THE EUROPEAN UNIONS GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

Introduction and overview of theoretical approaches

The European Unions (EUs) involvement in the Iranian nuclear deal, signed
in the summer of 2015, has reasserted EUs goal to be one of the major
actors in the current multipolar international system. Negotiations for the
deal have begun before the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), which
brought structural changes in EUs foreign policy, but have been more
coordinated after EUs High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy became a power position in the European institutional framework,
supported by an apparatus of diplomats. This papers research topic is
important for both European integration studies and to geopolitics in the
European and Middle Eastern spaces.
Firstly, European integration scholarship includes research on EUs ability to
represent an actor in international relations, taking into consideration its
uniqueness
in
a
Westphalian
nation-states dominated international system. It is relevant to assess EUs
ability to be a major actor in world politics, taking into account its importance
in the global economy. Furthermore, there is a widespread conception that
EUs capabilities in international affairs are limited due to its member states
foreign policies and the respective institutional frameworks involved in
carrying the policies. Secondly, from a geopolitical perspective, the Iranian
nuclear deal represents a key turn in the geopolitics of the region. In the
context of redefining energy security strategies all over Europe, mainly due
to the dependence on Russian energy sources, the emergence of an
enhanced cooperation between the EU and Iran could be a counterweight
against one of Russias most powerful foreign policy tools. Furthermore,
having Iran accept international regulations could lead to an increase of
security in world affairs, considering that Irans behaviour under the
international agreement becomes predictable and, therefore, less of a threat
for the international community.
This paper aims to analyse the European Unions role in the Iranian nuclear
deal, as Irans main negotiations partner within the internationally agreed
negotiations format (E3/EU and then E3/EU + 3 - EU, France, Germany,
United Kingdom, USA, Russia and China), as well as the Iranian nuclear deals
consequences for EUs foreign policy. The main theoretical approaches of this
paper include Halford Mackinders perspective on geopolitics, respectively
the closed political system in which states operate, and European
integration perspectives on EU as an actor in international affairs. The

introductory part of the paper aims to analyse the recent history of Iran and
its foreign policy as an Islamic republic, assessing its threats and
opportunities. Furthermore, the paper analyses the possible motivations
behind the successful negotiations between the EU and Iran, as polities with
different agendas and interests. Finally, the paper analyses the implications
of the Iranian nuclear deal on EUs foreign policy and the EUs geopolitical
interests beyond its neighbouring areas.

Context: Iranian foreign policy after the Islamic Revolution

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini and his successor, Sayyid Ali Khamenei,
have argued for a religious rule of the country, in order to deepen the
Revolutionary Guards strength in domestic affairs. This approach led to
promote Iran as a model for movements in other countries seeking freedom
from U.S. political influence (the Persian Gulf states, for example) and the
Soviet Union (Afghanistan, for example) (Curtis and Hooglund, 2008: xliii). In
this regard, Iranian leaders regarded the new constitutional order as a
pattern against any secular values, isolating the country in the international
system. This particular approach is highly important to understand Iranian
politics after its Islamic revolution: neither the US, nor the Soviet Union, the
two
super-powers before the 1990s, were eligible as possible partners in
international affairs for Iran, which wanted to have the certainty that its
development in accordance to the Islamic principles would not be affected by
any foreign interference. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and
of the Cold War, Iranian leaders had a more pragmatic approach towards
international politics. In early 1990s, Iran developed deepened diplomatic
ties with Japan, China and Russia, but also with Western powers such as
France and Germany (Curtis and Hooglund, 2008).

The turn of the century in Iranian foreign policy

Beginning with 2002, Irans main issue within the international community
consisted of its nuclear programme, which was regarded with high discontent
by world powers (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2015). Although Iranian
leaders have repeatedly emphasised on the peaceful purposes of the nuclear
programme, reports have indicated, over the years, that Iran had
continuously developed its nuclear capabilities according to a different
agenda. This led to sanctions from the United Nations (UN), the US and the

EU mainly against the Iranian oil and gas industries (Encyclopaedia

Britannica Online, 2015).
One explanation for Irans goal to develop nuclear capabilities resides in its
constant struggle to protect its borders from foreign influence: Without
secure borders, Iran would be vulnerable to foreign powers that would
continually try to manipulate its internal dynamics, destabilize its ruling and
then exploit the resulting openings (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2011). This
approach towards external factors reflects the traditional Cartesian cogito
rationalism in geopolitics (OTuathail, 1998). There are both a reality, which
exists beyond Irans borders, and an inner conscience, through which the
Iranian state power perceives the state itself and how it should be organised.
Consequently, the Iranian authorities are deeply concerned to conserve the
inner conscience and not let any outer influence change it. Furthermore,
being
part
of
the
post-Columbian epoch described by Halford Mackinder (OTuathail, 1998),
and functioning within a closed political system with no further space to
explore, Iranians might fear that their hostility towards superpowers such as
the US could represent a sufficient motive for the Americans to weaken their
political, social and economic models. This scenario would not be a premiere
for American foreign policy neither in Iran, nor in other states across the
world.
Hence, Stratfor Intelligence Groups (2011) assertion that a successful
nuclear programme would serve two functions for Iran could provide a
correct explanation for Irans actions over the last 15 years. A nuclear
programme might deter any existing external threat and, in the same time,
could serve as a catalyst to enhance state power. The rather short history of
the Islamic Republic of Iran easily justifies its need to strengthen internal
forces that legitimate the power structures, combined with a suspicious
foreign policy, characterised by mistrust in international relations, especially
with superpowers that possess the abilities to influence Iranian internal
politics.
The politics of mistrust represent a thread in Iranian foreign policy, in spite of
the multipolar international system that emerged since the end of Cold War.
The fall of USAs main political and military counterweight, the Soviet Union,
created a void of power in the international system in the 1990s; however,
there are two important aspects of post-Cold War geopolitics for this paper.
Firstly, the US foreign policy did not change drastically; there was a new
enemy, terrorism, a charge that has been also made against Iran over the
years. This meant that the US would not reduce its international presence,
but rather increase it. Secondly, the US did not emerge as the sole power in
the international system - China, the EU or Russia represent poles of power in
3

the system, which prevented a conspicuous American hegemony over the

world. However, the American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, at the
western and eastern borders of Iran, at the beginning of the 21 st century
increased Iranian authorities degree of mistrust, which eventually led to
developing a nuclear programme in order to secure its borders. The lack of
predictability of Iran in international affairs and its prospective military
behaviour made it a fearsome partner for Western countries; this, in fact,
meant that Irans goals were attained and foreign influence in Iranian
domestic affairs had been limited to a reasonable low.

The EU - Iran cooperation in the Euro-Middle Eastern region

The ongoing development of the EU, as well as its internal processes that
involved integration of its members - nation-states often perceived as
reluctant to ceding sovereignty, made it seem an actor with reduced
capabilities in world politics (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Having among its
members countries with a long diplomatic tradition, such as France, Germany
or the United Kingdom, further contributed to a perception of the EU as a soft
power, as opposed to the hard power of nation-states in the international
system, such as the US or the Russian Federation.
However, the European Union has been developing its Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) for the last 20 years, since its introduction as one of its
three pillars in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). After the enforcement of the
Treaty of Lisbon (2009), it became clear that the European Union pursued a
strengthened international presence. The EUs growing influence in
international affairs even made it a valid competitor for the American
dominance of post-Cold War world: An EU that encompasses Western and
Central Europe and whose wealth rivals that of the United States is in and of
itself a counterpoise to America (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27-28).
Therefore, EUs transformation in the post-Cold War years, which meant
expanding its borders to Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, having 28
member states in 2013, as opposed to only 12 in 1991, has certainly had an
impact on the European Unions capabilities in international politics. As
scholars of European integration claim, the EU has successfully achieved a
hegemony in what Europe means (Risse, 2004). In this regard, EUs foreign
policy is one of the most important policy areas for the European nation
states that adhered to the European bloc. Historically, larger EU member
states have seen their diplomatic capabilities reduced because of the
emergence of non-European powers, such as the US, China or even Russia.
Moreover, smaller European countries have never been major actors in
international relations, due to their limited ability to influence the
4

international agenda. Therefore, having a common foreign policy could

represent the main tool for European countries to shape international
politics.
As a direct result, the European Unions influence as an international actor is
a recurrent topic for IR and integration scholars. This paper does not aim to
analyse the EUs ability to produce and enforce foreign policy, but rather
assess the EUs ability to act as an international actor and to generate policy
that enables international cooperation and stability. In the Iranian deal, the
European Council (2003) decided to involve in negotiations with the Iranian
authorities, and the United Nations (UN) mandated the EU High
Representative to carry out negotiations with Iran on behalf of the
international community, through the UNSC Resolution 1835 2008 and UNSC
Resolution 1929 2010 (EEAS, 2015).
Several aspects might justify EUs central position in the negotiations with
Iran over its nuclear programme, which will be presented below. These
aspects refer to culture, neighbourhood, economic implications and
positioning in world politics. Firstly, EUs High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-president of the European Commission
(EU HR/VP) Federica Mogherini stated, during her visit to Tehran in July 2015,
after the negotiations were concluded, that both the EU and Iran are swings
of great historical civilisations (EEAS, 2015). Indeed, this retrospective
analysis could offer a basis for the development of bilateral relations. Europe
is regarded as the geopolitical space that provided the world much of its
actual political, economic, social and cultural achievements, beginning with
the Greeks and Romans and continuing with its multi-millennial history. On
the other hand, Iran is the direct heir of the Persian Empire - the countrys
name was Persia until the 20th century. Moreover, the two geographical
spaces have interacted since the time of Alexander the Great, which places
the relations between the European and Persian spaces dating for more than
2,000 years ago.
Secondly, the EU and Iran represent two neighbouring regions. The EU does
not have a direct border with Iran, but the European Unions neighbourhood
does. Furthermore, both political blocs have a direct interest in the
Mediterranean Sea and in the Middle East. Developments in the Middle East
situation, as well as the situation in the Mediterranean directly influence both
the EU and Iran due to their proximity and to relations established with the
countries in the region. Hence, there is a mutual interest in pursuing stability
and development for this region. Moreover, there can be observed a thread
in EU and Iran foreign policies. Both polities are interested in consolidating
their domestic spaces; for the EU, the issue of neighbourhood has been on
the agenda for more than 10 years now, having extensive policy and
5

financial tools in place in order to address its neighbouring spaces as a

means to tackle any potential threats (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008).
Similarly, Iran has been involved in shaping its near abroad, especially in
areas with a void of power, such as post-war Iraq or Syria nowadays. In this
regard, both the EU and Iran have demonstrated an interest in their
neighbouring spaces.
Thirdly, the EU sanctions on Iran have had a dramatic effect on the
commercial exchanges and investments between the two polities. According
to DG Trade (2015), the EU imports from Iran have been reduced by more
than 86%, from 5.7 billion EUR in 2012 to 0.8 billion EUR in 2013; similarly,
foreign direct investment (FDI) from EU countries dropped from 2.8 billion
EUR in 2012 to 0.4 EUR in 2013. Given the impact on the Iranian economy, a
lift of EU sanctions would further strengthen Irans economic growth and
provide the necessary resources for enforcing its policies. Mogherini (EEAS,
2015) clearly stated during her visit to Iran: it is important to stress that
Iran can expect major investment from EU countries.
Lastly, but perhaps most important for this paper, there could be a direct
connection between EUs role in the world and its role in the Iranian nuclear
deal. The EU, as asserted above, is perceived as a normative power that is
often associated with areas such as peacekeeping, international cooperation
or promoter of democracy, rule of law and human rights (Bretherton and
Vogler, 2006). In the meantime, scholars in IR have asserted EUs ability to
represent a counterweight for the US influence in world affairs; given Irans
reluctance to negotiate with the US and their troubled relations since the
establishment of the Islamic Republic, Irans preference for negotiating with
the EU did represent the natural choice for Iranian foreign policy. Why not
negotiate with a normative power, instead of a military (and hostile) power,
which was also present in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan? Why not
undermine the US position in world affairs by enhancing relations with one of
its competitors when it comes to shaping global politics? Furthermore, there
has been a widespread discontent in Europe over the invasion of Iraq, in
2003, which emphasised on European and American divergences on world
affairs; this did not affect, however, the strategic relations between the US
and the EU, but it revealed the existing differences of the two spaces.

The implications of the Iranian deal for the EU foreign policy

EUs involvement in the negotiations with Iran regarding the latters nuclear
programme have represented rather a shift in the Unions traditional
approaches in its relations with third states. The EU foreign policy has been
rather centred on its neighbouring areas (both candidate countries and
6

neighbouring states) and on providing humanitarian aid and development

finance (the EU is the worlds largest donor of development finance,
according to its official portal). However, the endeavour could be seen as
part of EUs role to promote peace and stability in the world, as one of its
main vocations. This paper considers that encouraging a peaceful and
predictable Iran in international affairs can be done because of a common
interest and identity - peace and stability, but also in spite of diverging
identities and interests between Iran and the Western world.
Alexander Wendt (1999: 224) considers that identities are constituted by
both internal and external structures, which clearly states the importance of
how others behave in order to assess if they are part of ones group or of a
very different one. A very important factor when talking about identity is the
culture of the others (Wendt, 1999), which actually relates to the role
identities. It is essential how the others identify themselves in order to create
ones own identity and the lack of others practically provides no space for
the creation of ones role identity; hence, the importance of others is crucial
for individuals, groups or states. In this regard, the EU and Iran have
continuously shaped their identities as contrasting concepts about selves.
The EU is a beacon of freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights; on
the other hand, Iran is highly religious, enforcing the Sharia as state law, and
human rights is a rather uncommon concept for policymakers.
However, Wendt introduces the concept of collective self-esteem as a
national interest for states (Wendt, 1999: 235), which refers to one countrys
need to have positive feelings about respect and status in the international
system. Iran has long been a rogue state on the international stage, due to
its need to secure its borders and address concerns regarding domestic
affairs. Nonetheless, having Iran as part of an international system with
certain rules will also contribute to a more predictable behaviour. Iran now
has the certainty that significant Others in the system, as Wendt calls them,
respect its sovereignty and status, and this will lead to a reduction of the
need to secure its own territory in a zero-sum game with the Others. The
recognition of the Iranian states status in the international system, together
with the other three national interests analysed by George and Keohane
(Wendt, 1999), which refer to physical survival, autonomy and economic
well-being - could lead to a more cooperative Iran in international affairs and,
thus, reduce the risk of a violent and unpredictable state in an already
problematic region.
Furthermore, the European Unions approach towards Iran is, although rather
unconventional because of its typically different foreign policy agenda, part
of EUs mission to enhance cooperation with third states through its superior
normative system (Zielonka, 2006). The enhancement of cooperation with
7

Iran via both political and economic tools enables the EU to expand its
influence beyond its near abroad through its traditional instruments:
preferential trade agreements and financial aid () institutional dialogue,
and export of rules and governance models (Zielonka, 2006: 149). Certainly,
an assessment of how the EU actors, both public and private, will manage to
generate changes in Iranian domestic affairs would be based on
presumptions at this stage; however, it is expected that a certain degree of
changes will occur, due to the deepened political and economic cooperation
announced by HR/VP Mogherini in July 2015.

The EU geopolitical interests beyond its neighbouring spaces

It has been argued that the EU applies several geopolitical models, combined
with
geo-strategies when it comes to its neighbourhood (Browning and Joenniemi,
2008). Is it possible to assert that, through its rather successful involvement
in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, the EU is actively pursuing its geopolitical
interests in areas beyond its near abroad? This paper considers that, given
the dramatic changes of the international context after the Arab Spring and
the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has shifted its interests beyond its neighbouring
spaces, in order to tackle issues such as the Russian-Iranian cooperation or
the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.
The EU has been the main actor of European politics since the end of the
Cold War, with a Russian state shattered by the fall of the USSR and its
struggle towards capitalism. The EU enlargements towards east has reached
Russian borders and EUs neighbourhood policy (ENP) influences countries of
strategic interest for the Russian Federation, such as Ukraine. However, since
the breakout of the Ukrainian crisis in late 2013, the EU has become only one
of the two main actors in Europe, together with a more aggressive and
unpredictable Russia. In this context, EUs strengthened and prospective
deepened relations with Iran become more important in order to avoid an
emerging Moscow-Tehran power axis in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Firstly, the EU is highly dependent on Russian energy supplies: the EU
imports more than half of the energy it uses, and more than a third of these
imports come from Russia (Eurostat, 2015). EU-Russia relations have been
dramatically affected by the Russian annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in
2014 and the prolonged Russian intervention in conflicts in Eastern Ukraine,
thus making EUs dependency on Russian energy a weakness for EU foreign
policymakers. On the other hand, Iran has the second biggest reserves of gas
and oil combined, after Russia (BBC, 2015), being therefore a potential
alternative for European consumers. In this regard, EUs cooperation with
8

Iran could be seen as a means to balance and counterweigh Russian

dominance on the European energy market.
Secondly, the EU is interested in the development of conflicts in the Middle
East, especially the one in Syria, mainly because of the major influx of
refugees from this country. Since 2011, the EU has been critical of the Syrian
government, whose main supporters are Russia and Iran. The EUs influence
in Middle East could be severely diminished by a post-conflict Syria ruled by
Bashar al-Assad, due to the support of both Russia and Iran. In order to
address the possible outcomes of such a scenario, the EU could be interested
in developing a strengthened relation with Iran, given the low level of the EURussia relations, therefore acting towards the prevention of a powerful
alliance between two hostile powers, with considerable influence in EUs
neighbourhood.
However, there are a number of limitations given the European Unions
current approach on foreign policy. The EU mainly has a role as a security
actor that differs both conceptually and operationally from the conventional
model of a great power (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 211). The assessment
of EUs traditional foreign policy tools in the current situation in the Middle
East should provide new perspectives for the EUs geopolitical interests in
the region. Can the EU continue to be a mainly civilian power, as defined by
Bretherton and Vogler (2006), given the complex structure of the conflict in
Syria, for example? The EU is directly affected by the growing numbers of
refugees from the Middle East; in this regard, should the EU change its
perspective as a normative power in order to tackle the causes of the
conflicts and not only their effects?
EUs geopolitical interests in its neighbouring areas are clearly related to the
creation of a stable and secure area, in order to address insecurity beyond
these spaces. Nonetheless, conflicts and instability have affected countries
included in the ENP, such as Ukraine, Syria or Libya, and the effects of these
crises demonstrate a certain limit in EUs ability to tackle problematic
situations in its neighbourhood. With insecure regions at its southern and
eastern borders, the European Union is under pressure in order to develop
new means to address these issues. In this regard, the newly strengthened
bilateral relation between the EU and Iran does represent a ground for
policymakers who seek to preserve and extend EU influence abroad;
however, the historical affinities between Iran and Russia (Milani, 2007) could
represent a serious threat for further cooperation with Iran.

Conclusions

The main conclusion of this paper is that, while the EUs normative/civilian
approach towards its foreign policy has produced results, there is a need for
the development of new means in order to tackle a prospective emergence
of hostile power centres in EUs near abroad, given the current situation in its
neighbourhood. The EUs more than a decade-long involvement in the
Iranian nuclear deal reaffirmed the politys ability to act as an international
actor in an international system dominated by nation-states. The European
Unions foreign policy approaches have enabled its actions in a series of
international matters, including negotiations and third party enablement in
issues such as institution building and democratic development. This has led
scholars to describe the EU as a mainly normative or soft power, dealing
mainly with civilian tools in order to enforce it foreign policy.
However, the recent developments in international politics might represent
both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU foreign policymakers. The EU
has laid ground, through its involvement in the Iranian nuclear deal, to
develop further cooperation with a country that was perceived as hostile and
unpredictable until recently. Certainly, the EU - Iran relations are rather
described by a new found trust between the two parties. The moderate
government of Irans President Hassan Rouhani, who shifted his countrys
foreign policy once he took office, could easily explain the current trust in
bilateral relations. However, the developments in the Middle Eastern region,
such as the conflict in Syria, could severely influence the EU-Iran relations,
given their divergent opinions on how to tackle the Syrian civil war and how
to reduce the Islamic States influence in the region.
Therefore, several aspects could be topics of further research in order to
explain the EUs geopolitical interests in the region. In this regard, the EU
needs to assess its need to develop new policy tools in order to enforce its
foreign policy. Furthermore, depending on how the actual implementation of
the nuclear deal unfolds, the EU needs to estimate the extent to which a
strengthened relation with Iran might be favourable to one with Russia,
which has a growing influence in the Middle East. Certainly, there is also a
need to assess internal issues related to the EUs foreign policy making and
enforcement, in order to assess the diverging/converging interests of
Member States towards Russia, the Middle East or Iran and the extent to
which certain policy approaches would represent viable solutions for Member
States.

10

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