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20. People v.

Relova

Facts:
5 Feb 1, 1975 - Police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia; they discovered electric
wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed without necessary authority from city
govt
6 Nov 24, 1975 - Asst. City Fixcal filed info against Opulencia for violation of a city ordinance
which prohibits unauthorized wiring installations.
7 Opulencia pleaded not guilty and filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the crime had
alrdy prescribed (offense charged was a light felony w/c prescribes 2 mos from discovery
thereof.)
8 Lower court dismissed the case
9 Acting City Fiscal filed another info for theft of electric power
10 Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of double jeopardy
11 Judge Relova granted motion and dismissed the case.
12 Motion for Recon denied, hence this appeal

Issue: WON there was double jeopardy

Ratio Decidendi: A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having installed a
metering device to lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may
not be charged again for theft of electric power under the RPC

Reasons:
13 The second sentence of Art. IV Sec. 22 embodies an exception to the gen. Proposition: the
consti protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged
under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts
14 Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different statutes, the
inquiry, for purposes of double jeopardy is on the identity of offenses charged BUT where
an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts.
Since the dismissal of the case against Opulencia for violation of an ordinance alrdy amounted to
an acquittal, he can no longer charged with an offense punishable under a statute which arise
from the same act.
21. People v. City Court of Manila

Facts:
15 Oct. 17, 1972 - Diolito dela Cruz figured in an accident
16 Oct. 18– an info for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence (SPIRI) was filed
against private respondent driver of the truck
17 Oct. 18 – the victim died
18 Oct. 20 – private respondent was arraigned on the charge of SPIRI; he pleaded guilty
19 Oct 24 – an info for homicide thru reckless imprudence (HRI) was filed against priv. Resp.
20 Nov. 17 – city court of Mla dismissed above info on the ground of double jeopardy

Issue: WON there was double jeopardy

Ratio Decidendi: Where the victim of an accident died 2 days prior to the arraignment of the
accused who pleaded guilty to an info for SPIRI, he can no longer be charged with HRI as no new
fact supervened after the arraignment.

Reasons:
21 Molo v. People – held that where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does
not put him twice in jeopardy.
22 Above case not applicable in the instant case bec. there was no supervening event
23 (kasi nga patay na si Diolito nung na-convict si Gapay for SPIRI, if it were the other way
around, i.e. na-convict muna si Gapay bago namatay si Diolito, walang double jeopardy kc
may supervening event na)

Dispositive Portion: Order of dismissal of lower court affirmed.

24

22. Galman v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
25 Aug. 21, 1983 – Ninoy Aquino was assassinated while inside the premises of the Mla Intl
Airport.
26 3 hours after the incident, the military investigators reported that the man who shot Aquino
was a communist-hired gunman … the latter was gunned down in turn by the military (a few
days later, said gunman would be identified as Rolando Galman)
27 Marcos established a Fact Finding Board (the Agrava Board) to investigate the case
28 Oct 23 & 24, 1984 – after 125 days of hearing the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in
20377 pages of transcript, the Agrava Board came up with a minority and majority report,
both contending that the killing was not a communist plot but a military conspiracy.
ü Minority report – 6 persons who were at the service stairs as plotters, and Gen.
Luther Custodio was essential to the implementation of the plan
ü Majority report – 26 persons headed by gen Fabian Ver, all acting in conspiracy
with one another in the premeditated killing of Ninoy
ΠNov 11, 1985 РSaturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman together with 29 other petitioners,
charged the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan of serioud irregularities constituting
mistrial and resulting in the miscarriage of justice for want of due process of law; they
prayed for a TRO, a nullification of the proceedings and a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor
ΠNov 18, 1985 Рa 9-to-2 vote of the SB granted the TRO
ΠNov 28, 1985 Рthe same 9-to-2 ratio dismissed the petition and lifted the TRO
ΠNov. 29, 1985 Рthe petitioners filed a motion for recon based on the lack of legal ground for
the dismissal
Œ Dec 5 – all of the accused were acquitted … even though Galman was not on trial, he was,
in effect, convicted as the assassin of Ninoy
Œ Mar 6, 1986 – the Mla Times published an article entitled “Aquino Trial A Sham”, which had
for its context the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that the graft court
were convinced by Marcos to whitewash the criminal cases
ΠJune 5 РSC appointed a 3-member commission (Vasquez Commission) to hear and
receive evidence of the charges of collusion and pressure
Œ July 31 – the Vasquez Commission submitted its report with an affirmation of the “secret
meeting” held in Malacañang, wherein Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran to handle the case
(without raffling the case first) and for the entire tribunal to have all of the accused acquitted

Issue(among others): WON a call for a re-trial of the case would be tantamount to double
jeopardy

Ratio Decidendi: Where the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a fair trial, double jeopardy does
not attach.

Reasons:
29 No court whose presiding justice received “orders or suggestions” from a President whose
decree made it possible to refer a case to his court can be an impartial tribunal
30 Jurisdiction over cases shld be determined by law and not by the pre-selection of the
Executive, which could be too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the
outcome of individual cases
31 A dictated, coerced, and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment; in legal
contemplation, it neither binds nor bars anyone; such judgment is a lawless thing which can
be treated as an outlaw.
People vs Garcia, Evylyn
(hindi nakasama sa numbering but this is before PPL vs Burgos)
Nature:
Facts:
April 5, 1991: NARCOM, Cebu received information from an informer that accused was
engaged in the sale of marijuana.
Major Esa Hassan, commanding officer, instructed Sgt. Basilio Sarong to conduct
surveillance. The latter performed surveillance and witnessed the accused in the act of selling
marijuana. Sarong reported activities to Hassan.

April 10, 1991: Sarong conducted another surveillance for the purpose of a buy-bust operation. S
yielded positive results.
Hassan formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Saron as poseur-buyer and other
NARCOM officers.
32 marked 20 peso bill

April 12, 1991, 12:30 pm: team posted themselves and waited until accused approached Sarong
and asked him if he wanted to buy marijuana. Sarong said yes and accused asked him to wait for
awhile and when she retuned, she handed him 15 sticks of marijuana cigaretters. Sarong smelled
the sticks and when he was sure that they were marijuana sticks, he scratched his head (signal)
and the other members of the team arrested accused and recovered the 20 peso marked bill.

CIC Ceballos, evidence custodian conducted field test: positive


PNP Crime Lab: positive

Defense: was playing bingo with mom and neighbors when a man placed his arms around her
shoulders and led her 40 m. away from her house.
33 went with man coz he thought she was a relative or friend
34 another man alighted from NARCOM vehicle and showed her marijuana and asked her if
she had some, she said no
35 man frisked her, took P55 and brought her to office of NARCOM

Procedure:
April 16, 1991: accused was charged with violation of
36 Sec 4, Article 2, RA 6425
37 RTC, Cebu

RTC ruled:
38 guilty
39 LI +20thou
40 Seized objectes to be burned in the presence of NARCOM reps, prosecution, court
Issue:
1. WON objects in evidence were planted evidence
Held: NO
41 she only claimed that they have ‘earmarls of planted evidence’
42 earmarks are the result of normal handling of evidence
43 because sale was sufficiently established, there was actually no need to present the
cigarettes and the bill

Issue: WON there was a valid arrest and search


Held: Yes
Ratio:
If an accused is caught in flagrante in a buy-bust operation, then she could be lawfully
arrested without a warrant and searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense (Section 5(a), Rule 113 and section 12, rule 126)

Dispositive portion: DECICION AFFIRMED with modification as to penalty.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu in
Criminal Case No. CBU-21653 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification of the penalty.
Accused-Appellant EVELYN GARCIA Y DELIMA is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to Six (6) years of prision
correccional as maximum.

5. People vs Burgos
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur
Facts:
One Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities at the Davao del Sur Constabulary
HQ.

He testified that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him as member of NPA. Burgos
threatened him with the use of a firearm. Masamlok attended the seminar where Burgos spoke
about his membership with the NPA and the organization’s desire to overthrow the government.

Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to house of accused. Accused was
plowing the field when they arrived.

Pat. Bioco called accused and asked him about the firearm. Accused denied possession
of said firearm but later, his wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in
the ground.

After the recovery of said firearm, accused pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the
officers recovered:
44 marron notebook
45 pamphlets: Ang Byan, Pahayagan ng Paritdo Komunista ng Pilipinas ets

Accused admitted that firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimines, team leader of sparro
unit.

RTC: convicted

Issue: WON warrantless arrest was valid


Held: NO
Ratio:
Not under the conditions provided in rules
46 The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
47 The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator
48 Under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
person to be arrested has committed a crime; a crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first.

Issue: WON search was valid


Held: NO
Ratio:
If an arrest without a warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful.
49 There was to waiver to search in case at bar.
To constitute waiver, 3 requisites must concur:
50 that the right exists
51 that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right
52 that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right

Others:
53 denied of right to counsel during custodial interrogation
54 counsel was only called when accused subscribed under oath his statement

Masamlok’s testimony was uncorroborated. He was an interested witness. Wanted trade-off:


membership with Civil Home Defense Force.

Disposition. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.


ACQUITTED.

6. People vs Aruta, April 3, 1998


Nature: Appeal from a decision of the RTC, Olongapo City, Br 73
Facts:
Based on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-charge (NARCOM, olongapo and
P/Lt. Jose Domingo:

December 13, 1988: Abello was tipped off by “Benjie” that a certain Aling Rosa was arriving from
Baguio City the ff day with a large volume of marijuana.
Paello assembled team and they proceeded the next day to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo
City and deployed themselves near PNB building.

Victory Liner Bus 474 arrived and 2 females and 1 male got off. Informant pointed at Aling Rosa
who was then carrying traveling bag.

NARCOM approached accused and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. Abello asked
accused about contents of her bag and accused handed it to the former.

Inspection: dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cask Katutak.

Agents confiscated bag and ticket and brought accused to NARCOM office where a receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for confiscated leaves.

PC/INP Crim Lab: positive

Procedure:
Prosection rested its case after presentation of testimonies of arresting officers and technical
report.

Defense did not present evidence but instead:


Filed a Demurrer to evidence allegeging that:
55 illegal search and seizure
56 inadmissibility of materials seized as evidence

Trial court denied demurrer to Evidence and did not rule on the illegality of search and seizure
and inadmissibility of evidence.
Accused testified on her behalf:
57 just came from theater after watching Balweg
58 was merely helping old woman to carry shoulder bag when she was approached by
agents
59 she did not know woman personally and she averred that old woman was nowhere to be
found after her arrest

Prosecution made formal offer of evidence.


Defense filed Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution’s Offer of Evidence
60 contested admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly the product of an
unreasonable search and seizure

RTC: conviction for transporting 8 kilos and 500 grams of marijuana


61 section 4, article 2 of RA 6425
62 LI + 20 thou without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency

Issue: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest and search


Held: No
Ratio:
If probable cause is not established then a warrantless arrest and search incident to such
warrantless arrest is invalid.
63 no PC because accused was not even acting suspiciously
64 officers had reasonable time to get warrant
65 search was made on street, not on moving vehicle
66 not in plain view
67 not stop and frisk
68 not under exigent and emergency circumstances
69 not a waiver when she consented:
o The lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her consti
rights or a voluntary submission to a warrantless search
o To constitute valid waiver, there must be an actual intention to relinquish right.
No valid arrest under sec 5, rule 113
70 when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense

71 accused was merely crossing street


72 no PC to establish that she was committing crime at that time
If an arrest is incipiently illegal, then the subsequent search is similarly illegal, it being not
incidental to a lawful arrest.

JUDGeMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACCUSED ACQUITTED AND ORDERED


RELEASED.
7. Go VS CA
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts: (based on findings of San Juan Police)
Eldon Maguan was driving along Wilson Street heading towards P Guevarra St while
petitioner entered Wilson St and started traveling in the wrong direction (1-way street).
Their cars merely bumped each.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over, shot Maguan, and left the scene.
Police arrived shortly and retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition.
Security guard at nearby resto took down petitioner’s car plate number.
The ff day, petitioner went to Cravings Bakeshop and optained impression of the credit
card used by petitioner. Together with that and the positive identification by the bakeshop’s guard
of the Rolito Go, the police launched a manhunt.
On July 8, 6 days after the incident, petitioner and his 2 lawyers went to police station to
verify reports that police was hunting him.

Procedure:
Police detained him and filed a complaint for frustrated homicide.
1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ignacio informed him of his right to avail himself of his right to
prelim investigation but that he must 1st sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of RPC. He
refused.

While complaint was still with Prosecutor, Maguan died of his gunshot wounds. July 9, 1991

Prosecutor filed information for frustrated homicide before RTC. NO bail. Prosecutor certified that
no prelim investigation had been conducted because accused did not sign a waiver of the
provisions o Article 125. July 11, 1992

Counsel for petitioner filed with prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
preliminary investigation:
73 unlawful arrest
74 no preliminary investigation
Provincial Prosecutor interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a
cash bond of 100thou.

Urgent ex-parte motion to expedite action on bail recommendation.


Judge approved cash bond and petitioner was released. July 12

Prosecutor: motion for leave to conduct PI and that proceedings be suspended.


Granted and cancelled August 15 arraignment until after the conclusion of PI. July 16
Another Order issued motu proprio:
1. grant of bail was recalled and petitioner was given 48 hours to surrender himself
2. grant for leave to conduct PI cancelled
3. motion for immediate release and PI was treated as petition for bail and set for
hearing

Petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before SC:
75 info was null and void for lack of PI
76 moved for suspension of all proceedings pending resolution by SC of this petitioner
Denied by respondent judge. July 19

Petitioner surrendered himself to police. July 23

Court, by resolution, remanded above petition to CA. July 24

PETR(petitioner): motion to restrain his arraignment at CA. August 19

Judge: commitment order to admit PETR into the Rizal Provincial Jail. PETR was arraigned but
because of his refusal to enter plea, trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. Criminal case
was set for continuous hearings. August 23

PETR: petition for habeas corpus in CA


77 public respondents’ failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him,
after a lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be
released on habeas corpus. August 27

CA issued write of habeas corpus. Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and petition
for HC were consolidated. August 30

CA denied motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that motion had become moot and
academic. September 2

Trial commenced and prosecution presented its 1st witness. September 19


CA dismissed 2 petitions. September 23
PETR filed present petition for review on certiorari. Judge was ordered to hold in abeyance the
hearing of the criminal case until further orders.

Issue: WON a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by San Juan Police
Held: NO
Ratio:
Warrantless arrests are valid only when:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

78 Sec 5(a): NA

o Arresting officers were not present when shooting occurred

79 Sec 5(b): NA

o Crime hss not been JUST COMMITTED

o ‘arrest’ was effected only 6 days after shooting

o officers had no personal knowledge that the crime had been committed

o info was from witnesses

Issue: WON petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation
Held: NO
Ratio:
RULE: if the case has been field in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within 5 days from the time he learns of the filing of the information,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this rule.
80 not applicable to case at bar
81 accused was not arrested, he was not surrendering himself at the police station

RULE: Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case such as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of Court.
82 petitioner’s omnibus motion filed with prosecutor and prosecutor’s subsequent motion for
leave to conduct PI: effect was as if petitioner’s omnibus motion was field with trial court

RULE: If an accused fails to invoke that right to preliminary investigation before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment, then he is deemed to have waive such right.
83 NA to case at bar
84 Go had vigorously insisted on his right
85 At the time of arraignment, was at CA with petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.

Posting of bail here was not waiver of right to PI:


86 omnibus motion was both for release on bail and for PI
87 thus claimed his right to PI before judge approved cash bond and ordered his release
Disposition:
GRANT the petition for review on certiorari
Provincial prosecutor ordered to:
88 conduct PI within 15 days
89 trial on merits of criminal case in RTC: SUSPENDED
90 petitioner released upon posting of cash bond of 100thou

Cruz concurs.
NO waiver of PI. Insistent demand for PI

Gutierrez concurs.
Follow the rules. J

Griño-Aquino dissents.
NO need to conduct PI. It would be supererogatory.
Right to PI not a consti right.
Abolition of death penalty did not make right to bail absolute so accused may not be
released pending hearing of petition for bail.

8. People vs Baello
Nature:
Facts:
Barangay Captain Eustaquio Borja woke up at 5 am on October 10, 1990 and found his front door
open and their tv missing.
He told his wife about the incident and they went to 2nd floor to check on their daughter.
91 22 yr old vernonica Borja was found bloodied and dead
92 her room’s window was open

Captain summoned authoritities.

They later discovered that the ff. were also missing:


Cassette player
Camera
Jewelry

PC/INP Crime Lab: cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to multiple stab wounds

6 pm that same day:


Police recovered tv from house of Eugenio Tagifa, husband of accused’s sister
93 was brought to station for questioning
94 Sinumpaang salaysay: pointed to accused as person who placed tv under stairs

October 13, 1990 at 5:30:


95 accused was captured and brought to police station
96 made oral admission of his participation in crime

Was endorsed to the Criminal Investigation Division for formal investigation.

Asked if he could understand, read and write Tagalog: yes


Could not afford counsel so was assigned to Atty. Aber Generoso of PAO
97 accused said he committed robbery but denied having killed victim
98 he alleged that his companion Gerry could have killed her because he was the one who
stayed on 2nd floor
Police conducted formal investigation where accused gave his statement.
Procedure:
Information was filed with RTC, Pasig on October 18, 1990
99 accused John Amet Baello “Totong”
100 Robbery with Homicide

Arraignment on November 13, 1990:


101 entered plea of not guilty

Issue: WON the accused was given the right to counsel during the custodial investigation
Held: yes
Ratio:
See facts.
102 Right to counsel was in compliance with par 1, section 12, article 3 of consti:
o Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

If a person cannot afford the services of counsel, then must be provided with one.

May other issues pa pero ‘to muna.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

35. DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE 41 SCRA 1

The (Moot and Academic)Facts*:


November 7, 1968 - Then Magsaysay Misamis Oriental Mayor de la Camara was arrested and
detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and
the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., on August 21, 1968. 18 days
later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the CFI a cases of multiple frustrated murder and
for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo.

January 14, 1969- An application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the
assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He
likewise maintained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February
24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing of the
petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.

August 10, 1970- Judge Enage issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting
that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he
had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00 (P840,000.00 for the 14 counts of multiple murder plus P355,200.00 for the 12
counts of multiple frustrated murder.) There was a motion for reconsideration to reduce the
amount. Enage however remained adamant. De la Camara then files a petition for certiorari
assailing Enage’s order and prays for its nullification.

March 5, 1971- Enage answers that set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of the
above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind, would disprove any charge
that he was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order
would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He
sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.

March 31, 1971- both De la Camara and Enage did not appear at the hearing with De la Camara,
upon written motion was given 30 days to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, Enage
in turn having 30 days from receipt of memorandum to file his reply. De la Camara submitted the
memorandum on April 6, 1971.

May 26, 1971-Enage, instead of a reply, submitted a supplemental answer wherein he alleged
that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since been remained at
large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of his petition for lack of merit, to which
petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with
this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of
petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the
issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the
present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless
other Ricardo de la Camaras who may be awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the
power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail."

* While the facts of this case is moot and academic, it did not preclude the SC from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

ISSUE: WAS THE AMOUNT OF BAIL ORDERED BY ENAGE EXCESSIVE?

HELD: Yes yes yo kabayo! Sayang lang at pumuga/tumakas si mayor, kaya nga moot (court) &
academic ang petition

DISPOSITIVE: “WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without
pronouncement as to costs.”

SC’s rationale for requirement of non-excessive bail:

1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when
the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the lass of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not beyond the
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his
defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and the frustrate the hearing of his case.
A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. Nor is there anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a
death sentence, an ever present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be
resisted.

2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no
such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00
is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should
it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.

3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears
to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseñor v. Abaño case. The guidelines in the fixing
of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the
accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the
evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under
bond for appearance at trial in other cases." Enage ignored the decisive consideration appearing
at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail,
we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy."
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an
alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear misreading of the Abaño opinion when
such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be
to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words.

36. BERNARDEZ vs. VALERA 4 SCRA 9-11

THE FACTS:
February 18, 1961, between 7:30 and 8:00pm- After a hot exchange of words between petitioner
and Pedro Benedito, inside the NEW YORK (emphasis mine) Restaurant located in the poblacion
of Bangued, Abra, Bernardez fired several shots at the latter, hitting him on the left chest, left
forearm and in the lumbar region, and likewise hitting Cpl. Reinerio Buenafe’s instantaneous
death. The following day Lt. Antonio C. Garcia P.C., filed a complaint for frustrated murder against
petitioner in the Justice of the Peace Court of Bangued, in relation to the assault on Benedito and
after finding probable cause the respondent Justice of the Peace issued the corresponding
warrant of arrest and fixed the bail at P15,000.00.

February 21, 1961- an amended complaint for murder and frustrated murder was filed with the
same court. Two days later, after admitting the amended complaint, the respondent Justice of the
Peace issued another warrant of arrest but recommended no bail.

February 24, 1961-petitioner filed with the court a motion for bail, to which the prosecution
objected upon the ground that petitioner was charged with murder and the evidence of his guilt
was strong. Hearings on this motion were held in the course of which the prosecution presented
as evidence (1) the amended criminal complaint; (2) the affidavit of Benedito; (3) the affidavit of
Bersalona; (4) the affidavit of Sgt. Malengen, P.C., (5) the affidavit of M/Sgt. Estolas of the same
outfit; (6) the medico-legal autopsy report on the cause of the death of the deceased Buenafe; (7)
the medical certificate concerning the physical injuries inflicted on Pedro Benedito; and (8) an
affidavit subscribed by petitioner himself. In connection with the sworn statements, petitioner
stated during the hearing that he was willing to have them admitted as evidence in connection
with the incident before the court as if the affiants had actually testified in accordance with tenor
of their respective statement, and further waived his right to cross-examine said affiants. The
prosecution likewise presented as 5 empty shells: 1 slug found in the scene of the shooting;
another extracted from the body of the deceased Buenafe; another slug extracted from the body
of Benedito; 1 dud bullet and 1 live bullet allegedly found inside the magazine of petitioner's
firearm.
After the parties had submitted the incident for resolution, the respondent denied the
same. Thereafter, claiming that the respondent, in so doing, had committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a refusal to comply with a ministerial duty, as a result of which petitioner
was illegally detained, he files the petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari or Prohibition.

THE ISSUE: WON the respondent was justified in denying the motion for bail.

HELD/DISPOSITIVE PORTION: “IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent
judge denying the motion for bail filed by herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 1089 of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Bangued is hereby SET ASIDE, and said respondent is hereby
directed to order the release of petitioner upon the filing and approval of a bailbond in the sum of
P25,000.00.”

THE RULE: If the evidence of offender’s guilt is insufficient to prove the capital offense being
charge, then s/he shall be entitled to bail.

THE RATIO: It must be observed in this connection that a person charged with a criminal offense
will not be entitled to bail even before conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense
and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong. In the present case, the evidence submitted
by the prosecution in support of its opposition to the motion for bail could prove, at most,
homicide and not murder, because it does not sufficiently prove either known premeditation or
alevosia.

THE REASON BEHIND RATIO: The case of the prosecution is based on the sworn statement of
Benedito, the substance of which is to this effect: that prior to the shooting incident there was a
long-standing grudge between him and petitioner; that at around 4:00pm of February 18 when
Benedito passed in front of the house of one Regino Bernardez, where petitioner and his wife
were standing, petitioner asked him for the sum of P50.00 as advance payment for the amicable
settlement of a criminal case filed by a client of petitioner charging Benedito with having run over
and killed an old woman in Lagangilang two years before, and that petitioner was enraged when
he refused to pay the amount; that between 7:00 and 8:00 pm of the same day, Benedito had
some drinks at the New York Restaurant together with Sgt. Estolas and Cpl. Buenafe, while
petitioner, his wife and another woman were in the same place occupying another table; that after
Benedito and his companions had left the restaurant they were followed by petitioner who asked
him to return to the restaurant for some more drinks; that they returned to the place and took
beer; that in the course of their conversation petitioner remarked that it was strange that although
they were relatives he seemed to be unfriendly towards him, and when Benedito denied this,
Bernardez stood up and drew his gun; that although Benedito immediately grabbed petitioner's
hand, the latter started firing at him; that after being hit, he fell down on the floor and sought cover
under one of the tables; that petitioner kept on firing and one of the shots hit and killed Cpl.
Buenafe who had entered the restaurant and attempted to approach Benedito, telling petitioner at
the same time to stop firing.
The other affidavits submitted by the prosecution were of persons who did not actually
witness the shooting but their statements may be said to have the general tendency of
corroborating the sworn statement of Benedito regarding the events posterior to the shooting.
While the charge against petitioner is undeniably a capital offense, it seems likewise
obvious that the evidence submitted by the prosecution to the respondent judge for the purpose
of showing that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong, is not sufficient to establish that the
offense committed by petitioner, if any, was that of murder. On the basis of the sworn statement of
Benedito himself petitioner could only be held liable for homicide.

37. BASCO vs. RAPATALO 269 SCRA 220

THE FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused Morente filed a
petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not
heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said
date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did
not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail
was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were
not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.

Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later
learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at
all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order
dated June 29, 1995 was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the
bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00,"
signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that
there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the
Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was aborted and
instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.

Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor's option
not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the
amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for
bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he
approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing
since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor
recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused
was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for
reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the
motion for reconsideration. Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August 14
1995, in a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M.
Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an
accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING
EVIDENCE?

HELD: Nope.

DISPOSITIVE: “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo,


RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.”

HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being
strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the
court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio
to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been used to
prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the
judges might not want to release.

It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases
where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person"
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal action."

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court,
it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal.

To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound,
and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the
exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be
guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

The cited cases (w/c I didn’t include kse madami) are all to the effect that when bail is
discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first
be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the
court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to
the application to grant and fix bail.

Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from
the Tucay v. Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in
Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of
cases held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for
bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not
only the strength of the state' s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.

After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence
may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense.

An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite
his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid
down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-
94.

Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration
not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that
the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to
his having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of
the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been
reposed upon the prosecutor.

The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It
is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms
the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the
recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation.
Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application
for bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented
for or against the accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing.

The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or
fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced
to the case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons. It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee
was decided 50 years ago under a completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee
was indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said
"instructions" given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the
amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.

It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 crucial sentence “The evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.” is not found in the
counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a
situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the
application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. The prosecution
under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove whether
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the
accused. However, the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be equated with its
purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to
conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the
proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for
his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution
witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.

In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, SC
reiterated the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, supra);

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.

The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications.
(41) Callanta v Villanueva (77 SCRA 377)
Facts:
103 Respondent Judge denies the motions to quash two complaints for grave oral defamation
against petitioner.
104 Petitioners contest the validity of the arrest warrants issued by respondent Judge on the
ground that it should have been the City Fiscal who should have conducted the preliminary
investigation.
105 After the warrants were issued however, petitioner posted bail thus obtaining her provisional
liberty.

Issue: WON warrant of arrest may be invalidated after posting of bail

Held: NO
106Zacarias v. Cruz: Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the
arrest of a person, estops him from discussing the validity of his arrest.
107People v. Obngayan: Where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary
investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

PETITION DISMISSED

(42) People v Red (55 Phil 706, 711)


Facts:
108 The CFI dismissed 36 informations for violation of the Election Law on the ground that the
Judge issued warrants of arrest solely on the basis of the said informations, without
conducting a preliminary investigation as required by Sec 13, Gen Ord No. 58.
Þ “…the judge entertaining an information, particularly, one filed by the provincial fiscal must
examine under oath the prosecuting fiscal and such witnesses as he may desire to make
use of, reducing into writing the testimony of the witnesses.”
Þ In this case, the fiscal merely sent the informations together with a letter requesting the
deputy clerk to forward them to the Judge.

Issue: WON CFI committed an error in dismissing the info

Held: YES
109Section 13 of General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042, prescribes a summary
examination before the arrest of the person accused. This investigation is "merely to
determine whether a warrant of arrest should issue on the information filed by the
prosecution" (U. S. vs. Mendoza, 4 Phil., 124), and is different from the preliminary
investigation made after the arrest of the accused in cases of crimes, such as those
charged in these informations, falling within the original jurisdiction of a Court of First
Instance; these preliminary investigations, conducted according to Acts Nos. 194 and 1627,
are made for the purpose of inquiring, in case a plea of guilty has not been entered, whether
there is reasonable ground to hold that an offense has been committed, and that the
defendant has committed it; and, if so, providing for the detention of the accused (unless
the offense be bailable, and bond be given for provisional liberty) upon orders of the proper
Court of First Instance; or, if there be no reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty,
then, to order that he be set at liberty. (Sec. 2, Act No. 194.).
110 Although the defendants have posted bail, it cannot be implied that they have waived any
right, such as the summary examination of the case before detention. That they didn’t waive
this right is clear from the fact that they filed two motions praying for the stay of their arrests,
the first being on the same day they posted bail.
111 The waiver of the preliminary investigation required after arrest is not a waiver of that
conducted prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant.

DECISION AFFIRMED

(43) Gimenez v Nazareno (160 SCRA 1)


Facts:
112 Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was charged with murder. He was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing, he escaped from
detention.
113 Prosecutors file a motion to proceed with the hearing in absentia, invoking Sec 19, Art IV of
the 1973 Constitution.
Þ SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
114 The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was dismissed against the five accused,
while proceedings against de la Vega were held in abeyance.
115 The lower court denied recon of the “abeyance portion” of the decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue #1: WON court loses jurisdiction over an accused who escapes from detention after
arraignment

Held #1: NO
116 In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest
for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing
for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
117 Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of
the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.

Issue #2: WON an accused who has been tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence
and cross examine witnesses

Held #2: NO
118 REQUISITES FOR TRIAL IN ABSENTIA:
1. that there has been an arraignment;
2. that the accused has been notified; and
3. that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
119 The right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses is a personal right and can be
waived. Failure to appear during trial, after due notice, constitutes a waiver of these rights.
Þ Sec 1(c), R 115, 1985 ROC: " . . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable
cause at the trial on a particular date of which he bad notice shall be considered a waiver of
his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified
of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be
present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. . . ."
120 Rendering judgment for a trial in absentia is not a violation of the right to be presumed
innocent. The accused is still presumed to be innocent, and his conviction must be based on
evidence showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JUDGEMENT RE: ABEYANCE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE

NAME OF ACCUSED, Sec. 12, Rule 110


51. PEOPLE vs. GUEVARRA (179 SCRA 740)
Facts (as found by the prosecution):
April 8, 1980, evening; San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija: Armed men entered the
house of spouses Luisito and Priscilla Cruz and robbed them of P3,000 & jewelry. Subsequently,
they also took the spouses’ car and forcibly boarded Priscilla along with them. They headed
towards Manila, and along the way Priscilla recognized the one of the kidnappers, who then was
driving the car. They told her that they were holding her for ransom of P50,000, but later on left
her at Paxton Hotel in Valenzuela, the kidnappers having convinced themselves that the
kidnapping did not materialize.
On same date, Luisito Cruz reported the incident, which led the police authorities to the
detention and investigation of accused Vergel Bustamante at the WPD in Manila. He was later
identified by Priscilla as the driver of the car when they kidnapped her.
Procedure:
• Information
• Amended Information, per trial court’s order. The amended info charged Jaime Guevarra,
Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino, Baldo De Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi,
Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak”, and Chotse Doe alias Bernabe Sulaybar, with
kidnapping
• Separate trial for Abergas and Bustamante only, as Tolentino could not be served with
subpoenas and other accused were reported to have died already
• Conviction: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; sentence: Death Penalty
• Automatic review by Supreme Court. But with the adoption of the 1987 Consti., which does
not allow imposition of death penalty, the sentence was reduced to reclusion perpetua. Thus
Bustamante elected to continue the case on appeal.
• Bustamante’s claim on appeal: trial court erred in ordering amendment of the info. To include
Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak” as one and the same person

HELD:
1) Questioned order of the trial court to amend the info. and include the correct name of
“Dan Saksak” as Vergel Bustamante is not without basis. Records of the criminal case forwarded
by the MTC of NE to the RTC of NE led the judge of the latter to believe that Bustamante & Dan
Saksak was one & the same person (di sinabi sa case kung bakit kasali yung MTC dito.
Apparently, it conducted a preliminary examination):
121 A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in Crim Case Nos. 186-80 &
192-80 was directed to one Vergel Bustamante alias “Dan Saksak.”
122 In a return of service of one subpoena, the warden of the City Jail of Manila informed
the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Gapan, NE that Vergel Bustmante @ Dan Saksak
said to be one of the accused is not included in the list of present Inmates of said Jail
123 The order issued by the MTC of Gapan, NE finding a prima facie case against the
accused therein also stated that one of the accused is Vergel Bustamante alias Dan
Saksak
124 The letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of NE stated that one
of the accused therein, Vergel Bustamante @ Dan Saksak is detained at the Mla.
City Jail

2) In any event, THE ISSUE CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL .

THE ISSUE IS ONE AFFECTING JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON AND SHOULD

HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE RTC IN A MOTION TO QUAH THE INFORMATION.
SINCE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO DO SO, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE

WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE INFORMATION.

53. PEOPLE v. NUNEZ (310 SCRA 168; 1999)

Facts:

Accused Demetrio Nunez had carnal knowledge of her 14 yr. old daughter Janeth Nunez

in their own house one evening.

Procedure:

• Janeth voluntarily instituted a case which led to the filing of an information But said
info. merely charged accused with rape under art. 335 of RPC and alleged that the
accused had carnal knowledge of his daughter, without alleging the minority Janeth.
• Accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
• Trial commenced and prosecution presented its witnesses Dr. Ledesma, who
conducted the medico-legal examination on the victim; PO2 Raul Tonzo, who
arrested the accused; and the Social Welfare assistant who interviewed the victim-
complainant
• During second hearing, a re-arraignment was held upon manifestation of defense
counsel Atty. Te (taga-PAO sya, pero malamang hindi si Teddy Boy natin to, as you
may see later) that accused was willing to make a plea of guilty. The accused
pleaded guilty as charged, and the court after having ascertained its voluntariness of
the plea, entered his plea. (but it was clear from the records that in making the plea
of guilt, the accused was made to believe by both Atty. Te and the trial court that a
plea of guilt would mitigate his liability).
• Defense waived its right to present its own evidence and merely submitted the case
for decision.
• Trial court convicted accused of statutory rape under sec. 11, sub-par. 7 of RA#7659,
and sentenced him to death penalty by lethal injection pursuant to RA#8176
• On automatic review, accused claimed that the trial court gravely erred in accepting
accused-appellant’s improvident plea of guilty to a capital offense and in failing to
conduct a searching inquiry to fully determine whether the accused fully understood
the consequences of his plea.
HELD:

125 A plea of guilty may only be considered as mitigating when seasonably interjected,
that is, before the prosecution presents its evidence.
126 Furthermore, the penalty of death is indivisible and is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Thus, accused’s re-arraignment was indeed flawed. However,

It is settled that a decision based on an irregular plea may nevertheless be upheld where the

judgment is supported by other adequate evidence on record. In the case at bar, the

evidence supports the finding of guilt of the accused: oral testimony of complainant and

medico-legal finding of laceration on victim’s hymen and labia.

With regard to the imposable penalty, the Court held that:

THE FACT OF MINORITY AND RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT BEFORE DEATH PENALTY CAN PROPERLY BE

IMPOSED. IN QUALIFIED RAPE, BOTH THE FACT OF MINORITY OF THE VICTIM AND

THE ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AS WORDED IN RA#7659, MUST

BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. IN THE CASE AT BAR, ONLY THE RELATIONSHIP

OF THE PARTIES WAS ALLEGED.

Thus, THE COURT URGED THE PROSECUTING FISCALS WHO ARE CHARGED WITH

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PREPARING INFORMATIONS TO STATE WITH

PARTICULARITY THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDED FOR UNDER SEC. 11

OF RA#7659.

Judgment Modified. Accused sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.


57) PPL V. REYES

• There was a case (PPL v ESTRELLA) in the court of Judge Reyes


• Prosecutor made VERBAL MOTION to amend info on said case – to change date of offense
from AUGUST ’69 to AUGUST ’64
• Petition was denied by Judge Reyes – the change cannot be allowed since it would prejudice
the substantial rights of the accused
• Hence this petition via Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary injunction
• The ESTRELLA CASE:
127 For Qualified Theft of truck vs. Estrella and 3 others in Municipal court of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija
128 Info alleges: committed on AUGUST ’64
129 On November ’69, City Fiscal of San Jose (now a City) filed info (in respondent court) stating
the same facts BUT that the crime was committed AUGUST ’69
130 On Jan. ’70 Estrella was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY
131 The info was read in Tagalog so he could understand it
132 Although the Prosecution was present at the arraignment, they did not move or allege any
intent to amend date or even inform court of such mistake
133 May 21, 1970 – TRIAL DATE
134 Before PPL presented evidence, prosecutor makes VERBAL MOTION to ammend info
AUGUST ’69 to AUGUST ’64
135 Accused having come to court to defend offense of 1969, vehemently objected to such
motion
136Judge defers judgement on motion and asks 1st witness to testify
1371st witness, Alcantara, states that offense was committed in 1964
138 Defense does not question such witness since his statements were not for the offense
charged
139 After Parties submit memoranda on the amendment issue, Judge DENIES motion saying it
would prejudice the rights of the accused
140 Judge denies Recon saying AN HONEST MISTAKE IN THE INFO CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION
141 Argument that TIME is immaterial to Theft does not hold

ISSUE: WON there was Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part of the Judge when he
denied the amendment (change of date) on the ground that it would impair the
accused’s substantial rights guaranteed by the constitution?

SC SAYS: NO GAD
• ROC Rule 110 S. 13 (now S 14) says when Accused has already been arraigned and
pleaded, amendment may be allowed only as to form and cannot be done when it shall
prejudice substantial rights

• OPEMIA case :
• carabao lost in 1947, not on 1952 as alleged in info
• 5 yrs is a long stretch of time
• “one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by
defendants in 1952 were also perpetrated in 1947”
• the variance is unfair to the accused who are to defend a case different from the one
charged
• Case at Bar :
• investigated for offense committed in 1964
• charged for an offense committed in 1969 (wherein the plea is NOT GUILTY)
• Now, the PPL puts accused on trial for 1964 – CANNOT BE ALLOWED
• Argument that time is immaterial is wrong
• Disparity of time between 1964 and 1969 is so great to defy approximation in commission of
one and the same offense
• Approximation of time of commission is allowed, BUT, when it is so remote and so far
removed it surprises the accused and therefor no proper defense may be put up

58) PPL V. CA

• Shooting incident in Mandaluyong (June 5, 1971) results in filing of 2 informations on


frustrated homicide vs Sixto RUIZ (Criminal Cases 4747 & 4748)
• RUIZ arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY
• Reinvestigation with DOJ reveals RUIZ was in CONSPIRACY with PADILLA and
ONGCHECO
• State Prosecutor then files Motion for Leave of Court to Amend info
• Motion denied, Judge says – if amended (Conspiracy) it would amend the manner the crime
was committed, a substantial amendment, therefor it cannot be allowed
• State Prosecutor then files 2 NEW infos for Frustrated homicide vs PADILLA AND
ONGCHECO in conspiracy with RUIZ (referred to as accused in Crim case 4747 & 4748)
• The 2 new cases are crim case 9673 & 9674
• PADILLA & ONGCHECO move to quash/strike out conspiracy
• Judge denies motion – allegation of conspiracy does not alter the theory of the case, does not
introduce innovations, does not present alternative imputations, it is not inconsistent with
original allegations
• RUIZ, PADILLA & ONGCHECO now appeal to CA
• CA says – Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in denying motions, petitions granted,
allegations of conspiracy ordered deleted
• SC – reverses CA
• Amendments sought were only formal
• Participation of RUIZ as Principal did not change
• During investigation, all 3 were respondents
• Subsequent investigation yielded facts that the 3, and not only RUIZ were the offenders
• Therefor a need to amend or file new info arose
• Denial to amend 4747 & 4748 not a bar to filing new infos
• 9673 & 9674 merely describe the fact that RUIZ was already charged with the same
offense
• it was only a reference
• RUIZ not a defendant in 9673 & 9674, not ordered arrested for such, not araigned
• “inasmuch as RUIZ is not a defendant in 96743 & 9674, he cannot file a motion to quash; he
has no standing in said cases”

59) ANNOTATIONS

• Read RULE 110 S14


• Read RULE 119 S19
• AMENDMENT BEFORE PLEA
• May be done, substantial or in form, w/o leave of court, before plea
• Example : change from Homicide to Murder
• So that proper offense may be charged
• Change ok even if it alters the nature of charge so long as it is done without prejudice to the
accused’s substantial rights
• Vests Prosecuting officer with discretionary power
• Trial court has power to order amendment of info – when such is done, accused must be
arraigned and plead to new charge)
• No jurisdiction over complaint, no power to order amendment
• Only valid info can be amended
• Where info read to defendant is the original and not the amended one, his conviction under
the former suffers reversible defect for lack of arraignment
• AMENDMENT AFTER PLEA
• Allowed if - as to all matters of form, by leave and with discretion of court, can be done w/o
prejudice to rights of accused
• A plea of not guilty during P.I. does not prevent amendment of info/complaint before accused
pleads in court with jurisdiction so as to allege, as such, the presence of qualifying
circumstances
• No amendment after judgement has been rendered

• FORMAL AMENDMENTS
• Those not prejudicial to essential rights of the accused
• When it does not affect essence of crime
• Does not deprive defendant of opportunity to present evidence for proper defense
• To correct an erroneous allegation as to name of offended party, especially when made
before presentation of evidence by the prosecution
• SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS
If it changes the basic theory of the prosecution by alleging a new way the crime was committed
(such would spring surprise to accused and lead to possible injustice)
• Change of acts imputed
• When the offense charged is not yet punishable when original info was filed (court should
have dismissed original info and authorized presentation of new one)

57) PPL V. REYES

• There was a case (PPL v ESTRELLA) in the court of Judge Reyes


• Prosecutor made VERBAL MOTION to amend info on said case – to change date of offense
from AUGUST ’69 to AUGUST ’64
• Petition was denied by Judge Reyes – the change cannot be allowed since it would prejudice
the substantial rights of the accused
• Hence this petition via Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary injunction
• The ESTRELLA CASE:
142 For Qualified Theft of truck vs. Estrella and 3 others in Municipal court of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija
143 Info alleges: committed on AUGUST ’64
144 On November ’69, City Fiscal of San Jose (now a City) filed info (in respondent court) stating
the same facts BUT that the crime was committed AUGUST ’69
145 On Jan. ’70 Estrella was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY
146 The info was read in Tagalog so he could understand it
147 Although the Prosecution was present at the arraignment, they did not move or allege any
intent to amend date or even inform court of such mistake
148 May 21, 1970 – TRIAL DATE
149 Before PPL presented evidence, prosecutor makes VERBAL MOTION to ammend info
AUGUST ’69 to AUGUST ’64
150 Accused having come to court to defend offense of 1969, vehemently objected to such
motion
151Judge defers judgement on motion and asks 1st witness to testify
1521st witness, Alcantara, states that offense was committed in 1964
153 Defense does not question such witness since his statements were not for the offense
charged
154 After Parties submit memoranda on the amendment issue, Judge DENIES motion saying it
would prejudice the rights of the accused
155 Judge denies Recon saying AN HONEST MISTAKE IN THE INFO CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION
156 Argument that TIME is immaterial to Theft does not hold

ISSUE: WON there was Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part of the Judge when he
denied the amendment (change of date) on the ground that it would impair the
accused’s substantial rights guaranteed by the constitution?

SC SAYS: NO GAD
• ROC Rule 110 S. 13 (now S 14) says when Accused has already been arraigned and
pleaded, amendment may be allowed only as to form and cannot be done when it shall
prejudice substantial rights
• OPEMIA case :
• carabao lost in 1947, not on 1952 as alleged in info
• 5 yrs is a long stretch of time
• “one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by
defendants in 1952 were also perpetrated in 1947”
• the variance is unfair to the accused who are to defend a case different from the one
charged
• Case at Bar :
• investigated for offense committed in 1964
• charged for an offense committed in 1969 (wherein the plea is NOT GUILTY)
• Now, the PPL puts accused on trial for 1964 – CANNOT BE ALLOWED
• Argument that time is immaterial is wrong
• Disparity of time between 1964 and 1969 is so great to defy approximation in commission of
one and the same offense
• Approximation of time of commission is allowed, BUT, when it is so remote and so far
removed it surprises the accused and therefor no proper defense may be put up

58) PPL V. CA

• Shooting incident in Mandaluyong (June 5, 1971) results in filing of 2 informations on


frustrated homicide vs Sixto RUIZ (Criminal Cases 4747 & 4748)
• RUIZ arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY
• Reinvestigation with DOJ reveals RUIZ was in CONSPIRACY with PADILLA and
ONGCHECO
• State Prosecutor then files Motion for Leave of Court to Amend info
• Motion denied, Judge says – if amended (Conspiracy) it would amend the manner the crime
was committed, a substantial amendment, therefor it cannot be allowed
• State Prosecutor then files 2 NEW infos for Frustrated homicide vs PADILLA AND
ONGCHECO in conspiracy with RUIZ (referred to as accused in Crim case 4747 & 4748)
• The 2 new cases are crim case 9673 & 9674
• PADILLA & ONGCHECO move to quash/strike out conspiracy
• Judge denies motion – allegation of conspiracy does not alter the theory of the case, does not
introduce innovations, does not present alternative imputations, it is not inconsistent with
original allegations
• RUIZ, PADILLA & ONGCHECO now appeal to CA
• CA says – Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in denying motions, petitions granted,
allegations of conspiracy ordered deleted

• SC – reverses CA
• Amendments sought were only formal
• Participation of RUIZ as Principal did not change
• During investigation, all 3 were respondents
• Subsequent investigation yielded facts that the 3, and not only RUIZ were the offenders
• Therefor a need to amend or file new info arose
• Denial to amend 4747 & 4748 not a bar to filing new infos
• 9673 & 9674 merely describe the fact that RUIZ was already charged with the same
offense
• it was only a reference
• RUIZ not a defendant in 9673 & 9674, not ordered arrested for such, not araigned
• “inasmuch as RUIZ is not a defendant in 96743 & 9674, he cannot file a motion to quash; he
has no standing in said cases”

59) ANNOTATIONS

• Read RULE 110 S14


• Read RULE 119 S19
• AMENDMENT BEFORE PLEA
• May be done, substantial or in form, w/o leave of court, before plea
• Example : change from Homicide to Murder
• So that proper offense may be charged
• Change ok even if it alters the nature of charge so long as it is done without prejudice to the
accused’s substantial rights
• Vests Prosecuting officer with discretionary power
• Trial court has power to order amendment of info – when such is done, accused must be
arraigned and plead to new charge)
• No jurisdiction over complaint, no power to order amendment
• Only valid info can be amended
• Where info read to defendant is the original and not the amended one, his conviction under
the former suffers reversible defect for lack of arraignment
• AMENDMENT AFTER PLEA
• Allowed if - as to all matters of form, by leave and with discretion of court, can be done w/o
prejudice to rights of accused
• A plea of not guilty during P.I. does not prevent amendment of info/complaint before accused
pleads in court with jurisdiction so as to allege, as such, the presence of qualifying
circumstances
• No amendment after judgement has been rendered

• FORMAL AMENDMENTS
• Those not prejudicial to essential rights of the accused
• When it does not affect essence of crime
• Does not deprive defendant of opportunity to present evidence for proper defense
• To correct an erroneous allegation as to name of offended party, especially when made
before presentation of evidence by the prosecution
• SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS
If it changes the basic theory of the prosecution by alleging a new way the crime was committed
(such would spring surprise to accused and lead to possible injustice)
• Change of acts imputed
• When the offense charged is not yet punishable when original info was filed (court should
have dismissed original info and authorized presentation of new one)

62. POSADAS v OMBUDSMAN


2000

IF-THEN RULES in this case:


157 IF there no probable cause for the filing of an information against an accused THEN the
court may enjoin criminal prosecution to protect the citizen’s right to be free from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution

NATURE: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Prohibition.

FACTS:
158 Roger Posadas, then UP Diliman Chancellor, asked the Director of the NBI for assistance
in determining the persons responsible for the killing of Dennis Venturina, Sigma Rho
member, in a rumble between Sigma Rho and another fraternity on December 8, 1994
159 Orlando Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his team went to
UP à attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan & Raymund Narag, members of the
Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina
o On the basis of positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leonardo
Lachica & Cesar Mangrobang
o Taparan and Narag were then at the UPDP Station, for a peace talk between SJ
& Sigma Rho
160 Posadas, Marichu Lambino (Asst. Legal Counsel), Rosario Torres-Yu (Vice-Chancellor) &
a certain Atty. Villamor (counsel of the suspects) objected to the arrest on the ground that
the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them
à suspects not arrest as a result of the intervention but Posadas and Villamor
promised to take the suspects to the NBI office the next day
161 Dizon filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor charging Posadas,
Lambino, Torres-Yu, Villamor and Col. Eduardo Bentain (Chief of Security Force of UP
Police) with violation of PD 1829 – making it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension & prosecution of criminal offenders
162 Information filed stated that: petitioners “xxx delayed the investigation and prosecution of
the heinous case by harboring an concealing xxx suspects thus leading to the successful
escape of suspects Narag and another principal suspect Joel Carlo Denosta xxx”
163 On motion, Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case à
recommendation disapproved by Office of the Ombudsman – directed the Special
Prosecutor to proceed with prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.
164 Hence, this petition to set aside the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering
the prosecution of petitioners.

ISSUES:

165 WON there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of PD1829 –
None

166 Court held


o Regardless of petitioners’ suspicion, they could not have authorized the arrest
without warrant or even effected the arrest themselves à only courts could decide
the question of probable cause since the students were not caught in flagrante
delicto
§ Special Prosecutor in recommending dismissal: UP officials then present
had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on
campus.
167 WON courts may enjoin criminal prosecution
GENERAL RULE: Criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. Court ordinarily does not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and therafter, to file corresponding information with the appropriate
courts
EXCEPTIONS:
168 BROCKA v ENRILE (cited in VENUS v DESIERTO)
1. To afford protection to constitutional rights of the accused
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice and to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of suits
3. When there is prejudicial question which is sub judice
4. Acts of officer are without or in excess of authority
5. Prosecution under an invalid law, ordinance or regulations
6. Double jeopardy clearly apparent
7. Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
8. Case of persecution rather than prosecution
9. Charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
10. Clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash has been
denied
11. SC issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the threated unlawful arrest of
petitioners
àHERE, petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest
169 SALONGA v CRUZ PANO applies – Infinitely more important than conventional
adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for citizens’ right to be free
not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution

** Petitioners challenge to PD 1829 as unconstitutional not necessary à case disposed of on


some other ground

xx Petition granted. Ombudsman & agents prohibited from prosecuting for violation of pD1829
par.1[c], while Sandiganbayan ordered to dismiss information in Criminal Case no 22801.

63. BROCKA v ENRILE


1990

NATURE: Petition for Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
170 jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) à
demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed à
petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ‘85
171 petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC
QC
172 all petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes,
Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the
offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended
173 urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC à daily hearings held between Feb.1-7 ’85 à
On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka, et al’s
provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each à Brocka, et al filed respective
bail bonds BUT…
174 Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention à respondents-
police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against
Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ‘85
o Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et al.
175 Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases; hasty and
spurious filing of this second offense as follows:
o 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the
QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons à another phone call subsequently
received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to be at 2:00PM
o 2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal à complainants’
affidavits had not yet been received
o 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of
complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition
o 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against
Brocka, et al had been officially received à informed that said charges were never
coursed through the Records Office
o ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are,
almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for
Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a
matter of Constitutional right à appears that respondents have conspired to
deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail
o AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of their
rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that
they be given 7 days within which counsel may confer with their clients à no such
requirement required under the rules
176 Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres.Marcos à
release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey
Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:
o In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had
already been released à four on Feb15 ’85 and one on Feb.8 ’85
o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and
academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an
invalid charge of inciting to sedition.
177 Hence, this petition.
o Brocka, et al contend:
178 bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution
179 second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal – premised on
one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike
à matter of defense in sedition charge so, only issue here is…

ISSUE: WON criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined – YES

RATIO:
GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final
EXCEPTIONS:
180 To afford adequate protection to the consti rights of the accused
181 When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions
182 When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice
183 When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
184 Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
185 When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
186 When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
187 Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
188 Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance
189 When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground had been denied
190 Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners

à HERE, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state
officials in bad faith:

1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et al’s release from detention BUT

This PDA was issued on Jan.28 ’85 and invoked only on Feb.9 ’85 upon receipt of TC’s
order of release à violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in MM or 48
hours outside MM (Ilagan v Enrile)

Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production, prosecution merely presented a purported


xeerox copy of it à violates Court pronouncement that “individuals against whom PDAs
have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a
certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of
the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)

2. SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information
[instead of a petition for HC]

Court Held: such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the
circumstances then prevailing:
1. spurious and inoperational PDA
2. sham and hasty PI

à clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the
second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of
arrest anew

IF-THEN RULE:
If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where
petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed)
and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed
as a result should lawfully be enjoined.

xx Petition granted. TC permanently enjoined from proceeding in any manner with the cases
subject of the petition.

64. MANIAGO v CA
1996

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

FACTS:
191 Ruben Maniago – owner of shuttle buses used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.,), Inc. from Baguio City proper to plant site in Loakan, Baguio City
o Jan. 7 ’90 one bus figured in a vehicular accident with passenger jeep owned by
private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road
192 March 2 ’90 – crim case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries filed with RTC Baguio City, Br.III against Maniago’s driver
Herminio Andaya
193 April 19 ’90 – civil case for damages filed with RTC Baguio City, Br.IV
194 Maniago moved for the suspension of the proceeding in the civil case à denied by TC;
Reasons:
195 pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the crim
action and
196 Maniago was not the accused in the crim case
197 Maniago filed petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with CA, Maniago says civil action
could not proceed independently of the crim case because no reservation of the right to
bring it separately had been made à CA dismissed petition; Reasons:
198 Garcia v Florido and Abellana v Marave, held: independent civil action for
damages allowed even though no reservation to file it has been made
199 While this case was pending in CA, crim action was dismissed by RTC on July 10 ’92 for
failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence / prosecution failed to
prosecute its case
à Maniago: since the civil action was impliedly instituted with the crim action, the the
dismissal of the crim case brought with it the dismissal of the civil
200 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON espondent Boada may bring an action for damages against Maniago under 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code despite the absence of reservation in the crim case previously filed –
NO

GEN RULE: A civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
EXCEPTIONS:
201 civil action, arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the crim action,
is waived
202 right to bring it separately is reserved
203 action instituted prior to the crim action
Addt’l RULE: Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of
the crim case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal
is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

RATIO:
204Sec.1 Rule 111 – clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately
all civil actions for recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the crim case
a. Civil actions in this rule not limited to those which arise “from the offense charge,”
as originally provided in Rule111 before the amendment of the Rules à
reservation now applies to all civil actions whether arising from crime or quasi
delict (2176)
205 Statements in cases implying that Rule111 Secs.1 and 3 are beyond the rulemaking
power of the SC under the Constitution à only obiters and asides, not dispositive of the
case
b. Garcia v Florido: right of an injured person to bring civil action even if no
reservation in the crim action was made, upheld, on ground that by bringing the
civil action the injured parties had “in effect abandoned their right to press for
recovery of damages in the crim case”
Gladi: di ko nagets ang diff ng case na to sa present case; pareho lang namang crim
instituted before civil, pero in the Garcia case, civil independent of the crim, even without
reservation, was upheld
c. Abellana v Marave: the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation
because it was made after the decision of the City Court had been appealed à
Sec. 7 Rule 123: appeal had the affect of vacating the decision in the crim case
d. Madeja v Caro: civil action could proceed while crim case was pending because
widow had reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages
e. Jarantilla v CA: the acquittal of the accused in the crim case on the ground of
reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though
the filing of the civil action was not reserved à based on CC Art. 29 CC
Inapplicable à Here, dismissal based on fact that prosecution failed to
make a formal offer of its evidence
206 Question on whether the crim action and the civil action must be tried in a single
proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure à within the rulemaking
power conferred by the Constitution on the SC
à does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights à only regulates their exercise
in the general interest of orderly procedure - merely procedural in nature
à requirement of reservation not incompatible with independent character of civil
action - difference between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently
of the crim prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a
reservation to bring them separately must be made
it is the conduct of the trial not the institution through the filing of a
complaint which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the
crim case
207 prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission
Barredo v Garcia: the injured party must choose which of the available causes of
action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate
civil…his cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of
employer’s subsidiary liability under RPC Art.103
208 Nor does it matter that the civil action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious
liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the
employer is very much a party
à decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer
"not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount” - true
not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to
the civil liability under the Civil Code

xx Decision reversed. Complaint against Maniago dismissed.


When criminal action may be suspended, prejudicial question

65.Balgos vs Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287


Facts:

Accused:
Balgos: Clerk of Court, RTC Bayombong, NV/ ex-ooficio provincial sheriff

Dacayo, Sison, Cuaresma: Deputy Provincial Sheriffs

Accused enforced a writ of execution against a Mustang car registered in the name of
Leticia Acosta-Ang, despite their knowledge that the registered owner is not the judgment debtor
in CC 4047.

April 18, 86: they were charged with violation of Section 3 © of RA 3019.

March 18, 87: UY, prevailing party in CC 4047 filed complaint for rescission of sale of car by
Juanita Ang to Leticia Ang for being allegedly in fraud of creditors.

Petitioners were subsequently granted their motion for reinvestigation.

Tanodbayan issued order to dismiss case for lack of merit and to withdraw info in crim case and
filed with SB to withdraw info. Such was denied.

Petitioners filed motion to suspend proceedings in crim case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Denied.

Issue: WON SB committed grave abuse of discretion in denying motion to suspend criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question
Held: NO
Ratio:
209 no prejudicial question existed: the pending civil case for the annulment of the sale of the
car to Leticia is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts
allegedly committed by them in seizing the car
210 even if annulled, petitioners still have to establish that they acted in good faith in
proceeding with the execution on the car even when they were presented evidence
tending to show it did not belong to Juanito Ang anymore

RULE: Crespo vs Mogul


While the public prosecutor has the sole discretion and control in the prosecution of offenses,
once the complaint or information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case and all the subsequent actions that may be taken by the public prosecutor in relation to the
disposition of the case must be subject to the approval of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit and the restraining order is hereby lifted.
66. Bobis vs Bobis, July 31, 2000
Facts:
Isaganio Bobis married Maria Javier in 1985. During the subsistence of such marriage, he
married Marbella Bobis and then subsequently married Julia Hrnandez.

Marbella Bobis charged him with bigamy.

Sometime thereafter, he initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

He filed motion to suspend the proceedings in the crim case for bigamy invoking the pending civil
case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the crim case.

Judge granted motion. Marbella filed motion for recon. Denied.

Issue: WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a crim case for bigamy
Held: NO

Ratio:
211 A prejudicial question is one which arises on a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.
212 2 elements:
a. the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action
b. the resolution of such issue determines WON the criminal action may proceed

213Landicho vs Relova: he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the 1st marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy and in such
case, the crim case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity.
214 here: resorted to civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating of delaying his crim prosecution
215 A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the crim charge and
thus is not a prejudicial question

PETITION GRANTED. RTC orders reversed and set aside. Ordered to immediately proceed with
crim case
67. Cabaero vs Cantos, 1997
Facts:
Between Sept 1987 to October 1987, Cabaero induced Epifanio Ceralde to advance 1, 550,000
to be paid to MC Castro Contruction Co as payment for 6 parcels of land in Pangasinan.

Accusedpromised to pay back Ceralde as soon as loan applied by the their biz venture, Aqualand
Ventures and management, would be released by SOLIDBANK.

Perez falsely pretended that she given the authority to receive the check and induced the cashier
to release the same.

Ceralde never received his money back.

Upon arraignment, petitioners entered plea of not guilty and later filed an Answer with
Counterclaim alleging that the money loaned was duly applied to the purchase of lands and that
the filing of said info was unjustified and malicious.
216 dismiss nfo and the civil action impliedly instated in the crim action
217 ordering ceralde to pay:
a. 1.5M for moral damages
b. 500thou for exemplary damages
c. 100thou atty’s fees
d. 20lit fees

During initial hearing, prosecution moved that the answer with counterclaim be expunged from
records on 2 grounds:
218 TC had no jurisdiction over the answer with counterclaim for non-payment of the
prescribed docket fees
219 compulsory counterclaim against complainant is barred for failure to file it before
arraignment

Judge granted motion and denied petitioner’s motion for recon

Issue: WON judge committed GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering that the
answer with counterclaim be expunged from the records

Held: YES

Issue1: WON payment of filing fees is required for court to acquire jurisdiction over counterclaim
Held: NO
Ratio:
220 initiatory pleading
221permissive counterclaims, 3rd party claims and similar pleadings

Issue2: WON answer with counterclaim is proper


Held: YES
Ratio:
A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the ff circumstances
are present:
222 that it arises out of, or in necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim
223that it does not require for its adjudication the presence of 3rd parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction
224 that the court has jurisdiction to entertain claim

RULE FROM JAVIER CASE:


A civil case for malicious prosecution should be filed a a compulsory counterclaim in the
criminal action. The filing of a separate civil action for malicious prosecution would gave resulted
in the presentation of the same evidence involving similar issues in 2 proceedings: the civil action
impliedly instituted with the crim action and the separate civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution.

Source of problem:
225 ROC does not provide the procedure for counterclaims in cases where there is the
implied institution of a civil action in a criminal case
226 judgment in a crim action is not required to provide for the award of counterclaim:
sec 2, rule 120: only civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate action has been reserved or waived.

227 allowing counterclaims will complicate disposition of case: includes appli of rules of civil
actions
228 counterclaim may be filed only after initial hearing becoz private complainant may still
reserve his civil action at any time before evidence is presented

VALID COUNTERCLAIM but cannot be tried together with crim case

ORDERS are modified.


229 counterclaim set aside without prejudice
230 RTC directed to proceed with the trial of crim action and civil action arising from crim
offense that is impliedly instituted therein

Regalado, concurring:
Petitioners do not yet have a valid, complete and enforceable cause of action which could
constitute the basis and justification for their counterclaim.

Malicious prosecution:
231 there was false charge
232 there was final judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal
233 there was an order for the prosecution of the person who made charge

Vitug, separate opinion:


Javier ruling should be re-examined: where the civil case was not reserved, a counterclaim for
malicious prosecution, being compulsory in nature, should be filed in the same crim action.
Repdica vs CA
Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was driving her van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Pque.

Reckless: hit car of Bonsol


Ø physical injuries
Ø damage to car

Info was field: Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to property with Slight Physical injury.

Pleaded not guilty.

RTC Makati: convicted her of the quasi-offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries.

Petitioner appealed to CA. Subsequently filed motions for extension it file her brief. Granted then
file motion to Withdraw appeal for probation purposes and to suspend, ex abundanti Cautela,
period for filing Appellant’s brief.

Denied.

Issue: WON filing of complaint with fiscal’s office stops running of prescriptive period
Held: YES
Ratio:
234 Article 91 does not distinguish.
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not
imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries: light felony: prescribes in 2 months

Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of 8, 542, less grave felony:
prescribes in 5 months.

Francisco vs CA
People vs Cuaresma:
The filing of complaint even with fiscal’s office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

Instant petition is granted. CA decision set aside


Case dismissed.

77. DRILON vs CA
The Facts:

January 2, 1993- Añonuevo was allegedly shot in the back by Ramos. Añonuevo was reportedly
seized from Lipa City, mauled and then taken to a hospital for head injuries. He was then brought
before Marcia Reyes who asked him why he revealed her secrets concerning her indebtedness.
Later he was taken to a poultry farm in Concepcion, Batangas where he was shot and
subsequently brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital in Batangas City. The next day,
Añonuevo was transferred to St. Patrick's Hospital in the same city allegedly because he was
intentionally not being treated at the previous hospital.

The victim gave three statements on different days in order to fully narrate the events relating to
the crime. 1 In a letter dated February 13, 1993, counsel for private respondent Añonuevo
requested herein petitioner, then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, to order the transfer of
preliminary investigations in the case from Batangas to the Office of the State Prosecutor. The
Secretary of Justice granted the request and issued Department Order No. 72 designating
petitioner-State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu, as Acting Prosecutor of Batangas City in the
investigation of the case.

October 20, 1993- After the preliminary investigation was conducted, State Prosecutor Lugtu
rendered a resolution finding that a prima facie case for kidnapping with frustrated murder exists
against Manolo Ramos, Agapito Reyes, Marcia M. Reyes, Egay Perez, Ariel Hubilla, Dr. Rodolfo
V. Aguila, Jr. and Adoracion Moraleja and recommending that an information be filed against
them.

November 11, 1993- the State Prosecutor filed an Information with the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, charging the aforenamed persons with Kidnapping with Frustrated Murder.
Subsequently, the petition for review and/or reinvestigation filed by the aforenamed accused, was
denied by Undersecretary Ramon Esguerra on January 10, 1994. The latter, who is also a
petitioner in instant case, likewise denied their motion for reconsideration on February 3, 1994.

February 8, 1994- SC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the Executive Judge of the
RTC Manila for re-raffle. After being re-raffled, the same was assigned to Branch 11 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
February 19, 1994- the accused in said case filed with respondent CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, seeking
to have the resolution of State Prosecutor Lugtu set aside. A temporary restraining petitioners
Drilon et. al, from proceeding with any aspect of the case was issued by CA on March 3, 1994.
Apparently unaware that the re-raffle has already been conducted, the accused filed with the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a motion to hold in abeyance the issuance
of the warrant of arrest and to defer the raffle.

March 11, 1994 -Branch 11 of theRTC-Manila, not knowing of accused's motion, issued the Order
of Arrest against the latter.

CA formulated the issue thus: whether or not the criminal prosecution can be restrained upon the
claim of the accused that the state prosecutor's resolution is a mistake and that factually, no
prima facie case has been made out for the offense charged against them. CA found that there
was a prima facie case of offense charged against all accused with the exception of private
respondent Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila. There was no mention at all in the first two (2) statements
Añonuevo made and the only time Añonuevo mentioned Dr. Aguila was in the third statement
made more than a month after the purported incident on February 7, 1993 when in answer to one
(1) question, he had mentioned the name of Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr. and by another answer to
another question, had voiced out his suspicion.

Hence, the instant petition by then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, Undersecretary Ramon
Esguerra and State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu, where they allege that the latter committed no
grave abuse of discretion and that the Court of Appeals erred in permanently enjoining the
Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding against private respondent Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila

ISSUE: Did State Prosecutor Lugtu commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to
hold private respondent Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr. for trial?

HELD/DISPOSITIVE: NO.

“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 33372, "Manalo Ramos, et. al. v. Hon. Franklin Drilon, et. al.'' is hereby
MODIFIED so as to include Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila in the Information for Kidnapping with Frustrated
Murder. The temporary restraining order dated March 3, 1994 and made permanent on June 8,
1994, enjoining petitioners from proceeding against private respondent Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila, Jr.
in Criminal Case No. CR-94-133438 is hereby LIFTED.”

RATIO: The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to establish probable


cause and "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
. . ." It is an inquiry to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. The investigating judge or
prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief.

Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. It implies probability of guilt 13 and requires more than "bare suspicion" but "less
than evidence which would justify conviction."

Probable cause should be determined in a summary but scrupulous manner to prevent material
damage to a potential accused's constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and
fair play. The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that accused is probably guilty thereof. It
is a means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. The validity
and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
The Prosecutor's report made clear that, based on the victim's third Sworn Statement dated
February 7, 1993, respondent Dr. Aguila, Jr. was in the company of the other accused during the
shooting incident; that he suspected respondent Dr. Aguila wanted him to die because the latter
did not give him medical attention while at Batangas Regional Hospital; that the respondent even
warned him not to talk with the police regarding the shooting incident and that he saw respondent
talking with the other accused in the hospital

The narration in the 2nd sworn statement shows that Dr. Aguila had some participation in the plot
against Añonuevo. Taken altogether, all these constitute probable cause against private
respondent Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr.

Moreover, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutors
who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. 23 We have also ruled
that the courts should give credence, in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, to the
finding and determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary investigation. 24

To reiterate, such a finding of probable cause does not ensure a conviction, or a conclusive
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put
to test in a full-blown trial where evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or
disproved.

78.CASTILLO vs. VILLALUZ 171 SCRA 39

THE FACTS*:

In 1971 the preliminary investigation now in question was conducted by respondent Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court. He did so with respect to a complaint dated July 9, 1971 and the Joint
Affidavit dated July 21, 1971 filed directly with his Court by Montes and de Silva against Laconico.
The complaint charged the latter with estafa in the amount of P1,000.00. The investigation
culminated in the issuance by respondent Judge of an order on July 28, 1971 issuing an arrest
warrant against Laconico and ordering Rizal Provincial Fiscal to file the corresponding information
against the respondent before the court of competent jurisdiction within TWENTY-FOUR (24)
hours from receipt of order pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 13, Rule 112 of 1964 Rules of Court.

Notice of the Order was served on the petitioner-Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, on July 29, 1971, but
he failed to file the information required within the time appointed, or at any time thereafter.
Consequently, on October 1, 1971, he was directed by His Honor to explain within ten (10) days
"why he should not be punished for contempt of court for delaying the speedy administration of
justice for disobeying a lawful order of the Court." The Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration,
but this was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition was presented by petitioner
Fiscal, seeking annulment of the aforesaid orders.

*many years have passed during which Circuit Criminal Courts were abolished, as already the
petitioner Fiscal's public service was ended by compulsory retirement, and the respondent's stint
as Judge, ended by his promotion to a higher court. Sa madaling sabi nung nag-decide ang SC
sa kasong ito,halos 20 years ang lumipas.

THE ISSUE:

WON there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on His Honor's part to
seek to foreclose the petitioner fiscal's prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation to
determine for himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him to
show cause for not filing the information within twenty-four (24) hours, on the sole basis of the
Judge's conclusions.

HELD/DISPOSITIVE: NO.
“ WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders are hereby annulled and set aside. This resolution is
immediately executory. No costs.”

RATIO:

It is the fiscal who is given by law "direction and control" of all criminal actions. It is he who
initiates all prosecutions in the name of the People of the Philippines, by information or complaint,
against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved. It is he (or other public
prosecutor), therefore, who is primarily responsible for ascertaining through a preliminary inquiry
or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof." That function is not judicial but executive. When a
preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge, the judge performs a non-judicial function, as
an exception to his usual judicial duties. The assignment of that function to judges of inferior
courts and to a very limited extent to courts of first instance was dictated by "necessity and
practical considerations," and the consequent policy, as SC held in Salta, was that "wherever
there were enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts were to
leave that job which is essentially executive to them." It follows that the conclusions derived by a
judge from his own investigation cannot be superior to and conclusively binding on the fiscal or
public prosecutor, in whom that function is principally and more logically lodged. These
considerations argue against giving the term "refer" used in Section 13 of the former Rule 112 —
which provided that if the judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation finds probable cause
against a defendant," . . . he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to
the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information" — the effect of imposing upon the fiscal
the mandatory duty to file an information merely upon such reference being made; and this, even
without regard to the fact that in its ordinary sense, the word "refer" conveys no such import nor
connotes any compulsion. And it was no doubt on account of these obvious considerations that,
as Salta further observes, Section 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 reiterated "the removal from
Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region of the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations" and "Section 2 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
no longer authorizes Regional Trial Judges to conduct preliminary investigations." It may not be
amiss to point out, in this connection, that the 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (Sec. 5, Rule 112) explicitly provide inter alia that "(s)hould the provincial or city fiscal
disagree with the findings of the investigating judge on the existence of probable cause, the
fiscal's ruling shall prevail." Be it noted, however, that once the fiscal files an information with the
Court and the Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, the case may not be dismissed at
the fiscal's instance except only by consent of the Court, which may grant or withhold it in its
discretion.

79. PEOPLE vs. NARCA 275 SCRA 696


THE FACTS:

For the death of Mauro Reglos, Jr. , defendants-appellants Rodencio, Benjamin, Rogelio all
surnamed Narca and their brother-in-law Jaime were charged with the information for murder:

When appellants' failed in their motion to quash the above information, they filed a motion for bail.
During the bail hearings, the victim's wife Elizabeth, who was with him on that fateful night,
testified on direct examination. Defense counsel requested the court that his cross-examination of
Elizabeth be conducted on the next hearing. Such cross-examination on said date never took
place because Elizabeth and her son were bludgeoned to death. After hearing, the lower court
denied bail. During arraignment, appellants pleaded "not guilty". Trial ensued and the lower court
thereafter rendered judgment convicting appellants. Hence, this appeal.

The facts given credence by the trial court are as follows:

. . . (O)n March 10, 1990, between 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock in the evening, after
spouses Mauro Reglos, Jr. and Elizabeth Reglos have just come from the house
of the father of Mauro Reglos, Jr. at Barangay Cavite Plum, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, who was then sick, and on their way home to Sta. Ana, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, accused Benjamin Narca suddenly hacked Mauro Reglos, Jr. at the back
portion of his head with a long bolo known as "panabas". When Mauro was about
to fall at his back, Jaime Baldelamar, Rogelio Narca and Rodencio "Rudy" Narca
suddenly appeared, and they took turns in hacking Mauro with bolos. When
Mauro was being hacked, his wife Elizabeth screamed for help, and Arturo
Reglos and Dante Reglos responded and arrived at the scene of the incident.
They saw Benjamin, Rodencio "Rudy" and Rogelio, all surnamed Narca, and
Jaime Baldelamar, all armed with bolos, guarding their brother Mauro Reglos, Jr.
who was lying face downward, soaked with blood, but still alive. Arturo Reglos
and Dante Reglos and Elizabeth Reglos cannot approach Mauro Reglos, Jr.
because they were threatened by the Narca brothers and Jaime Baldelamar. Two
minutes after Arturo and Dante Reglos arrived, all the accused left, but accused
Rogelio Narca returned and hacked Mauro Reglos once more at his back.

THE ISSUE:

WON the preliminary investigation was valid because they were not represented therein by
counsel and was therefore deprived of due process.

HELD/DISPOSITIVE: Yup.

“WHEREFORE, subject to the modification that each appellant shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija convicting appellants Rodencio, Benjamin, Rogelio all surnamed Narca and
Jaime Baldelamar of murder and the imposition of the monetary awards are AFFIRMED.”

RATIO:

There is nothing in the Rules which renders invalid a preliminary investigation held without
defendant's counsel. Not being a part of the due process clause but a right merely created by law,
preliminary investigation if held within the statutory limitations cannot be voided. Appellant's
argument, if sustained, would make a mockery of criminal procedure, since all that a party has to
do to thwart the validity of the preliminary investigation is for their counsel not to attend the
investigation. It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full
exercise of the rights of the parties. This is why preliminary investigation is not considered as a
part of trial but merely preparatory thereto and that the records therein shall not form part of the
records of the case in court. Parties may submit affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses
though they can propound questions through the investigating officer. In fact, a preliminary
investigation may even be conducted ex-parte in certain cases. Moreover, in Section 1 of Rule
112, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is only to determine a well grounded belief if a
crime was "probably" committed by an accused. In any case, the invalidity or absence of a
preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which may have taken
cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC. 8, RULE 110
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (86 SCRA 542; 1978)

Facts:
Petitioners: City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and the Solicitor General
Public Respondents: CFI of Manila-branches VII & XVIII, CFI of Samar

• Par. 3, PD#9 provides:


• It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as “fan
knife,’ ‘spear,’ ‘dagger,’ ‘bolo,’ ‘balisong,’ ‘barong,’ ‘kris,’ or club, except where such articles
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct

• Petitioners-fiscals filed before the respective respondent courts several & separate
informations for illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Par. 3 of PD#9. (For
illustration, one of the similarly written infos. alleged: That…accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed
weapon…the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood
nor being used in connection therewith.)

• Respondent courts, upon motions to quash filed by the defense counsels, issued their
respective orders quashing the informations on common ground that the said informations did
not allege facts constituting an offense penalized under PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime: that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed,
pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. They said
that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.#1081 which seeks to attain the maintenance
of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. They added that the non-
inclusion of the aforementioned element of the offense leads to confusion as the same act
punished as an offense under par. 3 of PD#9 is also the subject of another penal statute and
a Manila city ordinance:
Sec. 26, Act#1780: It should be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly
weapon: x x x. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding P500, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 months, or
both…
Ordinance#3820—penalizes with a fine not more than P200 or
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both…anyone who shall carry
concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly
character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon…in any
public place.

• Thus, the 26 petitions for review assailing the respective orders of the respondent courts.
The petitions, having similar issues, were consolidated by the Supreme Court.

• The argument of the petitioners:


1. A perusal of par.3 of PD#9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy
2. The City Fiscal of Manila adds that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused
who commits the act is immaterial; it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated

ISSUE: W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and substance to constitute the offense
penalized under PD#9

HELD: NO.
• It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
• Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that for a complaint or information to
be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. This is
especially in the case at bar where the acts being punished are covered by 2 penal statutes
and a city ordinance. The right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted
with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him,
otherwise such act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting
fiscal, under any of the 3 punitive laws and thus expose the accused to oppression and
harassment.

• The elements of the offense under par. 3, PD#9 are: 1) the carrying outside one’s residence
of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and 2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet,
or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or
public disorder. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon,
if concealed, outside of the scope of Act#1780 and Ord#3820. Thus, a simple act of carrying
any of the weapons described under PD#9 is not a crime in itself. What makes the act
criminal under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without such motivation, the act falls
under the Act or the Ordinance. Consequently, the informations filed by petitioner are fatally
defective and quashal is proper.

• The filing of the petitions were unnecessary because the petitioners could have availed itself
of other remedies based on Rule 117, Sec.7. (Effect of sustaining the motion to quash); Rule
110, Sec.13 (Amendment of Info or complaint):
1. If the evidence so warranted, the People could have filed an amended info to include the
second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondents. The SC has
previously ruled that if the facts alleged in the info do not constitute an offense, the case
should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
info.
2. If the facts so justified, the petitioners could have filed a complaint either under Sec.
26 of Act#1780 or Manila city ordinance#3820, especially since the dismissal of the cases
were made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash. Under Sec. 8,
Rule 117, an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense unless the motion was based on extinguishment of criminal liability or
double jeopardy.

PETITIONS DENIED.

96. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO ARIPAZA


March 15, 2000

Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte

Facts:
235 In June 1995, 12-year old Rosita Encinas was sleeping with her brothers and sister when her
stepfather Rodolfo Arizapa entered their room and proceeded to rape her. Rosita reported
the incident to her two aunts and the barangay captain.

236 Arizapa was charged with the crime of rape. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
offense.

237 When Aripaza came to testify in his defense during the trial, he readily admitted having raped
his stepdaughter. Aripaza said that he was admitting the offense of his own volition.

238 On October 8, 1997, the trial court found the Aripaza guilty of the crime of rape as defined in
Art. 335 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 7659. He was sentenced to the supreme
penalty of death.

239 In this automatic review before the Supreme Court, Aripaza contends that the trial court erred
in convicting him of rape as it failed to conduct, before accepting his plea of guilty, a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea and his full comprehension of the
consequences thereof as mandated by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Section 3 – Pleas of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. – When the


accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.

Issue: WON the conviction of Aripaza may be set aside on the ground that his plea of guilty was
improvidently made

Held: NO, because the plea of guilt was made after the court had already extensively received
evidence which sufficiently proved the guilt of the accused.

Ratio:
240 The rationale behind Sec. 3 Rule 116 is that courts must proceed with caution where the
possible punishment is in its severest form, because the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
The purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt when grave crimes are involved since the
accused might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty
without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his plea.

241 In the present case, the record indeed shows that the lower court failed to fully comply with
the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116. There was no searching inquiry. The only question
asked of Aripaza was this: “Are you admitting the offense charged against you of your own
volition?”

242It must be noted however that the plea of guilty in this case was made AFTER the
prosecution had already rested its case, i.e. after all the evidence for the prosecution had
been presented. The testimonies of the victim, the victim’s aunts and the medical examiner
were heard by the court.

Since the trial court extensively received evidence in determining the guilt of Aripaza, the
manner in which the plea of guilty was made loses its significance because Aripaza was
convicted based on the evidence proving his commission of the offense charged and NOT on
his admission in open court. His conviction may only be set aside when the improvident plea
of guilty was the sole basis for the condemnatory judgment.

Decision affirmed with modification. (Modification refers only to the grant of P75,000 as civil
indemnity, in addition to the award of moral and exemplary damages in the trial court)

97.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN JAMBIEN


May 31, 2000

Nature: Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City
Facts:
243 Jambien was charged with three counts of rape committed against his minor daughter Emie.
1. Crim. Case No. 98-06 – incident occurred sometime in April 1997
2. Crim. Case No. 98-07 – incident occurred sometime in December 1995
3. Crim. Case No. 98-06 – incident occurred sometime in October 1986

Emie said that her father had been raping her 3-4 times a week since she was 11 years old.
The sexual assaults only stopped when she learned that she was pregnant and was brought
to the DSWD for counseling and assistance in the delivery of the baby.

244 During the arraignment, Jambien pled guilty to Crim. Cases No. 98-06 and No. 98-07. He
entered a not guilty plea in the other Crim. Case. Despite his plea of guilt in the first two
cases, the trial court required the prosecution to present its evidence. Thus, Emie testified
before the Court. The accused did not present any evidence.

245 On Feb. 16, 1998, the trial court found Jambien guilty of two counts of rape (98-06 and 98-
07). Two death penalties were imposed as his sentence. The trial of the third case was held
in abeyance.

246 In this automatic review, Jambien contends that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of
guilty without conducting a searching inquiry to determine whether he fully understood the
consequences of his plea. He argued that the number and character of the questions
propounded to him, after he entered his plea, were too sparse as to qualify as searching
inquiry.

Issue: WON Jambien’s plea of guilty was improvidently made

Held: NO, because the procedure in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was followed by the trial court

Ratio:
247Sec.3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure that the trial court should follow
when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. It is mandatory. It requires the judge to
do the following:
1. to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the accused’s plea;
2. to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of the
culpability;
3. to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow
him to do so if he so desires.

248In the case at bar, the trial court was not remiss in its duty to conduct a searching inquiry.
The Court queried Jambien if his pleas were not influenced from outside, and he said that
they were not, he having not been coerced to do so. He was again asked by the Court if he
understood his pleas and again, he said yes. When he was asked about the imposable
penalty, he said, it is death. When asked further, he answered that he is ready to die even
now. (NOTE: Please refer to the case in the original for a detailed account of the questions
asked to the accused.)

249 Jambien was neither coerced nor intimidated in entering his plea of guilty. Significantly, he
even pled not guilty to the third charge on the pretext that he was not present at the scene
during that time. This shows the voluntariness of his plea and that it was based on a free and
informed judgment. He understood the consequences of his plea and was aware that he will
be meted the death penalty.
250 Even without considering the plea of guilty of the accused, he may still be convicted if there is
adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. In the present case, there
is overwhelming evidence that established the guilt of the accused. The testimony of Emie is
clear and convincing. It contains horrid details of her deflowerment and the frequent sexual
assaults by her father. There is no reason to disbelieve her testimony.

251People vs. Tahop: Even if the accused’s plea was improvidently made, if the evidence
presented thereafter by the prosecution is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the court’s verdict of guilt based solely on hard evidence can be sustained. At this
point then, the improvidence of the plea of guilt is irrelevant.

Decision affirmed with modification. (The Court ordered the payment of P75,000 as civil
indemnity for each rape, in addition to the P50,000 moral damages awarded in the trial court)

NOTE:
In the Aripaza case, the plea of guilty was made AFTER the prosecution had already
presented its evidence.
In the Jambien case, the plea of guilty was made during the arraignment, but the
prosecution was still required to present evidence pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court.
In both cases, the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused. Hence, the plea of guilty loses its significance, whether it was improvidently made
(Aripaza) or not (Jambien).