Arnault v Nazareno
contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail
Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault
from confinement in the New Bilibid prison. Denied
Facts:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government,
through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates
known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of
P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid
for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to
Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-
in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault,
for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not
the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San
Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust
company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the
necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As
such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold,
conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural
Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine
Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was
borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the
latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No.
8, which created a special committee to investigate the
transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee
created by the resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L.
Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to
resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of
the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000
for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before
October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October
29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in
the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank
in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account
of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National
Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he
himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate
recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present
case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money,
the senate then approved a resolution that cited him for
and is being contested in this petition.
Issue:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the
petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES.
 Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
 The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body
to make, must be material or
 necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and
every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce
a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject
of the inquiry or investigation.
 The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect
relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and
the form and character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of
the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question.
2. NO
 Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the
House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
 Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper
bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison
for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways
open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO
 Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the
important question, which is the name of that person to whom
witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent
claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the
name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that
 he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown. "Testimony which is
obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify
and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to
testify would be so punishable."
 Since according to the witness himself the transaction was
legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt
in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, Court found
no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the
name of that person might incriminate him.
235 SCRA 506
Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner
vs.
Enriquez, respondent
Facts:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act Appropriating
Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines
from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes”
was approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to
any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25,
Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were
raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare
unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide
Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the
Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec.
Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the
National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA
of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special
provision in the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs
of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four
special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the
AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for
the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special
provisions is constitutional and valid?
Held:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a
debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are
germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are
appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the
entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said
provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving
fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. &
Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying
the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in
pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified
30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted
according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the
Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an
inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road
maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP
modernization, prior approval of Congress required before
release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative
veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a
law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a
separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions –
allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the
use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres.
may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly
vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of
CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of the
said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is
also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No.
6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to
repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13
MAR 1937]
Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition
against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a
violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public
funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any
church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the
principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose
of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church,
or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims.
Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to
Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to
respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps
as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to
religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills
into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize
violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was
not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of
the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of
showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a
map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the
words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The
focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the
city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the
officials merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance. Although such issuance and sale
may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was
no the aim or purpose of the Government.
OSMEÑA VS. ORBOS [220 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 99886;
31 MAR 1993]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956
creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as
the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was
designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in
crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from
exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world
market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability
account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and ordered released from
the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive
Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds
for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic
prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery
being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . .
P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL
FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a
special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue
generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be
used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to
another government objective." Petitioner further points out
that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to
the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created."
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority"
to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix,
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the
power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must
be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to
tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also
impose a specific limit on how much to tax."
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT"
in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy (now, the
Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to § 8, paragraph
1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund
being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution.
(2) Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1
(c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137,
for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative
power to the Energy Regulatory Board.
Held: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established
"for the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes
brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in
world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account
may be funded from any of the following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or
customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax
under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as
may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation
with the Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of
tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be
determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the
Board of Energy;
involved in the determination of the price of oil and petroleum
products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or
exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of
fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the
petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond
effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the undesirable
consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the
delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under
which it is to be exercised.

c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum

products to augment the resources of the Fund through an
appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy
requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the
business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing
petroleum products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso

costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and
petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using
the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of
Energy.

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be

referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It
is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in
what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the
COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with
the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the
practice is not without precedent.

With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative

power, the Court finds that the provision conferring the
authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which
the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general
policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing
and subsidizing domestic pump rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956
expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite,

quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to
tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on
the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation;
but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here
involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power.
Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose
additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of
taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding
consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency
in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced
by the police power of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors