— seas; PROPERTY; PROPORTIONALITY; PUBLIC GOODS; RESPONSIBILITY; WORK. Bibliography None of the works listed below directly deals with issues in business ethics in Islam; nor do these work address contemporary isues that are part of the ongoing debate im the areas of corporate social responsibility, advertising, conflict of interest and conflict of obligation, and environ- ‘mental responsiblity from the Islamic perspective. With — technicalisation of the Muslim world, international trade — regulations have replaced or even ignoted classical juristic rulings ofthe pre-modern Islamic law of trensactions. ‘Abmad, Kiursheed, ed, Studies in Islamic Economics. ‘Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980. ‘Abd al-Rahmin al-. Kisab alfigh ‘ald al-madhahib rba’ah. 4 vols. Caire: 1964-1969, Quoted from vol. , pp: 283-84 ‘Sed, Ayatullah Bair el-, Islam and Schools of Econom- ‘cs. Karachi: Islamic Seminary, 1982. Sidi, Muharnmad Nejatullah, Muslims Economic Think ing’ A Survey of Contemporary Literature. Leicester: I- Jamie Foundation, 1981 ‘Talegeni, Seyyed Mahmood. Islam and Ownership. Trans- lated from the Persian by Ahmad Jabbari and Perhang 2. Rajace, Lexington, KY: Mazda Publishers, 1985 Abdulazie Sachedina “Islamic ethics In contemporary English and North American writ- ‘ng, the most common references for ethics are in the area of “applied philosophy.” Thus, discussions of BIOETHICS, BUSINESS ETHICS, MILITARY ETHICS, and the like present important examples, particu- larly as these focus on the application of moral the- ries and the NoRMS related to them to questions about the right and wrong, or good and EVIL, of se- lected practical issues. In this sense, the most obvious examples of “Is- Jamie ethics” are drawn from the disciplines associ- ated with Islamic law—that is, usul al-figh or the sources of jurisprudence, and furu* al-figh, the branches of jurisprudence. The former establishes the theory, which is then applied to particular cases. ‘What makes a valid contract? What establishes the duty to obey the law of the State? Is ABORTION per- missible, or not? All these are questions of interest to the jurists, as practitioners of the art of Islamic PRACTICAL REASONING. Tt must be said, however, that too narrow a focus 889 Istamic ethics on this obvious example obscures our sense of the richness of Islamic ethics—and perhaps also of ethics in the contemporary West. For Muslims, in response to the foundational narrative of their com- munity presented in the Qur‘an and stories of the Prophet, discussed (and discuss) matters of right ‘and wrong, good and evil in 2 number of ways, each of which deserves attention from students of ethics. ‘The following discussion attempts to present some- thing of the varieties of discourse characteristic of Islamic ethics, in response to the Qur'n and the Prophet. Foundational Motifs [At the base of Islamic ethics (as indeed, of Ista in general) one finds the Quran. In the earliest pe- riod, however, as through all subsequent Islamic history, the Qur'an does not stand alone, but is joined with the story of the Prophet. Certainly scholars can and should debate matters affecting the textual integrity of the Qur‘am, its dating, and the like, as well as the status of sources related to the biography of Muhammad. For our purposes, however, such matters can be put aside; we are terested in the Qur'an and the Prophet, as Muslims understood them. ‘Overall, such understanding points to the follow- ing judgment: Islamic ethics finds meaning in the context of a community which finds its reason for being in carrying out the mission given to all hu- ‘manity—to submit, actively and willingly, to God, the Creator, Govemor, and Judge of the world. Such mission involves effort in every dimension of life; it includes self-discipline, as well as calling of others to submission. In sum, Islamic ethies, as a mode of discourse, finds its motive force in the notion that each human being, and all of humanity, are called to “command the good and forbid the evil,” in every aspect of the created order. "The story of the Prophet and the sending of the Qur‘an present a paradigmatic example for the aforementioned understanding of mission. As Mus- lims understood it, the Prophet's call and subse- quently his life's work took place in a context char- acterized by heedlessness. ‘The inhabitants of the ‘Arabian peninsula, as the rest of humanity, bore the impress of a primordial covenant between God and God's creatures. Or, more prosaically, one might say that all human beings are created with the capacityIslamic ethics to discern God's will and to submit. As the Qur'an has it: [Wihen your Lord brought forth from the children of Adam, from their loin, their seed, and made them testify of themselves, asking: am I not your Lord? They said: yes, ‘uly, we testify. That was in case you should say at the Day of Resurrection: We were not aware of this. Or in case you should say: Our fathers ascribed partners to God from ancient times, and we were only following them, as their seed. Will You destroy us on account of what they did? (7:172-73) ‘The text suggests that, no matter where human ‘beings live, or in what religious circumstances they are formed, they remain responsible to follow the way of Islam, Such responsibility is established in connection with the notion of a capacity given to human beings, by which they are able to discern God's will. In its most fundamental form, this ca- pacity involves “reflection,” thinking of the sort that probes for the meaning of existence, and that ulti ‘ately points to the reality of God, from whom hu- rman beings come, and to whom human beings will return. Given this, one might say that human beings are naturally equipped to respond to God; when they do so, they submit to God’s will and thus practice Islam. ‘Most human beings do not follow this plan, how- ever. Rather, they work against their nature and ul- timately harm themselves. This failure is due, not to any sort of inherited fault or ontological weakness, but to the very ordinary tendency to focus on ma- terial success. “Rivalry in worldly increase distracts you,” says the Qur'an. In doing 90, the text points to the human tendeney-to-focus on the attainment of created goods, rt forthe sake of survival orba- ity; then for the sake of standing out among ‘one’s peers. It is this focus on material success, with litdle or no attention to the type of searching iden- tified with “reflection” that the Muslims came to-call jahiliyya or “heedlessness.” As such, “rivalry in ‘worldly increase” represents the alternative to “ac- tive submission to the will of God.” Heedlessness and submission are the two great sets within which human behavior is to be classified. Muhammad's prophetic ministry took place in the context of heedlessness. In this, he was not (from 890 the Muslim point of view) unique. All prophetic rinistry has this character. In response to human failure, God sends messengers, whose role is to te- ‘mind human beings of their responsibilities. The preaching of the prophets “writes large” those no- tions that human beings ought to know of their own, coord: the oneness of God, the RESPONSIBILITY of human beings to submit, the reality of just retribu- tion. And the stories of the prophets indicate their struggle in carrying out this mission to stubborn, for- getful humanity. So with Muhammad. From the Mustim stand- point, his struggle epitomizes the contrast between heedlessness and submission. For our purposes, five aspects of the civilization in which Muhammad worked stand out: (1) the organization of the Arabs {nto tribal units—that is, units based on blood and kinship ties; (2) acceptance of the worship of a pan= theon of deities; (5) promotion of a notion of virtue centered on murawwa, “manliness,” or one might say, on the characteristics of the "big man” upon ‘whose patronage others rely; (4) a notion that the supreme ielos of a life lay in the performance of deeds that would cause subsequent generations to remember; and (5) a pattern of legitimation based con ancestral tradition, ‘Muhammad, and thus Islam, challenged each of these. Taking them in reverse order: (5)-the measure of legtimation would not be “that which has alw ‘been done,” but “that which God sends down,” viz, revelation; (4) the supreme goa! of life lay in the return to God, from whence one came, on the Day of Resurrection or of Judgment; (5) given the goal, the virtue of the “god-fearer” or one who prepares for the great day becomes paramount—thus, not manliness but fagwa (HUMILITY and godly fear) is to be lifted up among human qualities; (2) there is only cone God, who is-unique, having-no partners or equals; (1) the primary unit of human society is not to be the tribe, but the umma, a community based on piety. Here, the measure of value is not ancestral lineage, wealth, or other aspect of worldly existence. Instead, “the foremost among you will be the fore- ‘most in fagwa.” ‘The story of the Prophet presented Muslims with a narrative of struggle and hope. For all the Prophets difficulties, associated with resistance to his message, the saying related from the end of his career seemed to ring true: “Arabia is now solidly for Islam.” As subsequent generations saw it, thissuggested a great transformation in the social and moral order of life in the Arabian peninsula, From the standpoint of ethics, itis important to be precis the great transformation lay in a kind of reorienta- tion as regards identity, world view, and the hierar- chy of values. Arab life, it was held, exemplified heedlessness. Even s0, it was not entirely without merit. As the Prophet said it: “The one who was great in jahiliyya will also be great in Islam.” In cer- tain aspects, the common morality of the Arab tribes remained intact, as the Qur'an and Prophet ex- horted the tribes to live according to “well known” values (al-ma‘ruf) regarding cane for one’s near kin, for widows, orphans, and others in need, and for the establishment of justice. In another sense, placing this common morality in the context of radical mon- theism clearly involved a reordering of longstand- ing notions of value. Notions of virtue, of gender relations, ofthe ultimate goal of life were all affected by this new order. ‘Classical Islam ‘The classical period of Islam saw the rise of sev. eral distinctive types of inquiry, each of which must be taken into account in a discussion of Islamic ethics. First, and most obviously, it is during this period that religious specialists (wlama) developed the modes of reasoning commonly described as Is- lamic law. In so doing, these specialists proceeded from the assumption that there isan ideal way to live: 1 way that leads to HAPPINESS and success inthis life and in the life 10 come. That way was signified by the term shart'ah, which in its ordinary meaning indi- cates “the path” (leading to refreshment.) From this assumption follows a question: How cai human beings follow the-path? And the answer, based on the foundational motifs of Qur’an and pro- phetic example, wes “by attending to divine guid- ance.” As alShafi'i (767-820) put it, God gives guidance pointing to the way, in general and in every particular. The key is to recognize the guidance or, to utilize a mode of speech drawn directly from the Qur'an, to attend to the “signs” (ayaf) of God. These are available to those who reflect: on the natural or- der, on human history. om the succession of stages in @ human life, But one’s sense of these signs, one’s ability o read them, is immeasurably sharpened by the witness of prophets, and particularly by the prac- Islamic ethics tice of the last Prophet, with his book—i.e., by Mu- hammad and the Qur‘én. ‘The contribution of the fugaha, or practitioners of fgh, was thus to develop a systematic method for ascertaining the guidance by which human beings might know the direction and boundaries of the straight path. Usul alfigh, the sources of compre- hension, pointed first to a set of sources which were viewed as “signs” par excellence: as already indi- cated, these are the Qur'an and the example of the Prophet; or, since the prophetic example (surina) could be known only through the memory of his companions, one could say that the primary signs ‘were the Qur'an and those hadith or reports deemed sound, according to certain rules of evidence. The theory of the sources was then completed by indi cating certain modes of interpretation, or tests of interpretation, to be applied whenever & member of the Muslim community attempted to declare con- ceming the guidance of God in a particular situa- tion: one test was to be the “consensus” of religious specialists (or, in some versions, of the Muslim com- munity); as 1o modes of interpretation, one might specify reasoning by analogy (giyas), by reference to communal welfare (maslaha), or simply by “reason- ing” (ra’y ot, more commonly, jtihad), depending on the school of thought with which one associated. -In theory, and to-a considerable extent in practice, usul alfigh represented a consensus as to the ap- proach to practical judgment approved by the Mu Tims—in other words, to “ethics” in an Islamic mode, Certain questions are left unanswered in this dis- course, however; or perhaps better, one might say that the answers are more implicit than explicit. For example: what are the grounds upon which the ‘Qur‘dn and the Prophet declare an action good or evil, right or wrong? Or, since the Qur'an is God's, speech, and the Prophet's example is divinely in- spired: What are the reasons for God's judgment about particular acts? Does God call a thing good because itis 80; or is # thing good because God de- scribes it as such? ‘One mode of discussing such questions came to be called kalam—titerally, “speech” or “speaking,” though most scholars agree that a phrase like “dia- lectical theology” actually captures the sense of the enterprise. It was here that a number of Muslim re- ligious specialists debated matters like the nature of jous language, the number and nature of GodsIslamic ethics attributes, the nature of human capacity for ACTION, and the meaning of terms like good and evil. In the classical period (and sense), kalam was controversial ‘aziong the Muslims, some saying that its practitioners tried to answer questions on which there was no clear guidance from God; others saying that, since Qur’an and the Prophet did not engage in it, there was no warrant for the enterprise in authoritative sources. “This fact leads some rather significant scholars to downplay the significance of Kalam for an under- standing of Islam. For ethics, however, the discipline is crucial, And itis worth noting that, throughout the later classical petiod, religious specialists could iden- tify their leanings in terms of (1) the school of fight they associated with or (2) the school of Kalam: they held as correct, in terms of understanding the foun dations of Islamic judgments, ‘Among the practitioners of kalam, the Mu’ tazila stand out as holding that, in some way, the grounds of practical judgment are written into the structure of the universe and reflected in the ordinary intui- tions of human beings. A thinking person knows, as ‘Abd al-Jabbar (935-1025) put it, that to cause injury without good reason is blameworthy. Similadly, tole without good reason is to commit an evil act. To act so as to benefit another, by contrast, is known by rational beings to be praiseworthy. Or again, to keep one's promise is to coramit an act known by intuition to be good, ‘The position of the Mu'tezila on this point was joined with e number of other ideas, which together formed a coherent system, For our purposes, how- ‘ever, itis enough to see how they would have an- swered the question about the judgments of God dicated in the Qur‘an and the prophetic example. God declares things as good or evi, right ot wrong, because they are such. One must say, of course, that God created the world a its, and thus that the very existence of creatures depends on an act of God's choosing—in that sense, good and evil, right and ‘wrong are so because of God's decree, But in an- other sense, more appropriate to human under- standing, once God created the world as itis, there is no going back. Good and evil, right and wrong are built into the structure of things. And human beings know or intuit the basies of practical judg- ment because their minds are so constructed as to discern the morally relevant aspects of the (divinely authorized) structure of the world. 292 If the teaching of the Mu'tazila on the moral in- tuitions of humanity are reminiscent of certain NAT- URAL LAW or “objectivist” theoties developed by European and North American philosophers and theologians, the teaching of their primary opponents ‘must be seen as analogous to “divine command” or “yoluntarist” theories developed in the same con- texts. For the Ash‘ariyya held that acts are good or evil, right or wrong, according to God's decree. As al-Ash’ari (873-955) put it: If God commanded to lie, it would be right to do so, and none could gain- say God. For al-Ash’ari, further, the attempt to speak of continuity between the moral intuitions of humanity and the structure of the universe is wrong- headed, to say the least. How, for example, is one to speak of God as just? Justice, in common under- standing, means to give another what is due. But God cannot give to another—say, a human being— that which is due, since God owes nothing to any creature. What God gives (for example, faith, which is connected with life in Paradise) is given out of MeRcy, Accordingly, God gives faith to those whom God chooses, and there is again no gainsaying God. Kalam was not the only way to approach such questions. An alternative, which sometimes seems at odds with the approach presented by usul al-figh ~ and kalam, was known as falsafa (philosophy) Here, scholars such as Ibn Sind (AVICENNA, 980— 1037) and Iw Rusup (Avertoés, 1126-1198) adopted the heritage of PLaTo (430-347 8.c.e,) and ARISTOTLE (584-322 B.C.) for Islamic civilization. For them, the Prophet, and the Qur'an he pro-— claimed, served the purpose of translating the ab- stract and universal truths of reason into language accessible to ordinary people. In this was, a modi- cum of order becomes possible. Such order, in turn, provides a context in which those with the necessary. ability may engage in that contemplation necessary for a deep and abiding grasp of Truth. Philosophy, in the hands of Islamic practitioners, builds on those aspects of the Greek tradition that suggest discipline of body and mind, serves a therapeutic purpose, and ultimately engenders a kind of intellectual, moral,~ and spiritual perfection. As a kind of Islamic tele- ology, falsafa stands in a peculiar relationship to both figh and kalam. In one sense, the philosophers acknowledge the insights of both disciplines, in terms of the importance of obedience or adherence. to the right, known through reason and/or revela-aco tion. In another sense; the notion that the ethics of obedience was primarily for ordinary persons, 50 that an ethics of perfection would be possible for a certain elite, implied that obedience was in some sense Jess important. Figh, kalam, snd falsafa already present some- thing of the rich variety characteristic of Mustim re~ sponse to the foundational challenge of the Qur’an and the Prophet. Two other types of discourse must also be mentioned to fill out the picture. Akihlag, or CHARACTER, points to a kind of thinking in which the focus is on the identification of vieruEs and ‘vices, and the cultivation of the former. Thus, in- stead (or alongside) of thinking about adherence to the right, one spoke about COURAGE—what it en- tails, and how people may develop habits associated with it, Instead of thinking about the problem of disobedience, one spoke about cowardice—what ‘might be its characteristics, and how to avoid it. The Nasirean Ethics, attributed to Nasr al-din Tusi (1201-1274), provides one of the better examples of this genre, And adab, or “manners,” covers a ‘multitude of texts, in which the focus is on the be- havior appropriate to a gentleman—in some cases, a scholar involved in courtly culture; in others, a practicing physician; in still others, a political ruler. Contemporary Islam It is often noted that the political context that sve rise to classical formulations of Islamic thought, including ethics, no longer holds for contemporary ‘Muslims. The great imperial states associated with the Umayyad, Abbasid, Ottoman, Safavid, and Mo- ¢ghul dynasties are no more, And thus (it is said) the terms of Islamic discourse with respect to ethics ‘must change. In one sense, this is true, Beginning with the ad- vent of British rule in the Indian subcontinent in the latter part of the eighteenth century, much of the energy that gave rise to classical formulations of Is- amie ethics began to focus on issues of adaptation and resistence. What does it mean to respond to the ‘Qur'an and the Prophet in a context where Islam no longer dominates? As Muslims have increasingly seen, one answer lies in a revival of focus on the example of the Prophet. For Muhammad did not, afterall, live ina society characterized by submission to the will of God, His was a society of jahiliyya or 893 Islamic ethics heedlessness. And Islam was established only after he and his companions struggled, with great effort, to command good and forbid evil with all the means ‘at their disposal. From Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817— 1898) to Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), from Mubammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rid& (1865-1955) to Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), from Ruh Allah Khomeini (1902-1989) to Muhama- mad Hussein Fadlallah, the motif of renewal, based on a return to the sources of Islam, is common. For all these interpreters, contemporary Muslims find themselves in a situation similar to that of the Prophet: heedlessness abounds, and human beings need reminding of the natural religion—viz, Islam. In the midst of this renewel, however, classical forms of ethics continue to flourish. Indeed, one could say that, as Muslims return to the foundational sources of Qur’dn and Prophet, the classical disci- plines are similarly renewed. Practitioners of figh, for example, now issue guidance for those struggling ‘with questions raised by modem TECHNOLOGY. Old debates characteristic of the Mu'tazila and Ashtari- yya concerning the nature of revelation, and with it ‘of moral obligation, are revived. The practice of phi Josophy, now drawing on the thought of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and G. W.R HeceL (1770- 1851), receives fresh life, And akhlag and adab are present in new forms, for example in the wotk of novelists like the Egyptian Najib Mahfouz. ‘What does it mean, then, to speak of ethics in an Islamic context? The argument here is that it cannot ‘mean a focus on a single discipline or form of dis- course, even one 50 obviously relevant as figh. To study ethics in an Islamic perspective implies atten- tion to the several disciplines outlined above, con sidered as modes of responding to the foundational sources of the Qur’n and the example of the Prophet. Or, to put it another way, in such diverse forms as figh, kalam, falsafa, akhlag, and adab, we find the voice of Muslims, trying fo understand what it means to submit to the will of God. See also: ARISTOTLE; AUTHORITY; AVICENNA; CARE; CHARACTER; COMMON GOOD; COMPETITION; ETI ‘QUETTE; FAMILY; FARABI, -AL; HUMILITY; IBN RUSHD; IBN TUFAYL; INDIA; INTUITIONISM; ISLAM; ISLAMIC BUSINESS ETHICS; ISLAMIC MEDICAL PTHICS; LEGIN- MACY; MATERIALISM; MORAL RULES; NATURAL LAW; (OBEDIENCE TO LAW; PRACTICAL REASONIING]; PER-Islamic ethics FECTIONISM; PLATO; SELF-CONTROL; SHI ISM; SUNN- ISM; THEOLOGICAL ETHICS; VIRTUES; VOLUNTARISM, Bibliography AbAsh‘ari Ali ibn Ismail. The Theology of al-Ash ‘ari ‘Translated by Richard J, McCarthy. Beyrouth: Impre- rmerie Catholique, 1955. Critical texts and translations ‘of works by one of the most important among classical Islamic theologians. Camey, Frederick S., ed. "Focus on Muslim Ethics.” four nal of Religious Ethies 11/2 (Fall, 1983). Includes es- says on ethics in the Quen, Islamic law, theology, phi- Iosophy, and mysticism. Enayat, Hamid. Modem Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shi'l and the Sunni Muslims 10 the ‘Bwentleth Century. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982. An outstanding discussion of trends in twentieth century Islamic political writing, Fakhry, Majid. Ethical Theories in Islam. 24, expanded ed. Leiden; New York: E. J. Brill, 1994, Survey of philo- sophical writers and schools of thought, Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Venture of Islan. 3 vols, ‘Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, Hodgson’s survey is basic for any student of Tsiam; each volume contains references and further bibliography related to the various disciplines discussed in this article. Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Standard introduction which, despite the title, ‘covers not only Arab, but more generally, Islamic thought. Hourani, George F. Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. ‘A collection of essays by an outstanding scholar, par- ticularly noteworthy for his ability to bring Anglo- ‘American philosophical concepts into dialogue with classical Islamic thought. _Islamio Rationalism: The Ethics of Abd al-Jabbar. ‘Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Dis. cussion of an important and exemplary practitioner of ‘Mu'taail alam, Kelsay, John. Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics, Westminste/Jobn Knox Press, 1993. Discusses classical and contemporary Islamic thinking related to the justiestion and conduct of war ‘Kelsay, Jobn, and Fred Carney, eds. "Focus: Islamic Law ‘and Ethics.” Journal of Religious Ethics 22/1 (Spring, 1994). Includes essays on the role of divine commands ‘in Islamic ethies, on the reasoning of jurists concerning ‘Muslim minority popolations, and concerning the status of women, Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Conception of Justice. Bal- timore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, Solid discussion and survey of Islamic thinking on mat ters of law and ethics. Mayer, Ann Elizabeth, Islant and Human Rights: Tradi- tion and Politics. 3d ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, Critical analysis of contemporary argument com. cerning the relation between Islamic law and interna ‘onal human rights standards. John Kelsay Islamic medical ethics For thousands of years, ethics has been recognised 4s an essential requirement in the making of a phy- sicien, MEDICAL ETiics have been upheld in the ‘West because of the fact that each and every physi- cian had to take the Hippocratic Oath before they could qualify in the field of medicine. In the Mustim ‘world, materials on medical ethics per se have been ‘and are still scant. Muslim physicians and philoso- phers like al-Razi (865~925) and Jbn Sind (AV- CENA, 980-1057) did not write any treatise on Is: lamic medical ethics. The reason for this apparent comission was the presence of general works on Is- ‘Lawic Enancs (akiilég) and correct behaviout (‘adab) which serve to guide them in their relationships with their patients. Another factor that ought to be noted here is that ethics in ISLAM is closely linked to the Shariah (Islamic Law) which is an integral part of the Divine Revelation (wal). It is in effect the re- ligious and sacred law which stipulates how Mus- Jims should conduct their lives in harmony with the Divine Will. Thus the rules pertaining to the physictan-patient relationship were guided by the sections of the law-which dealt with the questions of chastity (al-Kayd), BENEFICENCE (Ihsan), and confidentiality (al-thigah). Physicians are thus ex- pected to examine persons of the opposite sex only in the presence of a third person in order to safe- guard their patients from being sexually abused by the attending physicians, The concept of beneficence implies that the physicians should not restrict them- selves to only the pathological prognosis oftheir pa- tients, but that they should also be concerned about their spiritual, social, and psychological well-being. Generally Muslim physicians are morally obliged to ‘guard the secrets of the patients concemed. In fact, the first Islamic Medical Conference, held in Kuwait in January 1981, drafted the “Islamic Code of Medi- cal Ethics” derived from Islamic sources which do in reality ditect Muslim physicians’ conduct vis-a-vis their patients and fellow colleagues. ners