JOSEPH ESTRADA petitioner v GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO respondent

G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2,

2001
Ponente: Puno, J.:

FACTS:

This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short outline of events that precipitated the
case at bar thus follows:

1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president, the respondent as vice-
president.
2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and his
family of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage.
3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one by
one resigned
withdrawing their support.
4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened, in December 7
Impeachment Trial began.
5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of the
president.
6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davide
administered
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner left
Malacanang and issued
a press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him, the
president to the vice
president becoming the acting president
7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged powers of the President.
8. Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency.

ISSUES:
There are several important issues sprouting in this case.
1. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically in
regard the
legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
2. WON Estrada merely resigned as President
3. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President
4. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

HELD:
The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

1. The question on the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is subject to judicial

review. It is a legal question, which is justiciable.
At first, it can be said that acquisition of the presidential seat of respondent Arroyo would be
similar to that of former President Corazon Aquino as they were placed into position by means
of the call of the people in a revolutionary mass demonstration known as EDSA I for Aquino,
and EDSA II for Arroyo.

It has been stressed by private respondents that Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that
she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign
governments. Consequently, the grounds of the case show that such is a political question.

SC read the case Lawyers League vs Pres. Aquino, which decided that the legitimacy of Aquino
administration in question was a political question. The Freedom Constitution declared that
Aquino's government was a result a successful peaceful revolution by the sovereign Filipino
people, hence a political question. In contrast, Arroyo's government was not revolutionary in
character. Arroyo swore under the 1987 Constitution.

There is a legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government; it presented then a political question. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President, presenting a legal and justiciable
question.

2. It was held that Estrada has resigned as President.

The issue was whether the petitioner resigned as President or should he be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
Public in view of Art. VII Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution.

It was said that there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. There is no formal requirement as to form of a valid resignation. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using the TOTALITY TEST, Estrada was held to have resigned as President.

Intent to Resign. There was public pressure for petitioner to resign. In the diary of Executive
Secretary Eduardo Angara called "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," an authoritative
window to the state of mind of the petitioner was provided. On January 20, 2:30 pm he
proposed for a snap election for president in May, emphasizing that he would not be a
candidate. This is an indication that he intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

As his support from his officials were withdrawn, he was even advised to have a "dignified exit
or resignation." Estrada did not object to this suggestion but stated that he would never leave
the country. At 10:00 p.m. he said to Angara "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have
five days to a week in the palace." This was proof petitioner had reconciled himself to the
reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he
could stay in the palace. Estrada became concerned with peaceful and orderly transfer of
power when he told Angara ""Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate
to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power." The resignation of the petitioner was
implied.

Acts of Relinquishment. In the press release containing his final statement before he and his
family left Malacanang, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and
that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.

3. The law which concerned this issue was Article VII Sec.11 which provides in part:

"Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President."

"If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office"

The operative facts concerning this issue are:

*Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
*Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
*Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175; followed by House Resolution No. 176 a resolution expressing the support
of the house of representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, adopted January 24, 2001.

Clearly, from the given facts, both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of temporary inability. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the
temporary inability and to revise thereafter the decision of both houses of Congress
recognizing Arroyo as President because this question involves the Legislature's
discretionary authority.

4. It was held the Estrada is not immune for liability. His claim that he must the
impeachment proceeding must first be decided before civil or criminal prosecution begin is
untenable for he has been considered resigned from office. Hence the impeachment tribunal
and proceeding has ceased. Hence, as a non-sitting President, he can be tried for civil and
criminal charges filed against him.

5. Petitioner contended that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
guilt. He stated that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the
criminal cases violation of his right to due process. It was held that there was not enough
evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. The evidence given by petitioner that
Ombudsman has been biased by the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him was
insubstantial.