THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141617. August 14, 2001]

ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and MERRYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. RITA C. MEJIA, as
Executrix of Testate Estate of ANDREA CORDOVA VDA. DE GUTIERREZ, respondent.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioners pray for the setting aside of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 13 April 1999 and its 15 December 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
19281.
As culled from the decisions of the lower courts and the pleadings of the parties, the factual
background of this case is as set out herein:
Andrea Cordova Vda. de Gutierrez (Gutierrez) was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Camarin,
Caloocan City known as Lot 861 of the Tala Estate. The land had an aggregate area of twenty-five (25)
hectares and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 5779 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. The property was later subdivided into five lots with an area of five hectares each and
pursuant thereto, TCT No. 5779 was cancelled and five new transfer certificates of title were issued in the
name of Gutierrez, namely TCT No. 7123 covering Lot 861-A, TCT No. 7124 covering Lot 861-B, TCT No.
7125 covering Lot 861-C, TCT No. 7126 covering Lot 861-D and TCT No. 7127 covering Lot 861-E.
On 21 December 1964, Gutierrez and Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation (Cardale) executed a
Deed of Sale with Mortgage relating to the lots covered by TCT Nos. 7124, 7125, 7126 and 7127, for the
consideration of P800,000.00. Upon the execution of the deed, Cardale paid Gutierrez P171,000.00. It was
agreed that the balance of P629,000.00 would be paid in several installments within five years from the
date of the deed, at an interest of nine percent per annum based on the successive unpaid principal
balances. Thereafter, the titles of Gutierrez were cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT Nos. 7531 to 7534 were
issued in favor of Cardale.
To secure payment of the balance of the purchase price, Cardale constituted a mortgage on three of
the four parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7531, 7532 and 7533, encompassing fifteen hectares of
land.[1] The encumbrance was annotated upon the certificates of title and the owners duplicate
certificates. The owners duplicates were retained by Gutierrez.
On 26 August 1968, owing to Cardales failure to settle its mortgage obligation, Gutierrez filed a
complaint for rescission of the contract with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12366.[2] On 20 October 1969, during the pendency of the rescission case,
Gutierrez died and was substituted by her executrix, respondent Rita C. Mejia (Mejia). In 1971, plaintiffs
presentation of evidence was terminated. However, Cardale, which was represented by petitioner Adalia
B. Francisco (Francisco) in her capacity as Vice-President and Treasurer of Cardale, lost interest in
proceeding with the presentation of its evidence and the case lapsed into inactive status for a period of
about fourteen years.
In the meantime, the mortgaged parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7532 and 7533 became
delinquent in the payment of real estate taxes in the amount of P102,300.00, while the other mortgaged
property covered by TCT No. 7531 became delinquent in the amount of P89,231.37, which culminated in
their levy and auction sale on 1 and 12 September 1983, in satisfaction of the tax arrears. The highest
bidder for the three parcels of land was petitioner Merryland Development Corporation (Merryland),
whose President and majority stockholder is Francisco. A memorandum based upon the certificate of sale
was then made upon the original copies of TCT Nos. 7531 to 7533.

On 13 August 1984, before the expiration of the one year redemption period, Mejia filed a Motion for
Decision with the trial court. The hearing of said motion was deferred, however, due to a Motion for
Postponement filed by Cardale through Francisco, who signed the motion in her capacity as officer-incharge, claiming that Cardale needed time to hire new counsel. However, Francisco did not mention the
tax delinquencies and sale in favor of Merryland. Subsequently, the redemption period expired and
Merryland, acting through Francisco, filed petitions for consolidation of title, [3] which culminated in the
issuance of certain orders[4] decreeing the cancellation of Cardales TCT Nos. 7531 to 7533 and the issuance
of new transfer certificates of title free from any encumbrance or third-party claim whatsoever in favor of
Merryland. Pursuant to such orders, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City issued new transfer certificates
of title in the name of Merryland which did not bear a memorandum of the mortgage liens in favor of
Gutierrez.
Thereafter, sometime in June 1985, Francisco filed in Civil Case No. Q-12366 an undated Manifestation
to the effect that the properties subject of the mortgage and covered by TCT Nos. 7531 to 7533 had been
levied upon by the local government of Caloocan City and sold at a tax delinquency sale. Francisco further
claimed that the delinquency sale had rendered the issues in Civil Case No. Q-12366 moot and
academic. Agreeing with Francisco, the trial court dismissed the case, explaining that since the properties
mortgaged to Cardale had been transferred to Merryland which was not a party to the case for rescission,
it would be more appropriate for the parties to resolve their controversy in another action.
On 14 January 1987, Mejia, in her capacity as executrix of the Estate of Gutierrez, filed with the RTC of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against Francisco, Merryland
and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-49766. On 15 April
1988, the trial court rendered a decision[5] in favor of the defendants, dismissing the complaint for
damages filed by Mejia. It was held that plaintiff Mejia, as executrix of Gutierrezs estate, failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence her allegations that Francisco controlled Cardale and Merryland and that
she had employed fraud by intentionally causing Cardale to default in its payment of real property taxes on
the mortgaged properties so that Merryland could purchase the same by means of a tax delinquency
sale. Moreover, according to the trial court, the failure to recover the property subject of the Deed of Sale
with Mortgage was due to Mejias failure to actively pursue the action for rescission (Civil Case No. 12366),
allowing the case to drag on for eighteen years. Thus, it ruled that xxx xxx xxx
The act of not paying or failing to pay taxes due the government by the defendant Adalia B. Francisco, as
treasurer of Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation do not, per se, constitute perpetration of fraud or an
illegal act. It do [sic] not also constitute an act of evasion of an existing obligation (to plaintiff) if there is no
clear showing that such an act of non-payment of taxes was deliberately made despite its (Cardales)
solvency and capability to pay. There is no evidence showing that Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation
was financially capable of paying said taxes at the time.
There are times when the corporate fiction will be disregarded: (1) where all the members or stockholders
commit illegal act; (2) where the corporation is used as dummy to commit fraud or wrong; (3) where the
corporation is an agency for a parent corporation; and (4) where the stock of a corporation is owned by
one person. (I, Fletcher, 58, 59, 61 and 63). None of the foregoing reasons can be applied to the incidents
in this case: (1) there appears no illegal act committed by the stockholders of defendant Merryland
Development Corporation and Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation; (2) the incidents proven by
evidence of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendants do not show that either or both corporations
were used as dummies by defendant Adalia B. Francisco to commit fraud or wrong. To be used as [a]
dummy, there has to be a showing that the dummy corporation is controlled by the person using it. The
evidence of plaintiff failed to prove that defendant Adalia B. Francisco has controlling interest in either or
both corporations. On the other hand, the evidence of defendants clearly show that defendant Francisco
has no control over either of the two corporations; (3) none of the two corporations appears to be an
agency for a parent (the other) corporation; and (4) the stock of either of the two corporation [sic] is not

owned by one person (defendant Adalia B. Francisco). Except for defendant Adalia B. Francisco, the
incorporators and stockholders of one corporation are different from the other.
xxx xxx xxx
The said case (Civil Case No. 12366) remained pending for almost 18 years before the then Court of First
Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. Even if the trial of the said case became protracted on account of
the retirement and/or promotion of the presiding judge, as well as the transfer of the case from one sala to
another, and as claimed by the plaintiff that the defendant lost interest, (which allegation is unusual, so to
speak), the court believe [sic] that it would not have taken that long to dispose [of] said case had plaintiff
not slept on her rights, and her duty and obligation to see to it that the case is always set for hearing so
that it may be adjudicated [at] the earliest possible time. This duty pertains to both parties, but plaintiff
should have been more assertive, as it was her obligation, similar to the obligation of plaintiff relative to
the service of summons in other cases. The fact that Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation did not
perform its obligation as provided in the said Deed of Sale with Mortgage (Exhibit A) is very clear. Likewise,
the fact that Andrea Cordova, the contracting party, represented by the plaintiff in this case did not also
perform her duties and/or obligation provided in the said contract is also clear. This could have been the
reason why the plaintiff in said case (Exhibit E) slept on her rights and allowed the same to remain pending
for almost 18 years. However, and irrespective of any other reason behind the same, the court believes
that plaintiff, indeed, is the one to blame for the failure of the testate estate of the late Andrea Cordova
Vda. de Gutierrez to recover the money or property due it on the basis of Exhibit A.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx Had the plaintiff not slept on her rights and had it not been for her failure to perform her
commensurate duty to pursue vigorously her case against Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation in said
Civil Case No. 12366, she could have easily known said non-payment of realty taxes on the said properties
by said Cardale Financing and Realty Corporation, or, at least the auction sales that followed, and from
which she could have redeemed said properties within the one year period provided by law, or, have
availed of remedies at the time to protect the interest of the testate estate of the late Andrea Cordova
Vda. de Gutierrez.
xxx xxx xxx
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
defendants Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, Merryland Development Corporation and Adalia B.
Francisco, and against plaintiff Rita C. Mejia, as Executrix of the Testate Estate of Andrea Cordova Vda. De
Gutierrez, and hereby orders:
1. That this case for damages be dismissed, at the same time, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration
dated September 23, 1987 is denied;
2. Plaintiff pay the defendants Merryland Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds the sum
of P20,000.00, and another sum of P20,000.00 to the defendant Adalia B. Francisco, as and for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals,[6] in its decision[7] promulgated on 13 April 1999, reversed the trial court, holding
that the corporate veil of Cardale and Merryland must be pierced in order to hold Francisco and Merryland
solidarily liable since these two corporations were used as dummies by Francisco, who employed fraud in
allowing Cardale to default on the realty taxes for the properties mortgaged to Gutierrez so that Merryland

could acquire the same free from all liens and encumbrances in the tax delinquency sale and, as a
consequence thereof, frustrating Gutierrezs rights as a mortgagee over the subject properties. Thus, the
Court of Appeals premised its findings of fraud on the following circumstances
xxx xxx xxx
xxx Appellee Francisco knew that Cardale of which she was vice-president and treasurer had an
outstanding obligation to Gutierrez for the unpaid balance of the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 7531
to 7533, which Cardale purchased from Gutierrez which account, as of December 1988, already amounted
to P4,414,271.43 (Exh. K, pp. 39-44, record); she also knew that Gutierrez had a mortgage lien on the said
properties to secure payment of the aforesaid obligation; she likewise knew that the said mortgaged
properties were under litigation in Civil Case No. Q-12366 which was an action filed by Gutierrez against
Cardale for rescission of the sale and/or recovery of said properties (Exh. E). Despite such knowledge,
appellee Francisco did not inform Gutierrezs Estate or the Executrix (herein appellant) as well as the trial
court that the mortgaged properties had incurred tax delinquencies, and that Final Notices dated July 9,
1982 had been sent by the City Treasurer of Caloocan demanding payment of such tax arrears within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof (Exhs. J & J-1, pp. 37-38, record). Both notices which were addressed to
Cardale Financing & Realty Corporation c/o Merryland Development Corporation
and sent to appellee Franciscos address at 83 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, gave warning
that if the taxes were not paid within the aforesaid period, the properties would be sold at public auction
to satisfy the tax delinquencies.
To reiterate, notwithstanding receipt of the aforesaid notices, appellee Francisco did not inform the Estate
of Gutierrez or her executrix about the tax delinquencies and of the impending auction sale of the said
properties. Even a modicum of good faith and fair play should have encouraged appellee Francisco to at
least advise Gutierrezs Estate through her executrix (herein appellant) and the trial court which was
hearing the complaint for rescission and recovery of said properties of such fact, so that the Estate of
Gutierrez, which had a real interest on the properties as mortgagee and as plaintiff in the rescission and
recovery suit, could at least take steps to forestall the auction sale and thereby preserve the properties and
protect its interests thereon. And not only did appellee Francisco allow the auction sale to take place, but
she used her other corporation (Merryland) in participating in the auction sale and in acquiring the very
properties which her first corporation (Cardale) had mortgaged to Gutierrez. Again, appellee Francisco did
not thereafter inform the Estate of Gutierrez or its executrix (herein appellant) about the auction sale, thus
precluding the Estate from exercising its right of redemption. And it was only after the expiration of the
redemption period that appellee Francisco filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. Q-12366 (Exh. I, p. 36,
record), in which she disclosed for the first time to the trial court and appellant that the properties subject
of the case and on which Gutierrez or her Estate had a mortgage lien, had been sold in a tax delinquency
sale. And in order to further conceal her deceptive maneuver, appellee Francisco did not divulge in her
aforesaid Manifestation that it was her other corporation (Merryland) that acquired the properties in the
auction sale.
We are not impressed by appellees submission that no evidence was adduced to prove that Cardale had
the capacity to pay the tax arrears and therefore she or Cardale may not be faulted for the tax delinquency
sale of the properties in question. Appellee Franciscos bad faith or deception did not necessarily lie in
Cardales or her failure to settle the tax deliquencies in question, but in not disclosing to Gutierrezs estate
or its executrix (herein appellant) which had a mortgage lien on said properties the tax delinquencies and
the impending auction sale of the encumbered properties.
Appellee Franciscos deception is further shown by her concealment of the tax delinquency sale of the
properties from the estate or its executrix, thus preventing the latter from availing of the right of
redemption of said properties. That appellee Francisco divulged the auction sale of the properties only

after such redemption period had lapsed clearly betrays her intention to keep Gutierrezs Estate or its
Executrix from availing of such right. And as the evidence would further show, appellee Francisco had a
hand in securing for Merryland consolidation of its ownership of the properties and in seeing to it that
Merrylands torrens certificates for the properties were free from liens and encumbrances. All these
appellee Francisco did even as she was fully aware that Gutierrez or her estate had a valid and subsisting
mortgage lien on the said properties.
It is likewise worthy of note that early on appellee Francisco had testified in the action for rescission of sale
and recovery of possession and ownership of the properties which Gutierrez filed against Cardale (Civil
Case No. Q-12366) in her capacity as defendant Cardales vice-president and treasurer. But then, for no
plausible reason whatsoever, she lost interest in continuing with the presentation of evidence for
defendant Cardale. And then, when appellant Mejia as executrix of Gutierrezs Estate filed on August 13,
1984 a Motion for Decision in the aforesaid case, appellee Francisco moved to defer consideration of
appellants Motion on the pretext that defendant Cardale needed time to employ another
counsel. Significantly, in her aforesaid Motion for Postponement dated August 16, 1984 which appellee
Francisco personally signed as Officer-in-Charge of Cardale, she also did not disclose the fact that the
properties subject matter of the case had long been sold at a tax delinquency sale and acquired by her
other corporation Merryland.
And as if what she had already accomplished were not enough fraudulence, appellee Francisco, acting in
behalf of Merryland, caused the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in the name of Merryland,
which did not anymore bear the mortgage lien in favor of Gutierrez. In the meantime, to further avoid
payment of the mortgage indebtedness owing to Gutierrezs estate, Cardale corporation was
dissolved. Finally, to put the properties beyond the reach of the mortgagee, Gutierrezs estate, Merryland
caused the subdivision of such properties, which were subsequently sold on installment basis.
In its petition for certiorari, petitioners argue that there is no law requiring the mortgagor to inform
the mortgagee of the tax delinquencies, if any, of the mortgaged properties. Moreover, petitioners claim
that Cardales failure to pay the realty taxes, per se, does not constitute fraud since it was not proven that
Cardale was capable of paying the taxes. Petitioners also contend that if Mejia, as executrix of Gutierrezs
estate, was not remiss in her duty to pursue Civil Case No. 12366, she could have easily learned of the nonpayment of realty taxes on the subject properties and of the auction sale that followed and thus, have
redeemed the properties or availed of some other remedy to conserve the estate of Gutierrez. In addition,
Mejia could have annotated a notice oflis pendens on the titles of the mortgaged properties, but she failed
to do so. It is the stand of petitioners that respondent has not adduced any proof that Francisco controlled
both Cardale and Merryland and that she used these two corporations to perpetuate a fraud upon
Gutierrez or her estate. Petitioners maintain that the evidence shows that, apart form the meager share of
petitioner Francisco, the stockholdings of both corporations comprise other shareholders, and the
stockholders of either of them, aside from petitioner Francisco, are composed of different persons. As to
Civil Case No. 12366, petitioners insist that the decision of the trial court in that case constitutes res
judicata to the instant case.[8]
It is dicta in corporation law that a corporation is a juridical person with a separate and distinct
personality from that of the stockholders or members who compose it.[9] However, when the legal fiction
of the separate corporate personality is abused, such as when the same is used for fraudulent or wrongful
ends, the courts have not hesitated to pierce the corporate veil. One of the earliest formulations of this
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was made in the American case of United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co.[10] If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a corporation will be looked
upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the
notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.

Since then a good number of cases have firmly implanted this doctrine in Philippine
jurisprudence.[11] One such case is Umali v. Court of Appeals[12] wherein the Court declared that
Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, when valid grounds therefore exist, the legal
fiction that a corporation is an entity with a juridical personality separate and distinct from its members or
stockholders may be disregarded. In such cases, the corporation will be considered as a mere association
of persons. The members or stockholders of the corporation will be considered as the corporation, that is,
liability will attach directly to the officers and stockholders. The doctrine applies when the corporate fiction
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a
shield to confuse the legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of
a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
With specific regard to corporate officers, the general rule is that the officer cannot be held personally
liable with the corporation, whether civilly or otherwise, for the consequences of his acts, if he acted for
and in behalf of the corporation, within the scope of his authority and in good faith. In such cases, the
officers acts are properly attributed to the corporation.[13] However, if it is proven that the officer has used
the corporate fiction to defraud a third party,[14] or that he has acted negligently, maliciously or in bad
faith,[15] then the corporate veil shall be lifted and he shall be held personally liable for the particular
corporate obligation involved.
The Court, after an assiduous study of this case, is convinced that the totality of the circumstances
appertaining conduce to the inevitable conclusion that petitioner Francisco acted in bad faith. The events
leading up to the loss by the Gutierrez estate of its mortgage security attest to this. It has been established
that Cardale failed to comply with its obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price for the four
parcels of land it bought from Gutierrez covered by TCT Nos. 7531 to 7534, which obligation was secured
by a mortgage upon the lands covered by TCT Nos. 7531, 7532 and 7533. This prompted Gutierrez to file
an action for rescission of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage (Civil Case No. Q-12366), but the case dragged
on for about fourteen years when Cardale, as represented by Francisco, who was Vice-President and
Treasurer of the same,[16] lost interest in completing its presentation of evidence.
Even before 1984 when Mejia, in her capacity as executrix of Gutierrezs estate, filed a Motion for
Decision with the trial court, there is no question that Francisco knew that the properties subject of the
mortgage had become tax delinquent. In fact, as treasurer of Cardale, Francisco herself was the officer
charged with the responsibility of paying the realty taxes on the corporations properties. This was
admitted by the trial court in its decision.[17] In addition, notices dated 9 July 1982 from the City Treasurer
of Caloocan demanding payment of the tax arrears on the subject properties and giving warning that if the
realty taxes were not paid within the given period then such properties would be sold at public auction to
satisfy the tax delinquencies were sent directly to Franciscos address in White Plains, Quezon City. [18] Thus,
as early as 1982, Francisco could have informed the Gutierrez estate or the trial court in Civil Case No. Q12366 of the tax arrears and of the notice from the City Treasurer so that the estate could have taken the
necessary steps to prevent the auction sale and to protect its interests in the mortgaged properties, but
she did no such thing. Finally, in 1983, the properties were levied upon and sold at public auction wherein
Merryland - a corporation where Francisco is a stockholder[19] and concurrently acts as President and
director[20] - was the highest bidder.
When Mejia filed the Motion for Decision in Civil Case No. Q-12366,[21] the period for redeeming the
properties subject of the tax sale had not yet expired.[22] Under the Realty Property Tax Code,[23] pursuant
to which the tax levy and sale were prosecuted,[24] both the delinquent taxpayer and in his absence, any
person holding a lien or claim over the property shall have the right to redeem the property within one
year from the date of registration of the sale.[25] However, if these persons fail to redeem the property
within the time provided, then the purchaser acquires the property free from any encumbrance or third
party claim whatsoever.[26] Cardale made no attempts to redeem the mortgaged property during this
time. Moreover, instead of informing Mejia or the trial court in Q-12366 about the tax sale, the records

show that Francisco filed a Motion for Postponement[27] in behalf of Cardale - even signing the motion in
her capacity as officer-in-charge - which worked to defer the hearing of Mejias Motion for Decision. No
mention was made by Francisco of the tax sale in the motion for postponement. Only after the redemption
period had expired did Francisco decide to reveal what had transpired by filing a Manifestation stating that
the properties subject of the mortgage in favor of Gutierrez had been sold at a tax delinquency sale;
however, Francisco failed to mention that it was Merryland that acquired the properties since she was
probably afraid that if she did so the court would see behind her fraudulent scheme. In this regard, it is
also significant to note that it was Francisco herself who filed the petitions for consolidation of title and
who helped secure for Merryland titles over the subject properties free from any encumbrance or thirdparty claim whatsoever.
It is exceedingly apparent to the Court that the totality of Francisos actions clearly betray an intention
to conceal the tax delinquencies, levy and public auction of the subject properties from the estate of
Gutierrez and the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-12366 until after the expiration of the redemption period
when the remotest possibility for the recovery of the properties would be extinguished. [28] Consequently,
Francisco had effectively deprived the estate of Gutierrez of its rights as mortgagee over the three parcels
of land which were sold to Cardale. If Francisco was acting in good faith, then she should have disclosed
the status of the mortgaged properties to the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-12366 - especially after Mejia
had filed a Motion for Decision, in response to which she filed a motion for postponement wherein she
could easily have mentioned the tax sale - since this action directly affected such properties which were
the subject of both the sale and mortgage.
That Merryland acquired the property at the public auction only serves to shed more light upon
Franciscos fraudulent purposes. Based on the findings of the Court of Appeals, Francisco is the controlling
stockholder and President of Merryland.[29] Thus, aside from the instrumental role she played as an officer
of Cardale, in evading that corporations legitimate obligations to Gutierrez, it appears that Franciscos
actions were also oriented towards securing advantages for another corporation in which she had a
substantial interest. We cannot agree, however, with the Court of Appeals decision to hold Merryland
solidarily liable with Francisco. The only act imputable to Merryland in relation to the mortgaged
properties is that it purchased the same and this by itself is not a fraudulent or wrongful act. No evidence
has been adduced to establish that Merryland was a mere alter ego or business conduit of Francisco. Time
and again it has been reiterated that mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of
all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the
separate corporate personality.[30] Neither has it been alleged or proven that Merryland is so organized and
controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or
adjunct of Cardale.[31] Even assuming that the businesses of Cardale and Merryland are interrelated, this
alone is not justification for disregarding their separate personalities, absent any showing that Merryland
was purposely used as a shield to defraud creditors and third persons of their rights. [32] Thus, Merrylands
separate juridical personality must be upheld.
Based on a statement of account submitted by Mejia, the Court of Appeals awarded P4,314,271.43 in
favor of the estate of Gutierrez which represents the unpaid balance of the purchase price in the amount
of P629,000.00 with an interest rate of nine percent (9%) per annum, in accordance with the agreement of
the parties under the Deed of Sale with Mortgage,[33] as of December 1988.[34] Therefore, in addition to the
amount awarded by the appellate court, Francisco should pay the estate of Gutierrez interest on the
unpaid balance of the purchase price (in the amount of P629,000.00) at the rate of nine percent (9%) per
annum computed from January, 1989 until fully satisfied.
Finally, contrary to petitioners assertions, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. Q-12366 does not constitute res judicata insofar as the present case is
concerned because the decision in the first case was not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it was merely
based upon the premise that since Cardale had been dissolved and the property acquired by another
corporation, the action for rescission would not prosper. As a matter of fact, it was even expressly stated
by the trial court that the parties should ventilate their issues in another action.

WHEREFORE, the 13 April 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby accordingly MODIFIED so as
to hold ADALIA FRANCISCO solely liable to the estate of Gutierrez for the amount of P4,314,271.43 and for
interest on the unpaid balance of the purchase price (in the amount of P629,000.00) at the rate of nine
percent (9%) per annum computed from January, 1989 until fully satisfied. MERRYLAND is hereby absolved
from all liability.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4218. July 20, 2000]
ROMEO H. SIBULO, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an administrative complaint against the respondent, Atty. Stanley Cabrera, for unethical
practice/conduct.
The facts that matter are as follows:
In a case, entitled "Brenda Sucaldito[1] versus Reynaldo Marcelo, et al.", docketed as Civil Case No.
90-55209 before Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, defendant Reynaldo Marcelo
retained the services of the herein respondent as his lawyer. Subsequently, however, the
respondent also entered his appearance as counsel for plaintiff Brenda Sucaldito in the same case,
without withdrawing his appearance as counsel for defendant Reynaldo Marcelo. In view of such
development Atty. Reyes Geromo, former counsel of Brenda Sucaldito, filed with the Manila
Regional Trial Court a motion to disqualify the respondent on the ground of unethical
conduct.[2] Finding merit in the said motion, the trial court ordered the disqualification of
respondent in the case.[3]
Complainant Romeo Sibulo, an intervenor in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 90-55209, brought
the present administrative complaint against respondent, praying for the latters removal from or
suspension in the practice of law, on the ground of unethical practice/conduct.
In his Answer[4] to the Complaint, respondent denied the wrongdoing alluded to him; theorizing
that "xxx I merely accepted a case from a plaintiff and at the same time I was the counsel as
intervenor of one of the defendants xxx."
This case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5]
Acting thereupon on April 7, 2000, the IBP came out with its Resolution No. XIV-000-163, which
reads:
"RESOLUTION NO. XIV-000-163

Adm. Case No. 4218

Romeo E. Sibulo vs. Atty. Stanly Cabrera
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution/Decision as annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, said recommendation is with
modification that Respondent be CENSURED and FINED One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)." [6]
The IBP Report,[7] in part, found:
"The respondents answer is quite revealing. While he denies any unethical conduct on his
part, respondent seeks to justify what he did and of which he is charged by tongue-in-cheek
declaring that he did no wrong considering that I merely accepted a case from a plaintiff and
at the same time I was the counsel as intervenor of one of the defendants.
Nothing further need be said. For all his disclaimers and the affidavits of two (2) witnesses in
his favor, it is beyond cavil that Atty. Cabrera has violated Canon 15 and the subsequent
Rules of Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainants motives are not of
paramount interest. To our mind, Atty. Cabrera has lain himself open to the specifications
against him. Remarkably, he admits the same by his lame explanation.
From all the foregoing, we recommend that Atty. Stanley R. Cabrera be CENSURED by the
Honorable Supreme Court and ordered to fine a pay (sic) in such amount as the Honorable
Court may see fit."
Respondent has all but admitted the wrongdoing complained of, when he stated in his Answer that
he "merely accepted a case from a plaintiff and at the same time I [he] was the counsel as
intervenor of one of the defendants." Such a revelation is a categorical admission that he
(respondent) represented two conflicting interests, which representations or appearances are
prohibited by Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
"CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
Respondent was bound to faithfully represent his client in all aspects of subject civil case. When he
agreed to represent the defendant and later on, also the plaintiff in the same case, he could no
longer serve either of his said clients faithfully, as his duty to the plaintiff did necessarily conflict
with his duty to the defendant. The relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double
dealing which could sometimes lead to treachery, should be avoided.[8]
Considering the attendant facts and circumstances, the Court is of the sense that the amount of
fine recommended below is not commensurate with the wrong done by the respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of unethical conduct for representing two conflicting
interests and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

CLARITA J. SAMALA,
Complainant,

ADM. CASE NO. 5439

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
_______________________
x-----------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a complaint[1] dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two
separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting
false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and
(d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[2]
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the
parties filed their respective memoranda[3] and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation[4] dated January 12,
2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution[5] passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension
from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the
recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
272, Marikina City, entitled Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of rentals, herein
respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay,
Valencia, Bustamante andBayuga[6] by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.[7]
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City,
entitled Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. SalveBustamante and her husband for ejectment,
respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property subject of the
controversy.Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,[8] Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz[9] warned respondent to
refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez v.
Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of MarikinaCity, respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a
Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case
No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not
for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the
tenants.[11] Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case
No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the
case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, because Valdez told him to include Alba
as the two were the owners of the property[12] and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint
for ejectment.[13] But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers
that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged
respondent with estafa.[14] Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.[15]He may not also undertake to discharge
conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.[16] It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one
of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[17]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[18]
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. It springs from the attorneys duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain
inviolate the clients confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as
to any of the privileged communications of his client.[19]
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after
the relation of attorney and client has terminated.[20] The bare attorney-client relationship with a client
precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the clients adversary either in the
same case[21] or in a different but related action.[22] A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent
client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. [23]
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides
no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client. The reason for the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the
expiration of the professional employment.[25] Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance
of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in
which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired
in the previous relation.[26]
In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the
latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the
complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client
but the fact that he filed a case entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, is a clear
indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent
cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without
observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where
the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of
no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which
the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two
actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of
whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.[29]

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that
a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge
must be considered sacred and guarded with care.[30]
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents representation of Valdez and Alba
against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case
of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have
withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court,[31] but the
same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in
Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all
appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave
at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor,
fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.[32]

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent
submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500
was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No.
273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.[33] During the hearing before
Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time
that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the
complaint, he did not do anything anymore.[34] Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the
truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract
and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed onNovember 27, 2000, [35] before RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in
2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before
Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although
in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in
lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that
a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's

submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8,
2002[36] dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying
to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled
and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to
the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients.[38] He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly
inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion.[39] The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[40] As such, he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate.[41]
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC,
Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both
entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City
Prosecutor.Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed
against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of
respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his
services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their
retainer agreement.[42]
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439[43] and 01-036162[44] both entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and
grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 004306[45] for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318[46] against Alvin Valencia[47] for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to
protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the
basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own
right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right
of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over
20 years of age,[48] while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first
wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in
1998.[49] Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by
complainant. However, he does not consider his affair withLagmay as a relationship[50] and does not
consider the latter as his second family.[51] He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he
has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.[52]

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of
immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression
by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three
children by thelatter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing,
respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - inMuntinlupa, where his first wife
lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives.[53] It is of no moment that respondent eventually
married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the
exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that
may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined
as that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.[54] Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to
discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community.[55] That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that
this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and
violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well
as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondents
personal records.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO,

A.C. No. 6174

Complainant,

Present:
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
- versus -

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING,
Respondent.

November 16, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196[1] of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint[2] for disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty.
Rodolfo T. Galing.

Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms.
Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding
payment of the checks.[3] Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in
the demand letter before filing her complaint.

On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[4]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation [5] filed by respondent for and on behalf
of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms.
Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003, respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor
of Manila.

Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that he drafted a demand
letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in deference to their long standing friendship and
not by reason of a professional engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any
professional fee for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that complainant would
have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that complainant, based on that agreement,
engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao.

To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant against Ms. Koa for
estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand letter he drafted but on the demand
letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.

Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the criminal cases. He further
contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are comares
for more than 30 years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba. [7] Respondent claimed that it is
in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters request that they be represented by him in
the cases filed against them by complainant and complainants daughter.He maintained that the filing of
the Motion for Consolidation which is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his appearance in the joint
proceedings should only be construed as an effort on his part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter
of the parties.

He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the parties achieve an out of
court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had
caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks
subject of I.S. No. 03G-19484-86.

Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the other checks caused a
lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly led her to vent her ire on respondent and
file the instant administrative case for conflict of interest.

In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved with
modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner.They found respondent guilty of violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and
for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he be

suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.[8]

We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,[9] as adopted by the
Board of Governors of the IBP.

It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant regarding the
dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.

It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by respondent in I.S. No.
03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa and I.S. No. 03G-19582-84 entitled Lani C. Justo vs. Karen
Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants
are likewise mother and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus,
movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.

Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant because there
was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered.Moreover, he argued that he drafted the
demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend.

We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship between
complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment complainant sought legal
advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent
further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal
complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in the
criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the Investigating Commissioner, by referring to
complainant Justo as my client in the demand letter sent to the defaulting debtor[10], respondent admitted
the existence of the lawyer-client relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming
otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from liability. Absence of
monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing
cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship
is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship. [11] We held in Burbe v.
Atty. Magulta[12] that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been
sought.[13]

Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Respondent was therefore bound to refrain from representing parties with conflicting interests in a
controversy. By doing so, without showing any proof that he had obtained the written consent of the
conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with the
clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[15]

It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[16]

The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client.[18] This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [19] Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. [20] Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[21]

The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was eventually engaged by
complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former
lawyer the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a violation
of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.

Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the disbarment sought in the complaint is deemed to
be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year is warranted.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice of law for one (1)
year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to append a
copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE,
INC. (RBCI) BOHOL,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 5736

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.

Promulgated:

June 18, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of Directors [1] of the Rural Bank of
Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido (respondent) for acts
constituting grave coercion and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders of RBCI, led his
clients in physically taking over the management and operation of the bank through force, violence and
intimidation.

The Facts

On 18 April 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. [2] RBCI alleged that respondent
violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

According to RBCI, on 1 April 2002, respondent and his clients, Dr. Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios
Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and Felix Rengel (Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and
intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of
RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and
installed their own staff to run the bank.

In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance
with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected
Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of
management.Respondent alleged that a termination notice was sent to Garay but he refused to
comply. On 1 April 2002, to ensure a smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and the
Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted
violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent then directed the security guards
to prevent entry into the bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the bank. Respondent,
through the orders of the Nazareno-Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault.

Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI was already
dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against him in retaliation for
the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.

Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their
allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified,
affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or
certified true copies.

The Ruling of the IBP

On 28 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.) submitted
his report and declared that respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as
vanguard of law and justice.[3] Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. recommended the imposition on respondent of
a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months to one year with a warning that the
repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.

According to Commissioner Villadolid, Jr., respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients could
not just forcibly take over the management and premises of RBCI without a valid court
order. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. noted that the right to manage and gain majority control over RBCI was
one of the issues pending before the trial court in Civil Case No. 6628. Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. said that
respondent had no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it was a naked power grab
without any semblance of legality whatsoever.

Commissioner Villadolid, Jr. added that the administrative complaint against respondent before the IBP is
independent of the dismissal and suspension of the criminal cases against respondent. Commissioner
Villadolid, Jr. also noted that RBCI complied with the IBP Rules of Procedure when they filed a verified
complaint and submitted duly notarized affidavits. Moreover, both RBCI and respondent agreed to
dispense with the mandatory conference hearing and, instead, simultaneously submit their position
papers.

On 20 March 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-120 which declared that
respondent dismally failed to live up to the exacting standards of the law profession and suspended
respondent from the practice of law for one year with a warning that repetition of similar conduct will
warrant a more severe penalty.[4]

On 5 July 2006, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 11 December 2008 Resolution, the IBP
denied respondents motion.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

We affirm the IBP Board of Governors resolution.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[6]Likewise, it is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the
law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence
in the legal system.[7]

Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with
the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client.[8] It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.[9]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid, Jr.s conclusion:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional
oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a
tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers
of the court. Thus, their duty to protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they are obliged to
present every available legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be

made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and
the fair administration of justice.[10]

A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics.[11] Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit
of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.[12]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules
1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
in all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6051

April 2, 2007

CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified complaint1 dated June 14, 2002, complainant Celia Arroyo-Posidio prayed for the disbarment
of respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan on account of deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in
violation of the lawyers oath.
Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent in Special Proceeding No. C-525, entitled
"Testate Estate of deceased Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo," filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. Complainant paid respondent legal fees in the amount of P20,000.00. However, on June 6,
1990, respondent withdrew his appearance as counsel in the said case, thus complainant engaged the
services of another lawyer.
Sometime in August 1996, respondent contacted complainant and showed her documents consisting of tax
declarations of properties purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman-Arroyo, but
were not included in the Inventory of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C-525. He

convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties and
demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After several months, however, respondent failed to
institute any action. Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of
the P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated demands.
Consequently, complainant filed an action for sum of money and damages against respondent before
Branch 81, Metropolitan Trial Court, Valenzuela City which was docketed as Civil Case No. 7130. On March
31, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREEFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the latter to:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
September 7, 1996 until the same is fully paid and/or satisfied;
2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P8,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
3. To pay the cost of suit.2
Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which affirmed 3 the Metropolitan Trial Court decision in
toto.Thus, complainant filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was granted on March 19,
2001.4
To satisfy the judgment against him, respondent issued Prudential Bank check number 0338742 5 dated
May 31, 2001 in the amount of P120,000.00 in favor of complainant. However, upon presentment for
payment, the check was dishonored for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Despite a written notice of
dishonor and demand6 dated September 3, 2001, respondent refused to honor his obligation. Hence, this
administrative complaint charging respondent with deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in
violation of the lawyers oath.
Respondent denied complainants allegations. He admitted having received the amount of P100,000.00 but
claimed that the same was partial payment for his services in Special Proceeding Case No. C-525. Further,
he alleged that he had already paid complainant the amount of P150,000.00 as evidenced by a Receipt &
Quitclaim7dated August 10, 2000.
On March 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On January 15, 2006, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his
Report8 finding respondent guilty of violating the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
in defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same. Thus
4.3 x x x
Noteworthy is the factual finding of the court that Complainant had already paid respondent the amount
ofP20,000.00 for services he had rendered in Special Proceeding case No. C-525. Thus, Respondents claim
that the P100,000.00 given to him by Complainant allegedly for payment of his legal services in the Special
Proceeding is not correct. The MTC decision likewise found that Respondent requested payment of
theP100,000.00 in consideration for his representing Complainant in the additional claims to be filed
against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. Respondent, however, failed to file the claims. Hence,
complainant demanded the return of the P100,000.00. The MTC decision has already become final and
executory as evidenced by a copy of the Order of Writ of Execution issued by the Court.
4.4 x x x

4.5 As already pointed out, the RTC had rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the MTC that
theP100,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent is not for the payment of his previous services
rendered in the Special Proceeding case No. C-525 but rather as payment for filing of an additional claim
from the estate of the late Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. It is clear that there is identity of parties in the
civil case for recovery of sum of money and damages and in the administrative case for disbarment filed by
herein Complainant. Thus, while the causes of action are different in the two cases, there is conclusiveness
on the factual circumstances surrounding Complainants delivery of the P100,000.00 to Respondent.
Respondent[s] bare assertion that his receipt of theP100,000.00 was for payment of legal services
previously rendered in the Special Proceeding case No. C-525 does not hold water and cannot overturn the
factual conclusions reached by the MTC in its decision.
4.6 A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for deceit or misrepresentation to the prejudice of or as a
means to defraud his client. In the case of Munar v. Flores, the Supreme Court suspended an attorney
who deceitfully defrauded a client of a sum of money allegedly representing cost of fees and other
miscellaneous expenses for a suit to be filed but which promised suit he never filed nor did he return the
amount despite demands. Failure on the part of the lawyer, upon demand, to return to his client the funds
or property held by him on the latters behalf gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
It is clear in this case that Complainant made demands for the return of the P100,000.00, but the same
remained unanswered by Respondent. This prompted Complainant to file a civil case for collection of sum
of money and damages. Worse, after the decision was rendered in favor of Complainant, and a writ of
execution issued, Respondent issued a check purportedly to settle the case only to have the check bounce
for insufficiency of funds. The conversion of the clients property is a gross violation of general morality as
well as professional ethics, and deserves severe punishment. This conversion of clients property is a
ground for disciplinary action and presupposes fraudulent intent on the part of the lawyer. In the case
of Manalato v. Reyes, the Supreme Court emphasized that fraudulent intent may be inferred from the
lawyers refusal to make restitution after demand. Such circumstance is present in this case.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, this Commissioner respectfully recommends that a penalty ranging from
suspension for a period of six (6) months to one (1) year at the discretion of the Board be imposed with
warning that repetition of similar conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.9
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the
penalty from suspension to reprimand10 with stern warning that a similar misconduct will warrant a more
severe penalty.
We agree with the findings of the IBP. However, we find that the penalty of reprimand is not
commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by respondent.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin every lawyer to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law.11 Lawyers are prohibited from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct12 and are mandated to serve their clients
with competence and diligence.13 To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the profession.14
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to account for all
money or property collected or received for or from his client. Where a client gives money to his lawyer for
a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal an adverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay

the purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyer should, upon failure to take such step and spend the
money for it, immediately return the money to his client.15
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional claims
against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an action, thus it was
imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand therefor. Having received
payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in keeping complainants
money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to do so despite
complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to delay any man
for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients.
A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.16 A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good
faith on his part is exacted.17 In Barnachea v. Quiocho,18 the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of
law for one year for his failure to return clients funds which were given to him for the expenses for the
transfer of title over real property and in payment for his legal services. The Court held:
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a
trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the
registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over
real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon
demand therefor. The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The
conversion by a lawyer [of] funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics
and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent must likewise be reminded that a lawyer should, at all times, comply with what the court
lawfully requires.20 It bears stressing that the judgment against him in Civil Case No. 7130 has long become
final and executory. However, up to this date, he has failed to comply with the order to pay complainant
the amount ofP100,000.00 as well as interest and attorneys fees. His refusal to comply with the said order
constitutes a willful disobedience to the courts lawful orders.
Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court. 21 And while respondent
issued a check in the amount of P120,000.00 in favor of complainant, purportedly to satisfy the judgment
against him, the check was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Respondent
never denied the issuance of the check or refuted complainants allegations regarding the same. Neither
did he question the veracity of complainants evidence which consisted of the check itself.
Needless to say, the act of issuing a bouncing check further compounded respondents infractions. Time
and again, we have held that the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the
same constitutes willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and
lawyers.22Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.23
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the exacting moral and ethical standards
imposed on members of the legal profession. Respondents refusal to return complainants money upon
demand, his failure to comply with the lawful orders of the trial court, as well as the issuance of a bouncing

check, reveal his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It cannot be overemphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. Whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only
the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.24
The Court believes that a penalty of suspension is called for under the circumstances. In Espiritu v. Cabredo
IV,25a lawyer was suspended for one year for failure to account for and return the amount of P51,161.00 to
his client. In Reyes v. Maglaya,26 a lawyer was suspended for one year for failure to return to his client the
amount ofP1,500.00 despite numerous demands. Likewise, in Castillo v. Taguines,27 a lawyer was
suspended for one year for failure to return to his client the amount of P500.00 and for issuing a bouncing
check.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of the respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all the courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6297. July 13, 2004]

DOLORES D. PARIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly
warrants that he possesses the necessary diligence, learning and skill to handle each case. He should exert
his best judgment and exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of his
clients cause.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden Parias (Parias) engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto (Paguinto) to annul her marriage to Danilo Soriano. They agreed that
for the legal services, Parias would pay Paguinto an acceptance fee of P25,000, the filing fee of P2,500 and
other incidental expenses.
On 2 December 2001, Parias paid Paguinto P10,000 in cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee.
An acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment.[1] Parias gave Paguinto a diskette containing a
narration of what happened between her and her estranged husband Danilo Soriano. Parias also furnished

Paguinto with a copy of her marriage contract with Soriano. Before the end of December 2001, Parias gave
Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee.
Sometime between January and April 2002, Parias inquired from Paguinto on the progress of her
annulment case. Paguinto informed her that the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 64 (RTC-Manila, Branch 64), before Judge Ricaforte and that the hearing was scheduled on 25 April
2002. Before the hearing, Parias requested for a meeting with Paguinto but the secretary informed her
that the hearing was cancelled. The secretary further informed Parias that the judge reset the succeeding
hearings originally scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26 June 2002 because the judge was sick or out of town.
On the first week of July 2002, Parias went to the trial court to inquire about her case but the court
personnel in RTC-Manila, Branch 64 informed her that there was no such case filed in their court. Parias
asked Paguinto for the case number, date of filing, copy of the petition and the court where the annulment
case was pending. Paguinto told Parias that the records were at his office and that he was in Malolos,
Bulacan attending to a case. It turned out that there was no annulment case filed in RTC-Manila, Branch
64. Paguinto promised to return the money that Parias paid as down payment. However, Paguinto
returned the P10,000 only after Parias filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) the present complaint for disbarment.
In the Order dated 14 February 2003,[2] the CBD directed Paguinto to answer the complaint. Paguinto
asked for an extension of 15 days to file his Answer. The CBD granted the extension in the Order dated 19
March 2003.[3] However, Paguinto failed to file his Answer within the extended period and thus the CBD
declared him in default in the Order dated 15 July 2003. [4] After the hearing, Parias submitted her Position
Paper praying that the CBD declare Paguinto guilty of violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On 10 September 2003, Parias filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal[5] of the complaint. Parias stated that
Paguinto personally explained exhaustively the reasons why he failed to comply with his obligations and
she realized that the complaint arose due to a misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and
miscommunication. Parias manifested that she was withdrawing the complaint, as she was no longer
interested in pursuing the case.
On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and Motion [6] explaining that he failed to attend the
hearing on 30 July 2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga attending a hearing in a criminal case for
frustrated homicide. He apologized to Parias for his actuations claiming himself solely to be blamed. He
further declared that he failed to timely prepare and file the petition for annulment because he spends his
time mostly in Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Cavite where he practices law catering to those clients who have less
in life.
Commissioners Report & Recommendation
The IBP designated Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Commissioner) as Commissioner to conduct a
formal investigation of the case. The Commissioner found Paguinto negligent in performing his duties as a
lawyer and as an officer of the court. The Commissioner declared that a lawyer has the duty to give
adequate attention, care and time to his cases, accepting only as many cases as he can handle. Paguinto
failed to comply with this duty. The Commissioner recommended the suspension of Paguinto from the
practice of law for six months.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissioner.
Parias gave Paguinto P10,000 cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. Parias also gave
Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee. Paguinto led Parias to believe that he had filed the annulment case.

Paguinto informed Parias that the case was filed with the RTC-Manila, Branch 64, before Judge Ricaforte.
However, Parias later found out that Paguinto never filed the annulment case in court.
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) provides that a lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[7] Money entrusted to
a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the client on demand.[8] Paguinto returned the money only after Parias filed
this administrative case for disbarment.
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer
accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic
learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the
prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case,
he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients
interests will suffer.[9] It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter.
He must also give adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A
license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill,
knowledge and diligence to manage their cases.[10] The legal profession demands from a lawyer the
vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family.
In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara,[11] we ruled:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his clients
cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is
justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. An
attorneys duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his retainer until his effective release
from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is
expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his clients interests may require.
And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code.[12]
Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to
render. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the
Code also provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence shall
render him liable.
One last point. Parias executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal[13] of the complaint stating that she was
withdrawing the administrative complaint against Paguinto after realizing that said complaint against the
respondent arose due to misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and miscommunication. Paguinto,
on the other hand, submitted a Manifestation and Motion apologizing to Parias for his actuations and
admitting that he was solely to be blamed. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an
administrative complaint against a lawyer,[14] especially in this case where the lawyer admitted his
misconduct.
Pariass affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does not exonerate Paguinto in any way. We
reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos[15] that

[A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken solely for the public welfare. x x x The
attorney is called upon to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto GUILTY of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we penalize Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto with SUSPENSION for SIX (6)
MONTHS from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, G.R. No. 153798

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO-MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ALELI CORAZON ANGELES
MAGLAYA,
Respondent. September 2, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles
seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 2002[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 66037,
reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein respondent Aleli
Corazon Angeles-Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition[2] for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged,
among other things, the following:
1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January
21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties;
2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Franciscos estate;
3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and,
together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs
of the decedent; and
4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Franciscos estate.[3] In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having
married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union
which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City,
and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also
averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as
Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on,
petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced
any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondents claim of being the
only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage,
legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of
Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.
In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices,
the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court
of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.[4]
Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of
her evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the
legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988. [5] She also
testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other
witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,[6] Francisco Yaya,[7] Jose O. Carreon[8] and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz.[9] Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry
stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the
question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.
Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government
service records.
After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition
for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed to state or prove a cause of action, it

being her stated position that [P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis--vis
the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles.[10]

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioners reply, to which
respondent countered with a rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,[11] the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed
to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the
[respondent] to state a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word in bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of
December 17, 1999.[12] Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29,
2002,[13] reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as
administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby
ordered to appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli Corazon Angeles as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises:
1. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the
underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;[14]
2. Petitioners motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present opposing
evidence to rebut respondents testimonial and documentary evidence; and
3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco.
Hence, petitioners instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in reversing the trial courts order of dismissal;[15] (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in
decreeing respondents appointment as administratrix of Franciscos intestate estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is
the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals
resolved the issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to
appoint respondent as administratrix of Franciscos estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate courts conclusion on the legitimate status of
respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of,
and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of
Appeals,[16] stated that since petitioneropted not to present any contrary evidence, the presumption on
respondents legitimacy stands unrebutted.[17]
Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption
of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the
rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .
actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status
cannot be attacked collaterally. xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family
Code], the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought.
The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status
of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to
force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that
the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be easily available.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife .
. . .(Words in bracket added; Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a)
a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of
such child cannot be attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption
to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. [18] For, a presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact
thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, [19] the
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code [20] may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a
child is legitimate does not arise.
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state
from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondents supposed legitimacy
arose. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondents
gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents
marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage
contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if one had been
solemnized[21] was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called
to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4)
witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At
best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Franciscos daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and
Paulita Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas)
father and her (Paulitas) mother, who are both Franciscos siblings, told them so.[22] And one Jose Carreon
would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in Franciscos house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to
court Genoveva before the war.[23] In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the
Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized;
the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and
Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to
testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly,
therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy
which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To
reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was
really nothing for petitioner to rebut.

Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in
1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous FranciscoBelen Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it
were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion as well as the appellate courts
conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared
that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage
with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now, then, if, as
respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were

married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to
Genovevas death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void, [24] in which case petitioner could
not be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a surviving spouse of the
decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:

4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58
years old, and BELEN S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by
his second marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . (Emphasis and word in
bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate
filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of
the marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. E). In it, her birth was recorded
as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word marriedis written in the
certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.

Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that [I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled . . . that [respondents] Birth Certificateindubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married.

The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by

Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is,
under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution:
the fact of birth of a child.[25] Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or
by the mother alone if the father refuses.[26] Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative value of
the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting
of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father
is necessary.[27]

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it
were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes and indubitably at that - not only respondents filiation to
Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the limit.
In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not just
filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally married. In
the apt words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician who merely
certified having attended the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. , created a marriage that of
Francisco and Genoveva, and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of Francisco[28]

It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. [29] It
cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the
attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother,
with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative fathers name in the appropriate space in the
birth certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth
certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any
scheming unmarried mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible
bachelor or affluent pater familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth
certificate that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring with that individual and the
certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination
will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima facie evidence when
and if the father dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx[30]

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to
Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records which indicated or purported to show that
Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco
giving respondents hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or
the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition. [31] And
needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records
and the testimony of respondents witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous
possession of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have
been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at issue
in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of administration on
her being a legitimate child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother, Genoveva, propositions
which we have earlier refuted herein.

If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for
another compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice
of.

As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court, filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the
petition of spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat
and two others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and
captioned Aleli Corazon Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos,
Franco Angeles and Belen S. Angeles, respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she
should have been notified of the adoption proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to
RTC, Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision[32] dated December 17, 2003, the Court
of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not,
contrary to her claim, a legitimate daughter of Francisco, nor a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco
M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the

argument that she is a legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there
is nothing in the record to support petitioners claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of
the late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M.
Angeles was never married before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad,
contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado
were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of
marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was
presented by petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the
celebration of such marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that

photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioners birth certificate and even
her marriage contract.. . . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . .
Equally inconsequential are petitioners school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of
both Francisco and Genoveva . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural
child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the
adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the
original; words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No.47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court viaits Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No.
163124, denying Aleli Corazon Maglayas petition for Review on Certiorari,[33] and Resolution dated October
20, 2004,[34] denying with FINALITY her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated January 24,
2005 resolved to NOTE WITHOUT ACTION Maglayas second motion for reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by
this Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment,[35] one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicataprinciple. Following
the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondents
legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in
a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again
be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent
action, regardless of the form of the latter.[36]

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained
by this Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial courts order of dismissal in Special
Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child of
Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to Dismiss[37] interposed by herein
petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot
and academic. It need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. [38] When the law speaks
of next of kin, the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the

decedents property;[39] one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed,[40] or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed
relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

THIRD DIVISION
EDUARDO P. MENESES, A.C. No. 6651
Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.
ATTY. RODOLFO P. MACALINO, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 27, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Eduardo P. Meneses (complainant) against Atty. Rodolfo
P. Macalino (respondent) for violation of the lawyers oath.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in March 1993, respondent offered his legal services to complainant to
help secure the release of complainants car from the Bureau of Customs. Respondent proposed to handle
the case for a package deal of P60,000. Complainant agreed and initially gave respondent P10,000 for
processing of the papers. In June 1993, respondent asked for P30,000 to expedite the release of the car. In
both instances, respondent did not issue a receipt but promised to furnish complainant with a receipt from
the Bureau of Customs. Since then, respondent failed to give complainant an update on the matter.

Complainant repeatedly went to respondents house to inquire on the status of the release of the
car. Complainant was always told that respondent was not around and to just return another day. This
went on for more than a year.
In April 1994, complainant went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to file a complaint
for estafa against respondent.[1] The NBI set the complaint for investigation on 27 April 1994.

Respondent wrote a letter[2] to the NBI dated 26 April 1994, requesting for postponement of the
investigation to 12 May 1994. Respondent stated in his letter that he would settle the matter amicably
with complainant and return the P40,000. Respondent failed to appear for the investigation scheduled
on 12 May 1994.

Respondent sent another letter[3] to the NBI dated 23 May 1994, requesting for the suspension of the
proceedings because he had partially settled the case.Respondent attached the acknowledgment
receipt[4] signed by complainant representing the partial refund of P20,000. Respondent promised to pay
the balance on or before 8 June 1994. However, respondent did not pay the balance. The NBI set the
complaint for investigation twice and subpoenaed respondent but he failed to appear.

On 22 January 1996, the NBI, through Director Mariano M. Mison, found insufficient evidence to prosecute
respondent for estafa. Nevertheless, the NBI advised complainant to file a complaint for disbarment
against respondent.[5]

On 30 April 1996, complainant filed a verified complaint[6] for disbarment against respondent with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant
charged respondent with failure to render legal services, failure to refund balance of legal fees, and failure
to apprise the complainant of the status of the case all in violation of the lawyers oath of office.

In an Order[7] dated 23 July 1998, Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. AlejandroAbbas (Commissioner Abbas) ordered respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent was
also warned that if he failed to file an answer, the Commission would consider him in default and the case
would be heard ex-parte.Although he received the Order, respondent failed to file an answer.

The case was set for initial hearing on 7 May 2002. Despite receipt of the notice of
hearing, respondent failed to appear. Complainant was present and he informed Commissioner Abbas that
he had previously filed a complaint for estafa against respondent with the NBI. Commissioner Abbas then
issued a subpoena duces tecum to Mr. Waldo Palattao, or his duly authorized representative, of the Anti-

Fraud Action Division of the NBI for the case folder and all the documents pertaining to the
complaint.[8] Mr. Emil Rejano, a confidential agent of the NBI, submitted all the documents during the
hearing on 29 July 2002.[9]

Further hearings were scheduled for 27 June 2002, 29 July 2002, 9 September 2002, 8 October 2002 and 5
November 2002. Despite due notice, respondent failed to appear on these dates.

On 18 August 2004, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa), who took over the
investigation, issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence on
record. Respondents failure to file an answer and to attend the hearings were deemed a waiver of his right
to participate in the proceedings and present evidence.[10]

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The IBP Board of Governors issued CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-414 (IBP Resolution) dated 7 October
2004 adopting with modification[11] Commissioner FunasReport and Recommendation (Report) finding
respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:

From the records of the case, there is clearly a breach of lawyer-client relations. Moreover,
[r]espondent has continuously exhibited his adamant refusal to comply with his legal
obligations to his client, despite many opportunities to settle the matter
amicably. Aggravating this is [r]espondents utter disregard of the legal process before the
NBI, choosing to ignore notices from the NBI in the middle of an investigation. In addition,
[r]espondent has continuously disregarded the jurisdiction of this Commission. It is clear
from the records of the case that [r]espondent has duly received the orders and notices
from this Commission as evidenced by the [r]egistry [r]eturn [r]eceipts.

In the absence of any counter-allegations from [r]espondent, which is by his own

doing, the allegations of the [c]omplainant shall stand and be given its due
credence.[12](Emphasis supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B[13] of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16,[14] Rule 16.01,[15] Rule 16.03,[16] and Rule
18.04[17] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

Respondent Failed to Inform and to Respond

to Inquiries of the Complainant
Regarding the Status of the Case

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, it is the lawyers duty to keep the client regularly
and fully updated on the developments of the clients case. [18] The Code provides that [a] lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients
request for information.[19]

The records show that after receiving P40,000, respondent was never heard of again. Respondent kept
complainant in the dark about the status of the release of the car. Only after complainant filed a complaint
with the NBI did respondent communicate with complainant. Moreover, it appears that respondent failed
to render any legal service to facilitate the cars release. In fact, respondent failed to secure the release of
the car. Respondents failure to communicate with complainant was an unjustified denial of complainants
right to be fully informed of the status of the case.[20]

Respondent Failed to Account and

Return the Money He Received from Complainant

The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.[21] The Code further states that [a] lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.[22] Furthermore, [a] lawyer shall deliver the funds and property
of his client when due and upon demand.[23]
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. [24] Consequently, if
the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.[25]
Respondent specifically received the P40,000 for his legal services and for the processing fee to facilitate
the release of complainants car. Since respondent failed to render any legal service to complainant and he
also failed to secure the cars release, respondent should have promptly accounted for and returned the
money to complainant. But even after demand, respondent did not return the money. Again, respondent
waited until complainant filed a complaint with the NBI before he refunded the P20,000. Even then,
respondent failed to return the balance of P20,000 as he promised.

Respondents failure to return the money to complainant upon demand is conduct indicative of lack of
integrity and propriety and a violation of the trust reposed on him. [26] Respondents unjustified withholding
of money belonging to the complainant warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. [27]
Respondent Failed to File an Answer and
Attend the Hearings before the IBP

The Court notes that respondents actuation reveals a high degree of irresponsibility [28] and shows his lack
of respect for the IBP and its proceedings.[29]Respondents attitude demonstrates a character which stains
the nobility of the legal profession.[30]

On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed

on Respondent

The Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP to suspend respondent from the practice of law for
one year well-taken. Following the rulings of this Court, those found guilty of the same or similar acts were
suspended for not less than six months from the practice of law. [31] Considering respondents lack of prior
administrative record, suspension from the practice of law for one year, and not disbarment as prayed for
by complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the legal profession. This
Court will exercise its power to disbar only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. [32]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino GUILTY of violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01,
Rule 16.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino from the practice of law for one year effective upon
finality of this decision. Respondent is ORDERED TO RETURN to complainant, within 30 days from notice of
this decision, the full amount of P20,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of
this decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of the amount within 15 days from payment.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

EN BANC

REYNARIA BARCENAS,Complainant,

A.C. No. 8159

(formerly CBD 05-1452)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -

VELASCO JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
MENDOZA and
PEREZ, JJ.

ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
April 23, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint[1] dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Anorlito A. Alvero filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio), entrusted to
Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta
to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San
Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt [2] dated
May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because
Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.[3]
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the
money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from
the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for
hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte
na? Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead
converted and used the same for his personal needs.
In his letters dated August 18, 2004[4] and August 25, 2004,[5] Atty. Atty. Alvero admitted the receipt
of the P300,000.00 and promised to return the money.The pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as
follows:
Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang perang tinanggap ko sa iyo,
lumakad ako agad at pilit kong kinukuha kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa akin
na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng gayong halaga. Pero tiniyak sa akin
na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin.
Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng karagdagang halaga upang
maisauli ko ang buong P300,000.00. Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa
akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng kaunting panahon upang malikom ko ang pera na
ipinagkatiwala mo sa akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x x[6]
Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking ipinagbibili ng
Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili gusto lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa
Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran.
Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00 na utang ng tagaLiliw ay darating sa akin ngayong umaga bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng pambayad
kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo ngayong hapon.
xxxx

Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak ko ay tinawagan ko

na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting panahon pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito,
tapos ang problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka na.[7]
However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to
return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal
profession.
On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the complaint.[8]
In compliance, in his Answer[9] dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he did not know
Barcenas prior to the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know that San Antonio was an employee of
Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know Barcenas only when the latter went to him to
borrow P60,000.00 from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio who entrusted to respondent. At
that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it might
jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of P300,000.00 from San
Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance
action.[10]
Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however,
insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was
never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since
he had, in fact, manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client
relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant complaint be
dismissed.
On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory conference. [11]
Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit[12] dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated that he indeed
sought Atty. Alveros professional services concerning an agricultural land dispute. He claimed that Atty.
Alvero made him believe that he needed to provide an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his
complaint, as the same would be deposited in court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: Hindi
pwedeng hindi kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos ay nasa
korte na ang pera. Believing that it was the truth, San Antonio was forced to borrow money from Barcenas
in the amount of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San Antonio gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition
to the professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment receipt.[13]
San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas allegation that they tried to borrow P80,000.00 from
the P300,000.00 they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found out that the latter lost a big amount of money
in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty. Alvero declined and stated, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera
pag nasa korte na.Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty. Alvero lied to them since the money was never
deposited in court but was instead used for his personal needs. For several times, Atty. Alvero promised to
return the money to them, but consistently failed to do so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alveros
letters dated August 18, 2004[14] and August 25, 2004[15] showing the latters promises to return the amount
of P300,000.00.
During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he was deemed to
have waived his right to participate in the mandatory conference.
In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Alvero be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was,

likewise, ordered to immediately account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or
Rodolfo San Antonio. The pertinent portion thereof reads:
The record does not show and no evidence was presented by respondent to prove
that the amount of P300,000 which was entrusted to him was already returned to
complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by way of justifying his non-return of the money,
respondent claims in his Answer that the P300,000 was the source of the principal cause of
action of the petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case No. R-04030011-04 as shown by a copy of the Amended Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex 1 and made an integral part hereof.
A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October 31, 2004 and
filed on November 3, 2004, will show that the Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that
he be allowed to cultivate the land after the P300,000 is consigned by Petitioner to the
Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no such
deposit or consignment took place and no evidence was presented that respondent
deposited the amount in court.
The fact is respondent promised to return the amount (Annex B and C of the
Complaint), but he failed to do so. The failure therefore of respondent to account for and
return the amount of P300,000 entrusted or given to him by his client constitute gross
misconduct and would subject him to disciplinary action under the Code.[16]

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved with modification as to penalty the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it
ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered
him to account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice.
The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular administrative complaint
against Atty. Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that this Court issue an extended resolution for the
final disposition of the case.
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 1.

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 16.

A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount of P300,000.00 from San
Antonio, specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court. However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty.
Alvero presented no evidence that he had indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court.
Neither was there any evidence that he had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio.

From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a
lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. [17] These, Atty.
Alvero failed to do.

Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his
client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they
become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return
the P300,000.00 despite complainants repeated demands.[18]

Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship
between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them,
case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him.[19]

Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted
the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his
own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.[20] They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for
which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.

- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Small v. Banares,[21] the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was
given him by the client, and for failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar
circumstances are attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent
a two-year suspension to be in order.
As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of
good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. [22] For the
practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who
are qualified and who possess good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the
responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law.[23]

WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of
Governors, which found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTY of gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He
is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal
record of Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC., A.C. No. 8380

Complainant,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,*
Carpio Morales,
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,*
Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,*
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Villarama, Jr., JJ.
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 20, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client.

The Facts and the Case

The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of
respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried
up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the
subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University.

In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents
he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on
top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for facilitation and processing. He in turn
promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done.

On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of
the property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to
approve it and that the documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably
failed to comply despite his clients repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the
University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it
gave him.

On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services
in the titling matter and demanding the return of theP500,000.00. But the letter could not be served
because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new
address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return
the money asked of him.

In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses
of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the Universitys application for a survey plan
which the DENR-NCR approved for a facilitation cost of P500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA
endorsement for a facilitation cost of another P500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the
Land Registration Authority for a facilitation cost of still another P500,000.00.

Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a
favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar
Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna
allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares
said, he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacunas instruction.

Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an
identical application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld
this fact from him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty
recommending approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous
application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it.

Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but
they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him
only P45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the Universitys conformity that he gave the P500,000.00 to
Lacuna.

The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the
complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and
adduce evidence in his defense.

On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation [1] in the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Phillippines Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize
Mijares to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been
unable to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath
having bribed a government official.

Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return
the P500,000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the University; and c) that Mijares sworn statement
that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if
warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna.
On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and
approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment
to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the P500,000.00 and all
pertinent documents to the University within six months from receipt of the Courts decision. [2]

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating
the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the
titling of a property that it claimed.

The Courts Ruling

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer
for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority
to do so.[3]

Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must
promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee
of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are
used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his
client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in
violation of the trust reposed on him.[4] A lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation
of professional ethics.[5]

Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record
that the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for
expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did
not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the application;
and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this
evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the
same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave theP500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the
Universitys conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in
a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned
out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the Universitys earlier application and the
Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement.

But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that
it had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead,
Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could
not return the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the
University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a
dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces.

Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to
act favorably on his clients application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The
Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another
way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to
shape up.

The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBPs recommendation that the Court include in its
decision an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The
University knowingly gave him that money to spend for facilitation and processing. It is not nave. There is

no legitimate expense called facilitation fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will
not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a
bad deal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of violation
of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in
addition, directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession
covering the titling matter that it referred to him.

Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances.

SO ORDERED.

[Syllabus]
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. CBD-174. March 7, 1996]

GIOVANI M. IGUAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the instant case, this Court has found occasion to again remind members of the Bar to observe
honesty in their dealings with clients and the public alike, and fidelity to the cause entrusted to them.
This case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by complainant with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on September 23, 1991 to initiate disbarment proceedings against the respondent, for
malpractice, deceit, dishonesty, (and) gross misconduct in his office as attorney and/or for violation of his
lawyers oath x x x.[1]Respondent was accused of having unlawfully withheld and misappropriated
complaints money in the amount of P7,000.00, allegedly paid by way of acceptance fee for a matter which
respondent never performed any work on.
The IBPs Committee on Bar Discipline, through its investigating Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas,
required respondent to answer the charges and thereafter held several hearings, during which the parties
were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the parties had filed
their respective formal offer of evidence as well as memoranda, the case was considered submitted for
resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Commissioners Report dated January 30, 1995,
which became the basis for the Resolution passed by the IBP Board of Governors on February 18, 1995,
which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XI-95-288
CBD Case No. 174
Giovani M. Igual vs.
Atty. Rolando S. Javier

RESOLVED to RECOMMEND to the Supreme Court that the respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) month and restitution of the SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00) acceptance fee.
The Antecedent Facts
Inasmuch as the findings of fact made by Commissioner Roxas in his report are substantiated by the
evidence on record, the same are herein adopted, to wit:
The complaint dated September 23, 1991 alleges that complainant met respondent attorney thru
complainants tennis partner, one Sergio Dorado, sometime April 1, 1991. Complainant asked Sergio
Dorado to make it possible for complainant to meet respondent at the latters house regarding the
possibility of hiring respondent to handle Civil Case No. 2 188-LRC No. 215, pending with the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan. A decision favorable to complainants mother had just been rendered but this decision was
appealed by the adverse party to the Court of Appeals, consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 32592
[1(a) Complaint-Affidavit]. Complainant said respondent is being hired because complainants mother
wanted the appeal expedited.
That very night, when Atty. Javier offered to collaborate in the appealed case [1(c) ComplaintAffidavit] because Atty. Javier through sweet talk and pretense of influence to several justices of the Court
of Appeals x x x that he could be of great help in expediting the speedy disposition of the case [1(b)
Complaint-Affidavit] complainant gave respondent P10,000.00 which money he intended to buy a
refrigerator with. Complainant alleged that he gave the money with the understanding that the money is
for safekeeping and as proof, according to him, x x x promising to return my money should my mother and
her lawyer Atty. Ibadlit disagree in his collaborating in the case [1(c) Complaint-Affidavit] - covered by
receipt which provides: Received the amount of Ten Thousand (P 10,000.00) Pesos from Mr. Giovani M.
Igual as Legal Fees and Filing Fees (Civil Case No. 2188). April 1, 1991 signed by respondent Atty. Rolando S.
Javier. [Exhibit A and Annex A to Complaint-Affidavit].
Respondent thus entered his formal appearance as collaborating counsel dated April 3, 1991 [Annex B
to Complaint-Affidavit]. Then complainant wrote respondent on June 27, 1991 stating that he is
demanding P7,000.00 balance since P3,000.00 had already been refunded by respondent. [Exhibit B and
Annex C, Complaint-Affidavit].
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed an Affidavit dated April 20, 1992, alleging that: he gave
back the P3,000.00 not as a settlement because complainant said his child was hospitalized and gravely ill
[par. 22, Affidavit-Javier] and that the reason why complainant wanted a refund of the remaining
P7,000.00 is because it is not the fault of the affiant if Giovani M. Igual had quarreled with his mother or his
brother or his sister as to the reimbursement or sharing of the Legal Fees - because the truth was that Igual
wanted to secure double or bigger reimbursement. [par. 30, Affidavit-Javier]. Complainant denied the
allegation of respondent in a Reply-Affidavit dated May 21, 1992.
Respondent presented Exhibit 4 which is certified xerox copy of the Decision dated March 19, 1991 in
Civil Case No. 2188 and LRC 215, Regional Trial Court of Aklan, Province.
Respondents declared purpose in the Formal Offer of Evidence was to show that Atty. Rolando S.
Javier had accepted the appealed cases and had obtained pertinent records or pleadings to work on it
[page 2 number (4) exhibit, Formal Offer dated February 6, 1993].
From the evidence, however, the decision is dated February 25, 1991 and the March 19, 1991 is the
date of the RTCs Order stating that the appeal had been perfected.
Complainant testified that he went back on April 3, 1991, to claim back the P 10,000.00 given last April
1, 1991. [TSN, page 15, July 8, 1992, Giovani Igual]. Respondent also reimbursed the P3,000.00 two (2)
months after. [TSN, page 19, July 8, 1992].

Respondent testified that he entered as collaborating counsel only and was promised P20,000.00 if he
wins the case and:
A: x x x as collaborating counsel I am going to to (sic) prepare the appeal brief and that I required Mr.
Giovani Igual to get the consent of his brothers, sisters and mother. [TSN, pages 12-13,September 16,
1992, Atty. Javier]. .
Respondent further testified that:
A: Now as to the agreement as to the fees, about few days after our agreement he returned and gave me
the money. The agreement is that that is my legal fee. That is an acceptance fee. I do not know where he
got that but that is what he paid me. [TSN, page 15, Sept. 16, 1992, Atty. Javier].
The Commission confronted respondent with the question:
Q: How about the copy of the appeal? (sic) [TSN, page 27, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier]
A: It was not finished, Your Honor, because we quarreled. When I am preparing the brief we quarreled
already. [TSN, page 27, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier].
Then again:
A: This is what I promised him. I told him that upon the arrival of all pertinent records in the Court of
Appeals, I am going to prepare the brief but on the basis of the paper that I have in my possession(.) I can
merely be guided by the decision. [TSN, page 34, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier]
Question: Did you not ascertain from them when did they receive the appellants brief because for
purposes of prescription there is the reglementary period within which to file appellees brief?
Answer: I did not ascertain anymore because at that time my thinking was that I have to study first the
case.
Question: Considering that this is the filing of appellees brief, is there a need to pay filing fee for appellees
brief?
Answer: If what you inquired from (sic) is the filing of an appellees brief, there is no such thing. But if you
see, in filing briefs in the appealed cases there are usually motions for reconsideration, supplement of the
appellees brief and if you look on the Rules of Court, even the motion for reconsideration is payable. Even
a motion for reconsideration on the appealed cases has to be paid.There is a fee so I put there the legal
fees or the filing fees but that does not necessarily mean that I am referring to a filing fee of an appealed
brief. Take note, sir, that in the rule of filing fees even motions for reconsideration or supplement to the
motion for reconsideration there must be a payment of fees. [TSN, pages 39-40, September 16, 1992, Cross
Examination of Atty. Javier]
Q: And only you did not specify that this is in payment for your professional services, is that correct?
A: Yes that is true. It is a matter of style. There are lawyers who specified transportation, fees, etc.
Q: Did you not also issue a receipt that this is only a partial payment?
A: I did not. What I did, Your Honor, is to issue a receipt for P 10,000.00 as my legal fees and filing fees in a
package deal basis with an unwritten agreement that if I will win the case on the appeal on the basis of my
appellees brief in a gentlemans agreement he will give me additional P 10,000.00. It is not written. [TSN
pages 44 to 45, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javiers cross examination] (italics supplied)

Commissioners Evaluation
Commissioner Roxas then rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidene presented:
This would have been a difficult situation had there been no written receipt of payment of fees. In a
lawyer-client relationship, what is governing is the written receipt datedApril 1, 1991. Respondent admits
he was hired to prepare an appellees brief Respondent admits he did not prepare said appellees brief
because he and his clients immediately quarreled after hiring. If that was the situation from the very
beginning - that respondent quarreled with his clients immediately within two days after April 1, 1991 respondent knew all along he would not get his papers of the case and he knew all along he will not make
the appellees brief.
In such situations, if indeed the lawyer cannot agree with the client, or, as in this case, the lawyer is
quarreling with his client, there are several options for the lawyer to exit from the relationship instead of
merely maintaining a cold war of doing nothing in the case, such as securing a written and signed notice of
withdrawal from the case, or, manifesting to the court the circumstances why he can no longer proceed in
representing his client. Otherwise, a lawyers act will be interpreted as abandonment.
More than the mere presumption that respondent abandoned his client if he does not render any
service to the case he is handling, there are other positive indications of why such presumptions may
altogether be confirmed as intentional:
FIRST, respondent alleged that he was angry at complainant because he resented what he testified to
as the attitude of the clients in calling him names in the neighborhood for failing to return the money.
SECOND, despite the fact the April 1, 1991 receipt specified that the money would be for legal fees
and filing fees, yet none of the two materialized.
Respondent claims the money given him is an acceptance fee. But, as known by respondent,
ambiguities in contracts prepared by him, are construed against him, and thus, if the receipt does not
specify that it is such an acceptance fee, it cannot be treated as such. When it comes to fees, the amount
and purpose must be clearly stated.Otherwise said contracts are interpreted against the lawyer who is
presumed to know better on such legal matters as against his client, as in this case, who is not a lawyer.
The crucial evidence against respondent is his own admissions that he never really performed any work
in preparing or submitting any appellees brief.
Respondent claims that he was forced to such a situation because of the attitude of the client which
compelled attorney to maintain his ground in refusing to reimburse money to someone who continues to
malign his character - which is the reason why respondent had acted as he did. This complainant did not
refute.
Respondent should have set aside his personal feelings and should have pursued diligently the cause
of his client within the bounds of reason, justice, and fair play. Public interest requires that an attorney
exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his clients cause [Cantiller vs. Potenciano,
180 SCRA 246]. It has been held that such neglect of respondent, his failure to exercise due diligence or his
abandonment of clients cause, renders him unworthy of the trust of his client [Ibid]. The Supreme Court
has pointed out that lawyers have a higher responsibility because they are an indispensable part of the
whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction [Ibid].
Respondents attitude of blaming his client for the latters allegedly maligning him is not being candid
with the Commission. Respondent must be reminded that candor towards the court is a cardinal
requirement of a practicing lawyer [Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. King, 172 SCRA 60].
For it has been held that a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as
such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in

society [Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316], and not contribute to propagating more disputes. (italics
supplied)
Commissioner Roxas then made the following recommendation, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors, that the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS be meted on respondent in view of the
circumstances.
which recommended penalty, as indicated above, was reduced by the IBP Board of Governors to a
suspension of one (1) month, but with the addition that respondent be required to restitute the P7,000.00
(balance) he received from complainant.
The Courts Ruling
We are in agreement with Commissioner Roxas findings and conclusions, as -approved by the IBP
Board of Governors. In addition, we note that respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the
complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in clinging to what was not his and to
which he absolutely had no right. Such lack of delicadeza and absence of integrity was further highlighted
by respondents half-baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his testimony before the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline represented by Commissioner Roxas. The sad thing is, he was not fooling
anyone at all. He only ended up making a fool of himself in the process.
Respondent, like all other members of the Bar, was and is expected to always live up to the standards
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.
CANON 16- A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 20 - A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith.
It goes without saying that respondent, by his deceitful actuations constituting violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good, as well as for
the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a whole.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, and consistent with the recommendation of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, respondent ROLANDO S. JAVIER is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) MONTH, effective upon notice hereof, and ORDERED to restitute to the complainant the
amount of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Let copies of this
Decision be spread upon his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6441. October 21, 2004]

VIOLETA R. TAHAW, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS P. VITAN, respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
A lawyer must at all times comport himself in a manner befitting a member of this noble profession
and worthy of his esteemed position in society. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.[1] Thus, any indicia of erosion in the dignity of
the profession will be dealt with accordingly by this Court.
In a Complaint[2] dated 11 March 2002, Violeta R. Tahaw claimed that she secured the services of
respondent for filing the appropriate action for the partition of a real property located in Makati City
sometime in 1999. As agreed upon, petitioner delivered to respondent four (4) checks in the total amount
of P30,000.00 representing payment of the latters professional fee. However, after almost a year without
petitioner hearing from respondent about the case he would file in court, petitioner sent respondent a
letter-inquiry as to the status of the case. Respondent assured complainant that he had already filed the
appropriate case in Makati. Not convinced by her counsels assurance, complainant went to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of Makati City to check if a case was indeed filed by respondent for and in her behalf.
A Certification dated 15 August 2000 issued by the assistant Clerk of Court of Makati City confirmed
complainants suspicion that respondent did not file the case as agreed upon. She wrote respondent
informing him that she is terminating the latters services as counsel and demanded the refund of
the P30,000.00. Respondent failed to refund the aforesaid amount, and complainant was thus prompted to
seek the assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The IBP, responding to complainants predicament and wrote respondent two (2) letters, [3] informing
the latter of complainants grievance and asking his position thereon. Respondent, through a letter [4] to the
IBP, claimed that the problem arose from a miscommunication between client and counsel. In addition,
respondent insinuated that the case he was supposed to file for the complainant was complicated by the
filing of other earlier complaints which he was not privy to. He promised to refund the complainant
theP30,000.00.
The IBP acknowledged receipt of respondents response and instructed him to issue six (6) postdated
checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 and dated a month apart, and to deliver the same to the IBPs
office to facilitate the return of the P30,000.00 to complainant. Despite the instruction, respondent failed
to refund the amount to complainant, and succeeded only in having complainant go back and forth to his
office. Complainant once more wrote to respondent regarding the checks, only to be told by respondent
that he will just send the checks through his secretary. Complainant then filed a complaint for disbarment
or suspension with the IBP.
For his part, respondent denied that he obligated himself to file the partition case upon receipt of
the P30,000.00 as claimed by complainant. He averred that the said amount represents consultation fees,
research fees, and minimal acceptance fees.[5] He stated that complainant failed to disclose to him
circumstances which would have adverse effects on the case sought to be filed [6] and that when he
confronted complainant about these, the latter became lukewarm.[7] Furthermore, he claimed that he
asked complainant for the filing fees but the latter dilly-dallied and after a while he received a letter
terminating his services.[8] In fact, complainant had already affixed her signature to the complaint but was
probably swayed by other advisers not to proceed with the case and instead pursue the refund of
the P30,000.00.[9]

On 27 November 2003, IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. As per the report, respondents agreement to represent
complainant in the partition case intended to be filed was established.[10] Likewise, the report pointed out
the inconsistency between respondents statement in his Answer denying that he obligated himself to file
the case upon receipt of P30,000.00 and complainants dilly-dallying in giving him the amount for filing fees,
as against his assurances to complainant that the case was already filed. [11] The report noted that
respondents failure to reply to or deny complainants allegation in her letter terminating his services was an
admission that he miserably failed to diligently attend to the latters case. [12] Finally, the report stated that
respondent failed to comply with his commitment to return the P30,000.00. Considering that the amount
was paid by the complainant for his professional services which he miserably failed to perform, the same
must be returned to complainant without delay.[13] The report recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and admonished to be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.[14]
On 27 February 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,[15] to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, considering that a lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client, Atty.
Jeremi[as] P. Vitan is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients and Ordered to Immediately Return the amount of P30,000.00 to
complainant.
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP in its
findings and conclusion that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities. However, this Court holds
that the appropriate sanction should be a suspension for a period of six (6) months.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In the case of Aromin v. Atty.
Boncavil,[16] this Court held:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated,
he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client save, by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney,
it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[17]
The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in a lawyer a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the legal profession.[18]
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that complainant wanted to partition a parcel of
residential land owned in part by her deceased husband, Simeon Tahaw, Sr. [19]Allegedly, Simeon owed
complainant sums of money which the former failed to pay, as a result of which, complainant filed a case
against him. To settle the case, the spouses entered into an agreement[20] dated 27 May 1987 wherein

Simeon Tahaw, Sr. and complainant agreed that a specific forty (40) square meter portion of the same
parcel of land shall pass on to complainant as her exclusive property to the exclusion of all other
heirs.[21] When Simeon died, complainant went to respondent to seek the partition of the same parcel of
land with the forty (40) square meter portion thereof awarded to her.
It is an elementary principle in civil law that every donation between the spouses during the marriage
is void.[22] The agreement relied upon by complainant for the proposed partition case partakes the nature
of a donation by Simeon of a part of his undivided share in the property. Hence, the agreement is void and
cannot be the source of any right in favor of complainant. The partition case was premised on a void
agreement and thus could not prosper.
Even if complainant did not disclose the previous litigation and agreements between her and her
deceased husband, respondent would eventually find out, as in fact he did, about it in the course of
drafting the proposed complaint. Any lawyer worth his salt would know that the partition case sought to
be filed would have no basis and would not prosper. Respondent should have immediately appraised
complainant on the lack of merit of her case. Instead, he asked for money for filing fees, and worse,
pretended to have filed the complaint.
Clearly, respondents protestations that the delay and eventual non-filing of the case for complainant
was due to the latters fault fall flat in view of the circumstances surrounding the case. Complainants
assertion that respondent reassured her that the case had already been filed remains uncontroverted by
the latter. Why would respondent lead complainant to believe that a case has been filed, and why would
the latter expect that it be filed, if as respondent claims, he was still waiting for the filing fees from the
complainant? Moreover, in his letter to the IBP dated 29 November 2000, [23] respondent stated that he
was willing to arrange for the refund of the P30,000.00 as he in conscience cannot file a case merely just
for the sake of filing a case to earn [a] few bucks.[24] If respondent believes that complainants case
appeared hopeless, why did he not advise her so? Why did he let the matter drag until this very proceeding
before he explained the non-filing of the proposed case?
When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion.[25] Thus, when respondents services were engaged by complainant,
the former took it upon himself to perform the legal services required of him. In the instant case, however,
respondent seemed to have forgotten his sworn duty after he received the money from his client.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and
integrity of its members. For this reason, this Court has been exacting in its demand of integrity and good
moral character of the members of the Bar. As explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina:[26]
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of the members of the
Bar. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his
duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this
end, members of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence
of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. [27]
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care, and if
he should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyers oath. [28] The records of the case clearly show that
respondent failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias P. Vitan is hereby found GUILTY of violation of Canons 7 and
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to file the necessary pleading for his clients case
and for the failure to return and immediately deliver the funds of his client advanced for the purpose of
filing the said case, upon demand, and even after his commitment with the IBP to do so. The respondent is

hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months effective from the date of promulgation hereof, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Atty.
Vitan is ORDERED to immediately RETURN the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Vitans personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5092. August 11, 2004]

LUCILA S. BARBUCO, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.[1] While a lawyer may decline to render
services for a person for valid reasons, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he begins to owe
fidelity to that cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve his client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care and devotion.[2]
On July 9, 1999, Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint[3] against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for
malpractice of law, negligence and dishonesty.
It appears that on March 31, 1998, complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of
respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 21, in the case entitled, Alexander Bermido, Plaintiff versus Lucila
Barbuco, Defendant. On August 6, 1998, complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum
of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.
Complainants appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58180, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution[4] dated September 25, 1998 for failure to file Appellants Brief, pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complainant found out that her appeal had been dismissed only on June 4, 1999, when her son went
to the Court of Appeals to verify the status of the case.
When asked to comment on the charges filed against him,[5] respondent Beltran averred that the
docket fees were paid on time and that on September 22, 1998, he filed the Appellants Brief[6] with the
Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed. On October 19, 1998, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration,[7] on the ground that he received the notice to file brief on June 25, 1998; however, on
June 26, 1998, he met a vehicular accident which physically incapacitated him for several days; and that as
a result of the accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose track of deadlines for the filing
of pleadings.
On March 9, 1999, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied on the ground that the brief for
defendant-appellant was filed forty-three (43) days late.[8]
On November 22, 1999, the complaint against respondent Beltran was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.[9]

After hearing, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
submitted on October 6, 2003 her findings and recommendation that respondent Beltran be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years.
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-234 affirming the
recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala but modified the recommended period of suspension
from five (5) years to six (6) months only.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.Respondents conduct relative to the
belated filing of the Appellants Brief falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and
commitment to their clients cause.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence,
more so if the delay of FORTY THREE (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result
thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of
a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant and the
pleadings which he signed for and on behalf of the Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such,
respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the Appellants Brief for him or, at
least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
In B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ruled that the confusion in the office of the
law firm following the death of one of its partners is not a valid justification for failing to file the brief. We
further ruled in the said case that upon receipt of the notice to file the brief, the law firm should have reassigned the case to another associate.
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on the part of
respondent. Complainants liability is further compounded by his failure to maintain an open line of
communication with his client, in violation of the provisions of Rule 18.04, which reads:
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information.
Clearly, respondents series of inadvertence prejudiced the case of the complainant. We can not
overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. [11]
Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. A lawyers fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the
responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the
interest of his client within the bounds of the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him.[12]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of negligence and malpractice and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4334. July 7, 2004]

SUSAN CUIZON, complainant, vs. ATTY. RODOLFO MACALINO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The saga of a clients one decade-long travails caused by a recalcitrant lawyer who defrauds his client
and flouts the directives of the highest court of the land must deservedly end in tribulation for the lawyer
and in victory for the higher ends of justice. The opening verses of the narrative may have been composed
by the lawyer, but it is this Court that will have to, as it now does, write finis to this sordid tale, as well as to
the lawyers prized claim as a member of the Bar.
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rodolfo Macalino was initiated by a lettercomplaint[1] dated October 27, 1994 filed by Susan Cuizon with the Office of the Court Administrator
charging the respondent with Grave Misconduct.
The antecedents[2] are as follows:
The legal services of the respondent was sought by the complainant in behalf of her husband Antolin
Cuizon who was convicted for Violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. When the spouses had no
sufficient means to pay the legal fees, the respondent suggested that he be given possession of
complainants Mistubishi car, which was delivered to the respondent. Later respondent offered to buy the
car for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (P85,000.00) for which he paid a down payment of Twenty Four
Thousand Pesos (P24,000.00). After the sale of the car, respondent failed to attend to the case of Antolin
Cuizon, so complainant was forced to engage the services of another lawyer.
The respondent was required to comment on the complaint lodged against him as early as December 5,
1994.
On December 29, 1995 the respondent was ordered to show cause why he should not be meted with
disciplinary action or declared in contempt for failure to comply with the order of the court, to comment
on complaint.
On June 17, 1996, for failure to comply with the previous orders of the court, a fine of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) was imposed upon him and the order requiring him to file his comment on the complaint was
reiterated.
On July 24, 1996 respondent paid the Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) fine imposed on him, however he
failed to fully comply with the order of the court.
On December 5, 1996 the Supreme Court received a letter from Antolin Cuizon informing the court that
the respondent again committed another infraction of the law by issuing a check against a closed account.
On February 12, 1997 the Supreme Court issued a resolution increasing the imposed fine on respondent in
the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) to One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and again the order
requiring the respondent to file his comment was reiterated.

On Noveber 13, 1997 the cashier of the Disbursement and Collection Division issued a certification that the
imposed fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) has not been paid by the respondent.
On December 10, 1997 the Supreme Court issued a warrant of arrest directing the National Bureau of
Investigation to detain the respondent until further Orders from the Court.
On February 23, 1998, Allen M. Mendoza Intelligence Agent of the NBI of San Fernando, Pampanga
rendered a Report and Return of the Service of Warrant of Arrest to the effect that the warrant could not
be served for reason that the subject is no longer residing at his given address.
On April 22, 1998 the court again issued another resolution requesting the complainants to furnish the
court with the correct and present address of the respondent.
In compliance with this directive, the complainant reported that the respondent had not changed his
residence. In fact, upon the information given by his own son, the respondent comes home at midnight
and leaves at dawn.[3]
In the Resolution[4] dated July 27, 1998, the Court resolved to consider the Resolution of December 10,
1997 finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court and ordering his imprisonment until he complies
with the Resolution of February 12, 1997, requiring him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and to submit his
comment on the instant administrative complaint served on the respondent by substituted service. The
Court likewise declared the respondent to have waived his right to file his comment on the administrative
complaint and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner forthwith filed her Report and Recommendation[5] dated October 27,
1998 finding the respondent unfit to remain a member of the Bar and recommending that he be disbarred.
The IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation with the modification that the respondent instead be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.[6]
In its Resolution[7] dated July 19, 2000, the Court resolved to return the case to the IBP which, in turn,
remanded the case to the Investigating Commissioner for further investigation and compliance with
procedural due process.[8]
As directed, the Investigating Commissioner conducted further investigation and submitted her Report
and Recommendation[9] dated November 16, 1999 stating that the respondent failed to appear during the
scheduled hearings on January 5, 1999 and March 23, 1999. Moreover, despite his counsels motion for
extension of time within which to file a comment on the complaint having been granted, the respondent
failed to file his comment. Hence, the Investigating Commissioner reiterated her recommendation that the
respondent be disbarred.
The IBP modified the Investigating Commissioners recommendation and urged instead that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five (5) years. [10] The Court noted the
recommendation in its Resolution[11] dated September 8, 2003.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client. However, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve his client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with whole-hearted
fidelity.[12] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. [13]
In the instant case, after agreeing to represent the complainants husband, taking possession of their
car and persuading the complainant to sell the same to him for a nominal amount, the respondent refused
to carry out his duties as counsel prompting the complainant to secure the services of another lawyer to
defend her husband. The respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The respondents infraction is compounded by the fact that he issued a check in favor of the
complainants husband which was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account.[14] Such conduct indicates the respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.[15]
The fact that the respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of
arrest issued by the Court exacerbates his offense. His repeated failure to comply with the
Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his comment on the complaint should also be taken into account.
By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the
authority of the Court.[16]
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The
highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and
processes.[17] A lawyer who willfully disobeys a court order requiring him to do something may not only be
cited and punished for contempt but may also be disciplined as an officer of the court.[18]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The foregoing acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct which renders him unfit to
discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of
the court.[19] His disbarment is consequently warranted.[20]
WHEREFORE, respondent Rodolfo Macalino is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to the respondents personal records and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6238. November 04, 2004]

LINDA VILLARIASA-RIESENBECK, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a Verified Letter-Complaint[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 11,
2000, complainant Linda Villariasa-Riesenbeck charged respondent Atty. Jaynes C. Abarrientos with
professional misconduct and neglect of duty.

Complainant alleges that respondent was her lawyer in CA-G.R. CV No. 45655, a case she had elevated
to the Court of Appeals. The case was unfortunately decided against her, so she asked respondent to
prepare a Motion for Reconsideration.[2] She paid him P5,000 for the motion, with the understanding that
if it became necessary to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court, she will pay him another P5,000
for the petition. Nevertheless, without first waiting for a resolution of the motion and barely a day after
the Motion for Reconsideration was filed, she paid respondent the P5,000.[3]
Respondent, who anticipated a denial of the motion, then asked her to get certified true copies of the
Court of Appeals adverse decision. She went to Manila on March 23, 2000, and got what respondent had
requested. But after she had given him the copies of the decision, respondent failed to apprise her about
the status of her case. Respondent never even called her at her landladys phone number which she left
with him.[4]
Fearful that the period to appeal might lapse, she and her husband, Johannes, visited respondent
several times in May 2000 to ask if a resolution on the motion had already arrived. In June 2000, she made
the inquiries by herself while Johannes, who had meanwhile left the country, continued to write and call
respondent from Holland.[5]
When she heard that a resolution had arrived, it was not from respondent but from Johannes. In the
first week of June 2000, when Johannes called from Holland, respondent told Johannes that a copy of a
Resolution denying the motion had already arrived. Respondent also said that a Motion for Extension of
Time to File the Petition had also been filed with the Supreme Court. She was surprised to hear this
because respondent never told her about the Resolution or the Motion for Extension of Time he
supposedly filed, despite her follow-up visits to him in the last week of May and early in June.[6]
She returned to respondents law office on June 23, 27, and 30, 2000, [7] to ask for a copy of the
Resolution and to follow up on the petition, which she expected respondent was preparing already.
Respondent, who never gave her a copy of the Resolution, kept assuring her that the petition would be
filed on time.[8]
On July 3, 2000, respondent told her that the petition was ready to be filed the next day. [9] When she
arrived at his office on July 4, 2000, however, respondent astounded her with the truth that the period to
file the petition had already expired. Respondent confessed that he received the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on April 18, 2000. She burst into tears because she knew that because of respondent, she
had lost all her hopes concerning the case.[10]
In his Answer filed on November 14, 2000, respondent insists he was diligent in the performance of his
duties. He claims that after he received the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on April 18, 2000, he
tried to reach complainant. He had his secretaries call her several times at the phone number she gave and
even repeatedly sent a messenger to her house at Humay-humay, Lapu-lapu City. Despite the messages
they left for her, complainant never showed up.[11]
When complainant did go to his office, it was only on June 23, 2000, long after the period to appeal
had lapsed.[12] He blamed her for coming late, and told her that even if she came on time, he would tell her
to look for another lawyer, as he was convinced that filing the petition was futile. He also told her that
filing a petition that merely reiterates the arguments in the motion for reconsideration would render him
liable for contempt. He advised her to tell her husband these things.[13]
Complainant had agreed with him, according to respondent, adding that she had lost interest in her
case. She said that she was only there because her husband, Johannes, had been pressing her to pursue
the case even when she lacked the money to do as he wished.[14]
The next time he saw complainant was a few days after, on June 27, 2000. Although she knew that the
period to appeal had expired, respondent said she pleaded with him to file the petition. He refused. On
June 30, 2000, she returned to his office and reiterated her request. At that point, he said that he returned
the records to her.[15]

Respondent further alleges that from the very start, he made it clear to complainant and her husband
that she stood to lose the case even before the Supreme Court. [16]Still, complainant and her husband
insisted that the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals be appealed. [17]
His apprehension to appeal the case notwithstanding, he agreed to file the Motion for
Reconsideration. He did not, however, categorically agree to file the petition. Accordingly, he apprised
complainant that the P5,000 for the petition will only be paid if he decided to file one. [18]
Respondent admits instructing complainant to secure certified true copies of the adverse decision of
the Court of Appeals, but denies instructing her to go to Manila to get it.[19] He likewise denies ever telling
Johannes in the first week of June 2000 that a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review
had been filed.[20]
In her Reply[21] to respondents answer, complainant points to the Joint Affidavit[22] of Nesa Y.
Bentulan, her landlady, and Marilyn Baay, the latters housemaid, who both averred that neither of them
received any phone call or visit from respondent or any of his personnel. Complainant avers that they are
the ones with whom respondents personnel would have to talk to because the phone number she left with
respondent belonged to Bentulan. They are also the ones with whom respondents messenger would have
to talk to in the compound where she lived.[23]
After investigating the matter, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
found respondent to have violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [24] In
Resolution No. XVI-2003-173, issued on September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the CBD
findings, and recommended to this Court that respondent be suspended for four months. It was likewise
recommended that respondent be ordered to refund the P5,000 complainant alleges she paid for the
petition.[25]
We are in full accord with the recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.
The proven facts of this case are contrary to respondents assertion that his sole obligation to
complainant was to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The description of legal services in the official
receipts that he himself issued for the two partial payments complainant made shows the extent of legal
services he contracted to render. The first receipt reads as follows:
Received from LINDA RIESENBECK the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) representing the
following:
PARTICULARS AMOUNT
Re: Partial Payment for Preparation of Motion
for Reconsideration & eventually Petition
for Review to the Supreme Court case
of Linda Riesenbeck vs. MAGICCORP
CA-G.R. CV-45655 - - - P5,000.00
Balance Remaining:
P5,000.00 to be paid upon filing of the Motion
for Reconsideration;
P5,000.00 to be paid on or before October 30, 2000.
(SGD.)
ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS
Cebu City, Philippines, February 24, 2000.[26]

The second reads as follows:

Received from LINDA RIESENBECK the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) representing the
following:
PARTICULARS AMOUNT
Re: Additional Partial Payment for the
Preparation of Motion for Reconsideration
& Petition for Review case of Linda Riesenbeck
vs. MAGICCORP - - - P5,000.00
Balance Remaining:
P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court.
(SGD.)
ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS
Cebu City, Philippines, March 04, 2000.[27]
As the first receipt shows, respondent bound himself to file not only the Motion for Reconsideration,
but also the petition for review. This is clear from the words Partial Payment for Preparation of Motion for
Reconsideration & eventually Petition for Review to the Supreme Court in the first receipt. The second
receipt, on its face, bears the words Balance Remaining: P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court. The tenor of these words, which respondent himself had written,
clearly shows the respondents obligations concerning complainants case.
That respondent was supposed to elevate complainants case is consistent with the fact that as early as
March 2000, during the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals,
respondent instructed complainant to secure certified true copies of the adverse decision to be attached
to the petition.[28] Not only is his action proof that he was obliged to elevate complainants case, his action
is also proof he considered her cause meritorious. Respondents present claim that he apprised
complainant from the very start that further appeal or petition would be unmeritorious is, therefore,
clearly a ruse.
Likewise unbelievable is respondents claim that he repeatedly sent his messenger and had his
secretaries call complainant several times. Respondent alleges that complainant could not be reached in
time for him to withdraw his services while allowing complainant sufficient time to hire other counsel. We
note, however, that respondent never attempted to write complainant to apprise her that he had already
received the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Sending a letter to her by registered mail would
have been the simplest thing he could have done to protect himself from liability if it were true that
complainant could not be found in time.
What is more, complainants landlady and the latters housemaid averred in a joint affidavit that none
of respondents personnel ever visited or called and left a message for complainant. Their declarations,
coming as they do from disinterested persons, are entitled to greater credence than the statements from
respondents own personnel. We have little doubt that respondent had invented a scenario to explain his
negligence.
Respondent should be reminded that once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause.[29] The lawyer must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the clients cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.[30] Otherwise stated, the lawyer

owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of the clients
rights, and the exertion of the lawyers utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.[31] This simply means that the client is
entitled to the benefit of any remedy and defense that is authorized by law and may expect the lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense.[32] Until the lawyers withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is
expected to do his or her best for the interest of the client.
As clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 18. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.[33]
Canon 19. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. [34]
Aggravating his negligence, respondent failed to demonstrate the candor he owed complainant.
Respondent kept hiding from complainant the fact that he had received a copy of the Resolution as early as
April 18, 2000, despite complainants many visits to his law office. Worse, respondent made complainant
believe that the petition would be filed in time before this Court.
Needless to emphasize, a lawyer must not keep a client in the dark as to the status of and
developments in the clients case. The lawyer is obliged to respond within a reasonable time to a clients
request for information.[35] A client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner by which
that clients interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or omitted. [36] A lawyer who repeatedly fails
to answer the inquiries or communications of a client violates the rules of professional courtesy and
neglects the clients interests.[37]
Respondents failure to exercise due diligence in attending to the interest of complainant caused her
grave material prejudice. Respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his
client. In line with our ruling in Abay v. Montesino,[38] respondents suspension is fully warranted. As
recommended, we find that his immediate suspension from the practice of law for four months is called
for under the circumstances.
As to the alleged overpayment of attorneys fees, the IBP recommends that respondent be made to
refund the P5,000 that complainant claims she paid for the petition for review. We find that based on the
receipts complainant submitted, the entire amount of fees and expenses agreed upon was P15,000. Of this
amount, complainant already paidP10,000, corresponding to the attorneys fees and expenses related to
making the Motion for Reconsideration. From the second receipt, it is clear that the remaining balance
ofP5,000 was payable upon the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court, which was never
done. Since evidence shows that he did file a motion but he was thereafter negligent and lacking in
honesty and candor in dealing with his client, a refund is fair and proper, not of the entire amount
of P10,000 but only of P5,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. JAYNES C. ABARRIENTOS is found LIABLE for serious misconduct and
negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for four
(4) months, with warning that commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely. He is also ORDERED to refund the amount of P5,000.00 soonest to complainant.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent, Atty. Jaynes C.
Abarrientos, in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies hereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.