Cases on Sales

1. Contract of Sale Concepts

a. LEABRES vs CA, December 12 1986
b. Co vs CIR, 99 Phil 841
c. Arnoldus Carpentry, 159 SCRA 199
d. Auiroga vs Parsons, 38 Phil 501
e. Gonzalo Puyat and Sons Inc vs Arco Amusement, 72 Phil 402
f. Dignos vs CA, 158 SCRA 375
g. Rayos vs CA, 434 SCRA 365
h. Cemeno Jr vs Lobregat, 09 September 2004
2. Object of Sale
a. Almendra vs IAC, November 21, 1991
3. Price
a. Bayongayong vs CA, 430 SCRA 210
b. Mapali vs Mapalo, 17 SCRA 114
c. Velasco vs CA, 51 SCRA 439
d. Villanueva vs CA, 267 SCRA 89
e. Swedih Match vs CA, October 20, 1004

4. Contract of Sale Concepts

a. Leaches vs CA, December 12 1986
b. Co vs CIR, 99 Phil 841
c. Arnoldus Carpentry, 159 SCRA 199
d. Auiroga vs Parsons, 38 Phil 501
e. Gonzalo Puyat and Sons Inc vs Arco Amusement, 72 Phil 402
f. Dignos vs CA, 158 SCRA 375
g. Rayos vs CA, 434 SCRA 365
h. Cemeno Jr vs Lobregat, 09 September 2004
5. Object of Sale
a. Almendra vs IAC, November 21, 1991
6. Price
a. Bayongayong vs CA, 430 SCRA 210
b. Mapali vs Mapalo, 17 SCRA 114
c. Velasco vs CA, 51 SCRA 439
d. Villanueva vs CA, 267 SCRA 89
e. Swedih Match vs CA, October 20, 1004

LEABRES vs CA, December 12 1986

[G.R. No. L-41847. December 12, 1986.]

CATALINO LEABRES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MANOTOK REALTY, INC.,Respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for Petitioner.
Marcelo de Guzman for Respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which is quoted
hereunder:
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In Civil Case No. 64434, the Court of First Instance of Manila made the following quoted decision:

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"(1) Upon defendants counterclaim, ordering plaintiff Catalino Leabres to vacate and/or surrender
possession to defendant Manotok Realty, Inc. the parcel of land subject matter of the complaint described in
paragraph 3 thereof and described in the Bill of Particulars dated March 4, 1966;
(2) To pay defendant the sum of P81.00 per month from March 20, 1959, up to the time he actually vacates
and/or surrenders possession of the said parcel of land to the defendant Manotok Realty, Inc., and
(3) To pay attorneys fees to the defendant in the amount of P700.00 and pay the costs." (Decision, R.A., pp.
54-55).
The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:

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"Clara Tambunting de Legarda died testate on April 22, 1950. Among the properties left by the deceased is
the "Legarda Tambunting Subdivision" located on Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, containing an area
of 80,238.90 sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 62042; 45142; 45149; 49578; 40957 and
59585. Shortly after the death of said deceased, plaintiff Catalino Leabres bought, on a partial payment of
P1,000.00 a portion (No. VIII, Lot No. 1) of the Subdivision from surviving husband Vicente J, Legarda who
acted as special administrator, the deed or receipt of said sale appearing to be dated May 2, 1950 (Annex
"A"). Upon petition of Vicente L. Legarda, who later was appointed a regular administrator together with
Pacifica Price and Augusto Tambunting on August 28, 1950, the Probate Court of Manila in the Special
Proceedings No. 10808) over the testate estate of said Clara Tambunting, authorized through its order of
November 21, 1951 the sale of the property.
In the meantime, Vicente L. Legarda was relieved as a regular Administrator and the Philippine Trust Co.
which took over as such administrator advertised the sale of the subdivision which includes the lot subject
matter herein, in the issues of August 26 and 27, September 2 and 3, and 15 and 17, 1956 of the Manila
Times and Daily Mirror. In the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 10808, no adverse claim or interest over
the subdivision or any portion thereof was ever presented by any person, and in the sale that followed, the
Manotok Realty, Inc. emerged the successful bidder at the price of P840,000.00. By order of the Probate
Court, the Philippine Trust Co. executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subdivision dated January 7, 1959
in favor of the Manotok Realty, Inc. which deed was judicially approved on March 20, 1959, and recorded
immediately in the proper Register of Deeds which issued the corresponding Certificates of Title to the
Manotok Realty, Inc., the defendant appellee herein.
A complaint dated February 8, 1966, was filed by herein plaintiff, which seeks, among other things, for the
quieting of title over the lot subject matter herein, for continuing possession thereof, and for damages. In
the scheduled hearing of the case, plaintiff Catalino Leabres failed to appear although he was duly notified,
and so the trial Court, in its order dated September 14, 1967, dismissed the complaint (Annex "E"). In
another order of dismissal was amended as to make the same refer only to plaintiffs complaint and the
counter claim of the defendant was reinstated and as the evidence thereof was already adduced when
defendant presented its evidence in three other cases pending in the same Court, said counterclaim was also

considered submitted for resolution. The motion for reconsideration dated January 22, 1968 (Annex "I"),
was filed by plaintiff, and an opposition thereto dated January 25, 1968, was likewise filed by defendant but
the Court a quo dismissed said motion in its order dated January 12, 1970 (Annex "K"), "for lack of merits"
(pp. 71-72, Record on Appeal).
Appealing the decision of the lower Court, plaintiff-appellant advances the following assignment of errors:

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I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DATED OCTOBER 9, 1967,
THUS DEPRIVING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HIS DAY IN COURT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT CATALINO LEABRES TO VACATE
AND/OR SURRENDER THE POSSESSION OF THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT TO DEFENDANTAPPELLEE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE THE
SUM OF P81.00 PER MONTH FROM MARCH 20, 1969, UP TO THE TIME HE ACTUALLY VACATE THE PARCEL OF
LAND. (Appellants Brief, p. 7)
In the First Assigned Error, it is contended that the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9,
1967, the plaintiff-appellant was not accorded his day in Court.
The rule governing dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute is provided for in Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court, as follows:
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If the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the Court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of
the defendant or upon the Courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise provided by the Court."
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Under the afore-cited section, it is discretionary on the part of the Court to dismiss an action for failure to
prosecute, and its action will not be reversed upon appeal in the absence of abuse. The burden of showing
abuse of this discretion is upon the appellant since every presumption is toward the correctness of the
Courts action (Smith, Bell & Co., et al v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., and Manila Terminal Co., No. L-5304,
April 30, 1954; Adorable v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-10698, April 22, 1959); Flores v. Phil. Alien Property
Administration, G.R. No. L-12741, April 27, 1960). By the doctrine laid down in these cases, and by the
provisions of Section 5, Rules 131 of the Rules of Court, particularly paragraphs (m) and (o) which
respectively presume the regularity of official performance and the passing upon by the Court over all issues
within a case, it matters not if the Court dismissing the action for failure to prosecute assigns any special
reason for its action or not. We take note of the fact that the Order declaring appellant in default was
handed down on September 14, 1967. Appellant took no steps to have this Order set aside. It was only on
January 22, 1968, after he was furnished a copy of the Courts decision dated December 9, 1967 or about
four months later that he attached this Order and the decision of the Court. Appellant slept on his rights if
he had any. He had a chance to have his day in Court but he passed it off. Four months later he alleges that
sudden illness had prevented him. We feel appellant took a long time too long in fact to inform the
Court of his sudden illness. This sudden illness that according to him prevented him from coming to Court,
and the time it took him to tell the Court about it, is familiar to the forum as an oft repeated excuse to
justify indifference on the part of litigants or outright negligence of those who represent them which
subserves the interests of justice. In the instant case, not only did the appellant wantonly pass off his
chance to have a day in Court but he has also failed to give a convincing, just and valid reason for the new
hearing he seeks. The trial court found it so; We find it so. The trial Court in refusing to give appellant a new
trial does not appear to have abused his discretion as to justify our intervention.
The Second and Third Assignments of Error are hereby jointly treated in our discussion since the third is but

a consequence of the second.

It is argued that had the trial Court reconsidered its order dated September 14, 1967 dismissing the
complaint for failure to prosecute, plaintiff-appellant might have proved that he owns the lot subject-matter
of the case, citing the receipt (Annex "A") issued in his favor; that he has introduced improvements and
erected a house thereon made of strong materials; that appellees adverse interest over the property was
secured in bad faith since he had prior knowledge and notice of appellants physical possession or acquisition
of the same; that due to said bad faith appellant has suffered damages, and that for all the foregoing, the
judgment should be reversed and equitable relief be given in his favor.
As above stated, the Legarda-Tambunting Subdivision which includes the lot subject matter of the instant
case, is covered by Torrens Certificates of Title. Appellant anchors his claim on the receipt (Annex "A") dated
May 2, 1950, which he claims as evidence of the sale of said lot in his favor. Admittedly, however, Catalino
Leabres has not registered his supposed interest over the lot in the records of the Register of Deeds, nor did
he present his claim for probate in the testate proceedings over the estate of the owner of said subdivision,
in spite of the notices advertised in the papers. (Saldaa v. Phil. Trust Co., Et. Al.; Manotok Realty, Inc.,
supra).
On the other hand, defendant-appellee, Manotok Realty, Inc., bought the whole subdivision which includes
the subject matter herein by order and with approval of the Probate Court and upon said approval, the Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of appellee was immediately registered with the proper Register of Deeds. Manotok
Realty, Inc. has therefore the better right over the lot in question because in cases of lands registered under
the Torrens Law, adverse interests not therein annotated which are without the previous knowledge by third
parties do not bind the latter. As to the improvement which appellant claims to have introduced on the lot,
purchase of registered lands for value and in good faith hold the same free from all liens and encumbrances
except those noted on the titles of said hand and those burdens imposed by law. (Sec. 39, Act. 496). An
occupant of a land, or a purchaser thereof from a person other than the registered owner, cannot claim good
faith so as to be entitled to retention of the parcels occupied by him until reimbursement of the value of the
improvements he introduced thereon, because he is charged with notice of the existence of the owners
certificate of title (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Lecardo, Et Al., CA-G.R. No. 25477-R, July 24, 1962; J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Manuel Abundo, CA-G.R. No. 29701-R, November 18, 1968).
Appellant has not convinced the trial Court that appellee acted in bad faith in the acquisition of the property
due to the latters knowledge of a previous acquisition by the former, and neither are we impressed by the
claim. The purchaser of a registered land has to rely on the certificate of title thereof. The good faith of
appellee coming from the knowledge that the certificate of title covering the entire subdivision contain no
notation as to appellants interest, and the fact that the records of these cases like Probate Proceedings Case
No. 10808, do not show the existence of appellants claim, strongly support the correctness of the lower
Courts decision.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find no reason to amend or set aside the decision appealed from,
as regards to plaintiff-appellant Catalino Leabres. We therefore affirm the same, with costs against
appellant. (pp. 33-38, Rollo)
Petitioner now comes to us with the following issues:

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(1) Whether or not the petitioner was denied his day in court and deprived of due process of law.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner had to submit his receipt to the probate court in order that his right over
the parcel of land in dispute could be recognized valid and binding and conclusive against the Manotok
Realty, Inc.
(3) Whether or not the petitioner could be considered as a possessor in good faith and in the concept of
owner. (p. 11, Rollo)
Petitioners contention that he was denied his day in court holds no water. Petitioner does not deny the fact
that he failed to appear on the date set for hearing on September 14, 1967 and as a consequence of his
non-appearance, the order of dismissal was issued, as provided for by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Moreover, as pointed out by private respondent in its brief, the hearing on June 11, 1967 was not ex parte.
Petitioner was represented by his counsel on said date, and therefore, petitioner was given his day in Court.

The main objection of the petition in the lower courts proceeding is the reception of respondents evidence
without declaring petitioner in default. We find that there was no necessity to declare petitioner in default
since he had filed his answer to the counterclaim of Respondent.
Petitioner anchors his main arguments on the receipt (Exh. 1) dated May 2, 1950, as a basis of a valid sale.
An examination of the receipt reveals that the same can neither be regarded as a contract of sale or a
promise to sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
There was no agreement as to the total purchase price of the land nor to the monthly installment to be paid
by the petitioner. The requisites of a valid Contract of Sale namely 1) consent or meeting of the minds of the
parties; 2) determinate subject matter; 3) price certain in money or its equivalent are lacking in said
receipt and therefore the "sale" is not valid nor enforceable. Furthermore, it is a fact that Doa Clara
Tambunting died on April 22, 1950. Her estate was thereafter under custodia legis of the Probate Court
which appointed Don Vicente Legarda as Special Administrator on August 28, 1950. Don Vicente Legarda
entered into said sale in his own personal-capacity and without court approval, consequently, said sale
cannot bind the estate of Clara Tambunting. Petitioner should have submitted the receipt of alleged sale to
the Probate Court for its approval of the transactions. Thus, the respondent Court did not err in holding that
the petitioner should have submitted his receipt to the probate court in order that his right over the subject
land could be recognized - assuming of course that the receipt could be regarded as sufficient proof.
Anent his possession of the land, petitioner cannot be deemed a possessor in good faith in view of the
registration of the ownership of the land. To consider petitioner in good faith would be to put a premium on
his own gross negligence.
The Court resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit and to AFFIRM the assailed judgment.
Feria, Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

LEABRES vs CA, December 12 1986 DIGEST

Doctrine:
A receipt can neither be regarded as a contract of sale nor a promise to sell. In here, there is an absence of the
essential requisites of a contract of sale.
Facts:
Plaintiff purchased a portion of a subdivision from the surviving husband of the deceased owner, evidenced by a
receipt. The Philippine Trust Co relieved the surviving husband as administrator and advertised the sale of the
subdivision. Since no adverse claim or interest over the subdivision or any portion thereof was ever presented by any
person, the Philippine Trust Co. executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subdivision in favor of the Manotok Realty,
Inc.. The deed was judicially approved and recorded immediately in the Register of Deeds which issued the
corresponding Certificates of Title.
Issue:
Whether or not a receipt is a valid basis of a contract of sale
Held:
No. An examination of the receipt reveals that the same can neither be regarded as a contract of sale or a promise to

sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). The requisites of a valid
Contract of Sale, namely 1) consent or meeting of the minds of the parties; 2) determinate subject matter; 3) price
certain in money or its equivalent, are lacking in the said receipt.

Co vs CIR, 99 Phil 841

[G.R. No. L-8506. August 31, 1956.]

CELESTINO CO & COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Celestino Co & Company is a duly registered general copartnership doing business
under the trade name of Oriental Sash Factory. From 1946 to 1951 it paid
percentage taxes of 7 per cent on the gross receipts of its sash, door and window
factory, in accordance with section one hundred eighty-six of the National Revenue
Code imposing taxes on sales of manufactured articles. However in 1952 it began to
claim liability only to the contractors 3 per cent tax (instead of 7 per cent) under
section 191 of the same Code;
and having failed to convince the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, it brought the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals, where it also
failed. Said the Court:
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To support his contention that his client is an ordinary contractor counsel

presented duplicate copies of letters, sketches of doors and windows and price
quotations supposedly sent by the manager of the Oriental Sash Factory to four
customers who allegedly made special orders for doors and windows from the said
factory. The conclusion that counsel would like us to deduce from these few exhibits
is that the Oriental Sash Factory does not manufacture ready-made doors, sash and
windows for the public but only upon special order of its select customers . I cannot
believe that Petitioner company would take, as in fact it has taken, all the trouble
and expense of registering a special trade name for its sash business and then
orders company stationery carrying the bold print Oriental Sash Factory (Celestino
Co & Company, Prop.) 926 Raon St. Quiapo, Manila, Tel. No. 33076, Manufacturers of
all kinds of doors, windows, sashes, furnitures, etc. used season-dried and kiln-dried
lumber, of the best quality workmanship solely for the purpose of supplying the
needs for doors, windows and sash of its special and limited customers. One will
note that Petitioner has chosen for its tradename and has offered itself to the public
as a Factory, which means it is out to do business, in its chosen lines on a big
scale. As a general rule, sash factories receive orders for doors and windows of
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special design only in particular cases but the bulk of their sales is derived from
ready-made doors and windows of standard sizes for the average home. Moreover,
as shown from the investigation of Petitioners books of accounts, during the period
from January 1, 1952 to September 30, 1952, it sold sash, doors and windows worth
P188,754.69. I find it difficult to believe that this amount which runs to six figures
was derived by Petitioner entirely from its few customers who made special orders
for these items.
Even if we were to believe Petitioners claim that it does not manufacture readymade sash, doors and windows for the public and that it makes these articles only
upon special order of its customers, that does not make it a contractor within the
purview of section 191 of the National Internal Revenue Code. There are no less
than fifty occupations enumerated in the aforesaid section of the National Internal
Revenue Code subject to percentage tax and after reading carefully each and every
one of them, we cannot find one under which the business enterprise
ofPetitioner could appropriately fall. It would require a stretch of the law and much
effort to make the business of manufacturing sash, doors and windows upon special
order of customers fall under the category of road, building, navigation, artesian
well, water works and other construction work contractors;
filling contractors as
enumerated in the section being invoked by Petitioners counsel. Construction work
contractors are those who alter or repair buildings, structures, streets, highways,
sewers, street railways, railroads, logging roads, electric, steam or water plants
telegraph and telephone plants and lines, electric lines or power lines, and includes
any other work for the construction, altering or repairing for which machinery driven
by mechanical power is used. (Payton vs. City of Anadardo 64 P. 2d 878, 880, 179
Okl. 68).
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Having thus eliminated the feasibility of taxing Petitioner as a contractor under

section 191 of the National Internal Revenue Code, this leaves us to decide the
remaining issue whether or notPetitioner could be taxed with lesser strain and more
accuracy as seller of its manufactured articles under section 186 of the same code,
as the Respondent Collector of Internal Revenue has in fact been doing since the
Oriental Sash Factory was established in 1946.
The percentage tax imposed in section 191 of our Tax Code is generally a tax on
the sales of services, in contradiction with the tax imposed in section 186 of the
same Code which is a tax on the original sales of articles by the manufacturer,
producer or importer. (Formillezas Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the National
Internal Revenue Code, Vol II, p. 744). The fact that the articles sold are
manufactured by the seller does not exchange the contract from the purview of
section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code as a sale of articles.
There was a strong dissent;
but upon careful consideration of the whole matter
we are inclined to accept the above statement of the facts and the law. The
important thing to remember is that Celestino Co & Company habitually makes
sash, windows and doors, as it has represented in its stationery and advertisements
to the public. That it manufactures the same is practically admitted
by Appellant itself. The fact that windows and doors are made by it only when
customers place their orders, does not alter the nature of the establishment, for it is
obvious that it only accepted such orders as called for the employment of such
materials-moulding, frames, panels-as it ordinarily manufactured or was in a
position habitually to manufacture.
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Perhaps the following paragraph represents in brief the Appellants position in this
Court:
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Since the Petitioner, by clear proof of facts not disputed by the Respondent,
manufactures sash, windows and doors only for special customers and upon their
special orders and in accordance with the desired specifications of the persons
ordering the same and not for the general market:
since the doors ordered by
Don Toribio Teodoro & Sons, Inc., for instance, are not in existence and which never
would have existed but for the order of the party desiring it;
and since Petitioners
contractual relation with his customers is that of a contract for a piece of work or
since Petitioner is engaged in the sale of services, it follows that
the Petitioner should be taxed under section 191 of the Tax Code and NOT under
section 185 of the same Code. (Appellants brief, p. 11-12).
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But the argument rests on a false foundation. Any builder or homeowner, with
sufficient money, may order windows or doors of the kind manufactured by
this Appellant. Therefore it is not true that it serves special customers only confines
its services to them alone. And anyone who sees, and likes, the doors ordered by
Don Toribio Teodoro & Sons Inc. may purchase from Appellantdoors of the same
kind, provided he pays the price. Surely, the Appellant will not refuse, for it can
easily duplicate or even mass-produce the same doors it is mechanically
equipped to do so.
That the doors and windows must meet desired specifications is neither here nor
there. If these specifications do not happen to be of the kind habitually
manufactured by Appellant special forms of sash, mouldings or panels it would
not accept the order and no sale is made. If they do, the transaction would be no
different from a purchasers of manufactured goods held is stock for sale;
they are
bought because they meet the specifications desired by the purchaser.
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Nobody will say that when a sawmill cuts lumber in accordance with the peculiar
specifications of a customer sizes not previously held in stock for sale to the
public it thereby becomes an employee or servant of the customer, 1 not the
seller of lumber. The same consideration applies to this sash manufacturer.
The Oriental Sash Factory does nothing more than sell the goods that it massproduces or habitually makes;
sash, panels, mouldings, frames, cutting them to
such sizes and combining them in such forms as its customers may desire.
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On the other hand, Petitioners idea of being a contractor doing construction jobs is
untenable. Nobody would regard the doing of two window panels as construction
work in common parlance. 2
Appellant invokes Article 1467 of the New Civil Code to bolster its contention that in
filing orders for windows and doors according to specifications, it did not sell, but
merely contracted for particular pieces of work or merely sold its services.
Said article reads as follows:

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A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the
ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market,
whether the same is on hand at the time or not, is a contract of sale, but if the
goods are to be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order,
and not for the general market, it is contract for a piece of work.

It is at once apparent that the Oriental Sash Factory did not merely sell its services
to Don Toribio Teodoro & Co. (To take one instance) because it also sold the
materials. The truth of the matter is that it sold materials ordinarily manufactured
by it sash, panels, mouldings to Teodoro & Co., although in such form or
combination as suited the fancy of the purchaser. Such new form does not divest
the Oriental Sash Factory of its character as manufacturer. Neither does it take the
transaction out of the category of sales under Article 1467 above quoted, because
although the Factory does not, in the ordinary course of its business, manufacture
and keep on stock doors of the kind sold to Teodoro, it could stock and/or probably
had in stock the sash, mouldings and panels it used therefor (some of them at
least).
In our opinion when this Factory accepts a job that requires the use of extraordinary
or additional equipment, or involves services not generally performed by it it
thereby contracts for a piece of work filling special orders within the meaning of
Article 1467. The orders herein exhibited were not shown to be special. They were
merely orders for work nothing is shown to call them special requiring
extraordinary service of the factory.
The thought occurs to us that if, as alleged all the work of Appellant is only to fill
orders previously made, such orders should not be called special work, but regular
work. Would a factory do business performing only special, extraordinary or
preculiar merchandise?
Anyway, supposing for the moment that the transactions were not sales, they were
neither lease of services nor contract jobs by a contractor. But as the doors and
windows had been admittedly manufactured by the Oriental Sash Factory, such
transactions could be, and should be taxed as transfers thereof under section 186
of the National Revenue Code.
The appealed decision is consequently affirmed. SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
Endnote:

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1 2. With all the consequences in Article 1729 New Civil Code and Act No. 3959
(bond of contractor).

a. Arnoldus Carpentry, 159 SCRA 199

b. Auiroga vs Parsons, 38 Phil 501
c. Gonzalo Puyat and Sons Inc vs Arco Amusement, 72 Phil 402
d. Dignos vs CA, 158 SCRA 375
e. Rayos vs CA, 434 SCRA 365
f. Cemeno Jr vs Lobregat, 09 September 2004
2. Object of Sale
a. Almendra vs IAC, November 21, 1991
3. Price
a. Bayongayong vs CA, 430 SCRA 210

b.
c.
d.
e.

Mapali vs Mapalo, 17 SCRA 114

Velasco vs CA, 51 SCRA 439
Villanueva vs CA, 267 SCRA 89
Swedih Match vs CA, October 20, 1004

4. Contract of Sale Concepts

a. Leaches vs CA, December 12 1986
b. Co vs CIR, 99 Phil 841
c. Arnoldus Carpentry, 159 SCRA 199
d. Auiroga vs Parsons, 38 Phil 501
e. Gonzalo Puyat and Sons Inc vs Arco Amusement, 72 Phil 402
f. Dignos vs CA, 158 SCRA 375
g. Rayos vs CA, 434 SCRA 365
h. Cemeno Jr vs Lobregat, 09 September 2004
5. Object of Sale
a. Almendra vs IAC, November 21, 1991
6. Price
a. Bayongayong vs CA, 430 SCRA 210
b. Mapali vs Mapalo, 17 SCRA 114
c. Velasco vs CA, 51 SCRA 439
d. Villanueva vs CA, 267 SCRA 89
e. Swedih Match vs CA, October 20, 1004