II. A.
Constitutional Policy on Labor
1. Sec. 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution
2. Labor Code Policy
i) Art. 3
ii) Art. 4
iii) Art. 211 (a) and (e): free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration,
mediation and conciliation; provide adequate
machinery for dispute resolution
B. Non-Unionized Establishments
a. Helplessness of unorganized labor
b. Adversarial situation
c. Denying worker participation does not promote
healthy and harmonious relationship
d. Labor-Management Council (LMC)
• Articles 255, 273 (g) and 277 (g)
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule XXI, Book V, Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
• Read Azucena, 8 PLG 44, No. 12
• Read Foz Article in III PAVA Journal No.2
(2002)
Philippine Airlines v. NLRC, 225 SCRA 301 (1993)
FACTS: On March 15, 1985, PAL completely revised its 1966
Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among the
employees and was immediately implemented, and some
employees were subjected to the disciplinary measures.
The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA)
filed a complaint before the NLRC contending that PAL, by its
unilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor
practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Art 249 and Art 253
of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had
been circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in nature
the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient
publication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and
prejudicial to the rights of the employees. It prayed that
implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that PAL
should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that
employees dismissed under the Code reinstated and their cases
subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of
unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages.
PAL filed a MTD, asserting its prerogative as an employer
to prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees' conduct
in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that it
had not violated the CBA or any provision of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the formulation of a Code of Discipline among
employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the
employees
HELD: YES.
Ratio Employees have a right to participate in the deliberation
of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of
policies relative thereto and one such matter is the formulation
of a code of discipline.
Reasoning It was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of
RA 6715, amending Art 211 of the Labor Code, that the law
explicitly considered it a State policy "to ensure the participation
of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare." However, even in the absence
of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management
prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs.
Medina, it was held that management's prerogatives must be
without abuse of discretion.
In San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union vs. Ople, we
upheld the company's right to implement a new system of
distributing itsproducts, but gave the following caveat: So long
as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in good
faith for the advancement the employer's interest and not for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employee, under special laws or under valid agreements, this
Court will uphold them.
All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of
managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by
limitations found in law, a CBA, or the general principles of fair
play and justice. Moreover, it must be duly established that the
prerogative being invoked is clearly a managerial one.
Verily, a line must be drawn between management
prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those
which affect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter,
management should see to it that its employees are at least
properly informed of its decisions or modes of action. PAL
asserts that all its employees have been furnished copies of the
Code, the LA and the NLRC found to the contrary, which finding,
is entitled to great respect.
 PALEA recognizes the right of the Company to determine
matters of management policy and Company operations and to
direct its manpower. Management of the Company includes the
right to organize, plan, direct and control operations, to hire,
assign employees to work, transfer employees from one
department to another, to promote, demote, discipline, suspend
or discharge employees for just cause; to lay-off employees for
valid and legal causes, to introduce new or improved methods or
facilities or to change existing methods or facilities and the right
to make and enforce Company rules and regulations to carry out
the functions of management. The exercise by management of
its prerogative shall be done in a just, reasonable, humane
and/or lawful manner.
Such provision in the CBA may not be interpreted as
cession of employees' rights to participate in the deliberation of
matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of
policies relative thereto. And one such matter is the formulation
of a code of discipline. Industrial peace cannot be achieved if the
employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of
matters affecting their rights.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union v. Ople, 170 SCRA
25 (1989)
GTE Directories Corp. v. Sanchez, 197 SCRA 452 (1991)
FACTS: Minister Sanchez decided the dispute in the exercise of
the jurisdiction assumed by his predecessor in accordance with
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
Even that assumption is open to question. The production and
publication of telephone directories, which is the principal
activity of GTE, can scarcely be described as an industry
affecting the national interest. GTE is a publishing firm
chiefly dependent on the marketing and sale of advertising
space for its not inconsiderable revenues.
Its services, while of value, cannot be deemed to be in
the same category of such essential activities as "the generation
or distribution of energy" or those undertaken by "banks,
hospitals, and export-oriented industries."
It cannot be regarded as playing as vital a role in
communication as other mass media. The small number of
employees involved in the dispute, the employer's payment of
"P10 million in income tax alone to the Philippine
government," and the fact that the "top officers of the union
were dismissed during the conciliation process," obviously do
not suffice to make the dispute in the case at bar one "adversely
affecting the national interest."
MERALCO v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173 (1999)
Facts: An arbitral award has been granted by the Secretary of
Labor to the MERALCO Union.
Petition had its origin in the renegotiation of the parties'
1992-1997 CBA, insofar as the last two-year period thereof is
concerned.
A letter from MERALCO’s Chairman of the Board and its
President addressed to their stockholders, which states that the
CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the period
December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997 is still with the
Supreme Court," as indicative of petitioner's recognition that
the CBA award covers the said period.
Issue:The parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction
of the arbitral awards by the Secretary of Labor should
commence.
Held: The period is herein set at two (2) years from 01
December 1995 to 30 November 1997.
The arbitral award can be considered as an
approximation of a CBA which would otherwise have been
entered into by the parties. The terms or periods set forth in
Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing
that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral
award by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable
law.
Despite the silence of the law, the Court ruled that CBA
arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of
the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both
employer and the employees or their union.
If there is no such agreement, the award shall retroact to the
first day after the six months following the last day of the CBA.
In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the
retroactivity date shall control.
Rule RE CBA retroactivity: (Art. 253-A)
If a CBA is renewed within 6 months from its expiry, it will be
retroactive from the day immediately following the expiry of the
original CBA. For instance, a CBA expires on December 31 and
its renegotiation is finished within 6 months, then the renewed
CBA dates back to January 01.
If there is no new CBA concluded within 6 months, then there
will be no automatic retroaction; both the retroaction (if any)
and the effectivity date of the new CBA will be left to the parties
to agree on.
III. Types of Dispute and Different Modes of Dispute
Settlement
1. Negotiation
2. Collective Bargaining including grievance handling,
mediation, conciliation and voluntary arbitration.
3. What is a labor dispute
Art. 212 (LC); Sec. 1 (s), Rule 1, Book V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LC
SMC Employees Union v. Bersamira, 186 SCRA 496 (1990)
FACTS: SMC entered into contracts for merchandising services
with Lipercon and D'Rite (L&D), independent contractors duly
licensed by DOLE. In said contracts, it was expressly understood
and agreed that the EEs employed by the contractors were to be
paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed EEs
or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee
relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one
hand, and SMC on the other.
Petitioner SMCEU-PTWGO (Union) is duly authorized
representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file EEs of SMC.
Their CBA provides that temporary, probationary, or contract
EEs are excluded from the bargaining unit and outside scope of
CBA.
Union advised SMC that some L&D workers had signed up
for union membership and sought the regularization of their
employment with SMC. Union alleged that this group of EEs,
while appearing to be contractual workers of supposedly
independent contractors, have been continuously working for
SMC for a period of 6 months to 15 years and that their work is
neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or
activities necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
SMC, and that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. It
was then demanded that the employment status of these
workers be regularized. This was not acted upon by SMC, and so
Union filed a notice of strike, and then a second notice.
Series of pickets were staged by L&D workers in various
SMC plants and offices. SMC RTC to enjoin the Union from:
representing and or acting for and in behalf of the employees of
L&D for the purposes of collective bargaining; calling for and
holding a strike vote to compel plaintiff to hire the employees or
workers of L&D, among others.
Union filed a Motion to Dismiss SMC's Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case/nature of the action,
which motion was opposed by SMC, which was denied by
respondent Judge. And after several hearings, issued Injunction.
RTC reasoned that the absence of ER-EE relationship negates
the existence of labor dispute, so court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of SMC's grievance. Hence, this action.
ISSUE: WON RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
controversy and properly issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
HELD: NO
Re: Definition of Labor Dispute (p4 of Outline)
Ratio A labor dispute can nevertheless exist “regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of
employer and employee, provided the controversy concerns,
among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a
"change" or "arrangement" thereof” The existence of a labor
dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and
defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. (A212 LC)
Reasoning Crucial to the resolution of the question on
jurisdiction, is the matter of whether or not the case at bar
involves, or is inconnection with, or relates to a labor dispute. An
affirmative answer would bring the case within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of labor tribunals to the exclusion of the
regular Courts. In this case, the matter re terms, tenure and
conditions of EE’s employment and the arrangement of those
terms as well as the matter of representation bring these issues
within the scope of a labor dispute. Hence it is the labor
tribunals that have jurisdiction and not the regular courts
Re: ER Functions and ULP (p30 of Outline)
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute,
jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals. So, Labor Arbiters
haveoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers including: [a] unfair labor
practice cases; [b] those that workers may file involving wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
and [c] cases arising from any violation of A265 LC, including
questions involving the legality of striker and lockouts.
 SMC’s claim that the action is for damages under A19, 20
and 21 of CC is not enough to keep the case within the
jurisdictional boundaries of regular Courts. That claim for
damages is interwoven with a labor dispute. To allow the action
filed below to prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which
is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
SC recognizes the proprietary right of SMC to exercise an
inherent management prerogative and its best business
judgment to determine whether it should contract out the
performance of some of its work to independent contractors.
However, the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law (S3, A13,
1987 Constitution)equally call for recognition and protection.
Those contending interests must be placed in proper perspective
and equilibrium.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED.
Gold City Integrated Port Service v. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627
(1995)
Note: A strike can only happen when there is a labor dispute.
In this case a strike occurred. It was an illegal strike for not
complying with formal requisites.
A STRIKE, considered as the most effective weapon of
labor is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute.
A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment of the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging
the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employers and employees.
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped
working and held the mass action to press for their wages and
other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the
cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor
dispute.
4. Types of labor dispute
a. rights dispute
b. interest dispute
Elgin, J. &. E. Ry. V. Burley, 65 S. Ct. 1282 (1945)
IV. Collective Bargaining
A. Nature and Purpose
United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Phils. V.
Noriel, 67 SCRA 267 (1975)
FACTS: The petition seeks to have the certification election
declared null and void, for it was held under circumstances that
manifested lack of fairness
It was alleged that the petitioner-union was included, but
under another name, in the list of contending unions in the
election, where the winning party had 63% of the votes, while
the petitioner only had 4.5% (thus, the winner won by a
landslide, even if the votes of all the other 7 contending unions
were combined. Therefore, the mistake didn’t really affect the
outcome of the election)
ISSUE: WON the certification election is void
HELD: NO
Ratio Considering what transpired, it is apparent that the
grievance spoken of is more fancied than real, the assertion of
confusion and demoralization based on conjecture rather than
reality. At most, it was an honest mistake
Reasoning The institution of collective bargaining is a prime
manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties
to the relationship, labor and management, make their own
rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in
matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a
number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be
represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be
discerned how crucial a certification election is.
There must be an opportunity to determine which labor
organization shall act on their behalf.It is precisely because
respect must be accorded to the will of labor thus ascertained
that a general allegation of duress is not sufficient to invalidate
a certification election; it must be shown by competent and
credible proof. That is to give substance to the principle of
majority rule, one of the basic concepts of a democratic polity.
Disposition Petition dismissed.
National Union of Restaurant Workers v. CIR, 10 SCRA
843 (1964)
FACTS: On June 9, 1960, a complaint for unfair labor practice
was lodged against the owners of Tres Hermanas Restaurant,
particularly Mrs. Felisa Herrera, on the ground, among others,
that respondents refused to bargain collectively with the
complaining union; respondents made a counter-proposal in the
sense that they would bargain with said union and would accept
its demands if the same would become a company union, and
one Martin Briones, an employee, was separated from the
service because he was found to be the organizer and adviser of
the complaining union.
Respondents denied the charges, and they were
exonerated. The judge found that the charges were not proven
and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUES
1. WON respondents refused to bargain collectively with the
union and committed unfair labor practice
2. WON respondents interfered, coerced or restrained their
employees in the exercise of their right to join the complaining
union
3. WONrespondents dismissed said employee because he was
found to be the organizer and adviser of the complaining union.
HELD
1. NO. Reasoning The court cited several instances that
showed respondent’s willingness to bargain with the union.
It is true that under Sec 14, RA 875 whenever a party serves a
written notice upon the employer making some demands the
latter shall reply thereto not later than 10 days from receipt
thereof, but this condition is merely procedural, and as much its
non-compliance cannot be deemed to be an act of unfair labor
practice. The fact is respondents did not ignore the letter sent by
the union so much so that they called a meeting to discuss its
demands.
The court also pointed out the markings on the letter
made by respondent in the meeting with the union on May 3,
1960 at their restaurant in Quezon City, indicating the
willingness and actual bargaining made with the union. (Check
for agreement, a cross for disapproval and a circle for demands
left open for further discussion)
It is contended that respondents refused to bargain with
the complaining union as such even if they called a meeting of
its officers and employees hereby concluding that they did not
desire to enter into a bargaining agreement with said union. It is
belied by the fact that respondents did actually agree and
bargain with the representatives of the union. Respondents were
of the impression that before a union could have that capacity it
must first be certified by the CIR as the duly authorized
bargaining unit, which they also stated in their answer to the
petition for certification filed by said union before the CIR. In that
case, another union known as the International Labor and Marine
Union of the Philippines claimed to represent the majority of the
employees of respondent restaurant, and this is what it alleged
in a letter sent to the manager of respondents dated May 25,
1962.
2. NO. Reasoning On this document certain notations were
made by one Ernesto Tan which are indeed derogatory and
which were allegedly made by him upon instructions of
respondent Felisa Herrera. Thus, the pertinent notation on which
the union relies is one which states that respondent Herrera
would be willing to recognize the union "if union would become
company union", which would indeed show that Mrs. Herrera
interfered with the employees' right to self-organization. But
respondents denied that they ever authorized Ernesto Tan to
make such notation or to represent them in the negotiations.
Although Tan was the nephew of respondent Herrera, in the
company, he was merely a bookkeeper whose duties were
confined to the keeping and examination of their books of
accounts and sales invoices. It appears that he was not even
invited to the meeting but merely volunteered to be present and
made those notations on his own account and initiative.
3. NO. Reasoning. Respondents maintain that Briones was
dismissed because of the “smouldering embers of hatred” that
Briones had against Mrs. Herrera, the threats he made, and her
fear for her own safety being always together with in her car
driven by Briones during business routine. Petitioners maintain
that Briones was dismissed because of his union activities. It
appears in Briones’ testimony that he is not the only one who
organized the union, yet the members who are more active in
the union and serve as its officers are still employed at the
restaurant.
DispositionCIR decision AFFIRMED.
Philam Mgt. Co. Inc. v. Philam Employees Association, 51
SCRA 98 (1973)
Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179 (1986)
FACTS: In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the
Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short) was
subsequently certified in a resolution dated November 29, 1978
by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant (Company for short). The Company's motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was denied on January 25,
1978.
December 7, 1978, the Union furnished the Company with two
copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. It also
requested the Company for its counter proposals. Both requests
were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.
The Union, on February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of
Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-
day statutory cooling-off period.
The Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the
National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration.
The labor arbiter set the initial hearing for April 29, 1979. For
failure however, of the parties to submit their respective position
papers as required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to
another date.
The Union submitted its position paper.
On July 20, 1979, the National Labor Relations
Commission rendered its decision declaring the respondent
guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain
Petitioner contends that the National Labor Relations
Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
rendering the challenged decision.
Petitioner further contends that the National Labor Relations
Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to
bargain is not supported by law
ISSUE/S: WON the respondent is guilty of unjustified refusal to
bargain
HELD: YES. Unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown
that the respondent employer, after having been served with a
written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not
even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal
Ratio Unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that
the respondent employer, after having been served with a
written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not
even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal
Reasoning Collective bargaining which is defined as
negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the
democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to
stabilize the relation between labor and management and to
create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a
mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is
characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249,
par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other
terms and conditions of employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an
agreement and executing a contract incorporating such
agreement, if requested by either party.
While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain,
the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate
contract negotiation.The mechanics of collective bargaining is
set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions
are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority
representation of the employees' representative in accordance
with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by
the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a
demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor
Code .
From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in
relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that
the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's)
attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's
disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the
Labor Code to bargain in good faith.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed
Divine Word University v. Secretary of Labor, 213 SCRA
759 (1992)
General Milling Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 514
(2004)
FACTS: Gen. Milling employed 190 employees in its two plants
in Cebu and Lapu-Lapu. They were all members of respondent
Gen. Milling Corp. Independent Labor Union (union), a duly
certified bargaining agent.
April 28, 1989: GMC and the union concluded a CBA
which included the issue of representation effective for a term of
three years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to
December 1, 1988 (expiration: November 30, 1991).
A day before the expiration, the union to GMC a CBA,
with a request for a counter-proposal to be returned within 10
days from receipt.
GMC received collective and individual letters from
workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union
membership, due to religious affiliation and personal differences.
Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a
CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
December 16, 1991: GMC wrote a letter to the union’s
officers, stating that even if there was no longer a basis for
negotiations (since there was no union already), management
was still willing to enter a dialogue with the union. The union
officers disclaimed the massive disaffiliation.
January 13, 1992: GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a
union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union
protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the
grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however,
advised the union to ―refer to our letter dated December 16,
1991.‖
July 2, 1992: the union filed a complaint against GMC with
the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu City, alleging unfair labor
practice. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the
recommendation that a petition for certification election be held
to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the
workers.
The union appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC set aside the
labor arbiter’s decision, and ordered GMC to abide by the CBA
draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years. NLRC
pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the
duration of a CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, is five (5) years which, in the case of GMC-
Independent Labor Union was from December 1, 1988 to
November 30, 1993; the union remained as the exclusive
bargaining agent.
ISSUES
1. WON GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the
duty to bargain collectively and/or interfering with the
right of its employees to self-organization;
2. WON CA abused its discretion when it imposed upon GMC the
draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from the
expiration of the original CBA.
HELD
1. YES Ratio Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to
submit a reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to
bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
Reasoning Article 253-A, Labor Code
Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. –Any Collective
Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term
of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no
certification election shall be conducted by the Department of
Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later
than three (3) years after its execution....
The representation provision of a CBA should last for five
years. The relation between labor and management should be
undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. It is
indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation
ofthe economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was
still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers,
because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years
from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988.
For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the
union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the
CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice
under Article 248 of the Labor Code:
ART. 248.Unfair labor practices of employers. –It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as
prescribed by this Code;
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. –The
duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement....
Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from
the facts. The effect of an employer’s or a union’s actions
individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the
impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole.
 Under Article 252 both parties are required to perform
their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiouslyin good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals fora new CBA to GMC. On the other hand,
GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to
devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the
union and the status of its membership to prevent any
negotiation. GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of
interest in bargaining with the union.
The CA found that the letters between February to June
1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the
union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its
employees. Yes, GMC interfered with the right of
employees to self-organization.
2. NO. Ratio The provision mandates the parties to keep the
status quo while they are still in the process of working out their
respectiveproposal and counter proposal. When one of the
parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the
bargaining process,a departure from the general rule is
warranted, that is, the court may impose on the erring company
the CBA proposed by its employees’ union -lock, stock and
barrel.
Reasoning By its acts, no less than its action which bespeak its
insincerity, GMC has forfeited whatever rights it could have
asserted as an employer.
-Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either
side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to
the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be
allowed to resort with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations
bygoing through empty gestures.
DISPOSITION Petition is dismissed.
Suarez v. National Steel, 569 SCRA 331 (2008)
Facts: Respondent National Steel Corporation was engaged in
the business of manufacturing steel products needed for pipe
making, shipbuilding, can-making and production of appliances.
When respondent suffered substantial financial losses, it
retrenched herein petitioners who received a separation
package in accordance with the retrenchment program. After
having been paid their separation benefits, petitioners executed
and signed a release and quitclaim. Subsequently, respondent
and the National Steel Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers
(NASLU-FFW), the certified collective bargaining agent of
respondent’s rank-and-file employees, signed a new CBA.
Pursuant thereto, petitioners were given their salary
differentials, for which they executed and signed another
release and quitclaim. Nothing was heard from petitioners, until
about 2½ years after their separation from the company, they
wrote respondent demanding payment of retirement benefits
under the CBA.
Petitioners’ prayer: To be paid retirement benefits in addition to
the separation pay they received from respondent pursuant to
Article XIV of the existing CBA providing for retirement benefits
Respondent’s prayer: To have the complaint dismissed on the
ground that its retirement plan expressly prohibits the payment
of retirement benefits to employees terminated for cause
Labor Arbiter: Complaint dismissed for lack of merit.
NLRC: Appeal granted, ruling of the Labor Arbiter reversed.
CA: Petitioners were no longer entitled to retirement benefits
after having received the separation pay, and were precluded
from claiming such benefits because of their quitclaims.
Issues: WON petitioners as retrenched employees who already
received their separation pay can still recover retirement
benefits.
Ruling: NO. While the CBA, on its face, does not contain an
express prohibition of payment of retirement benefits to
retrenched employees, the parties may still prove it by means of
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties to the
agreement, such as the execution of the affidavits by the
NASLU-FFW officers and respondent’s managers. According to
the officers of NASLU-FFW, the duly certified bargaining agent of
respondent’s rank-and-file employees, the intent of the parties
in drafting the CBA was to make payment of the separation
package for retrenched employees exclusive of retirement
benefits.
Ratio: If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall prevail. However, if the CBA imports ambiguity,
then the parties’ intention as shown by their conduct, words,
actions and deeds – prior to, during, and after executing the
agreement, must be ascertained.
Lepanto Mining v. Lepanto Local Union, 562 SCRA 495
(2008)
Facts: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (petitioner) is a
domestic mining corporation. Lepanto Local Staff Union
(respondent) is the duly certified bargaining agent of petitioner's
employees occupying staff positions. Petitioner and respondent
entered into their 4th CBA, which provides: ‘ARTICLE VIII - NIGHT
SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL Section 3. Night Differential pay. - The
Company shall continue to pay night shift differential for work
during the first (11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) and third (3:00 p.m. to
11:00 p.m.) shifts to all covered employees within the
bargaining unit. However, for overtime work, which extends
beyond the regular day shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.), there will
be no night differential pay added before the overtime pay is
calculated.’
Petitioner’s prayer: To have the complaint dismissed due to a
wrong interpretation of the CBA
Respondent’s prayer: To compel petitioner to pay employees in
the second shift night shift differential as provided in the CBA
Voluntary Arbiter: Petition granted; paragraph 3, Section 3,
Article VIII of the 4th CBA, only meant that an employee who
extends work beyond the second shift shall receive overtime pay
which shall be computed before the night shift differential pay.
In other words, it excludes the night shift differential in the
computation of overtime pay.
CA: Voluntary Arbitrator's decision affirmed; paragraph 3,
Section 3, Article VIII was clear and unequivocal in granting night
shift differential pay to employees of the second shift for work
rendered beyond their regular day shift. However, the night shift
differential was excluded in the computation of the overtime
pay.
Issues: WON, under the 4th CBA, employees in the second
shift are entitled to night shift differential for work performed
beyond the regular day shift
Ruling: YES. The provision in question was contained in
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd CBAs between petitioner and respondent.
During the effectivity of the first three CBAs, petitioner paid
night shift differentials to other workers who were members of
respondent for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. Petitioner also
paid night shift differential for work beyond 3:00 p.m. during the
effectivity of the 4th CBA. In fact, even after the promulgation of
the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision and while the case was
pending appeal, petitioner still paid night shift differential for
work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. All these affirm the intention
of the parties to the CBA to grant night shift differential for work
performed beyond 3:00 p.m.
Ratio: To ascertain the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts as well as their
negotiating and contractual history and evidence of past
practices shall be considered.
Almario v. PAL, 532 SCRA 614 (2007)
Facts: Almario was initially hired by PAL as a Boeing 747
Systems Engineer. He was eventually promoted to the position
of Airbus 300 First Officer. In order to comply with the
requirements of this higher position, Almario had to undergo
more than five months of training which included ground
schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Australia. PAL paid
for Almario’s training.
After the training, Alamario served PAL in his new rank as A-300
First Officer. However, after eight months of service, he
tendered his resignation for “personal reasons.” In response to
his resignation letter, PAL sent Almario a letter reminding him
that the company invested heavily on his personal training on
the basis that he would continue to serve the company for at
least three years. The letter also informed Almario that if he
would choose to resign, he would have to reimburse the
company an amount representing the cost of his training.
Almario pushed through with his resignation.
PAL filed a Complaint against Almario for reimbursement of
training costs at the Makati RTC. The company contended that it
had an innominate contract do ut facias (I give that you may do)
with Almario—that the company spent for Almario’s training with
the understanding that he would render service to PAL until the
costs of said training were recovered in at least three years.
Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he
would have to render service to it for three years after his
training failing which he would reimburse the training costs. He
pointed out that the 1991-1994 CBA between PAL and ALPAP, of
which he was a member, carried no such agreement.
The RTC ruled in favor of Almario. The RTC found no provision in
the CBA between PAL and ALPAP stipulating that a pilot who
underwent training must serve PAL for at least three years
failing which s/he should reimburse the training expenses. The
CA reversed the RTC and ruled in favor of PAL. The CA found
Almario liable under the CBA between PAL and ALPAP and under
Art 22 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not Almario should be ordered to reimburse
the costs for his training as a consequence of resigning before
the three-year period.
Held: Almario is liable; he must reimburse.
1. Almario is liable under the CBA (cf. Sec 1, Art XXIII). This
provision of the CBA does not explicitly state the requirement
that a pilot who has underwent training must render service to
the company for at least three years, lest s/he reimburse the
cost of the training. However, the Court held that this provision—
and CBA provisions, in general—should be construed liberally
rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place
a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
purpose which it is intended to serve. Sec 1, Art XXXIII was
incorporated into the CBA taking into consideration the reality of
prohibitive training costs and the need for PAL to have a return
on the investment of spending for a pilot’s training. The Court
also gave credence to the company’s testimony that it has been
the policy or practice of PAL to underwrite the training costs of
its pilots,
with the expectation of benefiting therefrom in order to recover
the costs of training.
2. Almario is liable under Art 22 of the Civil Code. One may
not enrich himself at the expense of another. PAL invested for
the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of
proficiency. PAL was justified in expecting to recover the training
costs by availing itself of Almario’s services for at least three
years. This expectation of PAL was not fully realized because of
Almario’s untimely resignation. He cannot refuse to reimburse;
otherwise, he will be violating the principle of unjust enrichment
Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran, 340 SCRA 587 (2000)
FACTS: Letran and the labor union (AEFL) were in the process of
negotiating a new CBA. However, the negotiations were
suspended by Letran after it purportedly received information
that a new group of employees ha filed a petition for certification
election
(there are other facts involved, but only these are relevant to
the topic)
ISSUE/S: WON Letran is guilty of ULP by refusing to bargain with
the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing
negotiations for a new CBA upon mere information that a
petition for certification has been filed by another legitimate
labor organization
HELD: YES
Ratio The filing of the petition for certification election was
barred by the existence of a valid and existing CBA.
Consequently, there is no legitimate representation issue and,
as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not
constitute a bar to the ongoing negotiation. There is no doubt
that petitioner is guilty of ULP by its stern refusal to bargain in
good faith with respondent union.
Reasoning Art.252, LC: The duty to bargain collectively means
the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work
andall other terms and conditions of employment including
proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising
under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating
such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does
not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.
The parties have the mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, the union
lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the
CBA to Letran. On theother hand, petitioner devised ways and
means in order to prevent the negotiation.
Letran’s utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union
is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the proposals
presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals
were submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any
counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of Letran prompted
the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996.
Petitioner could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of
Trustees had not yet convened to discuss the matter as its
excuse forfailing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of
Art.250, governing the procedure in collective bargaining[1]
Company's refusal to make counter-proposal to the
union's proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the
employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the
bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the
duty to bargaincollectively. Here, Letran’s actuations show lack
of sincere desire to negotiate (thus guilty of ULP).
 The claim that the suspension of negotiation was proper
since by the filing of the petition for certification election the
issue on majority representation of the employees had arose is
untenable. According to petitioner, the authority of the union to
negotiate on behalf of the employees was challenged when a
rival union filed a petition for certification election.
In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the
bargaining process there must be a valid petitionfor certification
election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the
mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso
factojustify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The
petition must first comply with the provisions of the LC and its
IRR. Foremostis that a petition for certification election must be
filed during the 60-day freedom period. The “Contract Bar Rule”
under Sec.3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: “.… If a CBA has
been duly registered in accordance with Article 231, a petition
for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within 60 days prior to the expiry date of such
agreement.” No petition for certification election for any
representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the 60-day
freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is
signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity
of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force
and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.
Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. The purpose is to
ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the
company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA
earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated
original period.
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was
from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by ACEC,
allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with DOLE
only on May 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the 60-
day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by the
existence of a valid and existing CBA. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the
petition for certification election did not constitute a bar to the
ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by petitioner of the
ruling in Lakas Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo
Enterprises is misplaced since that case involved a legitimate
representation issue which is not present in the case at bar.
Significantly, the same petition for certification election
was dismissed by the Labor Secretary.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
B. Bargainable Issues
1. Arts. 252, 260 LC
Manila Fashions, Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 104 (1996)
FACTS: Respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Manila
Fashions, Inc., through its president, respondent Nonito Zamora,
filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter on behalf of its one
hundred and fifty (150) members who were regular employees
of petitioner Manila Fashions, Inc. The complaint charged
petitioner with non-compliance, with Wage Order No NCR-02 and
02-A mandating a P12-increase in wages effective 8 January
1991. As a result, complainants' basic pay, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave pay, legal holiday pay, night shift
differential and overtime pay were all underpaid
Petitioner countered that the failure to comply with the
pertinent Wage Order was brought about by the tremendous
losses suffered by it which were aggravated when the workers
staged a strike on account of the non-adjustment of their basic
pay. To forestall continuous suspension/closure of business
operations, which petitioner did for three (3) months, the strikers
sent a notice that they were willing to condone the
implementation of the increase. The condonation was distinctly
stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) dated 4 February 1992, which was voluntarily entered into
by the parties and representsa reasonable settlement “The
Union realizes the company’s closeness to insolvency and, as
such , sympathizes with the company’scondition. Therefore, the
Union has agreed, as it hereby agrees, to condone the
implementation of Wage Order o. NCR-02 and 02-A.
The complainants admitted the existence of the
aforementioned provision in the CBA; however they denied the
validity thereof inasmuch as it was not reached after due
consultation with the members.
The Labor Arbiter sustained the claim that the subject
provision of the CBA was void but based its conclusion on a
different ground :
. . . While it is true that both union officers/members and
(petitioner) signed the agreement, however, the same is not
enforceable since said agreement is null and void, it being
contrary to law. It is only the Tripartite Wage Productivity Board
of (the) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) that could
approve exemption (of) an establishment from coverage of (a)
Wage Order . . .
ISSUES: 1. WON the condonation of the implementation of
Wage Order No. NCR-02 and 02-A contained in Sec. 3, Art. VIII,
of the CBA was valid
HELD: NO
Reasoning A Collective Bargaining Agreement refers to the
negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and
the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other
terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit,
including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration
machineries. As in all other contracts, the parties in a CBA may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Section
3, Art. VIII, of the CBA is a void provision because by agreeing to
condone the implementation of the Wage Order the parties
thereby contravened its mandate on wage increase of P12.00
effective 8 January 1991. Also, as stated by the Labor Arbiter, it
is only the Tripartite Wage Productivity Board of the DOLE that
could approve exemption of an establishment from coverage of
a Wage Order.
If petitioner is a financially distressed company then it should
have applied for a wage exemption so that it could meet its
labor costs without endangering its viability or its very existence
upon which both management and labor depend for a living. The
Office of the Solicitor General emphasizes the point thatparties
to a CBA may not by themselves, set a wage lower than the
minimum wage. To do so would render nugatory the purpose of
a wage exemption, not to mention the possibility that
employees may be unwittinglyput in a position to accept a lower
wage.
The cases that petitioner relies on are simply inapplicable
because, unlike the present case which involves a stipulation in
the CBA in contravention of law, they are concerned with
compromise settlements as a means to end labor disputes
recognized by Art. 227 of the Labor Code and considered not
against public policy by doctrinal rules established by this Court.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226 (1967)
FACTS: Republic Savings Bank (now Republic Bank or RB)
discharged/terminated private respondents Resuello, Jola et al,
for having written and published "a patently libelous letter,
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of
officers and employees of this bank, but also of your employer,
the bank itself." Respondents had written to the bank president,
Ramon Racelis, a letter-charge, demanding his resignation on
the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of RB
employees.
CIR ruled that RB’s act of dismissing the 8 respondent
employees constituted an unfair labor practice within the
meaning and intendment of the Industrial Peace Act (RA 875).
RB appealed. It still maintains that the discharge was for cause.
RB’s defense: CIR should have dismissed the complaint
because the discharge of the respondents had nothing to do
with their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the
hearing that the writing of the letter-charge was not a "union
action" but merely their "individual" act.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the 8 employees by RB constituted
unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of the
Industrial Peace Act
HELD:YES.
Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice. The
joining in protestsor demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests, is a concerted
activity protected by the IndustrialPeace Act. It is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated.
NLRCv. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co is case in point.
Held: An insurance company was guilty of an unfair labor
practice in interfering with this right of concerted activity by
discharging two agents employed in a branch office. The agents
acts of meeting and joining in a letter to the home office
objecting to the transfer to their branch office of a cashier from
another branch,for further discussion, approval and signature, is
a concerted activity that is protected.
Re Meaning of Duty to Bargain
 What the RB should have done was to refer the letter-
charge to the grievance committee. This was its duty, failing
which it committed an unfair labor practice RA 875 which makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dismiss, discharge
or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for
having filed charges or for having given or being about to give
testimony under this Act."
Collective bargaining does not end with the execution of
an agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain
imposes on the parties during the term of their agreement the
mutual obligation “to meet and confer promptly and
expeditiously and in good faith for the purpose of adjusting any
grievances or question arising under such agreement” and a
violation of this obligation is an unfair labor practice.
Instead of stifling criticism, RB should have allowed the
respondents to air their grievances. Good faith bargaining
requiredof the Bank an open mind and a sincere desire to
negotiate over grievances. The grievance committee, created in
the CBA, would have been an appropriate forum for such
negotiation. Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of the
continuous process of collective bargaining. It is intended to
promote a friendly dialogue between labor and management as
a means of maintaining industrial peace.
Disposition Appealed decision is AFFIRMED
FERNANDO, CONCURRING
Collective bargaining presupposes the give-and-take of
discussion. No party adopts, at least in its initial stages, a hard-
line position, from which there can be no retreat. That was not
the situation here. Respondents as labor leaders were quite
certain that the President of RB had offended most grievously.
They wanted him out. There was no room for discussion.
That for me is not bargaining as traditionally and
commonly understood. It is for that reason that I find it difficult
to agree fully with the view that their dismissal could be
construed as a refusal to bargain collectively. Moreover, they did
not as adverted to in the opinion of the Court, follow the
procedure set forth for adjusting grievances. It is my view
therefore that the dismissal amounted to "interference, restraint
or coercion" as prohibited in the Industrial Peace Act, and not
refusal to bargain collectively.
Nestle Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 504 (1991)
FACTS: Four CBAs with Nestle Philippines (Nestle) expired on
June 30, 1987. While the parties were negotiating, the
employees resorted to a "slowdown" and walk-outs prompting
Nestle to shut down the factory. Marathon collective bargaining
negotiations between the parties ensued.
The UFE declared a bargaining deadlock. The Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction and issued a return to work order. In
spite of that order, the union struck, without notice. Nestle
retaliated by dismissing the union officers and members of the
negotiating panel who participated in the illegal strike. The NLRC
affirmed the dismissals. UFE filed a notice of strike on the same
ground of CBA deadlock and ULP.
After conciliation efforts of the NCMB yielded negative
results, the dispute was certified to the NLRC by the Secretary of
Labor. The NLRC issued a resolution regarding the union's
demand for liberalization of the company's retirement plan for
its workers. Both the parties’ MFR were denied.
Nestle filed this petition for certiorari alleging that since
its retirement plan is non-contributory, it has the sole and
exclusive prerogative to define the terms of the plan because
the workers have no vested and demandable rights there under,
the grant being not a contractual obligation but merely
gratuitous. At most the company can only be directed to
maintain the same but not to change its terms. It should be left
to the discretion of the company on how to improve or modify
the same.
ISSUE: WON the Retirement Plan is a collective bargaining issue
HELD: YES.
Ratio The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e.,
that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the
plan, does not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations.
Reasoning Almost all of the benefits granted to its employees
under the CBA (salary increases, rice allowances, midyear
bonuses, 13th & 14th month pay, seniority pay, medical and
hospitalization plans, health and dental services, vacation, sick
& other leaves with pay) are non-contributory benefits. Since the
retirement plan has been an integral part of the CBA since 1972,
the Union's demand to increase the benefits due the employees
under said plan is a valid CBA issue.
The improvement of the existing Retirement Plan was
one of the original CBA proposals submitted by the UFE to
Nestle. The union's original proposal was to modify the existing
plan by including a provision for early retirement. The company
did not question the validity of that proposal as a collective
bargaining issue but merely offered to maintain the existing
noncontributory retirement plan which it believed to be still
adequate for the needs of its employees and competitive with
those existing in the industry. The union thereafter modified its
proposal, but the company was adamant. Consequently, the
impasse on the retirement plan became one of the issues
certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
The inclusion of the retirement plan in the CBA as part of
the package of economic benefits extended by the company to
its employees gives it "a consensual character" so that it may
not be terminated or modified at will by either party. Employees
have a vested and demandable right over existing benefits
voluntarily granted to them by their employer. The latter may
not unilaterally withdraw, eliminate or diminish such benefits.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 (1995)
NATURE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set
aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her
from enforcing the same
FACTS: Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) submitted to
arbitration to resolve WON the company has violated the
Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
The parties agreed to submit their respective Position
Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position
Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to
submit its Position Paper.
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision finding that the Bank
has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE : WON the Voluntary Arbitrator erred in finding that the
Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.
(the Court referred the case to the CA so the issue wasn’t
resolved…it said that elevating a decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator to the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari is in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the
NLRC or the Court of Appeals, which in its view is illogical and
imposes an unnecessary burden upon it)
HELD (only obiter… pertaining to topic)
Art. 260. Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration.
— The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include
therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its
terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the
adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery
which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the
date of its submission shall automatically be referred to
voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
For this purpose, parties to a collective bargaining
agreement shall name and designate in advance a voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, or include in the
agreement a procedure for the selection of such voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, preferably from the
listing of qualified voluntary arbitrators duly accredited by the
Board. In case the parties fail to select a voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators, the Board shall designate the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, as may be
necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in
the collective bargaining agreement, which shall act with the
same force and effect as if the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators have been selected by the parties as
described above
In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor
dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the
basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who
have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator
as final and binding.
Arbitration may either be compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a
dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to
strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute
through arbitration by a third party. Under voluntary
arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by
the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration
 clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third
person for a final and binding resolution.
Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied
with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has
been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by
both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are
presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of
settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they
have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and
decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de
bound by said arbitrator's decision.
-In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include
therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA or company personnel
policies.
-For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designate
therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include
a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited
by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Disposition The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court
of Appeals
C. Procedure
1. Arts. 251
2. Arts. 250-251; 233
3. Nature of Procedure
National Union of Restaurant Workers, supra.
Kiok Loy, supra.
Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran, supra.
Art. 242 (c), audited financial statements, including balance
sheet and profit and loss statement
4. DOLE Conciliation
• Art. 250 (c, d and e)
• EO 251, Sec. 4
• Art. 233
• Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LC, Rule 13, Sec. 6, Book V.
5. Duty to Bargain
Samahan sa Permex v. Secretary of Labor, 286 SCRA 692
(1998)
Facts: On January 15, 1991, a certification election was
conducted among employees of Permex Producter and Exporter
Corp, where maximum vote was "No Union" (existing union then
was National Federation of Labor). Subsequesnt to the CE, some
employees formed a labor organization known as Samahang
Manggagawa sa Permex, registered it with DOLE then later
affiliated with Philipine Integrated Industries Labor Union. On
August 16, 1991, Samahan wrote the company requesting
recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representatives of its employees. Permex recognized Samahan
and entered into a CBA with it, which was ratified by majority its
employees and certified by DOLE.On Feb 25, 1992, NFL filed a
petition for CE which was diemissed by Med-Arbiter. Upon
appeal, SOLE Usec LAguesma set aside Med-Arbiter and ordered
CE with the following choices: 1) NFL, 2) Samahan, 3) No Union.
Samahan moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the
current petiton.
Issue: 1) WON the order of holding a ceritifaction election is
valid despite recognition by the company and it's entering into a
CBA with Samahan.
Held: Yes. CE is proper. Samaahan could not be the exclusive
bargaining representative by virtue of employee recognition.
Quoting Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v Ferrer-Calleja, "if a
union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it, it in efefct
asks the employer to certify it as its bargaining representative of
the employees - a certification which the employer has no
authority to give for it is the employees' prerogative, not the
employer's to determine whether they want a union to represent
them. By EO 111, direct certification has been discontinued as
the method for selecting the exclusive bargaining agent.
Petitioner can neither invoke the contract-bar rule stating that
petition for CE may only be entertained within 60 days prior to
the expiration of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
This case is exempted from contract bar rule notwithsatnding
the existence of a CBA as Samahan entered into a CBA with
Permex when its status as an exclusive bargaining agent was
not yet established.
Associated Labor Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja, 173 SCRA 178
(1989)
FACTS:
May 7, 1986 – Associated Labor Union (ALU) informed GAW
Trading that the majority of its employees have authorized ALU
to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative. It
likewise requested for the execution of a CBA..
May 9, 1986 – Southern Phils. Federation of Labor (SPFL) and
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a strike
when GAW did not accede to their own demands. GAW
recognized ALU as exclusive bargaining representative. A
conference for the execution of CBA was thereafter set on the
same date.
May 13, 1986 – ALU presented copies of the proposed CBA
for comment or signing.
May 15 1986 – the CBA was signed by ALU and GAW
May 19, 1986 – GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU) filed a
Petition for Certification Election which was dismissed for non-
compliance with the subscription requirement.
May 27, 1986 – CBA between ALU and GAW was filed with
the Ministry of Labor.
May 28, 1986 – SPFL filed a Petition for Direct Recognition
where GALLU likewise participated as an intervenor.
Notwithstanding, the Med Arbiter ordered the holding of a
Certification Election. ALU appealed. BLR Director Trajano
reversed the Med Arbiter on the ground that the CBA had been
effective and the contract bar rule was applicable.
BLR Director Calleja, who succeeded to the position,
reversed and ordered the holding of a Certification Election on
the following grounds: (1) Contract Bar Rule does not apply since
the CBA was defective; (2) No proof that CBA had been posted in
at least 2 conspicuous places in the establishment at least five
days before its ratification and that it had been ratified by the
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
ISSUE: WON the CBA was valid such that it would constitute the
bar to the holding of a Certification Election under the Contract
Bar Rule?
HELD/RATIO: No. It suffers from infirmities:
There was failure to post the CBA in at least 2 conspicuous
places places in the establishment at least five days before its
ratification. Petitioner's rationalization that the failure was due to
the illegal strike staged by SPFL in all the stores of GAW Trading,
Inc. which made it impossible to comply with the posting
requirement in so far as the realization of its purpose is
concerned as there were no impartial members of the unit who
could be apprised of the CBA's contents is untenable.
The posting of the CBA is the employer’s responsibility which
requires a mere mechanical act. That there were no impartial
members is immaterial because precisely the purpose of posting
is to inform the employees of the contents of the CBA such that
they can intelligently decide whether or not to ratify it,
regardless of whether they already have their own opinion
regarding the same.
The assembly of the members of ALU wherein the agreement
in question was allegedly explained does not cure the defect.
The contract is intended for all the employees and not only for
the members of the purported representative alone. It may even
be said that the need to inform the non-members of the terms
thereof is more exigent and compelling since, in all likelihood,
their contact with the persons who are supposed to represent
them is limited.
This requirement becomes all the more important in this
case where there was an apparent and suspicious hurry in the
formulation and finalization of said CBA. In the aforementioned
letter where GAW required petitioner union to present proof of
its support by the employees, the company already suggested
that petitioner ALU at the same time submit the proposals that it
intended to embody in the projected agreement. This was on
May 12, 1986, and promptly on the following day the negotiating
panel furnished respondent company final copies of the desired
agreement which, with equal dispatch, was signed on May 15,
1986.
Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective
bargaining agreement is the finding of respondent director that
one hundred eighty-one (181) of the two hundred eighty-one
(281) workers who "ratified" the same now "strongly and
vehemently deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiation and
ratification of the CBA.”
Citizens Labor Union v. CIR, 18 SCRA 624 (1966)
FACTS: Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME) filed a petition
for certificaton election with the CIR to determine which union
will administer the contract during the remainder of the term of
the contract.
The Citizens Labor Union (CLU) and Esso Standard Eastern,
Inc. (ESSO) opposed the said petition, one of the grounds is that
the existing collective bargaining contract is a bar to the holding
of a certification election.
The CIR denied the motion to dismiss the petition, holding
that the existing collective bargaining contract is no bar to a
certification election, and requested the Department of Labor to
conduct the necessary election.
The results of the election shows that the MME obtained
votes of more than one-half of the rank and file employees and
laborers of the ESSO Pandacan Terminal unit eligible to vote.
Thereafter, CLU and ESSO filed separate motions to annul
the certification election on the ground that the election was
held illegally and irregularly as it was conducted on a holiday,
and that it was had without participation of the CLU therein.
The motions were denied and MME was certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the non-supervisory
employees of the ESSO at its Pandacan Terminal unit.
CLU filed an urgent petition praying for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and a petition for review.
Pending the adjudication of these cases, a "Motion for
Preliminary Injunction" was granted, refraining CLU and ESSO
from negotiating and concluding a new CBA.
ON EFFECT EXPIRY: No breaks. It is a sound and unassailable
labor practice for labor and management to conclude a new
contract before the expiry date of any CBA in order to avoid a
hiatus in management-labor relations.
The Industrial Peace Act was designed primarily to promote
industrial peace through encouragement of collective
bargaining. Any undue delay in the selection of a bargaining
representative can hardly be said to contribute to that end.
National Congress of Unions v. Ferrer-Calleja, 205 SCRA
478 (1992)
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor,
432 SCRA 304 (2004)
Facts: Petitioner Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of Standard Chartered Bank (Bank). The
Union and the Bank signed a 5 year CBA in 1990 with a provision
to renegotiate its terms in its 3rd year.
In 1993, the Union initiated negotiations. It submitted its
proposal to the Bank as well as a list containing the members of
its negotiating panel. The Bank submitted its counter-proposal
and the respective list of the members of its negotiating panel.
Before negotiations can begin, the Union suggested that the
Bank’s lawyers are to be excluded from its negotiating panel.
The Bank agreed. The Bank however, suggested that Jose P.
Umali, Jr., the President of NUBE be excluded from the Union’s
negotiating panel. However, Umali remained a member of the
Union’s panel.
During the preliminary negotiations, the parties laid down
the ground rules. The Bank suggested that the negotiation be
kept a “family affair”. The negotiations on the revisions on the
CBA began on March 12, 1993. The proposed non-economic
provisions were discussed first. The parties were not able to
reach at an agreement leaving some of the provisions as
DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED.
Afterwards, negotiations on the economic provisions began
on May 18, 1993. Like before, the Union and the Bank could not
reach an agreement. Umali chided the Bank for the insufficiency
of its counter-proposal and reminded the Bank how they got
what they wanted in 1987 and that they were willing to resort to
such means if needed.
The negotiations resumed but even after the submission of
counter-proposals from both parties, the impasse remained.
Exasperated, Umali asserted that it would be easier to bargain if
both parties trusted each other like before. The Bank requested
the Union to refrain from involving personalities and to focus on
the negotiations. On June 21, 1993, the Union declared a
deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB.
On its part, the Bank filed a complaint for unfair labor
practices against the Union with the Labor Arbiter. The Bank
claimed that the Union engaged in blue sky bargaining
(unrealistic or unreasonable demands in negotiations where
neither concedes anything or demands the impossible). The
Bank also claimed that the Union violated the no strike-no
lockout clause of the CBA.
Then Secretary of Labor Confesor assumed jurisdiction of the
dispute and dismissed the ULP charges of both the Bank and
Union. She also ordered the award of certain benefits. On March
22, 1994, the Bank and Union signed the CBA.
Claiming that the SOLE committed grave abuse of discretion
when she dismissed the ULP charge filed by the Union, they filed
a petition praying that her Order be set aside. In the petition, it
was claimed that the Bank committed ULP when it asked that
Umali be excluded from the panel and when it asked that the
negotiations be kept a “family affair”. It also claimed that the
Bank engaged in surface bargaining. For its part the bank
reiterated its claims for ULP against the Union in its complaint
before the Labor Arbiter.
Held: No ULP committed by the Bank or Union.
Article 248(a) considers it an ULP if the employer interferes,
restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to
self organization or the right to form an association.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the
Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the
claim. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
The facts show that the suggestion to exclude Umali Jr., was
not an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the
Bank adopted to undermine the free exercise of the right to self-
organization and collective bargaining of the employees
especially when it was requested after the Union requested the
exclusion of the Bank’s lawyer from its negotiating panel.
Further, the ULP charge was merely an afterthought as the
complaint was only made after a deadlock was declared by the
Union.
There was no surface bargaining on the part of the Bank.
Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of
negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement.
Such is a question of the intent of the party in question and
usually such intent can be inferred from the totality of the
challenged party’s conduct both at and away from the table.
The duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or require the making of a concession.
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Labor. It cannot be said that she acted in a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. There was no
showing that the public respondent exercised her power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
Likewise, neither is the Union guilty of ULP for engaging in
blue sky bargaining. The demands of the Union were not
exaggerated or unreasonably but based on the data of rank and
file employees and other prevailing economic benefits received
by employees in the industry.
6. Deadlock
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, 304 SCRA 1 (1999)
Facts: San Miguel Cooperation, alleging the need to streamline
its operations due to financial loses, shut down some of its
plants and declared 55 positions as redundant listed as follows:
seventeen (17) employees in the Business Logistics Division
("BLD"), seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC),
and eighteen (18) in the Magnolia-Manila Buying Station
("Magnolia-MBS")
Respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said
retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said
employees to the other divisions of the company.
The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to
Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties' 1990 Collective
Bargaining Agreement
During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the
employees were redeployed, while others accepted early
retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the
parties proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of the grievance
procedure. In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner
informed private respondent union that if by October 30, 1990,
the remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed, their
services would be terminated on November 2, 1990. The said
meeting adjourned when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a
representative of the union, declared that there was nothing
more to discuss in view of the deadlock.
Union gave notice of strike based on: a) bargaining deadlock;
b) union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance
procedure; d) failure to provide private respondent with a list of
vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that
was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary
arbitration award
SMC filed complaint with NLRC based on: : (1) the dismissal
the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling the respondent
union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in
the notice of strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of
litigation.
NLRC dismissed complaint
SC: In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon
by the private respondent union are non-strikeable. The issues
which may lend substance to the notice of strike filed by the
private respondent union are: collective bargaining deadlock and
petitioner's alleged violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. These grounds, however, appear more illusory than
real.
Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situation
between the labor and the management of the company where
there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting
in a stalemate" 11 This situation, is non-existent in the present
case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3)
of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of
the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed
of five representatives each from the company and the union, to
decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and
thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the
steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings
provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of
strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private
respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and
arbitration proceedings.
As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that
such a violation is chargeable against the private respondent
union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly
refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA. private
respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Abolition of departments or positions in the company is
one of the recognized management prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private
respondent San Miguel Corporation Employees Union — PTGWO
are hereby directed to complete the third level (Step 3) of the
Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration
proceedings if necessary.
Divine Word University v. Secretary of Labor, supra.
Samahan sa Top Form v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 171 (1998)
FACTS: The charge arose from the employer's refusal to grant
across-the-board increases to its employees in implementing
Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02 of the Regional Tripartite Wages
and Productivity Board of the National Capital Region (RTWPB-
NCR). Such refusal was aggravated by the fact that prior to the
issuance of said wage orders, the employer allegedly promised
at the collective bargaining conferences to implement any
government-mandated wage increases on an across-the-board
basis.
Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form
Manufacturing United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was
the certified collective bargaining representative of all regular
rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form
Manufacturing Philippines, Inc.
At the collective bargaining negotiation, the parties agreed
to discuss unresolved economic issues. According to the minutes
of the meeting the Union proposed that any future wage
increase given by the government should be implemented by
the company across-the-board or non-conditional.
Management requested the union to retain this provision
since their sincerity was already proven when the P25.00 wage
increase was granted across-the-board. The union acknowledges
management's sincerity but they are worried that in case there
is a new set of management, they can just show their CBA. The
union decided to defer this provision.
In their joint affidavit dated January 30, 1992, union
members Salve L. Barnes, Eulisa Mendoza, Lourdes Barbero and
Concesa Ibañez affirmed that at the subsequent collective
bargaining negotiations, the union insisted on the incorporation
in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) of the union
proposal on "automatic across-the-board wage increase."
On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order
No. 01 granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of
workers. This was followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated
December 20, 1990 providing for a P12.00 daily increase in
salary.
As expected, the union requested the implementation of said
wage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on
an across-the-board basis. Private respondent refused to accede
to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases
purportedly to avoid wage distortion.
On October 24, 1991, the union, through its legal counsel,
wrote private respondent a letter demanding that it should
"fulfill its pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-
the-board wage increase to all employees under the wage
orders."
Several conferences between the parties notwithstanding,
private respondent adamantly maintained its position on the
salary increases it had granted that were purportedly designed
to avoid wage distortion.
Consequently, the union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC
alleging that private respondent's act of "reneging on its
undertaking/promise clearly constitutes act of unfair labor
practice through bargaining in bad faith." It charged private
respondent with acts of unfair labor practices or violation of
Article 247 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically
"bargaining in bad faith," and prayed that it be awarded actual,
moral and exemplary damages.
Private respondent, on the other hand, contended that in
implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the
existence of a wage distortion" that would arise from such
implementation. It emphasized that only "after a reasonable
length of time from the implementation" of the wage orders
"that the union surprisingly raised the question that the
company should have implemented said wage orders on an
across-the-board basis." It asserted that there was no
agreement to the effect that future wage increases mandated by
the government should be implemented on an across-the-board
basis. Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated
and expressly stipulated in the CBA.
On March 11, 1992, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the NLRC that, in turn,
promulgated the assailed Resolution of April 29, 1993
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Still dissatisfied,
petitioner sought reconsideration which, however, was denied by
the NLRC in the Resolution dated January 17, 1994.
ISSUE: WON private respondent committed an unfair labor
practice
HELD: NO
Reasoning: If there was indeed a promise or undertaking on
the part of private respondent to obligate itself to grant an
automatic across-the-board wage increase, petitioner union
should have requested or demanded that such "promise or
undertaking" be incorporated in the CBA. After all, petitioner
union has the means under the law to compel private
respondent to incorporate this specific economic proposal in the
CBA. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code
defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty includes "executing a
contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either
party."
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties, the
collective bargaining representative and the employer-company.
Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to
give protection to labor. In the same vein, CBA provisions should
be "construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and
the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon
it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve." This is
founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but
one impressed with public interest. It goes without saying,
however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so
interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a
contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part
thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its
implementation. Because the proposal was never embodied in
the CBA, the promise has remained just that, a promise, the
implementation of which cannot be validly demanded under the
law.
DISPOSITIVE: NLRC decision affirmed.
San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418 (2003)
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS: SMC and Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) executed
a CBA wherein they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance
and arbitration proceedings, aside from no-strike, no-lockout
agreement.
IBM, through its VP and subsequently through its
president (which was opposed by the VP), filed with NCMB a
notice of strike against SMC for allegedly committing: (1) illegal
dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of
CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union
members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union
officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union
officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice. SMC filed a
Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss
on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and
that they affected 4 corporations.
NCMB: issues are non-strikeable, as only SMC was
impleaded when 4 different companies were involved. Notices of
strike converted into preventive mediation.
While separate preventive mediation conferences were
ongoing, the Union through its VP filed a notice of holding a
strike vote. SMC opposed, invoking PAL v. Drilon (no strike could
be legally declared during the pendency of preventive
mediation). NCMB reiterated conversion of notice of strike into
preventive mediation and grounds raised were only intra-union
conflict – nonstrikeable (who between the 2 groups shall
represent the workers for collective bargaining purposes, union
leadership).
IBM President group filed 2nd notice of strike against SMC,
NCMB found the additional grounds to be mere amplifications of
issues alleged in the 1st notice of strike. Ordered consolidation of
the 2nd notice of strike with 1st notice of strike. Group informed
SMC of its plan to hold a strike.
VP group notified the NCMB that their strike vote favored
the holding of a strike. NCMB issued a letter reminding the group
of the PAL v Drilon. IBM went on strike. Strike paralyzed the
operations of SMC, which caused millions of loses.
SMC filed with NLRC a Petition for Injunction with Prayer
for the Issuance of TRO, Free Ingress and Egress Order and
Deputization Order, which was issued by NLRC, without
prejudice to the union’s right to peaceful picketing and
continuous hearings on the injunction case. SMC also entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement with Union, calling for lifting
of picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of “good
faith talks” between the management and the labor
management committees. The MOA also stated that cases filed
in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected
in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. Work was then
resumed.
NLRC reconsidered the issuance of TRO, and sought to
dismiss the injunction case. SMC opposed, submitted copies of
flyers wherein IBM expressed their threat to revive the strike.
NLRC issued decision denying the petition for injunction for lack
of factual basis, there being no circumstance to constitute an
actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. MFR denied
ISSUES WON the strike held by IBM was illegal (therefore, NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for
injunction filed by SMC)
HELD YES
a. Procedural aspect of the strike
For a strike to be valid, it must be pursued within legal
bounds. One of the procedural requisites that A263 of the LC
and its IRR prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with
the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the
voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held
to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.
In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code, the conversion of the notice of strike to preventive
mediation has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike filed
by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we
declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in view
of the NCMB’s conversion of the notice therein into a preventive
mediation case. During the pendency of preventive mediation
proceedings no strike could be legally declared.
Therefore, since the notice of strike filed by the union
was converted into preventive mediation proceedings, the union
had lost the notices of strike required under A263. However, the
union defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was
ongoing. Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a
blatant violation of theImplementing Rules, which explicitly
oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and
prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.
b. on ruling of NLRC that there was lack of factual basis
(no circumstance to constitute an actual or threatened
commission of unlawful acts)
At the time the injunction was being sought, there
existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by
the flyers then being circulated by the IBM, which were not
denied by the respondent union. Moreover, a declaration of
strike without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited
activity (A264(a)), which may be prevented through an
injunction in accordance with A254.
c. on IBM’s failure to observe the CBA provisions on
grievance and arbitration
Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a
collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they
provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements
must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to
be achieved.
“We cannot sanction the respondent-union’s brazen
disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out
the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling
disputes. The state’s commitment to enforce mutual compliance
therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than
our Constitution. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate
weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of these
instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to
forestall grave injury to a business enterprise.”
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction
Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and
private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues
raised in the dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure
and proceed with arbitration proceedings as prescribed in their
CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
D. CBA Proper
1. Definition, Rule 1, Book V, Sec. 1 (jj) Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LC
2. Sub-standard CBA – Art. 239 (f)
3. Duration and re-negotiation
a. Art. 253-A
Rivera v. Espiritu, 374 SCRA 351 (2002)
Facts: As a result of a three week strike staged by PAL pilots
affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
(ALPAP) PAL which was already financially beleaguered suffered
serious losses, PAL’s financial situation went from bad to worse.
Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and
downsized its labor force by more than one-third. In protest to
such action PALEA went on strike which when PAL and PALEA
agreed to a more systematic reduction in PAL’s work force and
the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees.
President Estrada thru AO 16 created an Inter-Agency Task
Force to address the problems of PAL.
PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by
Lucio Tan, Chairman a plan to transfer shares of stock to its
employees which has a provision regarding the suspension of
the Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) for 10 years.
PALEA Members rejected the offer.Subsequently, PAL informed
the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations because
given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible,
and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop.
PALEA sought the intervention of the Office of the President in
immediately convening the parties, the PAL management,
PALEA, ALPAP, and FASAP, including the SEC under the direction
of the Inter-Agency Task Force, to prevent the imminent closure
of PAL.After several negotiations a the questioned PAL- PALEA
Agreement which provided for among others the suspension of
the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten (10) years, provided the
certain safeguards are in place.
Issue WON the PAL-PALEA agreement stipulating the
suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary
to public policy
Held: No. A CBA is “a contract executed upon request of either
the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative
incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with
respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any
grievances or questions arising under such agreement.” The
primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-
management relations in order to create a climate of a sound
and stable industrial peace. In construing a CBA, the courts must
be practical and realistic and give due consideration to the
context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is
intended to serve.
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of
voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the
light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with
the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting
industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure.
We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of
the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to
promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the
agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its
rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of
Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables wherein
negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing
in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending
the mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to
enforce the same.
In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive
bargaining agent of PAL’s ground employees, that voluntarily
entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that
voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either
case was the union’s exercise of its right to collective
bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after all,
includes the right to suspend it.
The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year
suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the
“protection to labor” policy of the Constitution. The agreement
afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared
responsibility between workers and employers; and the
exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation to foster industrial peace."
Disposition petition is DISMISSED.
New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 328
SCRA 404 (2000)
FACTS: The National Federation of Labor (NFL) was certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
regular rank-and-file employees of petitioner Company. As such,
NFL started to negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment but the same was allegedly rejected by Petitioner
Company, so that the former was prompted to file a complaint
for ULP.
The LA issued an order declaring (a) petitioner Company
guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as
the CBA. Petitioner’s appeal—and later certiorari—were both
dismissed. Petitioner Company complied with the LA’s order;
and, the case was considered closed following NFL's
manifestation that it will no longer appeal said order.
However, notwithstanding such manifestation, a "Petition
for Relief" was filed in behalf of 186 of the private respondents
who claimed that they were wrongfully excluded from enjoying
said benefits since the agreement with NFL and petitioner
Company limited the CBA's implementation to only the 142 rank-
and-file employees enumerated. They claimed that NFL's
misrepresentations had precluded them from appealing their
exclusion.
NLRC issued a resolution declaring that the 186 excluded
employees as part of the existing rank-and-file bargaining unit
and were, therefore, entitled to the benefits under the CBA.
Meanwhile, the private respondents, including the
original 186 filed individual money claims but LA Villena
dismissed these cases. The NLRC set aside the dismissal orders
for lack of legal basis. It sustained the earlier NLRC resolution
IFO the respondents. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUES: 1) Procedural – WON the Petition for Relief is proper
(even if treated as an appeal, WON it’s proper for being filed
several months after allowable period).
2) A) Substantive - May the term of a CBA as to its economic
provisions be extended beyond the term expressly stipulated
therein, and, in the absence of a new CBA, even beyond the
three-year period provided by law? B) Are employees hired after
the stipulated term of a CBA entitled to the benefits provided
thereunder?
HELD: 1) YES. No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC, when it entertained the petition for relief. A careful
scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the instant case
warrants liberality in the application of technical rules and
procedure.
2) A) YES. It is clear from Article 253 that until a new CBA
has been executed, the parties are duty-bound to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement. In the case at bar, the
existing CBA in its entirety, continued to have legal effect. The
automatic renewal clause provided for by the law, which is
deemed incorporated in all CBA's, provides the reason why the
new CBA can only be given a prospective effect.
To rule otherwise would be to create a gap during which
no agreement would govern, from the time the old contract
expired to the time a new agreement shall have been entered
into. Consequently, the employees from the year 1985 onwards
would be deprived of a substantial amount of monetary benefits
which runs contrary to the very intent and purpose of Articles
253 and 253-A of the Labor Code which is to curb labor unrest
and to promote industrial peace,
B) YES. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that
when a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the
union and the employer, even the non-member employees are
entitled to the benefits of the contract. In the same vein, the
benefits under the CBA in the instant case should be extended
to those employees who only became such after 1984. To
exclude them would constitute undue discrimination and deprive
them of monetary benefits they would otherwise be entitled to
under a new CBA to which they would have been parties. Since
in this particular case, no new agreement had been entered into
after the CBA's stipulated term, it is only fair and just that the
employees hired thereafter be included in the existing CBA.
Interphil Laboratories Employees Union v. Interphil
Laboratories, 372 SCRA 658 (2001)
SMC Employees Union v. Confesor, 262 SCRA 81 (1996)
Facts: 28 June 1990: SMCEU-PTGWO entered into a CBA with
SMC to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on
30 June 1989, for which the duration shall be for a term of 3
years or until 30 June 1992.
The terms of the CBA also provided that insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, the term of the CBA shall
be for five years: from 1 July 1989 to 30 June 1994.
13 August 1991: In a letter, SMC management informed its
employees that the company would undergo a restructuring
1 October 1991 – the Magnolia and the Feeds & Livestocks
Divisions were spun-off and became two separate and distinct
corporations: Magnolia Corporation and San Miguel Foods, Inc.
The CBA was renegotiated after 30 June 1992.
SMCEU-PTGWO (petitioner-union) insisted that the
bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of the
spun-off corporations, and that the renegotiated terms of the
CBA shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years
or until 30 June 1994.
SMC contended that the members/employees who had
moved to Magnolia and SMFI automatically ceased to be part of
the bargaining unit at the SMC, and the renegotiated terms
should be effective for three years in accordance with Article
253-A of the Labor Code.
Petitioner-union declared a deadlock on 29 September 1990.
On 2 October 1992, a Notice of Strike was filed against SMC. The
NCMB conducted preventive mediation upon the request of SMC,
but no settlement was arrived at. A strike vote was conducted
which resulted in a “yes vote.” The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute, after which several
conciliation meetings were held, but still no settlement was
reached.
Secretary of Labor issued the assailed order directing that
the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective for a period
of three years from 30 June 1992, and that such CBA shall over
only the employees of SMC and not of Magnolia and SMFI.
Issues: W/N the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA
is to be effective for three years or for only two years
W/N the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the
employees of the Magnolia and SMFI. (RE CORPORATE ENTITIES)
Held: The duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBS shall be
effective for three years, based on Article 253-A of the Labor
Code.
Under this provision, a CBA has a term of five years as far as
the representation aspect is concerned, and all other provisions
of the CBA shall be negotiated not later than three years after its
execution.
Representation aspect: refers to the identity and majority
status of the union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the appropriate bargaining unit
concerned.
The framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace
and stability, and thus no outside union could enter the
establishment within five years and challenge the status of the
incumbent union as the exclusive bargaining agent.
This way, the last year of the RENEGOTIATED terms,which is
technically the year after the five-year period of the
representation aspect - ASSUMING THE BARGAINING AGENT IS
CHANGED AFTER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD – becomes a sort of
adjustment period of “industrial peace” so as to let the
management and the new agent to get to know each other,
negotiate, etc. - gist of the quoted deliberations. :)
No, the bargaining unit of SMC excludes the employees of
Magnolia and SMFI.
The transformation of the companies was a management
prerogative and business judgments which the courts cannot
look into unless it is contrary to law, public policy or morals.
Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate
juridical personalities
In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the
test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests.
The employees sought to be represented must have substantial
mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions
as evinced by the type of work they performed. Considering the
spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their
respective and distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of
work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment.
The nature of their products and scales of business may require
different skills which must necessarily be commensurated by
different compensation packages.
PETITION WAS DISMISSED.
Grievance procedure
Navaro III v. Damaso, 246 SCRA 260 (1995)
Petitioner molested a female coworker. After investigating the
incident, it was recommended that he be dismissed. The case
was submitted for decision by the voluntary arbiter who agreed
with the recommendation of dismissal. He was dismissed by the
company for violating the Company Code of Conduct. Petitioner
contends that the grievance procedure provided for in the CBA
was not followed; hence, the Voluntary Arbitrator exceeded his
authority when he took cognizance of the labor case.
Section 2, Article X of the CBA specifies the instances when the
grievance machinery may be availed of, thus:
Any protest or misunderstanding concerning any ruling, practice
or working conditions in the Company, or any dispute arising as
to the meaning, application or claim of violation of any provision
of this Agreement or any complaint that any employee may
have against the COMPANY shall constitute a grievance
The instant case is not a grievance that must be submitted to
the grievance machinery. What are subject of the grievance
procedure for adjustment and resolution are grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of the collective
bargaining agreement.
The acts of petitioner involved a violation of the Code of
Employee Discipline, particularly the provision penalizing the
immoral conduct of employees. Consequently, there was no
justification for petitioner to invoke the grievance machinery
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. However as
the case of the petitioner was voluntarily submitted for voluntary
arbitration by the union and the employer with the petitioners
consent, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator was sustained.
Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, supra.
5. Contract Administration
Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,
220 SCRA 197 (1993)
Kimberly Clark Phil. v. Lorredo, 226 SCRA 639 (1993)
United Kimberly Clark Employees Union-PTGWO v.
Kimberly Clark Phil., G.R. No. 162957, March 6, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner is the labor union representing rank and file
employees of respondent. Way back in 1980, the parties agreed
to include in their CBA a provision which states that the
company agrees to employ immediate relative of an employee
who had retired, resigned, died provided that the employee had
rendered at least ten years service. There were no other
standards set with regard the acceptance of the said
recommendees and as a matter of fact, even high school
graduates were accepted.
In 1991, a case was filed against the company for
refusing to employ a nephew of a retiring employee (Kimberly
Clark vs Lorredo) as apparently the retiring employee had
children who he did not recommend and the company was
questioning this. In any case, the company lost in this case but
as part of the ruling of the Court, it was stated that Kimberly was
not obliged to unconditionally accept the recommendee
since the latter must still meet the required employment
standard theretofore set by it. Even a qualified
recommendee would be hired only on a “probationary status.”
As such, KCPI was not left without its own safeguards under the
agreement.
In 1995, the company issued the now questioned
guidelines which among others required that such
recommendees must be at least 18 years of age but not more
than 30 years old at the time of the hiring, and (b) have
completed, after graduating from high school, at least a two-
year technical/vocational course or a third year level of college
education. Moreover, where both husband and wife are
employees of the company, they shall be treated as one family;
hence, only one of the spouses would be allowed to avail of the
benefit.
The Union and the company agreed to postpone the
implementation of said guidelines until January 1, 1997 but only
with respect to the educational qualification. And the guidelines
were in fact implemented in the second half of 1998. A voluntary
arbitrator ruled on the controversy saying that the company
cannot upgrade the educational qualification as this is contrary
to what has been in existence and what had been a practice.
Appeal was filed with the CA which reversed the
resolution of the voluntary arbitrator with regard the upgrade of
the qualification of the recommendee. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that, under Article XX,
Section 1 of the 1997 CBA, respondent is required to hire only
those recommendees of retired/resigned, deceased or disabled
members of petitioner who had completed at least a two-year
technical/vocational course or a third-year level of college
education
HELD: NO. In the present case, the parties are in agreement
that, on its face, Article XX, Section 1 of their 1997 CBA does not
contain any provision relative to the employment qualification
standards of recommendees of retired/resigned, deceased or
disabled employees of respondent who are members of
petitioner. However, in determining the employment
qualification standards for said recommendees, the VA should
have relied on the November 7, 1995 Guidelines issued by
respondent, which reads:
D. Definition of the phrase “immediate member of the family of
an employee”
1. The phrase “immediate member of the family of an
employee” shall refer to the employee’s legitimate children and
in default thereof to the employee’s collateral relatives within
the third civil degree.
2. A resigned/retired employee may be allowed to recommend a
collateral relative within the third civil degree (e.g., brother,
sister, nephew or niece) as his/her replacement only in the
following cases:
a. Where the retired/resigned employee is single or if married
has no legitimate children.
b. Where the retired/resigned employee’s children are still
minors (below 18 years old) at the time of his/her separation
from the company. (Emphasis added)
E. General Provisions
1. The privilege to recommend a replacement can be exercised
by the employee concerned only once. Thus, in the following
cases, a recommendee who has been hired on probationary
status can no longer be substituted with another recommendee.
a. where the recommendee fails to pass in his performance
evaluation.
b. where the recommendee resigns without completing his
probationary period.
c. where the recommendee is dismissed for cause.
d. where the recommendee dies during his probationary period. 1
[48]
Respondent issued said Guidelines in light of the ruling of
this Court in Kimberly Clark Philippines v. Lorredo. Respondent
saw it imperative to do away with its practice of accommodating
1 2
recommendees who were mere high school graduates, and to
require higher employment standards for them.
By agreement of the parties, the implementation of the
Guidelines was deferred until January 1, 1997, unless revoked or
amended by the 1997 CBA. Petitioner proposed that the
practice of hiring recommendees of retired/resigned, deceased
or disabled employees who were union members, who were at
least high school graduates, be included in their CBA, but
respondent did not agree. Hence, Article XX, Section 1 of the
1997 CBA of the parties remained intact. There was thus no
more legal bar for respondent to implement the November 7,
1995 Guidelines. By executing the 1997 CBA, in its present
form, petitioner is bound by the terms and conditions therein set
forth.
The Court has recognized in numerous instances the
undoubted right of the employer to regulate, according to his
own discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment,
including but not limited to, work assignments and supervision,
working methods and regulations, time, place and manner of
work, processes to be followed, and hiring, supervision, transfer,
discipline, lay off, dismissal and recall of workers. Encompassing
though it could be, the exercise of this right is not absolute.
Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws, valid agreements such as the individual contract of
employment and the collective bargaining agreement, and
general principles of justice and fair play. 2[49] In this case, the
Court finds that respondent acted in accord with the CBA and
the November 7, 1995 Guidelines, which, by agreement of the
parties, may be implemented by respondent after January 1,
1997.
Disposition Petition is denied.
Manalang v. Artex, 21 SCRA 561 (1967)
TSPI Corporation v. TSPI Employers Union, 545 SCRA 216
(2008)
Facts: TSPIC is engaged in the business of designing,
manufacturing and marketing integrated circuits to serve the
communication, automotive, data processing and aerospace
industries. TSPIC Employees Union is the registered bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of TSPIC.
TSPIC and the Union entered into a CBA for the years 2000 to
2004, which included a provision on yearly salary increases
starting January 2000 until January 2002 for regular employees
within the bargaining unit as such: 10% on 1 January 2000, 12%
1 January 2001 and 11% on 1 January 2002.
The same provision also states that the wage/salary
increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive
of the mandated minimum wage increases under future Wage
Orders that may be issued after Wage Order No. 7, and shall be
considered as correction of any wage distortion that may have
been brought about by the said future Wage Orders.
The CBA also provided that employees who acquire regular
employment status within the year but after the effectivity of a
particular salary increase shall receive a proportionate part of
the increase: (1st quarter: 100%; 2nd quarter: 75%; 3rd quarter:
50%; 4th quarter: 25%)
1 January 2000 – all regular rank-and-file employees received
a 10% increase in their salary, including nine of the respondents.
6 October 2000 – Wage Order No. 8 was issued raising the
daily minimum wage from 223.50 to 250 effective 1 November
2000.
The wages of 17 probationary employees were increased
according to the WO. On various dates during the last quarter of
2000, these 17 employees attained regular employment and
received 25% of 10% of their salaries.
January 2001 – TSPIC implemented the CBA-mandated salary
increase. As a result, nine regular employees (respondents)
received less wages.
TSPIC's HR Department notified 24 employees that due to an
error in the automated payroll system, they were overpaid and
the overpayment would be deducted from their salaries in a
staggered basis, starting February 2001. TSPIC explained that
the correction of the erroneous computation was based on the
crediting provision of the CBA.
The Union asserted that this constituted diminution of pay.
TSPIC and the Union agreed to undergo voluntary arbitration
on the solitary issue of whether or not the acts of the
management in making deductions from the salaries of the
affected employees constituted diminution of pay.
Arbitrator Jimenez held that the unilateral deduction made by
TSPIC violated Art. 100 of the Labor Code. The CA affirmed this
decision.
Issue: Does the TSPIC's decision to deduct the alleged
overpayment from the salaries of the affected members of the
Union constitute diminution of benefits in violation of the Labor
Code?
Held: No. The CBA is the law between the parties and they are
obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract,
as in a CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations
shall control.
Sometimes, though the provisions of the CBA seem clear and
unambiguous, the parties sometimes arrive at conflicting
interpretations. Here, TSPIC wants to credit the increase granted
by WO No. 8 to the increase granted under the CBA. The Union,
on the other hand, insists that the “crediting” provision finds no
application in the present case, since at the time WO No. 8 was
issued, the probationary employees were not yet covered by the
CBA, particularly by its crediting provision.
The CBA states the specific condition that the wage/salary
increases for the years 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed inclusive
of the mandated minimum wage increases under future wage
orders that may be issued after WO No. 7, and shall be
considered as correction of the wage distortions that may be
brought about by the said future wage orders. Thus, the
wage/salary increases in 2001 and 2002 shall be deemed as
compliance to future wage orders after WO No. 7.
The intention of the parties is clear: As long as an employee
is qualified to receive the 12% increase in salary, the employee
shall be granted the 12% increase; and as long as an employee
is granted the 12% increase, the amount shall be credited
against any wage order issued after WO No. 7.
Respondents should not be allowed to receive benefits from
the CBA while avoiding the counterpart crediting provision.
Babcock v. Union, 453 SCRA 156 (2005)
FACTS: Some employees of Babcock-Hitachi Phils were
transferred from Makati to Bauan Batnagas, in line with the
company’s plan to transfer its Design Department in order to
improve the operating efficiency and coordination among its
various departments.
 The said employees demanded relocation allowance as
provided for in their CBA. However, the company refused saying
that under Policy Statement No. BHPI-G-044A, they are not
entitled to it considering that they are residents of Bauan or its
adjacent towns.
ISSUE: WON union members are entitled to relocation
allowance in light of the CBA between the parties.
HELD: YES.
Ratio: Any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between
management and the union members should be resolved in
favor of the latter (Article 1702 of the Civil Code). Contracts
which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their
literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment.
“the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
contract constitute the law between the parties. Those
who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the
event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the
aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress.”
(Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz)
DISPOSITION Petition is DENIED.
6. Grievance settlement and issues: Arts. 255, 260
Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. Brillantes, 279
SCRA 218 (1997)
FACTS: Anticipating the expiration of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement on July 31, 1995, petitioner CALTEX EMPLOYEES
ASSOC and CALTEX PHIL. negotiated the terms and conditions of
employment to be contained in a new CBA. The negotiation
between the two parties was participated in by the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) and the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. Some items in the new CBA
were amicably arrived at and agreed upon, but others were
unresolved.
To settle the unresolved issues, eight meetings between
the parties were conducted. Because the parties failed to reach
any significant progress in these meetings, petitioner declared a
deadlock. On July 24, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. Six
(6) conciliation meetings conducted by the NCMB failed to settle
the parties' differences. Then, the parties held marathon
meetings at the plant level, but this remedy proved also
unavailing.
During a strike vote on August 16, 1995, the members of
petitioner opted for a walkout. Private respondent then filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
assumption of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code. Sec. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction. He enjoined
any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended. The parties
were further directed to cease and desist from committing any
and all acts which might exacerbate the situation.
Several issues on benefits were raised. One of the issues
which stood out however was the grievance procedure of the
parties under the CBA. The Secretary ordered that the periods
to process/resolve grievances based on existing practice be
reduced from (45) days to (30) days at the first step and (10)
days to seven (7) days at the second step which is the level of
the VP for Manufacturing. The Secretary further reviewed the
steps through which a grievance may be processed and in line
with the principle to expedite the early resolution of grievances,
and found that the establishment of a joint Council as an
additional step in the grievance procedure, may only serve to
protract the proceeding and, therefore, no longer necessary.
Instead, the unresolved grievance, if, not settled within (7) days
at the level of the VP for Manufacturing, shall automatically be
referred by both parties to voluntary arbitration in accordance
with R.A. 6715.
As to the number of Arbitrators for which the Union
proposes to employ only one instead of a panel of three
Arbitrators, the Secretary deemed it best to leave the matter to
the agreement of both parties. Finally, the Secretary advised the
parties that the list of accredited voluntary arbitrators is now
being maintained and disseminated by the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board and no longer by the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
ISSUE: WON the Honorable Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in modifying the grievance machinery
HELD: NO.No particular setup for a grievance machinery is
mandated by law. Rather, Article 260 of the Labor Code, as
incorporated by RA 6715, provides for only a single grievance
machinery in the company to settle problems arising from
"interpretation or implementation of their collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies."
Article 260, as amended, reads: Grievance Machinery
and Voluntary Arbitration. The parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the
mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall
establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery
which are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the
date of its submission shall automatically be referred to
voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For this purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement shall name and designate in advance a Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, or include in the
agreement a procedure for the selection of such Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the
listing of qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by the
Board. In case the parties fail to select a Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board shall designate the
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, as may be
necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which shall act with same
force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panel of Arbitrators has
been selected by the parties as described above.
We believe that the procedure described by public
respondent sufficiently complies with the minimum requirement
of the law. Public respondent even provided for two steps in
hearing grievances prior to their referral to arbitration. The
parties will decide on the number of arbitrators who may hear a
dispute only when the need for it arises. Even the law itself does
not specify the number of arbitrators. Their alternatives
whether to have one or three arbitrators have their respective
advantages and disadvantages. In this matter, cost is not the
only consideration; full deliberation on the issues is another, and
it is best accomplished in a hearing conducted by three
arbitrators. In effect, the parties are afforded the latitude to
decide for themselves the composition of the grievance
machinery as they find appropriate to a particular situation. At
bottom, we cannot really impute grave abuse of discretion to
public respondent on this issue.
Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47 (1993)
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside
decision of NLRC
FACTS:Master Iron (MI) and its labor union (MILU) entered into a
CBA in Feb 1987. It provided that “there shall be no strike and
no lookout, stoppage or shutdown of work, or any other
interference with any of the operation of MI during the term of
this CBA, unless allowed and permitted by law.”
Right after signing the CBA, MI subcontracted outside
workers to do the usual jobs done by its regular workers
including those done outside of the company plant. Thus,
regular workers were scheduled by management to work on a
rotation basis allegedly to prevent financial losses thereby
allowing the workers only 10 working days/month. MILU
requested implementation of the grievance procedure which had
also been agreed upon in the CBA, but MI ignored the request.
MILU filed a notice of strike, and upon intervention of
DOLE, it was agreed upon that MI would give back the usual
work to its regular employees who were members of MILU
Notwithstanding the agreement, MI continued the
practice of hiring outside workers. MILU again went on a strike.
MI sought to have the strike declared illegal while MILU filed
complaint for unfair labor practice.
LA and NLRC decided for MI (strike was illegal for failure
to exhaust the provision in the CBA on grievance procedure),
hence this petition
ISSUE 1. WON the strike was illegal for failure to exhaust
grievance procedure
HELD 1. NO
Ratio MI’s refusal to heed MILU’s request to undergo the
grievance procedure clearly demonstrated its lack of intent to
abide by the terms of the CBA, thus committing an unfair labor
practice
Reasoning MI’s failure to traverse MILU’s allegation that NLRC
abused its discretion in holding that the provision on grievance
procedure had not been exhausted clearly sustains such
allegation and upholds the MILU’s contention that MI refused to
undergo said procedure. It should be remembered that a
grievance procedure is part of the continuous process of
collective bargaining. It is intended to promote a friendly
dialogue between labor and management as a means of
maintaining industrial peace.
On nature of the strike:
 MILU contend that notwithstanding the CBA’s non-strike
provision, the strike was legal because the reasons therefor are
non-economic in nature. On the other hand, in holding that the
strike was illegal, NLRC relied solely on the no-strike no-lockout
provision of the CBA. As the SC has held, a no-strike clause in a
CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if the
strike is founded on an unfair labor practice of the employer, a
strike declared by the union cannot be considered a violation of
the no-strike clause.
An economic strike is defined as one which is to force
wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not
required by law to grant. Here, MILU enumerated in their notice
of strike the ff grounds: violation of CBA or MI’s practice of
subcontracting workers; discrimination; coercion of employees;
unreasonable suspension of union officials, and unreasonable
refusal to entertain grievance.
MILU is not asking for an economic benefit not already
agreed upon, but is merely asking for the implementation of the
same.
Prof. Perfecto Fernandez: economic strike involves issues
relating to demands for higher wages, higher pension or
overtime rates, pensions, profit sharing, shorter working hours,
fewer work days for the same pay, elimination of night work,
lower retirement age, more healthful working conditions, better
health services, sanitation and more safety appliances.
The demands were within the power of MI to grant and therefore
the strike was not an economic strike.
Disposition Petition is granted.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Santos, 218 SCRA 415 (1993)
Facts: Respondents are Port Stewards of Catering Sub-
Department, Passenger Services Department of PAL who have
the following duties and responsibilities:Prepare meal orders and
check-lists, setting up standard equipment in accordance with
the requirements of the type of service for each flight; skiing,
binning and inventorying of Commissary supplies and
equipment.
On various occasions, several deductions were made
from their salary representing losses of inventoried items
charged to them for mishandling of company properties.
Respondents, represented by the union, made a formal
notice regarding the deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo
Abad, Manager for Catering. PAL did not act on it thus
respondents filed a formal grievance pursuant to the grievance
machinery Step I of the CBA regarding the illegal/questionable
salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and
merchandise being done by catering service personnel which
they believed should not be their duty.
The grievance was submitted to the office of Mr.
Reynaldo Abad who at the time was on vacation leave.
The grievants thru the shop steward wrote a letter on
December 5, 1984 addressed to the office of Mr. Abad, who was
still on leave at the time, that inasmuch as no reply was made to
their grievance which 'was duly received by your secretary' and
considering that petitioner had only five days to resolve the
grievance as provided for in the CBA,
Section 2, Article IV of the PAL-PALEA Collective
Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter, CBA), to wit:
"Section 2-Processing of Grievances xxx STEP 1-Any
employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall
take the matter up with his shop steward. If the shop steward
feels there is justification for taking the matter up with the
Company, be shall record the grievance on the grievance form
heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2) copies of the
grievance form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then
be presented to and discussed by the shop steward with the
division head. The division head shall answer the grievance
within five (5) days from the date of presentation by inserting
his decision on the grievance form, signing and dating same,
and returning one copy to the shop steward. If the division head
fails to act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period, the
grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party. If
the division head's decision is not appealed to Step 11, the
grievance shall be considered settled on the basis of the
decision made, and shall not be eligible for further appeal
Said grievance as believed by them was deemed
resolved in their favor.When Mr Abad returned he immediately
scheduled a meeting with the grievants. Thereafter, the
individual respondents refused to conduct inventory works.
Mr. Abad resolved the grievance by denying the petition
of individual respondents and adopted the position that
inventory of bonded good is part of their duty as catering service
personnel and that it was only proper that employees are
charged for the amount due to mishandling of company property
which resulted to losses. They were also suspended for not
conducting inventory work.
 Held It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr.
Abad's secretary during his absence. Under Section 2 of the CBA
aforequoted, the division head shall act on the grievance within
five (5) days from the date of presentation thereof, otherwise
"the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved
party." It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division
head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed their
grievance which was received by Abad's secretary.This
knowledge, however, should not prevent the application of the
CBA.
On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:
"x x x Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head
Reynaldo Abad had to act on the grievance of complainants
within five days from 21 November 1984. Therefore, when
Reynaldo Abad failed to act within the reglementary period,
complainants, believing in good faith that the effect of the CBA
had already set in, cannot be blamed if they did not conduct
ramp inventory for the days thereafter xxx it is hard to believe
that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand still
during his absence from office. To be sure, it is to be expected
that someone has to be left to attend to Abad's duties.
As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act
on the matter may have been due to petitioner's inadvertance,
but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the employees be
made to bear the dire effects thereof. Much as the latter were
willing to discuss their grievance with their employer, the latter
closed the door to this possibility by not assigning someone else
to look into "the matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private
respondents should not be faulted for believing that the effect of
the C13A in their favor had already stepped into the
controversy.
Disposition petition denied, assailed decision of NLRC is
affirmed
SMC v. NLRC, 304 SCRA 1 (1999) supra.
7. Extension/renewal
Seno v. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124 (1967)
Lopez Sugar v. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA
179 (1990)
Meralco v. Quisumbing, supra.
Facts: An arbitral award has been granted by the Secretary of
Labor to the MERALCO Union.
Petition had its origin in the renegotiation of the parties'
1992-1997 CBA, insofar as the last two-year period thereof is
concerned.
A letter from MERALCO’s Chairman of the Board and its
President addressed to their stockholders, which states that the
CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the period
December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997 is still with the
Supreme Court," as indicative of petitioner's recognition that
the CBA award covers the said period.
Issue: The parties dispute the reckoning period when
retroaction of the arbitral awards by the Secretary of Labor
should commence.
Held: The period is herein set at two (2) years from 01
December 1995 to 30 November 1997.
The arbitral award can be considered as an
approximation of a CBA which would otherwise have been
entered into by the parties. The terms or periods set forth in
Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing
that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral
award by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable
law.
Despite the silence of the law, the Court ruled that CBA
arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of
the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both
employer and the employees or their union.
If there is no such agreement, the award shall retroact to the
first day after the six months following the last day of the CBA.
In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the
retroactivity date shall control.
Rule RE CBA retroactivity: (Art. 253-A)
If a CBA is renewed within 6 months from its expiry, it will
be retroactive from the day immediately following the expiry of
the original CBA. For instance, a CBA expires on December 31
and its renegotiation is finished within 6 months, then the
renewed CBA dates back to January 01.
If there is no new CBA concluded within 6 months, then there
will be no automatic retroaction; both the retroaction (if any)
and the effectivity date of the new CBA will be left to the parties
to agree on.
Manila Central Line v. Manila Central Line Free Workers
Union, 290 SCRA 690 (1998)
Facts: Bargaining agreement had expired on March 15, 1989.
As the parties failed to reach a new agreement, the Union
sought the aid of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
on October 30, 1989, but the deadlock remained unresolved.
Parties submitted the case for compulsory arbitration.
Issues:
1. WON the Labor Arbiter had authority to act as voluntary
arbitrator.
2. Disputed effectivity date of the new CBA.
Held:
1. Manila Central Line Corporation must be deemed to be
estopped from questioning the authority of Labor Arbiter
Donato G. Quinto, Jr. to act as voluntary arbitrator and
render a decision in this case. Petitioner agreed, together
with the union, to refer their dispute for arbitration to
him.
2. The CBA in this case is part of an arbitral award. As such,
it may be made retroactive to the date of expiration of
the previous agreement.
In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting
retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code,
public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and
discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
Rule RE CBA retroactivity: (Art. 253-A)
If a CBA is renewed within 6 months from its expiry, it will
be retroactive from the day immediately following the expiry of
the original CBA. For instance, a CBA expires on December 31
and its renegotiation is finished within 6 months, then the
renewed CBA dates back to January 01.
If there is no new CBA concluded within 6 months, then there
will be no automatic retroaction; both the retroaction (if any)
and the effectivity date of the new CBA will be left to the parties
to agree on.
8. CBA and 3rd party applicability
Sundowner Development Corporation v. Drilon, 180 SCRA
14 (1989)
NATURE: Petition for certiorari to review the orders of the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
FACTS: Hotel Mabuhay, Inc. leased the premises belonging to
Santiago Syjuco, Inc. in Ermita, Manila.
Due to non-payment of rentals, a case for ejectment was
filed by Syjuco against Mabuhay in the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila. Mabuhay offered to amicably settle the case by
surrendering the premises to Syjuco and to sell its assets and
personal property to any interested party.
Syjuco offered the said premises for lease to Sundowner.
April 16, 1987 – The lease agreement was finalized and
was agreed to commence on May 1, 1987 and to expire on April
30, 1992.
May 4, 1987 - National Union of Workers in Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Services (NUWHRAIN for short) picketed
the leased premises, barricaded the entrance to the leased
premises and denied petitioner's officers, employees and guests
free access to and egress from said premises. This prompted
Sundowner to write a letter of complaint to Syjuco.
May 7, 1987 - A complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order was filed by
Sundowner. The Executive Judge of the court issued a
restraining order against respondent NUWHRAIN and its officers
and members. NUWHRAIN nevertheless maintained their strike
but filed an answer to the complaint.
May 14, 1987 - An order was issued by public respondent
Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute
pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. It required the 91
striking employees to return to work and for Mabuhay to accept
all returning employees pending final determination of the issue
of the absorption of the former employees of Mabuhay.
Mabuhay submitted its position paper alleging: That it
had sold all its assets and personal properties to Sundowner and
that there was no sale or transfer of its shares whatsoever.
Mabuhay completely ceased operation effective April
28,1987 and surrendered the premises to Sundowner so that
there exists a legal and physical impossibility on its part to
comply with the return to work order specifically on absorption.
June 26, 1987 - In order to commence its operation,
Sundowner signed a tripartite agreement so the workers may lift
their strike. In this agreement among Sundowner, NUWHRAIN
and Mabuhay, the latter paid to respondent NUWHRAIN the sum
of P638,000.00 in addition to the first payment in the sum of
P386,447.11, for which reason respondent NUWHRAIN agreed to
lift the picket.
July 13, 1987 - NUWHRAIN filed its position paper alleging
connivance between Mabuhay and Sundowner in selling the
assets and closing the hotel to escape its obligations to the
employees of Mabuhay. NUWHRAIN prays that petitioner accept
the workforce of Mabuhay and pay backwages from April 16,
1986 to April 28, 1987, the day Mabuhay stopped operation.
January 20, 1988 – Drilon, as DOLE secretary, issued an
order requiring Sundowner to absorb the members of the union
and to pay backwages from the time it started operations up to
the date of the order.
January 27, 1988 – Sundowner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order, alleging that the theory of implied
acceptance and assumption of statutory wrong does not apply in
the instant case and that there is no law requiring bona fide
purchasers of the assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its
employ the employees of the latter.
Drilon denied the MFR.
ISSUE: WON the purchaser of the assets of an employer
corporation can be considered a successor employer of the
latter's employees
HELD NO. Ratio The rule is that unless expressly assumed,
labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective
bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee
of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding
only between the parties.
Reasoning As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona
fide purchaser of assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its
employ the employees of the latter.
However, although the purchaser of the assets or
enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the
employers of the seller of such assets or enterprise, the parties
are liable to the employees if the transaction between the
parties is colored or clothed with bad faith.
In the case at bar, contrary to the claim of the public
respondent that the transaction between petitioner and
Mabuhay was attended with bad faith, the court finds no cogent
basis for such contention. Thus, the absorption of the employees
of Mabuhay may not be imposed on petitioner.
It is undisputed that when Mabuhay surrendered the
leased premises to Syjuco and asked Syjuco to offer same to
other lessees, it was Syjuco who found petitioner and persuaded
petitioner to lease said premises. Mabuhay had nothing to do
with the negotiation and consummation of the lease contract
between petitioner and Syjuco.
In the tri-partite agreement that was entered into by
petitioner with respondents NUWHRAIN and Mabuhay, it is
clearly stipulated that immediately after the execution of the
agreement, Mabuhay shall give a list of its members to
Sundowner that it desires to recommend for employment so that
the latter can consider them for employment, with no
commitment whatsoever on the part of Sundowner to hire them
in the business that it will operate in the premises formerly
occupied by the Hotel Mabuhay.
There can be no implied acceptance of the employees of
Mabuhay by petitioner and acceptance of statutory wrong as it is
expressly provided in the agreement that petitioner has no
commitment or duty to absorb them.
The court does not subscribe to the theory of Drilon that
petitioner should have informed NUWHRAIN of its lease of the
premises and its purchase of the assets and personal properties
of Mabuhay so that said employees could have taken steps to
protect their interest. The court finds no such duty on the part of
petitioner and its failure to notify said employees cannot be an
indicium of bad faith.
While it is true that petitioner is using the leased property
for the same type of business as that of respondent Mabuhay,
there can be no continuity of the business operations of the
predecessor employer by the successor employer as respondent
Mabuhay had not retained control of the business.
Disposition Petition granted. Orders reversed and set aside.
Manlimos v. NLRC, 242 SCRA 145 (1995)
FACTS:The petitioners were among the regular employees of
the Super Mahogany Plywood Corporation
A new owner/management group acquired complete
ownership of the corporation. The petitioners were advised of
such change of ownership; however, the petitioners continued to
work for the new owner and were considered terminated, with
their conformity, only when they received their separation pay,
13th month pay, and all other benefits due them.
Each of them then executed a Release and Waiver which
they acknowledged before the Hearing Officer of the Butuan City
District Office of the DOLE
 The new owner caused the publication of a notice for the
hiring of workers, indicating therein who of the separated
employees could be accepted on probationary basis. The
petitioners then filed their applications for employment. Except
for Rosario Cuarto, they were hired on probationary basis for six
months as patchers or tapers, but were compensated on piece-
rate or task basis.
For their alleged absence without leave, Perla Cumpay
and Virginia Etic were considered, to have abandoned their
work. The rest were dismissed because they allegedly
committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the new
management.
Petitioners then filed against the respondent a complaint.
The petitioners maintained that they remained regular
employees regardless of the change of management and their
execution of the Release and Waiver.
Respondent contended that the petitioners were deemed
legally terminated from their previous employment; that the new
owner was well within its legal right or prerogative in considering
as terminated the petitioners' probationary/temporary
appointment; and that the petitioners were not illegally
dismissed; hence, they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
Labor Arbiter ruled for the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter,
however, ruled that there was no "cessation of operations which
would lead to the dismissal of the employees."
Respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the
judgment of the Labor Arbiter, subject, however, to
recomputation based on the actual services of the petitioners
under the new owner up to the actual date of their separation
from the service. It found that the change of ownership in this
case was made in good faith since there was no evidence on
record that "the former owners conspired with the new owners
to insulate the former management of any liability to its
workers."
Their motion to reconsider the resolution having been
denied by the NLRC, the petitioners filed a special civil action for
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: NO. There was only a change of ownership of Super
Mahogany Plywood Corporation which resulted in a change of
ownership. In short, the corporation itself, as a distinct and
separate juridical entity, continues to exist. The issue of whether
there was a closing or cessation of business operations which
could have operated as just cause for the termination of
employment was not material.
The change in ownership of the management was done
bona fide and the petitioners did not for any moment before the
filing of their complaints raise any doubt on the motive for the
change. On the contrary, upon being informed thereof and of
their eventual termination from employment, they freely and
voluntarily accepted their separation pay and other benefits and
individually executed the Release or Waiver which they
acknowledged before no less than a hearing officer of the DOLE.
A change of ownership in a business concern is not
proscribed by law.
Central Azaucarera del Danao vs. CA: It is a principle
well-recognized, that it is within the employer's legitimate
sphere of management control of the business to adopt
economic policies or make some changes or adjustments in their
organization or operations that would insure profit to itself or
protect the investment of its stockholders. As in the exercise of
such management prerogative, the employer may merge or
consolidate its business with another, or sell or dispose all or
substantially all of its assets and properties which may bring
about the dismissal or termination of its employees in the
process. Such dismissal or termination should not however be
interpreted in such a manner as to permit the employer to
escape payment of termination pay. For such a situation is not
envisioned in the law. It strikes at the very concept of social
justice.
In a number of cases on this point, the rule has been laid
down that the sale or disposition must be motivated by good
faith as an element of exemption from liability.
Indeed, an innocent transferee of a business
establishment has no liability to the employees of the transferor
to continue employing them. Nor is the transferee liable for past
unfair labor practices of the previous owner, except, when the
liability therefor is assumed by the new employer under the
contract of sale, or when liability arises because of the new
owner's participation in thwarting or defeating the rights of the
employees.
Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith, the
transferee is under no legal duty to absorb the transferor's
employees as there is no law compelling such absorption. The
most that the transferee may do, for reasons of public policy
and social justice, is to give preference to the qualified
separated employees in the filling of vacancies in the facilities of
the purchaser.
Since the petitioners were effectively separated from
work due to a bona fide change of ownership and they were
accordingly paid their separation pay, which they freely and
voluntarily accepted, the private respondent corporation was
under no obligation to employ them; it may, however, give them
preference in the hiring. The private respondent in fact hired,
but on probationary basis, all the petitioners, except Rosario
Cuarto. The non-hiring of Cuarto was legally permissible.
Disposition Petition waspartly GRANTED. The challenged
resolutions of NLRC were MODIFIED; respondent was ordered to
pay petitioners Perla Cumpay and Virginia Etic their backwages
up to the expiration of their probationary employment contracts.
9. Substitutionary doctrine
Benguet Consolidated v. BCI Employees & Workers Union,
23 SCRA 465
Elisco-Elirol Labor Union v. Noriel, 80 SCRA 682 (1977)
Facts: In Feburary 1974, Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (Union)
negotiated and concluded a CBA with Elizalde Steel Consolidated
(Company).
Since the Union was not yet registered with the BLR, the
Union members resolved to register their union to preserve the
integrity of the CBA in its meeting on May 20, 1975. A Certificate
of Registration was issued in favour of the Union on May 28,
1975.
The Union then sought the implementation of the CBA. On
June 10, 1975, the Union members decided to disaffiliate from
NAFLU. The Union president then wrote to the Company
informing it of its disaffiliation from NAFLU and demanded that it
be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the Company’s employees however the
Company refused.
Thus, a petition was filed with the BLR to cite the Company
as guilty of ULP and to prevent NAFLU from representing itself as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees of the Company. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and was affirmed by the BLR Director.
Issue: WON the Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees of the Company.
Held: YES. The respondent Director erred when he ruled that
when the Union members disaffiliated from NAFLU, their
employment status with the Company was terminated.
The employees did not form a new union but merely
registered the local union which was their right under the law.
In a CBA, the local union is the principal party to the
agreement while a “mother union” is merely an agent of the
local union which remained the basic unit of association to act
for the interests of the employees which includes the freedom to
affiliate or disaffiliate. Such ruling was enunciated in the case of
Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.
Further, the substitutionary doctrine fully supports the
petitioner’s stand. Petitioner union to whom the employees owe
their allegiance has from the beginning expressly avowed that it
"does not intend to change and/or amend the provisions of the
present collective bargaining agreement but only to be given the
chance to enforce the same since there is a shift of allegiance in
the majority of the employees at respondent company.
Even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining
agreement executed between employer and employees thru
their agent, the employees can change said agent but the
contract continues to bind then up to its expiration date. They
may bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date.
In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only
consideration involved as the employees' interest in the existing
bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never entered the
picture.
10. Expiration of Contract
Pier 8 Arrastre v. Roldan-Confesor, 241 SCRA 294 (1995)
New Pacific Timber v. NLRC, supra.
Faculty Association of Mapua v. Court of Appeals, 523
SCRA 709 (2007)
Facts: MIT hired Arthur Andersen to develop a faculty ranking
and compensation system. In the 5th CBA negotiation meeting,
MIT presented the new faculty ranking instrument to FAMIT, who
agreed to the adoption and implementation of the instrument,
with the reservation that there should be no diminution in rank
and pay of the faculty members.
FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA effective 1 June 2001,
which incorporated the new ranking for the college faculty. The
faculty ranking sheet (Annex B) was annexed to the CBA, as well
as the college faculty rates sheet (Annex C) for permanent
faculty which included the point ranges and corresponding pay
rates per faculty level.
After a month, MIT requested for an amendment of Annexes
B, C and D (HS faculty rates for permanent faculty only),
claiming that C and D contained data under the heading “TOTAL
POINTS” that were not germane to the two other columns in
both annexes, and that B was inadvertently not attached to the
CBA.
FAMIT rejected the proposal, saying that these changes
would constitute a violation of the ratified 2001 CBA and result
in the diminution of rank and benefits of FAMIT college faculty.
(the proposed amendment in the ranking system for the college
faculty expands the 19 faculty ranks to 23)
MIT instituted some changes in the curriculum for the school
year 2000-2001 which resulted in changes in the number of
hours for certain subjects. Thus, MIT adopted a new formula for
determining the pay rates of the HS faculty: [Rate/Load x Total
Teaching Load = Salary] where total teaching load equals
number of classes multiplied by hours of service per week
divided by 3 hours (as practiced, one unit subject is equal to 3
hours of service.)
FAMIT opposed the formula, saying that MIT has not been
implementing the relevant provisions of the 2001 CBA (25%
increase in per rate/load for all high school faculty members
effective Nov 2000; 10% increase in per rate/load for all
permanent high school faculty members effective June 2001)
Together with the issue viz. college faculty, FAMIT brought
the matter to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board for
mediation. The case was submitted to the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators for resolution. They ruled for FAMIT regarding both
issues.
The CA reversed the PVA ruling. FAMIT appealed to the SC.
Issues: 1) Is MIT’s new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and
evaluation, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA?
2) Is MIT’s development of a new pay formula for the high
school department, without the knowledge of FAMIT, lawful and
consistent with the ratified CBA?
Held: 1) No. In the light of the existing CBA, the new point
range system proposed by MIT is an unauthorized modification
of Annex "C" of the 2001 CBA. It is made up of a faculty
classification that is substantially different from the one
originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties.
Thus, the proposed system contravenes the existing provisions
of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties.
Until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties,
they are duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in
full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor
qualification on which economic provisions of the existing
agreement are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must
be understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in
the said agreement. The CBA is the norm of conduct between
petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is
mandated by the express policy of the law.
2)No. MIT cannot adopt its unilateral interpretation of terms in
the CBA. It is clear from the provisions of the 2001 CBA that the
salary of a high school faculty member is based on a rate per
load and not on a rate per hour basis.
PETITION GRANTED.
E. Conciliation
a. Art. 211 (e)
b. Conciliation as part of collective bargaining:
Arts. 233, 250 (c), (d), (e), 261, 263 (e) and (h)
Philcom Employees Union v. Phil. Global
Telecommunications, 495 SCRA 214 (2006)
FACTS: Upon the expiration of the CBA between petitioner
Philcom union (PEU) and respondent employer (Philcom, Inc.),
the parties started negotiations for its renewal. While
negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) NCR, a Notice of Strike,
due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the
company. In view of the filing of said Notice of Strike, the
company suspended negotiations on the CBA. This moved the
union to file another Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining
deadlock.
At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office,
the parties agreed to consolidate the two Notices of Strike filed
by the union and to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of the proceedings. However, while the union and the
company officers and representatives were meeting, the
remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the
company premises, barricading the entrances and egresses
thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance
of the building. The following day, the company immediately
filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Then Acting Labor Sec Cresenciano Trajano issued an
Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any
strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the
parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may
exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return
to work within 24hours from receipt of the Secretary’s Order and
for management to resume normal operations, as well as accept
the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to
the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their
respective position papers and evidence within 10days from
receipt of said order. A few days later, a second order was
issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees
to return to work immediately.
The union filed MFR assailing, among others, the
authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction
over the labor dispute. Said motion was denied and as directed,
the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its
position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged ULP of
the company. The company, on the other hand, raised in its
position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged
by the union.
On the premise that the Labor Secretary cannot rule on
the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the
same illegal, petitioner union filed a Manifestation/ Motion to
Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcom’s Position Paper
for being irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues
assumed for resolution. In opposition, the company argued that
it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union
that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence,
the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the
strike.
The Secretary issued the first assailed order. Said order
directed the issuance of summons to Philcom Corporation to
appear before any hearing that may thereafter be scheduled
and to submit its position paper as may be required. It however
dismissed the union’s charges of ULP against the Company. It
further issued a return-to-work order and directed the parties to
cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate
the situation.
Philcom filed MFR and Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to
the NLRC for Compulsory Arbitration. PEU also filed MFR insofar
as the Order dismissed the ULP charges against Philcom and
included the illegal strike issue in the labor dispute. The
Secretary denied both MFRs.
PEU filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65. CA denied the petition and affirmed the orders of
the DOLE Sec. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES 1. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution
of the DOLE Sec including the issue of illegal strike
notwithstanding the absence of any petition to declare the strike
illegal.
2. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the
Secretary of Labor dismissing the Union’s charges of unfair labor
practices.
3. WON CA erred when it failed to issue such order
mandating/directing the issuance of a writ of execution directing
the Company to unconditionally accept back to work the Union
officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior
to the strike and as well as to pay their salaries/backwages and
the monetary equivalent of their other benefits.
HELD 1. NO. The Secretary properly took cognizance of the
issue on the legality of the strike. Since the very reason of the
Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction was PEU’s declaration of
the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental
to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself.
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the
police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good.
When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great
breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor
dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic
enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has
already taken place. In this case, the Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry
indispensable to the national interest: the telecommunications
industry.
 The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over
a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends
to all questions and controversies arising from such labor
dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to
enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute.
Besides, it was upon Philcom’s petition that the Secretary
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
Moreover, a careful study of all the facts alleged, issues raised,
and arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold
that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the
resolution of the present case.
2. NO. -Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate
the workers’ right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to
the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a
CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are
not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f),
which in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEU’s charge
of unfair labor practice.
A review of the acts complained of as ULP of Philcom
convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited
acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code.
The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of
employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other
monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water,
and other facilities, are all a matter of implementation or
interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between
Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure. All the
charges were adequately rebutted by the employer.
The Court has always respected a company’s exercise of
its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations.
Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, supervision and transfer of employees, working
methods, time, place and manner of work. This is so because the
law on ULP is not intended to deprive employers of their
fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they
honestly believe to be necessary to the proper, productive and
profitable operation of their business.
Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some
provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same was
a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic
provisions. The law mandates that such violations should not be
treated as unfair labor practices.
3. NO. -SC ruled on the legality of the strike if only to put an
end to this protracted labor dispute. The facts necessary to
resolve the legality of the strike are not in dispute. The strike
and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently
illegal for the following reasons:
1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by PD
823, as amended by PD 849, from strikes and lockouts. It is
therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike
policy of the State in regard to vital industries.
2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders, the
striking employees failed to return to work and continued with
their strike.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be
discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived.
While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk
of severing their relationship with their employer. see Art.264 of
the Labor Code.
A strike undertaken despite the Secretary’s issuance
of an assumption or certification order becomes a
prohibited activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a)
of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly
participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost
their employment status. The union members, including
union officers, who commit specific illegal acts or who
knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed
to have lost their employment status. Otherwise, the
workers will simply refuse to return to their work and
cause a standstill in the company operations while
retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and
preventing management to fill up their positions.
3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods.
e.g., human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the
company premises; use of coercive methods to prevent
company officials and other personnel from leaving the company
premises; prohibiting other tenants at the Philcom building from
entering and leaving the premises. see Art. 264(e) of the Labor
Code.
The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe
that any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and
defiantly picketing Philcom’s premises to prevent the
resumption of company operations, the striking
employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted.
4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive
mediation proceedings at the NCMB.
see Art264(a), LC. Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the IRR:
“During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which
may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute. They are
obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in good
faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation
meetings called by the regional branch of the Board.”
5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance
procedure established in the CBA.
PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance
machinery provided for in the CBA. In disregarding this
procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the
strike have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its
hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts.
A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not
been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the
CBA of the parties is premature and illegal. Having held the
strike illegal and having found that PEU’s officers and
members have committed illegal acts during the strike,
we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the
return to work of PEU officers who participated in the
illegal strike, and PEU members who committed illegal
acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the
Secretary issued. The issue of who participated in the illegal
strike, committed illegal acts, or defied the return-to-work orders
is a question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate
proceedings before the Secretary of Labor.
Disposition Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed with
the modification that the DOLE Sec is directed to determine who
among the PEU officers participated in the illegal strike, and who
among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the
return-to-work orders.
Nissan Motors v. Secretary, 491 SCRA 605 (2006)
FACTS: The labor dispute was triggered by a collective
bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the Union
resulting in the filing of four notices of strike with the NCMB.
DOLE issued an Order consolidating the 4th notice of
strike with the first three (3) notices and reiterating the
injunction contained in the assumption of jurisdiction
The Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to
Secure, Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NMPI,
alleging that despite the injunctions against any slowdown and
strike, the Union went on actual strike, picketed and blocked the
company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and
obstructed all entrances and exits points.
The Secretary of Labor issued an Order deputizing the
[PNP]
DOLE issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the
suspension of the 140 employees which is the subject of the first
notice of strike and sustained the dismissal of the Union officers
but recalled the dismissal of the Union members and reinstated
to their former positions without back wages. It also directed
BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU and Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. to
conclude a Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Company and the Union each sought partial
reconsideration, but their corresponding motions were denied
Therefrom, both the Company and the Union went to the
CA The CA, denied the parties’ separate petitions and affirmed
the respondent’s resolution
ISSUES 1. WON the CA acted within the bounds of the law when
it spared the striking workers or union members from the
penalty of dismissal.
2. WON the award of salary increases made by SOLE in the
disposition of economic aspects of the CBA which was based on
revelations sourced from the confidential position given to the
NCMB Administrator is proper.
HELD 1. YES. The Union engaged in work slowdown which under
the circumstances in which they were undertaken constitutes
illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the
subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the
Labor Code, for participating in illegal strike in defiance of the
assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary.
While the employer is authorized to declare a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union
members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a
distinction between union officers and members/ordinary
workers. An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as
a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike;
there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the separation pay and the effectivity of the new CBA, appears to be
strike. proper.
The law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment However, there is a need to modify some of the awards
the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to among which is the annual salary increases. In this regard, the
the assumption order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend Court cannot sanction the award made by the public respondent
rather than dismiss the employee involved. Secretary based ostensibly on the revelation of NCMB
Chief, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Solvic Industrial Administrator Olalia that was sourced from the confidential
Corporation vs. NLRC: “Except for the most serious causes position given him by the Company. The reason for this is
affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws frown simple. Article 233 of the Labor Code prohibits the use in
upon dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an evidence of confidential information given during conciliation
employee should not be sanctioned with a consequence so proceedings. NCMB Administrator Olalia clearly breached this
severe.” provision of law. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the
This disposition takes stock of the following Company, this confidential information given to Administrator
circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary Olalia was made prior to the Union’s slowdown and defiance of
striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown the Assumption Order of August 22, 2001 causing it additional
actually reported for work and continued to occupy their losses.
respective posts, or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they Disposition Decision and Resolution of the CA AFFIRMED , with
were only following orders of their leaders; and c) no evidence modifications
has been presented to prove their participation in the
commission of illegal activities during the strike. Pentagon Steel v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 174141,
Not to be overlooked is a factor which the CA, regarded June 26, 2009
as justifying the leniency assumed by the public respondent
Secretary towards the members of the Union. It is the fact that
Nissan Motor appeared to have also exacerbated, the emerging
volatile atmosphere among which is the en masse termination of
most of the Union members.
Any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise
engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption
order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status.
However, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties,
Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction
between union officers and its members or any other workers,
the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not
necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal
strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts.
Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs.
NLRC: the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an
illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore,
limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for
participation in an illegal strike is in order.
2. NO. The disposition made by the public respondent Secretary
relating to the economic aspects of the CBA, such as, but not
limited, transportation allowance, 14th month pay, seniority pay,