CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

1 American insurance association et al. v. GARAMENDI, INSURANCE

COMMISSIONER
2 Holy See V. Del Rosario Jr.,
3 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION� [GR No. 139465� January 18, 2000.]
4 International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon Leonardo A.
Quisumbing
5 Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights
6 Francisco. Et. Al. vs The House of Representatives G. R. No. 160261.
November 10, 2003
7 Ebranilag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu.
8 Aguirre vs Aguirre (GRN L-33080 August 15, 1974) 58 SCRA 461
9 People v. Mamstedt
10 Barnes v. Glen theatre, Inc. 501 U.D. 560
11 CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE VS. CITY OF HIALEAH
12 DOUGHERTY vs. EVANGELISTA
13 HELVERING v. HALLOCK, 309 U.S. 106 (1940)
14 M TUASON & CO., INC., VS. MARIANO (L-33140 October 23, 1978) 85
15 AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG
16 Lawrence v. Texas
17 Johnson, petitioner vs. Texas, respondent (509 U.S. 350)
18 Morales vs Paredes, 55 Phil 565, [G. R. No. L-34428 December 29, 1930]
20 VITA UY LEE and HENRY LEE, petitioners
21 ULEP v The Legal Clinic
22 IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent�
23 NIELSON & COMPANY, INC., v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY
25 Valmonte v. De Villa, [G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990.]
26 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA
27 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 655
28 MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER, PETITIONER v.CALIFORNIA
29 Andresons Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
30 ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA
31 Villanueva v. CA,
32 South Central Bell Telephone Company (Petitioners) Vs. Alabama
33 People of The Philippines vs. Dioscoro Pinuila, Et Al., Absalon Bignay,
defendant and appellant.�
34 Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading CO.,
35 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc.,
36 ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
37 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
38 Tecson, et al v. Comelec, GR No. 161434
39 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept
40 Clinton v. Jones
41 Freedman v State of Maryland
42 Near v Sate of Minnesota
43 People v. Cayat
44 PEOPLE v. MARTI
45 Zulueta v. CA
46 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 US 404�
47 O�SULLIVAN v. BOERCKEL
48 EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES OF OREGON v SMITH
49 Webb v. de Leon
51 Secretary of Justice v. Estrada, A.M.
52 People v. Rodrigueza

11 Missing Cases:
19
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CASE # 1
American insurance association et al. v. GARAMENDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
02-722. June 23 2003

FACTS
�California�s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA or Act),
requires any insurer doing business in that State to disclose information about all
policies sold in Europe between 1920-1945 by the company itself or any one
�related� to it.
Life policies issued during and during the Second Wolrd Ware were confiscated by
the Nazi Government of Germany.
GFA (German Foundation Agreement) was a result of negotiations at the national
level.
President agreed that whenever a German company was sued on a holocaust era claim
in an American court the Government would :
submit a statement that it be in this country�s foreign policy interests for the
foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for such claims
try to get state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive
mechanism.
ICHEIC was established to follow claims. Will negotiate with European insurers to
provide information about and settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and which
has setup procedures.
California made state legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insurers
(HVIRA 1999)
HVIRA required any insurer doing business on the State of California to disclose
information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company
or anyone �related� to it upon penalty of loss of its state business license.
Upon HVIRA�s enactment, the State of California issued administrative sub poenas
against several subsidiaries of European Insurance Companies participating in
ICHEIC.
Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would damage ICHEIC,
the only effective means to process quickly and completely unpaid Holocaust era
insurance claims, and that this would derail the GFA.
State Commisioner refused and continued to enact.
Petitioner insurance entities therefore filed this suit challenging the
constitutionality of HVIRA.
District Court issued preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA, and granted
petitioners summary judgement
Ninth Court reversed holding that HVIRA did not violate Federal foreign policy

ISSUE
WON HVIRA interferes with the National Government�s conduct of foreign relations.
W/N The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal foreign policy

HELD
Yes, The HVIRA of the State of California violates Federal Foreign policy
The decision was penned by Souter, J.
The judgement of the CA for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. HVIRA is preempted or
blocked.
Reasons
At the moment there is conflict in the interest of State power against policies on
foreign relations, the State must yield.
There is sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the president�s foreign
policy, as expressed both in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and
France, and in statements by high level Executive Branch officials to require
preemption here even without any consideration of the State�s interest.
NOTES:
california wanted to help victims of holocaust by passing a law called HVIRA
HVIRA forces insurance companies to disclose information on all transactions made
during 1920-1945
Why pass this law?
What happened?
American insurance companies were asking the courts to put a stop to HVIRA and say
the HVIRA was in conflict with the foreign policy of the president.

the holy see vs Eriberto u. rosario, jr.

GRN 101949, December 1, 1994. 238 SCRA 524

Nature of the Case: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set aside the
Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.

Facts
On April 17, 1988, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf the petitioner, the
Holy See, and Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), agreed to sell to Ramon Licup a
parcel of land (Lot 5-A located in the Municipality of Para�aque, Metro Manila and
registered in the name of petitioner) and lots 5-B and 5-D registered under PRC
with the following conditions: earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the
sellers and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters. In the same month,
Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc. and informed them of the assignment. Thereafter, private
respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos the fulfillment of the assignment; however,
Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the
lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or
that the earnest money be returned to the latter. Private respondent counter-
proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase
price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter.
Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private
respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original
purchase price in cash. Private respondent sent the earnest money back to the
sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC,
without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana), as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale,
one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer
certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in
the name of Tropicana. Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to
it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. Private
respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of
the lots, to no avail and private respondent is willing and able to comply with the
terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into
a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not
less than P30,000,000.00.

ISSUE
W/n tHE HOLY SEE HAS SOVEREiGN IMMUNITY in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5-
a).

HELD
YES. The Holy See has sovereign immunity in the sale of the parcel of land (lot 5-
A).
Claim to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is stated in the Public International
Law. When state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it
is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. The
Department of Foreign Affairs was allowed by the Court to intervene on the side of
petitioner by filing a memorandum of support for the petitioner�s claim of
sovereign immunity.
The Holy See exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. The petitioner is, therefore, a
foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.
The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit. The petitioner�s sale of the land is a commercial transaction that
is an act jure imperii. The petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The petition for certiorari was granted and the complaint against petitioner was
dismissed.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION�

GR No. 139465� January 18, 2000.

FACTS

Petitioner is the secretary of justice who has in his possession the extradition
papers to be filed against private respondent Mark Jimenez. Private respondent
requested the petitioner for copies of such documents against him and asks for
ample time for him to submit a response to it. Petitioner declined to grant such a
request in line with article 7 of the RP-US Extradition treaty. Private respondent
filed a petition against the petitioner at the RTC of the National Capital Judicial
Region for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, with an application for the
issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. His defense is that the
petitioner's actions violate his basic due process rights upheld by the
Constitution's due process clause. Respondent judge issued an order on August 10,
1999 favoring the side of the private respondent. Thus, the petitioner elevated its
case to the Supreme Court for certiorari.

ISSUE

W/N UPHOLD A CITIZEN'S BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR THE GOVERNMENTS IRONCLAD DUTIES
UNDER A TREATY

HELD
THE PETITION IS DISMISSED for lack of merit. The court grants that the right to
information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control
of the government. But in the case at hand, the invocation of this right by the
petitioner is premature since no official action of our own government has yet been
done. Only when such formal action is present that the court will favor the
interests necessary for the proper functioning of government The court also argues
that there is no conflict between the RP-US treaty and the Constitution. All they
see is a void in the provisions of the treaty as regards to the basic due process
rights of the extraditee. The court disagrees with such provisions of the treaty.
The court also rejects the petitioner's confidentiality argument as it is
overturned by the petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make
available at that time will be obtainable in trial.
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one side or to
seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of. The Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a
law or treaty.
THE COURT UPHELD THE BASIC DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. The
petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
papers against him and to provide ample time for him to submit his comment with
supporting evidence.

International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon Leonardo A. Quisumbing

GR # 128845, June 1, 2000
�
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the difference in salary rates between foreign��and�
local�� hires during the collective bargaining agreement held June 1995. Another
issue is whether foreign hires should be included in the approptiate bargaining
unit.
������������ On Sept. 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. June 10,1996,
DOLE issued an order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the
school. Motion for reconsideration was also denied by DOLE Sec. Quisumbing.
�
ISSUE:
�
1.WON the difference in salary rates between foreign and local hires constitutes
racial discrimination and contrary to the principle of "equal pay for equal work".
2. WON foreign hires be included in the apprpriate bargaining unit.
�
HELD:
�
YES on the first issue. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsiblity, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character"
nothwithstanding.
�
NO, on the second issue. It does not appear that foreign hires have indicated their
intention to be grouped together with local hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining in this school also shows that these groups
were always treated separately.Foreign hires have limited tenure, local hires enjoy
security of tenure.
�
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN
PART. The orders of the Sec. of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March
19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent School of according foreign hires higher salaries than local hires.

Carino vs. Commission on Human Rights

FACTS: On Sept. 14, 1990, members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), staged a protest rally at the
DECS premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands.� This action elicited no response from the
Secretary of Education thus provoking some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of MPSTA and ACT to undertake "mass concerted actions" in Liwasang
Bonifacio to "dramatize and highlight" their plight.� The "mass actions" consisted
in swaying away from their classes.�
Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hrs. or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements.
The directives notwithstanding, the mass actions proceeded with more teachers
joining in the next few days, among them were the 8 respondents (teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School in Manila).
The teachers failed to heed the return-to-work order and were subsequently charged
on the principal's report, given 5 days to answer the charges and preventively
suspended for ninety days.
Respondents Budoy, Babaran del Castillo and Esber filed separate answers and opted
for a formal investigation, and also moved for "suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution.|
Their motion for suspension was denied in November of 1990 as well as their motion
for reconsideration and due to this, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings."� After
evaluation of the evidence, Esber was dismissed and Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo

were suspended for nine months.� MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the
RTC against Carino which was dismissed and later went to the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, the respondent teachers proceeded to the Commission on Human
Rights to complain the fact that while they were participating in "mass actions,
they learned of their replacements as teachers (allegedly without notice and for
reasons unknown to them).� Consequently, the Commission scheduled a dialogue on
Oct. 11, 1990
and sent a subpoena to Sec. Carino requiring his attendance.� In the said dialogue,
the Commission issued an Order and expressed its intention to try and decide or
hear and exercise its jurisdiction.� Sec. Carino filed a motion to ismiss the said
Order but the Commission denied.� Thus, this case.�

ISSUE:� Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to determine with character of finality and definiteness the same
issues which have been passed upon and decided by the DECS Secretary and whether or
not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type
of cases.

HELD:� NO for both issues.

REASONS:� The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate and fact-finding is not
adjudication.� It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do.

PARAS, J., Concurring.

������ The Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are
also corresponding "human obligations."

Francisco. Et. Al. vs The House of Representatives

G. R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003

Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of this Court for �culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.� The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was �sufficient in form,� but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a �Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment� signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the
Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.

HELD:
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

RATIO:
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.
Ebranilag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu.

FACTS:
Petitioners are 43 high school students and elementary school students of public
schools in the towns around Cebu as represented by their parents.
The parents and consequently the children are affiliated in a religious sect know
as Jehovah's Witness.
J.W. admittedly teach their children not so salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or religious devotion, which they cannot conscientiously give to anyone or
anything except God."
On the above ceremonies in their respective schools, the children does not raise
their hand nor sing nor pledge but only stand attention during the ceremony.
The Schools of Cebu expelled these students based on R.A 1265 and Department order
No. 8 series of 1955 which govern rules and regulations for conducting the flag
ceremony in all educational institutions. This is also called the Flag Salute Law.

ISSUE:

Does the State have the right to impose its will on a religious belief on the
context that the ceremony in question is not an act of worship?

HELD: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest

priority and the amplest protection among human rights for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator.� Forcing a small religious group, through the
iron hand of law to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities. something that the ceremony is supposed to foster.�
Also, standing attention and not disturbing the ceremony could not possibly disturb
the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of serious evil to public safety,
public morals, health or any other legitimate public interest.

Aguirre vs Aguirre
GRN L-33080 August 15, 1974. 58 SCRA 461

FACTS
Leoncia, Luis, and Luningning Aguirre filed a petition for review of a decision of
the Court of Appeals that was actually in favor of them but the petitioners claimed
that it was short of what they should be entitled to under the law.
Respondents were Vicenta, Felipe, Andrea, Caridad, Soccoro, Severino (substitute to
deceased father Dominador), Luis Aguirre Jr. and Cristeta Lamahang, and the CA.
The Court of First Instance of Batangas acted favorably on the partition and
damages of the properties among the descendants of the spouses Gregorio Aguirre and
Regina Antolin. But petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals because of the
failure of the trial court to award them damages on the ground of �insufficiency of
evidence.�
But the CA said this was an error and found out that the damages suffered by the
petitioners amounted to P1,000 yearly since 1955. But the dispositive (transfer of
ownership) portion of CA�s decision simply says P1,000 without qualification; hence
the petition for review.
The P1,000 represents the value of corn, rice, mangoes copras, salt, among others
which the plaintiffs were entitled to but were not able to received because of
�unjustified acts of the defendants.� P800 was supposed to have originated from the
properties of Gregorio Aguirre and Regina Antolin while P200 was supposed to have
come from properties of Melencio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez.
Properties of Melecio Aguirre and Fructuosa Perez included unsurveyed coconut lands
with an area of 500 hectares. The coconut plantation in Jaybanga, Lobo, Batangas
has 3,000 fruit bearing coconut tress while the rice lands were cultivated by about
50 families, residing as permanent tenants.
Petitioners received shares of palay, salt, mangoes, corn only until 1954. In 1955,
Felipe, Dominador, Caridad and Socorro divided the 1/6 of the share due the
petitioners and gave these to a certain Cristeta Lamahang.
Aside from the P1,000 yearly damage, the CA also awarded attorney�s fees of P5,000;
moral damages of P2,000; exemplary damages of P1,000 and even fees for expert
witness of P500.

ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in failing to qualify the yearly damages to petitioners
Whether the CA erred in failing to sentence defendants to pay petitioners interests
and costs;
Whether petitioners are entitled to corresponding adjustment of the amounts granted
to them as a result of the rise in the dollar exchange rate;

HELD
CA�s decision was affirmed with modification:
Yes. The dispositive portion of its decision simply says P1,000 without
qualification, which is a manifest ambiguity, if not inconsistency. There can be
hardly any doubt that it was the intention of the CA to allow the recovery of the
yearly damages it found out to have suffered by the petitioners. �We must admit
that the delays in the administration of justice could be avoided if greater care
were taken in the drafting of the dispositive portions of decisions��
Yes. Petitioners were entitled to interest at the legal rate from the date of the
judgment of the trial court.
No. There is no sufficient legal basis for this.

People vs. Malmstedt

GR No. 91107 June 19, 1991

Facts:
1. Accused is Mikael Malmstedt
2. Upon information that illegal drugs were being transported from Sagada, NARCOM
official setup a checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province to check all
incoming vehicles from the Cordillera Region. A bus was stopped at about 130 in the
afternon where the accused was riding. A routine inspection was conducted by
officers of NARCOM and accused was questioned by officers when his waist was
noticed to be sporting a bulge. Officer's asked for accused passport and when the
accused failed to comply, officers asked him to bring out whatever was causing the
bulge. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag that contained what was
suspected to be hashish. Thereafter the suspect was invited outside the bus for
questioning. Accused stopped to get two travelling bags and when officers opened
the bag they found two teddy bears. It was only after the officers opened the bag
that the accused finally presented his passport. The officers noticed that the two
teddy bears also had bulges which did not appear to be foam stuffing. It was later
when the suspect was brought to NARCOM headquarters at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet that the officers confirmed that all the bulges were packets of hashish.

Issue:
W/N search without warrant is legal when searchis made pursuantto a lawful arrest?
W/N the search that led to Malmstedt's arrest was legal.

Held:
Yes. The officers search fall under warrantless search incident to lawful arrest.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting illegal drugs (hashish). The
crime of transporting was actually being committed when the search was made. The
accused was caught flagrante delicto.
The receipt of information that a foreigner from Sagada had illegal drugs in his
possession and the fact that the accused failed to produce his passport gave rise
to probable cause which justified the warrantless search.

Dissenting opinion: (minority opinion)

The fruits of the search (illegal drugs) retroactively established probable cause
or in other words justified the illegal search made by the officers. In essence the
officers were fishing for evidence illegally but since their actions produced a
successful arrest it gave them the probable cause they needed to justify the
search. The drugs are inadmissible in evidence since the search was made
illegally.

Barnes v. Glen theatre, Inc. 501 U.D. 560

Facts:
Glen theatre, Inc. and Kitty Kat lounge as represented by Ms. Darlene Millier, an
employee, would like to have complete nudity dancing/performances in their
establishments located in the state of Indiana.
The state has a public indecency statute w/c prohibits complete nudity in public
places and requires dancers to wear pastiesa or G-strings, thus petitioners cannot
hold their performances.
The petitioners claim that the indecency statute is contrary or is an infringement
on their First Amendment right on freedom of statement and that complete nudity is
an expressive activity protected by the Amendment.
Lower court rule in favor of petitioner saying that statute is facially overbroad.
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision back to lower court saying that
the type of dancing the petitioners are pursuing is not expressive activity coveret
by the Amendment.
Appealed once more, C.A. reversed the decision saying that it is an activity
protected by the First Amendment for it impedes the extending of the message of
eroticism by the dancers.
Supreme court now has the case as granted certiorari.

Issues:
whether or not complete nudity dancing is expressive activity covered by the First
Amendment on freedom of statement.
whether or not the Indiana public indecency statute is an infringement on the
petitioners� First Amendment rights.

Holding:
Issue 1- C.A. decision affirmed (nude dancing is a protected activity)
Issue 2 � C.A. decision reversed (indecency statute is not an infringement of the
First Amendment)

Reasons
Issue 1
Jurisprudence supports or says so: Doran v. Salem Inc, California v. Largue, Schad
v. borough of Mt. Ephraimm. (�nude dancing is not without the First Amendment)
Issue 2 - O�Brien Test (U.S. v O�brien)
The indecency statute is a general law regulating conduct and not specifically
directed at expression(nude dancing)
Govt regulation is sufficiently justified if within constitutional powers of
govt(Le roy v. Sidley)
govt interest is unrelated to suppression of free statement. Wearing of pasties or
G-strings does not suppress statement as ruled by the court. Nudity is targeted by
the statute, not eroticism or expression.
Incidental restriction on First Amendment rights to freedom of statement should be
no greater than is essential for furtherance of govt. interest.

CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE VS. CITY OF HIALEAH

91-948. Decided June 11, 1993�

FACTS:�
In April, 1987, the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye leased land in the city of Hialeah,
Florida and announced plans to establish a church, school, cultural center and a
museum.
According to its president and priest, petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, the Church�s
goal was to bring the practice of the Santeria religion, including its ritual of
animal sacrifice, out into the open.
The Church began the process of obtaining utility service and receiving the
necessary licensing, inspection and zoning approvals, which it all received by
early August, 1987.
The announcement of plans to establish a Santeria Church in Hialeah prompted the
city council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.
Resolutions and ordinances passed at this and later meetings are the following:
first, Resolution 87-66, which expressed the city residents� �concern� that
�certain religions may propose to engage in practices inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety� and declared that �the City reiterates its commitment to a
prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are
inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety; second, Ordinance 87-40, which
incorporated in full, except as to penalty, Florida�s animal cruelty laws; third,
Resolution 87-90, which noted the city residents� �great concern regarding the
possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices� and the state-law prohibition
and declared the city policy �to oppose the ritualistic sacrifices of animals�
within Hialeah, and announced that any person or organization practicing animal
sacrifice �will be prosecuted�; fourth, Ordinance 87-52, which defined �sacrifice�
as �to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture or mutilate an animal in a public or
private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption� and
prohibited the owning or possessing of an animal �intending to use such animal for
food purposes� with the restriction to any individual or group that �kills,
slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or
not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed,� exempting slaughtering by
�licensed establishment(s)� of animals �specifically raised for food purposes�;
fifth, Ordinance 87-71, which defined sacrifice as had Ordinance 87-52, and
provided that �it shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or
associations to sacrifice any animals within the corporate limits of the City of
Hialeah, Florida�; and sixth, Ordinance 87-72, which defined �slaughter�: as �the
killing of animals for food� and prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned for
slaughterhouse use, with the exemption for the slaughter and processing for sale of
�small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption
provided by state law.� All these ordinances and resolutions passed the city
council by unanimous vote. Violations of each of the four ordinances were
punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or
both.
Following the enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this
action, alleged violations of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause and
sought for a declaratory judgment and monetary relief, against the City of Hialeah
and its mayor and members of the city council in their individual capacities.
The District Court ruled for the City. Upon the elevation of the case to the Court
of Appeals, the said body affirmed and concluded that the ordinances were
consistent with the Constitution. The case was then petitioned to the US Supreme
Court.

ISSUE�
whether or not the resolutions and ordinances passed by the city council of Hialeah
violated the rights of the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye and its congregants under
the Free Exercise Clause. �
HELD�
The SC reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding the decision of the
inferior tribunals incompatible with the Free Exercise Clause. The laws passed were
neither neutral nor of general applicability. The SC further presented indicators
of bias against the religion and its practice of animal sacrifice in the process of
the formulation of the pieces of legislation stated above. The laws were also not
deemed necessary in attaining a compelling governmental interest, the only
exemption to the requirements of neutrality and general applicability.

DOUGHERTY vs. EVANGELISTA

G.R. No. L-2644, Nov. 24, 1906

FACTS: In 1895, Jose Evangelista, defendant, borrowed 2,000 pesos, at 6 per cent
interest from the R.C. bishop of the diocese of Nueva Segovia.� Defendant gave a
receipt reciting that the money came from the funds of Cofradia de las Animas of
the Cathedral of Vigan.� He did not state in the receipt the fact that he borrowed
the money from
the bishop.� After a year, the defendant signed a document acknowledging that 120
pesos (the amount of the unpaid) interest be advanced to him by the bishop and
added to his preexisting loan.� Evangelista contests the right of Dennis J.
Dougherty, R.C. bishop of the diocese, to recover the money loaned by his
predecessor claiming that the administration of funds of a Cofradia did not rest
with the bishop.

ISSUE:� Whether the bishop has the right to recover from Evangelista.

HELD:�� Yes.� From the RC bishop of Nueva Segovia he took the money, and to the RC
bishop of Nueva Segovia he must repay it.� (Verbatim from the decision)

RATIO:�� ����� Whatever relations the bishop held with the Cofradia, it is plain
that he made the loan as administrator in behalf of the Cofradia.� Barlin vs.
Ramirez 1 (5 Off. Gaz., 130)� Court holds that the defendant should not challenge
at the due of his payment, the same right he didn't question at the time of
borrowing.*note that the lower court judgment was for the plaintiff without
specifying Philippine or other currency.� This is the basis for the defendant to
appeal.� (See Facts 2)

FACTS 2:�� The defendant was asked by the court to serve his answer to a
previously overruled demurrer.� He was notified of this on Jan.7, bound within 5
days thereafter to serve his answer, but he neglected to except to the order.� He
duly made out and verified on Jan. 12.� He served it on March 2, deposited it in
the post office of Laoag, expecting it to reach Vigan before the opening of the
term of court on March 7.� It was delayed.� The service was received by the clerk
on March 13.� Judgment against him was entered by default.� He then moved for a new
trial under Subsec. 1 of Sec. 145 of Code of Civil Procedure on ground of accident
of surprise.

ISSUE 2:� Whether there should be a new trial

HELD:�� The decision of the lower court was held valid.� Costs against the
defendant.

REASON:� The delay of post was not the only reason for the non-arrival of the
answer.� The defendant offered no excuse for neglecting to answer 6 weeks after the
expiration of the legal time.� Rule of stare decisis was enforced Gaspar vs. Molina
1 (3,) Off. Gaz., 651).� The Court held that the word pesos must be understood as
the established currency of the country at the time it was rendered.� Since the
defendant did not move for a new trial on grounds that it was against the weight of
evidence, the court assumes that the proofs were sufficient to justify it.

DISSENTING OPINION:
CARSON J., dissenting

Carson agrees with the decision save for particularly the part where the judgment
seems to hold that when the judgment is rendered in pesos it should be interpreted
as pesos Philippine currency.� He states that while this may be the general rule,
this court has no right to give a wholly different meaning from the court's (from
which the case originated from) intention.� He believes that there is "no doubt
that the pesos mentioned in the disposing part of the judgment of the trial court
were of the same class as those mentioned in the decision and findings and the
original contract, and not pesos Philippine currency".� (Verbatim from dissenting
opinion)� He believes that the case should be sent back for the taking of further
evidence as to the relative value of pesos de plata in the cotract vs. pesos
Philippine currency with instructions to the lower court to render judgment
accordingly.

HELVERING v. HALLOCK et al. (two cases).

SAME v. SQUIRE.
ROTHENSIES v. HUSTON.
BRYANT et al. v. HELVERING.
Nos. 110-112, 183, and 399. 309 U.S. 106, Jan. 29, 1940.

This case covers 5 subcases (110-112, 183 and 399)

These cases raise the same question, namely, transfers of property inter vivos made
in trust, the particulars of which will later appear, are within the provisions of
302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property, rent or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated.
�To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or enjoyment at or after his
death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death (1) the possession or enjoyment o, or the right to the income from the
property, or (2) the right either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom: except in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money�s worth. Any transfer of a material part of his
property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the
decedent within two years prior to his death without such consideration, shall,
unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death
within the meaning of this title. (subchapter)� (Section 302c of the Revenue Act of
1926) � [placed this for reference]

HELVERING v. HALLOCK et al. (two cases).

Henry Hallock in 1919 created a trust under a separation agreement, giving the
income to his wife for life, with the provision that if and when Anne Lamson
Hallock should die and in such event, the trust shall terminate and said Trustee
shall pay Henry if he is living any accrued income, then remaining in said trust
fund. If Henry is not living then and in such event payment and delivery over shall
be made to the son and daughter Levitt Hallock and Helen Hallock.
Settlor died in 1932, his divorced wife, the life beneficiary, survived him.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trust instrument had conveyed
(transferred) the 'whole interest' of the decedent, subject only to a 'condition
subsequent,' which left him nothing 'except a mere possibility of reverter.'

SAME v. SQUIRE.
Nature of the Case: To review a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, 102 F.2d 1, affirming a decision of Board of Tax Appeal,
commissioner brings certiorari.

ROTHENSIES v. HOUSTON.
Decedent by an ante-nuptial agreement in 1925 conveyed property in trust, the
income to be paid to his prospective wife during her life, subject to the following
disposition of the principal:
'In trust if the said Rae Spektor shall die during the lifetime of said George F.
Uber to pay over the principal and all accumulated income thereof unto the said
George F. Uber in fee, free and clear of any trust. 'In trust if the said Rae
Spektor after the marriage shall survive the said George F. Uber to pay over the
principal and all accumulated income unto the said Rae Spektor-then Rae Uber-in
fee, free and clear of any trust.'
Mrs. Uber outlived her husband, who died in 1934.
The Circuit Court of Appeals deemed Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., supra,
controlling against the inclusion of the trust corpus in the gross estate.

Nature of the Case: To review a judgment if Circuit Court of Appeals for thr Thid
Circuit, affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the collector brings certiorari.

BRYANT v. HELVERING.
Testator provided for the payment of trust income to his wife during her life and
upon her death to the settlor himself if he should survive her.
The instrument, which was executed in 1917, continued: 'Upon the death of the
survivor of said Ida Bryant and the party of the first part, unless this trust
shall have been modified or revoked as hereinafter provided, to convey, transfer,
and pay over the principal of the trust fund to the executors or administrators of
the estate of the party hereto of the first part.' There was a further provision
giving to the decedent and his wife jointly during their lives, and to either of
them after the death of the other, power to modify, alter or revoke the instrument.
The wife survived the husband, who died in 1930.
The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the Commissioner to include in the decedent's
gross estate only the value of a 'vested reversionary interest' which the Board
held the grantor had reserved to himself. On appeal by the taxpayer, the Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained this determination.

Nature of the Case: To review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 104 F. 2d 1011, affirming the decision of the board, the executors
bring certiori.

ISSUE
WON the doctrine of stare decisis compel us to accept the distinctions made in the
St. Louis Trust cases as starting points for still finer distinctions spun out of
the tenuosities of surviving feudal law.
WON a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications.

HELD
NO, the Court thinks not. The Klein case rejected the presupposition of such
distinctions for the fiscal judgments which 302(c) demands.
NO, The Court holds that they are not bound by reason or by the considerations that
underlie stare decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in the application of a
statute which, on further examination, appear consonant neither with the purposes
of the statute nor with this Court's own conception of it. They therefore reject as
untenable the diversities taken in the St. Louis Trust cases in applying the Klein
doctrine-untenable because they drastically eat into the principle which those
cases professed to accept and to which we adhere.
In Nos. 110, 111, 112 and 183, the judgments are REVERSED. In No. 399, the judgment
is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concurs in the result upon the ground that each of these
cases is controlled by our decision in Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 , 51
S.Ct. 398. [309 U.S. 106, 123]

ADDITIONAL
This case covers 5 cases (110-112, 183 and 399) They raise the same question,
namely, whether transfers of property inter vivos made in trust, are within the
provisions of 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926.[2] All involve dispositions of
property by way of trust in which the settlement provides for return or reversion
of the corpus to the donor upon a contingency terminable at his death. Whether the
transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime is 'intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death' by reason of that which he retained,
is the crux of the problem. We must put to one side questions that arise under
sections of the estate tax law other than 302(c)-sections, that is, relating to
transfers taking place at death. Section 302(c) deals with property not technically
passing at death but with interests theretofore created. The taxable event is a
transfer inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of the transferred
property at the time when death brings it into enjoyment.
In each case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the trust property in
the decedent's gross estate. In deciding these cases, the lower courts came across
three recent decisions (Klein v. US where �the court rejected formal distinctions
pertaining to real property as irrelevant criteria in this field of taxation� that
the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought the
larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the
dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the
tax imposed.�, Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co. a nd Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co.
which had distinctions from the Klein doctrine.) In none of the three cases did the
dominion over property which finally came to the beneficiary fall by virtue of the
grantor's will, except by his provision that his own death should establish such
final and complete dominion. And yet a mere difference in phrasing the circumstance
by which identic interests in property were brought into being-varying forms of
words in the creation of the same worldly interests-was found sufficient to exclude
the St. Louis Trust settlements from the application of the Klein doctrine. Because
of the difficulties the lower courts found in applying the distinctions made by
these cases and the seeming disharmony of their results, when judged by the
controlling purposes of estate tax law, it was brought to the higher court.

M TUASON & CO., INC., VS. MARIANO

(L-33140 October 23, 1978) 85 SCRA 644

FACTS:
Manuela and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a
certain parcel of land.� They claimed that the land was acquired by their father by
Spanish title.

The Aquials alleged that J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon the
land.� They further alleged that the land in question had been fraudulently or
erroneously included in OCT No. 735, and was registered in the names of the
petitioners Tuason.� The Aquials also claimed that the TCT were issued to
defendants J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and the
National Waterworks and Sewerage System (NAWASA).

The Aquials prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared
void due to irregularities in the land registration proceedings.� J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.� The lower court denied
the motion

ISSUE:

W/N OCT NO. 735 AND THE TITLES DERIVED THEREFROM CAN BE QUESTIONED AT THIS LATE
HOUR BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

HELD/RULING:

NO.� The court noted that the supposed irregularities in the land registration
proceedings were the same issues raised n the civil cases decided by Judge Eulogio
Mencras.� In that case, Judge Mencias ruled that OCT 735 was invalid.� On the
appeal to the Supreme Court, that decision was reversed, and the validity of OCT
No. 735 was once
more upheld.

The court underscored the governing principle of Stare Decisis et non quieta
movere.�� The holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid should no longer be
open to attack.

AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG

160 SCRA 865 (1988)

FACTS:
Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the historic
EDSA revolution. The proposed motion picture would essentially be a reenactment of
the events that made possible the revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a 6-
hour mini-series television play, presented in a �docu-drama� style, creating 4
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background.
In a letter dated 16 Dec 1987, Hal McElroy informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the
projected motion picture. Enrile replied that he would not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema, film, or other medium of commercial
exploitation. Enrile further advised McElroy that in the production, showing, or
distribution of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written,
verbal or visual) should be made to him or any member of his family, much less to
any matter purely personal to him. McElroy acceded to this demand, deleted
Enrile�s name from the movie script, and proceeded with the project.
On 23 Feb 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint alleging that the production of the mini-
series film without his consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious
violation of his right of privacy. The RTC ruled for Enrile and ordered the Ayer
Prod to cease and desist from producing and filming �The Four Day Revolution�.

ISSUE:
Whether Ayer Prod., in filming �The Four Day Revolution�, is validly exercising its
freedom of speech and of expression protected under the Constitution.

HELD:
YES. The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in he
heirarchy of civil liberties (Phil Blooming Mills). It is not, however, without
limitations.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a court
to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Here, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by Enrile and the
right of freedom of expression invoked by Ayer Prod. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, the SC holds that under the particular circumstances
presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
entered into by Ayer Prod., the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
Whether the balancing-of-interests test or the clear and present danger test be
applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that the production
and filming by Ayer Prod. of the projected motion picture does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon Enrile�s right to
privacy.

Note: The Court also put into consideration that the portrayal of Enrile in the
movie was as a public figure. Public figure has been defined as a person who, by
his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or
calling which gives the public a legitimate in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a �public personage�.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right of
privacy for 3 reasons:
they had sought publicity and consented to it
their personalities and their affairs had already become public
the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those
who have become legitimate matters of public interests.
In the case at bar, film was not intrusive of Enrile�s right to privacy because he
was a public figure. The court defined public figure as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a �public personage.� It includes anyone who has arrived at
a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. As a public
person, Enrile had lost, to some extent, their right to privacy. Aside from that,
the EDSA Revolution was clearly a subject matter of public interest. It was not
about the personal life of Enrile. It merely included Enrile as a public figure
and not as a private person. Since only his actions as a public figure are
referred to in the film, a license from Enrile was not needed to show such actions.

Lawrence v. Texas
On June 30, 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled1 that a Georgia
state law which specified that sodomy was a crime punishable by between one month
and twenty years in prison was constitutionally permissable, dismissing claims that
such a law violated the privacy rights of those engaging in sodomy as being
obviously invalid on the grounds that "Proscriptions against that conduct have
ancient roots."
On June 26, 2003. the Supreme Court of the United States, ruling in a similar case
involving a law in the state of Texas which criminalized sodomy between members of
the same sex (while not banning sodomy between members of the opposite sex, or
between humans and animals), held that the "right to privacy" was violated by the
law and that laws banning sodomy are invalid.
Justice Byron White, who had been appointed by President Kennedy, wrote the
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. The centerpiece of his argument was that
the right-to-privacy cases, notably Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v.
Baird, had all been focused on family issues: child rearing and education,
procreation, marriage, and the like, and that it was "evident that none of the
rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy", and that it was the province of
the courts to protect those rights which were "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty", which sodomy was not.
Seventeen years later, in the case Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered
the case of two men who were arrested when police, responding to a weapons
complaint, entered their home and found them having sex. In the oral arguments for
the case, lawyers for the arrested men made two arguments:
There is a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses sodomy, and Bowers
should be overturned.
A law which bans homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy is an
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore this law
should be overturned.
The majority opinion handed down by Justice Anthony Kennedy (who was appointed by
President Reagan) threw out the Bowers decision wholesale, arguing that there is
some validity to the equal protection argument but that the current case requires a
re-assessment of Bowers. It agreed with the dissent in Bowers that "The statutes do
seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals." Moreover, the community's moral disapprobation of
homosexuality does not justify the use of the power of the State to enforce those
views. This should have been obvious when Bowers was decided, Kennedy's opinion
says. Moreover, case law since then has undermined what little validity the
decision had; in particular, the decision in Romer v. Evans that Colorado could not
name homosexuals as a solitary class of persons who were deprived of protection
under state antidiscrimination laws seriously undermined much of the argument in
Bowers. It concluded that "the rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful
analysis ... Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct
today. It ought not to remain binding precedent."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, another Reagan appointee, who was in the majority in
Bowers, declined to overrule it, but would overturn the Texas law on equal
protection grounds.
Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, complains that the overturning of Bowers is a
reckless disregard for precedent, and that the argument for overturning it could
just as reasonably be made about Roe. In addition, he accuses the majority of
unveiling the decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which was marked by
"extraordinary deference to precedent" as being, in essence, a lie.
Scalia's opinion proceeds to insist that (a) there is no emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult decisions regarding sex, and that
even if there were, an emerging awareness cannot possibly be deeply rooted in the
nation's legal tradition, and therefore emerging awareness cannot uncover a new
fundamental right. Moreover, it is right for a state to "further the belief of its
citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and unacceptable". He
dismisses out of hand the equal protection claim on the grounds that if prohibiting
same-sex marriage doesn't violate equal protection, criminalizing homosexual sodomy
without criminalizing heterosexual sodomy can't possibly do so either.
He concludes with a denunciation of the decision as "the product of a law-
profession culture that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda",
adding "It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war,"
and insisting that laws protecting gay people from discrimination deprive many
americans of their right to "[protect] themselves and their families from a
lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive." He warns that gay
marriage will be next.
Justice Thomas joined the dissent but added a shot of his own, echoing one of the
dissenters in Griswold: he would vote to repeal the sodomy law, were he a
legislator, on the grounds that ti is "uncommonly silly". But as a Justice, his job
is to interpret the Constitution, and he can see no Constitutional bar to this law.

Johnson vs. Texas

(509 U.S. 350)

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

Facts:
On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson Jr., then 19 and along with Amanda Miles
decided to rob Allup�s convenience store in Synder, Texas after some planning and
surveying the area.
Johnson announced the holdup and ordered the store attendant, Jack Huddleston to
lie on the floor.
After Huddleston complied with the order, Johnson shot him in the back of the neck,
killing him.
The pair had emptied the cash registers of about $160 and each grabbed a carton of
cigarettes.
A few weeks after the commission of the crime, Johnson was arrested for another
robbery and attempted murder in Colorado City, Texas.
Johnson confessed to the murder of Huddleston and the robbery of Allsup�s and was
tried and convicted of capital murder.
Two issues were raised to the jury:
Whether the conduct of Johnson which caused the death of Huddleston could result to
another death
Whether there is a probability that Johnson would commit crimes that would pose as
a continuing threat or danger to society in the future
Jury answered yes to both questions.
The trial court sentenced Johnson to death.

Johnson appealed the decision, stating that the jury did not take into
consideration his youth in deciding the verdict. He contends that petitioner�s age
must be considered as a mitigating factor in the decision. Defense presented
petitioner�s father to strengthen the claim, painting him as still immature and
reckless due to his youth.

Issue: Whether the age of the petitioner should be considered by the jury in
handling out a decision

Decision: Yes. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Reasons: Youth was considered by the jury in handling out a sentence. Petitioner�s
age is considered as a mitigating factor. He may change as he grows older.
However, the possibility of him committing dangerous acts in the future partly due
to his present actions cannot be ignored.

Dissent: His youth must not be taken against him.

Reasons: Youth is more than chronological fact. The emotional and mental
immaturity of young people may cause them to respond to events in ways that adult
would not. The jurors could not give effect to this aspect of Johnson�s youth.

Morales vs Paredes
55 Phil 565, G. R. No. L-34428. December 29, 1930]

Facts
Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of
land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and
on June 23, 1930, the application was granted and a decision to that effect
rendered. Baltazar Morales, the petitioner, now claims to be the owner of the land
but was not advised on the registration proceedings until the early part of
September 1930. He eventually filed a motion, through his counsel Nicolas Belmonte,
on September 18 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan for the
reconsideration of the June 23 decision and as the record shows, the motion may
still be pending. Without dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought the
present action before the Supreme Court (SC) praying that the aforesaid decision be
set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with Section 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

Issue
Whether Mr. Morales has legal contention in his petition filed at the SC.

Held
No. The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without deciding
that the allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the proper remedy is to
petition for a review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (LRA). The
plaintiff�s contention that such review cannot be made until the final decree has
been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by the SC as can be gleaned
in the case of Rivera vs. Moran (48 Phil., 836), wherein it was pointed out by the
court that Sec. 38 of the LRA, which provides that a petition for review of such a
decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed �within one year after entry of the
decree�, be given further reflection and that what it meant would have been better
expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of
one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable
construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining
party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.
The plaintiff�s view of the extent of actions under Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is erroneous. The SC had no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that
section if other adequate remedies are available, and such remedies are not lacking
in the present case. The case is therefore dismissed by the SC with the costs
against the plaintiff.

LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON

G.R. No. L-28126 November 28, 1975

Facts of the Case:

On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and
Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio
San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of about 2.7342
hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants Vita Uy Lee and Henry
Lee. Defendants filed in due time their answer with affirmative defenses. After
trial, the court decided in favor of Simeon and Vicencio. The counterclaim of the
defendants are dismissed. Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial
and later an urgent motion for reconsideration which were both denied by the trial
court in its orders of March 23, 1964 and June 25, 1964. The case is now before Us
on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal was
affirmed in toto. A timely motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants-
appellants (now petitioners) to no avail.
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve
petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law. before it."
More specifically, petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to
include in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by respondent
(now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee
before the expiration of the period within which redemption could be made
petitioners intimating that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as
another question is raised by them on the basis of the terminology of the three
letters.

Issues:
Whether or not the period to reconvey the property, subject of this case, under
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 has prescribed (expired or lapsed)..

Ruling:
Yes it has prescribed (expired or lapsed). The rule that tender of payment of the
repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in
civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an
applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit: "The
vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale ...".
It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire
to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell
short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of
redemption within the statutory five-year period, the right is lost and the same
can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel redemption after the
lapse of the period. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters
sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of
respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of payment,
did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that tender of the
repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to permit the
repurchase is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will
also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have
shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal,
her silence did not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of
payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was made within five-year
period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely filed an action to
compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period.
The Supreme Court, therefore, in the light of the above ruling reversed the
decision oif the Court of Appeals.

Mariano Ulep vs. Legal Clinic

GR. No. 553, June 17, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner is a member of the legal profession. He claims that he is offended and
ashamed by the advertisements issued by The Legal Clinic as they are _champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity_ of lawyers. Respondent meanwhile admits the
publication and issuance of said advertisements but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law. The Legal Clinic renders support services through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent (The Legal Clinic) as advertised
constitutes practice of law.
In either case, whether the same can properly be suspect of advertisements herein
complained.

HELD:
YES. The Court agrees with the observations of the various bar associations that
the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute the practice of law. The
use of the name _The Legal Clinic_ gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and thus renders legal services. While some of the
services being offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how, these will
not suffice to justify an exception. Though respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court, it is still engaged in the practice of law as
this is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice and contract drafting. Moreover, the advertisements in
question (annex B)are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
What is important is that respondent corporation is engaged in the practice of law
by the nature of the services it offers (though rendered by paralegals) which
thereby brings it within the statutory prohibitions against the publication of such
advertisements. _It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skills_law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising
his services or offering them in public._
The Court resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN respondent from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same
tenor and purpose as Annexes a and B.

IN RE: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES

Case No. 350 �August 7, 1959�

FACTS:
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a
final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two years,
four months and one day of destierro and to pay a fine of P2300, with subsidiary
destierro in case of insolvency.�

ISSUES:
Under Section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why
he should not be disbarred.�
In written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court
considering that he has six children to support.�
He made manifest to the court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him,
it was merely due to an error of judgment.�

DECISION:
He was disbarred from the roll of attorneys.�
Under Section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as
attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind
this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of
law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment.�
And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude, this court is
constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 21 of Rule 127.

NIELSON & COMPANY, INC. vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY.

26 SCRA 540 GRN L-21601 December 28, 1968

Facts:
Operating agreement between Nielson and Co., Inc and Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company, whereby the former operated and managed the latter�s mining property.
Contract was entered into on Jan. 30, 1937, for five years, with an option to renew
for the same term on the same basis. Contract was renewed in 1941.
Dec. 1941 � WW II
Jan. 1942 � mining operations ceased.
Feb. 1942 � mills, plants and other property were destroyed and occupied by the
Japanese Army.
1945 � Japanese forces are ousted and parties regain control of the property.
1945 � disagreement between Nielson and Lepanto as to w/n contract is to expire in
1947.
June 26, 1948 � mining operations officially resumed under Lepanto.
Terms of the contract: Both parties to this agreement fully recognize that the
terms of this Agreement are made possible only because of the faith or confidence
that the Officials of each company have in the other; therefore, in order to assure
that such confidence and faith shall abide and continue, NIELSON agrees that
LEPANTO may cancel this Agreement at any time upon ninety (90) days written notice,
in the event that NIELSON for any reason whatsoever, except acts of God, strike and
other causes beyond its control, shall cease to prosecute the operation and
development of the properties herein described, in good faith and in accordance
with approved mining practice.
Nielson contends that the contract was suspended and should be extended.
Lepanto contends that the contract expired in 1947 and that period of suspension
did not extend the contract.
The Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila held for the defendant, Lepanto.
Nielsen appealed to the Supreme Court (SC) and the SC reversed the decision of the
CFI; It held that the contract was suspended until Jan. 26, 1948, when mining
operations resumed.
Lepanto seeks for motion for reconsideration based on the ff grounds:
1. That the contract entered into was a contract of agency which was effectively
revoked and terminated in 1945;
2. That the court erred in holding that the period of suspension extended the
life of the management contract.
3. The court erred in reversing the ruling of the trial judge that the
management agreement was only suspended but not extended on account of the war.
4. The court erred in reversing the finding of the trial judge that Nielson's
action had prescribed, but considering only the first claim and ignoring the
prescriptibility of the other claims.
5. The court erred in holding that the period of suspension of the contract on
account of the war lasted from February 1942 to June 26, 1948.
6. Assuming arguendo that Nielson is entitled to any relief, the court erred in
awarding as damages (a) 10% of the cash dividends declared and paid in December,
1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00 for the month of January, 1942; and (c)
the full contract price for the extended period of sixty months, since these
damages were neither demanded nor proved and, in any case, not allowable under the
general law of damages.
7. Assuming arguendo that appellant is entitled to any relief, the court erred
in ordering appellee to issue and deliver to appellant share's of stock together
with fruits thereof.
8. The court erred in awarding to appellant an undetermined amount of shares of
stock and/or cash, which award cannot be ascertained and executed without further
litigation.
9. The court erred in rendering judgment for attorney's fees.

Issue 1: W/N management contract be considered a contract of agency and

therefore effectively revoked and terminated.

Held: No, the SC held that this ground of the motion for reconsideration be
brushed aside.
It is the rule, and the settled doctrine of this Court, that a party cannot change
his theory on appeal-that is, that a party cannot raise in the appellate court any
question of law or of fact that was not raised in the court below or which was not
within the issue made by the parties in their pleadings
(Obiter) Even if allowed, it cannot be sustained. It is the SC�s view that the
management contract is not a contract of agency but a contract of lease of services
hence cannot be unilaterally revoked.
Issue 2: W/N the contract was actually suspended and extended until 1948, on
account of the war and its aftermath.

Held: Yes, the contract was suspended and extended until 1948.
The management contract provides as follows: �In the event of inundation,
flooding of the mine, typhoon, earthquake or any other force majeure, war,
insurrection, civil commotion, organized strike, riot, fire, injury to the
machinery or other event or cause reasonably beyond the control of NIELSON and
which adversely affects the work of mining and milling; NIELSON shall report such
fact to LEPANTO and without liability or breach of the terms of this Agreement, the
same shall remain in suspense, wholly or partially during the terms of such
inability.� Also, since damages caused by the war were severe, rebuilding of the
mines had to be undergone and thus causing the operations to officially resume on
June 26, 1948.

Issue 3: W/N damages awarded to Nielson is proper; (a) 10% of the cash dividends
declared and paid in December, 1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00 for the
month of January, 1942; and (c) the full contract price for the extended period of
sixty months; (d) to issue and deliver to appellant share's of stock together with
fruits thereof; (e) an undetermined amount of shares of stock and/or cash, and; (f)
attorney's fees.

Held: Awards (a), (b), (c), and (f), with proper discretion of the court, are
granted. Awards (d), and (c), however, are not granted.
Awards (a), (b), (c) are awarded because it is based on the stipulations
stated in the contract agreed upon by both parties.
Award (f), is granted since attorney�s fees are given to the discretion of
the court.
Award (d) and (c) is not granted because it is under the Corporation Law that stock
dividends can only be given to stockholders of the said corporation, of which,
Nielson and Co., Inc., is not a part of.

Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990. 185 SCRA 665

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People�s Rights.
Their petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of checkpoints as
unconstitutional was dismissed. Petitioners filed the instant motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Respondents are General Renato de Villa
and the National Capital region District Command. Checkpoints may be allowed and
installed by the government. In its decision, the Court does not legalize all
checkpoints, declaring instead that checkpoints are not illegal per se. In fact,
checkpoints are used as security measure in order to entrap criminals, considering
recent and on-going events such as the sixth attempted coup d�etat staged last
December 1, 1989, the NPA move against the armed forces, murders, sex crimes and
smuggling. As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual�s right
against unreasonable search. A routine checkpoint stop involves only a brief
detention of travelers, answering a brief question or two. If vehicles are stopped
and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies
reasonable belief that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.

Issue:
W/n checkpoints are constitutional.
Held:
Yes. Completely banning checkpoints is to lose sight of the fact that the real
objective behind their use is necessary. The government has the equal right, under
its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving
them. Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude on the motoring public and cannot be
considered as violative of an individual�s right against unreasonable search.
Potential interference is minimal and checkpoint operations involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The Court�s decision was concerned with power,
on whether the government employing the military has the power to install said
checkpoints, and does not validate nor condone abuses committed by the military
manning the checkpoints. The Court assumes that the men in uniform are assigned to
the checkpoints to protect the citizenry.
Motion for reconsideration is denied.

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996.

FACTS
Petitioners are foreign corporations that lodged a formal complaint with the NBI
for violation of PD No. 49,as amended, a.k.a. �Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property� and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive.
Surveillance operations of various video establishments in Metro Manila were then
made, including that of Sunshine Home Video Inc. in Magallanes, Makati.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant
with the court a quo against Sunshine. Agent Reyes and other witnesses, Mr. Rene C.
Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, provided affidavits and depositions during the
hearing of the application for the warrant. Search Warrant No. 87-053 for violation
of sec. 56 of PD No. 49 was then issued. On December 14, 1987, at 1:45 p.m., the
warrant was served and a receipt of properties tendered to Mr. Danilo A.
Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine.
On December 16, 1987, A �Return of Search Warrant� was filed with the Court.
Then, a �Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant� was filed but was later denied
for lack of merit.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed and then granted by
the court, citing the fact that master tapes of copyrighted films were never
presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants in question.
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the Trial Court granting private
respondents� motion for reconsideration, to the Court of Appeals. Said appeal was
dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof denied. Hence. This petition
was brought to Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court�s
retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988 (long after hearing of
application for search warrant of Sunshine) in dismissing petitioner�s appeal and
upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., ordering that for the determination of probable cause to support
the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving
videograms, the production of the master tape for comparison with the allegedly
pirated copies is necessary, should be retroactively applied as grounds for quashal
of a search warrant previously issued.

HELD
NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case
because there was satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under
the law for determination of probable cause. The lower court could not have
possibly expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search
warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially
accepted, required with respect to finding of probable cause.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean. According to the Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of the legal maxim �legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet� � the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. But when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and
necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated Nov. 22, 1988, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988
upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED and said
court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate
proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are further assessed
against private respondents.

NOTES
PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY
o Applies not only to original or amendatory statutes and administrative
rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so to judicial decisions.
o Lex prospicit, non respicit � the law looks forward not backward

20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

164 SCRA 655

Facts:
The petitioner sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to conduct searches and seizures in connection with the latter�s anti-film piracy
campaign. Through a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, the petitioner alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over the Metro Manila were engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films, in video tape form which
constitutes a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property)
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of
the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private
respondents. These applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants on the
basis of probable cause.
After the raids occurred, respondents then filed for a Motion to Lift Search
Warrants.
Acting on the Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the lower court issued an order
lifting the warrants issued earlier. The petitioner thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner for
certiorari likewise filed by the petitioner.

Issue: W/N the search warrants were properly lifter by the judge for want of
probably cause.

Ruling:
Yes, Based on Sec. 2 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant shall
be issued except upon probable cause. This constitutional guarantee is a time-
honored precept, which circumscribes governmental action with regard to the
procurement of a search warrant.
In the case of Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, the Court had occasion to
define probably cause for a valid search �as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.� It was likewise held by the Court that this
constitutional provision demands �no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified� in order to convince the judge, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.
In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the questioned search warrants against
the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the
issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of
applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a
particular film have been committed. The lower court ruled that there was no
probable cause that the private respondents violated PD No. 49. As found by the
lower court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge
of the subject matter of their testimony which has the alleged commission of the
offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner�s counsel who was also a
witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that
he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the
fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
court during the application.
It was thus ruled that the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted
films which the pirated films allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of
search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced
from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of copyright infringement is the similarity or at least the substantial
similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the videotapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the
latter is unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted
films to the probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the
copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Moreover, the Court ruled that the questioned warrants were in the nature of
general warrants, against citing the case of Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP,
wherein the search warrants in question were declared void by the Supreme Court.
The articles described in the search warrants � television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders, and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video
tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out of video
tapes.

MARION REYNOLDS STOGNER v. CALIFORNIA

US Supreme Court No. 01-1757, June 26, 2003

Overview. California enacted a criminal statute of limitations in 1993 which

expanded the time to prosecute a child sex abuse case if the original statute of
limitations period had expired and the prosecution of the child sex abuse case was
initiated within one year of the victim�s report to the police.

Facts. The defendant Stogner was charged with child sex abuse for offenses that
occurred between 1955 and 1973, and at the time the offenses were alleged to have
occurred the statute of limitations in California was three years. The state of
California prosecuted Stogner under a new statute of limitations.
Issue. Does the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution permit the
prosecution of a criminal offense which has been previously time-barred by a
statute of limitations.

Held. The United States Supreme Court held that the California law violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court stated that the
California law �threatens the kinds of harm that the Clause seeks to avoid, for the
Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes with
manifestly unjust and oppressive retroactive effects.� The Court also emphasized
that California�s new statute of limitations inflicts punishment in cases that were
not subject to punishment because the original statute of limitations had run.
Finally, the Court stated that numerous courts have concluded that the Ex Post
Facto Clause forbids resurrection of a time-barred prosecution.

Andresons Group, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114928. January 21, 1997

FACTS:
Petitioner questions the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the two
orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which denied
private respondents� Motion to Dismiss petitioner�s complaint on the ground of lis
pendens.
Private respondent Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as
its commission agent for the sale of distilled spirits in Davao City.
November 8, 1991 � Denate filed a civil action for collection of sum of money
against petitioner in RTC of Davao City. Denate alleged he was entitled to the
amount of P882,107.95, representing commissions that petitioner failed and refused
to pay.
December 19, 1991 � Petitioner filed complaint for collection of money from Denate
amounting to P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances in RTC of
Kalookan.
February 5, 1992 � Denate filed a Motion to Dismiss the case filed against him by
petitioner on the ground of lis pendens, citing the case filed earlier in RTC of
Davao.
February 14, 1992 � petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
April 24, 1992 � RTC of Kalookan decides that the instant motion was without merit
since jurisdiction has already been acquired by the RTC of Kalookan.
May 29, 1992 � Denate filed Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC
on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set aside
the order of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens?

HELD:
Yes. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the
parties the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and
relief sought. It is also required that the identity be such that any judgment
which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata on the case on hand.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. Petitioner�s argument that
the Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties while the
Kalookan Court already did is untenable. A civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court. (Investors Finance Corp. v. Elarde, 163 SCRA 60 1988)
Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens
should apply. (Salacup v. Maddela 91 SCRA 275,279 1979)
In conceptualizing lis pendens, litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy
against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action
pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.
The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case yield to the
earlier. The criterion used in determining which case should be abated is the more
appropriate action or which court would be �in a better position to serve the
interests of justice.�
Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money
collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to
hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said
area.

ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CA

GR No. 117897, May 14, 1997. SCRA 272

FACTS:
In 1971, Islamic leaders organized and incorporated the ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IDP).
In the same year, IDP purchased property in Culiat, Tandang Sora, Q.C.
In 1972, Martial Law was declared and most members fled to escape political
prosecution.
Thereafter, two Muslim groups came about, the Carpizo Group and the Abbas/Tamano
group. Both claim to be the legitimate IDP.
In 1986, SEC declared that neither were legitimate IDP. Both were prescribed to
prepare and adopt by-laws for submission. Once approved, elections can occur but
neither adhered
In 1989, with no properly concluded Board of Trustees of the IDP, the Caprizo
Group, sold two lands to private respondent Inglesia Ni Cristo (INC) authorizing Ms
Ligon as the mortgagee.
In 1991, the Tamano Group, filed a petition (SEC case No.4012) before the SEC
seeking to declare null and void the sale of property by the Caprizo Group. Tamana
won the case in 1993.
Meanwhile, the INC filed a civil case no. Q-90-6937 against Ms. Ligon, to comply
with Caprizo�s obligations, which was ruled in 1991 in favor of the INC despite the
judge being informed of the SEC case No. 4012.
Tamano Group sought to intervene in the civil case no. Q-90-6937, but was denied on
grounds of lack of juridical personality of the IDP-Tamano Group.
Ligon,then filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in GRN SP-27973
which was dismissed so she further petitioned it for review before the Supreme
Court docketed as GRN 107751.
In 1993, INC filed a Motion of Intervention in SEC case No. 4012 but was denied
because the cause had been final and executory.
INC filed it in the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari docketed as CA-C.G. SP
No. 33295. The petition was granted in 1993.
IDP-Tamano Group then filed for instant petition for review in 1994 stating the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in:
Not upholding the jurisdiction of the SEC to declare nullity of the sale.
Encouraging multiplicity of suits
Not applying the principles of estoppel and laches.
While this pended, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in GRN 107751. Ms. Ligon�s
petition denied and affirmed the 1992 decision in CA-G.R No. SP-27973.

ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata applies in the Court of Appeals decision for granting
INC�s petition in CA-C.G. SP No. 33295.
Whether or not the Courts of Appeal commit reversible error in setting aside that
portion of the SEC�s Decision in SEC case no. 4012 which declared the sale of land
between the IDP-Caprizo group and INC, null and void.
HELD:
NO. Res judicata basically means that the case before the court has already been
resolved by another court, with the same parties, therefore the court at hand
should be dismissed. There are two concepts by which res judicata is known. The
first being �bar by prior judgment� where between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case the judgment was invoked, there is identity in
parties, subject matters, and cause of action. When the three identities are
present the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute
bar to the subsequent action. The other concept which is �conclusive of judgment�,
wherein there is identity of parties in both cases but no identity of cause of
action, then the judgment is conclusive in the second case only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involve d therein.
Neither of these cases find res judicata because while there is identity in the
subject matter (the IDP property), there is no identity in the parties of both
cases.
YES. The CA committed reversible error as according to Sec 3 and 5 of the
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there can be no question as to the authority of the
SEC to pass ruling on who the legitimate Board of Trustees are within a
corporation. Based on this reasoning that they can declare who the Board are, it
can also be said that they can declare those that are not on the Board or are
considered illegitimate. Since it was found that no correct elections occurred nor
any ruling was passed on as to who was the legitimate IDP, Caprizo had no right,
under the IDP�s name to sell any land that belonged to the IDP. This is found in
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which states that to constitute a valid contract
all three elements must be present: consent of the contracting parties, object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract and cause of obligation which
is established. Clearly, there was no consent of the contracting parties since the
Caprizo group is not the legitimate owner.

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

G.R No. 110921. January 28, 1998

Facts:
On March 16, 1989, petitioner Baltazar Villanueva filed a complaint for
reconveyance of property with damages against Grace Villanueva and Francisco
Villanueva.
The complaint was dismissed on October 29, 2990 for failure of the plaintiff and
his counsel to appear during the pre-trial and trial.
A motion for reconsideration was filed to reinstate the complaint but was denied by
the Court finding the motion not well taken and not meritorious.
On November 26, 1991, petitioner filed another complaint at the Regional Trial
Court, OC, for annulment of title and damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction involving the same real
property.
A motion to dismiss was file by private respondent on the ground that the
petitioner�s cause of action is barred by prior judgment to which petitioner filed
an opposition.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court, in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction would not disregard the fundamental principle that the
rules of procedure are not to be applied with rigidity since they are designed to
help secure justice, not to override the same.
Furthermore, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint. The same was admitted
by the trial court.
The private respondents moved to dismiss raising once again the reasons for forum-
shopping, res judicata and estoppel.
The trial court denied said motion to dismiss.
The private respondents filed a petiotion for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the orders of the lower court.
The C.A rendered a decision upholding the ground for dismissal but urge private
respondents there to elevate this decision to the Supreme Court who alone has power
to suspend the rules.

ISSUES
Whether or not res judicata applies to the two complaints filed by the petitioner?
If res judicata is applicable, whether or not the facts and circumstances are
justifiable for the relaxation or suspension of res judicata in favor of obtaining
substantial justice?

HELD
Yes, res judicata applies to both cases since all four elements for res judicata
are present. These are:
a) The former judgment or order must be final
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after
a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case.
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the sueject
matter and the parties
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.
No, because the facts and circumstances are not justifiable for the relaxation of
res judicata. The records show no reason for petitioner�s failure to prosecute. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for not being well-taken and not
meritorious. Moreover, if petitioner felt aggrieved by the order of denial he
should have filed an appeal, therefrom, instead of allowing said order to become
final and executory. The fact that petitioner did not further pursue the matter
signifies that either he acknowledged the correctness of the order or he realized
that it was not worth continuing the case. Moreover, it took him ten months to file
the second case after the dismissal of the first, exhibiting a lackadaisical
attitude unworthy of judicial sympathy. For his fault and complacence, petitioner
cannot now take refuge under the rule that justice should not be sacrifice to
technicality.
Therefore the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

South Central Bell Telephone Company vs. Alabama

Facts:
1. The state (Alabama) requires each corporation doing business in that state to
pay a franchise tax based upon the firm�s capital.
Domestic firm (organized under the laws of Alabama) � must pay tax in an amt.
Equal to 1% of the par value of the firm�s stock
Foreign firm (organized under the laws of a state other than Alabama) � must
pay tax in an amt. Equal to 0.3% of the value of �the actual amount of capital
employed� in Alabama
Alabama law grants domestic firms considerable leeway in controlling their own tax
base and liability as the firm can set its stock�s value at a level well below its
book or market value. Alabama law does not grant a foreign firm the same benefits.
In 1986, the Reynolds company and 3 other foreign corporations sued Alabama�s tax
authorities because they wanted a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid
on the reason that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations. Though this
tax law may benefit the foreign companies, it was more beneficial for local
companies because the latter can shrink its tax base significantly simply by
setting the par value of its stock at a low level. As a result, accdg to Reynolds,
the tax burden that the foreign corps. has was much higher than the burden on
domestic corporations and the tax thus violated both the Commerce and Equal
protection clauses (see reference).
The Alabama Supreme court rejected the claims. W/o denying that the franchise tax
imposed a special burden upon foreign corps.
While the Supreme Court was deciding on that, a different foreign corp, South
Central Bell (SCB) brought this lawsuit. They had the same claim as Reynolds though
in different tax years. They agreed to wait for the outcome of the former claim
before filing the suit.
The evidence they presented showed that the Reynolds were wrong, that the tax the
domestic corps pay does not offset discrimination in the franchise tax. The trial
court agreed with the Bell plaintiffs that their evidence, taken together with the
recent Com. Clause cases, �clearly and abundantly demonstrates that the franchise
tax on foreign corps. Discriminates against them for no other reason than the state
of their incorporation.
The state, argued that the Alabama SC�s decision rested upon an adequate state
ground namely state-law principles. The SC rejected its plaintiffs� claims on the
merits and relied upon Reynolds Metals. There is no valid defense that could be
made.
Turning to the merits, it is concluded that this court�s commerce clause precedent
requires the Court to hold Alabama�s franchise tax unconstitutional.

Issue:
The basic question of this case is whether the franchise tax Alabama assesses on
foreign corporations violates the Commerce Clause
Whether the Alabama courts� refusal to permit the Bell�s plaintiffs to raise their
constitutional claims because of res judicata (a matter not open to controversy)
�deprived� the plaintiffs of the due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment
Whether the franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violation
of the commerce clause

HELD:
The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent the following opinion.
Rather than dispute any of these matters, the State says that �the flaw in the
petitioners� claim lies not in the application to the Alabama�s corporate franchise
tax of this Court�s recent negative CC cases. The flaw lies rather in the negative
CC cases themselves. The State adds that the Court should �formally reconsider� and
�abandon its negative CC�
THUS answered the court, We will not entertain this invitation however because the
State did not make clear it intended to make this argument until it filed its brief
on the merits.
Turning to the merits, it is concluded that this court�s commerce clause precedent
requires us to hold Alabama�s franchise tax unconstitutional.
Justice Connor, concurring � �� the state�s failure to properly raise its challenge
to our negative commerce clause supports a decision not to pass on the merits of
this claim.
Justice Thomas, concurring � �� I agree it would be inappropriate to take up the
State�s invitation to reconsider our negative CC doctrine in this case because �the
State did not make clear it intended to make this argument until it filed its brief
on the merits.�

REFERENCE:
The Commerce Clause is a grant of power to Congress, not an express limitation on
the power of the states to regulate the economy.� At least four possible
interpretations of the Commerce Clause have been proposed.� First, it has been
suggested that the Clause gives Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce.�
Under this interpretation, states are divested of all power to regulate interstate
commerce.� Second, it has been suggested that the Clause gives Congress and the
states concurrent power to regulate commerce.� Under this view, state regulation of
commerce is invalid only when it is preempted by federal law.� Third, it has been
suggested that the Clause assumes that Congress and the states each have their own
mutually exclusive zones of regulatory power.� Under this interpretation, it
becomes the job of the courts to determine whether one sovereign has invaded the
exclusive regulatory zone of the other.� Finally, it has been suggested that the
Clause by its own force divests states of the power to regulate commerce in certain
ways, but the states and Congress retain concurrent power to regulate commerce in
many other ways.� This fourth interpretation, a complicated hybrid of two others,
turns out to be the approach taken by the Court in its decisions interpreting the
Commerce Clause.

People of The Philippines vs. Dioscoro Pinuila�

No. L-11374. May 30, 1958

Facts:
The defendant A. Bignay, along with co-accused D.Pinuila and Conrado Diaz, were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, with the murder of the
sleeping Buenaventura Dideroy in the early morning of October 20,1948 aboard Barge
No. 560 of the Visayan Stevedoring Company, which was at that time anchored
offshore from the mouth of the Victorias River in the municipality of Victorias in
the province of Negros Oriental. The mastermind of the crime was D.Pinuila, who had
a grudge against the victim, and it was he who paid the other two an amount of two
pesos each for their help in killing B.Dideroy. They were witnessed by Bonifacio
del Cano, a
shipmate of the victim, who awoke and managed to survive the attack; he positively
identified them later at the trial. A motion for dismissal was filed by the defense
on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the Court had not yet been established as
the scene of the crime was on a boat floating offshore and not actually on the
grounds of the municipality of Victorias. The motion was sustained by the Court and
the case dismissed, but this was appealed by the Government. Despite the objections
of the defense who invoked the principle of double-jeopardy, the Court of Appeals
decided on March 28,1952 that the jurisdiction of the trial court had indeed been
proven, therefore the appeal of the Government did not involve double-jeopardy and
remanded the case for further proceedings. In the
interim however, the accused were released due to a court order by a petition for
habeas corpus, and only A.Bignay was able to be reapprehended for a resumption of
criminal proceedings. During the retrial, the defense no longer raised the issue of
double jeopardy, and concentrated on the issue of the validity of evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. The defendant was found guilty of having committed murder, but
after taking into consideration the time he had already spent incarcerated before
his release and after his rearrest, a total of 7 years, as well as his voluntary
surrender and other factors, the court became inclined to be lenient to the
defendant. By applying the law on indeterminate sentence, the court then found him
entitled to the minimum degree of the penalty for the crime reclusion temporal,
thus sentencing him to a term of not less than 12 years of prsion major and not
more than 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal. However, while the
case was discussed and before it was voted upon, Chief Justice Paras raised the
question of double-jeopardy and claimed that the defendant should now be acquitted,
having been placed in jeopardy already once.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is indeed in double-jeopardy, and should therefore be
acquitted.

Held:�
No. In the opinion of the Court, with 9 justices concurring and 2 dissenting, the
defendant has already been proven guilty indeed beyond reasonable doubt, and the
question of double-jeopardy had already been answered when the Court revoked the
original order for dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings, in the process ruling that appeal did not violate prohibition against
double-jeopardy. Since the ruling had already long been decided, it should have
already become "the law of the case", meaning that it could not be modified or
changed anymore, especially since the defense failed to raise the question of
double-jeopardy in the retrial, and this failure may be regarded as a waiver of
that particular defense. Furthermore, while the "law of the case" rule is subject
to judicial discretion, this discretion is supposed to be used wisely with the
objective of helping justice by punishing the guilty, not thwarting it by letting
the guilty escape unpunished.

Solid Manila Corporation vs. Bio Hong Trading Co.

G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991

Facts:
Solid Manila Corp. owned a parcel of land in the vicinity of another parcel owned
by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.
The private respondent (i.e., Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.) acquired the land from a
prior owner who, in the deed of sale, indicated an easement of way (covering
approximately 914 sq. m. of private respondent�s lot) for the construction of a
private alley
In consideration for the easement, the prior owner decreased the selling price by
Php 287,200
The construction of the private alley was annotated in the private respondent�s
title. The pertinent provisions were:
�alley shall not be closed�
�alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be
placed thereon�
�shall allow the public to use the same�
Sometime in 1983, private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use of the alley
While the appeal of the private respondent at the Court of Appeals (CA) was in
progress for the original case, the private respondent filed for a petition at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to cancel the annotation. The court granted such
petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the CA erroneously reversed the trial court�s summary judgement?
Whether or not the CA erroneously held that merger had extinguished the easement?

Held:
The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of the petitioner on both counts. The
decision of the CA was set aside; the RTC�s decision was however reinstated.
Additionally, the private respondent and its counsel were asked to show cause why
they should not be punished for contempt of court. The counsel was also facing
administrative charges for forum shopping.

Rationale:
The Supreme Court found merit on the petition with regard to the summary judgment
rendered by the RTC. The SC invalidated the private respondent�s defense of merger
because of the defense�s impossibility. Also, the SC ruled that the sale
undoubtedly preserved the existing easement which affirmed the RTC�s decision to
render a summary judgment. Further, the decision of the CA on the case referred to
at the last bullet point of the case facts concerning the nullification of the
easement (i.e., the annotation) became the LAW OF THE CASE. By the CA�s decision,
the rights of the parties regarding the easement were established. This was used
by the SC to render a favorable holding to the petitioner.
The SC ruled that there was no merger since there was no full ownership of both
lands. Besides, the SC pointed out that the servitude was a personal one.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.
INC.
51 SCRA 189. NO. L-31195, JUNE 5, 1973

FACTS
Petitioner/s is a legitimate labor union composed of employees of the respondent.
Petitioners (Tolentino, Padgrigano, Roxas, de Leon, Paciente, Vacuna, Pagcu, Munsod
are officers of PBMEO
That on March 1, 1969, the union decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacanang on March 4 to protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Those
participating in the demonstration are workers in the 1st shift, regular 2nd and
3rd shifts.
The unions informed the Company of their planned demonstration
On March 2, the Company learned of the demonstration and on March 3 at 11 am, it
called for a meeting where the union confirmed the demonstration.
The Company warned the union that the workers of the 1st shift, without leave of
absence approved by the company who fail to report on March 4 shall be dismissed
because it is a violation of the NO LOCKOUT, NO STRIKE in the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Another meeting was convoked at 5 pm reiterating the same and appealing to the
PBMEO but the union countered that it was too late to change their plans.
March 4, at 950 am, PBMEO adviser Wilfred Ariston sent a cablegram to the company
containing �REITERATING REQUEST EXCSUE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMO MARCH 4,
1969�
Company filed charges against petitioner in the 1st shit with violation of the CBA
Under the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining
in bad faith and the officers of PBMEO, as a consequence, were considered to have
lost their status as employees in PBMCI
On Sept 19, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said order dated Sep
15 on the grounds that it is contrary to law and evidence as well asked for 10 days
within which to file their arguments
Their motion was 2 days late according to the rules of CIR and accordingly
DISMISSED.

ISSUES
W/N the of the motion for reconsideration filed by PBMEO which was DISMISSED be
reversed and the officers of the PBMEO who were removed from employment be
reinstated.

HELD
Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (being 2
days late) was rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have dominance
over procedural rules.) And, the company was directed to reinstate the eight
officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the one day�s pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their
separation from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed
too harsh a punishment for their actions)

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.

FACTS:
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court. Theodore O. Te for
petitioner, Adviento, Mallonga, Adviento Law Offices for private complainant
Rodessa �Baby� R. Echegaray.
The decision in this case which was death penalty through lethal injection has been
declared final and executory by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC Br. 104, Quezon
City.
The Secretary of Justice compelled the Judge Ponferrada to give him a certified
true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated Nov. 17, 1998 bearing the date of
execution of convice Leo Echegaray for there was no exact date published.
The date of execution was set at 3:00 p.m. of January 4, 1999.
A Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order was filed by
petitioner on December 28, 1998 due to supervening events about the review and
repeal of R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) and R.A. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law).
The Supreme Court held a special session on January 4, 1999 to deliberate on
petitioner�s Very Urgent Motion.
The Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and suspended the execution
until June 15, 1999.
The Solicitor General filed a Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration stating that the Congress would reject any move to review R.A. No.
7659.
The Supreme Court granted the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifted the Temporary Restraining
Order issued January 4, 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on finality of judgment has deprived the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.

HELD:
No. The finality of judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers
over the case. According to the well established jurisprudence of Retired Justice
Camilo Quiason on this issue: �the finality of a judgment does not mean that the
court has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of a judgment, what
the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final the court retains jurisdiction to execute and enforce
it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement
of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final.�

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

ESTRADA vs. Ombudsman

G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was
elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998. On October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. October 5, 2000,
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, accused the
petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson
from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner
strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. This led to the
resignation of economic advisers, department heads, etc. on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment. This caused political
convulsions in both houses of Congress. On November 20, the Senate formally opened
the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started. Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank, testified
that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
"Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with
their bank on February 4, 2000. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as
petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing
charges of insider trading. January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name
"Jose Velarde." By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and
speeches were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven senators. On January
19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. January 20, at 12:20
a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started at Malaca�ang Mabini Hall. Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in
stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning
until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, Chief
Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malaca�ang
Palace. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On February 7, the
Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio and has been terminated. After his fall, the petitioner's legal problems
appeared in clusters. The ombudsman, to investigate the charges, created a special
panel. The petitioner filed for a petition with a prayer of preliminary injunction.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
2. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Held:
1. No. The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
2. No. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character.
They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. These crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, are not covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president.
The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

Tecson, et al vs. Comelec

GR 161434, March 3, 2004

FACTS:
On December 31, 2003, Ronald Allan Kelley, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party at the Commission on
Elections. On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify the said candidate as he had misrepresented himself in his
COC for he was not a natural born Filipino. He was able to produce several public
documents that supported his petition to the COMELEC. On January 23, 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petitioner soon after filed
for reconsideration but it was denied on February 6, 2004. Four days after,
February 10, 2004, the petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
W/n Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen or not.

HELD:
YES. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino as it was proven that his father was also a
Filipino citizen. This statement in turn was proven as documents were able to show
that Lorenzo Pou, FPJ�s grandfather, was a Filipino. The death certificate of Puo
presented by the respondent shows that Pou died at the age of 84 in 1954 in
Pangasinan. By taking into account Pou�s age at the year of his death, he would
have been born in 1870. Furthermore, the petitioner was not able to show that Pou
was not in the Philippines during this period of time. It would then have to be
assumed that Pou was in the Philippine Islands all this time. This would make Pou a
Filipino citizen by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which declared that
Filipino citizens are those who resided in the Philippine Islands. Pou�s
citizenship would then extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ. By the time
FPJ was born, the 1935 Constitution had taken into effect and it had declared that
children, regardless of whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, are considered
to be Filipino citizens if their fathers are Filipino citizens themselves. This
fact also erases any doubts that were raised by the petitioner that FPJ was also
illegitimate which would have prevented him from taking on the citizenship of his
father.

CRUZAN vs DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et. al.

497 US 261, 111 L Ed 2d 224, 110 S Ct 284 [No. 88-1503]

FACTS
Petitioners are the parents of Nancy Beth Cruzan who filed a certiorari with the
U.S. Supreme Court.
A car accident left Nancy Cruzan in a persistent vegetative state. After it became
apparent that Nancy Cruzan had practically no chance of regaining her mental
faculties, her parents asked the hospital employees to terminate the artificial
nutrition and hydration procedures keeping her alive. The employees refused to
honor the request without court approval.
Her parents then sought judicial authorization of their request. A guardian ad
litem was appointed for their daughter. Following the hearing, the Missouri trial
court, directed the employees of the hospital to carry out the parent�s request.
Because based on the evidence, Nancy Cruzan will never recover because of the
gravity of the injuries she sustained.
However, both the state and the guardian ad litem appealed the decision. The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the decision, expressing that:
although the woman was in a �persistent vegetative state,� she was neither dead
within the meaning of Missouri statutory definition of death nor terminally ill;
the woman�s right to refuse treatment � whether such right proceeded from a
constitutional right of privacy or common-law right to refuse treatment�did not
outweigh Missouri�s strong policy favoring the preservation of life;
the woman�s conversation with her housemate was unreliable for the purpose of
determining her intent, and thus insufficient to support the parents� claim to
exercise substituted judgment on the woman�s behalf;
no person could assume the choice of terminating medical treatment for an
incompetent person in the absence of either formalities required under the living
will statute or �clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence,� which was
absent in the case at hand.

ISSUE
Whether or not, the Due Process Clause allows Missouri to require an incompetent
patient in an irreversible persistent vegetative state to remain on life support.

HELD
YES. Missouri requirement that incompetent�s wishes as to withdrawal of life
sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence held not violative
of the due process.
The due process clause of the Federal Constitution Fourteenth Amendment did not
forbid a state from requiring that evidence of an incompetent individual�s wishes
as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, and thus a state could apply such standard in proceedings where a
guardian sought discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in
persistent vegetative state.
The Missouri Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in deciding that the
woman�s desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn was not proved at trial
pursuant to the standard of clear and convincing evidence enunciated by the court
in its decision.
Since the due process clause did not require a state to repose the right to judge
whether an incompetent patient wishes to have life-sustaining medical treatment
withdrawn with anyone but the patient herself, a state was not required to repose a
right of substituted judgment as to such decision with close family members of the
patient, and it could choose to defer to only the patient�s wishes.

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON vs. PAULA COLE JONES

FACTS:
William Jefferson Clinton, was elected president in 1992 and re-elected in 1996.�
His term expires Jan. 20, 2001.� In 1991 he was governor of State of Arkansas.�
Paula Corbin Jones lived in Arkansas in 1991 and was employee of the Arkansas
Industrial Development Commission.� On May 6, 1994, respondent filed a complaint in
the US DC for the District of Arkansas by naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a
former State Police officer, as defendants.� The complaint alleges two federal
claims and two state claims.
The allegations were that- on May 8, 1991 during an official conference held at the
Excelsior Hotel in Arkansas, the petitioner alleges that Ferguson persuaded her to
leave her desk and to visit the petitioner in a business suite at the hotel where
petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances that respondent vehemently rejected.�
Respondent further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in
a hostile and rude manner and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those
advances.� Finally, respondent alleges that after petitioner was elected president,
Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reported that implied she had
accepted petitioner's alleged overtures and that various persons authorized to
speak for the president publicly branded her a liar by denying that incident had
occurred.
In response to complaint, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
presidential immunity until he is no longer president at which time the respondent
may refile the instant suit.� DC Judge denied the motion on immunity grounds but
ordered any trial stayed until the ends of petitioner's presidency.� Both parties
appealed.� A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the
motion to dismiss but reversed the order of postponing the trial.�
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner that he has immunity from suit grounded
purely in the identity of his office should be granted or not.

HELD:
Respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims.�
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.� An official's
absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions
of his office and not beyond the scope of any action taken in an official
capacity.� "The sphere of protected action must be related closely to the
immunity's justifying purposes."

FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND
380 U.S. 51. March 1, 1965.

FACTS:
Freedman exhibited the film �Revenge at Daybreak� at his Baltimore theater without
submitting the film to the Maryland Board of censors.
Freedman was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it first
to the Maryland State Board of Censors for their approval.
He argued that censorship impaired freedom of expression.
The conviction was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court reverses.

ISSUE: whether censorship of a film is a violation of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments (Freedom of expression)
HELD:
1. Submitting a film for review by the censors is not necessarily
unconstitutional.
2. A licensing statute can be challenged if it endangers freedom of expression.

NEAR v. STATE OF MINNESOTA

No. 91. (283 U.S. 697) June 1, 1931

FACTS:
In 1927, defendant J.M. Near, publisher of a periodical known as �The Saturday
Press� was tried by Floyd B. Olson, County Attorney of Hennepin County, in behalf
of the State of Minnesota,
Near was charged with violation of a state statute. Chapter 285 of the Session Laws
of Minnesota for the year 1925 which provides for the abatement, as a public
nuisance, of a �malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical.�
Near invoked the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the US.
Complainant alleged that The Saturday Press, on September 24, 1927 and on 8
subsequent dates until November 19, 1927, published articles �which were malicious,
scandalous and defamatory� concerning certain public officials the Minneapolis
Tribune, the Jewish race and members of the grand jury impaneled in November, 1927.
The district court found the defendant guilty. Judgment was entered that The
Saturday Press as a public nuisance and enjoined the defendants �from producing,
editing, publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving
away any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory
newspaper as defined by law and also from further conducting said nuisance under
the name and title of said The Saturday Press or any other name or title.�
Near appealed from this judgment to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Court affirmed
the judgment.
Near then appealed to the US Supreme Court.

ISSUE: whether a statute permitting suppression by injunction of business of

publishing malicious, scandalous
or defamatory newspaper or periodical, is an infringement of the liberty of the
press guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment which protects press from previous
restraint on publication.

HELD: a statute permitting suppression by injunction of business of publishing

malicious, scandalous or
defamatory newspaper or periodical, is an infringement of the liberty of the press
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the public officers named in the
case and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may be deemed
impeccable, cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an
unconstitutional restraint on publication. Judgment reversed

People of the Philippines vs. Cayat

[No. 45987 May 05, 1939]�

FACTS: �
Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was prosecuted for violating
sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639. Cayat, a member of the non-Christian tribes had
willfully, unlawfully, and illegally received, acquired, and have in his possession
and his control, a bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-
caled native wines and liquors which the members of that tribes have accustomed
themselves t make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court have found
him guilty of the crime and charged him to pay a fine of fifty pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of solvency.�
Section 2 of Act No. 1639 states that it is unlawful for any native of the
Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, or
have in possesion or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or any intoxicating
liquors of any kind other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves prior to the passage of the
Act and it is the duty of any police officer to seize and destroy any such liquors
found unlawfully possessed by the members of a non-Christian tribe�
Section 3 of Act No. 1639 states that any violation of the provisions of sections 1
and 2 of this Act shall be punishable by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months in the discretion of the
court�
The Act was created because the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-
Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering
the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization.�
The appellant challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the following
grounds: a.) that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
b.) that it is violative of the due process clause of the constitution; and c.)
that it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state�

ISSUE:�
Whether or not Act 1639 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: a.) that it
is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; b.) that it is
violative of the due process clause of the constitution; and c.) that it is an
improper exercise of the police power of the state�

HELD:�
NO. Act number 1639 is not unconstitutional. �
1. Act 1639 is not discriminatory and it does not deny the equal protection of the
laws. The counsel for the appellant mentioned that the Act causes discrimination
among non-Christian tribes. Act 1639 was created to secure peace and harmony and
not meant to mar the civilization and culture of these tribes. The guarantee of
equal protection before the law is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification such as Act No. 1639. Under the constitution, for an Act
to be reasonable, it must rest through substantial distinctions, must be germane to
the purposes of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act 1639 rests on substantial distinctions because the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian
tribes.
Act 1639 is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to ensure peace and
order in and among non-Christian tribes because in the past, as disclosed by the
lower courts, the free use of highly intoxicating liquor by the non-Christian
tribes often resulted to lawlessness and crimes thereby hampering the Government�s
effort to raise their standard of life and civilization
Act 1639 is not limited to existing conditions only. The Act is intended to apply
for all times as long as those conditions exists. The legislature understood that
civilization is a slow process and with it must go measures of security and
protection
Act 1639 apply equally to all members of the same class.
2. Act 1639 does not violate the due process clause of the constitution. The
appellant contends that the provision of law empowering any police officer to seize
and destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possesion of a member of
a non-Christian tribe is a violation of the due process of law provided by the
Constitution. But Act No. 1639 is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, notices
and hearings are not necessary to constitute the due process of law. The due
process of law means simply: that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with
the general powers of the legislative department of the government; that it should
be reasonable in its operations; that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and that it shall be applicable to all citizens of
the state or to all of a class. Thus, for example, a person�s property ay be seized
by the government in payment for taxes w/o judicial hearing.�
3. Act No. 1639 is not an improper exercise of the police power of the state. Any
measure intended to promote health, peace, prosperity, harmony, and wealth is a
legitimate exercise of the police power. Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace
and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral
and intellectual growth and eventually hasten their unification and equalization
with the rest of their Christian brothers. �
Act No. 1639 does not seek to mark non-Christian tribes as inferior. The Government
has endeavored to raise their culture and civilization to secure them the benefits
of their progress with the ultimate end of placing them with their other members of
society on the basis of true equality.�

PEOPLE v. MARTI
G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 AM, appellant Andre Marti and common-
law wife Shirley Reyes went to the booth of the �Manila Packaging and Export
Services� in Pistang Pilipino Complex, Manila, to send 4 gift-wrapped packages to
his friend Walter Fierz of Switzerland.
The proprietress, Anita Reyes, asked for the packages to be examined and inspected,
appellant refused.
The supposed content of the packages were books, cigars and gloves.
The proprietor, Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure before final
delivery to Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, opened the boxes for final
inspection. A peculiar odor emanated from the glove box, his curiosity aroused,
discovered dried leaves contained in the packages for the gloves.
Mr. Reyes wrote a letter and sent samples of the dried leaves to the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination at
about 1:30 PM of the same day. After being interviewed by the Chief of the
Narcotics Section, Mr. Reyes and 3 NBI agents and a photographer proceeded to Mr.
Reyes� office to inspect the remaining 3 other packages.
The packages that supposed to contain cigars and books were opened by Mr. Reyes and
was also discovered to contain dried leaves, which were dried marijuana leaves.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the boxes after signing
�Receipt�, acknowledging custody of the packages.
On August 27, 1987, the appellant was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the dried marijuana leaves, which were examined by the
Forensic Chemistry section of the NBI.
The appellant denied that the packages were his, instead he claimed that after a 30
minute conversation with a German national named Michael, the latter requested him
to ship the packages and gave him P2,000 for the cost of shipment because the
German was about to leave the country the following day.
The lower court convicted the appellant of violating RA 6425, or the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
The appellant appealed the decision.

Issues:
Whether the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and
seized objects contained in the parcels.
Whether the lower court erred in convicting appellant despite the undisputed fact
that his rights under the constitution while under custodial proceedings were not
observed.
Whether the lower court erred in not giving credence to the explanation of the
appellant on how the four parcels came into his possession.

HELD:
No.
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government. The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus it can only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If a search is made upon
the request of the law enforcers, a warrant must be generally be first secured if
it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right of
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
Records show that there is nothing to indicate, an �undisputed fact, that appellant
was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without
assistance of counsel.
The appellant�s disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human
experience. It can easily be fabricated. Evidence to be believed, must no only
come from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342[1968]..)

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 699 [GRN. � 107383, February 20, 1996]�

FACTS:�Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo

Martin. That petitioner accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982,
petitioner went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medicine,
without the consent of the latter. That on the same date mentioned, petitioner
opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and papers
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours.
The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a case for
legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below for
recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, decided in favor of private
respondent, declaring him �the capital/exclusive owner of properties described��
and ordering petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal
and moral damages and attorney�s fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore,
petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from �using or
submitting/admitting as evidence� the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial
Court. Hence, this petition.�

ISSUE:�W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.�

HELD:�NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring �the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable�(Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987
Consti) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband�s infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in
the constitution is if there is a �lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as provide by law.�(Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987
Consti) Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
�for any purpose in any proceeding.� (Sec.3,Par.2,Art.III,1987 Consti)
A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,Rule130,Rules
of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24,Rule130,Rules of Court)
PETITION DENIED.

Goesaert v. Cleary
335 US 404�

Facts: The case is an appeal from the US District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, actions by Valentine Goesaert, Margaret Goesaert, Gertrude Nadroski and
Caroline McMahon against Owen J. Cleary and others to restrain the enforcement of
Pub.Acts Mich.1945, No. 133, 19a. from a judgment denying an injunction of the
enforcement of the Michigan law. The particular public act is claimed to be in
violation of the equal protection clause that the state of Michigan is playing
favorites among women without rhyme and reason by making an exception in favor of
the wives and daughters of the owners of the liquor establishment instead of
denying to all women the opportunities for bartending.
The judgment was affirmed with Justice Rutledge, Justice Douglas and Justice Murphy
dissenting.

Issue:
Whether or not the enforcement of Public Acts of Michigan 1945, No. 133, 19a is in
violation of the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment*�
Pub.Acts Mich 1945, No. 133 19a: Michigan Statue requiring licensing of bartenders
in cities of 50,000 or more but providing that no female shall be licensed unless
she is the wife or daughter of the male owner of licensed liquor establishment
The equal protection clause precludes irrational discrimination as between persons
or groups of persons in the incidence of a law, but does not require situations
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same

Held:
No. Although Michigan cannot forbid females generally from being
barmaids/bartenders and at the same time make an exception in favor of the wives
and daughters of the owners of liquor establishments, the US Constitution does not
require situations �which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.� Michigan has not violated its duty to afford equal
protection of its laws��since bartending by women may, in allowable legislative
judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise
preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition
if it believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are operating to
eliminate or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for
prohibition.� The Michigan law therefore believes that ownership of a bar by a
barmaid�s husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid. �
Dissenting Judges: The statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal
protection for the statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners
of liquor establishments. While a male owner may employ his wife or daughter as
barmaids, a female bar owner may neither work as a barmaid herself nor employ her
daughter in that position, even if a man is present in the establishment to keep
order.

O�SULLIVAN v. BOERCKEL
No. 97-2048. June 30, 1999

FACTS:
In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit of Montgomery County,
Illinois, for the rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old woman.
Central evidence against him was his written confession.
Jury convicted him on all three charges. Sentenced to 20-60 years in prison on rape
charge and shorter terms on the other two.
Boerckel appealed to Appellate Court of Illinois. His claims were rejected. The
court affirmed his convictions and sentences.
Boerckel next filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal, and this Court
denied Boerckel�s subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari.
In �94, Boerckel filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC S
2554 in the US Dictrict Court for the Central District of Illinois. The amended
petition asked for relief on 6 grounds:
that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights
that his confession was not voluntary
that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction
that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal
that his right to discovery of exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland (1963)
was violated
Boerckel amended federal habeas petition raised three claims he had not included in
his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

ISSUE: whether a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in
a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

HELD: In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present
his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review when
that review is part of the State�s ordinary appellate review procedure.

EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES OF OREGON v SMITH

[No. 88-1213, April 17, 1990]

FACTS
Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental
purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Their applications for
unemployment compensation were denied by the State of Oregon under a state law
disqualifying employees discharged for work-related �misconduct�. On grounds of
violating the respondent�s First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of
Appeals reversed. State Supreme Court affirmed but vacated judgment and remanded
for a determination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by State�s
controlled substance law, which makes it felony to knowingly or intentionally
possess the drug. Pending that determination, the Court refused to decide whether
such use is protected in the Constitution. State Supreme Court held that
sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from the state law
prohibition, but concluded that prohibition was invalid under Free Exercise Clause

ISSUE
W/N FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE PERMITS STATE TO PROHIBIT SACRAMENTAL PEYOTE USE AND THUS
ALLOW DENIAL OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO PERSONS DISCHARGED FOR SUCH USE

HELD
Free exercise of religion clause permits a state to include religiously inspired
use of peyote within the reach of the state�s general criminal prohibition on the
use of that drug; where there is no contention that the state�s drug law represents
an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, or the raising of one�s children in those
beliefs
The free exercise of religion clause thus permitted Oregon to deny unemployment
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired
use
Generally applicable, religion-neutral criminal laws that have the effect of
burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified, under free
exercise of religion clause, by a compelling government interest.

Webb Vs. De Leon

95-404

Facts :
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction to
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by
respondents Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Crim. Case No. 95-404
Enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned
criminal case
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein.
On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb,Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano, Miguel Rodriguez,
Joey Filart, Hospicio Fernandez, Artemio Ventura, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong
with RAPE and HOMICIDE.
As a result, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zu�o to conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with rape and killing on June 30, 1991 Carmela N. Vizconde (19yrs),
Estrallita Nicolas-Vizconde(51yrs./mom) and Anne Marie Jennifer(7yrs./sister) in
their home at #80 W Vinzons, St.,B.F. Homes.
During the preliminary Investigation, the NBI presented the following
Sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness Maria Jessica M.
Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime.
Sworn statements of two of the former housemaids of the Webb Family in the persons
of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola
Sworn statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991, he was a
passenger of UA Flt No. 808 bound for new york and who expressed doubt on whether
petitioner Webb was his co passenger in the trip
Sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who
narrated the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime.
Sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids,
and statements of Normal White (security guard), and Manciano Gatmaitan (engr).
Autopsy reports showing that Carmela had 9 stab wounds, Estrellita 12, and Jennifer
19. The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
Petitioner Webb before submitting his counter-affidavit, filed with DOJ a Motion
for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the
following.
Certification issuede by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission
to and stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9,1991, to October
22,1992.
Lab Report SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, M.D.
Sworn statements of Gerardo C. Biong other than the S.S. dated Oct 7,1991
Photographs and fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde Residence taken during the
investigation
Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al
List of names of 135suspects investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
Sept. 2,1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent.
Records of Arrest, Interview, and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro other
than the May 22,1995 conducted by the NBI and other police agencies
Transmittal letter to the NBI, including the reports of investigation conducted by
Supt. Rodolfo C. Sision, Regional D.D., NCRC
Names of NBI officials/agents composing the task force Jecares, including their
respective positions and duties.
Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
The DOJ granted the motion and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. NBI
alleged that it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 S.S. of Alfaro. This
compelled Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the RTC of Makati, Br,. 63 for the
purpose of obtaining the original said sworn statement. Later on, Atty. Arturo L.
Mercader Jr produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena decus
tecum. The Original was submitted by petitioner Webb to DOJ with other evidence.
Webb failed to receive the copy of BU Report despite his request for its
production.
Petitioner Webb claims that he didn�t commit the crime since he left for the
U.S.March 1,1991, and returned Oct. 27, 1992. This alibi was reinforced by Honesto
Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo
Ventura and Pamela Francisco.
Bought a bought a bicycle and a 1986 toyota during the period, and was issued by
the state of California Driver�s License No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.
Submitted a letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Atache of the
US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at
San Francisco, Cali, on March 9,1991, as a passenger of UA flight 808.
Hospicio Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel
Rodriguez, and Gerardo Biong submitted S.S. and responses and a motion to dismiss
denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes.
Only Joey Filart and Artemio Ventura failed to file their counter affidavits though
they were served with subpoena in their last known address.
Gatchalian, in his S.S.alleged that from 11p.m. of June 29, 1991 until 3a.m. of the
following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at
New Alabang Village, watching video tapes. Also claims petitioner Lejano was with
him.
On Aug. 8, 1995, the DOJ panel issued a resolution finding Probable Cause to hold
respondents for Trial and recommended that an Information for rape with homicide be
filed against petitioners and their co-respondents. This was filed in the RTC of
Paranaque under CC No. 95-404 and raffled to branch 258 presided by Judge Zosimo V.
Escano. It was however Judge Raul de Leon, pairing Judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
Aug 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid an
suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his
appointment on the bench.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino, who
issued new warrants of arrest against petitioners and their co-accused.
Aug 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police at Camp
Ricardo Papa Sr., Bicutan. The rest gave themselves up after filing their own
petitions before the court.

ISSUE : If petition filed by appellants are of merit

Petitioners state the
Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest.
DOJ panel also gravely abused in holding that there is probable cause to charge
them with rape and homicide.
DOJ panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation
DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an Accused.

HELD:
These petitions were found to be bereft of merit.
After going through the S.S., the DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence
against the exculpatory evidence stating basically that..
The documents by respondent Webb to support his alibi can�t outweigh the evidence
submitted by complainant. Positive identification will outweigh any alibi. Just
because he alleged that he was issued several documents in the US, this does not
mean that he couldn�t have been in the country. Just because a receipt was issued
containing the respondents name does not guarantee that it was the actual buyer.
Gatchalian�s defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano.
The procedure entailing the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest was completed. (sec
3,4,5 of rule 126)
Judges Tolentino and Lejano did not gravely abuse since the issuance of the
warrant. The issuance of the warrant does not solely depend on their complete and
personal determination of probable cause, but could be satisfied with documents
submitted by the fiscal on the basis of probable cause.
a. Clear insufficiency of evidence on record thus making it necessary for
further personal examination
b. There is an eye witness account given by Alfaro
c. The alibi defense of Webb was disputed by the S.S. of their former maids.
The respondents were not deprived of their rights, in fact they were proactive in
the preliminary investigations. There was a trial period of 27 days,
Alfaro qualified under the qualifications of State Witness. (RA 6982 sec 10)
d. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge
is requested
e. There is no other direct evidence available except the testimony of the said
accused
f. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points.
g. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty
h. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
The failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does
not negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect
his constitutional right to life
�wHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. ESTRADA

[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001.]

FACTS
Petitioners are people who filed the request to the Sandiganbayan for this Court to
allow the live television and radio coverage of the trial in the mentioned Court of
the plunder cases against the former President Joseph E. Estrada. Their request is
based on the purpose of assuring the public of full transparency in the proceedings
of an unprecedented case in our history. It is obvious, for them, that the
foregoing cases involve a matter of public concern and interest. Allowing live
radio and television coverage satisfies the constitutional right of every citizen
to be informed on matters of public concern. The accused, Mr. Estrada, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines opposed such request. They contend that live
radio and television coverage is contrary to what jurisprudence tells us, wherein
the fundamental rights of the accused is to be preferred over the right to public
information. They argue that such coverage will not only affect the life and
liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice
system. They say that live radio and television coverage will not subserve the ends
of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding
lawyers.

ISSUE
W/N THE PETITION FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO ALLOW LIVE TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERAGE
OF THE TRIAL IN THE SAID COURT OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH
E. ESTRADA.

HELD
THE PETITION IS DENIED. The Sandiganbayan should not allow live television and
radio coverage of the trial in the mentioned Court of the plunder cases against the
former President Joseph E. Estrada.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an
object of public�s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by
any outside force or influence.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. This is why the coverage is not totally restricted but
is limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their
counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. Nevertheless,
within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process.
An accused has a right to public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else. Moreover, a public trial is not synonymous to a publicized trial;
it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
available seats, conduct with decorum and observe the trial process.
Although it is difficult to quantify, it is a fact, nonetheless, that live
television and radio coverage indeed has an influence the testimony of witnesses
and the decision of judges. It can also serve as a form of mental harassment to the
defendant. These effects cannot be evaluated but it is farcical to build around
them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of
public opinion. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof but
it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial
such as we know it now.

People vs. Rodrigueza

�
Facts: NARCOM agent Ciriaco Taduran got a tip from an informer�of an on-
going��illegal�traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.
��������� Taduran posed as a buyer and paid Don Rodrigueza (accused/appelant) P200
in marked money for 100 gms. of marijuana in a buy-bust operation but let the
accused go.
��������� Subsequently,NARCOM agents raided the house of the accused without a
search warrant and arrested his two companions without a warrant of arrest.
��������� When accused showed up at the headquarters, he was arrested and told to
sign� a waiver of counsel without the presence of counsel.
��������� RTC convicted accused under the Dangerous Drug Act.
��������� Accused appealed.
�
Issue: Did the RTC err and was the Arrest and Seizure violative of the
constitutional rights of the accused?
�
Decision: Judgement Reversed.
�
Reasons: 1. Prosecution erred in using evidence illegally obtained. There was no
search and arrest warrant.
�������������� 2. Sworn statement of the accused waiving counsel was without the
presence of counsel, a violation of Sec. 12(1),Art.II ofthe Phil. Constitution.
Agent Taduran, by letting Accused go after the buy-bust, violated the buy-bust
principle.

Marcos v. Manglapus

Daza v. Singson

Bondoc vs. Pineda

September 26, 1991, 201 SCRA 792

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Facts: In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M.
Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of
the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the fourth district of the province of Pampanga.
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc
filed a protest (HRET no. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda by margin of twenty-three (23) votes. The reexamination and reappreciation
of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc�s lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles
to proclaim the winner of the case.
Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991 to his �Chief� Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case
but also but also that he voted for Bondoc �consistent with justice and self-
respect�, and to honor �gentlemen�s agreement� among the members of the HRET that
they would abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot.
Congressman Cojuangco notified the chairman of the tribunal to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel
the promulgation of the tribunal�s decision in Bondoc v. Pineda case.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representative
in House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal at the request of the dominant
political party.

Ruling: No. If the House Electoral Tribunal would serve the interest of the party
in power, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal as embodied in the
Constitution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his votes in favor of the Nacionalista
Party�s candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative
of the House Electoral Tribunal to the Sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the
House Electoral Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which tree justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would
be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at
the treshold of the tribunal.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence-even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, �disloyalty to
party� and breach of the party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from HRET for havinf
cast a �conscience vote� in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion an
injustice, and a violation of the constitution. It�s resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is therefore, null and void.

Alejandrino vs. Quezon

Osmena vs. Pendatun

Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary

February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Executive Secretary.

Facts: Petitioner challenged the Executive Order no. 284, which in effect, allows
members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretary to hold
other government offices or positions in addition to their primary position, albeit
subject to the limitations imposed, runs counter to Sec. 13 Art. VII of the
Constitution.
Respondent on the hand, argued that the same Constitutional provision provided a
proviso stating that �unless otherwise provided in this constitution �. They
further contended that his proviso refers to if allowed by law or by the pressing
functions of his position.

Issue: Does the of E.O 284 violates the Constitutional limitation prohibiting
appointive officials from holding two offices?

Ruling: Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
impose stricter prohibition on President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
must be read with equal severity. The language of Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibitory
so that it must be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal negation
of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.

The 1987 constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,

members of the cabinet, their deputies or assistant from holding during their
tenure multiple offices or employment in the government except in those cases
specified in the constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to post
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions at their office.

Sec. 13, Art VII in relation to Sec. 7 par.2 Art. IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
of positions that the cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
in the government and government corporations. E.O. No. 284 allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Swc.13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibiting them from doing so unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 405 (1968)

Borjal v. CA 301 SCRA 1 (1999)

Hizon-Pamintuan v. People 234 SCRA 63 (1994)

Garcia v. Mojica 314 SCRA 207 (1999)

Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (1986)

Municipality of Malabang v. Benito 27 SCRA 533(1969)

Minucher v. CA 397 SCRA 244(1992)

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority 384 SCRA 152 (2002)

Uy v. Commission on Audit 328 SCRA 607 (2000)

UP Board of Regents v. Rasul 200 SCRA 685 (2001)

Azarcon v. Bunaga 399 SCRA 365 (2003)

People v. Garcia 313 SCRA 279 (1999)

Churchhill v. Rafferty 32 Phil 580 (1915)

Ass. Small v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 175 SCRA 343 (1989)

People v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443 (1958)

Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 (1963)

Rodriguez v. Tan 91 PHIL 724 (1952)

Manalo v. Sistoza 312 SCRA 239 (1999)

In re: Laureta 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU

MARCH 01, 1995, 219 SCRA 256

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition

Facts: All petitioners are Jehovah�s witnesses were expelled from their classes by
the school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A.1265 and D.O.#8 of the DECS.
Jehovah�s witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem for they believe that those are �Acts of worship� or �religious
devotion� which they �cannot conscientiously give to anyone except God? They
consider the flag as an image or idol representing the state. The action of the
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transience�s
constitution protects against official control.

Issue: Whether or not the children of Jehovah�s witnesses may be expelled from
school for disobedience of R.A.1265 and D.O.#8 series of 1955.

Ruling

Religious freedom is a fundamental right, which is entitled to the highest

priority, and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his creator.

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehova�hs witnesses

with regard to the observarnce at the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs, however �bizarre� those beliefs may join to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give
them aright to disrupt such patriotic exercises.

Wherefore, the position for certiorari and prohibition is granted.

Generoso R. Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals and Nerito L Santos

June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 637
J. Gri�o � Aquino

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts

Generoso R. Sevilla was acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City. In the

advent of the 1986 revolution the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan appointed Nerito L.
Santos as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City and a memorandum was given to Sevilla
informing him of the same, said memorandum was received by another person on his
behalf. A few months later Generoso R. Sevilla was designated as acting District
Engineer of Pasay City, Then on Feb. 3, 1987 he was removed from the office by the
New Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
Generoso R. Sevilla returned to Cabanatuan and filed a quo warranto petition
against Nerito L. Santos.
Generoso R. Sevilla contends that being a Presidential appointee he could not be
removed from office by the OIC Mayor and supposing that the OIC Mayor indeed have
authority his separation was illegal because there was no ground for said
separation and replacement.
Issue
Whether or not an acting appointment is merely temporary

Ruling

An acting appointment is merely temporary petitioner�s appointment has lapsed

upon appointment of Santos as permanent and not acting Civil Engineer of
Cabanatuan. Petitioner was an incumbent City Engineer of Palayan when he was
designated acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan. There is a difference between
designation and appointment. Appointment is a selection by the proper authority of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of an office; Designation, on the
other hand, connotes merely an imposition of additional duties upon a person
already in public service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election.
Appointment of City Engineer by Mayor confirmed by the Department of Public
Works and Highways is effective.Petitioner�s right to discharge his function as
acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan was extinguished when a permanent appointment to
the same office was made.

Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro C.
Cruz
May 7, 2001
GR No. 142840. 357 SCRA 545
J. Kapunan

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Facts

Teodoro C. Cruz, being born on 1960 in Tarlac to Filipino parents is

undoubtably a natural-born Filipino Citizen.

On 1985 Teodoro C. Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without consent of the republic of the Philippines took an oath of allegiance to
the United States as a consequence thereof he had lost his Filipino citizenship.

On 1990, in connection with his service in the United States Marine Corps, he
became a naturalized US citizen.

On 1994 he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under

RA 2630. He ran for election as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
1998 and won.

Subsequently Antonio Bengson III filed a case for quo warranto ad cautelam
claiming that Cruz was not qualified for the position since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Art. Vi, Sec 6 of the Constitution.

HRET dismissed the petition declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of
the 2nd District of Pangasinan.

Issue

Whether or not a natural born Filipino who became an American Citizen, can
still be considered a natural born citizen upon his reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship

Ruling
 The Court ruled that the act of repatriation under RA 2630 allows him to
recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
His original status as natural born Filipino was restored, needless to say he is
qualified for the position of Representative of the Lower House.

HRET was empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal�s decision can only be annulled

upon showing of grave abuse of discretion on HRET�s part. In the case at bar there
was no showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessive
jurisdiction thus the petition was dismissed.

Morohombsar vs. Alonto, Jr.

February 25, 1991
GR No. 937711. 194 SCRA 390
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the President of the Mindanao
State University.

Facts

On March 22, 1988, the petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of the

Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic affairs of MSU in a concurrent capacity
with her position then as VP for External Studies. On January 2, 1989, the Office
of the VP for the External Studies was merged with the OVCAA and as such the
functions for the former were to be exercised by the latter. The petitioner was
appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs on the same day. The Board of
Regents of the MSU approved her appointment as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic
Affairs. On March 14, 1990 respondent Ahmad E. Alonto, MSU President wrote the
petitioner informing her that he has decided to tap the petitioner�s talent for the
MSU system as VP for academic affairs which position is under administrative staff.
The petitioner did not accept the position. A certain Batara was later appointed
but refused the same. Now, the petitioner assails her removal as Vive-Chancellor
by the respondent President.

Issue

Whether or not her removal is valid.

Ruling

A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and

revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anytime
even without hearing or cause. A person who accepts an appointment in an acting
capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation and who acts
thereunder for a considerable time cannot be heard to say that the appointment was,
in reality permanent and theretofore there can be no removal except for cause.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora

July 10, 2001
GR No. 142801-802 360 SCRA 718
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

Facts

On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino, issued Executive No. 127
establishing the Economic Intelligence And Investigation Bureau as part of the
organization of the Ministry of Finance. On March 17, 1989, President Aquino
issued Memorandum Order No. 255 providing that the EIIB shall be the agency primary
responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters
and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On
January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No 191 entitled
deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau and later
issued executive Order No. 196 creating the President Anti Smuggling Task Force
�Aduana�. And on March 29, 2000 President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 233
providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be
separated from service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to
abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.

Issue

Whether or not there is a violation of their right to security of tenure.

Ruling

The general has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodge with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to
create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the
Constitution, statute or by authority by law. Thus, where the office was created
by the constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that
brought to existence. The exception, however, is that as afar as bureaus, agencies
r offices in the executive department are concerned, the President�s power to
control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.

AQUILINO T. LARIN, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

October 16, 1997
GRN 112745
TORRES, JR., J.

Nature of the case: Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioner's

removal from service as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Facts

A decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitioner

Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation of Section
268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A 3019 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209.

The fact of petitioner's conviction was reported to the President of the

Philippines by the then acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum.

It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found beyond reasonable
doubt to have committed acts constituting grave misconduct. Under the Civil Service
Laws and Rules which require only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is
punishable by dismissal.
Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of an
Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein
petitioner Aquilino T, Larin.

The committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charged

against him, and the petitioner complied on it.

Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. In the administrative charge and imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and
retirement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government
service.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition to
question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner was unlawfully removed from office?

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was given every chance to present his
side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The records clearly show
that on petitioner submitted his letter-response dated to the administrative charge
filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted various documents
attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his
defense, prior to this, he received a letter from the Investigation Committee
requiring him to explain his side concerning the charge. It cannot therefore be
argued that petitioner was denied of due process.

WENCESLAO P. TRINIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

December 15, 1999
GRN 134657
BUENA, J.

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seeking
to set aside the resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc.

Facts

Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio both ran
for the position of mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 18, 1998 private respondent Claudio was proclaimed by the Pasay City Board
of Canvassers as the elected mayor with 55,325 votes over petitioner Trinidad's
55,097 votes.

On May 23, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for correction of manifest errors and
annulment of proclamation. Alleged as grounds, among others, were the double
canvassing of five election returns and the inclusion of a bogus election return in
the canvass.
On June 8, 1998, petitioner filed a supplemental petition averring an error in the
Summary of Statement of Votes for District II of Pasay City (No. 094338). It was
alleged that in the said summary of statement of votes Trinidad gathered 1009 votes
per Statement of Vote (SOV) No. 094284. But in SOV No. 094284 it was reflected
therein that he obtained 1099 votes.

On June 9, 1998, an order was issued by the COMELEC requiring the parties to file
their simultaneous memoranda within five days after which the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution with or without memoranda.

The Pasay City Board of Canvassers filed its Answer on given date. Thereafter, or
on June 15, 1998, private respondent Claudio filed his answer/memorandum (with
counter-petition for correction).

In the counter-petition it was stated that some statements of votes contained

errors which, if corrected, would entitle Claudio to an additional forty (40) votes
but would result in petitioner's being deducted thirteen (13) votes.

Petitioner contested the filing of private respondent's answer/memorandum (with

counter-petition for correction) in his Manifestation and Comments dated July 18,
1998. In the said pleading, petitioner reiterated his plea for the addition of 90
votes to his total and manifested two (2) new errors, namely: (1) the election
returns from five precincts were not canvassed and (2) there were some
discrepancies in the election returns of nine precincts. These errors as well as
the uncanvassed returns, if corrected and accounted for in the total number of
votes, would allegedly give petitioner an edge of eighteen (18) votes over private
respondent: 55,229 votes to Claudio's 55,211 votes

The Commission dismisses the petition for annulment of proclamation of respondents

Jovito O. Claudio and Reynaldo Mateo and the Supplemental Petition for correction
of the Summary of the Statement of Votes. We AFFIRM the proclamation of respondents
Claudio and Mateo with the margin of votes indicated above.

Issue

Whether or not respondent commission on election committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the proclamation of
respondent Jovito Claudio as elected mayor of Pasay City.

Ruling

We take pains to emphasize that the same was filed only on July 18, 1998, thirty-
four (34) days after the case had been submitted for resolution on June 14,
1998.When a case is already deemed submitted for decision or resolution, the court
can only consider the evidence presented prior to this period. It can not and must
not take into account evidence presented thereafter without obtaining prior leave
of court. For as held in the case of Arroyo vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,

"(t)he rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter protestant

must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended
pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of protest or
counter protest."

A pre-proclamation controversy praying for the correction of manifest errors must

be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation while an
election protest must be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the said Manifestation and Comments,
whether it be considered a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest, was
filed beyond the reglementary period to do so.

CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP.

May 7, 2002.
G.R. No. 141707
DAVIDE, JR., C .J p:

Nature of the case: The pivotal issue raised in the petition in this case is
whether, for the purpose of computing an employee's retirement pay, prior service
rendered in a government agency can be tacked in and added to the creditable
service later acquired in a government-owned and controlled corporation without
original charter.

Facts

Petitioner Cayo F. Gamogamo was first employed with the Department of Health (DOH)
as Dental Aide. He was promoted to the position of Dentist 1. He remained employed
at the DOH for fourteen years until he resigned on 2 November 1977.

Petitioner was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation

(LUSTEVECO), a private domestic corporation. Subsequently, respondent PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation (hereafter Respondent) acquired and took over the
shipping business of LUSTEVECO, petitioner was among those who opted to be absorbed
by the Respondent. Thus, he continued to work as company dentist. Respondent
assumed without interruption petitioner's service credits with LUSTEVECO, but it
did not make reference to nor assumed petitioner's service credits with the DOH.
Then President Fidel V. Ramos issued a memorandum approving the privatization of
PNOC subsidiaries, including Respondent

Petitioner retired after serving the Respondent and LUSTEVECO for 17 years and 4
months upon reaching his 60th birthday. He received a retirement pay which is
equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and other benefits.

Petitioner filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
the full payment of his retirement benefits. Petitioner argued that his service
with the DOH should have been included in the computation of his years of service.
Hence, with an accumulated service of 32 years he should have been paid a two-month
pay for every year of service per the retirement plan.

Issue

Whether or not petitioner maintains that his government service with the DOH
should be recognized and tacked in to his length of service with Respondent because
LUSTEVECO, which was later bought by Respondent, and Respondent itself, were
government-owned and controlled corporations and were, therefore, under the Civil
Service Law.

Ruling

We cannot uphold petitioner's contention that his fourteen years of service

with the DOH should be considered because his last two employers were government-
owned and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law.

Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.

It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-
owned and controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence they are
not under the Civil Service Law.

In any case, petitioner's fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain
uncompensated because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the afore quoted
Section 12, as may be determined by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to
some benefits from the GSIS.
Adiong v. COMELEC 315 SCRA 712 (1992)

Macasiano v. Diokno 212 SCRA 464 (1992)

Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Notre 163 SCRA 182 (1988)

Bito-Onon v. Fernandez 350 SCRA 732 (2001)

Abbas v. COMELEC

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

Philip Morris case

Nicaragua v. U.S. case

Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3 SCRA 351 (1961)

Bayan v. Zamora 342 SCRA 449 (2000)

Antonio Bengzon III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro C.
Cruz
May 7, 2001
GR No. 142840. 357 SCRA 545
J. Kapunan

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Facts

Teodoro C. Cruz, being born on 1960 in Tarlac to Filipino parents is

undoubtably a natural-born Filipino Citizen.

On 1985 Teodoro C. Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without consent of the republic of the Philippines took an oath of allegiance to
the United States as a consequence thereof he had lost his Filipino citizenship.

On 1990, in connection with his service in the United States Marine Corps, he
became a naturalized US citizen.

On 1994 he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under

RA 2630. He ran for election as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
1998 and won.

Subsequently Antonio Bengson III filed a case for quo warranto ad cautelam
claiming that Cruz was not qualified for the position since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Art. Vi, Sec 6 of the Constitution.

HRET dismissed the petition declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of
the 2nd District of Pangasinan.

Issue

Whether or not a natural born Filipino who became an American Citizen, can
still be considered a natural born citizen upon his reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship
Ruling

The Court ruled that the act of repatriation under RA 2630 allows him to
recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
His original status as natural born Filipino was restored, needless to say he is
qualified for the position of Representative of the Lower House.

HRET was empowered by the Constitution to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal�s decision can only be annulled

upon showing of grave abuse of discretion on HRET�s part. In the case at bar there
was no showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessive
jurisdiction thus the petition was dismissed.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

April 18, 2001
G.R. No. 128055,
Vitug, J.

Nature of case: Petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

The herein petitioner was alleged in violating the Republic Act No.3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act upon willfully,
lawfully and criminally approve the application for the legalization of the stay of
disqualified aliens. Thus, the Sandiganbayan ordered for her preventive suspension.

Issue

Whether or not the herein respondent acted grave abuse of discretion in

issuing the said order.

Ruling

Section 13 of R.A 3019 does not state the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is allegedly to committed the acts with which
he has been charged -the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular
office under which he stands accused. Hence, R.A.3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore the Sandiganbayan did not err
in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Guingona Jr. vs. Gonzales

October 20,1992
G.R, No.106971,
Campos, Jr., J

Nature of the case: petition of prohibition

Facts

The herein petitioner, in behalf of his party (LAKAS – NUCD) filed a petition
for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit the said respondents from
sitting and assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments and
to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, as ex officio Chairman, of said Commission
from recognizing and allowing the respondents to sit as members of the said
Commission. Petitioner had allegedly that it was violative of the rule of
proportional representation, and the right of the minority political parties in the
Senate consistent with the Constitution in combining their fractional
representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein and
to decide who among the Senators in their ranks shall be additionally nominated and
elected.

Issue

Whether or not the said respondents are entitled as members of the said
Commission.

Ruling

The provision of Section 18 is a proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave and discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Court declares
the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of
the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being violation of the rule on
proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

Hence, petition is granted.

Cunanan vs. Tan

May 10, 1962
G.R. No. L-19721
Padilla, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for quo warranto.

Facts

The herein petitioner having been qualified and assumed the duties and
function as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration,
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Fortunately, on November 6, 1961,
the President extended to the said petitioner an ad interim appointment of his
position as Deputy Administrator. However, the Commission on appointment composed
of six Senators and seven members of the House of Representatives rejected the said
ad interim appointment. The herein respondent was designated by the President as
acting Deputy Administrator of said office without the consent of the petitioner.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioners ad interim appointment was valid by the

legitimate Commission of Appointment.

Ruling

The court holds that the rejection of the ad interim appointment of

petitioner by 13 alleged members of the Commission of Appointments and designation
of herein respondents in the same position as acting Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources when
said office was not vacant are null and void. Hence, the petitioner was entitled to
hold the said office and the respondent should vacate the same and turn it over to
petitioner.

Bondoc vs. Pineda

September 26, 1991
201 SCRA 792
Grino- Aquino, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Facts

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda
of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative
for the fourth district of the province of Pampanga.

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time,
Bondoc filed a protest (HRET no. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda by margin of twenty-three (23) votes. The reexamination and
reappreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc�s lead over Pineda to
107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim the winner of the case.

Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991 to his �Chief� Congressman

Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the
Bondoc case but also but also that he voted for Bondoc �consistent with justice and
self-respect�, and to honor �gentlemen�s agreement� among the members of the HRET
that they would abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot.

Congressman Cojuangco notified the chairman of the tribunal to withdraw the

nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and seeks to cancel
the promulgation of the tribunal�s decision in Bondoc v. Pineda case.

Issue

Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its representative in

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal at the request of the dominant
political party.

Ruling

No. If the House Electoral Tribunal would serve the interest of the party in power,
the independence of the Electoral Tribunal as embodied in the Constitution, will no
longer be protected. The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP,
because he cast his votes in favor of the Nacionalista Party�s candidate, Bondoc,
is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to the Sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

House Electoral Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which tree justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would
be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at
the treshold of the tribunal.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence-even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, �disloyalty to
party� and breach of the party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from HRET for havinf
cast a �conscience vote� in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion an
injustice, and a violation of the constitution. It�s resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is therefore, null and void.

Civil Liberties Union vs. The Executive Secretary

February 22, 1991
194 SCRA 317
Fernan, C.J.

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Executive Secretary.

Facts

Petitioner challenged the Executive Order no. 284, which in effect, allows members
of the cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretary to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary position, albeit
subject to the limitations imposed, runs counter to Sec. 13 Art. VII of the
Constitution.

Respondent on the hand, argued that the same Constitutional provision

provided a proviso stating that �unless otherwise provided in this constitution �.
They further contended that his proviso refers to if allowed by law or by the
pressing functions of his position.

Issue

Does the of E.O 284 violates the Constitutional limitation prohibiting appointive
officials from holding two offices?

Ruling

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose
stricter prohibition on President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in
the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read
with equal severity. The language of Sec. 13 Art. VII is prohibitory so that it
must be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.

The 1987 constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,

members of the cabinet, their deputies or assistant from holding during their
tenure multiple offices or employment in the government except in those cases
specified in the constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to post
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions at their office.

Sec. 13, Art VII in relation to Sec. 7 par.2 Art. IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
of positions that the cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions
in the government and government corporations. E.O. No. 284 allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Swc.13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibiting them from doing so unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Flores vs. Drilon

June 22, 1993
223 SCRA 568
Bellosillo, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action. Prohibition

Facts

The constitutionality of Sec. 13 par (d) of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
bases conversion and development Act of 1992 under which respondent Mayor Richard
J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is challenged in this original petition
with a prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds of public
funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached in the office.

Petitioners who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.U. Facility at the

Subic Zambales and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees
Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in
par. (d) Sec. 13, herein, infringes on the following constitutional and statutory
provisions: (A) Sec. 7, first par. Art IX-B of the Constitution which states Art
IX-B of the Constitution, which states that �No elective Official shall be eligible
for the appointment in any capacity to any public officer and position during his
tenure, because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective Official and the
Subject post are public offices of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint, since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President
who appointed the Mayor to the subject post (c) Sec. 26 par. (g) of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Issue

Whether or not the appointive was valid in the view of the provision of the
Local Government Code.

Ruling

Sec. 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutional of Sec. 13 par

(d) of RA 7227 for no legislative act can prevail over fundamental law of the land.

The view that an elective official maybe appointed to another post if allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference
in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec.7, Art. IX-B of the Constitution
holding of multiple offices by an appointive officials when allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or
designation of an elective official to the government post except as particularly
recognized in the constitution itself.

As an incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for

appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive of the
SBMA; hence his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes
that the Constitution cannot be sustained. He, however remains Mayor of Olaongapo
City and his Acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer.

Manalo vs. Sistoza

People vs. Marti

Jan. 18, 1991
Gr no. 81561
Bidin, J.

Nature of the Case:

Facts

This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the� special criminal court of

Manila RTC convicting the accused � appellant of violation of the provisions of RA
6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act. On August 14, 1987 the appellant
and his common law wife Shirley Reyes�went to the booth of the Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders carrying with them the 4 gift wrapped packages to be sent to a
friend in Z�rich, Switzerland. He claimed that only books, cigars and gloves are
contained in the boxes. The Proprietress Anita Reyes, no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. Before the� delivery of the appellant's box to the bureau
of customs, Anita and her husband Job Reyes, following the sop, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When� he opened Marti's box, a peculiar odor emanated within,
his curiosity aroused, he squeezed the box allegedly containing the gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. He� took several grams of the content inside. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter to NBI requesting the lab to examine the samples. NBI
made an inventory and took charge of the boxes. They tried to locate Marti but the
address that he used in his passport was that of Manila Central Post Office, On
August 27, 1987, they invited Marti to NBI as he was cling his mail at the post
office. Information was filed and appellant was then accused of violation of RA
6425.

Issue

Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally
searched and seized objects contained in four parcels and erred in convicting
appellant despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while
under custodial proceedings.

Ruling

The court sees no error committed by the trial court. The evidence was
obtained�and surrendered by a private person in his private�capacity and that
absence in government interference would mean that the constitutional guarantee
cannot be invoked against the state. In his second contention, the court examined
the records of the case and found nothing to indicate as an undisputed fact that
the appellant was not informed of constitutional rights.

People of the Philippines vs. de Castro

July 31, 1997
G.R. No. 119068.
Padilla; J
Nature of the Case:

Facts

An information, dated 14 November 1991, 1 was filed by Provincial Prosecutor

Alejandro A. Pulido of Cagayan charging Dante, Oscar, Rito, Joel, George, all
surnamed Castro, Caridad Menor y Castro alias Caring and Genesia Garcia y Castro
with the crime of murder.

On 10 February 1992, the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned and

pleaded not guilty to the charge. Defense counsel waived pre-trial for the accused
and moved for continuous trial which commenced on 2 March 1992 and terminating on
15 February 1994 when both prosecution and defense submitted the case for
resolution.

On 10 May 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan

rendered a decision where the parties are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the
present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in
any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already observed, the
resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on
the right of government workers to strike.

Issue

Whether or not the right of due process by the parties has been violated.

Ruling

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the

following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to
be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4)
a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases
should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a
representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers'
organization and a supervisor of the division. Mere membership of said teachers in
their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee.
Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its
investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers'
organization as its representative in said committee.

It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible

error in affirming the trial court's decision setting aside the questioned orders
of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents
and the payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that
accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or
dismissal. 21 Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are
void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover,
the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private respondents should,
as a consequence, be reinstated 22 and awarded all monetary benefits that may have
accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. 23
This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process,
which is a cornerstone of our legal system. Wherefore, premises considered, the
petition is hereby denied for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the
part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED.

Yap vs Lutero
April 30, 1959
Gr no. L- 12669
Concepcion, J.

Nature of the case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
City.

Facts

On September 12, 1956, petitioner Yap was accused, in Criminal Case No. 16054
of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, of reckless driving, in violation of a city
ordinance. December 10, 1956, he was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of
the same court, with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Petitioner moved to quash the latter information on the ground of double jeopardy.
This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meanwhile, the petitioner
was acquitted in Case No. 16054. Petitioner instituted the present case for
certiorari in the Court of First Instance, charging the respondent with grave abuse
of discretion in denying his motion to quash. The Petition was dismissed; however,
on motion for reconsideration, the decision was
set aside by an order directing the respondent to desist from further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 16443. Respondent has brought the case for review, contending
that the case of People vs. Francisco Diaz.

Issue

Whether or not the lower court erred in ruling that the accused is guilty of
reckless driving in violation a city ordinance.

Ruling

This pretense is untenable. Firstly, the crime of damage to property through

reckless driving-with which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance-is a
violation of Revised Penal Code, not the Automobile Law. Hence, Diaz was not twice
accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain
crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under different provisions
of said Automobile Law. Hence, from the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as distinguished
from Political or Constitutional Law-they constitute, strictly different offenses,
although, under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and,
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plead of double jeopardy may be
in order as regards the other, as in the Diaz case. The issue in the case at bar
hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in Case No. 16443,
petitioner could-if he failed to plead double jeopardy-be convicted of the same act
charged in Case No. 16054, in which he has already been acquitted. The information
in Case No. 16054 charged the petitioner with reckless driving; while in Case No.
16443 he was accused of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second information were not established by
the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very same
violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No. 16064, unless he pleaded
double jeopardy.

Decision affirmed.

People vs. Relova

De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals

2002
305 SCRA 303
Bellosillo, J

Nature of the Case:

Facts

Petitioners was public schools teachers from various schools in Metro Manila
who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed
by then sec. of DECS. It was immediately implemented. Petitioners appealed to Merit
System Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
CSC found petitioners guilt of �conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service� for having been participated in the mass actions and imposed the reduced
penalty of 6 months. However CSC ordered petitioners automatic reinstatement in
the service without back wages, in view of the length of time they�re out in the
service by reason of the immediate dismissal. Petitioners filed petitions for
certiorari with this court which were referred to CA. CA dismissed the petitions
for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that they should not be penalized because
they were merely exercising their constitutional right to free assembly.

Issue

Whether or not petitioners are exercising right to assembly and entitled to

award of back wages for the period they were not allowed to work while awaiting
resolution of their appeals.

Ruling

No. Petitioners did not exercise their constitutional rights within

reasonable limits. They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
service by staging mass protest on regular school days, abandoning their classes
and refusing to go back even after they have been ordered to do so. Petitioners are
not entitled to back wages on the ground that the petitioners were neither
exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the
grant of back wage in administrative disciplinary cases.

Fabella vs. CA
November 28,1997
G.R. No. 110379
Panganiban, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Facts

On Sept.17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to

all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various
dates during the period Sept. 26, 1990 to Oct. 18, 1990. The mass action had been
staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and
passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.

On Oct. 18, 1990 Secretary Carino filed Administrative cases against herein
petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge
sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service
laws and regulations.

Secretary Carino ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive

suspension. Administrative hearing started on Dec. 20. 1990. Petitioner-appellees�
counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be
furnished of the copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation. As he received no response from committee, counsel walked out.
Later, however, counsel was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.

The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the RTC in Quezon City, charging
the committee with fraud and deceit however the court denied the order. They
amended the complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner-
appellee Adriano S. Valencia filed a motion to intervene and the trial court
granted his motion. The DECS investigating committee rendered a decision finding
the appellees guilty. The teachers filed a petition in the Supreme Court which
issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court�s order of dismissal and
reinstating petitioner-appellee�s action. The trial court set the case for
hearing which denied the motion for reconsideration and the manifestation and
motion.

On July 3, 1992 the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Carino had
ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the trial court
failed to act on his motion. The trial court rendered a decision in which it
started the dismissal of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and
violative of the teacher�s right to due process. The petition was granted. From
this decision former DECS Secretary Carino filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition for review.

Issue

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process of law.

Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. In administrative proceedings, due process has

been recognized to include the following 1) the right to actual constructive notice
of the institution of proceedings which may affect the resondent�s legal rights, 2)
a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witness and evidence in one�s favor, and to defend one�s right, 3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality and 4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, R.A.
4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specially covers
administrative proceedings involving public school teacher�s organization and a
superior of the division.
 In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear
administrative charge against private respondents did not include � a
representative of the local or in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teacher�s organization� as required by Section 9. Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus all proceedings undertaken by
them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension
or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of of a representative of a
teacher�s organization in these committees was indispensable to insure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given a substance and meaning to
the right to be heard. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the
teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever
designated or authorized by the teacher�s organization as its representative in
said committee. Indeed in the case at bar neither the DECS Secretary nor the DECS-
NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a
committee composed of a division supervisor, secondary and elementary school
teachers and consultants. But there was no representative of the teacher�s
organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because
the provision for the representation of a teacher�s organization is intended by law
for the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges. When
counsel walked out of the hearing, the teachers did not waive their rights based on
such action of counsel. The walk out was staged in protest against the procedures
of the committee. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the
dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of
the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. The petition
is hereby denied.

Halili vs. Court of Appeals

March 12, 1998
287 SCRA 465
Panganiban, J.

Nature of the case: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Facts

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, leaving real properties in the

Philippines. His forced heir was his widow Helen Meyer Guzman and his son David Rey
Guzman both defendant appellee are also American citizens. Helen executed a deed of
quitclaim, assigning, tampering, and conveying to David Rey all her rights, title
and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from
Simeon. Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation. David Rey Guzman
sold said parcel of land to Emiliano Cataniag.

Petitioners who are owners of the adjoining lot filed a complaint before the
RTC questioning the validity and constitutionality of the two conveyances and
claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzman�s waiver
of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional
prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver
was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in
accordance with the Constitution and the law of the Philippines and not to subvert
them.

The Court of Appeals denied their appeal. Hence this petition.

Issue
 Whether or not the conveyance from Helen Meyer Guzman to her son David Rey
Guzman is illegal and should be declared null and void.

Ruling

The petition has no merit. Neither do we find any reversible error in the
appellate courts holding that the sale of the subject land to Cataniag renders moot
any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to
her son David Rey.

True Helen�s deed of quitclaim collided with the Constitution Art. 12 Sec. 7.
In fine non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands of the public
domain except only by way of legal succession. But what is the effect of a
subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen?
Jurisprudence is consistent that �if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfer to a citizen, the flaw is the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

Accordingly, since the disposed land is now owned by Cataniag, a Filipino

citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed the objective of the
constitutional provision - to keep one land in Filipino hands - has been served.

US vs. Barrias
September 24, 1908
GR No. 4349

Nature of the Case: The power of the Commissioner to prescribe rules and regulation
based on the legislative act promulgated by Congress.

Facts

Defendant was charged for violating paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397
of the Insular Collector of Customs which prohibits heavily loaded casco, lighter
or other similar craft to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or
moved by other adequate power. Defendant questions the validity of paragraph 70 of
Circular No. 397

Issue

Whether or not there was an illegal delegation of legislative power.

Ruling

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is revoked and defendant is

convicted of misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars. Act No. 1136 is
valid and there was no illegal delegation of legislative power. The criminal
offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the task given to the
commissioner was a mere matter of detail.

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto

August 22, 2001
317 SCRA 272
Pardo, J.

Nature of the Case: Special civil action for certiorari to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Ombudsman.

Facts

On Oct. 8, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos, issued Administrative Order No.13, creating

the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. President Ramos
issued a Memorandum Order No.61 directing the Committee to include in its
investigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans which shall embrace
both behest and non-behest loans. The Committee reported that the Philippines
Seeds, Inc. was one of the 21 corporations which obtained behest loans. In his
instructions, handwritten on the cover of the aforementioned report, Pre. Ramos
directed Committee Chairman Magtanggol C. Guingundo to proceed with administrative
and judicial actions against the 21 firms in this batch with positive findings as
soon as possible. The Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint against
the Directors of PSI and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines
who approved the loans for the violation of par. E & G of Sec.3 of R.A. 3019.

In its Resolution, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of

prescription. Relying on the case of People vs. Dinsay, a case decided by the C.A.

Issue

Whether or not the public respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion
in holding that the prescriptive period in this case should be counted from the
date of the grant of the behest loans involved and not from the date of discovery
of the same by the Committee.

Ruling

We agree with the Ombudsman that Sec.15 of Art. 11 of the Constitution apply
to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal actions such
as the complaint against the respected firms. This is clear from the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The upshot of the discussion is the
prosecution of offense arising from, relating or incident to or involving ill-
gotten wealth contemplated in Sec.15 Art.11 of the Constitution may be barred by
prescription. The applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is
Sec.2 of Act. No.326 in the special law violated. It stated that if the commission
of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it
was committed.

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman forthwith dismissed the complaint without
even requiring the respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and solely on the
basis of dates the alleged behest loans were granted or the dates of the commission
of the alleged offense was committed.

Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the
criminal actions should commence from the discovery of the offense, the Ombudsman
clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright the case.
Petition granted.

Fari�as vs. Barba

April 19, 1996
GR No. 116763
Mendoza, J.

Nature of the Case: Appointment of the Governor in case of permanent vacancy caused
by a Sangguniang Bayan Member who does not belong to any political party.
Facts

A member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, who does not
belong to any political party, resigned after going without leave to the United
State. To fill the vacancy, respondent Mayor recommended to petitioner Governor,
the appointment of Edward Palafox. Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas made the same
recommendation but to respondent Mayor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
the recommendation and Petitioner Governor appointed Nacino as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas.

Issue

In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the

cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who
can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure.

Ruling

There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay.

Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be made by
the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that members of
the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party affiliations.

Indeed there is no reason for supposing that those who drafted Section 45
intended to make the manner of filling vacancies in the Sanggunians, created by
members who do not belong to any political party, different from the manner of
filling such vacancies when created by members who belong to political party or
parties. The provision for the first must approximate the provision for the second
situation. Any difference in procedure must be limited to the fact that in the case
of vacancies caused by those who have political affiliations there is a party which
can nominate a replacement while there is none in the case of those who have no
political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no political party to make a
nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be considered the
appropriate authority for making the recommendation, by analogy to vacancies
created in the Sangguniang Barangay whose members are by law prohibited from having
any party affiliation.

Neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox is entitled to the

seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. For while petitioner Al Nacino was
appointed by the provincial Governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas, on the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended
by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the Mayor and not the provincial Governor who
appointed him.

Gamboa vs. Aguirre

July 20, 1999
GR No. 134213
Ynares-Santiago, J.

Nature of the Case:

Facts

Sometime in August, 1995, the Governor of Negros Occidental designated Vice-

Governor Romeo Gamboa, Jr. as Acting Governor for the duration of his official trip
abroad until his return. Later, when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) held its
regularsession, respondent members thereof questioned the authority of Gamboa to
preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor. When the court
declared Gamboa temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of
the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor, Gamboa filed this petition
for review.

Issue

Whether or not an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting

Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Ruling

A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-

Governor. This means that, for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives
and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. Under RA
7160, the governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP as he is not a
member thereof. Hence, being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue
to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office since the nature and
duties of the Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the
latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes
an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-Governor) to
preside during SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in
Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary
presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor�s (Vice-Governor) powers
as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity.
Under Sec. 49 (b), in the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer
to preside during SP session, the members present sand constituting a quorum shall
elect from among themselves presiding officer.

Victoria Amigable, Plaintiff-Appellant, Vs. Nicolas Cuenca, As Commissioner Of

Public Highways And Republic Of The Philippines, Defendants-Appellees.
G.R. No. L-26400
February 29, 1972
Makalintal, J.

Nature of the case: State immunity from suit and the capacity of a citizen to sue
the government.

Facts

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No.
639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435)
issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation
in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the
back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Aveunes. On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed
in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon
motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango
and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum
of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of
P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

Issue
 Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts
of the case.

Ruling

YES. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property
taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this
character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the
time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such
payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land
so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment."
If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there
was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to
benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is
not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use,
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.

Alexander A. Krivenko, Petitioner-Appellant, Vs. The Register Of Deeds, City Of

Manila, Respondent And Appellee.
G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
Moran, C.J.

Nature of the case: Constitutional right of an alien, if any, to own residential

land in the Philippines.

Facts

Alexander A. Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena

Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the
war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the
register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire
land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court
rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which
Krivenko appealed to this Court.

Issue

Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

Ruling

NO. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article

XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on
Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the
Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and
for their posterity." Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection
with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from
the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the
idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." And, of the same tenor was
the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our
lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright
should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. Lands and natural resources are
immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If
we do not completely nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am
afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born.
Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going
to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?"
Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention
one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization
of the natural resources of the country. This is ratified by the members of the
Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice
Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under
Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small
jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed
to own a piece of land.

Export Processing Zone Authority vs.

The Commission On Human Rights, Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia And Pedro Ordonez
G.R. No. 101476
April 14, 1992
Gri�o-Aquino, J.

Nature of the case: To ascertain the power of the CHR to issue a writ of injunction
or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights.

Facts

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain
parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export
Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into
Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation,
formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to
the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Before EPZA could take possession of
the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural
products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To
convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-
financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among
them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto
Aledia.Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia
and Pedro Ordo�ez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint
complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and
remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of
the complaint.

Issue

Whether or not the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or

restraining order against supposed violators of human rights.

Ruling
 NO. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary
writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the
victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may
only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It
may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of
a party thereto, and for no other purpose

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 113888
August 19, 1994
Quiason, J.

Nature of the case: Petitions for review of orders or resolution. En Banc

Facts

This is a consolidation of four cases upon to rule on the conflicting claims

of authority between the Legislative and the Executive. Providing the focus for the
contest between the President and the Congress over the control of the national
budget. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on
the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their
respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the President has
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise
of his veto power.

Issue

Whether or not the Presidential veto of the special provision in the

appropriation for debt services and the automatic appropriation of funds is valid.

Ruling

The Court went one step further and ruled that �provisions� are beyond the
executive power to veto, but such sections were not �provisions� in the budgetary
sense of the term, they are �inappropriate provisions� that should be treated as
�items� for the purpose of the President�s veto power.

The petitions were dismissed, except with respect to G.R. Nos. 113766 and
113105 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the
annulment of the veto.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. 91890
June 9, 1995
Romero, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition. En Banc.

Facts

Philippine Airlines, Inc seeks to review and annul and reverse the
decision of the Commission on Audit and to prohibit, enjoin and
prevent COA from enforcing or in any way implementing Department
Order No. 19, Circular No. 498 and 88-565 that PAL is required to
purchase its fuel requirements solely from Petron Corporation. Pal
sought for reconsideration for preferring to bid out and secure its
fuel supply from more than one supplier and such order should not be
applied to PAL. COA denied PAL's request for reconsideration, that
such order be applied to GOCC,including subsidiaries.

Issue

� Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in holding
that Department Order No. 19 of the defunct Department of General
Services applies to Pal?

Ruling

����� Pursuant to the government's privatization program, PAL's

shares of stock were bidded out, resulting in the acquisition by PR
Holdings, a private corporation, of 67% of PAL's outstanding stocks.
PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COa.
Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become
moot and academic.

����� The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

Joel B. Caes, , vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court

November 6, 1989.
Gr. No. 126379
Cruz, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court.

Facts

On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate information
with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the
court of First Instance of Rizal.

On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled
for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties.

In view of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled

hearings and also for the hearing which is an indication of lack of interest, upon
motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of the cases and with the
conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered
provisionally dismissed.
On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was denied on October 9 filed by
Major Dacanay who alleged that they could not attend the hearing for lack of
notice.

Issue

The present petition is based in two agreements to wit: a. that the motion to
revive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party nor was a
copy served on the petitioner; and b. the revival of he cases would place the
petitioner in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.

Ruling

It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of

the government prosecution and must always be under his control. This is true even
if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the
examination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses,
even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor of the
case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to
move for its dismissal or revival as they are not even parties thereto nor as they
represent the parties to the action. Their only function is to testify. In a
criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or
one acting under his authority, and by no one else.

On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopardy
has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with
the conformity of the accused. The petitioner denies that he consented to the
dismissal and submits that the dismissal was final notwithstanding its description.

Fittingly described as �res judicata in prison grey�, the right against double
jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been
previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be
subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same
offense.

It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy, there
must be a. a valid complaint or information b. filed before a competent court c. to
which the defendant had pleaded and d. of which he had been previously acquitted or
convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at
bar. What we must resolve is the effect of the dismissal, which the petitioner
contends finally and irrevocably terminated the two cases against him. Its
submission is that the dismissal was not provisional simply because it was so
designated, more so since he had not expressly consented thereto.

Petition Granted.

People of the Philippines, vs. Court of Appeals

June 26, 1998.
Gr. No. 7498990
Narvasa, C.J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Facts

On December 14, 1995, Senior Inspector PNP James Brillantes applied for search
warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had
allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

The following day, December 15, 1995, search warrant against Mr. Hussain was issued
not at Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani
nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such
as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t.shirts, belts, sunglasses and
traveling bags including cash amounting to $ 3,550.00 and P 1,500.00 aside from US
$ 5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant.

The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of foregoing verdict, describing to Court
of Appeals the following errors 1. sanctioning the lower courts precipitate act of
disregarding the proceedings before the issuing court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and particularly of the place to be searched.

Issue

Whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in
which private respondents were the actually residing.

Ruling

The government insists that the police officers who applied to Quezon City Regional
Trial Court for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. It claims that one of the said officers,
in fact, had been able to surreptitiously later the place to be searched or to the
search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail
Variety Store and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected
the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be
searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what
objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in
mind-the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No.1) at the rear of �Abigail
Variety Store�- was not what the judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind,
and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.

Wherefore the judgment if the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

August 7, 1996
G.R. No.91885
Panganiban, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review under Rule 45 to set aside the decision 1
of the court of appeals, 2 Promulgated on November 27, 1989 and the resolution 3
denying reconsideration, promulgated on January 17, 1990 in CA-GR. CV. No. 17828
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Laureano Bros., Co, Inc.

Facts
It appears that under the contract (date not indicated in the pleadings),
private respondent Laureano Brothers, Inc, undertook to supply petitioner republic
of the Philippines with plumbing materials for the use of the National Water and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) which procurement was financed by the United States
Government through the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). However, all
the materials delivered by private respondent to nawasa were rejected because they
did not conform to the agreed specifications. Refusing to refund the money paid for
says materials, private respondent was sued by the Republic in the then Court of
first Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 44566.

A decision was rendered by the trial court based on a compromise agreement

whereby private respondent agreed to pay the petitioner the amount of US$358,882.02
or its equivalent in Philippine peso. A disagreement on the rate of exchange for
conversion of the dollars into pesos was settled by this court in G.R. No. L-250554
by fixing such rate at P3.91 per US$1.00. This judgment became final and executory
on July 27, 1968. On April 16, 1973, the trial court issued an order authorizing
private respondent to sell the attached property. On May 31, 1973, Firma Techno
Machineries, Inc, purchased the said lot and building through a deed of sale
registered on June 1, 1973. Thereafter, private respondent remitted to NEDA the net
proceeds of P881,003.01 deducting P68,995.99 representing taxes. On December 10,
1973, NEDA disapproved said sale on the ground that the price was too low and that
the conditions imposed by the trial court were not allowed. NEDA thus returned the
two checks it received (P10,000.00 earnest money and O881,004.01 net proceeds of
the sale) and filed an action to annul the sale.

Issue

Whether or not the five-year period within which to enforce the decision in
Civil case No. 44566 was interrupted by the period when the question of the
legality if the sale of respondent�s properties was pending in the Court of Appeals
and before this Honorable Court.

Ruling

The court held that there is no question that the decision in favor of the
Republic has not been satisfied and the private respondent has not paid its
obligation under such judgment. The only question is how such decision shall be
enforced against the obligor. Under the Rules, 7 a �Judgment may be executed within
five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

Wherefore the petition is granted and the assailed decision is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby directed to issued the writ
of execution in Civil Case No. 44566 for the enforcement of the decision therein.

Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals

August 4, 1994.
G.R. No. 110662.
Padilla, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Facts

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil
case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent�s oral offer of

evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private
respondent�s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was
denied on 23 June 1992.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals
assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

Issue

Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.

Ruling

The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an

interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an
ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds
for assailing the interlocutory order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the
evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were
made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to
wire tap his home telephone.

Clearly, respondent trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-
quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in
question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 is hereby
set aside. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence

Hon. Renato C. Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines and
Manila Pilots Association
December 12, 1997
G.R. No. 111953.
Romero, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 6.

Facts

The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On
December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA�s
charter.

On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilot Association and the Manila
Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92
before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they informed by
then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that �the matter of reviewing, recalling or
annulling PPA�s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of
Directors as its governing body.�

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and

injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 93-65673.

Issue

Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondent�s right to
exercise their profession and their right to due process of law.

Ruling

The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA,
recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore a property right under Callanta
v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. Thus, abbreviating the term within which that
privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the
harbor pilots. Consequently, any �withdrawal or alteration� of such property right
must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process
of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public
hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned
about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision,
petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby dismissed and the assailed decision of
the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is affirmed.

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 113888
August 19, 1994

Nature of the case: Petitions for review of orders or resolution.

Facts: This is a consolidation of four cases upon to rule on the conflicting claims
of authority between the Legislative and the Executive. Providing the focus for the
contest between the President and the Congress over the control of the national
budget. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on
the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their
respective authorities, and by several Senators on the claim that the President has
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise
of his veto power.

Issue: Whether the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriation
for debt services and the automatic appropriation of funds is valid?

Ruling: The Court went one step further and ruled that "provisions" are beyond the
executive power to veto, but such sections were not "provisions" in the budgetary
sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as
"items" for the purpose of the President's veto power.
����� The petitions were dismissed, except with respect to G.R. Nos. 113766 and
113105 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special
provision on debt service and G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the
annulment of the veto.
Gloria vs. Court of Appeals
1999
306 SCRA 287
Mendoza, J.

Nature of the case:

Facts

Private respondents are public schools teachers. During the teacher�s

strike, they did not report to work. For this reason they were administratively
charge and place under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded
before the lapse 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty.
Respondent Margallo was dismissed from service while other respondents were
suspended for 6 months. Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and
Preventive Board (MSPB) which found him guilty. Other respondent also appealed but
it was dismissed. On appeal, Civil service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision
of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas,
Somebang) guilty of reasonable office rules and regulations and ordered them
reinstated to their former positions. Rspondent filed petition for certiorari in
this Court. The case was referred to Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered decision
(1) affirming the decision of CSC with respect to Amparo, Bandigas, Somebang but
(2) reversing the CSC ordered suspension of Margallo. The appellate court found
him guilty of reasonable office rules and regulations only and imposed him the
penalty of reprimand. Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending
that they should be exonerated of all charges against them and that they be paid
salaries during their suspension. CA ruled that they are entitled to the payment of
salaries during their suspension �beyond 90 days�. Petitioner Gloria moved for a
reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioner
contends that the administrative investigation was concluded within the 90 day
period of preventive suspension and that the continued suspension of private
respondents is due to their appeal, hence the government should not be held
answerable for payment.

Issue

Whether or not respondents are entitled to payment of salaries during the

period of their suspension and appeal.

Ruling

Yes, they are entitled. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of
civil service employee who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (�51) and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplinary
authority is suspension or dismissal and after review, the respondent is
exonerated. As already stated, CA ordered DECS to pay private respondents their
salaries, allowances and other �benefits beyond the 90 day preventive suspension�.
In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension
pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending
appeal in the event the employee is exonerated.

Wherefore decision of CA, dated Sept. 3, 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed
from the time of their dismissal/suspension by DECS until their actual
reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.
CAES vs. IAC
November 6, 1989, G.R. Nos. 74989-90

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari.

FACTS: On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate
informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated
on December 10, 1981.
Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason
postponed.
On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled
for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties.
On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset because
the prosecution witnesses were again absent.
On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been
personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on
June 6, 1983.
On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the
case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M.
Gorgonio issued the following order:
The failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled hearing and
also for the hearing today which is an indication of lack of interest, upon motion
of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of these cases and with the
conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered
Provisionally Dismissed.
On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had
been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that they could not
attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of notice.
On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge issued the following order:
On the "Motion for the Revival of the Case" no opposition has been filed and
considering that the dismissal of these cases was only provisional, for reasons
stated in the motion, the same is granted.
The petitioner questioned the judge's order which was dismissed for lack of merit
on May 20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1986. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUES
a) Whether or not the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was riot
filed by the proper party nor was a copy served on the petitioner; and
b) Whether or not the revival of the cases would place the petitioner in double
jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the

responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control.
The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the
prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the
case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not
even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. In a criminal
prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or one
acting under his authority, and by no one else.
The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and
he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of these
witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it
proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially
since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to
be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he was not so
informed made the irregularity even more serious.
On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double jeopardy
has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with
the conformity of the accused.
To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d)
of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at
bar. A case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused
himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused.
Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. The consent cannot be
presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure
to object, otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final.
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to
dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of
the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has
the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused,
because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure
to prosecute.
As the record shows, the petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was never
actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following
eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution was
not prepared. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his head
even as he was not given an opportunity to deny them because his trial could not be
held.
Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial.
The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was
described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that
dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the
consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an
acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that
Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent, as we have
repeatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the
presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a
constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases against
the petitioner and that the respondent court also erred in affirming that order.
Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and not having
expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases against him, he was
entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.
It is possible that as a result of its in attention, the petitioner has been
needlessly molested if not permanently stigmatized by the unproved charges. The
other possibility, and it is certainly worse, is that a guilty person has been
allowed to escape the penalties of the law simply because he may now validly claim
the protection of double jeopardy. In either event, the responsibility clearly lies
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its negligence and
ineptitude.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DECLARO

February 9, 1989, G.R. No. L-64362

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of the order of dismissal of
the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.

FACTS: As a result of a traffic accident that occurred at about 9:00 o'clock in the
morning of July 7, 1980 at Barangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan, Edgar lbabao
was charged for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence in a complaint
that was filed on September 5, 1980 in the Municipal Circuit Court of Malinao,
Aklan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1028-N wherein a certain Crispin
Conanan was the offended party. On October 1, 1980, an information for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against the same accused in
the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1421
with one Eduardo Salido as the offended party. This second case arose from the same
incident.
Upon the arraignment of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1028-N, he entered a plea
of not guilty. The case was first set for hearing on January 19, 1983. Both the
offended party and the prosecuting fiscal failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice. Counsel for the accused thus verbally moved for the dismissal
of the case for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution. This motion was
granted. A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by the fiscal on
January 27, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order dated May
27, 1983. The case was, therefore, set for trial. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the accused, the inferior court issued another order dated
August 30, 1983, dismissing the case anew.
Considering that the said case had been dismissed on January 19, 1983, counsel for
the accused filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground that the
dismissal of the prior case is a bar to the prosecution of the latter. The trial
court dismissed Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground of double jeopardy. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution but was denied.
Thus, this petition filed by the private prosecutor with the conformity of the
provincial fiscal. Petitioner argues that double jeopardy has not set-in in this
case because:
(1) The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N was at the instance and with the
express consent of accused and his counsel.
2) The second offense charged is not the same as the first, nor is it an attempt to
commit the same or a frustration thereof, nor does it include or is necessarily
included in the first.
(3) Criminal Case No. 1028-N is not yet terminated.

ISSUES
Whether or not there is double jeopardy.
Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial.

RULING: To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) when
the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Although there are criminal cases which were dismissed upon motion of the accused
because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and/or his
witnesses did not appear at the trial and where this Court held that the dismissal
is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense the facts and the circumstances of the present case do not
warrant a similar ruling.
In the present case, the accused was duly notified that the case was set for
hearing on January 19, 1983. On said date of hearing neither the complainant nor
the fiscal appeared despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after
arraignment. The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have
instead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in
court.
Thus, while a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial can serve as
a basis for the dismissal of a case, this must be balanced with the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In the instant case, the complaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appear
only in the first hearing. Even if the court did not dismiss the case but merely
postponed the hearing to another date, there would not have been a denial of the
right of the accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused to have a speedy
trial is violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without his case being tried. None of said situations exists
in the present case. Surely, it cannot be said that there was a violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. The more prudent step that
the court a quo should have taken was to postpone the hearing to give the
prosecution another opportunity to present its case. The dismissal of the case by
the trial court on the ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial is
unwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in this case.
Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent
of the accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of two
grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a speedy
trial. In both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of an acquittal. Since the
dismissal in this case does not fall under either of these two instances and it was
made with the express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense.

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS

October 27, 1989, G.R. No. 88211

Nature of the case: Motion for reconsideration on the Court�s decision dated
September 15,1989 dismissing the petition, after finding that the President did not
act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines.

FACTS: On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In
a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety and for the tranquility of the state and order of
society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to
our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or
the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising
the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines
is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country
of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights
guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner�s arguments are impressed with merit.

RULING: The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event,
has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed
to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased.
It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his
(or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
The Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

PHIL. ROCK INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS

December 15,1989, G.R. No. 84992

Nature of the Case: Appeal on decision dated March 21, 1987 by the Court of Appeals
setting aside the decision and order of execution pending appeal which the Regional
Trial Court of Manila issued in favor of the Philippine Rock Industries in Civil
Case No. 82-11394, authorizing the immediate execution of its decision against the
funds deposited in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of the respondent Board of
Liquidators as liquidator of the defunct Reparations Commission.

FACTS: On July 30, 1982, PHILROCK filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 38, a complaint against the Board of Liquidators for Specific Performance or
Revaluation with Damages, praying that the defective rock pulverizing machinery
which it purchased from REPACOM be replaced with a new one in good and operable
condition according to the specifications of their contract, or, in the
alternative, to refund the value of the defective rock pulverizing machinery at 31
% of its contract price. PHILROCK also prayed for actual damages of P 5,000 per
month for losses it allegedly incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining
the plant, P 4,000 per day as unrealized profits, exemplary damages, attorney fees
of P 50,000, plus expenses and costs of the suit.
On April 23, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHILROCK and
ordered REPACOM and the Board of Liquidators-
1. To reimburse Plaintiff Philrock for the expenses it had invested and incurred in
connection with its purchase of the said rock pulverizing plant from REPACOM in the
total amount of P l02,837.66;
2. To pay Plaintiff Philrock compensatory damages for unrealized profits from May,
1966 and up to December 31, 1983 in the amount of P 33,896,844.47;
3. To pay Plaintiff Philrock the amount of P 671,925.32 as reimbursement for the
expenses incurred in storage and maintenance of the rock pulverizing plant at
Philrock's plant site from June 1, 1966 up to December 31, 1982;
4. To pay Plaintiff Philrock exemplary damages of P 200,000.00;
5. To pay Plaintiff Philrock's (sic) Attorney's fee of P 50,000.00;
6. To pay the costs of this suit.
On May 5, 1987, PHILROCK filed an urgent motion for execution pending appeal.
On May 14, 1987, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, filed a notice of
appeal and an opposition to the "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal" on the ground
that the funds sought to be garnished by PHILROCK are public funds, hence, exempt
from attachment and execution.
On May 19, 1987, an order of Garnishment was served to PNB against the funds of
REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators to satisfy the judgment in favor
of PHILROCK.
On March 21, 1988, the Court of Appeals held that:
... the funds deposited by the Board of Liquidators in the Philippine National Bank
may not be garnished to satisfy a money judgment against the petitioner as these
funds are public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of
Liquidators in the Philippine National Bank may be garnished to satisfy a money
judgment against the BOARD.

RULING: The Board of Liquidators is a government agency under the direct

supervision of the President of the Republic created by EO 372, dated November 24,
1950. It is tasked with the specific duty of administering the assets and paying
the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM. Hence, when a suit is directed against said
unincorporated government agency which, because it is unincorporated, possesses no
juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e.,
the State.
The sale of the rock pulverizing plant to PHILROCK by the Board of liquidators,
although proprietary in nature was merely incidental to the performance of the
Board's primary and governmental function of settling and closing the affairs of
the REPACOM. Hence, its funds in the Philippine National Bank are public funds,
which are exempt from garnishment.
It should be mentioned that when the State consents to be sued, it does not
necessarily concede its liability. Even when the government has been adjudged
liable in a suit to which it has consented, it does not necessarily follow that the
judgment can be enforced by execution against its hands for, every disbursement of
public funds must be covered by a corresponding appropriation passed by the
Legislature.
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of
the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state
has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment
against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to
satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature
will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction
thereof.
Funds should be appropriated by the legislature for the specific purpose of
satisfying the judgment in favor of PHILROCK before said judgment may be paid.

SUMMERS vs. OZAETA

October 25, 1948, G.R. No. L-1534

Nature of the Case:

FACTS: Prior to February 16, 1946, the petitioner was a cadastral judge. On said
date he qualified for and assumed the position of judge-at-large of first instance
by Secretary of Justice, the petitioner having received an ad interim appointment
on February 11, 1946. On July 9, 1946, petitioner's ad interim appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on appointment, as a result of which the respondent
Secretary of Justice duty informed the petitioner that latter was thereupon
separated from the service. Thereafter and until the present action was instituted
on July 11, 1947, his efforts were limited to the task of being reappointed. It was
argued that then petitioner did not cease to be a cadastral judge. At any rate, the
petitioner does not pretend that he has ever rendered service as cadastral judge or
received any of its emoluments subsequent to the rejection of his ad interim
appointment by the Commission on Appointments.
It is now argued by the petitioner that under section 9, Article VIII, of the
Constitution, he is entitled to continue as cadastral judge during good behavior
until he reaches the age of seventy years or becomes incapacitated to discharge the
duties of said office; that the positions of cadastral judge and judge-at-large are
not incompatible and that therefore by the acceptance of the latter office he did
not cease to be a cadastral judge, especially where his ad interim appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner�s argument is with merit.

RULING: There can be no doubt about the constitutional right of member of the
Supreme Court and judge of inferior court to hold offices during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. Said right is waivable.
Petitioner's voluntary acceptance of the position of judge-at-large consequent upon
his taking of the oath of office on February 16, 1946, amounted to a waiver of his
right to hold the position of cadastral judge during the term fixed and guaranteed
by the Constitution.
An ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10,
Article VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the " President shall have
the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is an appointment
permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
In the case at bar, the petitioner accepted and qualified for the position of
judge-at-large by taking the oath of office of judge-at-large, and not merely of an
"acting" judge-at-large. As stated in Zandueta vs. De la Costa, supra, the
petitioner "knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was
subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
and that if said commission were to disapprove the same, it would become
ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.
In a situation faced by the petitioner, the safer course to follow would have been
for him to await the confirmation of the ad interim appointment before qualifying
for and assuming the position of judge-at-large.
The petitioner cannot seek refuge in the general principle that the acceptance of a
second office may be held as amounting to a vacation of the first, the two offices
must be incompatible.
The situation before us is undoubtedly not one wherein he may appropriately hold
two compatible offices at one time such, for instance, as the positions of town
recorder and county and probate judge but one wherein he cannot legally hold two
offices of similar category at the same time, like two positions of judge of first
instance. Two offices are incompatible when viewed in the light of the public
policy expressed in the statutes creating them and defining their powers and
duties. To hold otherwise would be to say that, in certain instances, there should
be but two magistrates in the township, and it would become wholly without force
and effect.
It becomes unnecessary to determine whether petitioner's acts after he was notified
by the Secretary of Justice about his separation from the service, constitute an
implied acquiescence therein or an abandonment of the position of cadastral judge.

SIMON, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

January 5, 1994, G.R. No. 100150

Nature of the case: A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order
and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent
CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo,
et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

Facts: A demolition order was signed Carlos Quimpo, in his capacity as an Executive
Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office
of the City Mayor, which was sent and received by herein private respondents. It
was an order to leave after 3 days, the area in North Edsa to give way to the
"People's Park".
Led by their President Roque Fermo, the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista
for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.
�On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners
to appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31
July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, �the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990,
ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under
the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from
further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a
citation for contempt and arrest."
A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction.
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the
courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners,
stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the
rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business."
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution,
along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private
respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the
motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).
In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and supplemental motion to dismiss.
In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.

Issue: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to investigate the
alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor
of Quezon City.

Ruling: The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. �It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via
Executive Order No. 163, �issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative
power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. �This view, however, has not heretofore been shared
by this Court. In Cari�o v. Commission on Human Rights, �the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only
the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to
the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Macasiano vs. Diokno

1992, G.R. No. 97764

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by
respondents Municipality of Para�aque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service
against petitioner.

Facts: Respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure
of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located
at Baclaran, Para�aque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market
thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC
Ordinance No. 2, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or
municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for
flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. subject to the following
conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the
majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea
market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be
marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by
pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly
designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once
the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
The municipal council of Para�aque issued a resolution authorizing Para�aque Mayor
Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending
areas.�In pursuant to the resolution, respondent municipality and respondent
Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Para�aque.
Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J.
Gabriel St. in Baclaran.
Hence, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint
petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary
injunction.
The trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 of the
Municipality' of Para�aque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from
enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of

Para�aque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites
for flea markets is valid.

Ruling: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into

property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what
consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by
this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered
public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government
which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute
control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is
vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress
to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10,
Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states:
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. � A local government unit may likewise, through its head
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing
law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or
provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part of
thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A
property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully
used or conveyed.
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government
units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted
in accordance with basic principles already established by law. These basic
principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil
Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of
man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with
before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose
of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances
show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public
service.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority
to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it
cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-
compliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for
the approval of the ordinance.
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with
the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The
allegations of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for
vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the
establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that
will show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by
respondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is
absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested
with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors
occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market
along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in
Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of the
other observations of the Solicitor General.
The powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to
limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount
considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community.

People vs. Macam

1994, G.R. Nos. L-91011-12

Nature of the case: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 104, Quezon City, finding Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Facts: In Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio
Cawilan, Jr., were accused of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
On or about the 18th day of August, 1987, in Quezon City, the accused rob one
BENITO MACAM entered the residence of Benito Macam and rob properties valued in the
total amount of P454,000.00. And by reason of the crime of Robbery, said accused
attacked Leticia Macam, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal injuries
which were direct and immediate cause of her death, and on the occasion of said
offense, Benito Macam, Salvacion Enrera, and Nilo Alcantara, all sustained physical
injuries which have required medical attendance.
Together with Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Criminal Case No. Q-53783 was filed
against Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused Eduardo Macam, Antonio
Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels, changed
their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty.�
The trial court rendered its judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. Q-53781 and
acquitting Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in Criminal
Case No. Q-53783.

Issue: Whether or not their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled
identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the
hospital are violative of their constitutional rights.

Ruling: In Gamboa v. Cruz, it was held that the right to counsel attaches upon the
start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused.
The counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the
trial, inasmuch as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law
and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the changes in
patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries
and the judicial system well before his trial begins. It is therefore appropriate
to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the
trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of
the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A
police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings.
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly
true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims
before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart
improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken
identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's
identification at the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the
admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not
be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who
made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again
identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court
identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such
objection, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were of
independent origin.
The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest.
However, appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
This issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. They
have not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this
ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering
a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.

People vs. Lamsing

1995, G.R. No. 105316

Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him accordingly.

Facts: The case arose from the killing in the early hours of November 1, 1989 of
Winnie Cabunilas, a security guard, while on duty at the construction site of a
Synergy building on Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City.
Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by policemen, while in
a drinking spree with friends at a basketball court near the scene of the crime. He
was detained and in a police lineup, was identified by witnesses as one of those
responsible for the death of Winnie Cabunilas.
On November 9, 1989, an information was filed against him and a John Doe for the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. As the other accused
was at large, trial proceeded against accused-appellant alone.
The prosecution evidence is the testimony of the witness Elizabeth de los
Santos.�The witness said that at dawn of November 1, 1989, she was roused from her
sleep by the cries of a distressed person calling for his "mama". She got up,
partly opened the door and saw, at a distance of about one meter, two male persons,
one of them holding Winnie Cabunilas and the other one stabbing him. She identified
the person who stabbed Cabunilas as the accused-appellant.
Appellant denied involvement in the crime. However, the trial court found the
testimony of Elizabeth de los Santos credible.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied due process.

Ruling: That Elizabeth De los Santos' testimony was uncorroborated does not make it
less worthy of credit. Uncorroborated testimony can stand alone if, as in this
case, it is intrinsically credible and there is no showing that it was improperly
or maliciously motivated. So long as it is credible and trustworthy and is
sufficient to support a finding of guilt, its probative value is not diminished and
corroborative testimony of another eyewitness becomes dispensable.
On the other hand, accused-appellant's defense consists merely of alibi which was
correctly rejected by the trial court. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses because
it is easy to fabricate it while it is difficult to disprove it. It cannot prevail
over the positive identification by the witness, especially where it is not
physically impossible for the accused to be present at the place of the crime or
its vicinity at the time of its commission. Positive identification by an
independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify
falsely must prevail over simple denials and unacceptable alibis of the accused.
The accused complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was
identified by three persons, including Elizabeth De los Santos, without the
assistance of counsel. It was settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to
counsel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend
to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reason
for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory. The accused's right to counsel attaches only from
the time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him.

People vs. Acol

1994, G.R. Nos. 106288-89

Nature of the case: Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly
staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to
court, not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed
firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in the commission
of the robo.

Facts: At around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was
driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay
Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up.
Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where the
other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket
of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas
Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his
passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith
formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding
police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen
jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to
accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men
scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses,
and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in
possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the arrest,
the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan
and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.
Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them.

Issue: Whether or not the accused were denied due process.

Ruling: It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused-

appellant can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to
present his defense, through his own narration on the witness stand.
The search in the case at bar falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113
which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:When an
offense has in fact been committed, and the has �personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it
The police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for
the crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta
that they had just been robbed.�And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it
follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid. Moreover, the unlicensed
firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery
and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.�The principle imparted
by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs.
Palacio that:. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to discover a
criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti.

EBRALINAG vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

1995, 251 SCRA 569

Nature of the case:

Facts: The petitioners 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns
of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province. All minors,
they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as
Jehovah' Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the
Philippines.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
notional anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No.
1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
"Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony,
which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem.
"Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or
cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony herein provided.
"Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and
in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education,
after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution
concerned and its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which
shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
"In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag ceremony provided by
this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause
the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational
institution responsible for such failure."
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion which they "cannot conscientiously
give x x x to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's
command to "guard ourselves from idols-1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an
image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit
that the Constitution protects against official control.

Issue: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for
refusing, on count of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony
which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem,
saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Ruling: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines,
an emblem of national sovereignty of national unity and cohesion and of freedom
and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a
system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is
utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve
any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the
taking an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to
the bar."
"In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a
religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory
school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or
Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying, at the duty imposed upon it by the
Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all
educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system
of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other
things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship."
"The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to
the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the
school population which by far constitutes the great majority."
"The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws,
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority."
"The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, via., freedom
to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare"
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend
their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in
the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is
no warrant for their expulsion.
"Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, x
x x--assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion-is not a
goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to
"protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to
make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witness with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious
beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt
such patriotic exercises.

SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR

1988, 167 SCRA 393
Nature of the case:

FACTS: In this consolidated case, three principal issues were raised.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner were denied due process when information for libel were
filed against them although the case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and subsequently, by the President.
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint affidavit.

RULING: Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that the �reason which
necessitates presidential immunities from suit impose correlative disability to
file suit.� He contends that is criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President�s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court�s jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way, defeat, her privilege of immunity from suit, or by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt
of court or perjury.
This privilege of immunity from suit-perhaps to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other person
in the President�s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case cannot raised
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against its
accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court�s jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President�s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.

TORRES VS. GONZALES

1987, 152 SCRA 272

Nature of the case: Original petition for Habeas Corpus

FACTS: A conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on

condition that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should condition be violated, he will be proceed against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the condition pardon and was consequently
released from confinement. Subsequently, the Board of Pardons and parole resolved
to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon based upon
the evidence showing that the petitioner had been charged 20 counts of estafa in a
criminal case which were then pending trial before the RTC and on his conviction by
the RTC of the crime of sedition which is now pending appeal before the IAC.
Respondent Minister of Justice based on the board�s resolution, recommended
cancellation of the conditional pardon. President cancelled the conditional pardon
after which the respondent issued by authority of the President, an Order of Arrest
and recommitment against petitioner. Petitioner was accordingly arrested. It was
the petitioner�s contention that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he
has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts estafa nor of the crime
of sedition. Petitioner also contends that he was not given the opportunity to be
heard before he was arrested and thus deprived of his rights under due process
clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment is necessary in this
case.
2) Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.

RULING: These issues were discussed in three cases before and can be summed up as
follows:
1) The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts that are not subject to scrutiny.
2) The determination of the occurrence of a breach of condition of a pardon and
the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to a judicial scrutiny under Sec 649i) of the Rev. Administration Code; or
it may be judicial act consisting of a trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Art. 159 Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
proceed under Sec 64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime if necessary, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in
his trials and conviction for the offense which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec
64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In this case, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec
64(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code that choice is an exercise of the President�s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

LLAMAS VS. ORBOS

202 SCRA 844, 1991

Nature of the case: Petition to review the resolution of the Executive Secretary

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice Governor of the Province of
Tarlac, he assumed the position by virtue of a decision of the office of the
President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano Ocampo II is the incumbent
governor of the province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period of 90
days, due to a verified complaint filed by petitioner against respondent Governor
before the Department of Local Government charging him with alleged violation of
the local government code and the anti-graft and corrupt practices law. Public
respondent Orbos was Executive Secretary at that time and is being impleaded herein
in that official capacity for being issued, by authority of the President, the
assailed resolution granting executive clemency to respondent Governor.
Petitioner�s main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only
in criminal cases, based on Art. VII Sec 19 of the Constitution. According to the
petitioner, the qualifying phrase �after conviction by final judgment applies
solely to criminal cases and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or
pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case.�

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases.

RULING: The President has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative
case because the law does not distinguish. The constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. There is no valid and convincing reasons why t he
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the view
of the SC that is the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
The President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all
executive-departments may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most
especially where the basis therefore would be to serve the greater public interest.
It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant �executive
clemency� but also to reverse or modify the ruling issued by a subordinate against
an erring public official.

RIVERA vs. COMELEC

July 12, 1991, G.R. No. 95336

Nature of the case: Petition to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.

Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia were candidates
for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay in the January 1998 elections. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by the
majority of ten votes.
Garcia filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) . The trial
court found Garcia to have obtained 6, 376 votes against Rivera's 6, 222.
Rivera appealed to the Comelec through its First Division, the COMELEC sustained
with modification the appealed judgment of the RTC declaring Garcia as the duly
elected Mayor of Gunibatan, Albay.
Rivera's motion for reconsideration was acted upon by the COMELEC en banc. COMELEC
denied the motion. Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor
of Guinobatan by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC decision
until when he has served notice of this Court's temporary restraining order issued
upon Rivera's motion.
Rivera filed the present petition seeking the annulment of the COMELEC en banc
decision. Garcia contends that the Constitution declares the decisions of the
COMELEC on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials to
be final, executory, and not appealable.

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving
elective municipal and baranagy officials, being final and executory and not
appealable, preclude the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.

Ruling: NO. The provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that
�decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and baranagay offices shall be final, executory and
not appealable� applies only to questions of fact and not of law. The said
provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve
questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Constitution.
The challenged COMELEC decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by
respondent. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such
factual determinations. The Court find none in the case.
The Court resolved to dismiss the petition.

LAZATIN v. COMELEC
January 25, 1998. G.R. No. 8007.

Nature of the case: Special civil action for certiorari.

Facts: Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed
office, and discharged the duties as Congressman of the First District of Pampanga.
The petitioner claims that the House Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the
sole judge of all election contests(Sec. 17 Art.VI of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue: Whether or not the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
election contests involving house of representatives.

Ruling: YES. Petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections
in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and
assumed his duties as congressman. For the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the
electoral protest against him would be usurp the functions of the House Electoral
Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation despite alleged irregularities
in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival
candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
The revocation by the COMELEC of petitioner's proclamation is set aside.

SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MORAN

July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 249

Nature of the Case: Petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of
First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed
against the petitioner.

FACTS: The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
Philippine Islands. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him.
Petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Manila is without
jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court
of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of
the Philippines and even under the Constitution of the Philippines original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,
is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.

RULING: Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a
consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is
accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the
laws of the country where he resides.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPIL

May 15, 1995, G.R. No. 95028

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

Facts: On 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures

located along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling
of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way
into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the second floor
where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded
the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom. They then rushed to the ground
floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of furniture
which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told
operatives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that
evening, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to
the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome
to the police investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar
failed to report for work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was
planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his sister's
child.
Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon,
to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records of the parish they
were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism
of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they proceeded to the
house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and his companions already
left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning to leave.
After being positively identified as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused
Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under
arrest. After regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily
admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the
heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was
then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On
their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before
midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He
divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his participation as a
lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop
since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went
inside. Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated
that after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo
Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared the loot
and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and
agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to
the house of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some
six (6) others including Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 October 1987
and divided among themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked up from
their conversation, was taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer until past
four o'clock the next morning.
The day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer
Melencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville
Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl.
Patricio Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout.
He named the six (6) other perpetrators of the and asserted that he was merely
forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the
masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ
Furnitures where he was the foreman.
Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in
Manila, Para�aque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.
Later on, an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil.
Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned.
After the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte
instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence. However, the RTC of
Manila, Br. 49, denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitutional
rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police
officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey
Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . .
(he) was made to confess and declare statements that can be used against him in any
proceeding." And, the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual
execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not cure the constitutional
infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory
statements from him the day before, which extracted statements formed part of his
alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral .
. . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide based on the
testimonies of other witnesses" which are replete with "serious and glaring
inconsistencies and contradictions."

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant was denied of his constitutional right.

Ruling: In People v. Rous, the Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be
admitted in evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provided
that it was read and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was signed.
However the Court adopts the view in Gamboa v. Cruz where the Court En Banc ruled
that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the
person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense."
In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately
subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas,
Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further
questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited
incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission
of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was
not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the
actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the
investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-
appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory
statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial
confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus the Court said that admissions obtained
during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully
explained to the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10)
minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional rights and the
consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.
While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it
mentions details which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the
other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it
in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, the
Court finds other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROUS

March 27, 1995, G.R. No. 103803-04
Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

Facts: Socrates Rous alias Bobby, Rolando Laygo y Collado alias Lando, Primitivo
Garcia alias Bong/Peming, Virgilio Pradis, and Celestino Rabina were charged with
the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide. Further accused, except Laygo, were
charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the other accused were never
arrested and have remained at large, the court a quo rendered a decision acquitting
Rous of the charge of carnapping, but finding both Rous and Laygo guilty under the
charge of Highway Robbery and sentencing each to an imprisonment term of reclusion
perpetua, aside from the payment in solidum of civil indemnity.
From said decision, Rolando Laygo and Socrates Rous appealed, with both of them
ascribing as error the admission of their extrajudicial confessions.
Accused-appellant Laygo contends that his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible
in evidence because the taking thereof was started and finished without the
assistance of counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the confession is admissible.

Ruling: We reject this argument.

The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed accused-appellant
Laygo of his right to counsel and categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the
assistance of counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo expressed his desire to be so
assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt. Robert Gaddi,
brought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Accused-appellant and Atty.
Datlag conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and accused-appellant returned
to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt. Gaddi started the investigation. Atty.
Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started and left before the last three
questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office. After the
extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and accused-appellant Laygo
went to the office of Atty. Datlag who read and examined Exhibit C, after which,
Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign Exhibit C. Laygo
did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed Exhibit C.
From the above facts, we find that there was more than substantial compliance with
the constitutional requirement that a person under investigation for the commission
of a crime should be provided with counsel, (Section 12 (1), Article III, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The very purpose of said
constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in extracting a
confession from a suspect. Any form of coercion, whether physical, mental, or
emotional in extracting confessions stamps the confession with the taint of
inadmissibility (People vs. Cuison, 106 SCRA 98 [1981]). Nowhere in the evidence is
it shown that coercion was ever employed by the investigating officer in obtaining
the confession of accused-appellant Laygo. The investigation was even witnessed by
the relatives of Laygo.
The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the investigation of Laygo had
begun and left before the confession was concluded does not negate the validity and
admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the confession was put
down in writing, accused-appellant and the investigating officer proceeded to the
office of Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferred with
Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign the confession. It will be readily seen that
the confession was voluntary and the signing thereof by Laygo was done upon advice
of counsel. The constitutional requirements were thus fully complied with.
Moreover, the presence of Rolando's uncle, Tiburcio Laygo and the latter�s wife,
Fely, clearly precluded the use of coercion in extracting the confession.
A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is admissible
until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency (People vs. Dasig, 221 SCRA
549 [1993]). There is not a speck of evidence to show that the confession of Laygo
was extracted by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag would not have affixed his
signature to the extrajudicial confession of Laygo as counsel for Laygo had he
known or had he been informed by Laygo of any infirmity in its execution. Said
confession is, therefore, admissible in evidence.
The same ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit G) of accused-
appellant Rous. Although Atty. Ferrer, the counsel of Rous, was not present when
the confession was taken, after the confession was prepared, Sgt. Gaddi brought
Rous to the office of Atty. Ferrer who read the confession and fully explained it
to Rous. Only after Atty. Ferrer had interviewed Rous and fully explained the
confession and apprised Rous of his rights and the consequences of his answers did
Rous sign said confession. It is clear, therefore, that Rous signed his confession
upon advice and in the presence of his counsel, without any violence, intimidation
or threats being employed against him. Said confession suffers from no infirmity
and, is therefore, admissible in evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution presented a
medical certificate (Exhibit H) issued by Dr. Cesar S. Bernabe of the Ilocos
Regional Hospital attesting that he physically examined accused-appellant Rous and
found no injury on his body, evidently showing that no violence was used against
accused-appellant Rous.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

PEOPLE vs. FLORES

December 8, 1994, G.R. Nos. 111009-12

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

Facts: Jose Flores y Salinas, Manuel Corpuz y Lacuata, Romeo Artienda y Galvez,
Jr., Amado Merca y Lopez, Edwin "Eden" Tubiera y Detabli, Leonito Macapagal and one
other unknown person who remains at-large, were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, with the crimes of Murder with Unintentional
Abortion, two (2) counts of Murder and Frustrated Murder in four (4) separate
informations
Upon arraignment, all the accused present pleaded not guilty to all the offenses
charged. The cases were tried jointly and on 2 July 1993, the trial court rendered
a decision finding Jose Flores y Salinas, Manuel Corpuz y Lacuata, Romeo Artienda y
Galvez, Jr., Amado Merca y Lopez, and Edwin Tubiera y Detabli GUILTY of the crimes
filed against them. For insufficiency of evidence, the Court finds the accused
Leonito Macapagal NOT GUILTY of the crimes charged and hence his acquittal him.
All five (5) convicted accused appealed the judgment to this Court claiming, among
others, that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS'
DEFENSE OF ALIBI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS FULLY CORROBORATED BY WITNESSES
WHOSE REPUTATION FOR PROBITY COULD NOT BE IMPUGNED.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants� right to be presumed innocent was

violated because their alibis were not given credence.

Ruling: In People v. Salveron, the Court held that: �The alibi itself, although
corroborated . . was not convincing enough in the face of the positive
identification.�
Furthermore, in People v. Cortes the Court ruled that:�Justifiably, courts have
always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have received the same
with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also
because of its easy fabrication. It cannot prevail over the clear, direct and
positive testimony of prosecution witness Dignos identifying appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime.�
In the cases at bench, the alibis presented do not clearly show that it was
impossible for the accused-appellants to be at the locus criminis at the time the
crimes were committed. It is of note that a certain police officer, Robert Cabrera,
who could have corroborated the alibis of Manuel Corpuz and Jose Flores, if the
defense version were to be given credence, was never presented. The presumption
therefore is that his testimony would be adverse to the defense.
The other defense witnesses who tried to establish the alibis of the other accused-
appellants can hardly be considered to be disinterested witnesses. Against Myrna
Diones' positive identification that the five (5) accused-appellants were the
perpetrators, the alibis would have to fail.
Accused-appellants in their Reply brief also argue that since Myrna Diones admitted
having fallen unconscious after she was struck in the head, she could not have
testified to the actual commission of the crimes. Hence, accused-appellants
conclude that the findings of the trial court that they committed the crimes are
really without basis.
The argument is specious. What occurred subsequent to Myrna Diones' becoming
unconscious is adequately established by the other circumstances testified to by
Myrna.
Myrna Diones was able to convincingly testify to the participation of the five (5)
accused-appellants in taking her and her three (3) female companions to Naguilian
Road in the early hours of 19 June 1992. Myrna testified that her two (20
companions in the Fiera-typed vehicle were handcuffed, tied around the neck with
rope and mauled by the accused-appellants. Myrna testified that she, herself, was
stabbed and hit three (3) times with a wooden club by accused-appellant Edwin
Tubiera before she fell unconscious. The acts of accused-appellants clearly show
that there was a conspiracy to inflict potentially fatal injuries on the four (4)
women. Myrna and the three (3) deceased victims sustained injuries consistent with
Myrna's account of how they were mauled, stabbed and strangled with ropes.
That accused-appellants were the authors of the crimes committed is adequately
established by circumstantial evidence which proves with moral certainty that
accused-appellants not only conspired in inflicting injuries on Myrna Diones and
the three (3) deceased victims but that they also conspired in committing the
crimes of Murder with Unintentional Abortion, Double Murder and Frustrated Murder.
Finally, the offer of accused-appellants to compromise, which was never denied,
constitutes additional evidence against their innocence.
Clearly, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of accused-appellants
has been overcome by proof which to a moral certainty establishes their guilt for
the crimes of Double Murder, Murder with Unintentional Abortion and Frustrated
Murder.
The five (5) accused-appellants are still fortunate that the court could not then
impose the penalty of death upon them, for undoubtedly they would have been
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death for having violated, so heinously
at that, the laws which they had sworn to uphold as members of the police force.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision rendered by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 92-
CR-1358, 92-CR-1365, 92-CR-1366 and 92-CR-1407 convicting the five (5) accused-
appellants is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

APOLONIO CABANSAG vs. FERNANDEZ

October 18, 1957, G.R. No. L-8974

Nature of the case: This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No.
9564 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his
lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay a fine
of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of the of
offense will next time be heavily dealt with.

Facts: Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from
a parcel of land. However, the case was only partially heard during the period of
seven years.
On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order
No. I creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was
later superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on March 17, 1954. And on August
12, 1954 Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by the delay in the
disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the
Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
Counsel for defendants, filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio
Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made
in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived
of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for
Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn
declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his
pleading. Acting on these charges and counter- charges, on September 14, 1954,
Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing
within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the above
letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President
and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not have the idea to
besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the court nor was he actuated with
malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there is no single
contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a
wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in
the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judges who previously
intervened in the case.

Issue: Whether or not the writing of said letter tend to draw the intervention of
the PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect of undermining the court's
judicial independence?

Ruling: We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve their
integrity and maintain their dignity without which their administration of justice
is bound to falter or fail. This is the preservative power to punish for contempt.
This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of self-
preservation. In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publications
which tends to impair the impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it regardless of
who is affected. For, "as important as is the maintenance of unmuzzled press and
the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary".The reason for this is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such said institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably
exercised this power in the instant case?
We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the
bottom of our democratic institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right
to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to balance and reconcile
the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us.
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting
rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary
between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the
"clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as
interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high"
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the
"disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe
published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be
abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm
the administration of justice.
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme
Court of the United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a
result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the
evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . A
public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding
still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must
necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The
possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the
published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press."
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in
relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech and press
should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court
unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who
ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. .
. . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a
judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The
fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent not merely a likely, threat to
the administration of justice.
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper
criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may
constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public
comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases."
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where
extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of expression ends
and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a
remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the
freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject
to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts
against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)
This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.).
The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a
sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the
PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned
above?
Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the
PCAC which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings, we would at once see
that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to
belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for,
undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other
way of obtaining the early termination of his case.
The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating
factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that
the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the
precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not
be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the
Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be
contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous
tendency" to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the
writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for
redress of a legitimate grievance.
Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for
entertaining the belief that the only way by which he could obtain redress of his
grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC which after all is the office
created by the late President to receive and hear all complaints against officials
and employees of the government to facilitate which the assistance and cooperation
of all the executive departments were enjoined (Executive Order No. 1, as amended
by Executive Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under the control
of the President is the Department of Justice which under the law has
administrative supervision over courts of first instance.(Section 83, Revised
Administrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President. It can,
therefore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended
for the Department of Justice where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sending
of that letter may be considered as one sent to the Department of Justice and as
such cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the mantle of
protection of our constitution.
DONALD BAER vs. HON. TITO V. TIZON
May 3, 1974, G.R. No. L-24294

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the
orders of the respondent judge.

FACTS: On November 17, 1964, respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for
injunction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald
Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo.
He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging in an area situated in
Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval Base
authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A
restraining order was issued by respondent Judge on November 23, 1964.
Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the
Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the
jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a
foreign sovereign without its consent.
Then, on December 12, 1964, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, wherein such
ground was reiterated. It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of
an agency or instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject
matter of the action being official acts done by him for and in behalf of the
United States of America. It was added that in directing the cessation of logging
operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely
within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the
security of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern
and most important duty of the Commander of the Base.
There was, on December 14, 1964, an opposition and reply to petitioner's motion to
dismiss by respondent Gener, relying on the principle that "a private citizen
claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover
possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the
Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in
doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government."
That was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge. Petitioner,
thereafter, on January 12, 1965, made a written offer of documentary evidence,
including certified copies of telegrams of the Forestry Director to Forestry
personnel in Balanga, Bataan dated January 8, and January 11, 1965, directing
immediate investigation of illegal timber cutting in Bataan and calling attention
to the fact that the records of the office show no new renewal of timber license or
temporary extension permits.
The above notwithstanding, respondent Judge, on January 12, 1965, issued an order
granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES
Whether or not the invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign
state without its consent is appropriate.
Whether or not the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, possess
diplomatic immunity.

RULING
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its
consent is appropriate. Based from the opinion of Justice Montemayor: "It is clear
that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of
jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The
U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but
it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the
courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and
of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof." Then came Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage
Commission, where respondent, a United States agency established to compensate
damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held as falling within
the above doctrine as the suit against it "would eventually be a charge against or
financial liability of the United States Government because ..., the Commission has
no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments." To the same effect
is Parreno v. McGranery, as the following excerpt from the opinion of Justice
Tuason clearly shows: "It is a widely accepted principle of international law,
which is made a part of the law of the land (Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution), that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before the courts of
another state or its own courts without its consent."
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this
Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo,
does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his
personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the
government which he represents. Thus, after the Military Bases Agreement, in
Miquiabas v. Commanding General and Dizon v. The Commanding General of the
Philippine-Ryukus Command, both of them being habeas corpus petitions, there was no
question as to the submission to jurisdiction of the respondents. As a matter of
fact, in Miquiabas v. Commanding General, the immediate release of the petitioner
was ordered, it being apparent that the general court martial appointed by
respondent Commanding General was without jurisdiction to try petitioner.
Thereafter, in the cited cases of Syquia, Marquez Lim, and Johnson, the parties
proceeded against were American army commanding officers stationed in the
Philippines. The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent Judge is
that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled into court in connection with
acts performed by it pursuant to treaty provisions and thus impressed with a
governmental character.
The infirmity of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even more glaring when
it is considered that private respondent had ceased to have any right of entering
within the base area. This is made clear in the petition in these words: "In 1962,
respondent Gener was issued by the Bureau of Forestry an ordinary timber license to
cut logs in Barrio Mabayo, Morong, Bataan. The license was renewed on July 10,
1963. In 1963, he commenced logging operation inside the United States Naval Base,
Subic Bay, but in November 1963 he was apprehended and stopped by the Base
authorities from logging inside the Base. The renewal of his license expired on
July 30, 1964, and to date his license has not been renewed by the Bureau of
Forestry. .. In July 1964, the Mutual Defense Board, a joint Philippines-United
States agency established pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes between the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador to provide "direct
liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities on military matters of mutual concern,' advised the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs in writing that: "The enclosed map shows that the area in which Mr.
Gener was logging definitely falls within the boundaries of the base. This map also
depicts certain contiguous and overlapping areas whose functional usage would be
interfered with by the logging operations.'" 36 Nowhere in the answer of
respondents, nor in their memorandum, was this point met. It remained unrefuted.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting
aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case
No. 2984 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The injunction issued by this
Court on March 18, 1965 enjoining the enforcement of the aforesaid writ of
preliminary injunction of respondent Judge is hereby made permanent.
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION vs. DOMINGO D. PANIS
December 21, 1993, G.R. No. L-106528

Nature of the case: An appeal by certiorari to review the decision and resolution
of the respondent judge.

FACTS: In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private

respondents before the metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered
against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable
compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the
Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.
As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted on
April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise issued by the
same court on May 30, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction
and restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner
herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the demolition
of their houses on the premises in question.
On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
90-53531 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for
the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectment
proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power
to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and
welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of
P2 million in the City of Manila representing the provisional value of the land,
was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly
a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to expropriate the Fabie
Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10
square meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and
distributed the portions to the actual occupants thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its
owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot
has been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila,
with the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of
the 4,842.90 square meter lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation will prosper.

RULING: Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No.
409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to "condemn private property for
public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same into
home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila
general powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent
domain, thus:
General powers. � The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure,
and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and
personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property
for public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and
defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinafter
conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3).
Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake
urban land reform, thus:
Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and
to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents,
giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and
second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of this
section, the city may raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general funds,
by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands
through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval of the
President . . .
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale
to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried
employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the
expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is
simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a
flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra;
Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho Ardona
v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform
and housing.
The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been
complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for
hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing Authority v. Valenzuela,
159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and
appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of due
process.
Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order, denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent courts, passed upon the very same issues raised by
petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner therefore
cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.
The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an
amount not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact remains
that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore
estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is
merely provisional. The parties still have the second stage in the proceedings in
the proper court below to determine specifically the amount of just compensation to
be paid the landowner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

May 17, 1993, G.R. No. 103125

Nature of the case: Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: This Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural

lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary
of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementor of the agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops
and a housing project for provincial government employees.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer
for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation
cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated
January18, 1990.

ISSUE: Whether the Expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is

subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform as the
implementor of the agrarian reform program.

RULING: The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution

is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would
inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of
Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would
be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of
the Constitution.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads,
bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use
of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects
would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use.
The petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the
trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province
of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.
�

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILS., INC. vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM.
July 14, 1989, G.R. No. 78742

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari.

FACTS: The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative
power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for
violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide
for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article
VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutionality of P.D. No.27, E.O. Nos.228 and 229, and
R.A. No.6657.

RULING: The said laws are constitutional. The argument of the small farmers that
they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits
has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. However, no evidence has
been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been
violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it
must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon
full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No.
27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

WRIGHT vs. COURT OF APPEALS

August 15, 1994, G.R. No. 113213

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari, to set aside the order of
deportation.

FACTS: Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for

indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation
of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence,
petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the
order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which
violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the trial court's
decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the court
below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized,
all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before this Court strike at the
validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the government against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the judge extraditing the petitioner valid.

RULING: The order of the trial court is affirmed.Desiring to make more effective
cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the
suppression of crime, the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the
7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions
of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the
Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both
States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the
entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required
for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant
for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every
offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the
person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted
for prosecution under the said article.
Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that
petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade
arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is
required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a
competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State,
a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already
absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals
correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged
with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over
individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is
within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia
regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either
country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution
dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of
the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements
for entry into force were complied with by both governments.

THE HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO

December 1, 1994, G.R. No. 101949

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari.

Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City
in Rome and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land registered in the name
of the petitioner. Said lot is contiguous to two other lots registered in the name
of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon
Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of one of the
lots to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for annulment of
the sale and specific performance and damages.
Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the complaint based sovereign
immunity from suit.
The trial court denied petitioner�s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner
�shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question�.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The trial court issued an order deferring the
resolution on the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, a motion for intervention was filed by the Department of Foreign
Affairs.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the court of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a
state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered �commercial� and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come
out with our own guidelines. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If
the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular
act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as
an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
subsequent of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said
property for the site of its mission. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim.
The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation. The donation was not made for a
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official
residence of the papal nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose
off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

US VS. RUIZ
May 22, 1985, G.R. No. L-35645

Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review.

Facts: The United States of America (US) had a naval base in Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States.
The US invited the submission of bids for several projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co.,
Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the
company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with its
requests.
Thereafter, the company received a letter from petitioner stating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects and said projects had been
awarded to third parties.
The company sued the US.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning
the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the
persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant US, a foreign
sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit.
Subsequently, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the
motion.

Issue: Whether or not defendants may be sued.

Ruling: No. Defendants may not be sued.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its waiver or consent. However, State immunity now
extends only to governmental acts or acts jure imperii.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
sued only when it enters into business contracts.
In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

US VS GUINTO
February 26, 1990, G.R. No. 76607
Nature of the case: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of State immunity.

Facts: In GR No. 76607, private respondents are suing several officers of the US
Air Force in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contract for barber
services. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private
respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the
Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.
Petitioners explained that said concession was not awarded to Dizon but was already
operating such, and the expiration of the contract had been extended. Private
respondents filed a complaint. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against the US, which had not waived its
suability. The trial court denied the motion.
In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint against petitioners for his
dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center. It had been ascertained
after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended
him and thereafter referred the case to the board of arbitrators. The board
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was employed as a barracks boy in an extension of
Clark Air Base. He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
individual petitioners herein. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista
was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages.
In GR No. 80258, according to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up,
handcuffed and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their
bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim
the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they
were struggling and resisting arrest.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may not be sued.

Ruling: The doctrine of State immunity is based on the justification given by

Justice Holmes that �there can be no legal right against the authority which makes
the law on which the right depends�. The doctrine is sometimes derisively called
�the royal prerogative of dishonesty� because of the privilege it grants the state
to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
The rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly
imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the State may be
manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general
law or special law. Consent is implied when the State enters into a contract or it
commences litigation.
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international
law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Treaty.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
State immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts or acts jure
imperii.
In GR No. 80018, petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging
their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The
agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so
denominated, as in the case at bar.
In GR No. 80258, the record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really
discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the
incident in question occurred. Only after it shall have determined in what
capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will
this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is
applicable.
In GR No. 79470, the Court can assume that the restaurant services partake of the
nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a
perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the US. Neither does it appear
that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well
known that they are available to the general public as well, including the
tourists. Such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and
not a governmental activity. The consequence of this finding is that the
petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal
of the damage suit against them by Genove. For that matter, not even the US
government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into
employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. There was nothing
arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in
terminating the private respondent�s employment for his unbelievably nauseating
act. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint
for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.
In GR No. 76607, the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the US
government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question
being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the US vs Ruiz case cannot be
applied.

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

September 12, 1974, A.M. No. 533

Nature of the Case: An administrative case against respondent herein based on his
citizenship.

Facts: On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo,

this Court ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of Florencio
Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962, for the purpose
of determining whether his name should be stricken from the roll of persons
authorized to practice law in the Philippines.
After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a
decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by
preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban
Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese,
respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio
Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar
was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma
previously issued to him.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court
in its resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned
the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter
alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter the
decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of
(1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at
Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's father) is
the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons
who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
Considering that the respondent, as a duly admitted member of the bar, should be
given ample opportunity to establish the true facts about his citizenship and that
no effort should be spared to ascertain the truth before strippling him of the
privilege granted to him by the Court since 1962, and denying him the practice of
his chosen profession which he has honorably discharged as far as the records show.
Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968, as
well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three basic arguments,
to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana
Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a
Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine citizenship; and (c)
respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.

Issue: Whether or not the citizenship of respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, for
if Esteban were a Filipino as respondent claims, the latter axiomatically would
also be a Filipino and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll of Attorneys
in the Philippines would lose legal basis.

Ruling: After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences herein
presented, the Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside
of Our decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration that respondent
Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification and right
to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.
In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was
denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his father,
Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be
considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was "an inhabitant of the
Philippines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate
issued by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na,
as "wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of
the evidence presented by therein applicant and consequently carries little
evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the
affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939, to the effect that he
had chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-
serving, but also it can not be considered a re-affirmation of the alleged election
of citizenship since no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to
exist.
With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority
granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent's
citizenship has been duly filled.
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person,
birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their
declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the
place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such
declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of
Esteban Mallare. Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth,
race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive.
Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from
persons who are not members of the family � the reason for the distinction is the
public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital
relations.
The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community
where relationships not in conformity with established contentions become the
subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalelon
that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness, would constitute
proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out
of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname
"Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be
straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by
Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that
alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare
is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere
conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on
the reputation in the community regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is
admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it must be
realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain
characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person
hails from the same region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that
the witnesses testified having known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon,
their declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of
credibility.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges
to which he is rightfully entitled.
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as
1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to show
his preference for Philippine citizenship. 15 Indeed, it would be unfair to expect
the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the
enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was
required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the
proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution.

AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

May 25, 1990, G.R. No. 83820

Nature of the case: A petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition
for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osme�a as candidate
for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.

Facts: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osme�a filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor
of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for
short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being
a citizen of the United States of America.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to
continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the
following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen:
Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed
by private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of Registration
No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance
dated January 3, 1980.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osme�a, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osme�a, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has
been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of
the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in
the Philippines since 1965.
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes,
private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof
that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the dismissal of the petition by the COMELEC was valid and
proper.
b) Whether or not the private respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: The petition is not meritorious.

A) There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a
registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy
was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. �
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. � Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after
the proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on
November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification
of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for
disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated
as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is
unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed
Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
B) We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's
citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been
proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of
the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,
therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a
foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osme�a did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other
mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and
permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an
American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to
the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who
are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the
United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

CRUZ vs. TANTUICO

October 28, 1988, G.R. No. L-49535

Nature of the case: A petition for review on certiorari in seeking relief from the
Court, in addition to the setting aside of certain orders of respondent COA Acting
Chairman, in the issuance of an order for the release of petitioner's retirement
benefits.

Facts: An investigation of an anomaly, involving treasury warrants, revealed that

it was the handiwork of a "syndicate" composed of employees of the Budget
Commission and the Department of Education and Culture (DEC). Using falsified
computations and service records, some sixty-eight (68) treasury warrants were
issued and made payable to fictitious or "ghost" teachers in Region IX (Zamboanga
del Sur), all of which appeared to be genuine and duly signed by the authorized
signatories of the DEC. Twenty-eight (28) of these warrants are the subject of this
case.
The Auditor assigned to the Treasury Vault and Banking Audit Division of the Bureau
of Treasury requested the National Cashier to "cause the dishonor of the subject
warrants and the encashment thereof charged back to the account of the banks
concerned or to Miss Cruz, as the case may be. The first charge back against Miss
Cruz as made on August 17, 1976 in the amount of the P15,308.91 and subsequently
increased by P6,236.17 on August 23, 1976 thus making her total cash
accountabilities amount to P21,545.08. The Auditor also formally demanded that
petitioner produce the missing funds while the Acting National Cashier required her
to increase her cash accountability.
In her written explanations to these demands, petitioner stressed that she paid the
warrants in good faith as there was nothing on their faces or in the endorsements
to raise any doubt as to their genuineness. Petitioner requested that in lieu of
charging her for the shortage, "the same be dropped from the cash book and
simultaneously recorded as a receivable (from the guilty party/parties) on the
books of the Bureau of Treasury.
Acting on the matter which was formally referred to him, the respondent Commission
on Audit (COA) Acting Chairman issued an order stating among others that:
�appearing from these papers that it was Miss Romana Cruz, Cashier IV, Cash
Division, that Bureau, who paid the treasury warrants in question totalling
P21,545.08 to wrong or fictitious payees and, therefore, is the last indorser
liable for the value thereof, it is hereby directed that she be required to restore
and restitute to that Bureau the said amount, without prejudice to her right of
recourse against the guarantors of said warrants, if any.
In case of failure of Miss Cruz to effect the restitution of said amount as herein
directed, her salary should be withheld pursuant to Section 624 of the Revised
Administrative Code and applied in settlement of her liability.
Manifesting his disagreement with the above ruling, the Treasurer under the 5th
indorsement opined ". . . that the loss of government funds arising from the
encashment of the subject treasury warrants as a result of the negligent act of the
DEC in issuing these treasury warrants to fictitious persons, should be borne by
the DEC and not by Miss Romana Cruz who paid them in good faith and pursuant to her
duty as Cashier IV of this Treasury to pay treasury warrants and government checks
presented to her for payment.
Hence this petition by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the treasury warrants.

Ruling: It is not disputed that on the face of the treasury warrants, there
appeared no irregularity The warrants were signed by the authorized signatories of
the DEC. Furthermore, Editha Gonzales, the party who presented the treasury
warrants for encashment, was a bona fide employee of the DEC who regularly cashed
warrants with the petitioner and was therefore known to her personally. Considering
these circumstances, the encashment by the petitioner of the subject treasury
warrants did not amount to an act of negligence for which she should be made
liable.
Having established that petitioner was not negligent in encashing the treasury
warrants, justice dictates that she should not be made personally liable for the
consequent losses.
As mentioned above, no neligence attended the petitioner's encashment of the
treasury warrants. Even assuming that. she could be held liable for non- compliance
with or violation of some rule or regulation, this Court agrees with the petitioner
that Section 624 of the Revised Administrative Code cannot be construed to
authorize a deduction of the value of the treasury warrants from her retirement
benefits. Said section provides:
Sec. 624. Retention of salary for satisfaction of indebtedness.�When any person is
indebted to the Government of the Philippine Islands (or Government of the United
States), the Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer to withhold the payment
of any money due him or his estate, the same to be applied in satisfaction of such
indebtedness.
The question to be determined is whether or not the gratuity of the petitioner in
this case can be withheld and applied to the payment of his remaining indebtedness
to the San Lazaro Investment Fund notwithstanding the provision of section 3 of Act
No. 4051 that the gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be attached or levied
upon execution. *** The respondents contend that the withholding of the
corresponding amount of the petitioner's gratuity was made with a view to its
application to the payment of his indebtedness to the Government, and that such
action is authorized by section 624 of the Administrative Code which provides that
"When any person is indebted to the government of the Philippine Islands or
Government of the United States, the Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer
to withhold the payment of any money due him or his estate, the same to be applied
in satisfaction of such indebtedness.
While Section 3 of Act No. 4051 refers merely to attachment or levy upon execution,
we are of the opinion that the exemption should be liberally construed in favor of
the pensioner. Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of
the Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide
the pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless
otherwise clearly provided, the pension should insure wholly to the benefit of the
pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved
was had under section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial
process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view
of the prohibition of section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by
administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and
enable the respondents to do indirectly what they can not do directly under section
3 of Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on February
21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies section 624 relied
upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. Considering section
3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority granted in section 624
of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two provisions is avoided.

TANTUICO, JR. vs. DOMINGO

February 28, 1994, G.R. No. 96422

Nature of the case: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Facts: Petitioner was a former chairman of the Commission on Audit. Petitioner

applied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in
preparation for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which
covered the period from 1976 to December 31, 1985. The clearance had all the
required signatures and bore a certification that petitioner was "cleared from
money, property and/or other accountabilities by this Commission.
After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner submitted his courtesy resignation to
President Corazon C. Aquino. He relinquished his office to the newly appointed
Chairman, now Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. on March 10, 1986. That
same day, he applied for retirement effective immediately.
Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the period from January 1, 1986 to
March 9, 1986. All the signatures necessary to complete the second clearance,
except that of Chairman Guingona, were obtained. The second clearance embodies a
certificate that petitioner was "cleared from money, property and/or accountability
by this Commission. Chairman Guingona, however, failed to take any action thereon.
Chairman Guingona was replaced by respondent Chairman. A year later, respondent
Chairman issued COA Office Order No. 87-10182, which created a committee to
inventory all equipment acquired during the tenure of his two predecessors.
Not satisfied with the audit reports he received, respondent Chairman created a
special audit team for the purpose of conducting a financial and compliance audit
of the COA transactions and accounts during the tenure of petitioner from 1976 to
1984. The special audit team submitted its report stating: (i) that the audit
consisted of selective review of post-audit transactions in the head offices and
the State Accounting and Auditing Center; (ii) that the audit disclosed a number of
deficiencies which adversely affected the financial condition and operation of the
COA, such as violations of executive orders, presidential decrees and related rules
and regulations; and (iii) that there were some constraints in the audit, such as
the unavailability of records and documents, and personnel movements and turnover.
While the report did not make any recommendation, it instead mentioned several
officials and employees, including petitioner, who may be responsible or
accountable for the questioned transactions.
In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by petitioner on
December 27, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of his
application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9, 1986.
However, respondent Chairman added:
. . . In view, however, of the audit findings and inventory report adverted to
above, payment of only one-half (�) of the money value of the benefits due you by
reason of such retirement will be allowed, subject to the availability of funds and
the usual accounting and auditing rules. Payment of the balance of said retirement
benefits shall be subject to the final results of the audit concerning your fiscal
responsibility and/or accountability as former Chairman of this Commission.
In a letter dated January 22, 1990, petitioner requested full payment of his
retirement benefits.
Petitioner submitted a letter-complaint, wherein he cited certain defects in the
manner the audit was conducted. He further claimed that the re-audit was not
authorized by law since it covered closed and settled accounts.

Issue: Whether or not the non-payment of petitioner�s full retirement benefits is

legal and proper.

Ruling: Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be

discovered from the audit concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA
Chairman, respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under the
retirement laws.
In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that the
employee had been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and property
responsibility, and held that the retirement pay accruing to a public officer may
not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.
In Tantuico, we cited Justice Laurel's essay on the rationale for the benign ruling
in favor of the retired employees, thus:
. . . Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the graciousness of the
Government intended to reward past services and, at the same time, to provide the
pensioner with the means with which to support himself and his family. Unless
otherwise clearly provided, the pension should inure wholly to the benefit of the
pensioner. It is true that the withholding and application of the amount involved
was had under Section 624 of the Administrative Code and not by any judicial
process, but if the gratuity could not be attached or levied upon execution in view
of the prohibition of Section 3 of Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by
administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the same prohibited result and
enable the respondent to do indirectly what they can not do directly under Section
3 of the Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later statute having been approved on
February 21, 1933, whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which embodies Section
624 relied upon by the respondents was approved on March 10 of that year.
Considering Section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception to the general authority
granted in Section 624 of the Administrative Code, antagonism between the two
provisions is avoided.
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor
General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the
benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution.
Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended (The Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not be
subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes."
Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of
the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and
comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.

DAZA vs. SINGSON

December 21, 1989, G.R. No. 86344

Nature of the case: Petitioner challenges his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

Facts: After the congressional elections of May 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among
the several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.
In September 1988, the LDP was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in
the HOR. Twenty-four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party
and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing
their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, the HOR
raised its representation in the CA by withdrawing the seat occupied by the
petitioner and giving this to the newly formed LDP.
Respondent Singson was added as a member from the LDP. The petitioner went to the
Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the commission and the assumption of
his seat by the respondent. The respondent questions the court�s jurisdiction on
the ground that it is political in nature.

Issue: Whether or not the SC has the competence to act, in the case at bar, since
it involved the legality of the act of the HOR in removing the petitioner from the
CA.

Ruling: The Court declared that it has the competence to act on the matter at bar.
The case is not a discretionary act of the HOR that may not be reviewed by the
court because it is political in nature. What is involved is the legality not the
wisdom of the act of the HOR in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. This is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion
explained in Ta�ada vs. Cuenco:
The term political question connotes in legal parlance, a question of policy. In
other words, it refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. Not
legality, of a particular measure.

Garcia vs. De la Pe�a

February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 766

Nature of the Case: Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court. Partiality, abuse
of authority and grave abuse of discretion.

Facts: Petitioner Garcia filed an administrative case before the Supreme Court
against respondent Judge Meljohn dela Pe�a for partiality, abuse of authority and
grave abuse of discretion for presiding over a criminal case in which the
respondent's brother was a complainant and petitioner Garcia's wife was an accused
in said criminal case. A complaint was earlier filed by the complainant against
respondent judge before the Office of the Ombudsman, which however, dismissed the
complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of an administrative case by the Ombudsman,

filed against an erring judge precludes the Supreme Court from taking cognizance of
the resolution of such administrative case filed before it by the petitioner.

Ruling: Respondent judge dismissed from the service. The dismissal of the criminal
aspect of the same complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman in its resolution of
March 23, 1993 will not affect the resolution of this case which basically relates
to the power of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the presiding justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws and pertinent
rules and take proper administrative action against them, in the event that they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Buenaseda vs. Flavier

September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to nullify the order of the Ombudsman
Facts: Private respondent Juan Flavier, among others, filed an administrative
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Dra. Brigida S.
Buenaseda, among others, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.
Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation
stressing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. Petitioners likewise seek the nullification of the order of
suspension by the Ombudsman. The Solicitor General submitted its comment finding
that the authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no
direct power to suspend. Respondents argue that the power of the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend government officials and employees is vested under Section 24
of R.A No. 6770 as being contemplated by Sec. 13 (8) of Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend Government officials
and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending
the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and
employees.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the
power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees, it referred
to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
"suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Section 24 of R.A No. 6770, which grants the
Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisite therein set
forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such
actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him
to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need
to suspend the respondent.

Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 426

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating
contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Dev't. (BED) for the
exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. However, it turned out that the
Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corp. (MMIC) shall be the logical coal operator.
Thus, IEI & MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby IEI assigned and
transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are
the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Eventually, IEI filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati Br. 150 an action for rescission of the MOA
with damages on the ground of certain violations of the provisions of the MOA.
The RTC ordered the rescission of the MOA. The CA reversed the RTC ruling that the
latter has no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under PD No. 1206, it
is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration,
exploitation and development of coal blocks. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit
for rescission of the MOA concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks.

Ruling: Petition denied. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of
what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact
is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-
operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-
bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the
integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of
rationalizing the country's over all coal-supply-demand balance. IEI's cause of
action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to
it of the operation of the coal blocks. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
applicable in this case. Such principle applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its view.

Rosario vs. CA
1992, 211 SCRA 384

Nature of the case: Petition for review of the decision of the CA

FACTS: There was a land dispute that arose between petitioner Juanito A. Rosario
and private respondent Alejandro Cruz over a lot. The controversy stemmed from the
"land for the landless program". The City of Manila through its City Tenant's
Security Commission (Commission) undertook to subdivide and award parcels of land
to the occupants thereof. Lot 3, Block 3 was subdivided into three lots,
designated as lots 3-A, 3-B and 3-C with areas of 56.5 sq. m. each. Private
respondent, as original lessee of the area, sublet his house on lot 3-A to
petitioner. Both parties filed with the City Tenant's Security Commission their
applications to purchase lots 3-A and 3-C. The Commission awarded lot 3-A to
Rosario while lot 3-C was awarded to Cruz. Not satisfied, Cruz opposed the award
of lot 3-A to Rosario. Eventually the Commission revoked its resolution awarding
lot 3-A to Rosario. Rosario filed an action to quiet title before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) which dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner
did not exercise his right to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an appeal
to the Office of the President before seeking a judicial review thereof. The CA
likewise dismissed petitioner's appeal filed before it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a

hard and fast rule, the failure to resort thereto warrants the dismissal of the
case before the judicial tribunal.

RULING: Decision of the CA reversed. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies

is not, however, necessarily fatal to an action. Citing Soto vs. Jareno, 114 SCRA
116, the Court ruled that failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only
effect of non compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of
a cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.
It does not appear in this case that a motion to dismiss, based on non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies had been filed. The Supreme Court, in the broader
interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for
certiorari although the proper remedy is appeal.

Benito vs. COMELEC

1994, 235 SCRA 436

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner Ottomama Benito and the deceased Hadji Murad Kismen Sampiano Ogca
were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in the
May 11, 1992 elections. There was a disqualification case filed against Ogca and
investigations were conducted. However, Ogca was killed in an ambush. Petitioner,
probably not aware of the death of his opponent, filed a motion to suspend the
proclamation of Ogca as elected mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur in which the
COMELEC denied the same. The Municipal Board of Canvassers ruled that the votes of
deceased Ogca be excluded from tallying, counting and canvassing. Herein private
respondent appealed the above ruling to the COMELEC praying that the Municipal
Board of Canvassers be enjoined from implementing its ruling. The COMELEC directed
the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained
the highest vote. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the
duly elected mayor. The COMELEC declared such proclamation null and void. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes in a regular election shall allow the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes to be proclaimed as the winner.

RULING: Petition dismissed. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes dies, or is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for
the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over
the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and
meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.

MARQUEZ vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR

March 16, 1989. G.R. No. 80685. 171 SCRA 337

Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari with the issuance of temporary
restraining order.

FACTS: Private respondent Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL- KATIPUNAN) in

behalf of seventy nine (79) of its members who are employed at the Little Folks
Snack Mobile owned by petitioner, filed on July 16, 1986 with the Office of the
Director of the National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
a complaint for underpayment of minimum wage, non-payment of ECOLA, non-payment of
incentive leave benefits and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint was later
amended to include non-payment of holiday pay, non-payment of premium pay on rest
day, non-payment of maternity leave benefits and illegal exaction.
Minerva Peran, the representative of the employees during the proceedings before
the hearing officer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Little Folks Snack Mobile (SAMAHAN) a local chapter of respondent
KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN, to which the seventy nine (79) employees allegedly belong, and
petitioner employer were able to settle amicably their dispute through a compromise
agreement. The employees opposed the motion on the ground that Minerva Peran was
not authorized to enter into the alleged compromise agreement and much less to move
for the dismissal of the complaint. The Regional Director if DOLE rendered a
decision denying the motion to dismiss and directing petitioner to pay the
employees their various claims. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the
decision of the Regional Director. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with
the issuance of temporary restraining order, after their two motions for
reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner relies heavily on the amicable settlement which was allegedly entered
into with the employees through their representative Minerva Peran. According to
petitioner, with the execution of the amicable settlement, the employees' complaint
was rendered moot and academic and petitioner's submission of a position paper
became unnecessary. Petitioner also alleged denial of due process when the Regional
Director of DOLE rendered judgment in favor of the employees.

ISSUE
1) Whether or not an amicable settlement entered by a Union Representative is
valid.
2) Whether or not there was denial of due process.
3) Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction.

RULING:
1) The rule in this jurisdiction is that money claims due to laborers cannot be
the object of settlement or compromise effected by the union, union officers or
counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. This is
so because the aggrieved parties are the individual complainants themselves. Their
representative can only assist but not decide for them. In the light of the
categorical denial by the employees that Peran was authorized to enter into an
amicable settlement as regards their claims, the Court holds that public respondent
Secretary of Labor ruled correctly in upholding the Regional Director's rejection
of the agreement.
2) There is denial of due process when a party is not accorded an opportunity to be
heard in a case filed against him. However, what the law prohibits is the absolute
lack of an opportunity to be heard. Hence, it has been ruled that there was no
denial of due process where the employer was duly represented by counsel and given
sufficient opportunity to be heard and present his evidence nor where the
employer's failure to be heard was due to the various postponements granted to it
or to his repeated failure to appear during the hearings.
Petitioner, in this case, was given at least three chances by the hearing officer
to submit his position paper but failed each time. Even prior to the hearing
officer's order for the submission of the position paper, petitioner was given the
opportunity to traverse the employees' complaint when he was ordered to comment on
the employees' computation of their claims. The comment was never submitted since
petitioner failed to appear during the two hearings set for the purpose despite due
notice. Clearly, petitioner was granted ample opportunity to present his case
before the Regional Director.
3) Petitioner impugns the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and the Regional
Director to award the money claims of the employees contending that all money
claims of workers arising from an employer- employee relationship are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as provided by Art. 217 of the Labor
Code, as amended. This contention, which is being raised for the first time in this
petition, can no longer be considered by the Court at this stage.
The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled
with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body
where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.

CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS

December 2, 1940, G.R. No. 47800

Nature of the case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of

Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against
the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission;
Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of
Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
As alleged, the National Traffic Commission�s resolution to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmari�as Street, from 7:30 a. m. to
12:30 p. m. and from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11
p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic and as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not now allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of prohibition may be issued.

Ruling: The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied.

Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state to this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is
withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox
lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very
means of insuring its preservation.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort. and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MORAN
July 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 249

Nature of the Case: Petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of
First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed
against the petitioner.

FACTS: The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila,
Philippine Islands. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him.
Petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Manila is without
jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court
of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of
the Philippines and even under the Constitution of the Philippines original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls,
is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.

RULING: Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a
consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is
accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the
laws of the country where he resides.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.

July 20, 1994. G.R. No. 111097

Nature of the case: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order

Facts: In light of establishment of casinos in Cagayan de Oro City by PAGCOR, the

Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 entitled as �AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT
TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION
THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.� and Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled �AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
THEREFOR.�
Pryce assailed the ordinances and succeeded.
Petitioners assailed the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the ordinances and
that under the Local Government Code�s general welfare clause, the petitioner was
justified in enacting said ordinances.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are valid.

Ruling: The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there
is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or,
for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which
this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding
the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to
which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to
the courts of justice.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners
are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated
with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869
and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is
the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot
prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the
Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but
merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino
over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of
P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or
repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that
the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code
has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly
speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government
unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section
458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted
meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress
gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling.
Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or
centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to
the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no
longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue
through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing
clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly
mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by
the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire
repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No.
319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are
hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the
Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential
Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree
Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered
of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs
locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended;
Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in
the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the
contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source
of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board
of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust
punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures
for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two
statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the
Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity
more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort
to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the
handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict
between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul
the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is
possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to
hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed
must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except
only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws
must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective
and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to
wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern
concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The
petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of
gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a
clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following
this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and
B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309
and R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the
conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are
valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the
decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of
gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which
they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units
although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government
units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and
large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

BARRIOQUINTO v. FERNANDEZ
January 21, 1949, G.R. No. L-1278

Nature of the case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

Facts: Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the
crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against
the former, Jimenez was to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an
appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8,
which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed
during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy
control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other
petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the
same.
The Amnesty Commission returned the application of the petitioners to the CFI of
Zamboanga, without deciding over the amnesty on the ground that inasmuch as neither
Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because
Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to application for amnesty.

Ruling: Respondents are entitled to amnesty.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated
on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be
distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or
forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of
the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"
while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
It is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit
having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege
the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms
of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance."
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party,
conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused,
on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot
or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty
Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created
thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits
granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence
presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented
either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived,
because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty
Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in
the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of
the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as
the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has
committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof,
so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a
criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the
nation inn committing such an act.

Vera v. People
January 31,1963, 31 SCRA 711
Nature of the Case: Special proceeding for certiorari to set aside a decision of
the Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioners Gaudencio Vera, Restituto, Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo

Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon petitioners'
motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of
1946, the case was referred to the Eighth Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which
actually tried it.
During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed
the crime charged and as there was no admission to their crime the Commission, in
its decision of January 12, 1956, held that it could not take cognizance of the
case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked
only by defendants in a criminal case who.. admitting the commission of the crime,
plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and
perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of
origin for trial. Where the court denied the application for amnesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit
having committed the crime of which they were accused.
HELD: Petitioners are not entitled to amnesty in not admitting the crime.
It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for
an act which, according to him., he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes
certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the
existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea
of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations
against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which,
if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty
proclamation.
At any rate, the facts established before the Commission no not bring this case
within the terms of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. Note that said proclamation extends
its provisions to "all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised
Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding
in the war effort of the enemy." As found by the Commission, the killing of the
deceased (Loza�es) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due
to the rivalry between the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he belonged, and the Vera's
Guerrilla of petitioners.

Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

August 24, 1993, G.R. No. 96541

Nature of the case: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

Facts: Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C.
Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods
International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the
scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and
antique silverware seized from Malaca�ang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his
relatives and cronies which was authorized.
The Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to
President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment
Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG
Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality;
(b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor
track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject
of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their
disposal was prohibited by law.

Issue: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this
Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.

Ruling: Petition is denied. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents

Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of
a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the
question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or
controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself.
On the first requisite, the Court have held that one having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in
obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on
a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the
rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by
the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given
to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries
on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings
and silverware were taken from Malaca�ang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership
of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying
with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any
constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent
disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose
authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners
of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners
do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed
by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the
government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not
challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they
allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that
the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not
with public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot
or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable
by a court of justice. 16 A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has
become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale
of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the
issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, the Court need to emphasize that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of
an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved.
However, there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the
relaxation of the rule.
The Court agrees with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the
law, it is the Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the inventory,
registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts, of
important cultural properties and national cultural treasures. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned.

Marcos v. Manglapus
October 27, 1989, 177 SCRA 668

Nature of the Case: Petition for mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents
to issue travel documents to the petitioner.

FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members
of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President�s decision to bar
their return to the Phils. Petitioners advance the view that the President�s powers
are limited to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, i.e. the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices; the power to execute
the laws, the appointing powers, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause;
the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans; the power to enter into treaties
of international agreements; the power to submit budget to Congress and all the
power to address Congress and that what is not enumerated is impliedly to her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

RULING: Yes the President may under her residual powers.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated in the Constitution. The President has the obligation under
the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national
interest. To the President, the problem is one of the balancing the general welfare
and common good against the exercise of right of certain individuals. The power
involved us the President�s residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. The request of demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return cannot be
considered in the light solely of the Constitution provisions guaranteeing the
right of liberty to abode and travel. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to the residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect the general welfare.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat
to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will
cause the escalation of violence against the State that would be the time for the
President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the
Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and
direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State-the fruition of the people's sovereignty-is an obligation
in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution
and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

Cua v. COMELEC
December 17,1987, G.R. No. 80519-21

Nature of the case: Petition to review the order of the Commission on Elections.

Facts: Petitioner Cua was proclaimed as winner in the lone congressional district
of Quirino through a 2-1 decision rendered by COMELEC First Division but
nevertheless was suspended of his proclamation due to the lack of the unanimous
vote required by the procedural rules in COMELEC Resolution No. 1669 dated May 2,
1984.
The position of the petitioner is that the 2-1 decision of the First Division was a
valid decision of the COMELEC itself despite the above rule because of Article IX-
A. Section 7 of the new Constitution, providing that "each Commission shall decide
by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it." He
argues that this applies to the votings of the COMELEC both in division and en banc
and that the private respondent himself recognized this when he filed the motion
for reconsideration/appeal with the COMELEC en banc.
Respondents argue that in any case no valid decision was reached by the COMELEC en
banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did
not constitute a majority of the body.

Issue: Whether or not a valid decision was rendered by the COMELEC First Division.

Ruling: Petition is granted and the public respondent is enjoined from further
proceeding with the private respondent�s motion. The restraining order enjoining
petitioner from assuming office is lifted.
A 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division is a valid decision as the total
number of votes which were three constituted a majority.
�After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court
holds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision
under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members
who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members
who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under
the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the
basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to
assume his seat in the House of Representatives.
It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seemingly
interminable debates on this matter that have been festering for quite some time
now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the COMELEC. The
indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and application of its
own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our people who remain
unrepresented to date in the House of Representatives despite the fact that the
congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.�

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals

March 16, 1994, G.R. No. 110120.

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer
for restraining order

Facts: The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to
dispose off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and
sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin,
Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the
hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of
the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation and found that the water collected from
the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in
turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other
than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling.
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely
halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste
matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14,
1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and
issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan
from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

Issue: Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of
the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Ruling: The petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte
cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of
Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in
P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to
draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the
order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple
and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of
the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated
as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital
public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II,
Section 16.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative
duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the
state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of
1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of
its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease
and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.

Flores vs. Drilon

June 22, 1993, G.R. No. 104732.

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order

Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known
as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay etropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this
original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds
by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . . ."
Paragraph (d) reads that a the President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees
Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in
par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during
his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and
the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution,
which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject
posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, stated that this
act of appointment would result to an election offense.

Issue: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states,
"Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.

Ruling: The proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . .
Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer
or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the
delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-
time job.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely
what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of
the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective
official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no
moment.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by
an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution
itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-
President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress
who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the
second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the
first paragraph.
Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to
make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead,
"ex officio" would have been used.
The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by
respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged
proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, the
argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another
post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double
compensation would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the
constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3,
Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office
or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and
discharge the duties of the same.
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act
of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the
appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a
presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one
eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify
for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his
discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the
essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature
itself of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid
legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an
encroachment on his prerogative.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from
his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before
he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another
public office.
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by
the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not
eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot
be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision
should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his
seat . . . ." "Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one
office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either
generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the
incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the
second is void .�
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto
officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the
interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were
exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or]
under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

BASCO v. PAGCOR
May 14, 1991, G.R. No. 91649

Nature of the case: Petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation Charter (PD 1869).

Facts: The petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR Charter PD1869 because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order and because it waived the
Manila City government right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized
by law. Petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national
policy of the �new restored democracy� and the people�s will as expressed in the
1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a �gambling objective� and therefore
is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Art. II Sec. 1 of Art. VII and c. 3(2) of
Art. XIV of the present Constitution. Petitioners contend that PD 1869 constitute a
waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees that the
exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principles of local autonomy. They
must be referring to Sec. 13 par 2 of PD 1869 which exempts PAGCOR as the branches
holder from paying any tax, any kind of term income or otherwise as well as fees,
charges as levies of whatever nature whether national or local.

Issues
Whether or not the local autonomy clause was violated by PD 1869.
Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated.

Ruling
1.) The petitioner�s contentions are without merit.
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer
that power or the municipality cannot assume it". Its "power to tax" therefore must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the "inherent power to tax".
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" which has the
power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general
legislative powers". Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru
the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was
vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the
City of Manila.
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter
role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation
might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at
least, the instrumentalities of the United States and it can be agreed that no
state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way
as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities
or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation".
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked", its "exemption clause"
remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose
taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
or an "imperium in imperio."
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.
2.) No valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores
the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things
to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to
be treated in law as though they were the same.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied.
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all
occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do
what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in
which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would
insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the
law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

August 29, 1996, GRN 119761. 261 SCRA 236

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of Court of Appeals.

FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the

manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.
On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More"
cigarettes. In a letter, dated 06 January 1987, of then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., to Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, "the initial position of the Commission was to
classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in
the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune
Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More to 'Premium More,'
thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Proof was also
submitted to the Bureau (of Internal Revenue ['BIR']) that 'Champion' was an
original Fortune Tobacco Corporation register and therefore a local brand."
A bill, which later became Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654,6 was enacted, on 10 June
1993, by the legislature and signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by the President of
the Philippines. The new law became effective on 03 July 1993.
About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectivity of RA
7654, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was issued by the BIR
which expressed:
"In view of the issues raised on whether 'HOPE.' 'MORE' and 'CHAMPION' cigarettes
which are locally manufactured are appropriately considered as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, this Office is compelled to review the previous
rulings on the matter.
"Under the foregoing, the test for imposition of the 55% ad valorem tax on
cigarettes is that the locally manufactured cigarettes bear a foreign brand
regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand was
sold or transferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. The brand must be
originally owned by a foreign manufacturer or producer. If ownership of the
cigarette brand is, however, not definitely determinable, 'x x x the listing of
brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World
On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.On 10
August 1994, the CTA upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco.
In its resolution, dated 11 October 1994, the CTA dismissed for lack of merit the
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
Whether RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative rule the issuance of which needs no
prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory Ruling which calls for the twin
requirements of prior notice and hearing, and,
Whether RMC 37-93 is discriminatory in nature.

RULING: The Court must sustain both the appellate court and the tax court.
Petitioner stresses on the wide and ample authority of the BIR in the issuance of
rulings for the effective implementation of the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Let it be made clear that such authority of the Commissioner is not
here doubted. Like any other government agency, however, the CIR may not disregard
legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of its quasi-
legislative powers.
Let us first distinguish between two kinds of administrative issuances - a
legislative rule and an interpretative rule.
In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance
Secretary, the Court expressed:
"a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way
that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that
before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
"Public Participation. - If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far
as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.
"(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
"(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
"In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules
are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
charge of enforcing."
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it
has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a
corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past
Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended,
but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury,"
"Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.
Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally
manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified
as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the questioned circular, "Hope
Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes were in the category of locally
manufactured cigarettes not bearing foreign brand subject to 45% ad valorem tax.
Hence, without RMC 3 7-93, the enactment of RA 7654, would have had no new tax rate
consequence on private respondent's products. Evidently, in order to place "Hope
Luxury," "Premium More," and "Champion" cigarettes within the scope of the
amendatory law and subject them to an increased tax rate, the now disputed RMC 37-
93 had to be issued. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily,
it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then
ignored.
Indeed, the BIR itself, in its RMC 10-86, has observed and provided:
Nothing on record could tell us that it was either impossible or impracticable for
the BIR to observe and comply with the above requirements before giving effect to
its questioned circular.
Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of
taxation.
Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to
be uniform and equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on equal footing both
in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of
the same class must be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with the
same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.
Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," Premium More" and
"Champion" cigarettes and, unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the
submission of private respondent that the circular should, as in fact my esteemed
colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate opinion, be
considered adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process following the
Ang Tibay doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. In
its decision, the CTA has keenly noted that other cigarettes bearing foreign brands
have not been similarly included within the scope of the circular,

All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen
short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.
A brief discourse on the powers and functions of administrative bodies may be
instructive.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of powers.
Interpretative rule, one of the three (3) types of quasi-legislative or rule making
powers of an administrative agency (the other two being supplementary or detailed
legislation, and contingent legislation), is promulgated by the administrative
agency to interpret, clarify or explain statutory regulations under which the
administrative body operates. The purpose or objective of an interpretative rule is
merely to construe the statute being administered. It purports to do no more than
interpret the statue. Simply, the rule tries to say what the statue means.
Generally, it refers to no single person or party in particular but concerns all
those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said interpretative
rule. It need not be published and neither is a hearing required since it is issued
by the administrative body as an incident of its power to enforce the law and is
intended merely to clarify statutory provisions for proper observance by the
people. In Ta�ada v. Tuvera,6 this Court expressly said that "interpretative
regulations x x x need not be published."
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power
of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law.7 The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.8 In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are
affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
The importance of due process cannot be underestimated. Too basic is the rule that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. Thus when an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, notice
and fair open hearing are essential to the validity of the proceeding. The right to
reasonable prior notice and hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence
but also the opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.
The right to submit arguments implies that opportunity otherwise the right may as
well be considered impotent. And those who are brought into contest with government
in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are
entitled to be fairly advised of what the government proposes and to be heard upon
its proposal before it issues its final command.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative
proceedings. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations9
enumerated these rights (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision
must have something to support itself, (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5)
the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or
any of its Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision; and, (7) the tribunal should in all controversial questions
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding may know the
various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.
In determining whether RMC No. 37-93 is merely an interpretative rule which
requires no prior notice and hearing, or an adjudicatory rule which demands the
observance of due process, a close examination of RMC 37-93 is in order.
Noticeably, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue at first interprets Sec.
142, par. (c), subpar. (1), of the NIRC, as amended, by citing the law and
clarifying or explaining what it means Section 142 (c) (1), National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6956, provides: On locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-five (55%) Provided, That this rate shall
apply regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the foreign brand
was sold or transferred by its owner to the local manufacturer. Whenever it has to
be determined whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign brand, the listing of
brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in the current World Tobacco
Directory shall govern.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of
Tax Appeals, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE, JR.

February 13, 1989. G.R.No. 74930

Nature of the Case: Special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.

Facts: Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of
the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners seem to the public records for the subject information.
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte
which provides:
xxxAs a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am
requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of
(the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on
guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila
was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith
shall be borne by us.
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom
Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply, "We are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necesary within
the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the
instant suit.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Issue : Whether or not there was a lack of exhaustion of administrative

proceedings.
Ruling
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can
be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law,
comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum, However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of
law is involved.

The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the

scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon
by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from
the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue. We now address ourselves to
the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts
sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be
done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to
access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy
directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera,
and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the Court upheld the
people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and
ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral
and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned
under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by
the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had
been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized
in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by
implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information
sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern". As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or
not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a terra that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.

In the Ta�ada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional
right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various
laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was
the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring
civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles."

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be

enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not
be among those excluded by law.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy
of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy
may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in
this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that
the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be
invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. Neither can the GSIS through its
General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The
right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person
whose privacy is claimed to be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned

borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest
they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy
as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny.

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions
of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions" only.

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation

performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of
access to official records.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely
incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by
the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information
which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans

granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage
to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties
of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other
persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant

thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not
accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters
of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that

the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must
be clear and specific.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted.

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego

December 21, 1989
GRN 89572. 180 SCRA 533
CRUZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, M.M., Br. 172. Dizon-Capulong, J.

FACTS

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a

degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the
NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.1 When he applied to take it again,
the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then
went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private
respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition.2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and
equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring
the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE

Whether or not the three-flunk rule is constitutional?

RULING

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a

measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to
take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized
medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as
a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before
us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality
of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to
the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in
the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical. practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general,
and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests
in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT]) and quite probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure
or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled
to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not
applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission
test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at
bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant.
This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid
than the former in the regulation of the medical profession

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of
a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to
insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a

constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the
public interest is involved; and the closer the link the longer the bridge to one's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to
see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while
also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients.
If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so
advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the
other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student
who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course
in nursing, however appropriate this career may he for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute.
The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements."

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our
system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best
suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are
lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated
January 13,1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so
ordered.

Ricardo Valmonte vs. Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.

170 SCRA 256
GRN 74930 February 13, 1989
CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
to review the decision of the GSIS General Manager.

FACTS
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte which
provides::

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting
that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the)
Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on
guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila
was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith
shall be borne by us.

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom
Constitution of the present regime.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte
wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "We
are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necesary within the
premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant
suit.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies

ISSUE

Whether or not there was a lack of exhaustion of administrative proceedings.

RULING
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be
allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law,
comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum, However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of
law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v.
Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA, 210; Malabanan v.
Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional
right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely
legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed
of this procedural issue. We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not
mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done,
both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to
access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly
involving the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No.
63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld
the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and
ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which
states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used an basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and
artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned
under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by
the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had
been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized
in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by
implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is
of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and
"public concern". As observed in Legaspi:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there

is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
terra that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public. [Ibid, at p. 641.]
In the Ta�ada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to
information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws
which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was the
"legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles."

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced
through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among
those excluded by law.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a
citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may
arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in
this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that
the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be
invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College
v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of
privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to
the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely
personal in nature (Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285,
46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286
(1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be
violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the
GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right
to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing
proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to
official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely
incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by
the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information
which is applicable only to "official" transactions.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans

granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may
promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage
to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties
of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other
persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The
petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a
right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of
the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to
documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the
time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may
deem necessary.
Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Luis Santos
August 2l,1992.
GRN 94115. 212 SCRA 768
NOCON, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction to review the decision of the GSIS General Manager

FACTS
Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been
elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to
serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometime around March
1988.

Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary of
Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to
petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed
from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from
receipt thereof.

On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable
violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino
Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam,
all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup.
Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint.

On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter from

petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary's December 4,
1989 letter requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or removed from
office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning
of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he
was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the

complaint of Mayor Veronica Agatep and others.2 On the basis thereof, respondent
Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice,
pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him.

Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding

petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as
Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the
ViceGovernor of Cagayan.

Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition, namely: (1)
that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government
officials under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987
Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or
remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as
Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner
should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not he a mere preponderance
of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections.
Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him, all
based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of the March 19,
1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The Commission on Elections granted the
petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992. On the same day, acting upon a
"Motion to Clarify" filed by petitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the
resolutions of the Commission become final and executory only after five (5)days
from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor
pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with this Court.

Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court, d seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his
disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporary
restraining order against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing its May
9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification case, thereby
allowing the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However,
the Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided
the case.

On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting the
petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the ground
that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is
still ending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the
elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor
of Cagayan

ISSUE

Whether or not Secretary of Department of Local government has the power to

suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as
embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is
now vested in the courts.

RULING
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition
meritorious.

Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the

administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the
canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province.

Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the Constitution
provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for which
the officer was elected or appointed.

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.' (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. 17 SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966])
(See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [19741)3
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds
no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.

The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration. Petitioner

contends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg.
337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is now vested in the
courts.

We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government

officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the
legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X
(4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision
over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head
are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him.4 The
statutory grant found in RR Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been
enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973
Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided as follows SEC. 2. The
National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be
amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive
and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall,
allocating among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local government
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not
take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose.5

A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,

which reads:

'SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment, and removal, term and salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation
of the local units.6
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government
code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is
found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it can not
be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present
Constitution.

Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7 this Court had the
occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of
the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of
1991 is approved.
The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government to remove
local elective government officials is found in Sees. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337.8
As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary to
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but point to
Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to wit In case a
permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . . refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functionc of his office, the vice-
governor ... shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No, P-10437-89,
dismissing petitioner as Governor Cagayan. is hereby REVERSED.

Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres vs. Court of Appeals

1998
284 SCRA 276
Alejandro Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
January 29, 1996
GRN 1064. 252 SCRA 412
VITUG, J

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS

Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig,

Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters.
When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of
1986, pursuant to Section 41 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to
be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved
by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No.
133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he
explained:

"According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are
associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a
turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of
the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made
contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national
landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is
a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x.

"The National Museum and the National Historical Commission are hereby vested with
the right to declare other such historical and cultural sites as National Shrines,
Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in accordance with the guidelines set forth in R.A.
4846 and the spirit of this Decree."

Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-
General, instituted a complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that:

"Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical

Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January,
1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above
described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the
'Iglesia ni Cristo,' as a National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perforce
needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a public purpose."

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for 'the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the
provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.5 Petitioners
sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August
1989 order of the trial court.

On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to

petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its
denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February
1990,17another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the
motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with
the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial
court in its 16th April 1991 order.

ISSUE

Whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in

the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as a national historical
landmark.

RULING

We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates.

Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency,
as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of
sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather
than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described
as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that
may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State.9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property
within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to he an
essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable
from sovereignty.10 The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."11 This
proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to
protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by
this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,12 to wit: (a) the
size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c)
the extent of social and economic reform.13 Petitioners suggest that we confine the
concept of expropriation only to the following public uses,14 i.e., the
"x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges,
ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses, parks,
playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerage
systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads."

This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.

The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President's
power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for
subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or
occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made
the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in
nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be
understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and
landed estates.

The term "Public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must
be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency.16 Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the
term; thus:
"Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking
property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, 'public use' is one which
confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use
by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities
for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether
exercised by one or many members of public, a 'public advantage' or 'public
benefit' accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs.
Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
"Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to
take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole
community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member
of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and
directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or
exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43
S. Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness,
utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited
to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and
not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the public,
which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A
'public use' for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it changes
with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing
conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances
brought about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and
transportation.
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use
should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use"
is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded.

"We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not

desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.
It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end.

It has been explained as early as Se�a v. Manila Railroad Co.,19 that:

" A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use' to be one
of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase
and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be
devoted. x x x for 'whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public
use."'
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project
is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to
the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use."20

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration,21 has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that "is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet
adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately
emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."

Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be
significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might
follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to
the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may
be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character
of public use.

All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and
jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

J.M Tuazon Company Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration

DECEMBER 26, 1961
G.R. L-18672. 31 SCRA 413
FERNANDO, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition

FACTS

The record shows that the judgements rendered in 1955 by the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal in the two ejectment cases filed by J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
against respondents, Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon, were upon regular appeal,
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.The CFI, after the appellate court�s
decision became final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ of
execution of the judgement against the said respondents as prayed for by the
landowner, Tuason & Company. Subssequently, On November 19, 1960, the CFI issued
orders of demolition of the houses of the evictees or judgement debtors.

On November 16, 1960 , the landowner also applied for prohibition in the CFI
against the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), the Auditor-General and the
Solicitor-General to restrain from instituting expropriation proceedings of the
petitioner Company�s land in Quezon City, generally known as �Tatalon Estate� by
virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2616, that became law without executive approval
on August 3, 1959 on the basis that said law is unconstitutional, null and void as
legislation aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of squatters and
occupants, even if said property had been actually subdivided and its lots were
being sold to public.

ISSUE

Whether or not expropriation proceedings can be had by the LTA pursuance to

R.A. 2616 which the landowner claimed to be unconstitutional?

RULING

The court saw nothing in the terms of R.A. No. 2616 to justify the belief
that the Legislature intended departure from the normal course prescribed for
eminent domain cases, where the rights of the owner of the land may not be
disturbed without previous deposit of the provisional value of the property brought
to be condemned. The effectivity of Section 4 of R.A. 2616, discontinuing
ejectment proceedings against a present occupants and restraining any act of
disposition of the property, is justifiable only if the Government takes possession
of the land in question by depositing its value. It needs no argument to show that
by restraining the land owner from enforcing even final judgements in his favor to
recover possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons of
his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his title is left as
an empty shell. The landowner would then be deprived of those attributes of
ownership that give it value, and his property is virtually taken from him without
compensation and in violation of the Constitution. Particularly, Bill of Rights
requires that �private property shall not be taken for public use without payment
of just compensation� and Article XIII, Section 4 in prescribing that �Congress may
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots an conveyed at cost to individuals,� prohibit any
disturbance of property rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity. Hence
the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot,
by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee�s dominical rights, whether of
possession, enjoyment, or disposition, And this is especially the case where final
and executory judgements of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of
the property as in the case at bar. The LTA confesses that it has only Two Million
Pesos available funds, an amount way short of the P6,034,865.95 reasonable assessed
value of the property subject of the case. Based on the foregoing, the court
remanded the case to CFI to hear and resolve the prohibition case filed by the
landowner with all practicable dispatch.

Tanada vs. Angara

May 2, 1997
G.R. 118295. 272 SCRA 18
PANGANIBAN, J.

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

FACTS

The emergence of World Trade Organization (WTO) after half a century and several
dizzying rounds of negotiations where the Philippines joined as a founding member
with the goal, brought about the ratification of the WTO Agreement by then
President Fidel V. Ramos on the basis, as articulated in his two letters to Senate,
of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Subsequently, this Agreement was concurred by
the Senate.
However, this drew unfavorable reactions from various sectors of the Philippine
society, that resulted in the filing of the subject petition-case on the grounds
that:
WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products;
WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and
the Supreme Court.

Hence, assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution
to �develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos� (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,
among others.

ISSUES:

Does the petition present a justiciable controversy (involve a political question)?

Does the provisions of WTO Agreement and its three annexes contravene section 19 of
Article II, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution?
Do the provisions of said Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress?
Do said provisions unduly impair or interfere with the exercise of judicial power
by this court in promulgating rules of evidence?
Was the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its annexes sufficient
and/or valid, considering that it did not include the final act, ministerial
declarations and decisions and the understanding commitments in financial services?

RULING

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is
clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, � Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. As this Court has repeatedly and
firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave
abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. The Court stress
though that in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, it will not review
the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country
into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of the trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
government�s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies,
quantitative restrictions and other import/trade barriers. Rather it will only
exercise its constitutional duty �to determine whether or not there had bee a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction� on the part of the
Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.

The Constitution indeed mandates as bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,

labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and
limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolation policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods,
services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution
does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services, and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on

the domestic level, it is however, subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-
type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution �adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations.� By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. �A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligations but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties� A state which has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA --- international agreements must be performed in good faith.
Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies the intrusion, if
any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain unreasonable burden
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
By signing the Final Act, Secretary Rizalino Navarro, as representative of the
Philippines, undertook to submit, as appropriate the WTO Agreement for
consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking
approval of it in accordance with their procedures; and to adopt the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions (MDD). The assailed Senate Res. No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.

The MDD were deemed adopted without the need for ratification. They were approved
by them ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade) which provides that representatives of the members can meet �to give
effect to those provisions of this Agreemet which invoke joint action and generally
with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering of this Agreement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh
does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which �have
indicated their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary
entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information and national
treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing
available in the normal course of business.

Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty,

the WTO remains the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Let the people,
through their duly authorized elected officers make their free choice.

PETITION WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

PEOPLE vs. GALIT
MARCH 20, 1985
G.R. L-51770. 135 SCRA 465
CONCEPCION, JR., J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the Judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal.

FACTS

The defendant-appellant, Francisco Galit, was convicted for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide with death sentence as its penalty. Such being the case it is
subjected to the automatic review of the High Court.
That on or about the 23rd of August, 1977 in the municipality of Montalban,
Province of Rizal, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow was found dead in the bedroom
of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal as a result of seven (7)
stab wounds inflicted upon the different parts of her body by a blant instrument.
More than two (2) weeks later, police authorities of Montalban picked up the
herein defendant, an ordinary contruction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal
on suspicion of the murder based on the testimony of his son-in-law, Florentino
Valentino. Valentino testified that he heard accused Galit and his wife�s
arguments in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim which the
former, together with two of his accomplices, Juling Dulat and a certain Pabling
perpetrated.

ISSUE

Whether or not the alleged extra-judicial confession extracted and the pictures of
the supposed re-enactment obtained from the accused-defendant are admissible as
evidence?

RULING

After a review of the records, the Court found that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial
court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent
evidence. In the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, the court laid down the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation which, � At the time the person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for his arrest ad he
must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he
might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, pr anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means � by telephone if possible�or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be conducted in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.�

There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state

witnesses and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The
only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. Such confession was
obtained after such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer which does
not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights
under the Constitution and our laws. The court said that there should instead be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in
dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar
and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his
arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a
friend, In fact his sisters were and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had
executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement
does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-enactment, again
accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. The court declared that these
constitute gross violations of his rights, hence, the alleged confession and the
pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they
were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDES PAYNOR

SEPTEMBER 9, 1996
G.R. 116222. 261 SCRA 615
REGALADO, J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Roxas, Isabela Br. 23

FACTS

On September 18, 1991, on or about 4:00 in the afternoon, a ten-year old pupil
named Fesnaida Magaway, while sweeping the ground near her classroom having been
assigned as cleaner that day, witnessed the stabbing incident perpetrated by the
accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor against the victim-teacher of Roxas Central
Elementary School known as Carmelita Aguinaldo. The victim was rushed to the
hospital by her fellow teachers but was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA). Through
the lone testimony of witnessed Magaway and after due investigation, a criminal
case was filed against the accused in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas,
Isabela. RTC rendered its decision on April 21, 1994 declaring the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder provided for and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes upon him a penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with all the necessary penalties provided by law, to indemnify
the heirs of victim in the amount of P50,000 pesos, without however, subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay cost.

Appellant sought the reversal of that verdict claiming that the lower court erred,
among others, that there was violation of the MIRANDA DOCTRINE.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused rightfully raised the issue of violation of the
MIRANDA DOCTRINE when allegedly the police unceremoniously stripped him of his
clothing and personal items, the latter having been introduced as evidence during
the trial?

RULING

The court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial
investigation which is invoked by the accused-appellant, Lindes Paynor, refers to
TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (Bill of
Rights) provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent, the right to counsel and the right to waive the right to counsel
in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of such rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in
People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right applies only against testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. In
fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
JULY 28, 1989
G.R. 85279. 175 SCRA 686
CORTES, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

On June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. The
reason for the strike was due to SSS�s failure to act on the union�s demands which
included, among other things, implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues, payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay, conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent status and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances
and benefits granted to other regular employees of the SSS, etc. The strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) which ordered the
strikers to return to work. For failure of the strikers to heed the PSLMC�s order,
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the strike and
that the strikers be ordered to return to work.

ISSUE

Whether or not the employees of the Social Security System have the right to
strike?

RULING

The court held that while the 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights provides that the State �shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and peaceful concerted
activities in accordance with law (Article XIII, Section 31), it is silent as to
whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort to the intent
of the framers of the organic law as gleaned from the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only without
including the right to strike. Further, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the
sponsors to the provision that the right to self-organization shall not be denied
to government employees, explained in his answer to the apprehension expressed by
Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla , �When we proposed this amendment providing for
self-organization of government employees, it does mean that because they have the
right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different matter.
We are only talking of organizing, uniting as a union. Now then, if the purpose of
the state is to prohibit the strikes from employees exercising governmental
functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then the union
which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 875. In R.A. No. 875, workers including those from
government-owned and controlled are allowed to organize but they are prohibited
from striking.� Apropos to the constitutional guarantee of the right of the
government employees to organize, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 180 which provides that the �Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress�, apparently referring
to Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission dated
April 21, 1987 which prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees�enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass actions which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service�. The court is of
the considered view that SSS employees are covered by the prohibition against
strikes considering that under the 1987 Constitution �the Civil Service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
(Article IX.B, Section 2(1) and Section 1 of E.O. No. 180)� with SSS is one such
government controlled corporation with original charter having created under R.A.
No. 1161. Thus, the court declared that the strike staged by the SSS employees was
illegal.

BANGALISAN vs. CA
276 SCRA 619
July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS

Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school
teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their
grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities
to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for
their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners
failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with
"grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law,
rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform
official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneously
placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed to
submit their answer to the complaint so, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision
finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service
effective immediately.

Petitioners Bangalisan et al, filed a motion for reconsideration with the DECS
Secretary who subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for nine
months without pay. Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their
respective cases, petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) who
decided to rule on the merits of their appeal in the interest of justice. All the
petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all
denied, except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because of his failure to
inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application for leave
therefor. This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court but their
petition was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95.4

ISSUE

Whether or not employees in the public service have the right to engage in
strikes.

HELD:

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public

service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of
government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.

Rosales vs. CA
September 15, 1998
165 SCRA 344
BIDIN, J.:
Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

On April 11, 1972, the Don Bosco Technical Institute posted the list of honor
students for the graduation of its elementary department which was to take place on
April 22, 1972. Rommel Rosales, a student of Grade VI, candidate for graduation and
likewise candidate for Valedictorian, reported to his parents that he was not
listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the name of
Conrado Valerio. The parents of Rommel demanded for a re-computation of the grades
of their son who, they averred, should be class valedictorian and filed a formal
complaint with the Director of Bureau of Private Schools against the school
claiming anomalous ranking of honor pupils for the grade school with a request for
a review of the computations made by the school. The Chief of the Legal Division of
the Bureau of Private Schools sent a copy of the complaint by first indorsement to
the Rector of herein respondent school stating, among others, that the complaint
had lost its validity because the same was filed on the eve of the commencement
exercises of the school, in violation of the provision of paragraph 176, Section XI
of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools requiring complaints of the kind to
be filed not later than ton (10) days before commencement exercises. However,
defendant Rector indicated that he would welcome an investigation in order to erase
any doubt as to the selection of the honor students of the grade school concerned.
On May 5, 1972, the Director of Private Schools rendered a decision holding that
Rommel Rosales was the rightful valedictorian. On November 29, 1972, Rosales filed
a complaint for damages in view of the failure of the school to graduate Rommel
Rosales as valedictorian of his class. In its answer, respondent school prayed that
the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the Director of Private Schools
acting on its motion dated May 11, 1972 reconsidered and set aside his decision of
May 5, 1972 and instead "approved and/or confirmed the selection and award of
honors to the students concerned for the school year 1971-1972 as effected by the
school."

Petitioners, in their reply, averred that said motion for reconsideration was
mysteriously filed, there being no original copies of the same in the Office of the
Director of Private Schools which would show the date of filing thereof and their
corresponding receipt of a copy thereof by the petitioners. Respondent school
however, insisted that their motion for reconsideration was regularly filed and the
assailed decision was in fact reconsidered as above stated on December 18, 1972.
The records show that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on January 11,
1973 of said decision of December 18, 1972 but was denied on January 19, 1973.
Thus, on February 7, 1973, petitioners appealed both decisions of December 18, 1972
and January 19, 1973 to the Secretary of Education which appeal was still pending
at the time of the filing of their complaint in court.

On September 14, 1973, the trial court issued an order finding that plaintiffs have
not exhausted all administrative remedies against the defendants and that it does
not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement. Since the
complaint does not allege exhaustion of said remedies principally on appeal to the
Secretary of Education which was available to him, the Court finds that the
complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute cause of action. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the court a quo incurred no error when it
found that the decision of the Director of Private Schools dated May 5, 1972 was
far from being final and that the administrative remedies availed of by plaintiffs
had not yet been exhausted and affirmed the decision appealed from in toto.

ISSUE
 Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable in this case.

HELD:

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through

court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have been
exhausted at the administrative level. When an adequate remedy may be had within
the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or
refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere.
This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but
likewise on respect; convenience of the party litigants and respect for a co-equal
office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court.

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HON. ALFONSO ABAD

February 24, 1992
206 SCRA 482
CRUZ, J:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review from the decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.

FACTS

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it

to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500
hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years. Private
respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for the cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious violations of
its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same
charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the RTC of Pagadian
City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet
exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly
prohibited by Section I of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and also the motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of
Appeals, which sustained the trial court�s decision and in its resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the
several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The
respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the
urgent need for judicial intervention. The decision also declared invalid Section 1
of PD 605, which provides:

Section 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in
any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval,
revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative
official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of
any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration
and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The
respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,7 where several
presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the
judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases.

ISSUE

Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not

correctly applied.

HELD:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first

to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of
justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action,8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the
dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke
it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and
the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed. One
of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments.
The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to
resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed
by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions
are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the
rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases
which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.

As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of

instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question
raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the
act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial
intervention: 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will
be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when
strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is
private land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.

In this case, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy was not correctly
applied. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require
prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given,
if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such
reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent
laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development,
disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of
the public domain, and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of
Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws and
regulations" here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment
clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the
first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts
of justice may intervene.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC vs. CA
March 25, 1999
305 SCRA 147
PURISIMA, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review for Certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.

FACTS

Macario Aro was the former owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land in
Dasmarinas, Cavite and the members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapdula,
Inc. were the tenants thereon. Sometime in 1979, Mr. Aro sold the said parcels of
land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., which was founded by Ricardo Silverio who
envisioned to establish a car assembly plant within the area. In the process, the
members of petitioner were evicted. But the establishment of a car assembly plant
in the place never materialized. The parcels of land in question were later leased
to the spouses Rodriguez for a term of seven (7) years and were then developed
into a sugarcane plantation, with the herein private respondents as the regular
farmworkers.

The same property was acquired by the Philippine National Bank at a Sheriff's
auction sale. The members of petitioner sought the assistance of the former
Ministry of Agrarian Reform now Department of Agrarian Reform, through then
Minister Heherson Alvarez, for their reinstatement as farmworkers thereon, but
nothing came out of such efforts. The ownership of subject parcels of land was
later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust which conveyed the same to the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DAR. In furtherance of its
objective of instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued Certificate
of Land Ownership ("CLOA") for the said parcels of land in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing their petition for Certiorari with the CA.
2.Whether or not there was observance of due process by the DAR prior to the
issuance of Certificate of Land Ownership in favor of petitioner

HELD:

1. From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned that

decisions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned before DARAB. Pertinent rules,
provide:

"SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters
or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No.
27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the
following:

(c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR

officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their
amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;" (Rule II,
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure)

From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals
from decisions or orders of DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also
irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a decision of the
Secretary, who issued and signed the same. Consequently, the propriety of the
recourse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition for
certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond
cavil. Under Section 54 of RA 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR may be brought
to the Court of Appeals by certiorari. Time and again, this court has ruled that in
cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
unnecessary. The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright.

2. Respondent court found that herein private respondents were denied the
opportunity to ventilate their stance before the DAR. But according to the
petitioner, during the investigation and conferences conducted on the question of
inclusion of subject properties in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
government, Mr. Ruben Rodriguez was notified of the same Records show, however,
that the letter which was supposed to be the notice to the private respondents
regarding the inclusion of subject properties in the CARP, was ineffective. First
of all, the letter of Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Serapio T. Magpayo to Mr.
Ruben Rodriguez indicates no receipt of the same by Mr. Rodriguez nor was it signed
by Mr. Magpayo. Secondly, if it was ever sent, it was sent too late, the same being
dated June 5, 1991, when the said parcels of land had already been awarded to the
members of petitioner. (The CLOAs under controversy were issued on March 26, 1991.)
Thirdly, the letter was addressed to Mr. Ruben Rodriguez, who no longer possessed
the said properties as his lease thereover ended on July 8, 1990.

There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the beneficiaries of subject
parcels of land. In such hearings, the private respondents, who were deprived of an
opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should participate. This is in pursuance of
the provisions of Section 40(4),17 in relation to Section 2218 of RA 6657,
providing for the order or priority of the qualified beneficiaries of CARP.

Natividad Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals

February 23, 2000
GR NO.131641. 326 SCRA 338.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS
On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad avers in her complaint
that she is the sole and absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Naic,
Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Sometime in
April 1981 Natividad's brother, Romeo, and his wife Eliza convinced Natividad to
lend them TCT No. 51798 to be used as collateral to a loan the proceeds of which
would be used in the completion of the construction of the Naic Cinema on the
subject property. Natividad agreed on the condition that title to her property
would be returned within one (1) year from the completion of the construction of
the cinema. Accordingly, Natividad executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
spouses Romeo and Eliza over the lot covered by TCT No. 51798. The sale, however,
was simulated because Natividad did not receive any consideration therefor.
The cinema was completed in November 1981 but despite several demands by Natividad,
spouses Romeo and Eliza failed and refused to return Natividad's title to the
property; instead, they had the property transferred in their name. Consequently,
TCT No. T-118276 was issued in their name in lieu of TCT No. 51798.
Spouses Romeo and Eliza denied that the property belonged to Natividad. On the
contrary, they averred that it originally formed part of the estate of the late
Maximino Nazareno, Jr., father of Romeo and Natividad. According to Romeo, the
property was his share in their inheritance. As regards the deed of sale, he
explained that it was only resorted to for the purpose of carrying out and
implementing the transfer of the property forming part of the estate of Maximino
Nazareno Jr., the distribution of which was entrusted to Natividad.
The trial court found for the spouses Romeo and Eliza and ruled that although the
Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated, the same could be treated as an adjudication
and a conveyance to Romeo of his share in the estate of his father.
But the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. It found that during pre-trial, the
parties stipulated that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Natividad and spouses
Romeo and Eliza was simulated as there was in fact no money consideration.
Consequently, the burden of proof was shifted to Romeo to prove that the transfer
was in reality a conveyance of his share in the estate of his father. But during
trial, Romeo failed to prove this so-called conveyance of his share. On the other
hand, Natividad satisfactorily showed that the property was previously sold to her
by their late father. Romeo failed to disprove this fact. Neither did he
successfully cause the deed of sale executed by Maximino Nazareno Jr. in favor of
Natividad to be declared null and void. Resultingly, its authenticity and validity
remained unrebutted.
In short, the Court of Appeals did not sustain the trial court and set aside its
Decision.
The case was brought to us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari but we denied the
petition after having ascertained that the appellate court committed no reversible
error. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision became final and executory on 13 June
1996.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a deprivation of property without due process of
law.
RULING
A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed; it may not vary
the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of
the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity.
To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against
depriving a person of his property without due process of law.
Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it
would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to
obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who have no
right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations anew.2 An exception
however exists where the actual possessor has shown a valid right over the property
enforceable even against the owner thereof.
Execution not in harmony with the judgment has no validity. It must conform more
particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
decision, as the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of
execution.
Therefore, to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. Moreover, it is a
settled rule that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession
unless sought in connection with (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of
property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has
intervened; and (4) in execution sales.
It is an undisputed fact that this case is for the annulment of a private sale made
by petitioner to private respondent. This action is not a land registration case
nor a foreclosure of mortgage whether judicially or extrajudicially nor was the
subject property sold in execution. Petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ of
possession in connection with a decision in a civil action for annulment of a
private sale and damages.
Evidently, the decision of the Court of Appeals required no writ of possession as
the writ of execution would suffice to place Natividad in possession of Lot 504-A-
3. A case in point is Perez v. Evite7 wherein the lower court declared Evite as
owner of the disputed land. When the judgment became final and executory, Evite
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the trial court granted. Perez
moved to quash the writ arguing that the writ was at variance with the decision as
the decision sought to be executed merely declared Evite owner of the property and
did not order its delivery to him. Perez argued citing the cases of Jabon v. Alo8
and Talens v. Garcia9 which held that adjudication of ownership of the land did not
include possession thereof. In resolving in favor of Evite this Court held -
Considering that herein plaintiff-appellants have no other claim to possession of
the property apart from their claim of ownership which was rejected by the lower
court and, consequently, has no right to remain thereon after such ownership was
adjudged to defendant-appellees, the delivery of possession of the land should be
considered included in the decision. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of
justice should we require that for herein appellees to obtain possession of the
property duly adjudged to be theirs, from those who have no right to remain
therein, they must submit to court litigations anew.
In the instant case, spouses Romeo and Eliza could not use Jabon v. Alo and Talens
v. Garcia to support their contention that the adjudication of ownership over the
land does not necessarily include possession. As already decreed in Perez v. Evite
-
It may be observed that in both decisions (Jabon v. Alo and Talens v. Garcia), this
Court underscored the possibility that the actual possessor has some rights which
must be respected and defined. It is thus evident that the pronouncement was made
having in mind cases wherein the actual possessor has a valid right over the
property enforceable even against the owner thereof. As example, we gave the cases
of tenants and lessees. However, it is our view that that above doctrine may not be
invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor of the
possessor. In the instant case there appears in the appealed order of June 30,
1959, the specific finding of the trial court that "the plaintiffs have not given
any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property" x x x x This
factual finding cannot be reviewed in this instance as the appeal has been taken to
us directly on a question of law x x x x
The same ruling would apply in the instant case. The Court of Appeals categorically
declared that the claim of spouses Romeo and Eliza over the disputed lot has
utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to remain in possession of
the property.
But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The matter of ownership and
possession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue. Consequently, petitioner
cannot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical occupancy of the Naic
Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not also mean that she is
automatically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise,
the actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since in
her complaint and subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner
thereof. On the contrary, she claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate of
her father. On the other hand, respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the
Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot wrest possession of the moviehouse from
respondent spouses through a mere writ of possession as she herself even disclaims
being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic Cinema must be threshed out in a
proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession will not
suffice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
issuance of a writ of possession is AFFIRMED.

UP BOARD OF REGENTS vs. RASUL

August 16, 1991
G.R. No. 91551. 200 SCRA 685
GANCAYCO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision and order of RTC Pasig, Manila.

FACTS

Estrella was appointed as PGH Director. After several weeks, the new UP President
recommended the reorganization of the PGH and renaming it as UP-PGH Medical Center.
The Board affirmed the recommendation and declared all seats in the former PGH,
including that of Estrella, as vacant. Estrella filed an Injunction of for the
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) alleging that he enjoys security of
tenure. UP Board argues that it has the power to abolish the position of PGH
Director held by Estrella and that there was a valid reorganization conducted by
it.
�
ISSUE�

Whether or not respondent Dr. Felipe A. Estrella who holds the position of Director
of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) can invoke security of tenure during his
term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the said position by the University
of the Philippine Board of Regents.
�

RULING

1.)��� As the PGH Director and UP-PGH Medical Director�s functions are one and the
same, the abolishing of the former position is not and abolishment, bona fide,
against Estrella but only a renaming of office.
2.)��� Estrella is protected by the security of tenure by virtue of his
appointment. Hence, the purported reorganization is not valid. The Dario V. Mison
doctrine is affirmed.
3.)��� Assuming there was an abolition, the charter at UP does not grant its power
to abolish but only to merge colleges and departments.
�

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
January 20, 1999.
G.R. No. 123997. 301 SCRA 237.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus.�
�
FACTS

The Republic against Balbanero filed a forfeiture of alleged unexplained wealth

over the amount of ten (10) Million. By reconciliation of records, it was
decreased into Php165,043.00 to which Balbanero likewise presented appointing
documents. He made several motions with the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the
case and the cancellation or suspension of scheduled hearings for the presentation
of Republic�s evidence. The same were all denied by the sandiganbayan. Come
hearing date, the Republic through the ASGs however were not prepared due to flimsy
excuses of substitution and re-alignment of prosecutors. Republic moves for the
re-schedule of hearing but the Sandiganbayan ordered them to file formal offer of
evidence. Republic contends that it will be deprive of due process by the order of
the court.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was deprivation of due process.

RULING

Order for filing of formal offer of evidence affirmed. The counsel of the Republic
should have prepared with due diligence the cause of its client and not
unreasonably request for postponement of hearings cause at which is due to its own
negligence.
Under the circumstances, it cannot rightly be said that the OSG was not guilty of
inexcusable carelessness, presumptiousness, indifference to and neglect of duty in
assuming that public respondent would grant its oral motion for postponement,
coming to court unprepared and without a witness. Hence public respondent was well
within its authority to deny the Republic's oral motion for postponement of the
hearings set on 19 and 20 October 1995 and require it, instead, to just formally
offer its evidence within fifteen (15) days from notice. Petitioner is not guilty
of abuse of discretion, much less grave, nor can it be charged by petitioner with
denial of due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENIED.

GABRITO vs. Court of Appeals

November 24, 1988
G.R. No. 77976.167 SCRA 623.
BIDIN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction �to review
the order of the Court of Appeals. Campos, J.

FACTS

Tan�s predecessor applied for a sales application over a parcel of land and had it
leased by Gabrito. Tan later on acquired the land and when he decided to use the
land for their personal use, demanded its return from Gabrito, although the
original sales application is pending approval. Gabrito failed to heed the demand
and later on filed a sales application for the same with the Bureau of Lands and
praying for annulment of sales application of Tan�s predecessor. Tan filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Gabrito and was sustained by the MTC, the
RTC and the CA. Later, Gabrito�s application was granted and the prior sales
application of Tana�s predecessor was cancelled but Tan filed an appeal of the same
with the DENR.

ISSUE

Gabrito interpose the issue of ownership as to the unlawful detainer case.�

RULING�
The issue in unlawful detainer is the possession and the issue with the Bureau of
Lands is for ownership; although the law grants the Administrative Agency the power
to decide issue on ownership, it does not deprive courts the power to decide issue
of possession.
� The application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as a
condition precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to
controversies arising out of the dispositive of public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta,
102 Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of
public lands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the
respective rights of rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra)
and not to possessory actions involving public lands which are limited to the
determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land
in question (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra)."
In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the
jurisdiction of the courts to decide the case on the question of physical
possession, although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).
Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities; of the
Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City and finally of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is Affirmed and the
temporary restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.

Sabello vs. DECS

December 26, 1989
G.R. No. 87687. 180 SCRA 623
GANCAYCO, J:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review the decision of the Secretary of Department
of Education, Culture and Sports.

FACTS

Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant
Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City. The
barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students
could hardly pay for their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also, the
President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaining was giving aid in the
amount of P 2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions
alloted the amount of P 840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high school
teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a barrio
project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in
question.

The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by
the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was subsequently
deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High
School. That was a grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it involves
the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its
technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a
sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office.

The herein petitioner appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila.

The Court of appeals modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being
involved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a
lawyer to proceed to the highest court of the land.

Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and political
rights.' With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for
reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong
position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary
School Principal I.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior to his
conviction that of Elementary Principal I.

RULING

There is here a justiciable controversy. Petitioner claims he must be restored to

the same position he was in before he was convicted on a mere technical error and
for which he was given an absolute pardon.
This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not academic or moot for, to
our mind, there is a definite and concrete controversy touching the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal relations. This is a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a court decree that is conclusive
in character. The case does not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for
affirmative relief .
As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed
to his former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but
under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived
of' what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of
giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the
part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.

As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be
sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in
their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit
against the officials of this government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a non-lawyer, who claims
that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, We also set aside the requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of
the petition.

In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 3 this Court held that the absolute disqualification
from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although
such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to
automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.
In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the
service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank,
justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary
School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.

However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to
November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this Court said he is not entitled to
automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government
service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had
been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is
afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.
In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made
continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate when
he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate
retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom
teacher.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby
directed to appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I or
it equivalent, without pronouncement as to cost. This decision is immediately
executory.

RULLAN vs. VALDEZ

November 28, 1964
G.R. No. L-20031. 12 SCRA 501
DE VEYRA, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City.
�

FACTS
�
Rullan and Valdez are members of Baguio Loakan Placer Mining Association (BLPMA)
at which Valdez owes 40% interest. BLPMA has located and grabbed mining claims at
Morning Glory and Silica. Unknown to his co-members, Valdez decreased the protion
at Silica and included the excluded portion to his lease application for Selecta
Placer claim. Rullan filed and adverse claim against the same lease application,
pending due course at the adverse claim, Rullan filed an action with the CFI for
the recognition of BLPMA/Rullan�s rights over the excluded portion. Defendant
Valdez moved for its dismissal for lack of sufficient allegation of rights but was
denied, on Motion for Reconsideration, Valdez argued that CFI has no jurisdiction
yet on the action as to the adverse claim in the lease application has yet to be
given course by Director of Mines. CFI dismissed the complaint.
�
ISSUE

Is the action on the adverse claim a condition sine qua non for the filing of claim
in court?

RULING

No. Section 73 of CA 137 prescribes that the adverse claimants must file their
claim in the Bureau of Mines and thereafter file an action with the proper court
within twenty (20) days from such filing at adverse claim. The filing in court
stays the application.
The law applicable to the issue before us is Section 73 of Commonwealth
Act No. 137, as amended by Republic Act No. 745, which we quote:
"Sec. 73. At any time during the period of application, any adverse claim may be
filed under oath with the Director of Mines. and shall state in full detail the
nature, boundaries, and extent of the adverse claim, and shall be accompanied by
all plans, documents, and agreements upon which such adverse claim is based: * * *
Upon the filing of any adverse claim all proceedings except the making and filing
of the affidavit in connection therewith, as herein prescribed, shall be stayed
until the controversy shall have been settled or decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the adverse claim waived. It shall be the duty of the adverse
claimant, within thirty days after filing his claim, to commence proceedings in a
court of competent jurisdiction to deter. mine the controversy and to prosecute the
same with reasonable diligence to final judgment, and a failure to do so shall be
considered as a waiver of his adverse claim.�

The above statutory provision prescribes the method by which a person

having an adverse claim to a certain mineral land can have his day in court. If he
fails to file an adverse claim within the time therein provided for or fails to
commence the proceeding within the statutory period, his claim is deemed waived.
Any person who has an adverse interest in the whole or to a portion of the surface
of a mining claim for which a lease is applied for by another may file an adverse
claim which must state in full the nature, boundaries and extent thereof, to be
accompanied by the necessary plans, documents and greomonts upon which the issue is
based. The filing of said adverse claim produces the effect of staying all the
proceedings on the application filed with the Bureau of Mines, except only in
relation to the publication and proof of notice, until the controversy shall have
been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since then the functions of the
Bureau of Mines are suspended to, await the action of the court.

This is the situation herein obtained. After plaintiffs had filed their adverse
claim with the Bureau of Mines with regard to the lease application of certain
mining claims filed by defendant, they at the same time commenced the present
action wherein they squarely brought to the fore the issue of ownership over the
mining claim controverted. The question, therefore, comes well within the
jurisdiction of the court a quo regardless of whether the action of the Director of
Mines on the adverse claim filed in his office is still pending. This is the
reverse situation of a case involving the ownership of a portion of public land
wherein exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, for here the law is
specific that the question of ownership affecting an adverse claim must first be
determined by the competent court before administrative action could proceed to its
termination. It is, therefore, error for the court a quo to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies
before coming to court. The situation obtained herein is just the contrary.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. This case should be
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. Costs against appellee.

DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

October 9, 1997
GRN 113447. 280 SCRA 400
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Facts

"At about 2: 10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from
the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a
driver named Arnold Enriquez AasdrivingaTarnaraw vehicle which was the official car
of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of' the Kalookan City
Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
vehicle. They then chanced Upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared
high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking
in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male
person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo
Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He
found Suspected Crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents.

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan
City Police Headquarters Lind was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for
investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated
wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat,

Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he
wrote 'Evidence 'A' 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.' The white sheet of paper was marked as
Exhibit 'E-3'. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded
paper. (Exhibit 'E-4').

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue
(Exhibit 'D'). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit 'A'). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral
slip (Exhibit 'D') to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the
subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas
appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit 'D'.

The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral
slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11,
1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit 'D'.

It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical
examinations of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit 'E')13 Mrs. Pascual
referred to the subject specimen as 'crushed marijuana leaves' in her Certification
dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit 'F').14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive
results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In

this examination, she also found that the 'crushed marijuana leaves' gave positive
results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her examinations
(Exhibit 'G'), After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen
in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit 'E'). She then wrote
identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit 'E-1').

Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit 'F' from the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong
prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit
'C')

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle
but was walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of
(the) accused (and) in Ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved
(beyond) reasonable doubt.

RULING

The petition has no merit.

The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of
Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the
right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat
him for weapons.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along
the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular
hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the AntiNarcotics Unit
of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession.

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that

petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial.
A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1)
the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure
to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is
deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the
trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal
of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below
cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBEN MONTILLA

January 30, 1998.
GRN 123872 . 285 SCRA 703
REGALADO, J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the RTC Dasmari�as, Cavite, Br.90

FACTS

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of
Dasmari�as, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver
twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited
drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the public interest.

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not
guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. Trial was
held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a
decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme
penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount
of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at
around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,
Dasmari�as, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both
members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmari�as.
Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana
bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a
total weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in
the arrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had
informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug
courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in
Barangay Salitran, Dasmari�as from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of
marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the
appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day,
hour, and place.

Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He
claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he
traveled to Dasmari�as, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage.
His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a
prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return
to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1
Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.

He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmari�as, Cavite,

he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of
the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated
appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she
reportedly worked as a supervisor, although, as the trial court observed, she never
presented any document to prove her alleged employment.

ISSUE
Whether or not the search warrant is valid?

RULING
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search
and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
said constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1)
customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
and (6) "stop and frisk" measures 18 have been invariably recognized as the
traditional exceptions.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the

arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as
one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).
These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in
flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a
relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of
each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to
the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney
the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by
pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told
them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box
which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was
their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of
luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced
themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of
the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory
inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without
bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to
their headquarters for questioning.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the
point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which
by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded
and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The
search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that
appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited
drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the
requisite warrant were both justified.

Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the
evidence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced
themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and
after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to
open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood
resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When
an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same
conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof.

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific
penalty where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the
second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if
the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said
section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. 32 While the minority or the death of the victim will
increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic
aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the
single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either of such
factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of
penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither
a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in
Article 63 of the Code govern.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmari�as,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-
appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE
March 28, 1996
GRN 104386. 255 SCRA 238
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the
Solicitor General to set aside the order of the respondent Judge dismissing
Criminal Case No. Q-91-17782, on the ground that the prosecution was not prepared
for the first scheduled hearing of the case due to the non-availability of its
witness who was out of town on official business.

"That on or about the 10th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of one DEMOCRITO
T. MENDOZA, a well-known labor leader in Cebu and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Democrito T. Mendoza to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused (sic) to
be published in Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines based in Cebu City an article.

On May 3, 1991, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of Criminal
Case No. Q91-17782 was scheduled for July 29, 1991.2

Three days before said scheduled hearing or on July 26, 199 1, private prosecutor
Amado A. Caballero filed an urgent motion for postponement,3 citing as ground
therefor, the fact that the complainant, Atty. Democrito T. Mendoza, "would still
be out of town during said date for the reason that he would be in Cebu City to
attend to the strike of some workers in some firms in Cebu City and his personal
presence thereat is very necessary." Since said witness "would be out of the
country during the month of August 1991 to attend to some official transaction
relative to the International Labor Movement" and would be back during the first
week of September 1991, private prosecutor prayed that the scheduled hearing be
reset to a later day, preferably on September 9 or 13, 1991 at 8:30 a.m. Only the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City was furnished a copy of this motion.

Also on July 26, 1991, private respondent, through Atty. Lorenda Estrella-Amion of
the Public Attorney's Office, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that
the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense.4 Invoking Kunkle
vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons5 holding it not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed but that a third person must
be able to identify the complainant as the object of the libelous publication,
private respondent claimed that the Information did not identify the person
allegedly alluded to in the article and neither did it state that a third person
could identify said Democrito T. Mendoza as the object thereof. Private respondent
stressed that he did not write the article nor cause its publication, and never had
the intention to publish the same. The Office of the City Prosecutor was duly
served a copy of this motion.

On July 29, 1991, the day of the scheduled hearing, private prosecutor manifested
in open court that he had filed an urgent motion for postponement, and moved for
the cancellation of hearing for that day due to the unavailability of the
prosecution witness.

The public prosecutor did not object to the postponement. On the other hand, the
defense manifested that it had filed a motion to dismiss. The respondent Judge then
issued in open court the following Order6 now being assailed:

The private prosecutor filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of said
Order, stating that the prosecution had no opportunity to file an objection to the
motion to dismiss as it was served a copy thereof only on the day of hearing
itself. He insisted that the court should have considered as valid the reason for
the absence of the prosecution's principal witness, as his presence in Cebu City
was duly certified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board.

On August 7, 1991, the trial court gave the defense five (5) days from notice
within which "to file a comment to the motion for reconsideration furnishing copy
to the opposing counsel who shall have five (5) days to file a reply, after which
the matter shall be deemed submitted .�

ISSUES:
Whether or not the grant of the prosecution's motion for postponement have violated
the accused's right to a speedy trial
Whether or not would the reversal of the trial court's assailed Orders place the
accused in double jeopardy?

RULING

To be perfectly clear, we restate the general rule: motions for postponement are
granted only upon meritorious grounds and no party has the right to assume that his
motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is
addressed to "the sound discretion of the court, (which) should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts
or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served
thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our
procedural system of dispensing justice."15 Thus, when no substantial rights are
affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the corresponding motion to
transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion
to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated.
Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered
with either by mandamus or appeal.
While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule
15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial
cognizance,17 this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of the
rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities
may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. As this Court held
in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals "an order of the court granting the motion to
dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is
merely an irregularity in the proceedings x x x (which) cannot deprive a competent
court of jurisdiction over the case."

In the case at bench, the postponement of the July 29, 1991 hearing was the very
first one ever requested by the private prosecutor. And it was for a valid reason:
the principal prosecution witness, a labor lawyer, had to be in Cebu City to attend
a conciliation meeting concerning a strike/picket. Such reason is likewise easily
verifiable, and as already mentioned, was in fact certified to in writing by the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board's officerin-charge in Cebu City. There
being no showing that any substantial right of the accused would have been unduly
prejudiced by the postponement, respondent Judge should have granted the motion to
afford the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case. As it is, his
precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to denying the State due process.
In People vs. Navarro20 this Court held that:

The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement of
scheduled hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial
for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial. The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to
deprive the prosecution its day in court.21 As held in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:

x x x (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy

trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed,
and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the delay, are considered."

Anent private respondent's claim that a reopening of the case would place him in
double jeopardy, this Court previously ruled in Tampal that:

"x x x The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the
first. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (italics supplied)

In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused
(private respondent) through his motion to dismiss.
In any event, private respondent's right to speedy trial not having been violated,
he cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy:
"It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the
accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their
right against double jeopardy."23 (italics supplied)

In sum, it must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled
to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty
dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually
increased the workload of the justice system -as a whole and caused uncalled for
delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the
precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the burden of the
accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily
delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to
avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of
justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, The Order of July
29, 1991 as well as the Order of November 5, 1991 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-
91-17782 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to
proceed with the trial and resolution of the case with judicious and deliberate
dispatch, with a stern warning to avoid similar unjustified and unwarranted
dismissals in the future.

Malaluan vs. COMELEC

March 6, 1996
G.R. 120193. 254 SCRA 397
HERMOSISIMA, Jr.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
FACTS
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both
mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the
Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent
Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly
elected Mayor.

On May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court
contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial
court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found
private respondent liable not only for Malaluan�s protest expenses but also for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney�s fees. On February 3, 1994, private
respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC. on February 4, 1994,
petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was granted by
the trial court.

By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of

Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office.
Such exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to
Malaluan�s continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato,
the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to
vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private respondent to
be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a
consequence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited
damages in favor of private respondent.

RULING
YES. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearly
unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results
contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming, ex gratia argumentis, that this is
a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to
conclude a malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest private
respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling
of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the
filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does
not, in the absence of clear proof, make the suit �clearly unfounded� for which the
complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and
attorney�s fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by
respondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having been a clearly
unfounded one under the aforementioned circumstances.
It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in
the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become
moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner�s right to the mayoralty seat
in his municipality because expiration of the term of office contested in the
election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic.
Sarmiento vs. Mison
156 SCRA 549
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
PADILLA, J:

Nature of the Case: Delineation of Constitutional Boundaries. Petition for

Prohibition.

FACTS
The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries
and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.

RULING
NO. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
������However laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) which were approved during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus,
like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD
No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that,
while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that
devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
�

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

February 6, 1997
G.R. No. 111682. 194 SCRA 402
MEDIALDEA, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining order to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS
Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of four (4) parcels of land
"by feigning and signing the name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his signature
anymore due to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing it to
appear that said Pablo Floro [had] participated in the execution of the said
document when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, said deed of sale
was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor did he ever appear before
any notary public for the purpose of acknowledging the deed above mentioned.
������Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then
followed.

ISSUE
Whether the trial court properly held petitioner to have waived the right to
present evidence because of her failure to proceed despite several postponements
granted to her.

RULING
NO. It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which appear
to be the cause for the defense's failure to present its evidence. Atty. Tenorio's
negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even a lapse in strategy but
something as basic as failing to appear in court despite clear warning that such
failure would amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence in her
defense.
Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of counsel
was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner's
constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest
easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because
the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid
application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where
justice is due � to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove
his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be
charged.
������WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 29,
1995 is GRANTED.
�

Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee

November 28, 1975
G.R. No. L-40779. 68 SCRA 277
FERNANDO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.

FACTS
In summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in
Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same
course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had
written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission
in their school; That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do
not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any
violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross
misconduct.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia possesses such right as to allow her to
continue studying at said school and that such right ought to be respected.
RULING
NO. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable
in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to respect
freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount
to minimizing the full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly
granted by the Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is equally
difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and universities
should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to
admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different,
and certainly higher, category.
�
MOY YA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
October 4, 1971
G.R. No. L-21289. 41 SCRA 292
BARREDO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a decision of CFI of Manila.

FACTS

Lau Yuen Yeung was a Hong Kong national who came to visit the Philippines and was
allowed to stay for 1 month. Upon approved extensions however, she was able to stay
for more than one year and later married Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen. The
Commissioner of Immigration however, ordered her to leave the Philippines as she
was already staying beyond the allowed time. Petitioner Moy Ya Lim Yao then filed a
petition seeking the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of
Immigration as Lau Yuen Yeung is now a Filipino citizen by virtue of marriage,
which was denied. They then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung is a Filipino citizen by virtue of marriage.

RULING

Under Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, a foreign woman who marries a
Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen provided she possesses none of the
disqualifications for naturalization. The proviso that she must be one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or
acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to
establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and
proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies
that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had
(the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. That
she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at
her marriage, she became a citizen. Lau Yuen Yeung, is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage.

Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice

5 SCRA 108
Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr.
1990
170 SCRA 190
FERNAN, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the resolution of the Deputy Executive
Secretary.

FACTS

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (assistant

treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused of the complex crime of estafa
thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction
which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended by the President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to the past assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant.
ISSUE

Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by
the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the pardon does not ipso facto restore
convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason
of such conviction.

� The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of

the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification
of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her
guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office
which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public past, the facts constituting her
offenses must and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. The pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in remaining her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former past as
assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission
1991
196 SCRA 69
GUTIERREZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari to review the resolution of the CSC.

FACTS

The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal
was left vacant. In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director
Reynaldo Abella of the Department if Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that
Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a
memorandum issued by the petitioner.
������
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then
Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private
respondent Cecilia Almajase as PBO of Rizal as the basis of comparative study of
all Municipal Budget officers of the said province which included three names of
the petitioner. On August 1, 1988 DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabinguit Jr.
signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the
aforestated recommendation of Abella.

������ In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Corague, the

petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the
contested petition unaware of the earliest appointment made by Secretary Cabuguit.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Department Head free to appoint anyone he foresees in

the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Department of Budget and Management
may appoint provincial budget officers only from the list of qualified recommendies
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask
for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualification as
enunciated in EO# 112 Sec 1. The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM.
Provincial and Municipal Budgets are prepared at the local level and after
completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. It is for this
reason that there should be genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, a
harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for
the reason that the nomination and appointment involves a sharing of power between
the two levels of government.
������
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
������The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajase is nullified. The Department
of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer�of
Rizal among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.
USA vs. Ruiz
May 22, 1985.
G.R. No. L- 35645. 136 SCRA 487
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the orders of the CFI of Rizal Br. XV, Ruiz,
J.

FACTS

The United States invited bids for the repair of the military base in Subic.
Respondent who submitted a bid was asked to confirm the price proposals and to
submit the name of its bonding company. Respondent complied with the request. Later
on the projects were awarded to another. Respondent sued the US for specific
performance on the ground that the request was an acceptance pursuant to the biding
practices of US.

ISSUE

Whether or not the US may be sued in the case at bar.

HELD

The US is immune from suit without its consent. While the immunity extends
only to governmental acts and does not extend to proprietary acts, no tacit consent
to be sued can be deemed to have been given in this case. The contracts relate to
the exercise of the sovereign functions of the US. The projects were integral parts
of the naval bases devoted to the defense of the US and RP.
USA vs. Guinto
February 26, 1990
182 SCRA 644
CRUZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction to review the decision of RTC, Angeles City Br.62.

FACTS

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barbering services in the said base.
������
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for
preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against
the USA which had not waived its non-suitability. The individual defendants as
officials or employees of the US Air Force were also immune from suit.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners are immune from suit.

HELD:

There is no question that the USA, like any other state will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suitability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract undue its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. The barbershops
subject of the concessions granted by the US government are commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. The petitioner cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed by the private respondents.

Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

September 30, 1954
103 PHIL. 473
PARAS, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from an Order of the CFI of Manila.

FACTS

Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it

had been repossessed by the Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by
the government, following the original purchaser, Fernando Froilan�s, default in
his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for the said vessel. Pan
Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the
vessel and paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to
purchase, pursuant to a bareboat charter contract entered between said company and
the Shipping Corporation.

������The Cabinet resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original
contract of sale on condition that he shall pay a sum of money upon delivery of the
vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining installments due, and
that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the
vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan�s rights under the
contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the
Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property,
Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan
paid the required cash of P10, 000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender
possession of the vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover
possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property.

������The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case
praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted
thereon may be foreclosed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the government�s motion to dismiss Pan Oriental

counterclaims may prosper.

HELD:

Under the circumstances already ad voted to, Pan Oriental cannot be

considered a possessor in bad faith until after the institution of the instant
case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant is entitled to the
refund of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been
reimbursed therefore. As it is by the corrected acts of defendant and intervenor
Republic of the Philippines that the appellant ha a lien far his expenses,
appellees Froilan, Compania Maratma, and the Republic of the Philippines are
declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as
allowed by law, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.
AMIGABLE vs. CUENCA
FEBRUARY 29, 1972
G.R. No. L-26400. 43 SCRA 360,
MAKALINTAL, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cebu.

FACTS

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad
Estate in the Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mongo and Gorordo
Avenues. Amigable�s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of her lot which has been appropriated by the government.
The claim was disallowed. Amigable then filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu for
the recovery of ownership and possession of the land traversed by the Mongo and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of
P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of
P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Said
court rendered a decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff�s
cause of action on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
certified the case to the Supreme Court, there being no question of fact involved.

ISSUE

Whether or not a registered owner of a parcel of land, where the government

used to construct avenues without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, may
properly sue the government.
HELD:

If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for
public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should
not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint
they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to
abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just
as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say
that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned
upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes
manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then
that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of
any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the
whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of
the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now
and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the
plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the
land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount
of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION vs. CIR

July 25, 1975
65 SCRA 416
FERNANDO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari from an order of the CIR.
FACTS

On December 20, 1966, private respondents filed with respondent Court a petition
wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess
of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Petitioner
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations and raised the
special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444. After the parties submitted the case for decision, the
then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order
sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December
23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing
petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was a motion for
reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges

governmental and not proprietary functions.

HELD:

A reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation suffices to

demonstrate the merit of petitioner's plea that it performs governmental and not
proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its
purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective
merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those
engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To
establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and
its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and
stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus
reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To
create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing
facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia
tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return
of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading,
classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and
economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." The amendatory
statute, Republic Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a
governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is
declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco
industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities
needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to
establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a
climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the
consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the
quality of locally manufactured cigarettes." The objectives are set forth thus: "To
attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1.
Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at
the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia
tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality
of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia
leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one
kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the
importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. CEBU CITY

NOVEMBER 5, 1992
215 SCRA 382
Bellosillo, J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the then CFI of Manila, Br. 22.

FACTS

Proclamation No. 430 was issued reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of
Cebu City, for warehousing purposes under the administration of National
Warehousing Corporation (NWC). Subsequently, a warehouse was constructed thereon.
On October 4, 1947, E.O. 93 dissolved NWC with NDC, a government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC), taking over its assets and functions. Commencing
1948, Cebu City (CEBU) assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the
land and the warehouse thereon. NDC wrote the City Assessor demanding full refund
of the real estate taxes paid to CEBU claiming that the land and the warehouse
standing thereon belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. CEBU
did not acquiesce in the demand; hence, the present suit filed 25 October 1972 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, which ruled in favor of NDC. The defendants
appealed to the Court of Appeals which however certified the case to the Supreme
Court as one involving pure questions of law.

ISSUE

Is a public land reserved by the President for warehousing purposes in favor of a

government-owned or controlled corporation, as well as the warehouse subsequently
erected thereon, exempt from real property tax?

HELD:

To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3, par. (a), of the
Assessment Law, it is important to establish that the property is owned by the
government or its unincorporated agency, and once government ownership is
determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or
sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have been ceded to NWC
(later transferred to NDC) is merely the administration of the property while the
government retains ownership of what has been declared reserved for warehousing
purposes under Proclamation No. 430. However, as regards the warehouse constructed
on a public reservation, a different rule should apply because "the exemption of
public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands
made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or occupants, at their
own expense, and these are taxable by the state." Consequently, the warehouse
constructed on the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by NDC), indeed,
should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement does not appear to
belong to the Republic.
Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous tax payments
collected by CEBU should be refunded to NDC. This is in consonance with Sec. 40,
par. (a) of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from taxation real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions, as well as any GOCC so exempt by its charter.

MELO vs. PEOPLE

March 22, 1950
85 PHIL 766
Moran, C.J.

Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

FACTS

Petitioner was charged in the CFI with frustrated murder, for having allegedly
inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill.
Several serious wounds on different parts of the body. On December 29, 1949, at 8
in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15
in the evening of the same day Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was
available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the next day, an
amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. Melo
filed a motion to quash alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by
respondent court, hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the amended information was rightly allowed to stand.

HELD:

The rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes their character of the offense and
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense. The accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense. Hence, the amended information was rightly allowed to stand.

CUISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

April 15,1998
289 SCRA 159
Panganiban, J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS

Respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39)
rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554 finding accused
Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and
therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each
offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the
heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was
affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to
P50,000.00. The Supreme Court denied accused�s petition for review. The case was
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the
decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated on April 4, 1995 the decision of
the Court of Appeals only with respect to the modified civil liability of the
accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.
The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Clarify Decision. Respondent Judge then set
the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set
Aside Promulgation on the ground to pursue with the scheduled promulgation will
violate the accused�s constitutional right against jeopardy. In a Resolution dated
April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner�s right against double jeopardy was violated.

HELD:

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) a

first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense,
or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has]
been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil
action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of
both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial
court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. As
earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact
and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In
excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete
promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996
Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act
of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the
first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.

ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

November 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-80838. 168 SCRA 236
CORTES,J.:

Nature of the Case:

FACTS
On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against
Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial
on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a judgment of conviction was rendered
against Perez. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the
crime of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainant
Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983,
this time for Qualified Seduction. Petitioner Perez filed a motion to quash
invoking double jeopardy.

ISSUE
Whether or not double jeopardy exists for two distinct offenses punishable
separately by law.

RULING
No.
The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution,
Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means
identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may
appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. A
single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws or articles of the same code define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they
may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not identical offenses as
would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy.
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction,
namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be over
twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements
differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common
elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her
consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away
of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an information
for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of
authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse
with the woman.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
July 31, 1967
G.R. No. L-24693
CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and
general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City
of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was then alleged
that the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved
by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila.

In the answer filed, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding
the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the
hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited
Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a
cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the
police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

The lower court declared the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void and made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
unconstitutional and violates due process of law.

RULING
No.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance
is void on its face which is not the case here.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily

rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties and the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person are subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

Due process is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates

of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus
hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the
act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and
political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically
in slavery to form or phrases.

Considering the foregoing principles and rules of law, it would thus be an affront
to reason to stigmatize the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather
serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem
that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the
state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of
the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has
been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to
petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out
such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the
area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by
the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels but these fees clearly in the nature
of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld inspite rarely been
declared unreasonable. Moreover, the fixing amount of the license fees by the
municipal corporations is allowed in a much wider discretion in this class of cases
and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Nor does the restriction on the
freedom to contract on the ground that there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction.

STATE PROSECUTORS vs.JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO

September 19, 1994
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876. 236 SCRA 505
PER CURIAM

Nature of the Case: Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01, 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

FACTS
In a letter-complaint dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors
Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That the respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases on the
basis of a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date
hereof, has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a
mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the
said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge
acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full
intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same
provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases
before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations
previously issued on the matter;
2. That respondent Judge did not even have the prudence of requiring first the
comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank
Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the same,
thereby denying the Government of its right to due process; and
3. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the
cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken
despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court
(the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11,
1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30
o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias
and partiality;
The respondent judge�s order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari
filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting
aside the order of Judge Muro, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-
101969 on the ground that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal.

ISSUE
I. Whether or not judicial notice exists.
II. Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING
I.
The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter
is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge
of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance
is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere
newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice
removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls,
a matter which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general
notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not
yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that
judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The
reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still in existent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration,
which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper
for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not
yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

II.
This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the
law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the
eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be
heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a
blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably
indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as
possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does such
professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right
to be heard and a violation of its
right to due process of law.

To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted
without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty that diligence,
prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public
service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though
there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results
logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.

In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge
reveals that no substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justification
of his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or even equitable
justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given
is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not
speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge.

On the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge
Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

September 26, 1996
G.R. No. 118882. 262 SCRA 452
MELO,J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS
Petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order is filed before the Supreme Court, seeking to: (a) annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied
the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39,
respectively, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and
"People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin respondent judge from
conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases. All the respondents
have not yet filed their comments after several notices were sent to them, for
verily, delay in the submission of the same would appear to benefit respondents,
and sanction against them may not really amount to much, considering that most of
them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the disposition of
Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we now resolve to dispense with
respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the cold neutrality of an impartial judge is an indispensable
imperative of due process

RULING
Yes.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. In Javier vs.
Commission on Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), this Court has repeatedly and
consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. Due process is intended to insure that
confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants
shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are
supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on
the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

In the case at bar, Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves
as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his
impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more
prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding
Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed
in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from taking cognizance of Criminal
Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be
re-raffled to another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
MANGUBAT vs. DE CASTRO
July 27, 1988
G.R. No. L-33892.
J. Paras, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Police
Commission.

FACTS

On January 11, 1963, a case against Detective Florencio Mangubat, Cebu City
Police Department for misconduct, dishonesty and/or violation of law was instituted
by Mayor Carlos J. Quizon of Cebu City with the former Municipal Board of the city
pursuant to RA 557. He was thereafter, temporarily suspended by the Mayor pending
the outcome of the investigation and was reinstated 60 days thereafter. However,
before the case could be decided, the name Municipal Board was changed to City
Council of the City of Cebu, pursuant to the approval of Charter of Cebu City (R.A.
3857) on June 10, 1964, providing under Section 30 thereof that the Fiscal of the
City shall investigate and report to the mayor whenever it is brought to his
knowledge that any city officer or employee is guilty of neglect or misconduct in
office.
���
��� The case was forwarded to the Cebu City Fiscal for reinvestigation. On
the basis of the records and testimonies before the Municipal Board (now City
Council) and finding no prima facie evidence, the Assistant City Fiscal, in a
resolution, recommended the dismissal of the administrative case, affirmed by the
City Fiscal and transmitted to the City Mayor on December 14, 1965. Records show
that no appropriate resolution was submitted by the City Fiscal and no such
administrative order was issued by the Mayor.

����� �On February 5, 1968, invoking Section 26 of R.A. 4864, the Mayor
forwarded the records of the case to Jesus E. Zabate, Acting City Treasurer and
chairman, Cebu City Board of Investigators requesting that he take cognizance of
this case. The case was thereafter forwarded to the Police Commission. Apparently
the Chairman of the Board of Investigators, found a formal investigation no longer
necessary since the City Fiscal's Office had recommended dismissal of the
aforementioned administrative case. On the other hand, the Commission found
Mangubat of the Cebu City Police Department guilty of Grave Misconduct and
Violation of Law and was dismissed from the service with prejudice.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent commission violated Petitioner�s constitutional

right to due process.

HELD:

� NO. Petitioner insists that the action of the Police Commission was highly
irregular when it took over the case and thereafter made its own findings, contrary
to the findings of the City Fiscal acquitting petitioner of the charges, apart from
the fact that its decision was based on the records which were forwarded by the
Board of Investigators without the latter making its own investigation, and its own
findings and recommendation.

� This argument misconceives the meaning of due process. The proceeding

provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the
principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." Otherwise
stated, where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally
sustained.

� The records show that the case at bar was exhaustively heard both in the
Municipal Board and in the Fiscal's Office, with both parties afforded ample
opportunity to adduce their evidence and argue their causes. But as earlier stated,
the findings of the Fiscal that there was no prima facie case were not finalized
with the requested brief statement of materials and relevant facts on which a
conclusion could be based. Without the requested resolution, the City Mayor was
unable to issue the corresponding administrative order. Verily, the respondent
Commission can not be bound by the findings of the City Fiscal, much less was it
prohibited from making findings of its own on the basis of the records which both
the Commission and the Board of Investigators considered sufficient for purposes of
rendering a decision. Neither was the Board's discretion not to conduct a new
investigation foreclosed by such findings.
� �Furthermore, apart from the fact that the uniform requirements of due
process were all complied with under Republic Act No. 557, Republic Act No, 3857
(the Revised Charter of Cebu City) and Republic Act No. 4864 by the investigating
officials, there is nothing in the records indicative of any act on the part of
subject administrative bodies amounting to a deprivation of petitioner's right to
administrative process.

� At this juncture, the oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative

agencies are generally accorded not only respect but also finality where the
decision and the order of execution issued by public respondents are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack
of jurisdiction deserves reiteration. The findings of fact must be respected, so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or
preponderant.

�� Indeed, if the Police Commission were to accede to the suggestion of

petitioner that the Board of Investigators be directed to conduct its own
investigation and give the parties a chance to present their evidence and not
merely rely on the result of the investigation conducted by the Municipal Board and
by the City Fiscal's Office, this would be favoring technicalities over substantial
justice.

�� Clearly, petitioner was given his "day in court" and there is no occasion to
impute deprivation of due process. On the contrary, the rendition of the questioned
decision by the Police Commission actually promoted and served the interests of
justice. In addition, there is no denial of due process if the decision was
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. NLRC
�June 13, 1997
G.R. No. 102467.
J. Vitug, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil Action for Certiorari.

FACTS

�Private respondent Ricardo Sadac was appointed, effective 01 August 1981, Vice-
President for the Legal Department of Equitable Banking Corporation. However,
on�June 26, 1989, nine lawyers of the bank's Legal Department, who were all under
private respondent, addressed a "letter-petition" to the Chairman of the Board of
Directors, accusing private respondent of abusive conduct, inefficiency,
mismanagement, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. The individual written
complaints of each of the nine lawyers were attached to the "letter-petition."
Private respondent was furnished with a copy of the letter.
Private respondent promptly responded and manifested an intention to file criminal,
civil and administrative charges against the nine lawyers. Various alternatives and
avenues to solve the crisis, nothing positive, however, came out of their meeting,
Convinced that reconciliation was out of the question, A report submitted a report
to the Board of Directors with the findings that abusive conduct, mismanagement and
inefficiency, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness are proven and/or established by
the same nature of the evidence.
On August 10, 1989, a memorandum was issued to private respondent Sadac informing
him that no formal hearing would there be instituted just to terminate his
services, consonant with the due process requirements of the Constitution, the
Labor Code, the Implementing Regulations thereof and other pertinent laws, it has
chosen the more compassionate option of�voluntary resignation. Private respondent
requested for a full hearing by the Board of Directors. It was stressed by
petitioners that private respondent's services were not terminated by the Board
which, instead, was merely exercising its managerial prerogative. Likewise, in
order to adhere to the Bank�s compassionate policy, a hearing would not anymore be
resorted to. Private then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Petitioners. The Board of Directors after learning of the filing of the complaint
adopted Resolution No. 5803 terminating the services of private respondent "in view
of his belligerence" and the Board's "honest belief that the relationship" between
private respondent and petitioner bank was one of "client and lawyer." Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, convinced that the relationship
between petitioner bank and private respondent was one of lawyer-client. On appeal,
the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NLRC ruled that private
respondent was denied the right to due process with the bank's failure to observe
the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

ISSUE

Whether or not the dismissal of private respondent is illegal for failure of

petitioner to comply with the procedural requirements of due process.

HELD:

� �YES. Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for terminating

one's employment taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory,
any judgment reached by management without that compliance can be considered void
and inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation and
conferences such as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the
proper observance of notice and hearing. For having violated private respondent's
right to due process private respondent shall, considering the attendant
circumstances particularly his repeated, but unheeded, request for a hearing, be
entitled to an amount of P5,000.

PALMERA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

August 4, 1994
G.R. No. 110168.�
J. Cruz

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a resolution of the Civil Service
Commission.

FACTS

� �Rodolfo Palmera started working in the government in 1953 and has held
various positions in the Ministry of Public Works. On October 1, 1982, upon the
merger of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministy of Public Highways, he was
appointed Assistant Regional Director of the National Capital Region (NCR). Palmera
then turned over his office to Pacifico Mendoza as directed by DPWH Minister
Rogaciano Mercado.

� On June 26, 1987, Palmera was charged along with several others, with grave
misconduct and dishonesty in two administrative cases and were placed under 90-day
preventive suspension, which was lifted on November 16, 1987. On December 1, 1987,
he was again charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty. Palmera was again placed
under preventive suspension. All such administrative cases were based on the
recommendation of the DPWH Fact-Finding Committee in an investigation of anomalies
in the flood control and related projects in Metro Manila. Its findings were
embodied in a number of separate complaints and information filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and the Sandiganbayan, for malversation, estafa,
falsification and violations of R.A. No. 3019 and P.D. 1759. On May 19, 1988,
Palmera's second preventive suspension was lifted but he was no longer ordered
reinstated.

The petitioner alleged that it was while he was still under preventive suspension
that he learned of Pacifico Mendoza's appointment to his position. Palmera said he
was repeatedly assured he would be appointed to another position but no such
appointment was ever extended him. Instead, Palmera was hired on a contractual
basis for the period from January 1 to December 31, 1987, to provide a legal basis
for the payment of his salaries. After December 31, 1987, the contract was never
renewed. On November 21, 1991, Palmera filed with respondent Civil Service
Commission a letter-appeal for his reinstatement with full back wages and without
loss of seniority rights. He also prayed for the nullification of the appointment
of Mendoza as Assistant Regional Director.
� The Commission found the contract of employment issued to Palmera to be
violative of the Civil Service Law and Rules. Nevertheless, it dismissed the appeal
mainly on the ground of laches mainly because of failure to contest the issuance of
the contract and his non-reinstatement within a reasonable period, thus rendering
the appeal moot and academic.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner�s constitutional right to security of tenure was

violated when he was held guilty of laches.

HELD:

YES. It is not disputed that the petitioner has the constitutional right to
security of tenure P.D. 807 specifically includes the position of Assistant
Regional Director in the Career Executive Service. The career service is
characterized by (1)entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical
qualifications;(2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
security of tenure.

� �Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in the Civil Service

shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process. In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the herein petitioner's
acceptance of the temporary appointment evidences that Palmera had no intention to
abandon his permanent position and his security of tenure therein. The petitioner
had been working in the government for about 34 years. It cannot be reasonably
supposed that by signing the contract, he was knowingly relinquishing his permanent
post and all big concomitant rights, including his accrued leave benefits.
Furthermore, the petitioner was already getting on in years and could not afford to
face an uncertain future without a regular and steady income. It can be inferred
that Palmera did not seek to be appointed as Technical Assistant to the Secretary.
He was not informed of the real objective of contract. He was made to understand
that the contract was merely for the sake of formality, to give some legal basis
for his compensation for 1987.

� Furthermore, a public office may become vacant by abandonment, In order to

constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as
clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. Temporary absence is not
sufficient. There must be an intention, actual or imputed to abandon the office.
The Commission itself has held that the contract of service entered into by the
petitioner and DPWH officials was null and void for being contrary to law and
public policy, A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect
from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into, and which cannot be
validated either by time or by ratification. Hence, the subject contract cannot be
used as basis for the claim that the petitioner abandoned his post as Assistant
Regional Director.

� In addition, the doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to

promote but never to defeat justice. Thus, where laches is invoked against a
plaintiff by reason of the latter's failure to come to court within the statutory
period provided in the law, the doctrine of laches will not be taken against him
where the defendant is shown to have promised from time to time to grant the relief
sought for. Section 24 (d) of P.D. 807 provides:

Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service
and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom may be
reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified. It follows
that the petitioner should be immediately reinstated to his former position or
appointed to another position of equivalent rank and compensation.

LUMANTA vs. NLRC

February 8, 1989
G.R.No. 82819
J. FELICIANO

Nature of the Case: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC

FACTS

� On March 20, 1987, Luz Lumanta, joined by 54 other retrenched employees,

filed an original complaint for unpaid retrenchment or separation pay against
private respondent Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) with the Department of Labor and
Employment. Private respondent FTI argued that being a government-owned and
controlled corporation, its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law not by
the Labor Code, and that claims arising from employment fall within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Department of Labor and
Employment. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that although FTI is a
corporation owned and controlled by the government, it has still the marks of a
private corporation - it directly hires its employees without seeking approval from
the Civil Service Commission and its personnel are covered by the Social Security
System and not the Government Service Insurance System. Petitioners also argued
that being a government owned and controlled corporation without original charter,
private respondent FTI clearly falls outside the scope of the civil service as
marked out in Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.

� The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. NLRC
affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not a labor law claim against a government-owned and controlled

corporation, such as private respondent FTI, falls within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor and Employment.

HELD:

� NO. The pleadings show that FTI was previously a privately owned enterprise,
created and organized under the general incorporation law, with the corporate name
"Greater Manila Food Terminal Market, Inc." The record does not indicate the
precise amount of the capital stock of FTI that is owned by the government; the
petitioners' claim, and this has not been disputed, that FTI is not hundred percent
(100%) government-owned and that it has some private shareholders.
As provided under Article IX-B, Section 2 [1]) of the 1987 Constitution which took
effect on February 2, 1987 - The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter. It is concluded that because
respondent FTI is government-owned and controlled corporation without original
charter, it is the Department of Labor and Employment, and not the Civil Service
Commission, which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from employment of the
petitioners with private respondent FTI, and that consequently, the terms and
conditions of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations.

� Public respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in

dismissing petitioners' complaint. Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED and
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further appropriate proceedings.
BENGZON vs. DRILON
April 15, 1992.
G.R.No. 103524.
Guttierez Jr., J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the
President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal
Year 1999.

FACTS

� On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No. 910 was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, who have
rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years
or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The
retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary
which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

� President Marcos issued PD 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of
Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and
Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the
retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of
the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed
Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. PD 1909 was also issued providing for
the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have
retired prior to September 10, 1979. While the adjustment of the retirement
passions for the Armed Forces who�number in the tens of thousands was restored,
that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only
a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.

Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of
RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was under the impression that PD 644 became law after
it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note
of HB 16297 and SB 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact RA 1797 and 3595 to
restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members
of the Constitutional Commissions in order to assure those serving in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions
even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished
substantially by worldwide recession or inflation.
�
President Aquino, however vetoed HB 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that it
would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere
faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as
articulated in RA 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. Further, the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group
of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service
servants.

ISSUE

Whether or not the veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation
of powers.

HELD:
�
Yes. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President,
nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of
government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and
application to cases and controversies.
� The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain
inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the
duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go
beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government
itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people.
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it
also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
�
In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it
comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money
to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it
may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to
approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this
reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be
vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.
�
In the case at bar, it turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid
law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not
repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it
was enforced from 1957 to 1975, so should it be enforced today. House Bill No.
16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also produce any effect.
Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises. It can be seen that when
the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she
was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to
accomplish. Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No.
1797 never achieved that purpose because it was not properly published. It never
became a law.

The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not
countenance as they undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive
has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. We must
emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within
its powers to pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or
defining what the law is and whether or not it violates a provision of the
Constitution.

As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to

retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was
amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay the retirement
pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every Thus,
Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying
funds and savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the SC
Resolution. As long as retirement law remains in the statute book, there is an
existing obligation on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension rate
pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA. Neither may the veto power of the President
be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the
Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no
power to amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal
existing laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by
Congress. There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The
attempt to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to
deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
Accordingly, Section 3 Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,
after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. The importance of
and the need for an independent judiciary cannot be overstressed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence.
�
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as
may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of
their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme
Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and
sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given
by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional
duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of
the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the
Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited
their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that:

"Requirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because

their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when
he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the
best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity
commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the
least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he
feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well,
and was rewarded for it." For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under
laws which continue to be effective, the government can not deprive them of their
vested right to the payment of their pension.
���
�� The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and
subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release
pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject
pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 122156. 267 SCRA 408.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Special Civil action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and
Mandamus.

FACTS

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i. e., in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 5 1% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC The winning
bidder. or the eventual "strategic partner." is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing, reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel, In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation. a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 %
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share. or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner

and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent
GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33-
000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad x x x 5which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad. petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect;
(2) Assuming Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII is selfexecuting, whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement
Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
'petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a
foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.

RULING

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the
guiding policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and
general framework of the law and government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed
selfexecuting and can be enforced without further legislative action.6 Some of its
provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted by
the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is selfexecuting is a

hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law
oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find
out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a
definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement.
The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision
in question.
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as selfexecuting,
rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement.10 The reason is
not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily
ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights
but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on

arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-
incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life,
liberty and the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to
constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public
use without just compensation.
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not
self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect.19 Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article II of our
Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should
generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State.20 We have
also ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human
Rights," and Article XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and
Sports''cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is
addressed to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for
legislation23 to effectuate their policy content.

Guided by this map of settled Jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is selfexecuting or not. It reads:
"Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities."

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per cent26 of whose capital
stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact laws that will
encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges
covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the
State to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set
priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there
is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting.foreign ownership
in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and
operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision
is clearly still in esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of
legislation. Parenthetically. this paragraph was plucked from Section 3, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution.27 The provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our
ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong v. Hernandez,28 where we upheld the
discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain areas of investments.29
By reenacting the 1973 provision. the first paragraph of Section 10 affirmed the
power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of
Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to
the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of
our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy
and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not
merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as
granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges
covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that
any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse
its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is
unconditional and it is now.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled

"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that
''[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.'' It engrafts the all-important Filipino First
policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs
its enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half-pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila
Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The
records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners entertained
the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony"
refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of
our race.By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of
the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos
in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the
Manila Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The
value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day
Romulo,31 the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by
the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila
while travelling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino craftsmanship
were utilized in its construction. For sometime, it was exclusively used by
American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the
American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began
coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese
occupied Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-
ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the
Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the war, the
Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings,
premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports
celebrities were housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international
conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it was the venue of historic
meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has reaped and
continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and
ingenuity. These are judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased
mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant
to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony.
Republic Act No. 486, 'The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
merely provides a procedure whereby a particular cultural property may be
classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural property."32
Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 3 74 in 1974, the law is limited in
its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing Section 10, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure
and cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the
respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned
and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly
contributions of government employees and the government.33 The funds are held in
trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently.34 They are
to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of the
employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS.35 Excess
funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the
benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS' investment in the
Manila Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the
contemplation of Section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is

essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original
charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil
Service Commission37and the Commission on Audit.38 As a state-owned and controlled
corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the
Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the
people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people
elevated as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase "qualified
Filipinos" and their "preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining
their contents. This is as it ought to be for a Constitution only lays down
flexible policies and principles which can be bent to meet today's manifest needs
and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can
grow as a living constitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR.

February 11, 1999
GRN 130906. 96 PHIL 770
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto.
FACTS

On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of the then Court of First
Instance of Albay, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1113 of the
Cadastral Survey of Legazpi, G.L. Cad. Rec. No. 88, containing an area of fifty
eight thousand and twenty six square meters (58,026), more or less, situated in
Legazpi City.

The plaintiff seeks to judicially declare the transfer certificate of titles

described in the preceding paragraphs null and void; to order the said defendants
to surrender the owner's duplicate of their aforesaid titles to the Register of
Deeds of Legazpi City and directing [sic] the latter to cancel them as well as the
originals thereof and to declare the reversion of the lots covered by the aforesaid
titles to the mass of the public domain.

In support of its stand, the plaintiff contends among others that on letter request
addressed to the Honorable Solicitor General dated March 20, 1994, residents of
Purok No. 1 and Bgy. 24 Legazpi City, represented by Antonio F. Aguilar, requested
that Original Certificate of Title No. 408 (500) in the name of Elias Imperial be
cancelled and the land covered thereby reverted back to the State on the ground
that the land subject thereof is a foreshore land. Subsequent investigation
conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region V,
Legazpi City, upon the request of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
disclosed that OCT No. 408 (500), from whence the transfer certificate of titles of
the defendants were derived it null and void, and was, thus, acquired to the
prejudice of the State, considering that:
a. the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) has the features of a foreshore
land;
b. natural ground plants such as mangroves and nipas thrive on certain portions of
the land in question;
c. some portions of the same land are permanently submerged in seawater even at
low tide;
d. some portions of the same land are not anymore inundated by seawater due to the
considerable amount of improvements built thereon and the placing of boulders and
other land-filling materials by the actual residents therein.

The plaintiff alleged that consequently on the basis of said findings, the
Director, Lands Management Bureau recommended to the Director, Lands services,
DENR, the cancellation of OCT No. 406 [sic] (500) as well as its derivative titles
through appropriate proceedings.

The plaintiff contended that since the land in question is foreshore land, the same
cannot be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, now F.D. No.
1529) in the name of private persons since it is non-alienable and belongs to the
public domain, administered and managed by the State for the benefit of the general
public.

The plaintiff further contended that under Public Land Act No. 141, as amended,
such land shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise
as soon as the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, now DENR, shall declare that the same are not necessary for
public services and are open to disposition.

Within the time for pleading, defendants EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and
Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest of the
defendants, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Jr., Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial
and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss.

The aforesaid motion to dismiss was anchored on the following grounds: (a) the
lands covered by the defendants' transfer certificate of titles which were derived
from OCT No. 408 (500) was already the subject of the cadastral proceedings in 1917
and which has been implemented by the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) under the
Torrens system.

The adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world
including the plaintiff since cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government
itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and is a direct and
active participant. OCT No. 408 (500) issued under the Torrens system has long
become incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the entry of decree of
registration; (b) OCT No. 408 (500) was judicially reconstituted in 1953 in
accordance with Republic Act [No.] 26 in the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
by Jose R. Imperial Samson in Court Case No. RT-305, entitled. The Director of
Lands vs. Jose R. Imperial Samson. The proceedings in the judicial reconstitution
in said case No. RT-305 is one in rem and has long become final and gave rise to
res judicata and therefore can no longer legally be assailed; (c) the findings of
the Director of Lands dated February 22, 1983 [sic] from which no appeal was taken
in said administrative investigation that Lot No. 1113, Cd. 27 and a portion of it
covered by Lot No. 1113-M-5 in the name of Jose Baritua cannot be considered as
part of the shore or foreshore of Albay Gulf. This finding of the Director of Lands
has become final and thus constitute res judicata, and finally moving defendants
contended that several interrelated cases have been decided related to OCT No. 408
(500), specifically Civil Cases Nos. 6556, 6885, 6999 and 7104, all of the Regional
Trial Court, Legazpi City which have been brought by several squatters [sic] family
against Jose Baritua attacking the latter's title over Lot No. 1113-M-5 which was
derived from OCT No. 408 (500) which cases were all decided in favor of Jose
Baritua, hence, the decisions rendered therein have become final and executory and
constitute res judicata.

The plaintiff through the Office of the Solicitor General filed an objection to the
motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) the purported decision issued
by the Court of First Instance of Albay in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 supposedly
resulting in the issuance of OCT No. 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 does
not constitute res judicata to the present case; (2) the incontestable and
indisputable character of a Torrens certificate of title does not apply when the
land thus covered, like foreshore land, is not capable of registration; (3) a
certificate of title judicially reconstituted from a void certificate of title is,
likewise, void; (4) administrative investigation conducted by the Director of Lands
is not a bar to the filing of reversion suits; and (5) the filing of the motion to
dismiss carries with it the admission of the truth of all material facts of the
complaint.

After hearing the motion to dismiss, or on 9 August 1996, the trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in
G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and our resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. No.
85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not
foreshore. The 1917 cadastral proceeding was binding upon the government, which had
initiated the same and had been an active and direct participant thereon. Likewise,
the 1982 petition to cancel OCT No. 408 (500) filed by the claimants of Lot No.
1113, Cad-47, and resolved by the Director of Lands in his 22 February 1984 letter5
to the effect that "Original Certificate of Title No. 408 (500) 2113 in the name of
Elias Imperial and its derivative title[s] were legally issued" was res judicata
to the instant case. Petitioner's contention that the judicially reconstituted
certificate of title was void since the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was
foreshore land was a mere assumption contrary to existing physical facts. The court
further considered as forum shopping petitioner's attempt to seek a favorable
opinion after it was declared in related cases questioning the title of a certain
Jose Baritua, which was also derived from OCT No. 408(500), that the land in
question was foreshore.

On 28 October 1996, petitioner filed a notice of appeal.

On 18 April 1997, the Court of Appeals required petitioner to file its appellant's
brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice. Petitioner received
said notice ten (10) days later, or on 28 April 1997.

Due to the alleged heavy workload of the solicitor assigned to the case,
petitioner moved for an extension of thirty (30) days from 12 June 1997, or until
12 July 1997, within which to file the appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals
granted petitioner's motion for extension in a resolution dated 26 June 1997.
On the same ground of continuing heavy pressure of work, petitioner filed, on 12
July 1997, its second motion for extension of thirty (30) days or until 11 August
1997 within which to file the appellant's brief.
On 11 August 1997, petitioner asked for a third extension of thirty (30) days, or
until 10 September 1997, within which to file appellant's brief citing the same
ground of heavy pressure of work.
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution, the full text
of which reads:

The Office of the Solicitor General is GRANTED a LAST EXTENSION of thirty (30) days
from July 12, 1997, or until August 11, 1997, within which to file the oppositor-
appellant's brief. Failure to file said brief within the said period will mean
dismissal of the appeal.6
On 12 August 1997, petitioner received a copy of the aforesaid resolution.
On 26 August 1997, petitioner moved to reconsider the 30 July 1997 resolution and,
despite the appellate court's warning, reiterated its third motion for extension of
another thirty (30) days to file the appellant's brief.
On 10 September 1997, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion requesting
another extension of five (5) days, or until 15 September 1997, within which to
file appellant's brief, reasoning that the brief, although finalized, was yet to be
signed by the Solicitor General.

On 15 September 1997, petitioner filed the required appellant's brief.

On 29 September 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit and sustained its Resolution of 30 July 1997
dismissing the case for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended
period.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore
lands which constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules
and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief.

RULING

The rules of court governing practice and procedure were formulated in order to
promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding
without sacrificing substantial justice and equity considerations.

The filing of appellant's brief in appeals is not a jurisdictional requirement.

Nevertheless, an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own motion
or on that of the appellee upon failure of the appellant to serve and file the
required number of copies of the brief within the time provided.

If the appeal brief cannot be filed on time, extension of time may be allowed
provided (1) there is good and sufficient cause, and (2) the motion for extension
is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.9 The court's
liberality on extensions notwithstanding, lawyers should never presume that their
motions for extension would be granted as a matter of course or for the length of
time sought; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised
in accordance with the attendant circumstances.

What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules
is discretionary upon the court. The court has the power to relax or suspend the
rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant
or when the purpose of justice requires it. Among the reasons which the court
allowed in suspending application of the rules on filing an appeal brief were the
following: (1) the cause for the delay was not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (2) there was no
objection from the State, and the brief was filed within the period requested; (3)
no material injury was suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay in filing
the brief; (4) the fake lawyer failed to file the brief; (5) appellant was
represented by counsel de oficio; (6) petitioner's original counsel died; and (7)
the preparation of the consolidated brief involved a comparative study of many
exhibits.

At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are
foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public
domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as
"that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the
flux and reflux of the tides."19 It is also known as "a strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to
the flow of the tide."

The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of

government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands
Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as to
questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling
is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore
be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of
the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR
Secretary.

There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the
DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands
found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No. 18655, which stemmed from OCT
408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."23 Petitioner, on the
other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi
City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles
were derived "has the features of a foreshore land."24 The contradictory views of
the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of
the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot
be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved.

The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of
petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient
cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for
extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an. exceptional
circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; the Resolutions of 30 July 1997
and 29 September 1997 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE; petitioner's appeal is
reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

U.S. vs. Ruiz

Supra at 95.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA

August 31, 1977
GRN L-36084. 78 SCRA 470
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

Nature of the Case: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition.
FACTS

The jurisdictional issued raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf

of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of reiterated doctrine of the non-
suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its
consent.

It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn

Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the
collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.1 Such a motion
to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading ease of Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Servicewere Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There
is thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional infirmity
against the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated October
4, 1972.4 What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the
explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The
State may not be sued without its consent."

ISSUE
Whether or not the State may be sued without its consent.

RULING

The doctrine of nonsuability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the

effectivity of the [19351 Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal
right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right
may be predicated. Nor is this all. Even if such a principle does give rise to
problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage
in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Why
it must continue to be so, even if the matter be viewed sociologically, was set
forth in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic thus: 'Nonetheless, a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance-of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the
loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of
such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well
be imagined.'"It only remains to be added that under the present Constitution
which, as noted, expressly reaffirmed such a doctrine, the following decisions had
been rendered: Del Mar v. The Philippine Veterans Administration;8 Republic v.
Villasor;9 Sayson v. Singson; and Director of the Bureau of Printing v. Francisco.

Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the
private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn
Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of
contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.13 The consent.
to be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for
defendant Rice and Corn Administration Weed to had no binding force on the
government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority At any rate, Justice
Sanchez, in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations,14 was quite categories] as to
its "not [being] possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the
contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office directly 'under the Office of
the President of the Philippines/'"

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4.
1972 denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration
nullified and set aside and the petition for prohibition is likewise granted
restraining respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case No. 79082 pending in his
sala except for the purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973 by this Court is made
permanent except for the above-mentioned purpose of definitely terminating this
case. Costs against Yellow Bill Freight Lines, Inc.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL vs. UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

May 21, 1955
GRN L-6776. 97 PHIL 58
REYES J. B. L., J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from resolution of the CFI of Manila, Ibanez, J.

FACTS
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed
of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino
citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot
No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the
unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three
trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of
Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation
and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action
of the Rizal Register of Deeds.

ISSUE

Whether or not the transcribed consulta of a deed of donation of a parcel of land

executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and
administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered

RULING

It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious
organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese
citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions
of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines
limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of
which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271,
and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of
Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for
registration.".

Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee
Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of
the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act
No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:

"SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or

denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of
other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands
upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable
institutions.
"SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in
the name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; * * *". (Printed Rec.
App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion
clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].

We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the
absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act
No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the
Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing
that,"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines",the
Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is
there any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the
acquisition of public agricultural lands and other natural resources to
"corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).

The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not
suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its
members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement
is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire
agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos;
and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock,
the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire

agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious
land holdings in this country. We can not ignore the historical fact that
complaints against land holdings of that kind were among the factors that sparked
the revolution of 1896.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of

the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no
means convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not
worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land
held in fee simple.The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Resolution appealed from, affirmed.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN vs. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

December 8, 1988
G.R. No. 84297
CORTES, J.:

Nature of the Action: Special Civil action for certiorari, and prohibition to
review the resolutions of House Electoral Tribunal.

FACTS

Petitioner and private respondent are candidates for Representative of the first
district of Pampanga. Despite Private respondent�s objections and suspension of
proclamation of winner, petitioner was proclaimed winner. Private respondent then
filed for petition to declare petitioner�s proclamation as void ab initio and to
prohibit him from assuming office which was granted by COMELEC. Petitioner then
challenged the said Resolution in the Supreme Court which was granted in his favor.
Private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46.
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had
been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with
Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the election protest had been seasonably filed.

RULING

The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the
HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before
it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution. Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

EVANGELISTA vs. JARENCIO

November 27, 1975
G.R. No. L-29274
MARTIN, J.:

Nature of the Case: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction

FACTS

The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) and vested in the Agency all the powers of an
investigating committee including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation. Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,
issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer
of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness
at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ...
then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein.�
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari
and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order and assailed
its legality. Manalastas� petition was granted by the judge. Petitioners then
elevated this matter directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

RULING

An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in

proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or
judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into
evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions. Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed
subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas
is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. The order of respondent
Judge, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.
TEODORO CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
January 31,1987
G.R.Nos.L-49167-70
SANCHEZ, J.:

Nature of the Case: Original and Supplementary Petition in Supreme Court. Mandamus
and Habeas Corpus.

FACTS

Carlos Teodoro was hired by Teodoro Chavez as security guard in his fish pond
and later was asked to find workers to construct salt beds. Teodoro and his
brothers then constructed salt beds in the said fishpond and were the ones who
maintained it for several years. They were however forcibly ejected one day from
their work and not allowed to return. They then filed a case against Teodoro Chavez
to restore them to possession, maintenance and cultivation of the said salt beds as
they are tenants of Chavez which was granted by the court. Defendants appealed to
the court of Appeals but were denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE

Whether or not the Private Respondents are tenants.

HELD:

Participation of the private respondents in an the phases of farm work in the salt
bed cultivation of the questioned landholdings leaves no doubt that the tenancy
relationship existing between petitioners and respondents is fully substantiated by
the records. The findings of facts of the trial court which heard, saw and observed
the witnesses testify in Court should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or otherwise misinterpreted some
facts or circumstances which when properly weighed and interpreted, would justify a
reversal of the appealed decision- In the same manner, the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are generally binding upon the Supreme Court. Decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.

MUNICIPALITY OF PAOAY, ET AL. vs. TEODORO MANAOIS, ET AL.

June 30, 1950
G.R. No. L-3485. 86 PHIL 629
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Nature of the Case: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction.

FACTS

The municipal waters of the town of Paoay were divided by the municipality and
leased out to private persons for fishing. One of the lots was leased to Francisco
Duque but was later confiscated for his failure to comply with the lease
agreements. The said lot was later leased to Teodoro Manaois. When Manaois tried
to enter said lot he was refused entrance by Duque as the latter still assumes
ownership over the said lot. Manaois then brought an action against the
municipality for the recovery of the sum paid by him plus dmages which was decided
in his favor. A levy of attachment was then executed. The municipality then filed
a petition for dissolution alleging that the said lots are not subject to levy as
they are properties for public use, which was denied. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the properties for public use can be levied.

RULING

The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, are
clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the
municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. section 2321 of the
Revised Administrative Code reads:
1. SEC. 2321. Grant of fishery. � A municipal council shall have authority, for
purposes of profit, to grant the exclusive privileges of fishery or right to
conduct a fish-breeding ground within any definite portion, or area, of the
municipal waters.

"Municipal waters", as herein used, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal
waters, include within the municipality, not being the subject of private
ownership, but also marine waters include between two lines drawn perpendicular to
the general coast line from points where the boundary lines of the municipality
touch the sea at high tide, and third line parallel with the general coast line and
distant from it three marine leagues.

Where two municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less than
six marine leagues of marine waters between them the third line shall be a line
equally distant from the opposite shores of the respective municipalities.

The order of the respondent Judge is reversed insofar as it failed to dissolve the
attachment of the fishery lots. In all other respect, said order is hereby
affirmed.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

October 1, 1990
G.R. NOS. 89898. 190 SCRA 206
CORTES, J.:
Nature of the Case: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

Petitioner Municipality of Makati initiated to expropriate the land owned by

private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., et. al, attached to
the action it filed is the petitioner�s certification that it opened an account at
PNB Buendia Branch, however, after the writ of execution filed by the private
respondent was granted by the RTC, petitioner refused to pay on the ground that
the manner of payment should be installment which was opposed by private
respondent.

Pending resolution of the above motions petitioner filed a Manifestation

informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner
of the subject property because a new title for the property has been registered in
the name of Philippine Savings Bank

Petitioner later admitted that it has two accounts with the PNB Buendia , one
was exclusively opened for the payment of said land and the other for statutory
obligations and other purposes of the municipal government which it contended as
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner municipality can refuse to effect payment considering

that the orders assailed of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount, the funds
garnished by respondent sheriff in excess, which are public funds earmarked for the
municipal government�s other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required under the law?

RULING

Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided by a statute. However, this does not to say
that private respondent and PSB are left with no other recourse. They may avail of
the remedy of mandamus to compel the enacment and and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance anddisbursement of municipal funds therefore.

Within the context of the State�s inherent power of eminent domain, just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owner but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the
property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

The State�s power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of
fair play and justice. In this case, considering that valuable property has been
taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed and the Municipality is in full
possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three years, the
Court finds the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full
compensation.

Petitioner should immediately pay Phillippine Savings Bank and private respondent
the corresponding amount and to submit to the Court a report of its compliance with
this Court�s order.
LORENZO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH
September 1, 1927
G.R. NO. 27484. 50 PHIL. 595
MALCOLM, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila.

FACTS

Petitioner who is a counsel for the leper confined at the San Lazaro Hospital
contends that the law authorizing the segregation of lepers found in Article XV of
Chapter 37 of the Administrative Code Section 1058 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE

Whether the law authorizing the segregation of the lepers is

unconstitutional.

RULING

All questions relating to the determination of matters of fact are for the
legislature. If there is probable basis for sustaining the conclusion reached, its
findings are not subject to judicial review. Debatable questions are for the
legislature to decide.

Petitioner should reopen the question to the local legislature who has
regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control the
dread scourge.
IN RE: GONZALES
April 15, 1988
GRN 8845433, 160 SCRA 771
PER CURIAM

Nature of the Case: Review of an Administrative Matter. Resolution.

FACTS

������ The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr.
Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel
Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan
had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of
the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.

The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous
letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against
Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this."
The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on
29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in
the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez.
Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading
Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court
asking Tanodbayan's intervention.

The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to furnish Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez a copy
of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative
Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which
Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complainant Cuenco
against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the
Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr.
Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cuenco, the Court had granted him an extension
of up to 30 March 1988 within which to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court of 17 February 1988. On 28 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a
pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia,
Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned,
the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam
Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr. Cuenco's Motion
for Reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not removal of a member of the Supreme Court is valid,

RULING
 It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved.
This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public
officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar
as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office
only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of
such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense
which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of
which would amount to removal from office.

The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988:
"There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only
by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment
of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to
circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the
Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain
offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation
exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to
Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections
(Article XI [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id. and the members of the
Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1]
[1], id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the
Philippine Bar."

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that its Members or
the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity
from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that
there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such
liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first
be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2
and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme
Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer
either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence

and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is
important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would
be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of
reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
Republic vs. Go Bon Lee
1961
1 SCRA 1166
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM LI YAO
1992
G.R. No. L-35947. 214 SCRA 748
ROMERO, J.:

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the order of the CFI of Manila, Br.5

FACTS

William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on

June 3, 1949 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which petition was
docketed as Case No. 8225. After several hearings on the petition were held wherein
the Office of the Solicitor General, in the representation of the Republic of the
Philippines appeared, the lower court rendered a decision in his favor.

About fifteen years later, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of
naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained. That
he was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous
relationships with several women other than his lawfully wedded wife, by whom he
fathered illegitimate children. In contracting marriage, he used the name Fransisco
Li Yao without prior judicial authority to use the aforesaid first name Francisco,
the same not appearing to be his baptismal name. He was also known and had used the
name and/or alias LI CHAY TOO, JR. before the last World War, and under which name,
a trust fund was created for him. He evaded the payment of lawful taxes due to the
government by under declaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns
for the years 1946-1951. He committed violations of the Constitution and Anti-Dummy
laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring real properties by employing dummies in the
formation of a private domestic corporation, which acquired the real properties. He
made it appear, falsely, in the baptismal certificate of an illegitimate son he
fathered, named William Jose Antonio, that the latter's mother is Juanita Tan Ho
Ti, his law-mother is another woman.

William Li Yao opposed the forgoing motion on July 22, 1971. The lower court,
however, without touching on all the grounds upon which the said motion was based,
relied solely on ground that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due
the government by under declaration of income as reflected in his income tax
returns for the years 1946-1951. William Li Yao filed a motion for reconsideration
on December 29, 1971, which the lower court denied. William LI Yao filed a notice
of appeal to this Court, manifesting that he was appealing from the order of the
lower court dated July 22, 1971, and from the order dated December 29, 1971. After
the parties had filed their respective briefs, petitioner-appellant Li Yao died.
The case has not, however, become moot and academic since its disposition, either
way, will have grave implications for the late petitioner-appellant's wife and
children.

ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether or not the cancellation of the certificate
of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the
government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.

RULING

The appeal is without merit. It is indisputable that a certificate of

naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
therefore obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and
jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization
upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.
Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, the
decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any matter that
would support a judgment canceling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of
illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding
of evasion of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of
the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct
himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living," to strip him of his citizenship without
going into the other grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.
Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has
repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the
qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino
citizenship.

Philippine Constitution Commission vs. Enriquez

1994
G.R. No. 113105. 235 SCRA 506
QUIASON, J.:

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of orders or resolutions of the Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Budget and Management, National Treasurer, and the
Commission on Audit.

FACTS

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members
of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets. The President signed the bill
into law. The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A.
Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the
special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President
of the Special Provision of �
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a
Countrywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and
credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries."
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and
identify the projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development
Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in
an appropriation act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign

his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category, claiming
that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.
�
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized
to realign the savings as appropriated.
�
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of
the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of
Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt
service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution it
should be education that is entitled to the highest funding.

The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article. Petitioners
claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for
debt service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose.
The Solicitor General counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the
item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of an
item veto.

Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provision
on the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically
appropriate funds for debt payment without complying with the conditions for
automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D.
No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative Code of
1987 and P.D. No. 1967.

ISSUE

The validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an

appropriation bill.

RULING

Under the Constitution, the spending power belongs to Congress, subject only to the
veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still the
final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.

The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as
broad as Congress wants it to be.
�
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects
and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was
Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.
�
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation
of the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994,
the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the members
of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was
set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other
projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for
funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short,
the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular
projects or activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is
innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation
must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the
operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there
was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of
Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or who hold cards
for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members
of Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise
his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a
Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a
recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and
their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of
their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines,
the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best
position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings
available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their
operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve
the realignment.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has
tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The
compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set
aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets.
This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according
highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any
power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited
from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect
the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may
not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in
the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation
to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25
[2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an
Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to
which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
 It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the
appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the
amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds
other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of
1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should
be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process. That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative
Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the
Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of
validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to
show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not
merely parts thereof. The exception to the general veto power is the power given to
the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations
bill. In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate
fiscal unit.
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute
the laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions
will be done in contravention of the laws. We reiterate, in order to obviate any
misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the
item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any
payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress
of the Philippines .
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, except with respect to G.R. No. 113105 only
insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt
service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of
the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the
use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators"), which is GRANTED.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529

Nature of the Case: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: The subject programs were barred from public viewing by the board for
attacking certain doctrines and practices of the Catholic and Protestant religions,
but were sustained by the regional trial court, which also prohibited the Board
from requiring the petitioner to submit its programs to it for previous clearance.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, prompting the INC to go to the
Supreme Court for relief.

ISSUES: Two basic issues were raised, to wit, whether the Movies and Television
Review and Classification Board had the power to review the petitioner�s programs
and clear them for showing on television and, assuming it had, whether it gravely
abused its discretion in prohibiting their exhibition as x-rated material.

RULING: The majority of the Court held for the Board on the first issue but
found that it should not have banned the telecast of the programs because they did
not attack but merely criticized the other religions in the exercise by the INC of
its freedom of _expression and religion. The criticisms did not create a clear and
present danger requiring the prior restraint of the state, according to Justice
Puno, who was joined by Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Francisco and Torres,
with Chief Justice Narvasa concurring in the result. Justices Padilla, Melo and
Kapunan, while agreeing that the Board had indeed committed grave abuse of
discretion, filed strong dissents impugning its censorship powers as violative of
the Bill of Rights.

LORENZO M. TA�ADA, vs. JUAN C. TUVERA

December 29, 1986, G.R. No. L-63915. 146 SCRA 446

Nature of the Case: Resolution

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure
of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. In the decision of this case, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners move for reconsideration/ clarification of that decision by asking
where the publication is to be made..

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to decide the issue beyond the
contemplation of the law.

RULING: We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all

since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Publication
in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. At any rate, this Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we
find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen
days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.