Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
No. 12-1555
ALAN CLUKEY and DERA CLUKEY,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF CAMDEN,
Defendant, Appellee.
and
documents
incorporated
by
reference
into
the
new hires without providing Clukey any notice that he was not being
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The Town
claims,
arguing
that
Clukey did
not
have
Clukey's
claim
was
not
cognizable
under
1983.
In
claim
was
one
recommended
for
breach
dismissal.
of
contract,
The
district
the
magistrate
court
adopted
judge
the
Clukey appeals.
II.
complaint is de novo.
individuals
of
their
property
interests
in
certain
Barry
v.
Barchi,
443
U.S.
55,
64
(1979)
(professional licenses).
The Town asserts, without citing any precedent, that it is
impossible for Clukey to have a property interest in his right to
recall because "no property interest in continued employment can
exist if one is not already employed." This argument ignores the
centrality of state law to the property interest inquiry.
The
concurring)
("[T]he
federal
process
protects
the
property
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (quoting Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)); see also Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 757
("Resolution of the federal issue begins . . . with a determination
of what it is that state law provides.").
In considering whether state law creates an entitlement, we
look primarily to the discretion state law accords state actors to
withhold the entitlement from individuals.
Rather,
"the
more
circumscribed
is
the
government's
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Colburn v. Trs of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 598 (7th Cir. 1992)
("Property interests exist when an employer's discretion is clearly
limited so that the employee cannot be denied employment unless
specific conditions are met."); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("To have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it.
it.
it.").
That a tenured public employee has a protected property
interest
in
continued
employment
is
beyond
question.
See
protected
property
interest
in
injury
leave
Similarly, we have
See Acosta-
-8-
See Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 336 (1st Cir. 1992).
At least one of our fellow circuits has also determined that public
employees can have a property interest in a veteran's preference in
promotions.
Cir. 1993) (concluding that armed forces veteran had interest "not
in the promotion per se, but in being given a preference when his
promotion is considered").
Although we have never addressed whether the right to be
recalled following a lay-off can be a constitutionally protected
property interest, we have addressed closely analogous situations,
such as the right to be reinstated following a period of disability
leave.
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law
employees.
at
issue
created
such
substantive
right
in
the
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Id. at 762-63.
filled with new hires, rather than the tenured teachers who had
been laid off.
Id. at 763.
recalled brought suit against the state alleging, inter alia, that
the state had deprived them of their property interest in their
right to be recalled without due process.
After initially determining that the teachers did have a
substantive right to recall, see Chi. Teachers Union v. Bd. of
Educ., No. 10-3396 (7th Cir. March 29, 2011), the panel, in
response to a petition for rehearing en banc, decided to certify to
the Illinois Supreme Court the question of whether Illinois law
granted the teachers such a substantive recall right.
Taking on the certified questions, in Chicago Teachers Union
v. Board of Education, 963 N.E.2d 918 (Ill. 2012), the Illinois
Supreme Court compared two separate Illinois statutes - one
governing teachers in Chicago and one governing Illinois teachers
outside of Chicago. The court concluded that the statute governing
Chicago teachers did not create a property interest in recall
because the statute did not contain any mandatory language and
concerned primarily the powers of the Board, not the rights of the
individual teachers. See id. at 925-26 (discussing 105 Ill. Comp.
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Stat.
Ann.
5/34-18(31)).
By
contrast,
the
statute
governing
Maine
law,
constitutionally
protected
property
See
See
(Emphasis added.)
We agree with the district court that the plain language of
this proviso compels a conclusion that Clukey had a property
interest in his right to be recalled.
discretion
in
re-hiring
qualified
laid-off
employees
with
"dispatcher
functions,"
he
has
not
established
the
In other
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Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 ("While the legislature may elect not
to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once
conferred,
without
appropriate
procedural
safeguards."
the private
interest that
will
be
affected
by
We
the
of
additional
or
substitute
procedural
safeguards;
and
Id. at 335.
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In
is
entitled
fact-specific. . . .").
to
pre-deprivation
hearing
is
The
from
offering
evidence
of
the
administrative
and
We leave it to
the
case.
For
present
purposes,
however,
Clukey's
district
court
concluded
that
Clukey's
claim
was
Following
the district court's lead, the Town also urges us to find that any
1983 claim Clukey might otherwise have is foreclosed by the
availability of either (1) state law contract remedies, or (2) the
grievance procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. As we
will explain, the existence of these alternative remedies does not
foreclose Clukey's 1983 claim.
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the
contractor
for
work
it
had
performed
pursuant
to
the state had deprived it of property without due process when the
state withheld payments following a state agency's determination
that G & G had engaged in unfair labor practices.
Id. at 193.
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Id. at 196.
the facts in Lujan from cases where plaintiffs allege that they are
"presently entitled either to exercise ownership dominion over real
or personal property, or to pursue a gainful occupation." Id.
Here, we are not dealing with a contractual dispute over
compensation for past work performed analogous to Ramrez or Lujan.
The property right at issue in this case is the right to be
employed if certain conditions are met. Lujan made clear that the
right "to pursue a gainful occupation . . . cannot be fully
protected
by an
ordinary
breach-of-contract
suit."
Concepcin
Chaparro v. Ruiz-Hernndez, 607 F.3d 261, 267 n.2 (1st Cir. 2010)
(quoting
Lujan,
532
U.S.
at
196)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted); see also Baird v. Bd. of Educ., 389 F.3d 685, 691-93 (7th
Cir. 2004) (discussing Lujan and concluding that deprivation of
property interest in employment would not be satisfied by breachof-contract claim).
in
this circuit
holding
that
public
employees
who
have
been
See, e.g.,
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It is
See
bargaining
agreement
contains
hearing procedure,
however, does not mean that constitutional due process minimums are
satisfied.
due
process
claim
only
if
the
procedures
meet
or
exceed
right
to
pre-deprivation
process,
collective
bargaining
agreement,
597-99
(3d
Cir.
2011)
provided,
of
course,
those
(holding
that
even
where
post-
facts
establishing
that
he
had
protected
property
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state law claims, which were dismissed for want of any surviving
federal claims.
Costs to appellant.
So ordered.
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