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FACTS:
Respondent has a legal problem with regard to its real estate holdings.
The law requires that respondent’s real estate holdings should only be
50% of its net worth. This constituted a bar to the planned expansion
of respondent. To solve the predicament of the respondent, it created
a separate entity, which is petitioner, wherein the existing branch sites
would be unloaded and the said petitioner would also acquire new
branch sites for respondent and lease it to the latter. Pursuant to the
agreement between the two parties, the petitioner acquired properties
from respondent and then leased them to the latter. It was a part of
the agreement that petitioner only holds properties for the respondent
and that the said properties would be returned to respondent at its
pleasure.
There came a time when there was a disagreement between the two
parties on which of the 2 lease contracts of lease presented by each
party governs them. Petitioner contends that it is the 11-year contract
while the other presents a 20-year contract. Both contracts have been
allegedly notarized and executed on the same date.
Using the 11-year contract as basis, the petitioner filed a petition for
ejectment against respondent. However, the petitioner lost in all its
cases and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA
mentioned in its decision that the lower courts erred in refusing to
exercise jurisdiction, when the issue of possession and issue of validity
of contract is intertwined. Nonetheless, it dismissed the petition to
maintain judicial consistency and stability as other ejectment cases
like the one at bar have already been decided on. Petitioner filed MR
and was granted by ordering respondent to pay the unpaid rentals.
Subsequently, the respondent filed an MR and the CA reversed its
decision, which made petitioner file an appeal to the SC saying that
the CA erred in considering the ruling of the court in another case as
the law of the case between petitioner and respondent. Respondent
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to
the case at bar even if the parties and properties involved are
different?
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the titles can still be questioned by respondents?
HELD:
FACTS:
The case at bar is an appeal of respondent of the decision
rendered by the lower court, finding him guilty of the crime of treason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to
the case at bar?
HELD:
FACTS:
Before this, the Court, with regard to cases like this, used the
principle of jus soli, adopted from the US Constitution, which says that
all those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its
jurisdiction is a citizen of the US.
ISSUE:
Whether or not precedents regarding citizenship should be
upheld, following the principle of stare decisis?
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD:
In the prior judged case, the cause of action was for the quieting
of title or removing the cloud on the title of the land. While in the case
at bar, the cause of action was not only to ask for the nullification of
the award and sale of the parcel of land but also, it questions the
validity of appellee corporation’s award and sale of the parcel of land
to the spouses. Given such, the two causes of action are different
from one another.
FACTS:
The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the
bank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it to
respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M.
Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a
bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case?
HELD:
Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect
of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
The decision of the trial court, which was final, declaring the
deeds of absolute sale null and void, precluded the CA from further
adjudicating the validity of the deeds and titles.
FACTS:
The trial court ordered a writ of replevin and with a motion for
reconsideration, respondent immediately appealed to the CA who then
set aside the said order and dismissed the case filed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was reversible error on the part of the CA
when it dismissed the case of petitioner due to litis pendentia?
HELD:
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
FACTS:
On July 31, 1985, Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. filed a
complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, a manager of their Cebu branch
for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83, which is
allegedly his unremitted premium collections owing to the Stronghold.
For failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear at the pre-trial, he was
defaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present his evidences,
without the other party. On the basis of Stronghold’s evidence, the
court decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of Stronghold.
Buaya appealed to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in favor of
Buaya, annulling the decision and remanding the case to the lower
court for further proceedings. The lower court therefore set a hearing
on December 13, 1990 but Buaya filed a ‘Motion of Postponement’ of
the hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion and gave
several reasons to postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991,
Stronghold opposed the motion, but the court granted Buaya’s motion
provided that the next time he does it, it will be considered a waiver of
his right to present evidence. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate its
previous decision dated, September 17, 1987. Buaya filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. He files a ‘Petition for Certiorari’
assailing the orders of the court but was dismissed for lack of merit.
On June 28, 1993, the court’s decision has became final and executory
and thus denied all other appeals made before it.
ISSUES:
1. Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the
Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered
the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter
order its execution?
2. When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of
Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the Buaya of
the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial
court merely require the presentation of evidence for Buaya and
without anymore requiring the presentation of Stronghold’s
evidence for cross-examination by the Buaya?
RATIO:
1. Annulled Decision: The decision of the trial court was not
annulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it had
merely been set aside. This shows that the trial court's Decision
was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court.
Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his
evidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the
trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to
take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present
evidence. An authentic copy thereof should have been
submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court
had indeed been annulled by that of the CA. Hence, a copy of
the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would
support the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient
ground for this Petition's dismissal.
2. Final and Executory Judgment: Once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right, it is axiomatic that once a decision attains
finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim
that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment
may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal
infirmities or errors it may contain. Litigations must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that once a judgment has
become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the
fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed
by the same parties.
Facts:
Argel alleged in his complaint that Judge Pascua rendered a
decision convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had
already been previously acquitted by Pascua in her Decision. Argel
contends that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of
violation his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling: Yes.
Ratio:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
His client was the husband of a patient who was a patient in St.
Luke’s Hospital where the petitioners are doctors. The patient had
complications alongside her pregnancy but was released during
Christmas day to be with her family. The next day, she was rushed
back to the hospital and she died later on together with the unborn
child.
The husband filed a case against the hospital and the doctors.
During one of the hearings, respondent borrowed the records from the
clerk of court and reaped of pages from the medical record. He then
handed this over to his driver. He was being followed by one of the
court’s staff due to suspicion and got from the driver the torn pages.
The driver then disappeared.
Issue:
Ruling:
Canon 1. . . .
FACTS :
13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not
reveal identity of the client, nor undertook to reveal the identity of the
client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law
of agency; absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction
for equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not
holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG;
unreasonable or unjust
HELD:
The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity
of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their
clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within
recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not
privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set
aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint.
1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client. Reasons: 1. Court has a right to know
that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood. 2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege
does not attach until there is a client. 3. Privilege generally pertains to
the subject matter of the relationship. 4. Due process considerations
c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.”
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-
incrimination and subverts the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
1. Court must confine itself to the key issue, issue burried: whether or
not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
excluding the defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033.
4. They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have
complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot
be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss.The rule of
confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness.
4. Atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue involves the
applicability of attorney-client privilege: petitioners included as
defendants and conspirators.
6. The issue poses a trilemma: need for courts to discover the truth,
need to protect adversary system of justice, need to keep inviolate the
constitutional right against self-incrimination and effective counsel in
criminal litigations.
FACTS:
When the judge then issued an order to set a date for hearing of the
case, petitioners tried to secure a reconsideration of the hearing order
but it was denied. They filed then a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CFI against Respondent – since the Petitioner
group did not want the case to be heard.
Respondent in defense argued that the order, which ordered the case
to suspended for 2 years or until further notice, is merely an
interlocutory order thus it cannot be reviewed by a petition for
certiorari. They argue that the case must be heard. CFI dismissed the
petition, grounded on the finding the lower court’s order was
interlocutory and that the case must be heard. CFI held that actions
for ejectment were filed before the enactment of RA1162. General
principle of Laws can only be enforced prospectively. Municipal Judge
saw it fit to suspend the proceedings with the expectation that the
question of the constitutionality of RA1162 will be discussed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES. It was interlocutory since the dispositive portion of the order did
not provide a definite resolution to the case, instead it suspended the
hearing of the case. But, the Supreme Court affirms the order of the
lower court dismissing the appellants petition for certiorari and
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Case at hand
- Supreme Court found the following:3
: no justiciable controversy4
: the cause of action5 to which SJS insisted on is merely
speculated or anticipated
: the 5 page SJS Petition merely sought an opinion
: SJS does not have solid evidence showing that their interests
would be greatly affected6
: Lower courts that denied the Motions for Dismissal and
Reconsideration without explanation and without allowing the
parties to file their answers, respectively
: The earlier decisions did not have dispositive portions7
Substantive
-whether or not the RTC decision -No10
conform to the form and
substance required by the
Constitution, the law and Rules of
Court
-whether or not endorsements of -No definitive answer11
candidacies by religious leaders is
unconstitutional
13
Partied are required to attend pre-trial briefs wherein evidences will be presented. Failure to do so
results to dismissal of case with prejudice to the absent party
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 37 of 147
INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY VS. ISABEL AGUINALDO COJUANCO-
SUNTAY, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 132524 DECEMBER 29, 1998
Case at hand
- Federico filed a petition18
Issue:19
- Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion20
Held:
- Petition dismissed
Ratio:
14
Because several names occur in the family tree, this will make understanding the case easier; those
highlighted are the ones involved in the case
15
In order of events
16
Take note of time because it is of significance to the court’s decision
17
Isabel’s parents’ marriage was declared null and void by the trial court
18
Grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to dismiss
19
In consideration of what segment- ratio decidendi - of the course line the case is under (Ratio
decidendi-reasoning or principle upon which a case is based); also including the other issue- fallo- to
which ratio decidendi is being compared (fallo-dispositive part of the order)
-dispositive part of the order is the judgment of the court notwithstanding all the contrary
statements that arise in the body of the decision
20
… and therefore reverse earlier decision and reward the petitioner to dismiss the respondent’s
earlier petition to right of administration of grandmother’s properties
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 38 of 147
- Under Section 1 Rule 1621, the time limit for petition to dismiss is
long overdue22
- Respondents are legitimate children23 which is clear under the
third paragraph of Article 85 of the New Civil Code24
21
Rules on Civil Procedure
22
Section1, Rule 16: Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim
- the time when the court filed Isabel’s claim on her grandmother’s properties is not
provided, but it would seem that Federico’s petition to dismiss was too late since the higher
court found the earlier court’s ruling without grave abuse
23
Because the court’s decision on the respondent’s parents’ legal separation stated ‘null and void’,
the petitioner insists that the respondent is an illegitimate child
24
Article 85: A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage: (1)x ; (2)x ; (3) That either party, was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife; … (6) x
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
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INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS
MERCADO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 149375, NOVEMBER 26, 2002
*RATIO DECIDENDI- THE PRINCIPLE WHICH THE CASE ESTABLISHES;
THE REASON FOR THE DECISION
Facts
Issue
Ruling
Facts:
Petition to prevent and restrain Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission
from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed
by respondent Antonio Guillermo a.k.a Silver
Issue:
Ruling:
The petition for prohibition was granted and the preliminary injunction
issued by the Supreme Court on Nov. 24, 1950 made absolute with
costs against Guillermo. He may not raise again the issue in any
The courts are not excluded in deciding any claim for amnesty, thus
the Court has jurisdiction over the amnesty petition of Guillermo. It
was also found that the petition was an ill-advised attempt to delay
execution of the judgment of conviction which no court of justice will
countenance. The finding of the Court that Guillermo is not entitled to
the benefits of amnesty is final and conclusive, not an obiter dictum,
under the principle of res judicata.
Facts:
-Petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
several parties including IBC-13, which the labor arbiter ruled in favor
of Villanueva. IBC-13 appealed to the NLRC, filing a surety bond
supposedly issued by BF General Insurance Company and a
confirmation letter from its President.
-Both documents were found to be falsified, so that criminal
informations for falsification of public documents against a number of
accused including respondent Villadores were filed.
-After Villadores was arraigned, the fiscal’s office submitted a Motion
to Admit Amended Informations with the following amendment: "to
the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and of public interest and
in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein
proclaimed.” (granted). Villadores filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(denied).
-Villadores then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to
annul the Order admitting the amended informations as well as the
Order denying his motion for reconsideration. Although the petition
was dismissed, the CA pronounced that Villanueva is not the offended
party in the cases and that he could not have sustained damages from
the falsifications.
-Villadores then moved in the trial court to disqualify Rico & Associates
as private prosecutor of Villanueva on the basis of the CA’s
pronouncement. Villanueva opposed the motion on the ground that the
pronouncement is mere obiter dictum. The trial court denied the
motion for disqualification. Villadores sought reconsideration (denied).
-Villadores then filed petition for certiorari with the CA seeking
annulment of the Order denying his motion for disqualification and the
Order denying reconsideration. The CA reversed the Orders and
directed that Villanueva’s name appearing as he offended party in the
criminal cases be stricken.
-Villanueva now comes to the Supreme Court on a petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
w/n the pronouncement of the appellate court that petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in the criminal cases is obiter
dictum (opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which
Ratio:
-The pronouncement touched upon a matter clearly raised by
Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the amended
informations. Among the issues therein was w/n Villanueva is the
offended party.
-An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum; this rule applies to all pertinent
questions (even only incidentally involved) presented and decided in
the regular course of considering the case, and led to its conclusion (or
any statement on a matter on which the decision is based).
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not one can file an appeal regarding a court’s
dissenting opinion?
HELD:
No. What comprises a decision which can be subject of appeal
or special civil action is the majority opinion of the court and not the
dissenting opinion. Never has it happen that the dissenting opinion
has been the one appealed of. Doing such is contrary to logic and
reason.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the personalities seized using an illegal search
warrant be returned?
HELD:
All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule
totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of
the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent
case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August
30, 1985). ...
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ratio:
Facts
The petitioner is the state of Indiana represented by Atty. Barnes,
while the respondents are The Kitty Kat lounge inc. and Glen theatre.
Issue
The issue lies within Indiana’s statutory of prohibited nudity and its’
infringement upon freedom of expression, and whether or not the
court was correct in stating that nude entertainment provided by
establishments such as the Kitty Kat lounge and Glen theatre is in fact
a form of expression protected under the 1st amendment of the United
States constitution.
Held
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, as the restriction
on nude dancing is a valid “time, place, or manner” restriction where
government regulation is justified
Ratio
The “time, place or manner test” was developed for evaluating
restrictions on expression that take place on public property
FACTS:
• Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church) and
Ernesto Picardo its president filed an action against the city if
Hialeah and its city council named as defendants alleging violation
of the their rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
• In April 1987, the church announced plans to establish a house
of worship, school, cultural center, and museum with the goal to
bring the practice of the Santeria faith, including its ritual of animal
sacrifice, into the open.
• On June 9, 1987 and other subsequent days the Hialeah city
council held an emergency public session where several ordinances
and resolutions where passed in response to the distress of
members of the community regarding practices of the Santeria
religion specifically animal sacrifice.
(1) On June 9, Resolution 87-66, noted the "concern"
expressed by residents of the city "that certain religions may
propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety," and declared that the City
reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all
acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety.
(2) On June 9, Ordinance 87-40, incorporated in full, except
as to penalty, Florida's animal cruelty laws which punishes
unnecessarily or cruelly killing of any animal. With the
consent of the attorney general of Florida the city attorney
assured that the prohibition of sacrificing of animals in a
religious practice or ritual is not inconsistent with the state
law therefore the city council can make ordinances against it.
(3) On August 11, Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual
sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah was passed.
(4) On Sept. 8, Ordinance 87-52 prohibiting public
ritualistic animal sacrifice, other than for the primary purpose
of food consumption was passed.
(5) On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-71 stating that It shall be
unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations
to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City
of Hialeah, Florida where the word sacrifice shall mean: to
unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hialeah city council is in violation of the First
Amendment in enacting Ordinances 87-14, 87-52, 87-71 and 87-72.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioner and reversed the
previous decisions concluding that that each of Hialeah's ordinances
pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct
motivated by religious belief.
RATIONALE:
The US Constitution provides that the Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof through the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
which was applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given that the Santeria is a religion, its beliefs such as animal sacrifice
“need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to
others in order to be protected by the First Amendment.
Facts:
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
FACTS:
Recuerdo, petitioner, issued checks to Yolanda Floro in exchange
of a 3-karat loose diamond, 3 of which were cleared while the 5 were
dishonored due to the closure of the petitioner’s account. The check
when presented for payment within 90 days thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank (Prudential) for the reason “ACCOUNT
CLOSED” and despite receipt of such dishonor the accused failed to
pay the said payee the face amount of the said check or to make an
arrangement for full payment within 5 banking days after receiving
said notice.
After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MTC finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on
five (5) counts and therefore sentences the accused to suffer
imprisonment, and pay an amount to Miss Floro plus an amount as
damages to compensate the payment for attorney’s fees.
The RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the MeTC. And the
court of Appeals affirmed that of RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Joy Lee Recuerdo violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) on 5 counts.
RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding the petitioner guilty of violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. In lieu of imprisonment, Joy Lee Recuerdo, is
ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the five cases at bar. And she is also
ordered to pay private complainant Yolanda Floro, the amount of
RATIONALE:
These matters subject of petitioner’s contention have long been settled
in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez where this Court upheld
the constitutionality of B.P 22:
“BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being instead ensure
the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual
substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one
has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, of the
terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate
application of the legislative enactment can be made.”
Facts:
Respondents executed a Deed of Undertaking binding themselves to
jointly and severally pay or reimburse upon demand of such money or
to repair the damages, losses or penalties which petitioner may suffer
on account of its guarantees. Letters of Guarantee were issued in favor
of the Philippine National Bank as security. When PNB called upon the
respondents to pay their obligations, respondents refused to pay and
resulted the petitioner to secure services of the counsel and later incur
expenses.
Respondents Phil Infra Inc. filed motion to dismiss on the ground that
complainant states no cause of action since it does not allege that
petitioner has suffered damages because of the guarantees on the
behalf of Phil Infra. --- denied RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of failure
to state cause of action.
Decision:
Petition is Granted. Earlier resolution of the Court of Appeals to dismiss
the case are reversed and set aside. Decision of the RTC to dismiss the
case and deny reconsideration are null and void and set aside.
Facts:
PNB demanded from respondents
1. P20,959,526.36 for aggregate amount of guarantees of
petitioner
2. P351517.57 for various fees and charges
Motion to Amend
Petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo, treasury department manager
of petitioner, and testified that 19M was paid by the petitioner through
the National Treasury for the principal loan and interest
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Rationale:
FACTS:
ISSUES:
DECISION:
The Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari and the proceeding is
dismissed.
RATIONALE:
A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the
court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are
decision within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous
they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari.
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring
the municipal president to issue the license, for the reason that he was
not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person,
he had the right to exercise discretion as to whom the license should
be issued. We do not believe that either of these questions go to the
jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in a
mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has
the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the
plaintiff asks him to perform. In the case at bar no one denies the
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 66 of 147
power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take
cognizance of an action for mandamus {mandate, an order of the
court} and to decide every question which arises in that cause and
pertains thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those
questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident
contradiction.
The fact that another action may have been pending involving the
same subject matter and even between the same parties, which was
not the fact in this case, does not touch the jurisdiction of the court to
act.
A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court
touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully support the
proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its decision of any
question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be
reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal.
(See also: Hagerman vs. Sutton, Paine vs. Mooreland, Colton vs.
Beardsly, Wertheimer vs. Boonville, O'Rielly vs. Nicholson, Gray vs.
Bowles),
Facts:
The Ruling:
Ratio:
The Judicial act of 1948 sec. 44 states that the Court of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which
the penalty provided by the law is imprisonment for more than six
months or a fine of over 200 pesos. Estafa more than meets with
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
The plaintiff should have filed a motion to set aside the order of
default under section 2, Rule 38, and if denied, to appeal from the final
judgment of the court on the merits of the counterclaim. Unless he has
filed said motion, the defaulting party can not appeal from a final
judgment on the merits. And on appeal, appellant may not only have
the judgment revised and corrected, but he may also raise the
question as to whether or not the order of default was correct or in
accordance with law and facts of the case, because the reversal of the
order of default will necessarily carry with it the invalidity of the
subsequent final judgment on the merits.
FACTS:
PP 1017:
W/N the issuance of PP 1017 was justified and had factual bases.
Factual Bases:
The issuance of PP 1017 was indeed justified and had factual bases.
Constitutional Bases:
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 74 of 147
On PP 1017:
On G. O. No. 5:
Applied Challenge:
Factual Bases:
Constitutional Bases:
PP 1017 Constitutional:
PP 1017 Unconstitutional:
Applied Challenge:
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Ratio:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
On the first issue, no, the Texas special issues allowed adequate
consideration of petitioner’s youth. There is no reasonable likelihood
that Johnson jury would have found itself foreclosed from considering
the relevant aspects of his youth, since it received the second special
issue instruction and was told to consider all mitigating evidence.
Youth’s ill effects are subject to change as a defendant ages and thus,
are rapidly comprehended as a mitigating factor in consideration of the
2nd special issue.
Facts:
Accused has been charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. He was tipped off by an informer of the NARCOM and was
identified through entrapment or buy-bust operation. Though it should
be noted that he wasn’t arrested when he was caught red-handed.
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
He then filed a civil case against Scalzo for damages on account of the
trumped up charges of drug trafficking done by the latter.
Private respondent was asking for the dismissal of the complaint since
he had diplomatic immunity. He even raised this concern to the SC
but the SC denied such and remanded the case to the trial court,
which later on found him guilty. Even if he was granted diplomatic
immunity, he was still responsible for acts outside of his official duties.
This was however reversed by the CA saying that he was clothed with
diplomatic immunity, excusing him from civil or criminal jurisdiction.
Issue:
Held:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this
Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank
shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly
done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions,
said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on
the grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence
of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein,
the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have
no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984
—
FACTS:
- Ichong, filed a petition with regard to certain provisions
stipulated in Republic Act No. 1180, “An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business”, declaring such to be unconstitutional; and to
enjoin Hernandez, Secretary of Finance, et al., from enforcing its
provisions.
- Petitioner’s grounds:
o RA 1180 denies alien residents equal protection of law;
deprives them of their liberty and property without due
process of law
o subject not expressed in title thereof
title is misleading or defective as it conceals the real
purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein
o Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines
o Provision of the act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business from hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or
entity to entitle it to engage in retail business violates
constitution
- In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that:
o The act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival
o The act has only one subject embraced in the title
o No treaty or international obligations are infringed
o As regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected
but the value of the property is not impaired, and the
institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
ISSUE/S:
- Whether or not the court shall grant Inchong’s petition with
regard to the validity and constitutionality of RA No. 1180
RATIO:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling/Decision:
Ratio:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Did the State’s refusal to terminate the life support system of Cruzan
violate her right to due process and liberty interest rights to refuse
medical treatment?
Ruling:
The US Supreme Court in a 6-3 ruling found that a person did have a
liberty interest under the due process clause of the 14th amendment to
refuse medical treatment, provided that they are competent and there
was clear and convincing evidence that the person didn’t want artificial
support to keep them alive. Petitioner Nancy Cruzan was rendered
incompetent due to her injuries from an automobile accident. Without
this evidence, a state obligation to uphold human life overrules the
wishes of patient or parents. The court found that the statements of
Nancy Cruzan under certain conditions were unreliable for the purpose
of determining her intent and thus insufficient to support co-guardians
claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy’s behalf. It rejected
the argument that Cruzan’s parents were entitled to order the
termination of the life support system, concluding that no person can
assume that choice of an incompetent in the absence of formalities
FACTS:
In a letter dated December 16, 1987, Australian film maker and
petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile
about the motion picture he intended to make, which was about the
EDSA Revolution. The respondent did not approve of the showing of
the film and filed a complaint with application for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on February 23, 1988. On February 24, 1988,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 134, issued a TRO
and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. In
response, Hal McElroy filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction. Petitioner Ayer Productions also
filed its own Motion to Dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action as the
mini-series had not yet been completed. In an order dated March 16
1988, respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against
the petitioners. On March 22 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions filed a
Petition for certiorari dated March 21 1988 with an urgent prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. On March 23 1988,
petitioner Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with
Urgent prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated
March 22, 1988. By a Resolution dated March 24, 1988, the petitions
were consolidated and Enrile was required to file a consolidated
answer. The Court also granted a TRO partially enjoining the
implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of March 16 1988 and
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the
petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the
projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or
his family or to any fictitious character based on the respondent. As a
result, Enrile filed his Consolidated Answer on April 6, 1988, invoking
his right of privacy. In a Manifestation dated March 30, 1988,
petitioner Hal McElroy informed the Court that a TRO dated March 25,
1988, was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the RTC of Makati, Branch
147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled "Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd., McElroy Film Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope
Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production. Private respondent filed
a Counter-Manifestation on April 13, 1988.
ISSUES:
RESOLUTION:
a. The Petitions for Certiorari are granted due course, and the March
16, 1988 order of trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
set aside. The limited TRO granted by the Court on March 24, 1988 is
modified, enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent
Judge's order of March 16, 1988 and made PERMANENT
RATIONALE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the Texas statute, making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct, is valid; or whether or not it violates the Due Process
Clause
HELD:
- The Texas statue making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the
Due Process Clause; unconstitutional
RATIONALE:
Concurring opinion
Justice O’Connor
- Agrees with the Court that Texas’ sodomy law banning “deviate
sexual intercourse” between consenting adults of the same sex,
but not between consenting adults of different sexes is
unconstitutional; based conclusion of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause – “all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.”
Dissenting opinion
Justice Scalia
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 105 of 147
- Texas’s prohibition of sodomy does not infringe a “fundamental
right” (which the Court does not dispute). Fundamental rights,
as defined, are those deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.
o Bowers held, homosexual sodomy do not implicate a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.
o Court failed to establish that the right to homosexual
sodomy is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.” On the contrary, Sodomy was a criminal
offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of
the original 13 States when the ratified the Bill of Rights.
- Texas’s prohibition of sodomy is unsupported by a rational
relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate state
interest.
o Due Process Clause prohibits states from infringing
fundamental liberty interest unless infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
- Texas’s prohibition of sodomy does not deny equal protection of
the laws.
Facts:
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the
PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial
relations for being filed two days late.
Issue:
Held:
Doctrines:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only
civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his
life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights
can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe.
When a Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders
become null and void.
A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice
requires it.
Held:
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is
evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation
against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree
of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an
inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far
adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon
a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of
those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there
can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality
in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate
measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them
the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing
them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is
indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding,
are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as
appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-
and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social
scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other
professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America.
Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of
community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a
source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But
whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or
complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively
within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine.
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC committed an abuse of discretion in
abandoning its original decision?
HELD:
FACTS:
The COMELEC then issued a resolution saying that they have the
exclusive jurisdiction over appeal concerning election cases and also, it
ordered for respondent to be reinstated to the position of mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is merit to the stand of COMELEC having
exclusive jurisdiction over appeal of election cases?
HELD:
Yes there is. The COMELEC has been granted this through a
special law, Section 50 of BP 697:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the order of the trial
court to execute its decision pending appeal?
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice requirement has been complied with
to effectuate a legal dismissal?
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment as secret agent of a provincial
governor constitutes sufficient defense for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
HELD:
FACTS:
But acting on a filed Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the trial court
withdrew the warrants. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrants were properly lifted due to
lack of probable cause?
HELD:
It was thus ruled that the master tapes be presented from which
the copyrighted films were allegedly copied, which was necessary for
the validity of the search warrants against those who allegedly
engaged in pirated films. The court cannot presume that the
duplicates were taken from the master tapes that petitioner owns.
FACTS:
A Motion To Lift Search Warrant was filed but was later denied.
Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration of the Order was filed. The
court granted the said motion and justified it on the ground that the
master tapes of the copyrighted films were never presented.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the ruling in the 20th Century Fox case could be applied
in deciding the present case?
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
In the case at bar, the Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
non-participation in the flag ceremony in no way poses a clear and
present danger to society. Thus, restraint on the part of the
government would be unjustified. Moreover, the petitioner’s right to
quality education, as granted by the Constitution was likewise violated
by effecting the expulsion.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power to inquire by
Congress?
2. Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to
information with regard to public concern?
3. Whether or not the implementation of EO 464 without prior
publication in a newspaper of general circulation constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 132 of 147
HELD:
FACTS:
• Historical background:
o One of the economic problems caused by the Great
Depression was faltering oil prices. This was due to
overproduction and a general economic slowdown.
o The oil industry sought Congressional intervention to
control the situation.
• President issued Executive Order 6199 on July 11, 1933, banning
interstate oil shipments if the oil was produced in excess of state
quotas.
o Basis for this EO was section 9(c) of title 1 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, which authorizes the President to
prohibit transportation of excess oil and prescribes
punishment of a fine, imprisonment, or both.
• President issued Executive Order 6204 on July 14, 1933,
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to exercise authority as
vested in the President in enforcing section 9(c) and EO 6199.
• Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out EO 6199
and 6204 on July 15, 1933.
o Regulation IV: Every producer of petroleum should file a
monthly statement giving information on the company and
oil production.
o Regulation V: Every purchaser/shipper/refiner of
petroleum should file a monthly statement giving
information on the company and oil production.
o Regulation VII: Aforementioned should keep adequate
books and records of all transactions involving the
production and transportation of petroleum and petroleum
products.
• Further EOs:
o President issued “Petroleum Code” (Code of Fair
Competition for the Petroleum Industry) on August 19,
1933 regulating the production of petroleum as deemed
necessary by each state’s requirement.
o President issued an EO on August 28, 1933 designating the
Sec. of the Interior as the Administrator and the
Department of the Interior as the federal agency, to
ISSUE:
RULING:
EO 6199, 6204 and the regulations issued by the Sec. of the Interior
are without constitutional authority.
RATIO:
FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:
With regard to the intervention of the DFA in the case, and its
certification of the sovereign immunity of petitioner is a political
question and is conclusive upon the courts. When the plea of
sovereign immunity is affirmed and recognized by the executive
branch, courts should accept such claim as not to embarrass the
executive branch of the government.
FACTS:
The petitioner moved for the case to dismiss, stating that it has
sovereign immunity. Private respondent opposes this by citing a
clause in the Agreement, which says “any legal action arising from the
Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City.”
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and this was appealed to
the CA for the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the trial court. The
CA affirmed the decision to deny petitioner’s motion. The CA said that
the petitioner waived its sovereign immunity by agreeing to the
abovementioned clause.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the decision of the trial court
in denying the motion to dismiss?
HELD:
Yes.
FACTS:
The petitioner is the labor union of the local hires in the said school.
There came a deadlock in CBA negotiations between them and the
school, especially with regard to the compensation scheme. They filed
a notice to stike and the DOLE took jurisdiction of the case. The DOLE
decided in favor of the school, following that there was valid
classification of the foreign hires and local hires. Hence, the case at
bar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the foreign hires should be given a higher pay than the
local hires?
HELD:
FACTS:
This prompted Jimenez to file with the trial court a writ of mandamus,
prohibition, and certiorari and the court issued a temporary restraining
order against petitioner. Hence, this case at bar.
ISSUES:
HELD:
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed.
There is no conflict with regard to the treaty and municipal law, they
are actually intertwined. It doesn’t matter if the treaty is void on any
provision on one’s right to due process, nonetheless, then the rules of
fair play should be employed. An application of one’s right to notice
and hearing wouldn’t conflict anything with the extradition proceeding.
Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010
Page 146 of 147
In administrative proceedings, one has the right to explain himself and
seek consideration of whatever resolution was made.