimate governmental purpose."

if

in the

punishment without due

of punishment or whether

Thus,

detention, see id.

___ ___

security and order

detainee alleging

"court must

purpose

id. at 535.
___

pretrial detainee that effectuate his

at 537, and

pretrial

See
___

process, the

imposed for

to

"punishment."

Id. at 538.
___

condition

or

detention

is

restriction
related

to a

or

more, amount

Conversely,

condition is
legitimate

if

not reasonably

goal --

the

an incident of some

reasonably related to a legitimate government

objective, it does not, without

by a

if it

is

arbitrary

or

purposeless

--

court

permissibly may infer that the purpose of the

governmental
not

action

is punishment

constitutionally

be

that may

inflicted

upon

detainees qua detainees.

Id. at 538-39.
___

the

detention

The

government has a valid interest

facility

administrative measures

and,

toward

that may be

that

end,

discomforting or

in managing

may

employ

are of

nature that the detainee would not experience if he were released

-7-

while

awaiting trial.

evidence"

that

an

See
___

id. at
___

administrative

540.

Barring "substantial

measure

is

an

exaggerated

response to these considerations, "courts should ordinarily defer

to their expert judgment in such matters."

Huard's

different issue.

claim

of

error

Id. at 540 n.23.

___

addresses

conceptually

Huard argues that the magistrate's instructions

were erroneous because they failed to incorporate the appropriate

standard, which she contends

is the Eighth Amendment "deliberate

indifference" standard applied when a pretrial detainee alleges a

denial

of

misconceives

allegation

appropriate

the

as it

claim

related

medical

at

care.

issue in

to Huard

Huard's

contention

case.

O'Connor's

this

was that

she intentionally

provoked

or

incited him

taunting

him.

into

O'Connor

"rage

attacks" by

claimed that

Huard

relentlessly

engaged

in such

actions so that she could subsequently discipline him by imposing

"administrative

lock

claim, the magistrate

down."

Given

nature of

O'Connor's

was correct in denying Huard's

request to

incorporate "deliberate indifference"

the

instructions into the jury

charge.

We

case

or in

emphasize that

this opinion

facility may not

nothing in

is meant

the resolution

to suggest that

security.

a detention

discipline a pretrial detainee who violates the

facility's administrative regulations employed to

and

of this

O'Connor's challenge

maintain order

was not that

the Kennebec

County Jail's system of allowing a pretrial detainee's discipline

following

violation

of

its

administrative

regulations was

-8-

suspect, but rather that Huard's intention was to punish O'Connor

and her

this

provocative or instigative actions

end.

reasonably

Thus,

the

discipline

ability

detainees

of

who

implicated by the issues presented in

found

that

Huard's

acts

were

were directed toward

detention

violate

facility

rules

is

to

not

this case, in which a jury

tantamount

to

arbitrary

and

unreasonable punishment.

II.
II.

Qualified immunity
Qualified immunity

In her motions for directed

of O'Connor's case

and at the close

verdict, both at the close

of all the

evidence, Huard

argued that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based

on the merits of

notwithstanding

judgment as

O'Connor's claim.

the

verdict, she

a matter of law

the first time,

the defense

In her motion for

again

judgment

argued entitlement

on the merits and

to

also raised, for

of qualified immunity

as a

ground

entitling her to judgment as a matter of law.

Federal Rule of Procedure 50(b) specifies that a party,

having submitted a motion

for a directed verdict may,

verdict and entry of judgment, "move

after the

to have the verdict and any

judgment entered thereon

set aside and to

have judgment entered

in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict[.]"

Civ.

P. 50(b).

party may

not raise

notwithstanding the verdict that

a ground

Fed. R.

for judgment

was not previously presented to

the trial court in a motion for directed verdict.

See Systemized
___ __________

of New England, Inc. v. SCM, Inc., 732 F.2d 1030,

____________________
_________

1035 (1st Cir.

1984) ("A

party may not base its motion for a judgment n.o.v. on

-9-

ground

that

verdict.").

was not

"The last

argued

in its

(1st Cir.

for

a directed

opportunity to raise [qualified immunity]

is by motion for directed verdict."

949, 953

motion

1991) (applying

Lewis
_____

v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d

________

Systemized of New England,

___________________________

Inc. in the qualified immunity context).

____

Having

immunity

error.

failed

to

properly

claim, Huard can prevail

See Lewis, 944 F.2d at 953.

___ _____

a very possible defense that

preserve

only upon a

her

finding of plain

"The fact that [Huard] lost

would have eliminated liability for

fees is not enough; plain error requires much more."

never brought

forward any

qualified

evidence suggesting that

Id.
___

Huard

her actions

were

objectively

established

reasonable

due process right.

acted as O'Connor alleged.

record to support a

court's denial of her

we affirm

in

the

light

of

O'Connor's

Instead, she denied that she had

Because there was

no evidence in the

finding of qualified immunity, the

motion was not plain error.

district court's

clearly

denial

district

Accordingly,

of Huard's

motion

for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

III.
III.

Attorney's fees
Attorney's fees

On

order

1988.

November 13,

1996, the

district court

granting O'Connor attorney's fees pursuant

The

court essentially

reasoned that,

entered an

to 42 U.S.C.

although O'Connor

received only nominal damages of one dollar, the jury had granted

the

relief at the heart

of O'Connor's claim

by barring Huard's

actions in violation of his due process rights.

-10-

Huard argues

O'Connor is not entitled

under

that we should reverse

to attorney's fees.

the order because

She

contends that

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), although O'Connor is

______
_____

properly characterized as the prevailing party, the award of only

nominal damages

compensable

highlights O'Connor's failure

damages.

Having

failed

relief, Huard appears to contend that

case was technical or de minimis.

__________

Although

attorney's

fees

the

to

plaintiff's success was

and relief sought, the

rule

that a

damages

obtain

actual,

compensatory

O'Connor's success in this

We cannot agree.

Farrar
______

Court

civil

rights

reversed

plaintiff

de minimis when compared

__________

Court's opinion did

prevailing plaintiff

is not entitled

to

to prove

to fees.

opinion instructed district courts,

who is

To

the

grant

because

of

the

to the outcome

not impose a per se

_______

awarded

only nominal

the contrary, the Court's

in which discretion rests to

grant attorney's fees to civil rights plaintiffs, see 42 U.S.C.

___

1988

("In any

section[] . .

action or

proceeding to

. 1983, . .

. the court,

allow the prevailing

part of

the costs."), that

the

amount of the

Hensley
_______

fee award.'"

discretion they

of an award of fees

the

extent of

Farrar, 506
______

may

attorney's fee as

in exercising their

"'relationship between

provision of

in its discretion,

party . . . a reasonable

should consider the reasonableness

of

enforce a

success

in light

and the

U.S. at 115-16 (quoting

v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 438 (1983)); see also Wilcox

_________
________ ______

v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d

_____________

550, 554 (9th Cir.

"Farrar
______

a district

establishes that

-11-

1994) (noting that

court should

give primary

consideration to

whether

the degree of success achieved

to award

attorney's

fees," and

when it decides

affirming

a grant

of

$66,535 in fees on award of one dollar in nominal damages), cited

_____

with approval in Krewson v. Town of Quincy, 74 F.3d 15, 17 (1st

_________________ _______
_______________

Cir. 1996).

Here, the

factors

warranting

district court recognized

the grant

of attorney's

district court's order recognized

several important

fees.

First, the

the importance of providing an

incentive to attorneys to

who seek

represent litigants, such as O'Connor,

to vindicate constitutional rights but

not result in

whose claim may

substantial monetary compensation.

Second -- and

worth noting in light of the Farrar Court's emphasis on the

______

fact

that Farrar sought only compensatory damages in the amount of $17

million and ultimately received one dollar from each defendant --

the most basic

remedy O'Connor

sought in this

case was

relief

from Huard's infliction of punishment without due process of law.

Third,

the

court

litigation, which

pretrial

requested

underscored

defendants who were

deterrent

will prevent "future

detainees."

amount

the

Fourth,

for

fees

the

impact

abuses of the

court

hours related

deducted

solely

to

of

this

rights of

from

the

the

two

not part of the trial, hours spent in excess

of that reasonably

required of a

inapplicable areas

of law,

detailed.

Based

considerations,

we

on

find

task, hours spent

and hours inadequately

the

appropriateness

that

the district

attorney's fees was within its discretion.

-12-

IV.
IV.

O'Connor's claim regarding damages

O'Connor's claim regarding damages

of

researching

explained or

all

court's

of

these

grant

of

On

cross-appeal, O'Connor

first time, that

the jury's

appears to

failure to award

argue, for

the

him punitive

and

compensatory, rather than only nominal, damages was unreasonable.

The short

answer

to O'Connor's

contention

is that

the

issue

should have been raised before the district court in a motion for

a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a motion for new trial.

We

generally

damages award

failed to

Carlton v.
_______

will not

review

is excessive or

party's

contention that

insufficient where the

allow the district court

to rule on the

the

party has

matter.

See
___

H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1981) (no
______________

appellate review of allegedly excessive or inadequate damages was

available

exercise

where trial

court was

its discretion on

not given

the

opportunity to

the matter), cited with approval in

_______________________

Wells Real Estate, Inc. v.

________________________

Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850

_______________________________

F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1988); Braunstein v. Massachusetts Bank &
__________
____________________

Trust Co., 443 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1971) (denying review of
_________

claim that award was excessive

because appellant failed to raise

the issue before the district court).

More importantly,

not

unreasonable in

punitive

damages.

however, we

failing to

O'Connor

put

find that the

award O'Connor

forward

jury was

compensatory or

evidence of

damages

related to his mental and emotional suffering endured as a result

of

Huard's actions, and did not present any evidence of economic

damages.

Assuming the jury was properly instructed on the issue

of damages, and

O'Connor does not challenge the

instructions on

-13-

appeal, the jury could reasonably have believed that O'Connor did

not suffer a compensable

harm.

See Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d

___ _____
_________

22, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1992).

Additionally,

O'Connor appears

to argue

that Huard's

actions registered such malicious intent, reckless disregard,

or

callous indifference to O'Connor's constitutional rights that the

jury was unreasonable in

Our

review of the record

'point

so strongly

[plaintiff] that

failing to award him

punitive damages.

indicates "that the

evidence does not

and overwhelmingly

a reasonably

[its] conclusion.'"

Accordingly,

determination that

could not

of the

movant

have arrived

at

Id. at 30 (quoting Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v.

___
______________________

Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd.,

_______________________________

1985)).

jury

in favor

we

756

will

F.2d 930,

not

disturb

punitive damages were not

of the facts of this case.

934

See id.
___ ___

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

affirm
______

(1st

the

Cir.

jury's

warranted in light

-14-