Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Nos. 10-1966
10-1967
THOMAS MLODZINSKI; TINA MLODZINSKI, individually
and as mother and next friend of J.M.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
MICHAEL F. LEWIS, in his individual and official capacities as
Bristol Police Department Sergeant; TIMOTHY J. WOODWARD, in his
individual and official capacities as Bristol Police Department
Officer; GORDON C. RAMSAY, in his individual and official
capacities as Bristol Police Department Officer; RICHARD ARELL,
in his individual and official capacities as Northfield Police
Department Officer; CENTRAL NEW HAMPSHIRE SPECIAL OPERATIONS
UNIT, a/k/a CNHSOU; ROBERT CORMIER, in his individual and
official capacities as Plymouth Police Department Officer; CHRIS
TYLER, in his individual and official capacities as Littleton
Police Department Officer; RICK TYLER, in his individual and
official capacities as Grafton Sheriff's Department Officer,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges.
June 2, 2011
2,
2006,
defendant
law
enforcement
officers
from
the
Bristol, New Hampshire police force and the Central New Hampshire
Special Operations Unit (CNHSOU) used excessive force in executing
search and arrest warrants.
Plaintiffs also
issues, the two sides offer vastly different versions of the facts.
The district court denied the motions. Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 731 F.
Supp. 2d 157, 184 (D.N.H. 2010). Defendants have appealed from the
denial of qualified immunity.
part.
I.
An interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds lies only if the material facts are
taken as undisputed and the issue on appeal is one of law.
-3-
U.S.
at
312,
and
it
held
that
questions
of
"evidence
Id. at 317.
Thus, it balanced
Id. at 317-18.
-4-
court
has
assumed
Id.
interlocutory
appellate
plaintiffs'
best
case,
they
are
entitled
to
immunity.
Rodrguez-Rodrguez, 391 F.3d at 40; see also Valdizn v. RiveraHernandez, 445 F.3d 63, 65 (1st Cir. 2006) (accepting jurisdiction
over issue of whether, on a given set of facts, an employee
occupied
position
for
appropriate qualification).
which
political
affiliation
is
an
or
an
objectively
reasonable
officer
could
have
concluded (even mistakenly) that his or her conduct did not violate
their rights, then qualified immunity must be granted.
appellate
review and
granting
immunity
in
this
type
Accepting
of
case
This not
only raises some of the same concerns that led the Supreme Court in
Johnson to limit interlocutory jurisdiction, but also leads us to
question whether this use of appellate review is in the best
interests of those seeking immunity.
issue,
so
we
accept
jurisdiction.
See
Behrens
v.
see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
-6-
We
identify the "version of events that best comports with the summary
judgment standard and then ask[] whether, given that set of facts,
a reasonable officer should have known that his actions were
unlawful."
young
male
nightstick.
interviewed
victim,
They
one
Brandon
responded
of
Stachulski,
to
the
Stachulski's
scene
with
an
of
the
assailants,
and
expandable
attack
and
Stachulski
Rothman
for
second-degree
assault
and
to
search
his
-7-
discussing
the
situation
with
Lewis,
Cormier
It is standard operating
the
preparations
for
the
execution
of
the
-8-
plaintiff
Mlodzinski,
Thomas
and
his
mother,
plaintiff
Tina
woke
the
sleeping
plaintiffs.
The sound of
Upon
being
awakened, Michael Rothman walked out of his room into the hallway,
where he encountered the officers and lowered himself to the floor
as ordered.
He is not a plaintiff
in this case.
After this point, the parties sharply dispute the facts,
but we recite plaintiffs' version, as defendants have conceded--in
order to obtain these interlocutory appeals--that all facts and
inferences should be taken in plaintiffs' favor.
We assume in
-9-
He entered
Jessica testified
that while she was on the floor, she thought Arell said that she
could get up and she started to do so, rising into a crouched
position, but that Arell then put his hand on her back and
forcefully pushed her toward the floor screaming "Get down."2
She
lost her balance, and her left kneecap was severely injured as it
struck the floor.3
Back on the floor, Jessica was handcuffed behind her back
with metal handcuffs, either by Arell or by defendant Rick Tyler,
another CNHSOU officer who had entered the room upon hearing
Officer Arell yelling "Get down" and hearing Jessica scream.4
Jessica testified that she was detained on the floor with a gun
pointed at her head by Arell, and that during this period, she was
"just staying still and trying not to get shot."5
She estimates
that she was detained in this manner for seven to ten minutes,
after which she was brought downstairs to the living room.
In
the
meantime,
CNHSOU
officer
wearing
military
fatigues and carrying an assault rifle had also entered the bedroom
of
plaintiffs
Tina
and
Thomas
Mlodzinski.
This
officer
Tina
testified
was
that
another
CNHSOU
officer
in
Thomas
military
explained that she did not have a top on, she was allowed to stay
on
the
bed,
covering
herself
with
pillow.
She
was
also
In response to a
question about how long she was detained in this manner, she stated
that "it seemed like it was forever but [was] almost half [an]
hour."
into the room, wrapped a sheet around Tina, and brought her
downstairs to the living room.8
When Tina arrived downstairs, Jessica and Thomas were
already there, as was Rothman's girlfriend, Amy Furmanick, and
their baby.9
There were
Ramsay took Jessica and Amy into the kitchen at separate points to
ask them questions.
Thomas then
army fatigue pants while he searched the apartment for five minutes
and the basement for ten minutes.
In the meantime, Jessica's handcuffs were also removed,
and she and Officer Ramsay accompanied Amy in going outside for a
cigarette.
Jessica and Amy that if the police could not find the nightstick,
they were going to take away Amy's baby.
onto the porch as part of her walk around the house with the
officer.
12
the "head guy" in the CNHSOU also did not leave until this point.14
In the end, the search uncovered three baggies with small
quantities of marijuana, a glass smoking pipe, and an eight-inch
hunting knife hidden under Rothman's bed. No gun or nightstick was
ever found.
Guillemard-Ginorio v.
does
not
violate
clearly
established
statutory
or
13
defense to liability."
Id. at 269.
Id. at 37 (quoting
"in
the
light
of
pre-existing
-16-
law."
Anderson
v.
has made clear that officers can "be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,"
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002), it has also stressed that
qualified immunity "is designed to protect 'all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,'"
Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 429 (2007) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Immunity
will
not
issue
if
"it
is
obvious
that
no
lawful,
but
if
"officers
of
reasonable
competence
could
-17-
and battery claims brought by Tina and Jessica against the CNHSOU
officers who detained them in their bedrooms prior to bringing them
down into the living room.
Although excessive force is by definition unreasonable
force, "reasonable people sometimes make mistaken judgments, and a
reasonable officer sometimes may use unreasonable force." Morelli,
552 F.3d at 24.
499
F.3d
2,
18
(1st
Cir.
2007)
("[O]fficers
receive
they must show "an incommensurate use of force beyond that needed
to establish a garden-variety excessive force claim and, further,
beyond the 'hazy border' noted by the Saucier Court." Morelli, 552
F.3d at 24 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206).
Here,
plaintiffs
and
defendants
accept
four
basic
of
established
the
warrants.
that
"officers
They
agree
executing
that
it
search
was
clearly
warrant
for
-18-
Muehler v. Mena,
544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
705 (1981)). They acknowledge that the "authorization to detain an
occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use
reasonable force to effectuate the detention."
(emphasis added).
Id. at 98-99
-19-
the
risk
of
harm
to
officers
is
substantial
Once he
was removed, any threat from him or that the three plaintiffs would
try to assist him in avoiding arrest was eliminated.
The question
the
combined task
of
searching a
These
three bedroom
-20-
of
keeping
them
in
handcuffs,
however,
The
is
different matter.
Defendants rely heavily on Mena, which at the time was
the most recently established Supreme Court case on detention in
handcuffs during execution of a search warrant.
In Mena, a
qualified immunity case, the Supreme Court held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation when Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs
for the two- to three-hour duration of a warrant-authorized search
of her building for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership
following a drive-by shooting.
It was
known that the suspect in the shooting, and possibly other gang
members, rented rooms in the building.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
garage, the four detainees remained cuffed. Id. They were guarded
by one or two officers, while the other officers performed the
search.
Id.
The Court concluded that the "use of force in the form of
-21-
Id. at 99.15
intrusion."
Id. at 100.
Under the
Court
recognized
that
Id.
handcuffing
was
more
Id.16
15
search
thoroughly
and
efficiently,
and
the
use
of
of the house from interfering with the search, and from attempting
to dispose of the nightstick.
-23-
made any complaints about the handcuffs. Indeed, the cuffs on Tina
apparently loosened so much that when the police said they would
cut them off, she said they did not need to.
slipped them off.
She apparently
Mena
which
considered.
we
believe
reasonable
officers
should
have
opinion).
Third,
the
object
of
search
was
-25-
officer
might
well
have
reached
different
conclusion
than
F.3d 504, 509 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 341
(stating that qualified immunity is available when "officers of
reasonable competence could disagree").
We reverse the denial of immunity on all claims arising
out of this handcuffing and order entry of judgment granting
qualified immunity.
Jessica
and
Tina
claim
that
they
were
-26-
17
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments . . . in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,"
for
an
actionable
excessive
force
claim,
Alexis
v.
McDonald's Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir. 1995),
no reasonably competent officer would have thought the totality of
force used against Jessica was permissible given the facts of her
situation,
taking
all
inferences
in
plaintiffs'
favor.
Cf.
reasonably
competent
officer
also
would
not
have
-28-
old girl for seven to ten minutes, far beyond the time it took to
secure the premises and arrest and remove the only suspect.
See,
summary
judgment
on
grounds
that
constitutional
the same set of facts, defendants would have had fair warning that
given the circumstances, the force they are alleged to have used
was constitutionally excessive.
F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Although there may not be a prior
case specifically prohibiting the use of handcuffs and weapons by
more than twenty officers to subdue an unarmed eleven-year-old boy
who is not suspected of any wrongdoing and is cooperating with the
officers, '[a]ny reasonable officer should have known that such
conduct constituted the use of excessive force.'" (alteration in
-29-
have
not
even
come
forward
with
In that
period of time, her son was removed from the house, her husband was
taken downstairs, and she was handcuffed and lying partially nude
in bed. While the CNHSOU officers did initially have to make split
second decisions to assess Tina's threat level and the possible
need for restraint, that does not characterize the entire period in
the bedroom, which she says was half an hour.
Rather, it quickly
18
of contraband or weapons.
with all orders.
The
have
been
engaged
in joint
criminal
activity with
Cf.
id. at 615.
Defendants had fair notice that under the circumstances
alleged, the detention of Tina with an assault rifle at her head
was objectively unreasonable.
-31-
danger"); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 773-74 (7th Cir.
2000) (denying qualified immunity to officer who pointed a gun at
an elderly man's head for ten minutes after realizing that he was
not the desired suspect and presented no resistance or threat); see
also Harrington, 268 F.3d at 1193 ("Where a person has submitted to
the officers' show of force without resistance, and where an
officer has no reasonable cause to believe that person poses a
danger to the officer or to others, it may be excessive and
unreasonable to continue to aim a loaded firearm directly at that
person, in contrast to simply holding the weapon in a fashion ready
for immediate
use.").
As
with
Jessica,
defendants
offer no
-32-
640, 652-54 (6th Cir. 2010) (denying official immunity from assault
and battery claim arising out of excessive force during arrests for
essentially the same reasons that it denied qualified immunity from
overlapping Fourth Amendment claim).
A more fleshed-out record on summary judgment than the
bare-bones details with which we have been presented could well
have affected the outcome of each of the immunity issues.
For
son
was
being
apprehended.
Our
denial
of
immunity
on
-33-