ITALY ESSAY PLANS

HOW STABLE WAS ITALY BY 1914

POLITICAL INSTABILITY
- trasformismo
- PSI threats (20% by 1913, though not grave due to divisions)
- Catholic hostility (no political participation so because paternalistic)
- extension of franchise mean less seats (1913, liberals lose 71)

INTERNATIONAL STANDING
- did not have Italia irredenta (damaged national pride)
- Libyan invasion (empire but did not unite Italians or placate nationalists)
- army growing but weak comparably (1914: 14 battleships to USSRs 67)

SOCIAL DIVISIONS
- no sense of Italian identity (2% spoke Italian)
- distance between real and legal Italy (corrupt ruling class vs mass peasant population > resentment)
- N/S divide (80% illiterate, suffered at benefit of elites)

ECONOMIC SITUATION
- mechanisation / industrialisation led to general improvement (1899 Fiat is a success but still 68% agricultural by 1914)
- industrialisation of north vs lack of progress in south (lopsided economy, developments only a northern phenomenon)
- trade deficit (lack of natural resources, in the red so heavy industry could not take off, reliant on US investment)

CONCLUSION
- v. unstable
- entire political system at risk of crumbling due to disenchantment w. self serving elites
- Libya only served to divide Italians more
- economy slowly improved but served to increase inequality & was still incomparable to neighbours
- deeply ingrained issues from unification were left to grow & worsen under corrupt Liberal politics

HOW FAR WAS THE RISE OF ITALIAN NATIONALISM AS A POLITICAL FORCE THE MAIN REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF THE
GIOLITTI PROGRAMME

RISE OF ITALIAN NATIONALISM

- constant criticism of Liberal corruption exposed Italians to its weaknesses (since ANI 1911 establishment)
- claimed Liberal govt were unpatriotic (1896 Adowa failure, no action to reclaim irredenta, no national identity)
- nationalist icons denounced Giolitti & encouraged support for action politics (DAnnunzio, loud minority)

RELATIONS W. SOCIALISTS
- 1906 state neutrality in industrial disputes encouraged socialists to radicalise (unrest, trade unions wanted state support)
- deals w. socialists angered right wing (neutrality angered industrialists who previously supported Liberals, fear of revolution)

EXTENSION OF FRANCHISE
- made Giolitti seem democratic & eager for political involvement (electorate from 4 to 5.8mil, yet undermined by corruption)
- undermined Liberals as other parties gained more seats (destabilises, Liberals lose 71 seats in 1913 election)
- Giolitti had less influence in south (trasformismo didnt work w. politically engaged, disproportionate to peasants = socialists)

LIBYAN INVASION
- costly, war not worth the colony (morale fell after original enthusiasm, a year long, 3500 deaths)
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- nationalists claimed responsibility (undermined L.S as nationalists had pressured for it, blamed lack of patriotism for fatalities)
- socialists used it as an opportunity to criticise L.S as oppressors of masses (conscripted peasants despite war of elite)

CONCLUSION
- new & energetic group were a major threat but socialists were more
- nationalists were fringe despite pressing war, insignificant in comparison
- extension of franchise led to rise of socialism

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE GIOLITTIAN PROGRAMME SUCCESSFUL

RELATIONS W. SOCALISTS
- was able to improve working conditions & standard of living (social reforms ex. 1913 old / ill fund for merchants & navy)
- calmed socialist threat to some extent (won over leader Turati, Bisolatti offered place in cabinet, but radicals not absorbed)
- conflict w. other groups (Giolitti too involved in socialism for Catholics, angered industrialists over 1906 neutrality)

RELATIONS W. CATHOLIC CHURCH

- repeatedly stated separation of Church & State (2 parallel lines that do not cross, did not solve Roman Question)
- offered some concessions to Church (promoted catholic interests in education, 1904 blocked divorce bill, won Catholic vote)
- over reliance on Church would be his eventual downfall (Gentiloni claimed 228/318 Liberal seats after 1913 were Catholic)

LIBYAN WAR
- improved international standing (had finally conquered land to rival counterparts, revenge for 1896 Adowa)
- criticism from nationalists (ANI membership increases, result of pressure, blamed lack of patriotism for fatalities & length)
- radicalised socialists (conscripted soldiers who were mostly peasants, didnt benefit from war of elite, maximalists in control)

EXTENSION OF FRANCHISE
- made Italy into a stronger & more inclusive democracy (concept of democratisation undermined by corruption & paternalism)
- other parties gained more seats (Liberals lose 71)
- Gio > less influence in south (men could vote regardless of literacy, peasants are naturally socialist so disproportionate gains)

CONCLUSION
- Gio aimed to absorb all social groups & despite slight improvements ex. working conditions, unable to complete aim
- Libyan invasion & extension of franchise unsuccessful
- only progress was w. socialists but this was eradicated by Libyan war

TO WHAT EXTENT DID WWI DESTABILISE ITALY

AGGRAVATED NATIONALISM
- ex-soldiers believed Italy did not receive just rewards for her war efforts (should receive from TOL, Fiume not given in St. G)
- Italy needed dynamic politics to replace L.S (rise in popularity for eccentric DAnnunzio, ex-soldiers & nationalists hailed him)
- 1919 occupation of Fiume by DAnnunzio (heroism made L.S look weak & undermined power)

POST-WAR ECONOMIC CRISIS

- high inflation decreasing living standards (16 to 85 mil lira debt 1914-19, + printing money quadrupling prices)
- cease in demand for war materials led to failure of war industries (1921 collapse of Ansaldo & Ilva causing banking crisis)
- wave of labour militancy & industrial disputes (workers vented frustration over inflation)

RADICALISATION & SOCIALIST THREAT

- war radicalised socialism (no longer supported gradual reform, advocated revolution insp. by 1917 Russian revolution)
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- increase in socialists popularity challenging Liberals (largest party in 1919 elections w. 156 seats, 200k members)
- threat led to growing fear of revolution among m/c (turned to other groups ex. squadristi to crush socialists as L.S was weak)

CONCLUSION
- WWI exacerbated fundamental weaknesses that Italy already had (weak govt & economic situation)
- encouraged anger toward govt from all groups, diminishing support
- economy failure encouraged socialist radicalisation inspiring fear in m/c & lack of trust in action-lacking govt

HOW FAR DO YOU AGREE THAT THE MAIN REASON WHY ITALY COLLAPSED 1919-20 WAS THE POST WAR ECONOMIC CRISIS

POST-WAR ECONOMIC CRISIS

- inflation angered m/c encouraging a new type of politics (savings destroyed, real wages went down, prices went up)
- unemployment & inability of veterans to find jobs (poor reward for their sacrifice after fighting for prosperity, 1919: 2mil)

RISE OF NATIONALISM & MUTILATED VICTORY

- underwhelming territorial result fed nationalists (L.S did not work to win Fiume, wanted more than St. G, L.S unpatriotic)
- occupation of Fiume 1919 (2000 men, govt didnt act so looked weak inc. internationally)

SOCIALIST THREAT
- 1918 universal male suffrage gave more power to left (economic upheaval after war gave support for socialists, 156 seats)
- radicalisation led to 1919-20 Biennia Rosso (influence of Maximalists growing, Sept 1920 strike of 0.5mil workers, scares m/c)

CONCLUSION
- main cause was economic problems because mass unemployment led to resentment leading to socialism & chaos
- economic problems more long lasting discontent as socialists were never strong enough to overthrow govt

HOW ACCURATE IS IT TO SAY THAT FASCIST IDEOLOGY CHANGED CONSIDERABLY 1919-21

BECAME LESS LEFT-WING TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES AS A CURE TO SOCIALIST THREAT

- failure of fascists w. left wing policies in 1919 elections (nationalisation, progressive taxation, workers rights > no seats)
- moved to the right economically to win elite support (1920 New Programme : nationalisation was dropped, pro-business)
- radical change from founding principles, meant it was now a broad & unspecific movement (1921, 35 seats were on right)

DROPPING OF LIBERAL POLICIES

- dropping of anti-clericalism & increased support for Church (Nov 1921, promised to solve Roman Question on Popes terms)
- 1922 abandonment of republicanism (M. realised power of king in appointing / dismissing PMs, & aware of aristocracy power)
- abandonment of other liberal policies (1919 stood for universal suffrage inc. women, dropped to gain elite support)

INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

- continued violence to suppress socialism (1919 squadristi burned down Avanti offices & 1921 80 T.U offices destroyed)
- Ms attempt to undermine Ras (pushed for 1921 Pact to end violence & assert power, moving fascism into mainstream)
- Fascist ideology had moved from a movement w. focus on localised violence to an official mainstream party (1921 PNF)

CONCLUSION
- very accurate that it changed considerable > established as left wing in economic & social policy but these were abandoned
- less focused on political policy & rather focus on pleasing political elite & policy which would attain power most effectively
- violence remained central but approached far more cautiously later on by Mussolini to win over the elites

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HOW FAR DO YOU AGREE THAT THE POLITICAL ELITE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR MUSSOLINIS APPOINTMENT AS PM IN 1922?

LONG TERM FAILURES OF POLITICAL ELITE

- inability to tame nationalists (after vocal dissatisfaction post-Libya & Fiume occupation in 1919)
- inability to control socialists (had allowed 1919 Biennio Rosso & subsequent growth in Fascist support for fear of socialism)
- weakness of Liberal coalitions (torn apart from internal strife, Fascists in National Bloc in 1912 giving respectable face)

SHORT TERM FAILURES OF POLITICAL ELITE

- unstable govts meant M was only viable option (Facta resigned after martial law refused, Calandra unable to form govt)
- weakness of King directly caused Ms appointment (changed mind over martial law dreading replacement by his cousin)

FEAR OF SOCIALISM
- Biennio Rosso made the socialists appear a real threat (1917 Russian revolution, industrialists began to support fascists)
- rural fear > Agrarian fascism > mass movement (small landowners harmed by socialist local govts, fascists took control)

ECONOMIC ELITE
- support from confindustria (donations a vertebra in backbone of rise, h/e industrialists only made up 2.8% of party in 1921)
- legitimised fascists as a party (endorsement presented party as a legitimate group, reassured the rest of elite)
- reliance on fascists to stop strikes (allowed fascist movement to take out left opposition as confindustria saw fascism as cure)

CONCLUSION
- sympathy rose as hatred for socialists grew
- Ms appointment was not a reflection of Fascist popularity in elections
- responsibility lay predominantly w. political elite who had
- (in long term) failed to create sustainable or popular govt managing threat of socialism
- (in short term) had persuaded King to appoint M in 1922 due to infighting

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FASCIST DICTATORSHIP 1922-26 A RESULT OF THE MISTAKES OF
MUSSOLINIS OPPONENTS

MISTAKES OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

- concerned elite didnt do enough to convince the king of Ms danger (despite 1924 Matteotti crisis > many were concerned)
- 1924 Aventine Succession was impractical & made it easier for Mussolini (little more than symbolic)
- lack of unity among Aventine deputies meant they did not do enough to act against M (as were a range of different parties)

MUSSOLINIS COMPROMISE & COERCION

- M gave elites positions to reassure conservatives he wouldnt be radical (DStefani for those worried about economic change)
- reassured confindustria that he would act in their interests (had persuaded them by 1923 & did not attack tax evasion)
- compromised w. Catholics to gain their support (policies convince Pope to support over PPI, Cavazzoni as Minister of Work)
- Ms speech to chamber in 1922 allowed him to rule by decree (tool of intimidation w. violent threats of squadristi, 306 to 116)

MUSSOLINI CONTROLLING THE PNF

- creation of 1922 FGC undermined cabinet & allowed more power (as no other fascists in cabinet & only 35 deputies in CoD)
- M formalised previous violent fascists into MSVN 1923 (ensured elite support, increased personal control from 300k oath)
- M worked to expand PNF membership to dilute Ras power (doubled to 783k members since MoR, revolutionaries decreased)

CONCLUSION
- most important was support from conservative elite
- only person w. power to remove was King who listened to elite advisers
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- all actions wrt controlling his own party were the result of a desire to please conservative elite & appear unthreatening
- in essence, the elite accepting these concessions from M. was a mistake so the statement in question is true

HOW FAR DID MUSSOLINI ACHIEVE HIS POLITICAL GOALS IN RELATION TO ITALYS YOUTH 1926-30

FASCIST YOUTH GROUPS

- importance of military training and physical activity in ONB to produce fascist fighters (camaraderie for army, warlike nation)
- ONB was social & enjoyable group not focused on indoctrination (attendance of ONB willingness to die for the Duce)
- ONB was all encompassing; M was able to influence all of Italian youth (compulsory by early 30s, but rural areas not high)

CATHOLIC INFLUENCE ON YOUTH

- continuation of Catholic Action meant sharing control w. Church (1mil, from 1929 Lateran Pacts, but didnt contradict fascism)
- influence on education (M wanted to instil a devotion to Italy but devotion to god meant ideologies would be hard to conflate)

EDUCATION POLICIES
- ensured fascist influence through teachers (those of suspect views were dismissed from 1925, all had to take oath in 1929)
- promotion of Cult in schools (sycophantic biographies used in schools, Duces portrait alongside King - but not fascism)
- censorship of literature (books which were insufficiently patriotic were banned in 1926, claimed Italy was at forefront of world)

CONCLUSION
- doubtlessly encouraged view of Ms greatness but probably did not create loyal fascists
- had to share power w. church but relatively minimal & usually did not interfere w. encouraged political teachings

HOW FAR DO YOU AGREE THAT MUSSOLINIS CONTROL OF ITALY WAS MAINLY A RESULT OF PROPAGANDA AND
INDOCTRINATION

PROPAGANDA
- cult used to encourage support for fascism morally but specifically Mussolini (30mil photos, sole leader, Gold for Patria)
- indoctrination of youth in ONB / schools (ideal Balilla would swear an oath, girls movements > fertility, only social reasons?)
- M attempted to force a reform of customs to transform into true fascists (goose step, anti-Semitic decrees for identity)

POLITICAL COMPROMISE
- endorsement from Pope allowed tighter grasp (due to concern of Socialists, 1929 Lateran Pacts solved Roman Q)
- pandering to economic elite (1926 Rocco law banning strikes & removing TU, supported big business over small in GD)
- King & political elite were only people w. constitutional power to rival Duce so compromised (DStefani, MOC useless)

PRESS CONTROL AND CENSORSHIP

- 1926 press control laws meant any narrative opposing fascism were eradicated (Avanti shut, pieces provided, no crime)
- importance of press control is limited as pre-existing newspapers stayed open (Vaticans Osservatore sold 600% more)

REPRESSION AND TERROR

- OVRA acted as a force to repress the nation > more suppression than indoctrination (1927 police, Rosselli brothers)
- Confino & Special Tribunal (dissidents in exile, opposition messages did not spread so anti-fascist culture did not emerge)
- relative lack of brutality meant M did not greatly rely on terror (9 death sentences pre WWI, focus on prominent anti-fascists)

CONCLUSION
- main reason why M maintained control was political compromise as elites were the only people w. power to remove
- propaganda & indoctrination were not that important as on the whole did not work > party members were careerists
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HOW FAR DO YOU AGREE THAT MUSSOLINI CREATED A NATION OF LOYAL FASCISTS BETWEEN 1926 AND 1939

INDOCTRINATION OF YOUTH
- ONB to create nation of militaristic fascists (boys taught bomb throwing etc. but mainly social occasions, & not in south)
- propaganda & censorship used in schools to help promote fascism (sycophantic biographies, control over literature)
- youth policies propagated loyalty to Mussolini not belief in fascism (Duce portrait next to King)

THE OND
- set up in 1925, 20% of industrial workforce in 1935 & 4mil peak in 1939, most popular aspect of regime
- absence of indoctrination meant loyal Fascists were not created but M seemed a more amicable leader

THE CULT OF IL DUCE

- portray of Duce as a man of immense ability was effective in increasing popularity (dynamic, attracted all, Caesar, slogan)
- inability of cult to make more radical policy popular after 1935 (1937 anti-Semitic laws not met with enthusiasm)
- effect of cult meant people supported Mussolini as a character not in fascism (fascism unsustainable therefore)

CONCLUSION
- clear that M failed to create loyal nation of Fascists between 1926-29, policies unpopular
- Mussolini was hugely popular but Fascist ideology was not esp. after Abyssinian War 1935

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS MUSSOLINIS ECONOMIC POLICY SUCCESSFUL IN THE YEARS 1926-39

BATTLE FOR LIRA

- revaluation of Lira increased Ms prestige w. foreign bankers & Italians (fixed to 90 per gap in 1927, demonstrated his will)
- effect on Italy exports (goods almost twice as expensive, textiles in depression, unemployment trebled 1926-28, wage cuts)
- high tariffs as a result of autarky meant imports were not cheaper either (only winners were heavy industries ex. armaments)

CORPORATE STATE
- extent of empowerment of workers (corporate state to allow better communication but 1927 Charter & MoC did not benefit)
- industrialists benefited greatly as kept control of businesses, but successful for M (Fascist officials represented workers)
- use of corporate state for pro-M propaganda (prove that M had overcome problems of class conflict & constructed a 3rd way)

AUTARKY
- bilateral agreements ensured Italy could minimise import spending (strengthened control of foreign currency & rose exports)
- govt control of industry, esp. heavy, ensured a degree of self-sufficiency (IRI scheme but expensive, spending x2 1934-38)
- battle for grain 1925 (production rose 50% from pre-1914 levels but cash crops discouraged so unsuccessful)

RESPONSE TO DEPRESSION
- hit Italy (unemployment 2mil by 1933, wage cuts by 12% in 1930 & car production halved despite Fascist attempt to mitigate)
- h/e successful compared to western neighbours (state intervention in public works schemes, IRI 1933, keynsian economics)
- state intervention came at great cost to the taxpayer but still weathered better than others & promoted Ms image

CONCLUSION
- M quite successful in preventing economic disaster after WSC but overall success limited
- economic elite relations were strengthened but policies unsuccessful for Italians as a whole
- Italian workers suffered & stripped of rights under corporate state
- only successful as a means to promote M through propaganda or pandering to confindustria
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TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE 1935 INVASION OF ABYSSINIA A SUCCESS

ECONOMIC EFFECTS
- extortionate cost of war (billions, state debt from 3.5 to 16bil, worsened already weak economy + halfhearted LON sanctions)
- had to keep spending on ongoing guerrilla war as only 1/3 was occupied in 1940s
- Abyssinia was not, in long term, an economically favourable colony (only 2% exports sold there, not arable land, no oil)

POPULAR SUPPORT
- genuine popularity among elite (Gold for Patria, Church endorsed as thought they could extent influence)
- effect on Cult of il Duce (Italian women followed in Queens footsteps, M seemed dynamic compared to 1896 Adowa, Caesar)

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
- Britain & France condemn meaning M lost potential allies (weak LON sanctions, chemical weapons changed perception of M)
- pushed Italy towards Germany (as B&F were weak, but became too reliant & this was unpopular w. Italians > 1936 R-B Axis)

CONCLUSION
- in excitement & positivity of 1935 invasion, war appeared to be exclusively positive as was originally quick
- massive achievement for cult & caused peak of Ms popularity in 1935
- but a long term failure as was a heavy economic burden & devastating impact on international relations

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS MUSSOLINI IN ACHIEVING HIS FOREIGN POLICY AIMS BEFORE 1935

CONTROL OF MEDITERRANEAN
- was able to assert dominance over Corfu 1923 making M seem a strong leader but no material gain (only 50mil arbitration)
- some success in increasing Italian power in s/e Europe (1928, Albania became protectorate)
- still subservient to Brits (navy weaker despite growth, wouldnt compromise control ex crucial Suez Canal, economic reliance)

ITALIAN TERRITORY
- failed to convince B&F to extend territory at Locarno treaty (but his invite suggested international standing had grown)
- managed to gain Fiume (Yugoslavia handed over in 1924, great significance but materially small & unimportant)
- maintained Libyan colony through violence (chemical weapons killed 1/3 Libyans solidifying colony but did not expand)

CONTROLLING NAZI GERMANY

- attempted to create 1933 4 Power Pact to hem Germany in (never ratified)
- avoided Anschluss so seemed saviour against aggression in 1934 but Hitler was still consolidating anyway

CONCLUSION
- M was not v successful as had not gained anything material except Fiume
- failed to reduce British influence in Med as hands were tied
- strengthened cult of il Duce as small actions were manipulated to be great victories, increasing Ms popularity

HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS MUSSOLINI IN ACHIEVING HIS FOREIGN POLICY AIMS 1935-40

INVASION OF ABYSSINIA
- support for M increased in short term & helped cult (Gold for Patria, Church endorsement, compared to Adowa, Caesar)
- high cost of war for invasion & long term (debt from 3.5 to 16bil lira, devalued lira by 40%, ongoing guerrilla war, 2% exports)
- international condemnation led by LON (halfhearted sanctions, M seen as increasing threat to peace, propaganda for M)
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SPANISH CIVIL WAR

- high cost of war (14bil, raised taxes, complete failure of independence & autarky as became reliant on Germany)
- lack of popularity (no territorial benefits, showed Ms failure to turn Italy into warlike nation, did not gain real ally in Franco)
- detrimental effects to army > long term effects on WWII performance (3.5 years, 14k dead, could not join WWII at first)

GAINING CONCESSIONS FROM BRITAIN & FRANCE

- Hoare-Laval Pact for 2/3 Abyssinia to Italy in return for keeping Stresa front (despite uproar, official recognition of claim)
- increasing shift to Hitler made B&F unwilling to grant concessions (R-B Axis 1936, anti-comintern pact, 1937 LON withdrawal)

CONCLUSION
- somewhat successful in short term due to Abyssinia but would become more of a burden so not successful
- aim to expand army & make them great warriors not achieved > by end were weak & weakened Italy as military force

- no territorial gains as Britain & France unwilling to make concessions due to shift & power reduced due to lack of respect

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