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Lolita Lopez et.,al v. Quezon City Sports Club, Inc. (QCSC)

G.R. No. 164032, January 19, 2009

Facts :

The Kasapiang Manggatgawa sa Quezon City Sports Club (Union) filed a compliant for
Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against QCSC. On July 1997, the union wrote to the management for the
release of the members’ salaries and for the implementation of wage increase mandated by CBA.
When the letter was unanswered, the union filed a notice of strike. QCSC placed some of its
employees under lay-off status due to redundancy and likewise filed a petition for cancellation of
registration against union.

QCSC contended that the union was not a legitimate labor union as it had a pending complaint
for cancellation of certificate of registration, that there was no valid CBA and staged an illegal strike.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) decides finding QCSC guilty of ULP. In turn, the union filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for non-perfection due to failure to post the appeal bond. The QCSC
filed a Supplement to its appeal. The NLRC in its decision, granted the appeal and reversed the LA


Whether the simultaneous filing of the matter to reduce the appeal bond and posting of the
reduced amount of bond within the reglementary period for appeal constitute substantial compliance
with Article 223 of the Labor Code.


It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, it is
merely a statue of privilege and may be exercise only if in manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. The party when seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the
requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.

In case a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond raised by a reputable bonding company and admitted by
the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment applied for.

Appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance with the following
mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the memorandum of appeal ;
and (3) payment of the required cash or surety bond. Thus, the posting of the bond is indispensable to
the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the labor arbiter

Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL)
G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009


Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees –herein petitioners for allegedly caught
in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the
PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section.

After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for transgressing company’s Code of Discipline
prompting them to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision
ruled on their favor ordering PAL to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision.
Prior to the judgment, SEC placed PAL under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who subsequently
replaced by Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said decision and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.
Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of his
decision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the
validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by LA but suspended and referred the action to the
Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action.

On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the petition and effectively reinstated the
NLRC resolution insofar as it suspended the proceedings. By manifestation, respondent informed the
Court that SEC issued an Order granting its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings.


Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the period between the LA’s Order of
reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the LA, now that PAL has
exited from rehabilitation proceedings.


A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive
wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a
restraining order, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement and it is
mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.

The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the LA
is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view
that the LA’s order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit
them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate
them in the payroll, and that filing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the
employee’s salaries.

When reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the
survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period
when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in
order to survive.

General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phls., Inc. (General
Santos City)
G.R. No.


In 1990, the Company experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian
economic crisis. To curve the negative effect, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement
Program (ERP). Meanwhile, there was a memorandum issued mandating to put on hold all requests for
hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions. Because several availed of the ERP,
vacancies were created. This prompted the Union to negotiate with the Labor Management Committee
(LMC) for filing up of the vacancies. No resolution was reached on the matter. Faced with the freeze
hiring, the company engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation that provides manpower

Union filed in 2002 with the Nat’l Conciliation and Mediation Board (MCMB) a Notice of
Strike on the ground of ULP for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members.
Parties failed to file an amicable settlement. The Company filed a Petition for Assumption of
Jurisdiction with DOLE. On 2003, the NLRC ruled that the Company is not guilty of ULP. On
appeal, CA affirmed the decision and found that contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management
prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. Hence, this petition.

Whether contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to ULP.


Unfair Labor Practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The
prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA.
Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practice.

Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair
labor practices. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its
allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge.

Wherefore, petition is denied.

Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa SAMMA-LAKAS sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng
Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) v. SAMMA Corporation
G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009

Facts :

Petitioner, SAMMA-LIKHA, filed a petition for certification election in DOLE. Respondent

moved for the dismissal of the petition. In an Order of Med-Arbiter, the petition was dismissed on the
ground of (i) lack of legal personality; (ii) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees; and (iii) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

Petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition
for cancellation of petitioner registration. The Secretary of Labor, treating petitioner’s MR as an
appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter.

Meanwhile, the DOLE revoked the charter certificate of petitioner’s local chapter.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed the decision of Secretary of
Labor. Hence, this petition was filed by petitioner.


Whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.


Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election
among its rank-and-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that, in
certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail the
certification election.

The petition is granted. The record of the case is remanded to the office of origin for
determination of the status of petitioner’s legal personality.

Jackbilt Industries, Inc. v. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU
G.R. Nos. 171618-19, March 13, 2009


Due to economic crisis on construction industry, petitioner decided to temporarily stop its
business of producing concrete hollow blocks compelling most of its employees to go on leave for six
months. Respondent protested the temporary shutdown and later on went on strike.
Petitioner filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of TRO in NLRC which
NLRC issued. Reports of both the implementing officers and Labor Arbiter revealed that respondent
violated the TRO. Respondent wrote letters to respondent participated in strike to explain why they
should not be dismissed for committing illegal acts in the course of a strike. Failure of respondent to
comply despite the extensions granted, petitioner dismissed the concerned employees.

Hence, respondent filed a complaint for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages. In its
decision, LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, because the petition did not declare
the strike illegal before terminating some employees, the company is found guilty of illegal dismissal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of LA and held that petitioner should be held
liable for monetary awards granted to respondent. Petitioner appeal before the CA. The CA dismissed
the petition but modified the NLRC decision and held that the temporary shutdown was moved by
anti-union sentiments. Petitioner was guilty therefore of unfair labor practice.


Whether the filing of a petition with the LA to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua
non for the valid termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of strike.


The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore,
pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal.
The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.

Consequently, we uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondent. Article 264 of the Labor
Code further provides that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts
in the course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right to terminate respondent.

The petitioner is granted.

De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
G.R. No. 177283, April 7, 2009

Facts :

In 2001, a splinter group of respondent filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE
alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since
1985. Respondent’s officers claimed that by virtue of RA 6715, which amended the Labor Code, the
term of office of its officers was extended to five years or until 1992 during which a general assembly
was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations.

Acting on the petitioner, the DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondent’s
incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA and ordered the
conduct of elections subject to pre-election conferences.

Respondent wrote a letter to DLSU President to put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and
whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until the
election of union officials has been scheduled and been held. Petitioner in response, to do the
following: (1) establish a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues and agency will
be deposited and held in trust; and (2) discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union
including the incumbent set of officers.

Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) claiming
that petitioner unduly interfered with its internal affairs. During the pendency of this complaint,
respondent file a notice of strike. LA dismissed the respondent ULP complaint. On appeal, NLRC
affirmed the decision of LA. On respondent’s petition for certiorari before the CA, the Court set aside
the decision of NLRC. Hence, petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari.

Whether the NLRC gravely abuse its discretion when it held that petitioner were not guilty of
ULP considering that the temporary measures implemented by the University were undertaken in good
faith and only to maintain its neutrality amid the intra-union dispute.


It bears noting that at the time petitioners’ questioned moves were adopted, a valid and
existing CBA had been entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms
and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations that
a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer become the law between the
parties, compliance with which is mandated by express policy of the law.

UST Faculty Union v. University of Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009.

Facts :

The UST Faculty Union (USTFU) informed its members of a General Assembly. One of its
agenda is the election of officers. The Secretary General of UST issued a Memorandum allowing the
request of Faculty Clubs to hold a convocation which the members of the faculty including members of
USTFU attended without the participation of UST administration. Also, an election of USTFU was
conducted by a group called Reformist Alliance. Learning that the convocation was intended for
election, some members walked out but the election was conducted among those present (Gamilla
Group). Thus, two (2) groups claim to be USTFU namely; (1) Marino Group; and (2) Gamilla Group.

Marino group filed a compliant for ULP against UST with the Arbitration Branch. It also
filed a complaint before Med-Arbiter praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group.

A CBA was entered between Gamilla Group and UST superseding the existing CBA of UST
and USTFU. The Med-Arbiter declared the election of Gamilla Group as null and void. On appeal,
the BLR affirmed the decision of Med-Arbiter. On appeal before this Court, the Court upheld the
ruling of BLR. With the decision of this Court, the case before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC was
dismissed for lack of merit. USTFU appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA.
When the case is elevated to CA, the Court affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition.


Whether CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the Petition despite
abundance of evidence showing that Unfair Labor Practices were indeed committed.


The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While,
there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of
proving such ULP.

Thus, we ruled in De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC that “a party alleging a
critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due processs.”

“In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial
evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Januaria Rivera v. United Laboratories, Inc.
G.R. No. 155639, April 22, 2009.

Facts :

Rivera commenced employment with the Company as senior manufacturing pharmacist and
later became Director of the Manufacturing Division. In 1959, the Company adopted a comprehensive
retirement plan. The parties do not dispute that under the plan, a member is compulsorily retired upon
reaching the normal retirement date which is the age 60 or has completed the service of 30 years of

In 1988, Rivera completed 30 years of service and the Company retired her pursuant to the
terms of the plan effective in December 1988. At Rivera’s request, the company allowed her to
continue working and even promoted to the position of AVP in 1989 until 1992. Rivera then retired
from the company.

From 1993 to 1994, Rivera worked as a personal consultant under contract with the
Company’s sister companies which assigned her to the Company. The Company amended its
retirement plan in 1992. Rivera wrote the company to increase her retirement benefits in accordance
with the amendments. The company denied her request because she compulsory retired in 1988.

Rivera sought relief for recovery of unpaid retirement pay differential. The Labor Arbiter
(LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the
LA. Rivera elevated the case to CA and CA ruled in favor of her and set aside the NLRC decision but
remanded the case to LA for hearing on the merits finding the claim had not yet prescribed at the time
of its filing. Hence, this petition.


Whether CA erred in ruling that Rivera’s claim for additional retirement benefits had not


It should be noted in this regard that Articles 1139 to 1155 of the Civil Code provide the
general law on prescription of actions. Under Article 1139, actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time
prescribed by law. That law may either be the Civil Code or special laws as specifically mandated by
Article 1148. In labor cases, the special law on prescription is Article 291 of the Labor Code. The
Labor Code has no specific provision on when a monetary claim accrues. Thus, again the general law
on prescription applies -- Article 1150 of the Civil Code. The day the action may be brought is the day
a claim started as a legal possibility. In this case, this date came when Rivera learned that she was
being paid on the basis of her December 1988 retirement computations for the retirement that she
claimed to have occurred on December 1992.

Thus, by strict standards of law, we cannot grant Rivera’s petition. Interestingly, the same
conclusions obtains if the case were to be viewed solely from the ordinary norms of fairness. We go
out of our way to say this in light of what Rivera stated in her demand latter to UNILAB; she felt
aggrieved because the retirement benefits she received were less than what other employees – with less
years of service, with lower rates of pay, or with lower rank – received. Apparently, Rivera failed to
realize that she cannot compare herself with these other employees because she and they were not in
the same situation; these other employees retired later and under retirement plan terms that, by then and
for various reasons not attributable to any company wrongdoing, had been enhanced. Both in law and
under the common concept of fairness, there is inequitable treatment only if persons under the same
situation or circumstances are treated differently. Rivera was not so treated by UNILAB; rather, she
was given her just due under the specific rules that applied to her. Hence, we cannot likewise
recognize the validity of Rivera’s claim even from the point of view of justice administered according
to ordinary norms of fairness.

Herminigildo Inguillo et., al. v. First Philippine Scales, Inc.
G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009.
Facts :

The Company employed Bergante and Inguillo as assemblers on August 1977 and September
1986, respectively. In 1991, the Union, FPSSILU, entered into a CBA which duration is for 5 years
from 1991 to 1996. During the lifetime of the union, Begante and Inguillo and other members of the
union join another union, NLM. Subsequently, NLM filed with DOLE an intra-union dispute against
the Union and Company. The Med-Arbiter decided in favor of Union.

Meanwhile, the Union filed a petition with the Company seeking the termination of the
services of the employees on the ground of disloyalty to the Union and others. On May 1996, Inguillo
filed with the NLRC a complaint against the Company for illegal withholding of salary and damages.
Also, on May 1996, the company terminated the services of the employees mentioned in the petition.
The following day, separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by NLM and Inguillo which
were consolidated.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaints against the complainants entered in
amicable settlement. The remaining complainants were Bergante and Inguillo. In its decision, LA
dismissed the complaints and declared that Bergante and Inguillo were not illegally dismissed, that the
two clearly violated the Union Security Clause of the CBA when they joined NLM. On appeal,
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. On Motion for Reconsideration, NLRC set aside its decision
and held that Bergante and Inguillo were not illegally dismissed. On petition, the CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and affirmed the legality of the dismissal. Hence, this petition.


Whether the dismissal of Bergante & Inguilla is legal.


The Labor Code has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated,
namely (1) just causes under Article 282; (2) authorized causes under Article 283; (3) termination due
to disease under Article 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285.
While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in
the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our

“Union Security” is a generic term, which is applied to and prehends “closed shop,” “union
shop,” “maintenance of membership” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees
the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition of employment.

The Petition is denied.

Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National
Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries
G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009

Facts :

The respondent union is a certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of the Hyatt Regency Manila (HRM), a hotel owned by petitioner (Company). In 2001, the company
suffered a slump due to the local and international economic slowdown aggravated by the 9/11 incident
in the USA. The company decided to cost-cut by implementing among others reducing work weeks in
some hotel departments.

In August 2001, the union filed a notice of strike due to a bargaining deadlock before the Nat’l
Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). In the course of the proceedings, the union accepted the
economic proposal. Hence, a new CBA was signed. Subsequently, the company decided to
implement a downsizing scheme which the union opposed. Despite the opposition, a list of the
position declared redundant and to be contracted out was given to the union. A notice of termination
was also committed by the company to the DOLE. Thereafter, the company engaged the services of
independent job contractors.

The union filed a notice of strike. A conciliation proceeding was again conducted but to no
avail. The union went on strike. The Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration. The NLRC orders the suspension of the conciliation proceedings. However,
the LA already issued decision declaring the strike legal. On appeal by the company, the NLRC
reversed the LA decision and declared the strike to be illegal. On petition, the CA reversed the
decision of the NLRC and declared the strike legal. Hence, this petition.


Whether the CA’s decision declaring the strike legal is accordance with law and established


A valid and legal strike must be based on “strikeable” grounds, because if it is based on a
“non-strikeable” ground, it is generally deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on
ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are
committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the
strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes
that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good
faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair
labor practices were found to be groundless.

Here, the union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after
the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both
parties under a CBA. Indeed, those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP.
Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP, since the attendant
circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was structured to
weaken the bargaining power of the union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal.

Teodorico Miranda, Jr. v. Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI)
G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009

Facts :

Petitioner was employed by respondent as Checker I and a member of the company union.
On April 1992, petitioner was then the VP of the union and appointed to the position of Shop Steward
which is a union position under the payroll of the company. The CBA between the union and
company provided for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union members upon
recommendation of the union president. The Shop Steward is a field representative of both the
company and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of all complaints brought to his attention.

On December 1993, the union president wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding his recall as a
Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence. After investigation, the company recommends the
recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and reversion to his former position as Checker I in accordance
with CBA. Petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE. In an order, the Med Arbiter ordered the
reinstatement of petitioner as Shop Steward. The order of Med-Arbiter was affirmed by the Secretary
of Labor.

Petitioner again filed a complaint with Med-Arbiter involving money claims in the form of
allowances, etc., The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a series of
complaints with NLRC one of which is for ULP which later amended to illegal demotion. The LA
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. While the cases filed were pending, a second
complaint for ULP was filed, the LA dismissed the same for lis pendencia. On third complaint, the
same is dismissed for res judicata. Petitioner appealed the decision to NLRC which NLRC remanded
the case.

Upon remand, the LA ruled that the demotion was for cause but was effected without
observance of procedural due process and ordered the respondent to pay petitioner indemnity.
Confusion followed, petitioner filed a motion to be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward which
was resolved in his favor. Respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition, Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of
Permanent Injunction claiming that petitioner should be reinstated to his previous position of Checker
I. The NLRC issued a TRO. Petitioner filed a petition before the CA. The CA took note of the
reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of Checker I. Hence, this petition.


Whether the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward.


Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy surrounding his recall from his
position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the union. As “Internal Union Dispute” or intra-
union conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances
arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a
union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the

The Med Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, ruled that there was neither cause nor
due process in the recall of the petitioner from the position of union Shop Steward. He found that the
claim of loss of trust and confidence due to the petitioner’s alleged absenteeism was not substantiated
and that the recall was not approved by the Board of Directors of the union, as required by the APCWU
Constituion and By-Laws.

The Petion is dismissed for being moot and academic.

Eduardo Mariño, et.,al. v. Gil Gamilla et.,al.
G.R. No. 149763, July 7, 2009

Facts :

Petitioners were among the executive officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union
(USTFU), the bargaining representative of the faculty members of the university. Respondents were
professors and likewise members of USTFU. The 1986 CBA expired on May 1988. Thereafter, a
bargaining negotiations unsued between UST and the petitioners. As the parties were not able to reach
agreement, a deadlock was declared by USTFU and filed a notice of strike. The DOLE issued order
laying the terms and conditions for a new CBA and said CBA were entered in 1991 effective June
1988. Subsequently, a MOA was executed whereby faculty members belonging to the CBA will be
granted additional economic benefits. Respondent filed a complaint with the Med Arbiter for the
explusion of the petitioner’s group that they violated the rights and conditions of membership of


Club Filipino, Inc. v. Benjamin Bautista et.,al.
G.R. No. 168406, July 13, 2009

Facts :

Petitioner and the union had a CBA which expired on May 31, 2000. Within the freedom
period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not
muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. In order to compel the company to
negotiate, union filed a request for preventive mediation with NCMB but again failed. On April 2001,
a notice of strike was filed by the union and thereafter, a strike was held.

Petitioner filed before the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The LA, in its
decision, declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC decision is affirmed the LA
decision. Upon elevation to CA, the court set aside the ruling of the LA and NLRC as far as other
respondent but dismissed the other respondent. Hence, this petition.


Whether the strike staged by respondent is legal.


The court ruled in affirmative. It is undisputed that the notice of strike was filed by the union
without attaching the counter-proposal of the company.

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the
unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the
union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle
differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts
complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicable. Any notice which does not conform
with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and
the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board.

The union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-
proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-
proposal. The union filed a notice of strike, after several request for negotiation proved futile. It was
only after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of
its counter-proposal.

Nowhere in the ruling of the LA can we find any discussion of how respondents, as union
officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the
strike was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis.

The petitioner is denied.

University of San Agustin, Inc. v. University of San Agustin Employees Union-FWW
G.R. No. 177594, July 23, 2009


On July 2000, petitioner forged with the union a CBA effective for five (5) years or until July
2005. Among agreed was to include a provision on salary increase based on the incremental tuition
fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) and pursuant to RA 6728, Tuition Fee Law.

The union refused to accept the proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500.00 per
month. Likewise, union rejected petitioner’s interpretation of term “salary increase” as referring not
only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Parties agreed to
submit the case to voluntary arbitration (VA). By decision, the VA held that the salary increase shall
be paid out of 80% of the TIP should be same be higher than P1,500.00. On appeal, CA sustained the
VA’s interpretation of the questioned CBA but reversed its finding on the TIP computation. Hence,
the present petition seeks only the review of the appellate court ‘s interpretation of the questioned
provision of CBA.


Whether appellate court erred in interpreting the questioned provision of the CBA.

It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the
parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the
CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
their stipulations shall control.

It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employees benefits only mandate the minimum that an
employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional benefits
if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would
appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision petitioner will, in effect,
be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnel’s share in the tuition fee increase, petitioner’s
remedy lies not in the Court’s invalidating the provision, but in the parties’ clarifying the same in the
subsequent CBA negotiations.

The decision of CA is affirmed.

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries – Manila Pavilion Hotel
Chapter v. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009


A certification election was conducted on June 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of
Holiday Inn. Petitioner and another union (HIMPHLU) refer the case back to Med Arbiter to decide
which among those votes be opened and tallied. 22 votes were segregated because; (1) eleven were
cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal is still pending before CA, (2) six
were cast by those already occupying supervisory positions; and (3) five were cast by probationary
employees, and pursuant to the CBA, such employees cannot vote.

The Med Arbiter ruled to open the votes cast by dismissed and by those holding supervisory
employees. The union appealed to SOLE, arguing that the vote of probationary employees should
likewise be opened and tallied. The SOLE affirmed the decision of Med Arbiter. On appeal, CA
affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition.


Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification election should be
allowed to vote.


The court ruled in affirmative. The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it
was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification
election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As
Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. FErrer-Colleja, 180 SCRA 749, holds: In a certification election, all rank
and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled
to vote.

Petition is granted. The decision of CA is annulled and set aside.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009

On February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), instituted a petition
for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of petitioner and its affiliates. The
Med Arbiter ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. In
the meantime, CLUP-Sta. Lucia, reorganized itself and re-registered itself as CLUP-SLECCAWA and
filed a petition.

The company filed a motion to dismiss and averred that its recognized the CLUP- Sta. Lucia
and as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees and that the collective
bargaining negotiation already commenced. On November 2001, a CBA was ratified between the
company and the CLUP-Sta. Lucia. CLUP-SLECCAWA opposed the execution of CBA as the same
is tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy. Med Arbiter dismissed CLUP-SLECCAWA’s
petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. On appeal, SOLE reversed and set
aside Med Arbiter’s decision. The company filed a petition before the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling
of SOLE. Hence, this petition.


Wether the CA erred in affirming the SOLE decision.


The petition has no merit. The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among
the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c ) of Article 239 of the
Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-Sta. Lucia and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not
be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for the company is to file a petition for cancellation of
certificate of registration and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings.

The petition is denied.

A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation Cooperative
G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009


On May 1997, petitioner and respondent entered into a CBA effective until December 1999.
The CBA included “No-Strke, No-Lock-out” clause. On several dates, which were legal holidays and
peak season, some of the members of the union refused to rendered overtime work. Petitioner treated
the refusal as a concerted action which is a violation of the No-Strike, No-Lock-out Clause. Thus, it
meted the workers 30-day suspension and filed an illegal strike against them. The attempted
settlement having been futile, the union filed a Notice of Strike. Despite the conciliation no amicable
settlement of the dispute was arrived, the union went on strike. The company filed a motion to re-open
the case which was granted by LA. In its decision, LA declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal,
the NLRC dismissed it in per curiam decision.

In the interim, into the second strike, petitioner filed a complaint before LA for illegal strike
on the ground of alleged force and violence. In its decision, LA declare the second strike illegal. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LA’s decision. On appeal to CA, the CA reversed and set aside
the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present position.


Whether the strike staged by respondent is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts
and violation of the No-Strike, No-Lockout” clause of the CBA.

While the strike is the most preeminent weapon of workers to force management to agree to
an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts some disquieting effects not only
the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society
and economic well-being of the State. If such weapon has to be used at all, it must be used sparingly
and within the bounds of law in the interest of industrial peace and public welfare.

The petition is granted.

Oldarico Traveño v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
G.R. No. 164205, September 3, 2009


Petitioner was hired by TACOR and DFI to work at a banana plantation in Davao Del Norte.
Petitioner asseverated that while they worked under the direct supervision of TACOR and DFI, these
companies used different schemes to make it appear that petitioner were hired through independent
contractors, that they are required to join cooperative and be member of the respondent.

Sometime in 2000, the respondent began utilizing harassment tactics to ease them out of their
jobs. Without seeking approval from DOLE, they changed the compensation package to pakyawan
rate. One after another, three (3) separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by petitioners
with the NLRC against respondent including TACOR and DFI. In a consolidated decision, LA found
respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. On partial appeal, petitioner questioned the LA denial of their
money claims and dropping their complaints against TACOR and DFI. The NLRC sustained the
decision of the LA. On appeal, CA dismissed petition on the ground that the verification and
certification for forum shopping is defective. Hence, this petition.


Whether DFI wich TACOR had been merged and DPI should be held solidarily liable with
the Cooperative for petitioner’s illegal dismissal and money claims.


To be sure, the matter of whether the Cooperative is an independent contractor or a labor-only

contractor may not be used to predicate a ruling in this case. Job contracting or subcontracting refers
to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the
performance of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of
whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside .the premises of
the principal. The present case does not involve such an agreement.

There being no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and the Cooperative’s co-
respondents, the latter are not solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioners’ illegal dismissal
and money claims.

The petition is dimissed.

Patrcia Halagueña et,al. v. PAL
G.R. No. 172013, October 2, 2009.


Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on different dates prior to

November 1996. They are members of FASAP union exclusive bargaining organization of the flight
attendants, flight stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA
incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory
retirement of 55 for female and 60 for males).
In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter, manifested that the
provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is discriminatory. On July 2004, FASAP president
submitted their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations at the soonest possible
time. On the same month, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with issuance
of TRO with the RTC Makati. The RTC issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on its
motion for reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted respondent’s
petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. Hence, this petition.


Whether the provision on compulsory retirement in CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional.


The petitioners’ primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part
A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight
attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exlusively cognizable by the
RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil
action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the
application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution
and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg
Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer and
employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article
217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute arising from an employer-employee relationship which can
only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Ferrer Antonio
G.R. No. 171587, October 13, 2009


Respondent was hired by petitioner to work as a seaman on board its various vessels.
Petitioner took the licensure examination for 2nd Engineer while petitioner’s vessel was dry docked for
repairs. On February 1996, while in Japan, and in the employ of petitioner, respondent suffered a
fractured left transverse process of the fourth lumbar vertebra. He was advised to rest for a month.
He was later examine and declared fit to work. However, he was not admitted back to work In dire
for financial need, he applied for an optional retirement on January 1997. Petitioner disapproved on
the ground that his shipboard employment history and track record as a seaman did not meet the
standard required in granting the optional retirement benefits.

Respondent filed a complaint with the DOLE, for failure to reach amicable settlement, the
case was forwarded to NLRC for proper proceedings. The LA in its decision, rendered judgment in
favor of respondent. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. On appeal to CA, it affirmed the
decision of NLRC but modified the award of moral damages in the reduced amount. Hence, this


Whether CA erred in awarding the respondent of the optional retirement benefit being applied
for in US Dollars under the gratuity plan of petitioner.

The petition is meritorious. Respondent is not entitled to optional retirement benefits under
the Labor Code. Clearly, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or
employment contract. In the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law.
Under the law, the mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while the minimum age for
optional retirement is set at 60 years.

In the case at bar, there is a retirement gratuity plan between the petitioner and the respondent.
Under paragraph B of the plan, a shipboard employee, upon his written request, may retire from service
if he has reached the eligibility age of 60 years. In this case, the option to retire lies with the employee.

Records shows that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied for optional retirement,
which was 19 years short of the required eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claim optional retirement
benefits as a matter of right.

Due to foregoing findings of facts of the CA, although generally deemed conclusive, may
admit review by this Court if the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion and when the judgment of the CA is premised on
misapprehension of facts. The CA erred in affirming the rulings of L and the NLRC, as the availment
of the optional retirement benefits is subject to the exclusive prerogative of the sole option of the

The petition is granted.

Continental Steel V. Mariano
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009


Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation

(Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a
premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor
due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did
not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the
entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Hence according to the oetitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus
that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could
not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from
the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this


1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die

2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee


1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that
civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.

The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached
38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for
sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation
of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way,
the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any
doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
(Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)])

Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible,
lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this
case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
“G” Holdings, Inc., v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU)
G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 2009


NAMAWU was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Maricalum
Mining Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex. MMC was
incorporated by the DBP and PNB on account of their foreclosure of MMC’s assets. Later, DBP and
PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a
non-performing asset.

On October 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) executed between
petitioner and APT, petitioner brought 90% of MMC’s shares and financial claims. Upon signing of
PSA and full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, petitioner immediately took physical
possession of the mine and its facilities and took full control of the management and operation of

Four years after, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU with the latter filing
with the NCMB of a notice of strike. LA ruled in favor of NAMAWU. It ruled that the lay-off
implement by MMC is illegal and it committed ULP. On petition with this Court, we sustained the
decision of LA. A partial writ of execution was issued. The writ was not fully satisfied because of
MMC’s resisted its enforcement.

On October 2002, GHI filed with RTC a Special Civil Action for Contempt with issuance of
TRO. GHI contented that the property were subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage
executed MMC in favor of petitioner. RTC issued a TRO. On appeal to CA, CA set aside the RTC
issuance of writ. Hence, this petition.


Whether RTC can validly issued TRO to prevent the execution issued by labor tribunal.


It is settled that a RTC can validly issue a TRO and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent enforcement of a writ of execution raised by a labor tribunal on the basis of a third-party’s
claim of ownership over the properties levied upon. While, as a rule, no temporary or permanent
injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be issued
by any court – where the writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon the
property of a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima facie showing of ownership of such
claimant – a separate action for injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since
said action neither involves nor grows out of labor disputes insofar as the third party is concerned.

Petition is granted.

Marival Trading, Inc. (MTI) v. NLRC
525 SCRA 708


Ma. Vianney Abella worked as a chemist/quality controller at MTI for almost 8 years. The
petitioner was engaged in veterinary products, by which the Manuel’s held business. On July 14,
2000, a staff meeting was held. After the meeting, Abella went out of the room and left her
belongings. While she was out of the room, the VP Gen. Manager of the company requested two (2)
male employees to move some tables so they could conduct an officer’s meeting. Abella’s belongings
were placed on one of the tables. When she returned to the room, she attended to her belongings,
when her shoulder bag felt badly on the floor, disputing the officer’s meeting. The VP General
Manager approached Abella to ask what the problem was and the latter expressed her resentment over
the fact that the employee’s were not informed first before their tables were moved. Three (3) days
later, Abella received a memo from the VP General Manager directing her to explain within 24 hours
why no disciplinary action should be imposed for her disrespectful insubordination & unprofessional

In her response, she denied the accusation against her and clarified that her shoulder bag
accidentally fell to floor and such should not have caused any offense to the officers present at the
meeting. She maintained that she aired her side regarding the table rearrangement in a tactful &
courteous manner.

Abella filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA) alleging that she
was dismissed from work without just cause and without due process. She prayed for reinstatement
with full backwages and without loss of seniority right and other benefits. The LA held that Marival
had grounds to take disciplinary action against Abella but since this was her first offense, the LA
considered the penalty of dismissal too severe & ordered her reinstatement to former position.
However, she was not awarded backwages. Abella appeal with the NLRC which affirmed the order of
the LA. Hence, this petition.


Whether Abella was entitled to backwages and attorney’s fees.


Serious misconduct, as a ground for dismissal under Art. 2282 of the Labor Code must be
serious, must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties and must show that the employee has
income unfit to continue working for the employer. In this case, the acts complained of, under the
circumstances that were done did not in any way pertain to Abella’s duties as chemist/quality
controller. In previous cases, the SC held that grave & insulting language as tantamount to gross
misconduct but in Abella’s case, the utter back of respect for her supervisor was not patent.

Philippines Transmarine Carriers (PTC) v. Carella
525 SCRA 586


Felicisimo Carella was hired by PTC, a manning agent, in behalf of its principal Anglo-
Eastern Ship Mngt., Ltd. to work as master on board MV handy cam azobe for 12 months. They
approved the POEA contract, they would get US$170,000.00 as basic monthly pay, fixed monthly
overtime as US$765.00, master allowance of US$170.00 and leave with pay of six (6) days per month
or US$340.00 or a total of US$2,975.00 a month.

While the vessel was in Bombay, India, Carella was dismissed and repatriated to the
Philippines. On August 1995, he field with DOLE the illegal dismissal with claims for salaries and
other benefits for the unexpired portion of its contract as well as unremitted allotments and damages.
He alleged that he was dismissed without notice and hearing and without valid reason.


Whether Carella’s dismissal is illegal.


No it was not. According to the SC, CArella’s overtime and leave pays should not be
included in the computation of the unexpired portion since he was no longer rendering services during
that period of time, as he had already been repatiated. Overtime pay is granted only if the worker
actually rendered service in excess of the number of his regular work hours. It was incorrect to
include that even without sufficient evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, Carella would
automatically be entitled to overtime pay. As regards, leave pay, the Court stated that the claim for
days leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract was unwarranted since the same was given
during the actual service of the seaman. Hence, the Court partially granted the petition and ordered
that the award for overtime pay and leave be deducted from the total monetary award of the LA.

525 SCRA 361


The CBA between PILTEA and PILTEL, was due to expire on December 1997. On October
1997, the union submitted to the company its proposal for the renegotiation of the non-representation
aspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several issues, the parties submitted their dispute to
the NCMB, for preventive mediation. The conciliation proceedings before the NCMB failed.

On July 1998, the union filed a notice of strike with NCMB for ULP due to the alleged acts of
“restraint & coercion of union members & interference with their right to self-organization” committed
by the company’s managers. The company filed a petition for consolidated assumption of jurisdiction
with the office of the Sec. of Labor on August 1998 and the assumption order was issued. On
September 1998, the union filed a second notice of strike with the NCMB.

On September 1998, the Secretary directed the striking union officers & members to return to
work within 24 hours where the union complied. On December 1998, the company filed with the
NLRC a petition to declare the union strike illegal. The LA issued a decision declaring the strike as
illegal. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. The CA reduced the penalty of the union from
dismissal to suspension of 6 months.


Whether the strike was valid.


The strikes was illegal for the following reasons: (i) the union staged the strike on the same
day that it filed its 2nd notice of strike and thus violated the 7-day strike ban. This requirement should
be observed to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carried the
approval of the majority of the union members.

Faculty Association of Mapua v. CA
524 SCRA 709


On January 2001, in the 5th CBA negotiation meeting, MIT presented the new faculty ranking
instrument developed by Andersen to Faculty Assoc. of Mapua. They agreed to the adoption of the
same with the reservation that there should be no diminution in rank and pay.

FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA. It incorporated the new ranking for the alleged
faculty, however, there shall be no diminution in the existing rank and the policy “same rank, same
pay” shall apply. After a month, MIT called FAMIT attention to what it perceived to be flows or
omissions in the CBA signed by the parties. It argued that the CBA failed to include the faculty
ranking point range sheet of the new faculty ranking instrument. FAMIT rejected the proposal.
Meanwhile, MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty.
Upon learning the changes, FAMIT opposed the formula. It averred that MIT had not been
implementing the relevant provisions of the 2001 CBA, particularly the general welfare clause. The
parties then met to settle the issue but were unable to reach a settlement.

FAMIT brought the matter to the NCMB for mediation and ruled in favor of FAMIT. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision.


Whether the MIT’s new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and
consistent with the ratified CBA.


The SC held that the new point range system proposed by MIT was an unauthorized
modification of Annex C of the 2001 CBA. It was made up of a faculty classification that was
substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties.
Thus, the proposed system contravene the existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law
between the parties.

Until the new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty bound to keep the
status quo & to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement.
The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the
existing agreements are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must understood as encompassing
all the terms and conditions in the said agreement.