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Viewing cable 66BUENOSAIRES2481, EXTENDED NATIONAL
JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
1966-12-28 2010-11-28 Embassy Buenos
66BUENOSAIRES2481 UNCLASSIFIED
18:06 18:06 Aires
P R 281848Z DEC 66
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCSO
CINCLANT
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 2481
Original Telegram was Confidential but has since been

de-classified
--------------------------------------------- ----
Copy from the National Archives
RG 59: General Records of the Department of state
1964-66 Central Foreign Policy File
File: POL 33-4 ARG
--------------------------------------------- ----
E.O. 12958: DECL: DECLASSIFIED BY NARA 09/02/2009

TAGS: EFIS PBTS AR
SUBJECT: EXTENDED NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS
REF: STATE 106206 CIRCULAR; STATE CA-3400 NOV 2, 1966
¶1. PRESS REPORTS AND VARIETY EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM

NEW ARGENTINE LEGISLATION UNILATERALLY CHANGING SEAS JURIS-
DICTION NOW UNDER ADVANCED REVIEW. REPORTEDLY LAW WOULD
ESTABLISH SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, PLUS ANOTHER SIX MILES
OF EXCLUSIVE FISHING JURISDICTION, PLUS ANOTHER EXTENDED ZONE
OF "PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION" FOR FISHING PURPOSES. DRAFT-
LAW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ARGENTINE SENATE BEFORE JUNE 28
COUP WOULD HAVE DEFINED ZONE OF PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION
AS "EPICONTINENTAL SEA OUT TO 200 METER ISOBAR". IN SOUTHERN
ARGENTINA THIS ZONE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILES WIDE AND BLANKETS
FALKLAND ISLANDS.
¶2. NAVATT STATES ARGENTINE NAVY THINKING OF PREFERENTIAL

JURISDICTION OUT TO 200 MILES (AS IN PERU, ECUADOR, CHILE)
RATHER THAN EPICONTINENTAL SEA. 200 MILE LIMIT DOES NOT
RPT NOT REACH FALKLANDS. ARGENTINE NAVY OFF TOLD NAVATT
"200 MILE LIMIT SOON WILL BE STANDARD THROUGH HEMISPHERE".
¶3. FONOFF OFFICIALS REFERRING TO RECENT BRAZILIAN AND US

LEGISLATION HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED DECISION ALREADY
FINAL RE SIX MILE TERRITORIAL SEA PLUS SIX MILE EXCLUSIVE
FISHING JURISDICTION, BUT THAT "PREFERENTIAL JURISDICTION"
STILL UNDER STUDY. TWO FONOFF MEN VOLUNTARILY AND INFORMALLY
SOUGHT EMBASSY REACTION TO POSSIBLE EXTENDED PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION BY SUGGESTING THAT US IN FACT HAS ACCEPTED
UNILATERALLY CREATED ECUADORIAN, PERUVIAN AND CHILEAN 200 MILE
LIMITS. EMBOFF REJECTED IDEA US ACCEPTS THESE LIMITS IN ANY
WAY AND POINTED OUT 1965 AMENDMENTS TO AID LEGISLATION AIMED
AT FURTHER PROTECTING US FISHING RIGHTS.
¶4. FONOFF LEGAL ADVISOR CONCEDES DISTINCTION BETWEEN

"EXCLUSIVE" AND "PREFERENTIAL" FISHING JURISDICTION A SEMANTIC
NICETY. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IN ZONE OF "PREFERENTIAL" JURIS-
DICTION ARGENTINA WOULD CLAIM RIGHT TO TAX, LICENSE AND OTHER-
WISE CONTROL ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EXPLOITATION OF
RESOURCES OF SEA.
¶5. DRAFT LEGISLATION ON SEAS JURISDICTION LAY DORMANT UNTIL

SUDDEN AND SUBSTANTIAL IN FISHIN ARGENTINE EPICONTINENTAL SEAS
BY CUBAN AND EAST EUROPEAN (ESPECIALLY SOVIET) VESSELS PAST
SIX MONTHS ALARMED ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES. (SEE NAVATT IR
5-804-0-140-66 OF NOV 18) NOT RPT NOT ALL SOVIET VESSELS WERE
FISHING OR FACTORY TYPES. FONOFF SOURCES INFORMALLY STATE
ARMED FORCES PRESSURE MAKES EMISSION NEW LAW IMPERATIVE, QUITE
POSSIBLY APPEARING WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS. WHEN ASKED BY FONOFF
MEN ABOUT "SECURITY PROBLEMS CREATED BY SOVIET TRAWLERS OFF US
COAST", EMBASSY OFF REPLIED US DID NOT RPT NOT SEE THAT
UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO EXTEND SEAS JURISDICTION OFFERED ANY
REALISTIC SOLUTION FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS, WHILE SUCH
ACTION COULD CREATE NEW SOURCES POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING AND
CONFLICT.
¶6. RE PAR 3 STATE 106206 BELIEVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL MIGHT

FORESTALL UNILATERAL ARGENTINE ATTEMPT TO SUBSTANTIALLY EXTEND
"PREFERENTIAL" FISHING JURISDICTION ONLY IF EMBASSY CAN BE
AUTHORIZED DISCUSS IDEA WITH ARGENTINES IMMEDIATELY. EVEN THEN
CHANCES SUCCESS LIMITED BY (A) ADVANCED STAGE PROPOSED ARGENTINE
LAW AND (B) PRIMACY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ARGENTINE THINKING.
WE WOULD BENEFIT SOME FROM FONOFF LEGAL ADVISORS' QUALMS ABOUT
UNILATERAL ACTION, AND FROM RESTRAINT OF RECENT BRAZILIAN
LEGISLATION WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND 12-MILE LIMIT.
¶7. FOR DISCUSSION WITH ARGENTINES WOULD MODIFY TEXT IN STATE

10942 CIRCULAR TO: (A) MAKE ALL REFERENCES TO ARGENTINA, VICE
CANADA; (B) REFER TO PROPOSED ARGENTINE CLAIMS OF PREFERENTIAL
JURISDICTION OVER WATERS WE REGARD AS HIGH SEAS; (C) ELIMINATE
REFERENCES TO "TRADITIONAL DISTANT WATER FISHERIES", SINCE
ARGENTINE COAST NOT RPT NOT TRADITIONAL FISHING ZONE (WHEREAS
NO. 3); (D) ADD NOTATION THERE NO TRADITIONAL FISHING AND
CONFINE OPERATIVE AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONS FOR NON-TRADITIONAL
FISHING; (E) ELIMINATE LAST THREE PARS OF AIDE-MEMOIRE HANDED
TO CANADIAN AMB.
¶8. IF AUTHORIZED, ENVISAGE TWO-STEP APPROACH TO FONOFF.

FIRST, INFORMAL AND ORAL, STRESSING OUR INTEREST IN FREEDOM OF
HIGH SEAS, NOTING EARLIER FONOFF CONFIRMATION NEW LAW UNDER
STUDY, OUTLINING OUR PROPOSAL IN GENERAL TERMS. ON BASIS
FONOFF REACTION, WE WOULD THEN COUCH AIDE-MEMOIRE IN TERMS
WHICH WOULD APPEAR MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED.
GP-3
SACCIO
Viewing cable 72TEHRAN1164, ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN

Discussing cables
ID e.g. #72TEHRAN1164.
72TEHRAN1164 1972-02-25 09:09 2010-11-28 18:06 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tehran
R 250930Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7561
INFO SECDEF
EUCOM
CSAF
UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164
E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006

TAGS: MASS MARR IR
SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN
REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603
COUNTRY TEAM. MESSAGE
BEGIN SUMMARY
GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER
HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON
OF F-4ES TO IRAN IN 1972. REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER SOVIET
AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY
UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR. SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US
BUT IS TURNING TO USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FA-4E
PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE FRIEND. END SUMMARY
ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US REVIEW F-4E PRODUCTION LINE AND
RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE
MAY BE AVAILABLE.
¶1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON

INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN
SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US
OFFICALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ
SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY
EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED
CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION
INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINZING AND
STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES. MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN
ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND HOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E
AIRCRAFT.
¶2. AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON
ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973)
BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOWEVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USG AND
MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO
MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES
IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME. SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USG BE
ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED
F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIIVERY OF F-4FS IN
LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME.
¶3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION,

INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD
AND APPRECIATED SHAH'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY
RESPONSIVE TO SHAH'S WISHES. CURRENTLY, AZIMI'S DEPUTY GEN. TOUFANS, WAS IN US
DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISIION INCLUDING F-4E.
ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS
WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES
WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS
COMPLETELY INFORMED OF POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY
LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST. GEN. TOUFANIAN PROBABLY
WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURE OF SITUATION THAN WE NOW HAD IN IRAN.
¶4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFANIAN DISCUSSIONS,
BUT DECISON ON F-4E COULD NOT BE DELAYED. AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT AQUISITION
OF 16 F-4E AIRCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM
OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN
RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN
WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS
(AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME FRAME.
¶5. CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAHS REQUEST TO, WASHINGTON AND THAT USG IN
SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE
RESPONSIVE. CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT
ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH'S NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM,
OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOI KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT
ACQUISITION WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF IIAF AND COULD LEAD
TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN IIAF EFFECTIVENESS. AZIMI REPLIED THAT
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN, CLOSELY STUDIED BY IlAF WITH MAAG
ASSISTANCE, AND IIAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE
EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE. AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY
ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
¶6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS

STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND
APPEARING TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY, TO IRAQ. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQIRES IRAN'S
FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BEEFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED
SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF
DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE
NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.
¶7. WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAH'S CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT
REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND EIGHTH
SQUADRONS OF F-4E --HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN
TURNING TO USG BECAUSE IN PERIODS OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR
COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE BE
RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY. THUS
USG CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL
DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USG-GOI RELATIONS. DECISION
SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN FOR VITAL US
NATIONAL INTERESTS.
¶8. ACTION REQUESTED. COUNRY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC
ATTENTION TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT, FROM WHATEVER
SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED (INCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAF). WE
RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URGE THAT EVERY AVENUE
BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRY
TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO
MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOI. IF DELAYS
OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZE, WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT
WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE (E.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972)
AND THAT PERSUASIVE RATIONALE CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS
FOR ANY SHORTCOMING. IN ORDER TO DIMINISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT.
HECK
Viewing cable 72TEHRAN5055, CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE
Discussing cables
72TEHRAN5055 1972-08-22 09:09 2010-11-30 16:04 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tehran
R 220927Z AUG 72
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055
E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006

TAGS: IR PTER
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TERRORIST VIOLENCE
REF: TEHRAN 4887
SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE. SAVAK MAINTAINING ITS POLICY OF
WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE ARRESTS AND, WHILE THIS RUNS RISK OF HEIGHTENING
RESENTMENT AMONG POPULACE, OFFICIALS SEEM CONFIDENT THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ON THE
RUN. WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE OFFICIAL OPTIMISM AND FEEL THAT SANGUINE PUBLIC
STATEMENTS AND THE GUERRILLA REACTION THEY USUALLY PROVOKE MAY FURTHER ERODE
CREDIBILITY OF SECURITY ORGANS IN MIND OF PUBLIC.
END SUMMARY
¶1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS

BRIGADIER GENERAL SAID TAHERI (REFTEL) WHO WAS ALSO CHIEF OF AN ANTI-GUERRILLA
SUBCOMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES HAS INCREASED. RECENT CONFIRMED INCIDENTS HAVE INCLUDED A BOMB IN A
TEHRAN DEPARTMENT STORE WHICH INJURED THE TERRORIST PLANTING IT, BOMB IN TEHRAN
NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY BUILDING WHICH KILLED WATCHMAN, APPREHENSION OF A
TERRORIST IN SOUTH TEHRAN WHICH RESULTED IN ONE KILLED AND FIVE WOUNDED, AND
SHOOTING TO DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN IN A SMALL BAZAAR IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NUMEROUS
OTHER BOMBINGS AND SHOOTINGS RUMORED BUT NOT VERIFIED BY EMBASSY OR CONFIRMED BY
GOI.
¶2. SAVAK AND OTHER SECURITY ORGANS ARE PROCEEDING WITH A WIDESPREAD AND, WE
HEAR, NOT VERY WELL TARGETED ROUND-UP OF SUSPECTS, AIDED BY LISTS OF NAMES AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS FOUND IN DWELLING OF A RECENTLY SLAIN TERRORIST LEADER. POLICE
NETS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY HAULING IN THE INNOCENT WITH THE GUILTY, HAVE
EXTENDED AS FAR AFIELD AS ISFAHAN WHERE A NUMBER OF SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED TWO
WEEKS AGO.
¶3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN

OPTIMISTIC. CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE LTG JAFFARQOLI SADRI ASSURED EMBOFF AUG. 17
THAT CURRENT FLURRY OF INCIDENTS CONSTITUTES DYING GASP OF GUERRILLAS WHO, HE
CLAIMS, HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS IN PAST YEAR AND ARE FORCED TO ACT NOW
TO SHOW THEY STILL EXIST. IN A MEDIA INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN LOCAL PRESS AUG. 19,
SADRI UPPED FIGURE FOR REDUCTION OF GUERRILLA FORCES TO THREE FOURTHS, PREDICTED
THAT REMAINING TERRORISTS WOULD SOON BE WIPED OUT AND REITERATED STANDARD
GOVERNMENT LINE THAT GUERRILLAS ARE CONFUSED MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS OF MARXIST-
LENINIST BENT BUT WITHOUT GOALS OR PROGRAM. IN DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF SADRI
ATTACHED NO PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO MURDER OF GENERAL TAHERI, ASSERTING THAT
TERRORISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN SATISIFED WITH ANY HIGH-RANKING OFFICER AND CHOSE
TAWERI ONLY BECUASE OF IOSLATED LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR
LONG WALKS ALONE. SADRI ALSO DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY THAT ASSASSINS WERE OF
HIGHER CALIBER THAN RUN-OF-THE-MILL GUERRILLAS, POINTING OUT THAT SHOTS WHICH
KILLED TAHERI HAD BEEN FIRED FROM 50 CENTIMETERS AND THAT "A CHILD COULD HIT A
MAN FROM THAT DISTANCE."
COMMENT: WE CONSIDER IT MORE LIKELY THAT TAHERI WAS PERSONALLY TARGETED DUE TO
HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, SKILLFUL MANNER
IN WHICH ASSASSINATION CARRIED OUT, REQUIRING CAREFUL PLANNING AND
RECONNAISSANCE AS WELL AS DEFT EXECUTION, APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THOSE
INVOLVED WERE MUCH BETTER TRAINED THAN AVERAGE TERRORISTS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE
BEEN BLOWN UP BY THEIR OWN BOMBS.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NUMBER OF GUERRILLA INCIDENTS WILL BEGIN TO TAPER OFF, BUT
WE DO NOT SHARE SADRI'S CONFIDENCE THAT HIS TACTICS AND THOSE OF SAVAK CAN
COMPLETELY HALT TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN FACT OVER REACTION AND TOO ZEALOUS A
REPRESSION BY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS SEEM AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO RECRUIT NEW
GUERRILLAS AS TO STAMP OUT OLD ONES. IN ADDITION WISDOM SEEMS QUESTIONABLE OF
SECURITY OFFICIALS MAKING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT BREAKUP OF GUERRILLA
GROUPS AND PREDICTIONS OF THEIR DEMISE. WE RECALL THAT THE LAST SUCH
ANNOUNCEMENT LAST JANUARY WAS FOLLOWED BY SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS ON US-PROPERTIES
AND OTHER SITES IN TEHRAN. IN OUR VIEW SUCH PUBLIC DECLARATIONS RUN RISK OF
INCREASING CREDIBILITY GAP AND RESENTMENT ON PART OF PUBLIC WHO LIKELY BE
INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS THAT DO NOT SEEM TO BE
STAMPING OUT TERRORISTS.
THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT,

DESPITE SUCCESSFUL MURDER OF TAHERI, WE DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT GUERRILLAS WILL NOW
PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON ASSASSINATION AS A TOOL. REASON IS THAT TERRORISTS
STILL LACK ENOUGH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO PULL OFF ASSASSINATIONS ON REGULAR BASIS.
FARLAND
Viewing cable 75TEHRAN2069, IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY CREATED
BY SHAH
Discussing cables
75TEHRAN2069 1975-03-04 11:11 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tehran
R 041125Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 2069
Declassified/Released US Department of State EO

Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY CREATED BY SHAH
SUMMARY: CREATION OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY ANNOUNCED BY SHAH

MARCH 2 IS MOVE TO SEEK BROADER SUPPORT FOR MONARCHY AND THE SHAHPEOPLE
REVOLUTION. ALL IRANIANS OF VOTING AGE ARE EXPECTED TO
EXPRESS ALLEGIANCE TO NEW PARTY OR RISK BEING VIEWED AS OPPONENTS
OF SHAH AND EVEN TRAITORS WHO SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON.
SHAH EXPLAINED IRAN'S RETURN TO SINGLE PARTY SYSTEM AS NECESSARY
BECAUSE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES UNQTE BY SOME IRANIANS SHOWED NEED
FOR IRANIANS TO CLOSE RANKS IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE QTE GREAT
CIVILIZATION, UNQTE AND BECAUSE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAD FAILED.
ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SUMMER WILL APPARENTLY BE HELD, BUT IT IS
NOT CLEAR HOW THEY WILL BE ORGANIZED. NET RESULT IS TO MAKE
IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM LESS FLEXIBLE. INTERNATIONAL REACTION
WILL PROBABLY RANGE FROM INDIFFERENCE TO CHARGES OF INCREASED
TOTALITARIANISM. SHAH APPARENTLY PLANS TO CONTINUE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT
IN DAILY POLITICAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS CONTRARY TO EARLIER SUGGESTIONS
THAT HE MIGHT BE MOVING GRADUALLY TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO
BROAD POLICY GUIDANCE AND LEAVE IMPLEMENTATION TO GOVERNMENT. END
SUMMARY.
¶1. SHAH'S LENGTHY STATEMENT AT HIS MARCH 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, FROM

WITH CORRESPONDENTS FOR FOREIGN MEDIA WERE EXCLUDED, (TEXT SENT BY
AIRGRAM) ESTABLISHED IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY. NEW PARTY WILL
ABSORB RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY, LOYAL OPPOSITION MARDOM PARTY,
AND THE ULTRA-NATIONALIST PAN IRANIST PARTY AND ITS SPLINTER
GROUP THE IRANIANS PARTY. PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA IS TO BE SECRETARY
GENERAL FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST TWO YEARS. SHAH WILL LATER
PROPOSE CHAIRMAN OF NEW PARTY'S EXECUTIVE BOARD AND PRESIDENT FOR
ITS POLITICAL BUREAU. A PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE HELD, PERHAPS
WITHIN TWO MONTHS. GENERAL ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD THIS SUMMER
UNDER AUSPICES OF NEW PARTY.
¶2. SHAH'S STATEMENT BEGAN WITH FAMILIAR RECITATION OF IRAN'S

GROWING SELF-RELIANCE AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE CONTRASTING SHARPLY
WITH ITS RELATIVE WEAKNESS IN FIRST HALF OF CENTURY. HE NOTED THAT
OPPOSITION PARTIES WERE CREATED IN RESPONSE TO HIS OWN WISHES
AND COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN FACED WITH A DIFFICULT TASK.
SHAH OBSERVED THAT THEY HAD FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR PROPER ROLE. HE
COMMENTED THAT SOME IRANIANS HAD MADE QTE SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES
UNQTE WHICH REFLECTED A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN' GOALS. IN
ORDER TO WELD ALL IRANIANS TOGETHER IN PURSUIT OF GOALS OF THE
SHAH-PEOPLE REVOLUTION, HE HAD, THEREFORE, DECIDED TO CREATE NEW
ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD SUPPRESS PARTY DIFFERENCES. ONLY REQUIREMENTS
FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NEW ORGANIZATION WOULD BE LOYALTY TO (1)
MONARCHY, (2) IRAN'S CONSTITUTION, AND (3) SIXTH OF BAHMAN (SHAHPEOPLE)
REVOLUTION. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID NEW PARTY WOULD FOSTER
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM, AND HE PREDICTED THAT POLITICAL WINGS
WOULD EVOLVE WITHIN NEW PARTY. HE URGED ALL IRANIANS ELIGIBLE TO
VOTE TO ENTER INTO NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE OR CLARIFY THEIR POSITION.
BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THOSE WHO COULD NOT AGREE WITH THE
THREE PRINCIPLES SHOULD LEAVE IRAN OR GO TO PRISON AS TRAITORS
UNLESS THEY OPENLY EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPROVAL AND WERE NOT ANTINATIONAL.
IF DISAPPROVAL IS IDEOLOGICAL, PERSON WOULD REMAIN FREE
IN IRAN BUT QTE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY EXPECTATIONS UNQTE. FULL
PARTICIPATION IN IRAN'S PROGRESS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE MEMBERSHIP
IN THE IRAN RESURGENCE PARTY. HE SAID IT WAS HIS EXPECTATION
THAT WORKERS, FARMERS, AND TEACHERS WOULD BE THE FIRST GROUPS TO
ANNOUNCE THEIR LOYALTY TO THE NEW PARTY.
¶3. COMMENT: ABOVE ALL, SHAH'S ACTION IN RETURNING TO SINGLE PARTY

SYSTEM OF 1964-67 PERIOD SHOWS HIS EXTREME SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM
AND STRONG DESIRE TO RECEIVE OVERT EVIDENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT.
AFTER HE EXPERIMENTED WITH TAME OPPOSITION PARTIES IN
1956-64 PERIOD WITH POOR RESULTS, SHAH THEN TURNED TO HASSAN ALI
MANSUR'S PROGRESSIVE SOCIETY TO CREATE IRAN NOVIN PARTY AS INSTRUMENT
TO IMPLEMENT HIS SIXTH OF BAHMAN REVOLUTION. MARDOM PARTY
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REJUVENATED TO STIMULATE IRAN NOVIN TO PERFORM
MORE EFFECTIVELY. DESPITE CONSTANT STATEMENTS OF LOYALTY TO SHAH
AND HIS PLANS FOR IRAN, PARTIES HAVE APPARENTLY NOT PLEASED HIM.
AS INDICATED BY FAILURES OF FORMER MARDOM PARTY SECRETARIES
GENERAL ALI NAQI AND NASSER AMERI, EVEN ACTIVITIES OF GELDED
OPPOSITION HAD PROVED TOO CRITICAL FOR SHAH'S TASTE. NEVERTHELESS
HIS PAST STATEMENTS INDICATED CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR COCCEPT OF
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN IRAN, AND IMPERIAL DECISION TO INSTITUTE ONEPARTY
STATE REPRESENTS 180-DEGREE SHIFT IN POLICY WHICH ALSO
APPEARS TO NEGATE EARLIER PROMISES OF FREER ELECTIONS LATER THIS
YEAR. KEY SECTION OF SPEECH IS COMMENT THAT HE HAD HEARD QTE SOME
REALLY SHAMEFUL UTTERANCES, WHICH IN NOW WAY SHOULD BE EXPECTED
FROM AN IRANIAN. THIS SCENE, OF COURSE, HAS ALWAYS RECURRED WHEN
IRAN HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE DEFENCE OF ITS RIGHTS AT A HISTORIC
JUNCTURE. THIS SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE, UNQTE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WE DOUBT THAT MUCH CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM WILL EMERGE
FROM THE IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY.
¶4. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS LITTLE HAS CHANGED, FOR DESPITE FACADE OF

QTE ME-TOO UNQTE OPPOSITION PARTIES SHAH HAS ALWAYS CALLED THE
TUNE AND ONLY RULING IRAN NOVIN PARTY HAD ANY IMPORTANCE. PRIME
MINISTER HAS BEEN LEAD DANCER, AND HIS SELECTION AS SECGEN AT
JANUARY PARTY CONGRESS HAD TIED IRAN NOVIN PARTY EVEN CLOSER TO
SHAH. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF NEW MOVE HAS BEEN FLOOD OF STATEMENTS
OF LOYALTY TO SHAH, CONSTITUTION AND REVOLUTION, BOTH BY
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. THERE IS CLEARLY NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR
IRANIANS WHO WANT TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN IRAN'S DEVELOPMENT
AND SHARE ITS PROSPERITY. ALL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT
SHAH'S PLAN FOR IRAN WILL BE SUPPRESSED UNTIL NEW PARTY
DEVELOPS AN IDEOLOGY AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS CONSTITUTED.
¶5. SHAH'S SPEECH IS VAGUE ON GOALS OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY AND

MANY OTHER POINTS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW CANDIDATES
WILL BE SELECTED FOR SUMMER ELECTIONS AND ON WHAT PLATFORMS THEY
WILL RUN. SPEECH SHOWS SIGNS OF HURRIED PREPARATION FOR ISSUANCE
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGIERS. WHILE MOST IRANIANS WILL
ACCEPT NEW CHANGE WITH TYPICAL CYNICISM, IMPLIED CRITICISM OF ALL
PARTIES FOR FAILING TO GET BEHIND SHAH'S PUSH FOR REVOLUTION FROM
THE TOP MAY ALIENATE SOME PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAVE
WORKED HARD FOR IRAN NOVIN PARTY ON ASSUMPTION THEY WERE CARRYING
OUT SHAH'S WISHES.
¶6. INTERNATIONAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY VARY FROM INDIFFERENCE TO

INCREASINGLY SHRILL CHARGES OF TOTALITARIANISM. IRAN'S IMAGE AS
COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL ELEMENTS WERE BEING TAPPED IN DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS MAY SUFFER UNLESS NEW PARTY'S MEMBERSHIP COMES FROM BROAD
SPECTRUM. IT APPEARS THAT EARLIER SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN POLICY OF
COMPROMISE AND COOPERATION HAS BEEN REPLACED BY QTE TAKE IT OR
LEAVE IT UNQTE STANCE IN DEALING WITH OPPOSITION.
¶7. IN A-19 EMBASSY NOTED THAT SHAH HOPES TO MOVE TOWARD SITUATION
IN WHICH HE GIVES POLICY GUIDANCE BUT KEEPS HIS DISTANCE FROM
DAILY ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT. INITAL IMPRESSION OF HIS ACTION IN
CREATING NEW POLITICAL PARTY AND FORECASTING HIS PERSONAL SELECTION
OF SOME OF ITS LEADERS IS THAT HE HAS RETURNED TO MORE DIRECT
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT. BETTER JUDGMENT ON THIS
POINT CAN BE MADE WHEN FUNCTION OF NEW PARTY BECOME CLEAR.
¶8. IN SUM, GIVEN EXISTING STRICT DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONTROLS,

SHAH'S DECISION TO MELD ALL POLITICAL PARTIES INTO ONE APPEARS TO
OFFER LITTLE IN WAY OF IMPROVEMENTS TO IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
WHILE ADDING SEVERAL DISADVANTAGES BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.
HELMS
Declassified/Released US Department of State EO

Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006
Viewing cable 79TEHRAN8980, NEGOTIATIONS

Discussing cables
79TEHRAN8980 1979-08-13 04:04 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tehran
R 130458Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR IR
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS
¶1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
¶2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE

EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND
SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE,
HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING
BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES
THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL
REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION,
BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES
ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE,
WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF
BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES
WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS
COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.
¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN

PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE
IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY
WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL
EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION
WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS
OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT
IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS
DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA.
SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY
IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE
PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE
GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDITY
OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN
CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED
TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.
¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN,

AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM,
IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN
WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT
NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT
HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH
INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES
TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY
JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT
SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED
"BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A
MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN
FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES
PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER
NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND
HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE PGOI IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS
WITH GTE.
¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A

GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS
EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT
AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT
SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE
WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE
IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE
INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING
THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE
PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION
IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING
IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN
AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN
ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.
¶6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY

SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS.
AGAIN, YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE
IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY REMAIN
IN PLACE. "BUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME THEY
WOULD GO BY MONDAY," HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS
THAT THE SHERRY CASE IS "90 PERCENT SOLVED," BUT WHEN
A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING
HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS
MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED
BY ACTION AND RESULTS.
¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE

AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER
AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH.
PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE
INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS
ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE
EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST
YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?
¶7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE
WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS:
- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF

THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL
BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH
SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION
OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.
- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY

TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE
NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH
HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF
THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED
TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING
RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING
WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT
LEAST TO THE LATTER.
- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS

OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND
REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY
COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.
- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE

SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS
OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.
- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE

IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL
TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE
TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE
MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED
ON BOTH SIDES.
- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT

OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT
BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN
NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE
IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL
(FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.
LAINGEN
CONFIDENTIAL
Viewing cable 86MADRID5480, QADHAFI RETALIATES AGAINST

SPANISH EXPULSIONS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #86MADRID5480.
86MADRID5480 1986-05-12 17:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Madrid
O 121758Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8202
EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
S E C R E T MADRID 05480
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER PINR PREL SP LY
SUBJECT: QADHAFI RETALIATES AGAINST SPANISH EXPULSIONS
REF: A) MADRID 5426, B) MADRID 5425, C) MADRID 5418
¶1. (C) LIBYA MAY 12 RESPONDED TO FRIDAY'S EXPULSION OF

ITS CONSUL GENERAL, CHARGED WITH PASSING FUNDS TO
A SPANISH ARMY COLONEL ON THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC RIGHT,
BY PNG'ING THE SPANISH COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL
COUNSELORS IN TRIPOLI. MFA'S SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL FOR
NORTH AFRICA TELLS US THAT THE GOS WILL NOT RETALIATE
SPECIFICALLY FOR THESE EXPULSIONS; AS INVESTIGATIONS
CONTINUE INTO THE LIBYAN ACTIVITIES HERE, HOWEVER,
MORE EXPULSIONS ARE QUITE POSSIBLE.
¶2. (U) AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED, WE RECEIVED

A WIRE SERVICE REPORT QUOTING INTERIOR MINISTER
BARRIONUEVO SAYING THAT SPAIN DID NOT PLAN ADDITIONAL
LIBYAN EXPULSIONS.
¶3. (C) COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THIS SERIES

OF EXPULSIONS AND REPRISALS IS GOING TO TAKE SPANISH-
LIBYAN RELATIONS. THE GOS IS DRIVEN BY TWO MUTUALLY-
EXCLUSIVE DESIRES. ON THE ONE HAND, IN THIS ELECTORAL
PERIOD IT WANTS TO DISCREDIT THE FAR RIGHT (WHICH IT
HAS DONE BY PUBLICIZING THE COLONEL'S CONNECTION TO
QADHAFI - REF C), AND SHOW IT IS
EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM (WHICH IT DID
BY BAGGING THE 10-MAN "CALL OF JESUS CHRIST" GROUP -
REF A). AT THE SAME TIME THE GOS WANTS TO AVOID
BECOMING A PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR QADHAFI BY PERSERVING
AS MUCH OF A RELATIONSHIP AS POSSIBLE. FOREIGN
MINISTER ORDONEZ PLAYED TO THE SECOND LINE THIS
WEEKEND WHEN HE REFUSED TO COMMENT ON LIBYAN ACTIVITIES
HERE, SAYING "I DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT WHICH
MIGHT AGGRAVATE A STATE OF RELATIONS WHICH IS PASSING
THROUGH A DELICATE MOMENT." WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR
MFA SOURCE THAT SENIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS MET TODAY
TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT TO LIBYA'S RETALIATION
(WHICH LEAVES THE GOS EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI WITH ONLY
3 DIPLOMATS). THE DECISION TO DO NOTHING IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE MINISTRY'S LINE -- TAKEN PUBLICLY
THIS WEEKEND -- THAT IT DOES NOT WANT TO SEVER
RELATIONS WITH TRIPOLI. THIS STRATEGY IS ONLY POSSIBLE
IF QADHAFI PLAYS ALONG.
ENDERS
Viewing cable 89PANAMA8545, PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A

SUCCESSFUL COUP
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #89PANAMA8545.
89PANAMA8545 1989-12-13 19:07 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Panama
P 131914Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7213
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 8090
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
PANCANAL COMM
USLO CARIBBEAN
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY BONN
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PANAMA 08545
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM US
SUBJECT: PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP
-- NORIEGA PLANS FOR A NEW YEAR IN POWER
¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
--------------------------------
SUMMARY
--------------------------------
¶2. THROUGHOUT 1989, RAPIDLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS HELD OUT HOPE TO MANY PANAMANIANS FOR
A RESOLUTION TO PANAMA’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS: THE ELECTION OF MAY 7, THE SUBSEQUENT OAS
NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLINE OF
SEPTEMBER 1, THE COUP ATTEMPT OF OCTOBER 3, AND
THE TREATY DEADLINE OF JANUARY 1, 1990.
PROJECTING INTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1990, NO SUCH
HOPEFUL EVENTS AND DATES ARE READILY APPARENT.
THE OPPOSITION’S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SURVIVE
POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND LITERALLY UNTIL THE
NEXT COUP. NORIEGA WILL HAVE TO TRY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER THE PANAMA DEFENSE
FORCES (FDP) AND AVOID ANOTHER UPRISING.
¶3. PRESSURES ON NORIEGA HAVE INCREASED ACROSS THE

BOARD, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DETERMINED THAT HE CAN
MANAGE THEM. DESPITE NEW U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,
THE MOST PRECIPITOUS ECONOMIC DROP IS OVER FOR
NOW, FOLLOWING A TWO-YEAR, 25 PERCENT DROP IN
GDP. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION REMAINS AN IRRITANT
TO THE REGIME, BUT IT IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR
NORIEGA’S STABILITY. U.S. ACTIONS, FROM THE
APPOINTMENT OF AN ACTING CANAL ADMINISTRATOR TO
RUMORED COVERT PLANS AGAINST NORIEGA AS WELL AS
NEW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ALLOW NORIEGA TO BEAT THE
NATIONALISTIC DRUM AND MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF
DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIM IS GROWING.
¶4. NORIEGA’S WEAKEST POINT REMAINS HIS OWN
INSTITUTION. WHISPERS THAT “THE OCTOBER 3 COUP IS
NOT OVER” CONTINUE AND NORIEGA CONTINUES TO HOLD
ON MAINLY BY BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ANY POTENTIAL
NEW INSIDE OPPONENTS. WHEN ANOTHER ACTION TO
REMOVE NORIEGA WILL TAKE PLACE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT
WAITING FOR THAT POSSIBILITY IS THE MAIN PROSPECT
FOR PANAMA IN 1990. END SUMMARY.
---------------------------------------
THE CRISIS GRINDS ON
---------------------------------------
¶5. THE PANAMA CRISIS CONTINUES TO GRIND ON WITH
NO CLEAR END IN SIGHT. NORIEGA TENACIOUSLY HOLDS
ON TO POWER, INTIMIDATING HIS OPPONENTS AND FIRING
UP HIS SUPPORTERS WITH SLOGANS CALLING FOR
RETRIBUTION AGAINST “PANAMANIAN TRAITORS AND THEIR
U.S. MASTERS,” SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO HIM.
NORIEGA IS WEAKER THAN HE WAS AT THIS TIME LAST
YEAR, BUT THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SET OF
PRESSURES HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO EJECT HIM FROM
OFFICE.
¶6. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF AN

ALLEGED U.S. COVERT ACTION PLAN AGAINST NORIEGA
HAVE ONCE AGAIN RAISED HOPES OF SOME PANAMANIANS
THAT THIS MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF HIS END.
NORIEGA HIMSELF IS APPARENTLY ATTACHING SOME
CREDIBILITY TO THE PRESS REPORTS. HE HAS REACTED
NERVOUSLY BY STEPPING UP HARASSMENT OF THE
OPPOSITION AND INCREASING THE SIZE, TRAINING,
ACTIVITY, AND ARMAMENT OF HIS “DIGNITY
BATTALIONS.” THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP IS
CONCERNED OVER THE NEW “EYE FOR AN EYE”
PARA-MILITARY CAMPAIGN, WHICH NORIEGA HAS USED TO
REMIND THE OPPOSITION OF ITS VULNERABILITY.
---------------------------------------
REGIME POLITICAL ACTIVITY
---------------------------------------
¶7. THE RODRIGUEZ ADMINISTRATION, UNSURPRISINGLY,
REMAINS INEFFECTUAL, BUT CONTINUES TO LIMP ALONG.
REGIME SOURCES INDICATE WITH SOME DEGREE OF
CERTITUDE THAT NORIEGA IS UNHAPPY WITH HIS
CIVILIAN PUPPETS, THAT HE MAY EVEN FIRE RODRIGUEZ,
AND PLANS TO TAKE OVER THE FORMAL REIGNS OF
GOVERNMENT SOON. THE ASSEMBLY OF 510 LOCAL
DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES (ANRC) CONFIRMED HIM AS
”NATIONAL COORDINATOR” ON NOVEMBER 22. THIS
BRINGS HIM ONE STEP CLOSER TO BEING NAMED “HEAD OF
GOVERNMENT”, WHICH HE AND OTHERS AROUND HIM HAVE
HINTED AT FOR SOME TIME.
¶8. MANY VIEW THIS NORIEGA MOVE AS THE FINAL STEP

TOWARD A TOTALITARIAN REGIME AND FURTHER SEVERE
REPRESSION. SOME SEE THIS AS A PENDING NORIEGA
MISTAKE. AS “HEAD OF GOVERNMENT”, HE WOULD HAVE
TO BEAR FULL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME
ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, BY INTRODUCING A NEW
ELEMENT -- HIS GOVERNMENTAL ROLE -- INTO THE STALE
POLITICAL SITUATION, NORIEGA MAY BE ABLE TO USE
HIS USUAL MIXTURE OF OBFUSCATION AND INTIMIDATION
TO BUY HIMSELF MORE TIME AND POLITICAL BREATHING
SPACE.
------------------------------------------
THE OPPOSITION
------------------------------------------
¶9. NORIEGA’S MOST RECENT PARA-MILITARY SHOW OF
FORCE FURTHER CONVINCED THE OPPOSITION THAT
POLITICAL ACTION WILL RESULT ONLY IN GREATER
REGIME BRUTALITY AGAINST THEM, NOT NORIEGA’S
DEPARTURE. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP QUIETLY
HOPES THAT CLANDESTINE (AND OTHER) U.S. ACTION,
POSSIBLY COUPLED WITH ANOTHER COUP WILL REMOVE
NORIEGA. THE LEADERS SEE THEMSELVES PLAYING A
ROLE IN THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT AND THEIR CURRENT
PREPARATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON BEING ABLE TO MOVE IN
TO FILL THE GOVERNMENT VACUUM IF THE NEXT EFFORT
SHOULD SUCCEED. THE CIVILIAN OPPOSITION
RECOGNIZES THE POLITICAL REALITY THAT THE MILITARY
IS THE MAIN POLITICAL FORCE IN PANAMA.
¶10. AS THE MEMORY -- AND TO SOME EXTENT THE

LEGITIMACY -- OF THE MAY ELECTION RECEDES, THE
PRESSURE ON THE LEADERSHIP FROM WITHIN THE
OPPOSITION RANKS “TO DO SOMETHING” TO MAINTAIN
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IS GROWING, HOWEVER.
OPPOSITION ABILITY TO CULTIVATE POLITICAL SUPPORT
AND TRUST IN THE ADOC LEADERSHIP ARE HAMPERED BY
EFFECTIVE NORIEGA INTIMIDATION AT THE GRASS ROOTS
LEVEL. MEANWHILE, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE
CONTINUING TO HURT AND NEW MEASURES ARE
UNPOPULAR. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP FEARS THAT
MANY PANAMANIANS -- INCLUDING THEIR FOLLOWERS --
WILL INCREASINGLY DEMAND THAT THE AMERICANS GET
OFF THEIR BACKS, IF NORIEGA WON’T.
¶11. PANAMA’S OPPOSITION AND PANAMANIANS IN

GENERAL RAN UP MANY SHORT TERM HILLS IN 1989 -
WITH THE END ALWAYS JUST OVER THE HORIZON. MAY
ELECTIONS, THE OAS NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1,
OCTOBER 3, AND NOW JANUARY 1, 1990 HAVE ALL TOO
EASILY BEEN ACCEPTED AS TARGETS FOR WHEN THE
PANAMA CRISIS WOULD “HAVE TO” BE SOLVED. ALREADY
ADOC LEADER GUILLERMO “BILLY” FORD IS TALKING OF
FEBRUARY 25 (NICARAGUAN ELECTION DAY) AS A DATE
BEFORE WHICH NORIEGA MUST FALL IF THE U.S. DOES
NOT WISH TO HAVE THE PRECEDENT OF AN ANNULLED
ELECTION REPEATED IN NICARAGUA . OVERALL,
HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION HAS LITTLE ENERGY LEFT TO
CHARGE UP ANOTHER HILL UNLESS CONVINCED IT IS THE
LAST ONE. ONLY ANOTHER COUP HOLDS OUT SUCH A
PROMISE, BUT THE OPPOSITION IS NOT ABLE TO
INFLUENCE THAT TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE.
---------------------------------------
THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT
---------------------------------------
¶12. THE MOST (AND MAYBE ONLY) HOPEFUL SIGN FOR
NORIEGA’S OPPONENTS IN 1990 IS THAT TROUBLES
INSIDE THE FDP ARE WORSE THAN THEY HAVE EVER
BEEN. REASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS FLOWING FROM
THE POST-COUP PURGE ARE JUST NOW BEING MADE --
MORE THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER THE EVENT. MANY OF THE
MORE “PROFESSIONAL” FDP OFFICERS AND NCO’S WERE
KILLED, TORTURED, OR DISMISSED AFTER OCTOBER 3.
THE SUCCESSOR CROP OF TRUE BELIEVERS HAS NEITHER
THE EXPERIENCE, TRAINING OR INTELLIGENCE TO FILL
THE SHOES OF THEIR PREDECESSORS. NORIEGA HAS HAD
TO RELY MAINLY ON HIMSELF OR THE SUPPORT OF THIS
SMALL CLIQUE OF LOYALISTS SINCE THE COUP ATTEMPT.
HIS INCREASED USE OF DIGNITY BATTALIONS IS ALSO
WEARING ON THE CAREER SOLDIERS. WHAT LITTLE
MILITARY PRIDE THEY HAVE LEFT HAS BEEN INJURED BY
THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS PARA-MILITARY RABBLE WHICH
THEY FEAR WILL GET OUT OF CONTROL AND ULTIMATELY
HURT THE INSTITUTION. WITH THE DIGNITY BATTALIONS
AND OTHER IRREGULARS OVER 2000 IN NUMBER THE IMAGE
OF A COMPETING PARA-MILITARY FORCE IS BEGINNING TO
ARISE.
¶13. DISCONTENT AND FEELINGS OF REVENGE CONTINUE

TO FESTER INSIDE THE FDP AND THERE ARE NUMEROUS
REPORTS THAT THERE ARE “INDIVIDUALS” WHO ARE
PREPARED TO ACT ON THESE EMOTIONS. ONE REGIME
INSIDER RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT NORIEGA’S NOMINAL
NUMBER 2, COLONEL MARCO JUSTINES, IS HIMSELF
LOOKING FOR WAYS TO INCH OUT HIS BOSS. MEANWHILE,
NOTORIOUS CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS OF NORIEGA, SUCH AS
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX(STRICTLY PROTECT),
ARE ALREADY LOOKING BEYOND NORIEGA’S DEPARTURE IN
ADVOCATING WITH EMBOFFS AN OPPOSITION DECLARATION
OF AMNESTY FOR REGIME SUPPORTERS. SOURCES NOW
INDICATE THAT NORIEGA SUSPECTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO
UNSEAT HIM AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15.
------------------------------------------
THE STATUS OF “UNRELENTING PRESSURES”
------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL
-------------
¶14. THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF THE OASGA CONFIRMED
NORIEGA’S ISOLATION IN THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WAS MET
WITH ONLY FLEETING INTEREST IN PANAMA. THE FDP’S
DISINVITATION TO THE RECENT CONFERENCE OF THE
AMERICAN ARMIES IN GUATEMALA WAS POTENTIALLY A
MORE SERIOUS BLOW TO FDP MORALE, BUT THIS COLD
SHOULDER FROM THEIR LATIN COLLEAGUES PASSED
LARGELY UNNOTICED BECAUSE OF NORIEGA’S ABSOLUTE
CONTROL OF INFORMATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE HIS
INSTITUTION.
¶15. AMBASSADORS OF MOST NATIONS REMAIN OUTSIDE

PANAMA, EITHER ON VACATION OR CONSULTATIONS, BUT
LOCAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION MAY BE IN DANGER. THE
FRENCH AMBASSADOR RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HIS
”VACATION” TO REJOIN HIS ITALIAN AND SPANISH
COLLEAGUES WHO NEVER LEFT. SEVERAL AMBASSADORS
AND MILITARY ATTACHES (E.G. MEXICO) MAY VISIT
THEIR FAMILIES WHICH ARE RESIDING HERE AT
CHRISTMAS. NORIEGA IS MAKING ALL HE CAN OUT OF
CONTACTS WITH THE USSR, THE PRC, LIBYA, CUBA,
NICARAGUA, AND EVEN U.S. ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT
GROUPS. HE WILL ALSO SEEK TO CONJURE UP SOME
LIMITED LEGITIMACY IN HIS PLEA FOR LATIN
SOLIDARITY OVER THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR ISSUE.
ECONOMIC
--------
¶16. THE REGIME CONTINUES TO HAVE CASH FLOW
PROBLEMS, BUT THE ECONOMIC DOWNWARD SPIRAL HAS
LEVELED OFF FOR NOW. NORIEGA IS ABLE TO COMBAT
THE WORST DISRUPTIONS BY SALARY ADJUSTMENTS AND
CONTINUED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OF LOYALISTS.
UNEMPLOYMENT OVERALL IS ON THE RISE, BUT ONE OF
THE “PILLARS” OF THE PANAMANIAN SERVICE ECONOMY --
THE COLON FREE ZONE -- IS HAVING RECORD SALES AND
PROVIDES SOMEWHAT INCREASING EMPLOYMENT IN THE
POLITICALLY VOLATILE COLON AREA.
¶17. MEANWHILE, PARA-MILITARY DIGNITY BATTALIONS

ARE ENLISTING OR SCARING THE UNEMPLOYED.
BUSINESSMEN, HURT BY NORIEGA AND U.S. SANCTIONS,
ARE INCREASINGLY MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD
ACCOMMODATION WITH NORIEGA. MANY FEEL THEY HAVE
TO GIVE PRIORITY TO BEING ABLE TO STAY IN BUSINESS.
U.S. PRESSURES
--------------
¶18. FURTHER U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HEIGHTEN THE
SENSE OF CRISIS IN PANAMA, CREATING THE PARADOX OF
REGIME-OPPOSITION-CHURCH AGREEMENT IN OPPOSING
THEM. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE U.S. PORT BAN FOR
PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF
A TEMPORARY CANAL ADMINISTRATOR CREATE NEW
PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORIEGA. BANNING
PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS FROM THE U.S. WILL ROB
NORIEGA AND HIS CRONIES OF A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT
OF INCOME. SOME OF THE LATTER MAY EVEN JUMP SHIP
AND TURN ON HIM. BUT IN THE END RESULT, MANY MORE
MAY REALIZE THAT IT WAS THEY WHO DEPENDED ON HIM,
NOT HE ON THEM.
¶19. THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTMENT OFFERS

NORIEGA SOME ADDITIONAL NATIONALISTIC PEGS TO
SUPPORT HIS SEARCH FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT. BLOWING THE TREATY VIOLATION AND
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WHISTLE MAY WELL GAIN HIM
SOME SUPPORT. PLAYED WELL, HE MAY AGAIN BE ABLE
TO DO WHAT HE DOES BEST: BUY TIME.
---------------------------------------------
THE FUTURE OF THE PANAMA CRISIS
---------------------------------------------
¶20. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPPOSITION TO NORIEGA IS
SHOWING SIGNS OF FATIGUE. FOREIGN ATTENTION IN
PARTICULAR IS DISTRACTED BY MUCH HIGHER PROFILE
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, FROM EL
SALVADOR TO BERLIN. OF COURSE, NORIEGA TOO IS
TIRING, EXEMPLIFIED IN HIS SLOWNESS IN SETTLING
THE TURMOIL INSIDE HIS OWN INSTITUTION. BUT HE IS
A MASTER OF SURVIVAL AND ABLE TO BUILD ON THE
FATIGUE OF OTHERS. RENEWED NOISES IN RECENT
REGIME PRONOUNCEMENTS OF A WILLINGNESS TO “TALK”
ARE A CLASSIC MANIFESTATION OF TRIED AND TRUE
NORIEGA TIME-BUYING TACTICS.
¶21. THE POLITICAL TENSION IN PANAMA, INCREASED BY

RECENT PRESS REVELATIONS AND U.S. SANCTIONS
ANNOUNCEMENTS, WILL LIKELY EBB IN EARLY 1990,
ABSENT SOME MAJOR EVENT. NORIEGA IS SHOWING NO
SIGNS THAT HE HAS ANY INTENTION OF LEAVING
VOLUNTARILY. GIVEN BROAD POLITICAL REALITIES IN
THIS COUNTRY, THE ONLY HOPE FOR A FIRST STEP IN
CRISIS RESOLUTION IS ANOTHER COUP. WAITING FOR
THAT TO HAPPEN IS THE MAIN POLITICAL PROSPECT FOR
PANAMA IN 1990.
BUSHNELL
Viewing cable 90CAPETOWN97, ESSA MOOSA TALKS ABOUT MANDELA

AND OTHER TOPICS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #90CAPETOWN97.
90CAPETOWN97 1990-01-17 15:03 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Cape Town
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01 CAPE T 00097 01 OF 03 182017Z

ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 EUR-00 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01
P-02 T-01 /037 W
------------------352654 200910Z /23
R 171512Z JAN 90
FM AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAPE TOWN 00097
LONDON FOR KOLKER, PARIS FOR FENDRICK

TAGS: PGOV PHUM SF
SUBJ: ESSA MOOSA TALKS ABOUT MANDELA AND OTHER TOPICS
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
--------
SUMMARY
--------
¶2. ATTORNEY ESSA MOOSA WHO SPOKE WITH HIM LAST WEEK,
SAYS MANDELA FULLY EXPECTS THAT ON FEBRUARY 2 DE KLERK
WILL ANNOUNCE THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS, THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY,
THE RETURN OF POLITICAL EXILES TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 CAPE T 00097 01 OF 03 182017Z
RELEASE OF SEVERAL POLITICAL PRISONERS INCLUDING MANDELA

HIMSELF. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS WOULD COME
SWIFTLY AFTER DE KLERK'S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF
PARLIAMENT.
-
¶3. THE SAG IS CONCERNED OVER ANC RELATIONS WITH THE SACP
AND OVER THE WORKING DEFINITION OF "ONE MAN ONE VOTE,"
AMONG OTHER "WHITE FEARS" ISSUES. MANDELA HAS PASSED
DE KLERK'S "PROPOSALS" ON THESE TOPICS TO THE ANC.
THE ORGANIZATION'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT IS WILLING TO
NEGOTIATE EVEN WHILE APARTHEID LAWS REMAIN IN PLACE MAY
BE PART OF THE ANC'S REPLY TO THE SAG.
¶4. TENSIONS IN THE COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY

REDUCED BY THE SAG'S TACTIC OF OPENING DIALOGUE AND A
COMMITMENT SHARED BY THE MDM TO REDUCE CONFRONTATIONS.
WHILE MAINLY OF BENEFIT TO THE SAG, THIS PERIOD OF CALM
COULD ALSO FAVOR THE ANC'S NEW STRATEGY OF PRAGMATISM.
¶5. RAISING THE PENDING VISIT OF JESSE JACKSON, MOOSA

EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IT WOULD BE BAD FOR THE STRUGGLE
IF JACKSON ADVOCATED LIFTING SANCTIONS UPON HIS RETURN TO
THE US. END SUMMARY.
-
¶6. IN A HALF HOUR CONVERSATION WITH POLECONOFF. ESSA
MOOSA. THE WESTERN CAPE UDF'S LAWYER AND ONE OF THE
ATTORNEYS WHO MET WITH MANDELA LAST WEEK, MADE THE F0LLOW-
ING REMARKS:
--------------------------------------------- -------------
MANDELA RELEASE WILL BE ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 2 IN PARLIAMENT
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶7. MANDELA MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 CAPE T 00097 01 OF 03 182017Z
PRESIDENT FW DE KLERK TO MAKE SEVERAL MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENTS

IN HIS FEBRUARY 2 SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT.
DE KLERK WILL ANNOUNCE:
-- THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL

- ORGANIZATIONS;
-- THE END OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY;
-- THE RETURN OF POLITICAL EXILES TO SOUTH AFRICA;
-- THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS,

- INCLUDING NELSON MANDELA.
-
¶8. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS WILL NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL
THE ITEMS LISTED WILL TAKE EFFECT AS OF THE TIME OF THE
SPEECH. BUT FIRM PLANS AND A COMMITMENT TO CARRY THEM OUT
SWIFTLY WILL BE PART OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
-------------------------------
WHERE WILL MANDELA BE RELEASED?
-------------------------------
¶9. MOOSA SIDESTEPPED A QUESTION ABOUT WHERE MANDELA'S
HOME BASE WOULD BE UPON HIS RELEASE. HE ONLY REMARKED
THAT MANDELA CAN TELL THE SAG WHERE HE WANTS TO BE
RELEASED AND WHERE HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE WOULD THUS
TAKE PLACE. SENTIMENTALLY, SAID MOOSA, PAARL (WHERE
MANDELA IS NOW IN PRISON) SEEMED TO APPEAL TO MANDELA.
(COMMENT: BUT POLITICALLY AND PRACTICALLY THIS MAKES
LITTLE SENSE. JOHANNESBURG SEEMS BY FAR THE MOST
SUITABLE VENUE. END COMMENT.)
-
--------------------------------------------
CONFIDENTIAL
R 171512Z JAN 90
FM AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 CAPE TOWN 00097
LONDON FOR KOLKER, PARIS FOR FENDRICK

TAGS: PGOV PHUM SF
SUBJECT: ESSA MOOSA TALKS ABOUT MANDELA AND OTHER TOPICS
--------------------------------------------
DE KLERK-ANC COMMUNICATION THROUGH MANDELA
--------------------------------------------
¶10. WHEN HE MET SEVERAL WEEKS AGO WITH MANDELA, DE KLERK

PROVIDED A SET OF PROPOSALS AND ASKED FOR THE ANC'S
RESPONSE. MANDELA HAS NOT DISCUSSED THOSE PROPOSALS
IN ANY DETAIL WITH PEOPLE HERE (AT LEAST HE DID NOT DO SO
WITH THE LAWYERS' GROUP OF WHICH MOOSA WAS A MEMBER) BUT
HE DID TRANSMIT THEM TO ALFRED NZO AND THABO MBEKI.
MOOSA BELIEVES (PIECING TOGETHER STRAY REMARKS WHERE AND
THERE) THAT THE PROPOSALS RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO THE NEED
TO ALLAY WHITE FEARS. SPECIFICALLY, HE THINKS ONE ISSUE
WAS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ANC TO THE SACP (SOUTH AFRICAN
COMMUNIST PARTY) AND ANOTHER WAS THE DEFINITION OF ONE MAN
ONE VOTE.
¶11. ASIDE FROM BEING AN EFFORT TO SEIZE THE MORAL HIGH

GROUND BY PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATING FLEXIBILITY, THE ANC'S
RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE
EVEN WHILE APARTHEID LAWS LIKE THE GROUP AREAS ACT REMAIN
IN PLACE MAY BE PART OF THE ORGANIZATION'S REPLY TO DE
KLERK.
¶12. MOOSA UNDERSTANDS MANDELA TO HAVE WORKED OUT A

GAME PLAN FOR "NEXT STEPS" IN A NEGOTIATION WITH DE KLERK
SO AS TO ENSURE THAT HE IS NOT RELEASED FROM PRISON
INTO A VACUUM.
¶13. MANDELA HAS TOLD VARIOUS VISITORS THAT HE HAS A GOOD

OPINION OF DE KLERK AS A SINCERE INDIVIDUAL EVEN THOUGH
HE REGARDS HIM AS STILL THE LEADER OF THE NATIONAL PARTY
AND NOT MORE THAN THAT.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
COMMITMENT ON SAG AND MDM SIDE TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶14. MOOSA AGREED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IS MUCH LESS TENSE

THAN EVEN SIX MONTHS AGO. FOR EXAMPLE, LAST YEAR THE
RETURN TO SCHOOL RESULTED IN THE USUAL ACCUSATIONS AND
PHYSICAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND TRAINING (DET), AIDED BY THE POLICE,
AND STUDENTS SUPPORTED BY PARENTS, TEACHERS AND THE MDM.
THIS YEAR THERE IS AN EVEN WORSE CRISIS DUE TO LACK OF
SPACE IN BLACK SCHOOLS AND THE FAILURE OF OVER 100,000
STUDENTS TO PASS THEIR "MATRIC EXAMS." YET THERE IS A NEW
SPIRIT OF DIALOGUE AT THE DET AND ACTIVISTS ARE
THEREFORE ABLE TO CHANNEL STUDENT FRUSTRATIONS IN A CON-
STRUCTIVE MANNER.
¶15. THE SAG'S NEW "TACTIC" OF ALLOWING DISSENT AND

ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE INSTEAD OF STONEWALLING "IS WORKING
FOR THEM," MOOSA SAID. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT IT
COULD ALSO, IF DEALT WITH POSITIVELY, WORK FOR THE MDM
AND ANC. THOUGH AN ABSENCE OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION IS
"DEMOBILIZING FOR THE MASSES," FEWER RAW NERVES AMONG
ACTIVISTS COULD MAKE THEM MORE AMENABLE TO THE ANC'S
INCREASINGLY PRAGMATIC STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE SAG.
THAT STRATEGY, MOOSA SAID, IS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY MANY
ACTIVISTS, ESPECIALLY YOUTH, WHO FEAR A SELL-OUT OF THEIR
CAUSE. THERE REMAINS A LOT TO DO TO EXPLAIN THE VIRTUES
OF FLEXIBILITY TO THEM.
--------------------------------
PAC AND BC -- A THORN IN THE SIDE
--------------------------------
¶16. MOOSA DESCRIBED THE CONFERENCE ON A DEMOCRATIC

FUTURE AS "NOT A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE IN COOPERATION."
HE OPINED THAT THE PAC AND BC COULD TURN OUT TO BE A
REAL PROBLEM. HE EXPECTS THEM TO REMAIN ALOOF, SNIPING
AT THE ANC'S POSITIONS FROM THE SIDELINES AND STIRRING
UP YOUNG PEOPLE IN PARTICULAR.
----------------------
JESSE JACKSON VISIT
----------------------
¶17. MOOSA INQUIRED ABOUT THE DATES FOR JESSE JACKSON'S

VISIT AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT JACKSON HAD MET WITH
THE PRESS AT SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR KOORNHOF'S
RESIDENCE. MOOSA FEARED THAT THE SAG WAS GOING TOO GOOD
A JOB OF CULTIVATING JACKSON AND THAT HE MIGHT RETURN
TO THE US AND ANNOUNCE THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED.
MOOSA APPEARED TO HAVE GREATER CONFIDENCE IN KOORNHOF'S
PERSUASIVE ABILITY THAN IN THAT OF THE SACC LEADERSHIP
WHICH IS HOSTING THE JACKSON VISIT.
BAQUET
Viewing cable 03ABUDHABI2641, UAE TO SUPPORT JORDAN OIL NEEDS

FOR
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #03ABUDHABI2641.
Embassy Abu
03ABUDHABI2641 2003-06-03 12:12 2010-11-29 23:11 CONFIDENTIAL
Dhabi
null
Diana T Fritz 03/21/2007 05:47:09 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results
Cable
Text:
CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
TELEGRAM June 03, 2003
To: No Action Addressee
Action: Unknown
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2641 - UNKNOWN)
TAGS: PREL, EPET, EAID, PGOV
Captions: None
Subject: UAE TO SUPPORT JORDAN OIL NEEDS FOR THREE MORE MONTHS,
PROVIDED $40 MILLION TO RABAT AFTER TERROR ATTACKS
Ref: None
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 02641
SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: POL
INFO: AMB DCM P/M ECON RSO
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: A/DCM:TEWILLIAMS; ECON:CMCRUMPLER
VZCZCADI319
OO RUEHC RUEHAM RUEHRB RUEHRH RUEHKU RHEHNSC
RUEAIIA RHEFDIA RUCJACC
DE RUEHAD #2641 1541250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031250Z JUN 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0227
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0446
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0279
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1263
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0863
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/POLAD//
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002641
SIPDIS
S/S-O PLEASE PASS NEA A/S BURNS
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/ARN AND NEA/ENA
NSC FOR THEROUX
EO 12958 DECL: 06/03/08

TAGS PREL, EPET, EAID, PGOV, JO, MO, SA, KU, TC
SUBJECT: UAE TO SUPPORT JORDAN OIL NEEDS FOR
THREE MORE MONTHS, PROVIDED $40 MILLION TO RABAT AFTER TERROR ATTACKS
REF: Abu Dhabi 1384
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).
¶2. (C) MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid contacted the Ambassador on June 2 to
convey information about the UAEG’s ongoing assistance to Jordan and Morocco.
With regard to Jordan, Hamdan reported that the UAE has agreed to continue
supporting Jordan’s oil needs for the next three months. Hamdan indicated the
level of support would continue to be the cash equivalent of 25,000 barrels per
day. The UAE began helping to fill Jordan’s oil needs at the outbreak of
hostilities with Iraq in March. While the Jordanians, in recent representations
to the UAE, asked for support to cover the next year, Hamdan advised that the
UAE, due to its own financial crunch, would only be able to provide assistance
for the next three months.
¶3. (C) Hamdan also informed the Ambassador that, following the terror attacks
in Casablanca, the UAEG provided $40 million in cash assistance to Morocco. The
Moroccans intend to use the money to purchase much needed equipment. The
Emiratis have asked the Moroccans to provide an accounting for the money spent.
Hamdan confided that he had told his Kuwaiti and Saudi counterparts the UAE’s
donation was $80 million, in an effort to encourage them to give more. He wanted
to make sure that the USG knew the real UAE contribution, in the event that this
is raised with us.
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Jordan and Morocco both enjoy extremely close ties to the UAE.
The Emiratis have long felt it important to provide economic assistance and
support to these two moderate Arab states. The fact that Abu Dhabi is offering
cash assistance, vice assistance-in-kind, is a measure of just how close these
ties are since the Emiratis usually balk at writing checks. The UAE’s strong
official ties with Jordan and Morocco are bolstered by personal relationships
between the ruling families. Jordanian King Abdullah II is a close friend of UAE
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (MbZ). The two
frequently hunt -- in Morocco and Tanzania -- joined, more often than not, by
England’s Prince Andrew. The ties with the Moroccan monarch are equally warm.
Shaykh Zayid and other Emirati ruling family members maintain vacation palaces
in Morocco and have poured money into assistance projects there. END COMMENT.
WAHBA
Viewing cable 04ANKARA348, turkish p.m. Erdogan goes to washington: how
strong a leader in the face of strong challenges?
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #04ANKARA348.
04ANKARA348 2004-01-20 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available.
201247Z Jan 04
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 04 ankara 000348
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 01/07/2014 Tags: prel, pgov, pins, tu Subject: turkish p.m.
Erdogan goes to washington: how strong a leader in the face of strong
challenges?
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on Cyprus, economic
reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among other issues. In turn he will press
for (1) concrete U.S. actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by
accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2) concrete U.S. actions
against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear USG support for his government. While the
Turkish side sees the visit as mainly about developing our broad common
strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can characterize as
concrete results. At the same time, although Erdogan is currently unchallenged
as the paramount political figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep
challenges which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity in
government, Turkey's democratic development, and U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End
summary.
¶2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and uncommon luck as
he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to Washington, where he hopes to
demonstrate the Administration recognizes him as an equal partner.
¶3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken expressions of U.S. interest
in Turkish action (1) to reach a Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to
credible economic reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly
against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist ones (he rejects the
term “Islamic terrorism”); (4) to cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with
Armenia; and (6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in a way
acceptable to the Patriarchate.
¶4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish relations to a
higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG political and diplomatic actions
to dispel the conviction and consequent resentment among Turks of all political
stripes that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de facto
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2) concrete USG actions to remove
the PKK threat from Iraq; (3) high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's
new Cyprus initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the U.S. stands
behind the democratically-elected government.
Who are we dealing with?
¶5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and phenomenal memory for
faces and functions of thousands of party members across the country, Erdogan
has a strong pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the radical
Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us unhappily by his (radical)
former spiritual leader Kemal Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid
precipitously pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist
headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and persona as someone
persecuted by the secularist Establishment to maintain his hold on the hearts of
his more religious supporters.
¶6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common touch and an
ability to communicate his empathy for the plight and aspirations of the common
citizen. He projects the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on
corruption and privilege and to defend conservative traditions. As a result his
AK Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national
elections. Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national level,
good record in providing services at the municipal level, and lack of viable
political alternatives, AK could gain around 50% of the vote in March 28
nationwide local elections. Party insiders project that such a result would give
AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in Turkey, including
probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps even Izmir, where AK has not done well
to date, plus most of the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish
Establishment to try to diminish him – whether by blocking legislation or
attacking his motives – cements his popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and
across the Anatolian heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in
various loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no credible
political opponent or party.
¶7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained credit well beyond AK
supporters, as well as in the EU, for political reforms which, if fully
implemented, will substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His government's
inability to pass legislation or regulations favored by AK supporters – land
registry reform, Supreme Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform – has
not eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who remain wary of AK
readily tell us the Establishment's opposition to such reforms is
counterproductive. Even if one can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and
interest rates in 30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging
market trends rather than to the AK government's actions, Erdogan has reaped the
political benefit.
¶8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy through

direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan has relished being feted by EU
leaders for the past year. He will have had positive visits by EU Commission
President Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip and looks
forward to the February visit by German Chancellor Schroeder. He sees himself at
this point as one of (if not the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.
Erdogan's view of relations with the u.s.
¶9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important for Turkey's
economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as managing Turks's ambivalence
toward us; at the same time he wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From
the low point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken several
supportive steps, while being careful not to be too closely associated with us
since opening Turkish airspace for the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line
of communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed through authorization
for a Turkish deployment in support of the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop
rotation through Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires, he
took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away from its no-solution
stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now to do more. He seems to be more open
than any previous Prime Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate's Halki seminary.
¶10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort with what most
fellow Turks also see as American complicity in creation of a de facto
independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against
the PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American suspicions among the AK
parliamentary group or within the Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the
margins of a symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul continues
to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown of U.S. deployment and to
advocate a more Arab/Islamic foreign policy orientation as a counter to
relations with the U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and
Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as essential to his
survival, and he wants a successful visit.
The deeper challenges for erdogan
¶11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen serious domestic
challenges which, if he does not manage them well, will begin to put a severe
strain on his ability to govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to
maintain dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:
–Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him seriously vulnerable
to miscalculating the political dynamic, especially in foreign affairs, and
vulnerable to attacks by those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First,
overbearing pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief God has
anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a close confidant of Erdogan and
his wife Emine from 1997-2003, has analyzed this trait in a draft book on
Erdogan's character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the AK
Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his God-appointed mission). Third,
an authoritarian loner streak which prevents growth of a circle of strong and
skillful advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or development of
effective communications among the party headquarters, government, and
parliamentary group. This streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned.
Fourth, an overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho image,
renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at moments which call for
swift and resolute decisions. Fifth, a distrust of women which manifests itself
not only in occasional harsh public comments but also in his unwillingness to
give women any meaningful decision-making authority in AK.
–Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors and a raft of M.P.s
constantly tell us of the tensions between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter
appearing repeatedly to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent
Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK M.P.s, has also caused
problems for Erdogan on controversial questions like pushing the right to wear
headscarves at State functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the
past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking, especially on questions
involving the U.S. (e.g., troop rotation through Incirlik).
–Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear to be capable of

learning on the job, others are incompetent or seem to be pursuing private or
lodge (cemaat) interests. AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control
or making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal evidence, not only
from those on the secularist left who have deep prejudices against AK but also
from contacts on the right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial
levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK officials – from Cabinet
Ministers to local-level party activists across the country – admit to us that
the party's choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the March
local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the election of
controversial or inept AK candidates would complicate AK's ability to govern
both at the local and national level.
–Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden agendas: Erdogan lacks
advisors who are able to pre-empt or handle the news cycle; none of his advisors
has good working relations with the Turkish military. His government has failed
continually to consult broadly and openly or to prepare public opinion for
legislative initiatives, long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g.,
pre-war U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK creates the
impression, exploited by the Establishment, that it harbors an anti-republican,
deep Islamist agenda or is selling out the country, leading to Establishment
(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to retreat.
–Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's revulsion against

corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed his fortune through kickbacks as mayor
of Istanbul have never been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders
that close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk, Mucahit Arslan, and
Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale influence peddling. xxxxx that Erdogan
and he benefited “directly” from the award of the Tupras (state petroleum
refinery) privatization to a consortium including a Russian partner. Erdogan's
direct acquisition of a significant interest in a food distribution company has
become a public controversy.
–Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such as Prime Ministry

Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his 1995 article calling into question the
relevance of the Republic), Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in
the past called himself an “ummetci”, i.e., a follower of a greater Islamic
order and an opponent of the Republic), and head of State-run Turkish Radio and
Television Demiroz (who once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar),
have made the core of the State Establishment – Armed Forces, Presidency, and
Judiciary – profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's refusal to condemn these positions, the
question of the level of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including
the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the presence of Turkish
Hizbullah supporters in AK Party provincial structures in the Southeast have
also raised deep concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who
themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the pernicious effect of a
“closed brotherhood mentality” (cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected
in his Jan. 10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can control
the phenomenon remains a very open question.
Comment
¶12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in Turkey and for wider
prosperity, he challenges those who have traditionally reserved power and wealth
for themselves at least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While his
ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this time Erdogan is the
only partner capable of advancing toward the U.S. vision of a successful,
democratic Turkey integrated into Europe. Edelman
Viewing cable 04AMMAN1288, MUASHER ON PRODUCTIVE KUWAIT
MEETING, PERSISTENT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #04AMMAN1288.
04AMMAN1288 2004-02-19 20:08 2010-11-29 23:11 SECRET Embassy Amman
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001288
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/19/2014

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IZ, KU, SY, JO
SUBJECT: MUASHER ON PRODUCTIVE KUWAIT MEETING, PERSISTENT
PROBLEMS WITH SYRIA
REF: KUWAIT 539
Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) FonMin Muasher told the Ambassador February 18 that the Iraq neighbors
Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait had been frank and productive, with the
neighbors arguing strongly for guarantees of Iraqi unity and the rights of Iraqi
minorities. Iraqi FonMin Zebari responded that Kurds do not want a separate
state, but will seek to preserve some of the independence they have enjoyed for
twelve years. Muasher complained to Zebari that IGC member Ahmed Chalabi had
spoiled two Jordanian bank deals in Iraq. According to Muasher, Syrian FonMin
Sharaa was the only negative voice at the Kuwait meeting, and is increasingly an
irritant in inter-Arab relations. END SUMMARY
-----------------------------------
PRODUCTIVE FONMIN MEETING IN KUWAIT
-----------------------------------
¶2. (S) Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher described the Iraq neighboring states
Foreign Ministers meeting to the Ambassador and PolCouns February 18 as “a good
honest discussion.” He said that for the first time, Iraqi FonMin Zebari had
fully participated in the discussions. For their part, the neighboring states
had told Zebari that, without a strong Iraqi commitment to unity, Iraqi
federalism is a regional -- not only internal -- issue that affects the
interests of neighboring states. Similarly, the lack of protection of minority
rights in Iraq could cause instability and become a regional issue as well.
¶3. (S) Zebari responded by saying that -- speaking as a Kurd -- there is no

possibility of the creation of a separate Kurdistan, and that Kurds understand
there is no support for the idea in the region. However, Kurds have been living
a semi-independent existence for twelve years, and will not be willing to give
up that status completely. Accordingly, Zebari reportedly argued, Kurds “need to
be recognized as a special case.” Zebari told the group that Iraqi Shia want not
only to rule Shia areas of Iraq, but all of Iraq.
¶4. (S) Muasher said that Zebari had underscored the desire of the Iraqi
government to cooperate closely and cement good relations with Jordan,
“regardless of the opposition of Ahmed Chalabi.” Muasher said he told Zebari
that Jordan, too, wanted close cooperation with Iraq, but blamed Chalabi for
spoiling deals negotiated by Jordan’s Arab Bank and Export and Finance Bank with
Iraq banks. Muasher said he would be raising this issue with senior USG
officials on his upcoming trip to Washington.
---------------------
SYRIA THE ODD MAN OUT
---------------------
¶5. (S) In this frank and productive discussion, Muasher commented, “the Syrians
stood out like a sore thumb. Even the Iranians were positive.” For example,
Muasher said, Syrian FonMin Farouq Sharaa insisted that Syria would not agree to
any document that referred to the November 15 agreement between the CPA and IGC,
“since it was not approved by all members of the Governing Council.” (Muasher
said that Zebari shot back that he doubted that all policies of the Syrian
government were approved by all segments of Syrian society.) During the meeting,
Muasher said that Zebari had asserted -- without specifics -- that terrorist
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is “moving freely back and forth between Iraq and
Syria,” as are other al-Qaeda operatives. Muasher had the impression that Zebari
might have been exaggerating a bit.
------------------------
SYRIAN “STARK IGNORANCE”
------------------------
¶6. (S) Sharaa’s behavior in Kuwait, Muasher said, simply underscores Syria’s
“stark ignorance” of the U.S. and the rest of the outside world. Bashar al-Asad
had told King Abdullah on his recent visit to Damascus that he was not worried
about who would win the U.S. presidential elections, since even a Democrat could
choose to keep on the senior civilian officials in the current administration.
Similarly, Sharaa had told the Jordanians accompanying the King a tabloid-like
story that showed how out of touch with reality he is: Sharaa told the group
that British Prince Charles would soon be implicated in a Scottish judicial
investigation into Princess Diana’s death, and was consequently planning a trip
to Iraq and Iran “to seek the support of the Muslim world.” “They just don’t get
it,” Muasher lamented.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (S) Muasher was enthusiastic about the frank and positive tone of the Kuwait
neighboring states meeting. However, he is focusing more and more on Syria --
and Farouq Sharaa in particular -- as the cause of friction in inter-Arab
relations and an impediment to progress.
¶8. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman’s classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the State
Department’s SIPRNET home page/
GNEHM
Viewing cable 04ANKARA7211, ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO

YEARS IN POWER:
Discussing cables
04ANKARA7211 2004-12-30 05:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Ankara
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 007211
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2029

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: ERDOGAN AND AK PARTY AFTER TWO YEARS IN POWER:
TRYING TO GET A GRIP ON THEMSELVES, ON TURKEY, ON EUROPE
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: PM Erdogan and his ruling AK Party seem to

have a firm grip on power -- if for no other reasons that
there is currently no viable alternative and inertia weighs
heavily in politics. Nevertheless, Erdogan and his party
face enormous challenges if they are successfully to embrace
core principles of open society, carry out EU harmonization,
and develop and implement foreign policies in harmony with
core U.S. interests. End summary.
¶2. (C) As PM Erdogan strode through the EU corridors of power

Dec. 16-17 with his semi-pro soccer player's swagger and
phalanx of sycophantic advisors, he may have seemed a strong
candidate for European leader of the year. A regional leader
to be reckoned with for a decade to come. The man who won
Turkey the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU.
Who broke loose three decades of frozen Turkish policy on
Cyprus. Who drove major human rights reforms through
parliament and through constitutional amendments. Whose
rhetorical skill, while etched with populist victimhood, is
redolent with traditional and religious allusions that
resonate deeply in the heartland, deeply in the anonymous
exurban sprawls. Who remains the highly popular tribune of
the people, without a viable or discernible political
rival...outside his own ruling AKP.
¶3. (C) In short, Erdogan looks unbeatable. But is he? And

is he willing to give relations with the U.S. the leadership
and momentum they need from the Turkish side?
¶4. (C) Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament. Main

opposition left-of-center CHP amounts to no more than a bunch
of elitist ankle-biters. There is currently no serious,
broad-based political alternative, owing to Erdogan's
rhetorical dominance and control of the debate on social
questions close to the hearts of the center-right majority in
Turkey; other party leaders' political bankruptcy; and the
stultifying effect of current party and election laws on
entry for younger, untainted political aspirants. AKP argues
that the economy, at least from the perspective of macro
indicators and continued willingness of emerging-market
portfolio investors to buy the expectations and sell the
facts, appears to have stabilized. Moreover, the authority
of AKP's nationwide party machine is blurring with the
Turkish State's executive power at the provincial and
district level and with municipal functions to an extent not
seen since the days of the one-party state. These factors
seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
¶5. (C) Yet Erdogan and AKP face politically fateful

challenges in three areas: foreign policy (EU, Iraq, Cyprus);
quality and sustainability of leadership and governance; and
resolution of questions fundamental to creation of an open,
prosperous society integrated with the broader world (place
of religion; identity and history; rule of law).
EU
--
¶6. (U) Erdogan indexed his political survival to getting a

negotiation date from the EU. He achieved that goal. The
Wall Street Journal and other Western and Turkish media have
opined that the EU owes Turkey a fair negotiating process
leading to accession, with the Journal even putting the onus
on the EU by asserting that while Turkey is ready the
question is whether Europeans are ready for Turkey.
¶7. (C) But there's always a Monday morning and the debate on
the ground here is not so neat. With euphoria at getting a
date having faded in 48 hours, Erdogan's political survival
and the difficulty of the tasks before him have become
substantially clearer. Nationalists on right and left have
resumed accusations that Erdogan sold out Turkish national
interests (Cyprus) and Turkish traditions. Core institutions
of the Turkish state, which remain at best wary of AKP, have
once again begun to probe for weaknesses and to feed
insinuations into the press in parallel with the
nationalists' assertions. In the face of this Euro-aversion,
neither Erdogan nor his government has taken even minimal
steps to prepare the bureaucracy or public opinion to begin
tackling the fundamental -- some Turks would say insidious --
legal, social, intellectual and spiritual changes that must
occur to turn harmonization on paper into true reform. The
road ahead will surely be hard.
¶8. (U) High-profile naysayers like main opposition CHP

chairman Baykal, former Ambassador Gunduz Aktan, and
political scientist Hasan Unal continue to castigate Erdogan.
But theirs is a routine whine. More significant for us is
that many of our contacts cloak their lack of self-confidence
at Turkey's ability to join in expressions of skepticism that
the EU will let Turkey in. And there is parallel widespread
skepticism that the EU will be around in attractive form in
ten years.
¶9. (C) The mood in AKP is no brighter, with one of FonMin

Gul's MFA advisors having described to UK polcounselor how
bruised Turkey feels at the EU's inconsistency during the
final negotiations leading to Dec. 17 (EU diplomats in Ankara
have given us the other side of the story). Gul was
noticeably harder-line than Erdogan in public comments in the
lead-up to the Summit, and was harder-line in pre-Summit
negotiations in Brussels, according to UK polcounselor.
There was noticeable tension between Erdogan and Gul in
Brussels according to "Aksam" Ankara bureau chief Nuray
Basaran. She also noted to us that when negotiations seemed
to have frozen up on Dec. 17, Erdogan's advisors got phone
calls from Putin advisors urging Turkey to walk. Basaran
says that at least some of Erdogan's advisors urged him to do
so.
¶10. (C) AKP's lack of cohesion as a party and lack of

openness as a government is reflected in the range of murky,
muddled motives for wanting to join the EU we have
encountered among those AKPers who say they favor pursuing
membership...or at least the process. Some see the process
as the way to marginalize the Turkish military and what
remains of the arid "secularism" of Kemalism. We have also
run into the rarely openly-spoken, but widespread belief
among adherents of the Turk-Islam synthesis that Turkey's
role is to spread Islam in Europe, "to take back Andalusia
and avenge the defeat at the siege of Vienna in 1683" as one
participant in a recent meeting at AKP's main think tank put
it. This thinking parallels the logic behind the approach of
FonMin Gul ally and chief foreign policy advisor in the Prime
Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu, whose muddy opinion piece in the
Dec. 13 International Herald Tribune is in essence a call for
one-way multi-cultural tolerance, i.e., on the part of the EU.
¶11. (C) Those from the more overtly religious side of AKP
whinge that the EU is a Christian club. While some assert
that it is only through Turkish membership and spread of
Turkish values that the world can avoid the clash of
civilizations they allege the West is fomenting, others
express concern that harmonization and membership will water
down Islam and associated traditions in Turkey. Indeed, as
AKP whip Sadullah Ergin confided to us recently, "If the EU
says yes, everything will look rosy for a short while. Then
the real difficulties will start for AKP. If the EU says no,
it will be initially difficult, but much easier over the long
run."
¶12. (C) AKP also faces the nuts-and-bolts issue of how to

prepare for harmonization. In choosing a chief negotiator
Erdogan will need to decide whether the risks that the man he
taps will successfully steal his political limelight outweigh
the political challenge his choice will face since it will be
the Turkish chief negotiator's responsibility to sell the EU
position to a recalcitrant Turkish cabinet. It is because
the chief negotiator is likely to be ground down between EU
demands and a prickly domestic environment that some
observers speculate Erdogan might give the job to his chief
internal rival Gul.
¶13. (C) At the same time the government must reportedly hire
a couple thousand people skilled in English or other major EU
languages and up to the bureaucratic demands of interfacing
with the Eurocrats who descend on ministries as harmonization
starts. If the government continues to hire on the basis of
"one of us", i.e., from the Sunni brotherhood and lodge
milieu that has been serving as the pool for AKP's civil
service hiring, lack of competence will be a problem. If the
government hires on the base of competence, its new hires
will be frustrated by the incompetence of AKP's previous
hires at all levels.
Questions About AKP Leadership and Governance

---------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Several factors will continue to degrade Erdogan's

and AKP's ability to effect fair and lasting reforms or to
take timely, positive decisions on issues of importance to
the U.S.
¶15. (C) First is Erdogan's character.
¶16. (C) In our contacts in Anatolia we have not yet detected

that Erdogan's hunger for absolute power and for the material
benefits of power have begun to erode his grassroots
popularity. Others disagree. Pollster and political analyst
Ismail Yildiz has asserted in three lengthy expositions to us
late in Dec. that the erosion has started. We note that (1)
Yildiz expressed frustration to us that the AKP leadership
did not respond to his offer to provide political strategy
services; (2) he is currently connected to mainstream
opposition figures; and (3) he also runs a conspiracy-theory
web site. So we treat his view cautiously. However, judging
by his references and past experience in the Turkish State,
he appears to have maintained conncetions with the State
apparatus and to have a network of observers and data
collectors in all 81 provinces.
¶17. (C) Inside the party, Erdogan's hunger for power reveals
itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust
him." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
explains his failure to understand the context -- or real
facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With
regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."
Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
MPs and party intellectuals.
¶18. (C) Erdogan's pragmatism serves him well but he lacks

vision. He and his principal AKP advisors, as well as FonMin
Gul and other ranking AKP officials, also lack analytic
depth. He relies on poor-quality intel and on media
disinformation. With the narrow world-view and wariness that
lingers from his Sunni brotherhood and lodge background, he
ducks his public relations responsibilities. He (and those
around him, including FonMin Gul) indulge in pronounced
pro-Sunni prejudices and in emotional reactions that prevent
the development of coherent, practical domestic or foreign
policies.
¶19. (C) Erdogan has compounded his isolation by constantly

traveling abroad -- reportedly 75 foreign trips in the past
two years -- with a new series of trips planned for 2005 to
Russia, "Eurasia", the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, his
staff says 2005 is the "year of Africa", but they provide no
coherent reason why. This grueling cycle of travel has
exhausted him and his staff and disrupted his ability to keep
his hand on the tiller of party, parliamentary group, and
government. He has alienated many in the AKP parliamentary
group by his habit of harshly chewing out MPs. Moreover, we
understand that MUSIAD, an Anatolia-wide group of businessmen
influential in Islamist circles who gave Erdogan key
financial support as AKP campaigned prior to the 2002
elections, is disaffected by Erdogan's unapproachability.
Judging by comments to us of insiders in the influential
Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen such as publicist
Abdurrahman Celik, the lodge, which has made some inroads
into AKP (Minister of Justice Cicek, Minister of Culture and
Tourism Mumcu; perhaps 60-80 of 368 MPs; some appointments to
the bureaucracy), has resumed the ambivalent attitude it
initially had toward Erdogan and AKP.
¶20. (C) Second is the coalition nature of AKP, the limited

number of ministers whom Erdogan trusts, and the efforts of
some -- principally FonMin Gul but from time to time Cicek --
to undermine Erdogan. No one else in AKP comes close to
Erdogan in grassroots popularity. However, Gul's readiness
to deprecate Erdogan within AKP and even to foreign visitors
(e.g., Israeli deputy PM Olmert) and his efforts to reduce
Erdogan's maneuvering room with hard-line criticisms of U.S.
policy in Iraq or EU policy on Cyprus have forced Erdogan
constantly to look over his shoulder and in turn to prove his
credentials by making statements inimical to good
U.S.-Turkish relations. We expect Erdogan to carry out a
partial cabinet reshuffle early in 2005, but he will be
unable to remove the influence of Gul.
¶21. (S) Third is corruption. AKP swept to power by promising

to root out corruption. However, in increasing numbers
AKPers from ministers on down, and people close to the party,
are telling us of conflicts of interest or serious corruption
in the party at the national, provincial and local level and
among close family members of ministers. We have heard from
two contacts that Erdogan has eight accounts in Swiss banks;
his explanations that his wealth comes from the wedding
presents guests gave his son and that a Turkish businessman
is paying the educational expenses of all four Erdogan
children in the U.S. purely altruistically are lame.
¶22. (S) Among the many figures mentioned to us as prominently

involved in corruption are Minister of Interior Aksu,
Minister of Foreign Trade Tuzmen, and AKP Istanbul provincial
chairman Muezzinoglu. As we understand it from a contact in
the intel directorate of Turkish National Police, a
continuing investigation into Muezzinoglu's extortion racket
and other activities has already produced evidence
incriminating Erdogan. In our contacts across Anatolia we
have detected no willingness yet at the grassroots level to
look closely at Erdogan or the party in this regard, but the
trend is a time bomb.
¶23. (S) Fourth is the poor quality of Erdogan's and AKP's

appointments to the Turkish bureaucracy, at party
headquarters, and as party mayoral candidates. A broad range
of senior career civil servants, including DefMin Gonul,
former Undersecretary of Customs Nevzat Saygilioglu, former
Forestry DirGen Abdurrahman Sagkaya, and many others, has
expressed shock and dismay to us at the incompetence,
prejudices and ignorance of appointees such as Omer Dincer,
an Islamist academic whom Erdogan appointed Undersecretary of
the Prime Ministry, THE key position in the government/state
bureaucracy. Dincer is despised by the TGS. Many
interlocutors also point to the weakness of Erdogan's deputy
party chairmen. The result is that, unlike former leaders
such as Turgut Ozal or Suleyman Demirel, both of whom
appointed skilled figures who could speak authoritatively for
their bosses as their party general secretary and as
Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, Erdogan has left
himself without people who can relieve him of the burden of
day-to-day management or who can ensure effective, productive
channels to the heart of the party and the heart of the
Turkish state.
Two Big Questions

-----------------
¶24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of

pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's
Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly
Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam
in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a
strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see
in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with
the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent
(ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in
theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively
progressive.
¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is

that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of
"secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)
pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to
follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction-
and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs
Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in
Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and
intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable
to eject those who would politicize it in a radical,
anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly
educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,
anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.
Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to
challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,
verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so
long been used to justify violence against "infidels".
¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of

politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized
Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in
Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,
defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and
unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society.
¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its

citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'
individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,
and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and
practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind
one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief
assembles his party cadres and, warning against various
ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's
only that damned past that keeps changing."
¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,

including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free
and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the
concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will
it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate
policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are
joining what is still only a handful of others to take
tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.
However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of
education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,
and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between
citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi)
Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate
road."
¶29. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

EDELMAN
Viewing cable 04PARIS8983, FRANCE: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM
REPORT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #04PARIS8983.
04PARIS8983 2004-12-16 08:08 2010-11-30 16:04 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Paris
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 008983
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT(KINCANNON AND MCCUTCHAN) AND TTIC
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PTER ASEC FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
REF: STATE 245841
¶1. (U) Post encloses the 2004 annual terrorism report for
France. Per reftel, Word versions will be e-mailed to John
Kincannon and Kiersten McCutchan at S/CT. Post POC is
Political Officer Peter Kujawinski, x.2575.
France ) 2004
OVERVIEW
In 2004, France made progress in a number of areas that

enhanced its already robust counter-terrorism capability.
The Perben II law entered into force on October 1, ensuring
domestic implementation of the European Arrest Warrant and
expanding the tools police, security and judiciary officials
can use to combat terrorism. In April, French authorities
discovered and shut down a network of the Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group that was considered to be extremely
dangerous. In July, it took custody of four former detainees
at Guantanamo Bay and charged them with terrorist conspiracy.
All four of the detainees remain in pretrial detention and
trials are expected to begin in 2005. In October, French and
Spanish authorities struck a significant blow to ETA
terrorism in their arrest in France of two top ETA leaders
and in the seizure of significant arms and materials caches.
With these and a number of other high profile arrests and
convictions in 2004, it is clear that France continues its
aggressive and effective anti-terrorist policies. Despite
robust U.S.-French cooperation on counter-terrorism, French
officials continue to differ with the U.S. on the impact of
Operation Iraqi Freedom on international terrorism, with
French officials suggesting that Iraq,s liberation has made
the world less safe and increased international terrorism.
In 2004, four French nationals were identified as having been
killed while fighting Coalition and Iraqi forces in Iraq.
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
France continues to be an active and engaged participant in

the international war against terrorism. On the military
front, its special forces participate in counter-terrorist
operations in Afghanistan and a French admiral commands Task
Force 150, a multinational naval force that patrols the Red
Sea and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of
suspected terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian
Peninsula. At the political and diplomatic level, France
continues its engagement within the UN,s Counter-Terrorism
Committee and the G-8,s Counter-Terrorism Action Group.
France is a party to all 12 international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism.
In 2004, France expanded its cooperation in international

judicial cooperation. With the entry into force of the
Perben II law, France incorporated into its domestic
legislation the provisions of the European Arrest Warrant and
strengthened its already extensive judicial and police powers
to combat terrorism. For example, the law outlaws websites
that post bomb-making instructions. In September, police
shut down three such websites and arrested a computer science
student for building one of them. In addition, France signed
with the United States on September 2 two new agreements that
updated a bilateral extradition treaty and improved overall
counter-terrorism cooperation. France and the Netherlands
were among the first European countries to sign such
agreements with the United States.
France and the United States continue to cooperate closely on

border security issues, including airplane safety and the
Container Security Initiative. Possible threats to airplane
flights during the 2003-2004 holiday season were investigated
jointly by US and French authorities. French police and
security services have been very responsive to US requests.
In addition, France is active internationally in proposing
bioterrorism safeguards and nuclear facility safeguards. In
March, the Paris Prefecture of Police announced the formation
of a specialized, 90-person firefighting unit that would
focus on combating nuclear, radiological, biological and
chemical terrorist attacks. Also, in May, the French
government simulated a bomb attack on the Paris metro to test
the ability of emergency services to respond.
On terrorism financing, France continues to develop the

competencies and capabilities of TRACFIN, the Ministry of
Finance,s terrorism financing coordination and investigation
unit. TRACFIN has expanded the number of economic sectors it
monitors within the French economy, with a particular
emphasis on institutions, non-governmental organizations and
small enterprises suspected of having ties to Islamic
terrorism. At the level of the European Union, France plays
an active role in the Clearinghouse, the Union,s terrorism
financing coordination body. France has designated as
terrorist groups those that appear on the EU list of
terrorist organizations. As of yet, it has not designated
Hamas-affiliated charities, arguing that they have no links
to terrorism. It also, along with its EU partners, has not
designated Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist organization.
French authorities consistently condemn terrorist acts and

have made no public statements in support of a
terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism issue.
Nevertheless, France, along with its EU partners, retains
diplomatic relations with all of the governments designated
as state sponsors of terrorism, with the exception of North
Korea. In 2004 it cosponsored with the United States UN
Security Council Resolution 1559, which targeted Syrian
domination of Lebanon and called for dismantlement of armed
groups and militias in Lebanon and extension of Lebanese
government control throughout Lebanese territory, to include
areas under the de facto control of Hizballah.
DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES
Viewing cable 05PARIS104, GTMO AND DJAMEL BEGHAL TRIAL

UPDATES
Discussing cables
05PARIS104 2005-01-06 17:05 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET Embassy Paris
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000104
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI -- AMB PROSPER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2015

TAGS: FR PGOV PINR PREL KISL
SUBJECT: GTMO AND DJAMEL BEGHAL TRIAL UPDATES
REF: A. PARIS 8729

¶B. PARIS 8918
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso

ns 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) Summary: The investigation against four former GTMO

detainees (reftels A and B) appears to be proceeding well;
all appeals for pre-trial release have been denied and the
investigating judges feel confident that the trial, likely to
begin this summer, will result in conviction. However, in a
related action, France's highest appeals court for criminal
matters overturned two previous courts' decisions and
referred, to the Paris Court of Appeals for action, a
complaint brought by the families of two ex-GTMO detainees
requesting an investigation into their detention.
¶2. (C) Summary continued: Separately, the public trial

against suspected terrorist Djamel Beghal and five
accomplices accused of plotting to attack US interests in
France, including an attack against the Embassy, began
January 3. Thus far, the trial has been highlighted by the
defiance of the defendants during questioning. Post will
continue to report on these cases, as well as that of Mohamed
al-Jundi, the Syrian driver of the two French journalists
kidnapped in Iraq (septel). Al-Jundi filed suit against U.S.
forces alleging torture while in U.S. custody following his
liberation from insurgent captivity. End summary.
EX-GTMO DETAINEES
-----------------
¶3. (S) The ongoing investigation against the four ex-GTMO

detainees currently in French custody is progressing well and
the trial is likely to begin this summer. Thus far, all
appeals by defense attorneys for the release of their clients
from pre-trial detention have been rejected. A recent
defense appeal to obtain transcripts from alleged
interrogations by French authorities while the detainees were
still at GTMO was similarly denied. The anti-terrorism
judges investigating the case communicate regularly with
Post, and they are confident the evidence obtained by French
authorities since the four were remanded to French custody is
overwhelming.
¶4. (C) France's highest appeals court, the Cour de

Cassation, ruled January 4 that the Paris Court of Appeals
would have to address a complaint filed by the families of
two former GTMO detainees seeking a criminal investigation
into certain unknown and unnamed persons (undoubtedly U.S.
officials) for the illegal detention of the two in
Guantanamo. The complaint had initially been filed in 2002
and was dismissed by a judge in Lyon. The Lyon Court of
Appeals upheld this initial decision in 2003, arguing that
that the detention could not be investigated because it was
the result of an American military operation covered by a
unanimously adopted UN resolution. However, yesterday's
appeal court decision indicated that the complaint could not
be dismissed without investigating whether there was evidence
related to the complaint that could be applicable under
French law. The complaint is now remanded to the Paris Court
of Appeals, which technically could rule with the Lyon
decisions, but will likely have to open an investigation
itself or designate a judge to investigate the complaint.
Media reports indicate that requests for U.S. judicial
explanations are likely. It is not yet clear how this
complaint could affect the French investigation against the
detainees. Post will continue to follow the developments of
this case closely.
DJAMEL BEGHAL TRIAL

-------------------
¶5. (C) The trial of six men suspected of plotting in Afghani

terror training camps to target U.S. interests in France --
specifically, to bomb the US Embassy in Paris in 2001 --
began January 3. The proceedings have thus far been
dominated by combative responses from the defendants.
Suspected cell leader Djamel Beghal, a 39-year-old
Algerian-born French citizen who was arrested in the UAE in
July 2001 after leaving Afghanistan, told authorities in
Dubai that he was the head of an al-Qaeda-linked cell intent
on attacking US interests in France, including the U.S.
Embassy in Paris; however, Beghal later retracted his
confession and told the chief judge in the trial that he had
given it under "methodical torture." In Beghal's testimony
he referred to himself in the third person, responded to the
judge's questions with questions of his own, referred at one
point to the proceedings as an "Inquisition court," and
refused to explain his reasons for visiting Afghanistan.
Kamel Daoudi, arrested in Britain and extradited to France in
September 2001, posed multiple definitions for the term
"jihadist" and proclaimed his innocence as a terrorist,
despite being arrested in possession of texts by Ayman al
Zawahiri and other Islamic extremists, claiming that "when
someone reads 'Das Kapital,' he is not necessarily a
Marxist." French authorities allege that Beghal admitted in
questioning that Abu Zubaydah gave the order to attack U.S.
interests in an Afghani terror camp in March 2001; both
Beghal and Daoudi deny having met Zubaydah. The trial is
expected to last seven weeks, and if convicted, the six
defendants face up to 10 years in prison.
Leach
Viewing cable 05PARIS479, FRENCH ARREST ELEVEN IN 'JIHADISTS TO

IRAQ'
Discussing cables
S E C R E T PARIS 000479
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2014

TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH ARREST ELEVEN IN 'JIHADISTS TO IRAQ'
INVESTIGATION
REF: PARIS 8760 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS

ONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (SBU) Summary: French media reported on January 26 the

arrest two days prior of seven people suspected of
involvement in recruiting and sending French residents to
fight Coalition forces in Iraq. The Embassy also learned
that an additional four suspects were arrested in the morning
of January 26. These are the first arrests since the
investigation of French jihadists going to Iraq was begun in
September 2004. End summary.
¶2. (S) After French officials spent most of 2004 publicly

denying that French citizens might be going to Iraq, the
Paris Prosecutor's office ordered the opening of an
investigation in September 2004. Investigating judges
Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard were given
investigative authority. As reported reftel, the judges were
initially cautioned to be circumspect in their investigations
because of GOF fear that the investigation might harm two
French journalists held hostage in Iraq. The hostages were
released December 21, 2004. When last queried about the
investigation in early January, Ricard told Poloff that the
investigation was progressing, although authorities had no
indication of a distinct "network" sending Islamic radicals
to Iraq. Rather, they believed that the jihadists to Iraq
benefited from more informal support through local mosques
and families.
¶3. (S) In a lunch hosted by the Ambassador on January 24

(reported septel), Bruguiere revealed that several suspects
had been arrested that morning in connection with the
investigation. He added that in examining the case, he had
come across reports of the involvement of minors as young as
13-years-old. Two days later, the French press reported
these arrests and added additional detail. According to the
press reports, the DST (France's internal security service)
arrested seven people on January 24, three who were planning
to go fight in Iraq and four suspected of recruitment and
fundraising. Two of the seven are reported to be women. The
press reported that those arrested were affiliated with the
Adda'wa mosque in Paris' 19th arrondisement. Four French
citizens reported killed in Iraq had ties with mosques in the
19th arrondisement, and three of them had frequented the
Adda'wa mosque. An unnamed "high-level" Interior Ministry
official quoted in the reporting said police and security
services benefited from increased surveillance powers
included in the recently enacted Perben II law. (Comment:
This unnamed offical, probably a member of Interior Minister
Villepin's Cabinet, also lauded the counter-terrorism
policies enacted by Villepin as being instrumental in the
arrests. That is a stretch, given that Villepin did not
figure in the passing of Perben II or the assigning of the
case to the counter-terrorism investigating judges. End
comment.)
¶4. (S) Ricard (strictly protect) told Poloff January 26 that,

in addition to the seven arrested on January 24, an
additional four were arrested on January 26. He said that
none of those arrested was under 18, although some would
probably be implicated in recruiting minors for jihad in
Iraq. Of the eleven arrested, he said 3-4 were of "special
interest" to French authorities. Depending on the results of
the DST's interrogations, the others would either be released
or charged with relatively minor crimes. Ricard said the
investigation was ongoing and could involve additional
arrests.
¶5. (U) Minimize considered.
Leach
Viewing cable 05PARIS482, JUDGE BRUGUIERE DISCUSSES ONGOING

TERRORISM
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2014

TAGS: PREL PINR PTER FR
SUBJECT: JUDGE BRUGUIERE DISCUSSES ONGOING TERRORISM
CHALLENGES
REF: 04 PARIS 8760 AND PREVIOUS

ONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (S) Summary: During a January 24 lunch hosted by the
Ambassador, top terrorism investigating judge Jean-Louis
Bruguiere discussed a number of ongoing investigations he was
leading and also commented on a variety of terrorism-related
issues. He believed that 2005 would be a dangerous year,
given the expertise demonstrated during terrorist attacks in
2004, and thought in particular that Europe and Asia would be
targeted. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Bruguiere heads the Paris-based section of

investigating judges that focus on terrorism issues. He and
fellow investigating judge Jean-Francois Ricard concentrate
on international and Islamic terrorism, while the other
investigating judges examine Basque, Corsican and
Breton-related terrorism. Bruguiere is by far the most
visible and media-savvy of the terrorism investigating
judges. Just in the past month, he has been the subject of
extensive profiles in Le Monde, a French center-left daily
newspaper, and the Financial Times.
---------------------
INTERNATIONAL THREATS
---------------------
¶3. (S) Bruguiere said he believed both Europe and Asia were
front-line targets for terrorism in 2005. One essential
problem with the European Union response, said Bruguiere, was
that different countries had different institutional
approaches to dealing with terrorist threats, despite the
fact that many EU states had open borders via the Schengen
agreement. He cited Germany and the Netherlands as two
countries whose legal and administrative institutions made
them difficult partners, despite their political will.
Bruguiere speculated that those countries with direct
experience of terrorism, such as the U.S., Spain, France and
the U.K., had more fully developed their counter-terrorism
capabilities. Potential terrorists knew which countries
offered comparatively greater protections, and they took
advantage of these opportunities within the EU, said
Bruguiere.
¶4. (S) Al-Qaida-linked terrorists demonstrated their ability

to strike within Europe not only during the Madrid bombings,
but also during the 2004 Istanbul bombings, said Bruguiere.
He noted that British financial and diplomatic institutions
were targeted in Istanbul at the exact time that President
Bush was in the U.K. Bruguiere also mentioned his ongoing
concern with the Caucasus and Chechnya. He believes that
al-Qaida terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has an extensive
network in the region. The Caucasus, said Bruguiere, are
only "a three-hour flight to Paris." In order to combat this
mosaic of threats, Bruguiere said European countries needed
to undertake two key actions: further sensitize their
populations and strengthen the crackdown on informal
financial networks, especially neighborhood storefronts and
Pakistani-origin hawalas.
¶5. (S) Bruguiere also cited Asia as a particular area of

concern. He and Ricard had discovered a Japan-based network
after arresting and interrogating French citizen and longtime
Japanese resident Lionel Dumont. Bruguiere said he believed
terrorism in Asia would target financial centers. He was
particularly concerned by the Pakistani-based terrorist
organization Lashkar-i-Tayyiba.
-----------------------
DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS
-----------------------
¶6. (S) Bruguiere and Ricard's investigation into French

nationals going to fight in Iraq (reftel) led to several
arrests in the morning of January 24, Bruguiere said
(additional reporting septel). He said their investigation
had found juveniles as young as 13 trying to reach Iraq.
Their investigation had not revealed formal recruitment
networks, said Bruguiere, but rather a number of autonomous
attempts to go on jihad to Iraq. The most common route for
those trying to reach Iraq was through Syria and its many
madrasas and other prayer centers. He noted that the
conflict in Iraq has emerged as a powerful recruitment tool
for terrorism.
¶7. (S) Responding to a question regarding false documents,

Bruguiere said that the market for French passports was quite
strong, but that French police were increasingly able to
detect false papers when they came across them. Passports
from Maghreb countries were also in demand, said Bruguiere,
because holders of such passports were given visa-free entry
rights to Middle East countries, especially Syria. Bruguiere
said he remained confident regarding the ongoing trial of
Djamel Beghal and four of Beghal's associates. (The "Beghal
network" is accused of plotting to bomb the U.S. Embassy in
Paris.) Bruguiere said he had heard from prosecutorial
sources that Beghal's defense was not going well.
¶8. (C) Bruguiere praised U.S.-French counter-terrorism

cooperation, and said he looked forward to continuing the
strong relationship his office had with USG interlocutors.
Leach
Viewing cable 05ANKARA1730, TURKEY ADRIFT

Discussing cables
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001730
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2015

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ADRIFT
REF: A. ANKARA 1074

¶B. ANKARA 1231
¶C. ANKARA 1275
¶D. ANKARA 1511
¶E. ANKARA 1342
¶F. ANKARA 944
¶G. ANKARA 1102
(U) Classified by CDA Robert Deutsch; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is stuck in a domestic and foreign policy drift stemming
from leadership and structural problems in ruling AKP. A long-overdue healthy
debate over Turkey's identity and AKP, including its handling of relations with
the U.S., has started. But AKP's policy muddle is leaving a vacuum that
resurgent nationalism is seeking to fill. This period of drift could be
extended, making EU reforms and bilateral cooperation more difficult. The drift
may well continue until the next crisis creates new political alternatives in a
day of reckoning. End Summary.
AKP Government Adrift

-----------------------
¶2. (C) As the AKP government confronts the arduous task of EU harmonization, it
is manifestly adrift on domestic political and economic reform. Implementation
of reform legislation passed in 2003-2004 is seriously deficient (refs A and B).
The AKP government has a poor working relationship with the military, the
Presidency and the largely-secular state bureaucracy. It is failing to control
corruption in the AK party. It has been slow to introduce the banking, tax
administration and social security legislation required by the IMF as a pre-
condition for a new stand-by program. It is neglecting relations with the EU.
Erdogan has delayed appointing a chief negotiator for EU accession negotiations;
both Erdogan and FM Gul have made statements which have disturbed EU officials
and politicians. Erdogan has still not decided on a much-anticipated cabinet
reshuffle.
¶3. (C) AK party officials publicly deny the government's obvious drift and we
see no sign it has yet begun to undermine Erdogan's voter base. AKP's ability to
get back on track is compromised by its Islamist/neo-Ottoman reflexes and
single-party-state spoils system. We doubt this government will be able to
refocus or move our bilateral relationship – which remains strong in some areas
– back to a more strategic level.
¶4. (C) PM Erdogan is isolated. He has lost touch with his Cabinet and
parliamentary group. We hear MPs and Ministers alike, xxxxx who is close to
Erdogan, complain they no longer have comfortable access, or feel obliged to
kowtow for fear of incurring Erdogan's wrath. Business associations, strong
advocates of AKP economic policies, tell us they feel they have lost the PM's
ear. Erdogan has cut himself off from his closest spiritual advisors in the
Iskender Pasa Naksibendi brotherhood in which he grew up, as we have heard
directly from xxxxx.
¶5. (C) According to a broad range of our contacts, Erdogan reads minimally,
mainly the Islamist-leaning press. According to others with broad and deep
contacts throughout the establishment, Erdogan refuses to draw on the analyses
of the MFA, and the military and National Intelligence Organization have cut him
off from their reports. He never had a realistic world view, but one key
touchstone is a fear of being outmaneuvered on the Islamist side by “Hoca”
Erbakan's Saadet Party. Instead, he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the
filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the Web or are lost in
neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies, e.g., Islamist foreign policy advisor and Gul
ally Ahmet Davutoglu.
¶6. (C) Inside the AKP, the more ideological Deputy PM/FonMin Gul continues
behind-the-scenes machinations, especially during Erdogan's foreign junkets. Gul
seems to be trying to undermine Erdogan and take on more party control. He may
hope to reclaim the Prime Ministership, which he was forced to cede to Erdogan
four months after AKP acceded to power. With his relatively good English, Gul
works to project an image of being “moderate”, or “modern”. In fact, Gul's peers
say he has a far more ideologized anti-Western worldview than Erdogan. Gul,
reflecting his pragmatic streak, has made some constructive statements on
bilateral relations and on Turkey's Iraq policy since the Iraqi elections.
However, we understand that Gul and a group of like-minded MPs and journalists
continue to see fomenting anti-American attitudes as one way to get at Erdogan
while also being moved by emotions of Islamic/Sunni solidarity.
¶7. (C) AKP's disarray has generated significant internal unease from those who
support Erdogan, but also from some of the other tendencies forming AK. xxxxx
that Erdogan does not know how to proceed, either on domestic policy or on
rebuilding relations with the U.S. xxxxx, a bellwether of Islamist sentiment,
has told two of our insider contacts that he is about to resign in disgust at
the party's rampant corruption. xxxxx one of Erdogan's closest business and
brotherhood friends and advisors from Istanbul, says he sees no future for this
government and thinks it is time for a more flexible and open leader. Leading
member xxxxx has expressed to us the Gulenists' sense that Erdogan cannot hack
it. Long Overdue Healthy Debate
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) The ferment is not all bad. It is beginning to force some to question
the real roots of inertia and stasis in a Turkey that needs to accelerate its
transition. We are encouraged by the determination of some to open a long-
overdue, healthy debate on AKP and its handling of Turkey's relations with the
U.S. Secretary Rice's February 6 visit and subsequent U.S. media coverage helped
ignite the debate. Another catalyst was Deputy CHOD Basbug's January 26 press
briefing, in which he coolly analyzed Turkish concerns about Iraq and repeatedly
emphasized that one cannot reduce broad and comprehensive U.S.-Turkish relations
to a single issue. It was not until late February, that Erdogan – albeit without
conviction in his voice – expressed anything similar to Basbug's assessment of
the importance of bilateral relations.
¶9. (C) The debate has now produced some sustained trenchant criticism of AKP's
domestic and foreign policies from several insightful mainstream commentators.
However, mainstream commentators are seen as too “pro-American” to be persuasive
among AKP or its supporters. Perhaps more important have been the decisions of
some pro-AKP Islamist columnists to write unusually blunt warnings that the AKP
government must pull itself together or risk a fall. The Parliamentary
opposition has continued its anti-American 60's leftist rhetoric as it winds its
merry way to irrelevance.
Resurgent Nationalism
----------------------
¶10. (C) There is a more disturbing consequence of AKP's weakness: resurgent

nationalism. Two of the hottest selling books in Turkey are “Metal Storm”, a
conspiracy novel that feeds the worst instincts of Turks with its tale of a U.S.
invasion of Turkey followed by Turkish nuclear counter-strike with the help of
the Russians; and “Mein Kampf” (ref C). Under instructions from the Directorate
of Religious Affairs, imams across Turkey delivered a March 11 sermon against
Christian missionaries (ref D), claiming they aim to “steal the beliefs of our
young people and children.” We are receiving increased reports of anti-Christian
activity in different regions of Turkey (e.g., ref E). The Central Bank Governor
told us that nationalist/isolationist forces are behind the problems with the
IMF (ref F). An attempt to burn the Turkish flag during a Newroz celebration in
Mersin has drawn strong nationalistic statements from across the spectrum,
including a statement from the General Staff that “the Turkish nation and the
Turkish armed forces are ready to sacrifice their blood to protect their country
and their flag.” The decision to memorialize, after a 47-year hiatus, the
killing by British forces of several Ottoman soldiers during the Allies' W.W.I
occupation of Istanbul also bespeaks the national mood.
¶11. (U) The Turkish media have given prominent coverage to what appears to be a
growth in street crime and to a parallel refusal of the police, angry at
limitations on their operational abilities under the new EU-inspired criminal
code, to patrol aggressively. In a March 18 column, Ertugrul Ozkok, managing
editor of Turkey's leading newspaper “Hurriyet” and one of the most
authoritative press voices of the Establishment, noted that the Turkish public
is deeply disturbed by what it perceives as a breakdown of law and order. Ozkok,
in what would appear to be an overstatement, closed with a warning to Erdogan
that, when democratic forces cannot ensure safety in the streets (sic), then the
public and political space is left to other forces. In a March 4 column, Umit
Ozdag, now in the running for chairmanship of the right-wing nationalist MHP,
cited increased crime as one reason for the current popularity of “Mein Kampf.”
¶12. (C) Resurgent nationalist feelings probably also played a role in the press
and government reactions to comments from EU Ambassador Kretschmer about the
government's loss of momentum and EU accession, to the EU Troika's worry about
the police violence against a March 6 Istanbul demonstration, and the press
feeding frenzy over Ambassador Edelman's innocent remarks on Syria.
Comment
------
¶13. (C) Having reached one of its primary goals – a date to begin EU accession
negotiations – Erdogan's AKP government is out of ideas and energy. For now, EU-
and IMF-required reforms will face tougher opposition from re-energized
nationalists, the government will be tempted to delay difficult decisions in any
realm, and resistance to change will be the default mode. Bilateral cooperation
will be more difficult, more vulnerable to characterization as unreasonable U.S.
“demands” that infringe upon Turkish “sovereignty.”
¶14. (C) This period of drift could last a long time. AKP's Parliamentary
majority is eroding, but only slowly (ref G). Despite the unhappiness inside
AKP, there is currently no political alternative and there are risks to anyone
who actually forces a split. Erdogan still has a “nuclear” option in hand –
early elections. The danger is that tough decisions and the settling out of the
political system will be put off until a real new crisis emerges which will
either energize the AKP or bring new political alternatives. Waiting bears a
real cost, since Turkey needs to be more nimble in pursuing the political,
economic, social and foreign policy agendas many Turks, the EU and the U.S.,
have been supporting, than this type of static drift will permit.
DEUTSCH
Viewing cable 05PARIS1306, SARKOZY WATCH: FORMER FOREIGN
MINISTER DE CHARETTE
Discussing cables
05PARIS1306 2005-03-01 17:05 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001306
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/28/2015

TAGS PREL, FR, PINT
SUBJECT: SARKOZY WATCH: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE
EXTENDS UMP HAND OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TO U.S.
Classified By: Ambassador Howard Leach, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a remarkable initiative, the new head of international

relations of the governing UMP party, former Foreign Minister Herve de Charette
called on Ambassador Leach March 1 offering a hand of friendship and
cooperation. Charette applauded the positive results of U.S. policies across the
Middle East -- on Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon -- and even assigned blame
for the “embarrassing” downturn in relations over Iraq to President Chirac.
Charette said the UMP would like to establish links with both major U.S.
political parties, and connect with official U.S. visitors to Paris, as
appropriate. Charette’s gesture, unprecedented in our memory, reportedly came at
the behest of UMP President Sarkozy. The views he expressed are, just as
clearly, those of the politician currently best placed to end Chirac’s tenure as
President. End Summary
¶2. (C) Former Foreign Minister Herve de Charette called on Ambassador Leach
March 1 in his capacity as head of international relations of the governing UMP
party. (Note: UMP President Nicolas Sarkozy recently named Charette to this
position. De Charette is also vice-president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the National Assembly. He served as Foreign Minister from 1995 to 1997 under
Prime Minister Alain Juppe.) Charette, referring to recent events in the Middle
East -- Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt -- observed that U.S. policies
have prospered. The UMP applauds these positive results. He and the UMP also
agree with the USG thesis that “the Middle East is immobile politically because
it is immobile economically.” He cited Secretary Rice’s view -- which he shares
-- that it is necessary to work with the world as it is, but we need not accept
that it must remain as it is. (This is a view, he added, that comes more
naturally to a great power; smaller countries generally must accept the hand
they have been dealt.) Charette said that this commonality of views had led the
UMP to the conclusion that it should “organize a useful relationship with the
U.S.” Charette spoke specifically of reaching out to U.S. political parties --
to its natural partner the Republican Party, but also to the Democrats. In
addition to contacts with parties, the UMP would be interested in meeting
official visitors to Paris, as deemed appropriate by the Ambassador.
¶3. (C) Commenting further on the current scene, Charette posited that “the
relationship with the U.S. is the basis of French foreign relations.” The last
two or three years have been “embarrassing.” Charette pointed the finger of
blame in one direction: “The President of the Republic went down a route that
didn’t make things any easier.” (Note: In February 2003, Charette was one of
only a handful of French parliamentarians to warn against a French veto of a new
UNSC resolution.) The UMP welcomes the positive turn of recent weeks, said
Charette. He put particular stress on recent progress on Palestinian-Israeli
relations, returning several times to a refrain, commonly heard here, that this
is the key issue for European-U.S. relations. France, he said, needs to adjust
its approach so that it does not always “fall on the same (i.e. Palestinian)
side of the road.” The U.S., which tends to fall on the other side, has been
right to reproach the Palestinians for never being able to control their
terrorist movements. The second intifada was disastrous -- for the Palestinians,
for the peace camp in Israel, and because it encouraged the establishment of
more settlements. The new Palestinian leadership will not be able to escape the
need to settle matters with the terrorists. The Israelis, for their part, cannot
hope to keep 250,000 of their own in the Palestinian territories. The situation
is extremely complex, said Charette, requiring all the energy of the U.S. and
Europe. He said he remains extremely anxious about the situation, and skeptical.
It is not at all clear that the conditions for peace are at hand -- bearing in
mind the downward spiral that occurred after promising beginnings in the 1990s.
¶4. (C) Ambassador Leach took the opportunity to ask Charette his views
regarding Turkey and the EU, given his chairmanship of the Franco-Turkish
Friendship Group in the National Assembly. Charette said that the French people
have a “deep and strong conviction against Turkish entry. It is a feeling that
will not disappear over time.” (Note: This view, in contrast to that of
President Chirac, reflects the opposition of UMP President Sarkozy and the
majority of the UMP membership.)
Leach
Viewing cable 05PARIS1699, TWO EX-GTMO DETAINEES CHARGED
WITH TERRORIST
Discussing cables
SS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001699
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE, S/CT, AND S/WCI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2015

TAGS: PGOV PREL FR PTER KJUS
SUBJECT: TWO EX-GTMO DETAINEES CHARGED WITH TERRORIST
CONSPIRACY BUT ONE ORDERED RELEASED ON BAIL
REF: A. PARIS 1610
¶B. KUJAWINSKI-FRANCE DESK 3/11 E-MAIL
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS

ONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (S) Summary and comment: Ridouane Khalid and Khaled Ben
Mustafa, two of the three ex-Guantanamo (GTMO) detainees
returned to French custody on March 7, were formally placed
under investigation on "terrorist conspiracy" charges March
11 by terrorism investigating judges Jean-Louis Bruguiere and
Jean-Francois Ricard. Later that evening, a "liberty and
detention" judge upheld the terrorism judges' request that
Ben Mustafa be sent to pretrial detention. Curiously, a few
hours later on March 12, the same "liberty and detention"
judge examined Ridouane Khalid's case and ordered him
released pending trial. It is highly likely that the office
of the Paris Prosecutor will appeal the judge's decision, but
for the time being Khalid remains released on bail. The
Khalid decision is the first setback for Judges Bruguiere and
Ricard as they work on the "French detainees in Guantanamo"
dossier. For the first time in this dossier, a defense
lawyer won a victory for his client, a fact that would
embolden the lawyers for the other five detainees still in
pretrial detention. When reached March 14, Ricard (strictly
protect throughout) told Poloff that he was not optimistic
regarding the dossier. He said the "liberty and detention"
judge's decision could impact the continued detention of the
other five detainees. End summary and comment.
¶2. (S) Poloff spoke with Judges Bruguiere and Ricard on March
10 regarding the three ex-GTMO detainees returned to French
custody on Monday, March 7. They confirmed that on March 11,
they would charge Ridouane Khalid and Khaled Ben Mustafa with
"terrorist conspiracy," which carries with it a maximum
sentence of 10 years. They also revealed that the cases
against the two would be more difficult than for the four
original detainees returned to France in the summer of 2004.
Bruguiere said that the DST had not uncovered any substantial
additional information during the interrogation of Khalid and
Ben Mustafa, which contrasts with the new information they
had garnered from the original four detainees during their
initial interrogation. Ricard confirmed this, and added that
both Khalid and Ben Mustafa did not have substantial records
of involvement in Afghanistan, in contrast to the original
four. Regarding Ben Mustafa, Ricard said they had
comparatively little information, due largely to the fact
that Ben Mustafa had "barely enough time to set down his
suitcase in Afghanistan before 9/11." The French have a
little more on Khalid, but only because he was known to
French services as being active in underground Islamist
circles in Paris as far back as 1998. For these reasons,
both judges said they personally considered the cases against
Khalid and Ben Mustafa more difficult to prosecute.
¶3. (S) Regarding the third detainee, Mustaq Ali Patel,

Bruguiere confirmed March 10 that the French had no
derogatory information against him, and for this reason, he
was released on March 9 (reftel A). He also said that Patel
has severe mental and physical problems, and Bruguiere
believed these problems had been exacerbated during Patel's
multi-year imprisonment in Guantanamo.
¶4. (S) Following the formal announcement of an investigation,

Khalid and Ben Mustafa were brought before a "liberty and
detention" judge whose role is to determine whether or not
the defendant should be released on bail pending the trial or
remanded to pretrial detention. Ben Mustafa went first and
the judge ruled in favor of Bruguiere and Ricard's requests
that he be kept in pretrial detention. Khalid went before
the same judge a few hours later and, surprisingly, given the
similarity of the cases against the defendants, the judge
ordered Khalid released pending trial. According to the
Saturday (March 12) edition of Le Monde newspaper, the judge
said Khalid's long detention in Guantanamo and the fact that
the other five ex-GTMO detainees were in pretrial detention
minimized Khalid's flight risk.
¶5. (S) Judge Ricard's reaction March 14 reflected his

surprise with the decision; "Don't ask me for explanations
(for the judge's decision) because I don't have any. The
(liberty and detention) judge's reasoning makes no sense."
Ricard said he had been unsure of the two cases against
Khalid and Ben Mustafa, but expected nonetheless that the
judge would either approve the detention of both or reject
the detention of both. Ricard said there were few
differences in the cases against Khalid and Ben Mustafa.
However, he speculated that the following three issues may
have influenced the judge to order Khalid's release: 1)
Khalid's lawyer, Paul-Albert Iweins, is a former president of
the Paris Bar and as such, is extremely skilled and
reputable. This probably had a significant influence on the
"liberty and detention" judge, said Ricard. 2) Khalid is
hepatitis-C positive and this, combined with other more minor
medical issues, may have decreased the judge's fear that
Khalid was a flight risk; and 3) Khalid was less talkative
during the DST's interrogation, said Ricard, which made
compiling a dossier against him significantly more difficult.
¶6. (S) Moving forward, Ricard said it was probable that the
Paris Prosecutor's office, upon recommendation of the
terrorism investigating judges, would appeal Khalid's release
this week. In addition, Ben Mustafa's lawyer has filed two
separate appeals for his release, one of which will be heard
this week, and the other shortly thereafter. Ricard said the
appeals were based largely on the fact that the cases against
Ben Mustafa and Khalid were similar. The lawyer will argue,
said Ricard, that if Khalid was released, Ben Mustafa must be
released as well. Ricard said that the other four ex-GTMO
detainees in pretrial detention since summer 2004 would
undoubtedly resubmit petitions for their release based on the
success of Khalid's lawyer.
¶7. (S) Comment: In our dealings with Ricard and Bruguiere on

the Guantanamo detainees issue, Ricard has consistently
evinced more uncertainty and his reaction to this first
setback demonstrates that. The fact that the "liberty and
detention" judge allowed bail for one defendant and not the
other suggests that incarceration in Guantanamo was not a
decisive factor in deciding pretrial detention. Ricard and
Bruguiere remain determined to pursue charges against six of
the seven GTMO detainees, although there is little doubt that
their defense lawyers will redouble their efforts to obtain
bail for the other detainees as a result of the "liberty and
detention" judge's decision. End comment.
Leach
T ONE ORDERED RELEASED ON...
Viewing cable 05PARIS1807, VILLEPIN'S POLICE ADVISOR DISCUSSES

FRENCH
Discussing cables
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001807
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015

TAGS: PREL PTER FR PGOV KJUS
SUBJECT: VILLEPIN'S POLICE ADVISOR DISCUSSES FRENCH
INTERNAL SECURITY
REF: PARIS 1569

ONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (C) Summary: Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin's

cabinet advisor on the police said March 15 that the French
security establishment is going through a period of
"synthesis," in which reforms proposed over the past decades
are gradually finding their place within standard operating
procedure. He said France remains as focused "as ever" on
combating terrorism, but that the latitude offered terrorism
investigating judges in the 1980s and 1990s may be waning due
to the country's increasing distance from periods when
terrorists repeatedly struck on French soil. Regarding
violence in French society, he said virtually all acts of
violence and criminality were on the decrease, except for
troubling increases in the amount of rapes and "gratuitous
violence." End summary.
¶2. (C) On March 15, Poloff met with Jerome Leonnet, the
"technical counselor" in Interior Minister Villepin's cabinet
in charge of "the organization and administration of
police/terrorism/relations with Renseignements Generaux"
(France's police intelligence agency). Leonnet has been in
Villepin's cabinet since summer 2004. He said he previously
worked for seven years with the DST (France's internal
security service), seven years with Renseignements Generaux,
and a number of years with the Prefecture of Police in Paris.
¶3. (C) Leonnet described the 1980s and 1990s as decades of

great turmoil within the security establishment. He said
that terrorism attacks during that period, especially in
Paris during the mid-1980s, fed a perception among French
citizens that the security establishment was relatively
helpless to stop terrorism. In addition, in the late 1990s,
France underwent a significant rise in violent crimes,
something it had not experienced before. In response, the
GOF instituted a number of different laws, including the
famous "terrorist conspiracy" law, to give more freedom of
action to its security services. This period of reform
lasted through 2004, said Leonnet, with the passage of Perben
II, an omnibus legal reform bill (reftel). Pointing to two
thick red books of criminal law on his shelf, Leonnet said
that France had no more need of new laws; what was needed now
was bureaucratic implementation, streamlining and
coordination. Leonnet expected this period of "synthesis" to
continue for the next few years, with a particular focus on
training and crisis-response. He also addressed the
oft-debated idea to combine the DST and RG intelligence
services. It was a bad idea, said Leonnet, because each
service had different goals and competencies, and when any
mixing of dossiers occurred, it was quickly ironed out
through the interagency process.
¶4. (C) Turning to terrorism, Leonnet said he expected that

getting convictions with the "terrorist conspiracy" charge
(used to great effect from the 1980s onward) will become more
difficult for France's terrorism investigating judges.
Initially, said Leonnet, investigating judges like Jean-Louis
Bruguiere were given enormous leeway in the conduct of their
investigations. Standards of proof for "terrorist
conspiracy" were much lower than standards in other criminal
cases. However, said Leonnet, the level of evidence required
for "terrorist conspiracy" convictions is on the increase.
Terrorism investigating judges will need more evidence than
was necessary before. Leonnet described this evolution as a
natural progression away from the reactive policies of the
1980s and 1990s that takes into account current realities, in
which the memory of actual terrorist acts has grown distant
and the demand for civil liberties has become stronger.
Still, he considered French citizens sensitized to terrorism
and aware that France remained a prime target for terrorists.
¶5. (C) Asked to comment on a newspaper article in early

February drawing on Renseignement Generaux sources that
reported Islamist radicals controlled approximately 40
mosques/prayer halls in France and numbered approximately 500
militants and 5000 sympathizers, Leonnet said the estimates
were correct. There had clearly been an increase in radical
Islam in France over the past few years, said Leonnet.
Nonetheless, he was optimistic that the long-term trend
towards radical Islam would begin to decline. Citing efforts
by the GOF such as ensuring that all imams spoke French,
close surveillance of mosques and troubled neighborhoods by
police and security services, the "veil" law, and a
determination from President Chirac on down to foster
integration, Leonnet said the GOF was well aware of its
challenges regarding the spread of radical Islam, and it was
taking the necessary steps.
¶6. (C) In any case, said Leonnet, the issues of integration

and immigration had no effect on criminal violence. He said
that over the past few years, incidents of violence and
criminality have been on the decrease. Violence perpetrated
by immigrants usually has a financial or social goal, said
Leonnet, and those types of crimes have gone down. The two
exceptions were cases of rape and "gratuitous violence." On
the increase in rapes, Leonnet speculated that the wide
diffusion of pornographic films on cable television was an
important contributing factor. Regarding "gratuitous
violence," or violence committed with no goal in mind,
Leonnet said that societal structures that previously weeded
out and controlled such behavior no longer played the same
role. Mandatory military service was gone, as was full
employment and cohesive family structures, all of which
contributed to identifying individuals with a propensity
towards gratuitous violent acts.
Leach
Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1580, MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE:

SOME FOREIGN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #05TELAVIV1580.
05TELAVIV1580 2005-03-17 10:10 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001580
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2010

TAGS: PGOV PREL KWBG IR IS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGN
FIGHTERS BEGINNING TO LEAVE IRAQ
Classified By: Pol/C Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) an

d (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told CODEL Corzine
March 13 that Israeli and U.S. thinking on Iran largely
tracks, adding that he believes the EU dialogue with Iran
will ultimately fail. Dagan said that Israel has evidence
that some foreign fighters have returned home from Iraq,
perhaps indicating that the tide may be starting to turn in
the U.S. battle against the insurgency there. He worried
however, that these militants' countries of origin -- in
particular Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Sudan -- are
ill-equipped to control the returning jihadis, who might then
pose a threat to stability in the region and, ultimately, to
Israel. End Summary.
----
Iran
----
¶2. (C) Senator Jon Corzine, accompanied by Senate staff

member Evan Gottesman, the Ambassador, Pol/Res and Poloff
(notetaker), met with Mossad Chief Meir Dagan March 13.
Acknowledging that there are at times differences in analysis
of the facts, Dagan stressed that it is similarities rather
than differences that are at the heart of the GOI-U.S.
intelligence relationship, particularly on Iran. The facts
themselves are not in dispute, Dagan continued, adding that
the U.S. and Israeli assessments of Iran's intentions and
plans are largely in accord. Iran has decided to go nuclear,
Dagan said, and nothing will stop it. Dagan predicted that
the EU dialogue with Iran will not succeed and that the issue
of Iran's nuclear ambitions would eventually go to the UN
Security Council.
-------------------------------------
Iraq - Foreign Fighters Heading Home?
-------------------------------------
¶3. (S) In response to the Senator's question, Dagan said

that the tide may be starting to turn in Iraq with regard to
foreign militant activity. Dagan said Israel has evidence
that foreign fighters originating from Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Syria and Yemen have arrived back in their home
countries, and he assumes that some had returned to Saudi
Arabia as well. Dagan predicted that, as with men who fought
in Afghanistan during the 80's and 90's, these returning
militants would stay in touch with each other, forming a
network based on their common experiences in Iraq.
¶4. (S) Stressing that Israel has no assets in Iraq other
than a friendly relationship with the Kurds, Dagan said that
Israel's interest is more in the impact the jihadis from, for
example, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will have once they return
to their countries of origin. Although he predicts Egypt and
Jordan will "do all right," Dagan said he is less confident
that governments in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan
are sufficiently well-equipped to face down the domestic
challenge these returning militants will pose. The
combination of their military training and the absence of
strong governments willing and able to confront these men
could have a devastating impact on Israel by causing chaos in
their home countries, he added. Dagan predicted that these
jihadis will have less of a direct impact on Palestinians,
because Palestinians are already well aware of militant views
and opinions via Internet chat rooms. Furthermore, Dagan
said he feels that most Palestinians are not searching for
"foreign flags," such as al-Qaeda, under which to rally,
because those inclined to do so are already being
well-mobilized under existing groups in the West Bank and
Gaza.
-------
Lebanon
-------
¶5. (C) Dagan opined that Hizballah will never make the
transition to a purely political party in Lebanon, since the
organization remains very dependent on its jihadi
orientation. Noting that even the recent
Hizaballah-sponsored march in Beirut has not deterred the
Lebanese from pressing for a full Syrian withdrawal, Dagan
advised the U.S. to remain firm in its demand for a complete
pullout, and attributed the willingness of the Lebanese
people to rise up to U.S. action in Iraq.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Essential to Use All Assets in the Fight Against Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶6. (C) Dagan said it is essential to combine all types of

intelligence assets, rather than relying exclusively on human
intelligence or signal intercepts, to counter terrorist
threats. Terrorist organizations have been seeking to obtain
WMD as a matter of course and, unlike countries that wish to
acquire these weapons as a deterrent, non-state actors would
be more inclined to actually use them, in Dagan's opinion.
Asked about the relationship between illicit activities such
as narcotic or arms trafficking and terrorism, Dagan
confirmed that terrorist organizations try to fund their
activities by criminal means, adding that credit card fraud
and counterfeiting are also methods favored by these groups.
Weapons originating from Yemen and Sudan are smuggled into
the territories through Egypt for sale, as well as for use by
militants, Dagan said.
¶7. (U) CODEL Corzine did not have an opportunity to clear

this message.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
KURTZER
Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1593, C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS

REGARDING THE
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015

TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP EU IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to

its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the "point of
no return" for Tehran's nuclear weapons program. The GOI
believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as
sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the
EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement.
The Israelis support a unified international front but are
concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position.
Despite the GOI's focus on the diplomatic track, public and
private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes
continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is
aware of significant differences from its successful strike
against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including an
uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition
forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to
retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed
strategic environment. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
The Iranian Threat, "Point of No Return," and Timelines
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran "the main threat to Israel" and
has recently expressed concern that some states are "getting
used to" the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other
senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran's
nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan
calls an "existential threat" that alters the strategic
balance in the region.
¶3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December,

Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the
enrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for the Iranian
program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad
Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian
program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires
outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At
the technical level, the director for external affairs at the
Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the
critical step would be Iran's operation of a centrifuge
enrichment cascade.
¶4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when
they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In
February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there
is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window
of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned
that Iran is "less than one year away," while the head of
research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would
reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the
IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability
within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A
few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates
need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA's
strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from
1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998
at the latest.
--------------------------------------------
Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3
--------------------------------------------
¶5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining

diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and
EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC
sanctions, e.g. on Iran's airlines and trade, as noted below.
President Katsav has said that Tehran is "very conscious of
international opinion." Other MFA and NSC officials point to
the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos
case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect
decision-making in Tehran.
¶6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3

efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon
told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to
"play for time." In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and
military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are
"too soft." Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that
Iran will "cheat" on any commitments it makes. MFA staff
told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort
will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or
that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against
Iran.
¶7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the
Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would
like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities
covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each
step. Second, they want more robust verification measures
and greater focus on Iran's denial of access to IAEA
inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final
agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that
noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level.
Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that
would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the
concrete consequences of such failure.
¶8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans
to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but
noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on
March 10 that "it would probably not be advisable to impose
an oil embargo on Iran," PM Sharon advocated trade and flight
restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps
could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe,
limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and
suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within
the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign
affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S.
for a "complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle
program." In the short term, this means a full suspension of
all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor
construction, and related R&D activities.
--------------------------------------------- --
Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement
--------------------------------------------- --
¶9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the

Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by
the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its
efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to
take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December
12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with
the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including
sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to "wait
for the Europeans."
¶10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the

extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic
front. The IAEC's director for non-proliferation admitted
that the GOI sees "little we can do" to increase pressure on
Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement.
The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said that
Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities,
such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material
related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes
that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a
surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on
Israel's own nuclear activities.
¶11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the

President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked
if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA
for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is
probably necessary to build international consensus for
taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed
concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called
the EU's habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full
compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also
disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is
re-examining its position on Hizballah.
------------------------------------------
The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak
------------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli

officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible
military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the
importance of the "political and economic" track. During a
recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy
Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz
similarly said "we don't want to go there." In February,
President Katsav told the Secretary that "the military option
is not necessary -- bring the issue to the Security Council."
¶13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes

usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air
Force's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. In private,
GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would
make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission.
A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that
the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located
and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the
Iranian program. The MFA's office director for the Gulf
states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed
throughout the country, with several located in built-up
civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian
assistance in restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and said
that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian
casualties and endanger Moscow's cooperation.
¶14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets
and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise
additional complications. An Israeli assault would
necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq,
they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation
throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and
NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit
a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians,
effectively freezing the peace process.
¶15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military
strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and
the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran's
ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by
its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that
Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of
reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA's
office director for the Gulf states said that she believed
that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in
Israel and the Occupied Territories.
¶16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also
creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis
felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi
threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian
problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, "I do
not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an
Israeli problem -- it is a matter of concern for the whole
world."
--------------------------------------------- --
Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but ...
--------------------------------------------- --
¶17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic

channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real
concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against
the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown
time and again that it will act militarily if it believes
that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most
certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli
press reported that in February PM Sharon's Security Cabinet
had given "initial authorization" for an attack on Iran. The
press reports cited an unnamed "Israeli security source," who
claimed that the USG would "authorize" an Israeli attack.
Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations
for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose
nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force
activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme
sensitivity of the issue and the GOI's near inability to
prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held,
probably even from many members of PM Sharon's Cabinet.
¶18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its
interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at
the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3
effort is on track and backed by a solid international front.
We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position
may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should
recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will
understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not
match current USG assessments.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
KURTZER
Viewing cable 05PARIS2333, GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY PARIS
FEEDBACK
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/PGI (BUCKNEBERG) AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014

TAGS: PTER PREL FR
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: EMBASSY PARIS FEEDBACK
REF: A. STATE 60796

¶B. 04 PARIS 8983
¶C. PARIS 280
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (S) Summary: U.S.-French cooperation on terrorism is

mature and broad-based. For a number of reasons, including
the memory of terrorist attacks in Paris during the 1980s,
the French bring significant expertise, focus and
determination to their C/T activities, and are valued
partners for a wide range of USG agencies. C/T cooperation
with the USG is largely insulated from the day-to-day
political and diplomatic tussles that can make the French
often difficult allies. Notwithstanding this solid
foundation, Post has outlined three areas where we believe
our C/T objectives can be better served, and proposes
suggestions to implement these objectives. End summary.
---------------------------------
A MATURE, SUCCESSFUL RELATIONSHIP
---------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Embassy Paris comprises one of the widest range of

USG agency representation anywhere in the world. Many of
these agencies play a role in the remarkably broad
U.S.-France security and counter-terrorism relationship. In
addition to State's Consular, Diplomatic Security, Economic,
Political, and Public Diplomacy sections that each handle
pieces of the terrorism portfolio, other non-State sections
in Paris that deal with the French on terrorism issues
include the DEA, the Defense Attache, a DOJ liaison
prosecutor, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) located
in Paris and in the port cities of Le Havre and Marseilles,
Legatt/FBI, NCIS, OSI, ROAL, a Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) representative, and the Secret Service.
A significant portion of the work of the Embassy's EST office
is now counterterrorism-related. Other non-traditional
security-oriented offices also contribute to counterterrorism
work. For example, the Foreign Agricultural Service Office
liaises with French agriculture authorities on biosafety
risks. In addition, USG personnel are assigned to Interpol
headquarters in Lyon, France's second largest city.
¶3. (S) Two reasons for this breadth of USG representation are
1) France's own outsized role internationally and within the
EU on counter-terrorism issues; and 2) a long-term
institutional desire by the GOF to maintain close relations
with USG C/T professionals. In addition to this permanent
USG presence, delegations from the United States often visit
France to discuss specialized aspects of C/T. Two noteworthy
recent examples were a DOE/NRC/NSC/STATE visit in January on
the protection of nuclear facilities and radiological
materials. The visit has led to the development of the a
multi-year program to share best practices, swap observers at
nuclear security exercises, and collaborate scientifically to
improve passive security measures for nuclear facilities.
Also, in December 2004, then-Secretary of Health and Human
Services Tommy Thompson led an HHS/STATE delegation to a G-8
meeting hosted in France to engage at a deeper level on the
threat of bioterrorism. The ongoing work of the Bioterrorism
Experts Group includes such items as best practices in
protection of the food supply; information sharing on
zoonotic diseases; licensing issues on medical
countermeasures; sharing of information regarding vaccine
availability; and the sharing of national response plans.
France hosted two bioterrorism conferences in April in Lyon:
the first Interpol conference devoted to this subject and a
WHO-sponsored meeting on Biosafety and Biorisks. France
participates actively in these fora and sends experts to
U.S.-hosted biosafety/biorisk seminars in the U.S.
¶4. (S) Internationally, France is a long-standing contributor

of military troops and assistance in Afghanistan and a French
admiral is regularly in the rotation to command Task Force
150, a multinational naval force that patrols the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected
terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula. French
Special Forces also operate closely with coalition forces in
Afghanistan. It is a key member of the UN's
Counter-Terrorism Committee and the G-8's Counter-Terrorism
Action Group, and it has supported (and co-sponsored, where
possible) terrorist designations to the UN's 1267 sanctions
committee. Bilaterally, France recently signed two updated
agreements on extradition and counter-terrorism cooperation,
and cooperates closely on Container Security Initiative (CSI)
and airline security issues. Domestically, France continues
to hold in pretrial detention 6 of the 7 ex-GTMO French
citizen detainees (the seventh was declared not an enemy
combatant by the Department of Defense). All six will be
charged with "terrorist conspiracy," which has a maximum
sentence of ten years. Most recently, terrorism
investigating judges and prosecutors successfully argued for
the conviction of Djamel Beghal and five accomplices arrested
in 2001 on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy in
Paris. Beghal and his five accomplices were convicted on
March 15 and all received jail sentences. Other significant
C/T operations include the dismantling of a local cell of
"French jihadists to Iraq," a raid on and continuing
investigation of the MEK presence in France, the dismantling
of a GICM cell, and the near-destruction of ETA support cells
in the south of France. Additional examples are reviewed in
ref B.
----------------
AREAS TO IMPROVE
----------------
¶5. (S) As noted in ref C, France often appears to react

differently to terrorism and radical Islam depending on its
distance from it. Within its borders, the GOF reacts
proactively, with speed and firmness. Elsewhere in the
world, it is much more equivocal. Political and diplomatic
considerations carry substantial weight, and sometimes trump
security considerations. A good example of this is continued
French intransigence within the EU on Hezbollah. It sees the
EU's listing of Hezbollah as a bad idea for Lebanon's
political stability and therefore, it continues to hold a
firm line against listing, despite a growing openness within
internal security circles to acknowledge that Hezbollah has
committed terrorist acts and should be considered a terrorist
organization. An approach that combines convincing the GOF
of a case's merits and, where necessary, isolating France
diplomatically offers the best chance of success, although in
this particular situation, it will prove difficult to
overcome the firm conviction of President Chirac and others
that designating Hezbollah is a bad idea. Nevertheless,
France's intelligence and security services must be persuaded
by the existing evidence that Hezbollah is a terrorist
organization. Presenting the GOF with evidence of Hezbollah
involvement in terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza is
particularly important, as the GOF cannot overlook
Hezbollah's efforts to destroy the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process. Having the Palestinian leadership weigh in with the
French at a high level would be important as well; up to now,
the French have maintained that only the U.S. and Israel are
pressing them on Hezbollah, while the Palestinians remain in
the background on the issue. Second, France must be isolated
within the EU Clearinghouse. A number of EU countries hide
behind France's strong opposition, but if they are peeled
away, France may be more amenable. In general, France does
not like to be seen publicly as blocking consensus, a fact
that worked to our advantage in finally convincing the EU to
designate Hamas.
¶6. (S) The Embassy believes that a gap in French C/T planning
is its development of mass-casualty emergency response. The
GOF understands they have improvements to make and have begun
to conduct exercises to build and test their emergency
response capabilities. However, France could benefit from
observing the USG crisis simulation exercises. Post would
recommend, therefore, for the invitation (where possible) for
a GOF official to observe USG exercises and simulations. One
good recent example is the inclusion of two high-level French
officials as observers to the TOPOFF 3 simulation in the U.S.
Expanding on this worthy initiative, Washington might
consider inviting French officials as observers to other,
similar simulations in the U.S. and abroad, to include USG
training programs with other countries (such as those
referenced in Jakarta 4212). The French can be prickly if
given the impression that they need to be "trained" and in
addition, giving them decision-making roles is often best
avoided. One way to overcome these issues is to focus on
"professional exchanges" and invite them to observe
USG-organized emergency response simulations and allow them
to translate best practices to the French system. In
addition, Post will work to procure invitations for the USG
to observe French-led crisis simulations.
¶7. (S) As mentioned in para 1, U.S.-French C/T cooperation is

largely removed from daily political and diplomatic
pressures. One reason for this is that GOF counter-terrorism
is itself separated from the rest of the government.
France's intelligence-related agencies and coordinating
bodies - of which the DST, the RG, the DGSE and the SGDN are
primary examples - all deal with terrorism (although the DST
has a primary role domestically), but their investigations
and cases are guarded carefully and rarely shared with the
rest of the GOF. Similarly, the renowned terrorism
investigating judges - led by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere -
operate in a different world than that of the rest of the
judiciary. In short, the GOF counter-terrorism community is
highly professional, but insular and centralized in Paris.
Because of this, judiciary and police services not directly
involved in counter-terrorism (but who may play an indirect
support role) have a largely insufficient understanding of
USG counter-terrorism policy and the judicial/investigative
procedures that frame this policy. To replace working-level
and upper management, France's counter-terrorism community
draws upon the available pool of judicial and security
professionals, many of whom have little understanding of the
U.S., its judicial/law enforcement system, and its law
enforcement organizational structure and resource
allocations. We need to reach these judicial and security
professionals as they begin their careers, and not only when
they enter the counter-terrorism community, sometimes with
already-formed prejudices. To this end, Post proposes
approaching the National Magistrate School, other
professional academies, and programs for already serving law
enforcement officials with offers to deliver lectures on U.S.
approaches to terrorism and law enforcement. We would
request assistance from Washington in developing these
proposals. Although in this case, results would probably not
be immediate, in the long run, the USG would have much to
gain by exposing French judicial and security professionals
to the U.S. counter-terrorism and law enforcement system at
an early stage in their careers.
LEACH
Viewing cable 05ABUDHABI2178, MBZ ON IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN

Discussing cables
05ABUDHABI2178 2005-05-16 09:09 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Abu Dhabi
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002178
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015

TAGS: PREL MASS PHUM ELAB IR IZ XF SA PK FR TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN
REF: ABU DHABI 1008
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison.

For reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d).
¶1. (U) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly
Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a
visiting National Defense University delegation to observe
first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ,
brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were
joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and
businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.
NDU
---
¶2. (U) NDU President Lt. Gen. Dunn and National War College
Deputy Commandant Ambassador Wahba briefed MbZ on several new
NDU initiatives, including opportunities for UAE students in
the Information Resources Management College program, which
emphasizes threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in a
net-centric environment. Ambassador Sison praised the UAE's
selection of NDU candidates, noting that several were serving
in key positions today: GHQ Armed Forces Deputy Chief of
Staff MG Mohammed Hilal al-Kaabi, GHQ Director of General
Procurement Obaid Al Ketbi, Deputy Commander UAE Air Force
Brigadier Ali, and MbZ's aide Yousef al Otaiba had all
benefited from NDU programs.
Iraq
------
¶3. (C) Ambassador Sison noted that day's visit to Iraq by

Secretary Rice, highlighting the Secretary's encouragement
SIPDIS
for continued momentum in the political process and her
meetings with PM al-Jaafari and KDP leader Barzani. MbZ
voiced disdain for al-Jaafari, citing (again) his concerns
over the Prime Minister's ties to Iran. These concerns were
aimed at Jaafari's Dawaa Party colleagues, as well. While
agreeing that it was important for Iraq's Sunni Arabs to be
more involved in the political process and in drafting the
constitution, MbZ complained that "there wasn't one
worthwhile Sunni" on the scene. He criticized new Sunni
Defense Minister Dulaimi as being "in it for himself." Nor
did MbZ have anything good to say about former Iraqi Finance
Minister Mahdi's nomination as one of two Vice Presidents,
complaining that Mahdi "did not work for the people of Iraq."
Nonetheless, MbZ said he agreed with the USG's efforts to
encourage the various Iraqi factions to work together. The
UAE would continue to help train Iraqi police forces at the
UAE's police academy in Al Ain and provide reconstruction
assistance. It was important for the region as a whole that
the U.S. and its allies "got it right" in Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
and Egypt, he underscored. (Note: MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba
had a few days earlier shared with Ambassador concerns passed
by former PM Allawi that Dulaimi was "devious," "bad news,"
"very close" to Iranian intelligence, and had been introduced
to the Iranians by Chalabi. Yousef had also noted the
UAEG,s impression Mahdi had not always been a "team player"
in the government of former PM Allawi. End note.)
Iran
----
¶4. (S) Turning to Iran, MbZ voiced certainty that the EU-3
efforts with Iran would break down and that Iran would resume
its nuclear activities ) if it had not already done so.
Repeating concerns first voiced to us in February (reftel),
MbZ appeared convinced that it was only a matter of time
before Israel or the U.S. would strike Iranian nuclear
facility targets. U.S. installations in the Gulf could be
targeted by Iran in the aftermath of such an action, he
warned. MbZ agreed with the USG,s tough line with Tehran
and the Europeans. A nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize
the Gulf region and possibly allow terrorist access to WMD.
MbZ asked Lt. Gen. Dunn whether it would be possible for
&anyone8 to "take out" all locations of concern in Iran via
air power; Lt. Gen. Dunn voiced doubt that this would be
possible given the dispersed locations. "Then it will take
ground forces!" MbZ exclaimed. Ambassador noted that the
UAE's Director of Military Intelligence, BG Essa al Mazrouei,
would pay counterpart visits this week to CENTCOM, J-2, DIA,
and CIA for discussions on Iran and Iraq-related matters.
MbZ said he looked forward to sharing "contingency planning"
scenarios in future conversations.
Pakistan
--------
¶5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to
Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ
chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the
Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda
operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to
congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms
to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense
technology to Pakistan. It was important to support
Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While
the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision,
the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no
alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he
continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military
balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's
strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not
ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then
slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf
asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval
for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the
UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for
MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us
for some time.)
Gyrocopter, GAWC
----------------
¶6. (SBU) MbZ also referred to his interest in exploring

selling the UAE's "gyrocopter" (a helicopter-supported UAV
co-developed with Austrian company Schiebel) to the U.S. Air
Force, an idea he first floated during Gen. Moseley,s visit
for the May 3 F-16 ceremony. MbZ noted that his aide would
pass detailed gyrocopter specifications to the Embassy this
week. (Note: We will be exploring this initiative with
CENTAF and CENTCOM in relation to force protection aerial
surveillance system needs at Al Dhafra airbase for the 380 th
Air Expeditionary Wing. End note.)
¶7. (C) Lt. Gen. Dunn complimented MbZ on the Gulf Air
Warfare Center (GAWC), which he and the NDU group had toured
that morning. MbZ expressed satisfaction over the
relationship between the UAE and U.S. Air Forces, but
expressed disappointment that more GCC countries had not
joined recent GAWC classes. Ambassador noted the recent
robust participation by Saudi Arabia in the GAWC's fourth
class, which had included six Saudi F-15s and two young
pilots who were also members of the Saudi royal family. MbZ
asked whether the two high-ranking Saudis had actually
completed all requirements for graduation or had been "passed
through." Ambassador confirmed that they had completed all
course requirements. MbZ commented that "the real reason"
the Saudis had turned out for the GAWC class had been "to see
what the UAE was up to" with the F-16 Block 60 and other
procurement successes. Although Egypt and Jordan wished to
join in the next GAWC class, MbZ added, they also wanted the
UAE Air Force to pay fuel costs. MbZ said he had asked both
countries "to go talk to ADNOC," the state-owned Abu Dhabi
National Oil Company.
France
------
¶8. (U) MbZ noted that he would travel to Paris June 18-20 to
meet with President Chirac, recalling that he had canceled
his trip to France at the last minute in mid-January.
Camel Jockeys
-------------
¶9. (SBU) On the margins of the MbZ conversation, Ambassador

thanked Interior Minister Sheikh Saif for his assistance the
week before in allowing G/TIP visitor Feleke Assefa access to
camel jockey rehabilitation and social support centers.
Ambassador noted that a Tier 3 ranking remained a possibility
despite the UAEG,s vigorous efforts since mid-March with
UNICEF, IOM, and others. A trafficking in persons
reassessment would take place in August, she noted, and it
was important for the UAE to continue the good work it was
doing in solving the problem. MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba
promised to forward a copy of the UAE-UNICEF TIP implementing
agreement and budget. (Note: he has done so; we have
forwarded the document electronically to G/TIP and NEA/ARPI.
End note.)
Labor and the FTA

-----------------
¶10. (SBU) Labor Minister al Ka'abi noted he had received

reports that the U.S. and UAE sides had moved closer on the
text of the labor chapter of the FTA during the last day of
negotiations. He reiterated the UAEG,s concern that it
receive some recognition of its unique demographic situation,
as only 15 percent of the population held Emirati
citizenship.
SISON
Viewing cable 05BRASILIA1207, BRAZIL: Ambassador's Lunch with General

Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional Security
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #05BRASILIA1207.
05BRASILIA1207 2005-05-06 15:03 2010-11-29 09:09 SECRET Embassy Brasilia
S E C R E T BRASILIA 001207
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015

TAGS: PINR PREL BR US
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: Ambassador's Lunch with General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister
for Institutional Security
Classified by Ambassador John J. Danilovich for reasons 1.4 (B),(C) and(D).
1.(S) Ambassador hosted General Jorge Armando Felix, Minister for Institutional
Security, for lunch at the residence on 4 May 2005. While General Felix has much
less influence than his predecessor from the previous government, he is still
the country's most senior intelligence official and the rough equivalent of
national security advisor to the president. In addition to his own staff at the
Ministry for Institutional Security (GSI), which contains representatives from
the various Brazilian Government security and foreign relations agencies,
General Felix is also responsible for overseeing the Brazilian National
Intelligence Agency (ABIN).
2.(S) The Tri-Border Region: The Ambassador asked General Felix for an
assessment of the transnational crime situation in the tri-border region of
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. General Felix admitted that there were serious
problems in the region and that the illegal movement of arms, money, drugs and
the like through the region was of concern to the Brazilian Government. Felix
said that both ABIN and the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) were devoting
additional personnel and resources to the problem and noted that ABIN even had
some joint programs with RMAS that were focused on these issues.
3.(S) Counterterrorism: This led to a discussion on terrorism issues/operations

in the tri-border region and throughout Brazil. General Felix said that ABIN
worked closely with RMAS in jointly targeting individuals of interest, and the
Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this assistance. General Felix said
that in addition to the joint operations that we were working together, the
Brazilian government was also appealing to moderate, second generation Arabs,
many of whom were successful businessmen in Brazil, to keep a close eye on
fellow Arabs who may be influenced by Arab extremists and/or terrorist groups.
General Felix said that it was in the interest of these moderate, Arabs to keep
potential firebrands in line and keep the microscope off of the Arab community
in Brazil. General Felix said that the recently murdered former prime minister
of Lebanon sent that same message to the Arab community in Brazil during a visit
a few years back. General Felix said that it was important that counterterrorism
operations were packaged properly so as not to negatively reflect on the proud
and successful Arab community in Brazil.
4.(S) Venezuela: Following the CT discussion, the Ambassador raised Venezuela

and its president Hugo Chavez and noted that Chavez was disrupting Brazil's
efforts to play a leading role politically and economically in South America.
General Felix nodded his head and appeared to be very carefully measuring his
response. He then said that he had his own personal opinions about Chavez (which
he did not share) that were different from the Brazilian Government?s position.
That being said, General Felix said that he preferred keeping in line with the
official position (though he did not elaborate on it either). Felix noted that
whether one was pro- or anti-Chavez, he had become very much a part of the
"Latin American" reality.
5.(S) Additional Assistance: The Ambassador asked General Felix if there were
any areas where the USG could better assist the GSI and/or ABIN. Felix said that
he was very happy with the assistance currently being provided by the USG. One
area where he claimed that the Brazilian Government was falling behind was in
protecting its own classified and unclassified computer systems. Felix said that
he would welcome any assistance (courses, visitors, etc.) in this area. Felix
also said that he was trying to beef up the GSI and ABIN's SIGINT capabilities
and could always use some assistance along those lines. 6.(S) Embassy Comment:
General Felix is an amiable, low- key individual. He does not appear overly
ambitious and admitted that he preferred traveling for the sake of pleasure as
opposed to business. He is not someone who will make waves, and this likely
contributed to his walking carefully through the Venezuela discussion. The above
being said, General Felix has always been a straightforward interlocutor, and
his term at GSI has been highlighted by very cooperative, joint CT operations
between RMAS and ABIN. All in all, his continued presence at GSI bodes well for
U.S. interests. DANILOVICH 2005-05-06
Viewing cable 05PARIS3118, FRENCH JUDGE SAYS C/T FOCUS IS ON

"JIHADISTS TO
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/WE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2014

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH JUDGE SAYS C/T FOCUS IS ON "JIHADISTS TO
IRAQ"
REF: PARIS 479
Classified By: A/DCM JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (S) Summary: Islamic/international terrorism

investigating judge Jean-Francois Ricard (strictly protect)
told Poloffs May 6 that his section's open-ended
investigation into potential "jihadists to Iraq" has become
their current priority. With two networks already
discovered, French authorities fear that "jihadists to Iraq"
is a growing problem not unique to France, and one that will
affect other EU countries. Ricard also discussed the
ex-Guantanamo (GTMO) detainees (with the news that one
detainee may be released), the recent announcement of a GOF
"white paper" on terrorism, and C/T resource issues and
rivalries within the French government. End summary.
---------------------------------------------
PRIORITY ON "JIHADISTS TO IRAQ" INVESTIGATION
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (S) French press reported the arrests April 24 and 25 of

six people in the Paris and Marseilles areas suspected of
involvement in the recruitment and sending of potential
jihadists to Iraq. This is the second network uncovered in
France since an inquiry by the terrorism investigating judges
into "jihadists to Iraq" first began in September 2004. In
comparison to the first network (reftel), Ricard said two of
the suspects recently arrested had significant, long-standing
ties to Islamist circles. One of them, Said al-Maghrebi, had
in the past recruited European Muslims to fight in
Afghanistan. Ricard said he believed that France, and Europe
in general, was facing only the beginning stages of attempts
to form networks to fight jihad in Iraq. As an example,
Ricard said that GOF investigations into this most recent
network revealed that the suspects had significant ties to
other Islamists in England. The open-ended "jihadists to
Iraq" investigation is now the priority, said Ricard, based
on the premise that those going to Iraq not only endanger
Coalition forces and Iraqi stability, but upon return to
Europe, might constitute a significant terrorist threat.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
ONE EX-GTMO DETAINEE MAY BE RELEASED "BEFORE THE SUMMER"
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (S) When asked about the status of the six ex-GTMO
detainees currently in pre-trial detention, Ricard said his
office was considering the release and dropping of charges
against Imad Kanouni, one of the original four ex-GTMO
detainees transferred to French custody. Ricard said Kanouni
had never undergone military training in Afghanistan, and
though active in extremist religious circles, they had no
evidence linking him to terrorism planning. The continued
detention of Kanouni could damage GOF cases against the
others, said Ricard. He said his office depended
significantly upon its reputation within the French justice
system, which tends to give the terrorism investigating
judges the benefit of the doubt. (As an example, Ricard said
that the proof against recently convicted Djamel Beghal and
his accomplices, accused of plotting to bomb the US Embassy,
would not normally be sufficient to convict them, but he
believed his office was successful because of their
reputation.) If they proceeded to trial with the information
they currently possessed on Kanouni, it would be clear that
the judges had been holding Kanouni without sufficient
evidence. Therefore, Ricard and fellow investigating judge
Jean-Louis Bruguiere are in favor of his release. Although
he cautioned that a formal decision had not yet been made,
Ricard said that Kanouni may be released "before the summer."
Turning to the eventual trial of the ex-GTMO detainees,
Ricard said he was in favor of trying them separately to
avoid the spectacle of multiple defense attorneys arrayed
against one prosecutor.
------------------------------------
GOF TO ANALYZE C/T IN A "WHITE BOOK"
------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Prime Minister Raffarin announced on May 3 the

long-rumored commencement of a GOF "white paper" on internal
security and terrorism. Specifically, the goal of the white
paper will be to analyze and report on the type of terrorism
France might face in 2020 and the government's potential
responses. The report will be written by the General
Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) in conjunction with
SIPDIS
the Ministry of Interior, and will be given to President
Chirac in early 2006. The paper encompasses six areas, all
of which are being led by different ministries and
individuals. Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, head of the DST
(France's internal security service), will lead a group
studying possible threats; Pierre Brochand, head of the DGSE
(France's external intelligence service), will study
terrorist threats to world stability; Jean-Michel Hubert,
vice-president of the general council on information
technology within the Ministry of Finance, spearheads a group
on the use of technolgy by terrorists; Jean-Marie Huet,
director of Criminal Affairs within the Ministry of Justice,
will lead a group studying the role of the legal system in
combatting terrorism; Stanislas Lefebvre de Laboulaye, U/S
for Political Affairs-equivalent at the MFA, will study
international C/T cooperation; and Francois Heisbourg,
director of the Foundation for Strategic Research thinktank
(an organization closely linked to the French government)
will lead a group studying the involvement of citizens and
public outreach to combat terrorism. Heisbourg already heads
an effort by the GOF to put online a publicly accessible
database on terrorism. When asked about the "white book,"
Ricard said he hoped it would result in the passage of
stiffer penalties for "terrorism conspiracy" charges, which
currently carries with it a maximum prison sentence of ten
years. A contact in the Interior Ministry told Poloff May 4
that the GOF hopes its white book will be taken up for
discussion by the European Union, with the goal of applying
many of its conclusions to the EU's counter-terrorism
approach.
---------------------------------
C/T RESOURCE ISSUES AND RIVALRIES
---------------------------------
¶5. (S) With the announcement in early April by Justice

Minister Perben that additional magistrates will be assigned
to counter-terrorism, Ricard said his section in the Paris
Prosecutor's office will likely grow from its current number
of five investigating judges to seven within the next year.
He said the investigating judges will also be given
additional support staff. Recruiting the investigating
judges has been difficult at first, said Ricard, given that
he and Bruguiere and the other veteran judges - Gilbert Thiel
and Laurence le Vert - have a distinct, more hierarchical,
work environment than is usually the case in the French
judiciary. Ricard also commented on recent press articles on
a renewed attempt by DNAT (the National Counter-Terrorism
Division, a section of France's judiciary police) to wrest
away from the DST that service's near-monopoly on Islamic
terrorism investigations. Currently, DNAT focuses on
Corsican and Basque terrorism investigations. Ricard
believed that the DST would continue its primary role, given
that it also is in charge of international liaison, and as
such, it is the recipient of terrorism-related information
from other countries, which is a key component of Islamic
terrorism investigations.

WOLFF
Viewing cable 05ANKARA3199, CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG
SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN
Discussing cables
081545Z Jun 05
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2025

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM TU
SUBJECT: CABINET SHUFFLES AND THE LONG SQUEEZE: PM ERDOGAN
SETS HIS SIGHTS ON FONMIN GUL
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Long rumored to be considering a cabinet re-shuffle, PM Erdogan

has made his first move suddenly and in limited fashion. However, more ministers
in a cabinet which is still dominated by people loyal to Erdogan's chief
internal rival FonMin Gul may be in Erdogan's sights as he tries slowly but
surely to whittle down Gul's influence. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a trademark sudden move, PM Erdogan announced the replacement of

three ministers in a mini-Cabinet shuffle June 4. Cabinet changes have been an
intense subject of debate and waiting-for-Godot expectation in ruling AKP since
Erdogan inherited the Cabinet from his internal arch-rival Abdullah Gul, now
FonMin, in March 2003. Yet despite the heavy Gul influence (until this shuffle
Erdogan could depend on only four of 22 ministers for internal political
support) and despite his overriding popular support, Erdogan long appeared
intimidated from making any changes. When Minister of Culture and Tourism Erkan
Mumcu resigned in Feb. 2005, Erdogan remained in thrall to Gul for the abortive
choice of current State Minister Besir Atalay and eventual choice of Atilla Koc
to replace Mumcu.
¶3. (C) Now Erdogan appears to have overcome his indecision, spurred in part by
what Minister of Energy Hilmi Guler told a close contact of ours June 6 is
Erdogan's realization of how much damage to his policies Gul and his circle are
wreaking. Finally dismissed are three prominent incompetents: Minister of
Agriculture Sami Guclu, a barrier to progress on issues of concern to the U.S.
and a Gul ally; Minister of Public Works Zeki Ergezen, infamous for his scornful
remarks about “infidels” (gavurlar), surrounded by rumors of corruption, unable
to finish Erdogan's 15,000 kilometer divided highway project on time, an ally of
Minister of the Interior Abdulkadir Aksu, and reportedly close to Gul; and State
Minister for Women's Affairs Guldal Aksit, daughter of Galip Demirel, a
prominent follower of controversial Islamist sage Fethullah Gulen and a close
associate of Aksu.
¶4. (U) Erdogan appointed as Minister of Agriculture Mehmet Mehdi 1), a

Diyarbakir MP from a prominent local family with high status in the Naksibendi
brotherhood. Born in Bismil (Diyarbakir province) 1956; graduate of Ankara U.
veterinary faculty, MA in agricultural economics from Aberdeen U, PhD from
Ankara U.'s health sciences institute. Veterinarian. Worked in upper-mid-level
positions in the Agriculture Ministry and as director of veterinary affairs in
the Greater Istanbul Municipality when Erdogan was mayor. Married, three
children. Speaks English, but we haven't yet tested his level.
¶5. (C) An AKP xxxxx and two other long-term Embassy contacts with deep
relations in AKP describe Eker as a decent but passive man, close to Erdogan.
These contacts and Minister of Energy have described in detail how Eker was
deeply involved in a plan to remove former Minister Guclu by concealing from him
a Russian government note threatening six months ago to suspend imports of
Turkish fruits and vegetables for phytosanitary reasons; the ban recently went
into effect with Guclu looking ineffectual and uninformed. Embassy Ag
Counselor's contacts note that Eker is unlikely to be able to override the
Ministry's entrenched, protectionist bureaucracy.
¶6. (U) The new Minister of Public Works is Trabzon MP Faruk Nafiz 2) (umlaut
over the O). Born Trabzon 1946. Civil engineering degree from Karadeniz
technical University in Trabzon. Senior civil engineer. Former captain of
premier league Trabzonspor football team. Chairman of the board of YAPISUN
construction company. Chairman of the board of Trabzonspor. A founder of the
Trabzon development Foundation. Married, two children. Reportedly speaks
English.
¶7. (C) A fellow Trabzon contractor and Trabzonspor board member describes Ozak
as coming from the Sufi (mystical) line of the Milli Gorus Islamist movement; he
is a quiet, reserved, obedient Erdogan man. As part of Erdogan's strategy to use
sports to maintain AKP's grassroots support, and in the wake of AKP's defeat in
the Trabzon mayoral race in March 2004, the Istanbul-Black Sea axis which forms
Erdogan's Istanbul power base reportedly subsequently succeeded in having Ozak
appointed Trabzonspor chairman of the board. At the same time Erdogan reportedly
agreed to transfer several million dollars from one of the Prime Ministry's
hidden reserves to permit Trabzonspor under Ozak to purchase better players. Our
contacts expect Ozak to be relatively more upright than Ergezen was (not a high
bar).
¶8. (U) Istanbul Second District MP Nimet 3) is the new State Minister for
Women's Affairs. Born Ayranci (Ankara) 1965. Grew up in relatively well-to-do
circumstances with a family summer home on Heybeliada, one of the Princes'
Islands off Istanbul. Law degree from Istanbul U. law faculty. Worked as an
independent attorney, most recently representing the Islamist businessmen's
association MUSIAD. A founding member of AKP. Married, one child.
¶9. (C) Cubukcu is focused, highly ambitious, and months ago made clear to us
she sought the state minister position. She has ensured that she stays close to
Erdogan's wife Emine, which appears to have been a major factor in her
selection, according to what party deputy chairman Saban Disli told us June 7.
Her businesslike approach and relative openness in private about problems in AKP
brought her to our attention early in AKP's tenure; she participated in
Embassy's NATO tour for MPs in Feb. 2004 and in the NDI-sponsored democracy
commission trip to Washington in Spring 2005. Responding to the bitter
complaints of many women from AKP's grassroots in the northeast Black Sea region
who have seen their husbands take Russian and other Black Sea-littoral women as
second wives, Cubukcu vigorously argued for criminalization of adultery during a
controversy over adultery in autumn 2004. On the other hand, although she talks
about her son, she rarely mentions her husband and there are persistent
questions among some observers of AKP about her attitude toward her own
marriage.
¶10. (C) With the dismissal of Guclu and these appointments Erdogan has shown
more clearly that he intends to whittle down Gul's influence. By dismissing
Aksit and Ergezen and appointing Eker, whose family status in Diyarbakir makes
him a powerful rival to Interior Minister Aksu, Erdogan has also drawn the noose
around Aksu. Aksu has most recently served Erdogan's purposes by dismissing
Hanefi Avci, an leading Gulenist who as National Police (TNP) department head
for organized crime was starting to push corruption investigations that were
leading to the heart of AKP. However, Erdogan has long been troubled by Aksu,
whom he suspects of being ready to bolt from AKP with a number of disgruntled
MPs. Aksu's Kurdish favoritism, reported ties to the heroin trade, well-known
predilection for teenage girls, and his son's open Mafia links make him a weak
link in the Cabinet, one Erdogan knows the core institutions of the Turkish
State could exploit at any time.
¶11. (C) Contacts such as Prime Ministry advisor xxxxx who has provided a wealth
of accurate insights into AKP, foresee a high possibility that Erdogan will
continue to shuffle his cabinet in stages. In addition to Aksu, those who appear
to be most in his sights are Minister of Labor Murat Basesgioglu, a former
ANAPer who has a poor record of responding to AKP MPs' queries and requests;
Minister of Trade and Industry Ali Coskun, who appears to be deeply implicated
in a major corruption scandal at the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE) –
involving payoffs of $500 million for certifications, according to the TSE
director's statement in the June 7 press; and State Minister for Foreign Trade
Kursad Tuzmen, a former (ultra-nationalist) MHPer who was implicated in the Iraq
oil for food payoffs and is described by multiple contacts as open to every type
of kickback.
¶12. (C) Erdogan may also be aiming over time to remove Gul's close associate
State Minister Atalay and Minister of Justice and government spokesman Cemil
Cicek, who has not bothered to hide his prime ministerial and presidential
ambitions and his disrespect for Erdogan. MOORE
Viewing cable 05LONDON4981, IMO SECGEN REPORTS ON HIS TRIP TO

THE KOREAN PENINSULAR
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #05LONDON4981.
2005-06-15 2010-11-29 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFO Embassy
05LONDON4981
10:10 21:09 RN London
Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de/
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 004981
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/T/HTP, EUR/UBI, EAP/K, L/LEI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015

TAGS: EWWT JA KR PREL UK IMO PSI
SUBJECT: IMO SECGEN REPORTS ON HIS TRIP TO THE KOREAN PENINSULAR
Ref: london 4212
Classified By: ESTOff Trevor Evans for reasons 1.4 (d) and (e):
Summary
--------
¶1. (C) On June 10, Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary General
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) briefed
ESTOff on his trip the previous week to the Korean Peninsula.
Even before his arrival, the North had indicated that his
offer of the IMO's good offices to increase North-South
maritime cooperation was appreciated, but that the "time was
not right." Instead, much of what he heard in the North
involved current perspectives on the 6-party talks and North
Korea's relationship with the U.S. Mitropoulos said he had
met with the North Korean Ambassador in London earlier in the
day, and gave EstOff his confidential notes from that meeting
(see para 6). End Summary.
In seoul - messages for the north

---------------------------------
¶2. (C) On June 10, Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary General
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) briefed
ESTOff on his trip the previous week to the Korean Peninsula.
Mitropoulos spent little time describing his itinerary in
South Korea, only to say that in meetings with the President
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was asked to
encourage the North to increased cooperation in maritime
affairs and to express the South's concern for the treatment
of North Korean ships calling at Japanese ports. In addition,
the Vice Minister for the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries asked Mitropoulos to convey a message of friendship
to the North and suggesting joint fishery activities or
projects in the context of the bilateral maritime agreement.
Mitropoulos noted, however, that even prior to his departure
from London, the North Korean Ambassador in London had
conveyed IMO's offer to Pyongyang. Pyongyang responded that
it appreciated IMO's offer, but in the context of the
Sunshine policy, "the time was not right" to pursue the IMO's
proposed areas of cooperation. (Per reftel, Mitropoulos
proposed that the IMO assist in the following areas: 1)
cooperation on search and rescue, 2) joint responsibilities
for responding to major pollution incidents, 3) technical
cooperation including training of maritime personnel, and 4)
cooperation on maritime traffic between the two countries.)
¶3. (C) The ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs also thanked IMO
for offering its good offices to increase cooperation with
the North. He then asked Mitropoulos to tell the North that
"the message from the South is to come back to the six-party
talks." Once the North participates, he said, and the
nuclear program is dismantled and verified by the
International Energy Administration (IEA), food, energy, and
security will be guaranteed and we will activate the maritime
agreement. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs added that
were these conditions met, "funds would be made available to
effect these programs." The Vice Foreign Minister added that
the South feels it is under pressure from the U.S. He said,
the U.S. is trying to stop the ROK from doing anything until
the North agrees to return to the talks. The ROK President,
he said, will find himself in a difficult position during his
meeting with President Bush in Washington. For this reason,
it would be nice if Mitropoulos could tell the North that the
ROK would appreciate the North sending a positive signal that
the President of ROK could take with him on his visit to
Washington.
In pyongyang - messages for the u.s.

-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) Flying to the North via Beijing, Mitropoulos met wit
the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the "President of
the Presidium" who told him that attempts to improve
relations with the South had been repeatedly frustrated by
"outside forces" (i.e., the U.S.). He said the North's
attempts to pursue a policy of "consultation, cooperation,
and reconciliation" had been frustrated by the U.S. and its
stand on nuclear issues. As an example, he asserted that the
South had pledged to send the North 500K tons of fertilizer,
but ended up only sending 200K tons due the U.S.
intervention. The North, he said, wants to phase out its
nuclear program, but through dialogue, since the U.S. is
directly threatening the North with nuclear weapons. xxxxx
The U.S. should show sincerity, he said, by entering
into bilateral talks with the North. Vice President Cheney's
remarks were slanderous, he added, and make it clear and the
U.S. has no interest in resolving the talks peacefully. "If
you meet our American friends, he said, "please pass this
message to them - that the U.S. should come with sincerity
and honest minds to resolve this issue." He stated, the
current U.S. proposal that we dismantle or nuclear program,
after which they will give assurances is not fair - the two
gestures should occur simultaneously "in trust." Mitropoulos
countered that he understood the U.S. position somewhat
differently. Further, he said that if the North does not
trust the U.S., it seemed to him that it would be better off
working within the six party framework, rather than in a
bilateral discussion. That way if any party did not live up
to its end of the bargain, all of the North's neighbors would
be at the table, not just the U.S.
Impressions
-----------
¶5. (C) Mitropoulos said he had few expectations for the
North, but was surprised further by what he found, beginning
with the flight from Beijing on a dilapidated Russia-made
passenger jet. He the flight was about 80% full, with over
half the passengers Iranian. He noted, "How do they expect
the West to believe their nuclear program is not a threat
when flights to the country are full of Iranians?" He was
housed in a huge eight bedroom guesthouse with no other
guests, and enjoyed a modern TV which included 114 channel,
only one of which worked - the government's channel. When he
got off the plane, he was greeted by a party including
officials bearing flowers that he "might want to dedicate" to
the Great Leader. Feeling he had no choice without creating
an incident upon arrival, Mitropoulos laid a wreath at a
statue of Kim Il Sung while TV cameras whirred. He was then
asked if he had brought any gifts for the Great Leader, even
though his staff had made it clear that he would not be
bringing gifts on the trip. When he visited port facilities,
he felt that there had been no special preparation for his
visit, and the Port Security Manager was unavailable to
escort him on the tour of the Port's security system.
¶6. (c) notes from the secgen's june 10 meeting with north
korean ambassador in london (ri yong ho)
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
begin text:
Memo for the file on the visit of the Ambassador of the

Democratic Republic of Korea on 10 June 2005 (on SG's return
from his mission to DPRK)
(Covers the DPRK Ambassador's statement to SG's opening

remarks)
In his response, the Ambassador of DPRK said that they feel

that bilateral talks with the Unites States would be better
able to establish that the United States are serious and wish
to reach an outcome. They are not bothered what format is
used for the actual agreement - bilateral or six-party
agreement - but bilateral talks are necessary to establish
the seriousness of intention. Russia and China do not want
to pin down what format is used. I noted any discussion is
better than none, and that a note of point regarding the
6-party agreement is it gives more guarantee.
Confidence is not there for a bilateral agreement. The point

is that DPRK does not believe the US is really prepared to
seriously address the issue and reach a conclusion. The US
is trying to buy time; and is not prepared to be flexible on
the issue.
Also he noted that there is pressure within the US

Administration regarding Iraq and France. Therefore, The US
are taking a tough stand on DPRK. Within the Administration
itself they do not seem to be saying the same things.
Later, when passing on the reaction of his capital to the

SG's meetings with Government officials during his visit, the
Ambassador of DPRK said that they were grateful that SG had
shown interest in the affairs and willingness to help with
problems in the peninsula exceeding his mandate as IMO SG.
That was strongly appreciated. They were delighted to hear
that the SG would bring about technical co-operation for
better maritime development in DPRK; and emphasized that SG
of IMO, an important agency of the UN system, has sympathetic
ideas on the concerns of the Korean peninsula and its status
as a nuclear-free region.
The messages brought by the SG from RoK were duly noted and
there is some discussion and initial reaction as far as
co-operation between North and South is concerned. Some
people in the DPRK Government are interested in co-operation
with the South, in particular on maritime affairs although
others believe these are not the most important ones, placing
emphasis particularly on military issues. They hold the view
that co-operation in the maritime field is good and they are
willing to help whenever incidents involving RoK ships within
their jurisdiction so require. But entering into a binding
agreement with RoK on search and rescue (SAR) is a very
serious issue as it means that the military will be bound to
such an agreement and, because of the particular situation
with PSI, the military is not prepared to be bound by legal
agreements, so it will take some time for consideration.
For other international conventions and treaties on maritime
affairs, there are only technical problems not political, so
it will only depend on preparations which they are willing to
pursue.
Re: the 6-party talks, there are some new developments since
SG's visit. Their Government has indicated it is willing to
go back to the table once there is something from the US side
for face-saving, because they want the US to withdraw
their insulting comments and particularly the statements
about DPRK as an "outpost of tyranny" made by Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice. Once US indicate that these
statements are withdrawn or that they will stop, the DPRK
will return to the table for 6-party talks. They are open
for any form of agreement. They have never been against the
6-party talks. The 6-party talks are better at the end stage
but at the initial stage bilateral talks are better for
efficiency; or, possibly, the bilateral talks and 6-party
talks could go hand-in-hand with the bilateral talks taking
part continuously with updates to the 6 parties every 3
months. Once no more insulting comments are forthcoming from
the US, things can move ahead. He believes this position has
been passed from Pyongyang to the RoK side - today or
yesterday.
He assured the SG that he would forward the SG's comments
right away to Pyongyang. He also felt that using the sea as
a bridge was a good idea, as the SG had suggested. So far,
the sea has been a source of clashes for so many people.
SG emphasized the importance of security in the peninsula and

how crucial it was to ensure that nothing goes wrong causing
the loss of innocent lives.
End of text.
xxxxx
Johnson
Viewing cable 05CAIRO5924, EGYPTIAN GTMO DETAINEES - STATUS OF

DISCUSSIONS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #05CAIRO5924.
05CAIRO5924 2005-08-01 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET Embassy Cairo
S E C R E T CAIRO 005924
SIPDIS
NEA FOR FO, ELA
S/WCI FOR AMB PROSPER AND RMILLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2015

TAGS: PTER EG GTMO
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN GTMO DETAINEES - STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS
REF: CAIRO 5589 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: CHARGE STUART E.JONES, REASONS 1.5 B AND D
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In the context of the close and sustained

cooperation between the USG and GOE on counterterrorism, Post
believes that the written GOE assurances regarding the return
of three Egyptians detained at Guantanamo (reftel) represent
the firm commitment of the GOE to adhere to the requested
principles. These assurances were passed directly from
Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Chief Soliman
through liaison channels -- the most effective communication
path on this issue. General Soliman's word is the GOE's
guarantee, and the GOE's track record of cooperation on CT
issues lends further support to this assessment. End summary.
EGYPTIAN ASSURANCES
-------------------
¶2. (S) As stated in reftel, Post has received written

assurances from the Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) regarding the acceptance and humane treatment of three
Egyptians currently detained in Guantanamo:
-- Abdul Rahman Mohammed AL-MARZOUQ, ISN US9EG-00369DP;
-- Allah Muhammad SALEEM, ISN US9EG-00071DP;
-- Sami Abdul Aziz Salim ALLAITHY, ISN US9EG-000287DP.
Post believes that these assurances represent a firm

commitment by the GOE to handle the matter in accordance with
our stated principles. We recommend that the interagency
consider approving transfer now on the basis of these
assurances.
DIRECT CHANNEL
--------------
¶3. (S) Post has established that the most effective conduit
for addressing this issue is through Cairo Station - EGIS
Liaison. The written assurances (reftel) were passed directly
from EGIS Chief General Soliman through this channel.
General Soliman's stature and power in the Egyptian
establishment, and his history of close cooperation with the
USG on counterterrorism, corroborate the Egyptian intent take
responsibility for the detainees in such a way that protects
both U.S. and Egyptian security interests. In addition to
the written assurances regarding the detainees treatment,
EGIS has conveyed orally to Cairo station that all three will
be taken into custody upon arrival in Egypt and will be
investigated and prosecuted in accordance with Egyptian law.
¶4. (S) We understand the need for specific language on this

matter. However, the danger of seeking specificity beyond
what we have already received in EGIS' written assurances is
that EGIS may decide to turn the case over to the MFA. MFA
involvement will complicate the process and delay disposal of
the cases.
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo
You can also access this site through the

State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.
JONES
Viewing cable 05PARIS5335, ALLAN HUBBARD'S CALL ON INTERIOR

MINISTER SARKOZY
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, DRL, AND EB

COMMERCE FOR ITA
LABOR FOR ILAB
NSC FOR TRACY MCKIBBEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2015

TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN ELAB PGOV FR
SUBJECT: ALLAN HUBBARD'S CALL ON INTERIOR MINISTER SARKOZY
REF: PARIS 5232
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Stapleton and National Economic

Council Director Allan Hubbard met with Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy on August 1. Sarkozy expressed his
admiration for President Bush and said he looked forward to
the opportunity to tackle France's economic and social
problems with the same directness for which the President is
justly famous. Sarkozy confirmed that he would be running
for President of France in 2007. He said his own struggle to
rise to high office, as the son of immigrants challenging
entrenched elites, in part explained his deep admiration for
America's values. He said he would stress opportunity and
making a "deep break with the past" -- by proposing
significant change to France's social model -- in his 2007
campaign. On economic issues, Sarkozy reprised many of his
now familiar policy themes: France's economic model holds
back growth; people need to work more and be rewarded for
doing so; and people need to be told the truth about the
economic situation. He was upbeat
about France's future if the country seized the opportunity
that reforms could bring. He also tossed out a few of the
"policy zingers" for which he is well known, notably "The
European Central Bank confuses a strong currency with a
strong economy," and "France needs to do what Reagan did in
the U.S., Thatcher in Britain, and Gonzales in Spain." End
Summary.
¶2. (U) Ambassador Stapleton and Allan Hubbard, Director of

the National Economic Council, met with France's Minister of
Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy on 1 August. Sarkozy is also the
president of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, a
coalition of center-right parties founded by President Chirac
in 2002. The meeting took place in Sarkozy's office at the
Ministry of the Interior and was also attended by Sarkozy
Chief of Staff Claude Gueant and Interior Ministry Staffer
Cederic Goubet. Embassy Econ Counselor, Poloff and Economic
Analyst (as interpreter) accompanied Mr. Hubbard and
Ambassador Stapleton.
ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT BUSH

-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Sarkozy expressed his admiration for President Bush.
Sarkozy said that, like the President, he too was committed
to keeping his word and to dealing honestly with the real
problems of the country, "unlike the rest of those
politicians." Throughout the hour-long meeting, Sarkozy
returned again and again to the importance of leveling with
people. He illustrated his point by saying the "French
people have to be told the truth -- and they want to hear
it." He added that most politicians, and specifically
President Chirac, just keep stringing the people along with
their "constant tergiversating." Economic Council Director
Hubbard's presentation of the President's direct and
principled tackling of America's major domestic challenges
(taxes, social security, education), drew the high compliment
from Sarkozy that he too would like to tackle the same
problems, in the same way, for France.
DISAGREEING WITH VERSUS UNDERCUTTING THE U.S.

---------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Sarkozy lamented the troubled state of U.S.-France
relations during recent years. He drew a sharp distinction
between disagreeing with friends and undercutting them. He
said, "we should always be able to disagree." Calling it
something he "would never do", he cited President Chirac's,
and then-Foreign Minister de Villepin's, use of France's
Security Council veto against the U.S. in February 2002 as an
unjustifiable and excessive reaction to a difference of
views. He added that he would have advised the U.S. not to
undertake the invasion and occupation of Iraq -- but that
that didn't prevent him from "feeling it personally when
American soldiers die in combat." He proudly pointed out
how, at the height of anti-American feeling and anti-U.S.
demonstrations (contemporaneous to Sarkozy's first stint as
Minister of the Interior (2002 - 2004)), he took it as a
personal responsibility to see to it that "no U.S. Embassy or
Consulate was so much as touched" by demonstrators.
IDENTIFYING WITH AMERICA'S VALUES

---------------------------------
¶5. (C) "They call me 'Sarkozy the American,'" he said, "they
consider it an insult, but I take it as a compliment."
Sarkozy stressed how much he "recognized himself" in
America's values. He recalled how as a boy, he told his
father that he wanted to grow up to be president. He said
his Hungarian-born father retorted, "In that case, go to
America -- because with a name like Sarkozy, you'll never
make it here." Proving that wrong, Sarkozy said, was a
touchstone for his efforts both to succeed and to transform
France into a place where "outsiders" like him could also
enjoy opportunity untrammeled by prejudice. Comment: Very
much unlike nearly all other French political figures,
Sarkozy is viscerally pro-American. For most of his peers
the U.S. is a sometimes reviled or admired, but decidedly
foreign, other. Sarkozy identifies with America; he sees his
own rise in the world as reflecting an American-like saga.
End Comment.
FIGHTING FRANCE'S ELITE

-----------------------
¶6. (C) Sarkozy pointed to his own political career as an
example of both his success and the difficulty of achieving
it. "I'm not a member of the elite...I'm someone who wants
to speak for the France that gets up every morning and
works," he said, as he recalled his own rise from "knowing
nobody and beginning as a simple party supporter, and
climbing every step in the ladder" to his current bid for the
presidency. With some vehemence, Sarkozy insisted on his
having had to "challenge those stronger than me" every step
of way.
CONFIRMING HE WILL RUN

----------------------
¶7. (C) Sarkozy confirmed his intention to run for president
to Ambassador Stapleton and NEC Director Hubbard, saying, "I
am going to be a candidate in 2007". Outlining his campaign
strategy, Sarkozy said, "we are going to propose change to
the French people." "I'm convinced that it can work...people
want to believe they can succeed." Sarkozy then touched on
many of his specific proposals for providing more opportunity
for the able and more support for the disadvantaged -- tax
cuts, labor law reform, affirmative action, immigration
reform, and monetary policy that "recognizes that the
currency is an instrument for supporting a strong economy."
RECALLING REAGAN, THATCHER AND GONZALES

---------------------------------------
¶8. (C) On economic affairs, Sarkozy repeated his
often-stated assertion that the French economic model is
"bad." France needs to do what Spain, the UK and other
successful countries have done over the past twenty years;
take the best of what they have done and adopt those policies
in France. In response to Mr. Hubbard's question on what
Sarkozy's economic vision for France was, Sarkozy said that
the French people have to understand that they need to work
more and that the Government must make it more profitable for
people who do so. He said that France needed to a go through
a period similar to the U.S. under Reagan, the UK under
Thatcher, and Spain under Gonzalez. "France is not an old
country," he said, "but right now it's acting like one."
INCENTIVES FOR TAKING INITIATIVE

--------------------------------
¶9. (C) Sarkozy explained his theory that unemployment
benefits should be higher than they currently are for people
immediately after they are laid off. However they should
quickly phase out to provide an incentive for people to look
for work. Unemployed people should be required to look for
work; now they are not required to. Echoing comments made by
Finance Minister Breton, Sarkozy said, "people are ready for
the politics of truth." He added that his directly expressed
assessments of France's economic problems and his insistent
advocacy of work, innovation and entrepreneurship in fact
contribute to his popularity. "Some people told me never to
say such things, people will hate you; clearly they don't
hate me," he observed.
OVER-VALUED EURO AND NO ALAN GREENSPAN

--------------------------------------
10 (C) On the deficit, Sarkozy said that for 25 years France
has been living beyond its means. Now it is paying the price
for that. He said that the U.S. had two advantages that
France did not have: "Greenspan and the dollar." He said
that France was suffering from no longer having control of
its own currency and observed that European Central Bank
(ECB) president Trichet was pursuing exactly the wrong
policies; "he confuses a strong currency with a strong
economy." Europe needed a pro-growth ECB, not one focused on
fighting inflation only. The U.S., he observed, "has often
had its strongest economy when the dollar was at its
weakest." Turning to Chairman Greenspan, Sarkozy said, "he
is a genius. A genius. He has pursued exactly the right
policies."
FRANCE'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

----------------------------
¶11. (C) Returning to his priorities for France, Sarkozy
noted that France's biggest challenges were outsourcing, a
lagging research sector, savings that are "too static and
don't really help move the economy," and a lack of profitable
mid-size companies; "we have lots of big ones and lots of
really small ones, but few in between." He sees natural
strengths for France in the health, agriculture and food,
transportation, communication and nuclear energy sectors.
WORKING TOGETHER AT THE WTO

---------------------------
¶12. (C) Responding to Mr. Hubbard's observation on the need
for the Doha trade round to move forward this autumn, Sarkozy
agreed, and noted that the EU needed to reach a better
understanding with the U.S. on agricultural issues. He said
that U.S. and EU officials were talking but prescribed much
more intensive discussion so that a common understanding
could be reached. If that happened, he believed the upcoming
Hong Kong ministerial could be a success.
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C) For many years, Nicolas Sarkozy has been France's
most popular politician. Current polls show his approval
ratings holding steady at around 60 percent, and defeating
any probable opponent in 2007. By experience and conviction
-- his experience as interior minister and his "liberal,"
free-market oriented convictions -- he seems particularly
well-suited to lead France in meeting the key challenges it
now faces: security in this era of global terrorism and
prosperity in this era of adapting to economic globalization.
In addition, Sarkozy's deep identification with American
values -- opportunity, initiative, competition, society that
sustains individual liberty as much as it supports national
power, make him France's best hope for catalyzing the shift
in social values that the French need to make if they are to
take full advantage of globalization.
COMMENT CONTINUED
-----------------
¶14. (C) Sarkozy's vision for France is a powerful one, and,
as his popularity reflects, it resonates with a big part of
the electorate. However, resistance to social change is
particularly strong in France. Attachment to the benefits
and advantages that most of them receive, in one way of
another, from the state -- the substance of the "French
social model" -- is very strong among ordinary French people.
Sarkozy's popularity may be a reflection of change the
French would like to make, but are too conservative to in
fact undertake. End Comment.
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 05ANKARA7215, NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING

AKP PARLIAMENTARY
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015

TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY
GROUP -- FOR NOW
REF: A. ANKARA 6543

¶B. ANKARA 6251
¶C. ANKARA 6337
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 12958, reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Despite media reports and opposition rumors

of splits among PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's
(AKP) 357 parliamentarians, the group remains intact )- for
now. Among AKP MPs, there are distinctive pious, pragmatic
and nationalist currents, with crosscutting personal
loyalties. Recent events in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish
southeast have heightened tensions between AKP,s
Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group.
While AKP MPs, numbers may slowly erode over the next year
(ref A), a major split is unlikely as long as AKP -- and in
particular PM Erdogan -- retain power and popularity. End
Summary.
Despite Wishful Thinking, AKP Not Crumbling Yet

--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Over the past year, the Turkish press has repeatedly
predicted open splits in the 357-member AKP parliamentary
group. While AKP has ideological and personality-based fault
lines, there appears to be little chance of a major split
while AKP remains Turkey,s number one party and Erdogan the
country,s most popular politician. Even Ankara AKP MP
Ersonmez Yarbay, a maverick frequently openly critical of his
own party, downplayed to us the rumors of party splits,
saying they have been fueled by the opposition to force early
elections.
AKP,s Ideological Currents

--------------------------
¶3. (C) AKP,s parliamentary group is composed of politicians

with widely differing viewpoints. There are three main
ideological currents: pious, nationalist and pragmatic.
Most AKP MPs do not fall neatly into any one category, and
personal loyalties crosscut ideology, mostly among pious MPs.
Pious
-----
¶4. (C) Almost all AKP MPs are religiously observant to some
degree; for example, the vast majority fast during Ramadan.
However, there is a large and distinctively more pious group
of MPs, comprising former members of the banned Islamist
Virtue (Fazilet) Party, former members of the National View
Islamist youth group, and members of a wide range of
(officially banned) Muslim brotherhoods. Most of AKP,s top
leaders fall into this group: PM Erdogan, DPM/FM Abdullah
Gul, parliament Speaker Arinc, Vice Speaker Alptekin (former
PM and Islamic Saadet Party head Erbakan's right-hand man)
and all five of AKP,s parliamentary whips. Pious MPs
generally represent the central Anatolian heartland, speak no
English, and have traveled little.
¶5. (C) While most Turkish Islamists oppose the EU, AKP,s
Islamist MPs toe the AKP line and support it, albeit less
enthusiastically since October 3. Typical of Turkish
Islamists, they dislike Turkey,s military and have no ties
to it other than their required military service. Attitudes
about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious, but
most favor better ties with the Muslim world. Although the
GOT, under Erdogan,s leadership, has taken a politically
courageous public stand favoring privatization and foreign
investment, many pious MPs oppose both.
¶6. (C) AKP,s pious MPs are widely rumored to be deeply

unhappy about PM Erdogan,s inability to ease restrictions on
the wearing of headscarves and on religious schools.
However, since AKP came to power in November 2002, no AKP MP
has resigned and gone over to the Happiness (Saadet) Party,
on AKP's Islamist flank.
Nationalists
------------
¶7. (C) It is hard to find a Turk who is not nationalistic.

Yet a significant number of AKP MPs (as many as 50, according
to one former MP), many of them former members of the
ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) or center-right
True Path Party (DYP), are strong nationalists, even by
Turkish standards. This group includes Justice Minister and
party spokesman Cemil Cicek, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener,
State Minister Kursad Tuzmen, and parliament Vice Speaker
Sadik Yakut.
¶8. (C) Among AKP MPs, nationalists take the hardest line
against &concessions8 to the EU and on Cyprus. MFA
officials have told us on several occasions that the GOT is
delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement extension protocol to
parliament for ratification out of concern for the reaction
of nationalist AKP MPs (ref B). Nationalist AKP MPs are
deeply suspicious about the motives of Turkey,s ethnic Kurds
and were vocal critics of PM Erdogan,s August declaration in
Diyarbakir that Turkey has a &Kurdish problem.8 Like their
pious colleagues, nationalists, attitudes about the U.S.
vary widely, from friendly to suspicious. However, even
pro-U.S. nationalists become extremely prickly at any
perceived U.S. slight to Turkish national honor.
Pragmatists
-----------
¶9. (C) AKP,s pragmatic MPs generally speak English, are

foreign-educated, and tend to be better-traveled than their
colleagues. They often come from large cosmopolitan areas,
particularly Ankara or Istanbul; some were previously members
of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP). Three of AKP,s
five vice chairs, who frequently deal with foreigners, are
from the pragmatic wing: Bulent Gedikli, Reha Denemec and
Saban Disli. All are U.S-educated and represent either
Istanbul or Ankara. The same is true for pragmatic Erdogan
translator and foreign policy advisor Egemen Bagis, who
accompanies the PM on his trips to Europe and the U.S.
¶10. (C) Although the pragmatic MPs are often AKP,s most
visible face to foreigners, they have less influence inside
AKP than their pious and nationalist colleagues. In early
2005, there were signs of frustration among AKP,s moderates,
when a spate of AKP MP resignations went mostly to ANAP.
Culture Minister Mumcu, AKP,s highest-profile resignation
who went on become ANAP,s Chairman, said publicly he had
only felt like a &guest8 in AKP (ref C).
¶11. (C) Erdogan can ill afford to lose the pragmatists. In

addition to giving AKP a reasonable, big-tent image that
plays well in the U.S. and Europe, AKP,s pragmatists are
links to Istanbul and Ankara elites. These MPs are AKP,s
friendliest face toward the U.S. (Bagis heads parliament,s
Turkey/U.S Friendship Committee), and most receptive to
liberal political and open market economic reforms needed for
EU accession.
Crosscutting Personal Loyalties

-------------------------------
¶12. (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality as by

politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut
ideological ones. PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP
together; a chunk of AKP MPs were part of Erdogan,s team
when he was Istanbul mayor and have followed him onto the
national stage. They include Finance Minister Unakitan,
Transportation Minister Yildirim, State Minister Cubukcu, AKP
whip Irfan Gunduz, and Erdogan speechwriter Huseyin Besli.
All are personally pious or, in Cubukcu,s case, at least
have consistently supported positions of the party,s pious
wing. Cubukcu, a female, was one of the few MPs who publicly
supported Erdogan,s 2004 proposal to re-criminalize adultery.
¶13. (C) Erdogan has consistently protected all three

"Istanbul" Ministers despite repeated calls for their
resignation. Many other AKP MPs profess staunch loyalty to
&Tayyip Bey8 and seek to stay close to him. One contact
suggests that Erdogan's strategy is to keep subordinates
competing with each other for his attention so they are too
busy to be a threat to him.
¶14. (C) DPM/FM Gul remains Erdogan,s chief political rival

within AKP. Their differences are not ideological ) Gul and
Erdogan are both pious ) but spring from Gul,s ambitions
for greater power. Gul, who represents the parliamentary
faction of the banned Virtue Party, has a small, quiet
following among AK MPs that includes whip Salih Kapusuz (from
Gul,s home town of Kayseri), former AKP public relations
vice chair Murat Mercan (sacked for incompetence by Erdogan
earlier this year) and Taner Yildiz (also from Kayseri).
¶15. (C) Parliament Speaker Arinc is AKP,s third leading

personality and potential future rival to Erdogan. However,
Arinc is well behind Gul in influence and, according to our
contacts, currently without a significant group of MP
loyalists.
AKP's Kurdish MPs

-----------------
¶16. (C) About 60 AKP MPs, mostly from Turkey,s southeast,

are of Kurdish origin; Political and Legal Affairs Vice Chair
Dengir Mir Firat is AKP's most visible Kurdish MP. The Kurds
who joined AKP and were elected to parliament tend to be
pious, stressing the common bonds among all Muslims over
Kurdish nationalism. (The strongest Kurdish nationalists ran
from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People,s Party (DEHAP) in
2002 elections and failed to enter parliament because DEHAP
did not cross the ten percent electoral threshold.) One
former Kurdish-origin MP, himself pious, has consistently
told us even he considers AKP,s Kurdish MPs extraordinarily
passive on Kurdish issues.
¶17. (C) Yet recent events in the southeast, including AKP

nationalists' reaction against PM Erdogan,s August &Kurdish
problem8 speech in Diyarbakir and alleged Jandarma
involvement in a November bombing in the southeastern town of
Semdinli, have created tension between AKP,s Kurdish-origin
MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group. An Ankara
provincial AKP official told us recently that tension with
AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs has infected AKP's pious wing,
weakening it relative to other AKP factions.
¶18. (C) Comment: AKP's parliamentary strength, so far,

springs from Erdogan's ability to keep such a diverse group
of MPs united, and the lack of any viable opposition. The
question is whether Erdogan can continue to keep the
parliamentary group together without turning AKP into an
internally-undemocratic, personality-based party in the
classic Turkish tradition. AKP,s opposition will eventually
come from inside AKP itself. However, for now, Erodgan
appears well in control and there is no viable political
alternative for dissatisfied AKP MPs. End Comment.
WILSON
Viewing cable 05PARIS8442, FRANCE: 2005 COUNTRY REPORT ON
TERRORISM
Discussing cables
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM EFIN FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: 2005 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 193439
¶1. (U) Per reftel, enclosed is the 2005 country report on

terrorism for France. Embassy point of contact is Poloff
Peter Kujawinski, who can be reached on either the classified
or unclassified e-mail systems.
France - 2005
OVERVIEW
In 2005, France continued to discover and dismantle terror
networks present on its soil, including several that
recruited jihadists to Iraq. Following the July bombings in
London, French officials worked closely with their British
counterparts. They also perceived a number of deficiencies
in their counterterrorism capabilities, and proposed
legislation to remedy these deficiencies. This legislation
is expected to enter into force in early 2006. From March
on, the French government has worked to draft a white book on
terrorism, with publication expected by the end of the year.
A conference in October about the white book underscored the
French government,s belief that terrorism is a primary
strategic threat to France, and that dealing with it is
consequentially a central priority. France consults
extensively with the U.S. on terrorism, at the tactical and
strategic level. In general, counterterrorism cooperation
between the U.S. and France is excellent.
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
France continues to be an active and engaged participant in

the international war against terrorism. On the military
front, its special forces participate in counterterrorist
operations in Afghanistan and as a part of Task Force 150, a
multinational naval force that patrols the Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected
terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula. In
Afghanistan, French Mirage-2000 fighters have flown with USAF
fighters to assist American and Afghan ground troops. At the
political and diplomatic level, France continues its
engagement within the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee and the
G-8,s Counterterrorism Action Group. France is a party to
all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism.
France and the United States continue to cooperate closely on

border security issues, including aviation security and the
Container Security Initiative. French police and security
services have been very responsive to US requests. In
addition, France is active internationally in proposing
bioterrorism safeguards and nuclear facility safeguards. The
U.S. and France continue their dialogue on nuclear security
cooperation.
On terrorism financing, France continues to develop the

competencies and capabilities of TRACFIN, the Ministry of
Finance,s terrorism financing coordination and investigation
unit. TRACFIN has expanded the number of economic sectors it
monitors within the French economy, with a particular
emphasis on institutions, non-governmental organizations and
small enterprises suspected of having ties to Islamic
terrorism. It has also strengthened its coordination with
justice and security officials. Within the European Union,
France plays an active role in the Clearinghouse, the EU,s
terrorism financing coordination body. France has designated
as terrorist groups those that appear on the EU list of
terrorist organizations. France has not designated
Hamas-affiliated charities, such as the French-based Comite
de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, arguing that
they have no proven links to terrorism. France also opposes
EU designation of Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist
organization, though it supports Hizballah's eventual
disarmament, which the GoF maintains will be the result of
Hizballah's gradual integration into Lebanese politics.
French authorities consistently condemn terrorist acts and
have made no public statements in support of a
terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism issue.
Nevertheless, France, along with its EU partners, retains
diplomatic relations with all of the governments designated
as state sponsors of terrorism, with the exception of North
Korea. It continues to cooperate closely with the United
States in pressing for the implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1559, which targeted Syrian domination of
Lebanon and called for the dismantlement of armed groups and
militias in Lebanon (including Hizballah) and extension of
Lebanese government control throughout Lebanese territory, to
include areas under the de facto control of Hizballah.
French and Spanish authorities have jointly made significant

progress in combatting Basque separatist groups, including
the ETA. French-Spanish investigative teams focusing on
al-Qaida-related groups and Basque separatist groups continue
to function. In the first use of the EU arrest warrant for
terrorism, French authorities extradited ETA suspect Unai
Berrosteguieta Eguiara to Spain on February 18.
DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES
France is perhaps best known for its counterterrorism police

forces and judiciary. Within the Ministry of Interior, the
DST (internal security service), RG (police intelligence),
DNAT (counterterrorism brigade) and Brigade Criminelle
(criminal investigations) all play important roles in French
counterterrorism work. A number of organizations coordinate
the activities of the counterterrorist forces, including
UCLAT (a counterterrorism coordination unit with the Ministry
of Interior), the SGDN (attached to the office of the Prime
Minister) and the Council for Internal Security (attached to
the office of the President.) Although there is little
legislative oversight of intelligence and security agencies,
Interior Minister Sarkozy proposed in late November the
creation of an oversight working group that will include
members of French intelligence and legislators. Sarkozy
promised to submit a draft law on this issue by February 15,
¶2006.
The counterterrorism section of the Paris Prosecutor,s

office usually leads the French government,s terrorism
investigations. Investigative judges, who in the French
system combine prosecutorial and judicial powers, concentrate
on Islamic/international terrorism, Basque/ETA terrorism and
terrorism linked to Corsican separatist groups. Their
mandate is extensive, and includes terrorist acts on French
soil and acts abroad that affect French citizens. Their
powers are substantial and they are given wide freedom to
investigate. They cooperate closely with French police and
security services. In March, then-Justice Minister Dominique
Perben announced the hiring of four additional terrorism
investigating judges, along with additional support staff,
bringing the number of specialized terrorism investigating
judges to nine.
French police and intelligence services within the Interior

Ministry have extensive powers of surveillance, monitoring
and detention. These powers were enhanced with the 2004
passage of the Perben II law and include expanded detention
(up to four days before charges must be brought), more
authority for police to go undercover, warrants for searches
at night, more leeway in granting document searches, and
increased authority to wiretap. These expanded powers are to
be used only in cases that involve investigation of
organizations "that imperil society," such as the mafia, drug
traffickers and terrorist organizations. Even if government
authorities are found to have misused their new powers, any
evidence they have found would still be accepted in court.
The French government continues its policy of expulsions for

non-French citizens engaged in activities that promote hate.
Interior Minister Sarkozy stated in August that France was
monitoring dozens of radical imams. He also announced
October 4 that 19 Islamic extremists had been expelled from
France since the beginning of the year; 102 have been
expelled since 2002. In March, the CSA, France,s
FCC-equivalent, ordered the Eutelstat satellite company to
cease transmitting Sahar 1, an Iranian television station,
because of its anti-Semitic and hate-filled broadcasting.
Following the CSA,s banning of Hizballah-affiliated Al-Manar
satellite television, Hizballah deputies lobbied the French
government in 2005 to lift the ban. Separately, the Conseil
d,Etat, France,s highest administrative court, is reviewing
an appeal by Al-Manar to reinstate its broadcasting license.
France remains worried over the rise of radical Islam.

According to a November 12 press report, the RG, France,s
police intelligence service, kept 350 places under
surveillance (including 42 Islamic prayer halls and 300
businesses) during the first seven months of 2005 because of
suspicions of radical Islamist activity. The RG estimates
that, of the approximately 5 million Muslims in France,
200,000 are practicing and of that number, between 5,000 and
9,000 are linked to extremist causes.
French officials are also concerned regarding the role of

prisons in converting petty criminals to jihadism. Prisons
served as a center of recruitment for the Safe Bourrada
terror network (dismantled in late September, see below).
According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Justice
in September, 358 people are imprisoned for terrorism; 159
are Basque-related, 94 are Islamic extremists and 76 are
Corsica-related. France has proposed several measures to
address Islamic extremism in prisons, including the
establishment of a corps of moderate Muslim prison chaplains.
The July bombings in London caused many French officials to

reexamine their counterterrorism capabilities. In addition
to the initial reaction of elevating the Vigipirate alert
system and coordinating closely with British officials, the
French government soon proposed a new counterterrorist bill
that calls for increasing video surveillance in public areas,
allowing police more access to phone and Internet records,
and more closely monitoring international travel by ship,
rail and plane.
Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up
to 96 hours before charges are filed. The new bill making
its way through the legislature proposes extending the
96-hour period an additional 48 hours, for a maximum total
detention of 144 hours. Suspects can be held for up to three
and a half years in pretrial detention while the
investigation against them continues. Other proposed
measures in the bill include increasing the maximum penalty
for association with a terrorist enterprise from 10 to 20
years in prison, and increasing the maximum penalty for
terrorist enterprise organizers from 20 to 30 years in
prison. The National Assembly approved the bill in late
November. The Senate is expected to take up discussion of
the bill in December, with probable approval in January 2006.
Another reaction to the July bombings in London was a

decision by the French government to encourage the heads of
its domestic intelligence agencies - RG and the DST - to take
on more public roles, in order to sensitize the public to the
threat of terrorism. In a related action, the French
government, in coordination with a local think-tank, opened a
public website focused on the details of past terrorist acts,
at https://bdt.frstrategie.org
French police and security officials conducted a large-scale

exercise in November that simulated multiple chemical attacks
throughout Paris. Local prefectures, especially Paris, have
instituted PRM, a French acronym for "plan red - multiple"
that focuses attention on the prospect of multiple attacks,
either simultaneous or sequential. A similar large-scale
chemical attack simulation took place May 9 in the Val
d,Oise region. In addition, the Paris Prefecture has
created a specialized NRBC unit of firefighters.
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORIST ACTIONS - 2005
On January 26, French police arrested eleven people (three of

whom were eventually charged with terrorism conspiracy) in
Paris, 19th arrondissement for reportedly recruiting young
French residents to launch terrorist attacks in Iraq. It was
the first arrest since the opening in September 2004 of an
investigation by the Paris Prosecutor,s office into
"jihadists to Iraq." French intelligence, security and
judicial authorities have consistently identified the
conflict in Iraq as an attractive force for French jihadists.
French officials stated in November that 22 young people had
left for Iraq, and at least seven had been killed there,
including two suicide bombers.
Djamel Beghal, the ringleader of a group arrested in 2001 on

suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, was
convicted March 15 of "terrorist conspiracy," and received a
maximum 10-year sentence. His five accomplices were all
found guilty as well, and received sentences ranging from one
year to nine years in prison.
The last three French nationals detained at Guantanamo were

transferred to French custody on March 7, following the
transfer of four nationals in 2004. France released Mustaq
Ali Patel in March and Imad Kanouni in July. The other five
remain in pretrial detention and may be charged with
terrorist conspiracy. The former Guantanamo detainees,
detention has withstood multiple appeals by defense lawyers.
France has been one of the most aggressive and proactive
countries in prosecuting its citizens formerly held by the
U.S. at Guantanamo.
On April 24, French police in Paris arrested Said

al-Maghrebi, an Afghanistan training camp veteran, on
suspicion of organizing potential jihadists to fight in Iraq.
Four others reportedly belonging to al-Maghrebi,s network
were arrested in Paris and Marseilles. Two were later
released.
A French court on May 16 declared five people guilty of
organizing logistic support for the suicide bombers who
assassinated Afghan Commander Ahmad Sheikh Massoud on
September 9, 2001. The five were sentenced to between two
and nine years imprisonment.
On May 20, a Paris court condemned Corsican nationalist

Charles Pieri to 10 years in prison for terrorism finance
conspiracy and extortion.
French police arrested Hamid Bach on June 21 in the city of

Montpellier on suspicions of organizing a terrorist ring
focused on attacking targets in France and sending potential
jihadists to Iraq.
French police arrested 9 people in late September on

suspicion of belonging to a terrorist group. According to
press reports, the group, reportedly led by GSPC sympathizer
and convicted terrorist Safe Bourrada, was in the initial
phases of planning terrorist attacks against targets in
France, including the Paris Metro, Orly airport and the
headquarters of the DST, France,s internal security service.
Four more suspected members of the Bourrada network were
arrested in early October.
On November 29, French police arrested six people suspected

of financing extremist and terrorist causes. One of them was
a prison guard and two were former Islamic chaplains. The
group reportedly had visited Bosnia and attempted to recruit
jihadists to Iraq. The group belonged to the fundamentalist
Tabligh movement.
British authorities transferred Rashid Ramda to French

custody on December 1. Ramda is the suspected financier of
the 1995 GIA attacks in the Saint-Michel RER train station,
the Musee d,Orsay RER train station and the Maison-Blanche
metro station. Ramda had been in British custody for the
last ten years, and his extradition to France removes a major
irritant in French-British relations.
On December 12, French police arrested approximately 25

people, in the largest terror-related sweep in Europe since
the aftermath of the Madrid bombings in 2004. Those arrested
are suspected of involvement with terrorist financing. The
reported ringleader is Ouassini Cherifi, a French-Algerian
who had spent time in prison for passport fraud. French
police suspect he, like Safe Bourrada, recruited low-level
criminals to his network while in prison.
Judicial investigations following the arrests in 2003 of

German national Christian Ganczarski and Moroccan national
Karim Mehdi continued in 2005. Ganczarski and Mehdi, who are
suspected of ties to al-Qaida, remain in pretrial detention
in France.
The judicial investigation into the activities of six

suspected members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
(GICM) arrested in 2004 continues. The six suspects are
being held in pretrial detention and are thought to have
provided logistical support to those who committed the
attacks against Madrid trains on March 11, 2004.
Investigations into the "Chechen network," a loose grouping

that is reported to have links with the Beghal network and
the Frankfurt network (which attempted in 2000 to attack
cultural sites in Strasbourg, including the cathedral) have
concluded, although a trial date for those arrested has not
been set. Members of the Chechen network reportedly were
interested in using chemical agents to commit terrorist
attacks. Several suspected members of the Chechen network
were arrested in France in 2005.
Corsica continues to experience low-level terrorist

activities. Recent attacks have occurred against peoples of
North African ancestry. The FLNC Union of Combatants claimed
responsibility for firing a rocket on September 29 at the
prefecture in Ajaccio. The rocket attack did not cause any
injuries, although it exploded a few meters from where the
prefect and a receptionist were working.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton
Viewing cable 05PARIS8462, COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON ALLEGATIONS OF

SECRET
Discussing cables
150613Z Dec 05
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015

TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR FR EUN
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON ALLEGATIONS OF SECRET
DETENTION CENTERS AND RENDITIONS
REF: A. STATE 221655
¶B. PARIS 8313

¶C. STATE 219905
¶D. STATE 220071
¶E. PARIS 7785
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso

ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Council of Europe Secretary General Davis

warned the Ambassador December 12, citing NATO
"unresponsiveness" to repeated written queries, that he
intended soon "to go public" with respect to the alleged use
of KFOR-run detention centers in Kosovo for secret CIA secret
prisons (this despite the fact that French NATO officers
present at the scene have categorically rejected the
allegations). On renditions, Davis took a more discreet
approach, saying that this was an issue the CoE's
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), not its SYG, was addressing;
he added that in fact this was a matter between the COE and
individual member states rather than between the COE and the
U.S. PACE President Rene van der Linden and investigator
Dick Marty have taken a confrontational approach in advance
of a January 23-27 plenary session, publicly stirring the pot
in member states by provocatively accusing the U.S. of
withholding information. End summary.
Kosovo:Access to Alleged secret detention center

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (C) During a December 12 meeting with the Ambassador,

Council of Europe (COE) Secretary General Terry Davis
complained of what he described as continued NATO
unresponsiveness to COE requests for access to KFOR-run
detention centers in Kosovo. He claimed he had sent seven
separate letters to NATO SYG de Hoop Sheffer, none of which
had elicited a satisfactory response. Davis described Kosovo
as a "black hole" for the COE Committee on the Prevention of
Torture, notwithstanding the fact that the COE charter gives
the organization the right to visit any detention place in
member states. Given NATO's obsructionism, Davis told the
Ambassador -- "as a courtesy," he said -- that he would have
no/no choice but to "go public" over the issue in early 2006.
¶3. (C) Davis concluded that others, but not he, had begun to
"connect the dots" and were speculating that Kosovo might be
a site for secret CIA prisons free from international
scrutiny. We note that on November 26, Le Monde carried an
article in which the COE's Human Rights Commissioner, Alvaro
Gil-Robles, is reported as claiming that a September 2002
visit to Camp Bondsteel had given him the impression that it
may have served as a detainee camp. This story was rebutted
the following day in Le Figaro and Le Monde by the French
general who was in charge of KFOR at the time, who stated
that all interrogations of suspects at Bondsteel had been
conducted in the presence of NATO -- that is to say, French
-- officers.
Renditions
----------
¶4. (C) On the renditions issue more broadly, Davis noted that
PACE President van der Linden and investigator Marty, rather
than he, were addressing the matter for the COE. He assured
the Ambassador that he personally viewed the question as one
between the COE and its member states, not between the CoE
and the U.S. Davis noted that the COE had asked European
member state governments, in light of allegations of secret
prisons, whether they were in any way involved.
¶5. (C) Van der Linden and Dick Marty, for their part,
continue to seek to keep the issue alive. Marty declared to
the press December 13 that he found the allegations of U.S.
renditions credible, even if he allowed that it was still too
early "to assert that there had been any involvement or
complicity of (CoE) member states in illegal actions.". He
publicly chastised the U.S. for failing to provide any
"information or explanations," putting aside any mention of
the Secretary's December 5 statement on the controversy (ref
c), which was provided to Marty under a cover letter from
Ambassador Stapleton on December 7.
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) For any number of reasons, including some that may
have more to do with institutional rivalries rather than the
issue at hand, van der Linden and Marty appear to have
decided to take a much more confrontational, public approach
than Davis on the renditions issue. The result is that,
whatever their motivations, the renditions issue appears
likely to stay on the front burner. The PACE Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights announced December 13 that it
will ask the PACE to schedule debate on the issue at the
January 23-27 plenary session. End Comment.

Stapleton
Viewing cable 05PARIS8606, AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KEY SARKOZY

ADVISOR FRANCOIS
Discussing cables
2005-12-22 2010-11-30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL Embassy
05PARIS8606
12:12 21:09 USE ONLY Paris
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SOCI FR EUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KEY SARKOZY ADVISOR FRANCOIS
FILLON
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Sarkozy advisor and former Education

Minister Francois Fillon told the Ambassador December 20 that
Sarkozy had a chance to buck the French predisposition to
vote against the ruling party in 2007 by focusing his
presidential campaign on the electorate's deep-seated desire
for real "change." Fillon argued that the victor in 2007
would need to make the presidency more personally accountable
and involved in explaining government policy to the populace.
The EU, in Fillon's opinion, is struggling under the weight
of new members, and it was time to bring the UK into the
Franco-German union in order to move the body forward.
Fillon believed transatlantic relations would be more cordial
under a Sarkozy presidency; although disagreements would
certainly arise, they would be handled in a more nuanced
manner. Fillon elaborated on Sarkozy's plan to improve the
French economy through welfare reform and greater flexibility
for businesses, and offered his own views on needed changes
for the French education system. End Summary.
2007 Elections
--------------
¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met December 20 with Francois
Fillon, former Minister of Education (2004-2005) and Social
Affairs, Labor, and Solidarity (2002-2004) in the Raffarin
government, who was named in July 2005 to be the Political
Counselor to Nicolas Sarkozy in his role as president of the
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). Fillon noted the
instability of the French Fifth Republic compared to the
governments of Germany and the UK, and commented that the
French electorate always voted for change. This suggested
that the Socialist Party (PS) should logically win in 2007,
but Sarkozy had a chance because he was a strong proponent
for change, whereas the PS had turned into a party of
"restoration" of the status quo ante. He insisted that most
French voters really do want change, although he conceded
that they are also afraid of losing what they have. Chirac
always erred on the side of French fears rather than a desire
for change and Villepin's big liability would be that he is
seen as a continuation of Chirac. Sarkozy, by contrast, was
betting that people really wanted reform.
¶3. (SBU) Fillon believed that Sarkozy would remain in the

government until January of 2007, when the UMP would
officially nominate its presidential candidate, at which time
he would break with Chirac/Villepin to run for the
presidency. He said that Chirac and Villepin would do
everything possible in the meantime to trip him up. The
recent unrest in the suburbs had not hurt Sarkozy, Fillon
noted, because he was seen as taking action on the issue.
Fillon did not foresee a cohabitation government, saying,
"The people will choose a president and give him a majority"
in Parliament.
Institutional Reform
--------------------
¶4. (SBU) Elaborating on his statement that the French Fifth
Republic is inherently "unstable," Fillon said there was a
need to move to a presidential system in which the president
would have to take a more active role in explaining the
government's actions to the people and the parliament. (The
only such public appearance by Chirac was his disastrous Town
Hall-style appearance in early May in favor of the EU
Constitution.) While there were also arguments in favor of a
more parliamentary system, Fillon said that it would be
impossible to convince the French electorate to abandon the
election of a president by universal suffrage. Nor was in
possible any longer for the president to remain above the
fray, he said, then blame everything on the PM. The move to
a five-year presidential term of office had reinforced this
trend. He characterized what he said was a PS plan to weaken
the powers of the presidency in favor of the prime minister
as "unrealistic."
The EU
------
¶5. (SBU) The EU currently suffered from a lack of direction
and leadership, Fillon said. He explained that enlargement
was the main problem, which made it difficult to take
decisions efficiently. "We can hardly express ourselves in
meetings" with 25 members, he lamented, since there was no
time to take the floor more than once. In order to move the
EU forward, Fillon saw a need to expand the Franco-German
"couple" into a Franco-Germano-British "menage a trois." His
basic point was that it was hollow to think that Europe could
progress without the UK. He saw the emergence of Angela
Merkel as positive, while commenting that Chirac was trying
to make his relationship with her appear closer than it was
in the vane of the mythical Franco-German tandem. Returning
to his analysis of the French electorate, Fillon argued that
the May 29 French referendum vote was not a rejection of
change or Europe, but in fact a vote for a more radical
overhaul of the system. This coincided with the tendency of
the French to vote against the current government, which had
backed the EU Constitution. However, Fillon conceded this
was his interpretation, and that it was difficult at the
moment to accurately draw conclusions from the referendum
vote.
U.S.-French Relations
---------------------
¶6. (SBU) Fillon thought a Sarkozy government would better be
able to work together with the U.S., and be less overtly
critical and more nuanced in its public statements. Under
Sarkozy, he continued, disagreements would not as easily lead
to blow-ups with close and vital allies. At the same time,
he cautioned, this would not change the very real
anti-American sentiments of some parts of the French
populace. In response to the Ambassador's comment that
France is perceived as an obstacle to U.S. ambitions for
NATO, Fillon noted that there needed to be a better balance
in NATO between Europe and the U.S. First, however, he said
that Europeans themselves needed to be clearer about their
priorities. Separately, Fillon noted that Sarkozy did not
necessarily see the need for high levels of defense spending.
Economy
-------
¶7. (SBU) On economic issues, Fillon called for fusing
welfare with unemployment so that the unemployed would be
more compelled to take jobs they were offered. He noted that
a Sarkozy economic system would push for more flexibility for
businesses and a simplification of the work codes. He also
advocated breaking the power of unions, including requiring
that elections be held every several years with open
candidacies.
Education
---------
¶8. (SBU) Fillon spoke at length about giving schools more
autonomy (citing this as yet another area where Europe was
falling behind), but stopped short of recommending
decentralization. He criticized the burdensome bureaucracy
of the education system and lamented that the short time that
leaders remain in power limited their ability to effect
change. Increasing immigration required adaptation of the
system, but France had avoided such adjustments. He thought
universities should become independent, and that communes
should assume more responsibility for early education. He
talked about using limited resources for overtime pay for
those teachers willing and most able.
Comment
-------
¶9. (SBU) Fillon came across as a seasoned, non-dogmatic, and
serious political figure. He appeared pragmatic,
forthcoming, accessible, and open to continued dialogue. He
has commented publicly on his disappointment at not being
included in the Villepin government because of his support of
Sarkozy. Fillon is among Sarkozy's closest advisors, and is
considered a potential prime ministerial candidate should
Sarkozy be elected president in 2007. End Comment.

Stapleton
Viewing cable 06CARACAS219, CUBA/VENEZUELA AXIS OF MISCHIEF:

THE VIEW FROM
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06CARACAS219.
06CARACAS219 2006-01-30 19:07 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Caracas
VZCZCXRO6607
PP RUEHAO
DE RUEHCV #0219/01 0301912
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301912Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2920
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5901
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5109
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1580
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 9782
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1652
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0351
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 1276
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0396
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 3007
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0300
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0532
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0769
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3525
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0525
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0971
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3222
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0914
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0543
RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 2777
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0420
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 CARACAS 000219
SIPDIS
SECRET NOFORN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 01/26/2021

TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: CUBA/VENEZUELA AXIS OF MISCHIEF: THE VIEW FROM
CARACAS
REF: A. A: HAVANA 00118

¶B. B: HAVANA 00697
¶C. C: TD-314/63777-05 LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
¶D. D: IIR 6 902 9698 06
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S//NF) As noted in REF A, the Venezuelan relationship

with Cuba continues to intensify. Thousands of personnel
sent by the Cuban Government are involved in the Venezuelan
health sector and other BRV social missions. Cubans
cooperate extensively with Venezuelan intelligence services.
Cubans may also participate heavily in the BRV's efforts to
naturalize foreigners and provide documentation for citizens,
according to various reports from Embassy contacts. Cubans'
roles in the military are less clear but probably are also
less significant.
¶2. (C) Venezuelans' views of individual Cubans are mixed.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez appears to be trying to
promote the involvement of Cubans in Venezuelan society,
although he has proceeded slowly and carefully. Anti-Chavez
politicians have barked up the wrong tree by decrying Cuban
communism and sovereignty violations, issues that simply do
not resonate with poor Venezuelans. While the economic
impact of Cubans working in Venezuela may be limited, Cuban
intelligence has much to offer to Venezuela's anti-U.S.
intelligence services. End Summary.
----------------
How Many Cubans?
----------------
¶3. (S) Although the numbers of Cubans sent by the GOC to

work in Venezuela are significant, the exact figures are
difficult to establish. Embassy officers have noted regular
flights of Cubans--or Venezuelans returning from official
visits to Cuba--at Caracas's Maiquetia airport. According to
a DOD analysis of flight activity, an average of about 350
people arrive on three to five commercial or military flights
from Cuba to Venezuela per day. Most of these flights land
at Maiquetia, but Barcelona and Maracaibo are also common
destinations. Post cannot determine how many Cubans are on
the flights or how many passengers stay in Venezuela
permanently. Airport officials spirit passengers through the
building without stopping in customs or immigration. ONIDEX,
Venezuela's National Office of Identification and
Immigration, reports that it naturalized only 12 Cubans out
of a group of 22,664 persons naturalized in December 2005.
Whether or not they enjoy Venezuelan citizenship, however,
thousands of Cubans have Venezuelan documentation. In
addition to the over 20,000 Cubans involved in the Venezuelan
health sector (see below), less reliable reports indicate
that thousands more are active in the Venezuelan interior.
Manuel Rosales, the opposition Governor of Zulia State, told
the DCM in October 2005 that 20,000 Cubans resided in Zulia
alone. Former National Assembly deputy Pedro Pablo Alcantara
(Accion Democratica) told us in October that Lara State had
the most Cubans per capita in Venezuela. He claimed more
flights from Havana arrived in Barquisimeto, Lara than in
CARACAS 00000219 002 OF 006
Caracas. Complicating the matter further are some 30,000

Cuban exiles in Venezuela, the Cuban exile NGO Net for Cuba
estimates.
------
Health
------
¶4. (C) The BRV created Mision Barrio Adentro (Inside the
Neighborhood Mission) to provide basic health care for
disadvantaged neighborhoods in December 2003, shortly after
signing a bilateral agreement with Cuba to swap oil for
medical services. As of mid-2005, about 21,000 Cuban
physicians, nurses, and support staff along with some 6,000
Venezuelan personnel staffed the mission, according to the
Ministry of Communication. Mission clinics are small,
two-story hexagonal structures that also house two to three
doctors. The BRV provides the clinics' equipment and
reduced-cost medicines. Through Barrio Adentro, the BRV
identifies patients eligible for Mision Milagro (Miracle
Mission), which flies Venezuelans to Havana for cataract
surgery. Anecdotal reporting suggests the care Cuban doctors
provide is often lacking and that many "physicians" are
actually medical students. The BRV has recently begun Mision
Barrio Adentro II, a network of more advanced diagnostic
centers and inpatient clinics to be administered and staffed
mostly by Venezuelans.
¶5. (C) Notwithstanding the 90,000 to 100,000 barrels of oil

Venezuela provides Cuba per day on barter terms, Cuban
doctors earn relatively little. According to press reports,
Cuban doctors receive salaries of up to USD 400 per month, a
figure slightly lower than local averages. A Cuban physician
told Post's medical advisor, however, that he received room,
board, and toiletries but that the Cuban Government was
"holding" his salary until he finished his two-year tour.
Some Cuban doctors have "deserted" and fled. A European
diplomat told polcouns in mid-January 2006 that the number of
Cuban asylum requests received by EU missions in Venezuela
had increased over the past few months. A local legislator
with extensive contacts in poor neighborhoods told us in
November 2005 that Cuban doctors complained bitterly that the
Cuban regime held their families hostage while the doctors
relied on local donations to survive. In contrast, according
to REF B, the GOC receives from Venezuela between USD 1,000
to 5,000 for each Mision Milagro cataract operation, which is
comparable to the roughly USD 3,500 that a Venezuelan private
clinic would charge for the procedure.
------------
Intelligence
------------
¶6. (S//NF) Sensitive reports indicate Cuban and Venezuelan

intelligence ties are so advanced that the two countries'
agencies appear to be competing with each other for the BRV's
attention. Cuban intelligence officers have direct access to
Chavez and frequently provide him with intelligence reporting
unvetted by Venezuelan officers. Venezuela's Directorate of
Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP), moreover, may
be taking advice from Cuban intelligence on the formation of
a new intelligence service (REF C). Cuban intelligence
officers train Venezuelans both in Cuba and in Venezuela,
providing both political indoctrination and operational
CARACAS 00000219 003 OF 006
instruction. They also may work in other Venezuelan

government ministries, unconfirmed sensitive reporting
suggests.
--------
Military
--------
¶7. (C) Post has received no credible reports of extensive

Cuban involvement in the Venezuelan military, despite the
Venezuelan Armed Forces' attempts to imitate Cuban military
doctrine and uniforms. According to DAO reports, Cubans
train and advise Chavez' military security detail.
Anti-Chavez military officers have told us that Cubans hold
liaison and personnel exchange positions within the
Venezuelan military formerly held by European and other Latin
American officers. Moreover, a few Venezuelan military
officers--along with some from the Foreign Ministry--undergo
ideological training in Cuba. Chavez has also sent a
military team to Cuba construct a complex of 150 houses,
according to press reports.
--------------
Other Sectors?
--------------
¶8. (S//NF) Cuban involvement in other agencies and missions

is harder to confirm. Cubans have been heavily involved in
ONIDEX, according to various unconfirmed sources. A local
academic with a background in electoral systems told poloff
that Venezuelans trained in Cuba helped expand the national
electoral registry by over two million voters through Mision
Identidad (Identity Mission) in 2003. He added that the
Venezuelan process to receive an identity card was a carbon
copy of the Cuban process. Anti-Chavez military officers
told us in July 2005 that Cubans helped run ONIDEX and
reported that an active duty army colonel was running an
operation to print identity cards for Cubans. According to
an Embassy employee with access to secure areas of Caracas'
Maiquetia airport, Cubans hold supervisory positions at the
airport's auxiliary terminal. Cubans also have established
and continue to service the airport's biometrics equipment,
according to sensitive reports. Some anecdotal sensitive
reporting further suggests Cuban officials had a Venezuelan
officer dismissed for resisting their attempts to take
temporary operational control over a section of the airport
during a visit of Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
¶9. (C) Ruben Flores, the editor of a rancher newspaper,

told poloff in early 2005 that Cuban involvement in the
agricultural sector was second only to that in the health
sector. Such a claim may be exaggerated, but Cubans are
likely involved to a great extent. According to the
Agricultural Attache, Cuban officials hold senior positions
in the Ministry of Agriculture and also operate in the
Venezuelan interior. Citing technical experts in the
Ministry, Flores told us in January 2006 that Cuban officials
were helping design Venezuela's "Planting Plan 2006," which
would prescribe the crops to be sown in each region. Jaime
Perez Branger, head of the company that owns cattle ranch and
nature preserve Hato Pinero, told us in January that Cubans
advised the BRV on agricultural productivity and on setting
up cooperatives in such missions as Vuelvan Caras. (Vuelvan
Caras, or "About Face," is a BRV program offering six months
CARACAS 00000219 004 OF 006
of job training, after which participants form cooperatives,

often in the agricultural sector.) Venezuela, South
America's only net importer of agricultural products, is also
setting up Cuban sugar mills in Venezuela in the wake of
Cuba's failing sugar industry.
¶10. (C) Industry contacts have told the Agricultural

Attache that Cubans helped design and manage Mision Mercal,
the BRV's subsidized grocery program. An Arthur D. Little
consultant told us in February 2005 that a Cuban vice
minister of commerce works with Mercal full-time. Flores
told poloff in January 2006 that ALIMPORT, Cuba's agency that
handles all food imports, was advising the BRV on food
distribution. Venezuela finances some of its own food
imports through a Havana branch of the Industrial Bank of
Venezuela, and Chavez' brother Adan Chavez, the Venezuelan
Ambassador there, may profit illicitly from the loan process,
according to DAO reporting (REF D).
--------------------------
Venezuelan Views of Cubans
--------------------------
¶11. (SBU) Cuban citizens' resentment of Venezuelans (REF A)

is not completely mutual. Some Venezuelans, including many
who experienced the infiltration of violent Cuban
revolutionaries during the 1960s, do dislike Cubans. The
average Venezuelan's view of Cubans, however, is more
nuanced. Some poor Venezuelans admire Cubans involved in the
missions for providing free services. Others, while
disapproving of their political system, appreciate Cuban
culture displayed by individual Cubans, especially those
among the exile community.
¶12. (SBU) Chavez appears to be trying to promote a friendly

image of Cubans. Cubans have appeared increasingly on public
television, including on Chavez' "Alo Presidente" show.
Images of crossed Cuban and Venezuelan flags have also begun
to appear in Caracas. The polling firm Datanalisis reports
that Chavez' recent attempts to "sell" the Cuban political
model may have increased Venezuelans' rejection of the Cuban
regime from May 2005 (63 percent) to October 2005 (81
percent). (Embassy note: Whether Chavez' promotion of Cuba
is paying off or backfiring is unclear. Answers to
Datanalisis' question, "what do you think of Venezuela taking
the Cuban regime as a model," may reflect a growing sense of
nationalism and uniqueness among Venezuelans--consistent with
Chavez' calls for a "new socialism"--rather than a rejection
of Cubans. Indeed, almost half of the Chavez supporters
polled, who would seem least likely to oppose Cuba, responded
negatively.)
¶13. (SBU) Despite the increasing publicity, signs of

Cuban-Venezuelan partnership in Caracas are not as ubiquitous
as they apparently are in Havana, and Cubans generally keep a
low profile. Chavez' sense of self-importance may partly
explain why Cuba figures less prominently. The "Bolivarian
Alternative for Latin America" is not a synonym for
Cuban-Venezuelan cooperation in Venezuela because Chavez
pitches it as a movement he has launched throughout the
hemisphere. Chavez features call-ins from Castro during his
public appearances, such as a mid-January 2006 sendoff for
Venezuelans going to study medicine in Cuba. Nonetheless,
Chavez does not part with the spotlight for long. His weekly
CARACAS 00000219 005 OF 006
"Alo Presidente" broadcasts routinely run longer than five

hours.
----------------------------
The Opposition Has Failed...
----------------------------
¶14. (C) Some of Chavez' opponents appear to be trying to

inflame a prejudice against Cubans that is uncommon among
Venezuelans. They rant about "Cuban invaders" and
"sovereignty violations" that resonate little with the
Venezuelan poor. Opposition politicians also berate Chavez
for attempting to introduce Cuban communism, although few
Venezuelans believe he will do so. Former opposition
National Assembly deputy Carlos Casanova (Socialdemocrata)
told poloff the public's response to the opposition was "look
around, this isn't communism, chico!" Still, over-the-top
critiques can impede focused criticism. Asked how the
opposition could exploit opposition to Chavez' oil "loans" to
Cuba, Accion Democratica's former international relations
secretary Alfredo Coronil replied to poloff that Cuba was
SIPDIS
planning to intervene in Africa after Venezuela, brushing
aside poloff's remark that Cuba could hardly still afford
adventurism on a Cold War scale.
¶15. (C) The political opposition does little to exploit

alleged medical malpractice in Mision Barrio Adentro or to
report on returning Mision Milagro patients' impressions of
Cuba. In fact, much of the opposition remains ignorant of
how such missions work because it does not reach out to poor
neighborhoods for the most part. One anti-Chavez retired
military officer, however, told poloff in June 2005 that
groups of Venezuelan doctors had begun treating people in
poor areas with the support of certain pharmacies. The scope
of the initiative is unclear.
-----------------------------------
...But Finally Getting the Picture?
-----------------------------------
¶16. (U) Primero Justicia (PJ) has been the only political
party to criticize Chavez consistently for his handouts to
other countries. Promising additional programs to
redistribute oil wealth, PJ presidential candidate Julio
Borges has asked the BRV to explain why ordinary Venezuelans
are not receiving the money sent to Cuba, according to press
reports. With the closure of the Caracas-La Guaira bridge,
other elements of the opposition are also beginning to
contrast BRV gifts abroad with problems at home. An internet
blog site has displayed the amounts spent on foreign
infrastructure next to photos of the crumbling bridge.
During its assembly in mid-January 2006, the Venezuelan
Episcopal Conference criticized grants and loans the BRV had
awarded overseas.
-------
Comment
-------
¶17. (C) The economic impact of Cubans in Venezuela is mixed

but limited. (Venezuelan subsidies to Cuba, on the other
hand, could eventually pose greater problems for the BRV
(SEPTEL).) By helping the BRV pad its voter rolls and
naturalize suspicious immigrants, Cubans are doing jobs that
CARACAS 00000219 006 OF 006
Venezuelan government personnel could and would do in their

absence. Cuban doctors, however, are treating communities
mostly unreached by Venezuelan health services. Venezuela
continues to purchase costly conventional weapons systems
despite the influence on paper of Cuba's "asymmetric" warfare
doctrine.
¶18. (S//NF) The impact of Cuban involvement in Venezuelan

intelligence could impact U.S. interests directly.
Venezuelan intelligence services are among the most hostile
towards the United States in the hemisphere, but they lack
the expertise that Cuban services can provide. Cuban
intelligence routinely provides the BRV intelligence reports
about the activities of the USG. Cuban dissemination of
ideological propaganda in Venezuela is less of a threat.
Chavez, the revolution's most effective proponent, still
appears to be involving Cubans in public discourse and BRV
projects with some discretion.
Viewing cable 06BRUSSELS524, SECSTATE LEGAL ADVISER ON WAR ON

TERROR
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06BRUSSELS524.
06BRUSSELS524 2006-02-15 17:05 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brussels
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000524
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DOD FOR HAYNES

NSC FOR WIEGMANN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016

TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SECSTATE LEGAL ADVISER ON WAR ON TERROR
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Secstate Legal Adviser John Bellinger met

with a comprehensive array of EU interlocutors in Brussels on
February 7-8 to discuss U.S. views on the legal framework for
the war on terrorism. He stressed that U.S. decisions on how
to deal with an unprecedented global terrorist threat had
been made after serious consideration of all legal and
political options, and that European officials must publicly
underline U.S.-EU solidarity in the fight against terror. On
Guantanamo detainees and Al Qaeda, Bellinger argued that the
U.S. was and is acting in the context of a new form of
international armed conflict, and that therefore, while the
Geneva Conventions do not fit this new situation well, the
rules of war provide a more appropriate framework than
domestic criminal law. He discussed European concerns about
the treatment of detainees. Bellinger also argued that
rendition is a vital tool against terror. Finally, he urged
the EU not to support a Cuban resolution at the UN Human
Rights Commission on Guantanamo. The EU response to the
visit was for the most part extremely positive, with the
Legal Adviser of the Austrian EU presidency underlining that
"the fight against terror is our (shared) struggle."
Europeans, however, remain concerned about protection issues.
END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------
COMPREHENSIVE SET OF MEETINGS
-----------------------------
¶2. (SBU) On February 7-8, Secretary of State Legal Adviser

John Bellinger met with a wide range of EU and member-state
officials, including Robert Cooper, Director-General for
Common Foreign and Security Policy at the EU Council
Secretariat; Jean-Claude Piris, the Director-General of the
SIPDIS
Legal Services of the EU Council Secretariat; Michel Petite,
Director-General of the Legal Services of the European
Commission; Jim Cloos, EU Council Secretariat Director for
Transatlantic Relations, Human Rights and UN; and Gijs de
Vries, EU Coordinator for the Fight Against Terrorism. The
visit was capped by a two-and-a-half-hour discussion with the
EU Legal Services Working Group (COJUR), comprising the MFA
Legal Advisers of the 25 EU member states, plus Commission
and Council Legal Services and Romanian and Bulgarian
observers.
--------------------------------------------
BASIC CONTEXT: UNPRECEDENTED GLOBAL CONFLICT
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Bellinger stressed that the situation in which the

U.S. and its allies find themselves is unprecedented -- faced
with thousands of Al Qaeda and associated terrorists around
the globe whose goal is to inflict mass casualties on
innocent civilians by any means possible. The legal
frameworks that are readily available, the Geneva Conventions
or domestic criminal law, do not fit this unprecedented
situation well. In this context, the USG has thought long
and hard about how best to prosecute the conflict thrust upon
it in a way that is politically and legally legitimate, and
the answer to the question of what the rules should be that
govern the war on terror is not an easy one.
------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH AL QAEDA
------------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) It is clear, Bellinger said, that the military

response against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan
following the September 11 attacks, an action covered by UNSC
Resolution 1373, is properly categorized as an international
armed conflict. The U.S. believes that the continuing
struggle against Al Qaeda remains a legal state of
international armed conflict. Al Qaeda has attacked, and
continues to attack, our ships, embassies, people, and
territory. Its leaders have explicitly declared war on us.
Therefore, the proper legal framework cannot be that of
domestic criminal law. Al Qaeda is not the same as domestic
European terrorist groups like the IRA or RAF because it is
global and operates outside the U.S. and across borders. It
is in effect a new manifestation on the battlefield, that of
"armies of terrorists." Conceptually, this is a military
conflict, not a police action to round up criminals. Most
detainees have been picked up by our armed forces on foreign
battlefields. Practically, these cases would be virtually
impossible for domestic courts to handle, since there are
rarely witnesses, statements, or forensic or documentary
evidence that would meet domestic standards. Accordingly,
the most appropriate framework would be the rules of
international armed conflict.
¶5. (SBU) It is important to note, Bellinger emphasized, the
distinction between the President's political statement that
we are part of a "war on terror" and the legal status of the
international armed conflict with Al Qaeda. When the
President speaks of the War on Terror after 9/11, he is
taking the position that we must all declare our opposition
to terrorism of any kind. The U.S. also believes, however,
that it has been and continues to be in a legal state of
armed conflict specifically with Al Qaeda.
----------------------------------------
DETAINEES COVERED BY GENEVA CONVENTIONS?
----------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Bellinger stressed that the current rules of

international armed conflict do not fit this unprecedented
situation very well. After 9/11, the U.S. carefully
considered whether and to what extent the Geneva Conventions
would apply. Article 2 of the Third Geneva Convention
declares that these conventions apply only between High
Contracting Parties. While Afghanistan was a High
Contracting Party, Al Qaeda is certainly not. In addition,
Article 4 dictates that a POW must be a soldier in a national
army, wear a uniform with marked insignia, carry arms openly,
and follow the laws and customs of war. Because the Taliban
did not meet any of these conditions, they are not covered as
POWs under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, Al Qaeda
members could not be considered "protected persons" under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth Convention defines
"protected persons" as civilians caught up in a conflict. Al
Qaeda was not caught up in, but rather initiated, the
conflict. Bellinger noted that privileges are given to POWs
under the Geneva Conventions for following the laws of war,
which are intended to protect civilians from harm. Al Qaeda
and the Taliban completely disregard the rules of war and
intentionally target civilians.
¶7. (SBU) If not covered as POWs or protected persons, what,

then, is the status of Al Qaeda and Taliban combatants?
Bellinger asserted that there is a clear gap between these
terms, and that the gap is intentional. Article 5 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, he notes, specifies that "spies and
saboteurs" are not granted rights and privileges under the
Geneva Conventions. This designation, "spies and saboteurs,"
is the designation in the Geneva Conventions that most
closely describes Al Qaeda terrorists. Thus, though they are
combatants, they are best defined as unlawful combatants who
do not have a right to any protections under the Geneva
Conventions. Bellinger also explained that the term
&unlawful combatant8 is not a new term but rather has been
used for many years in treatises and military manuals to
describe those who engage in combat, but in an unlawful
manner.
¶8. (SBU) Bellinger added that the U.S. response to Al Qaeda

attacks does not make members of Al Qaeda legitimate
combatants under the Geneva Conventions. Al Qaeda does not
follow the laws of war, and the fact that the U.S. is
fighting back in no way renders unlawful combatants
legitimate under the very laws they do not respect.
------------------------------------
STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) If the protections of the Geneva Conventions do not

apply, Bellinger said, there is the question of what rules
the U.S. is applying to detainees. Accordingly, to clarify
U.S. policy towards detainees President Bush issued a public
directive on February 7, 2002, titled "Humane Treatment of Al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees." This directive orders that all
detainees under the control of the Armed Forces be treated
humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
In addition, the U.S. remains bound by, and committed to, the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This includes
Article 4, which prohibits torture, and Article 3, which
prohibits transfers of persons to countries where there is
substantial likelihood that they will be tortured. Article 3
is applied on a case-by-case basis. A country's poor record
on human rights will raise a red flag, but not necessarily
entail a prohibition against transferring a detainee to that
country. Instead, in each individual case the U.S. seeks
assurances that the person involved will not be tortured, and
a transfer is only allowed if those assurances are deemed
credible. Regarding Article 16 of the Convention Against
Torture, which prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, the U.S. Senate expressed reservations during
ratification in 1995 because there was no definition of
"cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" in the Convention.
The Senate's reservation dictated that the U.S. would tie
this provision to the prohibitions of cruel and unusual
treatment in the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. Because these constitutional
amendments apply only to U.S. citizens in territories under
U.S. jurisdiction, the Department of Justice interpreted the
Senate reservation to mean that Article 16 applies only
inside the United States. Nonetheless, as Secretary Rice
said in December, as a matter of policy the U.S will treat
detainees in a manner consistent with these standards.
¶10. (SBU) Bellinger described recent U.S. legislation further

codifying the standards applied towards detainees. The
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, he explained, allows the
Armed Forces to use interrogation techniques listed in the
U.S. Army Field Manual. In addition, the McCain Amendment
codifies the prohibition of cruel, unusual and inhuman
treatment, as interpreted by the Senate in its reservation
concerning Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture, of
any detainee regardless of nationality or of where he is
being held. Also, the Graham-Levin Amendment allows
detainees to appeal the results of military commissions or
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (see para 12) to federal
courts, while limiting detainees' ability to file frivolous
habeas corpus suits in U.S. courts. Bellinger also explained
the President's signing statement, issued with his signature
of the McCain Amendment. Bellinger said the statement is in
keeping with customary presidential practice and does not
indicate any intention to ignore the law. Rather, the
statement explains how the President intends to interpret the
law consistent with the powers conferred upon him by the
Constitution. Bellinger pointed further to the public
statement released by the White House at the same time, which
demonstrates the President's commitment to upholding the
McCain Amendment.
--------------------------------
REGULAR REVIEW OF DETAINEE CASES
--------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) Bellinger then raised some of the more troubling

questions. For example, according to the rules of
international armed conflict, a nation may hold detainees
until the end of the conflict, when they no longer pose a
threat. How long, however, will the war against Al Qaeda
last? Can detainees be held indefinitely? What if some are
innocent? The U.S. recognizes that these are troubling
questions, but does not believe such questions could justify
a decision not to detain people who represent a danger to
American citizens. To deal with this problem at Guantanamo,
the U.S. has created an annual Administrative Review Board
process to determine, for each individual detainee, whether
that detainee should still be considered as in a state of war
with the U.S. This process has resulted in the release of
180 detainees and the transfer to other countries of 76,
leaving approximately 500 detainees left in Guantanamo. Of
those released, at least a dozen people are known to have
gone back to fighting against the United States.
¶12. (SBU) The question has also been raised as to the

possible innocence of Guantanamo detainees. As the Geneva
Conventions dictate, if there is any doubt about whether or
not an individual is a POW, there must be an Article 5
tribunal. Since Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters clearly did
not meet the conditions necessary to be granted POW status,
the President decided that Article 5 tribunals were not
necessary. In 2004, however, Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (CSRTs) were mandated by the Supreme Court. The
CSRT process goes beyond the brief tribunals required by
Article 5, providing each individual detainee with a full
review. These CSRTs have resulted in the determination that
there was not enough information upon which to hold a further
38 detainees.
----------
RENDITIONS
----------
¶13. (SBU) Bellinger pointed out that renditions have been

used for decades to detain terrorists and criminals who
cannot be extradited or otherwise detained or brought to
justice. He stressed that the United States does not conduct
"extraordinary" renditions for the purpose of torturing
suspects or transferring them to countries in which they will
be tortured. There are many circumstances in which a
rendition might be the best option. In all cases, renditions
are conducted in a manner consistent with international
obligations and the sovereignty of other states. The U.S.
would expect that states cooperating in rendition activities
would also do so in a manner consistent with their domestic
law.
¶14. (SBU) Bellinger sought to dispel allegations that

hundreds of people had been kidnapped from European streets.
He pointed out that there is no evidence for such
allegations, and that the United States respects the
sovereignty of European governments. On renditions, CIA
flights, and other intelligence operations, the U.S. will not
confirm or deny specific allegations, in order not to
compromise the confidentiality of intelligence operations as
such. Bellinger noted that denying five out of six such
allegations would in effect confirm the sixth. The U.S.
trusts that European governments will continue to follow the
same policy.
----------------------------------------
GUANTANAMO AT UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
----------------------------------------
¶15. (C) Some EU interlocutors expressed concern that some EU

member states would support a Cuban resolution against U.S.
actions in Guantanamo at the upcoming UN Human Rights
Commission, that might be modeled after a European Parliament
resolution on the subject. Bellinger warned that European
support for a Guanatanamo resolution would be a serious
setback to U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism, and give
the unacceptable impression that the EU was aligned with Cuba
against the U.S. EU Council Director-General for Common
Foreign and Security Policy, Robert Cooper, said some EU
member states might feel obliged to support the resolution
because they had agreed last year not to in return for U.S.
commitment to allow the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture,
Manfred Novak, to visit Guantanamo; now, the U.S. had gone
back on that agreement. Bellinger explained that the U.S.
had invited Novak to visit, but that Novak had chosen
publicly to reject the U.S. offer (to visit under normal
conditions, but not to able to interview individual
detainees, as only the ICRC may do that). Cooper said the
EU, having cooperated with the U.S. in resisting Chinese
attempts to impose conditions on visits of Special
Rapporteurs, was having difficulty justifying the U.S.
attempts to impose conditions on Novak's Guantanamo visit.
Both sides agreed that the U.S. and EU needed to consult
further in order to avoid a train wreck at the Human Rights
Commission on this.
------------------------------------
EUROPEAN REACTIONS POSITIVE FOR U.S.
------------------------------------
¶16. (C) COMMENT: By and large, Bellinger's European

interlocutors responded very positively to his visit. Their
questions were many and varied, and all of the meetings were
marked by vigorous but constructive discussion. It is clear
that many Europeans continue to believe that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions can be applied to enemy combatants, and
still afford the United States the flexibility it seeks. It
is also apparent that lingering concerns (fed by negative
public perceptions) remain about the treatment of detainees,
and protection against wrongful detentions. Some governments
remain focused on renditions, and the possibility that there
will be negative revelations that impact on them directly.
¶17. That said, the visit was very helpful in beginning to

dispel European misunderstandings and misgivings about our
pursuit of the war on terror. Continued engagement on these
issues is critical in the coming months to persuade EU
governments to stand more firmly and publicly in the face of
their public's concerns and suspicion regarding Guantanamo,
renditions, and the legality of U.S. actions against Al
Qaeda. The Austrian Chair of the COJUR meeting, Ferdinand
Trauttmansdorf, concluded the meeting with the following
message: "We leave this discussion with the notion that
America is carefully considering these difficult questions in
good faith." He said also that the fight against terror was
a burden shared by the EU, and that the U.S. has as much of a
right to ask questions of the EU, as the EU does of the U.S.
On the upcoming Human Rights Commission, urgent consultations
with the EU will be necessary to avert the possibility of EU
support for a Cuban Guantanamo resolution.
¶18. (U) This message has been cleared by Legal Adviser John
Bellinger.
Gray
Viewing cable 06MADRID293, SPAIN: CHIEF PROSECUTOR FORCED TO

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2006-02-03 2010-11-30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Embassy
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TAGS: PGOV PTER SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: CHIEF PROSECUTOR FORCED TO QUIT
¶1. (U) Attorney General Candido Conde Pumpido forced the

Chief Prosecutor of Spain's National Court, Eduardo
Fungairino, to step down for alleged mismanagement of
terrorism cases under his supervision. Fungairino, a
highly-respected 26-year veteran of the National Court, will
move to a position with the Supreme Court and retain a role
in terrorism cases. Fungairino's deputy, Jesus Santos, will
take over duties as Chief Prosecutor, at least on until a
successor is named. Conde Pumpido remonstrated Fungairino
for failing to secure Supreme Court confirmation of the
sentences of al-Qa'ida members convicted in September 2005
(thus allowing two terrorists to exit prison after having
served only half of their sentences) and for failing to push
for the completion of the 2004 Madrid train bombing
investigation. However, Fungairino's supporters claim that
the Zapatero government removed Fungairino because of his
strong opposition to a negotiated settlement with ETA,
negotiations that may require the cooperation of the National
Prosecutor's office.
¶2. (U) The story immediately developed political overtones,
with the Socialist-leaning "El Pais" running lengthy
descriptions of Fungairino's failings and incompetence and
serving as a platform for Conde Pumpido's version of events.
Conde Pumpido accused Fungairino of failing to consult with
colleagues and of dominating judicial relations with the U.S.
Department of Justice and with EU counterparts. The centrist
"El Mundo," which is strongly anti-ETA, ran a headline
declaring that Fungairino was a removed for impeding
government negotiations with ETA. "El Mundo" suggested that
Conde Pumpido decided to dismiss Fungairino because he had
blocked the banned ETA front group Batasuna from holding a
public meeting, despite hints from Zapatero that such a
meeting might be allowed in the interest of steering ETA
towards the political arena. The opposition Popular Party
and center-right judicial organizations rose to Fungairino's
defense, while center-left groups and Basque nationalist
organizations hailed the dismissal.
//EARLY RELEASE OF CONVICTED TERRORISTS//
¶3. (U) The main failure cited by Conde Pumpido - the early
release of convicted terrorists - is troubling, but
responsibility for the issue rests with several actors.
Under Spanish law, a detainee must be released after serving
half their maximum prison term if the sentences have not been
confirmed by the Supreme Court. The problem in this instance
is that many of the detainees in the Barakat Yarkas case were
held in pre-trial detention for nearly four years, time that
counts towards their sentences. Since many of those
convicted received jail terms of eight or fewer years (see
full listing in para 5), the half-way point came nearly
immediately after their September 2005 convictions, giving
the notoriously slow Spanish legal system little time to win
confirmation of the convictions by the Supreme Court. It was
up to both the Prosecutor's office and the Supreme Court to
shuttle the cases through, and they failed to do so in time
to prevent the release of two al-Qa'ida cell members. The
government is expected to move quickly now to prevent further
releases.
//COMMENT//
¶4. (SBU) The Embassy has enjoyed a close, collaborative

relationship with Fungairino for many years. While it is
true that he sometimes seemed to have difficulty delegating
responsibility, he was also seen as a key leader by many
Spanish prosecutors and a brilliant legal strategist. It
appears that his personal and political differences with
Conde Pumpido were the main cause of his removal, though the
inability to prevent the early release of the terrorist
convicts is difficult to defend. Regardless of the political
motives surrounding Fungairino's removal, his departure will
hurt U.S.-Spain judicial cooperation, at least in the short
term. Fungairino was a devoted anti-terrorism activist who
pursued close cooperation with the USG and with EU allies in
terrorism cases. One piece of good news is that Fungairino
will reportedly remain a member of the U.S.-Spain Bilateral
Counterterrorism Experts Working Group, where he has played a
positive role in smoothing over conflicts generated by
differences in the U.S. and Spanish judicial systems. Also,
Jesus Santos, Fungairino's temporary replacement, is well and
favorably known to the Embassy. However, this does not
outweigh the loss of so valuable an interlocutor in the
National Prosecutor's office.
//TERRORIST SENTENCES - POSSIBLE RELEASE DATES//
¶5. (U) Status of terrorists convicted in Barakat Yarkas case.

(NOTE: Half-way marks vary because pre-trial detention times
MADRID 00000293 002 OF 002
varied):
-- Said Chedadi - 8 year sentence. Released November 17

after completing half of his sentence.
-- Mohamed Najib Chaib - 8 year sentence. Released January 20.
-- Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas - 27 year sentence. Could be

released in May 2015.
-- Osama Darra - 11 year sentence. Could be released in June

¶2007.
-- Jasem Mahboule - 11 year sentence. Could be released in

June 2007.
-- Jose Luis Galan - 9 year sentence. Could be released in

August 2006.
-- Abdulla Khayata Kattan - 9 year sentence. Could be

released in July 2006.
-- Mohamed Zaher - 9 year sentence. Could be released in May

¶2006.
-- Abdalrahman Alarnot - 8 year sentence. Could be released

in March 2008.
-- Mohamed Needl Acaid - 8 year sentence. Could be released

in May 2006.
-- Sadik Meriziak - 8 year sentence. Could be released in

September 2007.
-- Abdulaziz Benyaich - 8 year sentence. Could be released

in November 2007.
-- Hassan al Hussein - 8 year sentence. Could be released in

September 2007.
-- Taysir Alony - 7 year sentence. Could be released in

March 2008.
-- Kamal Hadid Chaar - 7 year sentence. Could be released in

November 2006.
-- Mohamed Ghaleb Kalaye Zouaydi - 9 year sentence. Could be

released in October 2006.
-- Jamal Hussein Hussein - 7 year sentence. Could be

released in April 2008.
-- Dris Chebli - 6 year sentence. Could be released in June

¶2006.
AGUIRRE
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AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016

TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: EUR PDAS VOLKER'S FEB 3 MEETING WITH SARKOZY
ADVISOR AND FORMER INDUSTRY MINISTER PARTICK DEVEDJIAN
REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 6

¶B. 2006 AND PRIOR
(WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.CFM)

ns 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EUR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Kurt Volker reviewed on February 3 with Patrick Devedjian, a
former industry minister and key advisor to Interior Minister
Sarkozy, how a possible Sarkozy administration would likely
approach relations with the U.S. Devedjian said a Sarkozy
administration would make "economic gestures" in connection
with the reconstruction of Iraq to signal -- as much as
domestic French opinion would allow -- France's more active
association with U.S. goals in the region. Devedjian
acknowledged that a Sarkozy victory in 2007 is far from a
sure thing, while discounting Prime Minister de Villepin's
chances of pushing Sarkozy aside as leader of the
center-right governing party. Devedjian acknowledged that
the unexpectedly persistent popularity of Socialist Party
(PS) dark horse Segolene Royal (ref A) was an unforeseen
development that is forcing contenders of both left and right
to revisit their electoral calculations, even if he did not
believe she could win in the end. END SUMMARY.
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) "We will make economic gestures with regard to the
Iraq situation" is how Devedjian expressed what would be a
new French willingness, under a Sarkozy administration, to
more actively support U.S. goals in Iraq. Devedjian, evoking
the strand of anti-Americanism that persists in France and
the widespread public hostility to the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq, cautioned however that how much France might be able to
do along these lines depended on what would be "politically
possible" at the time. Devedjian did not specify what those
"economic gestures" might be. Comment: Increases in
development aid and, possibly further debt forgiveness, could
be what he had in mind. End Commentg.
¶3. (C) Devedjian used the phrase "Atlanticist and

communitarian" to describe Sarkozy's overall outlook, and to
distinguish it from that of Villepin, which is often
described as "nationalist and Republican." Devedjian
underlined that "we will not be ceding to an anti-American
campaign," notwithstanding the efforts of Sarkozy's opponents
to try and tar Sarkozy as pro-American. Devedjian made clear
that not only would the Sarkozy campaign not engage in any
outbidding of the opposition in anti-Americanism, but that it
would also make every effort to avoid "bringing the U.S. into
our domestic politics."
¶4. (C) In response to PDAS Volker's hope that, at NATO, a

Sarkozy victory might result in useful, operationally
consequential changes in French behavior, Devedjian lamented
that the French press and public "are not interested in
NATO." This has permitted President Chirac, he said, to
conduct French policy in NATO beyond public scrutiny, without
accountability for the consequences. Devedjian suggested
that French institutional reforms proposed by Sarkozy,
specifically, an NSC-like coordinating mechanism for foreign
policy and periodic reports by the president to the
parliament on current issues, could have the effect of
bringing France's NATO policy out of the shadows. This might
eventually lead to a more positive appreciation of NATO's
role by the French public.
LONG, UNCERTAIN ROAD TO 2007

----------------------------
¶5. (C) Getting to a Sarkozy administration in 2007, as
Devedjian soberly acknowledged, was far from a foregone
conclusion. Devedjian believed that Sarkozy's "type of
leadership" -- "the hands-on leadership" seen in Sarkozy's
successful, personal management of the security response to
the urban unrest that swept France last fall, along with the
"rupture" with past practice advocated by Sarkozy -- are what
the French people truly want. Devedjian specified that by
"rupture with the past," Sarkozy primarily means slimming
down a bloated and pervasive state that stifles growth by
taking too big a share of national wealth and which
undermines individual initiative and commercial innovation by
over-regulation of business activity. Devedjian underlined
that voters want "renewal," and he musingly volunteered that
PARIS 00000953 002 OF 003
"Sarkozy on the right, and Segolene (Royal) on the left" were

"the two candidates that would most respond to this desire
for change."
¶6. (C) Devedjian confidently dismissed the possibility of

Prime Minister de Villepin mounting a successful campaign to
replace Sarkozy as the candidate of the center-right in 2007.
Devedjian said that "Villepin and Sarkozy are in agreement"
that some sort of primary process should decide a single
nominee for their party, the UMP. Devedjian observed that
Villepin won't challenge Sarkozy for control of the party so
long as Sarkozy clearly benefits from both firm command of
the party and a healthy public image. He added that Villepin
"has always counted on Sarkozy's self-destruction -- which
he's been counting on in vain since 2002." Devedjian alluded
to Villepin's view that Sarkozy's personality -- somehow, not
presidential -- would in the long run work to shift the
support of the center-right to Villepin.
¶7. (C) Turning to the potential opposition to Sarkozy on the

center-left, Devedjian clucked at the long-running, confused
contentiousness in the Socialist Party (PS) over both who
will lead the party and what the party will stand for in
¶2007. In Devedjian's view, neither Party First Secretary
Francois Hollande nor any of the party's mainstream figures
are likely to make compelling candidates. Asked to assess
the option for the socialists of "bringing back Jospin" --
that is, unifying the divided PS under former Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin -- Devedjian declared that "Jospin isn't the
future, he's the past -- and that's not what voters are
looking for." As for the popular President of the
Poitou-Charentes Region, Segolene Royal, Devedjian said that,
despite her appeal to voters wanting change, "Segolene has no
chance" of winning the PS nomination.
¶8. (C) Devedjian pointed out that Royal had in preceding

days made statements in support of "Blairist" policies to
address some of France's economic problems. "The only other
Blairists in the PS are Kouchner and Bockel," Devedjian
summed up. (Note and comment: Former Health Minster Bernard
Kouchner and Mayor of Mulhouse Jean-Marie Bockel are the PS's
most outspoken "liberals." Adoption of anything resembling
their views is out of the question for the vast majority of
PS party members. Even so, Devedjian's inference is
disingenuous -- Royal is exceedingly popular among party
members. End note and comment.) Reflecting on how Royal's
popularity -- the emergence of her candidacy as a potentially
serious one -- has upset the calculations of contenders on
both left and right, Devedjian joked, "Now that she's wound
up and going, even Francois Hollande must realize she's not
going to quit at his, or anybody else's say so." (Note:
Royal and Hollande have been domestic partners for over 20
years. End Note.) Devedjian reprised the familiar refrain
that Royal's personality, allegedly both disagreeable and
brittle, is not up to carrying the weight of the presidency.
Implying that this unfitness for the job would become evident
in due time, Devedjian said that "Everybody who knows her
knows it, Francois Hollande most of all."
PARTICIPANTS
------------
¶9. (SBU) Devejian was accompanied by the UMP's Director for
International Affairs, Pascal Drouhaut and a staff assistant,
Marie-Celie Guillaume. PDAS Volker was accompanied by POl
M-C and PolOff. Devedjian and Volker parted agreeing to stay
in touch -- in particular, should Devedjian, Drouhaut or
other Sarkozy advisors travel to Washington in the near
future.
SARKOZY'S ADVISORS
------------------
¶10. (C) Sarkozy's inner circle of political allies and
advisors consists of Francois Fillon, Brice Hortefeux and
Patrick Devedjian. Hortefeux is currently Junior Minister
(for Territorial Collectivities) under Sarkozy at the
Interior Ministry. Fillon and Devedjian, who were members of
the government of Jean-Pierre Rafferin, were excluded from
the current Villepin government precisely because of their
closeness to Sarkozy. Under Rafferin, Fillon was Minister of
Education and Devedjian was Junior Minister for Industry.
Both now have positions in the UMP, and devote themselves
full-time to making Nicholas Sarkozy the next president of
France. Fillon tends to take the lead in the fashioning of
Sarkozy's policy proposals, while Devedjian tends to focus on
PARIS 00000953 003 OF 003
tactics for countering other contenders and on strategy for

getting the votes to win. Fillon is considered a likely
candidate for prime minister, with Devedjian at Justice or
Interior, should Sarkozy win in 2007.
¶11. (U) This message has not been cleared by PDAS Volker.
Stapleton
Viewing cable 06ISLAMABAD3705, POST REQUESTS TWO WEEK DELAY

IN JUD DESIGNATION
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06ISLAMABAD3705.
06ISLAMABAD3705 2006-03-07 15:03 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO0913
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #3705 0661510
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071510Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9891
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 7852
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5674
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 003705
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/07/2016

TAGS EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTS TWO WEEK DELAY IN JUD DESIGNATION
REF: A. A. MAIER - QUINN EMAIL MAIL 06 MARCH 06 B. B. LAMBERT - ENGLEKEN EMAIL

21 FEB 06
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) After reviewing the time line presented in ref A and B for moving
forward with the UN 1267 and domestic terrorism finance designation of Jamaat-
ud-Dawa (JuD) as an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-
Tayyba (LeT), Ambassador requests a two-week delay in pre-notificaion,
presentation to the UN 1267 Committee and in the domestic designation. Post’s
preferred timeline is:
-- pre-notification: no earlier than 30 March -- request to UN 1267 Committee:
no earlier than 15 April -- domestic action: no earlier than 15 April
¶2. (S) Post’s reasoning for requesting this delay is based solely on force-
protection considerations. DAC-PAK personnel will continue flying helicopter
sorties in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir
(AJK) until the end of March; ground support personnel will be deployed in
Muzaffarabad, AJK as long as the helicopters are flying. By the end of the first
week of April, U.S. military personnel will have redeployed from NWFP and AJK to
the Islamabad area, awaiting onward tranport out of Pakistan. In order not to
increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful
mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be
taken until all DAC-PAK operations have concluded and DAC personnel are in the
Islamabad area. CROCKER
Viewing cable 06PARIS1681, SARKOZY ADVISOR ON FIRST

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, END
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1418
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DE RUEHFR #1681/01 0751531
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016

TAGS: PGOV ELAB PREL FR SOCI PINR EUN
SUBJECT: SARKOZY ADVISOR ON FIRST EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, END
OF VILLEPIN'S PRESIDENTIAL CHANCES
REF: PARIS 953
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Former Industry Minister and close Sarkozy

advisor Patrick Devedjian predicted March 15 that student and
labor union opposition to the First Employment Contract (CPE)
was spreading and might yet become a major test for the
government. In any event, he believed that PM de Villepin
was finished as a potential presidential candidate.
Devedjian blamed the current impasse squarely on Villepin's
impetuousness and autocratic methods, which, while leaving
the governing party (and Sarkozy) no choice but to support
him publicly, had given the opposition Socialist Party a
potent rallying call for coalescing against the government.
He thought it possible but not likely that Villepin would be
replaced, but ruled out a Sarkozy prime ministership as
"suicidal." Devedjian nonetheless judged that knowledge of
Sarkozy's "differences" with President Chirac and Villepin,
despite his official support for the government, would spare
him most of the electorate's wrath and leave him well
positioned to win the 2007 party nomination and presidential
elections. Devedjian saw Segolene Royal as the opponent to
be most feared on the left, although he thought she might
self-destruct if nominated by the PS, and believed that the
PS would probably prevent her from winning its nomination in
any case. Comment: Devedjian's views, reported here, are
four parts hard analysis, one part wishful thinking. End
comment and summary.
¶2. (U) Patrick Devedjian, former Industry Minister and close

advisor to Interior Minister and UMP President Nicolas
Sarkozy, met March 15 with Embassy reps from the U.S., the
UK, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and Russia to discuss the
state of play with respect to the First Employment Contract
(CPE) and its impact on the current government under PM de
Villepin, as well as the line-up for the 2007 presidential
elections.
CPE and spreading unrest

------------------------
¶3. (C) Devedjian described growing public opposition to the
First Employment Contract (CPE) and declared he "was not
optimistic" for the future, even if there was some hope that
unemployment figures would begin to improve again. He
predicted a turbulent period ahead -- beginning with the
large demonstration planned for March 18 -- which would last
at least one and one-half to two months, and judged that the
government's only real option would be to try to ride out the
storm in the hope that public opinion would eventually turn
against the protesters. Although the government had promised
a few amendments to the law to appease public opinion and was
now expressing a willingness to engage in dialogue, Devedjian
expressed concern that the manner in which the government had
proceeded had resulted in uniting, or in his word,
"coagulating," its adversaries. He concluded that
developments had now moved "beyond the CPE."
More important than unrest in suburbs

-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Devedjian noted ironically that the students
currently protesting against the CPE were relatively
privileged and much more likely to find jobs than the
uneducated and unemployed youths in the suburbs whom the CPE
was intended to help. He saw nothing particularly unusual
about this state of affairs, saying this was what always
happened in France. He termed the November unrest in the
suburbs "a revolt without a message" (sans discours),
concluding that it was primarily a cultural revolt by
third-generation immigrants. At the same time, he argued
against multiculturalism, saying that the real problem lay in
France's failure to inculcate adequately French culture and
values into these unemployed youths and in the government's
long-time policy of effectively ghettoizing immigrant
populations in lieu of dispersing them throughout French
society. He called for some kind of affirmative action and
stressed the importance of demonstrating visibly that members
of a minority can make it to the top. In sum, he did not
appear to take last fall's suburban violence all that
seriously. While the images of the unrest were spectacular,
he said, they had little real (political) import.
Villepin to blame
-----------------
¶5. (C) Devedjian viewed Villepin's impetuous personality and
autocratic style as largely responsible for the current
impasse. Villepin's decision, during the recent debate in
the National Assembly, to let other ministers respond to
hostile questioning and distance himself personally from the
CPE would not succeed in attenuating this perception.
Devedjian blamed Villepin for his refusal to engage in
dialogue with the labor unions before proceeding -- in
PARIS 00001681 002 OF 003
particular with the generally pro-reform-minded CFDT that had

supported Raffarin's pension reforms, and which had now
turned against him. He criticized Villepin for repeating
Balladur's mistake of 1994 of singling out one specific
segment of the French public for reform, which to the French
electorate smacked of discrimination and violated the
principle of equality. Devedjian especially castigated
Villepin's recourse to article 49.3 of the constitution to
put a stop to parliamentary debate as "very dangerous" and a
blow to the strength of democratic institutions. He decried
France's "monarchical mentality," which viewed decisions in
terms of decrees and offered solutions before discussing the
questions.
UMP trapped, but Villepin finished

----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Devedjian described a UMP trapped by Villepin --
forced to support him on the CPE without enthusiasm because
it was obligated to support the government. He believed that
the government, having closed the doors to dialogue, no
longer had any escape paths. Villepin's decision not to
allow the opposition to debate the issue in parliament, if
only as a venting exercise, had ineluctably moved the debate
into the streets. Devedjian judged that the current unrest
would spell the death knell for Villepin's presidential
aspirations. If things got bad enough, he held out the
possibility that Chirac would have to appoint a new prime
minister, probably either Defense Minister Michele
Alliot-Marie or Employment and Social Cohesion Minister
Jean-Louis Borloo, while judging in the end that Chirac would
probably stick with Villepin. Devedjian firmly ruled out the
possibility of Sarkozy accepting the job as prime minister,
which he said would be "suicidal." He did not believe that
President Chirac would withdraw the law and suffer yet
another loss of face. But whether the CPE remains or is
jettisoned, Devedjian concluded, this would be the last
reform pushed through by the current government.
Socialists smell blood

----------------------
¶7. (C) Devedjian said that the Socialist Party (PS) had now
smelled blood and had come to the conclusion that its views,
and not those of the governing party, were more
representative of a majority of the French electorate.
Moreover, this was the latest in a string of setbacks that
included, inter alia, the failed referendum on the EU
constitutional treaty, growing opprobrium directed against
Chirac, and the recent wave of social unrest in the suburbs.
Sarkozy, he asserted, was the best positioned to overcome
this alienation, since the public and press largely
understood that he supported the government but was different
from it (solidaire mais different). This would remain so
despite efforts by PS presidential hopeful Dominique
Strauss-Kahn to paint Villepin and Sarkozy with the same
brush.
Sarkozy still the one to beat

-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Devedjian expressed certainty that Sarkozy would be
nominated to represent the governing party during the first
round of the 2007 presidential elections, and that he would
fare well enough to be one of two candidates in the second
round. He judged that Sarkozy's law-and-order reputation
would ensure that most far-right National Front (FN)
supporters would vote for Sarkozy in the second round, adding
that the FN would die out with the passing from the scene of
Le Pen. Devedjian acknowledged that Sarkozy, having first
consolidated his right wing, would need to do more to attract
centrist voters. He argued there was still time for this,
noting that Sarkozy had already come up with a number of
proposals that one normally would have expected to originate
on the left, for instance that immigrant permanent residents
be allowed to vote in municipal elections.
Segolene Royal the best on the left

-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Asked whom he feared most among the Socialist
candidates, Devedjian named Segolene Royal, citing the
difficulty of running against an "image". (Comment:
Throughout the discussion, Devedjian stressed the importance
of running on projects for the future rather than past
accomplishments; no one, he said, won elections out of
gratitude for what they had done. Jospin, despite his record
of reducing unemployment, was proof of that. End comment.)
Fortunately, he said only half in jest, the PS would likely
refuse her the nomination and thereby spare Sarkozy the need
to defeat her himself ("they will take care of her for us").
Devedjian said her candidacy could fall apart if she
continued to commit gaffes such as calling on regional
leaders to block government subsidies to mayors who apply the
CPE, which was against the law. Also making fun of her
repeatedly expressed admiration for British PM Tony Blair,
PARIS 00001681 003 OF 003
Devedjian judged that Royal, known for her support for family
values and the work ethic, tended "to demobilize" the
far-left, which would hurt her chances in the second round,
since Communist Party supporters would not vote for her.
(Note: Devedjian said that, to win, a party has to mobilize
its own voters and demobilize those of the opposition.)
Asked who would be the candidate if Royal did not run,
Devedjian named former PM Lionel Jospin. But he predicted
that Jospin's age and history would tend to work against him.
(Comment: By contrast, Socialists often predict that voters
will react "with nervousness" to the super-charged Sarkozy
and gravitate toward a more reassuring figure. End comment.)
Sarkozy's plans if elected

--------------------------
¶10. (C) Asked whether Sarkozy, if elected, would attempt to
push through a whole series of ambitious reforms in the early
months of his office, before French opposition to change
blocks further reforms, Devedjian said this would not be the
case. The one exception would be the judiciary, where he saw
a need for deep-reaching changes. He said he was also
interested in changing the constitution to abolish article
49.3 and reduce or abolish the possibilities for censure of
dissolution or the parliament. He believed a move to either
a more presidential (with the U.S. as model) or parliamentary
system (as in the UK) could be accomplished by amending the
existing constitution.
Devedjian's plans
-----------------
¶11. (SBU) Devedjian said he would expect to be a part of a
Sarkozy government, but he refused to speculate in what
capacity, although he subsequently launched into a discussion
of needed judicial reforms. (Note: Pundits predict Sarkozy
would name him as Justice Minister.) In departing, he
recalled warmly his February 3 meeting with EUR PDAS Volker
and Pol M/C (reftel).
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) Devedjian was friendly and animated, and in no hurry
to leave. Sarkozy's circle has come to the conclusion that
Villepin is now effectively finished as a potential
presidential candidate, even though this clearly also
represents wishful thinking on their part. Noteworthy was
Devedjian's judgment that the CPE may yet prove to be a major
test for the government, which contradicts the perception of
many that opposition to the CPE has not reached crisis
proportions. We'll know more following the March 18
demonstrations.

Stapleton
Viewing cable 06PARIS2069, UPDATE/FAREWELL FROM TERRORISM

INVESTIGATING JUDGE
Discussing cables
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O 301339Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0705
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0848
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0741
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0043
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016

TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV FR IZ MO AG TS LY KISL
SUBJECT: UPDATE/FAREWELL FROM TERRORISM INVESTIGATING JUDGE
REF: A. 05 PARIS 7528 AND PREVIOUS

¶B. 01/11/06 PARIS POINTS
PARIS 00002069 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS

ONS 1.4 B/D
¶1. (S) Summary: Jean-Francois Ricard, terrorism investigating

judge for 12 years and deputy to renowned investigating judge
Jean-Louis Bruguiere, is being promoted and transferred to
the Ministry of Defense to work as chief magistrate for
military penal affairs. Speculation abounds that Ricard is
being groomed to replace Bruguiere, who is nearing the
mandatory French civil service retirement age of 65. In a
March 28 meeting with poloff, Ricard discussed a range of C/T
issues, including the "jihadists to Iraq" investigation, the
Christian Ganczarski case and the conclusion of the ex-GTMO
detainees investigation. End summary.
--------------------------------------------- ---
CHANGES AMONG THE TERRORISM INVESTIGATING JUDGES
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶2. (S) Ricard described his new position at the Ministry of

Defense as advisor on military jurisprudence and informal
advisor on C/T matters to Defense Minister Alliot-Marie, with
the title of "magistrate general." He also plans on
continuing in an informal advisory role with the terrorism
section of the Paris Prosecutor's office. Ricard said it was
possible he would return in two to three years to take
Bruguiere's position. Leaving for a higher-level position,
as is the case for his new job at the Ministry of Defense, is
a prerequisite to being eligible for Bruguiere's job.
¶3. (S) When asked whether his replacement would be one of the
recently hired terrorism investigating judges, Ricard said
no. His replacement would likely be someone more senior who
already has the confidence of the DST, RG and DGSE
intelligence agencies. Ricard explained that the specificity
of a veteran terrorism judge like himself or Bruguiere is
that they are shown all manner of raw intelligence, even that
which can never be included in judicial investigations.
Being trusted by the intelligence agencies with this type of
information is a slow process, said Ricard. As an example,
he said it was only after five years as a terrorism
investigating judge that the intelligence agencies allowed
him to see the full scope of raw intelligence. Of all the
terrorism investigating judges in the Paris Prosecutor's
office, only he and Bruguiere are given this latitude, said
Ricard. Relationships within the French intelligence and C/T
world evolve slowly.
¶4. (S) Ricard confirmed that Bruguiere was seeking a position

in a future Sarkozy administration, either as Minister of
Interior or deputy Minister of Interior. Traditionally, such
positions are given to elected officials (with the notable
exception of current PM Villepin), and therefore Bruguiere
will likely run as a UMP candidate for deputy in the third
district of Lot-et-Garonne (southwest France) in the June
2007 legislative elections (ref B).
-------------------
"JIHADISTS TO IRAQ"
-------------------
¶5. (S) Ricard said the open-ended dossier on "jihadists to

Iraq" continued to dominate the workload of the terrorism
investigating judges. Within the dossier are four separate
investigations, and interest among French Islamic radicals in
fighting "jihad" in Iraq continues. Recently, Ricard said he
had questioned a suspect in one of the investigations who had
converted to Islam in prison, and upon his release, was
focused on leaving for Iraq. Iraq has begun to overshadow
the Israel-Palestinian conflict as the obsession for many
Muslim prisoners, said Ricard.
-----------------
EX-GTMO DETAINEES
-----------------
¶6. (S) Ricard confirmed that the investigation of the six

ex-GTMO detainees was finished, and the Paris Prosecutor will
likely charge all of them with "terrorism conspiracy."
Although the maximum prison term is ten years, Ricard did not
believe that any of the six would be given the maximum. The
investigating judges had successfully kept the Guantanamo
issue out of the actual case files, but it would be
impossible for the judges issuing the sentences not to take
PARIS 00002069 002.2 OF 002
into account the detainees' previous imprisonment at

Guantanamo, said Ricard. He considered only two of the
detainees - Khaled Ben Mustafa and Redouane Khalid - to be
serious threats. Ricard added that he and Bruguiere had
fought to keep Ben Mustafa and Khalid imprisoned, but the
length of their pretrial detention, coupled with their
detention at Guantanamo, had swayed the "liberty and
detention" judge to release them on bail. The trial of the
six ex-GTMO detainees should begin in mid-May, said Ricard.
Only one detainee, Brahim Yadel, is still in prison.
-----------------------------------------
THE INVESTIGATION OF CHRISTIAN GANCZARSKI
-----------------------------------------
¶7. (S) German convert Christian Ganczarski and Moroccan

national Karim Mehdi were arrested in 2003 and since then
have been in French custody under suspicion of having ties
with al-Qaeda. Their investigation continues, but Ricard
said he is convinced that Ganczarski was aware of the
planning for the 9/11 attacks. He mentioned a video he had
seen showing Osama bin Laden lecturing, Ganczarski listening
to bin Laden in the front row and Mohammed Atta, one of the
9/11 hijackers, right behind him. Ganczarski refuses to talk
at all, said Ricard. "In another time, he would've been an
SS general," Ricard added.
-----------------------
TUNISIA, GICM AND LIBYA
-----------------------
¶8. (S) In other updates, Ricard said intelligence-sharing

relationships recently had become strained between Tunisia
and France. The strain originated on the Tunisian side, said
Ricard, and he assumed that it was due to political
calculations. (Comment: Since a FM Douste-Blazy visit to
Tunis last fall, the GOF has become more outspoken on human
rights in Tunisia, though still much less so than the U.S.
End comment.) Regarding the Moroccan terrorist group GICM,
Ricard said investigations into a GICM cell discovered in
2005 were wrapping up, and he expected those arrested to go
to trial in September. Finally, the GOF had picked up some
signs that small terrorist groups made up of individuals from
North Africa are quietly using Libya as a training base, said
Ricard. He speculated that the Libyan intelligence services
are generally aware of this and working to disrupt them, but
said it would likely be difficult to do so given that the
groups are very small.
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

Stapleton
Viewing cable 06ABUDHABI1401, SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND

SECURITY AND
Discussing cables
2006-04-10 2010-11-28 SECRET//NOFOR Embassy Abu
06ABUDHABI1401
14:02 18:06 N Dhabi
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, INR/NESA, AND S/CT - H. CRUMPTON

NSC FOR FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN ZARATE, MIKE TAYLOR, NICOLE
SHAMPAINE, NIK RAMCHAND, ELLIOTT ABRAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016

TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP KPAL AE IZ IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO THE UAE
REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243

¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
¶C. ABU DHABI 409
¶D. ABU DHABI 779
¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
¶G. ABU DHABI 176
¶H. ABU DHABI 605
¶I. USDEL 00007
¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
you to the UAE on April 23. In the aftermath of the
controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your
assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ), your host for the visit, that the USG values the
UAE as an ally and friend will be well received. While you
should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation,
you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his
brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the
UAE on several areas of interest to the USG:
counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq,
and ideological extremism (each is covered in the
scenesetter). The UAE remains a committed partner in the
global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc
approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem
for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
Committee (JTFCC), but the discussions were not as detailed
or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated. Treasury
U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting
April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.
¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and
compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same
time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the
UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate
between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership--which has
told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization--plans
to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role
in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence
that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face
of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE
leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist
extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.
Counterterrorism Efforts
------------------------
¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers
homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
and procuring equipment. The UAE has also aggressively tried
to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South
Asian expatriates. UAE officials publicly and strongly
condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has
been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the
mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the
Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.
¶4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with
evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not
approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem. The UAEG must
be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must
investigate fully, and it must share information with other
Gulf countries and with the USG.
¶5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE
on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior
leadership that it needs to continue to display political
will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a
transnational approach. MbZ is the person most able to
elicit this type of change. Embassy recommends you have a
frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ
and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of
change. Although you should commend them for the UAE's CT
efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be
personally involved in developing a more effective and fully
cooperative counterterrorism posture.
Counterterrorism Finance
------------------------
¶6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal
framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date,
investigation and prosecution has been weak. In an effort to
increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the
first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives
from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one
participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an
effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
participate. Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April
30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.
Iran
----
¶7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating

tensions between Iran and the international community. The
UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its
leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE.
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of
those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State
Security Organization explained during the 11 February
U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
decision to not inspect the containers had been a political
decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
(ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
Abbas.
¶8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has
expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran.
MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the
need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and
its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any
sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the
Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he
did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E). "Whoever is
interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged," he
said. "I don't think it's logical or smart to wait for
everyone to get involved so we can sail. ... If another GCC
member believes it's not right, that's his choice." In the
Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan
as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are
"capable to work with us." He told A/S Welch that the UAE
would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran
and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran.
In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid,
MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of
urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against
Iran and its president sooner rather than later. "I believe
this guy is going to take us to war. ... It's a matter of
time," MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and
President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year.
MbZ said he was unwilling to wait much longer. "Personally,
I cannot risk it with a guy like Ahmedinejad. He is young
and aggressive."
¶9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that
Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also
expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
was supporting Hamas. During your meeting, you should
explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You
should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
with the USG on interdiction requests. This meeting will be
a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April
8, where Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran
(septel). (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for
U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should
come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." End
Note.)
Palestinian Territories/Hamas
-----------------------------
¶10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
"going to the right people." UAE Vice President and Prime
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of
optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas,
"with some pressure," would understand the need to respect
the will of the international community.
¶11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant

financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically,
the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas
electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
(including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
that was announced last year).
¶12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative
side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the
fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch
how the USG would react to those countries that did support
the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told
Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
"official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.
Iraq
----
¶13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues

to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom). The UAE has also
been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has
publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
expressed their concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq's
internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu
Dhabi February 23. MbZ further told General Abizaid that
discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari was
creating volunteers for al-Qaida. He pledged the UAE's
support to the fight against al-Qaida. In his meeting with
A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to
tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are
dying at the hands of the insurgents. If Iraqis were to see
the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of
the insurgency is "not worth it."
Ideological Extremism
---------------------
¶14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the

issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the
region. MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE's preferred
approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than
allowing them to play a role in the political process.
Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in
countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence,
he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with
elections. The Emirati leadership has told us that they will
not allow Islamists to participate in elections. (Note: The
UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal
National Council would be elected while half would continue
to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) MbZ
also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational
system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable
resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps.
SISON
Viewing cable 06ABUDHABI1725, SCENESETTER FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR
Discussing cables
06ABUDHABI1725
13:01 18:06 N Dhabi
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016

TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR
CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE
REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243

¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
¶C. ABU DHABI 409
¶D. ABU DHABI 779
¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
¶G. ABU DHABI 176
¶H. ABU DHABI 605
¶I. USDEL 00007
¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
¶L. ABU DHABI 1520
¶M. ABU DHABI 1716
¶N. ABU DHABI 1422
¶O. ABU DHABI 1724
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming

you to the UAE on May 7. U.S. and UAE officials have had a
number of productive meetings on the topic of
counterterrorism, the most recent of which came on April 22,
when Fran Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, met over lunch with Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and his brother,
Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ). Your visit
builds on our ongoing dialogue and efforts to push the UAE on
several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism,
counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological
extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). We have
requested separate meetings with Foreign Minister Sheikh
Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ), whom you met in New York last
September, and State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin
Zayed, whom Deputy Coordinator Urbancic met last October. In
your meetings, you should commend the UAE for its assistance
and cooperation, including its strong condemnation of the
April 24 bomb attack in Dahab. The UAE remains a committed
partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take
an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the
problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
Committee (JTFCC). Treasury U/S Levey is currently in the
UAE to hold a second meeting that will focus on cash couriers
and charities.
¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could provoke their neighbor
and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the
same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of
the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate
between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership, which has
told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization, plans
to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role
in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
process and continues to condemn the sectarian violence that
is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of
growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership
is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to
gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.
Counterterrorism Efforts
------------------------
¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers
homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
and procuring equipment. In your meetings, we recommend that
you inquire about the government's plan, announced by
President Khalifa in December 2005, to place all the security
agencies under a newly established National Security Council.
MbZ, asked by Townsend if the UAE was worried about its oil
infrastructure, responded emphatically, "absolutely." He
told Townsend that there are three international companies
currently conducting risk assessments of the UAE oil
infrastructure and maritime security for the UAEG. Townsend
offered U.S. assistance in helping the UAE to reduce its
vulnerability (ref O).
¶4. (S) The UAEG reacts quickly when presented with evidence
of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach
the problem from a transnational posture. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem. Townsend
discussed this matter with MbZ and urged the UAE to instead
to fully investigate terror suspects and share the results of
those inquiries with the USG.
Counterterrorism Finance
------------------------
¶5. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal
framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date,
investigation and prosecution have been weak. In an effort
to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing,
the
first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives
from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one
participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an
effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
participate. The April 30 meeting will focus on cash
couriers and charity regulations.
Iran
----
¶6. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating

tensions between Iran and the international community. AbZ
publicly expressed his country's concern, and the entire
region's "vulnerability," at a press conference in Kuwait
April 25, while urging a peaceful resolution (ref M).
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of
those instances has resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State
Security Organization explained during the 11 February
U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
decision not to inspect the containers had been a political
decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
(ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
Abbas. AbZ told U/S Joseph during his April 8 visit to Abu
Dhabi that the USG should approach the UAE on interdiction
requests "only as a last resort" (ref N). Two weeks later,
he assured Townsend that the UAEG does not want Iran to take
advantage of the UAE's open trading environment. He said the
UAE was in the final stages of ratifying its export control
law and that it would be announced "soon." In an encouraging
development, the UAE on April 15 privately endorsed the
Proliferation Security Initiative's Statement of Interdiction
Principles (ref L).
¶7. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, Abu

Dhabi's ruling family has expressed clear support for U.S.
initiatives against Iran. The U.S. and UAE have a "common
desire to succeed," AbZ told U/S Joseph, noting that the
combination of Iran and terrorism is something that cannot be
tolerated. "The threat from al-Qa'ida would be minor if Iran
has nukes," AbZ said (ref N). MbZ told Townsend April 22
that the Iranians think that the U.S. will not do anything
about their recent declaration that they have successfully
enriched uranium. He added that he thought the Iranians were
wrong. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23
about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the
region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified
that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership,
not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28
that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
proceeding with any U.S. plans against Iran (ref E). He told
A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to
USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the
challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM
Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat
with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of
taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather
than later. "I believe this guy is going to take us to war.
... It's a matter of time," MbZ warned, adding that action
against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this
year or next year.
¶8. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that
Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also
expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
was supporting Hamas. During your meetings, you should
explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You
should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
with the USG on interdiction requests. These meetings will
be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with AbZ
April 8, when Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for
Iran. (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S.
initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come
to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." End
Note.)
Palestinian Territories/Hamas
-----------------------------
¶9. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
"going to the right people." In his meeting with Townsend,
MbZ said that the UAE "felt the Muslim Brotherhood rally
behind Hamas" after its electoral victory in the Palestinian
territories, and that the Hamas victory should be a lesson to
the West. UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told
Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure,"
SIPDIS
would understand the need to respect the will of the
international community.
¶10. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant

financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically,
the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas
electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
(including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
that was announced last year).
¶11. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative
side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the
fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch
how the USG would react to those countries that did support
the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told
Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
"official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.
Iraq
----
¶12. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues

to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The UAE has also
been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has
publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ told Townsend that he had "no
confidence" in the new Iraqi Prime Minister-designate, Jawad
al-Maliki, and he reiterated his concern about Iran's
meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. He has pledged the
UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida.
Ideological Extremism
---------------------
¶13. (S) The Abu Dhabi ruling family continue to be outspoken

on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to
the region. MbZ told Townsend that if there were an election
in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.
He said the challenge is to find a way to remove the
extremists in a way that they never come back. One way he
and his brothers have been trying to accomplish this is by
reforming the education system, which they say was penetrated
by the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1960s. (Note: The UAE
has announced that half of the members of the Federal
National Council would be elected while half would continue
to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) UAE
officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and
terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of
government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques.
SISON
Viewing cable 06BUCHAREST576, ADOPTIONS: ROMANIA OFFICIALLY
REJECTS ALL PENDING
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06BUCHAREST576.
06BUCHAREST576 2006-04-05 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bucharest
VZCZCXRO3212
DE RUEHBM #0576 0951604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051604Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2190
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000576
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE BILL SILKWORTH;

AND CA/OCS/CI CHRIS LAMORA AND SCOTT BOSWELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2026

TAGS: CASC PREL PGOV PHUM RO
SUBJECT: ADOPTIONS: ROMANIA OFFICIALLY REJECTS ALL PENDING
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION CASES
REF: A) BUCHAREST 0536 B) 2005 BUCHAREST 2550
Classified By: DCM Mark Taplin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (U) On April 5, Embassy received by mail a letter from

Theodora Bertzi, Secretary of State for the Government of
Romania,s (GOR) Romanian Office for Adoptions (ROA), dated
March 29 and including the final report of the GOR Working
Group established in June 2005 to audit pending petitions by
foreign families to adopt Romanian orphans and abandoned
children. Post has faxed the letter to EUR/NCE and CA/OCS/CI.
¶2. (U) The report shows that none of the 1,092 children
identified in the pending petitions will be available for
inter-country adoption, ostensibly for the following reasons:
-- 41 reintegrated into biological family
-- 12 integrated within extended family
-- 227 adopted by Romanian families
-- 17 adopted by other foreign families by the rules of the

adoption moratorium (2001-04)
-- 8 under legal guardianship in Romania
-- 12 reached or will soon reach age 18
-- 47 petitioned after a February 6, 2004 emergency ordinance

suspended even exceptional approval of intercountry adoptions
during the moratorium
-- 2 died
-- 6 not found in GOR,s database of orphans or abandoned

children
-- 90 had petitions withdrawn by the foreign families (1 from

the U.S.)
-- 132 in process of final domestic adoption
-- 415 not adoptable, protected within substitutive (sic)

families
-- 83 not adoptable, placed in the protection system (their

biological family did not consent to adoption before Court or
the Court did not approve the opening of the domestic
adoption procedure).
¶3. (C) Comment: The Working Group had been expected to issue
its report by the end of March, and Bertzi had announced
publicly in December 2005 that none of the cases would be
approved for inter-country adoption. However, the utterly
non-transparent process of the Working Group and the opaque
quality of the report suggest some of the children may in
fact remain in non-permanent situations in which their
welfare is not being adequately protected. Post believes we
should continue to press the GOR to open up the Working
Group,s "conclusions" for a transparent, objective
international review and to establish a legal framework that
would allow inter-country adoption for appropriate pending
cases. We will provide Department with our updated
recommendations soon. End comment.
TAUBMAN
Viewing cable 06PARIS2242, VISIT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES

FROM MARCH 1 TO
Discussing cables
06PARIS2242
15:03 21:09 USE ONLY Paris
VZCZCXRO3289
RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
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DE RUEHFR #2242/01 0951517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051517Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
SIPDIS
DOJ PLEASE PASS TO OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL

DIVISION (FRONT OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM SECTION, OFFICE OF INTERNAT
AFFAIRS)
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: KJUS FR KJUS PREL PGOV KCRM PTER
SUBJECT: VISIT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES FROM MARCH 1 TO
4, 2006.
REF: NONE
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Attorney General Alberto Gonzales traveled to

France from March 1 to 4, 2006. He met with Pierre de
Bousquet de Florian, Director of the DST; Nicolas Sarkozy,
Minister of the Interior; French Counter-terrorism
Officials; Ron Noble, Secretary General of Interpol; Pascal
Clement, Minister of Justice and a number of media and
opinion maker representatives. The meetings were cordial
and constructive and focused on counter-terrorism
cooperation; with the Attorney General expressing
appreciation to his counterparts for the excellent working
relationship between France and the United States in this
area; and his making a number of appearances with the media
and opinion makers to explain to the French public the
United States approach to combating terrorism. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) After a March 1 evening arrival, on March 2, the

Attorney General met with Pierre de Bousquet de Florian,
director of the DST, France's internal security service.
Both the Attorney General and de Bousquet complimented US-
French C/T cooperation, calling it "exceptional," and
recognizing that both countries were fighting a common
enemy, and both had experienced losses. France's C/T fight
was led by intelligence agencies working in concert with
the judiciary, said Bousquet. Although France did not
pretend that its model could be applied elsewhere, it
strongly believed that judiciary and police/intelligence
services needed to cooperate closely in order to attack
terrorist networks before they struck.
¶3. (SBU) In response to questions from the Attorney

General concerning the DST's view of the evolving nature of
the terrorist threat, de Bousquet expressed a concern that
democracies not compromise their essential values in
combating terrorism as this could weaken the foundation of
their societies. Most important, said Bousquet, was to win
the battle of communication. Videos of USG actions were a
continuing source of motivation and repulsion for
extremists. Although USG communication regarding terrorism
was focused on convincing its citizens, images of abuses in
Iraq and the messages of the USG as received overseas both
rebounded negatively overseas and encouraged Muslim youth
to join extremist movements, said Bousquet.
¶4. (SBU) Bousquet said France was most concerned about

the worldwide upsurge of radical Islam. For this reason,
the GOF was building a "French Islam" a moderate Islam
that worked within the French culture. All those who
refuse to participate in this system would have no place in
French society, said Bousquet. He believed that the next
generation of terrorists would be born and well-integrated
into French society, since well-educated and integrated
French Muslims were already beginning to be seen in
jihadist circles. He called for continued close
coordination between intelligence and police agencies, and
asked that the Attorney General look into streamlining
current procedure for passing telephone and Internet
communication details based in the United States and needed
for investigations in France.
¶5. (SBU) The Attorney General also met Minister of the

Interior Sarkozy. Also present for the Ministry of the
Interior were Diplomatic Advisor David Martinon, Legal
Advisor Sylvie Smanniotto, and DST Director de Bousquet de
Florian. Sarkozy complained that the Ministry of the
Interior felt cooperation in terrorism matters with the
United States were one sided. He declined to give further
specifics Attorney General Gonzales stated that if Sarkozy
had a specific complaint, he should feel free to call him
directly. [Note: Subsequent discussion with de Bousquet
and Sarkozy's staff yielded apologies and assurances that
GOF-USG CT cooperation is, and is seen as, good.]
¶6. (SBU) Sarkozy also signaled that he was under pressure

to remedy the current inability of France to produce
biometric visas in conformity with recent U.S. legislation,
so as to participate in the visa waiver program. [Note:
Septel on recent biometric passport developments.]
¶7. (SBU) Sarkozy also discussed general geopolitical

issues concerning France and the United States. He
believed France should not be in an adversarial posture
with the U.S. and should change its approach. The U.S. is
an important friend and ally of France, the level of
PARIS 00002242 002 OF 004
convergence of interest is much greater than with major

non-democratic powers like Russia or China. While he was
constrained by the current government's policies, he
believed the situation would change after the election. He
indicated he would travel to the U.S. to be able to tell
the French public what his impressions were of the U.S. and
that he would provide more detail on his positions as his
run for the French presidency advanced. Sarkozy stated
that France and the international community would have to
help the United States resolve the situation in Iraq, as
the U.S. could not do so alone; perhaps with international
forces eventually replacing the U.S.
¶8. (SBU) On the morning of March 3, Ambassador Stapleton

hosted a breakfast for the Attorney General and four key
French counter-terrorism officials, counter-terrorism
investigative judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, Prosecutor
General of Paris Yves Bot, Prosecutor of Paris Jean-Claude
Marin, and Director of the Criminal Division of the Justice
Ministry Jean-Marie Huet. The Attorney General started the
discussion by thanking the officials for their assistance
and asked them for their assessment of the current counter-
terrorism situation. Led by the commentaries of Judge
Bruguiere, the officials noted the advantages they operated
under, including their ability to protect the sources of
intelligence information that they use in their
investigations, the fact that they do not need to detail
facts to the same extent as in the U.S. to arrest persons,
or undertake searches and seizures or wiretaps, and the
fact that there was no jury system, no formal rules on
admissibility of evidence and no hearsay rule. There
followed a general legal discussion on these aspects of the
French system.
¶9. (SBU) Judge Bruguiere also outlined the two general

threat trends France was experiencing: First, that French
youth were being drawn into terrorist activities to a
greater extent, reflecting that the threat was moving from
East to West. Second, that the new terrorists were on an
increasing level of sophistication and education. Recent
arrests had demonstrated that highly educated electronics
experts had been recruited by jihadist networks for
purposes of executing attacks in Europe, and that they had
developed highly sophisticated methods for detonating
explosive charges at long distance.
¶10. (SBU) The Attorney General next met with Ron Noble,
Secretary General of Interpol, on March 3. The discussion
SIPDIS
commenced with the Attorney General inquiring about the
recent request for Interpol red notices made by Italy
concerning the alleged abduction of an individual from
Italy by USG officials. Noble advised that the procedure
at this stage is for Interpol to review the requests to
determine whether issuance of the red notices would be
consistent with the Interpol Constitution, which prohibits
Interpol from participating in political matters, or
pursuing politically motivated requests.
¶11. (SBU) Noble also briefed the AG on a number of current

issues, including a push to list with Interpol those al-
Qaida and Taliban members on the UN sanctions list so that
Interpol could generate a new kind of notice providing
details on these persons to police in member states, and to
facilitate wider contribution to and use of the Interpol
database on lost or stolen passports. Regarding
lost/stolen passports, a pilot project conducted between
Interpol and the Swiss government demonstrated that the
Interpol database could be used in real-time, leading to a
marked increase in the seizures and prosecutions for those
using false travel documents. He cited the example of one
seized passport that had been in use since April 2003, had
passed through 19 countries and had successfully gone
through border controls 46 times without being caught.
¶12. (SBU) Noble requested that the Attorney General

consider detailing a legal attach/prosecutor to Interpol
headquarters, given the rise in legal issues in recent
years. The Attorney General expressed concern that a DOJ
prosecutor might have to address cases that would
conceivably work against USG interests. Noble replied that
the DOJ prosecutor would always have the option of recusing
him/herself.
¶13. (U) Embassy Paris also organized three press events

for Attorney General Gonzales on March 3: a print press
PARIS 00002242 003 OF 004
roundtable, an interview with Radio France Internationale,

and an interview with French all-news channel LCI-TV.
Major French newspapers as well as wire services Agence
France Presse, Reuters, and Associated Press, attended his
print press roundtable. The AG took numerous questions on
Guantanamo and detainee treatment. He explained the
differences between treatment of detainees on a battlefield
and prisoners in the criminal justice system and
underscored that the U.S. treats detainees humanely and in
accord with Geneva even if they do not come under the
Geneva Convention since they are unlawful combatants. Wire
reports quoted AG Gonzales as saying: "The relationship
between French and U.S. law enforcement is outstanding,"
and, "Both countries share the common objective of
preventing terrorist attacks." The press roundtable also
triggered articles in center-left daily Libration
(circulation: 158,086) and Catholic daily La Croix
(circulation: 102,022). La Croix highlighted that, "Four
years after 9/11, the determination of the U.S. government
has not faltered when it comes to fighting against terror."
¶14. (U) Excerpts of his interview with the French

worldwide broadcasting radio network Radio France
Internationale (RFI-- similar to Voice of America) aired on
March 3, and the interview was aired in full in RFI's
weekly Wednesday, RFI English service program "Voices." In
the radio interview, AG Gonzales was asked about the CIA
flights controversy, and he emphasized that the U.S. is a
nation of laws that respects its legal commitments.
¶15. (U) The all-news television network LCI featured the

full interview in its "News of the World" program, which
was re-broadcast three times the same evening. The
Attorney General was asked about his visit to Paris, the
use of death penalty in Texas when President Bush was
governor -- AG referred to the due process of law accorded
the prisoners, and the possible death penalty for Zacharias
Moussaoui who, the AG said, has pleaded guilty and his
sentence will be decided by the Court.
¶16. (SBU) The Attorney General met with French Justice

Minister Pascal Clement on March 3. The two complimented
U.S.-French cooperation as "very good" on terrorism and
other legal matters. The Attorney General said Interior
Minister Sarkozy had complained that counter-terrorism
information sharing was not as robust as it could be, to
which Clement responded that in his opinion, information
sharing between U.S. and France was good. They compared
notes on the different French and U.S. legal systems. The
Attorney General reassured Clement that any information
provided by France for the Moussaoui trial would not be
used to support a death penalty conviction. He also
invited Clement to the United States. Clement thanked the
Attorney General and said he would be pleased to do so when
their schedules permitted.
¶17. (SBU) Clement hailed the U.S. and France's mutual

exchange of magistrates as a way to ward off any budding
legal problems between the two countries. He said the lack
of major problems to discuss was a fruit of this type of
exchange. Clement asked the AG when the U.S. would ratify
the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, noting that
France had recently done so. The AG stated that he hoped
we would be able to overcome final Senate objections soon
and get the treaty ratified. They also discussed a number
of other issues, including the sex offenses, and
psychiatric testimony, child abduction cases, and growing
illegal drug use. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
ministers had a walk-out for the press, in which they
delivered statements regarding the issues discussed. The
Clement statement included mention of the assurance
provided by the U.S. that the evidence provided by France
in the Moussaoui case would not be used to obtain the death
penalty.
¶18. (U) This visit provided a good opportunity for Attorney

General Gonzales to both meet in depth key French law
enforcement officials, express U.S. appreciation for the
strong cooperative law enforcement relationship between the
two countries, as well as to explain the French public
through his interviews the United States approach to
combating terrorism. Ambassador Stapleton accompanied the
Attorney General to all of his meetings. The Attorney
General departed on March 4, 2006, for other meetings in
the United Kingdom.
PARIS 00002242 004 OF 004
¶19. (U) This message was approved by the Office of the Attorney
General.
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 06PARIS2358, FRENCH MFA URGES CLOSE

CONSULTATION ON HUMAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO8911
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DE RUEHFR #2358/01 1010753
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O 110753Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2322
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0710
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 0394
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0324
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016

TAGS: KUNR PREL PHUM UNGA FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA URGES CLOSE CONSULTATION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL
REF: STATE 55461
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas

ons 1.4b,d
¶1. Summary: (C) IO DAS-Equivalent Beatrice Le Fraper du

Hellen on April 7 regretted that the Human Rights Council
(HRC) would be a less credible institution without USG
participation. However, she admitted that she herself had
urged the MFA not to seek an HRC seat in 2006, but to wait
until 2007 when members would be elected for full three-year
terms. With the U.S. absent, Le Fraper urged regular
French-U.S. dialogue so that USG equities could be taken into
account. She warned that the EU may put forward a
Guantanamo-related resolution, but suggested that the EU had
learned lessons from the fracas over renditions at the
Council of Europe. Le Fraper lauded the U.S. aim to
encourage the HRC to address the worst human rights abusing
nations, including Iran. She suggested that France had lost
patience with Zimbabwe in the domain of human rights,
although the French UN delegation in New York chafed at any
confrontation with the Africa Group. Lastly, Le Fraper
mentioned that France and Argentina would roll out a draft
convention on enforced disappearances at the HRC. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) IO DAS-Equivalent Beatrice Le Fraper du Hellen on

April 7 regretted that the Human Rights Council would be a
less credible institution without USG participation (ref).
She tempered her disappointment however with the observation
that she had likewise argued -- but without success -- that
France not seek an HRC seat in 2006. From a tactical
standpoint, it was smarter to hold off until 2007 in order to
obtain a guaranteed a full 3-year term on the Council.
Candidates this year, she explained to Poloff, were competing
for 1-year, 2-year or 3-year terms on the newly launched HRC;
in future, terms would run for three years. Le Fraper
bemoaned that France now had to launch a worldwide diplomatic
campaign for a seat without knowing in advance the length of
the term it would be alloted on the Council, which would be
determined later by lottery. Le Fraper asked for USG support
for the French candidacy. Le Fraper believed that the USG
would have at least as much influence as actual seated HRC
members on debates about establishing standard HRC procedures
during the inaugural year, because that policy would be
articulated through regional groups.
¶3. (C) With the U.S. absent from the HRC, Le Fraper urged
regular French-U.S. dialogue so that USG equities could be
taken into account. She noted the French and American
Geneva-based delegations enjoyed good relations. Regular
consulatations were crucial, especially given the possibility
that some EU member would lobby to advance a resolution on
Guantanamo detainees. However, Le Fraper believed the fracas
over renditions at the Council of Europe had been salutary,
if only for cautioning EU members that they should tread
lightly, since European governments lacked full awareness of
what transpired on their own territory, whether with or
without direct government complicity.
¶4. (C) Le Fraper lauded the USG aim to actively encourage

the HRC to address serious cases of human rights abuse in
countries such as Iran, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Burma, Sudan and
South Korea. FM Douste-Blazy was now particularly exercised
about Iran, she said. Moreover, France had lost patience
with Zimbabwe, Le Fraper insisted, pointing to French support
for a human rights-related UNGA resolution, a policy
decision, she added, that had vexed the French delegation in
New York, which had preferred not to roil the waters with the
Africa Group.
¶5. (C) Le Fraper forewarned that France and Argentina would

be introducing a new draft legal convention about enforced
disappearances at the HRC. She regretted that the USG would
not be present at the Council for discussions, but Argentina
in particular was keen on rolling out the draft this year,
which marks the 30th anniversary of the launching of the
so-called "Dirty War." The draft would also be presented at
the General Assembly. French involvement in the initiative
dated to 1978, after the disappearance of French citizens in
Argentina. Le Fraper commented she knew of U.S.
sensitivities about possible ramifications in the context of
the detention of non-state actors. The Government of
Colombia, Fraper added, had also had expressed concerns, yet
now appeared ready to support the draft. (Note: Human Rights
PARIS 00002358 002 OF 002
Desk Officer Donatienne Hissard clarified on April 10 that

the U.S. had joined consensus on negotiations of the
convention while nonetheless expressing reserves about the
"Right to Truth," e.g. the rights of victims to information
about the circumstances of their detention, as well as other
rights for detainees.)
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) Comment and BioNote: Le Fraper clearly sees the USG
as an indispensable player in the advocacy of human rights.
While worrying the HRC would lack weight without USG
membership, Le Fraper otherwise discounted the impact of USG
non-participation, apart from advising there would be a need
to consult closely in order to take USG equities into
account. Le Fraper said the MFA made an effort to avoid
dramatization of the U.S. decision in exchanges with the
press and with NGOs. Bionote: Le Fraper mentioned that her
sister, Dorothe Le Fraper du Hellen, was also a dedicated
human rights advocate, and a lawyer on the defense teams of
both Jose Bove and Zacarias Moussaoui. Le Fraper mentioned
she had just accompanied her sister to the U.S. consulate to
apply for an expedited visa so that she could make an
emergency trip to the trial. Le Fraper mentioned that MFA,
especially MFA spokesman Mattei, has been taking great pains
to work hand in glove with the USG with regard to the
Moussaoui trial.

Stapleton
Viewing cable 06ASUNCION589, PARAGUAY: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

ASSESSMENT REPORT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06ASUNCION589.
06ASUNCION589 2006-06-07 17:05 2010-11-30 16:04 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Asuncion
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INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS ASUNCION 000589
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHA FOR MICHAEL PUCCETTI

G/TIP
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KWMN SMIG PA
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY: TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ASSESSMENT REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 10.
¶2. (U) SUMMARY: The USD 155K that post received in FY-2004
has played an important role in helping Paraguay combat its
TIP problem, particularly in the areas of prevention and
protection. However, post anticipates these funds running
out by the end of 2006. Working closely with U.S. experts
and GOP officials, we have identified concrete requirements
to strengthen Paraguay's ability to combat trafficking in the
coming year. As part of a bilateral assistance project
between the Embassy of the United States in Asuncion and the
Government of Paraguay (GOP), the USG conducted a study of
Paraguay,s system of immigration and border controls between
July 23 through August 5, 2005, with a view to offering
recommendations to the GOP that would assist it in combating
the problem of trafficking in persons (TIP) by improving
border controls. A team of Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) officials led the assessment. The DHS Team included
agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Post requests an
allocation of USD 310,000 in FY-2006 INL funds consistent
with the DHS Team's recommendations and consultation with GOP
officials to continue assisting the GOP in combating TIP. End
Summary.
--------------
The Assessment
--------------
¶3. (U) Paraguay is a source country for trafficked women and

children, many of whom are smuggled across Paraguay's borders
into the neighboring countries of Brazil and Argentina.
Paraguay's Department of Immigration is aware of the TIP
problem and acknowledges the GOP must improve its border
controls in order to prevent traffickers from transporting
victims across its borders.
¶4. (U) During the assessment, the team spoke with several
Ministry and Secretariat officials in Asuncion, including the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Customs, and Interior
(Immigration Department), the Secretariats of Women,
Repatriations, and Children and Adolescents. They also spoke
to the Inter-American Development Bank and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as Grupo Luna Nueva, a local
recovery center for victims. The team visited several land
border inspection stations including Ciudad del Este,
Encarnacion, Pedro Juan Caballero and Puerto Falcon. They
also inspected the Silvio Pettirossi International Airport in
Asuncion.
-------------------------
More Money, Fewer Problems
-------------------------
¶5. (U) The assessment report has been reviewed by all the
stakeholders within AMEmbassy Asuncion and was translated
into Spanish and provided to our GOP counterparts. The next
phase of this project is to take action on the
recommendations made by the Team.
¶6. (U) In order to build on advances made by the GOP, Post

has identified several areas that will assist the GOP better
in its efforts to combat TIP. Our focus in the coming year
is to expand training for officials, investigators,
prosecutors and judges; assist the GOP to expand
rehabilitation center services in government run shelters;
enhance border controls; and establish and maintain a victim
database to provide better services to the victims of TIP and
prosecute perpetrators. However, the GOP will require
outside funds to meet essential program requirements.
----------
Prevention
----------
7.(U) Prevention represents the weakest link in GOP efforts

to combat trafficking. The GOP has taken some positive steps
that we have supported - information pamphlets and radio
spots along with a hotline -- but funding and prevention
programs remain weak. Post recommends continued funding
support for the Ministry of Womens Affairs outreach programs
to prevent trafficking as well as the following:
-- The DHS team recommends holding an annual border control

symposium in Asuncion with the participation of all border
control agencies. A symposium will provide the opportunity
for agency administrators to clearly communicate the mission
of the individual border control agencies, establish a
national strategy as well as coordinate a unified border
enforcement effort. In addition, this symposium would
address the concerns heard by the DHS officers of many border
control front line officials regarding a concern relating to
a "disconnect" between Asuncion and frontline border crossing
offices. Post would fund the first border patrol symposium.
-- The DHS team recommends that a supervisory level U.S.

Customs and Border Protection Officer be detailed to Paraguay
for a 30-60 day period to provide advisory assistance at the
various ports of entry to assist Paraguayan officials in
implementing administrative and procedural changes. The Team
feels that Paraguayan border control officials are capable of
performing their duties but lack the proper training and
guidance. A short-term advisor could assist in teaching them
to conduct interviews, searches, observation techniques, etc.
-- The DHS team recommends that selected Paraguayan officials

with direct supervisory responsibilities at Paraguayan ports
of entry be given the opportunity to travel to the U.S. and
observe first-hand U.S. border management techniques and
functions at specific U.S. ports of entry.
----------
Protection
----------
¶8. (U) The GOP has made some strides in providing support and
protection to victims but resources are few. The Ministry of
Repatriations seeks corporate funds to repatriate victims
because the GOP cannot support adequately the ministries
operations. In addition, the Ministry of Women's Affairs has
ambitious plans to establish a shelter to provide victims a
place to reside while in Asuncion once they are repatriated.
Again, the lack of GOP resources has prevented the ministry
from establishing a 50 bed facility. At this time, a
Catholic monastry is providing beds to the Ministry of
Women's Affairs. Usually the victims remain in Asuncion for
approximately 2 or 3 months while they are receiving legal,
medical, psychological and rehabilitative services. Once the
women leave Asuncion, there is no follow-up or support
program to assist victims in returning to their home town.
Last year, post provided funds to assist the Women's Ministry
in creating a rehabilitation center that provides trafficked
women with services including psychological and job
counseling. Post recommends identifying funds to support the
establishment of a more permanent shelter to protect victims
and assist them in making the transition to stability as well
as efforts to expand GOP support for victims in the interior
of the country.
Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1462, ARGENTINA: THE K-STYLE OF
POLITICS
Discussing cables
2006-06-29 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: THE K-STYLE OF POLITICS
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 01090

¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01403
¶C. BUENOS AIRES 02974
¶D. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141
¶E. 05 BUENOS AIRES 02835
¶F. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00115
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
------------------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
------------------------
¶1. (C) This cable is designed to examine President Nestor

Kirchner's unique operating and decision-making style that
has become known as the "K-Style." Given Kirchner's control
over all aspects of GOA policymaking, knowledge of Kirchner's
motivations and methods in arriving at decisions is essential
to understanding GOA actions.
¶2. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often

erratic operating and decision-making style defines current
Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching
focus on the short-term and politically expedient
accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power.
Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room for
dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken the
political opposition. While utilizing leftist, populist
rhetoric at times, in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that
his ideological leanings are always less important than the
practicalities of domestic politics. Studies show that
Kirchner's psychological profile includes a need to always be
in control, quick and decisive decision making, a constant
struggle against perceived enemies, and a tendency to respond
to challenges by lashing out, rather than negotiation.
Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always
subservient to domestic political considerations. President
Kirchner is not skilled at international diplomacy and often
ignores basic protocol. Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking
group of long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of
whom lack international, business and economic expertise.
END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
--------------------------------
THE K-STYLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
--------------------------------
¶3. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often

erratic operating and decision-making style defines current
Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching
focus on the short-term and politically expedient
accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power.
Close Kirchner insiders have described Kirchner's
decision-making process to Emboffs as one in which Kirchner
consults with a small number of trusted advisors, generally
one-on-one, and then makes all of the final decisions
himself. The Argentine political system places a great deal
of authority into the hands of the President, and President
Kirchner is a strong president even in the Argentine
historical context. As a result, the "K-Style" defines the
GOA policymaking process and gives the policy process a
short-term focus. As Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos
Zannini, a close Kirchner advisor, told the DCM, "The
President and I get up every morning, look at the morning
papers, and try to figure out how to survive the day."
Another long-time Kirchner associate, former Santa Cruz
Governor Sergio Acevedo told us that Kirchner focuses very
much on day-to-day issues, but always with the long-term
strategic goal of retaining political power. (COMMENT:
Kirchner's focus on retaining political power leads us to
discount speculation that Kirchner will step aside in 2007
and make his wife Cristina the presidential candidate. For
2011, assuming Kirchner's health holds, we would expect him
to either modify the Constitution to allow him to run for a
third term, or to pass the mantel on to his wife. END
COMMENT.)
¶4. (C) Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room

for dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken
BUENOS AIR 00001462 002 OF 005
the political opposition. Kirchner is quick to silence any

opposition to his policies from within his movement, as when
he recently expelled congresswoman Maria del Carmen Alarcon
from the presidency of the Lower House Agricultural Committee
and from Kirchner's Victory Front (FPV) after Alarcon
criticized the GOA beef policy (See Reftel A). Kirchner has
also proven adept at co-opting members of the opposition and
exploiting divisions within opposition parties. Through the
skillful use of his fiscal powers, Kirchner has been able to
draw in the majority of the Radical Civic Union (UCR)
governors, and many UCR mayors (See Septel on deteriorating
provincial finances and Kirchner's use of fiscal power for
political aims). He has also been able to co-opt the
political leadership from the now defunct center-left Frepaso
and most of the Peronists formerly aligned in opposition to
Kirchner with former President Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner has
exploited divisions within the UCR by heavily courting
Mendoza Governor Julio Cobos, long-time rival of UCR
President Roberto Iglesias, even encouraging rumors that
Cobos may be Kirchner's running mate in 2007. Kirchner also
does not accept criticism from those outside of the political
arena, attacking the press, the Catholic Church and business
leaders that have been publicly critical of the GOA.
¶5. (C) While utilizing leftist, populist rhetoric at times,

in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that his ideological
leanings are always less important than the practicalities of
domestic politics. As Acevedo recently told us, President
Kirchner has no true ideology. For example, the issue of
human rights and his political affiliations in the 1970s were
non-issues in the 20 years of Kirchner's political life as
Mayor of Rio Gallegos and Governor of Santa Cruz province.
Acevedo said Kirchner's recent support for the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo and a renewed focus on human rights crimes
committed under the last dictatorship was driven by his need
to develop a core base of support within the left wing of the
Peronist movement. Kirchner was also a big proponent of the
1990s privatizations at the time they occurred, but has since
vehemently attacked them. This does not mean that Kirchner
does not have left-wing sympathies, but rather that these are
completely subordinate to his personal political interests
and ambition (See Reftel B). Kirchner's left-wing sympathies
have not stopped him from forming alliances of convenience
with center-right Peronist leaders, such as Luis Barrionuevo
of Catamarca, Cordoba Governor Jose Manuel de la Sota, or the
largely conservative Peronist political machine in Buenos
Aires province.
¶6. (C) Kirchner's style of policymaking has become more

pronounced after the October 2005 elections and November 2005
cabinet changes left Kirchner firmly in charge of all aspects
of GOA decision making (See Reftel C). Prior to the October
elections, Kirchner had to consider former President
Duhalde's opinion in making major decisions. Kirchner's
resounding victory in Buenos Aires province in the elections
left him in control of the Peronist Party (PJ) and banished
Duhalde from the center stage of the political scene. Before
Kirchner's November cabinet changes, Kirchner also had to
contend with his independent-minded Minister of the Economy,
Roberto Lavagna, in making economic policy decisions, and
with then-Foreign Minister Rafael Bielsa, who occasionally
exhibited an independent streak. Their replacements, Felisa
Miceli and Jorge Taiana are loyal soldiers who follow
presidential orders. For example, recently Miceli was give a
copy of a communique that had been issued to a news agency by
the Casa Rosada with Miceli's comments criticizing a recent
speech by Lavagna before Miceli had actually spoken. As
leading pollster Roberto Bacman told Poloff, "Never since the
return to democracy (1983) has Argentina had a President that
was also the Minister of the Economy."
---------------------------------------------
KIRCHNER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE SETS K-STYLE
---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) According to recent studies, Kirchner's psychological

profile includes a need to always be in control, quick and
decisive decision making, and a constant struggle against
perceived enemies. Kirchner does not delegate policymaking,
BUENOS AIR 00001462 003 OF 005
making all of the important decisions himself. Kirchner only

consults with a narrow group of long-time advisors, who are
part of Kirchner's inner circle primarily because of their
loyalty, not their technical abilities (See Reftel D). He
often does not even consult or give warning to top GOA
officials before making major policy statements in their
respective areas of responsibility. According to Central
Bank officials, for example, Central Bank President Martin
Redrado found out that the GOA was going to use nearly 10 USD
billion in Central Bank reserves to pay off the IMF when
Kirchner publicly announced it. Casa Rosada insiders have
described Kirchner as prone to making quick, sometimes even
rash decisions. For example, Kirchner reportedly made a snap
decision to institute a six-month ban on beef exports after
learning that the price of beef had risen a significant
amount the previous day in the country's most important beef
market. Kirchner has lashed out at has perceived enemies,
both domestic and foreign, throughout his presidency.
Kirchner's targets have included the IMF, the U.S., the
media, the Catholic Church, the Argentine military, the
foreign and domestic business community, supermarkets,
foreign gas stations, anything that happened in the 1990s,
former Presidents Carlos Menem, Fernando de la Rua and
Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner often targets unpopular groups or
individuals as a means to increase his own public approval
ratings.
¶8. (C) When confronted with a problem, Kirchner's first

instinct is to go on the offensive, rather than negotiate,
upping the ante if his initial efforts fail to win the
desired result. When Kirchner faced resistance from the
business and agricultural sector on his efforts to control
inflation earlier in the year, Kirchner instituted a ban on
the export of beef and appointed the unorthodox Peronist
economist Guillermo Moreno to run the GOA's anti-inflation
efforts through bullying and threatening individual producers
to lower their prices. When Uruguayan President Tabare
Vazquez did not respond well to Kirchner's insistence that
Uruguay halt the construction of two paper plants on the
Argentine border to conduct additional environmental studies,
Kirchner's rhetoric encouraged the residents of the affected
province to step up their blockade of the bridges connecting
the two countries, resulting in millions of dollars of lost
trade and tourism income for Uruguay. Faced with rising gas
prices in early 2005, Kirchner called for a national boycott
of Shell Oil and sent thousands of piqueteros to blockade
Shell Oil gas stations until they agreed to lower their
prices.
¶9. (C) Kirchner has a reputation for taking slights or any

perceived lack of respect from others personally, but is also
known for quick changes in temperament. Acevedo told the DCM
that once then-Governor Kirchner became enraged with his
Deputy Energy Minister for making a statement regarding Santa
Cruz energy policy he did not personally approve. Kirchner
called the Deputy Minister into his office and proceeded to
scream at him at the top of his lungs, ultimately effectively
throwing him out of his office physically. Everyone in the
provincial government leadership expected the Deputy Minister
to be fired. Kirchner did not speak to him for two weeks,
until he unexpectedly called him asking for some trout for a
dinner that Kirchner was hosting. Acevedo said this
individual had a reputation for knowing where to get the best
trout in Rio Gallegos. The Deputy Minister complied with the
request, and two days later Kirchner invited him for coffee.
Kirchner greeted him warmly, thanked him for the trout, and
proceeded to chat with him for a long period, as if the
previous incident had never happened, to the shock of
everyone else present, including the Deputy Minister. In the
end, the Deputy Minister was not fired, and Kirchner did not
raise the issue again.
¶10. (C) Kirchner's health condition exacerbates, and perhaps

helps define, Kirchner's emotions and psychology. President
Kirchner has reportedly suffered from irritable bowel
syndrome for many years. According to the American Medical
Association, the psychological effects of this condition
leads those who suffer from it to be "often rigid, methodical
persons who are conscientious, with obsessive-compulsive
BUENOS AIR 00001462 004 OF 005
tendencies." Kirchner also reportedly works himself to

exhaustion and needs to take frequent vacations to recover.
The AMA further states "Psychologic and social stresses are
often present in patients with irritable bowel syndrome, and
may be related in a temporal sense to the exacerbation of
symptoms." This may account for Kirchner's lack of attention
to protocol that involves long ceremonies or tight schedules,
where Kirchner would not have quick access to a bathroom.
-----------------------------------
FOREIGN POLICY NOT KIRCHNER'S FOCUS
-----------------------------------
¶11. (C) Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always

subservient to domestic political considerations. Kirchner,
at least initially, took a hard line on the paper mills
dispute with Uruguay -- despite the damage to Mercosur and
regional relations -- because of the strong Argentine public
concern about the paper mills, particularly in
ruling-party-run Entre Rios province that is on the opposite
side of the river from the plants. Kirchner's explicit and
harsh criticism of the U.S. during his speech during the
Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata can only be
understood in the context of dismal public perceptions of the
U.S. and Kirchner's desire to appeal to his leftist political
base (See Reftel E). Kirchner's hardball tactics during
negotiations over Argentina's private sector debt and his
criticism of foreign companies that run major enterprises
that were privatized in the 1990s do not earn him any support
from foreign investors, but are popular with the Argentine
public. Likewise, Kirchner cut Argentine gas exports to
Chile in 2005 to cover shortages in the internal market
despite the existence of valid contracts between Chile and
local gas suppliers.
¶12. (C) President Kirchner is not skilled at international

diplomacy and often ignores basic protocol. Kirchner's
gaffes with foreign dignitaries are legendary. In June 2004,
Kirchner left Russian leader Vladimir Putin waiting at the
Moscow airport for a meeting that never happened, reportedly
because Cristina Kirchner wanted to spend more time shopping
at their previous stop in Prague. The GOA claimed that "bad
weather" had delayed their takeoff when weather reports
showed sunny conditions in Prague. Later that year,
President Kirchner failed to attend a state dinner he was
supposed to host for visiting Vietnamese President Tran Duc
Luong. In like fashion, Kirchner failed to attend a
reception in honor of the State visit of Queen Beatriz of
Holland in March of 2006. Kirchner also never receives new
Ambassadors, as state protocol would dictate, relegating this
responsibility to Vice President Daniel Scioli.
¶13. (C) Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking group of

long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of whom lack
international, business and economic expertise (See Reftel
D). No one from the Foreign Ministry is part of Kirchner's
inner circle of advisors, and very few of Kirchner's close
associates had overseas experience before Kirchner became
President (See Reftel F). As a result, Kirchner often
receives poor advice on international issues, such as when
Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos Zannini reportedly
convinced Kirchner that taking a tough line publicly on
counter terrorism would, in the eyes of the USG, compensate
for being critical of the U.S. in other areas and opposing
the FTAA at the Summit of the Americas (See Reftel E).
------------------------------------
COMMENT -- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Kirchner's peculiar operating and decision-making

style defines Argentine policymaking, and in the coming year,
may lead to more challenges in the U.S.-Argentine
relationship, as Kirchner focuses on shoring up his
center-left political base for the 2007 elections. Given
poll numbers that show Argentines have the least positive
view of the U.S. out of all nations in the region, the U.S.
will be a convenient target for Kirchner. As during the 2003
presidential campaign, Kirchner will likely portray himself
BUENOS AIR 00001462 005 OF 005
as the lone true defender of Argentina in the world

community. The Casa Rosada has reportedly already begun an
effort to link Roberto Lavagna to the U.S., for example by
encouraging press articles that the U.S. approved and is
sponsoring a potential Lavagna campaign for President.
¶15. (C) Kirchner has a history of using international

disputes, like the paper mill conflict with Uruguay, to gain
domestic popular support. We have been told by our British
colleagues that relations between the U.K. and Argentina are
at their lowest point in 15 years because Kirchner has chosen
a confrontational attitude with the U.K. on the Falkland
Islands dispute, thereby making political use of an issue
that is at the core of Argentine national identity. As
leading political analyst Rosendo Fraga told Poloff, "This
year, Kirchner will use the U.K. and Uruguay as targets, and
next year, it will be the U.S." Kirchner has been described
to us by his close associates as someone who constantly
focuses on the costs and benefits of his political decisions.
During a recent trip to Spain, Kirchner criticized the
U.S.'s "absence" and lack of significant assistance to the
region. Former Minister Lavagna told the Ambassador that
Kirchner did this in order to counter the image that he had
been too forthcoming with Spanish multinationals during the
trip. As the 2007 presidential campaign approaches, we
cannot rule out occasional anti-U.S. diatribes by Kirchner in
order to placate his leftist supporters.
GUTIERREZ
Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1594, ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER AT THREE
YEARS
Discussing cables
2006-07-18 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
06BUENOSAIRES1594 SECRET
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER AT THREE YEARS
REF: A. 05 BUENOS AIRES 02728
¶B. 05 BUENOS AIRES 03056

¶D. BUENOS AIRES 01403
¶E. BUENOS AIRES 00097
¶F. BUENOS AIRES 01566
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Coming to power after one of the worst economic,

political and social crises in Argentina's history, President
Nestor Kirchner has had a successful first three years in
office. He is seen as a strong and decisive leader and is
credited with restoring governability to the executive branch
and promoting Argentina's impressive economic recovery.
Kirchner has high public approval ratings and has restored
public optimism in Argentina. Despite these major successes,
Kirchner continues to face considerable challenges in dealing
with poverty, crime, inflation, and the need to attract more
foreign investment and resolve Argentina's long-term energy
shortage. Although Kirchner started his presidency by
strengthening the independence of the Supreme Court, Kirchner
has since then failed to strengthen Argentina's institutional
democracy, and in many cases has weakened it. Kirchner's
reliance on presidential decrees, manipulation of the
electoral system, tightened control over the Judiciary, and
pursuit of permanent "super" budgetary powers have enhanced
presidential power at the expense of Argentina's already weak
institutional framework. Kirchner campaigned in 2003 on a
strong anti-corruption message and his first Justice
Minister, Gustavo Beliz, championed the cause of rooting out
official corruption, but the GOA has placed less emphasis on
fighting corruption since Beliz was fired in 2004. On the
foreign policy front, President Kirchner's lack of attention
and understanding in the international relations arena has
resulted in an erratic GOA foreign policy. The Kirchner
administration's most important foreign policy theme is the
promotion of regional integration, which in practice has
meant the strengthening of relations with Venezuela and
Brazil. End Summary.
-------------------------
KIRCHNER'S MANY SUCCESSES
-------------------------
¶2. (C) Coming to power after one of the worst economic,

political and social crises in Argentina's history, President
Nestor Kirchner has had a successful first three years in
office. When Kirchner first took office in May 2003, many
analysts doubted he would finish his term. Since that time,
Kirchner has gained full control of the Peronis Party (PJ),
asserted his authority over the military, largely co-opted
the piquetero movement that threatened the stability of past
governments, won control of Congress in the October 2005
elections and maintained high public approval ratings. Not
only is Kirchner's survival no longer in doubt, polls show
that Kirchner would easily win reelection if elections were
held today. Kirchner controls Argentina's political system
and faces a weak and divided opposition. Kirchner has also
proven adept at the traditional Peronist art of co-opting key
elements of the opposition, including a majority of the
opposition governors.
¶3. (C) He is seen as a strong and decisive leader and is

credited with restoring governability to the executive branch
and promoting Argentina's impressive economic recovery.
Polls show that the Argentine public views Kirchner as a
decisive leader who was able to take charge and turn the
country around during a difficult time in Argentine history.
The wave of public demonstrations that stemmed from the
2001-2002 economic crisis that brought presidential authority
in Argentina to one of its lowest ebbs has subsided and
Kirchner has adeptly managed relations with protest leaders.
On the economic front, Argentina has strongly rebounded from
the crisis, with GDP growth rates of 9 percent for the past
BUENOS AIR 00001594 002 OF 005
three years. Through the GOA's private sector debt deal and
by paying off Argentina's IMF debt, Argentina's external debt
has been brought to a manageable level for the first time in
a decade. Under Kirchner's watch, Argentina has amassed
record budget surpluses. The tax collection system -- a
perennial problem for Argentine governments -- has been
significantly improved, albeit aided by the use of
distortionary taxes like the financial transaction tax and
the export tax. Argentina's move to a market-based exchange
rate regime in 2002 has triggered an export-led boom during
Kirchner's presidency that has been the driving factor behind
robust growth, accompanied by significant declines in
unemployment and poverty levels.
¶4. (C) Kirchner has high public approval ratings and has
restored public optimism in Argentina. Kirchner's approval
ratings stand at 65-75 percentage points -- depending on the
poll and how the question is asked -- a historical high for
an Argentine president three years into his term. Polls by
leading Argentine pollsters show that Kirchner receives high
marks for his handling of the economy and for promoting
political stability. Argentines also have developed a
renewed sense of optimism under Kirchner's administration.
In recent polling by a leading opinion research firm, a
plurality of respondents -- 44 percent -- thought that
conditions in Argentina would improve over the coming year,
while only 12 percent thought things would get worse. In
March 2003, the month Kirchner was elected, polling by the
same firm showed that only 29 percent of the population
thought things would get better in the coming year, while 30
percent thought things would get worse.
-----------------
CHALLENGES REMAIN
-----------------
¶5. (C) Despite these major successes, Kirchner continues to

face considerable challenges in dealing with persistent
poverty and high crime. Poverty rates have been nearly
halved from almost 60 percent of the population at the height
of the economic crisis to 34 percent today. At the same
time, however, reducing poverty in this traditionally
affluent country continues to be a major social policy
imperative for the Kirchner administration. The continued
problem of inflation -- which stood at 12.3 percent in 2005
and is on track to maintain a double digit rate in 2006 -- is
also of a top GOA concern. The GOA has resorted to price
controls, bullying producers to lower prices, and even banned
the export of beef as a means to control inflation. (See
Septel on evaluating Kirchner's economic policy.) Crime
continues to be a major public focus according to opinion
surveys. Argentines accustomed to minimal crime rates,
particularly in the Greater Buenos Aires area, have since the
economic crisis faced a major problem with street crime, home
invasions, kidnappings and other types of violent crime. The
Capital has had several recent cases of shootings, robberies
and rapes that have garnered a lot of media attention, giving
the public the sensation of a surge in crime. Interior
Minister Anibal Fernandez recently stated that GOA statistics
in fact show that crime is down, but this assertion is
impossible to verify because the GOA has not published
national crime statistics since 2004.
¶6. (C) On the economic front, sustained growth requires

increasing infusions of foreign investment, dealing with the
energy shortage and controlling inflation. Private Direct
Foreign Investment has increased significantly since the
crisis, particularly in the tradable goods and services
industries. Nevertheless, other sectors (e.g. public
services) are badly in need of investment in order to sustain
continued growth. A strategic flaw in the economic equation
continues to be the energy sector. The Kirchner
administration has faced serious pressure from utility
companies and the G-7 to raise utility rates that have been
pesified and then frozen for residential users since the peso
devalued in 2002. So far, the GOA has been unwilling to
raise utility rates for residential users, but Kirchner
recently said he is open to discussions on the issue,
although he made no promises. Without a utility rate
BUENOS AIR 00001594 003 OF 005
increase, it is doubtful that Argentina will see major new

foreign investments in public utilities in the short-term.
Argentina's gas and electricity production has not kept up
with the rapid growth of demand due to the absence of market
incentives (price) to invest or expand production. (Comment:
Kirchner's unorthodox methods of controlling inflation,
frozen utility rates and hardball tactics with the private
sector may earn Kirchner short-term benefits, but they are
not long-term solutions to Argentina's economic problems
because they scare away foreign investment that Argentina
needs to sustain its economic growth. End Comment.)
--------------------------------------------- -------
KIRCHNER WEAK ON SUPPORT FOR INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶7. (C) Although Kirchner began his presidency by

strengthening the independence of the Supreme Court, his
record since then on institutional-democracy building has
been poor. Upon assuming office, Kirchner moved quickly to
clean up former President Carlos Menem's "automatic majority"
Supreme Court that was widely regarded as corrupt. Kirchner
and his supporters in Congress forced three Menem-era Supreme
Court justices to resign and impeached two others. Kirchner
then appointed four well-respected jurists to succeed them.
However, since that time Kirchner has failed to fill the
remaining vacancies on the high court -- a second vacancy
opened up after another justice retired -- reducing the
effectiveness of the court. (Note: Rulings still require the
support of five justices, which is more difficult to achieve
with only seven instead of nine on the bench. End Note.) A
proposal by legal experts to reduce the number of Supreme
Court justices from nine to five, as it was before Menem's
1990 controversial judicial reform, has not been pursued by
the Kirchner administration.
¶8. (C) Over the past year, Kirchner has instigated a number
of actions that have further debilitated Argentina's already
weak democratic institutions. Kirchner has issued hundreds
of presidential decrees during his presidency, preferring to
avoid discussion or delay in Congress, and signed more
decrees in his third year of his presidency than laws
approved by Congress. A new law sponsored by his wife,
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, nominally is designed to
regulate the presidential-decree-making process. The bill,
which will likely be signed into law shortly, would authorize
presidential decrees that are not voted down by both houses
of Congress. The proposed bill does not set a time limit on
when Congress is required to vote after a presidential decree
is issued and allows decrees to remain in force pending a
congressional vote. (Note: Senator Cristina Kirchner
proposed a bill in 2000 designed to regulate presidential
decrees when Fernando de la Rua of the Radical Civic Union
(UCR) was President. Unlike her current bill, the 2000
Cristina Kirchner bill required Congress to vote on
presidential decrees within 20 days of their issuance and
made the decrees invalid if just one house of Congress voted
against them. Senator Kirchner's bill was not approved in
2000, but UCR Senator Rodolfo Terragno reintroduced
Kirchner's exact bill in the Senate earlier this year, to
which Senator Kirchner responded with the current modified
version of the bill. End Note.) (Comment: Congress'
regulation of presidential decrees is a long-overdue action
that was supposed to be addressed shortly following the 1994
constitutional reform. The current bill will serve to
legitimate what has become an arbitrary use of presidential
powers. Kirchner is not the first president to abuse the use
of presidential decrees, but he has taken their use to new
levels. End Comment.)
¶9. (C) Kirchner and his supporters' manipulation of the

electoral system before and after the October 2005
legislative elections gained them more power in Congress, but
sometimes ran counter to voters' wishes and the spirit of the
Constitution and electoral law. In the October elections,
the ruling PJ party split in five of the eight provinces that
were electing national senators, allowing them to gain all
three Senate seats in the five provinces. (Note: By dividing
in several provinces, and in most cases reuniting after the
BUENOS AIR 00001594 004 OF 005

election, the PJ circumvented a constitutional provision
reserving a portion of the Senate seats to miniority parties.
Electoral law further stipulates that those parties that
cannot agree on a unified electoral list hold primary
elections to choose candidates, which the PJ did not do in
most provinces. See Reftel A. End Note.) Kirchner's allies
in Congress also prevented right-wing Paufe leader Luis Patti
from taking his seat in Congress due to as yet unproven
allegations of human rights abuses when Patti was a police
commissioner during the last military dictatorship. Patti
was prevented from taking his seat despite a ruling by the
National Electoral Committee prior to the election that there
was nothing preventing Patti from assuming office and despite
the nearly 400,000 people that voted for him in Buenos Aires
province (See Reftel B).
¶10. (C) Kirchner and his allies have used other questionable
tactics that contradicted voters' intentions and have
supporting provincial allies in overturning term limits.
Cabinet Chief Alberto Fernandez drew newly-elected
congressman for the opposition Republican Proposal (PRO)
Eduardo Lorenzo Borocoto over to Kirchner's bloc by offering
his son a lucrative government job. Several Kirchner
congressmen elected in October never assumed their seats,
such as Jorge Taiana, who became Foreign Minister, and La
Rioja Governor Angel Maza, who left his newly-won Senate seat
to his sister, Ada Maza. Tucuman Governor Jose Alperovich,
with Kirchner's blessing, recently changed his province's
constitution to allow himself to run for reelection.
Kirchner is supporting similar efforts by friendly Governors
in Jujuy and Misiones, and Buenos Aires Governor Felipe Sola
is in discussions with Kirchner to allow him to change the
Buenos Aires Constitution or ensure a favorable legal ruling
so he also can run for reelection next year.
¶11. (C) Kirchner has achieved an unprecedented

centralization of decision-making, but has weakened
Argentina's system of checks and balances in the process. In
February 2006, Kirchner and his allies in Congress succeeded
in modifying the Council of Magistrates that regulates the
Argentine judicial system, strengthening the Casa Rosada's
control over the judiciary (See Reftel C). Congress is also
likely to shortly approve granting Cabinet Chief Alberto
Fernandez permanent "super" budgetary powers that will enable
him to freely move funds from one area of the budget to
another without approval from Congress. The opposition in
Congress claim the proposed law will strip Congress of its
fundamental democratic role of controlling the budget and
that these powers are no longer necessary because the
economic crisis is over. The opposition further argues that
the measure is simply designed to allow the GOA to spend
money however it wants during an election year, pointing out
that Alberto Fernandez reassigned ARP 500 million to social
and public works projects just two weeks before the October
2005 legislative elections using these same powers. The
Kirchners have lashed out repeatedly at the press and the
opposition for their criticism of the Casa Rosada's recent
actions in Congress. The GOA claims these are necessary
powers to ensure the smooth functioning of the government.
Regardless of the opposition's objections, the Casa Rosada
appears to have the necessary votes to approve the measure by
early August. (Note: These "super" budgetary powers were
first granted by Congress to the GOA at the start of the
economic crisis in 2001 and were re-approved every year
through the 2005 budget. They were not included in the 2006
budget -- passed before the October elections gave Kirchner
control of Congress -- because of opposition resistance. The
current bill would make these special budgetary powers
permanent. End Note.)
¶12. (S) Kirchner campaigned in 2003 on a strong

anti-corruption message and his first Justice Minister,
Gustavo Beliz, came with impeccable credentials and
championed the cause of rooting out official corruption.
Unfortunately, the GOA has placed less emphasis on fighting
corruption since then. In fact, since Beliz was fired in
2004, Kirchner has avoiding speaking publicly about official
corruption and the much-vaunted new Office of Anti-Corruption
has failed to live up to its envisioned potential. There
BUENOS AIR 00001594 005 OF 005
also have been credible allegations that Planning Minister

Julio De Vido, a key Kirchner insider, has been involved in
questionable federal and provincial public works contracts
during Kirchner's presidency (See Reftel D).
--------------------------------------------
KIRCHNER FOREIGN POLICY SUFFERS FROM NEGLECT
--------------------------------------------
¶13. (C) President Kirchner's lack of attention and

understanding in the international relations arena has
resulted in an erratic GOA foreign policy. President
Kirchner is not skilled at international diplomacy and relies
on an ever-shrinking group of long-time advisors who lack
foreign policy expertise to make key decisions. Kirchner has
touted Mercosur as a regional alternative to the FTAA, but
his conflict with Uruguay over the construction of two paper
plants has caused a crisis within the trading bloc.
President Kirchner has recently sought closer relations with
Spain, even as he is putting more pressure on Spanish
companies with major investments in Argentina, such as Repsol
and Aerolineas Argentinas. Kirchner has repeatedly thanked
the U.S. for its support to Argentina during the crisis and
sought to strengthen the bilateral relationship after
short-circuits during the Summit of the Americas, but took
the opportunity during a recent press conference in Madrid to
criticize the U.S. and claim that the U.S. left Argentina to
face the crisis alone (See Reftel E).
¶14. (C) The Kirchner administration's most important foreign

policy theme is the promotion of regional integration, which
in practice has meant the strengthening of relations with
Venezuela and Brazil. Argentina's most important goal during
its recent presidency of Mercosur was the integration of
Venezuela into the trading bloc (See Reftel F). Kirchner's
top officials have repeatedly told Embassy officials that the
GOA's relationship with Venezuela is based on economics and
Mercosur. Kirchner sees Venezuela as a solution for
Argentina's energy and financing problems. Kirchner, who
normally places a low priority on foreign relations, in the
past 12 months has traveled twice to Caracas and hosted
Chavez three times in Argentina. Kirchner will host Chavez
again for the July 20-21 Mercosur Summit in Cordoba,
Argentina. Kirchner has also sought to strengthen relations
with Brazil, recently endorsing Brazilian President Lula's
reelection and signing an accord on automobile sales between
the two countries.
¶15. (C) To his credit, Kirchner has remained committed to

OAS efforts to return Haiti to stability and constitutional
democracy. Senior GOA officials assure us that Argentine
peacekeepers will remain on the island for the long-term.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶16. (C) President Kirchner has numerous successes to show

after three years in office. The economy is booming and
Argentines feel a level of stability and dignity has been
restored to their country which was lost in the political,
economic and social disaster of 2001-2002. In Kirchner's
first years in office, Argentina needed a strong hand to lead
it out of the depths of crisis. History has shown that
long-term, broad-based economic growth needs to be
accompanied by a strong institutional framework. Now that
the crisis has past, the country needs a leader that is
willing to spend some of his built-up capital to strengthen
Argentina's weak democratic institutions. To date, it is
unclear whether Kirchner has the will or capacity to make
this transition. End Comment
GUTIERREZ
Viewing cable 06MADRID1914, COURT FREES "SPANISH TALIBAN"
Discussing cables
06MADRID1914 2006-07-28 11:11 2010-11-30 12:12 SECRET Embassy Madrid
VZCZCXRO3816
PP RUEHAG
DE RUEHMD #1914/01 2091105
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281105Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 1994
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001914
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL SP
SUBJECT: COURT FREES "SPANISH TALIBAN"
REF: A. 2005 MADRID 3528

¶B. TD-314/09169-05
MADRID 00001914 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: A/DCM Kathleen Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. The Spanish Supreme Court announced July 24

that it had annulled the six-year prison sentence handed down
in September by Spain's National Court against accused
terrorist Hamed Abderrahaman Ahmed, known in the media as the
"Spanish Taliban." Abderrahaman, a Spanish national captured
in Afghanistan by U.S. forces and held at Guantanamo until
being turned over to Spanish authorities in February 2004,
was immediately released from prison. The Supreme Court
found that Spanish prosecutors could not use any evidence
collected during their interview with Abderrahaman while he
was being held at Guantanamo under conditions the Court
termed "impossible to explain, much less justify." The Court
threw out other evidence collected against Abderrahaman prior
to his capture in Afghanistan and determined that prosecutors
had skewed Abderrahaman's testimony to incriminate him. This
finding had an immediate effect on the case of Lahcen
Ikassrien, a Moroccan national and former Guantanamo detainee
tranferred to Spanish custody in July 2005. Prosecutors
announced their recommendation to release Ikassrien on bail
while awaiting trial on terrorism charges, while
Abderrahaman's attorney said he would sue the U.S. Government
for suffering allegedly suffered by Abderrahaman during his
incarceration in Guantanamo. Spanish officials involved in
the Abderrahaman case expressed disappointment in his
release, but also said that he was not particularly dangerous
and dismissed him as a threat. This ruling does not indicate
a reduction in counter-terrorism cooperation by Spanish law
enforcement officials, but the Supreme Court's decisions will
clearly have to be taken into account as we pursue improved
judicial cooperation with Spain. The Spanish judicial branch
carefully guards its hard-won indepence, meaning it will not
shy away from rulings that cut across Spanish Government (or
USG) objectives. End Summary.
//BACKGROUND//
¶2. (S) According to sentencing documents, Abderrahaman

established contacts with al-Qa'ida elements in the Spanish
enclave of Ceuta and, in August 2001, traveled to Afghanistan
for religious and military training in Kandahar. When the
U.S. invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11
attacks, Abderrahaman fled to Pakistan, where he was
reportedly captured by the Pakistani military, who turned him
over to U.S. forces. Abderrahaman was transferred to
Guantanamo, where he was held until he was turned over to
Spanish authorities in February 2004 in response to a request
by magistrate Baltasar Garzon, who wanted to investigate
Abderrahaman in connection with the trial of al-Qa'ida cell
leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas. Under the terms of that
transfer, Spanish authorities agreed to:
-- Be prepared to detain, investigate, and prosecute

Abderrahaman, while treating him humanely;
-- Share with USG authorities any information developed

during the investigation;
-- Provide reasonable notice of any decision to release or

transfer Abderrahaman;
-- Conduct surveillance of Abderrahaman following his

release, and share any relevant information with the U.S.;
and,
-- Provide U.S. officials access to Abderrahaman if necessary.
¶3. (S) Garzon released Abderrahaman on bail in July 2004,

finding that Spanish National Police interrogations of
Abderrahaman while he was being held in Guantanamo could not
be used as evidence. However, the National Police had
previous wiretap evidence linking Abderrahaman to Barakat
Yarkas as well as what they viewed as incriminating
statements by Abderrahaman to police investigators following
his release from Guantanamo. In early 2005, a confidential
police assessment shared with USG officials concluded that
Abderrahaman had the "mental maturity of a 12-year-old," was
"naive and foolish," and did not seem to comprehend the
gravity of his detention in Guantanamo. But the report also
noted Abderrahaman's consistent statements to Spanish police
that he wanted to "go fight with the Chechens and kill
Russians." (REF B). Police provided this information to
prosecutors and to the National Court, which found
MADRID 00001914 002.2 OF 003
Abderrahaman guilty in September 2005 of "membership in a

terrorist organization." The case was then automatically
transferred to the Supreme Court to either overturn or
confirm the sentence.
//SUPREME COURT THROWS OUT CONVICTION//
¶4. (U) The Supreme Court overturned Abderrahaman's conviction

on the basis that the National Court had allowed prosecutors
to use inadmissible evidence to establish Abderrahaman's
guilt and that prosecutors had improperly translated
Abderrahaman's incriminating testimony. Specifically, the
Supreme Court found that testimony obtained by Spanish police
investigators during the course of interviews of Abderrahaman
in Guantanamo could not be used in court because the
"interrogations, euphemistically called "interviews," took
place under unequal circumstances because (the defendant) was
in detention" at the time of the interrogations. Further,
the Supreme Court finding stated that "although it is not for
(this Court) to issue a pronouncement regarding the situation
of those held in indefinite detention, we must state that, as
Ahmed was held in detention under the authority of the U.S.
military since he was turned over (to the U.S.) on an
undetermined date, all information obtained under such
conditions must be declared totally null and nonexistent."
The Court did go on to pronounce its position on Guantanamo,
criticizing the detention of "hundreds of people, among them
Ahmed, without charges, without rights, without controls, and
without limits," a situation the Court termed "impossible to
explain, much less justify."
¶5. (U) Just as damaging to the prosecution's case was the

Court's decision to throw out telephone intercepts
incriminating Abderrahaman obtained during the course of the
Barakat Yarkas investigation and long before Abderrahaman's
detention in Afghanistan. The judges found that the
intercepts had been obtained improperly (NOTE: the Supreme
Court had already ruled against allowing the intercepts
during its review of the convictions of Barakat Yarkas cell
members). The Supreme Court also determined that prosecutors
had improperly translated Abderrahaman's statements and had
omitted exculpatory evidence, such as Abderrahaman's
declaration that he did not belong to al-Qa'ida and had not
received military training. The Court criticized prosecutors
for omitting a document "signed in Guantanamo by Abderrahaman
before being turned over to Spanish authorities," a document
in which U.S. authorities allegedly acknowledged that
Abderrahaman was not a member of al-Qa'ida. On this basis,
the Supreme Court found that the case against Abderrahaman
failed to meet the minimum standards established by the
European Court of Human Rights for a finding of "guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt."
¶6. (C) Legat contacted Eduardo Fungairino, currently the head

of an anti-terrorism office assigned to the Supreme Court and
formerly the chief of the National Prosecutor's office, on
July 25 for his insights into the Abderrahaman decision.
Fungairino (strictly protect) dismissed the Supreme Court
decision as "facile and populist." He said that while he
acknowledged errors on the part of National Court prosecutors
in the case (and the legal problems generated by the
circumstances at Guantanamo), in his view the Supreme Court
ignored evidence of Abderrahaman's terrorist training in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, activities that are clearly
criminal under Spanish law. Fungairino indicated that one
consolation, in his view, was that Abderrahaman did not
represent a serious threat, echoing police assessments that
Abderrahaman was a pawn in events beyond his understanding
(see para 3).
//ABDERRAHAMAN PLANS TO SUE USG//
¶7. (U) In a July 25 press conference organized by

Abderrahaman attorney Marcos Garcia Montes, Abderrahaman told
reporters that he hoped to gain employment as a truck driver
and claimed that his vision had degraded so much during his
detention in Guantanamo that he was unfit for other
employment. Garcia Montes said that he planned to file a
"multimillion dollar suit" against the U.S. Government for
damages, including post-traumatic stress and vision loss on
the part of his client. The attorney told reporters that
Abderrahaman's suffering had been such that he could no
longer recall specific elements of his detention in
Guantanamo, nor of his time in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Abderrahaman roundly denied ever having been a terrorist and
insisted that his prior references to himself as a "martyr"
referred to his treatment in detention. Prompted by his
MADRID 00001914 003.2 OF 003
attorney, Abderrahaman related his alleged mistreatment in

U.S. detention, including the presence of a powerful
lightbulb in his cell that impeded sleep and threats that he
would never see his family again. Abderrahaman said he
planned to write a book about his experiences.
//IKASSRIEN ALSO TO BE RELEASED//
¶8. (U) Following the Supreme Court decision in the

Abderrahaman case, National Court prosecutors announced that
they would support the release on bail of Moroccan national
Lahcen Ikassrien, who was transferred to Spain from
Guantanamo in July 2005 and held in preventive detention
since his arrival. This comes less than a month after
prosecutors filed formal charges against Ikassrien, seeking
an eight-year prison term on charges of membership in a
terrorist organization. The case against Ikassrien is based
on three police interviews with him when he was being held at
Guantanamo (by the same investigators who interviewed
Abderrahaman) and on telephone intercepts developed in the
course of the Barakat Yarkas investigation, the same evidence
thrown out in the Abderrahaman case. (NOTE: According to
press reports, the Spanish police intercepts place Ikassrien
in Istanbul, Turkey in November 2000 along with suspected
terrorists Amer Azizi and Said Berraj. In a separate
intercept, Ikassrien requested assistance with documentation
from al-Qa'ida cell leader Barakat Yarkas). Prosecutors have
maintained that Ikassrien's own testimony since his transfer
from Guantanamo incriminates him since he has acknowledged
traveling to Afghanistan to "collaborate with the Islamist
regime." That is disputed by court observers who say that
Ikassrien's statements to the National Court have been
substantially less incriminating than those of Abderrahaman
¶9. (U) Ikassrien's attorney has already homed in on
Guantanamo as key to his client's defense, focusing on
Ikassrien's alleged mistreatment while in US custody. The
attorney's request claims that "while Ikassrien was in
Guantanamo, he was gassed, beaten, mistreated, and insulted,
and subject to repeated inspections, during which the
military officials undertaking the inspections would damage
or destroy (Ikassrien's) books, especially the Koran."
Ikassrien's attorney also alleges that his client was
forcibly injected with a substance that led to severe itching
that continues to affect him.
//COMMENT//
¶10. (C) Spanish counter-terrorism legislation was designed

over three decades to combat ETA, a group with a defined
structure, doctrine, and modus operandi. Police,
prosecutors, and magistrates working on investigations of the
far more amorphous cells of Islamist extremist have struggled
to develop evidence sufficient to meet the high threshhold
set by the Spanish Supreme Court. This was reflected in an
earlier decision by the Supreme Court to reverse the
convictions of several Barakat Yarkas cell members and to
reduce Barakat Yarkas' sentence on the basis that prosecutors
had not proved his connection to the September 11 attacks in
the U.S. (USG observers of the trial noted that the evidence
on the September 11 connection was indeed weak). Clearly, in
the Abderrahaman case the Supreme Court was also eager to use
this case as a platform to criticize U.S. detainee policies
in Guantanamo. While this sentiment has not influenced
Spanish police to reduce their close collaboration with the
U.S. in fighting terrorism, we must take it into account as
we pursue increased judicial cooperation with Spain in
terrorism cases. The Spanish judiciary carefully guards its
independence (a major achievement of the post-Franco era) and
has not shied from taking decisions that cut across the
obectives of the Spanish Government.
AGUIRRE
Viewing cable 06SEOUL2238, ROK REACTIONS TO DPRK MISSILE

LAUNCHES-DAY TWO
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06SEOUL2238.
2006-07-06 2010-11-29 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFOR
06SEOUL2238 Embassy Seoul
09:09 21:09 N
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #2238/01 1870941

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060941Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0907
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7391
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0977
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1286
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002238
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NSC FOR CHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015

TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK REACTIONS TO DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES-DAY TWO
REF: SEOUL 2211
Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
Rokg reaction
-------------
¶1. (C) xxxxx that despite its

decision to suspend humanitarian aid to the DPRK, it would
ship another 24,700 metric tons of fertilizer 6-7 July. This
final shipment will complete the delivery to the North of the
pledge of 350,000 metric tons South Korea made earlier this
year. MOU officials have explained that the ROKG is
proceeding with this shipment because it is a small, final
portion of a pledged commitment.
¶2. (U) Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok on July 6 told the

National Assembly Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Trade
Committee that Seoul would hold inter-Korean ministerial
talks set for July 11-14 in Busan as scheduled, adding that
it was not consistent to urge the North to return to talks
over its nuclear weapons programs but refuse to talk with the
North itself. Lee said it was still important to limit
Seoul's measures against the North to avoid further
escalation on the Peninsula.
¶3. (C) The A/DCM xxxxx to verify the items above. In a

frank exchange, A/DCM expressed disappointment that things
appeared to be "business-as-usual," with the shipment of
fertilizer this week and the holding of inter-Korean
ministerials next week. This was sending the wrong signals
to Pyongyang for its inexcusable behavior, A/DCM said.
xxxxx replied that a lot of internal
discussions had taken place, but that political-levels
concluded that breaking off the dialogue was not wise because
restarting it would be too costly and difficult. Moreover,
the dialogue must be used to send a stern message to North
Korea. Next week the ROK delegation would definitely make
the point that Pyongyang's demand for an additional 100,000
tons of fertilizer and 500,000 tons of rice was threatened.
Also, in response to the missile launches, xxxxx, Seoul
had decided to cancel North-South military liaison officers'
talks that were planned for July 7, which essentially meant
that General Officers' talks would not be held as hoped. In
addition, Seoul was holding back on approving new investment
permits for the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). A/DCM
encouraged xxxxx develop further measures and to publicize
them (septel).
¶4. (U) Senior Secretary for National Security Suh Choo-suk

said on the radio on July 6 that the ROKG has initially
concluded that the DPRK's failed missile launch was due to a
technical failure. He also defended the ROKG's reaction to
the missile launches as quick and appropriate.
¶5. (U) ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong on July 6 told

the National Assembly Defense Committee that the North might
launch more missiles, citing an assessment of the equipment
and groups going to and from the launch sites during DPRK
preparations over the past two months. He also rejected the
argument of an opposition lawmaker that there was a delay in
the ROKG reaction to the launches. Separately, an unnamed
senior official at the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly
denied media reports that the DPRK was preparing to launch a
second Taepodong II missile.
.
Political reaction
------------------
¶6. (C) During a July 6 opposition Grand National Party (GNP)

leaders' meeting, the GNP criticized the ROKG for its "idle"
approach to the DPRK missile launches and called for the
resignation of all the security-related ministers. The GNP
proposed a national investigation on the ROKG's reaction,
proposed an "emergency National Assembly committee," and
urged the ROKG to review its inter-Korean policies, including
the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the Geumgang Tourism Project,
and humanitarian assistance. xxxxx told
xxxxx that all cash support to the DPRK should be stopped
and that sending fertilizer north as missiles were being
fired was "nonsensical." xxxxx predicted that the missile
test could have a deciding effect on the July 11 GNP party
chair selection, to replace xxxxx who stepped down
last month. xxxxx said the lawmaker who could make people
feel the most secure would be selected and hinted that Kang
Jae-sup, with his more conservative prosecutor's background,
might be the more attractive choice in light of the current
situation.
¶7. (C) The spokesman for smaller opposition Democratic Party

(DP)xxxxx stated that the ROKG should recognize the
importance of closely coordinating with Washington and Tokyo
and improve its crisis management system that the DP said
failed to operate effectively. One Democratic Party staffer
noted to poloff that the missile tests should be viewed as "a
test" and nothing more.
¶8. (U) The progressive Democratic Labor Party (DLP)

spokesman said xxxxx that the ROKG should maintain
dialogue with the DPRK and prevent further DPRK provocations.
At the same time, the ROKG should encourage Washington to
negotiate directly with Pyongyang.
¶9. (C) Several Uri Party staffers told poloff that further
assistance would be difficult due to the lack of popular
support, but that aid already agreed upon should continue.
One staffer noted that the tests put the Uri Party in a
"difficult position" because they showed the ineffectiveness
of the current engagement policy. The Uri Party echoed much
of the GNP's frustration with the related ministers, but
stopped short of calling for them to step down. A common
theme also heard was that the ROK reaction to the tests was
"by the manual" developed by the Uri Party and not late at
all.
.
Press coverage
--------------
¶10. (U) ROK media reports on July 6 highlighted UNSC

discussions, criticisms that Seoul was caught flat-footed,
and speculations about DPRK motivations and prospects for
inter-Korean relations. The Dong-A Ilbo, a moderate daily,
criticized the ROKG government for responding too slowly,
delivering a weaker announcement than Washington or Tokyo,
and for poorly coordinating with the USG, which, the paper
said, created the information lag.
¶11. (U) As to why the North launched the missiles, opinions

ranged from (1) to get attention and negotiation leverage;
(2) to use for internal purpose to demonstrate DPRK strength;
and/or (3) for technical reasons to demonstrate DPRK missile
achievement. The progressive Hankyoreh opined that the
timing of the launch, on July 4, was special because it was
the 34th anniversary of the North-South Joint Statement from
1972, and it was the U.S. Independence Day, suggesting that
the DPRK was exhibiting brinkmanship and wanted to generate
more attention.
¶12. (U) Press stories quoted some analysts who opined that
North Korea might stand to gain from the launches. Kim
Tae-hyo, a political scientist at Sungkyunkwan University,
was quoted as saying that Kim Jong-il probably gambled that
Beijing and Seoul would not change their stances and that
this gamble was likely to pay off. Paik Hak-soon, a senior
researcher at Sejong Institute, suggested that the DPRK
launch was probably an effort to strengthen its position in
the Six Party Talks because it was unsatisfied with proposed
compensation for scrapping its nuclear programs. Peter Beck,
Director of the International Crisis Group's Seoul office
said that at most Seoul would probably only delay aid
shipments, versus a real change in its current policies.
.
Dprk watchers caution against sanctions at symposium
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶13. (SBU) The prevailing sentiment among North Korea experts

gathered at a July 6 symposium in Seoul on North Korean
Development and International Cooperation was for all parties
to exercise restraint in responding to the North Korean
missile launches.
¶14. (SBU) Amb. Sun Jun-young, Professor at Kyungnam

University and Former ROK Ambassador to the UN, said that the
missile launches were the DPRK's "last card" and showed not
its strength, but its weakness.xxxxx
that the DPRK felt so pressured by U.S. banking sanctions
that it felt compelled to show its might in some manner. xxxxx
believed that it would be a mistake to punish DPRK with
sanctions and that it would be a mistake for the ROKG to
suspend ministerial discussions scheduled for July 11. The
best decision, he said, would be to perhaps delay the
meetings, but to keep lines of communication open.
¶15. (SBU) xxxxx that the

Bush Administration's "neglect and containment policy" caused
North Korea to break its moratorium on missile testing. xxxxx
expressed concern that the launches would result in
sanctions. According xxxxx, every time sanctions were
applied to North Korea, the nuclear and missile situation
became aggravated. He said that the missile launches were a
signal from North Korea to the United States that it wanted
direct negotiations. Kyungnam University Prof. Lim Eul-chul
also said that the missile launches appeared to be a way of
bringing the United States back to the negotiating table. It
was North Korea's way of getting American attention, he
shrugged.
¶16. (SBU)xxxxx
that it would not be helpful to cut off assistance and
contacts, particularly in a time of crisis. It would be
important to keep channels of communication open in order to
facilitate an exchange of positions.
¶17. (SBU) Visiting xxxxx that

the best reaction to the launches would be to continue with
business as usual. He said that to overreact would be to
play into North Korea's expectations and fulfill its goal of
seeking attention. By minimizing public reaction and
continuing to seek opportunities for exchange and assistance,
there would be greater possibility of making a long-term,
positive impact. Also, imposing sanctions would only harm
ordinary North Koreans, who had nothing to do with the
missile launches. xxxxx advised at most a delay in
engagement activity with the DPRK.
¶18. (SBU) xxxxx, likened the missile crisis to a cold winter

before a warm spring. He criticized the USG for taking a
harsh line toward North Korea and precipitating the current
situation. But, he said, the situation could be salvaged if
the USG provided a security guarantee and food to North
Korea. This, he said, would initiate the process of
separating the regime from its leaders.xxxxx said
that imposing sanctions would be as effective as a dog
barking outside a city's walls. It would be much better to
use humanitarian aid like a Trojan Horse to start change from
within.
.
Dprk tourism and kic unaffected by missile launches
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶19. (SBU) Hyundai Asan President Yoon Man-joon said during

his keynote address at xxxxx that the
launches have had no impact on Hyundai Asan's operations in
North Korea. He said that of the 315 persons scheduled to
tour North Korea's Mt. Geumgang xxxxx, there was only one
cancellation. Noting that far more people usually canceled
at the last minute because of personal reasons, Yoon said
that people seemed determined to continue with their plans.
Yoon added that there has been no abnormal investor activity
with regard to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and
predicted that investors who were planning to invest in KIC
would probably delay their investments for a short time, but
then push ahead with their original plans. xxxxx
"political, not military, missiles" and predicted that travel
and investment in the DPRK would remain stable.
Vershbow
Viewing cable 06ANKARA4688, TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE

PM'S CIRCLE TO
Discussing cables
06ANKARA4688
14:02 18:06 RN Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #4688/01 2231453

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111453Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5386
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021

TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO
THE FORE
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) The long-standing split between the professional MFA

diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan
has widened noticeably in recent weeks. This gap has existed
under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, largely because of the close links that both PM
Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has
been willing to undertake numerous initiatives. Until
recently, however, such strains have usually been more
effectively papered over. This internal debate now affects
every step the GOT takes on the international stage.
2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and

well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so
on the domestic political front. PM Erdogan,s core of AKP
advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs,
understand what will play well with their constituencies.
Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is
handicapped, however, by their Turkey- and Islam-centric
vision of how they want the world to operate.
¶3. (C/NF) Decoupling MFA from the PM,s advisers can produce
a greater willingness to take chances. At the same time, it
can also create greater room for misunderstandings or
wrongfooted efforts. In the run-up to the February 2006
Hamas visit to Ankara, for example, MFA was kept in the dark.
The AKPers who dealt with the visit did so in a haphazard
and uncoordinated manner. MFA, uninformed, was unable to
preview it with us. The backlash from the U.S. in particular
truly took AKP aback. It took weeks -) even months -)
before limited understanding dawned on the depth of the
displeasure the Hamas venture had spawned, and why. It did
not (and still does not) fit within their frame of reference.
¶4. (C/NF) Most startling, perhaps, to AKP were those in the

U.S. and elsewhere who, in the aftermath of the Hamas visit,
asked how AKP would feel if we met with PKK leaders. For
Erdogan,s circle, it is not analogous: for them, terrorism
equals the PKK. It is difficult for PM Erdogan to believe
that his philanthropist Islamic friend Al Kadi could be
involved in terrorist financing, just as it is alien to their
frame of reference to view specific Islamic groups as
terrorists. Hamas and Hizballah are the result of western
policies gone awry, a response from desperate people )- not
truly terrorists. Allow them to talk reason to these people,
exert Turkish influence, and the Hamases of the world will
change. This has been evident in other Turkish efforts
throughout the region as well -- with Iran (FM Mottaki,s
visit here; Erdogan,s talks with Ahmedinejad on the margins
of international conferences); with Syria (the Turks believe
they were instrumental in getting Syria,s Asad to agree to
pull troops out of Lebanon, and to certain aspects of the
Hariri investigation); with the current conflict in Lebanon
and the Gaza strip.
5.(C/NF) A more recent example of the PM circle-MFA

disconnect involved Davutoglu,s trip to Damascus the first
week of July, where he met not only with Asad but Misha,al
as well. The MFA was cut out and furious (their Ambassador
to Damascus reportedly cooled his heels outside while
Davutoglu met with Asad).
6.(C) As the Israel-Lebanon crisis intensified, so has this

tendency within Erdogan,s small circle. AKP sees own its
back to the public opinion wall. Instead of exercising
leadership, Erdogan -- in populist pre-election mode -- has
followed. He is playing to AKP,s constituency; to those
within the party who have never been positively inclined
toward Israel; and to the greater regional Sunni audience
that he is trying to court. Two early results, aimed at
these audiences, were (1) the PM,s participation in the
August 3 extraordinary OIC executive council meetin in Kuala
Lumpur, where he again met with Irnian president Ahmedinejad
and uttered strong anti-Israeli statements; and (2) FM Gul,s
August 3 op-ed piece in the Washington Post, which aired GOT
ire in an unhelpful way and blindsided the professional
Turkish diplomats in Washington.
7.(C/NF) Complicit or not (we believe the former), Gul has

had his name sullied by a number of these efforts. He will
have to decide whether to give the MFA renewed weight -)
Foreign Ministry officials could be key in bridging certain

delicate issues, particularly Cyprus, with both the
government and the military, for example -) or go with the
PM,s circle.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
Viewing cable 06BERLIN2546, SPD IN DRIVER'S SEAT FOR BERLIN

ELECTION
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06BERLIN2546.
06BERLIN2546 2006-08-30 15:03 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #2546/01 2421538

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301538Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 002546
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2021

TAGS: PGOV GM
SUBJECT: SPD IN DRIVER'S SEAT FOR BERLIN ELECTION
Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (U) Summary. With three weeks to go, opinion polls and political
commentators and contacts all say Berlin's September 17 election of a new
parliament is the SPD's to lose. The Social Democrats lead the Christian
Democrats by over ten percent in all polls and the ratings gap between the two
parties' candidates for Mayor is even greater. Real interest is already focusing
on whom the SPD will chose as a coalition partner – the Left Party.PDS with
which the SPD now governs the city, or the Green Party. The election, which is
expected, in essence, to confirm Berlin's left of center majority, will have no
immediate national political implications. However, Mayor Wowereit has signaled
his interest in playing a role in national SPD politics in the future. Because
of the predicted low turnout, concerns have been expressed by some observers
that parties of the far-right will gain seats in some of Berlin's district
assemblies. End Summary.
The Campaign: SPD in Charge; CDU in Tatters

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The state of Berlin leaves much to be desired – the weak school system
has been the subject of a steady drumbeat of critical headlines for months; the
business climate is at best stagnant and high-profile departures or attempted
departures of big employers are an issue; the city's enormous debt continues to
grow steadily and is now at 60 billion euros. Nonetheless, support for the SPD
remains strong at 30-35 percent (ahead of the 29 percent taken in 2001) and
Mayor Wowereit is genuinely popular. CDU xxxxx admits that the CDU's lead
candidate, Friedbert Pflueger, simply cannot match Wowereit for charisma and
campaign skills. Moreover, the Berlin CDU has been damaged by: 1) years of
infighting and tension between modernizers in the party, including Pflueger, and
old-school conservatives; and 2) the lingering effects of a banking scandal that
drove it from office in 2001. Pflueger, from Lower Saxony, also suffers from a
carpetbagger image – his last-minute announcement that he would give up his
Bundestag membership and Defense Ministry State Secretaryship to concentrate on
Berlin has not helped. The CDU has been hovering at around 20 percent in polls
since even before the campaign began.
¶3. (C) CDU and SPD contacts agree that the turnout for the election will likely
be very low. SPD Berlin Business Manager Ruediger Scholz fears this could hurt
the SPD more than the CDU and so the party intends to focus on getting its core
supporters to the polls in the final weeks of the campaign. Scholz points out
that a low turnout is likely to benefit smaller parties with more ideological
voters – meaning the far-left WASG and the far-right NPD and Republicans. He and
most other interlocutors seem to expect that the far-right will win seats in the
district assemblies in at least some of Berlin's eastern districts while the
WASG could win seats in Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain. The threshold for entry is
winning only three percent of district votes. Neither far-right nor far-left is
given any chance of clearing the five percent threshold for entry into the state
parliament.
Coalition Politics
-----------------
¶4. (C) The Left Party.PDS, according to Berlin leader Klaus Lederer, cannot
expect a repeat of its 23 percent performance in 2001. That showing was the
result of the banking scandal, which briefly tarred the SPD as well as CDU, and
the star quality of then-PDS lead candidate Gregor Gysi, now fully occupied in
the Bundestag. Polls put the LP.PDS at around 15 percent, which is where the
Greens also stand. Thus, either party could be a plausible partner for the SPD.
Mayor Wowereit has stated his desire to remain in government with the LP.PDS,
though the two parties have not concluded a formal electoral alliance. The SPD's
Scholz, Green Berlin caucus leader Sibyll Klotz, and Berlin FDP leader Markus
Loening all agree that the LP.PDS would make the more comfortable partner for
Wowereit because of the ease of their cooperation thus far and because keeping
the LP.PDS in government defuses a large bloc of voters who could be mobilized
easily to protest the cuts and privatizations which the government has used to
try and recover control of the budget. However, Scholz notes that it would
probably be better for the city and for Wowereit given his political ambitions,
if he were to form a coalition with the Greens, who are more centrist
(especially on finance) and, at the federal level, presentable. Green state
parliament member Oezcan Mutlu argued strongly that Wowereit will opt for the
Greens based on these considerations, though he acknowledged that working with
the Greens would be harder. He even said that, given Green fractiousness, they
would have to bring a 7-8 seat majority into a coalition to make it stable.
¶5. (C) If the numbers did not work out for a two-party coalition (and all our
contacts reject the idea of a Grand Coalition), then the most likely option
seems to be an SPD-LP.PDS-Green alliance. However, some in the FDP (now at 8-9
percent in polls) hope that in such a situation, they might have a chance of
sidling into power. Berlin FDP lead candidate Martin Lindner and Loening have
told us that they believe the Greens would rather work with them than the
LP.PDS. This seems quite a long shot, though, as Berlin Greens stand quite far
to the left in the Green spectrum.
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) The Berlin election is unlikely to have major national significance
under any circumstances. The Grand Coalition recognizes this and, unlike in the
period before the spring elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate
and Saxony-Anhalt, is not postponing debate on contentious issues. However, in
two aspects the elections are noteworthy. First, a victory will boost Klaus
Wowereit's chance of playing a greater role in the SPD nationally, especially as
he is seen as a standard-bearer for the party left. Second, even very localized
success by the far-right will provoke comment and a measure of consternation and
signal that the particular problem posed by far-rightist ideologues in eastern
Germany remains to be resolved. End Comment.
KOENIG
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06CARACAS2367, CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE

BRV, ON BRV-GOC
Discussing cables
06CARACAS2367 2006-08-10 02:02 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Caracas
VZCZCXRO6327
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHCV #2367/01 2220226
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100226Z AUG 06
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5787
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6884
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5695
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 2255
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0500
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1399
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3945
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2340
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0966
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3695
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0943
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 0582
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0430
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016

TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE CU
SUBJECT: CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE BRV, ON BRV-GOC
RELATIONS
CARACAS 00002367 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Classified by CDA Kevin Whitaker for reason 1.4(d.)
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) BRV reaction to the announcement of Castro's

illness and recovery directly mirrored that of the Cuban
regime. There is no reason to believe that the fundamentals
of the Cuba-Venezuela relationship -- with Venezuela
providing huge resource flows, and the Cubans providing tens
of thousands of "advisors" -- will change through the medium
term. Castro's absence from the scene will deprive Chavez of
an avuncular presence and a proven crisis manager, which may
increase Chavez' vulnerability. In the event of Castro's
permanent departure from the scene, the mercurial Chavez may
become even more unpredictable. Chavez may believe his
regime's survival is tied to that of a Castroite successor
government, and under a conceivable set of circumstances
might even be willing to deploy Venezuelan military assets in
support of a successor regime. Embassy believes this would
be an apt moment to warn the BRV against intervening in Cuba
during its transition. End summary.
Initial BRV Reactions to Castro Announcement

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Initial Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV)

reaction to the news of Castro's illness and temporary
hand-over of power has been limited to parroting the Cuban
line. Speaking on August 1 in Vietnam, Chavez seemed a bit
taken by surprise and uninformed, but said he had talked to
Cuban officials who assured him that Castro "would return to
his job in some weeks." The same day, the Venezuelan Foreign
Ministry announced that they "had received, with
satisfaction, news from Cuban authorities" that Castro was
recuperating. Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel similarly
said that he spoke with his Cuban counterpart Carlos Lage and
Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, who assured him
that the Cuban leader was recovering normally.
¶3. (S/NF) Chavez returned to Caracas on August 3,

apparently without stopping in Havana. SIMO reports indicate
that he had wanted to do so, but the Cubans waved him off,
fearing that his presence would undercut their efforts to
convey a sense of normality. Chavez got the point; during
his August 6 "Alo Presidente," Chavez said he had learned out
that Castro was up and talking, and expressed his confidence
that the Cuban leader would be back in action soon.
Interestingly, Chavez did not suggest he'd spoken personally
to Castro. Too, he engaged in a lengthy digression about his
appreciation for being able to meet and work with a hero from
his youth. Certainly it was not his intention, but this part
of Chavez' comments took on the tone of an elegy.
Speculation on Raul-Chavez Relations

------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Regardless of whether Fidel is alive or not, it

would appear that Raul will continue to play a larger role
than in the past. Public and other sources have included
speculation about the lack of chemistry between Chavez and
Raul Castro. While we question the reliability of such
judgments, because it's unclear to us the basis for reaching
them, they are worth being aware of. Americo Martin, a
former Venezuelan Communist close to the Castros in the
1970s, told El Universal that the younger Castro views Chavez
with distrust and caution. Former Venezuelan Ambassador and
ubiquitous international relations analyst Julio Cesar Pineda
told poloff August 8 that he has heard that Chavez is close
to FM Perez Roque, and VP Lage, who it would appear are going
CARACAS 00002367 002.2 OF 004
to continue to play important roles in Cuba. Exiled Cuban

intellectual Carlos Alberto Montaner probably made the most
relevant observation in noting that Raul and Chavez lack the
emotional ties that bind Fidel and Chavez.
What Does it Mean for Venezuela?

--------------------------------
¶5. (C) While there are a number of unknowns in the

equation, there is no reason to believe much will change in
the bilateral relationship in the short to medium term. Both
countries derive benefits from the relationship. Cuba
benefits from the millions in oil and transfer payments for
services rendered; Venezuela benefits from the advice of
Castro and tens of thousands of "trainers" and doctors.
Apparent Cuban influence in Venezuela has grown dramatically,
to the point that opposition Venezuelans sardonically refer
to "Venecuba" or "Cubazuela" (both forms are acceptable).
Chavez relies heavily on Cuban advisors to implement programs
that are one of the keys to his political success. We assess
there could be as many as 40,000 Cubans currently in
Venezuela, managing, guiding, and implementing Chavez' social
missions (e.g., Barrio Adentro medical program, Mision
Robinson literacy program, Mercal state-owned grocery chain,
etc.) Rumors swirl about Cubans taking central roles in
sensitive government functions, including in Chavez' personal
security, the military, the National Electoral Council, the
national identification Office, even land titling offices.
None of that is going to change soon. The Bolivarian regime
is deriving political and organizational benefit from it, and
the Cubans are getting paid hard currency for it.
¶6. (S/NF) We judge that Chavez will also want to continue
Venezuela's generous petroleum support to Cuba, which we
currently estimate at 98,000 barrels per day, worth at least
$7 million a day, or $2.5 billion a year. SIMO reporting
indicates that Chavez directed that his staff find ways of
increasing resource flows to Cuba. We can think of two
motivations Chavez might have in increasing cash flow to
Cuba: first, to help a friend in need; the one thing he has
is cash, and he can give more of it. Second, it may also be
true that Chavez is looking to bump up transfer payments in
order to increase his influence in Cuba at this critical
moment. The economic assistance could become a problem,
however, if the egoistic, increasingly intrusive Chavez used
it to promote his own candidate in any ensuing power
struggle, prolonging the infighting and delaying a democratic
transition.
How Does Chavez Act if Castro is Debilitated or Dead?

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (S/NF) Castro's prolonged convalescence or even death is

likely to cause headaches for the region and roil bilateral
relations. Some argue that Castro has had a moderating
influence on Chavez, and so he'll really let go if Castro is
gone. The predicate seems wrong to us. It's hard to see
much moderation in Chavez' recent behavior: open
interventionism and tendency to pick fights with leaders
throughout the hemisphere, his embrace of pariah states
(including especially the vote for Iran at the IAEA and the
apparent endorsement of the DPRK's July 4 missile launches),
and his government's relentless assault on basic freedoms
within Venezuela. It may be closer to the mark to observe
that Castro is one of the few people who could contradict
Chavez or give him news he didn't want to hear. We've
received numerous reports that Chavez is left surrounded by
yes-men, because he simply won't accept bad news or
criticism. The absence of Castro -- to Chavez, respected and
avuncular -- could make the mercurial Chavez even more
CARACAS 00002367 003 OF 004
unpredictable and radical.
¶8. (S/NF) Over time, Chavez will probably move toward

assuming the mantle as (in Castro's words) "my successor to
advance social revolution." Chavez will need to work this
issue slowly, as he does not wish to suggest prematurely that
Castro is dead and inadvertently cause problems for -- or
with -- any successor Castroite regime. That said, Chavez
has neither the intellectual candlepower nor the
international environment to replicate Castro's rise to
international prominence. That doesn't mean he won't try,
and he'll play his best card -- oil wealth -- whenever he
needs to. And whatever the force of his arguments, his
checkbook is going to speak loudly.
¶9. (S/NF) We should be particularly mindful that Chavez

will be a committed advocate of the continuation of a
repressive regime in Cuba. Chavez has been on a losing
streak, with the electoral results in Peru and (it seems) in
Mexico; were Cuba now to turn toward democracy, Chavez would
be increasingly isolated as the sole radical leftist in the
hemisphere. Chavez may believe that the survival of his
regime is tied to that of the Castro regime.
¶10. (S/NF) There are some even more troubling scenarios

that one can play out in this regard. Chavez has said as
recently as this April that he'd be willing to spill
Venezuelan blood to save the Cuban regime (although he was
speaking about a U.S. invasion). Were there to be an
internal civil conflict in Cuba, we believe it possible that
Chavez would consider intervening militarily on the side of
pro-regime elements. It is not clear to us that such an
intervention would be militarily effective, but the presence,
or even threat, of a Venezuelan force in Cuba would have
important implications for Cuba and for us. Perhaps the most
likely scenario would have the Venezuelans providing lift
capability to loyalist troops; the Venezuelan Armed Force
(FAV) does retain some fixed-wing and rotary lift capability.
That said, a Venezuelan navy troopship regularly plies
between Venezuela and Cuba, and could conceivably be used to
move FAV troops to the island.
(11. (C) Comment: As noted in previous email traffic,

Embassy suggests that this may be an apt time to warn the BRV
against intervening in Cuba.)
An Achilles' Heel?
------------------
¶12. (S/NF) These are some fairly gloomy scenarios. We can

conceive how Castro's absence might actually make Chavez more
vulnerable. Hugo Chavez is a master tactician, regularly
assessing the domestic political situation better and faster
than the opposition, and making moves to box in his
democratic opponents. What Chavez is less good at is crisis
management. To take a recent example, Chavez' first instinct
to go to Castro's sickbed was wrong, because it would have
undercut the regime's "all is well" line. There are
historical examples, of Chavez cracking under pressure. In
both the 1992 and the 2002 failed coups, evidence suggests
that Chavez lost his nerve at key moments. His military
colleagues were willing to fight on in 1992 when he was holed
up in the Military Museum, but he surrendered them all. In
2002, a weepy Chavez was reportedly ready to sign the letter
of resignation and flee to Cuba. Castro has proved his worth
to Chavez as a proxy crisis manager. It was Castro who told
Chavez to fight on in 2002, and it was Castro who worked the
phones to reassemble a pro-Chavez consensus in the armed
forces. In 2004, as the recall referendum approached, it was
Castro who conceived and executed the "misiones" plan to buck
CARACAS 00002367 004.2 OF 004
up Chavez' popularity. In Cuba, from the Cuban Missile

Crisis to Mariel to the Maleconazo to the Special Period,
Fidel Castro has proven himself to be a superb crisis
manager. Should Chavez confront a thorny crisis, especially
a domestic crisis, he may suffer significantly from the loss
of Castro's steady hand at his back. This, in turn, could be
an advantage for us in our efforts to urge a return to full
democracy in Venezuela.
Viewing cable 06MOSCOW9533, A CAUCASUS WEDDING
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06MOSCOW9533.
06MOSCOW9533 2006-08-31 06:06 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO9862
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #9533/01 2430639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 310639Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 009533
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016

TAGS: PGOV ECON PINR RS
SUBJECT: A CAUCASUS WEDDING
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reason 1.4 (

b, d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Weddings are elaborate in Dagestan, the largest

autonomy in the North Caucasus. On August 22 we attended a
wedding in Makhachkala, Dagestan’s capital: Duma member and
Dagestan Oil Company chief Gadzhi Makhachev’s son married a
classmate. The lavish display and heavy drinking concealed
the deadly serious North Caucasus politics of land,
ethnicity, clan, and alliance. The guest list spanned the
Caucasus power structure -- guest starring Chechen leader
Ramzan Kadyrov -- and underlined just how personal the
region’s politics can be. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Dagestani weddings are serious business: a forum for

showing respect, fealty and alliance among families; the
bride and groom themselves are little more than showpieces.
Weddings take place in discrete parts over three days. On
the first day the groom’s family and the bride’s family
simultaneously hold separate receptions. During the
receptions the groom leads a delegation to the bride’s
reception and escorts her back to his own reception, at which
point she formally becomes a member of the groom’s family,
forsaking her old family and clan. The next day, the groom’s
parents hold another reception, this time for the bride’s
family and friends, who can “inspect” the family they have
given their daughter to. On the third day, the bride’s
family holds a reception for the groom’s parents and family.
Father of the Groom

-------------------
¶3. (C) On August 22, Gadzhi Makhachev married off his 19

year-old son Dalgat to Aida Sharipova. The wedding in
Makhachkala, which we attended, was a microcosm of the social
and political relations of the North Caucasus, beginning with
Gadzhi’s own biography. Gadzhi started off as an Avar clan
leader. Enver Kisriyev, the leading scholar of Dagestani
society, told us that as Soviet power receded from Dagestan
in the late 1980s, the complex society fell back to its
pre-Russian structure. The basic structural unit is the
monoethnic “jamaat,” in this usage best translated as
”canton” or “commune.” The ethnic groups themselves are a
Russian construct: faced with hundreds of jamaats, the 19th
century Russian conquerors lumped cantons speaking related
dialects together and called them “Avar,” “Dargin,” etc. to
reduce the number of “nationalities” in Dagestan to 38. Ever
since then, jamaats within each ethnic group have been
competing with one another to lead the ethnic group. This
competition is especially marked among the Avars, the largest
nationality in Dagestan.
¶4. (C) As Russian power faded, each canton fielded a militia

to defend its people both in the mountains and the capital
Makhachkala. Gadzhi became the leader from his home canton
of Burtunay, in Kazbek Rayon. He later asserted pan-Avar
ambitions, founding the Imam Shamil Popular Front -- named
after the great Avar leader of mountaineer resistance to the
Russians -- to promote the interests of the Avars and of
Burtunay’s role within the ethnic group. Among his exploits
was a role in the military defense of Dagestan against the
1999 invasion from Chechnya by Shamil Basayev and al-Khattab,
and his political defense of Avar villages under pressure in
Chechnya, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
¶5. (C) Gadzhi has cashed in the social capital he made from
nationalism, translating it into financial and political
capital -- as head of Dagestan’s state oil company and as the
single-mandate representative for Makhachkala in Russia’s
State Duma. His dealings in the oil business -- including
close cooperation with U.S. firms -- have left him well off
enough to afford luxurious houses in Makhachkala, Kaspiysk,
Moscow, Paris and San Diego; and a large collection of luxury
automobiles, including the Rolls Royce Silver Phantom in
which Dalgat fetched Aida from her parents’ reception.
(Gadzhi gave us a lift in the Rolls once in Moscow, but the
legroom was somewhat constricted by the presence of a
Kalashnikov carbine at our feet. Gadzhi has survived
numerous assassination attempts, as have most of the
still-living leaders of Dagestan. In Dagestan he always
travels in an armored BMW with one, sometimes two follow cars
full of uniformed armed guards.)
¶6. (C) Gadzhi has gone beyond his Avar base, pursuing a
multi-ethnic cadre policy to develop a network of loyalists.
He has sent Dagestani youths, including his sons, to a
military type high school near San Diego (we met one
graduate, a Jewish boy from Derbent now studying at San Diego
state. He has no plans to enter the Russian military).
MOSCOW 00009533 002 OF 005
Gadzhi’s multi-ethnic reach illustrates what the editor of

the Dagestani paper “Chernovik” told us: that in the last
few years the development of inter-ethnic business clans has
eroded traditional jamaat loyalties.
¶7. (C) But the Avar symbolism is still strong. Gadzhi’s

brother, an artist from St. Petersburg, ordered as a wedding
gift a life-sized statue of Imam Shamil. Shamil is the
iconic national symbol, despite his stern and inflexible
character (portrayed in Tolstoy’s “Hadji-Murat” as the
mountaineers’ tyrannical counterpart to the absolutist Tsar).
Connection with Shamil makes for nobility among Avars today.
Gadzhi often mentions that he is a descendant on his
mother’s side of Gair-Bek, one of Shamil’s deputies.
The Day Before

--------------
¶8. (C) Gadzhi’s Kaspiysk summer house is an enormous

structure on the shore of the Caspian, essentially a huge
circular reception room -- much like a large restaurant --
attached to a 40-meter high green airport tower on columns,
accessible only by elevator, with a couple of bedrooms, a
reception room, and a grotto whose glass floor was the roof
of a huge fish tank. The heavily guarded compound also
boasts a second house, outbuildings, a tennis court, and two
piers out into the Caspian, one rigged with block and tackle
for launching jet skis. The house filled up with visitors
from all over the Caucasus during the afternoon of August 21.
The Chair of Ingushetia’s parliament drove in with two
colleagues; visitors from Moscow included politicians,
businessmen and an Avar football coach. Many of the visitors
grew up with Gadzhi in Khasavyurt, including an Ingush
Olympic wrestler named Vakha who seemed to be perpetually
tipsy. Another group of Gadzhi’s boyhood friends from
Khasavyurt was led by a man who looked like Shamil Basayev on
his day off -- flip-flops, t-shirt, baseball cap, beard --
but turned out to be the chief rabbi of Stavropol Kray. He
told us he has 12,000 co-religionists in the province, 8,000
of them in its capital, Pyatigorsk. 70 percent are, like
him, Persian-speaking Mountain Jews; the rest are a mixture
of Europeans, Georgians and Bukharans.
¶9. (C) Also present was XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. He was reserved at the time, but in a
follow-up conversation in Moscow on August 29 (please
protect) he complained that Chechnya, lacking experts to
develop programs for economic recovery, is simply demanding
and disposing of cash from the central government. When we
pressed him on disappearances, he admitted some took place,
but claimed that often parents alleged their children had
been abducted when in fact their sons had run off to join the
fighters or -- in a case the week before -- they had murdered
their daughter in an honor killing. We mentioned the
abduction of a widow of Basayev, allegedly to gain access to
his money. XXXXXX said he had not heard of the case, but
knew that Basayev had had no interest in wealth; he may have
been a religious fanatic, but he was a “normal” person. The
fighters who remain are not a serious military force, in XXXXX view, and many
would surrender under the proper
terms and immunities. He himself is arranging the immunity
of a senior official of the Maskhadov era, whose name he
would not reveal.
¶10. (C) During lunch, Gadzhi took a congratulatory call from

Dagestan’s president, Mukhu Aliyev. Gadzhi told Aliyev how
honored he would be if Aliyev could drop in at the wedding
reception. There was a degree of tension in the
conversation, which was between two figures each implicitly
claiming the mantle of leadership of the Avars. In the
event, Aliyev snubbed Gadzhi and did not show up for the
wedding, though the rest of Dagestan’s political leadership
did.
¶11. (C) Though Gadzhi’s house was not the venue for the main
wedding reception, he ensured that all his guests were
constantly plied with food and drink. The cooks seemed to
keep whole sheep and whole cows boiling in a cauldron
somewhere day and night, dumping disjointed fragments of the
carcass on the tables whenever someone entered the room.
Gadzhi’s two chefs kept a wide variety of unusual dishes in
circulation (in addition to the omnipresent boiled meat and
fatty bouillon). The alcohol consumption before, during and
after this Muslim wedding was stupendous. Amidst an alcohol
shortage, Gadzhi had flown in from the Urals thousands of
bottles of Beluga Export vodka (“Best consumed with caviar”).
There was also entertainment, beginning even that day, with
the big-name performers appearing both at the wedding hall
and at Gadzhi’s summer house. Gadzhi’s main act, a
Syrian-born singer named Avraam Russo, could not make it
because he was shot a few days before the wedding, but there
MOSCOW 00009533 003 OF 005
was a “gypsy” troupe from St. Petersburg, a couple of Azeri

pop stars, and from Moscow, Benya the Accordion King with his
family of singers. A host of local bands, singing in Avar
and Dargin, rounded out the entertainment, which was constant
and extremely amplified.
¶10. (C) The main activity of the day was eating and drinking
-- starting from 4 p.m., about eight hours worth, all told --
punctuated, when all were laden with food and sodden with
drink, with a bout of jet skiing in the Caspian. After
dinner, though, the first band started an informal
performance -- drums, accordion and clarinet playing the
lezginka, the universal dance of the Caucasus. To the
uninitiated Westerner, the music sounds like an
undifferentiated wall of sound. This was a signal for
dancing: one by one, each of the dramatically paunchy men
(there were no women present) would enter the arena and
exhibit his personal lezginka for the limit of his duration,
usually 30 seconds to a minute. Each ethnic group’s lezginka
was different -- the Dagestani lezginka the most energetic,
the Chechen the most aggressive and belligerent, and the
Ingush smoother.
Wedding Day 1
-------------
¶11. (C) An hour before the wedding reception was set to begin
the “Marrakech” reception hall was full of guests -- men
taking the air outside and women already filling a number of
the tables inside, older ones with headscarves chaperoning
dozens of teenaged girls. A Dagestani parliamentarian
explained that weddings are a principal venue for teenagers
-- and more importantly their parents -- to get a look at one
another with a view to future matches. Security was tight --
police presence on the ground plus police snipers positioned
on the roof of an overlooking apartment block. Gadzhi even
assigned one of his guards as our personal bodyguard inside
the reception. The manager told Gadzhi there were seats for
over a thousand guests at a time. At the height of the
reception, it was standing room only.
¶12. (C) At precisely two p.m. the male guests started filing
in. They varied from pols and oligarchs of all sorts -- the
slick to the Jurassic; wizened brown peasants from Burtunay;
and Dagestan’s sports and cultural celebrities XXXXXXX presided over a political
table in the smaller of
the two halls (the music was in the other) along with Vakha
the drunken wrestler, the Ingush parliamentarians, a member
of the Federation Council who is also a nanophysicist and has
lectured in Silicon Valley, and Gadzhi’s cousin Ismail
Alibekov, a submariner first rank naval captain now serving
at the General Staff in Moscow. The Dagestani milieu appears
to be one in which the highly educated and the gun-toting can
mix easily -- often in the same person.
¶13. (C) After a couple of hours Dalgat’s convoy returned with

Aida, horns honking. Dalgat and Aida got out of the Rolls
and were serenaded into the hall, and into the Makhachev
family, by a boys’ chorus lining both sides of the red
carpet, dressed in costumes aping medieval Dagestani armor
with little shields and swords. The couple’s entry was the
signal for the emcee to roll into high gear, and after a few
toasts the Piter “gypsies” began their performance. (The
next day one of Gadzhi’s houseguests sneered, “Some gypsies!
The bandleader was certainly Jewish, and the rest of them
were blonde.” There was some truth to this, but at least the
two dancing girls appeared to be Roma.)
¶14. (C) As the bands played, the marriageable girls came out
to dance the lezginka in what looked like a slowly revolving
conga line while the boys sat together at tables staring
intently. The boys were all in white shirts and black
slacks, while the girls wore a wide variety of multicolored
but fashionable cocktail dresses. Every so often someone
would shower the dancers with money -- there were some
thousand ruble notes but the currency of choice was the U.S.
hundred dollar bill. The floor was covered with them; young
children would scoop the money up to distribute among the
dancers.
¶15. (C) Gadzhi was locked into his role as host. He greeted
every guest personally as they entered the hall -- failure to
do so would cause great insult -- and later moved constantly
from table to table drinking toasts with everyone. The 120
toasts he estimated he drank would have killed anyone,
hardened drinker or not, but Gadzhi had his Afghan waiter
Khan following him around to pour his drinks from a special
vodka bottle containing water. Still, he was much the worse
for wear by evening’s end. At one point we caught up with
him dancing with two scantily clad Russian women who looked
far from home. One, it turned out was a Moscow poet (later
she recited an incomprehensible poem in Gadzhi’s honor) who
MOSCOW 00009533 004 OF 005
was in town with a film director to write the screenplay for

a film immortalizing Gadzhi’s defense of Dagestan against
Shamil Basayev. By 6 p.m. most of the houseguests had
returned to Gadzhi’s seaside home for more swimming and more
jet-skiing-under-the-influence. But by 8 the summer house’s
restaurant was full once more, the food and drink were
flowing, the name performers were giving acoustic renditions
of the songs they had sung at the reception, and some
stupendously fat guests were displaying their lezginkas for
the benefit of the two visiting Russian women, who had
wandered over from the reception.
The Wedding -- Day 2: Enter The Man

------------------------------------
¶16. (C) The next day’s reception at the Marrakech was

Gadzhi’s tribute to Aida’s family, after which we all
returned to a dinner at Gadzhi’s summer home. Most of the
tables were set with the usual dishes plus whole roast
sturgeons and sheep. But at 8:00 p.m. the compound was
invaded by dozens of heavily armed mujahedin for the grand
entrance of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, dressed in jeans
and a t-shirt, looking shorter and less muscular than in his
photos, and with a somewhat cock-eyed expression on his face.
After greetings from Gadzhi, Ramzan and about 20 of his
retinue sat around the tables eating and listening to Benya
the Accordion King. Gadzhi then announced a fireworks
display in honor of the birthday of Ramzan’s late father,
Ahmat-Hadji Kadyrov. The fireworks started with a bang that
made both Gadzhi and Ramzan flinch. Gadzhi had from the
beginning requested that none of his guests, most of whom
carried sidearms, fire their weapons in celebration.
Throughout the wedding they complied, not even joining in the
magnificent fireworks display.
¶17. (C) After the fireworks, the musicians struck up the

lezginka in the courtyard and a group of two girls and three
boys -- one no more than six years old -- performed gymnastic
versions of the dance. First Gadzhi joined them and then
Ramzan, who danced clumsily with his gold-plated automatic
stuck down in the back of his jeans (a houseguest later
pointed out that the gold housing eliminated any practical
use of the gun, but smirked that Ramzan probably couldn’t
fire it anyway). Both Gadzhi and Ramzan showered the dancing
children with hundred dollar bills; the dancers probably
picked upwards of USD 5000 off the cobblestones. Gadzhi told
us later that Ramzan had brought the happy couple “a five
kilo lump of gold” as his wedding present. After the dancing
and a quick tour of the premises, Ramzan and his army drove
off back to Chechnya. We asked why Ramzan did not spend the
night in Makhachkala, and were told, “Ramzan never spends the
night anywhere.”
¶18. (C) After Ramzan sped off, the dinner and drinking --
especially the latter -- continued. An Avar FSB colonel
sitting next to us, dead drunk, was highly insulted that we
would not allow him to add “cognac” to our wine. “It’s
practically the same thing,” he insisted, until a Russian FSB
general sitting opposite told him to drop it. We were
inclined to cut the Colonel some slack, though: he is head
of the unit to combat terrorism in Dagestan, and Gadzhi told
us that extremists have sooner or later assassinated everyone
who has joined that unit. We were more worried when an
Afghan war buddy of the Colonel’s, Rector of the Dagestan
University Law School and too drunk to sit, let alone stand,
pulled out his automatic and asked if we needed any
protection. At this point Gadzhi and his people came over,
propped the rector between their shoulders, and let us get
out of range.
Postscript: The Practical Uses of a Caucasus Wedding

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶19. (C) Kadyrov’s attendance was a mark of respect and

alliance, the result of Gadzhi’s careful cultivation --
dating back to personal friendship with Ramzan’s father.
This is a necessary political tool in a region where
difficulties can only be resolved by using personal
relationships to reach ad hoc informal agreements. An
example was readily to hand: on August 22 Chechnya’s
parliamentary speaker, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, gave an
interview in which he made specific territorial claims to the
Kizlyar, Khasavyurt and Novolak regions of Dagestan. The
first two have significant Chechen-Akkin populations, and the
last was part of Chechnya until the 1944 deportation, when
Stalin forcibly resettled ethnic Laks (a Dagestani
nationality) there. Gadzhi said he would have to answer
Abdurakhmanov and work closely with Ramzan to reduce the
tensions “that fool” had caused. Asked why he took such
statements seriously, he told us that in the Caucasus all
disputes revolve around land, and such claims can never be
MOSCOW 00009533 005 OF 005
dismissed. Unresolved land claims are the “threads” the

Russian center always kept in play to pull when needed. We
asked why these claims are coming out now, and were told it
was euphoria, pure and simple. After all they had received,
the Chechen leadership’s feet are miles off the ground. (A
well-connected Chechen contact later told us he thought that
raising nationalistic irredentism was part of Abdurakhmanov’s
effort to gain a political base independent from Kadyrov.)
¶20. (C) The “horizontal of power” represented by Gadzhi’s

relationship with Ramzan is the antithesis of the
Moscow-imposed “vertical of power.” Gadzhi’s business
partner Khalik Gindiyev, head of Rosneft-Kaspoil, complained
that Moscow should let local Caucasians rather than Russians
-- “Magomadovs and Aliyevs, not Ivanovs and Petrovs” --
resolve the region’s conflicts. The vertical of power, he
said, is inapplicable to the Caucasus, a region that Moscow
bureaucrats such as PolPred Kozak would never understand.
The Caucasus needs to be given the scope to resolve its own
problems. But this was not a plug for democracy. Gadzhi
told us democracy would always fail in the Caucasus, where
the conception of the state is as an extension of the
Caucasus family, in which the father’s word is law. “Where
is the room for democracy in that?” he asked. We paraphrased
Hayek: if you run a family as you do a state, you destroy
the family. Running a state as you do a family destroys the
state: ties of kinship and friendship will always trump the
rule of law. Gadzhi’s partner agreed, shaking his head
sadly. “That’s a matter for generations to come,” he said.
BURNS
Viewing cable 06DUBLIN1020, EMERGING CONSTRAINTS ON U.S.

MILITARY TRANSITS AT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06DUBLIN1020.
06DUBLIN1020 2006-09-05 14:02 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dublin
VZCZCXRO1309
RR RUEHAG
DE RUEHDL #1020/01 2481445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051445Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0043
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 001020
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015

TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL EAIR PTER EI
SUBJECT: EMERGING CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. MILITARY TRANSITS AT
SHANNON
REF: A. DUBLIN 891
¶B. DUBLIN 709

¶C. USDAO DUBLIN EI U-0011-06
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (C) This is an action request. Please see para 10.
¶2. (C) Summary: Although supportive of continued U.S.

military transits at Shannon Airport, the Irish Government
has informally begun to place constraints on U.S. operations
at the facility, mainly in response to public sensitivities
over U.S. actions in the Middle East. Shannon remains a key
transit point for U.S. troops and materiel bound for theaters
in the global war on terror, while yielding diplomatic
benefits for the Irish Government and significant revenues
for the airport and regional economy. Segments of the Irish
public, however, see the airport as a symbol of Irish
complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in the Gulf/Middle
East and in regard to extraordinary renditions, a view that
underpinned a recent jury decision to acquit the "Shannon
Five" protesters who damaged a U.S. naval aircraft. The
Irish Government has repeatedly defended U.S. interests in
the face of public criticism, but has recently introduced
more cumbersome notification requirements for
equipment-related transits in the wake of the Lebanon
conflict. These requirements, which entail a more expansive
interpretation of munitions of war, are designed to give the
Irish Government mor latitude to decide on allowable
transits, accoring to a senior Department of Foreign Affairs
oficial. We suspect that the Government aims with tese new
constraints to dampen public criticism ahead of the 2007
general elections, and we would apreciate Department
gudance on a USG response, including on any next steps
regarding the Shannon Five. End summary.
Shannon: Significant Benefits and Sensitivities

--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (SBU) U.S. military access to Shannon Airport in western

Ireland is among the most tangible benefits of traditionally
strong U.S.-Irish relations. For the United States,
geography makes Shannon a key transit point for military
flights and military contract flights carrying personnel and
materiel to Iraq and the Middle East/Gulf theater in the
global war on terror, as well as to Europe and Africa. In
2005, roughly 340,000 U.S. troops passed through Shannon on
nearly 2,500 contract carrier flights; about 450
equipment-related/distinguished-visitor transit milair
flights and thousands of airspace overflights also took
place. Approximately 220,000 troops have transited to date
this year. For Ireland, U.S. military transits not only
demonstrate bilateral cooperation in support of U.S.
objectives in the Gulf/Middle East, but also generate
significant revenue for Shannon Airport and the regional
economy. In 2005, the airport turned a euro 2.9 million
profit after earning roughly euro 10.3 million from services
for transit flights, including landing, parking, catering,
and fuel. The economic gains for the Shannon area are less
easily calculated, but would include, at a minimum, payments
for hotels, food/beverages, transportation, and cultural
activities that come with 8-10 overnight stops per year for
roughly 200 soldiers each time. (Revenues may fall in 2006,
as World Airways, a DOD-contract carrier, has begun to
transfer operations from Shannon to its Leipzig hub for
internal logistical reasons.)
¶4. (SBU) For segments of the Irish public, however, the

visibility of U.S. troops at Shannon has made the airport a
symbol of Irish complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in
the Gulf/Middle East. This popular sentiment was manifest in
the July 25 jury decision to acquit the "Shannon Five," a
group of anti-war protesters who damaged a U.S. naval
aircraft at the airport in 2003 in the belief that they would
prevent loss of life in Iraq (ref A). Members of the Shannon
Five have subsequently called for a mass demonstration in
Dublin on September 23 (capitalizing on publicity for the
September 21-24 Ryder Cup tournament and the return of
university students) as part of a campaign to "demilitarize"
the airport. Although it is by no means clear that any
protest will reach "mass" proportions, participation in the
planned protest will likely draw from a vocal anti-war lobby
that has demonstrated against U.S. use of Shannon from the
start of the Iraq War up through the recent Lebanon conflict.
DUBLIN 00001020 002 OF 003
In late 2005/early 2006, EU-wide debate on extraordinary

renditions similarly galvanized this lobby, and the Irish
public generally, to question U.S. military access to the
airport.
The Irish Government and Shannon

--------------------------------
¶5. (C) The Irish Government consistently has acted to ensure

continued U.S. military transits at Shannon in the face of
public criticism. Since the Shannon Five decision, for
example, Irish authorities have upgraded airport security,
doubling the number of police and military personnel
patrolling the facility and introducing rigorous checks at
the parking lot and perimeter fence. (The upgrade is also
partly a response to possible Islamic extremist threats.)
Moreover, despite a general Government reluctance to
challenge independent court decisions, Defense Minister
Willie O'Dea and governing Fianna Fail party politicians have
publicly questioned the legal merits of the Shannon Five jury
decision. These public statements track with representations
to the Irish Parliament by Government ministers over recent
years and months in defense of U.S. practices at Shannon,
including by Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, who cited U.S.
assurances on renditions this past year to rebuff calls for
random aircraft checks. In parliamentary debate this spring,
Minister of State for Europe, Noel Treacy, dismissed renewed
calls for random inspections following the transit of a U.S.
military prisoner that occurred without prior notification to
the Irish Government (ref B).
¶6. (C) Notwithstanding its general support for U.S.

interests, the Irish Government has more recently begun to
place limits on certain forms of U.S. transits at Shannon.
On August 15, the Irish Department of Transport informally
advised Post by e-mail that all military equipment, including
HMMWVs and trucks, were to be considered "munitions of war,"
requiring prior notification to the Transport Department and
exemption waivers for transshipment. In addition to
diplomatic clearance requests for state aircraft, we have
heretofore provided notification for troop transits (with
accompanying weapons), hazmat, and actual weapons/munitions,
but not non-lethal military articles. The Transport
Department notice followed upon the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) oral but definitive decision during the Lebanon
conflict to forbid U.S. military transits carrying munitions
to Israel, a policy that DFA did not convey to Post before
informing the media. Indications of this trend to constrain
U.S. operations at Shannon first arose in the context of the
extraordinary renditions issue. In late 2005, for instance,
the DFA informally denied a DHS deportation transit through
Shannon of convicted foreign nationals from the United States
out of apparent concern that the public would misread the
transit as a rendition.
¶7. (C) In an August 30 meeting with the DCM and emboff, DFA
Political Director Rory Montgomery said that the Department
of Transport's more encompassing approach to munitions of war
and notification requirements reflected the Irish
Government's interest in knowing the full scope of military
materiel transiting Ireland. He recalled that the February
shipment through Shannon of U.S. Apache helicopters to/from
Israel, which the U.S. contract carrier had not listed as
munitions of war, elicited parliamentary criticism and
highlighted the need for clarity about the nature of materiel
in transit (ref C). More expansive notification requirements
that would apply to all countries would "make it easier" for
the Irish Government to decide on allowable shipments, while
remaining predisposed to respond quickly and positively to
U.S. transit requests, said Montgomery. He added that the
DFA would recommend that the Department of Transport consult
with Post in the process of clarifying and publishing
guidance on munitions of war. The DCM noted Post's intention
to confer with the Transport Department, and he emphasized
that broader notification requirements would make it more
cumbersome to process materiel shipments, with the
possibility that U.S. military planners would consider
alternatives to Shannon as a transit hub.
Comment and Action Request

--------------------------
¶8. (C) Comment: Irish sensitivities generally about foreign

military usage of the airport often make any inadvertent
DUBLIN 00001020 003 OF 003
breaches of Ireland's restrictive rules on foreign military

transits more visible and problematic. A neutral country,
Ireland has no military attache system, no SOFA for U.S.
activities, and strict rules regarding weapons transits and
the wearing of foreign military uniforms. Occasional and
inadvertent breaches of weapons and uniform policies, like
"failure" to notify transiting prisoners (ref B) and military
equipment, are met with public and press scrutiny, but also
with Government understanding. Any incident, however, that
becomes the cause for a public debate about the U.S. use of
Shannon will likely add pressure on the Government. Embassy
has sought to manage the policy issues, notification
requirements, and the coordination of transiting flights,
overflights, refuelings, crew rest overnights, and equipment
failure overnights with existing DAO and civilian Embassy
resources on the ground. With the help of extra TDY support
to the DAO office and a TDY EUCOM presence at Shannon airport
(which is three-and-a-half hours from Dublin), we have
managed the occasional problems adequately and well.
¶9. (C) More comment: We intend to engage other ranking DFA,

Transport, and Irish Defense Department officials, upon their
return from the August holiday period, on the reasons for new
constraints at Shannon, particularly the novel interpretation
of munitions of war and its application to other countries
(Russian transits to Venezuela, for instance). The Irish
public's overwhelming opposition to Israeli military actions
in Lebanon has exacerbated the governing Fianna Fail party's
sensitivity to public criticism ahead of Ireland's May 2007
general elections. The major opposition party, Fine Gael,
supports continued U.S. military use of Shannon, but the
Labour Party and the Green Party, Fine Gael's opposition
partners, favor a review, if not reversal, of Irish policy on
U.S. transits. Against this political backdrop, U.S.
missteps at Shannon could easily become campaign grist, a
Fianna Fail concern that mid-level DFA officials have cited
in informal discussions with Post. Compliance with the new
rules (entailing notification for almost any U.S. military
equipment transiting), if feasible from the U.S. logistical
perspective, will require a higher order of coordination
among TRANSCOM, Air Mobility Command, TACC, and the contract
carriers.
¶10. (C) Action request: We would appreciate input from the
Department and other USG agencies for our planned follow-on
discussions with Irish officials on Shannon. Embassy will
diplomatically pursue the most workable arrangements possible
with Irish officials, but we would appreciate Washington's
judgment as to whether the process of notification of almost
everything of a military nature (including by contract
carriers) through Shannon is becoming too difficult to make
the airport a preferred transit stop. Guidance is also
requested regarding the Shannon Five decision, an outcome
that DFA Political Director Montgomery described as "bizarre"
and presumably not precedential. Our understanding is that
the case, as a criminal matter, has run its course, as there
is no possibility to appeal a jury decision under Irish law.
There may be an option to pursue the case as a civil matter,
and Post would need authorization and funding to contact
local attorneys about this possibility. Another option would
be to present an itemized bill for aircraft damages to the
Irish Government, either to seek compensation outright or, at
least, to convey USG dissatisfaction with the Shannon Five
verdict.
KENNY
Viewing cable 06PARIS5974, FRENCH ELECTION 2007: NICOLAS

SARKOZY -- THE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2589
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #5974/01 2491539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061539Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS

AND EB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015

SUBJECT: FRENCH ELECTION 2007: NICOLAS SARKOZY -- THE
CANDIDATE WHO MIGHT CHANGE FRANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Eight months before France's 2007 Presidential
election, Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy remains the best
positioned of the many contenders for France's presidency.
He is a markedly different presidential heavyweight,
pro-American and committed to free-market principles.
Notwithstanding his evident strengths and popularity, many
French voters are still uncomfortable with the idea of
"President Sarkozy," and questions about his hyperactive
personality, his core law-and-order agenda, and divisions
within the ruling UMP make his election far from certain.
Sarkozy's Gaullist political heritage and his likely "I can
speak frankly to the Americans" refrain mean that France and
Sarkozy would remain an independent and challenging ally.
However, a Sarkozy presidency would certainly bring a new and
welcome tone to U.S.-French relations -- and perhaps, over
time, a French approach to world problems that is less
fixated on reflexively seeking ways to distinguish France
from the U.S. Sarkozy's greatest contribution to France
could be his promise to free the country's latent economic
dynamism from the constraints of statism and labor rigidity.
End Summary.
Timeline to the Election

------------------------
¶2. (U) Eight months ahead of the first round of France's
2007 presidential election, to be held on either Sunday,
April 15 or Sunday, April 22, 2007, Interior Minister and
President of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement
party (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy remains the best positioned of
the many contenders. In the last presidential election in
2002, there were 16 candidates in the first round. Slightly
fewer are expected this time around. The second round
run-off between the top two vote-getters of the first round
will be held two weeks later, either Sunday, April 29 or
Sunday, May 6. Sarkozy has served as Interior Minister in
the government of Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin since
that government's inception in June 2005. In January 2007
(tentatively scheduled for January 14-15) the UMP will hold a
party congress expected to designate Sarkozy, the party
leader, as its presidential candidate. Shortly before that
congress, Sarkozy may well leave the government to dedicate
himself full-time to pursuing the presidency. In recent
weeks Sarkozy has been careful to signal that he is keeping
all his options open in this connection, pointing out that
nothing prevents him from remaining in the government while
he pursues the presidency. Sarkozy himself will make the
final decision -- and will not hesitate to ignore the advice
of others -- as he did when he chose to rejoin the government
in June 2005.
The Best Positioned Contender

-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Ever since his first tenure as interior minister
(2002 - 2004), when he emerged as a top-tier national
political figure, Sarkozy has been highly popular with a
large segment of the French electorate. The most recent
polling figures show that popularity holding steady.
Sarkozy's unchallenged control of the Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP) party (which was founded by President Chirac)
also increases his election chances. Sarkozy has worked to
turn the UMP into a formidable electoral machine, complete
with focus groups for keeping his message tuned to voters'
concerns and volunteer organizations for turning out the
Sarkozy-for-president vote. Since he became president of the
party in 2004, Sarkozy has also increased the number of party
members from 100,000 to 250,000 today. This political
organization gives Sarkozy a powerful advantage, and should
ensure his presence in the second round of the election.
Moreover, Sarkozy is a formidable campaigner, energetic,
quick on his feet and appealingly direct. The combination of
popularity, control of his party, and masterful political
skills, including as a campaigner, is unmatched by any of the
other presidential contenders.
A Different Kind of Presidential Heavyweight

--------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Sarkozy is hard to pigeon-hole; he is not a
traditional French conservative, which is clear from some of
his policy proposals. Sarkozy often speaks of the need for
France to break with policies and attitudes that undercut the
PARIS 00005974 002.2 OF 004
country's economic dynamism. Sarkozy has long called for

lower taxes and more "liberal" (i.e., free-market) economic
policies to encourage entrepreneurship. He has also long
called for a less regulated environment for big business,
something of a novelty in a country in which both left and
right have always been comfortable with a high level of
government regulation of the economy. The untested
popularity of Sarkozy's free-market orientation helps explain
why few commentators at this stage are ready to hazard a firm
prediction on the outcome of the 2007 election other than to
affirm that -- presuming candidates of the center-left and of
the center-right compete in the second round -- it will be
exceedingly close; Sarkozy himself has indicated to us on a
numerous occasions that the election will be "51 - 49."
Sarkozy is well aware of the resistance in France to
shrinking the role of the state in protecting the economic
security of both individuals and businesses.
¶5. (C) Sarkozy's proposals in the field of social policy --

for example, affirmative action in employment and education
for immigrants who are discriminated against, and limited
voting rights for non-citizen residents -- are not policies
traditionally associated with the right of the political
spectrum in France. Sarkozy's proposals for reforming French
government institutions -- making the president answerable to
the legislature and responsible for the domestic policies of
the government, while giving the legislature more oversight
over France's foreign policy -- also break the mold of
traditional, center-right French Gaullism. Most of all,
Sarkozy is associated with tough, firm enforcement of
anti-crime and counter-terrorism measures.
Doubts about a "President Sarkozy"

----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Sarkozy is also perceived as a different kind of
political personality. Recent polls point to the austere De
Gaulle and the imperturbable Mitterrand as by far the most
revered of French presidents. That the edgy, intense,
hands-on Sarkozy is so far from the preferred model of
Olympian reserve raises the question of whether, as a matter
of cultural psychology, the French are ready to entrust the
presidency to Sarkozy. Clearly many French people recognize
that a "new model" is needed -- a presidency that directs and
is responsible for domestic policy, especially given the new,
shorter five-year presidential term. The iconoclastic
Sarkozy has the most extensive experience and strongest
credentials for filling that role. The French however, are
also famously hesitant to embrace change, and in a time of
apprehension and self-doubt could prefer a more traditional
and reassuring figure. Some also fear a Sarkozy presidency,
citing his "hyper-active" personality, and persisting
factional splits within his own party, and his polarizing
image as a law-and-order strongman. Electorally, Sarkozy's
law-and-order image is potentially the most significant. It
is this hard-edged profile that makes Sarkozy a divisive more
than unifying figure, generating intense allegiance on the
right and, equally strongly, unsettling so many on the left
and even the center of the political spectrum.
Pro-American at Heart, but Still a French Gaullist

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶7. (C) Sarkozy -- for a French politician -- is forceful and
unabashed about the need for France to get beyond its
anti-American reflexes. With the exception of his
reservations about the wisdom of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2003, Sarkozy is the French political leader most supportive
of the U.S. role in the world. Sarkozy has told the
Ambassador on several occasions that France needs to help the
U.S. "get out of Iraq." Sarkozy's pro-American orientation
has earned him the sobriquet "Sarkozy the American," and his
affinity for Americans and the U.S. is genuine and heartfelt.
Sarkozy's admiration for the U.S. comes through in one of
his favorite stories: when, as a young boy, he told father
that he wanted to be president, his father told him, "In that
case, with a name like Sarkozy, you'd better immigrate to
America." The young Nicolas replied that he wanted to become
President of France, not the U.S. Sarkozy has always wanted
to make France a land of equal opportunity for immigrants
also.
¶8. (C) Sarkozy's pro-Americanism , however, should not be

interpreted as meaning that Gaullist insistence on France's
(and the EU's) independence from the U.S. in the
international arena will disappear. France's selective
PARIS 00005974 003 OF 004
support for U.S. positions will continue. Nor will Sarkozy

likely abandon France's traditional preference for
strengthening the EU over NATO in the name of trans-Atlantic
rapprochement. As Sarkozy told a visiting Congressional
delegation last year, "We should never forget that we are
loyal friends -- and that friends can disagree." Although
Sarkozy feels close to America (to this day, he recalls with
fondness his "discovery" of America as an International
Visitors Program grantee in 1985), his assertive personality
is such that, as France's president, he would not shy away
from offering firm advice about how the U.S. might best
advance towards shared goals -- up to and including bald
advice to change course. Even so, what Sarkozy would call
the "loyalty" factor in his friendship toward the U.S. would
remain intact, and Sarkozy's articulate, public defense of
that attitude could, over time, result in a greater French
receptivity to America's global outlook and policy positions.
Especially if extended over a two-term, ten-year Presidency,
the result could be a France less resentful of the U.S. --
one less reflexively inclined to taking positions that
intensify and highlight France's differences with the U.S.
Sarkozy's Free-Market Convictions Could Transform France

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶9. (C) Sarkozy's greatest contribution to France could be in
freeing the country's latent economic dynamism from the
constraints of statism and labor rigidity. Sarkozy has,
since the beginning of his long career in politics, been
among the most outspokenly "liberal" (that is,
pro-free-market) of French political leaders. His speeches
on economic and social issues nearly invariably include
paeans to commerce, hard work, and entrepreneurship, followed
by an exhortation to Frenchmen and women to be proud of these
qualities. Sarkozy would like to make the French more
"liberal" than they are, and believes economic forces acting
on France justify his endeavor. Sarkozy often underlines the
inescapability of the global market and exhorts the French to
accept the challenges of competing in it with greater
self-confidence. He is adept at depicting, in ways that
ordinary voters understand, the drag on opportunity and
growth of a bloated state intent on monitoring nearly every
aspect of economic life.
¶10. (C) At the same time, Sarkozy understands that the

French want to be protected and that they are comfortable
with a high degree of state involvement in the economy. The
current controversy over the privatization and merger
involving the national gas company (GDF) and a the energy
giant Suez exemplifies the persisting sensitivity of
loosening state control over the economy in France.
Sarkozy's record -- he is above all a pragmatic politician --
as a "liberalizing" policy practitioner is quite mixed. For
example, during his tenure as Finance Minister
(March-November 2004), when confronted by labor union
resistance to significant privatization of state utilities,
Sarkozy compromised. He worked hard -- and offered
government assistance -- to keep factories threatened with
closure operating in France. Spurred by public complaints
about rising prices in supermarkets, he negotiated
"voluntary" price controls with major chains. He practiced
"patriotic liberalism" in helping engineer the merger of a
large French pharmaceutical company (Aventis) with a larger
French pharmaceutical firm (Sanofi) rather than with Sanofi's
foreign rival (the Swiss firm, Novartis). By and large, the
public approved Sarkozy's protectionist actions.
¶11. (C) It remains to be seen whether economic reform will

be a decisive issue in the upcoming presidential campaign.
(Comment: If the current trend of economic growth and reduced
unemployment continues, this is less likely to be the case.
End Comment.) If it does emerge as the key campaign issue,
and if a victorious Sarkozy moves early and aggressively to
effect reform, then he could push the French past the tipping
point and into a far-reaching and necessary restructuring of
the French social model. An ambitious Sarkozy reform program
would likely include, for example, measures to further loosen
the currently mandated 35-hour workweek, measures to reduce
wealth and inheritance taxes to encourage long-term
investment in family firms, measures to restructure
unemployment and welfare benefits so they act as incentives
to find work quickly, and measures to reform the university
system so it provides students with the skills the job market
requires from them. The result could be a society in which
entrepreneurship, self-reliance and optimism would be more
PARIS 00005974 004 OF 004
highly valued, and in which competition could co-exist with

the cherished notion of "equality." Such changes could
release the latent economic creativity and dynamism of the
French, who, by and large, are highly skilled and
hard-working. But it will be a tall order.
¶12. (C) In Sarkozy, who harbors a more America-like vision

for France, the moment might well meet the man, ushering in
an era of higher economic growth and innovation in France.
Such an economically re-vitalized France would cohere neatly
with Sarkozy's fundamentally Gaullist principles: renewed
economic vitality would bolster both France's ambitions to
lead in Europe and to play a major role in international
affairs.
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 06PARIS5975, INTERIOR MINISTER SARKOZY ON EVE OF
HIS TRIP TO
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2593
DE RUEHFR #5975/01 2491539
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061539Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS

AND EB
EO 12958 DECL: 04/07/2015

TAGS PGOV, ELAB, EU, FR, PINR, SOCI, ECON
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER SARKOZY ON EVE OF HIS TRIP TO
THE U.S.
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy told Ambassador September 5
he was “proud and honored” to be meeting with President Bush on September 12.
President Chirac had pressured him “not to go to the U.S.,” Sarkozy said, but
this would not stop him from “affirming my loyal friendship” for the U.S.
Moreover, it was appropriate for him to have “informal exchanges with the
world’s super power since I, after all, have one chance in two of becoming
France’s next president.” Sarkozy asked for overviews of the current U.S.
position on Iranian issues and the U.S. domestic political situation. Turning to
French domestic politics, Sarkozy said “things are going well” for him, “the
polls are good and the party is united.” He shrugged off the challenge Socialist
Party frontrunner Segolene Royal might pose. “She doesn’t bother me,” he said,
while also underlining his conviction that the election would be very, very
close. The meeting, punctuated by the visit of Sarkozy’s nine-year old son
Louis, offered a rare glimpse of a relaxed Sarkozy. End Summary.
“Proud and Honored to Meet with President Bush”

--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Sarkozy underlined to the Ambassador his gratitude to the President for
making room in his schedule for a meeting with Sarkozy (a drop-by in a meeting
with NSA Hadley scheduled for September 12). Sarkozy said he felt “proud and
honored to meet with President Bush.” Sarkozy confided that President Chirac had
pressured him “not to go the U.S.,” but then highlighted why he believed his
trip to the U.S. and meeting with the President was appropriate and important.
In typical combative, self-assertive fashion, Sarkozy said, “I did not hesitate
for an instant” to go ahead with the trip. Sarkozy went on to explain that he
considers it an opportunity to “affirm my loyal friendship for the U.S., which,
though it may be unpopular” (in France), “I nevertheless openly avow.” Sarkozy
then recalled how, in a major campaign speech before eight thousand Union for a
Popular Movement (UMP) party supporters two days earlier, he had held out as an
example to young French people the way “the citizens of the United States, a
nation of immigrants, listen to the national anthem and salute the stars and
stripes with their hands over their hearts.”
¶3. (C) Sarkozy and the Ambassador discussed the importance of Sarkozy’s
establishing “informal contacts” with U.S. leaders before the French
presidential elections, before -- if Sarkozy should become president -- the
constraints of high office condition outreach to other leaders. Sarkozy judged
that it was very fitting and proper for him to meet with the President “of the
world’s super-power, since I, after all, have one chance in two of becoming
France’s next president.” Iran was the only international issue raised by
Sarkozy during this meeting with the Ambassador.
Confident about his Own Prospects

---------------------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to French domestic politics, Sarkozy exuded confidence about his
own presidential prospects. He was uncharacteristically relaxed during the
meeting, as he assessed his chances of prevailing through both rounds of
France’s upcoming presidential contest. Sarkozy nonetheless underlined that
“whoever the Socialist candidate might be,” the election would still be very
close, “fifty-one, forty-nine -- very tight.” Sarkozy dismissed as “unlikely”
the possibility that extreme-right National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen might
repeat his performance of the first round of the 2002 election. Sarkozy said
that “overall, things are looking good for me,” and he pointed to his
consistently high poll numbers and his unification of the UMP party as pillars
of what he expects should be a successful electoral effort. That said, he
affirmed that Chirac remains an adversary who seeks to trip him (Sarkozy) up on
his way to the French presidency.
¶5. (C) Sarkozy was nearly cavalier in his dismissal of the capabilities of
Poitou-Charentes Region President and Socialist Party frontrunner Segolene
Royal. He said, “she doesn’t bother me,” meaning that he did not believe that
she would be a formidable opponent. He explicitly pointed to her “lack of
experience,” both in withstanding the rigors of high office and those of
presidential-level electoral politics, as crippling shortcomings in her ability
to mount a credible
PARIS 00005975 002 OF 002
presidential candidacy against his. (Comment: Ever since her emergence as a
highly popular presidential contender a year ago, Royal has been underestimated
by all of France’s professional politicians. End Comment.) Sarkozy mentioned
former prime minister Lionel Jospin as a possible alternative to Royal, but did
not venture a view on Jospin’s chances of upsetting Royal. He added that he felt
Royal’s candidacy was facing increasing turbulence in the run up to the
socialists’ primary election (in mid-November), and that this, along with her
dominance of the popularity polls with him, “protects me.” (Comment: By
absorbing so much of the attention of press and public, Royal is shielding
Sarkozy from the sort of criticism and scrutiny that might undercut his
candidacy. Sarkozy is making good use of this ‘blocking effect,’ using it to set
the agenda for the upcoming campaign in a series of speeches that articulate
both principles for action and concrete proposals. End comment.)
An Unforgettable Scene
----------------------
¶6. (C) As the Ambassador was about to leave, Sarkozy went to the line of floor-
to-ceiling windows that open from the interior minister’s office to the gardens
of the interior ministry, and called over his nine-year old son, Louis, who was
playing on the lawn (Sarkozy lives with his family in apartments above his
office). Sarkozy was clearly happy -- and proud -- to be in the company of his
young son and seemed tickled to be able to introduce him to “the Ambassador of
the United States.” Louis appeared at the threshold with a small dog at his feet
and a large rabbit in his arms. To shake hands with the Ambassador, Louis put
down the rabbit -- and the dog started chasing the rabbit through Sarkozy’s
office, which led to the unforgettable sight of Sarkozy, bent over, chasing the
dog through the ante-room to his office as the dog chased the rabbit, and Louis
filled the room with gleeful laughter. Please visit Paris’ Classified Website
at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 06LISBON2365, PORTUGUESE FM OFFERS TO RESIGN IF

CIA FLIGHT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06LISBON2365.
06LISBON2365 2006-10-20 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Lisbon
VZCZCXYZ0020
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DE RUEHLI #2365/01 2931652

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201652Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T LISBON 002365
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2026

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE FM OFFERS TO RESIGN IF CIA FLIGHT
ALLEGATIONS PROVE TRUE
REF: A. 2005 LISBON 1609

¶B. LISBON 1921
¶C. OCTOBER 12 DVC (WITH DOS DOD AND EMBASSY LISBON)
Classified By: POL CHIEF TROY FITRELL, REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Portugal's Foreign Minister offered to

resign if opposition forces can demonstrate any complicity on
the part of the government regarding alleged illegal CIA
rendition flights through Portuguese territory. While a
government investigation has refuted these allegations, the
saga continues due to continued opposition party and European
Parliament pressure. This pressure complicates the US
request to repatriate Guantanamo detainees via Portugal. End
summary.
¶2. (U) Ongoing pressure from Portugal's Left Bloc and from
the European Parliament led to a testy exchange in Portugal's
Parliament on October 18, in which Foreign Minister Luis
Amado offered to resign if the opposition could prove
Government of Portugal (GOP) complicity with the USG
regarding alleged illegal CIA flights violating Portuguese
sovereignty.
¶3. (U) Amado's most recent testimony reflected that of his

predecessor, Diogo Freitas do Amaral in December 2005 (Ref A)
and his own earlier testimony on September 5 this year,
noting the GOP had completed an investigation that discovered
no information to support allegations that CIA flights
violated Portugal's territory or airspace to transport
terrorism suspects. Amado told the Parliamentary Committee
that "None of the explanations or data collected...
constitutes a credible indication that the law may have been
broken on Portuguese soil." He went on to tell reporters
that a joint investigation by four government departments,
also involving the country's intelligence agencies,
immigration service and flight control authorities, conducted
a review of plane movements but found no firm evidence."
Amado admitted that the alleged CIA flights might have come
through Portugal, but added that Portugal "has nothing to be
ashamed of." According to the Minister, there is no evidence
that the CIA committed illegal acts in Portuguese territory
and even stated that he has had nothing but "total
transparency and cooperation" from American authorities.
¶4. (U) Freitas do Amaral had offered the government

investigation as a way to address the allegations. The
results, however, have not silenced the GOP's critics,
especially in the Left Bloc or the European Parliament.
Portugal's Parliament has established an ad hoc committee
to continue hearings on the subject and a delegation from the
European Parliament is scheduled to visit Portugal in
December to interview Amado, who has declined to visit
Brussels to meet with Euro Deputies.
Effect on Repatriation Request

------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Amado's testimony reflects the continued political
and media pressure on the GOP regarding this subject and
makes the GOP's efforts to assist in repatriation of
Guantanamo detainees all the more difficult. It is critical
that Washington readers recognize the GOP's need to ensure
that it is on solid legal ground regarding our request on
detainees.
¶6. (S/NF) Portuguese law, as interpreted by the GOP (which

could change), requires written assurance by the final
destination country that detainees will not be tortured or
receive the death penalty as well as a US guarantee that they
will be treated according to internationally-recognized
conventions in the destination country. Without these
assurances, the GOP will have difficulty n supporting
repatriation flights through Portuguese territory or
airspace. We eagerly await Washington addressees response to
the Portuguese points as discussed Ref C. The GOP will
undoubtedly expect this issue to be discussed at the October
24 meeting between Amado and Secretary Rice in Washington.
The Media
---------
¶7. (U) The local press eagerly reprints hearsay on this
tantalizing subject as left wing politicians unveil "new
facts" every few days to fan the political fires. Post
believes the media will continue to sensationalize the issue
as long as it has legs.
Comment
-------
¶8. (S/NF) The normally unflappable Amado lost his cool during
the testimony; an event that is completely out of character
and shows the effects of unrelenting media and political
attacks. Despite this outburst, we believe Amado will
continue to reiterate what the investigation has revealed -

the government has no evidence of illegal CIA flights
on/through Portuguese territory. However, Post underscores
the delicate balancing act Amado is confronting in minimizing
damage to his government - however unwarranted - due to the
CIA Rendition investigation while trying to convince it to
grant our request to repatriate Guantanamo detainees through
Lajes. Right now, it would be to our advantage to stroke him
a lot.
Hoffman
Viewing cable 06ISLAMABAD22174, TERROR FINANCE: EMBASSY

PRESSES GOP ON UN 1267
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO8925
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2174/01 3310955
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270955Z NOV 06
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9704
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1473
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3879
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0882
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1018
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1775
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6528
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9755
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2184
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3612
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1501
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Monday, 27 November 2006, 09:55

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022174
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS AF, EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN, UN
SUBJECT: TERROR FINANCE: EMBASSY PRESSES GOP ON UN 1267
COMMITTEE CASES
REF: ISLAMABAD 22000
¶1. (C) Summary: As noted in Ref A, post has raised the ongoing operations of
two UN 1267 Committee-designated entities -- Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust
and Lashkar-e-Tayyba/Jamaat ud-Dawa (LeT/JuD) -- with contacts throughout the
Government of Pakistan (GOP). While the Ambassador has pressed the issue with
the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, emboffs have engaged the
MFA’s UN Directorate and the Information Ministry. The GOP has responded by
reviewing its procedures to disseminate information on the prohibitions that
accompany UN 1267 designation to ensure that broadcasters and print media are
aware that they should decline requests to purchase advertising space. No GOP
official, however, has committed to taking direct action to close the operations
of these entities. In addition to raising the issue with GOP officials, post has
also shared open source reports of these entities fund-raising activities with
like-minded missions in the Islamabad diplomatic community, as well as with the
visiting UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate delegation. End summary.
¶2. (C) In a November 17 meeting, the Ambassador presented Foreign Secretary
Riaz Khan with open source material detailing Al Rashid’s television
solicitations for Zakat donations, a website highlighting federal Minister of
Information Durrani’s participation in an Al Akhtar Trust Ramadan event, and a
press report on the declaration of the Ministry of Defense Parliamentary
Secretary that he was proud to be a member of LeT and that he seeks to extend
support to jihadi organizations when they seek his “cooperation.” Each of these
reports is disturbing in itself, the Ambassador said, as they seriously damage
Pakistan’s image in the international community. These incidents point to a more
fundamental question: is the GOP is committed to implementing the sanctions that
follow a UN 1267 Committee designation?
¶3. (S) While the Foreign Secretary recognized the detrimental consequences of
the news reports of these incidents, he cited Al Rashid’s pending challenge to
the GOP’s implementation of 1267 sanctions (freezing accounts, closing offices,
etc.) as an impediment to more active government intervention. The Ambassador
emphasized that this series of incidents could lead reasonable observers to
conclude that the GOP is not serious about its UN 1267 obligations; he urged the
GOP to take immediate and definitive steps against the designated entities. The
Ambassador concluded by stating that without strong public action by the GOP,
the U.S. will be forced to formally bring these incidents to the attention of
the UN 1267 Committee. (Note: In an aside, the Foreign Secretary asked the
Ambassador whether the U.S, has evidence linking JuD to terrorist activity. The
Ambassador replied affirmatively, noting that the USG has shared such
information with GOP intelligence agencies. The Ambassador also advised the
Foreign Secretary that there is a growing concern in the USG about LeT/JuD
support to the insurgency in Afghanistan. End note.)
¶4. (C) A week later, in a November 24 meeting with National Security Advisor
Tariq Aziz, the Ambassador presented the same points, supported by copies of the
open source reports. (Note: This package of open source material included a
ISLAMABAD 00022174 002 OF 003
November 20 report of a full page Al Akhtar advertisement in a Karachi Urdu-
language paper solicit donations of meat for the poor during the coming Eid-al-
Adha holiday. End note.) The Ambassador reported that he had also raised the
issue with the Foreign Secretary, but was not certain that the gravity of these
UN 1267 Committee violations had registered with the MFA. The Ambassador
observed that the bilateral relationship would not be helped if the U.S. is
forced to formally notify the UN 1267 Committee of Pakistan’s lax implementation
of its international obligations. NSA Aziz agreed that the GOP wished to avoid a
formal referral to the UN 1267 committee, expressing serious concern over the
broadcast and publication of the Al Akhtar and Al Rashid zakat solicitations and
particular irritation over the remarks by the Parliamentary Secretary for
Defense. While saying that the GOP cannot close down the accounts and operations
of JuD, as the entity is not yet the subject of a 1267 designation, Aziz agreed
that there is no similar impediment to taking firm action against designees Al
Akhtar and Al Rashid Trusts. Aziz promised the Ambassador that he would pursue
the matter within the GOP interagency.
¶5. (C) Complementing the Ambassador’s outreach, Public Affairs Counselor and
econoff have raised the issue of 1267 designees’ published and broadcast fund-
raising solicitations with the Information Secretary and with the MFA
Spokesperson and Director General (UN). The Information Secretary pleaded
ignorance that UN 1267 sanctions applied to broadcast and print media; once the
matter was brought to his attention by the Embassy, he said that he ordered the
Information Ministry to advise all state-affiliated media outlets that they must
not/not to accept advertising or public service solicitations from any of the
1267 designees. (Note: According to the MFA, a similar effort to reach private
media outlets is said to be underway by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory
Authority. End note.) Tasneem Aslam, the MFA spokesperson and UN Director
General, reaffirmed the GOP’s commitment to honoring its UN obligations, but
noted that a way must be found to “rehabilitate” designated entities, as their
charitable and humanitarian activities are a vital part of Pakistani society.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador discussed the recent spate of public reports on 1267
designee solicitations with Ambassador Ruperez, who led the UNSC
Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) delegation on a November 17-24
mission to assess Pakistan’s commitment to combat terrorism. PolCouns also
privately briefed the senior legal advisor on USG concerns over the continued
operation of these entities in Pakistan. PolCouns has also shared the open
source reports of the 1267-designated entities with like-minded colleagues in
the diplomatic community whose Embassies’ also engage the GOP on terror finance
issues.
¶7. (SBU) Post’s efforts have not gone unnoticed: the November 25 edition of the
English-language “The Pakistan Post” carried a front-page article with the
headline “Banned Outfits’ Ads Annoy US.” The article said that the Interior
Ministry has instructed relevant government departments “to create awareness”
within the press that media should not accept advertising by organization
designated by the UN. The Pakistan Post says that the Interior Ministry’s report
notes that “our each and every paper is monitored by the U.S. State Department
that (sic) has a separate section to monitor Urdu newspapers.” The Post article
also reviews alleged U.S. efforts to include JuD in the LeT 1267 designation, a
campaign the paper describes as stymied after China demanded
ISLAMABAD 00022174 003 OF 003
evidence that JuD is connected to terror finance activities. (Note: The Post’s
story coincided with banner headlines describing dozens of new bilateral Pak-
Chinese initiatives announced during Chinese President Hu’s November 23-26 state
visit to Pakistan. End note.)
¶8. (C) Comment: Emboffs will continue to engage GOP officials and contacts in
the press, financial community, political parties and the diplomatic community
to raise awareness and generate multiple points of pressure to demand that the
GOP take firm action to terminate the operations of 1267-designated entities.
Post recommends reassessing GOP progress on this issue in late December, with an
eye to formal notification to the UN 1267 Committee in early 2007 if the GOP
response is unsatisfactory. End comment. CROCKER
Viewing cable 06JEDDAH700, TALES OF A PRINCE: CG MEETS WITH

GOVERNOR OF
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06JEDDAH700.
06JEDDAH700 2006-11-08 14:02 2010-11-29 23:11 SECRET Consulate Jeddah
VZCZCXYZ0016
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHJI #0700/01 3121437

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081437Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH
INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 6936
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T JEDDAH 000700
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/08/2016

TAGS PGOV, PINR, SCUL
SUBJECT: TALES OF A PRINCE: CG MEETS WITH GOVERNOR OF
ASIR’S FIXER
Classified By: Consul General Tatiana Gfoeller,for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) On November 7 the CG met with a prominent Western businessman who is
close to the Governor of Asir, Prince Khalid bin Faisal. The businessman is
known as a “fixer” for Prince Khalid. During their conversation, he recounted to
the CG a number of his interactions with the Prince.
¶2. (S) Their first encounter was at the prince’s majlis in Abha, the capital of
Asir Province. The businessman described the majlis to the CG and spoke of its
largesse, its lavish decor, and its eclectic makeup of people: tribesmen,
mutawa, and others. During the proceedings, a waiter approached with coffee and
tea. XXXXXXXXXXXX the businessman recalled, he knew that he and Prince Khalid
would get along well.
¶3. (S) The businessman’s second encounter with the prince was not actually with
the prince. He had been invited to the prince’s home to meet with his family. He
recalled how surprised he had been at such a gesture. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶4. (S) The businessman’s third encounter with Prince Khalid coincided with the
visit of Prince Charles of the United Kingdom. He informed the CG that Prince
Khalid and Prince Charles share a love of painting. Khalid opened a “painters
village” in Abha, the capital of Asir, called Al Muftah. People, including
faces, as well as objects are painted by Al Muftah artists, just as Khalid does
in his own works of art. (Note: This is very interesting since painting is
frowned upon by many conservative Saudis, and painting people and faces is
forbidden according to the Wahabi interpretation of Islam. End note.) The
businessman told the CG about a call that he received from a nervous Prince
Khalid because of the party that he had offered to host for Prince Charles.
During that time Prince Khalid, who has since built a new palace, was living in
his father, the deceased King Faisal’s old palace. His mother, Queen Effet,
lived upstairs on the second floor of the palace, but the first floor needed
attention. The palace was described as aged and in dire need of renovation. The
businessman recounted how he was called and asked by the Prince, to take care of
renovating the ground floor of the palace for a party that would take place in
three weeks from the time of the phone call. The businessman asked whether he
had a choice, and when told an emphatic “no,” then agreed to do it.
¶5. (S) According to the businessman, the first thing that he did was cut off
all electricity so that no one would be able to turn on the lights and see what
was taking place. Secondly, he inserted styrofoam into the holes in the walls.
Thirdly, he set up projectors to project colors and designs onto the walls. On
the evening of the party candles were the only source of lighting throughout the
house. The plan was successful as the Prince of Wales commented on how luxurious
and beautiful the palace was, despite the fact that it was not. Prince Khalid
was very happy and the relationship between the businessman and the prince was
cemented. (Note: The prince’s old palace has since become a university. End
note.)
¶6. (S) The next day Prince Khalid phoned this businessman and invited him to
meet the Prince of Wales. What the prince did not know was that while the
businessman had sacrificed three weeks to renovate the palace, his sister had
been visiting from out of the country and he had other obligations, which he
disregarded. The businessman ultimately declined the invitation to meet with the
two princes. When he received a phone call and a summons, the next day, from
Prince Khalid, he was frightened. He did not know what to expect and he feared
the worst.
¶6. (S) When the businessman arrived to meet Prince Khalid he was pleasantly
surprised to receive a painting by each of the princes, as gifts. He was also
shocked to receive, what Prince Khalid called, a “tip,” in the amount of
SR50,000 ($13,333). He confided to the CG that Prince Khalid is “known for being
extremely cheap.” The businessman concluded by reiterating how close his
relationship is to Prince Khalid and sharing more fond memories of the “phony
dinner” at the prince’s palace.
GFOELLER
Viewing cable 06BAKU1835, GOAJ INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT

USG POLICY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06BAKU1835.
06BAKU1835 2006-12-20 08:08 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baku
VZCZCXRO9720
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #1835/01 3540807
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200807Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001835
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2016

TAGS: PGOV PINR PBTS PREL MARR IRAJ
SUBJECT: GOAJ INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT USG POLICY
TOWARD IRAN - ACTION REQUEST
REF: A. BAKU 1761
¶B. BAKU 1819

¶C. BAKU 1700
BAKU 00001835 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge Jason P. Hyland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: President Aliyev stated to the Ambassador

that the USG and international community's policy towards
Iran has "failed," that Iran is "confident, comfortable, and
unconstrained," that he "does not understand USG policy on
Iran" and, consequently, Azerbaijan's policy must be to
"minimize potential risks" to Azerbaijan. Aliyev also said
that Iranian President Ahmadinejad has affirmed that he has
"burned his bridges" on the nuclear issue and warned Aliyev
directly that Iran will "attack from where it is attacked."
President Aliyev believes it is "always possible Iran will do
something against us." President Aliyev's foreign policy
advisor and the Foreign Minister have voiced similar
concerns; the Foreign Minister has again told the Ambassador
that Iran is planning various scenarios in response to
heightened tensions or military action, which the GOAJ
believes will include a provocation against Azerbaijani
interests on the Caspian, where the international legal
framework remains unclear. A recent anti-Azerbaijani
editorial which appeared in the Iranian newspaper Jomhouri
Eslami (reported incorrectly in the Azerbaijani press as
having been written by Supreme Leader Khamenei) appears to be
driving much of the GOAJ's concerns. In sum, the GOAJ at the
most senior levels has communicated to us in stark terms
their concern about the implications for Azerbaijani security
of the current situation in Iran, and their desire to better
understand USG policy to address it - and its implications.
This will impact our ability to work with the GOAJ on a range
of issues; we need to address their concern. End Summary.
------------------------
President Aliyev on Iran
------------------------
¶2. (C) In a 23 November one-on-one meeting with the

Ambassador, President Aliyev raised in stark terms his view
that USG and the international community's policy on Iran has
"failed" and that Iran is "confident, comfortable, and
unconstrained." Aliyev said that he "does not understand USG
policy" in response to this situation, adding that
Ahmadinejad has affirmed he has "burned his bridges" on the
nuclear issue and warned Aliyev directly that Iran will
"attack from where it is attacked." Aliyev said he believes
it is "always possible Iran will do something against us"
(ref a) and Azerbaijan's policy must be to minimize potential
risks to itself. Also as reported earlier, Aliyev's Foreign
Policy Advisor (ref b) and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov have
voiced similar concerns. In a December 14 one-on-one
meeting, Foreign Minister told the Ambassador again that Iran
is planning various scenarios to respond to heightened
tensions or military action, which Azerbaijan believes will
include a provocation against Azerbaijani interests on the
Caspian, where the international legal framework remains
unclear.
------------------------------------
Foreign Minister Mammadyarov on Iran
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) In a December 14 one-on-one meeting with the

Ambassador, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov said that recent
Iranian activities (the fueling of demonstrations in Nardaran
with respect to the anti-Islam article published in Sanat,
recent demonstrations in front of the Azerbaijani Consulate
General and Embassy - ref c) are intended to "send a message
to us that they won't wait" while Azerbaijan moves towards
NATO and the US, and on a possible resolution of the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. He pointed to a recent statement by
Supreme Leader Khamenei that "Azerbaijan should not feel
comfortable with respect to NATO," saying Iran is "watching
our policy in this area very carefully." In addition, he
said Iran "doesn't want us to make a move towards conflict
resolution because they know the conflict is the only serious
problem" facing Azerbaijan, and that if continued it keeps
Azerbaijan off base and under pressure. He also said that
Russia's and Iran's positions on this are very close.
¶4. (C) Mammadyarov repeated what he had told the Ambassador

some months ago, that the Iranians are developing different
"scenarios" for how they will react if the US or Israel
BAKU 00001835 002.2 OF 003
increase the pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue.

Mammadyarov feels that Azerbaijan is a "target" for Iran if
there is the possibility of military action against Iran,
which Iran "definitely" sees as being on the table. The GOAJ
thinks that a provocation of some kind on the Caspian will be
Iran's likely approach because whatever overt step Iran
takes, it will want to be within the framework of
international law, Mammadyarov said. There is no agreement
on Caspian delimitation, the international legal framework is
murky and "that is where Azerbaijan is vulnerable." However,
Mammadyarov also said that Azerbaijan believes Iran is
preparing scenarios for responses with respect to Lebanon,
Iraq and "even in Syria." Iran is "afraid of the Taliban"
and hence slow to consider any steps in Afghanistan. Iran
may also create difficulties with respect to its land border
with Nakhchivan (stopping buses, for example), with the aim
of turning the population against the GOAJ and provoking
"social problems" in Nakhchivan like those in Georgia.
According to Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan is planning to build a
railroad from Nakhchivan through Igdir, Turkey, as the next
stage of the Kars-Alkhakhalaki-Tbilisi railroad in order to
keep Nakhchivan from being cut off by Iran this way.
¶5. (C) Mammadyarov feels that Iran does not want Azerbaijan
to make a move on N-K resolution because the withdrawal of
Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territory will make
Azerbaijan stronger in the region. Mammadyarov believes that
Iran does not want Azerbaijan, as a secular Muslim country,
to succeed as a model. Poverty in the ethnic Azeri provinces
in the north of Iran is "like the middle ages" and as people
travel back and forth from Azerbaijan to Iran the contrast is
evident. Mammadyarov argued that it is in Iran's national
interest to see the conflict continue, and, hence, the
Iranian government is exerting increased pressure at any sign
of steps towards a resolution.
¶6. (C) Speaking to the role of religion, Mammadyarov

asserted that Islam in Azerbaijan is more a matter of
"tradition" than ideology. Iran started playing with religion
with the Sanat article and in Nardaran, hoping for a
"uprising" from the people. When this did not succeed,
Mammadyarov said that Iran's next step was the demonstrations
at the Azerbaijani Embassy and Consulate General (ref b). He
argued that Iran's aim is to portray the Government of
Azerbaijan as bad Muslims, poor followers of Islam.
Azerbaijan is going to continue its westward orientation,
cooperation with NATO and the US but "without rhetoric to the
public," Mammadyarov said. In Brussels, President Aliyev
made clear that Azerbaijan will "continue and deepen our
cooperation with NATO," moving to the second phase of its
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Mammadyarov said
that President Aliyev believes greater cooperation with NATO
and a greater NATO presence and involvement in the region
will bring predictability and stability. He said Aliyev was
"very happy" with paragraph 43 of the Riga Summit statement;
its language on regional conflicts was a "clear message to
everyone north, south, east and west of Azerbaijan;" and, it
helps him push back on those of his advisors who question
what Azerbaijan gains from cooperation with NATO.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Supreme Leader Khamenei's Alleged Anti-Azerbaijan Comments
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶7. (C) A recent anti-Azerbaijani article which appeared in

Jomhouri Eslami, a conservative Tehran daily, appears to have
played a key role in raising concerns about Iran within
senior GOAJ circles. The Azerbaijani press (to include the
opposition newspaper Azadliq) quoted Supreme Leader Khamenei
as having made numerous threats against Azerbaijan, even
claiming Azerbaijan to be part of Iran, characterizing it as
"Northern Iran" (a pointed dig at Azerbaijanis who refer to
Azeri-populated areas of Azerbaijan as "Southern
Azerbaijan"). In fact, the Jomhouri Eslami article widely
disseminated in the Azerbaijani press was an editorial piece,
not an article either written by or quoting the Supreme
Leader. While critical of the Azerbaijani government
(focusing on issues such as the Sanat article and closer ties
with the US), the original editorial did not threaten
Azerbaijan in as dire terms as suggested by the Azerbaijani
media with reported quotes such as "we would like to remind
politicians in Azerbaijan that the IRI has adequate power to
realize the historic will of the people."
-------
BAKU 00001835 003.2 OF 003
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Given the complex relations between Azerbaijan and

Iran, heated accusations in the press - and even overt
threats by Iran - are not uncommon. The most recent
bilateral spat occurred in March 2006, when Iran accused the
GOAJ of supporting regime change by hosting in Baku a world
congress of Azerbaijanis (including "Southern Azerbaijanis"
who roundly criticized the IRI during the conference).
However, President Aliyev's and Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov's recent statements to the Ambassador reveal
increasing levels of GOAJ concern about Iranian intentions
and USG policy toward Iran. Embassy contacts have also noted
that the level of Iranian rhetoric is sharper than in the
past (although their views likely are based on the somewhat
erroneous Azerbaijani press coverage of Iranian editorials).
The GOAJ at the most senior levels has communicated to us its
in stark terms concern about implications for Azerbaijani
security of the current situation in Iran, and their desire
to better understand USG policy to address it - and its
implications. This will impact our ability to work with the
GOAJ on a range of issues; we need to address their concern.
We also note that the GOAJ has regular and broad contacts
with Iranian officials and Aliyev and his key advisors, if
engaged in regular dialogue, can provide us useful insights
on Iranian officials and intentions as seen from Baku. The
Department's guidance on how to respond to Aliyev's concerns
is requested.
HYLAND
Viewing cable 06BRIDGETOWN2164, COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST
FOR BLACKWOOD AND DONALD TO
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #06BRIDGETOWN2164.
2006-12-08 2010-11-30 Embassy
06BRIDGETOWN2164 UNCLASSIFIED
17:05 21:09 Bridgetown
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHWN #2164 3421757

ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081757Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE 9517
INFO RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 5832
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3873
UNCLAS BRIDGETOWN 002164
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AIDAC
E.O. 12958:N/A
TAGS: OTRA ASEC EAID TD XL
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST FOR BLACKWOOD AND DONALD TO
TRAVEL TO TOBAGO
¶1. USAID BRIDGETOWN REQUESTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR MR. MANSFIELD

BLACKWOOD, SENIOR TECHNICAL SPECIALIST, USAID, AND MR. MICHAEL
DONALD, REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISER, TO TRAVEL TO TOBAGO FOR THE
PERIOD DECEMBER 13-14, 2006. THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO REVIEW
FOR INTERNAL CLOSING OUT PURPOSES SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES COMPLETED
UNDER OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
¶2. MR. DONALD HAS A TOP SECRET CLEARANCE; DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO.
900461216 - EXPIRING ON 08/31/08.
MR. BLACKWOOD HAS A NO-ACCESS SECURITY CLEARANCE; JAMAICAN PASSPORT

NO. A2519939.
MR. BLACKWOOD WILL TRAVEL FROM BARBADOS TO TOBAGO ON DECEMBER 13 ON

CARIBBEAN STAR FLT 8B 787 AND RETURN TO BARBADOS ON DECEMBER 14 VIA
CARIBBEAN STAR FLT 8B 756.
MR. DONALD WILL TRAVEL FROM GRENADA TO TOBAGO ON DECEMBER 13 ON

CARIBBEAN STAR 8B 787 AND RETURN TO BARBADOS ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 14
VIA CARIBBEAN STAR FLT 8B 756.
¶3. PLEASE CABLE CONCURRENCE. BRIDGETOWN APPRECIATES TRINIDAD'S

ASSISTANCE.
Viewing cable 06PARIS7884, FRANCE: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON

TERRORISM
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1568
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHGI
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DE RUEHFR #7884/01 3551529
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PTER FR ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR KPAO
SUBJECT: FRANCE: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 177128
¶1. In 2006, France continued to pursue aggressive

counterterrorism measures, including the dismantling of
terror networks on its territory, notably those assisting in
the recruitment or financing of terrorists to Iraq. French
terrorism officials remained on high alert since the London
subway bombings in 2005, and continued to conduct extensive
investigations into Islamic terrorism on French soil. The
French government arrested approximately 70 people in 2006 on
charges related to Islamic terrorism. In September, French
authorities announced they had arrested their 400th suspect
in connection with Islamic terrorism since the September 11
attacks in the U.S. More than 150 of those have been jailed.
¶2. In September the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

(GSPC) announced its union with al-Qaeda and declared France
to be its number one target. Several high profile events in
2006 -- including the local publication of the Danish
Mohammed cartoon pictorials, heated debate on the
interdiction of the veil in French public institutions, and
the presence of French troops in Afghanistan and Lebanon --
have been cited by various French authorities as factors
manipulated by Islamic extremists to incite violence against
the country. France,s chief counterterrorism judge,
Jean-Louis Bruguiere, maintains that all terrorist threats
currently faced by France can be directly linked to Iraq. In
May, intelligence officials announced that 29 people had been
detained in France for suspected association with terror
networks related to Iraq. In September, officials noted that
at least nine terrorists whose journey to Iraq began in
France have been killed, with two incarcerated and another
12-15 likely still engaged in combat against Coalition
forces. Increasing Islamic radicalization in the local
prison system also continues to worry French officials.
¶3. On January 23 the French government adopted new

counterterrorism legislation that considerably strengthened
police powers in criminal law and codified some current
practices. Preliminary detention for terrorism suspects was
extended from a maximum of four to up to six days. Current
legislation allows the state to thereafter place suspects in
pre-trial detention for up to four years when the evidence is
strong or when they present an imminent threat. The law
gives the government additional powers for the freezing of
assets, video and telephone surveillance, allows increased
monitoring of public transport records, and grants broader
powers of official access to connection data held by internet
cafes and to various personal data records. Sentences for
convicted terrorists were increased from 20 to 30 years for
leading or organizing an attack, and from 10 to 20 years for
assisting a terrorist organization or operation. The new law
also reinforced existing legislation that allows for the
revocation of French nationality and eventual expulsion if
the terrorist became a citizen through naturalization within
the preceding 15 years.
¶4. Under the auspices of the Prime Minister, the French

government published its White Paper on terrorism on March 7.
The paper, a publicly available document, sets out the
government,s overall policy efforts to combat terrorism. It
includes attack scenarios, threat analyses, and technical as
well as political responses to terrorism.
¶5. At the political and diplomatic level, France continued

its active engagement with the United Nation,s Security
Council (UNSC) Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), the G-8,s
Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), the UN,s 1267
Sanctions Committee (for the Taliban and al-Qaeda), and the
European Council,s Anti-Terrorism Strategy action plan.
France is a founding member of the joint U.S./Russia Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which was inaugurated
in October. France is a member and contributor to both the
Proliferation and Container Security Initiatives. The U.S.
and France maintain regular bilateral counterterrorism
consultations. France has also signed and ratified 12 of the
PARIS 00007884 002 OF 004

13 UN counterterrorism conventions. It signed, but has not
yet ratified, the Convention for the Prevention of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism.
¶6. On the military front, French Special Forces participated

in coalition operations in Afghanistan as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). France is also a key participant in
Coalition Task Force (CTF) 150, a multinational naval force
that patrols the Red Sea and Gulf of Yemen to interdict the
movement of suspected terrorists between Afghanistan, the
Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It has twice
commanded the Task Force and will assume command for a third
time next year. France,s overall contributions in
Afghanistan increased in 2006 and France currently commands
the International Security Assistance Force,s (ISAF)
Regional Command - Kabul. France is also a chief contributor
to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with
more than 1600 troops, which is under the command of a French
General through February 2007. UNIFIL,s mission includes
assisting the Lebanese Armed forces to secure its territory,
including against Hizballah.
¶7. France continued to develop competencies and capabilities

of TRACFIN, the Ministry of Finance,s terrorism financing
coordination and investigation unit. Within the European
Union, France played an active role in the Clearinghouse, the
EU process for designation terrorist organizations. France
has not designated HAMAS-affiliated charities, such as the
French based Comite de Bienfaisance et Secours aux
Palestiniens (Committee for the Well-Being and Assistance to
Palestinians), arguing that it has no proven links to
terrorism. France also continued to oppose any EU
designation of Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist
organization, although it supported Hizballah's eventual
disarmament, which it maintained would result in Hizballah,s
gradual integration into Lebanese politics.
¶8. The government continued its policy of expelling

non-French citizens engaged in terrorist activities or speech
that promoted hate or incited violence. Among those ordered
expelled from France during 2006 were at least 20 imams from
Algeria, Bangladesh, Morocco, and Pakistan. Chelali
Benchellali, an Algerian imam resident in France since 1961,
was expelled to Algeria in September. He was convicted to
six months, time served, in June of contributing to a
Chechnyan network terrorist plot. Several of Benchellali,s
family members were also convicted on similar terrorism
charges. His youngest son, Mourad, was a Guantamano detainee
for more than three years and is still facing trial in France.
¶9. The government also exercised its power to repeal French

citizenship and deport convicted terrorists. Adel Tebourski,
a Tunisian and French dual-national citizen, who was arrested
in 2001 and sentenced in 2005 for his contribution to the
September 9, 2001 assassination of Afghan War Chief Ahmad
Shah Massood, was stripped of his French nationality by
decree on July 19, and expelled to Tunisia on August 7.
Karim Bourti, a French GSPC supporter, was also stripped of
his citizenship in May.
¶10. Since May 2005, the government revoked the security

clearances of 72 individuals working in private companies at
Paris, Charles de Gaulle international airport. The majority
of those were announced in early November 2006. A handful of
those concerned brought legal action against the government
and were subsequently reinstated. The government claimed
that the individuals, while not terrorists, posed a security
risk to the airport based on background checks that showed
Islamic extremist sympathies. The Prefect charged with
governing the area noted that background checks are conducted
on a regular basis and that a number of security clearances
are revoked annually.
¶11. Key judicial proceedings in 2006 on Islamic terrorism

related crimes included:
PARIS 00007884 003 OF 004
- On June 13, 25 Islamic militants tied to a Chechen

jihad network that allegedly planned to bomb a commercial
center in Paris and the Eiffel Tower were sentenced in June.
Several members of the group, including Menad Benchellali and
Merouane Benhamed, received the maximum sentence of 10 years.
- Five of six former Guantanamo detainees who were

expelled to France in 2004 and 2005 are currently no longer
in detention (they were initially detained for many months
after their arrival in France). Brahim Yadel, however,
remains in custody for violating the terms of his conditional
release. All six former detainees face further charges in
France for terrorist conspiracy. In September 2006 the trial
was halted when a judge ordered further investigations into
the role of alleged visits of French intelligence authorities
to Guantanamo. The trial is scheduled to reconvene on May 2,
¶2007.
- Karim Mehdi, a Moroccan national, was sentenced to nine

years on October 26 for terrorism related activities. Mehdi
is alleged to have ties with September 11 terrorists (Ramzi
bin al Shaibah and Ziad Jarrah) and is suspected of planning
an attack on the island of Reunion in 2003. Mehdi will also
be deported following his sentence and not allowed in France
for a minimum of six years.
- Rachid Ramda, who was extradited to France from the UK

in December 2005 after ten years in detention, was sentenced
to ten years on March 29 for his role in the 1995 Paris
subway and train attacks.
- On November 12, France,s chief counterterrorism judge,

Jean-Louis Bruguiere, sent the cases of three suspects
allegedly connected to the 2002 Djerba, Tunisia attacks, to
the Paris Court of Assizes. Khalid Cheik Mohammed, Christian
Ganczarski and Walid Nawar are suspected of assisting
convicted terrorist Belgacem Nawar in the Djerba al-Qaeda
attacks whose victims included two French citizens. Cheik
Mohammed remains in U.S. custody at Guantanamo.
¶12. Three individuals were detained in France in late

November (two on November 25 and one on November 29) after
being expelled from Syria. They are suspected of attempting
to transit through Syria in order to join insurgents fighting
against Coalition forces in Iraq. Another nine individuals
were deported from Egypt in mid-December under similar same
charges. However all were released after a brief period of
detention.
¶13. French police cooperated closely with Spanish authorities
in the Basque region throughout 2006. Several arms caches
were discovered in France, and a number of arrests of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) suspects were made throughout
the year. Several were extradited to Spain. One attack,
allegedly claimed by Ipparetarek or an Ipparetarak
sympathizer (a defunct French Basque nationalist group),
occurred in France on June 11 against the Hotel Ostap, owned
by famed chef Alain Ducasse. There were no injuries and only
minimal damage.
¶14. During the first six months of 2006, 176 attacks or

attempted attacks occurred on the French island of Corsica.
112 of those were claimed by the National Front for the
Liberation of Corsica- Combatants Union, or by the National
Front for the Liberation of Corsica of October 22. Three
people, including two military personnel, were superficially
wounded in 2006. Three terrorists were killed during the
year by accident while attempting to carry out attacks. The
government has a widespread police presence in the region and
arrested dozens of people throughout the year in connection
with various attacks. The groups tend to target secondary
residences, and avoid serious damage or casualties.
Separatist groups appear to have largely given up their
political battle for independence but continue to wage an
intimidation campaign aimed at foreigners or mainland French
citizens interested in permanent residence or secondary homes
PARIS 00007884 004 OF 004
on the small island.

HOFMANN
Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI145, GENERAL ABIZAID TALKS IRAN, IRAQ,

AFGHANISTAN WITH
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017

TAGS: PREL PARM IZ IR AF AE
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID TALKS IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN WITH
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE
Classified By: Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (S) Summary. On the evening of January 21, Abu Dhabi

Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed
Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted
CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid for dinner. They
discussed regional security issues, but Iraq was clearly the
focus of MbZ's interest. MbZ expressed lack of confidence in
being able to work with the Maliki government. MbZ believes
that the Saudis will not support any Sunni group in Iraq with
Al-Qaeda ties, but that the Saudis are firm in their resolve
to counter Iran. MbZ reiterated UAE interest in acquiring
Predator B. Referring to the recent events in Somalia, MbZ
commented: "The Somalia job was fantastic." Also present
were UAE Chief of Staff, Lt. General Hamad Mohammed Thani
Al-Rumaithy; Director of Intelligence, Staff Brigadier
General Engineer Essa Saif Mohammed Al-Mazrouei; Commander of
the Special Operations, Major General Juma Ahmed Al-Bawardi
Al-Falasi; and Commander of the UAE Air Forces and Air
Defense, Staff Air Vice-Marshal (Major General) Mohammed
Sowaidan Al-Gimzy. End Summary.
Iraq
----
¶2. (C) Clearly the focus for MbZ, discussion began with his
pronouncement: "Let's talk about Iraq." Gen. Abizaid noted
that extremists on both ends of the Sunni/Shia spectrum are
largely irretrievable, but we still have an opportunity to
stabilize Iraq by reinforcing the moderate middle ground.
MbZ said that he had little confidence in being able to work
with this (Maliki's) government, saying of Maliki: "I think
we are operating on different frequencies -- no, different
radio systems altogether."
¶3. (S) MbZ asked General Abizaid what the U.S. hoped to
achieve with the extra troops set to deploy to Iraq in 2007,
and reiterated his concern about the level of ongoing
violence against the Sunni. Abizaid responded that the
violence in Iraq is highly localized, principally in the
Baghdad area, and that most of the rest of Iraq is quiet. The
extra troops are intended to bring calm to Baghdad and give
the government sufficient space and time to contain violence
even further. It will also send a message that the U.S. is
not abandoning Iraq. MbZ stated that Ahmad Chalabi and
others had made a "big deal" out of the Baathist threat, but
said that the Baathists were not and are not the problem --
even though specific individuals linked to the Ba,ath Party
were/are the problem. MbZ offered that de-Baathification was
and is "an unnecessary distraction," stating that "pursuing a
problem that doesn't really exist only leads to more
problems." He said he had seen Iyad Allawi a month ago --
noting that Allawi was looking to the UAE for support and
assurances. MbZ said that there is no assurance that the UAE
can give him, adding: "It's not his time." MbZ added that he
believes that the Saudis will not assist Sunni groups in Iraq
that are aligned with Al-Qaeda.
Iran
----
¶4. (S) MbZ acknowledged that Tehran knows that the U.S. is
serious in its stance against Iranian proliferation. This
can be clearly seen in "how Iran is changing its tactics."
Abizaid pressed that countries in the region should make
stronger statements. Weak statements only encourage the
Iranians: "We need our friends to say that they stand with
the Americans." MbZ avoided committing the UAE to anything
like a public statement and shifted the discussion to other
countries in the region saying: "The Saudis need no
encouragement -- they are Wahhabis after all -- and will
resolutely stand up to any Shi'a anywhere and counter them
strongly." Agreeing that it is only a matter of time before
the Iranians develop or acquire advanced weapons
technologies, including MTCR-controlled UAV technology, MbZ
asserted: "That's why we need it first . . . give me
Predator B." MbZ added: "Iran has to know that there is a
price to pay for every decision they make. They are
expanding day by day -- they have to be dealt with before
they do something tragic." But that said, he continued: "We
(UAE) are not ready yet" to confront Iran.
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
¶5. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the actions of the UAE forces
currently deployed in Afghanistan. MbZ reciprocated: "No --
ABU DHABI 00000145 002 OF 002
thank you. This has been a good chance for us, and we
appreciate the opportunity." MbZ questioned the role the
Iranians were playing in Afghanistan. He further observed
that Musharraf is not doing enough to engage the tribes in
the south, and needs to expand its efforts there.
Lebanon/Hizballah/Somalia
--------------------------
¶6. (S) Noting Lebanese PM Siniora's January 16 visit to the
UAE, MbZ characterized Siniora as &a good man. We are
supporting him." MbZ said that Hizballah has made a "big
mistake" in estimating its support in Lebanon, and has
"played it wrong -- they do not have the support of the
majority of the Lebanese people." MbZ discussed with Abizaid
the military technology that Hizballah used in 2006,
specifically noting the amount of anti-tank weapons that
Hizballah possessed. Abizaid acknowledged that Hizballah has
access to weapons technology that most Arab states don't
have. MbZ interrupted the conversation to state explicitly
that he wants the U.S. to understand that the UAE was not
involved in the transfer of those weapons or technologies in
any way. Referring to the recent events in Somalia, MbZ
commented: "The Somalia job was fantastic."
¶7. (U) POLAD Ambassador Richard Roth has approved this

message.
SISON
Viewing cable 07ALGIERS45, SENATE PRESIDENT RE-ELECTED

Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07ALGIERS45.
07ALGIERS45 2007-01-16 17:05 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Algiers
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000045
SIPDIS
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017

TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: SENATE PRESIDENT RE-ELECTED
REF: A. 2006 ALGIERS 2067
¶B. ALGIERS 30
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 b/d
¶1. (C) Abdelkader Bensalah was re-elected, 129-0, as the

President of the Conseil de la Nation (Senate) on January 12.
Bensalah remains first in line to succeed President
Bouteflika in the event that he is unable to complete his
current term. Bensalah's re-election became a foregone
conclusion when no other senator challenged him for the post.
A reporter for French-language daily newspaper Liberte,
Nadia Mellal, who covered all aspects of the election, told
us the result was predetermined once President Bouteflika
signaled to the senators that he wanted Bensalah to retain
his position. Mellal said senators privately complained
that, out of respect to Bouteflika, no other candidates had
presented themselves. Many told her the election became a
formality rather than an exercise in democracy, which was a
shame in their view.
BOUTEFLIKA APPOINTS SENATORS OF HIS GENERATION

--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C) On the day of the election, eight new senators joined
the Conseil de la Nation as part of the third of the
membership appointed directly by President Bouteflika (ref
A). All have one characteristic in common: they are
"moudjahidine," or veterans (like Bouteflika) of the war of
independence against France. According to Mellal, these
newly appointed senators, as members of the "revolutionary
family" and in a sense "siblings of President Bouteflika,"
will be very loyal to him. Some senators quietly expressed
to her their frustration that the president did not reach out
to members of the younger generation who will need to lead
the country after Bouteflika and his generation pass from the
scene.
VACANT SEATS FOR DEPARTING MINISTERS?

-------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Bouteflika appointed just eight senators out of the 24

allotted to him this year. Dalila Helilou, a former senator
from the presidential tier, told us Bouteflika made a
conscious decision to leave 16 seats vacant for later
appointment. While it may be true that Bouteflika had not
yet made up his mind in some cases, Helilou thought it more
likely that he wanted to keep some Senate seats in reserve
for ministers who are expected to be dismissed shortly from
the cabinet. Helilou said the number of vacant seats was a
good indicator that a cabinet shuffle was coming soon.
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Even though Bouteflika's illness is receding

in the minds of the public (thanks to television pictures of
an active president), the widely respected Bensalah is
considered able to manage the presidential succession process
should Bouteflika not be able to finish his term. Helilou's
analysis of the vacant Senate seats also strikes us as on the
mark.
FORD
Viewing cable 07DUBAI59, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23

MEETING WITH UAE VICE
Discussing cables
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2017

TAGS: PGOV PINS MARR AE IR IS LE
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH UAE VICE
PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND DUBAI RULER MOHAMMED BIN RASHID AL
MAKTOUM
REF: DUBAI 00018
DUBAI 00000059 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Paul R Sutphin, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: In a January 23 meeting in Dubai with U/S Burns,

UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (MbR) expressed concern about the
potential negative impact on Dubai of possible future UN
sanctions against Iran; he urged the quiet US-UAE cooperation on
financial and export control restrictions against Iran, offering
to set up a "joint committee" to this end. He agreed that Iran
should not have nuclear weapons, but warned of the dire regional
consequences of military action. U/S Burns said the US would
protect its interests in the region and support Gulf governments
in resisting efforts by Iran to dominate the region. He
emphasized the importance of continued support for the Siniora
government in Lebanon, and the high priority the US put on a
renewed effort to move the Israelis and Palestinians toward
peace. U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa Valapour, which
has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for nearly 16
months without charges before a court(although under the local
system police charges have been filed); MbR asked his aides to
ensure the case moved forward as rapidly and transparently as
possible End Summary.
2.(C) On January 23, U/S for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns

met with MbR for one hour in MbR's downtown office. Burns was
accompanied by NEA PDAS Jim Jeffrey, the Ambassador, the Consul
General, P Staff assistant Herro Mustafa and ConGen notetaker.
MbR was accompanied by his sons Sheikh Hamdan (who chairs the
Dubai Executive Council, the Emirate's governing body) and
Sheikh Mayed; Minister for Cabinet Affairs (and Dubai Holdings
head) Mohammed Gergawi; federal Minister for Education Dr. Hanif
al Qasimi; Dubai General Security Service head Brigadier
Mohammed al Qemzi; Dubai World head Sultan bin Sulayem; and
Emirates Airlines chairman and Dubai Civil Aviation head Sheikh
Ahmed bin Sayed al Maktoum. U/S Burns expressed admiration for
the Dubai's rapid development, hailing it as an open and
productive model that was now being emulated throughout the
region.
3.(C) Lebanon: U/S Burns conveyed the gratitude of the Lebanese

government for financial and other assistance from the UAE. MbR
said the UAE understands that the Siniora government needs
regional support. U/S Burns urged continued assistance, noting
the US will soon offer the Siniora government $1 billion for
security and reconstruction efforts.
4.(C) Iran sanctions: U/S Burns highlighted the significance of

the June 2006 international offer to negotiate with Iran to
resolve the nuclear issue--the first official US offer to
negotiate with Tehran in 27 years. Tehran had rejected this
broadly-supported, reasonable proposal, which offered economic
incentives such as sanctions relief and the sale of civilian
airliners in addition to negotiations. U/S Burns said that the
UNSCR 1737's limited sanctions were a first step to pressure
Iran to compromise, but that absent Iranian movement another,
more restrictive, sanctions resolution is likely in February.
The US was also taking bilateral action through Treasury
designations against Iranian banks that were funding terrorism.
5.(C) MbR expressed willingness to cooperate in financial

restrictions against Iran, but urged that the cooperation be
conducted quietly; he offered to set up a "joint committee" to
do so (he did not offer details); he later repeated this offer
with regard to military transfers (see para 8). He voiced
concern regarding the potential negative impact of economic
sanctions on Dubai, and against the "good Iranians" -- including
Dubai's estimated 350,000 Iranians residents. U/S Burns and
Ambassador Sison expressed readiness to engage with Dubai on
financial cooperation against Iran. (Note: the number of
resident Iranians was supplied by Al Qemzi, and is higher that
the 200-300 thousand usual cited by the Dubai officials.)
6.(C) Iran and Gulf Security: U/S Burns stated that the US will
protect its interests and support its allies, like the UAE, in
the face of Iranian attempts to dominate the Gulf. This is why
we have stationed a second carrier battle group there, and have
detained Iranian agents in Iraq who were providing arms and bomb
components used to kill US troops. MbR stated that the UAE does
not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, and urged continued
international pressure on Iran, but expressed deep concern about
the destabilizing consequences to the UAE and to region of a
military strike. He urged that the US find a way to stop or
disarm Iran without using military force. U/S Burns reiterated
DUBAI 00000059 002.2 OF 002
that the US wants a diplomatic solution, and is working with the

UN and its allies toward this end; strong UAE support was
important to this effort.
7.(C) MbR expressed hope for change inside Iran, which U/S Burns
echoed. Burns noted the US wants to support the influence of
moderate Iranians and encourage Iran to engage in negotiations.
Minister Gergawi mentioned rumors that Supreme leader Khamenei
is suffering from prostate cancer. Gergawi opined that the
merchant class in Iran has been pressuring Ahmadinejad over his
failing economic policy. He asserted that the growing sectarian
conflict in Iraq, as well as the hanging of Saddam Hussein
(which, he implied, was inspired by Iranian pressure), have now
undermined the possibility of a regional alliance between
extremist Sunnis and Shia. Regional Sunnis now blame Iran for
instability in Lebanon and Iraq. (Note: Gergawi's family is of
Iranian origin, and he acts as one of MbR's principal advisors
on Iran.)
8.(C) Security cooperation: U/S Burns called the Gulf

Cooperation Council a good forum for quiet security cooperation,
and reiterated that the US seeks a close, productive dialogue
with the UAE on Gulf security. The US opposes arms sales to
Iran and will urge its partners in the European Union, Russia
and the Middle East to cooperate on this front. MbR reiterated
his offer to set up a committee to cooperate on these issues.
9.(C) Israel/Palestinians: U/S Burns stressed that the US

believes progress between Israel and the Palestinians toward
peace is central to regional stability, and supports the
creation of a Palestinian state. This would be "the best
thing," MbR replied; a peace deal would make radical groups like
HAMAS "everyone's enemy". Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
should be supported, particularly since HAMAS is funded by Iran.
MbR noted UAE assistance was again flowing to the Palestinians,
although it had been suspended for a time because of corruption
concerns. U/S Burns said the US is careful to ensure its
assistance is going to the Palestinian people, rather than the
HAMAS government, and is confident in the assistance mechanisms
now in place.
10.(C) Valapour case: U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa
Valapour, who has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for
nearly 16 months. U/S Burns said the US sought return of
Valapour's passport, which has been held by the Dubai police.
He underscored that, while he was taking no substantive position
on the merits of the case, the US believes the case should move
forward with due process as quickly as possible. MbR was
unfamiliar with the case, and turned to Gergawi for background.
Gergawi outlined the Dubai government view of the case, saying
the bottom line is that Valapour and his non-USC partners had
profited from insider information in a deal on the Dubai Metro
project with a corrupt Dubai official. "We don't tolerate
corruption," Gergawi concluded. The Consul General noted that
he had recently met with the Dubai Attorney General (reftel) on
the case. The AG had agreed to meet with Valapour's US and
Emirati representatives to help to resolve the issue. MbR asked
his aides to ensure the case moved forward as quickly and
transparently as possible, and promised Valapour would receive
fair treatment.
11.(C) Afghanistan: U/S Burns expressed appreciation for UAE

assistance in Afghanistan, and urged support for the Karzai
government. MbR asserted the UAE and US are partners against
drugs, money laundering, and terrorism and in Afghanistan. He
said the best weapon against the Taliban was economic
investment. U/S Burns outlined ongoing reconstruction efforts,
and noted the difficulty of creating economically viable
substitutes for drug crops. MbR said Karzai is reluctant to
tackle the drug issue because he fears decreased support in the
provinces.
12.(C) Comment: MbR offered little new, other than his somewhat
vague offer to create a bilateral committee to address financial
and arms/technology flows to Iran. He is clearly concerned
regarding the prospect of more comprehensive UN economic
sanctions, given that Iran is Dubai's largest trading partner,
an assertion often cited by Dubai officials (although good
Dubai/Iran trade numbers are hard to come by). We will follow
up to try to get a better read on the scope of MbR's offer.
SUTPHIN
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD31, PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF BRIEFS GEN

SCHOOMAKER AND
Discussing cables
07ISLAMABAD31
13:01 21:09 RN Islamabad
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Wednesday, 03 January 2007, 13:51

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000031
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/02/2016
TAGS AF, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARAFF BRIEFS GEN SCHOOMAKER AND
AMBASSADOR ON STRATEGY FOR BORDER SECURITY
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
¶1. (C) Introduction and summary: During a December 29 meeting, President (and
Chief of Army Staff) Musharraf reinforced for U.S. Chief of Army Staff GEN
Schoomaker and the Ambassador that Pakistan and the U.S, are in the war on
terrorism together, sharing the same goals and fighting the same enemy. Noting
that allies may sometimes see things differently or disagree on how to proceed,
Musharraf outlined his strategy to secure Pakistani territory from violent
extremism and the prevent it from being used to support the insurgency in
Afghanistan. In Musharraf’s view, the essence of the problem of (and solution
to) the Taliban insurgency lies in Afghanistan; that said, the President also
acknowledged Pakistan’s responsibility to prevent cross-border collusion and
support from militants in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA). To date, Pakistan’s primary focus has been on disrupting Islamist
extremists in the FATA, Musharraf said, but the government now sees that it must
make greater efforts in Balochistan. Musharraf summarized his goal: Pakistan
checks support for the insurgency on this side of the border, so that the ISAF-
led Coalition can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. While underscoring his own
commitment, Musharraf questioned the degree to which Afghanistan is willing to
respond to Pakistan’s needs, noting that Pakistan’s request for assistance in
capturing Baloch militant Brahamdagh Bugti have yet to produce any results. End
introduction and summary.
¶2. (C) Comment: Musharraf was frank and forthcoming about Pakistan’s on-going
reassessment of its border security tactics, while underscoring his commitment
to a comprehensive strategy: winning the loyalty of the local population along
the border through political dialogue and socio-economic investment while using
special operations forces to root out and hunt down al Qaeda, Taliban and other
anti-Coalition elements based in Pakistan. Admitting that he is dissatisfied
with the facts on the ground after the September 5 jirga accord in North
Waziristan, Musharraf stressed that the task ahead is not to start over from
scratch, but to make the accord work and then extend it to the rest of the
border -- an assessment with which Embassy Islamabad agrees. Even as he
reaffirmed his determination to secure the border region, however, Musharraf
betrayed deep personal frustration that Karzai’s government appears to be doing
little to apprehend and repatriate Brahamdagh Bugti, End comment.
How to Proceed?
---------------
¶3. (C) Musharraf described the three critical points underlying his strategy
for enhancing border security:
-- Ending cross-border support for the Taliban in Afghanistan -- Closing Afghan
refugee camps in Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) --
Targeting al Qaeda and Taliban senior leaders who have established themselves on
the Pakistani side of the border.
In order to stop militants from unlawfully crossing into Afghanistan, Pakistan
will selectively mine and fence the border. The President has tasked the Army’s
Director General of Military Operations to be prepare to brief an implementation
plan that would be deployed on a test basis. Other Pakistani officials have been
directed to devise a strategy to close the Pir Alazai refugee camp in
Balochistan
ISLAMABAD 00000031 002 OF 003
and to significantly improve monitoring of access to and activities with the
three other most troubling camps.
¶4. (C) Finally, Musharraf said that he had directed Pakistan’s security forces
that the government must proactively clean the al Qaeda and Taliban presence out
of the border region, while simultaneously expanding the political dialogue with
the local population. We are now engaged on strengthening enforcement of the
North Waziristan Agency jirga accord, the President said, and seeking a similar
accommodation with tribal leaders in South Waziristan. Musharraf acknowledged
that some of the government’s interlocutors in North Waziristan might be
considered problematic from an outsider’s perspective (a tacit recognition of
international criticism of the government’s willingness to include local
militant commanders and “taliban” in the jirga negotiations), but these are the
people that must be enlisted if Pakistani authorities are to break the ties to
the insurgency in Afghanistan. Musharraf stressed that the Special Operations
Task Force must act more forcefully in targeting al Qaeda and Taliban commanders
in the tribal agencies (a use of force addressed in the North Waziristan
accord); senior Army staff will brief him on January 5 on plans to step up this
engagement.
Need for Coordination Across the Durrand Line
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Having outlined Pakistan’s efforts to enhance security in the border
regions, President Musharraf told GEN Schoomaker that he is deeply frustrated
that the Government of Afghanistan has not been responsive to greater bilateral
cooperation. In fact, Musharraf argued, Afghanistan is supporting terrorist,
specifically the violent Baloch nationalist insurgency led by Brahamdagh Bugti,
who Musharraf claims shifts between Kabul and Kandahar. Pakistan cannot tolerate
the increase in terrorist attacks seen in Balochistan over recent months.
Despite pressing President Karzai directly for assistance in repatriating Bugti
to face charges in Pakistan and sharing Pakistan’s frustration over Bugti’s
apparent safe haven in Afghanistan with a parade of international officials
(ISAF GEN Richards, A/S Boucher, etc.), Musharraf said, nothing is being done to
address the problem. Pakistan supports its allies in the fight against terrorism
and expects the same support when it comes to apprehending terrorists who target
Pakistan. Warming to his topic, Musharraf shared his anger over President
Karzai’s anti-Pakistan public remarks in December, observing that he had been on
the verge of calling a press conference to retaliate in kind until his staff
intervened in the interest of dampening the unhelpful cross-border rhetoric.
¶6. (C) Despite Musharraf’s personal frustration with his Afghan counterpart, he
commended reports that Karzai wishes to arm local militias in Afghanistan
southern and southeastern provinces as an idea worthy of consideration. The
concept of arming local tribal leaders to stand with the government against the
Taliban might work, Musharraf said, if Karzai is working with the right people.
(Note: We are not sure whether the President was referring to current efforts to
enhance Afghanistan’s auxiliary police service or to Karzai’s spring 2006 push
for provincial governors to raise their own militias. It is equally difficult to
judge whether Musharraf was sincere in his endorsement or simply trying to say
something positive after the heated criticism of Kabul’s failure to respond to
Pakistan’s requests to apprehend Bugti. End note.) Musharraf said that he had
accepted an offer by
ISLAMABAD 00000031 003 OF 003
EU representative Vendrell to serve as an informal communication bridge to
President Karzai. Musharraf’s first message to Karzai via the Vendrell channel
is that the cross-border aspersions and accusations must stop so that both sides
can focus their energies and resources on defeating their common enemy -- the
Taliban.
¶7. (U) Post has shared the information in this cable directly with Emb Kabul.
CROCKER
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD256, MUSHARRAF TELLS BOUCHER ABOUT

PAKISTAN’S PLANS FOR
Discussing cables
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4879
Wednesday, 17 January 2007, 06:41

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2016
TAGS EAID, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS BOUCHER ABOUT PAKISTAN’S PLANS FOR
BORDER SECURITY
¶1. (S) Summary and introduction: In his January 12 meeting with Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, Pakistani
President General Pervez Musharraf spoke of irritants in Pakistan’s relationship
with Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tactical adjustments to enhance security in the
border region. Musharraf described tougher procedures for border crossing,
selective fencing and mining of the border region, stronger leadership for local
police and plans to close Afghan refugee camps. He also underscored that tribal
leaders in North Waziristan have been given a month to improve implementation of
the September 2006 agreement or face possible military action. Boucher and
Lieutenant General Eikenberry briefed the President on their impression of
Afghanistan’s readiness to face a strong offensive by the Taliban in the spring,
noting that President Karzai is a stronger and more confident leader than only a
year ago. Boucher reaffirmed U.S. support for Pakistan’s development plans for
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and offered assistance as the Pakistani
and Afghan Jirga Planning Commissions begin to coordinate. Following the 45
minute meeting with the full American delegation reported here, President
Musharraf spoke privately for another 45-minutes with Boucher and Ambassador
Crocker. End summary.
¶2. (C) Meeting Participants:
U.S.
Assistant Secretary Richard A. Boucher, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry,
Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan Major General Ronald Helmly,
Defense Representative to Pakistan Ms. Caitlin Hayden, Senior Advisor, Bureau of
South and Central Asian Affairs Embassy notetaker
Pakistan
President Pervez Musharraf Lieutenant General Hamid Javaid, Chief of Staff
Additional Secretary Shahid Kamal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Major General
Shafqaat Ahmed, Deputy Chief of Staff
Afghanistan -- Rhetoric and Bugti
¶3. (C) President Musharraf decried the heated rhetoric emanating from Afghan
officials over the past month. Public accusations that al Qaeda and Taliban
figures are operating in our border regions are perhaps understandable,
Musharraf said, but it is completely unacceptable for Afghan officials to accuse
the Government of Pakistan and Inter Services Intelligence of collusion with the
enemy. Warming to his topic, Musharraf described Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s
January 4 visit to Kabul as a bad meeting, saying that President Karzai
bombarded the Pakistani delegation with outlandish accusations that Pakistan
seeks to enslave the Afghans to achieve strategic depth. This is nonsense,
Musharraf concluded; to the contrary, Pakistan wants good relations with the
Afghan government and with all communities in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials
and diplomats are under his personnel instructions not to interfere in
Afghanistan’s affairs. Boucher advised the President that U.S. officials have
noted the aggravated level of cross-border rhetoric and have counseled Afghan
interlocutors not to air their grievance in public. All must appreciate the need
to address issues responsibly and, when appropriate, privately.
¶4. (C) Musharraf told Boucher that militant Baloch nationalist and fugitive
Brahamdagh Bugti remains at large in Afghanistan, enjoying freedom of movement
to commute between Kabul and Kandahar, raising money and planning operations
against Pakistani security forces. Boucher said that he had raised Bugti’s
presence in Afghanistan with President Karzai, who offered assurances that
nobody would be allowed to use Afghanistan as a staging ground for terrorist
attacks on Pakistan. Musharraf had a simple response: “That’s bullshit.”
Afghanistan -- Channels of Communication
¶5. (C) Boucher noted the growth in channels of communication between Kabul and
Islamabad, commending the exchange of information that occurs within the
military Tripartite Commission and in trilateral intelligence channels. He told
his Pakistani hosts that Karzai has agreed to support exchanges between
Pakistani and Afghan parliamentarians and encouraged the two countries to seek
other opportunities to broaden their relationship. The President agreed, but
noted that he was disappointed that the agenda for the January 10 Tripartite
Commission plenary session did not address the most critical common challenges
facing the two countries: cross-border infiltration, repatriating Afghan
refugees and closing camps that have become safe havens for extremists.
Afghanistan -- Better Prepared for Spring Offensive
¶6. (C) Lieutenant General Eikenberry, who was making farewell calls in
Islamabad before relinquishing his command on January 21, shared his impressions
of the situation in Afghanistan with Musharraf. Eikenberry told Musharraf that,
although the we expect the insurgents to launch a strong offensive in the
spring, time is not on the Taliban’s side. Afghanistan’s security forces -- the
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police -- are growing in confidence and
capacity. President Karzai is a more confident commander-in-chief and chief
executive, replacing corrupt and poor-performing officials. Reconstruction
assistance is taking root in districts throughout the country. U.S. forces --
which will reach the highest level of strength in Afghanistan in 2007, despite
the inactivation of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan -- stand ready to give
NATO all necessary support to achieve it mission. The current winter lull is the
time, Eikenberry continued, to move forcefully to disrupt Taliban command-and-
control. A strike to the Haqqani network -- which controls some Taliban action
from Pakistan -- would deal a serious blow to both Taliban operational planning
and recruitment. Responding to Musharraf’s concern that the mil-mil Tripartite
Commission is not addressing issues such as refugee repatriation, Eikenberry
offered the opinion that the Tripartite Commission operates best when its
participants can deal with each other soldier-to-soldier; cross-border issues
carrying significant political baggage are better addressed through other
channels.
¶7. (C) President Musharraf suggested that NATO forces could enhance the effort
against the Taliban in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan by actively
enlisting the support of local populations, even to the extent of arming
village-level militias against Taliban insurgents. Boucher described an
invigorated effort to boost support for Afghan National Army and Afghan National
Police through auxiliary police units of local residents serving under the
Ministry of Interior. President Karzai is also responding to public frustration
with poor governance and corruption by cleaning out corrupt and dishonest local
officials. The international community is using the winter months to inject new
flows of development and economic assistance out to the provinces. Musharraf
applauded this effort, saying that the Taliban will eventually lose popularity
the more it is seen obstructing the country’s reconstruction.
Time to Close Refugee Camps
¶8. (C) President Musharraf advised Boucher that he and his senior advisors have
taken several decisions in recent weeks to improve security along Pakistan’s
border with Afghanistan, including closing at least one of the large camps
inhabited by Afghan refugees. These camps have become safe havens for militant
elements, Musharraf explained. As extensive collateral casualties would
inevitably follow any military operation to separate the militants from the
civilian residents, the only solution is to begin closing the camps altogether.
Musharraf has tasked his advisors with devising a camp closure plan that
incorporates recommendations on where the refugees could be relocated if they
choose not to return to Afghanistan. These measure will then be discussed with
Afghan and UN officials under the auspices of the refugee Tripartite Commission.
We agree with you that the camps should close, Boucher replied, underscoring the
urgency of devising a plan and coordinating with Afghanistan and the UN before
spring.
Stronger Border Security Measures
¶9. (C) Stressing that Pakistan understands that it must take firm measure to
gain control over its western border, Musharraf reviewed a range of actions
already under way. New senior police officials appointed to posts in Balochistan
and North West Frontier Province have been personally instructed by the
President to crack down on undocumented Afghans and other militant targets. The
Ministry of Interior is also in the process of lowering the number of official
border crossings in Balochistan from 33 to 6. Enhanced immigrations procedures,
including biometric crossing cards, have been introduced at the Chaman border
crossing, where 30,000 individuals transit daily. The Army has been ordered to
design a plan for selective fencing and mining along the border. Musharraf
assured Boucher that Pakistan has long and successful experience with mining
along its eastern border, and that extraordinary measures would be implemented
to prevent accidental civilian casualties or misappropriation of mines by
terrorists. Of course, minefields will not stop terrorism, Musharraf said, but
they can help us control the insurgents’ movements across the border. Boucher
noted that deployment of land mines is a complicated issue that the U.S. and
other Coalition partners will want to discuss with Pakistani military planners.
President Musharraf acknowledged that, but said that these are “unusual
circumstances” and Pakistan will take “unilateral measures” if needed.
Attack on Insurgents Infiltrating from North Waziristan
¶10. (S) The American delegation briefed the President on the Coalition assault
on a massive infiltration of Taliban fighters from North Waziristan on January
10-11. The fighters massed on the Pakistani side of the border before crossing
into Afghanistan, where U.S. forces attacked, killing up to 150. Musharraf
shared American concern that the enemy could mobilize such a large force during
the winter lull, and expressed some frustration that so large a force had been
able to collect on Pakistani territory and then cross the border unimpeded. He
suggested that this reflected a need for greater aerial surveillance of the area
or night-capable helicopter gunships to attack the enemy, indicating his
willingness to coordinate with U.S. forces on deploying whatever air assets are
necessary to identify and destroy these enemy movements. (Note: The President
was specific in calling for reliance on air assets, saying point blank that
ground forces are not an option. End note.)
Re-Assessing the North Waziristan Accord
¶11. (S) Musharraf briefed Boucher on the government’s recent review of the
September 2006 North Waziristan agreement. Governor Orakzai convened the jirga
that negotiated the agreement in December, dispatching the members to Miran Shah
to make clear to North Waziristan’s tribal leaders that they must take action to
prevent cross-border infiltration in support of the Taliban, eliminate foreign
fighters from the Agency and stop any effort to establish a parallel political
administration. Tribal leaders were given one month to gain control of the
situation or the government would consider taking military action. Musharraf
refused to be disheartened, saying that it will take time for the accord to take
hold. In the interim, the government has stepped up recruitment and training for
tribal levies and has assigned a Frontier Corps wing to the Political Agent.
This will give the Political Agent the muscle he needs to enforce the writ of
state, while the Army will be at hand to take on Taliban and al Qaeda targets.
Pak-Afghan Jirgas
¶12. (C) Boucher commended Musharraf for naming strong leaders to Pakistan’s
Jirga Planning Commission, encouraging the Commission to meet soonest with its
Afghan counterpart to discuss each country’s vision for the process. Noting that
he would discuss the jirgas with Interior Minister and Jirga Commission Chair
Sherpao later in the day, Boucher told the President that the U.S. stands ready
to support the process once Pakistan and Afghanistan determine what assistance
will be required.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Assistance
¶13. (C) Musharraf also spoke plans for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Secretariat and Development Authority to funnel near-term development assistance
through tribal maliks, to strengthen their stature within their tribes. Asking
maliks to identify development needs and direct resources will reinforce his
authority with the local population, said Musharraf. Boucher replied that the
U.S. hopes to offer substantial financial support for the Pakistani’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas Sustainable Development Plan.
¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden.
CROCKER
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD528, PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF MEETS

SPEAKER PELOSI AND 110TH
Discussing cables
2007-01-31
07ISLAMABAD528 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
12:12
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS AF, IN, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER, XF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF MEETS SPEAKER PELOSI AND 110TH
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and(d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 27 meeting lasting more than an hour-and-a-half,
Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Committee/Sub-Committee
Chairs of the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Appropriations
Committees called on Pakistani President Musharraf. The Speaker noted that this
was her first foreign travel in her new position, underscoring the importance
the Congress places on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Acknowledging that this
was an important visit, the President offered to describe Pakistan’s strategies
to defeat terrorism and extremism and to clarify U.S. misperceptions about
Pakistan’s commitment.
¶2. (C) At the CODEL’s request, the President reviewed his recent visit to
Middle Eastern capitals, where he promoted his vision of enlightened moderation
for the Muslim world; he also counseled Syrian President Assad to abandon his
confrontational approach and reconcile with the international community.
Musharraf offered a detailed analysis of the security situation along Pakistan’s
border with Afghanistan and his strategy to win the support of local tribes
through economic and social development, while eliminating al Qaeda and Taliban
leadership cells through security operations. Musharraf told the CODEL that
critics who suggest that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies are playing a double
game in Afghanistan are wrong, saying that such criticism only emboldens our
common enemies. The President specifically requested Congressional support for
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)and U.S. support for his FATA economic
initiative of USD 150 million per year, noting Pakistan’s own heavy commitment
of national funds toward economic development in the border areas; he also
reviewed his government’s programs to increase spending on education and health
care, as envisioned in the U.S.-Pakistan Shared Objectives. Musharraf cast a
hard gaze on narcotrafficking in the region, while highlighting Pakistan’s
anticipated achievement of “poppy free” status in 2007. He was optimistic
regarding the prospects for improved relations with India. Finally, Musharraf
told the Speaker that provisions of H.R. 1 (Implementing the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007) concerning Pakistan weaken his position vis-a-vis
extremists fighting for Muslim hearts-and-minds in the long war on terror; the
Speaker was non-committal in response. End summary.
¶3. (U) Meeting Participants:
U.S.
----
Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House Rep. Ike Skelton, Chair - House Armed
Services Committee Rep. Tom Lantos, Chair - House Foreign Affairs Committee Rep.
Silvestre Reyes, Chair - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Rep.
John Murtha, Chair - Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee Rep. Nita Lowey, Chair
- State and Foreign Operations Sub-Committee Rep. David Hobson, Defense
Appropriations Sub-Committee Mr. Michael Sheehy, National Security Advisor to
Speaker Pelosi Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Mr. John Gastright, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State
Pakistan
--------
President Pervez Musharraf
ISLAMABAD 00000528 002 OF 006
LTG Hamid Javaid, Chief of Staff BG Shafqat Ahmad, Military Secretary
Outreach to Middle East: Empower Moderates in Muslim World
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶4. (C) When the Speaker asked about Musharraf’s January 20-25 visit to Middle
Eastern capitals (Riyadh, Cairo, Amman, Damascus and Abu Dhabi), Musharraf
initiated a description of a Muslim World beset by tension. An incipient Iraqi
civil war along sectarian lines, sectarian strife in Lebanon, the Shi’a
dimension in the U.S.-Iran conflict and, at the core, the unresolved Palestinian
question have led the President to believe the time is ripe for a new Muslim
voice of moderation. In his talks with his Arab interlocutors, Musharraf laid
out his goals: promoting sectarian harmony, organizing joint action against
terrorist organizations and building partnerships with Europe and the U.S. The
next step is to engage the major non-Arab Muslim states -- Indonesia, Malaysia
and Turkey. (Note: Musharraf is visiting Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur this week. End
note.) He will then seek to develop a statement of common principals; if this
succeeds, Saudi King Abdullah has pledged to host an event to launch the
initiative. “I am trying to lead on this issue,” Musharraf said, admitting that
he cannot say whether his efforts will succeed.
¶5. (C) While in Damascus, Musharraf said that he had a “frank exchange” with
Syrian President Bashar Assad, telling the Syrian President that his policies
are contributing to instability in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. “Are you for
confrontation or not?” Musharraf demanded, noting that Syria now has few friends
left. Bashar responded by saying that he wants to reconcile with the
international community and work to solve problems. Musharraf pointed to the
need for peace between Hamas and Israel, obtaining Bashar’s word that Syria
would not obstruct communications between the two. Musharraf offered to help
Bashar regain standing in the international community, if Syria is serious about
a new direction. Representative Hobson asked whether the U.S. should take a
different approach with Bashar. Musharraf advised the U.S. to engage Bashar; he
also believes that moderate Muslims could influence the Syrian. He observed that
Bashar displayed a sense of being overlooked by the international community: for
example, Bashar told Musharraf that the entire world supports the Palestinians,
but has forgotten the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. Musharraf
wondered whether observers credit Bashar with wielding more power than he
actually has, speculating that other forces may be at work. Musharraf perceived
Bashar as facing problems similar to those along the PAK-AFG border, quoting
Bashar as saying that more than 1 million tribal refugees have flowed into Syria
from Iraq. (Note: On hearing this, Musharraf offered Bashar some friendly
advice: “Look into fencing.” End note.)
Straight Talk on Pak-Afghan Border Security
-------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Responding to Chairman Skelton’s desire to hear the President’s
perspective on efforts to secure the Pak-Afghan border, Musharraf decried the
“tremendous misunderstandings and misperceptions” that have led U.S. critics to
accuse Pakistan’s intelligence agencies of collusion with the Taliban, al Qaeda
and other extremists. Musharraf frankly acknowledged that remnants of al Qaeda
remain hidden in the mountainous border region. Pakistan is now also focused on
the Pashtun tribes who live on both sides of the PAK-AFG border. Of the seven
tribal agencies in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
populations in North and South Waziristan openly cooperate with Taliban
insurgents. Al Qaeda elements are concentrated in Bajaur. The other four
agencies, Musharraf contended, are relatively peaceful, although the Taliban has
made an effort to infiltrate Kurram, where it has encountered local resistance.
In contrast, Musharraf continued, Pashtuns residing in Balochistan are generally
peaceful; the trouble ther are Afghan Taliban commanders and foot soldiers who
have found safe haven in lawless refugee camps, from which they can operate with
impunity.
¶7. (C) Speaker Pelosi asked the President whether he knew the whereabouts of
Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Musharraf replied that Mullah Omar and the Taliban
movement emerged from Kandahar, where he presumably remains. “I do not believe
Omar has ever been to Pakistan,” Musharraf said, contrasting this to al Qaeda
leaders Osama bin Ladin and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who may be ensconced in the
mountains along the Frontier. Musharraf proceeded to describe Pakistani efforts
to locate and apprehend other al Qaeda leaders and Taliban commanders, including
Afghans Mullah Dadullah Lang and Jalaluddin Haqqani and Pakistani Baitullah
Mehsud; these leaders, Musharraf said, come and go from Pakistan, where they
recruit and motivate militants.
¶8. (C) What is required to defeat the Taliban? Musharraf answered his own
rhetorical question, saying that in Afghanistan, the Coalition must deploy
military and political resources, while Pakistan controls movement across the
PAK-AFG border. The President painted a vivid picture of the on-the-ground
challenges: there is no easy way to identify Taliban fighters amongst the 30,000
people who cross the Chaman border crossing in Balochistan daily, only one of 23
crossing points along the province’s 2300 km border with Afghanistan. Even with
954 border posts, the government has not been able to control dozens of informal
crossing points in Balochistan and the FATA. The strategy must therefore
penetrate deeply into the border regions, focusing on (a) eliminating safe
havens, including refugee camps; (b) launching military action against the
militants’ command-and-control targets, and (c) winning the loyalty of local
tribes through economic growth, social development and political reform.
¶9. (C) Arguing that military operations alone will alienate the tribes,
Musharraf segued into an overview of the FATA Sustainable Development Plan and a
description of the traditional leadership roles of maliks (who represent tribal
authority) and political agents (who represent federal and provincial
authorities). To ensure that political agents and maliks have the necessary
muscle to reinforce their authority to impose law and order, the government is
bolstering the numbers and capacity of tribal levies, the Frontier Constabulary
and the Frontier Corps. As the Speaker described Chairwoman Lowey’s leadership
of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Sub-Committee, the President expressed
appreciation for her support for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), and
appealed for USD 150 million/year for five years for FATA development to
supplement the national funds already budgeted.
¶10. (C) Political engagement is crucial, Musharraf said, shifting to a
discussion of the September 2006 jirga accord in North Waziristan. “This
agreement is much maligned,” Musharraf admitted, but it was critical for the
government to reach out to local tribal and religious leaders. Re-establishing
the writ of the government is imperative, but the authorities must work with the
local tribes to make this a reality. The greatest failure, Musharraf continued,
has been controlling cross-border movement and expelling foreign fighters from
the agency; the government is now pushing the tribes hard to live up to their
side of the bargain. If they do not, the President said, we will take military
action. “When we locate a target, we will hit it,” Musahrraf promised, noting
that Pakistani forces had done just that ten days earlier. Candidly assessing
the agreement as only 25 percent successful so far, Musharraf was adamant that
the jirga agreement is/is the only way forward. He said he believes that the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor should pursue a similar accord with
tribes in South Waziristan.
¶11. (C) Shifting back to preventing unlawful border crossings, Musharraf
addressed the possibility of selective deployment of fences and/or land mines
along the border. “Mining has problems,” Musharraf acknowledged, but said he
wants to proceed with fencing. Military experts have estimated that some 32 km
in FATA and 295 km in Balochistan would be appropriate for fences. When Chairman
Reyes noted the controversy generated by proposals to fence the U.S.-Mexican
border, Musharraf nodded in agreement, then cited Pakistan’s long experience
with fences and mines along its eastern border with India.
¶12. (C) Expanding his comments to include Pakistani plans to close lawless
Afghan refugee camps, Musharraf asserted that “nobody wants to assist us in this
task.” Frustrated that “all the ideas I put forward for controlling the border”
are opposed by both the international community and the government in Kabul,
Musharraf said that he welcomes other ideas. “Either help me control the border
or help me move the refugees out,” he said.
Defending Pakistan’s Commitment
-------------------------------
¶13. (C) Musharraf told the CODEL that the government is committed to fighting
terrorism, as Pakistanis do not want to see their country succumb to creeping
Talibanization. Musharraf detailed the heavy losses sustained by Pakistan’s
security forces, as well as the multiple assassination attempts against the
country’s political leadership, “We are not a banana republic and the ISI is not
a rogue agency,” Musharraf said, explaining that he could retire any active-duty
general officer with a swipe of his pen: “ISI is a disciplined service staffed
by seasoned military officers who follow my orders.”
¶14. (C) Later in the conversation, the President expressed concern about H.R. 1
(Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act). Musharraf said that
language in the bill questioning Pakistan’s reliability as an ally of the U.S.
directly damages his ability to wage war on our common enemies (“This weakens
me!”) and to inoculate his country against the infection of Islamic extremism.
Shared Objectives and Enlightened Moderation
--------------------------------------------
¶15. (C) Chairwoman Lowey asked the President to explain why Pakistan has not
met mutually-agreed targets for budgetary support for education set forth in the
bilateral Shared Objectives. Musharraf defended his record, saying that since he
assumed power, he has embraced human resource development as essential for
sustained growth. He opted for an inital focus on economic development to
generate revenue for health and education, and this is happening. Education
spending is increasing from 2.6 to 4 percent of GDP under his leadership.
Chairman Murtha raised the subject of madrassas, to which the President
responded that the appeal of a madrassa education will decline as the public
education system improves. Musharraf also highlighted the government’s record in
improving health care delivery, particularly maternal-pediatric services.
¶16. (C) Speaker Pelosi raised the specter of suicide bombings, seeking the
President’s advice on persuading all societies that such attacks are
unacceptable. Musharraf agreed, terming suicide attacks as un-Islamic. All
countries must find a way to deal with extremism,” the President said, “but such
terrorism must be addressed by force.” He then outlined his multi-point strategy
for combating extremism and promoting “enlightened moderation”:
-- Prevent the misuse of mosques -- Prohibit speech that incites the public to
violence -- Ban extremist organizations and their leadership (a delicate
business, the President admitted, as the government must not/not be seen as
anti-religion) -- Revise the national curriculum -- Reform madrassa education,
introducing a standard curriculum that includes secular subjects (math,
language, science, etc.)
A Poppy-Free Pakistan
---------------------
¶17. (C) Chairman Murtha also complimented Pakistan’s achievements in fighting
the drug trade, asking the President to explain Pakistan’s success in contrast
with the record poppy harvest in Afghanistan. Musharraf responded: “There is no
effective government control in Afghanistan.” Pakistan was able to implement a
coordinated strategy of eradication and destruction, complemented by programs to
offer alternative livelihoods. The poppy leads only to narco-fueled financial
flows supporting the insurgency. Musharraf suggested that the international
community provide funds to buy the Afghan poppy crop directly from the farmers.
Earthquake Relief
-----------------
¶18. (C) Chairman Lantos asked the President whether Pakistan needs the U.S. to
do more to support relief/reconstruction efforts in the areas devastated by the
October 2005 earthquake. Musharraf assured the Chairman that Pakistan is
managing the reconstruction process well, noting that prompt intervention had
prevented the predicted post- disaster plagues of epidemics, famine and
exposure. Now well into the reconstruction phase, the government has allocated
USD 3000 to 500,000 families, whose use of the funds to rebuild their homes also
injects capital to the recovering local economy. The government has built many
temporary schools and university buildings, many of which are better facilities
than those which were destroyed.
Indo-Pak Relations
------------------
¶19. (C) Chairman Lantos asked about the state of Pakistan’s relations with
India. Musharraf was upbeat in his response, saying that he has his fingers
crossed. The two countries have made progress with confidence-building measures
and have successfully maintained a cease-fire along the Line-of-Control in
Kashmir, but the process had stalled on conflict resolution. Now, Musharraf
indicated, he and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh are on the verge of an
agreement...”Soon -- sooner than anyone might think.” Musharraf appreciated
Singh’s flexibility, relating Singh’s personal invitation for the President to
attend the SAARC Ministerial in New Delhi in April. Musharraf explained his
decision to decline the invitation, saying that there is too much euphoria and
expectation at present. “If I went to Delhi, but we didn’t sign an agreement,
the people would think we had failed,” he said. Musharraf said that he has
conveyed two options to New Delhi: either PM Singh comes to Pakistan before
April to sign an agreement or the two hold a signing ceremony at the SAARC
Ministerial. Musharraf shared his enthusiasm for the just-concluded visit to
Pakistan by three Jammmu and Kashmir leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference, noting that he had advised them to egage and bring on board other
Kashmiris. “An agreement should not land like a bombshell,” said Musharraf.
Leaders must prepare their publics, as he is doing in Pakistan.
Iraq’s Shadow over the Region
-----------------------------
¶20. (C) Speaker Pelosi described the current situation in Iraq as the most
important foreign policy issue confronting the U.S., citing the terrible loss of
life and the consequences for America’s global reputation. President Musharraf
opined that dividing Iraq would be disastrous, citing Turkish opposition to an
independent Kurdistan. He believes that Iran is abetting the growing Sunni-Shi’a
schism. Referring back to his initiative to build a movement of moderate Muslim
voices, Musharraf said this must be done by partners who have credibility in the
region, something that the U.S. does not currently enjoy. If a consensus could
be endorsed by Sunnis, Shi’as and Kurds, Musharraf mused, perhaps an all-Muslim
security force could backfill following the withdrawal of U.S. and British
forces.
¶21. (U) The CODEL did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. CROCKER
Viewing cable 07KABUL185, BOUCHER, MOSBACHER AND KARZAI
TALK ENERGY,
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07KABUL185.
07KABUL185 2007-01-20 12:12 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kabul
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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Saturday, 20 January 2007, 12:35

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000185
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, SCA/CEN, S/CRS,
SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
STATE PASS TO OPIC DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DULCE ZAHNISER
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
EO 12958 DECL: 01/20/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, MARR, AF, PK
SUBJECT: BOUCHER, MOSBACHER AND KARZAI TALK ENERGY,
INVESTMENT, PAKISTAN AND COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
Classified By: A/DCM Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S/NF) On January 10, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian
Affairs Richard Boucher and Overseas Private Investment Corporation President
and Chief Executive Officer Robert Mosbacher met with President Karzai.
Mosbacher briefed Karzai on the Investment Corporation’s projects in
Afghanistan, focusing on energy projects, credit programs, and the 209-room
Marriott Hotel planned for Kabul. Boucher called on both Afghan and Pakistani
Jirga Commissions to meet as soon as possible. Karzai is doing everything he can
to make the jirgas work. The President expressed his opposition to Pakistani
mining and fencing of the border and suggested that Pakistan close madrassas and
terrorist training camps if it was really serious about terrorism. Karzai wants
to rid himself of the Bugti problem but argued that the Bugtis were not
terrorists. Boucher briefed on requested budget funding for Afghanistan. He
encouraged acceptance of ground spraying of poppy crops in Helmand. Karzai was
non-committal and pointed to British reluctance. Karzai believes that 2007 will
be a better year for Afghanistan and called for better preparations to show the
people that we were ready for the spring offensive. END SUMMARY
Overseas Private Investment Corporation Projects in Afghanistan
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶2. (SBU) President Karzai began by noting that electricity was becoming
increasingly important for Afghanistan. Electric power from Afghanistan,s
neighbors was unreliable and countries like Uzbekistan were raising prices, he
said. Mosbacher briefed Karzai on his meetings in Kabul on electricity and other
projects. He said new power capacity and building private sector development
were key. If and when the legal structure for independent power production was
established, the Investment Corporation would be able to help with more
financing.
¶3. (SBU) In response to a question from Karzai about projects being considered,
Mosbacher explained that industrial consumers were paying too much for
electricity. These entities would be good customers for new electricity projects
since households were not paying enough to support new investment. At the end of
March, the utility industry would be corporatized, but a consistent set of rules
will be needed to set a framework for independent power production. Any private
power project would take 18-24 months from the time the legal framework was
established. Karzai thought this was too long. Mosbacher explained that huge
pieces of equipment needed to be brought in, which takes time. They would be run
by heavy fuel oil, but natural gas was best as it was a fraction of the cost of
diesel. In addition, laws needed to be passed before investment could begin.
¶4. (SBU) Mosbacher explained that other Investment Corporation projects
included a 209-room, four-star Marriott Hotel. The project was on track but
outstanding problems on the lease needed to be resolved. He expected that
construction could start in the spring and with an opening within 18-24 months.
Much of the material and labor will be sourced in Afghanistan. The hotel will
employ 400 people.
¶5. (SBU) Mosbacher briefed that his organization was also going to be providing
small and medium-sized business credits for agricultural and manufacturing
facilities, through a new commercial and a non-bank lending institution. These
two
KABUL 00000185 002 OF 005
projects could start in 6-9 months.
Cross-Border Jirgas
-------------------
¶6. (C) President Karzai said that Afghanistan had done everything it could on
the jirgas, e.g., providing lists and documents to Pakistan. Prime Minister Aziz
explained during his visit that a Commission would soon be appointed. Assistant
Secretary Boucher urged that both sides get their Commissions together as the
next step, the sooner the better. He suggested it shouldn,t be too difficult to
work out the local versus national versions of the jirgas and pledged U.S. and
international support. Karzai reiterated that he was doing everything he could.
Boucher stated that he would nudge the Pakistanis on the jirgas and hoped the
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister-level meetings would continue.
¶7. (C) Karzai described Aziz as a “good man,” someone he could talk to openly
and frankly. Aziz had the intellectual capacity to talk through the issues.
Karzai hoped the U.S. could influence the Pakistanis on the jirgas. Boucher
noted that Speaker Quanooni had been invited to Pakistan and Karzai said he
would encourage him to go.
Border Mining and Fencing
---------------------------
¶8. (C) The Assistant Secretary relayed press reports that Pakistan may be
reconsidering its proposal for selective mining and fencing of the border. The
U.S. had been encouraging Pakistan to use the tripartite meetings to deal with
such issues. Karzai said there was speculation that Pakistan was clamping down
on the Taliban and the insurgency on the border as a pretext to get to the
Balochi refugees who were crossing the border. He observed that there was much
domestic pressure in Pakistan against mining and fencing. Boucher interpreted
the move as a sign of Pakistani frustration and that Pakistan was taking the
border problem seriously. Karzai rebutted that they could close madrassas and
training centers if they were really serious about terrorism. Pakistan just
needed to check its own intelligence.
¶9. (C) Karzai noted that some in the Pakistani media were calling for jihad
against the United States. He expected more bloodshed in 2007. Assistant
Secretary Boucher replied that the Pakistani media said many things but it was
important to look at the actual situation on the border. For example, in
November, there was actually a decrease in infiltration from North Waziristan,
although the reason is unclear. Karzai explained that the media in the region
was not like that in the West, as it was easily manipulated by governments. Both
the Pakistani and Afghan governments knew well how to use the media.
¶10. (C) Boucher told Karzai that the United States believed that Pakistan was
now doing more on terrorism. He pointed to an increase in arrests of more
Taliban and the recent attack on a madrassa in the Bajaur Agency. Boucher
acknowledged, however, that some Pakistani authorities also turned a blind eye
to infiltrators. He said we needed to keep reminding them of their
responsibilities. Karzai responded that we needed to keep reminding them to give
up the Pakistani dream of a larger Islamic Pakistani Emirate. Boucher conveyed
the United States, view that both Musharraf and Aziz knew well the dangers of
not cracking down on terrorism. He said events in North Waziristan have scared
them and they now fear they could lose control. Boucher agreed that we needed to
see swifter action by Pakistani authorities, but we should not doubt their
commitment.
KABUL 00000185 003 OF 005
Bugti
-----
¶11. (S/NF) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Karzai if he knew where Bugti was.
Karzai responded that a lot of Bugtis come to Afghanistan. In fact, over 200,
with their sons and money, have come. Karzai said he advised them to go the
United Nations for asylum, but many were frightened and are in hiding. The
United Nations declined to deal with the issue, considering it too sensitive.
Karzai said he was “not interested in having them in Afghanistan as it was too
much trouble.”
¶12. (S/NF) In his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz, Karzai had said
that the Bugtis were not terrorists and represented nobility in Afghanistan, so
it would be hard to turn them over to Pakistan. Boucher clarified that it was
the grandson that the Pakistanis were after for instigating an uprising. Karzai
responded that fomenting uprising does not make one a terrorist. The real
terrorists were Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Afghanistan needs a sign that
Pakistan will stop supporting these terrorists. Boucher asked Karzai which side
should move first and queried whether Afghanistan could take the grandson into
custody or strike some political deal. Karzai explained that the Bugtis would
blame the United States if Afghanistan turned them in. There would be disgust
toward both Afghanistan and the United States.
¶13. (S/NF) Boucher asked Karzai if he could assure Pakistan that the Bugtis
were not supporting armed struggle and that India was not involved. Karzai said
“yes”, though he doubted Pakistan would accpet his assurances. Pakistan would
continue to think India is involved. There is a lot of misinformation out there,
Karzai commented. He said he knew Bugti, who was highly respected in the U.S.
Karzai explained that Bugti had once tried to call Karzai but he had refused for
the sake of good relations with Pakistan. Now he cannot forgive himself for
refusing. Karzai assessed that Pakistan had troubles with many other tribes too,
as a result of its trying to divide and conquer and turn the tribes against each
other. Pakistan needed to address the bigger picture, Karzai urged. (Note:
Halfway through the discussion of Bugti, Karzai signaled that the issue was too
sensitive and asked that notetaking be suspended. End Note)
New U.S. Funding
----------------
¶14. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher briefed Karzai in broad terms on new
funding for Afghanistan that we expect to come from a supplemental budget. In
addition to an increase in U.S. funding we were working toward, a series of
international meetings would focus on funding and other needs for Afghanistan )-
the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
Political Directors meeting in Berlin, and the G-8. The United States will be
pushing countries to commit to funding where it is needed most. He reported that
Presidential Senior Economic Advisor Naderi had agreed to attend a series of
meetings to brief on where the money was most needed.
¶15. (C) Boucher explained that several key elements should move forward to
support the new money, namely the Presidential Appointments Commission, improved
governance, continuation of the Policy Action Group process (which he said was
working well), more government presence around the country such as the
Presidential Policy Action Group visit to Kandahar, and dealing with corruption.
Karzai expressed his disappointment with the Policy Action Group, asking “What
is
KABUL 00000185 004 OF 005
it doing?” He said that when displaced people from Kandahar have been returned
and when the youth in the South have jobs, then he will be able to declare that
the Policy Action Group was working. 16. (C) On corruption, Karzai called for
corrupt people to be punished and to simplify the procedures for doing so. On
governance, he believed that the situation was much better than three years ago.
Most governors were competent and knew what was going on in their provinces.
Karzai felt that the Government of Afghanistan was much more in charge than
three years ago. He said the police were better and were becoming more linked to
other police in other regions. Organization and training had much improved.
¶17. (C) Boucher said that the supplemental budget would allow for an expanded
target for police expansion and stepped up training. He shared that the budget
would be more than the normal USD 3 billion, but possibly broken up between 2007
and 2008, with the police and military portion showing up in 2007. The money
would focus on more training equipment, road construction, power grids, and
provincial judicial systems. Boucher said that the final figures would be out in
a few weeks, possibly around the time of the State of Union Address. Secretary
Rice would make an announcement at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting. More
details will emerge in February.
Strategic Dialogue
------------------
¶18. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher apologized that scheduling programs had
prevented the travel of Under Secretary Burns for the Strategic Dialogue
meeting. With the
SIPDIS expected arrival of Deputy Secretary Negroponte, Burns’ schedule should
become more flexible, he said. Boucher underlined that Burns was keenly
interested in the Strategic Dialogue. Karzai said it would send an important
signal.
United Kingdom, Helmand and Poppy
---------------------------------
¶19. (C) Karzai asked if the United States was “fine with the UK in Helmand? Are
they up to something?” Boucher responded that the British were trying to do a
good job and were focused on Helmand. Karzai said they need to know that Helmand
is part of a bigger picture. Boucher agreed and said it was important to get
other countries to look at the country as a whole and to promote national
authority, not just focus on the regions where they are operating.
¶16. Boucher said that everyone needed to accept ground spraying of poppy in
Helmand. Karzai stated that the United Kingdom would not accept it. Boucher
urged Karzai to focus on poppy this year to show our seriousness in the most
serious of places, Helmand. Karzai reported that Helmand Governor Wafa
complained that the British were willing to do eradication only in areas where
there was government control, but that we needed to eradicate where the Taliban
were. Boucher urged Karzai to consider a pilot project in Helmand and offered to
approach the British if necessary. Boucher said that he would be meeting his
British counterpart soon and would raise the issue.
Spring Offensive
----------------
¶17. Karzai believes that 2007 will be a better year but called for better
preparations to deal with the spring offensive. We need to show the people that
we are prepared, he said. Boucher stated that the spring offensive must be “our
offensive” and that we need to hit the Taliban hard
KABUL 00000185 005 OF 005
before they can come at us. He commented that all of us were better prepared
this year.
¶18. Karzai asked Boucher to convey to Prime Minister Aziz how grateful he was
for his recent visit to Afghanistan. He also noted that he enjoyed Boucher’s
recent meeting with him in Turkmenistan and he hopes to be the first visitor to
Ashgabat after the upcoming election.
¶19. SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden cleared this cable.
NEUMANN
Viewing cable 07PARIS159, FRANCE SEEKS EU COVER ON IRAN CIVIL

SOCIETY
Discussing cables
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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PRIMARY TAG)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2017

TAGS: KDEM LE PGOV PREL FR IR
SUBJECT: FRANCE SEEKS EU COVER ON IRAN CIVIL SOCIETY
REF: STATE 2659
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt,

reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche on January 16 to MFA

Iran Desk Officer Arnaud Pescheux, who indicated that France
had not budgeted any funds for democracy promotion in Iran.
"If we were to do something, it would undoubtedly be via
Brussels," Pescheux said. He noted that France "anticipated
supporting" a proposal by Javier Solana for the EU to expand
its own Farsi broadcasting capabilities, although he said
that details of that proposal have yet to be worked out.
While the MFA does not currently partner with any French NGOs
operating in Iran, in the past a few NGOs (e.g., Reporters
Without Borders) had brought members of Iranian civil society
to France to participate in programs.
French Envoy to Tehran

----------------------
¶2. (C) Citing a press report in the January 16 edition of Le

Monde, Poloff asked whether it was true that France planned
to send a presidential envoy to Tehran in the near future.
Choosing his words with care, Pescheux said that the Le Monde
report was "not false" but stressed that a final decision had
not yet been taken. Pescheux said that the envoy would not
engage on the nuclear file but would instead discuss regional
issues and, in particular, would seek to "find a solution on
Lebanon."
¶3. (C) Poloff said he was shocked that France, which had
steadfastly rejected entreaties to negotiate Lebanon's future
with the Syrian regime, apparently found the prospect of
conducting similar negotiations with Tehran less
objectionable. Had the Iranians given the French some
indication that they would be more forthcoming than Damascus?
No, Pescheux admitted, the Iranians had not tipped their
hand; they had merely indicated that they were willing to
talk.
Supreme Leader Still on Top

---------------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to the results of Iran's recent elections,

Pescheux indicated that the French were pleasantly surprised
by the outcome (immediately prior to the election, their
reporting from Tehran suggested that President Ahmadinejad's
supporters were poised to make significant gains in the
Assembly of Experts). The Quai's interpretation of the
election results is that the axis between Supreme Leader
Khamenei and former President Rafsanjani (i.e., the
traditional conservatives) has been strengthened, with
Khamenei remaining the supreme arbiter of Iran's political
balance of power. In an aside, Pescheux claimed that
notwithstanding the French diplomatic presence in Tehran, the
MFA has virtually no insight into the inner workings of the
Pasdaran.

STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS170, CHIRAC'S ENVOY TO IRAN -- WHAT'S

PROMPTING THIS
Discussing cables
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SIPDIS
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NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017

TAGS: FR IR LE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S ENVOY TO IRAN -- WHAT'S PROMPTING THIS
AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT
CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASONS
PAGE 02 RUEHFRA0170 S E C R E T
1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (S) LE MONDE'S JAN. 17 EDITION RAN A FRONT-PAGE STORY ON

CHIRAC,S INTEREST IN PURSUING A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN ON
LEBANON, THUS CONFIRMING WHAT MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR GERARD
ARAUD TOLD THE AMBASSADOR DURING THEIR JAN. 15 MEETING. WE
FACE THE PROSPECT OF UNTOWARD POLICY INITIATIVES BY CHIRAC
DURING THE WANING MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENCY. (THE FIRST ROUND
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WILL BE HELD APRIL 22; IT IS
WIDELY ASSUMED THAT CHIRAC WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO RUN
FOR A THIRD TERM.) WE MAY HAVE ENTERED A PERIOD IN WHICH THE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT WILL IMPACT DIRECTLY ON FOREIGN
POLICY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO LEBANON AND
IRAN.
¶2. (S) FIRST OF ALL THE FACTS, AS WE KNOW THEM AND AS

CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR STAPLETON BY ARAUD. CHIRAC FAVORED
ENLISTING IRAN IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN
LEBANON. TO THIS END, THE PRESIDENCY PROPOSED SENDING
FOREIGN MINISTER DOUSTE-BLAZY TO TEHRAN TO SOUND OUT THE
IRANIANS ON THEIR PLAYING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN LEBANON --
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY, UNCONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY IRANIAN
INTEREST, AND CONCERNED ABOUT APPROACHING IRAN AS A
DEMANDEUR, OPPOSED THE INITIATIVE. SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT
BOTH VOICED STRENUOUS OBJECTIONS. U/S BURNS RAISED USG
CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH ARAUD. THE ELYSEE THEREFORE BACKED
OFF "FOR NOW" ACCORDING TO THE MFA SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY.
WHILE ARAUD DID NOT MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO
TEHRAN BY A LOWER-RANKING ENVOY, LE MONDE HINTED THAT MIDDLE
EAST TROUBLE-SHOOTER JEAN-CLAUDE COUSSERAN, WHO VISITED THE
IRANIAN CAPITAL IN JULY, DURING THE ISRAEL/HIZBALLAH WAR,
COULD BE DISPATCHED AGAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
¶3. (S) REPORTING IN OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES THIS IS INDEED

POSSIBLE. THE DECISION NOT TO SEND DOUSTE-BLAZY COULD WELL
BE DEFINITIVE. EVEN IF A LOWER-LEVEL EMISSARY IS SENT TO
TEHRAN, THE MAKINGS OF A DEAL ON LEBANON ARE NOT OBVIOUS.
HOWEVER, THIS EPISODE HAS HIGHLIGHTED A NUMBER OF CONTEXTUAL
FACTORS AND HYPOTHESES THAT GIVE RISE TO A FEW CONCERNS.
¶4. (S) THE FIRST IS THAT THE DISTORTING EFFECT OF CHIRAC,S

"OBSESSION WITH LEBANON" (ARAUD,S WORDS) MIGHT ONLY BE
FURTHER ACCENTUATED AS HIS PRESIDENCY DRAWS TO A CLOSE.
CHIRAC,S FOCUS COULD BE NARROWING IN ON ONE SINGLE
OBJECTIVE: TO ENSURE THAT THE SYRIAN REGIME, WHICH HE REGARDS
AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF RAFIK HARIRI, DOES
NOT GAIN A NEW FOOTHOLD IN LEBANON. THIS COULD TRANSLATE
INTO A WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH IRAN TO FIND SOME SORT OF
ACCOMMODATION WHICH STRENGTHENS HIZBOLLAH IN LEBANON, BUT
PREVENTS THE STRATEGIC RETURN OF SYRIA. NO MFA OR ELYSEE
INTERLOCUTOR HAS POINTED US TO SUCH A CONCLUSION, BUT WE ARE
LEFT WITH FEW OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR CHIRAC'S APPARENT
DETERMINATION TO REACH OUT AT THIS TIME TO HIZBOLLAH,S MAIN
REGIONAL SPONSOR.
¶5. (S) MOREOVER, THIS ANALYSIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER

INDICATIONS OF LATE THAT FRANCE IS FIXATED ON LOWERING
TENSIONS IN LEBANON. THESE INCLUDE, INTER ALIA: THE
RELUCTANCE (THUS FAR) TO OPERATE FRENCH UAVS OVER SOUTHERN
LEBANON; THE MFA'S DECISION IN LATE DECEMBER TO "TAKE A
BREAK" FROM PUSHING FOR THE RAPID ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON; AND THE FACT THAT MFA
DESK OFFICERS ARE CAREFULLY SCRUBBING PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S
PROPOSED INTERVENTION AT THE JANUARY 25 LEBANON CONFERENCE TO
ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DOES NOT ANTAGONIZE THE
LEBANESE OPPOSITION. IN ADDITION, CHIRACS NEW-FOUND CAUTION
ON LEBANON AND HIS PROPOSED OVERTURE TO IRAN MAY BOTH REFLECT
THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S FEAR OF INCURRING FRENCH CASUALTIES IN
LEBANON IN THE FINAL MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENCY.
¶6. (S) ANOTHER CONCERN RELATES TO CHIRAC,S FOREIGN POLICY

LEGACY, WHICH HINGES SIGNIFICANTLY ON TWO ACHIEVEMENTS, HIS
LEADERSHIP IN OPPOSING THE U.S. OVER IRAQ, AND IN RESTORING
LEBANON,S INDEPENDENCE. THE LE MONDE REPORT WHICH BROKE THE
NEWS OF THE ABORTED DOUSTE-BLAZY MISSION CLOSES WITH
SPECULATION THAT CHIRAC IS INCREASINGLY ALARMED BY U.S.
INTENTIONS VIS A VIS IRAN. CHIRAC COULD BE TEMPTED BY POLICY
INITIATIVES THAT SERVE TO BOLSTER HIS LEGACY ON BOTH COUNTS:
PROTECTING LEBANON,S INDEPENDENCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME
STANDING STRONG AGAINST ANY PERCEIVED DANGEROUS DRIFT IN U.S.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, A REPRISE IN GENTLER FORM OF THE GLORY
DAYS OF 2003.
¶7. (S) FINALLY, CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HERE HAS IT THAT THE

ONLY CONCEIVABLE SCENARIO WHEREBY CHIRAC COULD BECOME A
VIABLE CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS. MIGHT CHIRAC BE POSITIONING HIMSELF TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN IRAN-CENTERED CRISIS THAT WOULD OFFER
HIS ONLY TICKET BACK TO THE ELYSEE?
¶8. (S) CHIRAC MAY CHOOSE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH HIS ENVOY IDEA
BEFORE WE CAN GET FULL CLARIFICATION. IF HE DOES, IT SEEMS
OBVIOUS (TO US AND TO MANY WITHIN THE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
ESTABLISHMENT) THAT THE IRANIANS WILL SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN AGENDA IN LEBANON WHILE TRYING TO DRIVE
A WEDGE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE WILL
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR INTERACTIONS WITH SENIOR FRENCH LEADERS
OVER THE COMING DAYS TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERNS, AS WE ASSUME
WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL DO AS WELL. HAVING NOTED THE
COALITION RAID ON THE IRANIAN OFFICE IN IRBIL, THE DEPLOYMENT
OF A NEW CARRIER BATTLE GROUP TO THE PERSIAN GULF, AND RECENT
STATEMENTS ON IRAN BY SECDEF GATES AND OTHERS, THE FRENCH ARE
AWARE OF THE GROWING PRESSURE ON TEHRAN. MAINTAINING OUR
FULL AND FRANK EXCHANGES WITH THE FRENCH ON IRAN WILL BE
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE COMING DAYS.
PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:

HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS257, FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S
VIEWS ON MIDDLE
Discussing cables
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TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE
EAST
REF: PARIS 170
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: French NSA-equivalent Maurice

Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) told the Ambassador on January 22
that "some" are calling for France to freeze plans for
establishing an international tribunal on Lebanon until next
autumn, in the hope that this delay would allow Lebanese PM
Siniora to break the political deadlock in Beirut. MGM said
that President Chirac did not espouse a delay, but suggested
(more than once) that the Lebanese themselves might request
one. Turning to Iran, he provided a somewhat unpersuasive
explanation of Chirac's rationale for contemplating the
dispatch of a high-level envoy to Tehran, saying such an
envoy might help to dispel misunderstandings of French policy
aims on a number of regional questions, and indicating that
he himself would not serve as an envoy to Tehran and neither
would FM Douste-Blazy. On Iraq, MGM said that France wanted
to see Iraq serve once again as a buffer against Iranian
expansionism, but doubted that the West had sufficient
resources to end Iranian influence in Iraq while
simultaneously solving the country's economic problems. On
Afghanistan, he reviewed the achievements of the Riga
Conference with satisfaction but said no European country was
prepared to send additional troops at this time. End summary.
Lebanon: Putting the Tribunal on Ice

------------------------------------
¶2. (S) The Ambassador hosted French NSA-equivalent Maurice

Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) for breakfast on January 22. MGM
cheerfully reviewed preparations for the January 25 Lebanon
Conference, saying France would announce a contribution of
500 million euros, while Germany would pledge somewhere in
the neighborhood of 80 million euros. He observed with
pleasure that British FM Beckett was now planning to attend
(a reversal he gratefully attributed to U.S. encouragement).
The only disappointment, he said, was Russia, which would be
represented by Special Middle East Envoy Saltanov, even
though FM Lavrov's schedule could have permitted him to
attend at least the opening session.
¶3. (S) MGM said he saw little chance of resolving Lebanon's

domestic political crisis prior to the Lebanese presidential
election in November 2007. Consequently, some had raised the
idea of "putting the tribunal in the freezer" until that
time, in hopes that a delay in setting up the tribunal would
aid PM Siniora to break the political deadlock. "Of course,
we (neither he nor Chirac) are not advocating this idea," MGM
stressed at several points. Nevertheless, he continued, the
Lebanese themselves might ask the French and the U.S. to put
the tribunal on ice, in part because Siniora would need the
opposition's help in order to deliver the economic reforms
that the GOL is promising at this week's conference. The
only other option, MGM continued, would be to change the
scope of the tribunal itself -- something France found
unacceptable. When pressed on why the French were
contemplating a change in their approach to the tribunal at
this point -- especially when it was unclear that Lebanon's
opposition had the upper hand -- MGM made another (and
somewhat jumbled) reference to the need to obtain the
opposition's support for economic reform.
Chirac's Iran Envoy: Is the Idea Dead or Not?

---------------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Turning to recent media reports concerning President

Chirac's plans to send a high level envoy to Iran, MGM said
he was strongly reminded of how a few years ago internal USG
discussion of possible changes in Iran policy had been leaked
to the Wall Street Journal, thereby killing the proposed
discussion before it had a chance to take place. He said
Chirac's envoy proposal had suffered much the same fate after
those opposed to any change in the French approach to Iran
(MGM did not speculate on who they might be) leaked the
content of sensitive MFA-Elysee discussions to Le Monde.
(Although Le Monde approached him for comment before running
with the piece, MGM said the journalist already had "the
whole story.")
¶5. (S) MGM acknowledged that the Elysee had two concerns
about sending an envoy to Tehran. First, one could argue
(and Saudi King Abdallah did, in the strongest terms) that
sending an envoy to engage the Iranians on Lebanon would
merely consecrate Iran's role in Lebanon. (The
PARIS 00000257 002 OF 003
counterargument, MGM said, was that Iran's influence is a

fact, like it or not.) The second concern was that the
Iranians might try to parley the overture into an invitation
to attend the January 25 Lebanon Conference. "But even if
they had asked, we weren't going to invite them," MGM assured
the Ambassador.
¶6. (S) As for the virtues of engaging with Tehran, MGM argued
that it would be useful to dispel Iranian misperceptions of
France's policy aims in the Middle East without engaging in a
debate on those aims. Hence, Chirac had mulled the
possibility of arming his envoy with a letter to Supreme
Leader Khamenei, which would spell out France's position on
Israel (i.e., that it has a right to exist), on UNSCR 1701
(that all states are obligated to work toward its full
implementation), and on Iran's need to promote regional
stability (code for stop interfering in Iraq). In addition,
Chirac and his advisors reasoned that an envoy's visit might
strengthen the hand of President Ahmadinejad's critics.
¶7. (S) MGM stressed that the idea of sending Foreign Minister
Douste-Blazy was no longer an option, not only because of the
Le Monde leak but also because of vehement opposition from
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. MGM also made it clear that he
himself would not be an envoy to Tehran, given the likelihood
that the Iranians would try to oblige him to see President
Ahmadinejad (which neither Chirac nor his advisers will do,
given Ahmadinejad's public declarations on Israel). However,
MGM did not categorically exclude the possibility that Chirac
would not send someone else (e.g., Jean-Claude Cousseran) as
an envoy.
UNIFIL: A Solution on Drones?

-----------------------------
¶8. (S) MGM indicated that France was searching for a solution
to the problem of operating UAVs (i.e., "drones") over
southern Lebanon in the wake of recent statements by
Hizballah claiming that France would share with Israel any
intelligence collected by the drones. MGM said France would
not allow Hizballah to draw red-lines impinging upon the
operations of French peacekeepers; Hizballah had attempted
this once before with respect to the deployment of Leclerc
tanks, and the French had deployed the tanks anyway.
However, he confirmed a difference of opinion between the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs: the military was
determined to operate the drones (which were shipped to
UNIFIL at the request of UNDPKO), whereas the diplomats
advised caution. Consequently, MGM said the French were
leaning towards a "demonstration flight" held in the presence
of members of the Lebanese Armed Forces with "maximum
transparency" so that it would be clear to the Lebanese
public that the UAV flights would not be used as a source of
intelligence for Israel. The final decision, he emphasized,
would only be made by Chirac himself.
¶9. (S) Noting that on the ground cooperation between Lebanese

civilians living in UNIFIL's area of operations and French
peacekeepers ended overnight following FM Douste-Blazy's
ill-considered declaration that Hizballah was an enemy to
France, MGM said France "must walk a fine line" while not
allowing Hizballah to dictate terms to UNIFIL. If necessary,
France could reinforce its military presence by deploying the
second of two battalions pledged to UNIFIL last year. MGM
confirmed that in February, the French would conduct a
6-month review of their participation in UNIFIL. While he
foresaw no change in France's participation as a result of
this review, he conceded that any attack against French
peacekeepers would likely lead to further evaluation of
France's role. Moreover, he admitted that the French are
deeply concerned that Hizballah might attempt to kidnap
French peacekeepers in the run-up to the French presidential
elections this Spring.
Syria
Viewing cable 07PARIS322, C/T JUDGE ON FRANCE, RWANDA, PAKISTAN,

AND HIS
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TAGS: PTER PREL INTERPOL KJUS TS AG MO RW
SUBJECT: C/T JUDGE ON FRANCE, RWANDA, PAKISTAN, AND HIS
POLITICAL FUTURE
REF: PARIS 186
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO

NS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: France,s chief counterterrorism judge,

Jean-Louis Bruguiere, told us on January 19 that a recent
surge in overall GSPC activities worried French
counterterrorism officials, who are convinced there is now a
significantly higher threat against France and its interests
abroad. Tunisian security services, he said, had essentially
shut the French out, preferring to deny the existence of a
threat. Morocco was cooperative, while Algeria remained hot
and cold, or "as usual."
¶2. (S) Summary continued: Operational relations between
France and the U.S. were excellent, Bruguiere said. He also
praised DNI John Negroponte,s comments on Pakistan, adding
that President Musharraf did not exercise control over all of
Pakistan and that this country posed the most immediate
threat to global security. He confirmed that he had
conferred with GoF officials, including President Chirac, on
the timing and fallout of his issuance of arrest warrants
against top Kigame aides and warned against better U.S.
relations with Rwanda. Bruguiere also confirmed rumors that
he will likely be leaving the top terrorism court to pursue
political ambitions. END SUMMARY
GSPC THREAT AND THE MAGHREB

---------------------------
¶3. (S) France,s chief counterterrorism judge, Jean-Louis

Bruguiere, told us on January 19 that he found an apparent
escalation in GSPC activities in the Maghreb during the past
several months particularly worrisome. France, he said, was
at a higher state of alert and would likely remain so for the
foreseeable future. While there was no specific threat
information, he said the GoF was convinced that cells and
supporters were prepared to be active in France and Europe.
The dismantling of at least two, relatively major, Islamic
cells on French territory every year showed a clear and
present threat. Information exchange with Tunisia, he said,
was now virtually non-existent. The Tunisian government was
either in denial or did not know how to proceed and was
shutting out the French. Morocco continues to be relatively
reliable with information, with Algeria as, "as usual,"
excellent on some days and like Tunisia on others. (COMMENT:
Bruguiere,s characterization of operational cooperation with
the Maghreb is worse than other C/T contacts have previously
reported. Bruguiere,s observations, therefore, may or may
not apply to all of the French intelligence services. End
Comment)
U.S./FRANCE COOPERATION
-----------------------
¶4. (S) Bruguiere commented that U.S./France judicial and

operational exchanges remained excellent. He said that while
France,s legal system gave him much more discretion than the
U.S. system, our ability to work together was not hindered by
this; we had to be creative. (Note: Bruguiere was an expert
witness in the successful prosecution of Ahmed Ressam in the
famed L.A. trial, the U.S. vs. Ahmed Ressam).
PAKISTAN
--------
¶5. (S) The judge praised DNI John Negroponte,s comments on

Pakistan during a recent Congressional intelligence briefing.
He said he was convinced that Pakistan posed the single
greatest threat to global security. President Musharaf, he
noted, lacked real control over both the territory of the
country and security and military agencies. Rogue elements
from Pakistan, he insisted, were the most likely to provide
nuclear weapons and safe-haven to terrorists.
RWANDA
------
¶6. (S) Bruguiere confirmed that he had consulted within the
GoF on his issuance of arrest warrants in the cases brought
PARIS 00000322 002 OF 002
against nine of President Kagame,s top aides for

assassination of President Habyarimana and three French
aircraft crew (see reftel A). He said he presented his
decision to French officials, including President Chirac, as
his independent judicial right, but chose to consult with
them because he was convinced of the need to coordinate
timing with the government. Bruguiere said he was not
surprised by Rwanda,s official reaction, and said that the
GoF had prepared for what it thought would be a violent
response against French nationals. He praised his own
decision to move forward, adding that the international
community had a certain moral responsibility, and that his
actions were in the pursuit of justice. Bruguiere was
satisfied that the nine individuals he listed could not leave
Rwanda without fear of arrest, but was doubtful the ICTR
would take up the case. (COMMENT: Bruguiere,s presented his
case in a very professional manner, but he did not hide his
personal desire to see Kagame,s government isolated. He
warned that closer U.S. ties with Rwanda would be a mistake.
END COMMENT)
BRUGUIERE MOVING ON?

--------------------
¶7. (C) Since 1982 Bruguiere has been one of the leading
players in the French fight against terrorism, and he is
considered a leading world expert in terrorism. He has been
the chief of the French counterterrorism court, created in
1986, since its inception. He has survived at least one
direct assassination attempt, and is the most visible
counterterrorism figure in France. Bruguiere,s ambitions
have now turned to the political, however. He told us that
he is likely to run for a parliamentary seat later this year.
Bruguiere also casually mentioned that a cabinet post
(Minister of Justice) would be his first choice. His
departure will be a loss to the court, but it has become a
solid institution under his tutelage and it,s clear that
Bruguiere intends to stay an active part of the C/T community.

STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV64, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S

JANUARY 13-15
Discussing cables
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TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IS KWBG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15
VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders

have intensified since your last visit and have reached the
point that there appears to be little coordination or even
dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we will
need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one
faction over another. The divisions at the top here are part
of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption
allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing
sense of political failure despite Israel's strong economy
and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks.
Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percent
in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the
political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public
confidence in the country's leadership at a time when
Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face
the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.
OPTIMISM ERODING
----------------
¶2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis.
The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayed
December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated
under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan
Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket
attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on
both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack
of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the
unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak
summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid
in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were
killed.
¶3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the

IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister of
Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of
coordination between Israel's military and its civilian
leadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealing
with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is
military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall
meet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a
peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab
willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding,
and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will
need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the
streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of
the Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon war
hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert,
Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff
Halutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that
they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for
serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has
refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting the
results of several separate investigations involving
corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage
him severely, if not force his resignation.
¶4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift

of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's report
has been allayed by statements by you and the President,
there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the
Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to
come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. public
support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with
interest the President's upcoming articulation of the
revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that
Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American
minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for
whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating
situation in Iraq.
¶5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great

anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across the
political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threats
to wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear in
his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a
nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically
by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to
Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments of
Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views
about what action Israel should take. The MFA and some of
the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to
state that military action must be a last resort and are
taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including
but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to
abandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however,
srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a
military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the
only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful
TEL AVIV 00000064 002 OF 003
Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran

did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland,
the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would
completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in
ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a
democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That
concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those
who say they do not want their children and grandchildren
growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.
LIVNI RISING
------------
¶6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued

refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on
polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the
Prime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in late
December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime
ministership if he continued not to give her his full
backing. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of
her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with
the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with
the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve
as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad
takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances
himself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to
us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with
Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livni
told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final
status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and
therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that
it could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us that
Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated.
She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern
that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point.
Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has
little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is
she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert).
Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become more
serious once the report's preliminary conclusions are
released next month.
SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA

-----------------------
¶7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria
would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the
international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in
Lebanon. While they see public relations downsides to
dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue
to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria
reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps
to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and
Hizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by
Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian
intentions. A significant part of the security
establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion
that it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions --
possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and to
seek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in that
view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and
the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to
refuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, often
comparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticized
decision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then led
to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 stated
that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that
he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a
timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of
U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to
clearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions and
capabilities vis a vis Hamas.
PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS
----------------------
¶8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party

leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely
disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephone
conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two
reportedly barely speak to each other. Television news
reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided
to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced
plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership in
late May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Office
almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt
here that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much of
the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as
Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz'
popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor
TEL AVIV 00000064 003 OF 003
members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they

saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to
intervene in their party's leadership contest. In any event,
the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree
of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of
the GOI.
PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS

--------------------------------
¶9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is

some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward
improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despite
his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious
partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement
and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push
by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce
barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the
Palestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh,
who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged
as the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz'
conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on the
Palestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," but
Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military
governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit,
and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an
intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat
commander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely
lacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to
express appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and to
encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant
elements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we can
achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it
will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in
the coming year.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
JONES
Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI187, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS

IRAN CONCERNS WITH
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TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN CONCERNS WITH
GENERAL MOSELEY
REF: A. ABU DHABI 97

¶B. ABU DHABI 145
Classified By: Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (S) Summary. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
(MbZ) Al Nahyan hosted Chief of Staff USAF General T. Michael
Moseley on February 1, 2007. MbZ warned Moseley of the
growing threat from Iran, stating that they (Iran) "can't be
allowed to have a nuclear program." MbZ further emphasized
that Iran's nuclear program must be stopped "by all means
available." As expected, MbZ inquired about Predator B.
Moseley informed MbZ that the question of Predator B would
require further discussion within the interagency and with
our MTCR partners, while Ambassador noted that the USG looked
forward to discussion of UAE defense requirements and our
shared security objectives in the context of the Gulf
Security Dialogue. MbZ expressed a desire to have a missile
defense system in place by Summer 2009, and was looking to
add ship-based launch platforms as a part of that system. He
also noted that the UAE had identified a location on the
northern border at an elevation of 6,000 feet that may be
suitable for installation of an early warning radar system.
End Summary.
Iran
----
¶2. (S) Stating that "we are living in a dangerous
neighborhood," MbZ stressed the importance of curtailing
Iran's nuclear program to the overall stability of the Gulf,
the Middle East as a region, and to the world's energy
markets. Pointing out that a nuclear weapon with even a
short-range delivery system puts all the critical
infrastructure in the Gulf at risk -- as well as the oil
shipping lanes -- MbZ asserted: "If Iran can increase oil
production to more than 15 million barrels of oil per day,
let them have nuclear power, but until they can replace (the
Gulf's) oil production they can't be allowed to have a
nuclear program."
¶3. (S) MbZ told Moseley that the US should not focus too much
on Ahmadinejad as the problem, but should focus instead on
"the greater Iranian threat." Calling Ahmadinejad "merely
the driver" of a bus (nuclear program) that has been running
for a long time in Iran, MbZ described Iran's nuclear program
as one that is no longer driven by personalities -- but which
has become part of the Iranian identity. Noting that even if
Ahmadinejad or other leaders were to change, the nuclear
program would still continue, MbZ stated: "Even a siege at
this point will not change anything." In answer to
Moseley's question what should be done, MbZ responded: "Delay
their program -- by all means available." He added: "I am
saying this knowing that I am putting my country at risk and
placing myself in a dangerous spot."
¶4. (S) Speaking about his fears of Iran's growing hegemonic

aspirations, MbZ warned the US not to underestimate the
Iranians characterizing them as "extremely smart." "It
amazes me," MbZ continued, "that the Muslim Brotherhood,
which controls Hamas, has at its core an opposition to all
things Shi'a, and yet they (Hamas) cooperate with Iran. That
shows you how smart they are." MbZ then pointed to what he
called successful Iranian actions in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,
and Palestine to illustrate how Iran has managed to
manipulate Muslim extremism in order to advance Shi'a and
Iranian goals.
UAV/Predator B
--------------
¶5. (S) MbZ again asked about the status of the UAE request to
acquire Predator B. GeneralMoseley informed MbZ that the
question of Predatr B acquisition would require further
discussionwithin the interagency and with our MTCR partners.
MbZ nodded in understanding: "We are patient." He then
added: "I hope the Iranians give us time; they are aggressive
and are moving fast." MbZ also mentioned that there were
several other countries offering UAVs to the UAE. Ambassador
added that the U.S. and the other 33 MTCR members would be
meeting in March to review the MTCR control list. Growing
demand worldwide for unmanned aerial vehicles had led to the
need for a general discussion of how the MTCR controls UAVs
and cruise missiles, and the USG looked forward to further
discussion of UAE defense requirements and our shared
security objectives in the context of the ongoing Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD).
Strategic Interests
-------------------
ABU DHABI 00000187 002 OF 002

¶6. (S) Moseley's meeting with MbZ immediately followed a
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing of MbZ on the ongoing
development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared early warning systems.
Speaking of a time frame for the first time, MbZ said he
wants a complete missile defense system by summer 2009. MbZ
expressed particular interest in the possibility of mounting
PAC-3 on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Learning that PAC-3
cannot yet be mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased
to note that SLAMRAAM has already tested successfully on a
wide variety of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh
(Major) Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on
critical infrastructure protection, took particular note of
this fact and asked about upgrading/extending their existing
Hawk/AMRAAM assets. When briefers noted the 32km limit of
unelevated radar, MbZ stated that he has a location
identified on the UAE's northern border at an elevation of
6000 feet that he would like contractors to come back and
look at as a possible location for an early warning radar
system. Also present was International Affairs Advisor to
the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba, who is a UAE
representative to the GSD.
¶7. (S) Comment: Although MbZ is increasingly talking tough on

Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with
Iran sooner rather than later" (ref A), his comments should
also be taken in the context of strong UAE interest in
acquiring advanced military technology and, specifically,
MbZ's repeated requests for Predator B (ref B). The UAEG is
clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their
much larger and militarily superior neighbor. The UAE's
significant trade relationship with Iran--approximately $4
billion--is another complicating factor in the relationship.
On more than one occasion, the UAE leadership has expressed
trepidation over the prospect of being caught in the middle
between the US and Iran. End Comment.
¶8. (U) POLAD, Chief of Staff USAF, Ambassador Marcelle M.

Wahba has approved this message.
SISON
Viewing cable 07BERLIN242, AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE

OF USG CONCERNS
Discussing cables
07BERLIN242 2007-02-06 17:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Berlin
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SUBJECT: AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS
REF: A. BERLIN 230
¶B. BERLIN 200
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy

National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel, the DCM reiterated our
strong concerns about the possible issuance of international
arrest warrants in the al-Masri case. The DCM noted that the
reports in the German media of the discussion on the issue
between the Secretary and FM Steinmeier in Washington were
not accurate, in that the media reports suggest the USG was
not troubled by developments in the al-Masri case. The DCM
emphasized that this was not the case and that issuance of
international arrest warrants would have a negative impact on
our bilateral relationship. He reminded Nikel of the
repercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wake
of a similar move by Italian authorities last year.
¶2. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that our intention was not to
threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German
Government weigh carefully at every step of the way the
implications for relations with the U.S. We of course
recognized the independence of the German judiciary, but
noted that a decision to issue international arrest warrants
or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the
German Federal Government, specifically the MFA and the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The DCM said our initial
indications had been that the German federal authorities
would not allow the warrants to be issued, but that
subsequent contacts led us to believe this was not the case.
¶3. (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the

German judiciary, but confirmed that the MFA and MOJ would
have a procedural role to play. He said the case was subject
to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny. From a judicial
standpoint, the facts are clear, and the Munich prosecutor
has acted correctly. Politically speaking, said Nikel,
Germany would have to examine the implications for relations
with the U.S. At the same time, he noted our political
differences about how the global war on terrorism should be
waged, for example on the appropriateness of the Guantanamo
facility and the alleged use of renditions.
¶4. (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from the

Bundestag and the German media. The German federal
Government must consider the "entire political context," said
Nikel. He assured the DCM that the Chancellery is well aware
of the bilateral political implications of the case, but
added that this case "will not be easy." The Chancellery
would nonetheless try to be as constructive as possible.
¶5. (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that the USG would likewise
have a difficult time in managing domestic political
implications if international arrest warrants are issued. He
reiterated our concerns and expressed the hope that the
Chancellery would keep us informed of further developments in
the case, so as to avoid surprises. Nikel undertook to do
so, but reiterated that he could not, at this point "promise
that everything will turn out well."
TIMKEN JR
Viewing cable 07BUENOSAIRES376, C) U.S.- ARGENTINE RELATIONS: DR.

JEKYL AND MR.
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TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON VZ AR
SUBJECT: (C) U.S.- ARGENTINE RELATIONS: DR. JEKYL AND MR.
KIRCHNER

Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4

(b)and(d)
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Argentina's President Nestor

Kirchner is trying to stake out a position for himself close
to Chavez yet still working well with the U.S. on issues
important to Argentina. With domestic political advantage
and 2007 elections in mind, we expect Kirchner to continue
the balancing act. Kirchner will lash out with largely
indirect criticism, he will cozy up to Chavez, and yet he
will maintain a number of open doors to us. Kirchner
recognizes the value of maintaining quiet, positive relations
with the U.S. -- particularly on key strategic issues, e.g.
non-proliferation and counterterrorism -- but sees no value
domestically in aligning himself publicly with the U.S. or
its policies. In fact, he gets a domestic boost from lashing
out at perceived pressure and in striking an independent
pose, a la Charles de Gaulle. Argentina's commercial and
economic relationship with Venezuela is also of strategic
importance (refs. a, b), the difference being that,
domestically, Kirchner does perceive value, in particular
electorally, in publicly linking himself to Chavez; he is
bringing home the bacon. The meetings between senior GoA
ministers and AG Gonzalez and U/S Burns and A/S Shannon were
uniformly positive, recognizing an important common agenda in
many areas (refs c-d and septels), and the press play from
the visits was positive and profuse. In light of this
dynamic, Kirchner's statements in Venezuela -- that Argentina
will "not contain Venezuela" and his invitation for Chavez to
visit in March are indicative of the GoA's desire to maintain
what they see as a "balance" in relations with the U.S. and
Venezuela. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Attorney General Gonzales' February 6-7 visit, and U/S
Nick Burns and A/S Shannon's February 8-9 visit to Buenos
Aires and meetings with senior Kirchner ministers served to
underscore improving bilateral relations, the breadth of that
relationship, as well as highlight U.S. policy priorities in
the region. Kirchner insiders, Cabinet Chief Alberto
Fernandez and Planning Minister Julio De Vido, confirmed to
Burns and Shannon the importance of the relationship to the
GoA, the strong working-level cooperation on
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and international support
for non-proliferation. Together with Foreign Minister
Taiana, they shared concerns about the situation in Bolivia
and Ecuador, and the need for strengthening stability in the
region, including through joint efforts in Haiti. They also
emphasized the importance they place on attracting U.S.
investment (although a negative decision made public during
the visit regarding a U.S. investment fund seeking a share of
a local energy transmitting company, indicates that the
actual message to potential investors, at best, is mixed).
Cabinet Chief Fernandez publicly characterized relations as
"good" the day after Burns' visit.
¶3. (C) The Kirchner style from the beginning, however, has
been combative in the face of real, imagined and fabricated
challenges from sources as varied as the Catholic church,
neoliberalism and the "Washington consensus," the World Bank
and IMF, parasitic foreign multi-nationals, the press and
political opponents (whether from within or from outside the
Peronist party) and -- indirectly stated -- the the U.S.
This style has stood him in good stead. As the economy
boomed, buoyed by favorable external factors, his popularity
ratings have soared, and have remained high, due in no small
part to his pugnacious character.
¶4. (SBU) Kirchner demonstrated again over the last two weeks
his willingness to attack external institutions for domestic
political gain. He lashed out on several occasions at the
IFIs and other international organizations, rejecting their
latest gentle criticisms of GoA economic policies and blaming
them again for the 2001/2002 financial crisis and also for
current high poverty levels. His outburst followed mildly
critical comments from the World Bank and World Trade
Organization officials about the sustainability of the GoA's
economic policies. He was also responding to an IMF
spokesman's comment to the press that an IMF agreement was
normally a prerequisite for Paris Club debt rescheduling.
Despite the IMF's explanation that this was a Paris Club, not
IMF, requirement, Kirchner blamed the IMF -- his favorite
whipping boy -- for blocking a Paris Club deal. He and his
Economic Minister, Felisa Miceli, also used the opportunity
to pander to the public's extreme hostility towards the IMF
by rejecting categorically any possibility of a Fund program
with Argentina.
¶5. (C) This dynamic helps explain the two faces of Kirchner
we see in our bilateral relations. Kirchner is essentially
pragmatic but excessively focused on domestic issues and
public opinion. The low point in recent bilateral relations,
occasioned by the GoA performance at the Mar del Plata Summit
of the Americas in November 2005, perhaps convinced Kirchner
he had gone a bit too far down the populist route. Since
then, we have seen a gradual and steady improvement in
relations with an increasing willingness by senior-level
officials in engaging in dialogue with us and in identifying
areas where we can strengthen cooperation.
¶6. (C) However, we do not expect to see a public embrace of

the U.S. or many of our policies. The public image of the
U.S. in Argentina is the lowest in the region. Kirchner's
regular verbal assaults on policies and institutions linked
in the public mind to the U.S., e.g. globalization and the
international financial institutions, resonate very well here
as long as they don't foretell a serious break (see latest
INR U.S Image paper from the Oct-Nov 2006 Latinobarometro
poll comparing Argentina with 17 other regional publics).
Kirchner calculates -- with at least one eye always on the
next election -- that there is little up-side to being linked
too closely with the U.S., and little down-side to
occasionally "standing firm" and "protecting the people's
interests" before the hegemonic power.
¶7. (C) The press here eggs this on, couching many issues as
the ideological struggle between the U.S. and Venezuela for
predominance in the region. As a reflection of this, GoA
actions are either portrayed as pro-Chavez or as a
rapprochement with the U.S. Contacts inform us that Kirchner
also sees himself as maintaining this balance between the two
-- a la Charles de Gualle between the cold war powers U.S.
and USSR. The Embassy has seen on several occasions, when
the press appears to be too caught up in portraying the
improving U.S.- GoA relations, that Kirchner will find an
opportunity to publicly stick a pin in that balloon. In the
aftermath of the Gonzalez/Burns/Shannon visits, Kirchner,
while in Venezuela recently to sign a number of commercial
agreements, may have felt compelled to "right the balance"
and demonstrate his independence with his gratuitous remark
that Argentina would not "contain" Chavez (ref. A). The
media here has, in fact, tied Kirchner's comments in
Venezuela to Burns/Shannon remarks made here during their
recent visit that the U.S. could work well with governments
like Argentina and Brazil but that Venezuela was "another
matter."
¶8. (C) Comment: It is clear we have foreign policy

differences with the Kirchner administration, particularly
over how we view Chavez and his actions in Venezuela and the
region. Press reports here say Chavez will be paying a
return visit to Kirchner next week, coinciding with President
Bush's visit to Uruguay (septel - Senior GoA contacts tell us
the visit is still unconfirmed). Ambassador has expressed
our strong concerns that Chavez will use the occasion to
organize another anti-U.S. rally (as is being reported in the
press), and that such an act would negatively impact our
bilateral relations. This, unfortunately, would be the type
of gesture to be expected of Kirchner; one focused on
short-term electoral political gain, with little thought for
longer-term consequences. We should not expect significant
changes in the GOA's foreign policy or GOA public statements
in support of the U.S. Nor is Kirchner likely to change many
of his interventionist economic tendencies. All of this is
especially true in an election year. But on most of the key
bilateral and multilateral issues important to the U.S., in
fact, we believe we can continue to build strong cooperation
in a quiet, deliberate way.
WAYNE
Viewing cable 07PARIS743, CODEL TANNER: MEETING WITH FRENCH

POLITICAL
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SUBJECT: CODEL TANNER: MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL
DIRECTOR ARAUD

ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During a meeting with Codel Tanner on February 22,

French MFA Political Director Gerard Araud reviewed the
current state of the bilateral relationship, commented on
NATO's continuing purpose, and compared France's and
Britain's historically distinct orientations towards the U.S.
He also discussed Afghanistan and Iran, two outstanding
cases of U.S.-French cooperation. On Afghanistan, Araud
highlighted France's continued participation in NATO
operations, but called for a more explicitly defined
"political strategy" for reaching a desired end-state. On
Iran, he emphasized the need for continuing pressure on Iran,
through P-5 unity, which is impacting on Ahmadinejad's
weakened position, and which offers the only hope for a
negotiated outcome. End Summary.
NATO's Purpose
---------------
¶2. (C) MFA Political Director Gerard Araud hosted Codel

Tanner, in Paris for the annual discussions of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) Economic Committee with the
OECD, to a meeting and luncheon on February 22. Ambassadors
Stapleton and Morella also attended. Both sides saluted the
historical links and continuing cultural and economic ties
between the U.S. and France, along with our wide-ranging
diplomatic cooperation. Araud took the opportunity of the
visit of the U.S. members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
to offer, in his typically plain-spoken fashion, a thumb-nail
history of U.S.-French relations since World War II,
including our different approaches to NATO. Recalling an
Cold War bromide, Araud said that NATO's original purpose had
been "to keep the Germans down, the Russians out, and the
Americans in." Its current purpose is -- for the newer
central European and Baltic members, given their fear of
Russia, "rational or not" -- to keep the Americans in. For
other members, NATO provides a way to meet their defense --
without having to pay for it. Araud decried the abysmally
low defense spending by the European allies. Among the
Europeans, only the French and the British come close to
carrying their weight, an exception which can be explained by
their history as global powers, and their residual desire to
exert influence.
Trans-Atlantic Ties: The Cases of Britain, France and Germany

--------------------------------------------- -----------------
¶3. (C) Taking up this theme, Araud offered the Codel a

historical disquisition on the differences between France's
and Britain's post-war relationship with the U.S. Britain,
for its part, tries to "ride the tiger," influencing U.S.
policy behind the scenes. This is what they have tried to do
on Iraq: "With what success, we might ask?" France, on the
other hand, tries to defend its interests, "tries to exist
(as an independent player)." The U.S. often views this
simply as opposition, or anti-Americanism, which it isn't:
"We're trying to exist, and to exercise our right to have our
own opinion, including on how to address international
crises. That means that we may agree in some cases -- as on
Iran where we work extremely closely, coordinating daily. In
others, as in Iraq, we disagreed, and still do. This is not
anti-Americanism, it's France developing its own analyses and
exercising its own policy." Stepping back, Araud recalled
that the 1956 Suez Crisis had marked the end of both France
and the UK's great power aspirations. Each, however, drew a
different lesson from their joint failure. U.S. opposition
to the Suez operation, (which together with the Soviet
Union's threat to use nuclear weapons had scuttled the
Anglo-French operation), had led the British to conclude that
"nothing was possible without the Americans," and that their
influence would have to be applied through the U.S., by being
at its side, and having its voice heard as America's most
trusted ally. The French took a distinctly different course,
that of autonomy and independence (as symbolized in its
decision, a few months after Suez, to create its own nuclear
force). Germany was a case apart, for historical reasons.
With a military that was totally integrated into NATO, it was
America's model ally. Now things are changing: for the first
time since WW II, during the Iraq crisis, Germany opposed the
U.S. While the British and French conception of their own
roles -- "the special relationship" and
independence/autonomy, respectively -- still apply, Germany's
is now a question mark.
Afghanistan
-----------
PARIS 00000743 002 OF 003

¶4. (C) In the back and forth that followed Araud's
presentation, Ambassador Stapleton noted that we describe the
current state of the relationship as "normal," a
characterization which Araud's historical synopsis supported.
It's a relationship we value, said the Ambassador; and we
certainly do not take the French for granted. Rep John
Tanner (D-TN) agreed on the value of a diversity of opinion.
Reaffirming strong U.S. support for NATO, he pointed to
Afghanistan as the Alliance's defining issue. The U.S.
appreciates France's support in this crucial battle.
Congressman Paul Gillmor (R-OH), Vice-President of the NPA,
noted the importance of the NATO to the U.S, France's
commitment of resources to defense, and the commonality of
interests in our joint effort in Afghanistan. (NOTE:
Congressmen Tanner and Gillmor earlier met with French
television and print media to push for strengthened Allied
support in Afghanistan. END NOTE.) Araud agreed, citing the
recent dispatch of the French aircraft carrier Charles de
Gaulle to the region, which will allow France to increase its
participation in airstrikes in Afghanistan. However,
France's concern is lack of a "political strategy" concerning
Afghanistan, a point Chirac tried to make at the Riga Summit.
Perhaps France's proposed Contact Group wasn't the right
solution, said Araud, as it raises the question of
neighboring countries' roles, and Afghanistan's as well. But
at the end of the day, success in Afghanistan will be
political, "and we are simply not convinced we have a
political strategy, an end-game in view, a roadmap to
success. If what we are doing simply amounts to killing
Taliban every Spring, some of us, five years from now, will
have tired of this. That's our concern; we're not
criticizing NATO, which is doing it's job. It's the
political strategy that's missing. For example, Iran is a
natural ally in the fight against the Taliban. And there is
the drug problem, which affects you, us and Russia. We're
concerned about where we're going."
Iran
----
¶5. (C) Responding to Congressman Dennis Moore's (D-KS)
question about the French view of Iran, Araud underlined how
closely the U.S. and France have been working together over
the past four years. He distinguished Iran from North Korea,
"a criminal regime which doesn't care about the suffering of
its people." Iran, on the other hand, is a "sort of
democracy," a proud country, where public opinion counts for
something, and which doesn't want to be seen as a pariah
state. This complex reality calls for a dual policy: a
readiness to negotiate, but in a context of international
pressure. During the negotiation of UNSCR 1737 a difference
opened up between the U.S. and the EU-3, said Araud, with the
U.S. seeking a stronger text, while the Europeans insisted on
one that could be supported by the P-5. Araud contended that
now the U.S. agrees, retrospectively, that the Europeans were
right on insisting on a unanimous outcome, one that could not
be interpreted as the West ganging up on Iran. UNSC
unanimity (and especially China's vote) sent a powerful
message of Iran's isolation, impacting strongly on Iranian
public opinion. Araud admitted that "mercantile" factors
were driving some, especially the Russians. While the French
Treasury "is furious" about U.S. warnings to European banks
about their operations with Iran, said Araud, those efforts
work -- they're very effective. Araud commented that the
U.S. military option is taken very seriously in Iran. As
recounted to him by well-known French journalist Bernard
Guetta, who recently returned from Tehran, "the Iranians are
terrified; they take the U.S. military threat seriously --
people don't want it." Another important factor is
Ahmadinejad's growing weakness. "He was elected because he
wasn't corrupt, he promised housing and good administration,
but he hasn't delivered. And there was his recent defeat in
the municipal elections. That said, although the music has
changed, the words haven't": The Iranians continue to refuse
to suspend enrichment. Therefore we must keep up the
pressure. And the pressure is working. So now we must work
on a second sanctions resolution, and keep the door open to a
"double suspension" deal with Iran. We haven't failed,
emphasized Araud. According to Guetta, he said, many people
close to Supreme Leader Khamenei had "incredibly violent
things to say about Ahmadinejad whom they regard as an
upstart. They want him out. The subdued celebration of
Revolution Day, including Ahmadinejad's speech, in which he
did not mention the Holocaust, was significant. Araud also
pointed to a recent press interview with Velayati in which he
affirmed that the Holocaust was a historical reality. We
have two to three years, concluded Araud, to work on this
before Iran gets the bomb. We will and must continue to work
on this together -- including with the Russians and Chinese.
(6). (U) Codel Tanner did not have the opportunity to clear
this cable before departing Paris.
PARIS 00000743 003 OF 003
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07ANKARA648, THE TRUTH BEHIND THE AKP'S "SECRET

ISLAMIC AGENDA"
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1479
DE RUEHAK #0648/01 0801533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211533Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2017

TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU
SUBJECT: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE AKP'S "SECRET ISLAMIC AGENDA"
REF: A. ANKARA 0629

¶B. ANKARA 0610
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b),

(d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Ever since its victory in the 2002 general
elections, rumours and suspicion have swirled around the
ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) "secret"
Islamist agenda. After more than four years in power, some
doubters are relieved to find an AKP that appears
conservative, Western- as well as Islam-oriented, reform
minded and democratic. Others remain convinced that AKP is
determined to impose Sharia law in Turkey and undermine the
country's secular system once it gains control of the triple
crown - the presidency, prime ministry and parliament - in
this year's double elections. The evidence either way is
circumstantial, but the issue is central to Turkey's future.
Turkey's traditional secularists (including the civil
service, judiciary and military), opposition parties and even
ultra and neo-nationalists are resorting to increasingly
desperate maneuvers, including rumour and innuendo, to
counter the perceived "threat" of an AKP-dominated
triumverate. Their concern is undoubtedly heightened by the
realization that AKP's reform agenda threatens the
established elite's traditional, top-down control. To keep
the public's trust and minimize tension as Turkish society
evolves, AKP leaders will need to continue to employ
broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End summary.
The Origins of Suspicion

------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Those looking to brand the AKP as Islamists
determined to undermine the Turkish Republic point first to
the AKP's religious origins and PM Erdogan's political roots.
AKP evolved from Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party (RP), an
Islamist party founded in 1993. Critics focus on Erdogan,
who in 1994 as Istanbul's mayor, called himself the "imam of
Istanbul" and praised God that he was a servant of Sharia.
Later, in 1998, Erdogan served four months of a 10-month
sentence for inciting religious hatred by reading a religious
poem at a rally. When the Constitutional Court outlawed the
RP in 1998, Erdogan and other RP members formed the
Islamic-oriented Virtue Party (FP). When FP was banned in
2001 for unconstitutional anti-secular activities, Erdogan
split off from Erbakan and formed AKP with more pragmatic
members willing to work within the existing political system.
Erbakan and more hardcore Islamists formed Saadet (Felicity)
Party. Erdogan moderated his rhetoric, making it easier for
voters to turn to AKP in the 2002 elections as an alternative
to traditional parties, mired in scandals, corruption and an
economic crisis. AKP surged to power with 34 percent of the
vote, one of the largest parliamentary majorities in Turkey's
history.
For the Defense

---------------
¶3. (C) Those who view AKP as reform-minded and democratic
are quick to cite AKP-backed reforms that strengthened
freedoms and democracy. AKP legislation that reduced the
military's influence in the National Secuity Council (MGK)
and eliminated military membership in the security courts and
the Board of Higher Education (YOK), among others, improved
the civil-military equilibrium that had been heavily skewed
toward military control. They cite as evidence of the
party's western-oriented, free market approach AKP's liberal
economic policies, which have stimulated the private sector,
increased foreign investment, reduced inflation and
stabilized the currency. AKP supporters argue that Turkey's
traditional power centers (the military, judiciary,
bureacracy) feel threatened by EU-linked human rights and
rule of law reforms that enhance individual freedoms. By
promoting EU membership, the AKP is slowly introducing more
balance into Turkey's strictly secular, statist society.
Supporters maintain that Erdogan's appointment of AKP
loyalists to influential positions previously held by
secularists has generated resentment against the AKP, further
fueled by the party's popularity. They frame attacks against
the party as desperate measures by entrenched secularists who
fear that further democratization will undermine their
traditional control and the economic benefits they derived
from state intervention in the economy.
¶4. (C) Opponents charge that AKP only pushed a reform agenda
ANKARA 00000648 002 OF 004
as far as necessary to convince the EU to begin accession

talks. Even then, AKP focused on those reforms needed to
dilute the military's power rather than those that might
interfere with the party's Islamic agenda. They note
Erdogan's support for greater freedom to express Islamic
practices (such as wearing the headscarf), and point to his
failure to allow Alevis, Kurds, Armenian and Greek Orthodox
communities similar freedoms. Suspicious that the accession
process is just a cover for the AKP's anti-secular Islamic
agenda, some in the military and opposition are reconsidering
the merits of EU membership. AKP officials admit reform
efforts have slowed, but explain that Turkey's bureaucracy
needs time to absorb and implement significant changes, such
as the complete overhaul of the Penal Code, Criminal
Procedure Code and Punishments Law passed between 2002 and
¶2004. They also note that parliament passed in November 2006
much of another major reform package, including legislation
relating to minority foundations and schools, military
audits, military courts and political party funding. In some
cases, parliament has had to re-approve the legislation to
overcome President Sezer's veto.
Circumstantial Evidence
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Conspiracy theorists and concerned secularists alike
build the case against AKP using persuasive but largely
circumstantial evidence. Many claim that Erdogan has used
AKP's parliamentary majority to weaken Turkey's secular
educational, financial and judicial institutions. They warn
that an AKP troika of president, PM and parliament speaker
would control the appointments process, transforming Turkey's
secular system into something approaching an Islamic
republic. They point to AKP-sponsored changes in the
strictly secular education system to allow graduates of
religious high schools (imam hatip) to compete for limited
university seats and qualify for government jobs.
Previously, imam hatip, like other vocational school
graduates, advanced to the clergy or other appropriate
professions. In addition, opponents charge that AKP has
undermined state regulation of private Koranic schools by
lifting age limits and extending hours of attendance. As a
result, the number of Koranic schools has increased
significantly, with correspondingly less government
oversight.
¶6. (C) Erdogan is also frequently accused of trying to

infiltrate the higher education system with Islamist-minded
professors and administrators. After some university rectors
resisted AKP efforts to introduce more Islam into the
curriculum, AKP opponents claimed the government began a
harrassment campaign. Police arrested one obstinate rector
in Van twice in 2006; both times he was reinstated by court
decision. Legislation creating 15 new universities gave the
government authority to appoint the new rectors, rather than
the usual procedure of approvals by YOK and the president.
The law, pushed through over President Sezer's veto, is
viewed as an end-run to allow Erdogan to select 15 new
rectors of his mindset. Parliament currently is considering
a proposal to establish another 17 new universities.
Green Money Seeping In
----------------------
¶7. (C) While many acknowledge AKP economic successes, some
doubters flag the alleged influx of "green" money from
Islamic sources as proof of the real direction AKP is taking
Turkey's economy. AKP opponents note that Islamist capital
is hard to track and question whether it is ultimately tied
to more Islamist policies. Increased investments from the
UAE and a promised doubling of trade with Saudi Arabia after
the Saudi King's unprecedented 2006 visit raised suspicions
among some western-oriented investors. The overall trend of
increased foreign investor inflows actually counters
insinuations of an Islamist take-over of Turkey's financial
sector, however. Investments from Islamic sources pale in
comparison to total foreign inflows and do not seem to be of
economic or political significance.
¶8. (C) Erdogan reputedly has manipulated the political

appointments process to place Islamist bankers in key
economic positions. Along with Finance Minister Kemal
Unakitan - a former board member of one of Turkey's leading
Islamic banks (al-Baraka) - Erdogan's appointment of seven
other al-Baraka officials to key positions in Turkey's
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is cited as support for an
ANKARA 00000648 003 OF 004
Islamist take-over theory. In 2006, the PM virtually

paralyzed financial policy when he tried to appoint an
Islamist as head of the Central Bank against President
Sezer's firm opposition. (The compromise candidate has
demonstrated independent decision-making since his
appointment.) To round out the "damning" evidence, critics
cite FM Gul's background as a specialist at the Islamic
Development Bank in Jeddah from 1983 to 1991 and his reported
objections to state scrutiny of Islamic enterprises.
Packing the Court

------------------
¶9. (C) Erdogan is also accused of staging a take-over of the
judiciary. The AKP pushed through legislation to lower the
mandatory retirement age for technocrats, opening the way for
Erdogan to name almost 4,000 of 9,000 judges and prosecutors.
In a stand-off with the judiciary, AKP has threatened to
refuse to implement high court rulings against the government
for obstructing AKP-sponsored legislation. Similar struggles
between AKP and President Sezer have caused Sezer to veto
over 3,000 AKP appointments and send over 100 AKP-backed laws
to the Constitutional Court for review. But for Sezer,
Erdogan would already be implementing his "secret" agenda,
worried secularists claim. Economic reformers, including the
IMF, for their part, would be only too happy to see an
AKP-inspired change in the judiciary, which has consistently
blocked forward-looking economic reforms.
¶10. (C) Erdogan rebutted the secularists' charges in 2006 by

noting that the AKP hadn't been in power long enough to
reshape the judiciary. Rigid bureaucratic controls on
promotions and a 15-20 year career path for judges limit the
influence of any particular government on the judiciary's
orientation. But critics note that Justice Ministry
budgetary control over the Supreme Council of Judges and
Prosecutors, which oversees assignments within the judiciary,
gives the AKP indirect influence that can have a long-term
impact. The president appoints five of the seven council
members. The Justice Minister, however, heads the council
and controls its funding, which could discourage council
members from voting against the Minister's proposed
appointees. The most recent charge is that the Minister, by
not attending Supreme Council sessions, is preventing 29
judicial positions from being filled.
Small Changes
--------------
¶11. (C) AKP's strategy to infiltrate its Islamist agenda into
Turkey's secular institutions extends to the municipal level
and beyond, according to AKP opponents. The party controls
four of Turkey's five largest cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa
and Konya). Measures by some AKP mayors to ban alcohol on
municipal property, establish women-only parks or equip
ferries with prayer rooms are seen as Islamic encroachments
on the secular system. Erdogan and other party leaders
explained the alcohol restrictions as consistent with the
state's obligation to protect children from alcohol, drugs
and gambling, rather than a religious proscription.
Municipalities are authorized to ban the sale and consumption
of alcohol on municipal property and near schools, religious
sites and related locations. Of the 62 provincial capitals
that have such a ban, 18 have non-AKP mayors. Of the 19
without alcohol bans, 14 have AKP mayors. As another
often-cited example of small but telling changes, critics
note that employees at the Health Ministry and state-owned
Turkish Airlines reported being questioned about their
religious beliefs and attitudes toward the Koran, an
unprecedented practice.
Internal Balancing Act

----------------------
¶12. (C) Erdogan has performed a delicate balancing act to
maintain unity within the AKP, despite the sometimes
conflicting interests of its competing factions. Many party
faithful are pious; keeping their allegiance is central to
the AKP's hold on power but Erdogan has won them few tangible
successes. He has not upheld earlier pledges to lift the ban
on headscarves in public buildings, though his strong
objections when the European Court of Human Rights upheld the
ban in public schools resonated with the party's more devout
members. AKP's more conservation faction was disappointed by
the failed attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004.
Erdogan's attempts to put loyalists into government jobs can
also be viewed through the prism of rewarding the party
ANKARA 00000648 004 OF 004
faithful.
The Jury Is Out

---------------
¶12. (C) Comment. To date, AKP critics can only muster
circumstantial evidence of an AKP Islamist agenda.
Opposition leaders, some media outlets, the military and
extreme nationalists have used this to play up fears that an
AKP triumvirate will allow Erdogan to make significant,
perhaps irreversible, changes that would undermine Turkey's
secular system. Using dramatic ad campaigns and threatening
rhetoric, they warn that Turkey may soon have an Islamist
president with a head-scarf wearing wife ready to take the
country back to the pre-republic "dark ages". President
Sezer, military leaders and the MGK chief have all warned
Erdogan against unconstitutional moves that might change
Turkey's secular identity. The secular establishment's
concern that AKP poses a genuine threat to Turkey's secular
system is undoubtedly heightened by the realization that
AKP's reform agenda threatens the established elite's
traditional, top-down control.
¶13. (C) Those not convinced of a nefarious AKP plan contend

that more than four years in power have matured the party.
Erdogan has had to moderate his message to balance factions
within AKP and lessen tensions with secularists threatened by
AKP reforms. Much of the party's success stems from its
image as being less corrupt ("AK" in Turkish means "clean", a
dubious claim for any party here) and more effective than the
opposition. Its record to date describes a center-right,
conservative party with Islamic roots that has modestly
advanced Kemal Ataturk's core principles of westernization
and modernization. Some of the changes tied to that process
will inevitably transform the traditional power balance and
strengthen civilian leaders. To keep the public's trust and
minimize tension as Turkish society evolves, AKP, and Erdogan
in particular, will need to continue to employ
broad-reaching, moderate, balanced rhetoric. End Comment.

WILSON
Viewing cable 07MADRID520, SPAIN/IRAQ: SOCIALISTS FIRE UP ANTI-

WAR RHETORIC
Discussing cables
07MADRID520 2007-03-21 12:12 2010-11-30 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
VZCZCXRO1244
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0520/01 0801235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211235Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0157
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000520
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017

TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/IRAQ: SOCIALISTS FIRE UP ANTI-WAR RHETORIC
FOR ELECTORAL SEASON
MADRID 00000520 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reason 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. In a volatile political climate leading up

to regional/municipal elections in late May, the ruling
Socialist Party (PSOE) and far left political allies have
ramped up criticism of the war in Iraq, in part to
counteract opposition Popular Party (PP) attacks on the
Zapatero Government's controversial policies on the ETA
issue. The Madrid Regional PSOE joined the far left "United
Left" (IU), unions, and pacifist groups staged mass
demonstrations against the war on March 17 - though the
turnout was lower than for the anti-ETA march. On March 20,
high profile magistrate Baltasar Garzon published an
editorial in the left leaning "El Pais" saying that the time
had arrived to investigate "criminal responsibility" for the
war in Iraq, to include possible charges against former
President Aznar, PM Blair, and President Bush (Spaniards
frequently refer to the "Picture of the Azores" in 2003 of
the three leaders as the moment in which the decision to go
to war was made, thus linking Aznar not just with the Spanish
troop deployment, but with full responsibility for the war).
PSOE Secretary Jose Blanco said in a March 20 television
interview that "someone must pay" for the war in Iraq, and
that if someone could demonstrate criminal culpability on the
part of political leaders, Blanco said he was "all for it."
The Ambassador contacted National Security Adviser Carles
Casajuana on March 21 to convey his deep concern regarding
the direction and tenor of PSOE statements on Iraq, which
could only harm bilateral relations. Casajuana discussed the
heated political context of the statements and said he
expected them to abate soon, but assured the Ambassador that
he would convey the Ambassador's concerns to President
Zapatero immediately. The DCM is following up with PSOE
Secretary Blanco to insist that the PSOE avoid dragging the
SIPDIS
USG into its domestic conflict with the PP. End summary.
//HEATED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT//
¶2. (C) In the runup to May 27 regional and municipal

elections, the political environment in Spain has become
increasingly aggressive. The PP has not gained in most
opinion polls, but its criticism of President Zapatero's
controversial policies in the Basque Region has steadily
eroded electoral support for the PSOE. In a show of
strength, the PP led an anti-ETA, anti-Zapatero demonstration
on March 10 in Madrid that drew at least 1 million people.
The PSOE stormed back the following week, refocusing public
attention on former President Aznar's unpopular decision to
commit Spanish forces to the war in Iraq. The Madrid Region
PSOE, joined by the PSOE Secretary for International
Relations Elena Valenciano, organized a smaller mass rally on
March 17 against the Iraq war and against the U.S. detention
of enemy combatants at Guantanamo.
¶3. (U) The PSOE Parliamentary group joined the fray on March
20, negotiating a non-binding resolution with the far left IU
that sharply criticized the "illegal" war in Iraq. The
resolution passed with the unanimous support of all parties
except the PP. The resolution condemned the "illegal,
immoral, and unjust" decision to go to war in Iraq, for
having "destabilized the region, and encouraged jihadist
terrorism, which most affects the Iraqi people themselves."
The resolution further states that the war was launched on
false pretenses, "as has been recognized by President Bush
and Prime Minister Blair... the (mismanagement) of the
conflict has undermined the credibility of fundamental
universal values, in the face of brutal realities at Abu
Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the execution of Saddam Hussein."
(NOTE: The PSOE version of the resolution removed IU language
calling on the USG to hand over three U.S. servicemen accused
of killing Spanish TV cameraman Jose Couso. END NOTE).
//GARZON, PSOE LEADER WEIGH IN//
¶4. (U) Judge Garzon published an editorial in the leading

daily "El Pais" on March 20 that lambasted Aznar for
declining to "heed UN inspectors... and instead lending
himself, along with a few other leaders, to provide cover and
support for this illegal action. Garzon went on to suggest
that the time had come to study whether "criminal
responsibility" should be assigned to Aznar, Prime Minister
Blair, and President Bush.Spaniards frequently refer to the
"Picture of the Azores" in 2003 of the three leaders as the
moment in which the decision to go to war was made, thus
linking Aznar not just with the Spanish troop deployment, but
with full responsibility for the war. Late on March 20, a
television news crew asked PSOE Secretary Jose Blanco
(effectively the number two PSOE leader after Zapatero)
whether Aznar should be prosecuted for having involved Spain
MADRID 00000520 002.2 OF 002
in the war in Iraq. Blanco said that "someone must respond

in the face of this horror, and if there are reasons and
grounds from the legal point of view, then I would be all for
it."
//AMBASSADOR CALLS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER//
¶5. (C) The Ambassador contacted National Security Adviser

Carles Casajuana on March 21 to express his concern regarding
the increasingly shrill rhetoric on Iraq on the part of the
ruling Socialist Party and its allies. The Ambassador said
that the PSOE was dragging the USG into Spain's domestic
political arena, a fact that could only harm bilateral
relations. The Ambassador said that he was aware of the
political context, but that he was running out of patience
with unfair Government and PSOE statements regarding the U.S.
¶6. (C) Casajuana said that the political environment was

"highly polarized" at the moment and blamed the PP for having
stirred the pot on the ETA issue in an inflammatory manner.
He acknowledged that the PSOE had judged that it could
counter attack by resurfacing the Iraq issue and going after
Aznar himself, particularly since the timing coincided with
the fourth anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq.
Casajuana said he understood that the "spillover" of the
debate had impacted USG sensitivities, but said he expected
the Iraq issue to run its course in the next couple of days.
Casajuana said he would relay the Ambassador's concerns
immediately to President Zapatero, emphasizing the Zapatero
Government's desire to keep this issue under control. The
Ambassador asked that President Zapatero act to tamp down the
matter and avoid fueling anti-American sentiment as the
political campaign continued.
¶7. (C) The DCM will follow up with a similar message to other
officials and has requested meetings with PSOE Secretary
Blanco and PSOE International Relations Secretary Elena
Valenciano to ask that they leave the U.S. out of their
political campaign.
Aguirre
Viewing cable 07MADRID546, GOS ACKNOWLEDGES US CONCERN

ABOUT IRAQ WAR COMMENTS
Discussing cables
07MADRID546 2007-03-23 17:05 2010-11-30 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
VZCZCXRO4139
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0546 0821713
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RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2562
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000546
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: GOS ACKNOWLEDGES US CONCERN ABOUT IRAQ WAR COMMENTS
REF: MADRID 520
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reaons 1.4 (b) & (d).
¶1. (C) The combination of the anniversary of the start of

Operation Iraqi Freedom with the fervor of the Spanish
campaign season led to a brief flurry of anti-US rhetoric
from public figures associated with the government. As
reported in reftel, magistrate Baltasar Garzon wrote an op-ed
on March 20 that proposed an investigation into "criminal
responsibility" for the war. Socialist Party (PSOE)
secretary Jose Blanco hopped on the bandwagon in a TV
SIPDIS
interview that evening. The Ambassador immediately contacted
National Security Adviser Casajuana to express concern.
Casajuana promised to take the message to President Zapatero.
¶2. (C) Casajuana called the Ambassador late on the night of

March 21 to follow up after speaking to Zapatero. He said
that Zapatero understands the USG's concerns and will try to
bring moderation to PSOE political operatives. Zapatero said
that he appreciated the USG's efforts to stay out of the
political arena and will work to enable the US to continue
staying out. In short, the message was that Zapatero "will
not add wood to the fire."
¶3. (C) DCM reiterated the USG's concerns on March 23 with MFA
DG for North America Jose Pons and asked that the GOS work to
keep the US out of the political crossfire. He told Pons
that the USG understands that the political climate in Spain
is highly polarized at the moment, but cautioned that
continued statements on this issue by senior Spanish figures
would be viewed negatively by the USG. Pons said that the
only official GOS statement on the issue had come from
Foreign Minister Moratinos, who said on March 20 that only
history will judge Iraq, thus emphasizing that the GOS would
stay far away from legal judgments on the war. Pons
emphasized that Blanco was speaking for the PSOE, not the
government, and that Garzon, an independent magistrate,
speaks only for himself. Pons said that he expects the issue
to die down now that the anniversary has passed.
Aguirre
Viewing cable 07PORTAUPRINCE408, RESPONSE TO INR/B

REQUIREMENTS ON PRESIDENT PREVAL
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07PORTAUPRINCE408.
2007-03-01 2010-11-30 Embassy Port Au
07PORTAUPRINCE408 SECRET
17:05 16:04 Prince
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RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 PORT AU PRINCE 000408
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR

DRL
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA)
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017

TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM HA
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO INR/B REQUIREMENTS ON PRESIDENT PREVAL
REF: STATE 5107
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons

1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Introduction: Reftel asks for a comprehensive

assessment of President Preval's decision-making process and
leadership style. As noted in reftel, post has reported on
many of the specific topics inquired about over the course of
Preval's re-election campaign and the first year of his
second term. We welcome the opportunity to reiterate key
judgments that we believe will become increasingly important
as the Preval administration approaches completion of its
first year in office. In sum, we believe Preval's commitment
to building democratic institutions, promoting political
stability, and developing the economy corresponds with our
own interests. However, Preval's weaknesses as an executive,
his reflexive nationalism, and his disinterest in managing
bilateral relations in a broad diplomatic sense, will lead to
periodic frictions as we move forward our bilateral agenda.
Case in point, we believe that in terms of foreign policy,
Preval is most interested in gaining increased assistance
from any available resource. He is likely to be tempted to
frame his relationship with Venezuela and Chavez-allies in
the hemisphere in a way that he hopes will create a
competitive atmosphere as far as who can provide the most to
Haiti. Additionally, Preval has displayed a tendency to
fixate on a particular issue at the exclusion of all others
and then to move on to other issues without leaving much to
show for his efforts. Since taking office in May 2006,
Preval has been the education president, the roads president,
and now the anti-narcotics president. All of these issues
are worthy of his time and attention, but require a coherent
approach to policy implementation in addition to rhetoric.
End Introduction.
¶2. (U) The answers below are keyed to the questions in

reftel:
Question A
----------
¶3. (C) How Does Preval make policy decisions? What sources
of information does Preval draw from when making decisions
and how does he process that information, e.g. is he
receptive new information, does he seek advice or rely on his
own intuition? Does Preval tend to see policy issues in
black and white or in shades of grey?
¶4. (C) We judge that Preval largely relies on his own

intuition and experience in formulating policy. We see that
experiences from his first presidential term are nearly
always a touchstone on key bilateral issues, even when
circumstances have significantly changed or the conclusion he
is drawing is not directly applicable to the issue at hand.
Preval's recent insistence that the U.S. does not do enough
to combat narcotics traffic through Haiti is a clear example
of an attitude carried over from his first term. Likewise,
Preval's current resistance to making a placating gesture to
China after the GoH voiced support for Taiwan at the UN is
based in part on Preval's belief that China behaved
unreasonably when renewing UN mission mandates during his
first term.
¶5. (C) On balance, we see that issues where Preval has a

fixed view, for example relations with China, he is
remarkably resistant to policy advice. On other issues,
where Preval is not so engaged either because of lack of
personal interest or lack of experience, Preval seems readily
open to new information and flexible in his approach. This
seems most apparent in issues relating to economic policy.
Rather than separating Preval's thinking into black and white
or shades of gray, we believe it is more useful to bear in
mind that Preval often appears not to fully think through the
implications or consequences of a particular issue. He
neglects to carry out the kind of study or put in place the
administrative structure required to turn an idea into
workable policy. This was most obvious in his approach to
negotiations with gang leaders, his focus throughout the
PORT AU PR 00000408 002 OF 007

summer of 2006. Due to a lack of results however, he
abandoned the effort. Preval's entire policy seemed to be
encapsulated in the formulation, ''disarm or die.'' He
never appears to have coherently addressed the issue central
to the negotiations -- the future of the most violent
gang-leaders.
Question B
----------
¶6. (C) Does Preval seek advice from a wide array of sources
or only look to certain people, if so, whom and on what
issues? Does he trust any of his advisers or ministers to
make key decisions in his stead? How does he deal with
dissension or criticism from his advisors? What tone does he
set when he meets with his advisers - e.g., does he encourage
them to work collegially, competitively, or within the formal
bureaucratic structure? Has Bob Manuel's influence with
Preval diminished, and if so, why? Does Manuel continue to
informally oversee the security portfolio? If not, who does,
is there another adviser poised to succeed Manuel as Preval's
''right-hand man.''?
¶7. (C) Preval seems open to a wide array of sources -- he

reportedly reads and pays attention to the media on a wide
variety of subjects and maintains a broad circle of friends
-- but appears to limit the number of people from whom he
actively seeks advice. Some, most notably Robert Manuel,
have complained that the number is growing smaller and that
his fiancee, Elizabeth Delatour, is the only advisor with
whom he has meaningful discussions. Fritz Longchamp,
Secretary General of the Presidency, appears to have gained
SIPDIS
access and influence to Preval regarding the dispute with
China. As a former foreign minister, Longchamp may also be
advising on broader foreign policy issues. Gabriel Verret
remains Preval's closest advisor on economic issues. Lionel
Delatour, Elizabeth Delatour's brother-in-law, maintains
somewhat regular access due to his family ties and his direct
involvement with the effort to promote HOPE legislation,
however Delatour himself has complained that Preval often
ignores his advice. With a few exceptions, Preval appears
not to trust his advisers or ministers to make key decisions,
or even to implement key decisions. The most recent account
of the council of ministers meetings provided by Gabriel
Verret to the Ambassador describes Preval going through the
action items of each ministry and demanding status reports.
¶8. (C) With the Embassy and USG representatives, ministers as

a group are deferential and mostly subdued in Preval's
presence. There is little air of give-and-take or
willingness among ministers to extemporize. In meetings with
USG officials Preval has abruptly cut off Prime Minister
Alexis on two occasions, disagreeing with his views. On
another occasion he cut off Minister of Public Works Frantz
Varella, who had offered an observation regarding security,
telling him that security was not his responsibility. We
hear of very little, if any, substantive criticism or
dissension among the cabinet in private. The most visible
intra-cabinet dissension, so far, has been between the
judiciary and security officials; most recently, a rift
between the justice minister and chief prosecutor Claudy
Gassant. Preval has pointedly refused to intervene. Many
among Haiti's chattering classes attribute this to a strategy
on Preval's part to keep members of his government divided
and weak. We judge rather that his attitude is more in line
with his overall passivity as an executive.
¶9. (C) Having observed the Preval-Manuel relationship over

the past two years since Manuel's return to Haiti to join the
Preval campaign, we judge that Manuel's role is most
accurately described as Best Friend. Manuel remains Preval's
closest confidante, and Preval still uses him as his personal
emissary, but the influence of Manuel's own views on any
given subject appear limited. For example, against Manuel's
advice and own wishes, Preval involved Manuel in his first
negotiations with gang leaders in the summer of 2006. With
Manuel's displeasure with this policy unabated, Preval simply
cut him out of the process. Manuel appears still to be
charged with the management of Preval's personal security,
PORT AU PR 00000408 003 OF 007
overseeing the Presidential Protection Unit (USPN) in the

palace, but Preval himself appears to have taken complete
charge of security policy. Manuel, along with the justice
minister, is charged with preparing President Preval for the
upcoming drug trafficking summit in the Dominican Republic on
March 16, but our contacts with Manuel on narcotics issues so
far indicate that he does no more than to restate Preval's
own views, often with more passion. Manuel confided to the
Ambassador that he is frustrated with Preval's unwillingness
to listen to him and heed advice and that he wants to leave
Haiti, preferably as Ambassador to Mexico, but that Preval
has been non-committal about the timing of his appointment.
Whatever the state of their relationship on policy issues,
Preval clearly values Manuel's friendship and may be
reluctant to let him go.
Question C
----------
¶10. (C) What is the nature of Preval's relationship with

Director General of the Haitian National Police Mario
Andresol, Foreign Minister Jean Reynald Clerisme, Secretary
of State for Public Security Luc Eucher Joseph, Secretary
General of the Presidency Fritz Longchamp, and economic
advisor Gabriel Verret.
¶11. (C) Preval's relationship with Andresol does not appear

to extend beyond their formal association as president and
the chief of police. Preval and Andresol had no personal
connection to speak of before Preval inherited and then
re-appointed Andresol director general of the HNP. For his
part, Andresol has, on several occasions, expressed
frustration that he has not been able to gain more trust from
Preval. Likewise, Preval's relationship with Eucher seems
limited to their formal roles: Eucher is not otherwise a
close of advisor from whom Preval seeks counsel. Preval and
Clerisme have a large number of mutual acquaintances from the
rural/populist movements, however they do not have a close
personal bond. Preval has reportedly taken personal charge of
all important foreign policy issues, leaving Clerisme with
little influence. Longchamp is both a trusted advisor and
personal friend. With Preval limiting PM Alexis' direction
of the cabinet, and not having named a chief of staff, the
importance of Longchamp's position has steadily increased.
Finally, Gabriel Verret, perhaps even more than either Robert
Manuel or Longchamp, is the other advisor in the palace who
can claim to be both a trusted confidante and influential
policy advisor, as Preval remains open to advice on economic
matters. In the same way, Elizabeth Delatour, who is also
formally charged with providing economic advice, might be the
single most important influence on Preval.
Question D
----------
¶12. (C) What are Alexis and Foreign Minister Clerisme's

perceptions of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide?
¶13. (C) Based on Alexis' long-standing personal association

with Preval from his previous administration through his
active role in the most recent presidential campaign, we
surmise that Alexis' views on Aristide hew closely to
Preval's own (i.e. that Aristide betrayed the Haitian
people). If Alexis believes otherwise, he gives no hint of
disagreement with Preval. We are less familiar with
Clerisme, but note that Clerisme's political engagement began
with his involvement as a liberation theology priest working
in the rural, peasant movement in Haiti's northeast. Most of
this movement's leaders became disillusioned with Aristide
during the mid-1990's. Whatever Clerisme's views, as with
Alexis, to the extent they do not correspond to Preval's, he
keeps them to himself.
Question E
----------
¶14. (C) Is Preval influenced by ideology, and if so, what are

the major influences? What motivated him to return to
politics? What role do Catholicism, voodoo, and
PORT AU PR 00000408 004 OF 007
liberation-theology play in his worldview? What is his full

educational history and experience working in private
industry?
¶15. (C) Preval seems profoundly uninfluenced and uninterested

in ideology at this stage in his life. Despite his
involvement in radical/communist circles as a student in
Belgium and his entrance into Haitian politics through a
populist movement deeply influenced by liberation theology,
Preval's public and private discourse is practically devoid
of any notions reflecting that background. In the context of
the developing world, we would most accurately describe him
as a neo-liberal, particularly in that he has embraced free
markets and foreign investment.
¶16. (C) At the same time, Preval's discourse regarding

Haitian politics remains framed in the context of his past.
He still refers broadly to ''the people'' and ''the
bourgeois'' in referring to Haitian society. His leftist
views reportedly caused a deep rift between himself and his
family, particularly his father, who although opposed to
Duvalier held traditional Haitian upper-class views. This is
as close to an insight as we may venture into his motivation
to return to politics, which is something of a puzzle. While
a canny politician and an effective campaigner Preval evinces
little of the ambition or overt drive typical of most
politicians. It may be simply that he rightly recognized
that he was the only leader in Haiti who legitimately
represented the broad-based popular movement that toppled
Duvalier and first brought Aristide to power.
¶17. (C) Like most Haitians, Preval was raised Catholic with
an exposure to voodoo practices. He is a non-observant
Catholic but maintains a cordial and respectful relationship
with Haiti's Catholic hierarchy. He is particularly close to
Haiti's Archbishop, who was a life-long friend of his
parents. Likewise, he maintains a respectful and cordial
relationship with Voodoo leaders. There are unconfirmed
reports that Robert Manuel, who is a born-again Christian,
influences Preval's religious views and that the two
regularly pray together. However, Preval has been jocular
and once dismissive of Manuel's praying in conversations with
ambassadors.
¶18. (C) Preval's educational and professional experiences

listed in open sources are mostly accurate. He studied
agronomy at the University of Louvain in Belgium but did not
receive a degree reportedly because he spent too much time
participating in political activities. Though he obtained a
position with the National Institute for Mineral Resources,
apparently as part of Jean-Claude Duvalier's conciliatory
gestures to his father's opponents, Embassy sources do not
believe he actually worked at his job. He went into the
bakery business with several friends in the mid-1970,
including Michele Pierre Louis, a renowned patron of Haitian
arts, and through her met Aristide. Preval's bakery was
successful, but destroyed by associates of the military after
the 1991 coup d'etat. Among the many incidents of conflict
between the right-wing and Aristide supporters, Preval
apparently holds a special grudge against those who destroyed
his business.
Question F
----------
¶19. (C) What is Preval's relationship to Geri Benoit? Does

his sister, Marie-Claude Calvin, play an influential role in
his administration? Does Elizabeth Delatour yield influence
over Preval's political decision-making? What is the status
of their impending nuptials? One of Preval's daughters lives
with him in Port-au-Prince. Where is the other and what does
she do?
¶20. (C) Though Preval and his second wife, Geri Benoit,
appeared together at times during the campaign, they have
apparently lived entirely separate lives since his
inauguration. Mrs. Calvin and Preval are very close. She
was among the family members on the payroll at his
agricultural foundation in Marmalade, which was funded by
PORT AU PR 00000408 005 OF 007
Taiwan. Calvin acts as his scheduler, keeps an office in the

palace, and one ambassador reports that Calvin kept him at
bay for several days when he had an urgent request to see
Preval. Calvin and her husband also accompanied Preval on
his second trip to Cuba for medical attention. Mrs. Calvin
does not appear to play any role in influencing government
policy.
¶21. (C) It is difficult to assess Elizabeth Delatour's

influence on policy. She is extremely private and reserved
and does not generally engage foreign officials in
substantive conversation. She politely resisted the
Ambassador's attempts to establish a more social
relationship. Numerous people close to Preval complain that
Preval has neglected both his work and limited the input of
other advisors in favor of Delatour. During the critical
juncture over the dispute with China regarding the renewal of
MINUSTAH's mandate, Delatour appeared to play a central role.
SRSG Mulet chose Delatour as his contact when he argued that
the GoH must provide China some kind of written apology:
Preval ultimately grudgingly signed a letter. Delatour
called the Ambassador in Washington when she was in the
Department for consultations asking for an update on the
Chinese delegation's position in New York. Preval's wedding
plans remain perhaps the best kept secret in Haiti. We have
confirmed from multiple reliable sources that they are
formally engaged, but no further reliable news regarding
wedding plans has emerged. Factors that might be
complicating their plans include Preval's health and living
arrangements for Delatour's 11-year old son.
¶22. (C) Preval's older daughter, Dominique, lives with her

mother in Port-au-Prince and runs a stationery store above
her mother's book store. She is close to both her parents.
Preval's younger daughter, Patricia, is currently in Sri
Lanka studying Asian art.
Question G
----------
¶23. (C) How much importance does Preval place on maintaining

close bilateral relations with the United States? Are there
aspects of the relationship he values more than others? Does
he view it as a mutually beneficial relationship? Does he
see Haiti as having obligations or responsibilities to the
U.S.? How does he view the U.S.' previous involvement in
Haiti? What is Preval's relationship with the Haitian
Diaspora?
¶24. (C) Preval recognizes that the U.S. is Haiti's most

important bilateral partner and that Haiti's closest societal
links internationally are with the U.S. His priority on the
bilateral agenda is to leverage and extract the most
assistance for Haiti on his own terms and to tap into the
wealth and resources of the Haitian-American community in the
U.S. As the president of a small, poor nation in the shadow
of the American behemoth, he clearly believes that the U.S.
has far greater obligations to Haiti than the other way
around, if, in fact, Haiti has any obligations at all.
Preval numbers a few close friends in the diaspora of whom we
know. He established a friendship with Dumarsais Simeus
during the presidential campaign, and they stay in contact by
email. For the most part, however, Preval does not seem
closely connected to or interested in Haitian communities
abroad. He has indicated on a number of occasions that he
fears that pro-Aristide extremists exert excessive influence
in diaspora communities.
Question H
----------
¶25. (C) Are cabinet officials involved in any illicit

activities? How does Preval handle corruption within his
administration?
¶26. (C) There has been little indication that cabinet members
have been involved in illicit activities so far. At the time
of the cabinet's formation, observers noted that the
ministers had been mostly free of suspicion over the course
PORT AU PR 00000408 006 OF 007
of their careers. Indications regarding Preval's own

attitude toward corruption are mixed. During his first term,
Preval either tolerated or was forced to accept gross abuses
on the part of close associates of Aristide. In either case,
Preval has exhibited a non-confrontational approach with
passivity toward difficult issues as the hallmark of his
political career. Preval maintains a reputation for personal
honesty.
Question I
----------
¶27. (C) How has Preval handled domestic criticism thus far?
Does he have a public communications or publicity strategy or
manager? How does he perform under significant stress? How
does he respond to confrontation, either personally or
indirectly, e.g. mass unrest?
¶28. (C) Preval has been remarkably impervious and

unresponsive to domestic criticism thus far, which mostly
centers on his approach to security and the gang activity
during the fall of 2006, when kidnapping and crime spiked
upward. There have been no significant incidents of mass
unrest since his inauguration on which to judge his reaction.
Based on his intense involvement in the daily review of
security policy, we surmise that he pays close attention to
public opinion, even if remaining uncommunicative himself.
He has a palace spokesman in name, Assad Volce but hardly
uses him. Nor does he use the minister for communication,
who is traditionally the government's chief spokesperson.
Regarding his public relations strategy, he has said on
several occasions, that he wants to change the tradition of
Haiti's presidents being the center of attention who make
promises that they are unable to deliver. ''I will talk when
I have some accomplishments to talk about.''
Question J
----------
¶29. (C) What is the status of Preval's Lespwa coalition? Is

it a cohesive coalition or is it fractured? Do its members
regard Preval as their leader? What is Preval's relationship
to Fanmi Lavalas (FL)?
¶30. (C) Preval has removed himself from involvement in Lespwa

and undertakes little visible role in managing relations with
the parliament. Lespwa is directionless as a party. Though,
in the general, Lespwa's drift does not particularly stand
out in the incohesive atmosphere of Haiti's parliament.
Senate President Joseph Lambert, has emerged as a leader
among Lespwa parliamentarians, but devotes more of his energy
to cultivating his image as parliament's chief, rather than
simply a party leader. No other Lespwa parliamentarian has
demonstrated a capacity to take direction of the party.
Lespwa parliamentarians no longer regard Preval as their
party leader, but recognizing he remains the country's most
popular politician and still associated with Lespwa in the
public's mind, they do not generally criticize him in public
or in private. Preval has virtually no contact with any of
the various FL factions.
Question K
----------
¶31. (C) How long are Preval's workdays? How many breaks does
he take during his workday, what does he do during them and
how long do they last? Under what circumstances?
¶32. (C) Preval appears to be keeping an increasingly busy

schedule, working longer hours and seeing more visitors. The
Ambassador has taken phone calls from him as early as 6:30 am
and has had meetings as late as 6:30 pm. Preval told the
Ambassador recently that he has for many years taken a full,
in-pajamas 2-3 hour nap every afternoon, allowing him to
maintain his energy.
Question L
----------
PORT AU PR 00000408 007 OF 007
¶33. (S/NF) What family history of alcohol or substance use

does Preval have? What alcohol or drugs has he been observed
using, how much, and under what circumstances? Any related
problems? Has Preval ever been observed to be high or drunk,
disoriented, trembling or physically jittery, or had memory
lapses? How many drinks can Preval consume before he shows
signs of inebriation? Does Preval take any medications?
¶34. (S/NF) Preval's parents both lived well into their

eighties. His father, in particular, reportedly enjoyed
robust health. No one in his immediate family has or had a
reputation for alcohol abuse. Preval drinks whiskey and
smokes in public, including at Embassy functions, but we have
not observed him inebriated nor seen him take more than one
or two drinks. Rumors abound about his deteriorating
physical condition -- intense physical pain, high dosages of
medication, however; we have no credible first-hand reports
to confirm this. In our meetings Preval has always been
completely lucid and has never appeared to be in any great
pain. Special intelligence indicates that he began taking
medication after the most recent round of medical
examinations in Cuba that indicated a possibility of the
return of prostate cancer.
TIGHE
Viewing cable 07BERLIN802, SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN
WASHINGTON: GOALS
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1520
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0802/01 1100748
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200748Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000802
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2022

TAGS: PREL PGOV ECUN EU GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON: GOALS
FOR EUROPE, GOALS AT HOME
REF: BERLIN 747

Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Angela Merkel arrives in Washington in an

enviable position of political strength, both at home and in
the EU. However, she is conscious that her strength derives
largely from the weakness of her counterparts and other
factors beyond her control. Achieving her goals for the EU -
in the trans-Atlantic context these are focused on climate
change and the Transatlantic Economic Initiative - will
reinforce her position at home and in the EU, and serve as a
springboard to success on the larger G-8 stage. A success
for Merkel is also a success for the U.S. Even after the
German EU Presidency, we will want the Atlanticist Merkel to
remain a dominant force within the EU. In Berlin, a
successful summit will strengthen her and other
trans-Atlanticists against those who favor a policy of vocal,
public antagonism. End Summary.
Leading in the EU; Muddling Through at Home

-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Angela Merkel's role as Germany's and Europe's leader

is undisputed. No other leader of a large member state is
politically fit enough to offer himself up as a leader. Her
leadership of the G-8 and Germany's intrinsic weight and
economic recovery are further boosts. At home, Merkel is not
only riding high in opinion polls (70 percent popularity
rating) and enjoying the benefits of leadership at a time of
long-sought economic growth, but has also wrong-footed her
coalition partner Social Democrats with reformist domestic
social policies. However, in both cases her apparent
strength is not entirely of her own making, but derives in
large part from her office, the weakness of her counterparts,
or from other factors beyond her control. She took the helm
of the EU at a time when progress on the European project had
largely come to a halt, when European institutions were
unsure of how or in which direction to move, and (as noted)
no alternative leaders were present. In Berlin, her coalition
partner and rival, the Social Democrats (SPD), are dealing
with weak leadership, a vacuum of ideas, and a challenge from
the left.
¶3. (C) Merkel has responded to these similar circumstances

with quite different tactics. In the EU, she has asserted
German and her personal leadership over the Council
Secretariat, especially with respect to her goal of
SIPDIS
developing a road map for furthering the EU constitution.
She has sidelined Brussels by putting her own representatives
on the road to discuss the constitution in other capitals and
has weighed in personally as needed to find compromises that
keep the constitutional project moving forward. Likewise,
she has vigorously pursued the Transatlantic Economic
Initiative within the EU to remove regulatory barriers, and
has pushed for agreement on the new EU climate change and
energy initiatives. She has not succeeded in all her
undertakings -- prospects for a new EU Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with Russia remain distant, for
example. Still, the view that we hear from Brussels is of
vigorous and effective leadership. In Berlin, Merkel is
known for her reticence to engage in aggressive politics,
preferring to stay in the background until the "correlation
of forces" is clear and then engaging to nudge the debate in
her preferred direction. Though the SPD is weak, Merkel has
been reluctant to push it hard. Her strategy appears to be
aimed at building and consolidating her own and her party's
dominance with a view toward a clear victory in 2009
elections, rather than attempting to score victories now that
could alienate significant voter groups.
Washington: What's In It for Merkel

-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) We sum up Merkel's goal for the U.S.-EU Summit as

being to achieve substantive progress in the U.S.-EU
relationship for its own sake and to build a lasting
foundation for her leadership in the EU and in Germany. The
substantive agenda is clear and we need not explore it in
detail here. It is focused on our political cooperation in
key areas - climate change and energy security as well as the
Transatlantic Economic Initiative. We recognize that in
these and other areas, European goals are not exactly aligned
with our own. Nonetheless, success in these areas, the
former a key concern of European publics and the latter
important to sustaining European growth, after a long period
in which trans-Atlantic relations were dominated by negative
headlines and exchanges focused on other regions, would prove
Merkel's particular competence at succeeding in Europe's key
external relationship. After success in Washington, Merkel
BERLIN 00000802 002 OF 002
can count on maintaining her position in Europe against any

incoming French President and UK Prime Minister-in-waiting
Brown. Success in Washington will also strengthen her hand
in the follow-on summits with Russia, Canada, and Japan and
sets the stage for success in G-8 summit deliberations on
climate change.
¶5. (C) At home, a Summit success may enable Merkel to end the
SPD's ability to use loud, public "principled" criticism of
the U.S. as a winning tactic. Gerhard Schroeder won the 2002
election with his public attacks on U.S. Iraq policy, but if
Merkel brings home meaningful agreements -- especially on
issues with domestic resonance such as climate change and
trans-Atlantic economic cooperation -- she will have shown
the German public that her policy of constructive engagement
with the U.S. brings real benefits on issues of concern to
it. Foreign policy, especially trans-Atlantic relations, is
one of the few areas where the SPD still enjoys greater
public support than does the CDU/CSU. Success in Washington
may undercut the SPD on that theme, as the CDU/CSU has
already undercut it on many domestic social themes.
A Note on Style
---------------
¶6. (C) Merkel is pushing for a Summit that is more than a

predictable set-piece, quickly forgotten. She looks for real
decisions to be made during the Summit discussions. This
does more than just ensure that she has something important
to do. It emphasizes her personal commitment to restoring
European-American relations and her belief in face-to-face
engagement. We recognize the difficulty of organizing
discussions in this format, but believe we too stand to gain
by such an approach.
What's In This for Washington
-----------------------------
¶7. (C) Post has previously reported on Merkel's risk-averse

approach to foreign policy. We do not expect her to change
her leadership style because of success in Washington. The
real benefits for the U.S. lie in how success will affect the
public understanding of how Germany can best build a
relationship with Washington and its view of the U.S., the
changing of which is a frequent theme in conversations with
German leaders and thinkers. A successful Summit will also
reinforce our message that the U.S. and EU are natural
partners, closely bound by common interests. As a cautious
conservative in a difficult coalition, Merkel will not run
great risks for the U.S. But, if she can show the public
that cooperation with the U.S. works, the effect will be to
cut the risk she runs by cooperating with the U.S. It is a
more complex path to a closer and more effective relationship
than we would perhaps like, but our observation of Merkel and
our conversations with her advisors lead us to see it as the
best path available.
TIMKEN JR
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD1583, MUSHARRAF TELLS MCCAIN: DON’T

PULL OUT OF IRAQ
Discussing cables
2007-04-10 2010-11-30 SECRET//NOFOR Embassy
07ISLAMABAD1583
12:12 21:09 N Islamabad
VZCZCXRO9612
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1583/01 1001227
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INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 2215
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0093
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0152
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0396
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 8117
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0732
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9872
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 3263
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 0912
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3644
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/10/2017

TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PK, AF, IZ, IR, ID, MY, SA, LE
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS MCCAIN: DON’T PULL OUT OF IRAQ
WITHOUT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
REF: ISLAMABAD 1517
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Peter Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) On April 3, President Musharraf met with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and
Representative Richard Renzi (R-AZ), Musharraf’s third U.S. Congressional
delegation of the day (reftel). The group,s discussion focused on Iraq, the
broader Middle East, and the Pak-Afghan border region.
--------------------------------------------- --
Muslim countries should play lead role in Iraq And help solve the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Musharraf noted that he and many Middle Eastern leaders were worried
that a premature pull-out of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq would spread
sectarian strife throughout the Gulf region. Musharraf underlined the importance
of increasing the capacity of the Iraqi armed forces and police. He noted there
could be little improvement in the situation in Iraq without broader political
participation from the Sunnis. Musharraf agreed with Senator McCain that Muslim
countries needed to lead efforts to help Iraq’s Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds reach
political consensus before a major withdrawal of coalition troops. Musharraf
said he understood U.S. public opinion was against prolonging U.S. presence in
Iraq, but hoped U.S. leadership could communicate the importance of the mission
in Iraq. Turning to the future of Iraq, Musharraf hoped that Muslim peacekeeping
troops (including Pakistanis) could replace U.S. forces under a United Nations
umbrella.
¶3. (C) Conflicts outside Iraq also contributed to the unstable situation in the
region, Musharraf said. Musharraf noted that in addition to Saudi King
Abdullah,s work in forging an Arab consensus on Iraq, he was working on building
consensus within the Muslim world on the Palestinian issue ) work that was
slowly but surely bringing Syria back into the Arab fold. Alluding to his own
outreach to the moderate Muslim world, Musharraf noted there was space for non-
Arab nations to play a role on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and
that Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia had agreed to form a united voice to help
promote peace in the region. Musharraf said he was the first non-Arab leader
invited to address the Arab League Summit.
¶4. (C) Musharraf said he believed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could play a
positive role in both Iraq and Lebanon, and that Assad could be “handled” if the
U.S. understood his issues: &If you want him to play ball, he needs comfort on
other fronts -- namely, the Golan Heights.8 Turning to another Iraqi neighbor,
Musharraf agreed with the delegation that Iran could not be allowed to create
further divisions in Iraq.
-------------------------------------
The Pak-Afghan border: Past decisions created present security problem
-------------------------------------
¶5. (C) When asked for his views on Afghanistan, Musharraf
ISLAMABAD 00001583 002 OF 003
said Pakistan was facing the fallout from security decisions made in the 1980s.
People who came to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviets settled in
Pakistan’s tribal areas and now had families. These people -- mostly Uzbeks and
Arabs -- developed links with al Qaeda. Recently, tribal groups in both South
and North Waziristan were taking action against Uzbeks and other foreigners
because of the foreigners, cruel and high-handed behavior. Pakistan’s military
provided covert support in the form of arms and ammunition. Musharraf reported
that in South Waziristan, a large group of foreign militants were surrounded on
a ridge and would soon surrender.
¶6. (C) Originally, Musharraf said, the Taliban movement was a reaction against
growing tribalism and warlordism in Afghanistan. Since Russia and India
supported Afghanistan’s (ethnic Tajik) Northern Alliance, Pakistan’s natural
ally was the (ethnic Pashtun) Taliban. This all changed after 9/11, Musharraf
said, and Pakistan had captured and killed hundreds of al Qaeda fighters near
Tora Bora.
--------------------------------------
We’re Going After Militants: Bin Laden May Be Here, But Mullah Omar’s Not
--------------------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Echoing similar statements he,d made during an earlier meeting with
CODEL Tierney (reftel), Musharraf said that although he had no direct evidence,
he thought al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were hiding in
Bajaur Agency, since it was in (Afghan militant leader) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s
territory and bordered Afghanistan’s Konar province. The landscape in videos of
Bin Laden and Zawahiri looked similar to Bajaur, Musharraf said, and the area
provided comfort, high mountains, positive support, and an absence of U.S.
troops in neighboring Konar.
¶8. (C) Musharraf voiced concern over Afghan President Karzai,s frequent
pronouncements about Pakistan’s &failure8 to capture Taliban leader Mullah Omar
in Balochistan’s capital Quetta. &Let me tell you,8 Musharraf emphasized, &Omar
would be mad to be in Quetta -- he has too many troops to command in southern
Afghanistan to make it feasible. In fact, the only parts of Balochistan where
there are Pakistani Taliban are in the province’s Afghan refugee camps, which we
are planning to shut down.8 Musharraf said that most Pashtuns in Balochistan
were traders and had no reason to join the Taliban. &They want roads to increase
their trade, not to fight.8 The same could not be said for the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf said.
¶9. (C) Musharraf said the Taliban were mainly in Afghanistan. Karzai,s
policies, Musharraf believed, alienated Afghanistan’s Pashtuns by favoring
(ethnic Tajik) Panshiris. After Coalition forces joined the Northern Alliance to
oust the Taliban government, there was no change in the ethnic makeup of the
victors when it came to planning. Panshiris were disproportionately represented
in the government, even though they had never ruled before and were, Musharraf
believed, the natural enemy of the country’s majority Pashtuns.
ISLAMABAD 00001583 003 OF 003
--------------------------------------
A New Strategy in the Tribal Areas And the Ethnic Dimension in Afghanistan
--------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Turning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf stated
that Taliban militants from Afghanistan drew support from Pakistan for re-
supply, hospitals, recruitment, and indoctrination of new troops. Musharraf
emphasized military force alone could not deny terrorists safe haven in the
Tribal Areas over the long term. That was why, Musharraf explained, Pakistan was
pursuing a four-pronged strategy that included military, political, development,
and administrative elements. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border in some parts
of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas would reduce some cross-border
movement, he said, but it was not enough. Musharraf described development as the
most forward-looking ) and in some ways most complex ) part of the strategy.
Pakistan was looking for U.S. assistance and expertise.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Pakistan’s Taliban Problem Is An Extremism Issue
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶11. (C) One of Pakistan’s biggest concerns, Musharraf said, was the spread of
talibanization, especially into settled and urban areas. Countering
talibanization required a well thought out strategy to cleanse society of the
Taliban culture and to encourage moderation. Modernization and economic
development were the way forward, Musharraf noted. Talibanization was even
spreading to Islamabad, as you could see by the recent events at the Red Mosque
(reported septel).
--------------------------------------------
Afghanistan’s Poppy Industry Should Go Legal
--------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) In response to McCain’s question about whether Musharraf was worried
Afghanistan would become a narco-state, Musharraf answered that he was,
especially because if it did it would affect Pakistan. Musharraf thought
Afghanistan could follow the example of other countries -- such as India --
where narcotics were purchased legally and channeled into the international
pharmaceutical industry. It was a $500-600 million annual industry, Musharraf
said, and the profits made from legal poppy sales could go toward poverty
alleviation instead of to the Taliban. BODDE
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV1114, CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH
OPPOSITION LEADER
Discussing cables
07TELAVIV1114 2007-04-18 06:06 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tel Aviv
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP EFIN IR KPAL IS
SUBJECT: CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION LEADER
BINYAMIN NETANYAHU: ECONOMIC SQUEEZE ON IRAN AND HAMAS;
SCENARIOS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT; RIGHT OF RETURN AS ACID
TEST OF ARAB INTENTIONS
REF: TEL AVIV 1086
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Representative Gary Ackerman (D, New York),

Chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of
the House International Relations Committee, accompanied by
the Ambassador, met with Opposition Leader Binyamin Netanyahu
at the Knesset April 11. The discussion covered Netanyahu's
ideas on how to pressure Iran in order to block its nuclear
program and topple President Ahmadinejad; Netanyahu's views
on dealing with the Palestinians; his critique of Prime
Minister Olmert's handling of the Second Lebanon War; and
Netanyahu's analysis of Israel's domestic political
situation. On Iran, Netanyahu advocated intensified financial
pressures, including a U.S.-led divestment effort focused
largely on European companies that invest in Iran, as the
best way to topple Ahmadinejad. On the Palestinians,
Netanyahu did not object to supporting President Abbas but
said Israel and the U.S. should first focus more on
"strangling" Hamas. Netanyahu asserted that Israel's
mishandling of the Lebanon war had strengthened Israel's
enemies. He predicted that Olmert would not be able to stay
in power much longer, then described several different
mechanisms for forming a new government. Netanyahu expressed
confidence that the Israeli public recognized that he had
been right, that unilateral withdrawals were a mistake, and
that the priority now must be stopping Iran. Netanyahu noted
that he thought dropping the "right of return" was the acid
test of Arab intentions and insisted that he would never
allow a single Palestinian refugee to return to Israel. End
Summary.
¶2. (U) House Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee

Chairman Gary Ackerman, accompanied by the Ambassador, Pol
Couns, Subcommittee Staff Director David Adams, and Staff
member Howard Diamond called on Opposition and Likud Party
Leader Binyamin Netanyahu at the Knesset April 11. Netanyahu
was joined by foreign policy adviser Dore Gold and MFA North
American Department Congressional liaison Eyal Sela.
Toppling Ahmadinejad
--------------------
¶3. (C) Representative Ackerman told Netanyahu that in his

meeting the day before with Egyptian President Mubarak, he
had asked Mubarak if military action were necessary to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, should the
strike be carried out by the U.S. or Israel? Mubarak had
responded that if it came to that, the U.S. should do it and
Israel should stay out. Netanyahu said he took Mubarak's
point, but commented that he thought the Iranian regime, or
at least President Ahmadinejad, could be toppled by economic
pressure, including a divestment campaign. Noting that
economic sanctions lose their effect over time, but can be
powerful in the short term. The goal should be to encourage
Ahmadinejad's political rivals to remove him from power.
Afterward, if the pressure could be maintained it might be
possible to bring down the entire Iranian regime, but that
would also entail identifying alternative leaders. The idea
was to use economic pressure to create a public sense of
regime failure. Netanyahu said he had consulted with noted
historian Bernard Lewis, who believed that Iran would be less
dangerous once Ahmadinejad was removed.
¶4. (C) Netanyahu said there were three bills in Congress

designed to divest U.S. pension funds from investing in about
300, mostly European, companies currently doing business in
Iran. Divestment would immediately bring down the credit
ratings of these companies, thus forcing them to respond.
Netanyahu urged Congress to support the divestment
legislation, adding that he also planned to use a visit to
the U.S. to raise the issue with Wall Street fund managers.
His approach was to tie in Darfur to expand the scope of
anti-genocide divestment and link it to U.S. policy goals.
Netanyahu said he was unsure that financial pressures would
be enough to stop Iran's nuclear program, but he was
confident they would succeed in bringing down Ahmadinejad.
He commended Dore Gold's efforts to put Ahmadinejad on a
genocide watch list as part of a broader effort to
delegitimize the Iranian President. Asked about the quality
of U.S. and Israeli intelligence on Iran, Netanyahu said his
nightmare was that we had missed part of the Iranian program.
He added that if the current intelligence was correct, it
would take Iran a few more years to develop a nuclear weapon.
He agreed with Ambassador Jones' assessment that
TEL AVIV 00001114 002 OF 003
Ahmadinejad's announcement of a breakthrough in Iran's

centrifuge program was probably exaggerated. It would be
critical, Netanyahu stressed, to target companies investing
in Iran's energy sector.
Bring Down Hamas

----------------
¶5. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked Netanyahu for his views on

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu said Abbas
was a "nice man who means well," but he added that Israel and
the U.S. should focus on "bringing down Hamas" through an
"economic squeeze." Netanyahu asserted that eight months
ago, the Hamas government had been on the brink of collapse,
but had become stronger because Israel became weaker as a
result of the Lebanon war. Without elaborating, Netanyahu
said it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthen
Abbas.
¶6. (C) Netanyahu commented that Shimon Peres had admitted to

him that the Oslo process had been based on a mistaken
economic premise, and as a result European and U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians had gone to create a bloated
bureaucracy, with PA employees looking to the international
community to meet their payroll. Netanyahu predicted that
Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can
deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an
"economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas would
receive the popular blame. Asked if Fatah knew how to
conduct an election campaign, Netanyahu said the Palestinian
patronage system should be forced to collapse, which would
have an immediate impact since the entire Palestinian economy
was based on graft and patronage. Instead, he asserted, the
opposite was happening. Hamas was also handling the prisoner
release issue well since they had created the impression that
Hamas was in control of the process and "sticking it to the
Israelis."
¶7. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked if Abbas would survive

politically. Netanyahu said he was unsure, since politics
were stressful, especially Palestinian politics. The policy,
he added, should be to starve the NUG. If any money is
given, it should go directly to Abbas. Netanyahu said it was
not clear the GOI has a policy, there was a general climate
of weakness.
Lebanon War Failures

--------------------
¶8. (C) Turning to the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu said the
problem was not the war's goals but rather the disconnect
between goals and methods. If the IDF had used a flanking
move by a superior ground force, it could have won easily.
Instead, Israel "dripped troops into their gunsights," an
approach he termed "stupid." The top leadership had lacked a
sense of military maneuver. In addition, they had been
afraid to take military casualties, but instead got many
civilian casualties. If Olmert had mobilized the reserves in
ten days, seized ground, destroyed Hizballah in southern
Lebanon, and then withdrawn, he would be a hero today.
Instead, Netanyahu predicted, Olmert will not last
politically. Olmert's current public support levels of three
percent were unsustainable.
A New Government?
-----------------
¶9. (C) Netanyahu said the pressure on Olmert was

accumulating as a result of corruption investigations as well
as the impending release of the Winograd Commission's interim
report. Olmert could be pushed out as a result of a
rebellion within the Kadima Party. Kadima members are
realizing they cannot allow Olmert to stay in power, but
Kadima itself might collapse since it was a "fake party."
Netanyahu described several options, including Kadima
replacing Olmert, a new coalition formed in the Knesset, or
Netanyahu's preferred option, new elections. New elections,
he stated, are supported by sixty-five percent of the public.
Netanyahu insisted he was in no rush since he was "enjoying
the time with his family" and rebuilding the Likud Party.
Likud was reaching thousands of new supporters, including
many highly educated professionals and high tech
entrepreneurs, through the internet.
¶10. (C) Netanyahu asserted there was a growing sense in the

public that he had been right in the last election.
TEL AVIV 00001114 003 OF 003
Unilateral "retreats" (i.e. such as the withdrawals from Gaza

and southern Lebanon) were the wrong way to go. Israel had
allowed an Iranian enclave to establish itself in Gaza.
Syria was arming itself for the first time in 20 years,
Hizballah had rearmed since the war, and Gaza was being
turned into a bunker. Egypt was not doing on a twelve mile
front along the Gaza border what Jordan was doing on a
150-mile front. The way out was to stop Iran, thereby
dealing with the octopus, not just its tentacles.
Right of Return the Acid Test
-----------------------------
¶11. (C) Netanyahu stated that a return to the 1967 borders

and dividing Jerusalem was not a solution since further
withdrawals would only whet the appetite of radical Islam.
Ackerman asked if the Palestinians would accept peace based
on the 1967 lines. Netanyahu said he would not agree to such
a withdrawal since the 1967 lines were indefensible, but he
added that the "right of return" was the real acid test of
Arab intentions. Instead of Israel making more step-by-step
concessions, Israel should insist that further concessions be
linked to reciprocal steps toward peace. The Palestinians
must drop the right of return and accept Israel's right to
exist. The Arab initiative did not meet this standard since
it keeps the right of return open. Israel will only have a
peace partner when the Palestinians drop the right of return.
Asked whether Israel could accept case by case exceptions,
Netanyahu insisted not one refugee could ever return. Israel,
after all, was not asking for the right of Jews to return to
Baghdad or Cairo.
¶12. (C) Netanyahu said UNSCR 242 was not a bad formula since
it did not specify precisely from which territories Israel
would withdraw. After the withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon,
there was deep disillusionment among Israelis about the
principle of land for peace. Even the noted Israeli leftist
writer AB Yehoshua had said in a recent interview that he
despaired about peace because the Arabs wanted all of Israel.
From 1948 to 1967, the conflict had not been about occupied
territories, but that point had been obscured by "effective
propaganda." The root of the conflict was an Arab desire to
destroy Israel, which had now become part of the larger
ambitions of radical Islam.
¶13. (C) The 1967 borders were not the solution since Israel
was the only force blocking radical Islam's agenda of
overrunning Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu proposed that
Israel offer to work with the Saudis against Iran. If Iran
was not stopped, there would be no agreement with the
Palestinians, and the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt
would come under tremendous pressure. There could be no
deterrence against "crazies" such as Ahmadinejad. Netanyahu
advised Congress to expedite the legislative effort for
divestment. If that did not work, we could reconsider other
options. Congressman Ackerman said that if Netanyahu came to
Washington, he would hold a hearing on divestment.
¶14. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
JONES
Viewing cable 07ANKARA1091, TURKEY: FM GUL AS THE BEHIND-THE-
SCENES MASTER
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2022

TAGS: PGOV PINR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: FM GUL AS THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES MASTER
REF: A. ANKARA 1006

¶B. ANKARA 1083 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) In contrast to rumors that Turkish FM Abdullah Gul is depressed after

having had to withdraw his presidential bid, a journalist xxxxx described his
demeanor as relaxed, confident and determined. xxxxx it was clear that both Gul
and Hayrunissa had long lobbied for him to be the ruling Justice and Development
Party's (AKP) presidential candidate – and they still retain ambitions. xxxxx
dismissed earlier press speculation that parliamentary speaker Bulent Arinc had
forced the issue. It was instead Gul who went to Arinc to press his own case and
ask for support. He reportedly told Arinc that he, Gul, did not want to see a
bureaucrat (DefMin Gonul) in Cankaya.
¶2. (C) The way Gul's candidacy ultimately played out was a reflection of the
long-running partnership – and rivalry – between PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
Gul, according to our contact. From the outset, the biggest hurdle was Erdogan
who, until the last minute, proved unwilling to renounce his personal
presidential ambitions. The PM waited so long that there was no time to cushion
a Gul candidacy via the media, whose initial reactions to Gul's candidacy had
been positive. The PM squandered an opportunity better to prepare both the
military and the public. At that point, the opposition People's Republican Party
(CHP) could have savored its “anyone but Erdogan” victory and Gul, who enjoyed
good relations both with CHP and with the military, could have helped smooth the
way. (Comment: It's not clear that a Gul candidacy would ever have been
acceptable to the military, though they certainly do not like surprises. End
comment.)
3.(C) Once the Turkish General Staff released its e-memo late on April 27, it
was allegedly Gul, not the PM, who persuaded AKP to take the democratic high
road and hard line reflected in GOT spokesman Cemil Cicek's April 28 statement
(ref A), which Gul reportedly penned. In the interview, Gul also reflected
confidence in AKP's prospects for doing well in the upcoming general election.
4.(C) One frequent TGS accusation has been that AKP has a hidden agenda. Gul had
rebutted it consistently, pointing to the raft of political and economic reforms
the AKP government has passed, and asking rhetorically if they would be working
hard to harmonize Turkish law with EU law if GOT's agenda were sharia. xxxxx
5.(C) According to xxxxx Gul was not a member of Milli Gorus, the old Necmettin
Erbakan cabal of pious, anti-Semitic Anatolians who have little subtlety. Gul's
initial political activity was with a serious student movement just prior to the
1980 coup (to which Erdogan also belonged), the Milli Turk Talebe Birligi
(National Turkish Student Union - MTTB), a formerly leftist student group turned
conservative/Islamist, then disbanded in 1980 as a result of the coup. After
1997, it was Gul's think-tank, Politik Arastirma Merkezi (Political Research
Center - PAM) that planned AKP's split from Erbakan's Fazilet and mapped out the
strategy that brought AKP to power in 2002. Gul is, per the journalist, the only
one in the party whom Erdogan truly respects, in the Turkish sense of
admiration, friendship and fear.
6.(C) Comment: This picture of Gul is one person's view (who has known the Gul
family for a long time), and stands in contrast to how others, including some in
AKP, have described Gul. xxxxx for example, told us the FM was devastated and
had never wanted to run. Whatever the truth about his mood, it is hard to
believe that Gul, a seasoned
Ankara 00001091 002 of 002
politician and operator, would let himself be pushed into something he didn't
want to do, even “for the greater good for his party.” End comment.

WILSON
Viewing cable 07ANKARA1258, TURKEY'S MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY

Discussing cables
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TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) The Turkish military's April 27 memorandum that

fueled the political crisis here was followed by a virtual
black-out with the military refusing to speak with either
domestic or foreign contacts. The silence was broken
recently when D/CHOD Saygun volunteered an explanation of the
military's motives and current thinking. We used the
exchange to reiterate the need for pragmatism and compromise
-- by all players -- in support of Turkish democracy and the
constitutional process.
¶2. (S) In a recent meeting with DCM, Saygun raised the

subject of Turkish domestic politics and said it was
important we understand why the military felt compelled to
make its April 27 statement. He said the military spoke out
solely to ensure the protection of Turkey's secular system.
This is the principle responsibility of the Turkish military,
which they are both obligated and determined to fulfill. He
asserted that Turkey's constitution empowered the military to
protect the secular state -- that was what they had done and
what they would continue to do.
¶3. (S) DCM responded by emphasizing the most precious

quality of contemporary Turkey is that it is both secular and
democratic -- and both must be preserved. She noted the
growing tensions and polarization throughout the country and
urged that the military exercise caution and pragmatism.
Avoiding confrontation and instability and ensuring that the
political process proceeds in a way that is fully consistent
with the constitution is in the best interest of Turkey and
of all Turks regardless of their partisan affiliation.
¶4. (S) Saygun said that the military did not want
confrontation and would not seek it out. He claimed they
easily could have sent tanks rolling in the streets if they
had wanted to, but they did not. He also argued that the
military was far more concerned with stability -- political,
economic, and social -- than the AKP which had made no effort
to compromise.
¶5. (S) DCM underscored the importance of having the

on-going parliamentary election proceed calmly and that all
accept the results of the popular vote. Saygun agreed
enthusiastically and claimed the TGS had "no problems" with
AKP in parliament or in government -- their only difficulty
was with radical policies that threaten stability.
¶6. (S) Comment: There is rampant speculation here about
TGS' next move in the on-going political drama. Overheated
rumors include efforts to shut down the AKP, discredit the
party leadership by releasing incriminating dossiers, and the
manufacture of crises. More prudent observers have suggested
that a tacit -- if still tense -- understanding has been
reached whereby the TGS has clarified its red lines on the
presidency and Islamist policies and the AKP has agreed not
to cross them. Rumors notwithstanding, it is clear that
maneuvering will intensify in the lead up to the July 22
elections, and USG support for democracy, compromise, and the
constitutional process will remain critical.

WILSON
Viewing cable 07MADRID911, SCENESETTER FOR US-SPAIN HIGH LEVEL

DEFENSE TALKS
Discussing cables
2007-05-14 2010-11-30 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFOR Embassy
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FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR OSD/P DASD DAN FATA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017

TAGS: PREL MARR SP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR US-SPAIN HIGH LEVEL DEFENSE TALKS
Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre for reasons 1.4 b & d.
¶1. (C/NF) Dan, welcome back to Spain. I appreciate your

patience and efforts to finally resolve the NCIS/OSI issue
and I'm glad that you've made this High-Level Defense
Committee (HLDC) meeting a priority. Now that the Permanent
Committee is back on track, handling routine issues at the
staff level, we can use the HLDC forum to share views and set
strategic direction on key international policy issues like
Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Couso case, missile defense, the
NATO Summit in 2008, and future US use of Moron and Rota
military bases. As we've discussed before, Spain can at
times be a difficult partner, but never more so than when it
feels ignored. This meeting, along with Secretary Rice's
visit in a few weeks, should reassure the GOS that we take it
seriously, but while reminding MOD that we have high
expectations of such important partners.
-- US USE OF SPANISH BASES --
¶2. (C/NF) The DCM, the Embassy's political-military team, and

I travel regularly to Rota and Moron, the Spanish bases where
nearly 3000 US troops and dependents live and work. With
each successive visit, I am more impressed by the important
activities and outstanding working-level cooperation at the
bases. The Czech Deputy Prime Minister, planning for the
possibility of US missile defense installations in his
country, recently visited Rota in order to understand how the
US military behaves as a tenant. Perhaps on your next trip
you'll be able to travel to southern Spain to get a better
idea of the key role that the bases play in US efforts in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations. As you know, it is
taking MOD longer than we expected to implement its new
interagency process for reviewing proposed Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and USAF Office of Special
Investigations activities. We continue to press them to
speed the process so that we can begin to implement the
agreement and our investigators can get back to work.
-- AFGHANISTAN --
¶3. (C/NF) Despite the limitations imposed by Spanish domestic

politics, which are foremost in every minister's mind, due to
nationwide local/regional elections in two weeks and national
elections within the year, Spain remains a stalwart ally in
Afghanistan. Though not currently in a position to increase
the 690-soldier troop ceiling that Parliament set, the GOS
insists that it is committed to maintain current levels for
the long haul. Your primary interlocutor, MOD Secretary
General for Policy Luis Cuesta, recently spent a week in
Kabul and Herat with his counterpart from MFA. They both
returned relatively optimistic that NATO-ISAF is making
progress but understanding more clearly than ever that NATO
won't be able to leave anytime soon. Top MOD leaders have
also told us privately that CHOD General Sanz has initiated
discussions in Brussels regarding the possibility that Spain
would staff the core of the ISAF HQ in summer 2008, after
Spanish elections. We continue to press the GOS to increase
its public diplomacy efforts, and to consider doing more when
it is able.
¶4. (C/NF) While the GOS has lately complained about the lack
of coordination between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom
-- specifically the airstrikes in Herat province that killed
civilians as well as Taliban -- Spain remains active on the
security and reconstruction fronts. The Spanish Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) is well regarded for involving
local Afghanis in its efforts to provide basic services and
critical infrastructure to the people of Badghis province,
but MFA officials note that there is no sign of the central
government or national security forces in the province. While
carefully complying with its caveat, Spanish troops supported
NATO-ISAF's Operation Achilles earlier this spring by sealing
the southern border of their zone. Regarding its Sevilla
Ministerial commitments, MOD sources say that two Spanish
military training teams (OMLTs) will arrive in Afghanistan in
early June to begin training Afghan National Army troops.
They have told us that that these 30-50 soldiers will be in
addition to the 690 troops that are already deployed. The
Spanish Army is also proceeding with its purchase of tactical
UAVs, and expects to have them in the field later this year.
-- KOSOVO --
¶5. (C/NF) In the Balkans, where its troops have served for
more than 15 years, Spain has shown its ability to maintain
troops for the long-term. Right now, however, we need keep
MADRID 00000911 002 OF 003
making our case to keep troops in Kosovo. For domestic

political reasons and fear of provoking Russia, Spain is
ambivalent about the current direction of Kosovo policy. So
long as there is a UN resolution authorizing the Ahtissari
plan, Spain will maintain its troops in KFOR. If the UN
fails to agree on a new resolution, Spain has said that it
would have to seriously consider pulling its troops out, but
has emphasized that it would do this only in extremis and
only in careful consultation with allies. We need to keep the
pressure on, reminding Spain that NATO has a critical role
and that we can't let the Russians drive a wedge between the
US and Europe on issues like this.
-- MISSILE DEFENSE --
¶6. (C/NF) Though initially tentative about the US missile

defense (MD) plan, Spain listened carefully to the Missile
Defense Agency Deputy Director BG O'Reilly's presentation in
March, asked some tough questions, and has taken the position
that so long as the US attends to Russian and is willing to
discuss the issue in NATO, it won't stand in the way. MOD
said that it will soon announce support for the development
of a NATO study on the issue. MOD has asked to see a
simulation of how well the proposed MD system would cover
Spain, though it says that it doesn't currently see a
particular threat from Iran and is willing to support the
US's plan primarily as a show of solidarity among allies.
While we need to continue to inform and engage MOD on this
issue, we don't see Spain causing problems on missile defense.
-- NATO --
¶7. (C/NF) On 2008 NATO Summit issues of enlargement and

partnership, Spain believes that NATO should keep an open
door to European applicants who can qualify. MOD says that
the Balkans should be treated as a single unit, despite their
different stages of development, because it will be important
to future Balkans stability to eventually get them all around
the NATO table. Regarding Ukraine and Georgia, Spain is not
opposed to the idea that they would eventually join NATO, but
says that the best thing at the moment is to wait and see
what direction they choose to go. Spain is a big fan of NATO
partnerships, especially the Mediterranean Dialogue, which it
believes should be strengthened for the sake of fighting
terrorism in North Africa and supporting the current
governments and militaries against extremists. MOD says that
the Med Dialogue countries know that they aren't going to
someday join NATO, but that they should be invited to observe
exercises, included in training, and given other
opportunities to deepen ties and cooperate with NATO.
-- CRITICAL SIDEBAR ISSUES --
¶8. (C/NF) A couple of other key issues will be in the air, if

not actually on the agenda. For our side, it will be
important to continue to raise the Couso case, in which three
US servicemen face charges related to the 2003 death of
Spanish cameraman Jose Couso during the battle for Baghdad.
XXXXXXXXXXXX. I raised this issue with Vice
President de la Vega on April 30. She was supportive but
uncertain that direct GOS involvement would be productive.
DCM spoke late last week with the Deputy Justice Minister,
and we continue to prod the GOS to appeal. We were informed
Monday morning that the Chief Prosecutor of Spain's National
Court has indeed filed an appeal, which will go to the same
court which originally dismissed the case (in 2006) on
procedural grounds. The Deputy DIGENPOL in MOD told the
Embassy last week that MOD completely supports the US
position, and said that he would raise with his superiors the
possibility of making a statement to the court or otherwise
demonstrating support. The Deputy Justice Minister also said
the GOS strongly opposes a case brought against former
Secretary Rumsfeld and will work to get it dismissed. The
SIPDIS
judge involved in that case has told us he has already
started the process of dismissing the case.
¶9. (C/NF) An issue that MOD may raise with you is their
perception of "imbalance" in the defense industrial
relationship. The HLDC is not the most appropriate forum for
a discussion of this issue, especially since Al Volkman,
Director of International Cooperation for acquisitions, will
be in Madrid at the same time as you precisely for the
long-scheduled 17th US-Spain Defense Industrial Cooperation
Committee meeting and the 4th US-Spain Declaration of
MADRID 00000911 003 OF 003
Principles meeting. Nonetheless, Spanish Defense Ministry

officials have seen you with Secretary Gates, and may raise
the issue with you in hopes of getting it top-level
attention. Defense Minister Alonso has raised the issue in
public speeches and his people have raised it in meetings.
They point to Spanish purchases like 24 Tomahawk missiles and
US AEGIS combat systems for its F-100 frigates and S-80 subs,
which the GOS made over the protests of European allies like
France and Germany, and say that while MOD plans to continue
a strong relationship with the US defense industry and knows
that it is getting the best when it buys US, it would
appreciate a "gesture" from the US so that it can show
domestic audiences that Spain gets something out of the
relationship. While we continue to push Spain to buy into
the Joint Strike Fighter program, we know that Spain is very
anxious to learn whether Spanish company EADS-CASA will get
the Joint Cargo Aircraft contract. We try to remind MOD that
while there may be a dollar imbalance in the defense
relationship, Spain benefits from the relationship in other
ways, not only getting the best technology for its military,
but also being able to sell products that include US
technology to third countries.
¶10. (C/NF) We want to use the HLDC to further strengthen the

Permanent Committee and are pleased that EUCOM will propose
the joint working group as a means to increase EUCOM
involvement on Spanish military issues. Direct and ongoing
communication between MOD and EUCOM at the staff level can
only help us to avoid minor problems that have the potential
to escalate, like NCIS/OSI.
Aguirre
Viewing cable 07PARIS1791, IT'S PRESIDENT SARKOZY -- IN A CLEAR-

CUT VICTORY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6880
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHFR #1791 1261831
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
UNCLAS PARIS 001791
SIPDIS
SIPDIS

AND EB
E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: IT'S PRESIDENT SARKOZY -- IN A CLEAR-CUT VICTORY
OVER SEGOLENE ROYAL
REF: A. (A) PARIS 1784 AND PREVIOUS

¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORT FOR MAY 4
¶C. 2007 AND PREVIOUS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- HANDLE ACCORDINGLY
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy has won France's presidency by a
clear cut, 53 percent majority. Official results -- 53
percent of the vote for Sarkozy and 47 percent for Socialist
Segolene Royal -- were announced by France's Interior
Ministry 8 P.M. Paris time on Sunday May 6. President Bush
called president-elect Sarkozy at 8:05 P.M. Paris time to
congratulate him. A record turn-out of 85 percent of
registered voters confirms the intense interest this election
has generated among the French, just as Sarkozy's convincing
victory confirms their collective decision to endorse the
market-oriented reform platform that he ran on. END SUMMARY
A CLEAR-CUT, CONVINCING VICTORY

-------------------------------
¶2. Former Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's second-round
win over Socialist Party candidate Segolene Royal in France's
2007 presidential election is, by any measure, a clear-cut,
convincing victory. Official, if preliminary, results
announced by France's Interior Ministry at 8 P.M. Paris time
on Sunday May 6 show that Sarkozy got 53 percent of the 38
million votes cast and Royal got 47 percent. Final, official
vote tallies will be posted as they come in on the French
Interior Ministry's website at http://www.interieur.gouv.fr.
The participation rate in this election is the highest for a
second-round presidential contest in France since the
election of 1981. Of France's 44.5 million registered
voters, 85.5 percent cast ballots on May 6 for either Sarkozy
or Royal, or cast null ballots.
THAT GIVES SARKOZY A MANDATE

----------------------------
¶3. (U) In electing -- by a clear-cut majority -- the
activist, mold-breaking Sarkozy the French have clearly
endorsed the largely market-oriented reform agenda that
Sarkozy ran on. They have also given him a vote of
confidence, betting that he will grow in office -- and that
his unsettling, often divisive, personality traits that put
off so many will be attenuated by the responsibilities of
office.
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

-----------------
¶4. (U) Sarkozy has said that he expects to be inaugurated
shortly before the end of President Chirac's term, probably
on Wednesday May 16 (Chirac's five-year term ends at midnight
on the 16). Sarkozy and Chirac might agree to transfer power
earlier, possibly as early as May 14. In the interim,
between his election and inauguration, Sarkozy has promised
that, accompanied by a small group of advisors, he will take
some days off to "reflect on the heavy responsibilities
ahead." Something more than speculation about who will head
the Sarkozy administration's first government should emerge
from this "retreat" led by the president-elect. Sarkozy has
promised that he will try to achieve gender parity in his
administration's first cabinet. Former Education Minister
Francois Fillon and current Minister of Social Solidarity
Jean-Louis Borloo are generally viewed as the two leading
candidates for the prime minister's slot. In coming days
president-elect Sarkozy's statements should confirm how, and
how quickly, he plans to proceed with his reform agenda, and
we will report accordingly.

STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS1844, ENGAGING THE NEW FRENCH

GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0961
DE RUEHFR #1844/01 1300917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100917Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017

TAGS: PREL FR EUN IR AF NATO IZ TU UNO LE YI RS
UNMIK
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN
POLICY: FIVE IMMEDIATE ISSUES
REF: A. PARIS 1789

¶B. PARIS 921
¶C. PARIS 777
¶D. PARIS 1817
¶E. EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORTS
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy played only a negligible

role in the presidential election campaign that concluded May
6, and Sarkozy has relatively little experience in foreign
affairs, despite his tenures as Interior and Finance
Minister. Nonetheless, Sarkozy's personality is such that he
will want to take the stage at the June 6-8 G8 and June 21-22
European summits as a full partner. Instinctively
pro-American and pro-Israeli, Sarkozy is fiercely opposed to
Turkish EU membership. He has promised that his approach to
foreign affairs will be different from Chirac's in its
emphasis on human rights, and has identified Europe, Africa
and the U.S. as his three immediate priorities. That said,
generally speaking, continuity will prevail, reflecting the
non-partisan, consensus support that French foreign policy
has enjoyed during the Fifth Republic. On Europe, his goal
is, by overcoming the current institutional crisis, to
re-impart momentum to European integration and make the EU a
major player on the world stage. On Africa, Sarkozy
advocates increased developmental aid as the offset for
regulating immigration (important for his domestic agenda)
and has repeatedly called for action on Darfur. He has
called for a "Mediterranean Union," to include Turkey and
Israel, as Europe's institutional link to the Middle East and
North Africa. With the U.S., he seeks a relationship based
on renewed confidence and trust that still allows for honest
differences of perspective; most recently, he has pointed to
global climate change (septel) as his major area of policy
difference with the U.S.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: The Deputy Secretary's May 16

meetings in Paris will occur the same day President-elect
Sarkozy assumes office (Sarkozy himself will therefore be
unavailable). Beyond welcoming the prospect of improved
U.S.-French relations, the Deputy Secretary can use his visit
to send a message on five key U.S. foreign policy concerns.
We can welcome Sarkozy's willingness to take a tough line on
Iran, but also will need to impress on him the stakes in
Afghanistan and the importance of France remaining a key
partner there. On Iraq, we can expect Sarkozy to drop the
needling rhetoric on a horizon for U.S. withdrawal, but
having told the President he "wants to help the U.S. get out
of Iraq," we should press him to offer a specific, symbolic
proposal -- such as active French engagement with friendly
Arab governments -- to associate France with our efforts
there. In assuring Sarkozy of strong U.S. support for a
strong Europe, we need to stress the importance we attach to
keeping Turkey's EU accession negotiations going. Finally,
we should stress the importance of a united front against
Russia as Kosovo goes before the UNSC. END SUMMARY.
A NOVICE IN FOREIGN POLICY

--------------------------
¶3. (C) A presidential election campaign dominated by the
domestic change and reform thematic left very little room for
foreign policy. Sarkozy has little foreign policy experience
and speaks only very limited English. Given his strong
character and action-oriented agenda, and his desire to put
France back on center stage, we can nonetheless expect
Sarkozy to move quickly to assert himself as an equal partner
at the upcoming June 6-8 G8 Summit in Germany and the June
21-22 European Council meeting in Brussels. (See ref A for a
discussion of Sarkozy's views on economic and trade issues.)
U.S.-FRIENDLIER, BUT STILL A GAULLIST

-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Most voters went to the polls May 6 convinced that
President-elect Sarkozy would seek a better relationship with
the U.S., which he explicitly affirmed in his May 6
acceptance speech. Sarkozy's opponents had attempted to use
his September 12, 2006 meeting with President Bush to suggest
that Sarkozy was a U.S. "poodle" who would have supported the
U.S. intervention in Iraq, unlike President Chirac. In a
recent press conference on foreign policy (ref B), Sarkozy
made clear he had supported Chirac's decision. Then and in
his post-election remarks, he nonetheless highlighted the
need for a friendlier tone and more confidence in the
U.S.-French bilateral relationship (and in NATO-EU
relations), in a way that also preserves Gaullist (and EU)
freedom of action. In effect, Sarkozy has already shifted
PARIS 00001844 002 OF 004
the focus of U.S.-French "differences" from Iraq and the

Israeli-Palestinian relationship to climate change and
Turkish membership in the EU (see also refs B, C and D).
EU TOP IMMEDIATE PRIORITY

-------------------------
¶5. (C) Sarkozy's first foreign policy priority will be to
impart new momentum to the EU and show that France is back as
a key EU player. Sarkozy no doubt knows already that his
idea of a simplified treaty is acceptable to London and
Berlin as the best means to avoid new referenda, and he will
move quickly to ensure that a process can begin by the end of
the German EU Presidency that would conclude at the latest by
the end of the French Presidency in December 2008, in advance
of European parliamentary elections in early 2009. Immediate
progress on this front would go a long way to overcome the
sense of malaise and indirection stemming from President
Chirac's failure to push through the referendum on the
Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. Sarkozy wants a European
Union that is a veritable player on the world stage, with
coherent policies to guarantee its energy supplies and create
buffers against globalization while harnessing its creative
energies.
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND DARFUR
------------------------------
¶6. (c) Sarkozy lacks the web of personal relationships with
African (and Middle Eastern) leaders that, in particular,
Chirac used to direct French foreign policy. Sarkozy intends
to make a virtue of his less personalized approach, reviewing
France's exposure based on a hard-headed re-evaluation of
French national interests. Sarkozy has identified Africa as
one of his three foreign policy priority areas (along with
the EU and U.S.), in line with his domestic campaign focus on
uncontrolled immigration to France. His interest in
development assistance for Africa appears aimed primarily at
offsetting Africans' concern over Sarkozy's domestic
political goal of reducing immigration from Africa -- and as
part of a more comprehensive international effort to address
conditions in Africa that give rise to mass emigration from
the continent. A review of French national interests may
augur a lessening of French military engagement across Africa
or an increased desire to see the EU take over some of its
missions. Sarkozy has called repeatedly for action on
Darfur, including prosecution of Sudanese leaders by the
International Criminal Court, but it is unclear at this stage
what concrete steps he might otherwise propose.
MEDITERRANEAN UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) We can expect Sarkozy to push hard his signature
"vision" issue, the idea of a "Mediterranean Union," to
include Turkey and Israel, which would supersede the EU
Barcelona process and create an area modeled after, and
having a privileged partnership with, the European Union.
Sarkozy has bluntly declared that pursuing Middle East peace
is not incompatible with ensuring Israel's security, while
assuring nervous Arab leaders -- most recently Egyptian
President Mubarak -- that his policies toward the Middle East
would be largely in synch with Chirac's. On the whole, it
seems likely that continuity will prevail, although the
traditionally pro-Arab MFA may have to accommodate Sarkozy's
greater emphasis on Israel's security needs. It remains to
be seen to what extent Sarkozy will attempt to leverage his
pro-Israel orientation for more leverage for France and/or
the EU in the Middle East peace process.
MORE HUMAN RIGHTS

-----------------
¶8. (C) Sarkozy has indicated very publicly -- enough so that
it is reasonable to assume that he will follow through --
that he intends to place more emphasis on human rights
issues. He has made clear that he would be less likely than
Chirac to accommodate even Russia or China in the name of
realpolitik, citing the situation in Chechnya and his
opposition to lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. A
consistent emphasis on human rights could have a significant
impact on French policy in Africa and the Middle East.
IMMEDIATE MESSAGES: IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,

EU/TURKEY, KOSOVO/RUSSIA
--------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) We believe that, beginning with the May 15-16 visit
to France of the Deputy Secretary, the USG should reach out
quickly to engage the new French government. Beyond
welcoming prospects for an improved U.S.-French relationship,
we need to send messages on the following five key issues:
PARIS 00001844 003 OF 004
Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, EU/Turkey, and Kosovo/Russia. If

time permits, the Deputy Secretary may also wish to review
the state of play on Darfur.
-- IRAN: Sarkozy views Iran as the most serious

international threat, and he will be at least as tough-minded
a partner as Chirac has been. He has expressed a willingness
to tighten financial sanctions against Iran. While he
prefers acting under the authority of the UNSC, we believe he
could support resorting to measures outside the UN framework
if necessary. The late-May consideration of next steps in
the UNSC offers a first opportunity to work with the new
government, and to test and shape its approach.
-- AFGHANISTAN: MFA Political Director Araud has underscored

the need for the USG to engage the new government to dispel
the widespread impression, shared by Chirac, that Afghanistan
may be a losing cause. Under the impact of the Taliban
kidnapping of French citizens, Sarkozy recently stated that
France's role in Afghanistan -- now that the anti-terrorism
campaign has largely ended and French Special Forces
withdrawn from OEF -- was no longer "decisive" and that
French forces would not remain there permanently. The
Taliban threat against the life of the one remaining French
hostage is still directly tied to a demand for France's
military withdrawal form Afghanistan. We will need to
impress on Sarkozy the importance of French perseverance over
the mid-term (including through more purposeful public
statements about the stakes there) and, as the French have
stressed to us on Bosnia or Kosovo, the importance of "in
together and out together," which also applies to national
caveats on the use of forces.
-- IRAQ: Chirac's departure from the scene should enable

France to put U.S.-French differences not only aside, but
behind us. Sarkozy, like most other French politicians, has
said he would have handled our differences in a less
confrontational matter. This does not change the fact that
he (now, in any case) believes Chirac made the right decision
in opposing the war. Moreover, concern about feeding the
"President Bush's poodle" accusation might militate against
any dramatic public change in GOF policy, at least in the
immediate future, with French parliamentary elections
looming. That said, we should take him at his word that he
"wants to help the U.S. get out of Iraq." Our goal in the
near term should be to push the French toward a more positive
declaratory policy, working with the new government to
identify a symbolic turning of the page on France's "let the
U.S. live with it" attitude of the Chirac/Villepin years.
One possibility would be active French engagement on Iraq
with Arab governments of the region.
-- EU/TURKEY: Publicly and privately, we should encourage

France to reassume its rightful place in Europe, as part of
our broader message that a re-invigorated Europe is in the
U.S. interest. If we decide to participate in an ESDP police
mission in Kosovo, we should use this as an example -- one
for them to follow -- of choosing the institutional framework
for joint action to match the needs of the situation. Luc
Ferry, a former Education Minister, political commentator and
close friend of Sarkozy's, has urged that we attempt to
change Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey's EU membership. While
a change of heart appears extremely unlikely given Sarkozy's
political identification with opposition to Turkish
membership and his categorical statements on the issue, we
should seek to persuade him to temper his post-election
rhetoric, allow accession negotiations to proceed, and at
least not close the door dramatically and completely at this
time.
-- KOSOVO/RUSSIA: We should stress the importance of a

united front in the UN Security Council on Kosovo's
independence. We would welcome a more active French role in
persuading Russia not to veto a UNSC Resolution.
ENGAGING THE SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION

-----------------------------------
¶10. (C) We will know more about the likely foreign policy
orientations of the new Sarkozy government once he names a
foreign minister and key advisors are in place. We would
expect him to designate someone of proven competence (such as
former FM Alain Juppe, Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie,
or former FM Michel Barnier). There is no reason to believe
that Sarkozy will come into office with the intent of
seriously challenging the Gaullist consensus underlying
French foreign policy. The MFA will work overtime to ensure
continuity in French policy positions. Over time, and as he
PARIS 00001844 004 OF 004
gains experience, Sarkozy is certain to assert his authority

over foreign policy more directly. It still remains to be
seen whether Sarkozy will create -- as proposed by Pierre
Lellouche -- the French equivalent of a National Security
Council that would supplant the Presidential diplomatic cell
and assume a larger role in coordinating French foreign
policy; we have no indication Sarkozy has personally signed
on to such a move. It is also unclear whether the
Presidency's Africa Cell, which has long enjoyed a privileged
position, will survive in its present form. Sarkozy's desire
to move away from Elysee-centered personal diplomacy with
African leaders may mean the days of this bureaucratic
post-colonial throwback may be numbered.
¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy will initially be focused on

domestic reforms and relaunching the EU, he will also grasp
every opportunity to showcase his leadership of a
re-invigorated France on the international scene, confident
of its place in the world. This entails -- and he will not
be shy about repeating this point publicly -- establishing a
relationship of trust and working together productively with
the United States. The Deputy Secretary's May 15-16 visit
will offer the first occasion to make our views known to the
new Administration, as it comes into office (unfortunately,
this also means that Sarkozy himself will be unavailable for
meetings). The Defense Secretary's June 5-6 visit to France
will offer an excellent opportunity to engage the leaders of
the newly-constituted government.

STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS1938, UK READOUT OF BLAIR-SARKOZY
MEETING
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO5285
DE RUEHFR #1938/01 1350913
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150913Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 6574
Tuesday, 15 May 2007, 09:13

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS PREL, FR, EUN, PGOV, ETRD, UK, GM, TU, PINR
SUBJECT: UK READOUT OF BLAIR-SARKOZY MEETING
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UK PM Blair’s May 11 meeting with French President-elect
Sarkozy focused primarily on next steps on the EU constitutional treaty in
advance of Sarkozy’s May 16 meeting with German Chancellor Merkel, according to
UK DCM Hitchens; the UK hope is that the Blair, Sarkozy and Merkel will reach a
quiet agreement on the way forward. He said French and UK positions were close
on avoiding new referenda, qualified majority voting, and no social charter, but
they differed on establishing an EU “President.” On Turkey, Blair had stressed
the importance of not interrupting Turkey’s accession negotiations, with Sarkozy
not clear on his intentions. There was little discussion of trade issues and
none of European defense. Hitchens surmised that Sarkozy’s operating style
within the EU would seek to make deals with major capitals above the heads of
the smaller states, and saw Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union as a way for France to
deal with the Turkish question. He said it remained to be seen whether Sarkozy
intended to act on his campaign rhetoric criticizing the European Central Bank.
Personal chemistry between Blair and Sarkozy was excellent; the relationship
with Brown will take time to build, not least because he speaks no French. Blair
also had a short and unremarkable meeting with Chirac. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) POL M/C and Deputy met May 14 with UK Embassy DCM Tim Hitchens for a
readout of UK PM Tony Blair’s May 11, late-afternoon meeting with French
President-elect Nicolas Sarkozy. This was President-elect Sarkozy’s first
meeting with a foreign visitor following his May 6 election; he had met with
Saad Hariri the previous day. His first official meeting as President will occur
May 16 in Berlin with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, following the transfer of
power ceremony earlier that same day in Paris with outgoing President Jacques
Chirac. The press has speculated that the focus of both meetings is on
overcoming the EU’s current loss of momentum following the French rejection in
2005 of the EU constitutional treaty. (Incoming Presidential Diplomatic Advisor
and National Security Advisor-equivalent Jean-David Levitte confirmed this in a
conversation with POL M/C re scheduling for the Deputy Secretary.)
MOVING THE EU FORWARD
---------------------
¶3. (C) Hitchens confirmed press reports that the discussions focused primarily
on how to overcome the EU’s current blockage on institutional reform. Blair’s
main objective, he said, was to ensure that the way forward toward a new
constitutional treaty would not require a referendum in the UK. The mood of the
discussions was positive, and UK experts would be meeting with their French
counterparts in the next day or so to try to close the distance between French
and UK positions to the greatest extent possible in advance of Sarkozy’s May 16
meeting with Merkel. While Sarkozy would not arrive in Berlin with a French-UK
“common position,” the idea was that Sarkozy would have an understanding of UK
red lines. The hope was that, by the end of the week there would be a clear
sense in London, Paris, and Berlin about what might be possible.
¶4. (C) POL M/C asked if Merkel would be speaking for the 18 countries that have
ratified the current draft constitutional treaty. Hitchens responded that Merkel
would want a deal by the end of her presidency, and the tradition was that the
Presidency was forced to settle for less than it ideally wanted. (Comment:
Hitchens demurred when asked whether the Germans were running a less “neutral”
Presidency than had the British. End comment.) If all went well, the German
presidency would end with a mandate for intensive negotiations on a document to
be approved by the end of the Portuguese presidency, leaving ratification for
2008. He thought it would be difficult for Portugal and Slovenia, as small
countries, and France, as the country that had rejected the EU constitutional
treaty, otherwise to reach a deal.
FOUR UK CONCERNS; SARKOZY CLOSE ON THREE
----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) On substance, Hitchens described four UK “conditions” for reaching an
agreement, on three of which he believed that the UK and France could succeed in
narrowing their differences. First, the UK would insist on an amending treaty
rather than a new constitutional treaty, in order to avoid a referendum; Sarkozy
appeared to agree. Second, the UK wanted less qualified majority voting than did
France, but Hitchens judged the differences as bridgeable. Third, the UK said
the UK did not favor symbols which gave the impression that the EU was a state,
and therefore does not support an EU “foreign minister.” Similarly, the UK was
concerned by a new Sarkozy proposal for an “EU President” that would go beyond
the rejected draft constitutional treaty. (Comment: This is the first we have
heard of this idea. End comment.) On
PARIS 00001938 002 OF 003
reflection, Hitchens speculated that Sarkozy was using the idea as a negotiating
ploy that would please his French domestic audience. Finally, the UK was not in
favor of a social charter. Hitchens said they believed that Sarkozy also was not
keen on the idea, but that this was a high priority for Merkel.
TURKEY THE TOUGHEST NUT
-----------------------
¶6. (C) On Turkey, Hitchens described Blair’s position as wanting to ensure that
Turkey’s accession negotiations would continue uninterrupted, as the UK viewed
the negotiations as virtuous in themselves. Hitchens acknowledged that Sarkozy
was a fierce opponent of Turkish membership, which he had made clear right away.
Hitchens said the UK hoped that Sarkozy did not perceive a political reason to
cause trouble in advance of the June 26 EU decision whether to open new chapters
for negotiation, or that, if he chose to do so, he would make waves only in
Paris and not Brussels. POL M/C asked whether Sarkozy’s idea of a Mediterranean
Union was intended as a face-saving way out. Hitchens affirmed that the
initiative was primarily aimed at Turkey, notwithstanding claims to the
contrary. He added it was typical of Sarkozy to take a strong position on a
subject, and simultaneously offer an escape route. Hitchens agreed that France
also saw a benefit in a Mediterranean vocation as a way to balance Germany’s
ties in Eastern Europe.
LITTLE ON TRADE
---------------
¶7. (C) Hitchens said there was no in-depth discussion of trade. He said the UK
supported the role of EC Commissioner Mandelson, whereas Sarkozy had argued that
it was illegitimate for an unelected Commissioner to negotiate on behalf of
Europe. Otherwise the discussion was unsurprising; or it was surprising only in
the sense that Sarkozy presented a “normal” French position, i.e., consistent
with what Chirac would have said. He allowed that the UK had been hoping for
signs of more flexibility, and suggested that the UK would want to revisit this
topic once a new government was formed.
NO ESDP
-------
¶8. (C) On European defense, Hitchens noted that, surprisingly, there had been
no discussion.
SARKOZY AND EUROPE
------------------
¶9. (C) Asked about the impact of Sarkozy on Europe more generally, Hitchens
expressed hope for a better UK-French working relationship, although he hastened
to add that UK-French relations would never threaten to overtake the Franco-
German tandem. Indeed, the UK hoped for good trilateral cooperation between
Europe’s main powerhouses. Hitchens thought there was a risk that Sarkozy would
make deals with “other major” interlocutors such as the UK or Germany, without
taking adequate account of the views of the smaller states; he described Sarkozy
as “not good at dealing with unimportant people.” Hitchens said Sarkozy would
discover that he did not like European diplomacy with its emphasis on process
and consensus. The UK was waiting with bated breath to see what kind of attitude
Sarkozy would take toward the European Central Bank now that the election
campaign was over. On a more “political” Europe, Hitchens predicted that Sarkozy
would want above all to put France back at the heart of European decision-
making, although the UK’s main priority was that the French economy do better.
While a more successful France might mean a more difficult France, this was
still unquestionably preferable to an unsuccessful France.
ORIGINS OF MEETING
------------------
¶10. (C) Hitchens said the idea of a meeting came up during one of Blair’s and
Sarkozy’s phone conversations, with Blair offering to meet Sarkozy at a venue to
be determined. Once it became clear that it would be Paris, Blair also arranged
a meeting with President Chirac. The British were frankly surprised that Sarkozy
agreed to see Blair before Merkel, although Sarkozy’s trip to Berlin would be
his first official visit. Noting that it was a pity that French and British
timing were not in synch -- Blair would be leaving as Sarkozy arrived -- the
meeting also made sense as a way for the British to make up for the fact that
their government would change in a few weeks, and thus would “fall behind” other
European countries in engaging with the new French government. Sarkozy was
accompanied at the meeting by likely PM Francois Fillon and Sarkozy’s chief of
staff, David Martinon (to be the Presidential spokesman). The interpreter who
came was not needed: as is customary, theirmeeting was entirely in French.
PARIS 00001938 003 OF 003
SARKOZY-BLAIR, -MERKEL, -BROWN
------------------------------
¶11. (C) Hitchens said the chemistry between Blair and Sarkozy was good, much
because they related to each other as politicos. Over the years, they have
enjoyed comparing notes on party organization, how to work with labor and
business, and how to appeal to the extremes. (Note: The suggestion was that
Sarkozy may have learned quite a little from Blair on this score.) Hitchens
noted that Sarkozy also traveled frequently to London with his wife for personal
reasons. Hitchens suggested that, while Blair and Merkel talked frequently,
their different personalities (she was far less outgoing) made for a more
distant relationship. But Blair had great respect for her, based on the
“brilliant hand” she had played during the EU’s budget discussions. Hitchens
hinted that Sarkozy would not immediately get on as well with Brown as he had
Blair, if only because Brown did not speak French.
MEETING WITH CHIRAC
-------------------
¶12. (C) Hitchens described Blair’s meeting with Chirac as uneventful. Chirac
spoke as an old friend, noting that the UK and France sometimes differed while
praising their cooperation on climate change and Africa. Hitchens noted that
Blair and Chirac would probably continue to cross each other’s paths in the
future, as both of them were setting up foundations to deal with these same
issues.
Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at:
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS1995, THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 6 MEETING WITH

FRENCH
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO9311
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017

TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO ECON SENV AF IQ RS TU PGOV
YI, UNO, IR, LE
SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 6 MEETING WITH FRENCH
PRESIDENT SARKOZY
REF: A. PARIS 1844

¶B. PARIS 1871
Classified By: CDA Thomas J. White for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) The meeting between the President and French

President Nicolas Sarkozy in Heiligendamm June 6 will be
their first official encounter since then-Interior Minister
Sarkozy met briefly with the President on September 12, 2006.
The two presidents will meet on the same day that Defense
Secretary Gates and new French Defense Minister Herve Morin
SIPDIS
commemorate D-Day on the beaches of Normandy. France's new
President -- who has promised France's citizens that he will
say what he will do and do what he has said -- has declared
that improving France's relationship with the United States
is one of his top priorities. We should take him at his word
and seek to exploit this opening to reinvigorate our
strategic relationship with France, since close cooperation
with France -- bilaterally, within NATO, at the UNSC, and
through the EU -- is a key force multiplier.
¶2. (C) That said, we will need to take into account the fact
that Sarkozy was elected President primarily with a mandate
for domestic reform. He will devote his first weeks and
months in office to delivering on his promises and
implementing that mandate. Even if Sarkozy handily wins the
June legislative elections, as currently expected, he will
face vigorous opposition from those with entrenched
interests, including unions and the coalition of students and
their parents who fear a loss of France's vaunted social
protections. In the foreign policy arena, as was made clear
in his May 16 meeting with German Chancellor Merkel on the
same day he assumed office, Sarkozy will focus in the short
term on the run-up to the June 21-22 EU Council meeting as a
means of finally re-imparting institutional momentum
following the French and Dutch rejection of the EU
constitutional treaty.
¶3. (C) The President will want to welcome Sarkozy's election

and the possibilities it represents for reforming and
re-energizing France and Europe, while acknowledging the
challenges that Sarkozy faces in the years ahead. Sarkozy
greatly enjoys political strategizing (the basis of his close
relationship with UK PM Blair), and can be expected to talk
at some length about his strategy of moving toward the
center, winning the upcoming legislative elections, and
pushing through an ambitious reform program in his first
months of office.
¶4. (C) The President should also welcome Sarkozy's

commitment to a U.S.-French relationship based on mutual
confidence and candor, and will want to address Sarkozy's
desire for frequent contact on the full range of issues. We
should suggest that NSA Hadley would hope to have the same
kind of close relationship with Sarkozy's diplomatic advisor,
Jean-David Levitte, and seek Sarkozy's agreement that they be
mandated to begin a quiet dialogue on how we might
reinvigorate the U.S.-French strategic relationship,
including through a larger and more positive French
leadership role within NATO. The President can assure
Sarkozy that this would not be at the expense of the EU -- we
do not see this as zero-sum -- but that we are striving for a
win-win outcome for both organizations.
¶5. (C) We believe it is essential for the President to raise

two issues in this initial meeting, Afghanistan and Iraq. On
Afghanistan, France has been sending mixed signals. MFA
Political Director Araud has counseled us to try early on to
move Sarkozy away from Chirac's pessimistic view of
Afghanistan, and lay the basis for a more activist,
multifaceted French effort there. Unfortunately, in
responding to the Taliban hostage-taking of a French NGO
worker, Sarkozy suggested that a long-term French presence
would not be "decisive," implying that he would consider
reducing France's commitments. Although we have since been
assured by Levitte that French policy has not changed, we
believe it is essential to obtain that commitment from
Sarkozy himself. NATO/ISAF requires France's continuing
engagement; as with Bosnia or Kosovo, when it comes to the
Alliance it must remain "in together and out together."
¶6. (C) On Iraq, Sarkozy recognizes that an American defeat

is also a defeat for Europe, and he told the President that
he would "help get the U.S. out of Iraq." We take for
granted that, at a minimum, this means that the needling
PARIS 00001995 002 OF 002

rhetoric of the past will be dropped, including repeated
calls to offer a "horizon" for an eventual troop withdrawal.
Beyond that, it is extremely unlikely that France would put
troops on the ground, but the President should seek a new
level of engagement that could be demonstrated, for example,
by visibly working with Arab governments in support of a
political settlement in Iraq. France could also raise the
level of its representation at, and support for, the regional
conferences with Iraq's neighbors now underway.
¶7. (C) Sarkozy is likely to have two priority issues of his

own to raise, climate change and Darfur. On the first,
Sarkozy signaled during his election victory speech that
climate change was his top priority, and he called on the
U.S. to "take the lead" in the fight against global warming.
Sarkozy has stopped short of calling on the U.S. to join
Kyoto, but he publicly advocates the idea of a carbon tax on
imports from non-Kyoto signatories as a means of defending
Europe's CO2 emissions trading system (ETS). The President
should express our interest in enhancing collaboration on
climate change with France, with a view to greater
cooperation on a positive science and technology agenda.
¶8. (C) Darfur is likely to be a high-profile issue for

Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister, former UN Kosovo Czar, NGO
(Doctors Without Borders) activist, and human rights
interventionist Bernard Kouchner, which would permit the
Sarkozy government to put more of a human rights stamp on its
foreign policy. (Sarkozy has himself called for greater
human rights emphasis in French foreign policy: he has been
sharply critical of Russia on Chechnya, and opposes the
lifting of the EU arms embargo on China, on human rights
grounds.) The President should assure Sarkozy of our desire
to work closely with Sarkozy Darfur, with the aim of
reproducing the kind of success we have had together on
Lebanon.
¶9. (C) As time permits, we would recommend that the

President touch on the need to maintain continuity on
U.S.-French cooperation on Lebanon/Syria and Iran, including
the need to ratchet up sanctions and reinforce them outside
the UN framework if necessary. The President should also
stress the importance of maintaining Western unity on Kosovo
in the face of Russian opposition. This might offer a chance
for a brief exchange on Russia more generally, including on
missile defense, and lead to a brief assessment by Sarkozy's
assessment of EU-Russia relations. (Sarkozy has a much more
critical view of Russia than did Chirac.)
¶10. (C) Finally, Sarkozy's opposition to Turkish entry into

the EU is public and likely unshakeable: it is one of his
few defining foreign policy issues. He has heard our
strategic rationale for bringing Turkey into the EU, but has
made clear that whatever the ramifications of keeping Turkey
out, he opposes bringing 70 million Muslims into Europe,
further diluting its identity and exacerbating France's own
sensitive immigration issue (although he puts his argument in
terms of "Turkey is in Asia Minor, not Europe.") The
President, while noting that this is an issue that only the
EU can decide, should nonetheless seek to persuade Sarkozy to
avoid any early or dramatic closing of the door; not taking a
decision at this time would allow the accession negotiations
so indispensable to Turkey's own internal reforms to proceed
uninterrupted.

WHITE
Viewing cable 07PARIS2027, THE FILLON GOVERNMENT, SARKOZY'S

REFORM TEAM, NAMED
Discussing cables
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AND EB
E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: THE FILLON GOVERNMENT, SARKOZY'S REFORM TEAM, NAMED
REF: A. (A) PARIS 1817 AND PREVIOUS
¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORT FOR MAY 18

¶C. 2007 AND PREVIOUS
PARIS 00002027 001.2 OF 007
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- HANDLE ACCORDINGLY
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Intent on maintaining the momentum for reform,
President Sarkozy moved quickly following his inauguration
May 16 (ref B). Sarkozy named his administration's first
Prime Minster, Francois Fillon the following day, May 17,
then immediately named the line-up of the Fillon government
on May 18. The new government includes major figures from
the wing of Sarkozy's own Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)
party that opposed Sarkozy's nomination as the party's
presidential candidate, from the opposition Socialist Party
(PS) (Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner) and from the
centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF) party (Defense
Minister Herve Morin). The Fillon government ministerial team
is the fruit of Sarkozy's outreach efforts across the
political spectrum in the days immediately following his
election (ref A). Sarkozy -- very confident that the UMP
will keep its parliamentary majority following the upcoming
June 10 and 17 legislative elections -- may well be
accelerating his plans to implement reforms; the newly named
government is designed to reflect multi-partisan
responsibility for the upcoming reform effort, which will be
actively, personally directed by Sarkozy himself. END
SUMMARY.
BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT NAMED QUICKLY

-----------------------------------
¶2. (U) As expected, President Nicolas Sarkozy -- after
naming Francois Fillon on May 17 the Sarkozy administration's
first prime minister -- immediately also named the members of
the Fillon government. On May 18, Claude Gueant, the new
Secretary General of the Elysee Palace who served as
SIPDIS
Sarkozy's campaign manager during the presidential race,
announced the composition of the new government (for list
names and bio info see paras 7 - 32 below). This government
is the result of 1) Sarkozy's early decision to name Fillon
PM (ref B), as all UMP electoral projections kept indicating
a very likely Sarkozy victory; and 2) Sarkozy's unexpected
outreach efforts across the political spectrum in the days
following his May 10 election victory (ref A).
"SARKOZY'S REFORM TEAM"

-----------------------
¶3. (U) This government is "Sarkozy's reform team," with
Fillon in the role of executive officer. All indications are
that the UMP will keep its current majority in the National
Assembly in the upcoming June 10 and 17 legislative
elections. The composition of this government -- which
includes prominent members from the formerly anti-Sarkozy
faction of the UMP (Juppe and Alliot-Marie) and a member from
the opposition Socialist Party (PS) Kouchner) and one from
the centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF) party (Morin)--
is designed to add the "multi-partisan, unity government"
card to Sarkozy's already very strong hand (a mandate-giving
victory and a new parliamentary majority) for pursuing his
reform agenda. On the reform implementation front, all
indications are that Sarkozy plans to keep up the pace he as
set not only in naming his administration's first government
in record time, but also in naming a government that, in
effect, significantly restructures France's executive branch.
FOUR FACETS OF RESTRUCTURING

-----------------------------
¶4. (SBU) As promised, the number of ministries has been
reduced to 15, driving a re-structuring of functions that
divides the large and un-agile mega-ministries of economy and
interior each into two "new" ministries. Sarkozy's
restructuring also includes the creation of a "super
ministry" of Ecology and Sustainable Development. It also
overtly moves foreign policy direction to the Elysee. The
economy ministry has been split into a pro-active Ministry of
Economy, Finance and Employment under former Social
Solidarity Minister Jean-Louis Borloo, and a more
accounting-oriented Ministry of Budget, Public Accounting and
Civil Service under UMP parliamentarian Eric Woerth. The
PARIS 00002027 002.2 OF 007
core interior ministry security functions remain in an

Interior Ministry under former Defense Minister Michelle
Alliot-Marie, as immigration and naturalization matters move
to a new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National
Identity and Co-development under Sarkozy's closest political
ally, Brice Hortefeux.
¶5. (U) Sarkozy's re-structuring includes the creation of a

Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Sustainable
Planning under former Prime Minster Alain Juppe. Juppe also
gets the title of Minister of State, which makes him number
two in the government after Prime Minister Fillon. With
regard to foreign affairs, Sarkozy has put policy direction
firmly under his personal control at the Elysee through a
far-reaching role for outgoing Ambassador to the U.S.
Jean-David Levitte, in a role similar to that of the U.S.
National Security Advisor. By naming Socialist Bernard
Kouchner (of Doctors Without Borders fame) as Foreign
Minster, Sarkozy has put an emphasis on humanitarian and
human rights matters in the mission of the Quai d'Orsay
A GOVERNMENT OF GENDER PARITY

-----------------------------
¶6. (U) Also as promised, the new government observes gender
parity -- seven of the new ministers are women. They are
Michele Alliot-Marie (Minister of Interior, Overseas
Territories and Local Governments), Rachida Dati (Minister of
Justice), Valerie Pecresse (Minister of Higher Education and
Research), Roselyn Bachelot (Minister of Health, Youth and
Sports), Christine Boutin (Minister of Housing and Cities),
Christine Lagarde (Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries),
and Christine Albanel (Minister of Culture and Communication,
Government Spokeswoman). Incidentally, the three top
officials in this new French administration, President
Sarkozy, Prime Minister Fillon and Minister of State Juppe
are graduates of the U.S. Government's International Visitor
Program (IVP) (Sarkozy in 1985, Fillon in 1984 and Juppe in
1978). It is also noteworthy that the two top officials,
Sarkozy and Fillon, are not graduates of France's elite
school for top civil-servants, the National School of
Administration (ENA). There follow biographical sketches of
the new government's Prime Minister (Fillon), Foreign Minster
(Kouchner), Defense Minister (Morin) and the government's
number two (Juppe), who is Minister of Ecology, Sustainable
Development and Sustainable Planning, and thumbnail bios of
the other members of the new government.
Prime Minister ) Francois Fillon

--------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Francois Fillon, a former Gaullist with a keen
interest in social affairs and defense issues, was named
Prime Minister on May 17, 2007. Fillon broke ranks with
former President Chirac following the UMP's crushing
electoral defeats in the regional and European elections of
¶2004. Fillon blamed Chirac's slow pace of social reforms for
that electoral defeat, and has since vowed to move quickly to
implement President Sarkozy's reform agenda. Fillon is best
known for pushing through a controversial reform of the
national pension system in 2003 -- arguably the most
significant reform passed during Jacques Chirac's 12-year
presidency.
¶8. (SBU) Fillon served in the Raffarin government as

Minister of Education from 2004-05, and as Minister of Social
Affairs, Labor, and Solidarity from 2002-04. Fillon is given
high marks for his handling of several politically sensitive
labor reform measures during the 2002-04 period, including a
de facto extension of the 35-hour workweek (by allowing
employees to work more overtime hours); simplifying and
raising the minimum wage; and passage of a controversial
pension reform bill. Several of Fillon's proposed reforms to
the education system, however, were watered down or withdrawn
in an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to mollify public
opinion in advance of the vote on the EU Constitution.
¶9. (SBU) Fillon served as a National Assembly Deputy from

the Sarthe department (in western France) between 1981-93 and
1997-2002. Throughout the 1980s and 90s, he was considered a
leading expert on defense-related issues and served as
chairman of the Assembly's Defense Committee during 1986-88.
He was among the few Gaullists to call for greater French
PARIS 00002027 003.2 OF 007
participation in NATO. Fillon also served as Minister for

Higher Education and Research during the government of
Edouard Balladur (1993-95), and as Deputy Minister for Posts,
Telecommunications, and Space during the government of Alain
Juppe (1995-97). Fillon's political career includes a
four-year stint (1998-2002) as President of the
Pays-de-la-Loire Regional Council in western France. He was
elected to the Senate in 2005 representing his native Sarthe
department.
¶10. (SBU) Fillon understands English, but prefers to speak

French. He met his British-born wife, the former Penelope
Clarke from Wales, when she was an English instructor at the
university Fillon also attended in the Maine region of
France. The couple has five children. Fillon has made
several trips to the United States, including a tour as an IV
grantee in 1984.
Minister of Foreign and European

--------------------------------
Affairs ) Bernard Kouchner
--------------------------
¶11. (SBU) In a surprise move, President Sarkozy has
appointed world renowned humanitarian Bernard Kouchner as
Minister of Foreign and European Affairs. Kouchner's
appointment to lead the Quai d'Orsay represents the
fulfillment of a longtime dream for the celebrated champion
of humanitarian causes. Kouchner has made a career out of
drawing attention to international humanitarian issues. His
numerous efforts include projects in Somalia, Bosnia,
Northern Iraq, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sudan, Ethiopia and Lebanon.
Considered a maverick among his Socialist Party colleagues,
Kouchner was one of the few politicians (left or right) to
openly support the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. An
experienced administrator, he has held three ministerial
portfolios in Socialist governments: as Junior-Minister for
Health (1997-98 and 2001-2002), as Minister of Health and
Humanitarian Affairs (1992-93), and as Secretary of State for
Humanitarian Affairs (1988-92). During 1994-97, Kouchner
served as a Member of the European Parliament. He officially
joined the Socialist Party in 1998.
¶12. (U) Appointed by then-Secretary General Kofi Annan,

Kouchner served as the UN's Special Representative in Kosovo
during 1999-2001. In this capacity he acted as a virtual
governor of the province during its occupation by a NATO-led
peacekeeping force. He had the power to levy taxes, write
new laws, and form a police force. Kouchner's appointment
represented a diplomatic victory for President Jacques
Chirac, who lobbied aggressively on Kouchner's behalf. Upon
conclusion of his mandate, Kouchner received international
praise for his competence, objectivity, and dedication. In
recent years Kouchner has unsuccessfully bid on two top IO
positions: UN High Commissioner on Refugees and head of the
World Health Organization.
¶13. (U) Kouchner has been active in aiding distressed

populations throughout the world since the late-1960s, when
he began working in Biafra and Chad. A gastroenterologist by
training, Kouchner left his Paris medical practice behind
and, in 1971, helped found &Medecins Sans Frontieres8
(Doctors Without Borders), an organization of volunteer
doctors dedicated to helping patients in disadvantaged
countries around the world. Following a rift with other
founding members, Kouchner set up Doctors of the World in
¶1980.
¶14. (SBU) Kouchner was born on November 1, 1939. Kouchner

has three children by a prior relationship. His longtime
companion, Christine Ockrent, hosts a news program on the
state-run TV network France 3. They have one child.
Kouchner speaks excellent English.
Minister of Defense ) Herve Morin

---------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) Herve Morin has represented the rural, 3rd
district of the Eure department in the National Assembly
since 1988. He is a member of the centrist Union for French
Democracy (UDF) party. Morin has been the leader of the UDF
parliamentary group in the assembly since 2002, and was
widely seen as the leader of the UDF parliamentarians who
PARIS 00002027 004.2 OF 007
rallied to Sarkozy once UDF leader Francois Bayrou was

eliminated in the first round of the presidential race.
Morin has been a close Embassy contact. Friendly and direct,
he is unabashed about his affection for the U.S., often
referring to his Normandy roots and the grateful memories of
the Liberation that he calls "our heritage." The French
press characterizes Morin as among the most Atlanticist of
all deputies. A relative newcomer on the national political
stage, Morin worked as an administrator in the National
Assembly beginning in 1978, and thus cannot be considered a
neophyte in the Assembly's corridors of power. He was a
counselor for parliamentary relations to then-Minister of
Defense Francois Leotard (UDF) during 1993-95, and also
served as spokesman and project coordinator for Francois
Bayrou's 2002 presidential campaign.
¶16. (SBU) In relatively short order, Morin became a member of

Bayrou's inner circle, largely by remaining a UDF loyalist
while other party leaders were defecting to Chirac's camp in
the run-up to the 2002 presidential election. In Bayrou's
2007 presidential bid, Morin filled a range of roles in the
campaign: coordinator for special communication projects and
point man for refuting UMP charges made against UDF
proposals. Morin understands some English, but prefers to
speak French.
Minister of Ecology and Development ) Alain Juppe

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶17. (SBU) Former Prime Minister Alain Juppe, once famously
described as "the best among us" by his mentor Jacques
Chirac, has returned to the national political stage to lead
a new "super ministry of ecology and economic development"
formally called the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable
Development and Planning. Juppe also gets the, largely
honorary, but coveted Minister of State title which places
him second (behind PM Fillon) in the government's official
protocol ranking. Juppe's high-profile appointment
underlines President Sarkozy's commitment to leading action
on global warming. In his May 6 victory address to the
nation, Sarkozy highlighted the need for the United States,
with France, to "take the lead" in the fight against climate
change.
¶18. (SBU) Juppe's appointment to a senior government post

represents a political comeback for the man once seen as
Jacques Chirac's likeliest (and preferred) successor.
Juppe's conviction, in 2004, on charges relating illegally
paid for political party staffers severely damaged his
political career. Juppe was given a 14-month suspended
sentence and one-year of ineligibility from holding public
office. Juppe was forced to resign from both his seat in the
National Assembly and his local elective office as mayor of
Bordeaux. But more importantly, his resignation from the
presidency of the UMP opened the door for Nicolas Sarkozy to
take over. During 2005 Juppe taught a year-long seminar on
globalization at Quebec's National School of Administration.
During his stint in North America he became increasingly
interested in environmental advocacy and, by his own account,
was greatly influenced by the anti-global warming campaign
directed by former Vice-President Al Gore.
Minister of Economy, Finance and

--------------------------------
Employment -- Jean Louis Borloo
-------------------------------
¶19. (SBU) Jean-Louis Borloo has been tapped to lead the
newly revamped Ministry of Economy, Finance and Employment
which now includes enhanced powers over employment issues and
economic strategy. A political maverick with a populist
streak, Borloo previously served in the Raffarin and Villepin
governments as Minister for Employment, Labor and Social
Cohesion during 2004-07. He was also Junior Minister for
Towns and Urban Renewal from 2002-04. In recent months
Borloo has overseen development of Nicolas Sarkozy's
so-called "Marshall Plan for the Suburbs," which seeks to
revive employment and education prospects in immigrant
neighborhoods. Self-assured, frank and quick-to-action,
Borloo remains a highly popular figure among the general
public.
Minister of Interior, Overseas Territories
PARIS 00002027 005.2 OF 007
------------------------------------------
and Local Governments -- Michele Alliot-Marie
---------------------------------------------
¶20. (SBU) Neo-Gaullist Michele Alliot-Marie has been named
to lead the Ministry of Interior, Overseas Territories and
Local Governments by President Nicolas Sarkozy. Often
referred to by her initials as "MAM" in the French press,
Alliot-Marie is one of the few holdovers from the Chirac
administration and was likely retained because of her strong
support during the campaign and, at least in part, because of
Sarkozy's desire to maintain gender parity in his new
administration. Alliot-Marie served ably as Minister of
Defense from 2002-07, becoming the first woman in French
history to hold that position. Known as a "hands-on"
minister, Alliot-Marie was well liked and respected by French
Armed Forces personnel. During her tenure she fought
successfully to prevent drastic cuts to the defense budget,
and made several visits to French troops stationed in
Afghanistan and Africa. Alliot-Marie also demonstrated a
sincere desire to maintain good U.S.-French
military-to-military relations, although she maintained a
problematic relationship with former Defense Minister Donald
Rumsfeld on such issues as European security (ESDP) and
coordinated European procurement (EDA).
Minister of Immigration, Integration, National

--------------------------------------------- -
Identity and Co-Development ) Brice Hortefeux
---------------------------------------------
¶21. (SBU) Long-time Sarkozy ally Brice Hortefeux has been
appointed to lead the newly created Ministry of Immigration,
Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. During
the 2007 presidential campaign Sarkozy said that immigration
reform would be a top priority of his administration and that
he wanted to create a single agency in order to consolidate
the administration of immigration policy portfolio that was
spread out among three different ministries. Hortefeux is
one of Sarkozy's oldest friends and political allies. He
served as Junior Minister of Collective Territories in the
old Villepin government from 2005-07. He was also a member
of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2005. According to
the press, Hortefeux and Cecilia Sarkozy, the president's
highly influential wife, often clashed during the run-up to
the 2007 presidential election. Hortefeux has maintained
close ties with the Embassy over the years, although in
private he has been a harsh critic of President George W.
Bush's policy in Iraq.
Minister of Justice ) Rachida Dati

----------------------------------
¶22. (SBU) Sarkozy protege Rachida Dati has been tapped to
serve as Minister of Justice ("Garde de Sceaux"). A lawyer
and former magistrate born to North African immigrants, Dati
joined Sarkozy at the Interior Ministry in 2002 as an advisor
on delinquency issues where she helped build up a network of
contacts and supporters among the immigrant community.
Impressed by her poise, intelligence and hard-driving work
ethic, Sarkozy later choose Dati to serve as a
co-spokesperson for his presidential campaign. Her political
experience began in 1995 when she joined the staff of the
Education Ministry. From 1997-99 she worked in the justice
ministry as an internal auditor, before being named a
magistrate at a criminal court in a town called Peronne. In
2001 she was named acting magistrate at the criminal court in
Evry, a suburb of Paris, where she specialized in financial
crime cases. Dati was born on November 27, 1965 in
Saint-Remy, France. Dati's Moroccan immigrant parents were
poor; hers is an up-from-poverty success story made possible
by hard work and free public education. She holds an
economic science degree from the Higher School of Business
(1993) and later took a masters in law (1996). She graduated
from the National School of Magistrates in 1997. Dati is
unmarried. Dati does not speak English.
Minister of Labor, Social Relations

------------------------------------
and Solidarity ) Xavier Bertrand
--------------------------------
¶23. (SBU) President Nicolas Sarkozy has named UMP rising
star Xavier Bertrand to lead the newly created Ministry of
Labor, Social Relations and Solidarity. A formidable
PARIS 00002027 006.2 OF 007

debater, Bertrand served admirably as one of Sarkozy's
spokespersons during the 2007 presidential campaign. A
relative newcomer on the national political scene, Bertrand
served in the Raffarin government as State Secretary for
Social Security from April 2004 to June 2005. During this
period he was responsible for negotiating with union and
employer representatives regarding the reform of France's
nearly-bankrupt health insurance system. In recognition for
his successful efforts, Bertrand was then promoted to
Minister of Health and Solidarity when Dominique de Villepin
took over the reigns of government in 2005. He resigned for
the government on March 26, 2007 in order to devote himself
full-time to Sarkozy's presidential campaign.
¶24. (SBU) Bertrand is a hard-working detail-oriented

administrator. As Health Minister, Bertrand worked closely
with U.S. officials to develop plans to cope with the
emerging Bird Flu threat. In 2006 he requested assistance
from visiting U.S. officials to help contain the Chikungunya
epidemic on Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean. Bertrand
later praised American contributions to the containment
effort, saying American assistance accelerated the
development and distribution of an effective vaccine.
Minister of Education ) Xavier Darcos

-------------------------------------
¶25. (SBU) UMP deputy Xavier Darcos has been named Minister
of Education. Darcos served as Junior Minister for
Cooperation, International Development and Francophone
Affairs from 2004-05, and as Junior Minister for Primary and
Secondary Education from 2002-04. A former senator from the
Dordogne region in southwestern France (1997-2002), Darcos
was not particularly close to former President Jacques Chirac
and hence was not kept on when the government of Dominique de
Villepin was formed in June 2005. He does not speak English.
Minister for Higher Education

------------------------------
and Research ) Valerie Pecresse
-------------------------------
¶26. (SBU) UMP deputy Valerie Pecresse has been named
Minister for Higher Education and Research. Plucky and
combative, Pecresse has served as spokesperson for the UMP
political party since 2004 and regularly appears on TV and
radio political debate programs. She was elected to the
National Assembly representing Versailles-Chevreuse
(Yvelines) in June 2002, and was immediately appointed to the
National Assembly's law commission. Pecresse played a
prominent role in President Chirac's 2002 reelection
campaign, where she was in charge of dissecting the
opposition's positions and preparing rebuttals for candidate
Chirac. She has been a member of the UMP's political bureau
since 2004, but does not appear closely allied to Nicolas
Sarkozy. However, her omnipresent and effective performance
during the 2007 presidential campaign likely assured her a
spot in the Fillon government.
Minister of Health, Youth and Sports

------------------------------------
) Roselyn Bachelot
------------------
¶27. (SBU) Roselyn Bachelot-Narquin has been named Minister
of Health, Youth and Sports. Bachelot served as Minister of
Ecology and Sustainable Development in the Raffarin
government from 2002-04. A long-time Chirac loyalist,
Bachelot served as the former president's spokeswoman during
his 2002 reelection bid. She was elected to a five-year term
in the European Parliament in June 2004. Bachelot served on
the European Parliament's commission investigating alleged
overflights of European territory by the CIA aircraft
transporting terrorist suspects. She has been a deputy
secretary general at the UMP political party since 2006.
SIPDIS
Minister for Housing and Cities

-------------------------------
) Christine Boutin
------------------
¶28. (SBU) Social conservative Christine Boutin has been
named Minister for Housing and Cities. Boutin as has served
in the National Assembly representing the 10th district in
the Yvelines department since 1986. Something of a political
PARIS 00002027 007.2 OF 007
maverick, she was first elected to the Assembly without the

endorsement of any party, but joined the center-right UMP in
¶2002. Boutin rose to national prominence for her opposition
to the 1999 &PACS8 legislation which provided a range for
civil union, tax benefit, inheritance and surviving partner
rights to gay and lesbian couples. After losing that battle,
Boutin ran for the presidency 2002, obtaining just over 1
percent of the first round vote.
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries

-------------------------------------
) Christine Lagarde
-------------------
¶29. (SBU) Christine Lagarde has been named Minister of
Agriculture and Fisheries. Laggard's appointment follows on
her successful tenure in the Villepin government as Junior
Minister for Foreign Trade from 2005-07. Lagarde's
performance reportedly made a favorable impression on
then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who was determined to
keep her in his future administration. An accomplished
lawyer specializing in antitrust and labor law, Lagarde
formerly served as worldwide president at Baker and McKenzie
from 2004-05. During the prior five year period, she was
president of Baker and McKenzie's executive committee in
Chicago.
Minister of Culture and Communication,

--------------------------------------
Government Spokeswoman -- Christine Albanel
--------------------------------------------
¶30. (SBU) Former Chirac collaborator and speechwriter
Christine Albanel has been named Minister of Culture and
Communication. She will also serve as the Fillon
government's official spokeswoman. Albanel served as
president of the Versailles Historical Site and Museum from
2003 until her ministerial appointment. A member the UMP's
predecessor, the Rally for the Republic (RPR) political
party, Albanel represented Paris on the Ile-de-France
Regional Council from 1986-1992 and again from 1998-2004.
Minister for Budget, Public Accounts
------------------------------------
and Civil Service ) Eric Woerth
-------------------------------
¶31. (SBU) UMP National Assembly member Eric Woerth has been
named Minister for Budget, Public Accounts and Civil Service.
Woerth represented the 4th district of the Oise department
in the National Assembly from 2002-04, before serving in the
Raffarin government as State Secretary for Reform of the
State from March 2004 to June 2005. He was reelected to his
old Assembly seat in a special by-election in that latter
year. At the local level, he has been Mayor of Chantilly
since 1995, and sat on the Picardie Regional Council during
1992-2002.
Four State Secretaries and a High Commissioner

--------------------------------------------- -
¶32. (U) Five other posts in the new government were also
filled. Under the Prime Minister's office: Roger Karoutchi
will be State Secretary for Relations with the Parliament,
and Eric Besson will be State Secretary for Strategic
Planning and Assessment of Public Policies. Under the
Minister for Foreign and European Affairs: Jean-Pierre Jouyet
has been named State Secretary for European Affairs. While
under the Minister of Ecology, Sustainable Development and
Planning: Dominique Bussereau is State Secretary for
Transportation. Finally, Martin Hirsch will serve as High
Commissioner for Pro-Active Solidarity Against Poverty.
WHITE
Viewing cable 07DUBAI355, DUBAI RULER DISCUSSES IRAN AND IRAQ

WITH SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07DUBAI355.
07DUBAI355 2007-06-03 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Consulate Dubai
VZCZCXRO3701
RR RUEHBC RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDE #0355/01 1541114
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 031114Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHZM/GCC C COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2461
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBAI 000355
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/3/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KNNP IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: DUBAI RULER DISCUSSES IRAN AND IRAQ WITH SENATOR LIEBERMAN
DUBAI 00000355 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Paul R Sutphin, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.

1.(S) SUMMARY. Senator Joseph Lieberman met with Sheikh

Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR), Vice President and Prime
Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, on 29 May. MbR voiced
support for US policy in Iraq, but expressed strong reservations
about the al Maliki government and its links to Iran. He called
for new elections to produce leaders who would work for Iraq's
interests. He voiced suspicion of Iran's goals in the region,
and their claims that their nuclear program was for energy
purposes alone. He recommended, however, that the US seek to
contain Iran through negotiations and diplomacy. Using force, he
said, would only help the current leadership stay in power. MbR
also talked about his ambitions for Dubai as a regional model,
noting "we want to be number one." END SUMMARY
2.(SBU) Senator Lieberman, along with the Ambassador, Consul

General, codel staff members and ConGen staff met MbR at the
Zabeel Palace in Dubai on 29 May. Joining MbR were Mohammad
al-Gergawi, his principal aide and UAE Minister for Cabinet
Affairs; Major General Dhahi Khalfan al-Tamim, Commander of the
Dubai Police; Brigadier Mohammad al-Qemzi, Director of the Dubai
General Department of State Security; Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed
al-Maktoum, head of Dubai Civil aviation and Emirates Airlines;
and a number of MbR's sons, including Sheikh Rashid bin
Mohammad, Sheikh Mohammad's eldest son; and Sheikh Hamdan bin
Mohammad, Chairman of the Dubai Executive Council and Sheikh
Mohammad's heir apparent.
Iraq: Any plan B?

------------------
3.(C) MbR restated the UAE's support for the US in the region,
noting "the UAE is the only country that is 100 percent with the
US." MbR said UAE support for the US effort remained firm, but
asked what is "plan B" should the current US approach not
stabilize Iraq. Senator Lieberman quoted the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as saying "plan B is to make plan A work."
Alternative Approaches: New Elections in Iraq?

--------------------------------------------- -
4.(S) Asked by the Senator for his advice on steps to move the
situation in Iraq forward, MbR commented that he has little
confidence in Iraqi PM al Maliki, and believes his loyalties lie
elsewhere, i.e. Iran. MbR suggested the way ahead would be
improved by new elections, which he believes would now yield a
better leader who is loyal to Iraq. Senator Lieberman noted he
thought that al Maliki and his allies would oppose new elections.
The Problem of Al-Sadr

----------------------
5.(S) MbR said that at the moment Muqtada al-Sadr is the single
most powerful person in Iraq; the US should act against him,
i.e. arrest and imprison him. Asked if new elections might not
yield a al-Sadr victory, MbR made clear he thought Sunnis would
now turn out in large numbers and that al-Sadr would not be able
to win - were the election fair. (Comment: Reflecting
commonly-held thinking by UAE seniors, he clearly implied that
al-Maliki had been elected through rigging in the last Iraqi
vote. End comment.)
Progress in Anbar Province: Look to the Tribes

--------------------------------------------- -
6.(C) Commenting on the improved security situation in western

Iraq, MbR voiced strong support for closer cooperation with the
tribal sheikhs. As has been proven, if the tribal leaders can
be co-opted to work with the US, they have the ability to defeat
or suppress Al-Qaeda. He stressed the importance of working
with the tribes without regard to their being Sunni or Shia.
Sheikh Mohammad on Iran

-----------------------
7.(C) Senator Lieberman asked MbR for his views on Iran and US
policies vis-`-vis Iran. MbR stated Iran is a large country
with great ambitions, a historic sense of its importance, and a
desire to dominate the region culturally and politically. Iran
has a long-term strategy for the region, and would like to
recreate the Persian Empire and spread Shi'a Islam throughout
area. Rehearsing themes often heard by US senior visitors, MbR
said Iran "can make trouble throughout the region" if it is
DUBAI 00000355 002.2 OF 003
provoked. While he suggested that Iran is the cause of the

deteriorating situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, he also noted
that Iran could make the situation in Afghanistan, for example,
"explode" should chose to do so.
Iran Promises a Peaceful Nuclear Program

----------------------------------------
8.(C) MbR told the Senator that the UAE does not want Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons. He said that during the recent visit of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the UAE that the Iranians had
promised their nuclear program is only to help meet domestic
energy needs -- quipping "how much can we believe what the
Iranians say is another question." MbR seemed perplexed about
the work of the IAEA inspectors and believed that they could
provide an objective view of the program. Senator Lieberman
reminded MbR that Iran has blocked the inspectors and they have
only been able to conclude that Iran will have the capacity to
produce enriched uranium on a sufficient scale to either
generate power or create a nuclear weapon within the next three
to eight years.
Negotiations - the Best Course of Action

----------------------------------------
9.(C) MbR and the Senator briefly discussed the recent meeting
in Baghdad between the US and Iran. MbR saw this as a very
positive move, recommending negotiations as the best way forward
with Iran. He said that threatening Iran encourages the Iranian
leaders to be defiant. Iranians are proud and the current
extremist leadership would not only endure, but benefit from an
attack by the US. Such attacks would ensure the continuing power
of the current government (note: presumable by rallying all
Iranians behind it in the face of a foreign enemy).
10.(C) Senator Lieberman commented would maintain the stick even

while it considered the carrot, and that the two carrier battle
groups now in the Gulf were sending a message to Iran. MbR
responded that everyone in the region knows the US is powerful
and can fight two wars simultaneously. He said that part of the
problem "is the way you (the US) talk." After making a demand,
"you (the US) should take two steps back before your next
action." Everyone in the region needs to avoid the dangerous
cycle of action and reaction. The Israeli-Palestinian problem
has worsened because actions are followed immediately by
reactions without thought.
11.(S) Brigadier Mohammad al-Qemzi, who heads State Security in

Dubai added that the Iranians are traditionally great game
players. He said that the US should play the game of
negotiation and diplomacy (to contain Iran) rather than engaging
in hostilities. Al-Qemzi recommended working for the longer
term, and believes that there will be a cultural and leadership
change in Iran -- over time, Iran would change for the better.
UAE Support for Counter Proliferation

-------------------------------------
12.(S) MbR reiterated the UAE's continued support of the US'
counter proliferation efforts in the region. Brigadier al-Qemzi
added that the previous day and in the previous week the UAE had
stopped Iranian vessels at US request suspected of carrying
goods proscribed by the UN sanctions regime. The UAE, he said,
would continue to work with us to stringently enforce UN
sanctions.
Dubai, the Region, and Transformation via Education

--------------------------------------------- ------
13.(C) Noting Dubai appeared to be a model of tolerance and

opportunity for the region, Senator Lieberman asked MbR to talk
about his goals for the emirate. MbR said bluntly "we want to be
number one." But, he said that Dubai has only taken the first
step on a journey of 1000 miles. He said that if Dubai plays it
right, the whole region can develop like Dubai.
14.(SBU) MbR indicated that Dubai has succeeded because it is a

place where all people can enjoy health, wealth, security, and
the opportunity to succeed. Commenting on his recent
announcement at the World Economic Forum in Jordan of a new $10
billion Mohammed Bin Rashid Foundation for education and job
creation (septel), he said "God gave us wealth and we must give
it back to the people in the region." MbR sees Dubai as the
leading city of a wide region and he commented "I am serving 1.5
billion [people] in the region." MbR underscored that education
is the key to regional modernization and moderation. In Dubai,
he noted, "we are trying to teach people how to fish and not
just giving a fish to our neighbor."
DUBAI 00000355 003.2 OF 003
15 (SBU) He also called for more US universities in Dubai, and

asked for Senator Lieberman's help in resurrecting the
possibility of the University of Connecticut building a sizeable
campus here (note: this deal was put on hold by UCONN leadership
after Connecticut state legislators and others objected to the
UAE regulation which prevents the entry of Israeli passport
holders).
16.(U) Senator Lieberman has cleared this cable.

SUTPHIN
Viewing cable 07PARIS2440, FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL SHARES VIEWS ON

IRAN/IRAQ
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFRA #2440 1581725

ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCE1074 1581702
O 071725Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/7/2017

TAGS: PREL FR IR IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL SHARES VIEWS ON IRAN/IRAQ
CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT,

REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: FRANCK GELLET, FRENCH DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR THE

PAGE 02 RUEHFRA2440 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002440
PERSIAN GULF, SHARED HIS VIEWS ON IRAN AND IRAQ ON JUNE 7.
GELLET ASSESSED THAT THE IRANIANS ARE OVERCONFIDENT AND
VULNERABLE TO A BAN ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL. HIS
ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ WAS NOTABLY BLEAK. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) OVER LUNCH JUNE 7, THE MFAS DAS-EQUIVALENT FOR THE
PERSIAN GULF, FRANCK GELLET, SHARED HIS VIEWS ON IRAN AND
IRAQ. HAVING RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A 15-DAY TRIP TO IRAN,
GELLET SAID THAT HIS MOST SERIOUS AND USEFUL INTERLOCUTOR WAS
FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS BEING
"LESS ROMANTIC" THAN THE REGIME'S OTHER FOREIGN POLICY
HEAVYWEIGHTS. GELLET SAID THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE IRANIAN
OFFICIALS HE MET OVERESTIMATED THE REGIME'S STRENGTH, BOTH ON
THE REGIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE. "THE IRANIANS ARE
CONVINCED THAT NO ONE -- INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- CAN
TOUCH THEM ECONOMICALLY OR MILITARILY. THEY SIMPLY CAN'T
IMAGINE THAT THE U.S. HAS THE CAPACITY AND THE POLITICAL WILL
TO LAUNCH A MILITARY STRIKE AGAINST THEM AT A TIME WHEN THE
U.S. MILITARY APPEARS TO BE BOGGED DOWN IN IRAQ," SAID
GELLET.
¶3. (C) GELLET SAID HIS OWN VIEW (WHICH, HE CAUTIONED, IS NOT
SHARED BY EVERYONE AT THE MFA), IS THAT IF THE EUROPEANS
REALLY WANT TO AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND IRAN THEN THEY NEED TO SHOW THE IRANIANS THEY ARE
SERIOUS ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. "THE IRANIANS WILL NEVER
BLINK UNTIL THEY FEEL THAT THE REGIME'S SURVIVAL IS AT
STAKE," SAID GELLET. HE SUGGESTED THAT -- IN ADDITION TO A
FURTHER SANCTIONS ON THE BANKING SECTOR, A FULL ARMS EMBARGO,
AND A CUT IN EXPORT CREDITS -- THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE
VULNERABLE TO AN EMBARGO OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. IN
ADDITION, HE SUGGESTED THAT WE NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DRAMATIC
ISOLATING EFFECT THAT A BAN ON INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL TO
AND FROM IRAN WOULD HAVE. GELLET NOTED THAT THESE WERE JUST
HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, AND SAID THAT HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED ANY
GUIDANCE FROM THE NEW PRESIDENCY ON IRAN SANCTIONS. HE
OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT SARKOZY TOOK A HARD LINE AGAINST THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM DURING HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT
SAID IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHAT THAT WOULD TRANSLATE INTO IN
POLICY TERMS.
¶4. (C) GELLET, WHO SERVED FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS AT THE
FRENCH EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD BEFORE ASSUMING HIS CURRENT
POSITION, HAD A PARTICULARLY GRIM VIEW OF IRAQ. "WE DON'T
HAVE THE SLIGHTEST HOPE IT CAN BE SALVAGED -- IT'S LOST," HE
SAID. HE PREDICTED THAT IRAQ WILL DESCEND INTO FULL-SCALE
CIVIL WAR WHETHER OR NOT MNF-I REMAINS. ON THE OTHER HAND,
HE PREDICTED THAT IF THE COALITION WERE TO WITHDRAW THERE
WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE AND HORRIFIC SPIKE IN THE LEVEL OF
VIOLENCE. "YOUR DEPARTURE WOULD BE SEEN EVERYWHERE AS A SIGN
THAT IT'S TIME FOR THE GLOVES TO COME OFF," HE SAID. HE
FURTHER PREDICTED THAT, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COALITION'S
DEPARTURE (WHENEVER THAT OCCURS), THE ENSUING CONFLICT WOULD
LAST MANY YEARS UNTIL IRAQ'S SUNNIS AND SHIITES (AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE PATRONS) WERE EXHAUSTED. AS FOR THE KURDS, GELLET
SAID THEY SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE RISK THAT THEY WOULD
BE ANNIHILATED DURING THE COURSE OF A CIVIL WAR THAT WOULD
LIKELY PULL IN MOST OF IRAQ'S NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING TURKEY.
¶5. (C) NOTWITHSTANDING HIS BLEAK ANALYSIS, GELLET ENCOURAGED

THE U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION.
HE NOTED THAT ONE COMPLAINT HE OFTEN HEARD FROM HIS SUNNI
CONTACTS WAS THAT THEY RECEIVED CONFLICTING MESSAGES FROM THE
VARIOUS USG AGENCIES ON THE GROUND IN IRAQ, AND WERE NEVER
SURE WHICH OF THEM HAD THE ULTIMATE DECISION-MAKING
AUTHORITY. GELLET FINISHED BY WARNING THAT OUR TRIBAL ALLIES
IN ANBAR PROVINCE WOULD TURN ON US WHENEVER IT SUITED THEIR
INTERESTS TO DO SO.
PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:

HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07ANKARA1842, TURKISH ELECTIONS: ANALYSTS ASSESS

MILITARY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7097
DE RUEHAK #1842/01 2001139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191139Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 1521
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3120
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 1293
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017

TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH ELECTIONS: ANALYSTS ASSESS MILITARY
CONFIDENCE IN ELECTION OUTCOME
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Experts on civil-military relations in Ankara

contend the Turkish General Staff (TGS) is satisfied with the
process set in motion by its April 27 warning and the
Constitutional Court's subsequent decision on the presidency
vote which brought Turkey to early elections. Analysts claim
that the military and pro-secular opposition parties, buoyed
by mass pro-secular demonstrations in May and June, believe
that even if the AKP emerges from July 22 elections able to
form a single-party government, it will be forced to accept a
consensus candidate for the presidency. Despite these claims
of confidence, the military continues to work to exploit
debate over a cross-border operation against PKK terrorists,
as well as press allegations that the US is either directly
or indirectly providing weapons to the PKK, to make the AKP
government appear weak on security. And of course there is
the possibility of a last ditch attempt by the military --
via public statements, policy maneuvering, or partisan
manipulation -- to sway undecided voters towards secular
opposition parties. Military reaction to the elections may
be affected by the TGS's all-consuming annual exercise of the
Supreme Military Council, which starts August 1. End Summary
¶2. (C) The crisis atmosphere following the TGS's April 27

warning, which led many to fear some kind of military
intervention, has been replaced by more traditional
politicking in the final stretch to July 22 national
elections. After public sparring with the government in May
and June over who would take responsibility for a
cross-border operation against PKK terrorists in northern
Iraq -- designed to show the AKP government as soft on
terrorism -- the TGS has refrained from public statements on
domestic political issues for the past two weeks. Chief of
Defense Gen Buyukanit and Deputy CHOD Saygun enjoyed
scheduled vacations on the coast in late June and early July.
¶3. (C) According to Ankara University professor Tanel

Demirel, the TGS achieved its primary short-term objective
via the April 27 announcement: preventing Abdullah Gul from
becoming president and ensuring a Constitutional Court ruling
raising the vote threshold for president to 367. The head of
the secular and nationalist Ataturk Thought Association
(ADD), retired General Sener Eruygur, pointed to the large
turn-out at pro-secular rallies in Istanbul, Izmir and other
cities as proof pro-secular forces are rising to challenge
the AKP.
¶4. (C) Several observers, such as Bilkent University

professor and military analyst Umit Cizre, identify the
pivotal moment in the AKP's relations with the military as
the private May 4 meeting between PM Erdogan and CHOD
Buyukanit at the Dolmabahce palace in Istanbul. Although
Cizre and other analysts are not sure what happened during
the 2.5 hour session, they conclude that Buyukanit and
Erdogan reached some understanding. Ankara University
professor Nuran Yildiz believes Buyukanit made military "red
lines" over the presidency clear to Erdogan at that
encounter. All agree that the situation relaxed considerably
after that.
¶5. (C) Analysts' views vary widely on the significance of the

military's April 27 internet warning that it was ready to
intervene to protect Turkey's secular democracy. Cizre and
Demirel believe the April 27 statement was both harmful and
unnecessary since the Constitutional Court was poised anyway
to affirm a 367 quorum requirement for the presidency and
thus defeat Gul's candidacy, precipitating early elections.
Yildiz and others, including retired general Riza Kucukoglu
at Ankara's Eurasian Studies Institute (ASAM), assert the
military has played its role correctly in counterbalancing
AKP attempts to monopolize all major power centers. Even
critics of the military's announcement, such as Ankara
University professor Bedriye Poyraz, believe that the AKP
provoked military intervention by blatant attempts to fill
ANKARA 00001842 002 OF 002
the government bureaucracy with its supporters and its

ill-considered nomination of Gul for president. They
acknowledge that, despite criticism of the military's
intervention by some intellectuals and pundits, most Turks
see it as natural, if not appropriate, for the generals to
make their political views known.
¶6. (C) Looking at post-election scenarios, most observers

with whom we have spoken tell us the military can live with
another AKP government, as long as the president is a secular
figure selected by consensus. The prospect of the AKP
cooperating with independent Kurdish deputies in order to
form a government is more controversial, as this would bring
together the military and secular establishment's two
archenemies: "Islamists and separatists." While Cizre
believes the generals could tolerate an alliance of AKP and
Kurdish independents as long as the president is secular,
ADD's Eruygur termed such an alliance a "nightmare" for
Turkey. ASAM's Kucukoglu asserted that the military would be
uncomfortable with independent Kurdish MPs, citing their past
behavior (in the early 1990s, the previous iteration of
pro-Kurdish MPs attempted to take the parliamentary oath in
Turkish and made statements that triggered the lifting of
their parliamentary immunity and eventual prosecution). He
claimed, however, that military coups are no longer
necessary, now that the majority of Turks who favor
secularism have found their voice.
¶7. (C) Comment: Despite analysts' claims of military

confidence, the generals are clearly working behind the
scenes, using ongoing PKK terrorism and the debate over the
necessity of a cross-border operation into northern Iraq to
portray the AKP as weak on terrorism. We also detect the
military's hand behind recent allegations that the U.S. has,
either directly or indirectly, provided weapons to the PKK in
northern Iraq. This is also designed to weaken AKP's
national security credentials and encourage undecided voters
to turn to "tougher" pro-secular parties. While the military
could roil the waters and make a public statement on the
elections at any time, its post-election reaction may be
delayed by the August 1 start of annual, and all-consuming,
Supreme Military Council (YAS) promotions and assignments
deliberations. End Comment.

WILSON
Viewing cable 07ANKARA1905, TURKEY: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF PRIME

MINISTER ERDOGAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO3114
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #1905/01 2071211
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P 261211Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017

TAGS: PGOV PINR PBIO TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER ERDOGAN
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Kelly Degnan for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Prime Minister Erdogan, chairman of the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP), is a perfectionist workaholic who sincerely
cares for the well-being of those around him, according to a top-level Prime
Ministry insider. His boss is very “democratic,” he said, but the overall
description sounds more like a benevolent patriarch who runs his domain
according to strict autocratic rules. While this is only one man's impressions,
they come from someone whose daily exposure to the PM lends credibility and
color to his comments. END SUMMARY AND comment.
¶2. (S) xxxxx provided a glimpse of PM Erdogan's personal style. Erdogan demands
perfection from himself and from those around him; he finds a way for even
perfect things to be improved. At the Central Decision-making and Executive
Board meeting after the July 22 election (in which AKP soared above even its
high expectations to win 46.6 percent of the vote), members expected Erdogan to
praise the results. Instead, he laid out the party's next goal of gaining a
foothold in the very few places left in Turkey without AKP representation: “Only
one and a half years until local elections. For AKP to be the party of Turkey,
we need to get Izmir, Trabzon, Tunceli, and (presidential palace) Cankaya.”
¶3. (S) The PM is a workaholic, xxxxx During the election, he traveled to three
provinces a day – a daily logistical feat for his staff in this huge country.
Erdogan is on vacation now for three days, which for him is a long time. Outside
of the election period, his staff routinely works until 11pm or midnight; they
stay in the office until they hear that the PM has gone to bed.
¶4. (S) “If you know the Prime Minister well, then you know he is very
stubborn,” our contact told us. Once he sets his mind to something, or more
importantly, once he believes in something, there is no dissuading him. He is a
very determined individual. He is also very skilled and influential in direct
personal relationships, which he works to cultivate with foreign leaders. As
examples, xxxxx mentioned his long meeting with President Bush, and noted that
even ice-cold Putin embraces Erdogan.
¶5. (S) The PM is a very fair person in his relations with employees. He
supports his staff; he takes interest in and the utmost care of his employees
and is attentive to their needs and concerns. He has a compassionate heart and
inspires tremendous loyalty, xxxxx stated. Last Ramadan, when Erdogan got locked
inside his armored car after collapsing from low blood sugar, his bodyguard
Halit grabbed a sledgehammer from a nearby construction site and smashed the
windshiel to break Erdogan out (Mercedes was apparently upset that it only took
him six minutes). Despite the fiasco, made much of in the press, Halit kept his
job; the PM viewed his action as one of true devotion and love for the Prime
Minister.
¶6. (S) Erdogan expects employee initiative. xxxxx PM's health, which he
described as “great.” If he were not
Ankara 00001905 002 of 002
in good shape, would he be able to travel so much and work such long hours?
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
Viewing cable 07HARARE638, The End is Nigh

Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07HARARE638.
07HARARE638 2007-07-13 10:10 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000638
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DEPARTMENT FOR P, AF, AND AF/S FOR MOZENA AND HILL,

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.
PITTMAN AND B. LEO; USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017

TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI
SUBJECT: The End is Nigh
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4b/d
¶1. (C) Having said my piece repeatedly over the last three years,
I won't offer a lengthy prescription for our Zimbabwe
policy. My views can be stated very simply as stay the
course and prepare for change. Our policy is working and it's
helping to drive change here. What is required is simply the grit,
determination and focus to see this through. Then, when the changes
finally come we must be ready to move quickly to help consolidate
the new dispensation.
THE SITUATION
¶2. (C) Robert Mugabe has survived for so long because he is more
clever and more ruthless than any other politician in
Zimbabwe. To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant
tactitian and has long thrived on his ability to abruptly
change the rules of the game, radicalize the political
dynamic and force everyone else to react to his agenda.
However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors:
his ego and belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive
focus on the past as a justification for everything in the
present and future; his deep ignorance on economic issues
(coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him
the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including
supply and demand); and his essentially short-term,
tactical style.
¶3. (C) While his tactical skills have kept him in power for 27
years, over the last seven this has only been achieved by a
series of populist, but destructive and ultimately
self-defeating moves. In reaction to losing the 2000
referendum on the constitution, a vengeful Mugabe unleashed
his QGreen BombersQ to commit land reform and in the
process he destroyed ZimbabweQs agricultural sector, once the
bedrock of the economy. While thousands of white farmers
saw their properties seized, hundreds of thousands of black
Zimbabweans lost their livelihoods and were reduced to utter
poverty. In 2005, having been forced to steal victory by
manipulating the results of an election he lost, Mugabe
lashed out again, punishing the urban populace by launching
Operation Murambatsvina. The result was wholesale
destruction of the informal sector, on which as much as
70-80 percent of urban dwellers had depended, and the
uprooting of 700,000 Zimbabweans. The current inflationary
cycle really began with Murambatsvina, as rents and prices
grew in response to a decrease in supply.
¶4. (C) And now, faced with the hyperinflationary consequences

of his ruinous fiscal policies and growing reliance on the
printing press to keep his government running, Mugabe has
launched Operation Slash Prices. This has once again given
him a very temporary boost in popularity (especially among
the police, who have led the looting of retail outlets and
now seem well positioned to take a leading role in the
black market economy) at the cost of terrible damage to the
country and people. Many small grocery and shop owners,
traders, etc., will be wiped out; the shelves are
increasingly bare; hunger, fear, and tension are growing;
fuel has disappeared. When the shelves are still empty
this time next week, the popular appeal of the price roll
back will evaporate and the government simply doesnQt have
the resources to replace the entire private commercial
sector and keep Zimbabweans fed. It may attempt to do so
by printing more money, adding even more inflationary
pressure on a system already reeling from the GOZQs
quasi-fiscal lunacy combined with the price impact of
pervasive shortages. The increasingly worthless Zim dollar
is likely to collapse as a unit of trade in the near
future, depriving the GOZ of its last economic tool other
than sheer thuggery and theft of othersQ assets.
¶5. (C) With all this in view, IQm convinced the end is not
HARARE 00000638 002 OF 004
far off for the Mugabe regime. Of course, my predecessors

and many other observers have all said the same thing, and
yet Mugabe is still with us. I think this time could prove
different, however, because for the first time the
president is under intensifying pressure simultaneously on
the economic, political and international fronts. In the
past, he could always play one of these off against the
other, using economic moves to counter political pressure
or playing the old colonial/race/imperialist themes to buy
himself breathing room regionally and internationally. But
he is running out of options and in the swirling gases of
the new Zimbabwean constellation that is starting to form,
the economic, political and international pressures are
concentrating on Mugabe himself. Our ZANU-PF contacts are
virtually unanimous in saying reform is desperately needed,
but won't happen while the Old Man is there, and therefore
he must go (finding the courage to make that happen is
another matter, however, but even that may be coming closer).
This is not some sudden awakening on the road to
Damascus, but a reflection of the pain even party insiders
increasingly feel over the economic meltdown. We also get
regular, albeit anecdotal, reports of angry and
increasingly open mutterings against Mugabe even in ZANU-PF's
traditional rural bastions. Beginning in March, the
other SADC leaders finally recognized (in the wake of the
terrible beatings of March 11 and the international outcry
that followed Q another self-inflicted wound for Mugabe)
that Zimbabwe is a problem they need to address. Thabo
Mbeki appears committed to a successful mediation and is
reportedly increasingly irritated with MugabeQs efforts to
manipulate him or blow him off altogether. If Mugabe
judges that he still commands all he surveys by virtue of
being the elder statesman on the scene, he may be
committing yet another serious blunder. Finally, one does
well to recall that the only serious civil disturbances
here in a decade came in 1998 over bread shortages, showing
that even the famously passive Shona people have their
limits. The terror and oppression of the
intervening years have cowed people, but itQs anyoneQs guess
whether their fear or their anger will win out in the end.
WHAT WILL THE END LOOK LIKE?
¶6. (C) This is the big, unanswerable question. One thing

at least is certain, Mugabe will not wake up one morning a
changed man, resolved to set right all he has wrought. He
will not go quietly nor without a fight. He will cling to
power at all costs and the costs be damned, he deserves to
rule by virtue of the liberation struggle and land reform and
the people of Zimbabwe have let him down by failing to
appreciate this, thus he neednQt worry about their
well-being. The only scenario in which he might agree to
go with a modicum of good grace is one in which he
concludes that the only way to end his days a free man is
by leaving State House. I judge that he is still a long
way from this conclusion and will fight on for now.
¶7. (C) The optimal outcome, of course, and the only one that
doesnQt bring with it a huge risk of violence and conflict, is
a genuinely free and fair election, under international
supervision. The Mbeki mediation offers the best, albeit
very slim, hope of getting there. However, as Pretoria
grows more and more worried about the chaos to its north
and President MbekiQs patience with MugabeQs antics wears
thin, the prospects for serious South African engagement
may be growing. Thus, this effort deserves all the support
and backing we can muster. Less attractive is the idea of
a South African-brokered transitional arrangement or
government of national unity. Mbeki has always favored
stability and in his mind this means a ZANU-PF-led GNU, with
perhaps a few MDC additions. This solution is more likely
to prolong than resolve the crisis and we must guard
against letting Pretoria dictate an outcome which
HARARE 00000638 003 OF 004
perpetuates the status quo at the expense of real change

and reform.
¶8. (C) The other scenarios are all less attractive: a popular
uprising would inevitably entail a bloodbath, even if it
were ultimately successful; MugabeQs sudden, unexpected
death would set off a stampede for power among ZANU-PF
heavy weights; a palace coup, whether initiated within
ZANU-PF or from the military - in which Mugabe is removed,
killed, exiled or otherwise disposed of, could well devolve
into open conflict between the contending successors. Similarly,
some form of "constitutional coup" i.e., a change at the top
engineered within the framework of ZANU-PFQs "legitimate"
structures could well prove to be merely the opening bell
in a prolonged power struggle. None of the players is
likely to go quietly into the night without giving everything
they have, including calling on
their supporters in the security services. Moreover, experience
elsewhere would suggest that whoever comes out on top
initially will struggle, and more than likely fail, to halt
the economic collapse. Thus, there is a good prospect of
not one but a series of rapid-fire Qtransitions,Q until
some new, stable dispensation is reached.
¶9. (C) The final, and probably worst, possibility is that Mugabe
concludes he can settle for ruling over a rump Zimbabwe,
maintaining control over Harare and the Mashona heartland,
the critical forces of the National Reserve Force and CIO
and a few key assets Q gold, diamonds, platinum and Air
Zimbabwe to fund the good times. Under this scenario the
rest of the country, in one of the comradeQs favorite
phrases, could Qgo hang,Q leaving it to the international
community to stave off the worst humanitarian consequences.
WHAT OF THE OPPOSITION?
¶10. (C) ZimbabweQs opposition is far from ideal and I leave

convinced that had we had different partners we could have
achieved more already. But you have to play the hand youQre dealt.
With that in mind, the current leadership has little executive
experience and will require massive hand holding and assistance
should they ever come to power.
¶11. (C) Morgan Tsvangarai is a brave, committed man and, by and

large, a democrat. He is also the only player on the scene
right now with real star quality and the ability to rally
the masses. But Tsvangarai is also a flawed figure, not
readily open to advice, indecisive and with questionable
judgment in selecting those around him. He is the indispensable
element for opposition success, but possibly an albatross around
t heir necks once in power. In short, he is a kind of Lech Walesa
character: Zimbabwe needs him, but should not rely on his executive
abilities to lead the country's recovery. Arthur Mutambara is young
and ambitious, attracted to radical, anti-western rhetoric and
smart as a whip. But, in many respects heQs a light-weight
who has spent too much time reading U.S. campaign messaging
manuals and too little thinking about the real issues. Welshman
Ncube has proven to be a deeply divisive
and destructive player in the opposition ranks and the
sooner he is pushed off the stage, the better. But he is
useful to many, including the regime and South Africa, so
is probably a cross to be borne for some time yet. The
prospects for healing the rift within the MDC seem dim,
which is a totally unnecessary self-inflicted wound on
their part this time. With few exceptions Q Tendayi Biti,
Nelson Chamisa Q the talent is thin below the top ranks.
The great saving grace of the opposition is likely to be
found in the diaspora. Most of ZimbabweQs best
professionals, entrepreneurs, businessmen and women, etc.,
have fled the country. They are the oppositionQs natural
allies and it is encouraging to see signs, particularly in
South Africa and the UK, that these people are talking,
HARARE 00000638 004 OF 004
sharing ideas, developing plans and thinking together about

future recovery.
¶12. (C) Unfortunately, among the MDCQs flaws is its inability to

work more effectively with the rest of civil society. The
blame for this can be shared on both sides (many civil
society groups, like the NCA, are single-issue focused and
take the overall dynamic in unhelpful directions; others,
like WOZA, insist on going it alone as a matter of
principle), but ultimately it falls to the MDC as the
largest and the only true political party, to show the
way. Once again, however, these are natural allies and
they have more reason to work together than fight against each
other.
STAYING THE COURSE, PREPARING FOR CHANGE
¶13. (C) If I am right and change is in the offing, we need to

step up our preparations. The work done over the last year on
transition planning has been extremely useful, both for
stimulating a fresh look at our own assumptions and plans
and for forging a common approach among the traditional
donor community. But the process has lagged since the
meetings in March in London and should be re-energized. It is
encouraging in this respect that USAID Washington has
engaged the Mission here in discussing how we would use
additional resources in response to a genuinely
reform-minded government . I hope this will continue and
the good work done so far will survive the usual
bloodletting of the budget process.
¶14. (C) The official media has had a field day recently whooping
that "Dell leaves Zimbabwe a failed man". That's not quite
how it looks from here. I believe that the firm
U.S. stance, the willingness to speak out and stand up,
have contributed to the accelerating pace of change.
Mugabe and his henchman are like bullies everywhere: if
they can intimidate you they will. But ther're not used to
someone standing up to them and fighting back. It catches them
off guard and that's when they make mistakes. The howls of protest
over critical statements from Washington or negative coverage
on CNN are the clearest proof of how this hurts them. Ditto
the squeals over Qillegal sanctions.Q In addition, the regime
has become so used to calling the shots and dictating the
pace that the merest stumble panics them. Many local
observers have noted that Mugabe is panicked and
desperate about hyperinflation at the moment, and hence heQs
making mistakes. Possibly fatal mistakes. We need to
keep the pressure on in order to keep Mugabe off his game
and on his back foot, relying on his own shortcomings to do
him in. Equally important is an active U.S. leadership
role in the international community. The UK is ham-strung
by its colonial past and domestic politics, thus, letting them
set the pace alone merely limits our effectiveness. The EU is
divided between the hard north and its soft southern
underbelly. The Africans are only now beginning to find
their voice. Rock solid partners like Australia donQt
pack enough punch to step out front and the UN is a
non-player. Thus it falls to the U.S., once again, to take
the lead, to say and do the hard things and to set the agenda.
Hundreds, maybe thousands, of ordinary Zimbabweans of all
kinds have told me that our clear, forthright stance has
given them hope and the courage to hang on. By this regimeQs
standards, acting in the interests of the people may indeed be
considered a failure. But I believe that the opposite is true,
and that we can be justifiably proud that in Zimbabwe we have
helped advance the PresidentQs freedom Agenda. The people of
this country know it and recognize it and that is the true
touchstone of our success here.
DELL
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2280, APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF

BMENA REGION WITH
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO3230
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2280/01 2071352
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261352Z JUL 07
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
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SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017

TAGS: PTER PREL KNNP KWBG EFIN IR IS
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the

President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC),
met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general
discussion of regional security threats. On the Iranian
nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about
the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most
other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism
regarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that the
Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued
for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC
resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from
Iranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, present
attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with the
Palestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyed
political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf,
and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the
challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------
Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran
--------------------------------------
¶2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting
with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions
against Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747
caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on
the Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions
had been particularly successful through their indirect
consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian
businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being
connected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG
cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic
problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.
¶3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the
Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" that
they have mastered the uranium enrichment process. The
reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they
are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something
they have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy in
Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the
Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of
supporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan's
view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian
leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but
there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a
retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new
policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength of
the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target
supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.
--------------------------------------------- -
Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the job
for them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of
affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief
accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "very
negative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of the
Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and
turning point for relations between the two countries.
Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of
urgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as
"a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoying
everyone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides --
Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and
some degree of independence. "I think you should remove your
bases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They have
confidence only because of the U.S. presence." Dagan
predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next
cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders
(specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps
to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally
responsible for its provocations.
----------------------------
Syria Taking Dangerous Risks
----------------------------
TEL AVIV 00002280 002 OF 003
¶5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an

Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of
readiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of
attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate
over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick
escalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance
with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views
these policies as both "successful and just." There is a
tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran,
said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening
Hizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: by
enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to
disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the
glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutions
would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried
for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continued
Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for
action by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficiently
frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies
in the Arab League.
---------------------------------------------
Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed

his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying
to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians,
"nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operations
against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding
control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah
would fall within one month and Abbas would join his
"mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what he
believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6
billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since
¶1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more
people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although he
expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that
the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as a
party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to
regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have
turned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chief
suggested that a completely new approach was required, but
did not provide Townsend any additional details.
--------------------------------------
Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns
--------------------------------------
¶7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour

of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to
combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by
radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as
his biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad"
groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in
possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not
care about the well being of states or their image in the
media. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in
power," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended that
Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the
right track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said
Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and
runs foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reason
Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was
that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regime
change. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more
serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly
dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical
Islamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues
"in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to take
little interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said that
Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the
region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down
the secular character of the state and could become more
radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military
received more direct support from the United States, it would
be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
TEL AVIV 00002280 003 OF 003
CRETZ
Viewing cable 07PARIS3534, FRENCH MFA "REFLECTING" ON

IMPLICATIONS OF
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO9415
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DE RUEHFR #3534/01 2361500
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IZ US
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA "REFLECTING" ON IMPLICATIONS OF
KOUCHNER'S VISIT TO IRAQ
Classified By: Political Minister-Councelor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso ns 1.4.

(b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: French FM Kouchner's visit to Iraq allowed

France to re-engage meaningfully with a wide range of Iraqi
political and confessional/ethnic leaders and left Kouchner
"moved" by the extent of destruction in that country. The
French MFA told us August 24 that Kouchner and his staff are
still "reflecting" over the visit as they decide how to
follow up. Kouchner's interlocutors received his message of
solidarity and desire to help with appreciation. Kouchner
also took pains to dissociate his visit from the USG and
denied any link to the meeting in Maine between Presidents
Bush and Sarkozy. The MFA denies Kouchner formally offered
to organize a dialogue among Iraqis and believes the press
has exaggerated the importance of some public musing on
Kouchner's part. France will reach out to the EU in support
of a new multilateral initiative. The MFA expects to be in
touch with the USG as well, although it may wait to see how
things play out in Washington in response to the Petraeus
report. The contours of French thinking should be clearer by
the time of the UNGA, which will be no coincidence given
Kouchner's desire to place the UN at the head of a
multinational effort for Iraqi reconstruction. One concrete
result of the visit was Kouchner's decision to proceed with
stalled plans to establish a French "embassy office" in
Irbil; for budget and other administrative reasons, however,
it is unclear when it will be set up. End summary
¶2. (C) French MFA Iraq desk officer Olivier Masseret

provided a readout August 24 of FM Kouchner's visit to Iraq
August 19-21. His main points, a number of which have been
made in the press, included:
--The visit was entirely at Kouchner's initiative and was in

no way tied to the meeting in Maine between Presidents Bush
and Sarkozy. Masseret recalled Kouchner's longstanding ties
to Kurdish leader and current former President of Iraq Jalal
Talabani, who had been pressing Kouchner to visit since
Kouchner became foreign minister.
--Making it clear that the visit in no way occurred at the

request of the U.S. or in furtherance of U.S. policies was
something Kouchner stressed with each of his interlocutors.
Masseret complained that it has been hard to shake the press
from the false but understandable impression that Presidents
Bush and Sarkozy had discussed or approved the visit when
they met in Maine. Kouchner also carried with him a copy of
an editorial he wrote before the March 2003 invasion entitled
"Neither Saddam nor War" to correct the misimpression that
Kouchner had supported U.S. military force to remove Saddam
Hussein.
--Kouchner's jam-packed schedule included meetings with

nearly every political leader and just about every
confessional grouping. Masseret indicated that Kouchner knew
he had some work to do rebuilding France's image. This
included dispelling the notion that France still harbors some
nostalgia for the days when Iraq's Sunnis dominated the
political scene. Masseret sought to correct the
misimpression that Kouchner only had contacts among Kurds to
say that this visit revealed to many for the first time that
he was well known in all the major ethnic and confessional
groups.
--Iraqi leaders responded well to Kouchner's core message of

solidarity with the Iraqi people's suffering, readiness to
listen and help, and commitment to turning the page in the
Iraqi/French relationship. There was some grousing about
France's policy under President Chirac, but even that seemed
pro forma. If anything, according to Masseret, the angriest
sentiment Iraqis expressed was that France had waited so long
after Saddam Hussein's fall to re-engage meaningfully.
--If anything impressed Kouchner, it was the absolute

devastation that marked Iraq in all spheres, especially the
economic and social. This fueled Kouchner's view, as
expressed publicly, that Iraq's ongoing crisis was not merely
a national tragedy but a catastrophe whose already dramatic
regional implications are only increasing. Masseret said it
may seem simplistic, but the visit was an eye-opening and
moving experience for Kouchner. In particular, the plight of
Iraq's Christians touched Kouchner because of the escalating
persecution they seem to face. (Comment: This was a point
Kouchner made in an interview on one of the nightly national
newscasts. End comment)
¶3. (C) Kouchner and his staff are now reflecting on the
visit and trying to figure out what to make France's focus
and how best to rally European and other international
support. Masseret dismissed press speculation about a
PARIS 00003534 002 OF 002
possible French-hosted gathering of Iraqi leaders along the

lines of the intra-Lebanese dialogue Kouchner initiated. He
explained that Kouchner did muse to reporters that France
would be open to creating a safe space for competing factions
to meet, but it was no more concrete than that. He denied
that Kouchner made the offer in his various meetings and
agreed that President Talabani's rejection of such an
initiative effectively took it off the table at least for
now. The bottom line for Kouchner, Masseret continued, was
that anything France does add real value and not appear to
another case of France off on its own pursuing objectives
that had no other buy-in.
¶4. (C) Masseret spoke of the UN angle, which is

symbolically and ideologically important to Kouchner. As
reported in the media, Masseret spoke of Kouchner's
insistence on arriving in Baghdad exactly four years after
the bombing of the UN compound that killed his friend Sergio
de Mello and many former colleagues from Kouchner's days
directing UN efforts in Kosovo. Kouchner further insisted
that his first official act in Bagdhad be the laying of a
wreath at the site of the bombing to honor the fallen. It
was not clear to Masseret how the UN will fit into Kouchner's
thinking, but press reports were right to highlight the key
role he will want it to play in any concerted multilateral
effort.
¶5. (C) How Europe will fit into French ideas for the way
forward in Iraq is a central aspect of evolving French
thinking. Masseret would not comment on press reports of
tepid responses by many of Kouchner's EU colleagues in
response to his encouragement that they follow his lead.
Europe, however, will be key should France seek to mobilize a
more robust UN presence and effort in Iraq. Although there
are no plans just yet, France will seek an appropriate EU
ministerial to discuss increased and concerted support for
Iraq. Masseret said that Kouchner will need to convince his
colleagues that this is not just another instance of France
going off on its own but something that has implications for
EU interests in the Middle East.
¶6. (C) Working with the U.S. is another subject under

discussion. Masseret said that Kouchner wants to consult
with the Secretary, as he did August 24, on a regular basis
but preserve France's independence. This includes its
ability to speak its mind when and as it deems necessary.
Agreeing that the visit arguably transformed the Iraq issue
from being a subject of disagreement to one about which we
could have a useful dialogue, the MFA will probably not have
recommendations on what to say to the U.S. until the current
"reflection" period ends. While not saying how long that
might last, he surmised that France will be ready to talk to
us and others about Iraq on the margins of the UNGA in late
September. Noting the release of the Petraeus report in
mid-September, Masseret expected it would inform French
thinking not merely for its content but also for its impact
on U.S. policy afterward.
¶7. (C) One area of U.S./French cooperation Masseret praised

effusively was the outstanding help provided for Kouchner's
visit by Baghdad Deputy Polcouns Rob Waller (on a one-year
TDY from his job as Paris NEA watcher). His role was vital
in ensuring coordination of security and other logistical
arrangements. (Comment: The acting director of the MFA's
equivalent to our NEA bureau echoed this point in a separate
encounter.)
¶8. (C) As a final note, Masseret confirmed tentative press

reporting that the MFA is now committed to the idea of
opening an "embassy office" in Irbil. He elaborated that it
would be lightly staffed -- a sort of "French presence post"
-- and not expected to handle consular duties (too few French
citizens in northern Iraq, no desire to take on visa work in
Irbil). When asked about the timeframe, Masseret was vague,
citing budgetary and other "administrative" issues that
needed to be worked out. Another problem arose after
Kouchner started informing his interlocutors of the office in
Irbil as Shi'a contacts pressed for a similar office in Basra
for "balance." Kouchner made a vague commitment to do what
he could, but Masseret stated the security situation in Basra
at the moment clearly ruled that idea out of the question.

PEKALA
Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2652, U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH

ISRAELI MOSSAD
Discussing cables
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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2652/01 2431245
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0441
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017

TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS KNNP UNSC PK IR IZ ZP
JO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
CHIEF MEIR DAGAN
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir

Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of
the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressing
Israel's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being,
(b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and
(c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are
unstable with unclear futures ahead of them. Dagan probed
for more detail about U.S. military assistance to the Gulf
states, and -- while signaling agreement with the U.S.
approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautioned that
they may not be able to absorb significant military
assistance. Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategy
concerning Iran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran is
economically vulnerable, and pressed for more activity with
Iran's minority groups aimed at regime change. Dagan urged
caution in providing assistance to the Siniora government in
Lebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.
¶2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangible

evidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed that
the U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included
-- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the region
for the long term. He described U.S. efforts to support the
Musharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition from
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the Gulf
Security Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facing
threats from Iran. The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. efforts
to isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing that
the U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track. He
shared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon,
and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult on
Lebanon. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on

security assistance could not have come at a better time, and
stressed that Israel appreciated America's support. The
Under Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the
U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiple
threats around the world, and that the Middle East is a very
dangerous region. He said that the MOU serves as a concrete
reminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term security
commitments to its friends, and is ready to help them with
their needs. The Under Secretary noted that the Middle East
is now at the heart of American interests. Because Egypt
also plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would also
renew its security assistance commitment to that country.
U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, and
America would stay true to those friendships, as well. The
Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed to
Israel's QME. He noted that the majority of systems and
equipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arab
partners would replace items that had been sold to those
countries in the past.
-------------------------------------------
DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in
the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the
fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another.
Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani
President Musharraf would survive: "He is facing a serious
problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability
could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime." Turning to
Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period.
There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and
Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability in
Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic
minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities,
and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in
TEL AVIV 00002652 002 OF 005
their lifetimes. As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federal

state comprised of three cantons or entities, one each
belonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.
¶5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are
concerned about the growing importance of Iran and its
influence on them. They are taking precautions, trying to
increase their own military defensive capabilities.
Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warned
that these countries would not be able to cope with the
amount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: "They do
not use the weapons effectively."
¶6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down
threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt
is struggling with the question of who will replace President
Mubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and
that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only
instability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees
Islamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, is
how long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defender
of Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.
¶7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough,

Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a
"very negative role" in the region. He observed that all of
these challenges have to be addressed globally -- they could
not be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as an
example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi
refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and
forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. This
is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan,
which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians
and the Saudis.
----------------------------------------
DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
----------------------------------------
¶8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan

said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "is
the right direction to go," especially as they are afraid of
Iran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in
the region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S.
security assistance to America's Arab partners. He expressed
concern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those
partners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Dagan
added that if those countries must choose between buying
defensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he would
prefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bring
them closer to the U.S.
¶9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now
is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, and
pointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying to
play all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S.
is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issues
from a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in a
unified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressed
understanding for Israel's frustration with how the region
looked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did not
engage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation would
become much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf states
focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approach
to countering it. Encouraging and supporting their
counterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said he
agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat of
radical Islam is real.
--------------------------------------------- ----
IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the
U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when
Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified
that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetable
is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considers
other factors, including the regime's determination to
succeed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time
to "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran
is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability:
"The threat is obvious, even if we have a different
timetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a
TEL AVIV 00002652 003 OF 005
nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort

ourselves."
¶11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of

five pillars:
A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran

before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit
of a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged that
pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone
will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable
for political action is different than the nuclear project's
timetable.
B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not

to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.
C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to

prevent know-how and technology from making their way to
Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.
D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had so

far been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the verge
of collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwide
impact. Iran's regime can no longer just deal with the
bankers themselves.
E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done

to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of
student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris,
Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.
¶12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded
countries must push on all five pillars at the same time.
Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due
time, especially if more attention were placed on them.
Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that
more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic
minorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and the
U.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and its
attitude towards backing terror regimes." He added, "We
could also get them to delay their nuclear project. Iran
could become a normal state."
¶13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can be
exploited. According to his information, unemployment
exceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages
experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30
year olds. Inflation averages more than 40 percent, and
people are criticizing the government for investing in and
sponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should invest
in Iran itself. "The economy is hurting," he said, "and this
is provoking a real crisis among Iran's leaders." He added
that Iran's minorities are "raising their heads, and are
tempted to resort to violence."
¶14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the
Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran. Under
Secretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help
SIPDIS
by reaching out to the Europeans. Dagan said that Israel is
already doing this, and would continue to do so. Dagan
reiterated the need to strike at Iran's heart by engaging
with its people directly. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts
are important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi are
needed. Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but
the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countries
to the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran. Russia, he
said, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russia
appears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globally
without considering Russia.
¶15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG is

focused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, but
also because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias in
Iraq. The U.S. approach is currently focused on the
diplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran through
sanctions. Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iranian
nuclear threat as one that affects international security,
and not just that of Israel. While UNSC members Russia,
China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressure
on Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctions
resolution. In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage the
Europeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateral
sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework. The U.S.
TEL AVIV 00002652 004 OF 005
will continue to encourage banks and financial institutions

to slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolate
it. Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted
that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in the
Gulf over the last six months, and that President Bush has
stated that he will interrupt Iran's activity in Iraq. As
for outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is now
broadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to get
more Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promote
people-to-people relations.
-----------------------------------------
PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
-----------------------------------------
¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is

losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is
whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
addition to his role as president. If not, he will have
problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary
Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in
American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is
committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support
Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.
is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
between India and Pakistan.
-----------------------------
LEBANON: DAGAN URGES CAUTION
-----------------------------
¶17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting

that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora
government would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel,
he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon,
and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessary
is finding the right way to support PM Siniora. "He is a
courageous man," Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah are
working hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what is
animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is
personal: "Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents
executed by the Syrians." This anti-Syrian sentiment has
forged an alliance based on personal and national interests.
Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan
suggested that the odds are against him. Under Secretary
Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as
much support as possible, and that we would continue to
consult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that he
would return to Israel in October.
--------------------
MEETING PARTICIPANTS
--------------------
18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meeting

were:
-- Ambassador Richard H. Jones
-- Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull
-- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Mary Beth Long
-- NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine
-- Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research
-- Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)
¶19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meeting

were:
-- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor
-- Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi
-- Two unidentified Mossad officials
¶20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on this

cable.
********************************************* ********************
TEL AVIV 00002652 005 OF 005
********************************************* ********************
JONES
Viewing cable 07BUENOSAIRES1888, CRISTINA IN HER WORDS: WILL

ARGENTINA'S
Discussing cables
2007-09-21 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
14:02 16:04 Aires
VZCZCXRO4533
DE RUEHBU #1888/01 2641441
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P 211441Z SEP 07
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001888
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2022

TAGS: PGOV PREL OVIP EFIN EINV EAIR AR
SUBJECT: CRISTINA IN HER WORDS: WILL ARGENTINA'S
PRESIDENTIAL FRONT-RUNNER BE A BETTER PARTNER FOR US?

Classified By: DCM Tom Kelly for reasons b, d.
¶1. (C) Summary. A well-briefed, confident Cristina

Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) described her policy priorities
to the Ambassador on September 20, a few days before she
departs for a five-day program in New York. Although she
defended GOA positions on controversial economic issues, CFK
expressed a strong desire to promote foreign investment,
increase scientific and educational exchange with the United
States, and "tell it like it is" with American policymakers.
The discussion's conciliatory content and tone confirms our
expectation that CFK will prove a more reliable, trustworthy,
and accessible partner of the United States than her husband,
Nestor Kirchner. End Summary.
¶2. (C) CFK met with the Ambassador for 45 minutes at the
Presidential Residence in Los Olivos on September 20.
Argentina's first lady and presumptive next president was in
full command of her brief, speaking without notes on a broad
range of topics. At one point, noting that she and the
Ambassador were reviewing topics that would resurface
throughout her New York trip, she said (referring to her
travels and speeches), "This is good preparation, but hey,
I'm already prepared!" She was gracious and relaxed
throughout, not rushing through any part of the conversation
and listening as well as talking. The meeting was CFK's
second with the Ambassador; in contrast, President Kirchner
has never met privately with the Ambassador. She also went
out of her way to ask the Ambassador to "send greetings to
Shannon," whom she recalled meeting early on in Washington
just before the Assistant Secretary was confirmed by the
Senate.
Paris Club: Willing to Deal "Without Preconceptions"

------------------------------------
¶3. (C) After CFK previewed her schedule in New York (ref A),
the Ambassador noted the great international interest in her
policy views. He commented that CFK's interest in the world
and willingness to countenance policy changes, especially in
the economic realm, were well-received abroad, including in
the United States, as is her evident openness to dialogue.
The Ambassador also mentioned issues that may well draw
questions from journalists, businessmen, and others during
her program, including prospects for a deal with the Paris
Club, the investment climate, prospects for inflation, and
the GOA's relationship with Iran and Venezuela.
¶4. (C) CFK replied in great detail on economic themes, but

refrained from commenting on Iran and Venezuela. On the
Paris Club (PC), she stressed Argentina's desire to reach an
agreement, but reiterated the current government's insistence
that a deal not be conditioned on a GOA accord with the IMF.
She said that Argentina's attitude stemmed not from a
anti-IMF bias, but from a conviction that IMF policies as
currently constituted are anti-growth -- and therefore
unacceptable. That is why, in her view, the IMF had
experienced a "serious loss of prestige in Latin American
societies." "If we don't grow," she continued, "we can't
pay. You can't collect debts from the dead."
¶5. (C) CFK characterized debt agreements reached by previous

Argentine governments as illusory, made by desperate
governments that never intended to repay. The current
government, and the one that she hopes to lead, sought to
break what she called "a cycle of lies" and restructure
Argentine debt without inhibiting growth. Such a
negotiation, she said, would need to occur "without
preconceptions," and both sides should come to the table with
flexibility and an open mind. She claimed that, during his
campaign swing through Argentina (ref B), French candidate
for IMF Managing Director Strauss-Kahn had expressed sympathy
for Argentina's approach and criticism of the IMF's track
record in Argentina. She acknowledged, however, that "he's
running for office, so maybe he was just telling us what we
wanted to hear." The Ambassador said that the United States
stands ready to engage constructively to move to a Paris Club
solution.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador mentioned the issue of bond-holdots

as another potential topic that CFK will face in New York,
noting that the U.S. bondholders are carrying out a
well-organized effort to win support for their cause. CFK
indicated awareness of the lobbying resources holdouts bring
to bear and their negative attitude towards the current
BUENOS AIR 00001888 002 OF 003
government. She said that she had encountered their

publicity campaign during her recent trip to Germany, and
knew they were active in Japan, too. At the same time, she
offered little hope that the holdouts would get a deal
anytime soon, noting that a law circumscribes what the
government can offer them. She told the Ambassador that "I
know this isn't what you want to hear," but said that
previous Argentine leaders would tell foreign Ambassadors
what their interlocutors wanted to hear, not what they really
thought or intended to do. She and her husband were
different, she insisted; they told it straight. CFK said
that she understood that Americans valued straight talk, and
she hoped that this quality would earn her trust and respect
in the United States.
Foreign Investment: Bring It On

-------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) CFK said that the GOA's main motivation in striking
a deal with the Paris Club was to entice foreign export
credit agencies to go back on cover in Argentina,
facilitating her plans to bring more foreign investment here.
She noted that foreign investment in certain sectors was
already booming. Auto companies, including Mercedes-Benz,
Peugeot, Ford, and GM were pumping tens of millions of
dollars of new investment into their plants, with many adding
new assembly lines and exporting much of their output.
¶8. (U) CFK reserved her greatest enthusiasm for Argentina's

progress in attracting investment in the information
technology sector as a means to expand Argentina's global
economic role. She noted proudly that IT represented the
fastest growing sector in the economy during her husband's
presidency. She expected great things from the sector in the
future. "We have great soccer players in Argentina because
our kids play so much soccer," she said. "Now they spend all
their time on computers, so I know that there's an Argentine
Bill Gates out there. We just have to find him." The
Ambassador agreed that this was an area of great potential.
He noted the significant U.S. investment in this sector,
including the fact that IBM is the largest U.S. employer in
Argentina. He also made a pitch for quick approval of Turner
Broadcasting's purchase of Claxion, a local audiovisual
company, which will lead to Argentine creations being
distributed throughout Latin America.
Playing Defense: Energy, Inflation

----------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Despite her expression of enthusiasm for foreign

investment, she was defensive about charges that the current
government is attacking foreign investors in the Argentine
energy sector (septel). She characterized Exxon's apparent
exit from the Argentine market as the result of a regional
draw-down in Latin America, and argued that "the energy
sector is a problem everywhere right now." She said that
private companies miscalculated domestic energy demand over
the past few years, failing to anticipate the government's
success in achieving extremely rapid rates of growth. Now,
there was little idle capacity in Argentina's energy sector.
The GOA, she insisted, was doing its part, presiding over the
construction of thousands of kilometers of new pipelines and
seeking new sources of supply.
¶10. (SBU) CFK was also defensive when she responded to

concerns that the GOA was manipulating economic statistics to
keep Argentine inflation numbers down. She said that there
were several biases in the way that the government's
statistical institute (INDEC) had previously collected price
data. She claimed that it did not account sufficiently for
seasonal variations in price data; collected food data in
posh food emporiums rather than in the modest groceries where
most Argentines shop; and focused on private school costs,
while the vast majority of Argentines sent their children to
public schools. She said that Argentina had revised its
inflation methodology six times since the 1930s. The
political opposition, she said, was behind the claims that
current methodological changes reflected a government plot to
understate inflation. She also blamed the opposition for the
growing warnings about electoral fraud in Argentina, which
she dismissed as "bizarre." CFK did acknowledge that the GOA
needs to settle with clarity the methodological issues as
well as to resolve the union problems troubling the
statistical institute.
Future Economic Goals
---------------------
¶11. (C) CFK returned to economic growth as the most
BUENOS AIR 00001888 003 OF 003
important objective of the government that she intends to

lead. She said that, if Argentina achieves positive growth
in 2007 and 2008, it will represent the first time in a
century that the country has grown for six straight years.
If its economy continues to grow at rates of five to six
percent for another decade, she continued, Argentina would
become "unbeatable."
¶12. (SBU) A key sector for the country's future, she said,
was tourism, an area in which her country had enormous
undeveloped potential. With the rise in ecotourism, the
wealthiest tourists were looking for unspoiled, safe venues,
which Argentina had in abundance. She noted that Argentina
experienced a travel boom after the Asian tsunami, as
tourists sought safer places in which to experience nature.
The Ambassador interjected that for the tourism sector to
achieve its potential, Argentina needed to address its
dysfunctional domestic aviation sector. She agreed,
identifying reform of domestic aviation as "one of our great
challenges." Without referring specifically to the
strike-prone national airline Aerolineas Argentinas, she
identified two specific problems in the sector: a need for
more resources and a conflictive labor environment in which a
handful of combative unions undermined all attempts to turn
the sector around.
Other Issues: Exchanges, TIP

----------------------------
¶13. (SBU) The Ambassador raised trafficking in persons (the

need to pass a federal law) and the importance of expanded
educational and cultural exchanges, especially among youth.
He asked for the Senator's support. CFK:
-- expressed strong interest in cultural and educational

exchanges with the United States, including an upcoming
Buenos Aires summit of hemispheric women leaders organized by
U.S. NGO Vital Voices;
-- told the Ambassador that Argentina "must not fail to take

advantage of your scientific resources; they're the best in
the world".
-- reassured the Ambassador that legislation to criminalize

trafficking in persons would pass the Argentine Congress
after the October elections "without any great difficulty."
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) The discussion's conciliatory content and tone

confirmed what we have observed in CFK's speeches and
gestures with increasing frequency: Argentina's presidential
front-runner seeks a rapprochement with the United States.
CFK seems to understand that a pragmatic, enmity-free
relationship with Washington will buy Argentina leeway on a
number of critical financial and geopolitical issues. At the
same time, this forward-leaning attitude is unlikely to
presage the next government's repudiation of the current
regime's nationalist, populist policies. CFK's defense of
GOA positions on the IMF, the investment climate, the energy
sector, and inflation numbers during this private discussion
suggests an unwillingness to break with the heterodox
policies of her husband. But even if the charm offensive is
calculated rather than heart-felt, there is no mistaking the
opportunities that await the USG beyond the Argentine
presidential election. CFK's conversation with the
Ambassador confirms our expectation that she will prove a
more reliable, trustworthy, and accessible partner of the
United States. That does not, however, take away from the
challenges we will face in forging solutions to such issues
as the Paris Club or bondholders' outstanding debt.
WAYNE
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD4085, MUSHARRAF TELLS DEPUTY

SECRETARY PAKISTAN IS
Discussing cables
2007-09-21 2010-11-30 Embassy
07ISLAMABAD4085 CONFIDENTIAL
10:10 21:09 Islamabad
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
Friday, 21 September 2007, 10:08

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS DEPUTY SECRETARY PAKISTAN IS
COMMITTED TO FIGHT AL QAEDA, TALIBAN
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
¶1. (C) Summary. During a September 13 meeting with the Deputy Secretary,
President Musharraf reiterated his intention, absent intervention by the Chief
Justice, to be re-elected before October 15 by the current National and
Provincial Assemblies. He explained the nature and required solutions to what he
described as the very different threats posed by al Qaeda, the Taliban and
extremism. He expressed frustration that the media and some in Washington did
not adequately understand the complex realities of these threats and were
questioning Pakistan’s commitment to combat them. Musharraf supported speedy
follow-up to the Peace Jirga by choosing the right people to participate in the
sub-jirgas. Musharraf also urged the U.S. not to undermine the agreement to sell
Pakistan F-16 aircraft. End Summary.
¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary, accompanied by Ambassador, SCA Assistant Secretary
Richard Boucher, and S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey met President Musharraf on
September 13. Musharraf congratulated Negroponte on leading a successful second
session of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue (septel). Musharraf outlined his
priorities as: (1) on the political front, to smooth the run up to his re-
election as president and then complete parliamentary elections; and (2) after
the elections, to focus on political reconciliation, good governance, sustaining
economic growth and fighting terrorism.
Re-Election Scenario
--------------------
¶3. (C) Musharraf said that he expected XXXXXXXXXXXX in attempting to disqualify
Musharraf as a candidate. He said that he could be re-elected in uniform and
before the current assemblies “legally and constitutionally.” The only question
is whether he will take off his uniform before or after he takes office again.
But it would depend on XXXXXXXXXXXX; Musharraf was hoping that he could engage
with him in a positive way in terms of the pending cases. Musharraf said the
process of the presidential election would require 18 days; to finish by the
October 15 deadline, the process must begin at the latest on September 27.
Musharraf reiterated that he has the majority of votes required in the current
National and Provincial Assemblies, but it cast a “moral” doubt on the election
if the opposition resigned en masse.
¶4. (C) On the deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Deputy
Secretary noted that the administration understood what had happened, but not
everyone in the U.S. appreciated the nuances of Pakistani politics. It was
important for Musharraf to be as inclusive as possible and ensure elections were
free and fair.
¶5. (C) Musharraf said that after the elections, it would be important to
include Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) leader Fazlur Rehman in the governing
coalition. Musharraf described him as moderate and pliable. It would be
important, especially if the agreement with Bhutto succeeds, to avoid the optics
of religious vs. non-religious political groupings, and Rehman can be helpful in
splitting the religious parties.
Afghanistan/India
-----------------
¶6. (C) Negroponte noted the successful trilateral meeting he hosted on
September 11 for Pakistan and Afghan Presidential Advisors Tariq Aziz and
Rassoul. He said he was encouraged by what he saw as the shifting attitude and
lower rhetoric of President Karzai towards Pakistan. He urged that both sides
name and organize meetings of the sub-jirga groups that had been agreed at the
Peace Jirga.
¶7. (C) Musharraf said he agreed and will go ahead with selecting Pakistan’s
group of 25 for the sub-jirga; these should be the “right” people with good
influence. But he suggested it would be even better to have a jirga with five to
six participants on both sides to lead their fellow tribesmen; Pakistan had
raised this idea with Kabul. The most important outcome of the Peace Jirga,
according to
ISLAMABAD 00004085 002 OF 003
Musharraf, was the Afghan recognition that they needed to talk to the
“opposition,” and this would be more successful with a smaller sub-jirga group.
¶8. (C) Musharraf asked the U.S. to intervene on one issue of real concern--the
“deliberate” attempt of Kabul and New Delhi to destabilize Balochistan. He
insisted that Pakistan had ample proof that India and Afghanistan were involved
in efforts to provide weapons, training and funding for Baloch extremists
through Brahamdagh Bugti and Baloch Marri, two Baloch nationalists, who were
living in Kabul. “We have letters instructing who to give what weapons to whom.”
Musharraf said he had raised this with Karzai, who replied “give me time and I
will address it.” Musharraf said he was still waiting. Assistant Secretary
Boucher noted that he had recently raised the issue with Rassoul. Musharraf
added “If India wants to continue, let’s see what our options will be.”
Negroponte asked if, after the elections, there was a possibility to move
forward on negotiations with India. Musharraf said yes, especially on Kashmir,
where the population was getting restless.
FATA: Al Qaeda, Taliban, Extremism Are Different Problems
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶9. (C) Negroponte noted that he had just received Embassy Islamabad’s briefing
on our plans to support the GOP integrated security and development plan for the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Musharraf said the GOP strategy was
good, but its application would take time and patience. Noting statements by the
media and some administration officials, Musharraf said that Pakistan did not
need to be told by the U.S. to take more action against terrorism because “we
know it is in our own interests.” He said he gives this message every day,
everywhere to thousands in Pakistan, and they are starting to listen.
¶10. (C) Musharraf outlined the differing threats of al Qaeda, the Taliban and
extremism. These, he asserted, were three distinct issues that too often are
confused by the media or “lower-level” U.S. officials who do not understand the
complexities of the challenge Pakistan is facing. Al Qaeda is in the mountains,
especially in North and South Waziristan and Bajaur, and the GOP is “trying to
deal with the locals to get them out.” The GOP is telling the locals to avoid
the trouble that comes with associating with foreigners, and there has been some
success especially in expelling the Uzbeks. Now, Musharraf wants the tribes to
expel the Arabs. The strategy is to do selected attacks and follow up with
political efforts; here, too, Fazlur Rehman can help. But the mountains absorb
lots of troops, so in the short-term, Musharraf has put a brigade in North
Waziristan and two more in the settled areas on the FATA border. At some later
point, the GOP will move troops into South Waziristan; the goal there was to
break Baitullah Mehsud and his organization.
¶11. (C) Turning to the Taliban, Musharraf said this was a different issue.
Pakistan could fight al Qaeda with troops, but the Taliban were being supported
by locals opposed to the foreign presence in Afghanistan. Military action
against these locals, explained Musharraf, would require “fighting against our
own people,” and this was very sensitive. So, the GOP was reinforcing the
borders and telling the locals they had no right to cross the border. This
problem required a combined military, political and administrative solution. On
the politics, again, Fazlur Rehman could help. Musharraf speculated, however,
that if Washington heard he was meeting with Rehman, he would be accused of
aiding and abetting religious extremists. On the administrative/development
side, Musharraf said he was reinvigorating the political agent system, building
boarding schools that could remove students from extremist influence, and
creating jobs in the marble and olive oil industries. Foreign Secretary Khan
reiterated Pakistan’s concern about including Article 347 and 348 on textiles
(cotton trousers) in pending Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation.
Musharraf noted that Pakistan was also expanding and better equipping the
Frontier Corps, Levies and Khassadar forces.
¶12. (C) Musharraf described extremism in Pakistani society as yet another facet
of the challenge, and this required
ISLAMABAD 00004085 003 OF 003
changing mindsets. He had attacked the problem in several ways. The GOP had
increased control over mosques, banning loudspeakers, collection plates, posters
and distribution of pro-jihad literature. The police now understood the
importance of this activity; there had been a 90 percent success in shutting
down these activities. Musharraf said he had banned 23 organizations (some
before 9/11), but they keep changing their names so this was a constant
challenge. He has had some success on madrassa reform by introducing new
curricula and registering 75 percent of madrassas with the government. The GOP
has introduced new secular subjects; 70 percent of the registered madrassas have
accepted the new program; and some have begun teaching these new secular
subjects.
¶13. (C) Musharraf thanked the U.S. for approving the five-year $750 million
plan for FATA projects but said that the projects and ROZs had not yet
materialized. Negroponte noted that we were making progress on the ROZ
legislation and had actually proposed more than $750 million over five years in
assistance. The funding process moves slowly, but the Pakistanis would be seeing
results soon. Musharraf replied that the perceptions were different in Pakistan,
and said that U.S. statements and the 9/11 Commission legislation showed that
the U.S. had doubts about Pakistan’s intentions. Why, Musharraf wondered again,
did the media and the U.S. believe he was playing a “double game” and not doing
enough?
F-16s: Don’t Violate Our Deal
-----------------------------
¶14. (C) In closing, Musharraf said that the Pakistan Air Force was upset over
what they felt was the U.S. undermining “by design” the agreement to sell
Pakistan F-16s. Musharraf said, “don’t violate this deal as it would
unnecessarily upset bilateral relations.”
¶15. (U) The Deputy Secretary’s staff has cleared this message.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 07PARIS3668, FRENCH MFA READOUT ON AUGUST 23

TEHRAN VISIT BY
Discussing cables
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DE RUEHFR #3668/01 2481250
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON AUGUST 23 TEHRAN VISIT BY
ELYSEE ADVISER RICHIER AND MFA DAS GELLET
REF: PARIS 3645 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosen

blatt for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The GOF took a hard line during an August
23 trip to Tehran by French presidency strategic affairs
adviser Richier and French MFA DAS-equivalent Gellet that
Iranian leader Khamanei's foreign policy adviser Velayati
hoped would open a new channel to Paris. Gellet explained
August 31 that Velayati was apparently operating from a
flawed premise that Nicolas Sarkozy would free France from
its "dependence" on the USG. Velayati further believed
France could be broken away from the P-5 over further
sanctions against Iran. Gellet said Richier previewed for
Velayati the line Sarkozy would use in a subsequent speech to
French ambassadors that the world faced a "catastrophic"
choice between Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran. Although
Velayati's hopes were shattered, Iran is still interested in
the channel; Gellet said that Richier has the lead in
deciding what the GOF will do next. Gellet expressed a
strong French desire to remain informed on U.S. plans
regarding Iran particularly should we decide to take military
action against Iran. End summary
¶2. (C) French MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the
Gulf Franck Gellet on August 31 provided a readout on his
August 23 visit to Tehran accompanying the French
presidency's strategic affairs adviser Francois Richier. The
visit followed an invitation from Ali Akbar Velayati, former
Iranian foreign minister and current foreign affairs adviser
to Supreme Leader Khamanei. Gellet confirmed information
that the French Embassy in Washington communicated to the
Department that Velayati wanted to establish a new direct
channel to Paris. Gellet elaborated that Velayati's
(apparently convoluted) thinking had been expressed in an
article he had written that took the view that the election
of Nicolas Sarkozy gave France a chance to break free of its
"dependence" on the U.S. in terms of its foreign policy.
Velayati, according to Gellet, believed that Chirac had been
entirely beholden to the U.S. during his presidency.
Sarkozy's election, therefore, offered Iran a chance to
appeal to France in a way that would allow France to follow
its independent line a la de Gaulle and thus pry France loose
from the coalition that now sought to impose tougher
sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.
¶3. (C) Despite this clearly flawed analysis of France's

position and political dynamics, the GOF decided this opening
was important enough to explore. Gellet recounted how he and
Richier met Velayati, heard him out, and proceeded to burst
his bubble. Richier, according to Gellet, told Velayati that
Sarkozy was firm on the nuclear issue and previewed for him
the line that Sarkozy would use in his August 29 speech to
French ambassadors that under current circumstances the world
faced the stark alternative that Iran would obtain "the bomb"
or be bombed. Velayati was not happy to hear this but did
not close the door to further discussion. Gellet surmised
that Velayati believes the French are still susceptible to
Iranian blandishments and wants to keep some sort of
alternative line open to the Elysee.
¶4. (C) Gellet stressed that Velayati's initiative was not

taken without reference to others in the Iranian government.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International
Affairs Abbas Araghchi sat in on the Velayati meeting just as
Velayati attended a meeting Gellet and Richier had with
Araghchi. Gellet did not indicate what other subjects came
up, but Velayati's pitch was the main one. When asked
whether France felt the visit had been worthwhile and what
sort of follow-up there might be, Gellet was vague. He said
that Richier, in his Elyse capacity, would decide what to
do, including whether to keep this dialogue going. Gellet
surmised that Richier would be willing to discuss this
further with USG officials, like PM A/S Rood, in future
meetings to discuss next steps in the nuclear fuel dispute.
¶5. (C) Gellet found the visit a bit surreal but quite
indicative of the bizarre way Iran functions. He noted the
diffusion of power among different entities and the
uncertainty that pervades Iranian decision making. Velayati
clearly sought to minimize or counterbalance President
Ahmadinejad's hard line but without actually taking a softer
line himself. Iran's core position, therefore, did not seem
to be shifting or subject to any flexibility. When asked how
France understood Sarkozy's either/or statement on Iran had
played in that country, Gellet replied that Iranian
authorities seem to have largely kept it out of the national
media. The implication that France sees Iran facing a
serious risk of military retaliation over its stance was thus
largely unreported. Gellet argued that this suits Velayati's
calculations because the impression remains that Iran can
PARIS 00003668 002 OF 002
somehow turn to France to blunt American pressure to impose

more sanctions and escalate the situation.
¶6. (C) On the issue of escalation, Gellet asked that the

USG keep France informed of its thinking as regards possible
military action against Iran. He claimed that the Elysee
worries about being blindsided if or when the time comes for
a strike. The timing and magnitude of such action, i.e., a
surgical strike or a more generalized campaign, could have
enormous stakes in terms of French interests. Gellet noted,
in this vein, French concerns about Iranian retaliation
against the Gulf States and their capacity to respond. He
surmised that a U.S./France dialogue, if it were to develop,
might occur at a much higher level than his. His hope, which
was personal as much as he said it reflected official
thinking, was that we would keep the French in the loop as we
moved into the next phase of high-tension diplomacy focused
on further UNSC sanctions.
¶7. (C) Comment: It appears that this latest Iranian

initiative to open a new channel to Paris is unlikely to
change the dynamics of Tehran's ongoing confrontation with
the world. The French seem keen to reassure us that they are
not wavering. President Sarkozy's tough words to the French
Ambassadors conference following the meetings in Tehran made
that point loud and clear. On whether to engage more
intensively with the French about the various contingencies
related to Iran, we believe we should continue to test
Sarkozy's apparent desire to deal with us differently than
his predecessors did. As an indication of different French
thinking, the newspaper "Le Monde" reported active discussion
in the Elysee of sanctions targeting Iran outside the UNSC
that France could impose alone or potentially with others in
the EU. The article made clear that, as "fissures" seem to
be appearing among the P-5 over Iran, France seems to be
toughening its position. We will follow up with Richier for
his take on this visit.

STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS3733, FRENCH ELYSEE NEA ADVISER RECOUNTS
TOUGH LINE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2330
DE RUEHFR #3733 2501830
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071830Z SEP 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IR
SUBJECT: FRENCH ELYSEE NEA ADVISER RECOUNTS TOUGH LINE
TAKEN WITH IRANIANS
REF: PARIS 3668
Classified By: Classified by Polmincouns Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons

1.4.(b), (d)
¶1. (C) Following up on reftel, Polmincouns and poloff asked
French presidential adviser for NEA issues Boris Boillon
September 6 about the visit to Tehran by French Presidency
official Richier and MFA DAS Gellet. Polmincouns noted the
stark phrasing in President Sarkozy's speech to French
ambassadors (indicating the world faced the choice between
Iran with a bomb or bombing Iran) and wondered what it meant
in the context of the visit. Boillon was glad we raised the
subject and stated that Sarkozy had wanted to warn Iran in a
dramatic and public way that it must cooperate with the
international community with respect to its nuclear program
or face potential catastrophe in the form of military action.
This did not mean, as some media were misinterpreting the
statement, that France would be ready to participate in such
action. Far from it, Boillon continued; France vigorously
opposed a resort to force and preferred to resolve the
ongoing dispute diplomatically.
¶2. (C) Boillon echoed much of what MFA DAS Gellet had
related in reftel when he observed that the Iranians do not
seem to understand the gravity of the situation or France's
position. They suffer, he complained, from a closed mindset
that he later termed "autistic." Boillon recounted in the
same terms as Gellet the origin of the Iranian initiative
from Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign affairs adviser to supreme
leader Khamenei, to establish a special dialogue between
Tehran and Paris. Even before Richier and Gellet traveled,
the GOF told the Iranians to "forget it" if their intention
was to split France away from the P-5 plus one. Richier and
Gellet repeated this message in Tehran and indicated that
France might be willing to speak of other subjects (NFI).
Boillon believed the level was perfect in that the French
sent senior working level officials well below the "political
level," whereas Velayati clearly was at the political level.
This disparity gave the French considerable leeway in terms
of the frankness with which they could speak.
¶3. (C) Boillon repeated that it was clear the Iranians did
not understand or accept the blunt message they heard. In
his characteristic candor, Richier told Velayati and other
Iranian officials that, absent full compliance, sanctions
against Iran will only ratchet up. As he previewed the tough
line that Sarkozy would express in his speech, Richier added
that France wants to avoid military action against Iran but
might eventually have to accept it as the only recourse left
to the international community to prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran.
¶4. (C) Boillon stated that the GOF had not decided whether
to continue the dialogue that Richier and Gellet had started.
Diplomatic contacts, nevertheless, continue apace, and he
pointed to a then current visit to Paris by Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs Jalili.
(Note: As reported by a staffer of KM Kouchner September 7,
Jalili had inexplicably not been briefed on Richier's and
Gellet's message to Velayati. End note) Boillon contended
that France had no problem pursuing a diplomatic dialogue per
se and kept its embassy in Tehran for just such a reason. As
Richier told the Iranians, however, there was no need for a
special channel if the Iranian aim was to pry France away
from the P-5 plus one. Richier was very direct that France
had no intention to deviate from the line it was on with its
partners. Boillon expanded his assessment of the Iranians as
"autistic like the Syrians. As with the Syrians, one must be
direct and not always 'diplomatic.'"

PEKALA
Viewing cable 07PARIS3956, KOUCHNER EXPECTED TO MEET IRANIAN

COUNTERPART AT
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM FR IR
SUBJECT: KOUCHNER EXPECTED TO MEET IRANIAN COUNTERPART AT
UNGA BUT NOT SARKOZY
REF: A. (A) PARIS POINTS 20 SEPTEMBER 2007
¶B. (B) PARIS 3668
Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Andrew Young for rea

sons 1.4. (b), (d).
¶1. (C) During a September 19 call on French MFA

DAS-equivalent for the Levant Ludovic Pouille, we asked
whether he had heard anything that might indicate FM Kouchner
or any other French officials planned to meet with Iranian
President Ahmadi Nejad in New York. Pouille shook his head
no on Ahmadi Nejad, but he stated that Kouchner is scheduled
to meet with his Iranian counterpart on the margins of the
UNGA.
¶2. (C) Although Pouille does not cover Iran, he stated that
posts throughout the NEA region had reported queries from
host governments about France,s policy in light of FM
Kouchner,s recent remarks about the possibility the
confrontation over Iran,s nuclear program could lead to war.
This had necessitated the drafting of &talking points8 to
be sent out worldwide to refocus attention on what Kouchner
said about the need to pursue diplomacy to the maximum extent
possible. Pouille (strictly protect) opined that Kouchner
had not for the first time allowed his tongue to get ahead of
his brain in terms of his public utterances. He has
struggled since to get the emphasis back on diplomatic
efforts to resolve the nuclear issue and to minimize the
importance of his reference to the possibility of war.
¶3. (C) We spoke September 20 to French MFA Iran desk

officer Arnaud Pescheux, who confirmed his understanding that
Kouchner was currently the most senior French official
expected to meet with the Iranians in New York, and then only
the foreign minister. He related that the Iranian mission in
New York had passed a formal written request to the French
mission for an Ahmadi Nejad/Sarkozy meeting. The GOF had
ignored the request in the same manner it ignored Ahmadi
Nejad,s congratulatory message to Sarkozy after his election
as president. Nonetheless, and as Kouchner has publicly
stated, Pescheux underscored that France continues to have a
normal relationship with Iran across the board, covering a
host of bilateral and regional issues (notably Lebanon).
This includes frequent visits to Paris by Iranian officials.
Tension over the nuclear issue has not changed this, even
though it has obviously complicated the bilateral dialogue
somewhat. In this respect, Pescheux stated that the French
embassy in Tehran has received numerous complaints about
recent public French statements despite the fact that few of
them have been replayed fully via the Iranian media to the
public at large. (Comment: This echoes what MFA
DAS-equivalent for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Franck Gellet and
others have told us per ref b. End comment)
¶4. (C) With respect to the new channel Velayati has tried
to open via Gellet and Presidency strategic affairs adviser
Francois Richier (also ref b), Pescheux said that it was not
closed off, just inactive until such time as France might
decide to make use of it. He repeated that the GOF is fully
aware that Tehran is trying to divide the P-5 1 by opening
such a channel. As for the idea, bruited by Pouille, that
French special envoy for Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseran might
travel to Tehran with a larger mandate than the situation in
Lebanon, Pescheux said that was under discussion. Nothing
had been decided, either in terms of dispatching Cousseran on
such a mission or possible timing, although it was unlikely
to happen prior to the end of the ministerial portion of the
current UNGA. Pescheux reiterated the often expressed view
at the Quai that, unlike Syria, Iran is not presently
inclined to stir things up in Lebanon. He explained that for
Iran, the consequences of a renewed civil war that could
inter alia pit Sunnis against Shi,a would set Iranian
efforts to expand its regional influence back.
¶5. (C) Comment: As ref a demonstrates, Kouchner is not

only trying to recast his earlier remarks in a way that
downplays references to the possibility of war with Iran but
to underscore his readiness to engage with Iran including via
a trip to Tehran. We are not aware of any plans for Kouchner
to travel there, however, and he was very careful when he
responded to a reporter,s question on this that he kept it
limited to whether in principle he was prepared to go.
Despite the rhetoric and the furor surrounding Kouchner,s
remarks, the French have not closed any doors to continued
engagement. We think it unlikely, given the charged
atmosphere and the French determination to keep Ahmadi Nejad
at arms length, that President Sarkozy will meet formally
with him on the margins of UNGA, although we would not rule
out the possibility of an impromptu pull-aside should the two
find themselves at a group event organized by the UN.
Sarkozy was unwavering in a national television interview
PARIS 00003956 002 OF 002
September 21 that Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear

weapons.

Pekala
Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD3504, PSD INCIDENT UPDATE: EMBASSY

APPROVES CONDOLENCE
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07BAGHDAD3504.
07BAGHDAD3504 2007-10-22 18:06 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGB #3504/01 2951859

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221859Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003504
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2017

TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL APER IZ
SUBJECT: PSD INCIDENT UPDATE: EMBASSY APPROVES CONDOLENCE
PAYMENTS, GOI INVESTIGATION REPORT RELEASED, RSO ACTIVITY
REF: A. BAGHDAD 03341

¶B. BAGHDAD 03307
¶C. BAGHDAD 03257
¶D. BAGHDAD 03164
¶E. BAGHDAD 03156
¶F. BAGHDAD 03143
¶G. BAGHDAD 03136
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons

1.4 (b) and (d)
CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
-------
Summary
-------
(C) 1. The Embassy obtained a copy of with the results of the

Government of Iraq's (GOI) investigation report of the
September 16 incident at Nisoor Square. The report portrays
the incident as an unprovoked attack on unarmed civilians,
references a number of other alleged incidents involving
Blackwater, recommends payments of $8 million and $4 million
for each death and injury respectively, and calls for the USG
to replace Blackwater within six months of the incident. It
is unclear to what extent the GOI is committed to these
recommendations or how it intends to implement them. The
Embassy has begun accepting claims from victims of the
incident, with 15 claims submitted so far. Post has approved
payments of $10,000 for each death, $5,000 for each injury,
and $2,500 for property damage. The Regional Security Office
(RSO) is implementing changes to procedures and increasing
linkages to the GOI for cooperation and information sharing
on PSD issues. The Embassy is awaiting the Department's
determination as to what information about past PSD incidents
can be shared with the Joint Commission, and is developing a
work plan to guide the meetings of the Joint Commission; this
work plan will also form the basis of Post's proposed
structure for the Joint Commission's report.
-----------------
GOI Investigation
-----------------
(C) 2. On October 11 the Ministry of Defense (MOD) gave the

Embassy a copy of the final report of its investigative
committee. The report was produced and endorsed by the eight
Iraqi members of the Joint Commission. The details of the
incident as described in the report portray a random and
unprovoked shooting involving small and medium arms fire
resulting in the deaths of vehicle passengers and bystanders.
The report states that there was no evidence the convoy was
fired upon, that a total of 17 Iraqis were killed, 27
wounded, 7 cars burned or damaged, and that 2 Iraqi Security
Forces were among the casualties.
(C) 3. The report concludes that the conduct of the PSD

violated Iraqi law and a number of CPA orders and that
therefore the incident is a pre-meditated murder for which
the Blackwater personnel must be held accountable. It also
claims that the Ministry of Interior has information on seven
other instances in which Blackwater personnel killed 10
Iraqis and wounded 15 others. It states that due to these
previous violations, the company's license was not renewed
after it expired in June 2006.
The report makes 5 recommendations:
-- 1: That a court investigate the crime and take actions as

stipulated by relevant CPA and Iraqi law immediately.
-- 2: That the Council of Ministers requests the U.S.
Government replace Blackwater within six months of the
incident and replace it with a more disciplined company.
-- 3: That Blackwater pay $8 million for each death and $4
million for each injury.
-- 4: That the MOI address the issue of Blackwater operating
illegally (without a license).
-- 5: That new legislation governing security contractors
drafted by the MOI and currently being considered by
legislative bodies be adopted as quickly as possible (Ref A).
------------------------------------
Embassy Approves Condolence Payments
------------------------------------
(C) 4. On October 18 and October 20 the Embassy sent a team

to the National Iraqi Assistance Center, a facility where
MNF-I collects claims paperwork from Iraqis injured in MNF-I
incidents, to collect applications from the Nisoor Square
incident. The Iraqi National Police previously provided the
Embassy with contact information of family members for 7 of
the 17 Iraqis killed and for 15 of the 27 injured, all of
whom were contacted. So far the Embassy has received
paperwork for 15 claims, including one claim form that was

previously submitted to MNF-I.
(C) 5. On October 21 the Embassy Claims and Condolence

Committee, chaired by the DCM, reviewed the claims submitted.
The Embassy's claims and condolence program is modeled after
MNC-I's, which typically provides up to $2,500 per incident
(death, injury or property damage) but which permits payments
of up to $10,000 per incident in extraordinary
circumstances, if approved by the MNC-I Division Commanding
General. Consistent with military practice and with the
Ambassador's approval, the Committee agreed to make payments
of $10,000 to the family members of those killed, $5,000 to
those injured, and $2,500 for each instance of property
damage. The Committee agreed to arrange a forum for payment
to the 15 claimants who have already filed paperwork, to
expedite this payment, and to work with the GOI to contact
the remaining potential claimants. The Embassy believes that
Blackwater should also make its own payments in this
incident, and requests the Department's assistance in
conveying this message.
--------------------------------------------- --
Preparing for the next Joint Commission Meeting
--------------------------------------------- --
(C) 6. As agreed at the first Joint Commission Meeting on

October 7 (Ref A), the Embassy is working with the Department
to decide what information regarding the Nisoor Square and
other PSD incidents can be shared with the Commission. The
Embassy Legal Advisor is developing a work plan for the
Commission, which, after consultation with our Iraq working
level counterparts, we plan to introduce at the next meeting.
The goal of this plan is to have each of the Joint
Commission's meetings focus on one of the major themes of the
report that the Commission will ultimately issue.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Investigation and Regional Security Office Update
--------------------------------------------- ----
(C) 7. The FBI continues its investigation with support from

the Regional Security Officer (RSO) as needed. The RSO is
implementing changes to its operating procedures. Diplomatic
Security (DS) agents are now in charge of and accompanying
all Chief of Mission (COM) motorcade movements in Baghdad
outside of the IZ and to the extent possible in the rest of
Iraq. An increased staffing pattern to sustain this larger
workload has been approved by Post Management and has been
submitted to the Department. DS is in the process of
procuring video systems for all PSD vehicles and
communications recording equipment for the Tactical
Operations Center. The RSO is also taking technological steps
to improve the mutual awareness of RSO and MNC-I elements in
the field, and is procuring radios that will allow tactical
communications between RSO air and ground assets and MNC-I
assets.
(C) 8. The RSO is also forming an investigative response unit

that will potentially include MNF-I and GOI representatives,
to investigate all incidents involving COM security assets,
including statistical analysis and metrics of PSD incidents
and systematic collection and archiving of recorded video
footage and radio communications. Additionally, the RSO is
reviewing the viability of alternative non-lethal escalation
of force procedures.
(C) 9. The RSO is working to improve linkages to the GOI for

the general sharing of information and investigation of
specific PSD incidents. The RSO will be participating
regularly in the GOI/USG Crisis Action Cell, which is a
weekly meeting between senior U.S. military officials, the
Minister of Defense, and the National Security Advisor where
PSD incidents are often raised. The RSO is scheduled to meet
with the Chiefs of the Iraqi Police and the National Police
in an effort to develop closer working-level relationships.
--------------
Media Coverage
--------------
(C) 10. The Nisoor Square incident and private security

contractors in general have continued to receive negative
coverage and have served as rallying points for Iraqi
politicians and government officials (both those in power and
in the opposition). Coverage of the establishment of the
Joint Commission stemmed mostly from U.S. Government
statements about it. Coverage of GOI statements included
those of Al-Dabbagh on October 7 saying that the Iraqi
investigation found Blackwater responsible for "deliberate
murder". Other reports focused on the GOI's call for
Blackwater to pay a total of $136 million for the incident
and comparing it to the Lockerbie bombing. An October 9
incident involving Unity Resources Group (URG), the PSD of a

USAID contractor, in which two Iraqi women were killed, was
reported as a "Blackwater-type massacre".
(C) 11. Newspaper and other coverage waned due to the Eid
al-Fitr holiday, but Blackwater returned to the press once
the news cycle resumed, with reports focusing on the Prime
Minister's advisor Sami al-Askri who said "the Iraqi
government has a clear position regarding the future of
Blackwater in Iraq. The security firm should be expelled
within six months." Editorials in all of Iraq's newspapers
have lashed out at Blackwater, likening it to another militia
contributing to the deterioration of Iraq's security.
Numerous editorial cartoons have been published depicting
Blackwater as bloodthirsty mercenaries. While the escalation
of the Turkish border issue has been dominating the media,
the Blackwater incident will likely remain a prominent issue
for editorials and political cartoons as the unpopularity of
private security firms makes it an easy target.
CROCKER
Viewing cable 07PARIS4357, PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL

VISIT TO THE
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0455
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 2102
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 1338
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

NSC FOR NSA HADLEY
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, SA, EAP, PM, E, EB, G, WHA, AND AF
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2017

TAGS PREL, OVIP, NATO, UNO, YI, RS, IR, IS, LE, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY’S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE

U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INDEPENDENT FRANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4. (b) & (d) .
¶1. (SBU) Introduction and Summary: The Nicolas Sarkozy who arrives in
Washington November 6 is in robust political health. He completely dominates the
politics of France. All the levers of institutional power in a highly
centralized state are at his disposal. He remains committed to a revitalization
of France, through a reform of policies and laws that have acted as a break on
French economic growth. The challenge now is to put his ideas and programs into
effect. Off to a quick start this summer, with the implementation of a first
series of reform measures, Sarkozy is now beginning to feel the full force of
French resistance to change. His public support as reflected in the polls is
high, but has slipped of late. The political impact of the first direct
challenge, last week’s national transportation strike, is not yet clear, but
strikes in other sectors are threatening, raising the possibility of the kind of
crisis atmosphere Sarkozy had hoped to avoid, given his electoral mandate and
professed openness to dialogue. The image of a well-oiled, disciplined machine
has suffered, as Sarkozy has repeatedly rebuked members of his team, including
his own Prime Minister, raising questions about a thin-skinned and authoritarian
personal style. The concentration of power and decision-making in the Presidency
has made for uneven decision-making and follow-through. The prospect of slower
domestic and international economic growth and a tight GOF budget have narrowed
his room for maneuver. His appointment to the cabinet of women and minority
representatives and the more populist style of his Presidency have been well-
received, but his omnipresence and hyper-activity risk overexposure and Sarkozy-
fatigue. Finally, freshly divorced from Cecilia, he is deprived of someone who
(by his own account) was crucial to his personal equilibrium and served as a
valued political sounding board.
¶2. (SBU) While not central to his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy has quickly
asserted French leadership in Europe and staked out new positions and a role for
France on the most pressing international issues. He believes that a
relationship of trust and close cooperation with the U.S. enhances France’s
ability to make an impact -- toward the achievement of what are in most cases
common objectives. After five months in office he (and his foreign minister,
Bernard Kouchner) have begun to make their mark. They have overseen a dramatic
shift in French policy on Iraq, reversed declining French support in
Afghanistan, have set in motion a possible “return” to NATO, toughened France’s
approach to Iran and also Russia, and promised a new one toward Africa. The top
foreign policy issue for Sarkozy is the environment, which he has embraced as a
headline issue, linking foreign and domestic policy. Sarkozy and Kouchner also
assign priority to Kosovo, Lebanon, and Darfur. Sarkozy’s decision to assist the
Dutch in Afghanistan is the latest illustration of a willingness to push a
cautious bureaucracy and military and to break the mold of Chirac-era policy.
Despite, and perhaps because of, convergence with the U.S. on key issues, and
the dramatic improvement in the tone of the relationship, Sarkozy has identified
specific areas of disagreement with the U.S.
¶3. (C) We continue to believe that Sarkozy represents an important opportunity.

Energetic, in full command at home, he is determined to make a mark on the
international scene. As distinct from Chirac, who advocated multi-polar
containment of U.S. hegemony, Sarkozy is well-disposed personally to the U.S. He
wants close policy cooperation with us, but in a relationship that gives France
its full due as an independent player. “Alliance, not alignment” is the way he
usually puts it, although he is not beyond striking a more defiant pose, as
recently in Moscow, when he stated publicly that he would not be a “vassal” of
the U.S. He will also continue to highlight differences on selected issues --
PARIS 00004357 002 OF 011

such as the environment, GMOs and Turkey’s relationship with Europe -- as
demonstrations of France’s independent policy course. His emphasis of French
independence makes less controversial at home both the warming up of the
bilateral relationship and the bold policy decisions in such areas as Iraq,
NATO, and Afghanistan. A distinct French approach, supportive on many issues,
but not in lock-step, is in our interest. A partner with the international bone
fides that France retains, as a leading European power close to but proudly
independent of the U.S., is one that can enlarge our ability to effect positive
outcomes internationally.
¶4. (U) In addition to setting the scene for Sarkozy’s first official visit to
Washington, this message iterates the state of play in a long list of issues
where opportunities and challenges abound in U.S.-France relations. End Summary
PART ONE: SARKOZY FIVE MONTHS INTO HIS PRESIDENCY
¶5. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Washington follows an exceptionally long

“state of grace” (as the French call a political honeymoon), one that only began
to peter out in October, the fifth month of Sarkozy’s Presidency. Through the
summer and well into the new French political year that begins in September,
Sarkozy seemed incapable of a political misstep. His poll ratings set records
both vertically (level) and horizontally (durability). For a politician long
attacked as an extremist and a divider, this was no small feat.
¶6. (SBU) Sarkozy’s success is attributable to several factors. While Candidate

Sarkozy ran a hard right election campaign geared to winning over the 15-20
percent of the votes that Jean-Marie LePen’s National Front had captured in
recent years, President Sarkozy quickly made clear he wanted to be a President
of all the French, not just the political right. He also made clear that his
ambition would not be satisfied with his election to the Presidency. He was
determined to use the office to get France moving again -- unleashing its
economic potential, allowing it to surmount long-term budgetary, financial and
social challenges. He would do this by making good on his program of concrete
reform measures, which had received a mandate from the French electorate.
¶7. (SBU) Immediately after his election in May, Sarkozy embarked on a policy of
inclusiveness (“ouverture”), bringing in leading figures of the opposition,
including the Socialist Party (such as Foreign Minister Kouchner), the non-
Gaullist center-right, and civil society. In addition, he shattered the white-
male cast of previous French governments with his appointments of women and
minorities, including to key ministries. On the strength of his electoral
mandate, and with this inclusiveness as cover, Sarkozy moved swiftly, and with
virtually no Socialist opposition, to implement his reform program, moving five
major pieces of legislation through Parliament by early October. Sarkozy seemed
well on his way to proving that France could embrace change, and that he could
imprint on it the “culture of results” that would be the basis for less painful,
self-renewing change in the future.
¶8. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, shadows have entered this unnaturally bright
picture. Current polling suggests that while support for Sarkozy remains at
historically high levels (in the low 60’s, depending on the poll), there has
been a slow erosion in his standing, which has perhaps accelerated in the past
few weeks. In the first serious push-back against a key reform, French public
transport unions engaged in a country-wide strike on October 18 over the
generous pensions available to public transport workers. Sarkozy
PARIS 00004357 003 OF 011

insists that this time unions will not be able to scuttle this or any other part
of the government’s reform program -- while continuing to stress the need for
dialogue, not government fiat, as the mode of action. However, international
economic uncertainty affords Sarkozy far less room for maneuver as he seeks to
reduce both government expenditures and taxes to unleash economic activity,
while not fatally exacerbating France’s already alarming debt situation.
¶9. (SBU) Sarkozy’s unexpected willingness to compromise on several of his

reform measures may signal recognition of the hard economic realities. However,
he risks diminishing this image of determination and command -- key components
of his political success thus far. Sarkozy appeared critical of both his Finance
Minister and his Prime Minister in turn when the former called for “greater
rigor” in state spending and the latter described the state as “bankrupt” in
parliamentary hearings. Sarkozy, fearing that alarmist pronouncements could
undermine the public’s confidence, risks creating an impression of friction and
hesitation at the top. Sarkozy’s close personal association with policy reform
has reduced his ability to cast aside the Prime Minister or other officials
should his policies lose public support.
¶10. (SBU) The transport unions are but one of the constituencies Sarkozy will
offend in shaking the French economy loose from policies that have held back
growth and bloated public spending. As he pushes for reforms that make it easier
to fire workers, shrink the size of the state (whose spending represents 52
percent of GDP) by cutting the civil service, and open up retail markets to more
competition, he can expect further pushback from well-entrenched constituencies.
Sarkozy has set in motion a series of negotiations on these issues that
ultimately could lead to important systemic change. But the real impact will
only become clear once the negotiations conclude -- probably in early 2008 --
and the government is forced to make politically difficult decisions.
¶11. (SBU) France’s broader economic environment will not make the reform
process any easier. Having promised the electorate measures that would bring an
extra percentage point of growth to the economy, the Sarkozy government finds
itself at a delicate point in the business cycle. The government has already
scaled back earlier 2007 growth estimates, and most private sector economists
believe the government’s 2008 estimates are inflated. Although the fiscal
stimulus from tax cuts passed this summer may give the president a short-term
boost, he is unlikely to enjoy the political benefit of a strong growth
environment in which to pursue his supply-side reforms. He has also promised the
French people increased purchasing power, which will be hard to achieve. Some of
this he blames on the strength of the dollar.
¶12. (SBU) Sarkozy is keen on unleashing market forces to reinvigorate the

French economy, but he is less than laissez-faire when it comes to restructuring
French industry. The French state owns a far smaller share of the economy than
was once the case, but it still has effective control of energy and other key
sectors. Sarkozy’s industrial policy seems to be based on facilitating the
emergence of key French firms as leaders in their industries in Europe and
globally. While European experience with national champions industrial policies
is shaky, the French have done comparatively well of late. Sarkozy does not
hesitate to reduce state ownership in these deals. The merger of Gaz de France
with Suez creates a European giant in gas and energy but also reduces the French
stake in its gas company from 80 percent to 30 percent.
¶13. (SBU) At the macroeconomic level, Sarkozy has been highly critical of the
European Central Bank’s tight money, strong Euro policy and he is all but
ignoring previously
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agreed Eurozone commitments to brining budgets back into balance. In both cases,
Eurozone partners have little recourse and France can ride for free on the
budget discipline of its partners, at least for a while. In the meantime, the
President’s approach plays well at home, and often appears designed for domestic
consumption.
¶14. (SBU) The U.S.-French economic relationship remains robust, with over $1
billion in commercial transactions per day taking place between the two
countries’ firms. During President Sarkozy’s visit, CEOs from some of the most
important of these will meet, for the first time in several years as the French-
American Business Council (FABC) to exchange views on policy priorities. U.S.
firms have been almost unanimously positive about the Sarkozy government.
Nonetheless there are a number of regulatory unknowns that could potentially
impact U.S. commercial interests. Among these are the GOF’s evolving views on
genetically-modified organisms, IPR in the digital environment and pricing
policy as it relates to pharmaceutical spending.
¶15. (C) On permanent overdrive and intense in the best of times, Sarkozy’s
recent divorce raises questions about his ability to maintain his equilibrium
and focus. Sarkozy has himself spoken of his dependence on Cecilia -- “my source
of strength and my Achilles Heel,” as he put it. During their separation in
2005, a highly irritable, darker Sarkozy came into view -- the same one that
reappeared at the Lisbon Summit the day after the announcement of the divorce.
How much Cecilia really anchored him, personally and politically, should soon
become evident, but we are betting on Sarkozy’s ability to bounce back.
¶16. (C) Notwithstanding the debate swirling around him and his slight decline
in the polls, Sarkozy’s political health remains strong. He controls all the
main levers of power: the Presidency, the Parliament, the dominant political
party, and the omnipresent agents of the French state. The opposition Socialists
are in disarray, incapable for the moment of taking unified policy positions.
Sarkozy is in a position to reassert French leadership in Europe and in
international affairs generally. He (and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner) have
also begun to make their mark, unevenly, on French policy. The foreign policy
equivalent of his domestic “rupture” are his Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and
possibly NATO. On Iraq, Sarkozy and Kouchner have made a dramatic difference,
offering political support and associating France with reconstruction efforts --
and prompting surprisingly little opposition or criticism. On NATO, Sarkozy has
challenged his bureaucracy -- and the U.S. -- to find a way to fashion a win-win
approach for NATO and ESDP that would entail a full French “return” to NATO,
although the specifics of Sarkozy’s conditions have not yet been worked through.
Sarkozy will be calculating the political cost of any shift on NATO, knowing
that he would be breaking a foreign policy consensus that has long enjoyed the
support of the Gaullist right, much of the center, and all of the left. Other
issues already showing Sarkozy’s imprint include: Russia, where he is less
willing to accommodate and is increasingly concerned about Russian intentions
and objectives; the Middle East, where he has introduced a new emphasis on
Israel’s security into the inhospitable ground of France’s “politique Arabe”;
and, Africa, where Sarkozy appears intent on finally making a break from
France’s post-colonial reflexes and relationships. Other high priority issues
which Sarkozy will also want to discuss include his top issue, climate change,
along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism and climate change.
Sarkozy’s approach to these and other international issues of concern to both
France and the U.S. are discussed in the second section of this cable.
PART TWO:
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KEY POLICY ISSUES: WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE WE WANT THEM TO BE
¶17. (C) The White House has already publicly enumerated key topics on the visit
agenda: Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East Peace, Lebanon, Darfur, Burma, Kosovo,
counterterrorism, and the promotion of democracy. Herein follows a snapshot of
where the French are on each of them and on some additional areas, and where we
would like to move them. Our list is topped by thee priority policy issues --
Iraq, NATO, and Russia -- sufficiently sensitive not to have been publicly
highlighted in the White House announcement, along with Afghanistan, followed by
climate change, which will likely be highest on Sarkozy’s list.
¶18. (C) Iraq: The sudden and dramatic French decision, days following the
President’s meeting in Kennebunkport, to break with previous policy and reengage
with Iraq has uncertain paternity -- with both Sarkozy and Kouchner claiming
credit. Following Kouchner’s three-day visit to Iraq in August, the GOF has
already hosted both President Talibani and FM Zebari. Last week, Sarkozy told
Talibani that France wanted to help Iraq across the board -- politically,
diplomatically, educationally, and culturally. French assistance will not
include any commitment of French troops in Iraq, but it could include training
for Iraqi security/police units as well as counterterrorism forces. The French
have promised other, initially symbolic measures such as opening a diplomatic
office in the northern city of Irbil and aid for a hospital in the same area.
Kouchner has already pressed the EU to become more active in multinational
efforts at reconstruction, which France would like the UN to head up. Any U.S.
diplomatic conference or initiative could garner French support: Kouchner plans
to attend the upcoming ministerial meeting in Istanbul of Iraq’s “neighbors.” In
fact, the French are just starting to figure out how they can best help Iraq,
especially to relieve what they see as a harsh humanitarian situation. Sarkozy
would likely be open to detailed discussion on this topic: Given his and
Kouchner’s identification with the new policy, and abiding lack of enthusiasm in
at least parts of the bureaucracy, he is in fact the best place to start.
Regarding the U.S. role, Sarkozy and Kouchner do not share their predecessors’
fixation on our continued troop presence. They understand and acknowledge the
reality that a hasty pullout of U.S. troops would lead to a worsening, not a
lessening, of the violence with potentially grave implications for the larger
region. We should push Sarkozy to implement humanitarian and reconstruction
programs in Iraq, starting with an already promised medical clinic in the
Kurdish north, as soon as possible.
¶19. (C) Iran: Sarkozy’s blunt language on the “unacceptability” of a militarily

nuclear Iran, and the need to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime
over its nuclear program has only been exceeded by that of his foreign minister.
The degree to which France has taken a public lead with the EU to press for
additional European sanctions should the UNSC be unable to act has been as
impressive as has Sarkozy’s willingness to confront Russian President Putin over
this issue. French officials make the point that Paris has a “normal” diplomatic
relationship with Tehran despite sharp disagreements on the nuclear question. In
this context, the French have particularly valued their quiet dialogue over
Lebanon, which has convinced them that, by contrast with Syria, Iran has no
interest in renewed internal violence that might accompany failure to elect a
new president. Sarkozy has proven impervious to Iranian blandishments aimed at
softening France’s position or even to break it away from the P-5 1 group, much
to Iran’s chagrin. The meetings with Sarkozy offer an opportunity to bolster
France’s tough line, and it can be expected that Sarkozy will want to get a
sense from the President of his analysis of our
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ability to influence Iranian choices, and how best to maintain international
pressure toward that end. Having just met with Israeli PM Olmert to discuss the
same issue, Sarkozy will be keen to understand the limits of our patience while
we pursue the diplomatic track, which, like us, France prefers to exhaust before
considering military options.
¶20. (C) NATO: In one of his first acts as President, Sarkozy launched a defense
“white paper” commission to review France’s defense and security priorities; one
component of the report (expected in March 2008) is a review of France’s
relationship with NATO. The defense white paper could set the stage for a
possible full re-integration into the NATO military command. President Sarkozy
and Defense Minister Morin launched a public debate over a deeper French role in
the Alliance in September in two major foreign policy speeches. Sarkozy
clarified that French rapprochement to NATO would be tied to two conditions:
1) strengthening European defense structures by developing Europe’s own
capabilities to plan and carry out defense and security operations, and
2) seeking French representation in the highest “decision making posts of NATO.”
The MFA and defense establishment uniformly caution us against raised
expectations, with some in the Sarkozy Administration (reportedly including
Prime Minister Fillon) concerned that abrupt moves toward NATO could be
controversial domestically. All, beginning with Sarkozy, argue that, at a
minimum, ESDP needs to be strengthened in parallel. The idea seems to be that a
French embrace of NATO will ease U.S. concerns about a more robustly structured
European defense, while progress on that front will help ease opposition at home
to France’s “return” to NATO. Sarkozy will likely use his speech before Congress
to further refine his public approach, casting France’s willingness to move
ahead in terms of working with the U.S. as an independent ally and partner (not
automatically “aligned” to U.S. positions). We believe this visit offers an
unprecedented opportunity to identify with Sarkozy the common ground on which a
mutually beneficial “bargain” on NATO and European defense might be elaborated.
In addition to addressing the substance of Sarkozy’s two “conditions,” we will
want to learn how open he is to modifying France’s narrowly military, Europe-
focused vision of NATO, and whether he will be on a sufficiently fast track to
implement or in some way foreshadow elements of a “bargain” at Bucharest in
April.
¶21. (C) Afghanistan: After a moment of hesitation during his Presidential

campaign, Sarkozy now publicly highlights the importance of French efforts in
Afghanistan. France has recently stepped up military commitments by deploying 3
additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to complement the
2,000 military personnel (ISAF and OEF) now deployed (largely in and around
Kabul). Significantly, Sarkozy recently responded positively to the Dutch Prime
Minister’s pleas for a French presence in Uruzgan, needed to secure
parliamentary approval for renewing the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF. In
agreeing to deploy a French OMLT, Sarkozy again demonstrated his willingness to
move ahead of more cautious advisors and a bureaucracy that prefers slow
adaptation to bold moves. France has taken other decisions to bolster its
presence in Afghanistan including moving six French Mirage planes from Dushanbe
to Kandahar. On September 10, the French and Germans reaffirmed plans to support
the German-led EU police training mission in Afghanistan despite delays. On July
30, SACEUR officially requested six medium-lift helicopters to provide rotary-
wing support in ISAF (to replace the U.S. helicopters which are scheduled to
depart early 2008). France is considering still this request. We should use the
opportunity of the visit to persuade the French to broaden and deepen their
efforts in Afghanistan, including by standing up a Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT). We understand the Presidency favors this proposal, while civilian
leadership at the MOD opposes a French PRT. Sarkozy may echo recent MFA and MOD
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calls for a more “comprehensive Afghanistan strategy,” integrating military
support and civilian reconstruction, and including a timeline for shifting the
burden from the international coalition to the Government of Afghanistan.
¶22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On his election day,

Sarkozy called for a greater U.S leadership role on climate issues. He will want
to come out of his meeting with the President able to say that he again pushed
the President to lead. The Embassy, backed closely by Washington agencies, has
impressed on not only Sarkozy and his staff, but also officials across France
that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in the fight against
climate change. We’ve impressed on them -- and Sarkozy should be told again --
that the U.S. has spent $37 billion in the past six years -- more than any other
country -- for climate science and energy research. We’ve developed new
international partnerships, part of a real strategy of international engagement
to reduce carbon emissions. We’ve shown the French that even with considerably
greater economic and population growth than in Europe, we’re doing a better job
at reducing both energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the President’s
Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September in Washington, French officials
offered to host the next meeting while expressing some disappointment with both
the lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions goal and U.S. reluctance
regarding market-based cap and trade measures. Areas of potential conflict
include concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction
schemes will put European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the
possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on imported goods.
Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing next generation
climate-friendly technologies, the French also criticize what they see as U.S.
over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and storage,
second generation bio-fuels, and advanced nuclear) to address emissions. France
is skeptical that China and India and other major emerging economies will take
steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. This is an opportunity to
convince Sarkozy that we take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to
make real progress.
¶23. (C) Democracy Promotion/Burma: Under President Sarkozy, the French position
on Burma has converged with that of the U.S. France vigorously condemned the
regime’s crackdown on peaceful protesters; pushed through as UNSC president a
presidential statement supporting the democracy movement; supported toughening
EU sanctions; and, bilaterally pressed ASEAN members to take a tougher stand on
Burma. FM Kouchner will have visited ASEAN countries and China in the week
before Sarkozy’s visit to Washington to push the Burmese leadership to reconcile
with Aung San Suu Kyi and the political opposition. While Sarkozy seems forward-
leaning (he reportedly considered French disinvestment before being dissuaded by
advisors), thus far France remains unprepared to implement unilateral sanctions.
Sarkozy, however, has urged French companies to freeze future investments. In
our efforts to work with France to promote democracy, we should appeal to
Sarkozy to redouble French efforts within the EU to push for tough sanctions
against the Junta and for measures in support of the democracy movement.
¶24. (C) Russia: During his first presidential visit to Russia on October 9-10,
Sarkozy’s advisors were reportedly struck by Putin’s defiant and distrustful
attitude toward the U.S. and his “revisionist” desire to dismantle or undermine
the perceived anti-Russian institutional framework -- regional and international
-- that has prevailed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Sarkozy made little or
no progress with Putin on a broad range of topics including Iran, missile
defense, Georgia and Kosovo. Sarkozy’s positions tracked with U.S. views except
on Georgia, where he favors future status that is short of NATO membership.
Sarkozy’s visit to Moscow highlights a sea-change in Franco-Russian relations
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from the Chirac era. Sarkozy has abandoned Chirac’s notion of Russia as a
counterweight to the U.S., and does not shy away from directly addressing
difficult issues, including democracy, human rights and rule of law problems in
Russia, Chechnya and energy policies. Sarkozy, for example, took the
unprecedented (for a French President) step of visiting human rights activists
while in Moscow. France is concerned about both Putin’s increasingly
authoritarian style and Russia’s increasing willingness to defy international
opinion, as on CFE and Georgia. Sarkozy is also less willing than Chirac to
allow energy security and trade priorities to dominate France’s appoach. That
said, the French never fail to remind us of Russia’s relative proximity and
France’s and Europe’s need to come to terms with a newly assertive Russia.
Sarkozy will want to address how the U.S. can work with France, in cooperation
with its major European partners, to find a new modus vivendi with Russia. We
should use the meetings with Sarkozy to solidify a common approach of tough
engagement with Russia and highlight the need for the closest cooperation on
four related subjects: Georgia, Kosovo, Missile Defense and the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
¶25. (C/NF) Georgia: In Moscow October 9-10, Sarkozy told Putin that France
opposes full NATO membership for Georgia (although we have been assured he did
not address MAP for Georgia with him). High-level French interlocutors have
emphasized in recent meetings that France remains open to “something less than
membership.” The GOF has maintained that NATO membership “should not create new
lines of division” and that territorial conflicts should be resolved prior to
membership -- and that Georgia does not meet these criteria. France is
considering whether NATO could offer Georgia a different kind of status and a
different approach to regional security, possibly combined with incentives
including abolishing visas with the EU. While we are aware of reports that
Sarkozy told Georgian President Saakashvili that he supports MAP for Georgia,
the GOF continues to oppose MAP which would, in its view, create additional
tensions with Russia and exacerbate Georgia’s problems with its separatist
regions. It also talks about the need to define the territorial limits of NATO
and its Article 5 collective security obligations.
¶26. (C) Kosovo: This is an opportunity for the President to reaffirm Sarkozy’s
commitment to an independent Kosovo. Sarkozy has stated numerous times that he
supports Kosovo’s independence and has instructed FM Kouchner to actively seek
EU consensus on the matter. The French also remind us from time to time that
Kosovo is a European issue which Europeans bear primary responsibility for
solving. The GOF is pessimistic that Serbia and Kosovo will come to a status
agreement and is working closely with the U.S. and the Contact Group on post-
December 10 actions. The French remain concerned that while EU member-states may
agree to not publicly oppose Kosovo’s independence, the EU may fail to reach
consensus on a legal basis for an ESDP mission in Kosovo. The GOF has accepted
UNSCR 1244 as a basis for an international force in Kosovo and agrees with the
U.S. that it would not be advantageous to seek a new UNSCR. Sarkozy lobbied
Putin in Moscow for more Russian flexibility, but received no commitments. The
U.S. and EU, Sarkozy will argue, must publicly demonstrate that a good faith
effort was made to come to an agreement. The French are not prepared to
recognize independence before the end of 2007 and are hopeful that the U.S. will
assist in convincing the Kosovars that it is in their interest to be patient
with the EU. Sarkozy will likely ask that the U.S. work closely with Kosovar
authorities to take a coordinated (U.S, EU, Kosovo) approach to Kosovo’s now
almost inevitable unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and avoid
dramatic rhetoric that will further embarrass Serbia, encourage similar UDIs by
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and put internal political pressure on EU states
like Greece and Cyprus to publicly oppose Kosovo’s
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independence.
¶27. (C) Missile Defense: The French agree that Russia’s objections to the
planned system are politically driven, reflecting a Russian view of its
relationship with its former satellites that is at once “revisionist” but is
also informed by real fears of NATO encirclement. The GOF is interested in U.S.
plans for NATO to adopt a complementary system to protect the exposed southern
flank of Europe from short- and medium-range threat, although it has warned that
there is “not one Euro” allocated to pay for such a system. Sarkozy will be
interested in learning of the status of U.S.-Russian discussions and our
analysis of prospects for bringing Moscow around to support a cooperative
effort. We should urge Sarkozy to use his leadership position in Europe to
promote understanding of the true nature and scope of the MD initiative, one
that in no way threatens Russia.
¶28. (C) CFE: The French government remains concerned over the Russian threat to
suspend participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
in December and strongly supports a unified Allied position in support of the
U.S. “parallel actions” plan. FM Kouchner recently wrote to Secretary Rice to
propose an informal CFE seminar in Paris on
SIPDIS November 5-6 to promote constructive dialogue leading to a comprehensive
political solution. These efforts are seen as key to keeping allied solidarity
and building pressure on Russia to recognize the consequences of pulling out of
a major arms control treaty. Despite these efforts, the French are increasingly
pessimistic; Political Director Gerard Araud was told recently in Moscow that
“the decision was already made” by Putin and the MOD to suspend participation,
due in part to Russian views that it is “humiliating” to have flank limits
imposed on Russian forces within its own borders. We should welcome French
initiatives to help resolve the CFE issue and continue our close collaboration.
¶29. (C) Lebanon: Sarkozy has not been as closely associated as FM Kouchner with
French efforts to help Lebanon elect a new president and emerge from its present
political crisis, but he has played a key supporting role. Initially unimpressed
with the March 14 majority leaders he met, Sarkozy?s view of Saad Hariri has
improved with subsequent meetings. After their last session, Sarkozy authorized
announcement of France?s tranche of more than $6 million for the Special
Tribunal, which France had been withholding pending a formal request for
contributions by the UN Secretary-General. Our close consultations with the
French
SIPDIS over Lebanon continue, although we differ over tactics and the risks
attached to any strategy that would allow the majority to elect a president via
simple majority. The French emphasize finding a “consensus” candidate acceptable
to all Lebanese and external parties and place more trust than we believe wise
in Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, despite his association with the
pro-Syrian minority. While the French have revived limited contact with Syria to
discuss Lebanon, we do not believe they intend to go further at this stage. We
will want to discuss with Sarkozy how to keep pressure on the Lebanese to elect
a president by the November 24 deadline without compromising the gains we have
made over the past two years in terms of reducing Syrian influence and
reasserting Lebanese independence. We will want to impress on him that the
election of a President -- whether by majority of consensus -- by November 24 is
a must; fear of the repercussions of election of a President by a “mere”
majority should not be ruled out if it is the only way to prevent a void that
the Syrians would only be too happy to fill.
¶30. (C) Middle East Peace Process: Sarkozy will want to hear about our efforts
to convene a regional meeting in support of Israeli/Palestinian efforts at
achieving a two-state solution. The French have generally supported our efforts
and not tried to get out in front. They are,
PARIS 00004357 010 OF 011
however, eager to play some sort of role. Sarkozy has taken to using his bona
fides as a “friend of Israel” to call on it for more “creativity” and “gestures”
toward the Palestinians in the run-up to the meeting. The GOF recently announced
its intention to host a donor’s conference for humanitarian assistance to help
the Palestinian people -- as an end in itself and in support of the political
process. Sarkozy will mostly be in a listening mode, though as someone who has
sought since taking office to underscore his readiness to listen at least as
attentively to the Israeli point of view as the Arab one.
¶31. (C) France-EU: President Sarkozy was instrumental in re-activating the

moribund political reform process in the European Union with the June
negotiation for a shortened “reform treaty” that will simplify some of the EU’s
operating procedures, while side-stepping efforts of deepened political
integration that doomed the EU constitution in 2005. This “reform treaty” was
approved by EU leaders in Lisbon last week and is scheduled to be signed in
December with ratification over the course of 2008. Sarkozy has said publicly he
wants France to be the first country to ratify the simplified treaty; the
process of parliamentary ratification will begin in December. The French will
also take over the rotating EU presidency from July-December 2008 and plan to
focus on immigration, energy, the environment and European defense during their
term. While Sarkozy remains firmly opposed to EU enlargement to include Turkey,
he has effectively sidestepped this issue by supporting continued negotiations
on the acquis communautaire that do not pre-suppose membership. He also
conditioned his position on EU support for a “Committee of Wise Men” to reflect
“without taboos” on the broader questions about the European future: i.e., what
is the European identity, what should the EU’s borders be, how to handle common
issues, and how deep can political integration go.
¶32. (C) Colombia: Sarkozy promised during his presidential campaign to work for
the release of Franco-Colombian FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt. He would sorely
like to be able to achieve in a few short months what Chirac couldn’t despite
years of effort. In June of this year, the French pushed Colombian President
Alvaro Uribe to release 200 FARC prisoners in an effort to move forward
negotiations for the release of FARC hostages. While the prisoner release did
not achieve the desired results, the French are now backing Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez’s offer to negotiate a hostage deal between the Colombian government
and FARC guerillas. Sarkozy invited Chavez to Paris in late November. The
French admit Chavez is a difficult political actor but accept a “bargain with
the devil” to advance prospects for the release of an iconic hostage. Sarkozy
may ask us to return two FARC leaders in U.S. prison to a third country in order
to obtain the release of French hostage. We should ask Sarkozy not to take any
steps that would result in separate treatment for Ingrid Betancourt and put U.S.
hostages in harm’s way.
¶33. (SBU) GMO Moratorium: When Sarkozy came into office not only did he create
a ‘mega’ environment ministry, but he also directed it to undertake a process,
the ‘Grenelle’, involving all sectors of the economy to reshape French
environmental policies. Among the topics considered in the Grenelle was what to
do about Genetically Modified Organisms, a subject of considerable domestic
concern in France. The result is that France is currently considering a
moratorium on biotech planting that would significantly undermine U.S.
agricultural exports to Europe. We believe President Sarkozy may support the
politically popular moratorium in order to gain capital to use in his reform
efforts.
¶34. (C) Darfur (and Chad, Central African Republic): Sarkozy demonstrated an
immediate renewed interest in Africa
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upon entering office, with France calling for and organizing the June 25
ministerial conference on Darfur, which served to refocus international
attention on that country. The French followed up with a ministerial meeting on
Darfur on the margins of the UNGA in New York in September and then hosted a
broader Security Council session on Africa for heads-of-state/government. France
has been instrumental in organizing a separate Security Council-blessed EU-UN
peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Paris
hopes to deploy this force as soon as practicable. In addition, the French have
firmly supported the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur (UNAMID). We
should thank Sarkozy for French leadership on Chad and the C.A.R.. Sarkozy may
ask for enhanced U.S. financial contributions to MINURCAT.
Stapleton
Viewing cable 07RABAT1657, SARKOZY SWEEPS MOROCCO OFF ITS

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Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07RABAT1657.
07RABAT1657 2007-10-29 16:04 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rabat
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TAGS PREL, PGOV, MO, FR
SUBJECT: SARKOZY SWEEPS MOROCCO OFF ITS FEET
Classified by DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: French President Sarkozy’s October 22-24 visit to Morocco was
viewed as a success by both sides. During a star-like visit and speech to the
Moroccan parliament, Sarkozy offered the most explicit French statement to date
in support of Morocco’s autonomy plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement
to the Sahara dispute. Sarkozy also essentially conceded the loss of the sale of
French Rafale fighters to a “better offer” to Morocco for U.S. F-16s. Sarkozy
and entourage completed nearly 3 billion Euros worth of commercial deals and
military sales during the visit, including a naval frigate. The French
Ambassador in Rabat downplayed the commercial aspects of the trip, instead
emphasizing Sarkozy’s “Mediterranean Union” summit proposal and his support for
Moroccan democratic and economic reforms. The visit received mainly favorable
attention in the local media, featuring images of two heads of state interacting
as equal partners and friends. End summary.
---------------------------------
Leaning Farther Forward on Sahara
---------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an interview with the pro-Palace daily Le Matin just before his
arrival, Sarkozy described Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the Sahara as
“serious and credible.” Addressing a joint session of parliament in Rabat on
October 23, Sarkozy appeared to take explicit French support for Morocco’s plan
a step further, describing it as “a new element,” in a long deadlocked process,
using the USG formulation that it could “serve as a basis for negotiation in the
search for a reasonable settlement to the Western Sahara issue.” Sarkozy’s
remarks on Sahara appeared to move France closer toward the Moroccan position,
and were embraced as such by most of the Moroccan press, which characterized the
president’s remarks as a breakthrough for French policy on the Sahara question.
(We understand the Polisario leadership has protested Sarkozy’s remarks.)
------------------------------------
Mediterranean Union and Other Themes
------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) During an October 26 briefing, French Ambassador Jean-Francois
Thibault emphasized to the DCM and other members of the diplomatic corps the
excellent atmospherics of the Sarkozy visit while downplaying its commercial
aspects. Thibault stated that Sarkozy came to underscore French support for
Morocco,s democratic development, reforms not only in the economic realm but
also in human rights, and Morocco,s importance for Europe.
¶4. (SBU) In that context, Thibault spent several minutes describing the
proposed Mediterranean Union Summit in June 2008. While noting that the union is
not intended to replace the Barcelona Process, he said that the themes would be
political, security, energy, educational and agricultural cooperation. In
response to a question, Thibault opined that the African Union and Arab League
would be invited to send observers as would some European nations that do not
border the Mediterranean.
¶5. (SBU) Queried about international issues, Thibault said there had been
little discussion beyond the public statements about Iran and the Middle East
Peace Process. Amb. Thibault also confirmed that France and Morocco also signed
agreements on extradition, prisoner transfer, social security, and sanitation.
--------------------------------------
Economic Agreements and Military Sales
--------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Though downplaying the economic issues that received the greatest
coverage in local media, Thibault confirmed that French companies had completed
a “draft” agreement to construct a high-speed rail line (&train a grande vitesse
or TGV8) from Tangier to Marrakech and from Casablanca to Oujda in three phases.
The first phase would be to provide the engineering, equipment and rolling stock
for the Tangier to Rabat to Casablanca portion; phase two would extend the line
to Marrakech; finally, the TGV would link Casablanca to Rabat, Meknes, Fes, and,
ultimately, Oujda. The agreement relates to the initial 200-km Tangier-Kenitra
portion of the route, at a cost of 2 billion euros, half of which will go to
RABAT 00001657 002 OF 002 French companies Alstom, SNCF, and Reseau Ferre de
France.
¶7. (SBU) The proposal, which has been under study since 2004, was apparently
seized on as a centerpiece for the visit once it became apparent that Rabat was
determined to proceed with purchase of American F-16 fighters rather than the
French Rafale, though the project is not expected to be commissioned until 2013.
Perhaps chastened by the Rafale experience, the French president told French
attendees at a Moroccan-French economic forum in Marrakech on the last day of
his visit that they cannot rest on their laurels. Instead they must aggressively
outbid and outhustle the competition, conceding (according to the Moroccan
press) that if the French lost the Rafale aircraft deal, “it is because the
Americans made a better offer.” Responding to a press question Sarkozy proudly
defended his good relations with the U.S.
¶8. (SBU) Other military contracts concluded during the visit included the sale
of a French frigate and the upgrade of 25 Puma helicopters and 140 armored
vehicles. In addition, an energy contract was signed to build a 200 million Euro
power plant near Oujda in Morocco’s northeast and the French nuclear group Areva
signed a deal with the National Phosphate Company (OCP) to extract uranium from
Moroccan phosphoric acid. In a press release, the company noted that Morocco’s
reserves of the material total 6 million metric tons, twice the world reserves
of actual uranium ore.
------------------------------------------
Press Coverage - Ecstatic, with Exceptions
------------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) The visit generated numerous positive images and sound bytes. During
Sarkozy’s address to parliament he called for “a real partnership without
arrogance” - and promised “France will be at your side” as Morocco moves forward
with its economic and political agenda. These and other sound bytes resonated in
numerous headlines above glowing articles in the Moroccan press, as did images
of Sarkozy affectionately greeting the King, the royal family, Moroccan
officials, and citizens in carefully managed photo-ops.
¶10. (SBU) Though press coverage of Sarkozy’s visit was overwhelmingly positive,
some commentators voiced resentment - the independent (Arabic) daily Al Massae
groused that French diplomacy “remains governed by traditional and obtuse
concepts” and accused the President of patronizing Morocco by issuing a
“certificate of good conduct” to the regime. A leading Islamist daily deemed
insulting Sarkozy’s assertion during his address to parliament that Islam stands
for goodness, tolerance, and peace, while political Islam stands for
separateness and engenders hostility toward “the other.” The Arabic daily
affiliated with the Islamist PJD denounced Sarkozy’s remark as a slap in the
face to the Islamist MPs present in the audience.
¶11. (C) While Sarkozy was generally well received, there was much gossip in
Moroccan salons about a “too relaxed” President slouching comfortably in his
chair as he and the King presided over an October 22 signing ceremony at the
Royal Palace in Marrakech. In one image, Sarkozy was seen crossing his legs and
pointing the sole of his shoe at the King - a taboo gesture in the Islamic
world. Sarkozy was accompanied throughout the visit, including at a banquet with
the royal family by his Justice Minister (of Moroccan heritage) Rachida Dati.
***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat’s Classified

Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Riley
Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD3895, UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI

NEGOTIATING STYLE,
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1775
PP RUEHDIR
DE RUEHGB #3895/01 3341039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301039Z NOV 07
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003895
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON PLEASE PASS TO GAYLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2027

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IQ
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI NEGOTIATING STYLE,
TACTICS
BAGHDAD 00003895 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(C) UK Ambassador to Tehran Geoffrey Adams, in a series of

meetings with U.S. Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I officials,
outlined his recommendations on how to negotiate with
Iranians. Ambassador Adams thought that Iran had several
goals from talks with the U.S., both superficial and
substantive. In negotiations, he advised being steady and
firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking
to engage and draw attention to mutual interests. He
outlined Iran,s preconceptions and its obsession with and
mistrust of the West, which, he said, can blind it to its
interests. He warned that the Iranian participants would
likely have very strict instructions what they could say and
that it would be difficult to get them off script, though the
element of surprise could work. Adams added that the
Iranians would be very nervous of negative repercussions if
they made a misstep, and they would likely report on each
other. Answers to questions and proposals would more likely
only come at follow-on meetings, and decision-making in Iran
is slowed by the need for consensus, so patience is needed.
That said, it was important to rid the Iranians of their
standard notion that time was on their side. End summary
2.(C) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams offered

advice in negotiating strategies with Iran in a series of
meetings with U.S. officials and military officers in Baghdad
November 24-25. The following is an amalgamation of three
meetings, held in advance of the fourth round of
Iran-Iraq-U.S. trilateral discussions on Iraq. Adams, who
has served in Tehran for almost two years, said his
observations were borne of much experience, to include a
&master class8 when Iran captured at gunpoint 15 British
Navy personnel in March 2007. British Ambassador to Kuwait
Stuart Laing also joined the discussions, as well as British
First Secretary in Tehran Alex Pinfield. Among those present
on the U.S. side at various briefings were Ambassador
Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister
Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries, MG Kevin Bergner, Special
Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO Director Jillian Burns. The
British ambassador,s views of Iran,s strategic interests
and the internal political situation to be reported septel.
3.(C) Iranians, goal, in Adams, view, is to

institutionalize talks with the U.S. and keep open the
possibility of broadening the agenda. While he heard that
the Iranians were disappointed in the &lack of substance8
in previous bilateral talks with the U.S, they felt they
derived good publicity from participating. Adams predicted
the Iranians will seek to keep them going both to engender
their prestige and to keep tabs on what the USG is thinking.
He also thought the talks had triggered a useful internal
debate in how to make the best use of the talks and their
strategic interests. Adams added that he believed there is a
significant lobby in Iran against holding talks with the U.S.
Assumptions
---------------
4.(C) In talks with Iranians, Ambassador Adams recommended

being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the
same time, seeking to engage. He stressed that Iranians are
obsessed with the West and this obsession at times blinds
them to their interests. In this light, the US side should
be aware of the following preconceptions on the Iranian side:
-- the USG seeks to remove the current regime and replace it

with a pro-Western one.
-- USG policymakers spend an inordinate amount of time and

energy thinking about (and plotting against) Iran. As such,
Iranians assume that everything we do or say has meaning and
has been carefully thought out and coordinated, both
internally and with the UK; there are no accidents.
-- The current U.S. administration is politically very weak,

facing major internal opposition, and as such, the threat of
US military action against Iran is not realistic.
-- Iran sees the U.S. as a tough, determined adversary that

can be manipulated and wounded.
Mistrust
----------
BAGHDAD 00003895 002.4 OF 003
5.(C) The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, when the international

community was either silent or sided with Saddam (even when
he used WMD against Iranians) must be kept in mind. Iranians
mistrust the outside world, to include the very same Western
powers and Sunni Arab states that are now seeking to ensure
that pro-Iranian Shias do not dominate power in Iraq.
Short Leash
--------------
6.(C) Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) government negotiators

arrive with precise and detailed instructions from which they
do not deviate, out of fear of professional repercussions.
They will go through all their talking points. The USG
should not expect substantive responses to questions or
initiatives in real time. This problem can be obviated to an
extent by scheduling &lots of breaks,8 allowing IRIG
officials time to confer amongst themselves and to seek
guidance via telephone from Tehran. However, given the fear
of a misstep on the IRI side, the USG should not expect real
engagement from the IRI outside of their instructions.
Answers to questions and responses to suggestions are likely
to come at follow-on meetings, although some questions never
get answered.
Preparation
--------------
7.(C) IRIG officials will likely prepare in detail for the

talks. They may consult with Iranians with extensive
experience with Americans, such as academics who have
participated in Track Two talks or worked in the U.S. He
also mentioned that the head of Iran,s Chamber of Commerce
Mohammad Nahavandian is also perceived as a U.S. expert and
is likely consulted. Adams doubted that Iran would seek
advice in negotiating with Americans from other countries.
Adams repeatedly said, &Iranians are not stupid,8 meaning
they follow all the issues closely, even if they at times
misread the signals.
Slow Process
----------------
8.(C) In light of the short leash negotiators have, plus the

collaborative and multi-polar nature of IRI decision-making
and the extreme sensitivity of the topic of direct USG-IRIG
talks, the USG should not expect immediate &big steps.8
Any progress will be slow and come only after much
deliberation and discussion in Iran, with push-back from
those circles opposing talks. If the IRIG concludes that a
policy shift is in their interests, it can do it and find a
way to justify it, but will first have to achieve internal
consensus.
Stay Calm
------------
9.(C) It is important with the Iranians not to lose one,s
temper or show that one is upset. Trading accusations allows
the IRIG to rely on a familiar script; far better is to ask
unexpected questions that will take them &off-script.8
When asked how to best broach continued IRIG support of JAM
splinter groups despite IRIG assurances to the Government of
Iraq to stop the flow of weapons, Adams recommended keeping
the tone matter-of-fact and raising issues in question form,
i.e. &given your assurances that you are seeking to help
Iraqi forces re-establish peace and security, how can we
explain the ongoing training of JAM-related illegal
combatants in Iran?8
Agenda
---------
10.(C) Don,t offer an agenda beforehand, otherwise the

agenda itself will become subject to ongoing negotiations.
Establish Mutual Interests

-------------------------------
11.(C) Seek to show a commonality or intersection of national

interests that will justify Iran taking actions suggested by
the USG. Prove to them that &if we fail in Iraq, they fail
too.8 Draw them out on their contradictory tactics in order
to spark debate within the IRIG. Assess what the Iranians
want out of the talks, beyond their publicly stated position
of wanting a timetable for a withdrawal of foreign troops.
BAGHDAD 00003895 003 OF 003
Clock Ticking
-----------------
12.(C) IRIG interlocutors assume that time is on their side

and hence default towards inaction. Convince them that now
is the time to act, and that not doing so will hurt their
interests and that the situation could get worse. In a
related vein, the IRI must be convinced that the USG is
prepared to stop dialogue (although not necessarily close the
channel) if there is no progress. At the same time, realize
internally that the negotiators cannot take a bold move
without consultation, a reasonable degree of patience is
required, and progress may take time.
Put the Ball in Their Court

--------------------------------
13.(C) Ask a lot of questions, always put the ball back in

their court. Doing so will encourage internal discussion and
debate in Tehran, as well as put pressure on them to deviate
from their prepared script. Wrong foot them by saying
something unexpected to try to take them off script. Focus
on accountability, asking for clarifications of actions that
contradict their stated commitments. Keep your message
clear, including redlines, and do not be too subtle.
Weaknesses
--------------
14.(C) Despite their rhetoric, Iranians understand their

weaknesses include a lack of allies and foreign investment.
Publicity
----------
15.(C) Iran is very sensitive to press coverage that makes

them look weak. At the same time, the IRIG has a &high
threshold for embarrassment8 when they are accused of
illicit activities. After the talks, the IRIG will seek to
present the exchange as &businesslike,8 with the US and
Iran on equal footing, where the IRIG &gave nothing away.8
BUTENIS
Viewing cable 07STATE152317, POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON

ONGOING MATTERS OF
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07STATE152317.
07STATE152317 2007-11-03 05:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Secretary of State
O 030503Z NOV 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T STATE 152317
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2027
TAGS: PARM PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN RAISED AT APEC BY PRESIDENT BUSH
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING

5361, (E) STATE 148514
CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST: IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR

MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT
BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS
RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY
BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT
HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON
NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN
ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an

imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the
same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It
is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this

demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and
Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be
seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more
extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from
North Korea to Iran.
--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally

engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts
between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue
with President Hu at the APEC Summit.
-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC
discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for
China to take immediate strong action.
-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be

maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC
resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718,
1737, and 1747.
--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile

technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these
two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese
territory.
--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly
scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order
to detect and deter these shipments.
--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the

intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it,
and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our
information accordingly and appropriately.
--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together
cooperatively and effectively on these issues.
--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as

possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council
resolutions.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North
Korea and Iran.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their
longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air-
shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of
these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently
transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran
Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is
the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to
UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile-
related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737
prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of
jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815.
These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and
¶1737.
¶4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the
highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the
United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate
occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy
Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these
transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are
continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised
by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks
in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue
with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a
telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007,
President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the
APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would
provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.
¶5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with
detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of
another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea
to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for
Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid
Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the
goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive
response from China to this information.
¶6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air

shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these
shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We
have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo
on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea
to both deter and detect these shipments.
¶7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on

this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this
critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these
shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action,
such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport
a less hospitable transfer point.
--------------------------------------------- --------
NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:
-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean

plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile
program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid
Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's
solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested
additional information.
-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped
to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.
--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under

UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States
are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea
would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring
these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components
included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they
would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the
mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these
concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate
this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.
------------------------------------------
BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR
------------------------------------------
¶9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:
--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials
the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and
North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised
U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit
in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United
States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details,
we are providing you further information regarding these activities.
Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an
imminent shipment of serious concern.
-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-

related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those
items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under
UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the
missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or
China determines that they would contribute to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such,
is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution.
With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities
urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to
Iran.
--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur
on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through
Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.
--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile
development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).
--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.
--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last

year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have
transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on
these shipments.
--14 December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang

probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes
for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under
development in Iran.
--On or about 15 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were

probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--On or around 23 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were

probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--On or about 16 May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 24 May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were
--On or about 6 June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
-- On or about 12 June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what

were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about 14 June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what

were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
--On or about 14 July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were
--On or about 26 July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an

unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
--On or about 22 August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet

vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North
Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.
--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase
dramatically in the future.
--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent
from North Korea to Iran.
--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500
and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100-
160 per month.
--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500

components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December
of last year.
-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly-

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been

seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian
Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries
shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates
are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an
insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking
these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or
quality of jet vanes required.
--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem
appropriate, including frequent inspection of Iran Air and Air Koryo
flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights
indicates that frequent regular inspections of Iran Air flights and
Air Koryo flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in
the future.
--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help

end this proliferation.
------------------------------
Reporting Requirement and POC
------------------------------
¶10. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by
November 8, 2007.
¶11. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is

Matthew Zartman (202) 647-7588
begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (202) 647-
7588 end_of_the_skype_highlighting, zartmanml@state.sgov.gov. Please slug
all responses for ISN, T, and EAP. Washington appreciates Post's
assistance.
RICE
Viewing cable 07TRIPOLI943, REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION OF
RETURNED DETAINEE ARM DISABILITY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #07TRIPOLI943.
07TRIPOLI943 2007-11-07 09:09 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET Embassy Tripoli
VZCZCXRO0002
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0943 3110914
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 070914Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3227
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA DAS GRAY, NEA/MAG, S/WCI (SHIN, STAMILIO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/2032

TAGS: PTER PREL PHUM PINS PINR LY
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION OF RETURNED DETAINEE ARM DISABILITY
REF: A) STATE 135205; B) STATE 127608; C) JOHNSON-STEVENS/GODFREY E-MAIL

10/15/07; D) TRIPOLI 797; E) TRIPOLI 723 AND PREVIOUS
CLASSIFIED BY: J. Chris Stevens, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (c), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Charge met November 1 with MFA Secretary for the
Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri and reiterated Post's request for
timely access to returned Guantanamo detainee ISN-194 (Muhammad
Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi) to follow up on ref A and B requests
for further information on when and how al-Rimi sustained an
injury to his left arm and suffered the loss of several teeth.
The CDA also requested access to ISN-557 (Ben Qumu Abu Sufian
Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda), who was returned to Libya September 26,
to assess his condition.
¶2. (S/NF) Fituri stressed that it has been made clear that the
ostensibly non-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation
(QDF), headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, has the lead on
facilitating access to returned detainees. He implied that the
MFA was not in a position to offer further assistance and
recommended that the CDA contact directly the QDF's Executive
Director, Dr. Yusuf Sawani, and possibly ESO Chief Musa Kusa to
follow up on the request for access to ISN-194 and ISN-557. The
CDA pushed back, acknowledging that while the QDF has been
designated as the organization responsible for facilitating
Watchdog Committee access to returned detainees, the GOL's MFA
also has a role to play in helping to ensure that such access is
granted. Fituri offered no substantive rejoinder. Post has not
been successful in its subsequent attempts to reach Dr. Sawani
or our other QDF interlocutors. (Note: Sawani and other Libyan
contacts are typically only reached by mobile telephone as many
of their offices lack functioning landlines. Post suspects, but
cannot confirm, that Sawani and his QDF colleagues are not
taking our numerous calls to avoid having to discuss this issue.
End note.)
¶3. (S/NF) Comment: CDA met with Dr. Sawani in mid-September to

request access to ISN-194 to follow up on ref B request for
further information on the nature of his left hand disability
and tooth loss. Sawani said QDF employees (NFI) conducted a
"pre-interview" of ISN-194 in mid-September in anticipation of a
second visit by Emboffs (first visit reported ref E) and were
told by the detainee that he sustained an injury to his left arm
during interrogation at GTMO. Post notes that the first (and
only) visit to ISN-194 came after two and a half months of
negotiation with the GOL and the QDF. Post notes that the GOL
has expressed a strong desire for access to all/all Libyan
national detainees remaining in GTMO (ref D), and recommends
that such access be explicitly conditioned on the GOL's
facilitation of the requested visits with ISN-194 and ISN-557.
End comment.
MILAM
Viewing cable 07BUENOSAIRES2345, ARGENTINE FUROR CONTINUES

OVER U.S. ALLEGATIONS
Discussing cables
2007-12-14 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
19:07 16:04 Aires
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #2345/01 3481907

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141907Z DEC 07
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1623
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017

TAGS: PREL SNAR CJAN ECON ASEC KJUS VE AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE FUROR CONTINUES OVER U.S. ALLEGATIONS
THAT VENEZUELAN MONEY WAS INTENDED FOR CRISTINA KIRCHNER
REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 2336 (B) MCWHIRTER 12/14/07
E-MAIL TO DS COMMAND CENTER
Classified By: Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) The GOA has repeatedly suspended Ministerial-level
contacts and has cut off some law enforcement contacts with
the USG in wake of the continuing furor (ref a) over DOJ
allegations that $800,000 intercepted August 4 by Argentine
officials was a BRV cash contribution for Cristina Kirchner's
(CFK) presidential campaign. The press reports that the GOA
is considering further responses, including the staging of a
massive protest in front of the Embassy which could involve
radical and sometimes violent groups. The Argentine Deputy
Foreign Minister advised the Ambassador that he would be
called in to the MFA on December 18. The Ambassador used a
previously scheduled holiday reception for more than 100
journalists to roll out Washington-cleared guidance
reinforcing the message that the recent arrests in Miami do
not constitute a U.S. conspiracy against the GOA and that the
United States wants a good relationship with Argentina. End
Summary.
GOA Ire Against USG Dominates Headlines

---------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Argentine media on December 14 continued to give

extensive coverage to the GOA's furious reaction (ref a) to
FBI allegations that $800,000 intercepted August 4 by
Argentine officials was a BRV cash contribution for Cristina
Kirchner's (CFK) presidential campaign. According to several
sources, CFK was very angry and upset, interpreting U.S.
arrests and charges as rejection of her overtures for better
relations, an attempt to destabilize
her new administration, and an effort to force her to
distance Argentina from Venezuela. Following the lead of
President Kirchner, her chief of staff and Justice Minister
-- whose remarks (ref a) were broadcast and re-broadcast
throughout the day and night -- a broad array of CFK's
congressional, gubernatorial, and mayoral allies have accused
the USG of slandering CFK and the GOA in premeditated fashion
in its effort to get Chavez.
¶3. (SBU) Opposition leader and presidential candidate Elisa

Carrio, who finished the October 28 polling in second place,
ridiculed the GOA's attempt to portray the arrests as part of
an anti-CFK conspiracy. "President Kirchner does not seem to
understand that the justice system in the U.S. is autonomous.
Thank God, (CFK) cannot stop the U.S. justice system. I am
happy that the Americans are investigating, because they're
the best guarantee (of an
impartial inestigation). Not even the U.S. president can
intervene." Leaders of other opposition parties questioned
CFK's ties to Caracas and criticized the GOA for having let
Antonini-Wilson leave the country before completing its own
investigation.
GOA Gives the USG the Silent Treatment

--------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) The press is further reporting that cabinet

ministers have been instructed not to meet with the
Ambassador, and that all U.S. requests for high-level
meetings with GOA officials must be coordinated through the
MFA. We are also hearing from our law enforcement contacts
that they are being instructed by the GOA leadership to
minimize contacts with us. Several bilateral meetings were
cancelled under instruction on December 13. The Airport
Security Police told Embassy they had been instructed not to
meet with U.S. officials. On the afternoon of December 14,
the GOA ended more than 24 hours of shunning contacts with
the Embassy when Deputy Foreign Minister Garcia Moritan
called the Ambassador. He advised the Ambassador that he
should come to the MFA to meet Foreign Minister Taiana on the
evening of December 18. We anticipate this will entail a
protest and an explanation of the steps the GOA plans to
undertake.
GOA-Organized Anti-USG Protest in the Offing?

---------------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) "La Nacion," the newspaper of record, and other

media have reported that CFK and her top advisers repeatedly
huddled Wednesday night and Thursday morning on how to deal
with "the worst moment of the bilateral relationship with the
United States" in the last four and a half years. According
to "La Nacion," "the Casa Rosada (presidential palace)
Thursday considered ordering mayors, social organizations,
and activists ("piqueteros") to organize a mass demonstration
of protest in front of the U.S. embassy." The article quotes
an unnamed official at Casa Rosada who said, "We have not
ruled it out. There is a great deal of anger with the United
States, but it has not yet been decided." (Mission ARSO sent
a report on this development and Mission counter-measures to
DS Command Center -- ref b.)
¶6. (SBU) The press reported remarks by WHA A/S Shannon that
the case was a law enforcement matter, not a political issue,
and that it should not be allowed to affect bilateral
relations. The press also quoted Department spokesman
McCormack on the strength of the bilateral relationship and
the independence of federal prosecutors, as well as similar
statements by the Embassy's spokesperson.
The Empire Strikes Back: Mission PD Response

---------------------------------------------
¶7. (U) The Ambassador used a previously scheduled holiday

reception for more than 100 print, radio, and TV journalists
December 14 to roll out Washington-cleared guidance on the
case. Several of the radio journalists used their cell
phones to transmit the Ambassador's words on the air through
their stations, and many rushed out after the Ambassador
concluded to call in stories. Several stories reporting on
the Ambassador's reception remarks have already hit the
wires. We expect that the Ambassador's remarks will dominate
Argentine headlines Saturday.
¶8. (U) We also gave the journalists recent quotes by

Assistant Secretary Shannon, Secretary Chao, Dana Perino, and
the Ambassador on the U.S.-Argentine relationship. We are
posting the Ambassador's remarks on the Mission's web page.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) What began as a black day for the U.S. image in
Argentina -- with headlines filled with attacks by CFK and
others about our supposedly dark intentions -- is ending on a
more hopeful note, as the quick work by State, Justice, and
the FBI to review and clear our draft guidance on the issue
enabled us to get our story out to a captive group of
Argentine journalists. As the first week of the CFK
administration draws to a close, we have given pragmatists
within the GOA material to work with in their effort to
convince CFK to climb back from the precipice and re-engage
with the USG as she begins the second week of her
presidential term. We will see their reaction and response
in the days ahead.
WAYNE
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD5288, CORRECTED COPY: PAKISTAN:

FIXING COALITION
Discussing cables
2007-12-15 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO2646
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #5288/01 3490557
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150557Z DEC 07
TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2017

TAGS PINR, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: PAKISTAN: FIXING COALITION
SUPPORT FUNDING
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 5266 ISLAMABAD 4817 B. ISLAMABAD 4369
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request, see Para 12. This is a retransmission
correcting text in Paragraph 10 of Ref A. Please refer only to this version of
the cable.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY. Since 2002, the USG has reimbursed Pakistan over 5.3 billion
USD for support to U.S. operations using Coalition Support Funds (CSF). When
pending claims are processed, that figure will likely exceed 5.6 billion USD.
The CSF authorizing legislation was written soon after 9/11; six years down the
road, we need Pakistan to more vigorously engage in the war on terror, but CSF
is not working the way it should. CSF is not reaching those parts of the GoP
that are shouldering the load in GWOT operations. Two clear examples of the
problem are helicopter readiness and medical support to the Frontier Corps. The
readiness of Pakistan’s helicopter fleet is poor. Despite giving the GoP 55 USD
million for helicopter operations over seven months, only 2 to 6 Pakistani
Cobras are fully mission capable at a time they desperately need air power to
fight spreading militancy. Additionally, we have processed or will process
reimbursement requests for 100 million USD over the year to support medical
operations, but the Frontier Corps still does not receive basic medevac support.
Another consequence of the current system is political. It fuels the internal
argument that the USG is “paying” Pakistan to fight a U.S. war - this at a time
when the Pakistanis need to accept the direct threat to their own security and
sovereignty posed by al-Qaida, Taliban and extremist forces.
¶3. (C) Post has worked extensively with the GoP to increase GoP transparency
and accountability. What we have discovered is that we are receiving
reimbursement requests for barbed wire and air defense radar systems that have
no or marginal impact on the GWOT. We recognize the legal and political
sensitivities involved in developing a new approach, but the program, as it is
currently being implemented, simply is not meeting U.S. or Pakistan counter-
terrorism objectives. This message outlines several ways forward. In the
meantime, DOD or CENTCOM should undertake an audit or program review of CSF. END
SUMMARY.
TARGETING CSF FUNDING TOWARD PAKISTAN AND U.S. STRATEGIC GOALS
¶4. (C) U.S. Public Law 109-289 (2206) authorizes CSF to reimburse Pakistan for
logistical, military and other support provided to U.S. military operations.
Under this authorization, the U.S. has reimbursed Pakistan 5.3 billion USD since
2002. When pending claims are processed, the total CSF reimbursement to Pakistan
will exceed 5.6 billion USD. Pakistan receives nearly 90 percent of total CSF
worldwide. While the December 8, 2003 guidance provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) on parameters for reimbursements is broad, there have
been multiple instances in which Post is confident funds have been diverted and
that reimbursed claims figures have been seriously inflated. A few examples:
-- HELICOPTER READINESS. Pakistan received 55 million USD for helicopter
operations from July 2006 to February 2007; however, Post estimates that as few
as 3 Cobra Helicopters were fully mission capable as recently as 10 weeks ago.
Post is confident Army Aviation Command never received the 55 million.
-- MEDEVAC ASSISTANCE TO FRONTIER CORPS. The Pakistan Army claimed 99 million
USD over past 12 months for medical operations and the U.S. has paid or is in
process of paying all/all submitted medical claims. Yet, despite providing this
plus fully funding 235 million USD CSF lease assistance for 26 new Bell 412
helicopters, the Inspector General of the Frontier Corps has repeatedly
requested U.S. assistance in providing assets for medevac, obviously unaware of
the resources the U.S. has provided.
--RADAR MAINTENANCE: Between August 2006 and July 2007, Pakistan submitted
claims for almost 70 million USD in ADA Radar Maintenance, although there is no
enemy air threat
ISLAMABAD 00005288 002 OF 002
related to the war on terror.
--BARBED WIRE: Between August 2006 and July 2007, we received a claim for 26
million USD in barbed wire and pickets. While these items are no doubt helpful
in protecting outposts, the claim figures are highly suspect.
¶5. (C) Ambassador, the Office of Defense Representative and DOD officials have
repeatedly raised CSF disbursement and other problems with the Prime Minister,
Ministry of Finance and key military officials but have not received
satisfactory responses. In fact, recent correspondence from Pakistan leadership
argues for additional funding to support increased operations.
¶6. (C) CSF reimbursement funds go directly into Pakistan,s general treasury --
from there we have no visibility on their final destination or application. And
we are not alone - based on our conversations with GoP officials, from President
Musharraf down to the average Pakistani private, no one in Pakistan seems to
have a clear grasp of the amount of US military reimbursement assistance
actually provided.
¶7. (C) The CSF authorization legislation was drafted soon after 9/11. Six years
down the road, we still need Pakistan to engage more vigorously in the fight
against extremism, but it is clear we also need to do a better job of making
sure our monies are targeted to meet our counter-terrorism objectives.
POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO CSF REFORM

¶8. (C) Potential options to address CSF issues include the following:
(1) Stop approving Pakistan’s CSF reimbursement requests until we receive
adequate assurances on disbursement; (2) Earmark CSF monies for specific areas:
maintenance, support, etc.; (3) Create a CSF “trust fund” that would allow the
USG to control reimbursement and to obligate some funds for specific needs; or
(4) Convert CSF into a direct cash transfer program.
¶9. (C) Option 1 would lead to a major political clash and damage our military
to military relationship, just as we have the potential for greater cooperation
under Chief of Army Staff General Kayani’s leadership. This would undermine the
very purpose of CSF--to encourage the GoP to continue fighting militant
extremism. The Taliban, al Qaida and Islamic extremists represent a clear and
growing danger to U.S. and Pakistani security and to regional stability. As
allies with forces in the region, we have a responsibility to strengthen and
focus our assistance to improve their security forces’ capabilities.
¶10. (C) We understand DOD has determined Options 2, 3 and 4 would require
asking Congress to amend the authorizing legislation. Post could attempt to
persuade Pakistan to concur with establishment of some form of “trust” mechanism
- pointing out the alternative may be a severe reduction or loss of funding if
Congress continues to see insufficient transparency and accountability. In any
event, a new approach is urgently required. We believe some variation of Options
2 and 3, which allow the USG to earmark at least some CSF monies for those
Pakistani military elements of vital interest to us (helicopters, special forces
and Frontier Corps), is the most logical and efficient approach.
CSF AUDIT/PROGRAM REVIEW

¶11. (C) Post repeats that we do not have visibility over the destination of CSF
funds. Accordingly, Post would welcome an audit or program review of the CSF
process by CENTCOM or by DOD.
ACTION REQUEST
¶12. (C) Action Request: Post would appreciate a front-channel response to the
options proposed in para 8 and the proposal for an audit/review. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 07ISLAMABAD5388, PAKISTAN’S NEXT PRIME MINISTER?

Discussing cables
07ISLAMABAD5388
VZCZCXRO1285
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #5388/01 3621640
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281640Z DEC 07
Friday, 28 December 2007, 16:40

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/28/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, SHUM, PK, PINS
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN’S NEXT PRIME MINISTER?
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4(b)(d).
¶1. (S/NF) The Pakistan Muslim League has unofficially selected former Punjab
Chief Minister and current head of the party’s Punjab chapter, Chaudhry Pervaiz
Elahi, as its candidate for the Prime Ministership following the January 2008
national elections. Elahi, who until the November 15 dissolution of the
provincial governments served as Punjab’s Chief Minister, has long been a
prominent figure in center-right politics in the Punjab province. While Elahi
lacks the personal charisma of other major political leaders, such as the late
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, his political instincts and organizational
skills more than compensate for this deficiency. Unlike Bhutto and Sharif, who
run their parties as personal fiefdoms based on the sheer force of their
personalities, Elahi and his cousin/brother-in-law Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain have
a history of deal-making and coalition-building with Pakistan’s center-right,
that has created personal and political ties between them and most of the
Punjab’s feudal and industrial elite.
¶2. (S/NF) Elahi first came to prominence along with his older cousin and
brother-in-law Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as supporters of center-right leader
Nawaz Sharif. As Lahore-based Kashmiris who relied primarily on the army and
intelligence agencies for political elevation, the Sharifs lacked personal ties
and common ground with most of Punjab’s center-right politicians who hailed from
the province’s traditional feudal and industrial families. The Chaudhrys,
industrialists from Gujrat, were among the first to recognize the Sharifs’
rising influence in center-right politics and first formed business and later
political ties to the family. For this reason, both Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat
were ultimately admitted to the Sharifs’ inner circle, making them arguably the
second most powerful family in the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The Sharifs
came to rely on the Chaudhrys for much of the political strategy and deal-making
that kept the coalition of Punjabi feudals and industrialists -- on which the
party was based -- working in tandem (despite Nawaz Sharif’s notoriously
difficult personality).
¶3. (S/NF) The Chaudhrys’ major rift with the Sharifs came following the 1997
elections. Nawaz Sharif had ostensibly promised Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat
that, in return for engineering an election campaign that resulted in a two-
thirds majority for the party in the National Assembly, Ch. Pervaiz would be
made Chief Minister of the Punjab. Following the party’s victory, however, Nawaz
broke his word and instead elevated his brother Shahbaz to the Chief Ministerial
office -- leaving Elahi as Speaker of the Provincial Assembly. While Elahi
remained loyal to Nawaz and the PML-N, the relationship between the two families
never fully recovered. Ch. Pervaiz has raised this story on more than one
occasion with the Principal Officer, as evidence of Sharif’s lack of trust in
non-family members, and as a reason for the break between the two families
following the 1999 coup.
¶4. (S/NF) The decision to remain with the PML-N in 1997, despite differences
with the Sharifs, was largely due to the Chaudhrys’ distaste for the Bhutto
family -- a rivalry that pre-dates the current generation. The Chaudhrys hold
Benazir Bhutto’s father responsible for the death of Ch. Pervaiz Elahi’s father
and for the imprisonment and torture of Ch. Shujaat Hussain’s father during the
elder Bhutto’s tenure as Prime Minister. Both Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat were
briefly detained by the elder Bhutto. Ch. Shujaat’s father was a close advisor
to Gen. Zia-ul-Haq following his 1979 coup against Bhutto, and is believed to
have encouraged Gen. Zia to have Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto executed. Rumor in Lahore
is that Ch. Shujaat’s father loaned Gen. Zia his pen to sign Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto’s death warrant. Ch. Pervaiz ostensibly purchased the same pen at an
auction some years later. The Chaudhrys are believed to have actively opposed a
pre-electoral deal devised between Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf in
September 2007, largely due to their personal animosity for Bhutto. Since her
death, Elahi, in conversation, has suggested that he would be able to form a
solid working relationship with either of her likely successors, Amin Faheem or
Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari.
ISLAMABAD 00005388 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) Following the 1999 coup both Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat were
detained by the National Accountability Bureau on corruption charges relating to
unpaid state-owned bank loans that were made to their companies. Charges against
both were dropped following an agreement they made to defect from the Pakistan
Muslim League - Nawaz and assist President Musharraf in building a new center-
right Muslim League in Punjab. The Chaudhrys are believed to have been offered
this deal at the behest of National Security Council Secretary Tariq Aziz -- who
they once counted as a close
SIPDIS political ally (they have since fallen out over differences relating to
the award of PML tickets in 2002 and 2005, and Musharraf’s negotiations with the
late Benazir Bhutto). The Chaudhrys carried out this new role in much the same
manner as they had for the Sharifs, putting together a party based upon personal
ties between them and other Punjabi feudals and industrialists. While the party
had no grassroots supporters, its candidates in both 2002 and 2005 performed
well due to their personal influence in their local areas.
¶6. (S/NF) As a reward for his political service, Ch. Pervaiz was appointed as
Punjab Chief Minister following the 2002 national elections -- the post earlier
denied to him by Nawaz Sharif. By all accounts, Elahi performed exceptionally
well in his role as an administrator. He clearly defined his government’s
priorities (health care, education, and infrastructure development); devoted
significant financial resources to these priority areas; and appointed capable,
competent ministers to head these departments. International donor agencies have
certified that Elahi’s government achieved significant improvements in many of
the key indicators in these areas.
¶7. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶8. (S/NF) Elahi has been a strong supporter of President Musharraf’s
enlightened moderation agenda and favors swift, decisive law enforcement action
against terrorists and extremist organizations. Senior law-enforcement
officials, who worked with Elahi as Chief Minister, claim that he gave clear
instructions that significant resources were to be devoted to infiltrating and
dismantling terrorist organizations and to monitoring and curtailing the
activities of religious leaders believed to have extremist tendencies. Under his
leadership, the Punjab police were successful in bringing down a number of
terrorist cells in the province.
¶9. (S/NF) At the same time, Elahi believes that the government must make a
clear distinction between terrorists, and conservative religious figures. While
Elahi and his family are followers of moderate Sufi traditions, he has, largely
for political reasons, built ties with more conservative Deobandi religious
institutions, particularly the Deobandi madrassa board and the Tablighi Jamaat.
These individuals, who had been traditionally ignored by Punjab’s center-right
politicians (almost all of whom follow the Sufi school of through), have
provided Elahi with a source of influence in these communities -- unparalleled
by other main-stream politicians. Elahi has used this influence to encourage
reform within Punjab’s madrassas and obtain strong statements from these leaders
condemning terrorist violence and declaring its un-Islamic. Absent the support
he enjoyed in these quarters, it is doubtful that the government could have
proceeded with its admittedly incomplete
ISLAMABAD 00005388 003 OF 003
religious-reform agenda.
¶10. (S/NF) Elahi is a close advisor of President Musharraf, and is regularly
consulted by him on political strategy. This advice, however, is not always
followed -- leading to a certain degree of tension in their relationship. Elahi
believes that if he and Shujaat had been listened to, the entire Chief Justice
episode and the state of emergency could have been avoided. If elected Prime
Minister, Elahi will not content himself with the titular role played by his
predecessors and will insist on full control over broad aspects of domestic
policy and political strategy. This will inevitably bring him into conflict with
the President, although given their prior relationship, these issues can
probably be resolved quite amicably.
¶11. (S/NF) Elahi was born in 1945 and educated at Lahore’s Forman Christian
College and Watford College of Technology in London. He is married with two
sons. The elder is a Sufi religious scholar, who avoids politics and public
appearances. The younger, Moonis Elahi, attended the Wharton Business School and
is being groomed by his father as the family’s political heir, Moonis is
contesting his first provincial assembly elections in January 2008, for seats in
both Lahore and the family’s base in Gujrat.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 07LONDON4472, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY PETERS’

DECEMBER 7 VISIT
Discussing cables
07LONDON4472 2007-12-05 2010-11-30 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFO Embassy
11:11 23:11 RN London
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #4472/01 3391158

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051158Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 2586
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 004472
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
BERLIN AND PARIS PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY PETERS AND

DELEGATION
EO 12958 DECL: 12/05/2017

TAGS EAIR, ICAO, ECON, SENV, ELTN, UK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY PETERS’ DECEMBER 7 VISIT
TO LONDON
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. TUTTLE FOR REASONS
1.4 B, D
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your December 7-8 visit to London comes after Prime Minister
Gordon Brown has finished putting his own stamp on the government, following
this summer’s transition from Tony Blair’s tenure, and begins focusing on
governing. It also comes at a time during which major infrastructure programs
such as Heathrow Terminal 5 are nearing completion and new proposals such as
London Crossrail and a new runway for Heathrow are being launched. Ruth Kelly,
Secretary of State for Transport, has highlighted security, liberalization, and
environmental protection as key priorities. Kelly’s tenure began two days before
terrorists drove a car with crude explosives into the Glasgow airport terminal,
and security remains a key transport concern in the UK. End Summary.
(U) UK Political Scene

----------------------
¶2. (C/NF) After leading the Labour Party for 13 years and Her Majesty’s
Government for ten years, Tony Blair stepped down in June and Gordon Brown
succeeded him as Prime Minister. Brown had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer
(finance minister) throughout Blair’s premiership and had always been the
obvious choice to succeed him. It was Brown who ran the economy; the New Labour
program that made the Labour Party electable again after 18 years in opposition
was as much his creation as Blair’s. Brown got off to a strong start over the
summer. The public welcomed his solid competence as a refreshing change after
Blair’s perceived slickness, and hoped he would turn the page on the deeply
unpopular Iraq war. The new PM responded well to several early crises: abortive
terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow; the worst flooding in 60 years; and an
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Brown’s unexpected lead in the opinion polls
fueled disunity within the main opposition Conservative Party and prompted
speculation that he would call a snap election this fall (though he need not do
so until May 2010). The prospect of a fourth consecutive general-election
trouncing caused the Conservatives (“Tories”) to rally behind their leader David
Cameron, who delivered a stellar speech to the annual party conference; the
Tories got a bounce in the polls, and the Prime Minister decided not to call an
election after all. That decision was widely seen as a humiliating climb-down,
and his claim that the polls had nothing to do with the decision damaged his
reputation for integrity. Ever since then, the bad news has just kept on piling
up for Brown:
- the Labour Party General Secretary abruptly resigned after it emerged that a
major donor was using proxies to conceal his contributions to the party and the
General Secretary knew about it and failed to comply with legal requirements;
- a government agency lost personal data - including bank account details - on

25 million people (out of 60 million) when a junior employee violated security
regulations all too easily. Another case emerged recently in which a government
contractor kept personal data for a year after finishing its project, leading to
serious questions of the government’s handling of data;
- the government’s loan guarantees in response to the mortgage bank Northern

Rock crisis (Britain’s first run on a bank since 1866) put over BPS 20 million
(equivalent to more than USD 40 million) of taxpayers’ money at risk; and
- ministers and civil servants alike are said to be demoralized by Brown’s

secretive and controlling approach, and parliamentary backbenchers despair at
his vulnerability to Cameron’s agile taunting.
Key Bilateral Issues

--------------------
¶3. (C/NF) The UK is our closest and most important ally. PM Brown is much less
outgoing than Blair and wishes to avoid being accused - as Blair was - of being
President Bush’s “poodle,” but he wants - and knows that Britain needs - a
strong relationship with the U.S. Administration. He considers Afghanistan the
primary front in the military conflict against Islamist terrorism and is
increasing the UK’s involvement there, while emphasizing that the global threat
of violent Islamist extremism cannot be defeated by military means. On Iraq, he
is reducing the British presence
while insisting that the UK will meet its obligations to the Iraqi people and
the international community. He attaches great importance to resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is keen to support economic development in the
Palestinian territories. All British nationals detained at Guantanamo have been
returned to the UK, and HMG has requested the return of five detainees who have
residency ties here; bilateral discussions are ongoing.
Surface Transportation Programs

-------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) In 2003, the Mayor of London introduced a congestion charge of BPS 5
(USD 10) per day to drive into the central portion of London (50 pence per day
for those living inside the zone). The city considers this a fee for service
(improved transportation infrastructure, decreased pollution and congestion),
and did not grant a diplomatic exemption. After determining that the fee was
actually a tax, and therefore not payable under the Vienna Conventions of
Diplomatic and Consular Affairs, the Department of State engaged in lengthy
negotiations with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the City of London. In
July 2005, after negotiations concluded unsuccessfully, the Department
instructed the Mission and its members to stop paying the tax. The U.S. Embassy
was not the first to refuse to pay, and following the expansion of the
congestion zone and increase in the fee to BPS 8 (USD 16) in 2007, a large
number of missions, including 23 of the 27 European Union missions in London,
now refuse to pay the tax. London Mayor Ken Livingstone has focused his ire
publicly against the U.S. Embassy and the Ambassador personally. His position,
however, should be seen in the wider context of his anti-American positions on
many issues and his coziness to the likes of Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro.
¶5. (U) In October, PM Brown gave the go-ahead to a major light rail program for
London that was first raised in the 1980s. Crossrail will be a new east-west
railway linking Maidenhead and Heathrow in the west with Shenfield and Abbey
Wood in the east via tunnels under Central London. The track will be 118
kilometers and will house 38 new stations, enabling an estimated 200 million
passenger journeys a year. Construction is set to begin in 2010 with the first
trains expected to run in 2017. PM Brown said Crossrail will be of “enormous
importance, not just for London but for the whole country” and would generate up
to 30,000 new jobs. Funding, projected to be BPS 16bn (USD 32bn), will be met by
the government, businesses and farepayers, with a BPS 5bn (USD 10bn) grant
coming from the Department for Transport. Direct contributions will be made by
some of the project’s key beneficiaries, including the City of London
Corporation. TfL estimates that Crossrail will contribute BPS 30bn (USD 60bn) to
the UK economy. Getting approval for this project is seen as a major
accomplishment for Ruth Kelly and her department.
¶6. (U) In 2004 the government announced the creation of the Transport
Innovation Fund (TIF), designed to support the costs of smarter, innovative
local transport packages. Projects address demand management, congestion
charging, and local and regional schemes to benefit national productivity. In
2005, Cambridgeshire successfully bid for BPS 385,000 (USD 770,000) and was
awarded a further BPS 1.055m (USD 2.11m) to fund a study looking at transport
packages that combine demand management measures with measures to encourage
modal shift. The funding was provided on the condition that the local authority
study whether a congestion charge would be appropriate in Cambridge. In October
2007 Cambridge submitted another bid for nearly BPS 500m (USD 1bn) which would
be used to fund large-scale improvements to public transport, highways and
cycling facilities and demand management measures, specifically congestion
charging. The government is also considering a bid from Manchester which would
involve BPS 3bn (USD 6bn) worth of public transport improvements in exchange for
a peak-hour congestion charge of up to BPS 5 (USD 10) a day.
¶7. (U) On November 14, the first high-speed Eurostar train left the modernized
St. Pancras station for Paris. The move to St. Pancras, on the north side of
Central London, from Waterloo, on the south side, will make it easier for
passengers from Northern England and Scotland to connect to the Continent. The
move is the culmination of a BPS 5.8bn (USD 11.6bn) 10-year project designed to
speed up travel to Britain from France and Belgium. The new 68-mile high speed
single rail line between St. Pancras and the tunnel under the
English Channel is the final section of high speed rail to be completed and
enables Eurostar trains to hit 190mph. It cuts journey times by approximately 20
minutes and links London with Paris in two hours, 15 minutes and London with
Brussels in one hour, 51 minutes.
(U) London Olympics

-------------------
¶8. (U) London will host the Summer Olympic Games in 2012. Transportation for
the Games will be delivered through a partnership between the Olympic Delivery
Authority (ODA) Transport team, Transport for London (TfL), Department for
Transport (DfT), Network Rail and other transport providers. The ODA aims for
100 percent of ticketed spectators to travel to the Games by public transport,
walking or cycling. There will be no private car parking for spectators except
for some “Blue Badge” disabled parking. An Olympic Route Network (ORN) will be
implemented for the transportation of athletes, comprising a network of roads
linking competition and key non-competition venues. In general, roads will
remain open to the public. However, some traffic lanes will be dedicated for
Games vehicles on the busiest sections of the route. An Olympic Transport
Operations Center (OTOC) will be established to manage all modes of transport.
Airport Infrastructure and Aviation Liberalization

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶9. (U) The UK remains the destination for the highest number of passengers
departing the U.S. by air, and Heathrow airport processes more international
passengers than any other airport in the world. In the face of continued rapid
aviation growth rates, airport infrastructure is a key concern in the UK.
Creaking and groaning under the weight of old infrastructure coupled with modern
security requirements, Heathrow operator BAA and the flying public will welcome
the opening of Terminal 5, on March 27, 2008. This new terminal, which is on
time and under budget, will nearly double existing capacity, and is capable of
handling the Airbus A-380.
¶10. (U) While there is light at the end of the passenger capacity tunnel,
Heathrow is unique among airports of its size in operating only two runways. In
fact, the southeast of England has not seen a new runway since the Second World
War, and the government is eager to see a new runway at Heathrow, Stansted, or
both. Nor is the issue limited to England, as Scotland’s Prestwick airport is
the busiest single runway airport in the world. On November 22, the Department
for Transport published a consultation on adding a third runway at Heathrow
airport by 2020. This has kicked off a lively public debate, with positions
crossing party lines. As may be expected, noise and local air quality issues
dominate the environmental debate around the third runway, although climate
change concerns figure prominently as well. In addition, the new runway would
require the demolition of an entire village just north of the airport.
¶11. (U) BAA (formerly, British Airports Authority, which was privatized in
1984) has also come under considerable criticism for its levels of service and
the Parliament’s Transport Select Committee has launched hearings on the issue.
In addition, the Competition Commission has recently investigated whether BAA’s
dominance of the London area should be allowed to continue. Finally, the Civil
Aviation Authority has just published on November 20 its proposal for fee
structures at Heathrow and Gatwick (along with Stansted, fees for these airports
are regulated by the CAA because of BAA’s near monopoly over London), which
neither airlines nor BAA find acceptable. On the whole, airport issues will
remain a major topic for Ruth Kelly for the remainder of her tenure.
¶12. (SBU) Sentiment in the UK regarding the conclusion of the first phase of
the U.S.-EU Air Services Agreement was largely negative, and Ruth Kelly and
other ministers are under considerable pressure to conclude successfully a
second round of negotiations, including concessions on foreign ownership of U.S.
airlines. Airlines such as Virgin and BA are eager to gain access to the U.S.
market, as you are well aware. Public opinion also plays a role, as the
agreement was seen by many as another example of UK interests being subsumed by
negotiators in Brussels. Department for Transport officials have raised the
desire for a timely and successful conclusion of a second phase on numerous
occasions, and have not been deterred by explanations of the U.S. political
climate - especially during an election year. Secretary Kelly may raise this
issue with you.
SIPDIS
UK-U.S. Climate Change Differences

----------------------------------
¶13. (SBU) The predominant environmental concern in the UK is climate change.

The UK was disappointed the U.S. did not sign the Kyoto Protocol. Local air
quality is a concern, but when faced with a trade-off, UK policy will tend to
favor reducing carbon output (as evidenced by the fact that around 50% of
vehicles in the UK run on diesel and would not meet most U.S. air quality
standards). There is strong support for action on climate change legislation
across the political spectrum and among the general public in the UK. The UK
participates in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), a cap-and-trade program
to help Europe meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments on carbon emissions. The UK
is also a key supporter of a European Commission proposal to include aviation in
the second phase of ETS, which is working its way through the legislative
process. The U.S. and other governments have registered concerns over the
legality of this unilateral environmental regulation on aviation emissions,
which should be resolved within the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Secretary Kelly’s office has indicated that she will raise this issue with you.
¶14. (SBU) Transportation is one of the largest and fastest growing contributors
to climate change in the UK, and aviation is seen as unique in that it is not
subject to fuel tax and duty (with the sole exception of non-commercial general
aviation). In an attempt to be seen to address the growth in aviation emissions
and make aviation pay its environmental costs, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT)
recently mooted a proposal to abandon air passenger duty (APD) in favor of a
charge on every flight leaving the UK. The proposal aims to include previously
excluded categories such as cargo, transfer passengers, smaller aircraft and
non-commercial aviation. The proposal still lacks detail, but the intent is to
provide incentives to reduce emissions and more closely align the tax with
environmental impact. HMT has held several meetings with UK, U.S. and other
passenger and cargo carriers. In addition, the Embassy met recently with HMT and
DfT officials to seek more information, including HMG’s views on the compliance
of the proposal with international obligations such as air services agreements
and the Chicago Convention. It is clear that UK analysis is not yet well
developed, but HMG indicated a willingness to exchange further information and
hold discussions with a view to avoiding another conflict over aviation and
emissions.
Transportation Security
-----------------------
¶15. (U) Transportation security remains high on Secretary Kelly’s agenda, as

transportation security oversight remains within her department. On June 29,
just one day after Kelly assumed her duties as Transport Secretary, police
discovered two failed car bombs in London’s West End. The following day,
terrorists drove a flaming vehicle equipped with a crude explosive device into a
terminal at Glasgow airport. This incident came less than a year after police
foiled an attempt to smuggle liquid explosives aboard U.S.-bound airlines and
almost two years to the day after the July 7 London bombings in which 52
commuters were killed on three Underground trains and a bus. UK aviation
suffered considerably after the liquid explosives attempt, with massive
cancellations and delays. The long term effects of the liquid explosive attempt
have been felt far and wide. However, in the UK, the overstretched security
infrastructure could not cope with the additional security requirements and
passengers were strictly limited to one carry-on bag. Secretary Kelly has
announced that this restriction will be lifted next year. This move, along with
additional measures, i.e., implementation of new technologies such as ct scans
at checkpoints at Heathrow and Gatwick, should improve passenger flow. U.S.-UK
transportation security and counter-terrorism cooperation is very strong. We are
encouraging UK security officials to focus on soft targets countermeasures,
counter radicalization and intelligence sharing.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index.
cfm Tuttle
Viewing cable 07PARIS4685, YOUR DECEMBER 16-18 VISIT TO FRANCE

Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017

TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PINR KPAL EU FR LG SY IS IR
SUBJECT: YOUR DECEMBER 16-18 VISIT TO FRANCE
PARIS 00004685 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) That the first international follow-on to Annapolis

is taking place in Paris reflects the new confidence and
greater cooperation that characterize our relationship with
France seven months into the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy.
France's support for our efforts to achieve peace in the
Middle East contrasts sharply with its previous preferred
role as a side-line critic. It is just one example of the
broader re-positioning of France vis-a-vis the U.S. which we
have been quick to recognize and take advantage of.
Sarkozy's desire to maximize France's influence by working
with the U.S. to address common challenges is the
international component of a larger ambition for his
five-year Presidency: to renew France though deep reform at
home and resumption of its leadership in Europe. With an
exceptionally long political honeymoon behind him, Sarkozy is
now pressing ahead with his domestic reform agenda. He has
met with predictable opposition (most dramatically in the
form of transport strikes), and some questioning among
political allies of his strategy of undertaking sequential,
calibrated reform rather than a Thatcherite big bang at the
outset of his term. Despite the difficulty of the challenge,
including an unsettled international economic context, and
little budgetary room for maneuver, Sarkozy remains
determined to see his program through. Given his dominant
political position, that remains a realistic prospect. An
activist on the international scene, with an opportunistic
eye for grabbing attention and credit, Sarkozy will remain a
challenging partner despite his desire to improve the
bilateral relationship. He has concentrated responsibility
for foreign affairs in the Presidency to an unprecedented
degree, while Foreign Minister Kouchner has focused on
selected policy issues. This message also addresses the
specifics of France's Middle East policies. While under
Sarkozy the French are more supportive, our collaboration
(and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has of late not been
as close as it should be, as Sarkozy's team in the Elysee has
focused single-mindedly on electing a President while
squeezing the democratically-elected majority and weakening
its ability to deal with post-election challenges. End
Summary
THE RELATIONSHIP
----------------
¶2. (C) Madame Secretary, The seven months since Nicolas

Sarkozy became President of France -- and the six months
since your last visit -- has been a remarkable period in
three respects. First, our relationship with France has
undergone a significant qualitative change. Sarkozy has set
in place a new paradigm for French foreign policy, one more
favorable to our interests. Scrapping Chirac's worldview,
which equated French leadership with containing U.S.
hegemony, Sarkozy has articulated the need for France to work
closely with the U.S. -- in order to address common
challenges, but also as the surest way to increase France's
global influence. France's increased involvement in and
commitment to Afghanistan, the beginning of a French interest
in Iraq, and France's consideration of a full return to NATO,
are the most symbolically powerful examples of France's
policy reorientation. Second, we have ratcheted up our
cooperation with France across our foreign policy agenda,
particularly on Middle East issues, but also on Kosovo,
Burma, Sudan/Darfur and elsewhere. In Lebanon, Sarkozy's
more activist foreign policy has already put the new
cooperative relationship to the test. Third, over the past
seven months, Sarkozy has begun to implement the ambitious
platform of domestic reform he had promised as a candidate.
SARKOZY
-------
¶3. (C) Before addressing the Middle East issues that will
be the focus of your visit here, a word on the domestic
context. Sarkozy enjoyed an exceptionally long political
honeymoon, one which extended well into the Fall. His
election -- representing the victory of a new-generation
leader, one with unmatched communication skills and a
detailed and ambitious program for renewing France -- led to
a season of national elan and optimism. The return to normal
PARIS 00004685 002.2 OF 004
in the political life of the country over the past two months
was predictable, as Sarkozy's efforts to implement difficult
domestic changes have run into opposition from those -- such
as rail workers -- who stand to lose, and many others who
fear change of any kind. Sarkozy has disappointed some in
his own camp for not immediately embarking on radical,
deep-rooted, pervasive reform, taking advantage of his
electoral mandate. Instead, Sarkozy has decided to carefully
pick his battles, gaining momentum from each piecemeal
victory. All in all, Sarkozy remains in a politically
powerful position, operating as the hands-on leader of a
largely unchecked executive branch, unencumbered for now by a
political opposition worthy of the name. He is determined to
make his mark during his five year term (which he insists may
be his single term of office), but has demonstrated greater
caution than might have been expected, mindful of the
international economic and financial environment, and severe
budgetary constraints at home.
KOUCHNER
--------
¶4. (C) Sarkozy's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was

the prize catch in Sarkozy's opportunistic effort to appoint
figures of the center and center-left to his government,
thereby increasing its legitimacy and political heft (and
depleting that of the opposition) as he waged the domestic
reform battle. While rumors circulate of a cabinet
re-shuffle early in the new year or following municipal
elections in March, Kouchner's position appears secure for
now. (Defense Minister Morin and Interior Minister
Alliot-Marie are among those thought most imperiled.) He
enjoys a personal chemistry with the President based on
Sarkozy's long-time admiration of Kouchner's personal and
political courage and humanitarian accomplishments. Kouchner
remains very popular -- consistently scoring at or near the
top of the polls measuring the popularity of France's
political leaders. But even his star quality (that he alone
in the government can claim) has not kept him from being
eclipsed by his hyper-active and media-savvy president.
Surely more of a concern to Kouchner, Sarkozy has
concentrated foreign policy decision-making and
implementation to an unprecedented degree in the Elysee, with
Secretary-General Claude Gueant and Diplomatic Advisor
SIPDIS
Jean-David Levitte accruing as much if not more influence
than Kouchner. Kouchner has largely focused on the issues
with which he has the greatest experience and level of
comfort -- Lebanon, Kosovo, and Darfur among them. While he
has of late curbed his penchant for off-the-cuff,
undiplomatic public comments, the thin-skinned Kouchner has
shown irritation over the involvement of Elysee officials in
the delicate negotiations over Lebanon's presidential
elections, and he may be uncomfortable with Sarkozy's
increasing willingness to downgrade human rights
considerations in his dealings foreign leaders, as
demonstrated by the way he has kept his distance from the
ongoing five-day visit to Paris of Mu'ammar Qadhafi.
Middle East
-----------
¶5. (S) Under Sarkozy, France's Middle East policies have

become more supportive of and congruent with U.S. interests,
but we are concerned that in the past few weeks our
collaboration (and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has not
been what it should be, as Sarkozy's Presidency team has
focused single-mindedly on electing a President in such a way
that squeezes the democratically-elected majority and weakens
its ability to deal with post-election challenges.
--Arab/Israeli peace: The French remain major supporters of

our efforts focused on supporting the Israeli/Palestinian
negotiations. Their eagerness to make Annapolis a success
and to host the Paris conference on assistance to the
Palestinians underscored this. Sarkozy and Kouchner both
want France to be a key player in what they hope will be a
strong and successful push in 2008 to the creation of a
Palestinian state. In many ways, France aspires to be a
favored additional partner to the Quartet. Syrian
participation at Annapolis has also sparked hopeful
commentary in the French media that a larger dynamic -- in
which France can participate -- is underway that inter alia
would foster an unraveling of the Syrian/Iranian relationship
and halt Iranian inroads through support of Hizballah in
Lebanon. Sarkozy and Kouchner will listen attentively to any
PARIS 00004685 003.2 OF 004
vision you may outline of how you expect the negotiations to

unfold and whether there is a reasonable expectation of them
broadening to include Syria.
--Lebanon: Even as the French have become a positive force

behind our efforts on behalf of Arab-Israeli peace, the close
collaboration with the GOF under former President Chirac,
with his single-minded focus on supporting Saad Hariri and
isolating Syria, has suffered. This is partly due to the
extremely fluid situation in Lebanon. But it also results
from the tug of war between Kouchner and the Elysee over who
is in charge of the issue, one that developed after it became
clear the deadline for electing a new president would pass
without a new candidate chosen. There is abundant evidence
that the Syrians, possibly with help from the Amir of Qatar
(a friend of Sarkozy and President Bashar al-Asad), lured the
Elysee into leading a process with far different objectives
than the one Kouchner began last summer. Whereas Kouchner
was focused on helping the Lebanese get out of their
political deadlock, Levitte and the Elysee have sought a
resolution of the presidential crisis that would satisfy
larger geopolitical aims involving Syria. It is also clear
to us that the Elysee, given Sarkozy,s obsession with
achieving results, is focused on electing a president so that
it can be considered another French diplomatic triumph. The
unfortunate net result continues to be the impression that
French pressure for a deal falls exclusively on the March 14
majority and not where it belongs -- on the March 8
opposition that is acting in close coordination with Syria
intent on wringing key concessions from the democratically
elected majority. Even if the presidential crisis is
resolved by December 17, we would recommend that you discuss
with Kouchner and Sarkozy how we can more effectively work
together as we address the multitude of difficult challenges
facing Lebanon, of which the Presidential election is only
the first.
--Iran: The public release of the recent NIE on Iranian

nuclear capabilities was a shock to all but the highest
levels of the GOF, which was briefed on its conclusions.
Although the French have publicly backed our view that Iran
continues to pose a serious threat and further international
sanctions are warranted (a line echoed in most of the French
press), the GOF anticipates a major "communication problem"
with its EU partners, the Iranians, China, and Russia. There
is further the delicate diplomacy France is undertaking with
different elements in the Iranian regime in order to maintain
a viable channel that bypasses President Ahmadinejad (who
appeared to complain about this in a recent letter to
Sarkozy). In geostrategic terms, the French see Iran as the
primary threat to the Middle East and worry about inroads it
has made in Lebanon and Iraq. As noted above, there is also
some thinking, at least among analysts outside the GOF, that
Annapolis and the NIE betoken a significant shift of U.S.
strategy in the Bush Administration's last year that involves
new U.S. thinking about Iran. Sarkozy and Kouchner would
welcome anything you could share with respect to how we
regard Iran in a post-Annapolis Middle East.
--Iraq: French follow-up to Kouchner's visit to Baghdad last

August and Iraqi President Talabani's subsequent visit to
Paris has been slow. Concern about the security situation,
despite what the French acknowledge to be marginal
improvements in some areas of Iraq, lack of coordination at
the working level among French ministries, and the failure so
far to achieve a breakthrough on national reconciliation have
slowed or prevented follow-on French engagement. Kouchner,
however, did ask SecDef Gates for a list of specific areas in
which we thought France could be helpful. We should use that
opening to engage the French in a more active dialogue
between representatives of our respective interagencies. We
recommend that you use the opportunity to inquire about
Kouchner's current thinking about French assistance to Iraq
and let him know we would like to send an interagency team to
Paris early in the New Year to begin these discussions. We
would further recommend that you ask Kouchner about his
efforts to rally EU support for and to promote meaningful
engagement with the Iraqi government. You might also praise
his personal commitment to Iraq's success, as demonstrated in
part by his participation in the recent Istanbul summit. We
understand Kouchner may next visit Iraq in February when
France is expected to open an embassy office in Irbil.
PARIS 00004685 004.2 OF 004

STAPLETON
Viewing cable 07PARIS4722, XXXXXXXXXXXX DESCRIBES CAUTIOUS,

Discussing cables
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EO 12958 DECL: 12/13/2017

TAGS PREL, PGOV, EUN, GM, FR
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX DESCRIBES CAUTIOUS,
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso ns 1.4 b

and d.
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. In a December 10 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX, said the December 7

Merkel-Sarkozy meetings in Paris were very productive even though Merkel and
Sarkozy’s personalities are like “fire and water.” XXXXXXXXXXXX described
Sarkozy’s management style as exhausting and said many expected a reshuffling of
the cabinet in January. XXXXXXXXXXXX described Germany’s views of the French
Mediterranean Union initiative as “cautious.”XXXXXXXXXXXX described close
French-German cooperation leading up to France’s EU Presidency in the second
half of 2008, which was echoed in a separate meeting withXXXXXXXXXXXX. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) In a December 10 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX, said the December 7 Merkel-

Sarkozy meetings in Paris were very productive even though Merkel and Sarkozy’s
personalities are like “fire and water.”XXXXXXXXXXXXsaid tension is felt
throughout the room when the two are together, then added that just being in a
room with Sarkozy is enough to make anyone’s stress levels increase.
XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Chirac and Schroeder also did not connect personally,
but still had a constructive partnership. XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that Sarkozy has
the unique tendency to disconnect policy areas in a way that normal, interagency
coordination would never permit, and that Sarkozy often seems to dismiss the
responsible bureaucracies from the policy-making process. The ensuing, less-
than-holistic results can provoke dissent in the government (for example,
regarding Libyan leader Qadhafi’s current visit to France). According to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, fatigue is also a byproduct of the chaos that goes with Sarkozy’s
hyper-activism on every front. Apprehension about imminent changes in the
ministerial line-up adds to the tension. XXXXXXXXXXXX said many expected a
reshuffling of the cabinet in January, adding that XXXXXXXXXXXX sensed ministers
and their staffers are “afraid to go on vacation because something might happen
to their jobs while they are away.”
¶3. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX described Germany’s views of the French Mediterranean Union

initiative as “cautious.” XXXXXXXXXXXX said the French government, and the
press, have characterized Germany as supportive of the initiative following the
December 7 meeting. However, a close read of Chancellor Merkel’s “very
diplomatic” statements following the meeting indicates no shift from the
cautious views Germany had previously espoused. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that French
Ambassador Alain Le Roy, charged with shepherding the initiative, had recent
consultations in Germany that provoked “very negative” reactions. Germany does
agree that the issues the Mediterranean Union is intended to address are very
important, but continues to prefer the Euromed dialogue established through the
Barcelona Process, in part because funding for the Mediterranean Union
initiative would be difficult to assure. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that some Germans
view France,s Med Union proposal as “parochial,” since Germany,s own backyard is
not the Mediterranean but Eastern Europe.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said President Sarkozy seems to have come around to
previous leaders’ conclusions that French-German cooperation is the “engine” of
the EU. French-German exchanges are intensifying in preparation for the French
EU Presidency in the second half of 2008. Just as the November 12 joint Council
of Ministers meeting focused on one of France’s Presidency priorities,
immigration and integration, the next intergovernmental meeting will focus on
the French Presidency priority of energy and environment. France and Germany are
also working closely on the third French priority, ESDP, with frequent contacts
at the Political Director level and between planning staffs. XXXXXXXXXXXX
characterized France as seeking to translate high-level, theoretical consensus
on ESDP goals into concrete projects such as the planned ESDP mission to Chad.
¶5. (C) Also on Dec. 10, XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX in describing close
French-German cooperation leading up to the French EU Presidency. XXXXXXXXXXXX
added that the next in the series of regular “Blaesheim” meetings involving
French and German heads of government and foreign ministers will focus on both
bilateral and European questions of security and defense.XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that
Germany participated in the French planning seminar for the EU Presidency in
November, drawing on its recent experience with the EU Presidency (Jan.-June
2007). On other points,XXXXXXXXXXXX said word in the German Embassy was that the
atmospherics of the Merkel-Sarkozy meeting were positive and that the French
clarification that all EU member-states could participate in the Mediterranean
Union initiative was well-received.
PARIS 00004722 002 OF 002
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 08BERLIN122, WELCOME TO BERLIN

Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: WELCOME TO BERLIN
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOHN KOENIG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D)
------------------------------------------
Electoral Fever Puts Pressure on Coalition
------------------------------------------
¶1. (C) NSA Hadley: Mission Germany looks forward to

welcoming you to Berlin January 31 to February 1. Germany is
currently consumed by the aftermath of bitterly fought state
elections that took place on January 27 in Hesse and Lower
Saxony. They are being seen as barometers for next year's
nationwide vote. Although the conservative Christian
Democrats (CDU) won comfortably in Lower Saxony, the CDU
suffered a major setback in Hesse, where CDU
Minister-President Roland Koch ran a divisive election
campaign that took his party from a commanding lead in early
polls to a virtual tie with the Social Democratic party
(SPD). The country is also digesting the significance of the
unexpected political gains by the (neo-Communist) Left Party
and its entry into both Hesse and Lower Saxony parliaments.
Over the next several weeks, state and national politicians
will evaluate coalition options, none of which appear to
please any of the major parties. The CDU's poor showing in
Hesse could energize its competitors and lead to further
domestic partisanship, thereby complicating Chancellor Angela
Merkel's goal of solidifying the political center in advance
of the 2009 national elections. On the other hand, the
success of CDU Minister-President Christian Wulff's
relatively low-key, centrist re-election campaign in Lower
Saxony has been seen as a vindication of Merkel's domestic
political strategy.
¶2. (C) The outcome of these two state elections, and that of
the February 24 Hamburg elections, will likely reverberate in
the day-to-day functioning of the CDU-SPD coalition.
Already, Merkel's conservatives and Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier's Social Democrats resemble the
proverbial couple that hated each other but stayed together
for the sake of the children: the lack of any other viable
coalition options is what sustains the partnership between
the CDU/CSU and the SPD at this point. On key priorities
like Afghanistan and Kosovo (and on certain aspects of Iran),
the gap between Merkel and Steinmeier is not so wide, and
cooperation with the U.S. has not been harmed by domestic
politics. Differences are becoming more evident on some
foreign policy issues however: Steinmeier's January 17
meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Muallem, over strong
opposition from the Chancellery, is just the latest example.
Increasingly, Christoph Heusgen and the Chancellery's small
staff are being blindsided by the Foreign Ministry on policy
matters that are significant but outside the spotlight.
Overall, we can expect Merkel's government to be more
hamstrung by partisan and interagency rivalries between now
and the fall of 2009 than was the case in its first two years
in office.
------------------------------------
Steinmeier's Evolving Political Role
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Steinmeier, who came to office with a reputation as a

technocrat, is increasingly a political rival to the
Chancellor. Like most of his predecessors, he has benefited
from the visibility conferred on the Foreign Minister. He
has become the most popular SPD politician in Germany and the
second most popular overall, trailing only Merkel. He
recently was named Vice Chancellor, was elected as one of
three national deputy chairmen of the SPD, and announced he
will run for a federal parliament seat in 2009. Steinmeier
is regarded, both within the SPD and among the general
public, as an attractive possible chancellor candidate in
2009, should SPD Chairman Kurt Beck stumble.
¶4. (C) With Steinmeier's evolution from technocrat to

political leader, he must cultivate much greater
rank-and-file support within the SPD. This is a particular
challenge for him, because on domestic issues he is seen as
relatively conservative. He was a key architect of Gerhard
Schroeder's economic reforms and stood by with a studied
detachment as Kurt Beck and the SPD's left wing began to roll
them back last fall. This is all the more reason for
Steinmeier to seek out foreign policy issues like arms
control and disarmament on which he can strike chords that
resonate with SPD voters (regardless of the shortcomings we
find in these ideas). Similarly, in policy toward Russia,
the former Soviet republics, and the Middle East, Steinmeier
misses no opportunity to evoke the legacy of Willy Brandt,
elevating dialog and economic engagement above open
expression of disagreement as tools of diplomacy.
¶5. (C) These internal factors amplify the tendency of

Steinmeier and his Foreign Office to pursue initiatives not
in harmony with the Chancellor's instincts or policy
preferences. Germany has a weak foreign policy coordination
process and the German constitution grants broad autonomy to
ministers. Therefore, the ability of the Chancellor and her
staff to rein in the Foreign Office is limited. A result is
that Germany does not always speak with a single, clear voice.
---------------------------------------------
IRAN: Importance of International Cooperation
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Although Merkel and the Chancellery have more
consistently toed our common firm line on Iran, both the
Chancellery and the Foreign Office are firmly committed to
securing a third UNSCR sanctions resolution as a basis for
more biting EU autonomous measures. MFA officials called the
January 22 P5 1 Ministerial a success in demonstrating unity
among the members, both by producing a new UNSC resolution
text and by showing a unified strategic approach in dealing
with Iran. MFA officials have told us in private that EU
autonomous sanctions would not be discussed at the January
28-29 GAERC. In conversations prior to January 22, German
officials have emphasized the importance of the broadest
possible international coalition, and thus highly value
efforts to keep all members of the P5-plus-1 on board,
deploying this argument when approached about either
unilateral or EU autonomous measures. However, they point to
pressures from their business community (as well as from the
Finance and Economics Ministries) as constraints on adopting
stronger unilateral action against the Iranian regime.
Privately, senior officials in the Chancellery and Foreign
Office have expressed frustration that the NIE has
complicated international diplomatic efforts. On December 4,
FM Steinmeier said the NIE on Iran offered the chance "inject
new momentum" into the nuclear negotiations and called on all
sides not to squander this opportunity. Merkel said publicly
on January 15 that the NIE had slowed the momentum behind
further UN sanctions; she simultaneously underscored the
seriousness of Iran's nuclear activities and the need for
international solidarity.
----------------------------------------
AFGHANISTAN: Need for Broader Deployment
----------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Encouraging greater German involvement in Afghanistan

is a key priority of Mission Germany; we have made some
progress, but the Germans remain very reluctant about
deploying combat forces outside of the North. In advance of
the April NATO Summit, Germany will increase its involvement
in the training of the Afghan National Army and will probably
agree to take over responsibility for the 150-man quick
reaction force (QRF) in the north. We should welcome the QRF
decision, because it would represent the first German ISAF
contingent deployable on short notice (including possibly in
exceptional and temporary circumstances outside the north),
which would be a qualitatively new and significant step
toward greater involvement in kinetic operations. Secretary
Gates' recent written request to Defense Minister Jung to
deploy German Special Operations Forces (SOF) under ISAF in
the south of Afghanistan is likely to be very controversial
here, but may prove acceptable in the end if, in return, we
were to offer Germany the option of ending its current offer
of SOF for OEF. Moving the German SOF commitment from OEF to
ISAF would also have the benefit of allowing us to shift the
considerable diplomatic resources and attention we devoted
last fall to getting the German OEF mandate renewed to
activities that may yield more practical benefits, such as
pressing Germany to increase its contributions to ISAF.
¶8. (C) We should encourage greater German leadership in the

EUPOL effort to train Afghanistan's civilian police force.
EUPOL is led by German Juergen Scholz, and Germany
contributes more police trainers than any other EU country,
but the program has been slow to start and the planned
ceiling of 195 EU police trainers is inadequate for the job.
Furthermore, activities are not currently planned at the
district level where the need is greatest. Germany should be
urged to accelerate the deployment of EU trainers to
Afghanistan, increase the number of trainers, and broaden the
geographic range of activities.
------------------------
RUSSIA: Split Approaches
------------------------
¶9. (C) There are significant differences between the

Chancellery and the Foreign Office on Russia, which invites
Russian wedge-driving. Merkel has never shied away from
plain talk about disturbing trends inside Russia. Steinmeier
was the first foreign visitor to get a meeting with
presidential candidate Medvedev after his nomination (a
meeting with President Putin was thrown in as well). Lately,
the combination of Russian CFE suspension, backsliding on
democracy, and intransigence on Kosovo has pushed even some
in the SPD to offer criticism. Still, the Foreign Ministry
will likely continue to seek an unhelpful bridging role with
Russia, in particular on CFE and other matters related to
arms control. The Chancellery can help constrain these
impulses, but we will also need to keep up pressure among the
Quad partners as well as from other key allies (e.g. Turkey
and Norway) to make clear that German unilateral initiatives
put transatlantic solidarity at risk.
-------------------------
KOSOVO: Close Cooperation
-------------------------
¶10. (C) We discern very little daylight between the

Chancellor and Steinmeier on Kosovo, and there is keen
interest in working closely with the U.S. to resolve status
and seal the EU's leadership role. While the Bundestag will
engage in intensive debate following an anticipated
coordinated declaration of independence, we expect the
multiparty consensus in favor of independence and the KFOR
and ESDP missions to hold.
-------------------------------------
COUNTERTERRORISM: Building on Success
-------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Your visit comes at a time when U.S.-German bilateral

cooperation on security issues is as close as it has ever
been. The successful cooperation surrounding the
September 4 arrests of three individuals planning large-scale
attacks and the upcoming conclusion of a new bilateral
agreement on fingerprint, DNA and other data sharing are the
latest evidence of this trend. Furthermore, no German senior
official pushes as hard, or argues so publicly, for closer
bilateral cooperation on security issues as Interior Minister
Wolfgang Schaeuble. Should the opportunity arise, you should
inform German officials that we are eager to build on our
successful record of counterterrorism cooperation and explore
how we might work together to address threats such as
European residents who seek terrorist training at overseas
camps and become jihadists in Iraq or Afghanistan.
----------------------------
ECONOMICS: Commitment to TEC
----------------------------
¶12. (C) Merkel highly values the U.S.-EU Transatlantic

Economic Council (TEC) -- a centerpiece of her 2007 EU
presidency -- aimed at reducing regulatory barriers to
transatlantic trade and investment. She is concerned,
however, about maintaining the momentum in the TEC and fears
that the European Commission and future EU presidencies
(including France) may lose enthusiasm for the project.
German officials also worry that a changing U.S.
Administration could derail what they regard as a highly
successful new transatlantic economic instrument; we should
emphasize our continued commitment to the TEC, and encourage
the Germans to maintain a leading role in it. The German
economy is expected to grow at only 1.7 percent this year.
Previous higher estimates were lowered due to rising oil
prices, the strength of the Euro, slower U.S. growth, and
continuing turmoil in financial markets. German economists
and business leaders are also worried about the possibility
of a national minimum wage as well as increased labor union
demands for wage increases, both of which could affect the
economy adversely. Merkel plans to highlight employment
gains -- as opposed to minimum wages -- as the focus of her
economic plan looking ahead to the 2009 national elections.
-----------------------------------
CLIMATE CHANGE: Aggressive Measures
-----------------------------------
¶13. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the rest of Germany's political

leadership remain serious about pursuing aggressive
international measures to meet the challenges of global
warming. Merkel has made climate change a priority of her
Chancellorship and enjoys the overwhelming domestic support
on this. Merkel's support for mandatory, targeted global
limits on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and an international
cap-and-trade regime reflects a deep-seated belief that only
drastic, concerted efforts on the part of the international
community can slow -- and ultimately reverse -- the human
contribution to global warming. If anything, Steinmeier
supports tougher standards. While the Germans have been
willing to consider alternative solutions, such as new
technologies for clean coal and renewables, fundamental
differences in our approaches to the issue of climate change
remain, and could lead to more public disagreement in the
future. For example, while Germany will send a delegation to
the January 30 Major Economies Meeting (MEM), the German
Government remains skeptical about the value that the Major
Economies Process (MEP) adds to the UNFCCC track. The Germans
are particularly concerned about the need to avoid
duplication of effort in the various other climate
change-related forums, including the UNFCCC and the G-8.
TIMKEN JR
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA43, COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL:

LOOKING BEYOND THE
Discussing cables
08BRASILIA43 2008-01-08 10:10 2010-11-29 09:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Brasilia
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RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7167
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RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7580
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000043
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2028

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM AR PA BR
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: LOOKING BEYOND THE
TRI-BORDER AREA
REF: BRASILIA 1664
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION PHIL CHICOLA FOR REASONS 1.4 B A ND D
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Government of Brazil remains highly sensitive to public
claims suggesting that terrorist or extremist organizations have a presence or
are undertaking activities in Brazil--a sensitivity that appears to be the rise
and is resulting in more than symbolic reactions. At an operational level and
away from the public spotlight, however, the GOB is a cooperative partner in
countering terrorism and terrorist-related activities. Even though the
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area (TBA) exclusively dominates headlines,
the primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S.
Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to
terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals
linked to Hizballah--in Sao Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil. To a
lesser extent, the TBA remains a concern, primarily for the potential that
terrorists may exploit conditions there--including lax border controls,
smuggling, drug trafficking, easy access to false documents and weapons,
movement of pirated goods, uncontrolled cash flows--to raise funds or arrange
logistics for operations. Post will focus over the coming year on keeping the
higher levels of the Brazilian government engaged politically and diplomatically
on CT objectives, and on seeking to ensure that they do not undermine the
productive partnerships at the operational level. End Summary.
---------------------------- Policy-Level Sensitivities
-------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) The Brazilian government is a cooperative partner in countering

terrorism and terrorist-related activity in Brazil--to include investigating
potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit
activity--that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or
elsewhere. Nonetheless, the highest levels of the Brazilian government,
particularly the Ministry of Foreign Relations, are extremely sensitive to any
public claims that terrorists have a presence in Brazil--whether to raise funds,
arrange logistics, or even transit through the country--and will vigorously
reject any statements implying otherwise. This sensitivity results, in part,
from their fear of stigmatizing the large Muslim community of Brazil (estimated,
but unconfirmed, by some sources at over 1 million) or prejudicing the area's
image as a tourist destination. It is also a public posture designed to avoid
being too closely linked to what is seen as the US's overly aggressive War on
Terrorism. This sensitivity manifests itself in various symbolic and concrete
ways. -- (C) The GOB participates reluctantly in the "3 1 Mechanism on Security
in the Triborder Area," which annually gathers diplomatic, law enforcement, and
intelligence representatives of the three Triborder (TBA) countries together
with the U.S. to deliberate strategies to deter a host of transnational criminal
activities that could be exploited by potential terrorists to facilitate
attacks. At the conferences, the Brazilian delegations often decry statements
made by U.S. officials claiming that the TBA is a hotbed of terrorist activity
and challenge U.S. participants to present the evidence on which U.S. officials
base those statements. Itamaraty officials repeatedly question the value of this
four-way cooperation, insisting that "bilateral concerns should be addressed
bilaterally" (reftel). -- (U) The GOB refuses to legally or even rhetorically
label U.S.-designated terrorist groups such as HAMAS, Hizballah or the FARC as
terrorist groups--the former two being considered by Brazil as legitimate
political parties. As a result, their threshold for accepting evidence of
terrorism financing BRASILIA 00000043 002 OF 004 activity in the region, at
least publicly, is very high and any information indicating that individuals in
the TBA send funds to the groups in Lebanon, in their view, does not necessarily
constitute an activity supporting terrorism. -- (U) At the diplomatic level, the
GOB has twice refused to officially endorse Argentina's claims that the
perpetrators of the 1994 terrorism attack in Buenos Aires may have received
support from individuals in the TBA by abstaining from voting in favor of
issuing Interpol capture notices for the 5 Iranian and 1 Lebanese national
suspected of involvement in the attack. -- (U) Two key CT-related legislative
initiatives continue to languish. Neither the anti-terrorism nor the anti-money
laundering legislation has been introduced to Congress, despite both being ready
for more than a year. If passed, the bills would establish the crime of
terrorism and associated activities and would facilitate greater law enforcement
access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize
illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate
prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money
laundering and making it an autonomous offense.
--------------------------------------- Combined with Operational Cooperation
---------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Despite negative rhetoric in Itamaraty and at higher levels of the
GOB, Brazilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies--principally the
Federal Police, Customs, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), and others--
are aware of the potential threat from terrorists exploiting the favorable
conditions existing in Brazil to operate and actively track and monitor
suspected terrorist activity and follow all leads passed to them. The Federal
Police will often arrest individuals with links to terrorism, but will charge
them on a variety of non-terrorism related crimes to avoid calling attention of
the media and the higher levels of the government. Over the past year the
Federal Police has arrested various individuals engaged in suspected terrorism
financing activity but have based their arrests on narcotics and customs
charges.
¶4. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations and

effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the Financial Activities
Oversight Council (COAF), to identify possible funding sources for terrorist
groups. The GoB has carried out name checks for persons and entities on the
UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not found any assets,
accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN terror-
finance lists. Brazil also established National Strategy to Combat Money
Laundering (ENCLA) and is creating a data base called the Electronic Declaration
of Cash Carriage (EDPV), which will assist in monitoring individuals who
transfer funds abroad. Although the system is a prototype and is still being
tested, Brazilian law enforcement officials are encouraged by initial results.
--------------------------------------------- --------------- Primary Concern:
Individuals Linked to Terrorism in Southern Brazil
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶5. (S/NF) The primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and
the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with
links to terrorism--particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some
individuals linked to Hizballah--in Sao Paulo and other areas of southern
Brazil. The Federal Police, and to a lesser extent ABIN, monitor the activities
of these suspected extremists who may be tied to terrorist groups abroad and
BRASILIA 00000043 003 OF 004 share this information with their U.S.
counterparts.
¶6. (S/NF) Brazilian law enforcement officials actively monitor the presence of
several suspected Sunni extremists with possible ties to terrorist groups abroad
who may be capable of lending logistical support--through financing, safehaven,
false travel documents-- for terrorist attacks in the region or abroad. In 2007,
the Federal Police arrested a potential Sunni extremist terrorist facilitator
operating primarily in Santa Catarina state for failure to declare funds
entering the country and is in the process of deporting him. Also in 2007,
Brazilian Federal Police took down a Rio de Janeiro-based false document ring
that was supplying falsified Brazilian documents to non-Brazilians, among them
suspected international drug traffickers.
--------------------------------------------- -------------- Secondary Concern:
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay Tri-Border Area
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶7. (S/NF) To a lesser extent, the TBA remains a concern for the U.S. Mission
and Brazilian counterparts, primarily for the potential that terrorists may
exploit the favorable conditions there--lax border controls, smuggling, drug
trafficking, easy access to false documents and weapons, movement of pirated
goods, uncontrolled cash flows--to raise funds or arrange logistics for
operations. While there are some individuals suspected of having links to
Hizballah and HAMAS, there is little evidence these groups have an operational
terrorist presence in the region. According to Brazilian security service
sources, the Muslim presence in Foz do Iguacu represents a very small percentage
of the Muslim population in Brazil, and even those who provide some financial
support to the groups have little or no connection to them. The GOB pursues CT
investigations in the TBA and shares the results of their investigations, but
their principal concern remains the array of other transnational criminal
activity that takes place in the region. The area is a major entry point for
drug traffickers into Brazil. In addition, it is a focus of concern for Brazil
in other areas such as arms trafficking, smuggling of pirated and counterfeit
goods, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing.
¶8. (S/NF) To cover this range of transnational criminal activity, the GOB's
police and intelligence services have an extensive presence in the region and
liaison relationships with Argentine, Paraguayan, and other national
intelligence services, including USG agencies. Furthermore, the GOB has
attempted to institutionalize some of this cross-border cooperation, although
with mixed success. For example, Brazilian Customs completed a new inspection
station at the Friendship Bridge in the TBA. This should enable the GOB to
intensify its crack down on contraband crossing the bridge, though law
enforcement officials expect that traffickers will respond to the tough controls
by trying to move their goods clandestinely across the border elsewhere via
boat. Brazil also conducts maritime patrols on their side of the Itaipu Lake to
deter smuggling activity, although resource constraints and lack of equipment
hampers their effectiveness. The long-standing goal of conducting joint patrols
with the Paraguayans remains elusive. Finally, in order to more effectively
combat trans-border criminal organizations with its neighbors, Brazil
established a joint intelligence center (JIC) in the TBA, but staffing issues
have hampered its operations, and it is not apparent that the GOB has pushed the
other countries too vigorously to send representatives. ----------- Comment:
-----------
¶9. (S/NF) Operational elements of the various Brazilian security and law
enforcement agencies understand that the BRASILIA 00000043 004 OF 004 full scope
of the problem goes beyond the TBA, and is almost certainly more significant in
Sao Paulo and other parts of Brazil. However, the constant barrage of terrorism-
related media coverage regarding the TBA tends to heighten GOB sensitivities,
and particularly those of Itamaraty, increasing their reluctance to countenance
any claims that terrorists could possibly have a presence in any part of Brazil.
While this sensitivity generally manifests itself in nothing more than public
rebukes of declarations by U.S. officials and sniping during meetings by
Itamaraty officials, it does occasionally result in more than symbolic reactions
by the GOB. Brazil's AMIA abstention at Interpol, reversal on CT legislation,
and inflexibility on 3 1 all represent concrete challenges to local law
enforcement officials and regional partners in advancing CT cooperation. Post
will focus over the coming year on keeping the higher levels of the Brazilian
government engaged politically and diplomatically on this issue, and on seeking
to ensure that they do not undermine the work being done at the operational
level. End Comment.
SOBEL 2008-01-08
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA129, BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON DCA,
TRIP TO FRANCE AND RUSSIA, CIVIL AVIATION
Discussing cables
08BRASILIA129 2008-01-25 14:02 2010-11-30 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000129
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM, WHA, AND EEB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018

TAGS: PREL MARR EAIR PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON DCA, TRIP TO FRANCE AND RUSSIA, CIVIL
AVIATION
REF: A. STATE 3557 B. BRASILIA 99 C. STATE 3163
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim told the Ambassador
January 17 that he would like to sign a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA, ref
A) when he visits Washington in March, but that he faces stiff opposition in the
Ministry of External Relations (MRE or Itamaraty). He briefed the Ambassador on
his upcoming trip to France and Russia, and on his continuing work regarding
civil aviation matters. The internal GOB discussion on the merits of a DCA will
likely center on the message the GOB thinks it will send regarding the nature of
Brazil's relationship with the United States. End summary.
Defense Cooperation Agreement: The Battle is Joined

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶2. (C) In a private breakfast on January 17, the Ambassador told Jobim that his
initial approach on a DCA to MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs Everton
Vargas had not been SIPDIS well received, and that Vargas had specifically
mentioned Secretary General (Vice Minister) Samuel Guimaraes when SIPDIS asking
for time to work the issue internally (ref B). Jobim responded that Guimaraes
posed a serious problem, not only on the DCA but on a variety of issues. Jobim
said that Guimaraes "hates the United States" and is actively looking to create
problems in the relationship. Jobim said that he has had to beat back more than
one outlandish proposal by Guimaraes calculated to upset relations with the U.S.
and other industrialized countries.
¶3. (C) Jobim said that he would like to sign the DCA when he travels to
Washington in March. Guimaraes has told him that cannot happen and is working
hard to prevent the DCA from being concluded. He argued that, as Jobim's
predecessor went to the United States in 2007, protocol demands a return visit
by the U.S. Defense Secretary. (Comment: Strictly speaking, this is not true, as
the meeting between the SecDef and Jobim's predecessor was not part of an
official counterpart visit. End comment.) He told Jobim that his trip would
"mean nothing" compared with the symbolism of a visit by the SecDef to Brazil.
Jobim said he pushed back, telling Guimaraes that "Itamaraty is the process,"
not the substance of engagement on his issues. But he told the Ambassador that
he does not want to "win the battle and lose the war" and expend too much
political capital on the DCA, so will have to proceed carefully. In particular,
he said, if Guimaraes and FM Amorim join forces against a DCA, that could be a
serious problem.
Submarines in France, Helos in Russia

-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that the primary purpose of his upcoming trip
to France is to discuss design issues for a nuclear-powered submarine. He also
said that he will look at France's Rafale airplane. In Russia Jobim's primary
purpose is to ensure servicing for Brazil's Russian helicopters. He noted that
Russia wants to open a jeep facility in Porto Alegre, and that he will travel to
Russia in an Embraer plane in the hope of making sales there.
Civil Aviation: Engaged on Latest Problems

------------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Jobim told the Ambassador that he believes he has found options for
avoiding the proposed draconian increase in landing fees at Sao Paulo's
Guarulhos airport (ref C), especially as they can have another apron ready
quickly. He asked for another few weeks to work the issue. Discussing Brazil's
airport operator Infraero, he said that the current management problems are so
big that more time will be needed before he can consider opening it up to
foreign investors.
¶6. (C) Comment: Jobim's candid comments on Guimaraes confirm similar messages
from U/S Vargas and Long-Term Planning BRASILIA 00000129 002 OF 002 Minister
Roberto Unger (ref B) regarding the difficult internal battle in the GOB that
will surround the proposal for a DCA with the United States. As he has since the
beginning of his tenure, Jobim continues to challenge the historic supremacy of
Itamaraty in all areas of foreign policy. President Lula's direction to Jobim to
postpone his visit to Washington (initially planned for January) until he had
met with his Latin American counterparts was almost certainly provided on the
basis of input from Itamaraty and presidential foreign policy advisor Marco
Aurelio Garcia. In the same way, the merits of a DCA are likely to be considered
by the GOB at least in part in light of the message it will convey regarding the
nature of Brazil's relationship with the United States. Once again, President
Lula may have to play the deciding role between an unusually activist Defense
Minister interested in developing closer ties with the United States and an MRE
that is firmly committed to maintaining control over all aspects of foreign
policy and to keeping a measure of distance between Brazil and the United
States.
SOBEL
Viewing cable 08CAIRO9, CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS

CHIEF SOLIMAN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08CAIRO9.
08CAIRO9 2008-01-02 18:06 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Cairo
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TAGS: PREL PGOV IS IZ SY EG
SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones

Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (S) Summary. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman told Ambassador and
a visiting Codel led by Senator George Voinovich December 31
that he is optimistic progress will be made on
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, Soliman was
concerned with continuing Israeli criticism of Egyptian
anti-smuggling efforts. He was worried that the Egyptians
would not be able to work out an arrangement with the
Israelis for Hajj pilgrims to return to Gaza. On Iran,
Soliman said that the USG's release of the National
Intelligence Estimate had altered the calculus through which
Arab states are interacting with Iran. On Iraq argued that
the Iraqi government needed to amend its constitution and
that Prime Minister Malaki should not deal with the Iraqi
people in a "sectarian way." End summary.
¶2. (S) Soliman led off the New Year's Eve meeting by telling
the Codel that the region is at a special, critical juncture.
Egypt is America's partner. Sometimes we have our
differences. But Egypt will continue to provide the USG with
its knowledge and expertise on the critical regional issues,
such as Lebanon and Iraq. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
remains the core issue; Soliman contended a peaceful
resolution would be a "big blow" to terrorist organizations
that use the conflict as a pretext. For this reason,
President Mubarak is committed to ending the Israeli-Arab
"stalemate."
¶3. (S) Soliman applauded the Administration's efforts,

commenting that Annapolis had given hope and begun a process.
The timing is right for progress based on four factors.
First, the PA leadership is moderate and willing to
negotiate. Second, Hamas is isolated and politically cut off
in Gaza. Third, the Israelis are ready for peace; Soliman
assessed that the GOI coalition is broad and strong, and
larger than Rabin's coalition of the mid-nineties. Fourth,
Arab states are ready to see an end to "the struggle."
¶4. (S) Soliman stressed that Egypt stands ready to help the
U.S. effort. The GOE knows both the Palestinians and the
Israelis, and knows the obstacles to peace. Soliman
recommended two steps be taken. First, both the Israelis and
Palestinians must be pressed hard to sign an agreement, which
the U.S. and international community could endorse, to be
implemented at the proper time. Second, the U.S. should
insist that "phase one" of the Roadmap should be completed
before the end of 2008.
¶5. (S) Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Soliman opined that the

Palestinian Authority was ready to sign an agreement, but
that establishment of a state may take between 1-3 years.
While Hamas is isolated politically and unable to stop an
Israeli-PA agreement, it remains entrenched in Gaza, and it
was unclear to Soliman how long that would last. At one
point in the discussion, Soliman seemed to imply Hamas may
remain in control of Gaza for more than a year; at another
juncture, he told Senator Voinovich that if negotiations
proceeded briskly, Hamas may be forced to cede power in Gaza
in 3-4 months. The bottom line for Hamas, according to
Soliman, is that they must be forced to choose between
remaining a resistance movement or joining the political
process. They cannot have it both ways, he said.
¶6. (S) Palestinian training: Soliman reiterated GOE

willingness to train and support Palestinian security forces.
He claimed that the GOE had training facilities ready, but
that he was waiting for an answer from U.S. Security
Coordinator General Keith Dayton. (Note: We have advised
Soliman that initial training of Palestinian security forces
will take place in Jordan, and that we will revisit the
option of training in Egypt this spring. End note). He
continued that the GOE would keep pressure on Hamas but will
maintain "low-level" contacts with Hamas. Egypt, he said,
wants Hamas isolated. The Qassam rocket attacks must stop.
When they do stop, the GOE will ask Israel to "meet quiet
with quiet."
¶7. (S) Border issues: Senator Voinovich asked Soliman why

the Israelis continue to report problems with Egypt's
anti-smuggling efforts. Soliman said that the Israelis do
not complain to him directly, and that GOI-GOE cooperation
and exchange of information continues. He was at a loss as
to why Israeli politicians continue to criticize Egypt
publicly. The GOE would like the USG to be included in the
GOI-GOE LAWIO discussions, but the Israelis continue to
object. "They don't want a witness in the room," Soliman
said. Nevertheless, Soliman was willing to turn the page.
"We have a short time to reach peace. We need it. We need
to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no
explosions, and no news of more deaths. We want everyone
happy. That is the Egyptian dream."
¶8. (S) Syria: Congressman Turner asked if Iran and/or Syria

might be play a spoiler role. Soliman answered that Syria
wants desperately to halt the United Nations special tribunal
on the Hariri assassination. At the same time, the SARG is
ready to negotiate with the Israelis, and Soliman believed
that the GOI also is ready. Syria, Soliman said, can be
induced to play a constructive role but added that there are
no guarantees, however, on Syrian performance.
¶9. (S) NIE: Regarding the USG's National Intelligence

Estimate of Iran's nuclear program, Soliman was concerned
that many in the Arab world were recalculating their position
vis a vis Iran based on an assumption that the NIE
represented a USG policy shift. Soliman said the Egyptians
are working to correct this misimpression among Arab states.
"We tell the Arab world: Don't be happy with the NIE and
don't warm up to Iran. We know that the United States will
never allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb."
¶10. (S) Iran: Soliman said that Iran remains a significant

threat to Egypt. It continues to influence Shiaa in Iraq and
the Gulf. Iran is supporting Jihad and spoiling peace, and
has supported extremists in Egypt previously. If they were
to support the Muslim Brotherhood this would make them "our
enemy," he said. The GOE continues to press the Iranian
regime to turn over extremists given "safe harbor" in Iran.
This issue, he said, will remain an obstacle to improving
Egyptian-Iranian relations. (Soliman met with Iranian former
nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani earlier in the week.
Larijani was in Egypt on a week-long "private visit."
¶11. (S) Iraq: Soliman said he remains concerned that the

Maliki government in Iraq is not representing all Iraqis
(i.e. the Sunni population). The GOE has urged Maliki not to
deal with the Iraqi people in a sectarian way, and to amend
to constitution to allow greater Sunni representation. In
addition, the Iraqi government must remove militias from the
ranks of the army and police. In the long run, Soliman did
not think that the decrease in violence would be sustainable
absent these two steps. In addition, Iranian influence is
problematic. Soliman said that the GOE had worked to
reconcile 21 clans and tribes in Iraq, with good results, and
that this kind of efforts had to continue. He assessed that
both Sistani and Sadr were practical men, and able to be
dealt with.
¶12. (U) Delegation composition:
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)

Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH)
Congressman Steve Pearce (R-NM)
Congressman Rob Bishop (R-UT)
Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA)
¶13. (U) The delegation did not clear this message.

Ricciardone
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD405, AMBASSADOR’S CONDOLENCE CALL
ON ASIF ZARDARI
Discussing cables
2008-01-28
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Monday, 28 January 2008, 09:30

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/28/2018
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S CONDOLENCE CALL ON ASIF ZARDARI
1, (C) Summary. During an hour and a half conversation with Ambassador on
January 25, Pakistan People’s Party Co-Chairman Asif Zardari called for
deployment of the Army to prevent fraud on election day, asked for a UN
investigation into Benazir Bhutto’s assassination to identify the forces behind
the attack, said he would create a national unity government if his party was
elected, shared his concerns about spreading talibanization, voiced support for
privatization and continued economic growth, indicated he would run for the
National Assembly in a by-election and said that the PPP had not yet chosen a
candidate for Prime Minister. He sought U.S. blessing for his leadership.
Although Zardari delivered what he knew his audience wanted to hear, overall he
demonstrated more poise and competence than we had expected. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Ambassador and Polcouns January 25 paid a condolence and introductory
call on Asif Ali Zardari, widower of Benazir Bhutto and Co-Chairman of the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The meeting at Bilawal House in Karachi lasted an
hour and a half. Roukhsana Bangash took notes for Zardari; PPP Sindhi President
Nisar Ahmad Khuro also attended the meeting. Wearing a western blazer and
slacks, Zardari appeared relaxed and focused through a wide-ranging discussion,
referring only once to his prepared notes.
¶3. (C) Ambassador expressed condolences over the death of Benazir Bhutto and
recounted how she had first met Bhutto just a few months ago in the same room.
She asked about the Bhutto children, and Zardari said that Bilawal, in
particular, was being besieged by well-meaning but stressful requests to attend
memorials or speak to the press. Bilawal wanted to come home for his school
holidays, but Zardari was still considering what was best. He had just visited
the daughters in Dubai. Zardari himself planned to live at least part time in
Lahore after the mourning period was completed.
¶4. (C) Zardari opened his remarks by saying that the U.S. is “our safety
blanket” and recounted how Benazir had returned despite the threats against her
because of support and “clearance” from the U.S. However, Zardari quickly moved
on to the PPP succession. He shared a photocopy of a one-page handwritten will
from Benazir in which she bequeathed the party to him. This document, Zardari
said, would be published in an upcoming book authored by Benazir. Zardari said
that for symbolic reasons he passed the PPP leadership to his son, Bilawal.
Although Bilawal was only 19, Zardari noted that Benazir had taken over the PPP
when she was only 22 years old. Benazir’s enemies, he said, do not understand
that she is now even stronger as a martyr.
Taliban Threat
--------------
¶5. (C) The challenge today, said Zardari, was to convert Benazir’s energy and
the sympathy from her death into a positive outcome for Pakistan. He warned that
what happens in Pakistan has a spillover effect in Afghanistan, Iran, and India.
Pakistan has a population of 175 million people that is growing at 3-4% per
year, so the effect of talibanization here can have a profound impact on the
entire region.
¶6. (C) According to Zardari, there was no such thing as a “moderate Taliban”
which had warped the concept of Islam. Zardari expressed concern about the
increasing level of Saudi money even in Sindh and said that mosques and
madrassas had become a “cottage industry” in Pakistan. It was important to
reverse the impact of former President General Zia’s Islamization, and he noted
that in helping the mujahideen fight the Soviets we had “taught people to fish”
and were now reaping the consequences. Ambassador noted that Benazir, more than
most Pakistani politicians, had understood the creeping threat of extremism.
That threat was now exhibiting itself, not only in the tribal areas, but in the
settled areas of Swat and through suicide bombings around the country.
Planning to Run
---------------
¶7. (C) Zardari agreed, saying that democracy was the way
ISLAMABAD 00000405 002 OF 004
forward. He had opposed former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s announcement
(twice) of a boycott and had not launched a FIR (first incident report) against
the government over Benazir’s death. Pakistan did not need any more chaos.
Zardari said he would support PPP participation even if the party was weak or he
was not in parliament. Zardari volunteered that the PPP had not yet chosen any
candidate for Prime Minister and said it was premature at this stage. He noted
that his sister is a member of the National Assembly from Nawabshah, and said
she could give up her seat within two months so that he could contest it.
Zardari was struggling, however, with how to explain to PPP rank and file the
idea of continuing to work with a superpower which supported Musharraf. He was
trying to convince his party that the U.S. supported democracy.
¶8. (C) Ambassador responded that the U.S. most definitely is supporting the
democratic process in Pakistan and believes that, as the broadest based party in
Pakistan, the PPP must be part of that process. We were working to make the
elections as free and fair as possible. It did not go unnoticed in Washington
that Zardari had agreed to a delay in elections and publicly had spoken out
against violence.
Call in the Army
----------------
¶9. (C) In response, Zardari ticked off the litany of PPP complaints about the
election process: the intelligence agencies were going to rig the voting; the
caretaker government was a sham and the former Musharraf government effectively
was still in place at the national and provincial levels; PPP workers were being
falsely arrested on charges connected to the post-assassination riots in Sindh;
and the Chief Election Commissioner was weak and took his power from a Supreme
Court that has now been hand-picked by Musharraf.
¶10. (C) What was needed, Zardari believed, was to have the Pakistan Army
deployed at all voting places on election day to supervise the process. He was
appealing to Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, Prime Minister Soomro and the
Election Commission to put a solider in every polling booth on election day.
Ambassador cautioned that in a recent meeting with CENTCOM Commander Admiral
Fallon, General Kayani had made it clear that the Army wanted to stay out of
politics. Zardari responded “out of politics, yes but not out of security for
the process.” There was precedent from former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s era
to deploy the Army. It was needed to stop intimidation of voters by the local
gangs belonging to some ruling party elites (he cited the Chaudhrys in the
Punjab). Zardari said that the ruling party controls the police and could easily
throw out the poll watchers so the process can be rigged.
¶11. (C) Noting that many western officials would see deployment of the Army as
a negative development, Ambassador pressed Zardari on this point. He confirmed
that the PPP believed the Army was a national institution that could be counted
upon to preserve security and prevent electoral fraud. However, Zardari admitted
that he was “scared” that the closer he gets to General Kayani, the weaker
Kayani will become.
Bhutto Investigation
--------------------
¶12. (C) Zardari confirmed that PPP officials were in the U.S. to push for a UN
investigation of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. He was not interested so much
in who the sniper was or exactly how Benazir was killed. This was not as
important as finding out who financed the killing, who were the “hands behind”
it. Zardari had met with Scotland Yard as a courtesy, and the PPP provided some
assistance, but the Scotland Yard mandate did not extend to what the PPP wanted
to know. Ambassador said that we believed Baitullah Mehsud was responsible;
Zardari dismissed this by saying that Mehsud was “just a pawn” in the process.
¶13. (C) Ambassador noted that our experience with the Hariri investigation was
not promising; after three and a half years and great expense, there was still
no final verdict. Moreover, it would still require an investigative body, and
the UN had to pull together a disparate group of
ISLAMABAD 00000405 003 OF 004
law enforcement officials and prosecutors to actually conduct the investigation.
We believed it was important to hear the results of the Scotland Yard
investigation before considering any other inquiries.
Post-Election Alliances
-----------------------
¶14. (C) In response to Ambassador’s question, Zardari said he could work with
the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as “they were not all bad.” He cited former
Foreign Minister Kasuri as an example of someone with whom he could interact.
The Chaudhrys continued to issue false campaign statements and unnecessarily
stir up Sindhi-Punjabi emotions, but Zardari insisted he had been careful “not
to name names” or close out options. He continued to talk to National Security
Advisor Tariq Aziz and confirmed that Aziz wants them to meet in Islamabad.
Zardari also confirmed meeting with ISI Director General Taj.
¶15. (C) As for other party politicians, Zardari described Nawaz Sharif as a shy
man. He had welcomed Nawaz’s condolence visit to Sindh, although he recounted
that Nawaz had put him in jail on false charges. Still, given the history of
Zulfakir Bhutto’s death, the PPP doesn’t “condemn or hang former prime
ministers.” Zardari dismissed the electoral prospects of Fazlur Rehman, leader
of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party, by saying Fazlur was afraid for his life,
hiding out on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Zardari questioned whether the
Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) really had the support of more than 20% of
Karachi, but said that it ruled through gerrymandering of districts. The same
was true of the PML’s support in Punjab. Zardari said he didn’t like the
aggressive side of MQM but could work with the party and wanted to form a
“national unity” government to heal the country.
Economic Policy
---------------
¶16. (C) Zardari lamented that, despite economic growth, Musharraf had wasted an
opportunity to improve social conditions in Pakistan. The country had received
$62 billion in international assistance since September 11, 2001, but it wasn’t
clear what the government had done with the money. There was a $6 billion
shortfall, and poverty had increased.
¶17. (C) Ambassador said that we shared the same concern. In particular, funds
we provided for the military were not reaching the forces who needed them to
fight extremism. She noted that there was some concern that PPP’s traditionally
populist ideas might undermine sound economic policy. Zardari responded that he
supported increased privatization and economic expansion to build the middle
class. The PPP, he insisted, had evolved beyond the days of Zulfakir Bhutto’s
slogans to give the people “roti, kapra, makan” (bread, clothing, shelter).
Request for Endorsement
-----------------------
¶18. (C) In closing, Zardari said flatly “I am not Benazir, and I know it. The
people respect me only because I spent eleven years in prison.” Therefore, “I
need help, especially from the U.S.” to continue her legacy. Ambassador
responded that we continued to support the PPP and our shared struggle against
extremism and in favor of the democratic process in Pakistan.
Comment
-------
¶19. (C) Zardari had prepared for this meeting and knew what his audience wanted
to hear. Nevertheless, he was calm, articulate and demonstrated a good grasp of
issues and politics. Missing was the egotism and emotional bombast that we
expected. He referred to conspiracy theories far less than Benazir had done and
appears ready to deal with a variety of political actors in a practical way.
Zardari’s decision to name his son as head of the party was a savvy recognition
of his own negatives, and it demonstrated a deliberate willingness to continue
exploiting the Bhutto name. By sharing a copy of what purportedly was Benazir’s
ISLAMABAD 00000405 004 OF 004
will (it has not been shared with the public despite numerous media requests),
Zardari appeared to be trying to convince us that Benazir indeed had anointed
him as her successor.
¶20. (C) Zardari seemingly wants to be the PPP’s candidate for Prime Minister,
with the USG blessing. Law is not necessarily an obstacle to politics in
Pakistan; however, the law requires that candidates have a university degree to
run for office, and the Election Commission has disqualified the Sharif brothers
(and other candidates) for being convicted/accused of crimes. Zardari has no
university degree and spent eleven years in prison on various charges ranging
from corruption and extortion to murder. He benefited from the National
Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that gave Benazir and others immunity from
prosecution, but the NRO is due to expire on February 4. In deciding whether to
extend the NRO, Musharraf thus has leverage over Zardari, his candidate
eligibility, and his possible role in a future government.
¶21. Within PPP party circles, there is still a great deal of suspicion and
dislike of Zardari. For now, most PPP members are lining up behind him as party
leader. The focus of infighting has been over who, other than Zardari, will be
the PPP candidate for Prime Minister. If Zardari presses his own candidacy, he
will place further strains on a party that already is showing signs of fracture.
As for running in his sister’s constituency, it is not clear if the government
will schedule by-elections until several months (possibly not before June) after
the February 18 elections. At a minimum, it still appears that the PPP will need
another candidate for Prime Minister if and until Zardari can sort out his
eligibility.
¶22. (C) The government already has announced that the Army will be stationed at
“sensitive” polling places to maintain law and order on election day. A
wholesale deployment of the Army designed to prevent vote rigging by the
Musharraf government, however, could very much politicize the Army in a way that
General Kayani has been seeking to avoid. It would also place additional duties
on forces increasingly overstretched in dealing with extremist militants in and
around the tribal areas. Politically, however, the call for Army deployment is a
clever move that puts the government in a no-win position, especially if/when
election-day violence breaks out.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08PARIS114, SARKOZY, KOUCHNER ADVISERS ON NATO,

RUSSIA, IRAN,
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
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TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO FR RU IR GG UP AG
SUBJECT: SARKOZY, KOUCHNER ADVISERS ON NATO, RUSSIA, IRAN,
AND SARKOZY

ns 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 16, Joseph Wood, Deputy

Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
Affairs, met with Philippe Errera, strategic affairs adviser
to FM Kouchner, and Francois Richier, strategic affairs
adviser to President Sarkozy. Errera and Richier provided
their views on NATO, ESDP, Russia, the Iran NIE, and
President Sarkozy's own guiding principles. Both advisers
emphasized that French reintegration into NATO needs thorough
consideration and is unlikely to take place before 2009.
They shared their concerns about recent signals from Russia
and described the "disastrous" consequences of the Iran NIE
on international efforts. Finally, they shared their
perspectives on the principles that underlie President
Sarkozy's dynamic administration, including France's desire
to be influential on the world scene while maintaining close
relations with its allies. END SUMMARY.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATO Reintegration -- Not Before 2009
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) Both Richier and Errera noted that President Sarkozy
has publicly accepted the principle of French reintegration
into NATO. Furthermore, according to Richier, he is the
first elected president in France to go on the record as
supportive of NATO. The U.S. should not underestimate the
attitude shifts that have made reintegration politically
feasible today. At the same time, both interlocutors
stressed that the GOF will not "rush" into a final decision
on reintegration into the military command structure.
Richier observed that the 2009 NATO summit would be a
reasonable timeframe for the announcement of a final
decision, noting the need for a thorough evaluation of the
implications of the decision. He added that France's defense
white paper will include a vision for French and collective
security, but that the exercise will conclude no sooner than
the end of April 2008.
¶3. (C) Errera said the GOF prefers the term "normalization"
to "reintegration," in part to underscore for domestic
political reasons that the NATO of today is not the NATO of
previous eras. Errera said that President Sarkozy wants to
work for a "new" NATO, and that France needs to be on the
inside to work for reform. He stressed that use of the
correct terminology should help frame the public dialogue
that is certain to ensue in France, despite the lack of
public outcry responding to Sarkozy's initial expressions of
interest. Richier noted that there is much ignorance in
France today about what NATO does; for example, many think
ISAF is under UN auspices. Errera pointed out that the
defense white paper commission, which is conducting a broad
review of defense and security policy, includes people who
are skeptical of NATO.
¶4. (C) Errera characterized this moment as "awkward," given

that formal discussions about the form of French
reintegration have not yet started. He noted that political
commitment and practical considerations had to be developed
simultaneously and incrementally, adding that the Joint
Chiefs must have a sense for where in NATO French officers
would be posted, for example, before a decision is made.
Most importantly, he said that France (including Sarkozy's
diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte) wants to avoid the
same mistakes that were made in the 1990s when reintegration
was last on the table. To avoid repeating those mistakes,
Errera said smaller, practical questions should not be
permitted to become pressure points that could block a
political decision. Richier said that it would be a mistake
to set firm goals today on what had to be achieved before a
political decision could be made, and that the overall
direction is more important than the specifics. He
acknowledged that there is suspicion in Europe regarding
France's motivations, and suspicion in France regarding NATO,
that will need to be overcome. He pointed to President
Sarkozy's scheduled February 1 meeting with NATO SYG Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer as one important step to alleviate some
concerns.
¶5. (C) Errera said that generally, newer members of NATO

will view French reintegration positively, reducing their
current suspicion of France for its non-normalized NATO
membership. On the other hand, newer members of NATO use
NATO jobs to reward their top leadership, and French
PARIS 00000114 002 OF 004
reintegration would put a tight squeeze on command structures

and high-level posts. High-level positions are also an issue
with Germany and the U.K.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATO and ESDP: Inseparably Linked
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) Errera stated that during France's upcoming EU

Presidency, President Sarkozy will push hard to strengthen
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), while working
for a revitalized NATO. Richier called this a transatlantic
effort to strengthen European security, while noting that
billing it as an "alternative" to NATO would be both
politically and financially absurd. Errera observed that
substantive progress on ESDP will be very difficult, partly
due to British concerns. Richier expressed hope that
European defense budgets could increase, noting that the gap
vis--vis the U.S. is growing, but added that if budgets
cannot be increased in the short term, efficiency must be
increased.
- - - - - - - - -
NATO Enlargement
- - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Adriatic 3: Errera said that France is comfortable

in principle with each of the Adriatic 3 candidates. In
particular, France has "no problems" with Croatian
membership. However, Errera said Albania seems to be taking
acceptance for granted, and needs to make more of an effort
to "clean up" corruption issues. Regarding Macedonia, Errera
said the GOM underestimates the seriousness of the name issue
for Greece and that the U.S. should not make the same
mistake. France will not pressure Greece on this issue.
Furthermore, if Athens were to give in on the name issue, the
Greek government could fall, thus bringing in a new
government which would be responsible for -- and presumably
hostile to -- the NATO enlargement ratification progress.
¶8. (C) Georgia and Ukraine: Errera said that the GOF does
not want a public dispute with the U.S. on these issues
before Bucharest, adding that European allies are hedging
because Washington is not sending clear signals. Errera
expects that new Ukrainian PM Tymoshenko will come out soon
publicly in favor of MAP for Ukraine, a step for which France
will "not have a great appetite." Errera said MAP is not
just one more step in closer relations, but a serious
decision in light of Article 5 commitments. Regarding
Georgia, he said Saakashvili "pulled off the election
somehow" but still not under ideal circumstances, and that
NATO may not be ready for Article 5 guarantees to Georgia
either. That said, the GOF has systematically made clear to
Russia that there is no Russian redline or veto regarding
Ukraine and Georgia. In response, Wood noted that France's
hesitation regarding Article 5 commitments implies a de facto
"sphere of influence," because Russia is the only possible
menace to Ukraine or Georgia.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Russia: Negative Trends
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) Richier characterized the current Russian regime as

revisionist, saying that Putin made much-needed improvements
to Russian infrastructure but has gone too far in seeking to
restore Russia's grandeur at the expense of international
cooperation and development. Among the Russian population,
many are culturally and economically oriented towards the
West, but remain politically tied to Putin. According to
Errera, Russian judgment on important issues is worsening.
In the past, Russia has been difficult to work with, but has
ultimately made the right decisions -- until recently. As an
example, in President Sarkozy's private meeting in Moscow
with President Putin, Putin was very hardline on Iran
(notwithstanding Russia's exports of fuel for Bushehr), but
that in the subsequent press conference, Putin distanced
himself on this issue, to Sarkozy's surprise and chagrin.
Errera said that in the past, Russia did not mind hurting
Iran as long as Russia was not hurt as well; now Russia seems
not to want to hurt the Iranians.
- - - - - - - - -
Energy Dependence
- - - - - - - - -
PARIS 00000114 003 OF 004
¶10. (C) Both interlocutors noted that France's use of

nuclear energy makes it less dependent than some other
European countries on Russian oil and gas. That said,
Richier expressed concern that Russia is "grabbing" gas
infrastructure and supply at a time of military buildup and
strong rhetoric. He said that it will be difficult for
Europe to agree on a common energy policy, as there is
currently no consensus, nor any great ideas, on how to solve
the problem. Richier described Russian policies as motivated
to obtain short-term profit for individuals, rather than to
build long-term, worldwide power. Errera observed that
dependence on Russia for energy is better than dependence on
Iran, which is the only other real option. He said that
Sarkozy had made overtures to Algeria on gas before and
during his visit to Algiers, but that France was "stiffed."
Nor is there any sense that there will be progress with
Algeria on gas in the near term. Errera said that while
France seeks a commercial relationship, Algeria views energy
cooperation as complicated by history and tinged with a sense
of nationalism.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
NIE: "The Best Christmas Gift Ahmadinejad Could Have
Imagined"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-
¶11. (C) Both interlocutors called the NIE a "disaster" that

has "substantially jeopardized" progress on Iran in the short
term and will have lasting consequences, including
eliminating France's ability to build consensus in Europe.
French views are unchanged, but many others have been
affected, and the NIE destroyed not just the momentum of the
international community but also what little leverage France
and the international community had on less radical Iranian
elements. Errera noted that the timing of the release of the
NIE was especially bad, with EU Political Directors having
been poised for a new UNSC resolution just before the NIE
release. He said at the IISS Manama Dialogue in December,
speculation was rampant about why the current U.S.
administration did not better manage the report's fallout by
postponing its release or changing the characterization of
Iran's enrichment activities as exclusively civil.
¶12. (C) Both interlocutors said quick passage of a new UNSC

resolution, although likely to be a weak, is key. Richier
said that Iran has no incentive to negotiate and that the
international community's most effective mechanism has been
creating a financially difficult operating environment for
Iran. If the perception declines in the financial community
that investment in Iran is dangerous, this will change.
Errera noted the EU might be able to go farther than the
Security Council will, perhaps with Gulf countries and/or the
G7, to pressure Iran on continued uranium enrichment by
raising the price for doing so.
¶13. (C) Errera also said that an intelligence team from the
French DGSE traveled to the U.S. recently to meet with their
U.S. counterparts regarding the NIE, and was disappointed
that the information shared was "even less" than has been
reported in the press. This reception did not help the
perception shared by some in the GOF that France has not been
treated as a full partner by the U.S., despite working
side-by-side and fielding criticism following the NIE
release.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sarkozy's Governing Philosophy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶14. (C) Errera said that two clear priorities underlie

Sarkozy's administration. The first is realigning French
presence with French objectives, and reestablishing French
influence where it had been diminished (for example, within
the EU, by giving momentum to the simplified EU treaty).
Errera said France will maintain its influence in Africa but
seeks to rebalance its overseas investments, for example by
creating a military base in the UAE. Errera said that France
cannot say Iran is a key threat without investing more in the
Gulf and that the Iranians will "get the message." He noted
that the new base in the UAE will be the first French
military installation not in a former colony. Secondly,
Errera said that Sarkozy believes in the concept of "the
West," making him the first non-Gaullist French president not
to consider France an exclusively independent actor. This
PARIS 00000114 004 OF 004
identification provides Sarkozy a clear course for steering

French policy even on difficult questions like dealing with
Libyan President Qadhafi.
¶15. (C) Richier suggested that Sarkozy's core conviction is

that France must be pulled into the 21st century. He said
Sarkozy likes to use the metaphor of a person who exercises
for the first time in a while -- many muscles may be sore
afterwards, but the exercise has done them good. Richier
said he sees new energy in French diplomacy, focused on
bringing diversity and reconciliation to the global stage.
Sarkozy wishes to encourage countries to accept the diversity
(ethnic, religious, etc.) within their own societies, as
tolerance for others is key to democracy. Sarkozy also
recognizes a need for reconciliation and believes the effort
to correct the course of a "bad guy" is worthwhile (COMMENT:
In public Sarkozy has defended his outreach to Qadhafi and
Hugo Chavez along these lines.) According to Richier,
Sarkozy believes the short-term costs of talking to rogue
actors by using carrots and helping them move forward are
less than the long-term costs of inaction. However, he also
recognizes the importance of not creating gaps between the
U.S. and Europe in reaching out to "bad guys," marking a
departure from previous French governments. Finally, Richier
noted that "relations with Islam" and climate change were two
immediate priorities of President Sarkozy's that would
nevertheless remain on the French agenda.

PEKALA
Viewing cable 08PARIS130, PRESIDENT SARKOZY ARTICULATES HIS

FRAMEWORK FOR
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SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY ARTICULATES HIS FRAMEWORK FOR
FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
PARIS 00000130 001.6 OF 003
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TAGS)
REF: A. EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORT FOR JANUARY 13

¶B. 2008
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (U) In this annual New Year's message to the Diplomatic
Corps on delivered on January 18, President Sarkozy laid out
a theoretical justification for recasting France's role on
the international scene in the twin challenges before the
international community: climate change and the "return of
the religious extremism" as a factor in international
politics. Sarkozy called for "four innovations" to prevail
over these challenges: 1) returning France to the "heart of
the occidental family," 2) dedicating France to a "diplomacy
of reconciliation," 3) affirming "diversity" while demanding
"its corollary, reciprocity," and 4) working towards the
"construction of a world order adapted to the emergence of
new powers and therefore capable of dealing effectively with
the challenges of the 21st century." The specific
initiatives Sarkozy said France would be pursuing during the
coming year -- from reform of the UNSC to pressing for
continued sanctions against Iran, from expansion of the G-8
to the hosting of an Afghanistan donors' conference -- all
link to Sarkozy's projected role for France as leading the
way towards the international unity needed to meet the
environmental challenge to humanity from global warming and
the political challenge to secular democracy from religious
fundamentalists. END SUMMARY.
NEW YEAR'S BEST WISHES TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS

--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (U) President Nicolas Sarkozy delivered the French
president's annual New Year's best wishes to the Diplomatic
Corps on the afternoon of January 18. Ambassador Stapleton
and DCM Pekala attended the event -- remarks followed by
reception -- at the Elysee palace. Traditionally, French
presidents have used these events to review administration
achievements and to unveil or re-iterate upcoming foreign
policy initiatives. True to form, Sarkozy went beyond review
of achievements and listing of initiatives, and laid out the
justification for his projected reform of France's role on
the international scene. Sarkozy began by pointing out -- as
he does in connection with nearly every area of public policy
-- "I was not elected to accept things as they are. I was
elected to reform France through a continuous process of
profound reform." He also underlined that France's foreign
policy "had to stem from a lucid analysis, realistic about
France's place in the world as the world is today."
TWO GREAT CHALLENGES -- AND THE NEED FOR UNITY

--------------------------------------------- -
¶3. (U) Sarkozy's analysis of the state of the world today
posits two great challenges -- climate change and religious
fundamentalism. Sarkozy said that global warming's "menace
to humanity" and the intention of "certain groups to impose a
fundamentalist, hegemonic and intolerant" religiosity would
"restructure international society in the 21st century
possibly more than ideologies did in the 20th." Sarkozy then
argued that these challenges could be successfully met only
"on one condition" -- "finding the unity" necessary for
concerted, effective international action. The four major
"innovations" in France's international affairs posture that
Sarkozy then claimed he had or was putting in place, and the
range of specific initiatives that he said France would be
pursuing in the coming year link directly, in Sarkozy's view,
to fostering the international unity necessary for taking
effective action against these two challenges. COMMENT: In
his presentation to the members of the diplomatic corps
Sarkozy projected as a candidate on the campaign trail --
working hard to win over his listeners to his way of looking
at things. As he has always done in connection with his
domestic reform campaigns, Sarkozy sets great store in
bringing people around to share his diagnosis of the
situation, from which follow the courses of action he
proposes. END COMMENT.
FOUR "INNOVATIONS"
------------------
¶4. (U) The four foreign policy "innovations" Sarkozy claimed
to be implementing are: 1) returning France to the "heart of
her Occidental family," 2) pursuing a "diplomacy of
PARIS 00000130 002.6 OF 003
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TAGS)
conciliation," 3) affirming "diversity" while demanding that

"its corollary, reciprocity" be honored by others, and 4)
advocating a reformed international institutional order
"adapted to the emergence of new powers and therefore capable
of dealing effectively with the challenges of the 21st
century." While he rejected previous government's use of the
word "hyperpower" to describe the U.S., he did describe a
multi-polar worldview with Europe become one of the active
poles.
¶5. In connection with the first, he evoked France's

new-found closeness to the U.S. Sarkozy underlined that
France was a "voluntary partner" of the U.S., and an
"independent ally and friend," while clearly implying that
France, for the sake of its own effectiveness and
credibility, was right to abandon its pretensions to
representing an alternative to U.S. leadership. Sarkozy also
underlined, inQnection with France's getting back in step
with the major western democracies, that doing so was key to
advancing France's leadership role in the EU. He said that
"it was France's ambition to see the EU emerge as an
important global actor in the 21st century," and that that
required "the development of an effective European defense"
capability (ESDP) independent of NATO. He stressed that, in
the face of today's "range of threats and crises" NATO and
ESDP were complimentary spans of a single security and
defense architecture for Europe. He said that France's
new-found unity with the U.S. and new-found unity with its EU
partners had reinforced France's leadership credibility both
"internally," among the western democracies, and
"externally," throughout the rest of the world.
¶6. (U) Sarkozy argued that France's "diplomacy of

conciliation" worked to attenuate differences, and, by
implication, promote the unity necessary for effective
international action. Sarkozy justified his recent dealings
with Qadhafi and Hugo Chavez in terms of this constructive
engagement, French-style, that he calls "diplomacy of
conciliation." He went on to say that France's foreign
policies would henceforth be anchored in the affirmation of
"diversity, and its corollary, reciprocity." He justified
the elevation of "diversity" to a guiding principle for
foreign policies as follows, "Even more than the fight for
democracy, it seems to me that the fight for diversity -- for
openness, tolerance, acceptance of others in all their
difference -- is fundamental. It is, in a way, the
precondition for extending liberty and durably implanting
democracy." Lastly, Sarkozy claimed the "innovation" of
advocating a reformed system of multi-lateral institutions,
and again justified these proposals as necessary for
achieving needed unity in the face of global challenges.
SPECIFIC INITIATIVES
-------------------
¶7. (U) Once he had dispatched the carefully constructed
theoretical underpinnings of his framework for France's
foreign policy, Sarkozy took up the range of specific
initiatives that France would be pursuing in the coming year.
NOTE: Sarkozy's speech, in its entirety, is available, in
English, on the Elysee website at www.elysee.fr; in addition,
post has reported separately (ref) on the outlook for
France's Africa policy as reflected in the speech;
furthermore, French policy under Sarkozy in the critical
areas of Iran, Afghanistan, NATO/ESDP, and Middle East Peace
have the subject of extensive and regular reporting. END
NOTE. Among the most salient of Sarkozy's specific
initiatives aimed at reforming international institutions are
enlarging the Security Council in its two categories of
members, and enlarging the G-8 to include, "progressively"
China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. In addition,
Sarkozy called for reform of the IMF, calling on it to become
more inclusive of emerging economic powers and to develop a
way of engaging the large international oil and other
similarly profitable global companies, in financing the
alleviation of poverty. He also said that "all must be done"
to produce an agreement by 2009 up to the "colossal challenge
of global warming via the Bali process."
¶8. (U) He reiterated France's commitment to continuing

sanctions against Iran, while aiming to return Iran to full
respectability "once it respects international law." Sarkozy
PARIS 00000130 003.2 OF 003

confirmed that France would host the next Afghanistan donors
conference. He said France would support "the process
envisaged at Annapolis" to result "in the creation of a
Palestinian State side-by-side to the State of Israel." He
reviewed France's priorities for its upcoming presidency of
the EU -- the Lisbon treaty, the environment and energy,
immigration, agriculture, and implementing ESDP -- and he
recommitted to "launching that important civilizational
project," the Mediterranean Union.
COMMENT
-------
¶9. (U) In this speech, Sarkozy did not unveil any new or
unexpected initiatives, but he did attempt to link France's
foreign policy initiatives to pressing international problems
without referring to "France's glory" or "France's history
and civilization". Sarkozy nevertheless articulated an
ambitious foreign policy framework that should help guide our
understand of the French approach over the coming months
including during its Presidency of the European Union that
begins in July. END COMMENT.
Viewing cable 08RIYADH102, SARKOZY IN SAUDI ARABIA

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TAGS FR, PGOV, PINR, PREL, SA
SUBJECT: SARKOZY IN SAUDI ARABIA
REF: RIYADH 0037
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s visited Saudi Arabia on
January 13-14 to make clear that Saudi Arabia is now “at the top” of the French
Middle East policy list. Pres. Sarkozy met with Saudi King Abdullah, addressed
the Shura council and spoke briefly with Saudi business leaders. Topics
discussed were Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Mid East Peace Process, Syrian meddling
in Lebanon, security in Iraq, and French-Saudi cooperation, including the offer
of nuclear energy technology. The visit can be viewed as a moderate success for
French-Saudi bilateral relations, although no major announcements were made.
Press reports of the visit along with a private readout by the French DCM were
positive, but our Saudi contacts passed on certain displeasure with the French’s
conduct. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) French President Nicholas Sarkozy arrived in Riyadh on January 13 for
a one night/two day visit. This visit was a follow up to Saudi King Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz Al Saud’s visit to Paris in June 2007. Pres Sarkozy was accompanied by
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Defense Hevre Morin,
Minister of Justice Rachida Dati, Minister of Culture Christine Albanel and
Minister of Education Valerie Pecresse. French DCM in Riyadh Emmanuel Bonne
provided a private readout to Acting Pol Counselor of this visit. Topics raised
included Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Mid East Peace Process, Syrian meddling in
Lebanon, security in Iraq, and French-Saudi cooperation, including the offer of
nuclear energy technology. Additionally, the main theme was to foster a stronger
personal relationship between Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah. Overall, King
Abdullah emphasized multilateral solutions, vice bilateral approaches, regarding
the multitude of issues discussed. Readouts from the French and the press were
positive, but our Saudi contacts privately shared displeasure with certain
French conduct.
IRAN
----
¶3. (S/NF) Pres Sarkozy reiterated his strong concern with Iran’s nuclear
ambitions to King Abdullah, asserting sanctions were the best way to put
pressure on Iran. Abdullah reportedly does not want to inflame the situation and
recommended continued international engagement (P-5 plus Germany) with Iran. He
emphasized that Iran must abide by its international obligations, specifically
the Non-Proliferation treaty. Abdullah reportedly concurred, noting Iran’s
destabilizing activities in Iraq and Lebanon, along with Saudi belief that
Iran’s ultimate goal is to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the Saudis are not
yet ready to take any action beyond diplomacy at this point and assured their
commitment to French efforts for a diplomatic solution with Iran. King Abdullah
stated that Iran knows its obligations and the next step is for the Iranians to
comply. The French had hoped to make a joint communiqu on Iran, but the Saudis
declined because they do not want to aggravate the Iranian situation. COMMENT:
It was not made clear just how the proposed communiqu would have aggravated
Saudi-Iranian relations. END COMMENT.
MEPP
----
¶4. (S/NF) Both Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah agreed to support the Annapolis
initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Abdullah told Sarkozy
that the issue of Palestinian refugees must first be resolved and that the
Israelis must cease all West Bank settlement construction. Abdullah maintained
that East Jerusalem must be the capital of a Palestinian state and that this
section of Jerusalem must be solely under Arab control. The French had hoped to
issue a joint communiqu on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, but no
consensus could be reached.
SYRIA/LEBANON
-------------
¶5. (S/NF) The issue of Lebanon was raised by Pres Sarkozy. Abdullah cautioned
that everyone should be very cautious in speaking with the Syrians, implying
their duplicity. He added the French “should be firm” with Syria in regards to
RIYADH 00000102 002 OF 003
Lebanon. In a separate meeting between French FM Bernard Kouchner and Saudi FM
Saud al Faisal, the French supported the Arab initiative on Lebanon. Saud added
he was skeptical of the current Lebanese political parties and doubted the
Syrians would comply with any accord.
IRAQ
----
¶6. (S/NF) Regarding Iraq, both Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah concurred that
Iraq’s security had dramatically improved since 2006. Abdullah reportedly opined
that Iraq must remained a unified state, and that external players, such as
Iran, must be dissuaded from interfering.
FRENCH-SAUDI COOPERATION
------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) General energy policy was discussed, including gas, oil and nuclear
power. Pres Sarkozy made an offer to provide civilian nuclear energy technology
(Reftel) to the kingdom. King Abdullah was receptive to the offer, but no firm
agreement was made.
¶8. (S/NF) In his speech to the Shura Council (Septel) on January 14, Pres
Sarkozy espoused tolerance of different religious faiths, women’s rights, and
freedom of expression. His speech barely mentioned political issues and instead
focused on a “civilization policy” - respect and dignity for all cultures. While
some of these themes are at odds with traditional Saudi society, Emb Off present
at this event reported that Sarkozy was well-received.
¶9. (S/NF) The French delegation included various Ministers to strengthen
educational, commercial and energy ties with the kingdom. Four cooperative
agreements were made: 1) political consultations to coordinate regional
activities; 2) energy policy regarding gas and oil; 3) vocational language
training increase from 100 to 500 students to help overcome the French-Arabic
language barrier; and 4) higher education with the goal to increase the number
of Saudi students in France (currently 4000). Pres Sarkozy had a brief (10-
minute) presentation to Saudi business leaders.
¶10. (S/NF) The overarching theme of the visit, according to French Embassy
Riyadh, was to strengthen the personal relationship between Pres Sarkozy and
King Abdullah. Former Pres Jacques Chirac and King Abdullah had a strong
friendship with agreement on a host of issues. Reportedly, the Saudis were
concerned by Sarkozy’s election last year because of his expressed support of
Israel and Jewish background. This visit was to dispel Saudi concerns and to
assure the Saudis that Pres Sarkozy could be counted on as strongly as Pres
Chirac. Likewise, the French told us they are modifying their Mid East policy.
The Levant states have been France’s top Mid East focus, while the Arabian Gulf
had been at the “bottom of the list.” Recognition of Saudi Arabia’s emerging
influence and status has resulted in the French putting Saudi Arabia “at the
top” of the French foreign policy Middle East list.
GOOD VISIT, BUT NOT GREAT
-------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) COMMENT. Per the French DCM, they were quite pleased with Pres
Sarkozy’s visit. They were disappointed they could not issue any joint
communiqus on any major issues, such as Iran or the MEPP. Still, they viewed the
reciprocal state visits were steps forward in French-Saudi relations. Press
coverage of Pres Sarkozy was positive with front page newspaper pictures of both
leaders smiling together.
¶12. (S/NF) However, our Saudi contacts provided some negative
comments. Minor in substance, but significant to Saudi sensibilities. Initially,
Sarkozy’s fiance Carla Bruni was expected to accompany him (but finally did not
travel), which the Saudis found offensive given their strict, conservative
culture against the company of an unmarried woman. Various protocol faux pas
were committed by the French delegation during the visit. The French advance
made, in Saudi opinion, unreasonable logistical demands. Finally, Pres Sarkozy
was viewed as less than gracious, in Saudi eyes, during certain events, such as
avoiding tasting traditional Arab foods and a bored look during the televised
arrival sword ceremony. While these are minor points, the fact our Saudi
contacts mentioned them shows their discontent. These incidents
RIYADH 00000102 003 OF 003
characterized one overarching private comment from the Saudis, that Pres Sarkozy
has not replaced Pres Chirac in Saudi eyes. Other usually well-informed Saudi
contacts have lamented the overtly commercial nature of the visit. Sarkozy
reportedly presented a list of fourteen (14) sales that French firms would like
to make to the Saudi government, complete with the original price and discounts
that Sarkozy was prepared to negotiate. END COMMENT. FRAKER
Viewing cable 08ASTANA338, CHEVRON INCIDENT REFLECTS

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TAGS PGOV, PREL, EPET, PINR, KZ
SUBJECT: CHEVRON INCIDENT REFLECTS CHANGING DYNAMICS IN
KAZAKHSTAN’S ENERGY HIERARCHY
REF: A. ASTANA 65 B. ASTANA 225
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
1.(C) On January 15, KazMunaiGas First Vice President Maskat Idenov expelled
from a meeting Chevron executives Guy Hollingsworth, President for Chevron
Eurasia, Europe, and Middle East Exploration and Production, and James Johnson,
Chevron Eurasia Strategic Business Unit Managing Director. In press reports, an
unnamed source stated that the two were thrown out of the meeting because of
“improper comments on Kashagan negotiations and disrespectful conduct towards
KazMunaiGas management.” Johnson told us later that the incident occurred at the
end of a meeting that had gone generally well, and resulted from an innocent
issue over the newly-arrived Johnson not having his cell phone number handy to
exchange with Idenov. Idenov,s version of the conversation was heavy with
descriptions of Hollingsworth &pounding on the table8 and Johnson slowly tapping
a business card on the table while telling Idenov all he needed was his
secretary,s phone number. Idenov almost immediately sent a letter of protest to
Chevron CEO Dave O,Reilly, and faxed (twice) a cc to the Ambassador. Knowledge
of the incident, and the letter, have been the talk of the diplomatic and
business community ever since, with sources ranging from the Indian Ambassador
to the local ABN Amro chief raising it with the Ambassador.
¶2. (C) In subsequent conversations with the Ambassador and Eurasian Energy
Diplomacy Coordinator Steve Mann, Idenov emphasized that his actions were not an
indication of poor relations with Chevron. In both conversations, Idenov
amplified his anger with Hollingsworth by explaining that Hollingsworth does not
understand &how we are doing business now8 ) followed immediately by a detailed
recitation of Hollingsworth,s extensive contacts with Timur Kulibayev in
locations ranging from the Astana golf course to the beach in Spain.
Comment
-------
¶3. What really appears to be at issue here is Idenov demonstrating that he, not
Timur Kulibayev, is now the &go to8 guy in Kazakhstani oil and gas. Idenov, the
chief negotiator for Kazakhstan on Kashagan, is now &number 1A8 at KMG,
according to one international oil company representative. Under restructuring
at KMG, all employees report to Idenov, and only Idenov to KMG President Uzakbay
Karabalin. The ascendant Idenov appears determined to show the international
majors that they need to deal with him. In an early stage of the Kashagan
negotiations, he tossed some less senior ConocoPhillips representatives out of a
meeting to deliver the message that he should be dealing with the upper levels
of KMG,s corporate partners. In the case of Chevron, he felt secure enough to
throw out of a meeting executives from one of Kazakhstan’s biggest money-makers.
It is difficult to imagine that any KMG official would have so criticized
Kulibayev, even in private to American diplomats, if he were not very confident
of his position.
¶4. (C) One very substantive aspect of determining who,s on top is related to
the oil pipeline that must be built to connect Kashagan (and Tengiz) to the
planned trans-Caspian oil terminal in Kurik. Both Hollingsworth and Prime
Minister Masimov have told the Ambassador that discussions are underway to make
this pipeline project a joint project between the GOK/KMG and Chevron. Masimov
has noted that the Kashagan companies, the natural partners for such a pipeline,
have been unable to agree on how to do this despite several years of trying.
Chevron, which is not involved with Kashagan, has a major interest in additional
transportation routes for Tengiz crude ) which it is 100 percent responsible for
marketing. The proposed pipeline would run right past the Tengiz field on its
way to the terminal; even a 25 percent Chevron share would give them an inside
track at getting their crude into that pipeline if there were capacity problems
with both Kashagan and Tengiz volumes. Idenov, by contrast, told the Ambassador
and Mann that KMG would build the pipeline &100 percent by ourselves8 and
conclude commercial contracts with the Kashagan shippers to transport their oil.
He specifically said that it would be a violation of business principles to cut
the Kashagan partners out of the process of determining how to build the
pipeline ) a direct swipe at the Chevron proposal. To make this mix even more
complicated, ExxonMobil country rep told Mann that his company was working with
KMG on a new legal basis to build
the pipeline that would allow the Kashagan partners to share ownership.
¶5. (C) Idenov’s actions are designed not only to demonstrate that he,s up, but
that Timur Kulibayev is down, if not actually out. We had already concluded that
Kulibayev,s influence in the oil and gas sector had been significantly reduced
with his removal late last year from a senior executive position at Samruk, the
state holding company that owns KMG. Shortly after Kulibayev was fired,
Hollingsworth told us that Kulibayev had explained (during a golf game) that it
was the desire of the President to &protect8 him from responsibility for the
Kashagan negotiations if they went wrong. This appears to be somewhat self-
serving: A former USG official told the Ambassador that she had been at a dinner
in Astana with the CEO of Samruk, Kanat Bozumbayev, immediately after Kulibayev
lost his position. According to Bozumbayev, he had been instructed to personally
deliver the news of the firing to Kulibayev, who appeared to have no inkling
that it was going to happen.
6.(C) Kulibayev is still the head of Kazenergy, the semi-official trade group,
and has obvious links to key government officials, including his father-in-law,
the President. Kulibayev is by all accounts a very savvy and effective
businessman. Samruk Board Chairman Richard Evans (retired CEO of BAE), told the
Ambassador that Kulibayev was the one real businessman he had met in the entire
Samruk structure. Our guess is that Nazarbayev, in the aftermath of the Rakhat
Aliyev affair, decided to minimize risks to him and his reputation by removing
all of his close relatives from major government positions.
ORDWAY
Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD357, IMPLEMENTATION OF

RECOMMENDATIONS ON PERSONAL
Discussing cables
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TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PINS IZ
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON PERSONAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICES: STATUS REPORT UPDATE #3
REF: A. A. 07 BAGHDAD 03668

¶B. B. 07 BAGHDAD 03764
¶C. C. 07 BAGHDAD 03767
¶D. D. 07 BAGHDAD 04001
¶E. E. 08 BAGHDAD 00248
Classified By: Patricia Butenis, Charge, for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) This cable is the third update of Embassy Baghdad,s

implementation of the relevant eighteen recommendations of
the Secretary,s Panel on Protective Services. The following
recommendations have been implemented by Post (reftel D):
¶A. (C) Kennedy Recommendation 12 - Joint Review Board

¶B. (C) Kennedy Recommendation 17- Direct RSO Engagement with
GOI Police and Security Officials;
¶C. (C) Kennedy Recommendation 18 - RSO Response Team
Facilitation to Embassy Claims Program.
¶2. (C) Embassy Baghdad has made significant progress on

recommendations 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 16 as outlined
in this cable. Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 15 require
Department action.
¶3. (C) This cable also provides an update on the Department

of State-Department of Defense Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
on private security companies, proposed Iraqi legislation
concerning Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, and
Embassy and Blackwater condolence payments in connection with
the September 16 incident. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Recommendation 2 - DOD and DOS Discussions with GOI on New
Regulatory Framework for USG Private Security Contractors
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶4. (C) STATUS: ONGOING. The legal status of DOD contractors,

including private security contractors, will be part of the
negotiations between the USG and the GOI on a Status of
Forces (SOFA) agreement expected to begin this month. The
Department of State will seek to obtain similar agreement on
immunities and related issues for DOS contractors separately.
---------------------------------------------
Kennedy Recommendation 4 ) Recommendation for Continued
Contract Services of Blackwater
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) STATUS: ONGOING. FBI investigation of the September

16 incident has not concluded. However, the Blackwater
contract expires in May 2008 and a decision on renewal may
have to be made before the FBI investigation concludes.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 5 - RSO to be provided with DS Agents
Staffing to Accompany PPS Movements
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶6. (C) STATUS: NEAR COMPLETION. Assistant Regional Security
Officers (ARSOs) and TDY DS Special Agents (SAs) are assigned
to command each Chief of Mission (COM) Personal Security
Detail (PSD) operating in the Baghdad area under the WPPS
contract. Fifty-two Special Agent positions and positions
related to the oversight of all DOS Private Security
Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq have been requested (reftel E) to
include RSO coverage of non-RSO Chief of Mission (COM) PSD
movements and coverage outside Baghdad. In late March, the
first group of approximately 12 new Special Agents will
arrive after completing training. This first group will be
assigned to Regional Embassy Offices (REOs) and the Regional
and Provincial Reconstruction Teams where DS has PSD
responsibilities. In the short term, Post continues to
maintain a staffing increase for this requirement through the
use of DS TDY personnel.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 8 - Revisions to the Embassy Rules For
the Use of Force
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶7. (C) STATUS: COMPLETED. The Baghdad Mission Firearms

Policy has been revised and issued. The Rules for the Use of
Force have been modified to make the language consistent with
the common principles outlined in the DOS-DOD MOA.
¶8. (C) To reduce the number of lethal force incidents, Post

has procured 24 Dazzlers. A Dazzler is a non-lethal
light-emitting weapon designed for use against perceived
vehicle threats as part of the graduated force response. On
February 20, instructors will initiate training to all PSD

teams on its proper application.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 9 - Video Recording Equipment in
Vehicles and Recording of Radio Communications
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶9. (C) STATUS: ONGOING/NEAR IMPLEMENTATION: DS Security

Engineering Officers (SEOs) are installing the approved
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) system into PSD vehicles in
Baghdad. Each COM motorcade traveling into the Red Zone now
has at least one vehicle with a camera system installed. A
second installation team is arriving this week to continue
the installation. The entire project is scheduled to
continue through the spring with the short term goal of
having at least two vehicles in every motorcade operating
with cameras. Nearly 400 COM vehicles throughout Iraq will
have cameras installed upon the completion of the project.
Initial experience with the cameras has been very positive.
¶10. (C) IRM procured, built and tested a system that can
simultaneously record 32 radio channels. The system is in
the delivery stage.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 10 - Vehicle Identification Numbering
System
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶11. (C) STATUS: NO CHANGE. RSO has engaged MNF-I on this

issue and reviewed the operational security (OPSEC) concerns
with respect to readable vehicle number signage. It is the
collective assessment of the Embassy and MNF-I that a vehicle
numbering system is only viable if all USG PSDs adopt the
same numbering scheme and non-USG PSDs also agree to
voluntarily adopt the same system. MNF-I is not inclined to
support a numbering system solely for US Embassy Baghdad PSCs
as it may offer enemy forces the ability to identify them as
such and bring greater risk to COM movements. Post
recommends that this recommendation be reconsidered in light
of the extensive communications and de-confliction measures
that have been put into effect by RSO, MNF-I, and MNC-I which
are proving to be effective.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 11 - Investigations and RSO Response
Unit
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶12. (C) STATUS: ONGOING/NEAR COMPLETION. RSO has established

a Force Investigation Unit (FIU) consisting of a dedicated
FIU supervisor and ARSO. The FIU currently draws upon other
RSO personnel as needed. The PSD Serious Incident
Investigation Handbook is in the DS approval process. RSO
has requested Special Agent and contract investigator
resources to fully staff this unit to 14 persons. The FIU
will be responsible for the investigation of all serious
incidents involving DOS-affiliated PSCs to include Tier I and
Tier II private security contractors. Position descriptions
have been written and funding is being pursued. The first
meeting of the Embassy and MNFI Joint Incident Review Board
will be conducted on February 12.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 13 - RSO AND MNF-I Procedures for
Coordination, Liaison, and Operational De-confliction
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶13. (C) STATUS: AWAITING RSO LNO TO THE Multinational Corps

) Iraq (MNC-I)Joint Operations Center (JOC). RSO, MNF-I and
MNC-I have developed commonly agreed operational procedures,
liaison coordination and exchange of information, and a
process for swift resolution of issues of mutual interest.
RSO participates in the MNF-I Strategic Operations daily
briefing and presents data on planned COM protective missions
for the next 24 hours. An MNC-I liaison officer (LNO) was
added to the RSO TOC and has been fully integrated into the
RSO TOC's operations. The LNO provides enhanced visibility to
MNC-I on PSD movements outside the IZ and serves as the focal
point for coordination and situational awareness between RSO
and battle space owners in Baghdad. An RSO LNO has been
identified and will be assigned to the MNC-I Joint Operations
Center to enhance coordination between the Embassy and MNC-I.
------------------------------------------
Kennedy Recommendation 14 ) PRC 152 Radios
------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) The procurement of additional communication

capabilities is underway, with the arrival of the Harris PRC
152 handheld radio system expected by the end of February.
These radios give PSDs the ability to contact military units
directly in the field to de-conflict issues or request

medical evacuation and quick reaction forces.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Kennedy Recommendation 16 - GOI-US Joint Commission Working
Group on PSC Licensing and Transparency
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶15. (C) STATUS: ONGOING. The Embassy, represented by the

RSO, and the Multinational Forces ) Iraq (MNF-I),
represented by the Chief of the Contractor Policy and
Oversight Division (CPOD), continue to hold regular joint
working group meetings with the Chief, Private Security
Regulatory Division, Ministry of Interior, and his staff to
address topics of mutual concern. Four meetings have been
held to date.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Completion of Negotiations on the DOS-DOD MOA on PSCs
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶16. (C) The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on private security

companies, negotiated by the Embassy and MNF-I, was signed by
the Deputies for State and Defense on December 5, 2007.
------------------------------------
Embassy Condolence Payments Continue
------------------------------------
¶17. (C) On November 26, 2007, the Deputy Chief of Mission,

Acting RSO, and Acting Embassy Legal Adviser made condolence
payments to one Iraqi who had been injured and to the widow
and brother of an Iraqi who had been killed in the September
16 incident. All claimants accepted the payments. In
addition, the Iraqi who suffered an injury informed the DCM
that he had been punished for his absence at work when he was
recovering from his injury. The DCM apologized and offered
to write a letter to his employer explaining the cause of his
absence, which was provided to the claimant at a later date.
¶18. (C) On December 27, 2007, the Deputy Chief of Mission,

RSO, and Acting Embassy Legal Adviser made condolence
payments to three Iraqis who had been injured and the widow
of an Iraqi who had been killed in the incident. All
claimants accepted the payments. The Embassy is continuing
to work to obtain contact information for all of the
potential claimants from the September 16 incident and plans
to make additional payments in the future as it locates those
claimants. To date, the Embassy has paid 132,500 dollars to
claimants: 40,000 dollars to the families of 4 killed, 65,000
dollars to 13 injured, and 27,500 dollars to 11 claimants for
vehicle damage.
------------------------------
Blackwater Condolence Payments
------------------------------
¶19. (C) On January 18, 2007, the DCM and RSO met with
Blackwater representatives and were briefed on Blackwater,s
intentions to make condolence payments to the victims of the
September 16 Nisur Square incident and to obtain an operating
license from the Ministry of Interior. In a change from
Blackwater's previous position, the representatives said that
Blackwater has hired a number of Iraqi attorneys, including
one who has had significant experience dealing with MNFI on
Iraqi claims cases, to work with local courts on payment
issues and plans to follow procedures for payments as
determined by local laws and regulations. Blackwater has set
aside "a generous pot" of money for these payments and the
Iraqi attorneys will be contacting survivors and relatives of
the deceased. Representatives said that they intended to make
payments to all claimants, including those with lawsuits
pending in the United States, largely because they did not
expect those lawsuits to be successful. They also said that
they would take into account the specific requests and
circumstances of the claimants where possible.
¶20. (C) Blackwater is also moving ahead with efforts to

obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Interior
(MOI), and said that through their lawyers' communications
with the MOI they were told that Prime Minister Maliki would
approve the licensing of Blackwater if condolence payments
are made. They have received this same assurance from
members of the Ministry of Interior responsible for
licensing.
¶21. (C) The DCM told Blackwater that the Embassy believed it
was morally correct for Blackwater to make condolence
payments. She also indicated that while the Embassy welcomes
this action by Blackwater, it will not have any effect on the
DOS/Embassy decision on whether to retain Blackwater, and
that in regards to the MOI licensing issue, under no
circumstances could the Embassy approve of or in any way be
part of a bribery effort. The Blackwater representatives

indicated that they understood and that the process would be
straightforward and transparent.
¶22. (C) In follow-up communications with Blackwater, RSO

provided a list of all known victims and their available
contact information. As of January 31, Blackwater's Iraqi
attorneys had been able to contact family members of 6 of the
deceased victims, and 12 of the victims that had suffered
injuries and/or property damage. They continue to reach out
to the additional victims (about 20 more) and have enlisted
the help of the Iraqi Police to locate the victims for which
there is no contact information (Note: Blackwater has agreed
to provide the Embassy with contact information for any
victims they are able to locate but for which the Embassy did
not have contact information or were not able to locate. The
Embassy will make its own payments to any additional victims
that it is able to locate in this manner. End Note.)
Blackwater said that on February 1, 2008, their Iraqi
attorneys would begin to meet with each of the victims to
express their sympathy and to interview them to subsequently
craft an individual condolence payment amount for each
victim. On average, Blackwater said it expects they will pay
at least twice as much as what the Embassy paid and
substantially more for victims or families that were more
significantly impacted by the incident. As an example, he
cited a family that lost their bread winner, a man who was
already supporting the families of four of his brothers whom
had been killed as a result of sectarian violence.
-----------------
CPA 17 Draft Law
----------------
¶23. (C) There has been no change in the status of the draft
law to repeal CPA Order 17. The Council of Ministers
approved a draft law and voted to send it to the Council of
Representatives, but to date the draft has not yet been
transmitted to the CoR. Once submitted, the law could pass
in as little as one to two weeks given existing procedures.
There has not, however, been much discussion on this draft
law in recent weeks. We have engaged the GOI in an effort to
prevent the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs from
submitting the proposed legislation to the CoR. In meetings
with and in letters to GOI officials, we have highlighted the
steps that the Embassy has taken to implement the Kennedy
Report recommendations, the Memorandum of Agreement between
the Department of State and Department of Defense on USG PSDs
that was recently signed, and the ongoing FBI investigation
into the September 16 incident.
BUTENIS
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA236, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH

MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOBIM
Discussing cables
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: BR PREL MARR

BR, PREL, MARR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOBIM
REF: A. BRASILIA 93
¶B. BRASILIA 175
¶1. (C) Ambassador Sobel met with Brazilian Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim
Feb. 13 to discuss Jobim's upcoming visit to Washington, regional security and
progress on defense cooperation. Jobim agreed with Ambassador Sobel's outline of
possible areas for discussion during his March visit to Washington, including
further discussion of a defense cooperation agreement. He also signaled that
Brazil would be open to discussions regarding negotiation of a General Security
of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA), similar to that concluded with France. Chief of Ministry Staff Murilo
Marques Barboza said that a GSOMIA had been discussed in the past, but had
broken down over arrangements for "inspections" of Brazilian facilities. This
probably reflects Brazilian sensitivities over allowing U.S. access to military
facilities, even with reciprocal access to those in the U.S. Jobim and Barboza
indicated openness to renewing a dialogue on a GSOMIA, but in order to complete
such an agreement, the "inspections" will need a clearer characterization as
reciprocal visits. Jobim also expressed interest in technology transfers,
particularly as they could apply to Brazilian plans to modernize its military.
Ambassador Sobel acknowledged that we were aware of Brazilian interest in U.S.
submarine technology and were preparing what we hoped would be a constructive
response.
¶2. (C) In a separate meeting with MOD Chief of Staff Barboza, DATT was told
that the MOD's response to the U.S. was aimed at reaching consensus with the USG
that could gain President Lula's support as a deliverable for Jobim's visit to
Washington, circumventing MRE obstruction. This was the tactic that led to
completion of the SOFA with France earlier this year. Barboza indicated that the
French SOFA used language that did not provoke constitutional onjections as
previous proposals for U.S.-Brazil SOFAs have. He counselled observing the
reaction of Brazil's Congress to the French SOFA (and completing the DCA) before
working on a U.S.-Brazil version. Barboza also expressed caution on the possible
GSOMIA, noting that no other information sharing arrangment to which Brazil is a
party would involve visits. He did, however, leave the door open to exploration
of a formula that could work for both sides.
¶3. (C) Jobim told Ambassador Sobel that the Brazilian government shared the
Ambassador's concern about the possibility of Venezuela exporting instability.
He believed that President Chavez has been saber rattling to distract from
internal problems. Brazil supports creation of a "South American Defense
Council" to bring Chavez into the mainstream of the continent and provide
reassurance that there is no security threat. Jobim believed that isolating
Venezuela would lead to further posturing from Chavez and a greater risk of
spreading instability among neighboring countries. 4. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT:
However impractical the suggestion may seem, it follows the traditional
Brazilian policy of trying to be everyone's friend by attempting to incorporate
Chavez' idea for defense cooperation into a supposed containment strategy. SOBEL
Viewing cable 08BUENOSAIRES235, ARGENTINA: GETTING PAST

SQUARE ONE WITH THE
Discussing cables
2008-02-26 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
12:12 16:04 Aires
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TAGS: PREL CJAN KJUS EFIN SNAR MASS VZ AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: GETTING PAST SQUARE ONE WITH THE
FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER GOVERNMENT

¶F. BUENOS AIRES 225
Classified By: DCM Tom Kelly for reasons b, d.
¶1. (C) Summary: With a seven-week period of bilateral

estrangement in our rear-view window, we have an opportunity
-- again -- to build a more constructive relationship with
Argentina. The warming trend in the bilateral relationship
continues. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and her
government rolled out the red carpet for CODEL Engel and
PDDNI Kerr, and the circle of GOA luminaries making positive
statements about the United States is growing. Capitalizing
on this opportunity, however, will be no easy task.
Confidence must be rebuilt on our side and in Buenos Aires.
The GOA must demonstrate its commitment to a constructive
relationship, including through visits to the United States.
But concerted effort is also needed from our side, including
visits to Argentina by senior USG officials. The presence of
authoritative USG officials here, and the attendant positive
media coverage it creates, feed the Argentine need for
attention, directly attacking one of the main causes of
anti-Americanism here -- the perception that the USG does not
care enough about Argentina. The hard work will be worth the
effort if we can make a dent in anti-U.S. sentiment and
influence Argentina to stay out of the Bolivarian camp.
Making Argentina a more cooperative interlocutor and
receptive audience for U.S. ideas is achievable. End Summary.
An Austral Warming Trend

------------------------
¶2. (C) Three weeks have passed since the GOA signaled an end
to its bilateral squabble with the USG via a highly
publicized meeting on January 31 betweQPresident Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) and Ambassador Wayne. (The U.S.
Ambassador is the only Chief of Mission who has been received
privately by CFK; she has now received him three times since
her inauguration.) The change in how the United States is
treated and portrayed by Argentine authorities is striking.
As we had agreed beforehand, CFK insiders followed the
January 31 session with positive and conciliatory statements
from Cabinet Chief Alberto Fernandez, Foreign Minister Jorge
Taiana, and others. From January 31 on, the Argentines have
given prominent positive public play to each event involving
a USG visitor, including the two (CODEL Engel and PDDNI) that
occurred in the last week.
¶3. (C) The chorus of anti-U.S. recriminations has fallen

silent. In their place, we are hearing positive
pronouncements about our country. On February 20, for
example, after a meeting between the Ambassador and Minister
of Defense Garre, a hold-over from the first Kirchner
administration who had previously resisted close cooperation
with the USG, the Defense Ministry issued an upbeat
communique on its website noting that "the Argentine side
expressed gratitude for American assistance." The statement
then proceeded to detail several areas of successful
bilateral cooperation that helped to train and transform
Argentina's military.
¶4. (C) In the wake of the meeting three weeks ago with CFK,
the Ambassador has had friendly and productive meetings with
Cabinet heavyweights such as Cabinet Chief Fernandez, MOD
Garre, Foreign Minister Taiana, Economy Minister Lousteau,
and Justice Minister Anibal Fernandez (reftels A-E).
¶5. (C) More importantly, CFK herself has demonstrated her

continuing personal interest in ties with the USG by hosting
two meetings in her presidential office at the Casa Rosada
with U.S. visitors in rapid succession: a positive,
well-covered session with CODEL Engel on February 21, and
PDDNI Kerr, who had a productive meeting with her on February
¶25. Privately, Rep. Engel described the CODEL's 90-minute
meeting with CFK as "a home-run." The meeting was covered

intensively by the media, which characterized the event as a
"Gesture of Detente" and "Improvement in Bilateral Relations"
in leading daily headlines. PDDNI Kerr's meeting was equally
positive. CFK warmly thanked him for his "important" visit,
and repeated several times her commitment to the struggle
against terrorism (saying, for example, that her government
was "strongly committed to fight terrorism at home and
internationally" and that her commitment to counter-terrorism
was "absolute").
Argentina Is In Play
--------------------
¶6. (C) The about-face is striking, because it comes on the

heels of a coordinated GOA effort, with the Kirchners and
other GOA all-stars front and center, to impugn the motives
of the United States in the Miami prosecution of Venezuelan
agents connected to the matter of Guido Alejandro
Antonini-Wilson's cash-filled suitcase. But the rhetorical
course-correction is not surprising. CFK spent much of the
latter half of 2007 telegraphing her intention to pursue
closer relations with the United States, holding three
meetings with Ambassador Wayne and spending a week in New
York City wooing investors and the media, as well as meeting
A/S Shannon. Just days before her inauguration, in a meeting
with the Ambassador, CFK expressed her admiration for the
United States and her desire to improve the bilateral
relationship. Her Cabinet Chief Fernandez and new Ambassador
to the United States Timerman argue forcefully that she wants
to change past GOA practices and maintain good relations with
the USG.
¶7. (C) Clearly, there is still hard work to be done to build

mutual confidence and establish a basis for sustained "good"
relations. To maintain and reinforce the recent positive
momentum, we need more engagement, not less -- by both sides.
The GOA certainly needs to demonstrate its commitment to
this effort. But it is important to remember that we also
have much to gain if things go well.
¶8. (C) The foreign policy orientation of the fledgling CFK

government is very much in play. Moreover, in our view, the
prevailing winds in the region favor our efforts to help
Argentina evolve into a constructive partner. Hugo Chavez
(whom CFK will visit in early March to ink an oil-for-food
deal -- septel) is being portrayed in the local media as
increasingly on the defensive, and Fidel Castro's withdrawal
from the Cuban political scene is being covered here as the
end of a radical era. In contrast, neo-left politicians like
Lula (who just visited Buenos Aires to sign a number of
bilateral agreements) and Chile's Michelle Bachelet are
well-regarded here as pragmatic leaders who are making
progress on social justice while maintaining good relations
with Washington. We read the tea leaves to indicate that CFK
much prefers to follow Lula's path than Chavez's, and wants
to diversify Argentina's good relations in the world.
¶9. (C) At the same time, there are countervailing forces that
could push the new president in another direction.
Influential figures within her government, such as Planning
Minister Julio de Vido, espouse a close embrace of Chavez's
Bolivarian project. Although de Vido's primary motive for
tilting towards Chavez may be pecuniary, a Bolivarian
approach to foreign policy would sit well with CFK's poor and
working class political constituency, and probably appeal at
a certain level to the Peronist/populist instincts of CFK and
her husband. Nestor Kirchner himself was never as
comfortable with the United States as his wife has proven to
be. For example, he never received this Ambassador or
publicized contacts with us, whereas CFK has met the
Ambassador six times and played each meeting positively and
prominently in the media. While Nestor Kirchner is still a
powerful decision-maker, he is by most reports ceding foreign
policy to CFK.
¶10. (C) In our view, the government's left-leaning,

nationalistic heritage does not necessarily lead to chronic
confrontation with the United States. CFK seems more

interested in governance and the longevity of her family's
political prospects than in gratuitous Yankee-bashing.
Without U.S. engagement, however, our opportunity to develop
a more constructive relationship with Argentina could be
squandered. We need to stay on the field to win the game.
Why Visits Help Educate and Show Interest

-----------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Engagement means, among other things, senior-level

visits in both directions. This is true for symbolic and
practical reasons. Like other geographically isolated
countries, Argentines keep track of who visits them and who
doesn't. The GOA's infatuation with the travel plans of
Assistant Secretary Shannon reflects a deep-seated,
society-wide insecurity about Argentina's relative importance
in the world. Argentines obsess over the perceived
indifference of other countries to their interests and
concerns, especially that of the United States. Visits to
the region by senior USG officials that seem to hopscotch
over Argentina are always noted in the press and the
corridors of power.
¶12. (C) CFK clearly shares this fixation. She told the
Ambassador late last year that she faults the USG for not
paying sufficient attention to Latin America (read:
Argentina) over the past few years, and repeated that
analysis to CODEL Engel on February 21 (ref F). This is not
new, or confined to CFK and her constituency. It is a widely
shared perception in Argentina that the United States has
only rarely sustained positive interest in the Southern Cone.
(At a recent lunch with prominent local analysts,
businesspersons, and media figures for PDDNI Kerr, this was a
recurrent theme -- and none of them were government
supporters.) High-level visits can be used to demonstrate
our good intentions and sincere desires for stronger
relations. For example, Secretary Chao's December visit to
CFK's inauguration helped us to rebut accusations of a U.S.
conspiracy against the GOA during the furor over the Miami
court case.
¶13. (C) Just as importantly, visits help GOA officials to

learn. CFK and her husband know little about the way that
our society and political system function. This holds true
for most of their closest advisors and the Argentine
political establishment writ large as well. The recent
bilateral crisis, for example, reminded us how few of them
(including those in the "pro-U.S." camp) really understand
the extent of our justice system's independence. To our
great advantage, Argentina is now headed by a President who
wants to learn more about our country -- evinced, for
instance, by the manner in which she pumps visitors for
information about the U.S. presidential race. (Though she
initially favored another woman candidate, it was clear by
February 21 that she had absorbed much about all three
leading candidates, and in both of her meetings with USG
visitors in recent days she made positive comments about all
three and about the vitality of our electoral process.)
Alberto Fernandez told the Ambassador that he recently
recommended that CFK accept Gordon Brown's invitation to
travel to London for a gathering of international political
party leaders precisely because it would be an excellent
opportunity for her to learn more about the global scene
through direct contact with other world leaders.
The Most Promising Areas of Focus

---------------------------------
¶14. (C) On the practical level, despite this Mission's

renewed access to every level of the Argentine government,
there are a number of concrete policy areas in which
Washington-based agencies and their leaders need to engage,
including via the personal contact that visits make possible:
-- (C) Finance: Achievement of a closer economic
relationship, which CFK has told us she wants, will not
happen without a Paris Club deal to normalize the GOA's debt

to official creditors. That in turn will require Treasury's
engagement with CFK's capable young Economy Minister Martin
Lousteau. A Paris Club deal would be a critical first step
towards an economically resurgent Argentina's broader
reinsertion into global capital markets. This, in turn, will
lessen Argentina's reliance on Venezuela to help place new
Argentine debt, a reliance that comes with Bolivarian
political and ideological strings attached. It could also
help Lousteau, who is engaged in an internal tug-of-war with
less market-friendly forces on many issues critical to the
500 U.S. companies doing business here, establish his primacy
within the GOA on economic policy.
-- (C) Defense Cooperation: The Ministry of Defense is more

friendly to us now than it has been at any time since MOD
Garre took office two years ago. The Army chief, who
previously kept his distance from the United States, has
reached out to us for contact. Argentina's Navy and Air
Force are eager to work with us. To capitalize on this
attitudinal shift, we need high-profile U.S. military leaders
like Southcom Commander Stavridis (scheduled to visit in May)
to come to Argentina. His visit could help us bring the
military relationship to another level, advancing the ball on
issues like Argentine participation in exercises, exchanges,
and regional security cooperation. Such a visit could also
keep U.S. military suppliers in the race for important
contracts like 3-D radars. MOD U/S Forti told the Ambassador
last week that he hopes to get MOD Garre to the United States
in the months ahead.
-- (C) Law Enforcement and Intelligence: Cooperation in this

area was a bright spot in the bilateral relationship, even
during the most difficult periods of the first Kirchner
administration. The worrying freeze in cooperation that took
place during the period of estrangement is over, and our
cooperation is returning to normal. We need senior-level
visits, such as the planned trip by Deputy FBI Director
Pistole in May, to advance U.S. interests in intensified
counter-terrorism work, and to resume our valuable
partnership with the GOA to bring the Iranian-sponsored
perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA bombing to justice. We also
need to get leading GOA law enforcement officials to the
United States for bilateral consultations.
-- (S) Intelligence: Argentine intelligence officials highly

value their relationship with U.S. counterparts, as PDDNI
Kerr's visit amply demonstrated. During a dinner with the
PDDNI February 23, the GOA's Deputy Director of Intelligence
recounted with pride that his service has shared high-value
information with us and worked closely with us in support of
U.S. goals. The PDDNI's visit reinforced our superb working
relationship with Argentina's service (the National
Intelligence Service -- SIDE), and we need to keep developing
it through continued cooperation.
-- (SBU) Science and Technology: CFK has repeatedly cited

this as an area where she hopes to expand contact and
cooperation with the United States.
¶15. (C) Visits by high-level U.S. and GOA officials to each
other's country on these and other areas will advance our
long-term interest in a friendly relationship with a
populous, fast-growing country with considerable talent and
resources. As importantly, such travel advances key U.S.
interests in specific policy areas -- normalization of
financial relationships between developing economies and
creditors, amicable military-to-military ties, and
cooperation on regional counter-terrorism issues -- that
matter to our country's security interests.
¶16. (C) Finally, travel by prominent USG and GOA officials to

each other's countries directly addresses one of the main
causes of anti-Americanism here -- the perception that the
USG does not care enough about Argentina. The positive media
coverage created by such visits makes Argentines at all
levels of society feel relevant in the world and taken into
considerations by our powerful country. This cannot help but
chip away at this society's collective animus towards out

nation, which stems to a large extent from its collective
insecurity about itself.
Let's Make It Work

------------------
¶17. (C) Events over the past two years remind us that
relations with the GOA are not easy. Nonetheless, we have a
real opportunity to reach a more positive equilibrium in the
bilateral relationship. In his January 31 meeting with CFK,
the Ambassador deployed Department-cleared talking points
that featured the proposal that both sides would demonstrate
interest in the relationship by engaging each other,
including via visits in each direction. As reported in ref
A, CFK agreed, and expressed interest in a steady stream of
high-level visits. We therefore have a deal in place with
the GOA on travel in both directions. The Argentines need to
hold up their end of the bargain. Cabinet Chief Fernandez
told the Ambassador February 21 that he had identified March
8-12 for travel to the United States. Foreign Minister
Taiana, MOD Garre, and Economy Minister Lousteau also intend
to travel to the United States soon. We should remain
committed to our part in this effort, especially after
several weeks of positive interaction with the GOA.
KELLY
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD483, THE BEST THING THAT COULD

HAPPEN IN PAKISTAN”
Discussing cables
2008-02-01
13:01
VZCZCXRO7265
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DE RUEHIL #0483/01 0321341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011341Z FEB 08
Friday, 01 February 2008, 13:41

SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: “THE BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN IN PAKISTAN”
REF: LAHORE 25 07 ISLAMABAD 5138
¶1. (C) Summary. During a meeting with Ambassador January 31, Nawaz Sharif
confirmed he was ready to work with the Pakistan People’s Party in a post-
election coalition government and described this union as “the best thing that
could happen in Pakistan.” He dismissed reports of threats against his life as
attempts by the government to dissuade him from campaigning. Noting that
emotions remain high in Sindh, he predicted violence if the election was seen as
being rigged for Musharraf’s party. As proof of his pro-Americanism, Nawaz
reminded Ambassador that he had overruled his Chief of Staff to deploy Pakistani
forces with the U.S. coalition in the first Gulf War. Nawaz remained firm in his
belief that all of the deposed judiciary must be reinstated. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Ambassador and Polcouns met former Prime Minister and Pakistan Muslim
League-N PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif January 31 for an hour during Nawaz’s recent
visit to Islamabad. PML-N leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan also attended the
meeting. Nawaz met with EU ambassadors the same day and urged them to take
preemptive action to prevent rigging in the upcoming election.
¶3. (C) Ambassador noted the reports about threats to Nawaz’s security and said
we were pleased to have briefed his staff on measures that could be taken to
enhance his safety. Nawaz responded that the GOP has said he is “number one on
the hit list” of the militants, but he is not convinced. Citing the belief that
an IED planted on the road he was to travel to a rally in Peshawar lacked a
detonator, Nawaz insisted he had received information from credible sources that
the device was planted by security services to go off hours after the rally.
This was another attempt at government intimidation to convince him not to
campaign. Ambassador cautioned him to remain vigilant as it was clear that
militant extremists wanted to disrupt the election.
PML-N/PPP: “the best thing that could happen”
--------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) In response to Ambassador’s question about whether PML-N could work with
the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in a possible coalition government, Nawaz
recounted how he had immediately gone to the hospital when he heard Benazir
Bhutto had been shot, and he had made a special effort to pay a condolence call
on Asif Zardari in Larcana. Ambassador said that Zardari had noted his
appreciation for this gesture of support. A PML-N/PPP alliance would be “the
best thing that could happen to Pakistan,” if it materialized, said Nawaz. The
PML-N had reached out to the PPP, and time would tell what alliances could be
built. They could also work together in the provincial government of Sindh or
Punjab. He predicted that the PPP could win enough seats to rule in Sindh with
or without the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM).
¶5. (C) Nawaz expected both PPP and PML-N would do well at the polls if the
elections were free and fair; he dismissed the Pakistan Muslim League party,
saying that Pervaiz Elahi would get few, if any votes. Claiming he had no
vendetta against President Musharraf, Nawaz said the PML-N had also reached out
to the Pakistan Muslim League and they in turn had contacted PML-N (Ref A).
(Note: He then launched into a long description of his mistreatment after
Musharraf overthrew Nawaz in 1999). The PML-N’s goal in government would be to
reinstate the deposed judiciary and restore the law and order situation. Without
restoring the judiciary, Nawaz argued, you cannot restore law and order and rule
of law.
¶6. (C) Ambassador said we continued to support an independent judiciary and
wanted to work with the new government on this issue. It was simply too
difficult to tackle before elections. We believed there should be a way to
restore some of the deposed judges, but not the former Chief Justice. Nawaz
insisted that without restoring the Chief Justice, there was no point to filling
other slots on the bench. Ambassador disagreed, noting that many of the
provincial judges could be restored for the benefit of Pakistan’s judiciary.
ISLAMABAD 00000483 002 OF 002
Emotions High
-------------
¶7. (C) Despite the decreased level of campaigning due to security concerns,
Nawaz and Khan both said that voter emotions were higher than they have ever
seen. Sindh, in particular, remains very tense, and could erupt if the election
outcome is perceived as being rigged. Nawaz noted that civil society and student
groups were politicized in ways they have not been before. The PML-N did not
want violence, but it might be impossible to control the people if they felt
they had been wronged. Nawaz expressed concern that extremists could take
advantage of and exacerbate tensions. He warned that what he described as
negatively-preceived U.S. support for Musharraf could create a backlash of anti-
Americanism, if the public perceives that the government rigged the elections.
“We could be sitting on a volcano, and the next four-five weeks will be critical
for the region and for Pak-American relations.”
¶8. (C) The best thing America has done recently, said Nawaz, was arrange to
have General Kayani named as Chief of Army Staff. This appointment is helping
Army morale and raising the level of public respect for the Army. Noting that
Musharraf met the UK equivalent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Khan said
the U.S. and the UK need to stop treating Musharraf as if he still ran the
military. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon would have met with Musharaf if the
President had not been travelling, asserted Khan. Ambassador replied that we had
excellent relations with the Pakistani military and meet them all the time at
various levels.
We are Pro-American
-------------------
¶9. (C) Nawaz and Khan both repeatedly said that the PML-N was pro-American.
Nawaz recounted his decision to override his Chief of Army Staff and deploy
Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. coalition in the first
Gulf War. Meanwhile, Khan noted, the PPP and its leaders were organizing street
demonstrations against Pakistan joining with the U.S. coalition. Now, Nawaz
said, he was hurt that the U.S. did not remember. Nawaz said he understood that
9/11 had changed things, but urged that the U.S. apply some balance to the
relationship. In the past, the U.S. was known as the power that rejected
dictatorships, that fought for independence of the judiciary and the rule of
law. Why, he asked, did we continue to support a man who fired the Supreme
Court, abrogated the constitution, and arrested civil society activists?
¶10. (C) Comment: The fact that a former Prime Minister believes the U.S. could
control the appointment of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff speaks volumes about
the myth of American influence here. Based on our understanding of the current
situation, we believe Nawaz can and should take the threats to his life
seriously. It comes as no surprise that Nawaz exaggerated his party’s election
prospects; his willingness to deal with the PPP is, however, a good sign he is
ready to cooperate on government formation.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD525, SCENESETTER FOR CJCS ADMIRAL

MULLEN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0004
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DE RUEHIL #0525/01 0361432

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051432Z FEB 08
TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PERSONAL FOR CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN FROM ANNE PATTERSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CJCS ADMIRAL MULLEN
¶1. (S) Summary. We look forward to your visit to begin the

process of strengthening and refocusing our military to
military relations with Pakistan's CJCS General Majid and
COAS Kayani. This has become increasingly urgent because of
the expanding insurgency in the tribal areas and attacks
against GOP targets. We need to bring more discipline to the
Coalition Support Funds (CSF), FMF and IMET programs we
established in the wake of September 11 so they better
support our counter-terrorism objectives. You may wish to
follow up on the visit of the DNI and the DCIA to push
Musharraf and Kayani on our objectives, including pressing
all of them on expanded U.S. training and mil-mil and
intelligence cooperation If you can set the scene for needed
reforms, we can follow up during the annual bilateral
Consultative Defense Group meeting in the spring. Although
they are concerned about the 2009 expiration of the
President's financial commitment to Pakistan, the military is
reluctant to make necessary reforms. Your visit will help
change their attitude.
¶2. (C) At the same time, I would like to discuss with you
the assignment of more American officers in ODRP. We cannot
have more effective military to military relations until we
have more American officers on the ground. It will still be
a long and painful struggle to improve relations, but the
presence of more American officers is a minimal condition.
End Summary.
Political Uncertainty
---------------------
¶3. (C) A year ago, Musharraf's popularity was high; we were

working together to support a smooth transition to a civilian
government. Beginning with his decision to fire the Chief
Justice in March 2007, Musharraf has made repeated political
blunders culminating in a state of emergency (SOE) and
temporary suspension of the constitution. He is increasingly
isolated after firing long-time advisors who disagreed with
some of these decisions.
¶4. (C) The February 18 elections are too close to call. No

party will win enough votes to form a government alone, and
the current game is one of coalition building. Musharraf's
party remains well organized in the critical Punjab, but the
state of emergency, Bhutto's assassination, rising food
prices and electricity outages have cut his job approval
rating to 15% in the latest polls. Most analysts predict a
surge in sympathy votes for Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
(PPP), but security concerns and a PPP leadership struggle
could reduce turnout and undercut this surge.
¶5. (C) If street expectations for a PPP victory are

disappointed, many are predicting violence, especially in
Bhutto's home province of Sindh. We can work with any of the
likely candidates for Prime Minister. But it may take weeks
or even months after the election before a new Prime Minister
is chosen and Pakistan again has a functional government that
can focus on tackling extremism and necessary economic
reform.
Security Concerns/Army Challenges

---------------------------------
¶6. (C) The January/February bombings in Lahore, Karachi,

Peshawar and Rawalpindi have further raised security
concerns, especially for political candidates. Suicide
bombings were practically unheard of in Pakistan two years
ago; in 2007, over 600 people died in suicide attacks
attributed to Baitullah Mehsud and other militants.
Militants have become increasingly emboldened, attacking
police, Army and intelligence targets. The Army was called
out to provide additional security during the Islamic month
of Muharram and will be deployed in sensitive polling areas
during the elections.
¶7. (C) Neither the Army nor the security services would
relish the prospect of adding post-election riot control in
Sindh to their currently full plate. Military operations in
Swat have been reasonably successful, but the Army will
likely have to maintain a significant presence there into the
spring. In the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA),
the Army has been working to prevent Sunni-Shia' violence,
exacerbated this year by militant involvement. In the
Waziristans, the government is encouraging rival tribes to
counter the influence of Baitullah Mehsud and his Uzbek
recruits.
¶8. (C) The militants continue to control the agenda; the

Army's currently limited strategy is one of containment
rather than pro-active engagement. Since they cannot defeat
ISLAMABAD 00000525 002 OF 002
Mehsud with military action alone, they are renewing

negotiations, hoping this time to deal from a greater ground
position of strength. Attacks on the Pak-Afghan border are
significantly lower than they have been in the past two
years, but we are seeing signs that militants are moving back
into Afghanistan ahead of the annual spring offensive.
¶9. (C) We are making progress on the Security Development

Plan (SDP) for the Frontier Corps, although Musharraf may
complain about aid levels. Progress on the tripartite Border
Coordination Centers (BCC) has not been quick enough. We
will brief you on our FATA development strategy and how the
SDP supports livelihood and other programs now being
implemented in FATA.
Nuclear Weapons
---------------
¶10. (C) Pakistan's leadership is increasingly frustrated

over media reports that its nuclear weapons are about to fall
into extremist hands. In January, both the Foreign Secretary
and General Majid called me in to protest U.S. reports
questioning the security of the GOP's nuclear weapons. You
will meet with the Director of the Special Plans Division
LtGen (ret) Kidwai who, at the Embassy's urging, recently
provided briefings to the diplomatic corps and the
international press on the organizational structure and
personnel controls that safeguard Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
As demonstrated by the February 1 test of its Ghauri/Hatf V
missile, Pakistan continues development of its missile and
nuclear programs as a deterrent to India's conventional force
capability.
Meeting Agendas
---------------
¶11. (C) Separately, we are providing briefing papers

covering our proposals to bring better discipline to CSF,
regularize FMF based on a mutual needs assessment, increase
IMET opportunities, and launch SOFA negotiations and MOA
talks on improving transshipment of fuel and cargo to support
U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
¶12. (C) General Majid: You will find Pakistan's Joint

Staff a young and weak organization, but CJCS Majid is an
excellent interlocutor. The lunch he is hosting will provide
an opportunity to deliver our messages on the need for CSF
and FMF discipline.
¶13. (S) General Kayani: As expected, Kayani is taking slow

but deliberate steps to distance the Army from now civilian
President Musharraf. Kayani announced that generals would
need his permission to meet the President, issued public
statements distancing the Army from civilian politics and is
rumored to be considering a decision to remove active duty
Army officers from civilian GOP jobs. Kayani also has
declared 2008 as the "Year of the Soldier" in an attempt to
improve morale. Privately, he has discouraged ISI
interference in elections. With Kayani, you should stress
the importance of accepting U.S. COIN training and building
Pakistani CI capabilities.
¶14. (C) President Musharraf: You will find Musharraf

increasingly defensive and unsure of how to reverse his
growing unpopularity ahead of parliamentary elections. In
your meeting, I would recommend that you ask him to appoint a
Pakistani "czar" to coordinate security and development
projects in the tribal areas. This coordination will be
critical in implementing the USG's $750 million FATA program
and supporting DOD's strategy in the tribal areas. Musharraf
and Kayani will likely raise slow CSF reimbursement because
an economic cash crunch has heightened the GOP's need for CSF
payments. The latest $282 million payment should be released
in mid-February. He will raise slow delivery of training and
equipment to the Frontier Corps. You will want to follow up
on some of the specific issues raised by the DNI and the DCIA.
Viewing cable 08ANKARA536, TURKEY: RULING AKP TO TRY TO

OVERCOME CLOSURE CASE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO9728
DE RUEHAK #0536/01 0792214
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192214Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018

TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: RULING AKP TO TRY TO OVERCOME CLOSURE CASE
BY AMENDING CONSTITUTION
REF: ANKARA 526 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is drafting
a mini-constitutional amendment package to attempt to overcome the closure case
filed against it in Constitutional Court. The package will include a temporary
clause that would wipe out existing closure cases, including against the pro-
Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). If necessary, the GOT would be prepared
to take the package to referendum. End summary.
¶2. (C) xxxxx told us March 19 the party is hard at work on a mini-
constitutional amendment package. The party sees the closure case as political
in nature. Its intent, he stated, is to decapitate the party and ban PM Erdogan
from politics. By the weekend, a small AKP committee will have drafted a package
to deal with future party closure cases; it will include a temporary article
intended to eliminate existing closure cases, including the case against the
DTP. AKP will then sit down and talk with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in
parliament, which, according to MHP General Secretary Cihan Pacaci, is drafting
its own package. Pacaci will speak to MHP's proposal on the floor of parliament
March 20, in a manner designed to condemn party closures in general and avoid
the specifics of existing cases.
¶3. (C) With respect to the concern voiced by many that the current case is
“untouchable” because Article 138 of the Constitution prohibits legislative
activity on ongoing cases, xxxxx said that much in the large body of legislation
parliament has passed in AKP's five years in government has touched on issues
before the courts. It is a basic principle of Turkish law that if a new
provision works in someone's favor, the person may benefit from it; if it would
work against the person, it does not apply. They will forge ahead.
¶4. (C) xxxxx AKP will work at a compromise with MHP; if that is not possible,
AKP will push the package through parliament. AKP on its own (likely with DTP,
which stands to benefit) has more than the 330 votes required to send a
constitutional amendment package to referendum. Pacaci, who claimed to know the
contents of the AKP package, said he did not like it. He confirmed that in the
absence of agreement with MHP (which would give the package a vote total that
would obviate the need for a referendum), AKP would likely send it to
referendum.
¶5. (C) Asked whether AKP, in pushing such a package, was not playing with fire,
xxxxx responded the party had concluded it would be more dangerous for the
country to go through another prolonged period of political and economic
instability and uncertainty than to face this head on. It was preferable to take
abrupt, decisive action to cut off the closures cases; then the GOT could
proceed with its agenda. He did not believe this was a matter in which the
military would interfere. Both xxxxx to us that AKP had made mistakes, including
failure actively to push its parliamentary agenda in recent months, and its
failure when it dealt with Article 69 on party closures in 2005 to limit the
Chief Prosecutor's sole discretion to file a closure case. But the party did not
deserve to be closed, nor did the 47% of the people who had voted for AKP.
¶6. (C) Comment: The AKP appears determined to fight this head on. This is well-
aligned with PM Erdogan's street-fighter instincts, and with the party's
reaction to the April 27, 2007 e-coup. They are indeed playing with fire - but
to be fair, the fire was lit under them first. If the package moves through
parliament to referendum, it is hard to believe it would not garner a solid
majority.

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Ankara 00000536 002 of 002
Wilson
Viewing cable 08BEIJING1141, STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES

NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN,
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08BEIJING1141.
08BEIJING1141 2008-03-26 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, KN, CH, IR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN,
AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Current bilateral cooperation on arms control, nonproliferation and
export control is “remarkable,” MFA Department of Arms Control Director General
Cheng Jingye told Staffdel Januzzi March 24. Nevertheless, there is a
“perception” that the United States counts on China’s support on
nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust China as an equal partner. On
Iran, China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via
Security Council resolutions and focusing on the diplomatic front. China’s
cooperation with Iran on energy is unrelated to the Iran nuclear issue and Cheng
“can’t imagine” the consequences if Sinopec is sanctioned. On North Korea, Cheng
urged the United States to find a creative resolution to the declaration issue.
End Summary.
¶2. (C) Frank Januzzi and Puneet Talwar, staff members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, met MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng
Jingye March 24 to discuss Chinese views on arms control, non-proliferation,
Iran and North Korea.
“Remarkable” Cooperation
------------------------
¶3. (C) Arms control, export controls and nonproliferation all contribute to
China’s security, said Cheng. A decade ago, cooperation between China and the
United States focused on certain cases, but today’s level of cooperation on
nonproliferation and arms control issues is “remarkable,” Cheng said. For
example, China is actively involved in diplomatic negotiation efforts on North
Korea and Iran. And in many areas of nonproliferation, said Cheng, the two
countries see “eye-to-eye.” He referred to multilateral agreements such as the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the
Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and said that even if China is not
a member of these various organizations, China has in place its own export
control regime. For example, there is interagency coordination on sensitive
exports as well as alleged proliferation cases raised by the United States.
Cheng noted that while the pace of implementing arms control agreements has
slowed in the past decade, China is prepared to move the disarmament conference
forward within the United Nations framework.
Equal Partners
--------------
¶4. (C) Cheng contended that there is a “perception” that the United States
counts on China’s support and cooperation on nonproliferation issues but does
not fully trust or treat China as an equal partner. For example, in the 1990s,
China was invited to join the MTCR and the Australia Group but declined to join.
Currently, however, China is “not welcome,” despite expressing a willingness to
join, Cheng said. China and the United States need to cooperate on a “mutual,
equal basis.” Cheng also raised the issue of sanctions against China Great Wall
Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC has been subject to sanctions for ten years
without “solid evidence,” said Cheng. Over the past 3-4 years, CGWIC has
restructured the company, changed its business model and prohibited contacts
with countries of concern to the United States. Cheng expressed hope that the
company would make progress during its March 20 meetings in Washington.
Iran
----
¶5. (C) Cheng said China and the United States share the same goal for Iran: no
further proliferation of nuclear weapons. China makes this point very clearly to
the international community and to Iran in the context of its private bilateral
contacts. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Iranian leaders during his
November visit to Iran that China is opposed to proliferation in the Middle
East. China supports the UNSCRs on Iran and the P5-plus-1 process, emphasized
Cheng. After the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and IAEA
reports on Iran last year, there is a need for more diplomatic efforts, Cheng
said. China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via UNSCRs
and focusing on the diplomatic front.
¶6. (C) One of the dilemmas of the Iran nuclear issue is that despite three
UNSCRs, Iran’s capability to enrich uranium
BEIJING 00001141 002 OF 002
continues to expand, Cheng underscored. China and other countries need to be
“creative” in devising a proposal “attractive” to Iran. The international
community must find a way to ensure its concerns about Iran’s nuclear
development are addressed and promote the peaceful development of nuclear
energy, maintained Cheng. Cheng reasoned that if incentives do not work, then it
will make applying pressure easier in the future because it shows that diplomacy
was not effective. The P5-plus-1 meeting in Shanghai in April will allow the
ministers to discuss strategy on next steps. Cheng noted that a recent proposal
from the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) includes some
interesting ideas and that his office is in the process of studying its
proposal. Cheng said that Germany has put forward a proposal to “refresh”
previous offers. China believes that the P5-plus-1 will need to offer new
incentives to Iran.
¶7. (C) Iran might be more willing to offer a reciprocal positive gesture on the
nuclear issue if it does not feel threatened by regime change, Cheng said.
Regarding Iran’s claim that it did not have a nuclear program prior to 2003,
China is not in a position to comment without presentation of evidence and
materials, Cheng said. China continues to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA
and encourages the IAEA to play a greater role. Cheng also discussed possible
incentives for Iran after international confidence is restored, including
reinstatement as a non-nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member, education
cooperation, normalization of economic relations, etc.
China-Iran Energy Cooperation
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Regarding China-Iran energy cooperation, Cheng believes that there is a
“misunderstanding” on the part of the United States. China has made clear its
need for energy resources and has previously stated that its cooperation with
Iran on energy has nothing to do with the Iran nuclear issue. China hopes that
the U.S. Congress understands this point, said Cheng. Specifically, the threat
of sanctions against Sinopec is a very serious issue, Cheng emphasized. Sinopec
is very important to China and Cheng “can’t imagine” the consequences if the
company is sanctioned. Januzzi noted Cheng’s concerns and said that he would
pass this message to Washington.
North Korea
-----------
¶9. (C) Januzzi recounted his meetings with DPRK counterparts during his five-
day trip to North Korea and said that he encouraged them to provide a
declaration. Cheng said that China does not have specific information on North
Korea’s alleged purchase of centrifuge technology and that China had received
this information from the United States. He urged the United States to focus on
the future and not to dwell on the past. The United States is not interested in
delving into North Korea’s past, Januzzi countered. The United States needs to
have clarity on certain issues, however, in order to move forward. According to
Cheng, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei urged the DPRK to take advantage of
this unique opportunity. The resolution of the declaration issue will require
some imagination and creativity, Cheng said. North Korea does not fully trust
the United States and remains concerned about admitting to an activity it claims
never existed, Cheng claimed.
¶10. (U) Staffdel Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
PICCUTA
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA351, SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF

MINISTER OF DEFENSE
Discussing cables
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DEPARTMENT FOR D, WHA AND PM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018

TAGS: PREL MASC OVIP BR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE
NELSON JOBIM TO WASHINGTON BRASILIA 00000351 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel
¶1. (C) Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim will travel to Norfolk and Washington
from March 18-22, 2008 on a counterpart visit. He will meet with Secretary Gates
in an office call on March 20 June. Minister Jobim,s objectives for the visit
are to enhance prospects for bilateral cooperation and explore possibilities for
access to U.S. defense technology.
¶2. (C) Summary: Minister Jobim is the first strong Minister of Defense in
Brazil. He is working to centralize civilian oversight of the Brazilian military
and hopes to learn from the U.S. military in this regard. He has also clearly
indicated a desire to pursue military cooperation agreements despite objections
from the Ministry for External Affairs, such as in the case of concluding a SOFA
with France. He has also expressed his desire to pursue a Defense Cooperation
Agreement with the U.S. and to have it approved directly by the President. Jobim
has also been helpful in making progress on a General Security of Information
Agreement, which requires approval by Brazil,s Ministry of Interior and Office
for Institutional Security. Although the U.S. and Brazil share the basic goals
of fostering hemispheric stability, preventing terrorist activity and
strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, U.S.-Brazil cooperation
is hindered by difficulties in completing a bilateral defense cooperation
agreement, providing protections for U.S. personnel involved in training and
joint exercises and taking proactive steps to address countries of proliferation
concern such as Iran. Brazil has maintained its leadership role in the Haiti
peacekeeping force MINUSTAH under the active advocacy of the Foreign Ministry.
Jobim,s visit comes at an important time as Brazil is formulating a new National
Defense Strategy and beginning to make decisions about acquisition of new
military systems and technology. Other military issues of interest include
service relations with the fledgling civilian defense ministry and the necessity
of negotiating further agreements with the U.S. in order to enhance our already
strong military-to-military relationship. End Summary.
-------------------------- Politico-Economic Overview --------------------------
¶3. (SBU) President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected in 2002 in large part
on promises of promoting an ambitious social agenda, including generous handouts
to the poor. On the strength of the popularity of these measures, he was re-
elected in 2006, although with diminished support from the middle class. The
public's top concerns - crime and public security - have not improved under this
administration. The Lula Administration has been beset by a grave political
crisis as interlocking influence peddling/vote-buying scandals plagued elements
of Lula's PT party, but the President,s personal popularity has not suffered,
even after many of his closest associates have been caught in corrupt practices.
MOD Jobim is perhaps among the most trusted leaders in Brazil. A former Supreme
Court Justice, he maintains a strong reputation for integrity that is rare among
Brazil,s leadership.
--------------------------------------------- -- Friendly Cooperation, But Not
Strong Friendship --------------------------------------------- --
¶4. (C) Brazil's democratic institutions are strong and stable after more than
20 years of civilian rule. A return to military dictatorship is today
unthinkable as Brazil's armed forces pursue a professional non-political
identity. With steady export-led economic growth having become the norm in the
recent past, Brazil has been a supporter of reasoned foreign policy goals and
has been steadfast in its support of democracy in the hemisphere. It has a
strong interest in hemispheric security issues that largely mirrors our own, and
actively cooperates with us on the operational level in the fight against
terrorism. BRASILIA 00000351 002.2 OF 003
¶5. (C) While relations between the U.S. and Brazil are generally friendly,
often the USG encounters major difficulties in gaining the cooperation of senior
policymakers on issues of significant interest to the United States. The
difficulty is most apparent in the Ministry for External Affairs (MRE) which
maintains an anti-American slant and has tried to block improved DoD-MOD
relations. In planning for Jobim,s visit, the MRE actively campaigned to limit
Jobim,s time in Washington to one largely ceremonial day with little substance.
¶6. (C) The current left-of-center administration has studiously avoided close
cooperation on pol-mil issues important to us and has kept us at arms length on
most security-related issues. Specifically, the MRE has dragged its feet on
completing a Defense Cooperation Agreement, General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
or Article 98 agreement. The GOB traditionally maintained that such agreements,
particularly the SOFA, were against Brazilian law, but reversed itself (over MRE
objections) and signed a SOFA with France earlier this year. We are exploring
the possibility of using the French SOFA as a starting place for a U.S.-Brazil
agreement.
¶7. (C) Brazil has stayed the course as leader of MINUSTAH in Haiti despite a
lack of domestic support for the PKO. The MRE has remained committed to the
initiative because it believes that the operation serves FM Amorim's obsessive
international goal of qualifying Brazil for a seat on the UN Security Council.
The Brazilian military remains committed as well, because the mission enhances
its international prestige and provides training and operational opportunities.
So far, President Lula has backed the Foreign Ministry's position, and Brazil
will likely continue to provide leadership and troops to MINUSTAH for the
conceivable future. Despite the success of the MINUSTAH deployment, Brazil has
not shown any interest in undertaking further peacekeeping operations, although
Brazilian contributions to UN operations in such places as Darfur have been
requested.
------------------------ CT and Non-Proliferation ------------------------
¶8. (C) The desire not to be identified with the U.S. is borne out as well in
the GOB's approach to counterterrorism. Cooperation remains excellent at the
operational level, especially between law enforcement agencies. However, the GOB
political leadership has refused to endorse U.S. counterterrorism initiatives
publicly and has insisted that official communiques of the 3 1 mechanism note
that there is no evidence of terrorist operations in the Tri-Border area, where
Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet. Wary of its large, prosperous and
influential Arab population, the GOB makes every effort to downplay in public
even the possibility of terrorist fund-raising going on inside Brazil.
¶9. (C) The GOB has a good record in non-proliferation efforts, but has been
slow to join international consensus in favor of sanctions on Iran. Brazil has
also not yet signed the NPT Additional Protocol, although it has not ruled out
signing it in the near future.
--------------- Military Issues ---------------

¶10. (C) Brazil established a Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the first time in
June 1999, uniting the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a single
minister. Jobim became Minister last year when the disastrous crash of a
Brazilian airliner highlighted weaknesses in the civil aviation system, which
comes under MOD purview. Organizationally, the MOD still faces challenges
managing the individual services. Each service is still fairly autonomous and
controls its own budget and acquisition programs. In addition, the Lula
administration,s focus on social reforms BRASILIA 00000351 003.2 OF 003 and
programs has meant decreases for military budgets, leading to fewer training
opportunities and equipment purchases. This situation is changing as there is
now near consensus among Brazil,s leadership that the military is under-
resourced and under equipped to accomplish its missions.
¶11. (C) To address this situation, the Lula government has tasked a new
National Defense strategy to be completed by this fall. This paper will set the
framework for military modernization and theoretically drive decisions on
acquisition of new equipment. In reality, such decisions will be made largely
for political and economic reasons. Brazil,s defense industrial base has
atrophied since the end of the Cold War, and it is a major objective of the
government to reinvigorate it. Decisions on major systems will be influenced
much more by access to foreign technology and opportunities for Brazilian
industry than by the capabilities such systems will add to Brazil,s military.
---------------------- General Points to Make ----------------------
¶18. (SBU) Our core message for Jobim's visit should be: -- Reinforcing and
underscoring the importance of these agreements in support of Brazil,s interest
to reequip and modernize its military with technology transfer is critically
important. It would also help to define how we, the anchor of the North America,
and Brazil the anchor of South America, may be able to work more closely in the
future to enhance hemispheric defense cooperation. We recommend SecDef also
emphasize the following points in conversations with Minister Jobim: -- We want
to continue improving our defense relationship. This is an imperative, given the
difficult global security situation in which we live today, and the importance
of Brazil,s role in the Americas. -- We are serious about our partnership in
Brazil. We see strong possibilities for joint research and production, exchanges
of military personnel and training. -- As you make important decisions about the
modernization of Brazil,s forces later this year, keep in mind that partnership
with the U.S. can help both our countries realize our common goal of preserving
stability in the Western Hemisphere. -- As we continue to develop our
partnership, we need to have in place several standard documents to assure
smooth cooperation. The Defense Cooperation Agreement is the first of these. We
understand your Ministry has approved the current draft and hope the rest of
your government will also. Next, we hope to complete an agreement on information
security and a Status of Forces Agreement to protect the forces of both
countries during joint exercises. -- The United States would like to
congratulate Brazil for its efforts in Haiti. The improving situation there is
in no small measure due to the professionalism and dedication of Brazilian
troops and leadership. We hope Brazil is resolved to continue to contribute to
the success of MINUSTAH. SOBEL
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA429, THOUGHTS ON THE VISIT OF DEFENSE

MINISTER JOBIM TO WASHINGTON
Discussing cables
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DEPARTMENT FOR WHA AND PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018 TAGS: PREL BR MARR OVIP
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE VISIT OF DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM TO WASHINGTON
REF: A. A) BRASILIA 236 B. B) OSD REPORT DTG 251847Z MAR 08 C. C) BRASILIA 175
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.
Reason: 1.5 d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Defense Minister Jobim's March 18-21 visit to Washington
focused on Brazil's efforts to modernize its defense institutions and on
possible avenues for bilateral cooperation and identified several areas for
further work, particularly completion of a General Security of Information
Agreement (GSOIA) and a possible Defense Technology Security Dialogue. Jobim
also used the visit to make the point that Brazil seeks defense modernization
that will benefit its domestic industries, while keeping open the possibility of
purchasing U.S. fighter aircraft. Brazilian coverage of the visit, however, has
largely ignored the real possibilities for cooperation and focused on Jobim's
advocacy of a South American Defense Council (SADC). In meetings with
Secretaries Rice and Gates and National Security Advisor SIPDIS Hadley, Jobim
remained cautious on enhancing bilateral defense cooperation, reflecting the
more negative approach of the Ministry for External Relations (MRE) which had
sought to curtail Jobim's trip and to inhibit the U.S.-Brazil dialogue on
defense issues. While there are good prospects to improve our defense
relationship with Brazil, MRE obstruction will continue to be a problem. Our
best avenues for progress will be through completing the GSOIA (to which the MRE
does not object), to look for opportunities to underline that Brazil will have
the same access to U.S. military technology as other friendly nations and to try
to get high level support within the Brazilian government for the Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which would allow the Defense Ministry to pursue
cooperation with the U.S. military without the current MRE veto. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) As reported in ref b, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim's visit to
Washington focused on Brazil's efforts to modernize its defense institutions and
on possibilities for bilateral cooperation. Coming out of Jobim's meetings,
Mission has identified several priorities for the bilateral defense
relationship, including the DCA, GSOIA, the Defense Techology Security Dialogue,
a possible visit by Air Force Science Officers and closer engagement on Joint
matters. Jobim did not, however, express optimism about the DCA, even though the
MOD has cleared on the current draft of the text. The current DCA draft is with
the MRE, which seems in no hurry to act on it. Separately, MRE political
military advisor Marcos Pinta Gama expressed the view that the DCA would require
high level intervention and should be a deliverable for a future Ministerial
level meeting. On defense modernization, Jobim's message was clear: Brazil's
priority will be to benefit its domestic defense industries. Purchases from U.S.
suppliers will be most competitive when they enable Brazilian production of
future military systems. Jobim understands the need for improving Brazil's
military capabilities, but will seek to do so in the context of independent
domestic production.
¶3. (C) The Air Force presentation on the F35 impressed the Brazilian
delegation, both with the aircraft's capabilities and the cooperative approach
being used for its production. Jobim did, however, express reservations about
the plane's cost and the degree to which Brazilian industries would benefit.
This will be the determining factor for Brazil. If there would be a possibility
for integration of Brazilian made hardware or weapons, the F35 would be a
leading candidate for Brazil's next generation fighter. Pinta Gama underlined
that Brazil will not be making a decision immediately, but in the context of
requirements derived from the Defense Modernization Plan, to be completed in
September. At the same time, he expressed a lack of confidence in Minister for
Planning Unger's leadership of defense planning, indicating that Jobim would do
better.
¶4. (C) Brazilian coverage of the visit has focused on Jobim's advocacy for the
proposed SADC based on the assumption that the U.S. would oppose such an
organization. BRASILIA 00000429 002 OF 002 Folha of Sao Paulo commented that the
SADC did not make sense as its purpose seemed to be to exclude the U.S. Working
level Brazilian staffers accompanying Jobim expressed surprise that the U.S.
reaction to the SADC proposal was positive because of a divergence of views on
what the SADC could do. While the U.S. views a SADC as a means to improve South
American military cooperation and facilitate peacekeeping, on the model of the
African Union, the Brazilians see its value more in terms of reinforcing
Brazilian leadership, moderating Venezuela President Chavez and facilitating
common military production (primarily in Brazil).
¶5. (C) While the Jobim visit served to clarify the prospects for future U.S.-
Brazil military cooperation, Jobim remained reserved on the subject. While he
told SecDef Gates that he wanted to strength the defense relationship, he also
stuck to rather shopworn talking points on why the U.S. made this difficult. He
dusted off the complaint that U.S. refusal to allow U.S. origin components in
the Super Tucano aircraft to be sold to Venezuela led to Chavez purchase of much
higher tech Russian fighters. In his public remarks at CSIS, Jobim avoided the
subject of defense cooperation and stuck to recent history and the SADC
proposal. It is likely that on his own Jobim would have been more forward
leaning on defense cooperation but was somewhat constrained by the MRE (which
sent a "handler" along for the trip). As Jobim told Ambassador Sobel in February
(ref a), he had pushed the Brazil-France SOFA through over MRE objections. As a
result, the MRE is now keeping a closer watch on Jobim as seen by the Brazilian
Embassy's foot dragging over scheduling Jobim's visit. While Jobim was telling
Ambassador Sobel that he wanted a full schedule, including the visit to Norfolk
and meetings with representatives of U.S. defense industries, the Brazilian
Embassy in Washington was telling us that the visit would be curtailed. Jobim's
chief of staff, Murilo Barboza told embassy officers that the Brazilian Embassy
had made several attempts to change the Minister's schedule in favor of a
shorter, less substantive visit.
¶6. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: Given the resistance from the MRE to the development of
the bilateral defense relationship, the most effective way forward will be to
pick the low hanging fruit, i.e. to push forward with areas of cooperation which
the MRE will support. Specifically, a GSOIA and the beginning of a Defense
Technology Security Dialogue should be first steps. The Brazilians are
interested in the Security Dialogue as a means to improve their effectiveness in
gaining access to U.S. technology through better compliance with U.S. export
control regulations. While pursuing these items, we should also continue to urge
completion of the DCA, looking for high-level opportunities to make the case.
The main advantage of the DCA will be to allow the MOD and DoD to work together
on supplementary protocols that could enhance the already good cooperation at
the forces level without having to rely on case by case approvals from the MRE.
END COMMENT. SOBEL
Viewing cable 08MUSCAT174, ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S

MEETING WITH SULTAN
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TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ENRG KWMN IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN
QABOOS
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional

issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J.
Fallon, CENTCOM Commander. On the domestic front, the Sultan
described his desire to empower the government to be more
responsive to citizen concerns. Seeking to strengthen the
role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference
in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership
of women in all aspects of Omani society. Sultan Qaboos also
shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman
and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas.
On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of
U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be
forthcoming if Iraqis would "come together" to take charge
of, and invest in, their own country. Sultan Qaboos shared
U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere,
but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S.
was not in its interest. Iran's "charm offensive" in the GCC
had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about
the true intentions of Iranian policies. End Summary.
¶2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the
Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id for
approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan's castles -- Husn
al Shumugh -- in the interior of Oman. (Note: The Sultan
was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week "meet the people
tour" during which he visits selected sites outside the
capital. End Note.) The Sultan appeared in good health and
was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of
Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the
things he wanted to do, such as reading more books. "My
office is wherever I am," he stated, noting that he
constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests
from his staff, among other tasks. The Sultan added that
despite his busy schedule, he always made time to "watch the
news," though he did not elaborate on his preferred media
outlet.
-------------------
CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ
-------------------
¶3. (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature

withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Recognizing recent
improvements in the security situation, he counseled that
American troops should only leave "when the time is right."
He stressed that Iraqis had to "take charge" of the fate of
their country, but questioned whether the different factions
would be able to "come together" to accomplish this. He
pointedly asked the Admiral, "Do you really think Prime
Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the
country together?" The Sultan did not directly respond to
Admiral Fallon's comment on the need for assistance and
investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region. Instead,
he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and
invested in their own country, others would follow suit.
¶4. (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely.

He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently
"come out well" in recent central government talks on budget
issues, and asked about the status of electricity production
in Iraq. The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in
Admiral Fallon's discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim's health and his
possible successors.
--------------------------
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
--------------------------
¶5. (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside

investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance
of assistance from regional states for infrastructure
development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations.
Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the
conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in
economic development. He then mentioned infrastructure
projects for Oman currently under consideration, including
construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the
northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm. The
Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be
linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC
states.
MUSCAT 00000174 002 OF 003
--------------
IRANIAN ISSUES
--------------
¶6. (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are "not
fools," and claimed that Tehran realized there are "certain
lines it cannot cross" (i.e., direct confrontation with the
U.S.). Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government,
he stated, "Iran is a big country with muscles and we must
deal with it." He continued that Iran's "charm offensive" in
the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC
authorities (he did not mention names) were now less
suspicious of Iranian intentions. The Sultan added,
laughing, that "I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on
the horizon, we have nothing to fear."
¶7. (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon's frustration with

Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that
Iranian meddling abroad was "almost a game" to the regime in
Tehran, and said that Iran's leaders would have to stop this
practice if Iran wanted to "join the world as a noble
country." The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly
tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his
upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran's unhelpful interference
in their internal affairs. On the possibility that Iran is
waiting out the President's final term before re-assessing
its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that
it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the
current administration.
------------------
THE SEARCH FOR GAS
------------------
¶8. (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined

fuel, the Sultan described Oman's efforts to obtain more
natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and
large-scale industrial projects. Oman had committed too much
of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural
gas (LNG) export contracts. As a result, the government was
trying to boost production by taking smaller and less
productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO) -- 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal
Dutch Shell -- and awarding them to outside companies such as
British Gas and BP. The Sultan claimed these firms were in a
better position to increase productivity in these fields, and
pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum
Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession
areas, such as Mukhaizna.
¶9. (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new
gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease
the country's natural gas shortage. India's Reliance
Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas
block in this body of water, but had made no significant
discoveries yet. Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by
2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to
meet outstanding needs. He added that Oman was still
supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the
UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir -- and which
the Sultan felt he could not break -- well before Oman was
squeezed for this resource.
---------------------------
THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
---------------------------
¶10. (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of

importance on education, and noted that a study of history
provided the context needed to better understand present
trends and events. Regarding claims that some rulers in the
region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to
more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this
strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace
more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood. Former Egyptian president and
pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had
"set the region back" by being "anti-everything" and engaging
in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant.
-----------------------------------
EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN
-----------------------------------
¶11. (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he

would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of
Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower
MUSCAT 00000174 003 OF 003
house of Oman's bicameral advisory body) on February 26. By

meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the
Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus
on important issues. He commented that both bodies also
needed to "demonstrate more leadership" and avoid past
foot-dragging on promises made to the populace. "People need
to see the results of decisions," the Sultan stated.
¶12. (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a

"secret," the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a
conference of all "notable women" in Oman in 2009 in a bid to
encourage Omani women to expand their participation and
leadership in different aspects of Omani society. Minister
of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya
(one of Oman's three female cabinet ministers) will chair the
meeting on the Sultan's behalf. Lamenting that no women won
seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura,
Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in
tradition and needed to be empowered to "take more charge"
and to be "less shy." "Some customs (regarding women)," he
added, "shouldn't be kept." Nevertheless, gradual change is
occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted. His philosophy was
to "let it happen," rather than hold it up to public debate,
as the latter course of action often led to factional
fighting, internal strife, and other ills.
---------------------------------------------
A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT
---------------------------------------------
¶13. (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to

his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani
government to citizen concerns. He stated that he would be
pressing "harder" on his ministers to engage in more and
better public relations efforts before the Omani police and
to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people
could see the benefits of announced actions. Giving one
particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply
announce a new development project, the government should
explain the downstream employment opportunities the project
would generate for Omani citizens. Effective cooperation
between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to
strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the
Sultan added.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶14. (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change

in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but
did not directly state) that such change was needed to
prepare the country for his eventual departure from power.
The Sultan's comments indicated that he may feel the
government is too dependent on his authority and should be
empowered to run more effectively without constant direction
from the palace. End Comment.
¶15. (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon.

GRAPPO
Viewing cable 08STATE30340, S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS:

PARAGUAY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08STATE30340.
08STATE30340 2008-03-24 18:06 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State
R 241830Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2033

TAGS: PINR KPRP ECON PREL PGOV ETRD PA
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PARAGUAY
REF: 07 STATE 161706
Classified By: PAULA CAUSEY, DAS, INR. REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (S/NF) This cable reports the results of a recent

Washington review of reporting and collection needs for
Paraguay. The review produced a list of priorities
(paragraph 5) intended to guide participating USG agencies as
they allocate resources and update plans to collect
information on Paraguay. The priorities also serve as a
useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and
collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans
(MSPs).
¶2. (S/NF) Important information often is available to

non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies
participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection
Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to
encourage relevant reporting through their own or State
Department channels.
¶3. (S/NF) Please note that the community relies on State
reporting officers for much of the biographical information
collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting by email
and other means is vital to this effort. When it is
available, reporting officers should include as much of the
following information as possible: office and organizational
titles; names, position titles and other information on
business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers
and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as
telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format
if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet
"handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site
identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent
flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant
biographical information.
¶4. (S/NF) This National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) is

compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework
(NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of
February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further
background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations
(shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in
NHCDs.
¶5. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
¶A. Terrorism and Crime

1) Terrorist Threats and Activities (TERR-2)
2) Government Counterterrorist Response (TERR-2)
3) Impact of Corruption and Government Response (CRIM-3)
4) Narcotics Trafficking and Government Response (DRUG-3)
5) Money Laundering (MONY-3)
¶B. Political Dynamics and Democratization

1) Political Stability (DEPS-3)
2) Democratic Practice and the Rule of Law (DEPS-3)
3) Foreign Relations (FPOL-4)
4) Human Rights (HRWC-5)
¶C. Economy, Trade, and Investment

1) Economic Policies and Performance (ECFS-3)
2) Trade (TRAD-4)
3) Foreign Investment (TRAD-4)
¶D. Military and Security Issues

1) Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFR-4)
2) Military Structure and Capabilities (FMCC-4)
3) GRPO can provide text of this issue.
4) Health and Medical Developments (HLTH-4)
¶E. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications (INFR-4)
¶6. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
¶A. Terrorism and Crime
1) Terrorist Threats and Activities (TERR-2)

- Information on the presence, intentions, plans and
activities of terrorist groups, facilitators, and support
networks - including, but not limited to, Hizballah, Hamas,
al-Gama'at al-Islamiya, al-Qa'ida, jihadist media
organizations, Iranian state agents or surrogates - in
Paraguay, in particular in the Tri-Border Area (TBA).
- Indications or evidence of terrorists' or terrorist support
networks' involvement with narcotrafficking, money
laundering, human smuggling, and/or other criminal activities
as a means of obtaining funding or other logistical support;
details on companies or organizations linked to terrorists or
terrorist activity, to include financial transactions,
shipping records, addresses, and associated
companies/organizations.
- Terrorist or terrorist support network plans and activities
in the areas of recruitment, training, support,
communications networks, local and regional command and
control.
- The arrival or expansion of Islamic NGOs or leaders with
known or suspected radical affiliations.
- Ties between and among terrorist organizations; evidence of
terrorist links to government-including
local/regional-officials, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) (such as Jama'at al-Tabligh, the World Assembly of
Muslim Youth, and the Muslim World League), front
organizations (including companies providing logistical or
financial support), and organized criminal groups.
- Identities information of terrorist members to include
fingerprints, arrest photos, DNA, and iris scans.
- Modus Operandi of individuals and terrorist groups, their
use and/or modification of passports, seals/caches, and
travel documents.
- Plans, intentions, and activities of domestic terrorist
groups and regional terrorist groups that operate in Paraguay.
2) Government Counterterrorist Response (TERR-2)

- Information on the government's policy, plans and
intentions for addressing the terrorist threat, including
support for or opposition to the United States in the war
against terrorism; Paraguay's position in regional and
international fora, including support for or objection to
U.S. counterterrorism policies.
- Security services' capabilities, at the national and local
levels, to counter terrorist groups and their activities;
government plans or intentions to further develop or expand
those capabilities.
- Details of police and security services' efforts and
programs to identify, monitor, and disrupt terrorist
activities throughout Paraguay, and particularly in the TBA.
- Government plans and efforts to deploy biometric systems.
- Willingness to cooperate with the U.S. Government and other
governments on counterterrorism issues, including the sharing
of terrorist data; challenges (political, economic,
financial, or personal) the government or government
officials face which may influence their cooperation.
- The status of, and prospects for, counterterrorism-related
legislation.
3) Impact of Corruption and Government Response (CRIM-3)

- Details about organized crime groups, including leadership,
links to government or foreign entities, drug and human
trafficking and smuggling, kidnapping, counterfeiting,
illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, connections to
other international organized crime or terrorist groups,
movement of organized crime into legitimate business
structures, their locations, support structures and means of
coordinating operations, with particular emphasis on their
efforts to influence, suborn or corrupt government, law
enforcement or security officials.
- Information on the involvement of government, military, or
security services personnel in corrupt practices, including
officials involved in narcotrafficking and arms smuggling,
trafficking in persons, funds diversion, influence peddling,
bribe solicitation, blackmail, fraud--especially of travel
documents--and nepotism; the impact of government corruption
on efforts to pursue, capture, and prosecute terrorists and
the effect on popular confidence in the government.
- Details of corruption in government offices, particularly
in the attorney general's office, the judiciary, and the
customs service; status of any government efforts to combat
corruption.
- National, regional, or international criminal activity,
including economic distortions caused by criminal activity;
the government's efforts to devise and implement plans and
policies to combat criminal activity; the level of
cooperation with foreign security services on detecting,
monitoring, and intercepting illicit arms and other smuggled
goods.
4) Narcotics Trafficking and Government Response (DRUG-3)
- Details of narcotics trafficking and associated criminal
activities, particularly in the TBA and other border regions;
illicit drug shipments and trafficking nodes, modalities, and
routes.
- Details on drug trafficking organizations, including
leadership (biographic information and biometric data),
communications (types and sources of technologies used), and
methods of operation, to include processing and storage
sites, methods of laundering money, and activities of front
companies (financial activities, shipping records, addresses,
and associated companies).
- Traffickers' subversion or coercion of political, economic
and judicial officials and systems, including attempts to
gain influence through campaign contributions; impact of
corruption from drug traffickers on executive offices,
legislatures, military and security organizations.
- Connections between narcotics traffickers and international
organized criminal or terrorist groups.
- Government control and enforcement plans, organizations,
capabilities, and activities; military and police roles in
combating drug trafficking or contributing to the trafficking.
- Government plans and efforts to interdict the movement of
narcotics through the TBA and elsewhere.
- Details of legislative initiatives to improve
counternarcotics enforcement and prosecutions.

- Evidence of international organized crime, terrorist
networks, drug producers, people smugglers, arms traffickers,
government officials, military, and security services
involvement in money laundering.
- Details on the methods used to conduct illicit financial
transactions.
- Identification of financial organizations and businesses
(names of personnel and physical location/address of
entities), including exchange houses and informal mechanisms
such as hawalas, involved in money laundering, the means
employed, and the amounts and frequency of activity.
- Government willingness and ability to enforce current law,
investigate, and prosecute money laundering and illegal
financial activities, to include plans to tighten financial
controls and strengthen its financial intelligence unit.
- Information about the underground market for treasury
notes, bearer bonds, and other financial instruments.
¶B. Political Dynamics and Democratization
1) Political Stability (DEPS-3)

- Plans and intentions of the government and ruling party to
prepare for, or influence the outcome of, the April 2008
election.
- Leading candidates and emerging leaders -- to include their
views of, and plans for relations with, the United States,
Venezuela, Cuba, and other Latin American nations -
especially for the 2008 election.
- Political parties' and candidates' preparations for the
2008 election; electoral politics, party platforms, tactics,
and strategies employed in the run-up to the election and
plans for the post-election period.
- Information-before and after the election-on governing and
opposition parties' alliances, rifts, internal factions, and
constituencies, including key people, tactics, and strengths.
- Details of post-election internal politics and political
maneuvering during the transition from one administration to
another.
- Information on financial or material support to candidates,
parties, or interest groups from foreign governments,
especially from Cuba or Venezuela; post-electoral aid
commitments from foreign governments.
- Details of corrupt, illegal, or unethical activities aimed
at subverting the electoral process.
- Biographic and financial information on all leading
contenders, and especially on Minister of Education Blanca
Ovelar, former Vice President Castiglioni, Lino Oviedo, and
Fernando Lugo; and biometric data, to include fingerprints,
facial images, iris scans, and DNA, on these individuals.
2) Democratic Practice and the Rule of Law (DEPS-3)

- Evidence of commitment, or lack of commitment, on the part
of the government, political parties, or special interest
groups to democratic principles, rule of law, transparent,
corruption-free governance practices, and free and fair
elections.
- Details of political deal making and bargains and the
resulting impact on popular confidence in the elections and
the political process; indications of government or political
party bargaining over the candidacy of Lino Oviedo and his
campaign.
3) Foreign Relations (FPOL-4)

- Information on the government's foreign policy plans and
intentions toward neighboring states, regional powers
(including the United States), and key international actors.
- Status of the government's relations with and views of
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his domestic and foreign
policies and actions; the Paraguayan government perspective
on Venezuelan efforts to influence Paraguay's political
process or leadership.
- Information on Paraguay's relationship with Cuba and the
Paraguayan government perspective on Cuban activities and
influence in Paraguay; Paraguay's policy on Cuba in
international and regional fora and the Paraguayan
leadership's views of the United States' Cuba policy.
- Student exchange programs and philanthropic activities in
Paraguay sponsored by Cuba or Venezuela.
- Paraguay's relations with the MERCOSUR organization and
its member countries in that multilateral environment.
- Details of Paraguay's position on U.S. policies and actions
in the region and internationally, including Paraguay's views
on, and participation in, multilateral sanctions endorsed by
the United States and/or the United Nations.
- Information on key bilateral regional relationships,
especially for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia.
- Relations with Iran and information on Islamic facilities,
including mosques, cultural centers, etc., supported by Iran.
- Information on other key bilateral international
relationships, especially for China, Taiwan, and Russia.

- Government plans and intentions with regard to human rights
issues, in particular willingness to crack down on - or
disregard - violations by police, military or security
services.
- Performance of the police, military, and security services
in upholding or violating human rights.
- Government programs and efforts to prevent violence,
trafficking in persons, prostitution, forced labor, slave
labor, or vigilante activity.
¶C. Economy, Trade, and Investment
1) Economic Policies and Performance (ECFS-3)

- Information on the state of the economy, the national
budget, and internal and external debt; information on
economic indicators, particularly for growth and inflation,
including views of the government, political leaders,
academics and other experts on Paraguay's economy and its
future prospects.
- Details on government efforts to improve economic
performance by developing and implementing policies on taxes,
investment, labor, or other resources.
- Details of the effects on the general population of
economic developments and programs.
- Impact on the economy of the discovery of potentially large
gas and oil deposits in the Chaco region.
- Government willingness and capability to fairly and
equitably enforce the law on economic, financial, and banking
issues and uncover/prevent illegal activities.
- Paraguay's interest and participation in the MCA Threshold
Program.
2) Trade (TRAD-4)
- Status of trade with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and other
countries in the region, including government positions on
future opportunities, areas for expansion, and potential
areas of conflict; the impact of MERCOSUR on Paraguay's trade
and the Paraguayan government's assessment of its benefits,
potential drawbacks, and future prospects.
- Paraguay's intentions with regard to ratifying Venezuela's
membership in MERCOSUR.
- The Paraguayan government's policies and positions related
to trade with the United States; indications of genuine
Paraguayan interest in negotiating a trade agreement with the
United States; developments in Paraguay's position on
intellectual property rights legislation and enforcement.
- Paraguayan plans and intentions to expand their requests
for market access to the United States beyond their
traditional commodities - beef, textiles, and sugar.
3) Foreign Investment (TRAD-4)

- Government plans and intentions to attract additional
foreign investment to Paraguay, including details of
incentives and disincentives for foreign investment in
Paraguay.
- Government and business views on the impact of rising crime
and concerns about the independence of the judiciary on
foreign investment, and government plans to deal with these
concerns.
- Paraguay's plans, policies, motives, and intended actions
on intellectual property rights issues.
- The Paraguayan government position on or participation in
the Venezuelan initiative to create a regional development
bank, the Bank of the South.
¶D. Military and Security Issues
1) Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFR-4)

- Paraguay's approach to critical infrastructure protection
strategies and technologies; efforts to reduce the
vulnerability of key systems, including energy (e.g.,
hydroelectric), telecommunications, and transportation.
- Overtures to the United States and others for assistance
in planning and implementing protective measures.
- Legislation or executive actions undertaken to improve
infrastructure security, especially the physical security of
power generation and distribution systems.
2) Military Structure and Capabilities (FMCC-4)

- Capabilities of the military, current and future, in light
of recent decisions to downsize and re-organize; objectives
and expectations for the budget and missions of this future
force.
- Evidence of denial and deception (D&D) programs,
including: personnel, organizations, strategies, tactics,
technologies, activity scheduling, or support by foreign
countries; evidence of satellite tracking or a satellite
warning program, especially any foreign involvement.
- Capabilities, plans, and intentions for participation in
international peacekeeping operations.
- Intentions with respect to cooperation with U.S. military
forces, including the potential for reinstatement of a Status
of Forces Agreement.
- Information on military cooperation, assistance received or
provided, or interaction with others in the region, for
example, the training provided by Argentina; status of
international military cooperation or assistance programs,
such as the kinds of military support that might be offered
by China, Iran, Venezuela, Taiwan, or other countries.
- Plans and intentions for weapons and equipment
acquisitions, including details on suppliers.
- Reactions to major arms acquisitions by countries in the
region.
- Paraguayan views on Venezuelan and Bolivian military
actions and activities, in particular, Bolivian deployments
near the border of Paraguay.
- Indigenous R&D, production, repair, maintenance or upgrade
of military material.
- Details on joint cooperation or co-production arrangements.
- Details on military command, control, communications,
computer and intelligence (C4I) systems.
- Biographic and financial information and biometric data on
military leaders.
3) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related

requirements.
4) Health and Medical Developments (HLTH-4)

- Infectious disease outbreaks; national strategies for
dealing with infectious disease, including detection and
control.
- Capabilities and quality of medical care in private,
public, and military medical facilities.
- Disaster planning and response capability.
- Sources, locations and levels of environmental and chemical
contamination of air, water, food, and soil that might affect
health; content and location of toxic industrial chemical
production and storage facilities.
¶E. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications (INFR-4)

- Details of telecommunications and information systems,
networks, and technologies supporting Paraguayan national
leadership, military, foreign intelligence and security
services (FISS), and civil sector communications.
- Define Paraguayan wireless infrastructure, cellular
provider information, and makes/models of cellular phones and
their operating systems.
- Define Paraguayan satellite communications infrastructure,
to include VSAT networks and use of point to point systems.
- Information on communications practices of Paraguayan
government and military leaders, key foreign officials in
country (e.g., Cuban, Venezuelan, Bolivian, Iranian, or
Chinese diplomats), and criminal entities or their
surrogates, to include telephone and fax numbers and e-mail
addresses, call activity (date, time, caller numbers,
recipient numbers), phone books, cell phone numbers,
telephone and fax user listings, internet protocol (IP)
addresses, user accounts, and passwords.
- Identify national and supranational telecommunications
regulatory, administrative, and maintenance organizations.
- Identify scope of Paraguayan telecommunications encryption
efforts, details on the use of and efforts to acquire modern
telecom technologies, regional and national
telecommunications policies, programs and regulations.
- Details on information repositories associated with RFID
enabled systems increasingly used for passports, government
badges, and transportation system.
RICE
Viewing cable 08ANKARA691, IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE

AND OUR PUBLIC
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC
POSTURE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (c) Summary: The closure case against Turkey's ruling

Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a blow to this
country's future. It reflects unresolved conflicts about the
nature of Turkey, the state, the extent of popular democracy
and the role of religion in society. It also results from
failed leadership by PM Erdogan over the nine months since
his re-election victory last July. The outcome is uncertain,
but the crisis here must be viewed through the peculiar
entity that is Turkish democracy -- imperfect, crabbed, but
functional in its way. US priorities are sustaining our
ability to work with this country on mutual interests and
supporting its democratic process in a broad sense, but we
should avoid opining on the specifics of Turkish politics.
This approach will respect the raucous and historic debate
and politicking among Turks taking place now about the future
of their country -- a vital process for democracy here to
continue to mature. End Summary.
Implications of the Closure Case

--------------------------------
¶2. (c) Here is one way of looking at the AKP closure case.
It is an attempted judicial coup, a Clausewitz-like extension
of politics by legal means. The indictment reads like a
political tract. It relies on newspaper clippings to justify
excluding the party and 70-odd leaders from politics. Among
more bizarre bits of proof that the AKP intends to undo
secularism are press reports of Secretary Powell praising the
country,s "moderate Muslim" government and on its support
for BMENA. The propriety of banning parties is questionable
in any democracy. A ban based on a legally weak indictment
of a party which nine months ago received 47 percent of the
vote nationally and pluralities in 76 out of Turkey's 85
constituencies looks like a travesty for democratic values
and the rule of law.
¶3. (c) Another way of looking at the case focuses on its

consistency with democracy Turkish style. The constitution
and laws have long provided for banning politicians and
dissolving parties, 26 of which have fallen victim. The AKP
had many years in office to change this and other
questionable policies (like Article 301 on insulting
Turkishness), but did not. What looks to Western democracies
like an unusual power in the judiciary to compromise the
results of last July's election is one of Turkey's check and
balancing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority --
in this case secularists who feel threatened by the AKP.
¶4. (c) Some truth exists in both of these points of view.

One clear thing is that PM Erdogan has stumbled badly. One
blunder was failing to make political bans more difficult
when relevant legislation was amended several years ago. As
if dizzy with his own success, Erdogan failed to reassure the
53 percent who voted against his government last July that it
would respect their interests too. He failed to use his
re-election mandate to continue EU-related reforms that were
the most formidable tools for calming fears of Islamization
and untrammeled majority rule. He allowed himself to be
goaded by the National Action Party (MHP) into putting the
headscarf ban at the head of the reform queue. For this
short-term populist win, he sacrificed a larger
constitutional reform package that would have significantly
strengthened Turkey's democracy. Effective, progressive
governance that was the hallmark of early AKP years in office
dried up in the 2007 election year, and no momentum returned
after that. These and other missteps exacerbated fears among
many that Erdogan was going too far, too fast; that there
were no effective constraints on the AKP (especially after
the military's botched intervention last spring); and that
fundamentalists might soon dominate the bureaucracy,
judiciary, universities, etc., to change Turkey in dangerous
and permanent ways.
¶5. (c) The closure case on its face is a set-back for

democracy and stability in Turkey. For many, especially the
large swath of previously neglected voters who make up
Turkey's emerging middle class and whom Erdogan's populism
galvanized, the message is that Turkish democracy is too
poorly developed to protect their interests against the
traditional elite. This message is even more threatening to
ANKARA 00000691 002 OF 003
those here who are still marginalized, especially Kurds.

More broadly, the case looks like, and to some extent is, the
revenge of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy against
Erdogan and popular democracy. Turks fear the Deep State and
many, including strong critics of the AKP, are deeply
uncomfortable with the judiciary's attempt to manipulate the
power balance. Associated turmoil also renders Turkey's
vulnerable economy more uncertain at a time when global
trends are already very negative; a big downturn would
reinforce the sense of crisis here.
¶6. (c) Today, however, Turkey remains a secure, relatively
stable emerging democracy. There is no serious violence on
the streets, and the economy has not crashed. The closure
case is not a catastrophe or the undoing of Turkey's peculiar
and imperfect democracy, at least not now. It is better seen
as one among many moves in a very long chess game that all
sides here, including Erdogan and the AKP, are adept at
playing. The mere fact of the indictment has already
moderated the AKP's rhetoric and pushed it to emphasize
effective governance and more consensual policies, especially
EU accession-related reform. It is only a slight
exaggeration to say that this is the way Turkey's crabbed,
military-drafted constitution intended the system to work.
Figures ranging from former President Demirel to former
parliamentary Speaker Cetin have remarked to us recently that
Turkey has seen worse and will come through these
difficulties all right. At this point, at least, their
reassurances seem more justified than not.
¶7. (c) How matters will play out in the short-medium term is
uncertain.
-- A "victorious" AKP will still face intransigent opposition

from one-third of the public, not to mention the courts,
bureaucrats and generals.
-- A post-closure AKP will reorganize under a new name and

almost certainly still have the votes among its un-banned MPs
to form the next government alone. People already talk about
plausible, post-closure scenarios that involve bringing
Erdogan and other potentially banned figures back into the
picture.
-- Banishing the AKP will not change the reality that the
main opposition parties are weak, divided and ill-equipped
for 21st century politics. Space may be created for a new
centrist party, but credible leaders are not evident now, and
the outlook for new elections that would propel them to
prominence is uncertain. The Islamist fringe in and outside
the AKP could coalesce and become more radical; tarikats like
the Gulenists may become more significant power centers than
they are now.
Without broad constitutional reform to replace the current

top-down state and better protect individual liberties, and
without more consensus on the extent and limits of secularism
in modern Turkey, this struggle is likely to continue.
¶8. (c) This episode will last at least six months and
possibly a year or more. In the meantime, Turkey's
leadership will be distracted and cautious. Unfortunately,
this comes during a period of immense challenges to and
opportunities for Turkish interests domestically and in the
region that include the Kurdish issue, relations with Iraq
and the KRG, energy security, Cyprus, Armenia, EU accession,
terrorism, etc. Policy creativity, never Turkey's strong
suit, will diminish. We also note that before the
Constitutional Court decides the AKP's fate, it will likely
rule on the headscarf amendments; reinstituting the ban at
universities may actually calm matters and defuse the
anti-AKP case. The Court may also rule on the closure of the
Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP); this
could prove more explosive than the AKP case, given that DTP
leaders and constituents accept much less of the
constitutional/legal order here than the AKP mainstream.
Our Public Posture

------------------
¶9. (c) None of this changes the reality that Turkey is an

extremely important ally in a dangerous region and that it
ANKARA 00000691 003 OF 003
is, despite many faults, more democratic and free than any
other country in the Muslim world. We should not stifle,
through our intervention, what should fundamentally be a
debate by Turks about the future of their country that is
essential if its democratic institutions are to mature.
Doing so would make this a US issue in ways harmful to our
interests, our influence and to democratic values here. We
should stick to general principles, and let Turks sort out
the details. At some point, as matters develop, our
intervention to head off a political meltdown here may be
necessary, but that moment isn't now and may well never come.
¶10. (c) With this in mind, our public comments should take a
positive and high road. We should:
-- Make clear our strong support for Turkey, its democratic

institutions and its commitment to democratic values and
secular principles that define our alliance and partnership.
-- Urge Turkey's leaders and institutions to work for

pragmatic solutions that reinforce stability and build
consensus at a critical time for the country and in the
region.
-- Emphasize support for Turkey's goal of accession to the EU

and its need to legislate and implement comprehensive
political and economic reforms that will sustain that goal
and secure liberty and prosperity in the future.
-- Look forward to continuing to work with Turkey on behalf

of common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the
Balkans, on terrorism, on energy security, on the Cyprus
problem and elsewhere in the region and the world.

WILSON
Viewing cable 08ASTANA760, LIFESTYLES OF THE KAZAZHSTANI

LEADERSHIP
Discussing cables
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000760
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADD “CLASSIFIED BY” LINE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/17/2018

TAGS PGOV, PINR, KZ
SUBJECT: LIFESTYLES OF THE KAZAZHSTANI LEADERSHIP
ASTANA 00000760 001.4 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Kazakhstan’s political elites appear to enjoy typical hobbies -- such as
travel, horseback riding, and skiing. Not surprisingly, however, they are able
to indulge in their hobbies on a grand scale, whether flying Elton John to
Kazakhstan for a concert or trading domestic property for a palace in the United
Arab Emirates. This cable recounts several instances in which Embassy officers
have learned of, or witnessed, the recreational habits of Kazakhstan’s leaders.
End Summary.
--------------
Sun and Horses
--------------
¶2. (C) President Nazarbayev, like many of his countrymen, has a strong affinity
for horses. In 2007, emboff visited the presidential horse farm XXXXXXXXXXX. The
farm is located on the outskirts of Astana in a residential area, but is
surrounded by a high-fence and security guards. Inside the gates are a large
stable, indoor and outdoor riding arenas, and a clubhouse with a pool table,
sauna, and exercise room. Emboff toured the stable and saw approximately forty
horses from various parts of the world. XXXXXXXXXXXX told him that Nazarbayev
visits the horse farm on occasion, though not too frequently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that Nazarbayev’s wife -- Sara Nazarbayeva -- never accompanies him,
XXXXXXXXXXXX Taszhargan, an opposition newspaper, printed a sympathetic article
about Sara Nazarbayeva XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶3. (C) Nazarbayev is also fond of traveling to warmer climes in the region. The
UAE Ambassador told emboff that Nazarbayev had traded property in Borovoe -- a
mountainous resort area of Kazakhstan north of Astana and sometimes likened to
Switzerland -- for a “palace” in the Emirates. He did not make clear whether the
transaction was a permanent arrangement or only a temporary one. The head of
Turkey’s liaison office in Astana, Orhan Isik, told emboff that Nazarbayev has a
mansion in Antaliya, which he visits 4-5 times a year. Isik claimed that
Nazarbayev received the property as a gift in the early 1990’s and now plans to
use part of the land for the construction of a luxury hotel.
------------------------
Dancing at the Nightclub
------------------------
¶4. (C) On March 7, two days after his trip to the U.S. was cancelled, Prime
Minister Masimov was spotted by emboff at Chocolat, one of Astana’s trendiest
nightclubs. Masimov entered at approximately 11:30 pm, accompanied by
Presidential Administration head Kairat Kelimbetov, Astana mayor Askar Mamin,
three middle-aged Kazakh women (presumably their wives), and a security detail.
Although the club offers a VIP area, Masimov chose to sit at a table in full
view of all of the club’s patrons. Emboff lingered close to Masimov’s group
XXXXXXXXXXXX Masimov led his companions on to Chocolat’s dance floor soon after
their arrival. The dance floor holds approximately 100 people, and at the time
perhaps 50 patrons were dancing. However, Masimov himself chose to dance on an
empty stage above the dance floor. His companions quickly tired but Masimov
remained, dancing alone and animatedly on the stage for another 15-20 minutes.
At approximately 1:00 am, Masimov and his retinue left the club.
-------------------------
Skiing with the Oligarchs
-------------------------
¶5. (C) In September 2007, Kazakhstani oligarch Aleksandr Mashkevich -- the co-
founder of metals and mining giant Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation and,
according to
ASTANA 00000760 002.4 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Forbes magazine, the 334th wealthiest man in the world -- hosted a dinner at his
house in Almaty for two visiting U.S. congressmen. Only two Kazakhstanis
attended the event, State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev and his assistant. Judging
from
SIPDIS the friendly banter between Saudabayev and Mashkevich, the two have a
quite cordial personal relationship. Mashkevich told a lengthy anecdote about a
ski vacation that he and Saudabayev had taken together in Europe.
¶6. (C) Saudabayev had hosted a codel at that same Almaty residence in 2005,
without Mashkevich in attendance. At that time, when the Ambassador asked
Saudabayev whose house it was, he would only say that it belonged to “a friend.”
Saudabayev has twice hosted visiting USG officials for a meal at Mashkevich’s
Astana residence -- both times without Mashkevich. It is not clear what
Mashkevich is spending his billions on, but it is certainly not culinary talent.
On all four occasions the Ambassador has eaten at one of his houses, the menu
has been similar and focused on beshparmak (boiled meat and noodles) and plov.
The wait staff appeared to be graduates of a Soviet cafeteria training academy.
The wine, at least, was somewhat upscale with reasonably good French vintage
bottles uncorked for the guests. The Astana residence has wooden plaques on the
doors that would fit in nicely in a Wyoming hunting lodge but are somewhat out
of touch with the upscale “Euro-remont” that is so popular among the Kazakhstani
elite.
-------------------------------
Private Concerts with the Stars
-------------------------------
¶7. (C) In 2007, President Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, celebrated

his 41st birthday in grand style. At a small venue in Almaty, he hosted a
private concert with some of Russia’s biggest pop-stars. The headliner, however,
was Elton John, to whom he reportedly paid one million pounds for this one-time
appearance. (Note: The British Ambassador relayed a slightly different story,
with an unknown but obviously well-heeled friend arranging and paying for Sir
Elton’s gig. End Comment.) There have been separate reports that Nelly Furtado
performed at the August 2007 birthday bash for Kulibayev’s wife, Dinara
Nazarbayeva. Kulibayev also appears willing to spend his fortune on others.
According to Turkish diplomat Isik, when the Kempinski group recently built
luxury villas in Bodrum, Turkey, Kulibayev bought up a number of them -- at a
cost of 4-5 million dollars each -- and doled them out as gifts to friends and
family.
-----------------------
Sports and Politics Mix
-----------------------
¶8. (C) Sports and politics mixed seamlessly in Almaty on April 2, when some of
Kazakhstan’s most prominent political figures participated in the Beijing
Olympics torch relay. Torchbearers included President Nazarbayev, Presidential
Administration business affairs head Bolat Utemuratov, Nur Otan party first
deputy chairman Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, and Agency for the Regulation of Natural
Monopolies head Mazhit Yesenbayev. All of these bigwigs, except Nazarbayev
himself, could justify their participation in the relay based not on their high-
ranking political offices, but rather on their prominent official positions in
the Kazakhstani sports world. Utemeratov just happens to head Kazakhstan’s
Tennis Federation, while Dzhakysbekov chairs the Football Federation -- a
position previously held by ex-Nazarbayev son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev. Yesenbayev
heads the Judo Federation. KazMunayGaz chairman Uzakbay Karabalin, who heads the
Boxing Federation, and Nazarbayev son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, who heads the Golf
Federation, also shared in the glory of carrying the Olympic torch. One
prominent sport federation president who missed the torch call was Defense
Minister Daniyal Akhmetov. He is head of the scandal-ridden Cycling Federation
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------------------------
Relaxation the Good, Old Soviet Way
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Kazakhstan’s political elites also have recreational tastes that are not
so exotic. Some, in fact, prefer to relax the old-fashioned way. Defense
Minister Akhmetov, a self-proclaimed workaholic, appears to enjoy loosening up
in the tried and true “homo sovieticus” style -- i.e., drinking oneself into a
stupor. While most of our accounts of Akhmetov’s indulgences with the bottle are
hearsay, we do have “eyes on” for one episode which supports the rumors. In June
2007, Akhmetov showed up in grand form for a meeting with a visiting senior U.S.
Defense Department official. Making no attempt to conceal his condition --
slouching back in his chair and slurring all kinds of Russian participles --
Akhmetov explained to this very senior guest that he had just been at a cadet
graduation reception “toasting Kazakhstan’s newly-commissioned officers.” Who
was toasted more -- the Defense Minister or the cadets -- is a matter of pure
speculation. Akhmetov’s excesses do not solely extend to the bottle. An insider
at Astana’s Radisson Hotel recently told us about preparations for the
unbelievably lavish and expensive wedding of Akhmetov’s son. In the Kazakh
tradition, the parents of the groom are responsible for the wedding -- so it
would seem that Akhmetov must have footed the bill.
ORDWAY
Viewing cable 08BERLIN531, GERMAN GRAND COALITION FACES

STRAIN OF UPCOMING
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7856
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN GRAND COALITION FACES STRAIN OF UPCOMING
2009 ELECTIONS
REF: A. BERLIN 313

¶B. 07 BERLIN 0674
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) The German Grand Coalition will increasingly face

tensions created by the need for the lead candidates to
position themselves for the 2009 national electoral campaign.
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier both remain highly popular. Merkel, however,
faces political risks if the economy turns for the worse. In
the second half of this year, as the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) moves closer to a decision about its chancellor
candidate, potential candidate Steinmeier will likely face
scrutiny and criticism from his own party's left-wing. It is
too early to predict the likely coalition outcome in 2009 --
although Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Christian
Social Union (CSU) are likely to come out ahead, they may not
have a better coalition option than continuing the current
Grand Coalition with the SPD. U.S. foreign policy is not
likely to play a central role in the campaign leading up to
Germany's national elections in fall 2009. Improved
U.S.-German relations under Merkel and German fascination
with the vibrant democratic process in the U.S. primary
elections have played significant roles in improving German
attitudes towards the U.S., thereby dampening the likelihood
that the SPD will use anti-American rhetoric to rally voters
as former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did in 2002. End
summary.
---------------------------------------------
Merkel's Possible Archilles Heel: The Economy
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) remains highly popular

among Germans, who view her as an effective leader with a
strong international stature. Her approval rating is 71
percent. In large part due to Merkel's popularity, the CDU
has held a commanding 8- to 14-point lead over the SPD in
polls over the last year.
¶3. (C) Although Merkel's high popularity is expected to

continue, she faces diffuse risks on economic issues. CDU
parliamentarians suggest that an economic downturn would be
the principal threat to Merkel's high popularity Economic
forecasts currently favor Merkel, with projections of 1.6 to
1.8 percent growth for this year (though slightly lower for
2009), but with no real evidence of recession despite the
global slowdown.
¶4. (C) Among CDU leaders there is a sense that the CDU may
have peaked (perhaps too early) and that caution is the
watchword. Merkel, who campaigned in 2005 on a program of
economic liberalization and watched a commanding lead in the
polls nearly vanish during the campaign, appears to be moving
toward the political center in an attempt to expand her base
and consolidate centrist support that the SPD is losing
because of its leftward shift. She is demonstrating
ever-greater focus on domestic policy and espousing popular
middle class enticements such as pension increases, a longer
duration of unemployment benefits for older workers, and
enhancement of nursing care insurance. While many consider
this move to be politically smart, some on the CDU's
right-wing have criticized the Chancellor for abandoning core
CDU values.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Steinmeier Could Get Roughed Up by SPD's Left Wing
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶5. (C) Social Democrats have speculated in recent months that

SPD Chairman Kurt Beck will eventually defer to the much more
popular Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier as the
party's eventual chancellor candidate (ref A). SPD insiders
consider this a 50-50 proposition. Kurt Beck's recent
victory in guiding competing factions of the SPD to agreement
on privatization of the railway monopoly Deutsche Bahn may
help shore up his position (septel). It is uncertain whether
Steinmeier would choose to accept the SPD nomination at a
time when the SPD is hovering in the mid 20's in the polls
and its electoral prospects seem poor. Note: In any case,
Steinmeier will run for political office, a federal
parliament seat from Brandenburg City, for the first time in
¶2009. End note.
¶6. (C) Steinmeier would face some detractors in his own
BERLIN 00000531 002 OF 002
party. Deputy SPD Chair Andrea Nahles, the leading left-wing

critic of Steinmeier's centrist approach, told Political M/C
that she was unhappy that "the U.S. knows more about
Steinmeier than I do," referring to Steinmeier's role as
Chancellery Chief of Staff and Intelligence Coordinator under
Gerhard Schroeder. Nahles suggested strongly that the left
wing of the SPD could portray Steinmeier as too close to the
U.S. on intelligence-related issues, especially his role in
the Murat Kurnaz affair (ref B), thereby damaging his
candidacy.
¶7. (C) Nahles admitted, however, that the SPD likely would do
better at the polls with Steinmeier as chancellor candidate
(between 30 and 35 percent of the vote). This would mean
more SPD parliamentarians holding onto their seats -- a
consideration that could have an effect on the SPD's choice.
Nahles added that Steinmeier "has little experience in
managing the party, but he's a fast learner."
----------------------------------
Grand Coalition Fated to Continue?
----------------------------------
¶8. (C) Deputy CDU national chairman and Lower Saxony

Minister-President Christian Wulff (CDU) told the DCM that
another grand coalition is the most likely outcome in 2009 if
the political landscape does not change significantly in the
coming months. The SPD's Nahles agrees. While Merkel and
the CDU still prefer to govern with the Free Democrats (FDP),
the numbers may not suffice for a majority. Although
experiments such as the CDU-Greens coalition in Hamburg are
enticing, replicating them at the national level remains
difficult.
¶9. (C) Comment: The CDU's fear of opening up its flanks to

SPD attacks -- and the SPD's self-obsession during a period
of turmoil in the party -- reveal a degree of caution on
policy issues that is remarkable even by German standards.
This is reflected in German caution on foreign policy issues
of interest to us such as Afghanistan and Iran. A particular
USG concern is whether the SPD or others will try to employ
anti-American rhetoric to curry voter support, much as former
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did in 2002. Even SPD
left-wingers like Nahles tell us, however, that foreign
policy is not as great a consideration for German voters as
it was around the time of the Iraq war, and therefore will
not likely be a decisive factor in next year's national
elections. It is also important to note that German
attitudes towards the U.S. have improved over the past year
due to our improved bilateral relations and German
fascination with democracy on display in the U.S. primary
elections. The current improvement is evidenced by a recent
Harris poll which showed a dramatic 21 percentage-point
increase in the number of Germans who regard the U.S. as a
trustworthy partner. Also, the German federal election
campaign will occur during what is expected here to be an
extended popular "honeymoon" for the new U.S. administration.
Consequently, German politicians might perceive less
political advantage in a critical stance toward the U.S. End
comment.
TIMKEN JR
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA504,
Discussing cables
08BRASILIA504
19:07 09:09 RN Brasilia
VZCZCXRO0361
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SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KCRM ETTC EFIN ASEC AR BR
REF: A. BRASILIA 000440 B. BRASILIA 000579 C. SAO PAULO 000991 D. SAO PAULO
000532
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Phil Chicola.

Reasons 1.4 B and D
¶1. (C) Summary: In November of last year the Government of Brazil announced
that it was backtracking on its effort to introduce counterterrorism (CT)
legislation after a years-long effort by a working group within the Presidency's
Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) to coordinate the drafting of the
initiative within the government. Although they now seek to downplay the
importance of having such legislation, prior to the reversal GOB officials
claimed that new anti-terrorism legislation was necessary to improve its legal
regime--which currently does not treat terrorist activities, terrorism
financing, or support of terrorism as crimes. Some news reports have suggested
that President Lula's powerful chief of staff quashed the proposed legislation,
which had been attacked by some social activists and advocacy groups who feared
it could be used against them and compared it to military era repression. The
media and political silence that greeted the government's reversal has exposed a
vacuum on matters pertaining to terrorism among the elites whose support would
be required to overcome GOB resistance. As a result, our efforts to put this
legislation back on Brazil's agenda will be an uphill climb. End Summary.
¶2. (U) This cable is the second of two that looks at the Brazilian government's
latest actions to counter terrorist activities. The first touched on Brazil's
reform of its intelligence and counterterrorism structure.
No Crime Without a Law to Define It
¶3. (U) In 2004, the GOB formed a working group within GSI, the Presidency's
office in charge of coordinating intelligence, counternarcotics and national
security, charged with examining Brazilian laws related to terrorism, as well as
the way the government was structured to deal with the challenges posed by
international terrorists (ref A). Prior to this effort, Brazilian government
officials and outside observers had concluded that Brazilian laws dealing with
terrorism were ambiguous and needed updating to account for modern realities
(refs B and C). Under Brazilian law, terrorist acts, their financing, and
activities supporting terrorist acts are not considered crimes. Both the
Brazilian constitution and the National Security Act (Public Law 7.170 of 1983),
which defines crimes against national security, criminalize acts of terrorism in
general. However, because the National Security Act harkens back to the military
regime, Embassy contacts have indicated that it is highly unlikely the
government would ever use it to charge someone with a crime related to a
terrorist activity (Ref B). In addition, because terrorism under that law is
proscribed without being typified, even in the unlikely case someone attempted
to test the prevailing wisdom on the applicability of a military-era national
security law to charge someone with the crime of attempting to commit an act of
terrorism, they probably would be unable to do so. The Act specifically
proscribes criminal acts that could be considered acts of terrorism, such as
sabotage and bombings, but only as distinct crimes from terrorism. Because of
this, terrorist activities consisting of defined crimes under the law could not
be charged explicitly as terrorism.
Domestic Politics to Blame
¶4. (U) As soon as news reports started surfacing in early 2007 that GSI was
about to wrap up its work, the government started coming under fire from
opponents of the bill. The BRASILIA 00000504 002 OF 004 influential Ordem dos
Advogados do Brasil (OAB, the Brazilian bar association) criticized the
government for pushing legislation that was, according to OAB's president Cezar
Britto, in reality a thinly veiled move to criminalize the actions of social
movements and those fighting for equality. Forced on the defensive, several
high-ranking GSI officials publicly suggested that any anti-terrorism
legislation would be rarely used and that judges would have discretion in
applying it. Then in late November 2007, the government unceremoniously
announced that it would not introduce the legislation to Congress.
¶5. (C) In a meeting with Poloff, Assistant Secretary Jose Antonio de Macedo
Soares of the Secretariat for Monitoring and Institutional Studies, at GSI (and
Ministry of External Relations representative to GSI, where he holds the rank of
minister) and GSI advisor Janer Tesch Hosken Alvarenga explained that it was
impossible to reach consensus within the government on how to define terrorism.
Asked to confirm a news item in the daily newspaper Correio Braziliense noting
that Minister Dilma Rousseff (chief of staff to President Lula in the Casa
Civil) had quashed the proposal, Alvarenga equivocated, suggested that several
"clients" had weighed in, including the Ministry of Justice. In the end, he did
not deny the news report, stating that the decision had been a "political" one.
¶6. (SBU) A Brazilian War College analyst on strategic intelligence and author
of numerous articles on counterterrorism topics, Andre Luis Soloszyn, went
farther, asserting to poloff that the Correio story sounded very credible to
him, and that the GSI working group was a smokescreen for the government to
demonstrate to the US and the international community that it was taking the
issue of counterterrorism seriously. Soloszyn noted that there was little chance
that this particular government, stacked with leftist militants who had been the
object of military dictatorship-era laws designed to repress politically-
motivated violence, was going to put forth a bill that would criminalize the
actions of groups it sympathizes with, such as the Landless Movement (MST), for
"there is no a way to write an anti-terrorism legislation that excludes the
actions of the MST".
An Idea Whose Time Has Come(and Gone
¶7. (C) Asked if there was a possibility the legislation could come back some
time in the future, both Soares and Alvarenga were pessimistic. Commenting on
the enormously complex nature of the issue, Alvarenga noted that discussions of
terrorism within Brazilian society remain at an immature stage, with few experts
on the topic and very few people interested. Soares added that people within and
outside the government find the possibility of a terrorist attack taking place
on Brazilian soil so improbable that they are incapable of giving the issue much
attention.
¶8. (SBU) Soloszyn echoed these comments, indicating that he is one of the few
individuals to focus on the issue of terrorism outside the government. Within
the government, the story is not much different, he added, and virtually no one
in Congress was focused on the issue. Most legislators and general public are so
in the grip of the "it can't happen here" mentality that they lack any idea of
terrorist tactics, the concept of support networks, the threat of homegrown
terrorism, and exploitation of soft targets. According to Soloszyn, the issue of
potential pockets of Islamic extremism among segments of Brazil's large Muslim
community is likewise an unstudied subject among specialists, and unthinkable as
a proposition among the public at large. The Brazilian mind even among the
highest echelons of the government, he added, can't get past its own cliches
about the multicultural paradise that is Brazil.
¶9. (SBU) According to him, the only factor that could change this indifference
is another wave of violence like that unleashed by the First Capital Command
(PCC) in Sao Paulo in 2006 (ref D). Terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists
is too remote for Brazilians to worry about. The only way they are going to move
on this, he added, is when it affects them on a daily basis. (Comment: In the
immediate aftermath of the PCC's violence in 2006, President Lula called their
actions terrorism, and made noises about finally getting some anti-terrorism
legislation on the books. End comment.)
"We have to Stop this Farce"
¶10. (C) In his conversation with poloff, Soares dismissed the importance of the
government's reversal, arguing that the success of any potential terrorist
attack against the Israeli Embassy in Brasilia is not going to be determined by
whether there is a law on the books outlawing terrorism. Brazil, according to
him, has excellent working relationships with other countries, he noted,
including with the US and Israel. Soares added that he hoped to continue
cooperating with the US, despite what he described as the "farcical" elements
within the bilateral CT dialogue: Soares did not miss the opportunity to repeat
the oft-heard complaint by GOB officials about comments on the part of USG
officials suggesting the Triborder Area (TBA) remains a top concern with regard
to potential terrorist activity, which then prompt the obligatory Brazilian
demands for evidence of such activity. He called the exercise pointless, since,
in his words, "we all know that your officials based their statements on
information we provide the US". Soares also criticized Argentine officials for
their comments linking the TBA to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, calling
their accusations "silly" and "baseless".
------------- Comment: -------------
¶11. (C) After various Brazilian government officials had warned of the flawed
nature of the Brazilian legal system, it is unfortunate, though not surprising,
to hear GSI officials now argue that there is no need for the GOB to improve
Brazil's legal regime to make it illegal to commit, finance, plan, or support
terrorist acts. Although we cannot confirm definitively that the Casa Civil
quashed the initiative for political or ideological reasons, it is certainly
plausible. Outside of some agencies focused on security issues, this government
evinces very little interest in terrorism issues, much less on legislation its
base has no interest in seeing enacted and that would require significant
political capital to push through Congress. Likewise, with little knowledge or
enthusiasm within Congress, there is no one to take up the mantle there either.
As a result, the initiative has become an orphan of Brazil's current political
realities. For the moment, any effort to suppress terrorism, its financing, or
activities supporting terrorist activities will have to continue for the
foreseeable future to follow the "Al Capone" approach of taking down terrorists
based on customs violations, tax fraud, and other crimes that unfortunately also
carry less jail time. While this approach can work, it is not a substitute for
giving police and judges the additional legal tools that the international
community has agreed are necessary in the fight against terrorism and nor is it
a substitute for institutionalizing counterterrorism within the Brazilian legal
system. Taking Brazil's reform of its CT structure (ref A) together with its
backtracking CT legislation once again shows a mixed picture of Brazil's overall
CT effort at the policy level. Furthermore, the low standing CT holds as an
issue among Brazil's elite casts some doubt as to whether the potentially useful
reform of ABIN will actually materialize. Over the next months, Mission will
consult with Washington agencies as we review our strategy for increasing
Brazilian attention to counter-terrorism.
¶12. (C) Comment, cont: On a separate note, we found Soares' admission that
Brazil provides the bulk of the intelligence on matters related to CT to be
highly atypical, although it sheds some light on a question that has long-
puzzled the Mission. That is, whether policy-level officials, particularly at
Itamaraty, where they tend to be most disinclined to accept the suggestion that
there may be terrorist elements active in their territory, receive the same
information from Brazil's intelligence elements as the U.S. receives. Although
we cannot answer definitively, Soares comments would suggest that to be the case
and that, despite their denials, they recognize the potential problems Brazil
faces. Another possibility is that they have access to the same information but,
either because the information would be inadmissible in a Brazilian court or
because it does not meet a presumed higher threshold of what constitutes
terrorist-related activity, they technically do not consider it evidence of such
activity. This means they are either playing games or they are defining
terrorism out of Brazil. Neither interpretation presents a flattering picture of
the seriousness with which the senior levels of the Brazilian government treat
the issue of terrorism, but both are consistent with what we have seen over the
last several years from a government that considers CT a low priority. End
comment. SOBEL
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD1432, POST REQUESTS FBI RECALL
DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON
Discussing cables
08ISLAMABAD1432
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Thursday, 03 April 2008, 12:23

SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED NOFORN CAPTION
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTS FBI RECALL DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON
FAZLUR REHMAN
REF: IIR 4 201 4569 08
Classified By: CDA Peter Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 2.
¶2. (S/NF) Post requests FBI recall information about Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-
F) leader Fazlur Rehman noted in Reftel. Reftel indicates that an individual
‘Fasil Ul Rehman’ believed to be associated with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is behind
the March 2008 bombing in Islamabad. Reftel then suggests that ‘Fasil Ul Rehman’
refers to political party leader Fazlur Rehman of the JUI-F. Post requests that
FBI recall this information from all hardcopy and database records due to
discrepancies and errors in the report.
¶3. (C) Prominent Pakistan politician Fazlur Rehman is not associated with the
JI, but instead leads his own political party, the JUI-F. From 2002-2007 the two
parties allied with other religious parties in the coalition Muttahida Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA). However, the JUI-F and JI retained separate leadership structures as
well as separate political objectives and methods.
¶4. (C) Fazlur Rehman’s JUI-F is a conservative Deobandi religious party that
recently has joined the new Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led government.
Rehman, more politician than mullah, has been a prominent and legitimate figure
in Pakistani politics since the 1980s. Rehman has publicly denounced terrorist
attacks, but prefers to use negotiations rather than military force against
militants. Although he is known to have contacts with Taliban and their
sympathizers, he has negotiated with religious militants on the government’s
behalf, garnering him criticism from the more hard-line religious sectors.
Rehman also has been a frequent and cooperative interlocutor with Post and
professes his support for cooperation with the United States.
¶5. (C) The JI is a religious party that appeals to a narrow sector of the
educated, conservative urban middle class. JI, which has a vibrant student wing,
began as a movement for social change based on Sharia. The JI party policy does
not support violence as a means to achieve their political agenda, however, the
party quietly has supported jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir by providing
recruits from their student corps. The party does not support violence
perpetuated within Pakistan, such as the recent attack on the restaurant in
Islamabad. In addition, ‘Fasil Ul Rehman’ and ‘Fazlur Rehman” are extremely
common Pakistani names, making it impossible to accurately identify the
individual in Reftel with the prominent JUI-F politician.
BODDE
Viewing cable 08KUALALUMPUR317, DEMARCHE: US-EU PRISONERS OF
CONSCIENCE DECLARATION
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08KUALALUMPUR317.
2008-04-24 2010-11-30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Embassy
08KUALALUMPUR317
09:09 21:09 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kuala Lumpur
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INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1067
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2533
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0555
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0227
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1567
Thursday, 24 April 2008, 09:01

UNCLAS KUALA LUMPUR 000317
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DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, IO, DRL/MLGA
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PREL, PHUM, UNGA, MY
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: US-EU PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE DECLARATION
REF: STATE 40380
(SBU) Poloff delivered reftel demarche and nonpaper to Adi Mohammed of the of
the MFA Multilateral Political Affairs directorate on April 21 and urged that
Malaysia cosponsor the declaration. Mohammed promised to review the issue with
the relevant MFA officials but to date we have been unable to elicit any further
response from MFA.
KEITH
Viewing cable 08LONDON929, DAVID CAMERON TELLS JOHN MCCAIN

TORIES WON’T BREAK
Discussing cables
08LONDON929
09:09 23:11 N London
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TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, IZ, AF, IS, IR, PK, UK
SUBJECT: DAVID CAMERON TELLS JOHN MCCAIN TORIES WON’T BREAK
WITH HMG WHERE TROOPS ARE CONCERNED
Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Conservative party leader David Cameron told Senator John
McCain the Tories won’t break ranks with HMG on policies affecting British
troops in battle. Cameron and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told McCain
and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham that Prime Minister Gordon
Brown had no political support to increase British troops in Iraq. McCain said
Basrah was “quiet for all the wrong reasons.” (This conversation took place
March 20 before the recent surge of violence in Southern Iraq.) McCain thanked
Britain for its support. The Senators also discussed Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Israel with Conservative leaders. End Summary.
Participants
------------
¶2. (U) Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham, accompanied
by the Ambassador, Senate staff Richard Fontaine and Dan Serchuk, and Poloff
Kirsten Schulz met March 20 in David Cameron’s House of Commons office. Cameron
had assembled an eager group from his front bench including Hague, Shadow
Chancellor George Osborne, Shadow Defence Minister Liam Fox, as well as Chief of
Staff Edward Llewellyn, former party leader Michael Howard, and Dame Pauline
Neville-Jones. The room was packed and the atmosphere collegial.
McCain’s Assessment of Iraq

--------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) Senator McCain said the situation in Iraq had improved. He warned
that Al Qaeda would put up a fight in Mosul and the Iranians were “not going to
go quietly into the night.” Maliki, McCain told the group, was weak but getting
better. In Anbar province, he added, there was a demand for elections. McCain
praised General Petraeus and the quality of the military leadership and
mentioned Petraeus’ upcoming congressional testimony. Cameron asked what the
American troop numbers were likely to be. McCain said the U.S. would “stick at
180,000” and noted, “it’s not the number of troops, but the number of
casualties” which is of import. Al-Qaeda, said McCain, had taken to using
suicide bombers and now to deploying women bombers. He said one woman was asked
why she had tried to become a suicide bomber. She replied, “because my husband
told me to.”
Cameron Asks McCain for Appraisal of Basrah

-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Cameron asked McCain what he thought was happening in the south of
Iraq. McCain said he was very worried. He said it was like “Chicago in the 20’s”
and “could go at any time.” The Iranians were there and the Iraqis were likely
to find “the going to be extremely difficult.” “Just because its quiet,” said
McCain, “doesn’t mean it’s good. It is quiet for all the wrong reasons.”
Pledge on Troops
----------------
¶5. (C/NF) Cameron and Hague told the Senators that the Conservatives would
never take a policy position that would undermine British policies where troops
are involved. Hague noted the Conservatives largely share the Labour foreign
policy agenda. Cameron said Prime Minister Brown did not have the political
support to increase the British troop presence in Iraq, saying “that moment has
passed.” Hague seconded Cameron’s assessment. Cameron asked McCain whether the
British plans for a further draw-down should not go forward, given that HMG
could not both maintain a presence in Iraq and build up its role in Afghanistan.
In response, McCain thanked Cameron and for Britain’s contribution in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
¶6. (C/NF) McCain said he understood the Prime Minister intended to withdraw
British troops prior to the next election. Hague confirmed Brown politically
could not do otherwise. “I understand that,” said McCain, “the British people
have my gratitude for all that you have done.”
Israel
------
LONDON 00000929 002 OF 002
¶7. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron that Israel’s Prime Minster Ehud Omert was “still
paying the price for Lebanon.” Cameron asked whether Quartet Leader Tony Blair
was optimistic. McCain said he admired Blair for his steadfastness, but what
McCain had noticed in international relations was the tendency of statesmen to
be optimistic once they become negotiators.
Iran
----
¶8. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron he saw an increasing, and increasingly damaging
role, for Iran in regional affairs. This included an increase in activity in
Iraq and in arming Hezbollah. McCain said he advocated gathering Europe to “cut
off all credit” to Iran. Not just Europe, but other like-minded nations such as
Japan, should be encouraged to take collective action on such matters, he said.
Hague responded that he and the Conservatives had been pushing for this for the
last two years. Hague and Cameron alleged that the release of the National
Intelligence Assessment had set back this effort.
Afghanistan and Pakistan

------------------------
¶9. (C/NF) Cameron told McCain that he and his party focused on Afghanistan as
the key foreign police issue. This was due, not least, to the timeline for when
the Conservatives might come into office (2010 or 2009 at the earliest) and the
fact that British troops were meant to be out of Iraq by then. Cameron also
raised Pakistan, noting that 60,000 individuals travel to Pakistan from the UK
each year and that this has implications for the UK’s own significant domestic
“terror threat.” Cameron said he was interested in exploring the idea of whether
ISAF and Enduring Freedom operations could be combined, as well as whether an
increase in military presence was required or an enhanced civilian presence was
more important. McCain replied that Afghanistan is complicated by the
uncertainty in Pakistan. “We all like Karzai,” he said, “but his is a very weak
government.” Cameron said NATO troop capacity was “patchy” and there appeared to
be perpetual problems with shortages of air transport support. McCain said he
was worried about Pakistan. “If they don’t cooperate and help us, I don’t know
what we are going to do,” he said. He added, “Waziristan hasn’t been ruled for
2,000 years.” On a positive note, McCain praised the fighting capacity of
Afghans, whom he called “great fighters.” Cameron said each year he met with
Karzai, and each year he had the sense Karzai’s sphere of influence was
shrinking.
¶10. (U) CODEL McCain did not clear this cable.

cfm Tuttle
Viewing cable 08LONDON930, WILLIAM HAGUE SAYS “NEAR DEATH

EXPERIENCE” HAS
Discussing cables
08LONDON930
10:10 23:11 N London
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/31/2018

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, AF, UK
SUBJECT: WILLIAM HAGUE SAYS “NEAR DEATH EXPERIENCE” HAS
IMPROVED TORY CHANCES
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the DCM the
Tories are “more likely to win than lose” the next general election. High
approval ratings in the polls allow the Conservative Leader David Cameron a
“latitude to maneuver” that he does not possess when the polls are running
against him. Referring to Afghanistan, Hague said the party “would be hard
pressed to part with HMG policy where British troops are concerned.” Hague
asserted that he, Cameron, and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne are all
“children of Thatcher” and staunch Atlanticists but acknowledged that the
network of ties once binding the British public to America may not be as thick
for all citizens of Britain. End summary.
Saved by “Near Death” Experience

--------------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) William Hague and DCM, accompanied by Hague’s Senior Advisor Arminka
Helic and Poloff Kirsten Schulz, met in Hague’s House of Commons office March
19. Hague was upbeat about the Conservatives’ prospects, arguing that the “near
death experience” of actively contemplating a snap general election last August
when Cameron was down in the polls had forced party members and leaders to
unite. Prime Minister Gordon Brown having “bottled it (lost his nerve),” after a
strong Conservative Conference and a well-regarded performance by David Cameron,
had left the Tories with an “internal confidence” previously lacking, said
Hague.
¶3. (C/NF) When the Conservatives are leading in the polls as they are now,
Cameron has more latitude to attack the Government, said Hague, and their
proposals are taken as genuine possibilities for the future, rather than carping
against the majority. He said the Conservatives are “more likely to win than
lose” the next general election which he suspects will be called in fall 2009 or
spring 2010. From the Conservatives’ point of view, added Hague, later was
better. The longer Brown stayed in office, the more the public would tend to the
view that it was time for a change and a 2010 election date would mean the
Labour government will have been in power for thirteen years. Hague said the
state of the economy would play a role and he suspected Brown’s strategy would
be to cast an economic downturn as international in nature and not the product
of any of his actions. Hague said the polls showed the British public is “less
hostile” to the Conservative Party and, while he is optimistic about Cameron’s
chances, said it is also likely the Conservatives will come to power as a
minority government.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶4. (C/NF) The DCM asked Hague how the Conservatives viewed Afghanistan,
recognizing that Cameron believes policy toward that country will be at the top
of his agenda. Hague said there was no great difference between the
Conservatives and HMG when it came to foreign policy. There were skirmishes
about the EU but otherwise there was agreement. The Conservatives, said Hague,
“would be hard pressed to part with HMG policy where British troops are
concerned.” Thus any criticism of current Afghanistan policy would be muted.
Hague said there was concern about marrying NATO and political goals. He mused
that some expert on the country suggested that, at some future date,
administrative control of Kabul and the North would be separated from the less
plausible goal of administering the South, but he was not advocating such a
shift at this, or any near, date.
National Security
-----------------
¶5. (C/NF) The DCM asked Hague what he thought of Brown’s national security
strategy, which had been released the day before. Hague said it was “more a
worthy list of goals than a strategy.” Without having studied it in detail,
there was little in it with which the Tories would disagree, said Hague. He
thought Brown had not gone far enough. The Conservatives themselves are in the
process of conceiving a national security strategy. They will call for an
American-style National Security Council, not just the creation of a panel of
senior advisors to inform the Prime Minister. Hague added that other domestic
security initiatives launched by Brown, like the creation of a Border Service,
were also thin. He said the Conservatives wanted to stop spending money on the
creation of a national identity card, for example, and use that money to build a
“real border and customs police where we actually track who leaves the
LONDON 00000930 002 OF 002
country.”
Is the Relationship Still Special?

----------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) The DCM asked Hague whether the relationship between the UK and the
U.S. was “still special.” Hague said he, David Cameron and George Osborne were
“children of Thatcher” and staunch Atlanticists. Speaking more broadly, Hague
acknowledged that this was a hard question to answer. Politicians, in his view,
“sit at the top of the pyramid” of the general public and it is unclear whether
the British people will maintain the network of ties to America that has
sustained the special relationship. For his part, said Hague, he has a sister
who is American, spends his own vacations in America, and, like many similar to
him, considers America the “other country to turn to.” Asking his Senior Advisor
her views, Helic (who is Bosnian), said, “America is the essential country.”
Hague said whoever enters 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister soon learns of the
essential nature of the relationship with America. He added, “we want a pro-
American regime. We need it. The world needs it.”
cfm Tuttle
Viewing cable 08RIYADH649, SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR

PRINCES ON SAUDI
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2648
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RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I

SATTERFIELD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2018

TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IZ PGOV PREL MOPS SA IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and

General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd
al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General
Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd
al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during
their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior
Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all
making essentially the same points. They said that the
Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an
embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are
satisfied that the security situation has improved and the
Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all
Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian
influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility
regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance
for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the
Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel
al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by
the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and
al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce
changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to
Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.
Positive Signs in Iraq
¶2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress
in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in
Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in
Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the
Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion
away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was
described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls
were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying
Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically
al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias,
especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations
unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in
Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all
their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to
join us in supporting Iraq.
The Saudi Embassy Issue
¶3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince

Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an
ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near
future, citing both security and political grounds in support
of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had
considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi
diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi
embassy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go
any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a
separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in
Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi
ambassador there. "He would immediately become a target for
the terrorists and the militias," he said.
¶4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending
a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential
political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to
resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed
lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to
resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts
about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to
his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he
does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had
"lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain
actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say
precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have
been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules
Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.
¶5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King

did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to
Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider
RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003
doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the

autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate
whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in
ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the
Shia, King Abdullah asserted.
Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq
¶6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential

softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's
problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with
the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself
admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved
in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that
al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting
extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and
Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However,
the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would
be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi
behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that
much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is
attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi
attitudes.
¶7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG
should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a
unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different
Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in
blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited
directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince
Saud al-Faisal said.
Possible Saudi Economic Assistance
¶8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all
suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to
consider the provision of economic and humanitarian
assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of
assistance that the US government would like to see the
Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that
this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in
aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid
Conference but still not delivered due to security worries.
He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million
in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with
strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank
would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi
government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be
in the range of $75-$300 million.
Possible Debt Relief
¶9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will
come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir
told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He
also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to
its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt
relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.
The Need to Resist Iran
¶10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and

Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate
with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence
and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on
this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well.
Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US
to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons
program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he
recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to
roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority
for the King and his government.
¶11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called

instead for much more severe US and international sanctions
on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on
bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing
that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval.
The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military
pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.
RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003
¶12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King
on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That
said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are
eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian
encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador
Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign
Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever,
the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new
measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although
further discussions will be required to make these ideas a
reality. End Comment.
¶13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus.
GFOELLER
Viewing cable 08STATE37957, POSSIBLE RELEASE OF A.Q. KHAN
Discussing cables
http://www.nytimes.com
VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #7957 1012232

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 102226Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PK PREL
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RELEASE OF A.Q. KHAN
Classified By: SCA Richard A. Boucher, Reasons: 1.4 B C AND D
--------------------------
SUMMARY AND Action request
--------------------------
¶1. (C) Washington is concerned that the government of

Pakistan may release A.Q. Khan. Washington requests Post to
please draw from points in para 4, as appropriate, with
senior government officials including the Director General of
Strategic Plans Division Lt. Gen (retd) Kidwai.
End summary and action request.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶2. (S/NF) Post should achieve the following objectives:
-- Inquire about the accuracy of press reports indicating

that Dr. Khan will soon be released from house arrest.
-- Express Washington,s strong opposition to the release of

Dr. Khan and urge the Government of Pakistan to continue
holding him under house arrest.,
-- Explain the possible negative consequences that the

release of Dr. Khan will have on Pakistan,s image in the
international community. Note that it would undermine the
positive steps Pakistan has taken on nonproliferation.
-- Urge Pakistan to consider the long-term gains it could

garner from the international community by continuing Dr.
Khan,s current status rather than the short-term domestic
political gains that could result from his release.
End objectives.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶3. (S/NF) Recent press reports indicate a plan for Dr.

Khan,s release was approved for delivery to Prime Minister
Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani. We should determine the accuracy of
the reports and clearly indicate to the new government, as
well as Director General Kidwai, our strong opposition to
Khan,s release. Dr. Khan was the central figure in the most
egregious violation of nonproliferation norms to date and his
release would likely indicate to the international community
a disregard by Pakistan for the dire threat still posed to
international security by Dr. Khan,s activities. It could
also undermine ongoing prosecution efforts underway in other
countries to punish Khan associates and would be a setback to
our ongoing bilateral nonproliferation efforts with Pakistan.
End background.
--------------
Talking Points
--------------
¶4. (S/Rel Pakistan) Begin Talking Points for Pakistan:
-- Pakistan has taken positive steps over the past few years
to demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation, including
enacting its 2004 export control law, establishing the
Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), and joining the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
-- We are deeply troubled by press reports that Pakistan may

consider releasing Dr. Khan. We hope that these press
reports are not accurate.
-- We urge you not to change Dr. Khan,s current status.

While the release of Dr. Khan would be viewed positively by
some in Pakistan, it would undermine Pakistan,s broader
nonproliferation efforts and signal to the international
community that Pakistan is no longer concerned about the harm
caused by Dr. Khan and his network.
-- When Dr. Khan was pardoned by President Musharraf,

Pakistan was widely criticized in the international community
for not having prosecuted him or anyone else associated with
his proliferation activities.
-- The damage done to international security by Dr. Khan and

his associates is not a closed book. Other countries
continue efforts to prosecute those involved. The U.S., and
other countries, as well as the IAEA, are expending enormous
amounts of time and resources to address the threats that
resulted from Dr. Khan,s engagement with Iran, North Korea,
and possibly other states.
-- Because of Khan,s actions, the international community

must contend with the reality that the uranium enrichment
technology and nuclear weapons designs that were sold to
Libya are now available to other states and non-state actors.
This will make it much harder to combat nuclear
proliferation in the future.
-- The U.S. and Pakistan have worked together to address the

problems caused by Dr. Khan,s proliferation to other
countries and we look forward to our continued close
cooperation on this and other related issues.
End talking points for Pakistan.
------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------
¶5. (U) Please report response if possible by April 17, 2008.
----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------
¶6. (U) Department point of contact is Chris Herrington

ISN/CPI, 647-5035. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and
SCA. Washington appreciates Post,s assistance.
RICE
Viewing cable 08CAIRO1067, CODEL BAIRD MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN
LEADERS ON MARGINS
Discussing cables
08CAIRO1067 2008-05-27 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO3741
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1067/01 1481153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271153Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001067
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, H
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2018

TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EG
SUBJECT: CODEL BAIRD MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN LEADERS ON MARGINS
OF WEF
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Codel Baird discussed Egyptian and regional

issues with Egypt's political and business leaders on the
margins of the May 18 - 20 World Economic Forum (WEF) in
Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. President Mubarak, Intelligence
Chief Omar Soliman, and presidential son Gamal Mubarak
focused on the need for deep engagement to resolve the
Israeli/Palestinian crisis and to hinder Iran's growing
influence in the region. On Iraq, Mubarak said "you cannot
leave" but advised strengthening the military and allowing a
"fair" dictator to come to power via a coup. "Forget
democracy," he opined, "the Iraqis are too tough by nature."
On the economic side, Egypt's business leaders regretted the
lack of a U.S.-Egypt free trade agreement and asked the U.S.
to push Egypt harder on good governance and democratic
reform. Codel Baird consisted of Representatives Brian Baird
(D-WA), Christopher Shays (R-CT), Peter DeFazio (D-OR), Jeff
Fortenberry (R-NE), and Jim Cooper (D-TN); Representative
Jane Harman (D-CA) joined the codel briefly on May 18. End
summary.
President Mubarak
-----------------
¶2. (C) The codel began by thanking Mubarak for his positive
leadership on regional issues. Mubarak said that he had
advised Vice President Cheney and other U.S. officials not to
invade Iraq and that "no one listened," but that now "it
would be a mistake" to withdraw forces immediately because it
would further open the door for Iran. Asked about U.S.-Egypt
relations, Mubarak confirmed that "we have very good
relations with the U.S.," but "your administration is not
well-informed." However, "I am patient by nature," he said,
in apparent reference to U.S. criticisms over human rights
and democratization. Congressman Shays encouraged Mubarak
to engage with Iraq as much as possible and asked if Egypt
would send an ambassador, to which Mubarak replied "no, I
cannot do it. When there is stability I am willing, but I
cannot force civilians to go."
¶3. (C) Asked about Egypt's reaction if Iran developed nuclear

weapons capability, Mubarak said that none will accept a
nuclear Iran, "we are all terrified." Mubarak said that when
he spoke with former Iranian President Khatami he told him to
tell current President Ahmedinejad "not to provoke the
Americans" on the nuclear issue so that the U.S. is not
forced to strike. Mubarak said that Egypt might be forced to
begin its own nuclear weapons program if Iran succeeds in
those efforts.
¶4. (C) Asked about whether the U.S. should set a timeline for
withdrawal from Iraq, Mubarak said "you cannot leave" because
"you would leave Iran in control." Mubarak explained his
recipe for a way forward: "strengthen the armed forces, relax
your hold, and then you will have a coup. Then we will have
a dictator, but a fair one. Forget democracy, the Iraqis are
by their nature too tough."
Omar Soliman
------------
¶5. (C) Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) chief

Omar Soliman gave the codel an expansive evaluation of the
key issues in the region. He focused on Iran's growing
influence in Iraq, with Hamas, with Hizballah in Lebanon, and
with Shia communities in the Gulf. To solve regional
problems Egypt is working on three tracks - Palestine,
Lebanon, and Iraq.
¶6. (C) Egypt hopes to achieve something soon on the

Palestinian track, he said, but neither side is ready to stop
the vicious circle of violence, although most on both sides
want "quiet." Soliman's job now, he said, is to bridge the
gaps on specific issues like border crossings, prisoner
exchange, and bringing Hamas and the PA back together. He
hoped to see an agreement on borders for a Palestinian state
by the end of 2008, and noted that as a practical matter very
few Palestinian refugees would seek right of return.
¶7. (C) On Lebanon, speaking a week before the Doha agreement

was penned, Soliman said the three problems are Syria's large
influence, lack of power of the majority over militia forces,
and weak Arab support for the government. Syria is seeking a
deal with Israel and the U.S. over returning the Golan and
canceling the Hariri tribunal to lessen its meddling and
Lebanon needs a strong, nationalist army. Soliman bemoaned
that the Arab states have too poor relations with Syria to
CAIRO 00001067 002 OF 002
push them effectively.
¶8. (C) On Iraq, Egypt meets regularly with Jordan, Saudi

Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Turkey to discuss reducing Iranian
influence. The GOI must understand it has support from the
Arabs and the U.S., not just Iran, he said. Soliman
advocated making Iran suffer economically to be "too busy
with its people" to make problems in Iraq. Reducing Iranian
influence will help the Iraqi government become one, and not
a competition between Sunni and Shi'a. he said.
¶9. (C) Asked about the consequences of any U.S. strike on

Iranian nuclear capabilities, Soliman said such an attack
would not destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities and would only
unite Iranians with their leadership and against the U.S. He
repeated the need to make Iran "busy with its people" by
effective sanctions, citing the successful example of Libya.
Asked about Sudan, he said that Egypt is still working to
make north-south unity attractive, and to encourage talks
between the GOS and rebels and between Bashir and Deby.
¶10. (C) Asked what it means when Arabs say that the U.S.
"should listen to us," Soliman gave the example that
President Mubarak warned Vice President Cheney about the
consequences of the U.S. invading Iraq. Additionally, "your
unilateral positions on economic aid are difficult."
However, Soliman emphasized that Egypt is keen to continue to
have a "very close" relationship with the U.S.
Gamal Mubarak
-------------
¶11. (C) Gamal opined that the "battle lines are clearer for
Egypt than ever before" on regional issues. The region "will
not realize its full potential as long as geopolitical
problems continue," he said. With the Israeli/Palestinian
problem in particular, "we are racing against time." Gamal
advocated close engagement by the U.S., Egypt, and other
countries (NFI) in order to make practical improvements in
the every day lives of Palestinians and develop a framework
for a final deal, with borders as the key issue. Other
regional issues such as Iran and Lebanon are "much more
complicated," he said; "the picture is not that rosy."
¶12. (C) Representative Baird raised the issue of USAID

efforts to assist conservation of Red Sea reefs, which Gamal
agreed was an important issue. Representative Shays asked
Gamal's opinion of Syria President Bashar Al Assad, to which
Gamal replied that "he understands the world better than his
father," but that he is worried that opening up politically
or economically could result in a loss of control.
¶13. (C) Representative Harman asked for Egypt to do more to

fight smuggling to Gaza through tunnels, perhaps by setting
up roadblocks a few miles before the border to intercept
contraband. Gamal said that the border is a "shared concern"
and Egypt is doing what it can to address smuggling.
¶14. (C) Representative Fortenberry asked about how to counter

a developing Iranian nuclear program. Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, as well as Jordan, are the "heavyweights" that can
counter Iran, Gamal said, but he advocated movement on the
Israeli/Palestinian track to remove a prime issue that Iran
can use as a pretext.
American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt

-------------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) The AmCham group led by President Omar Mohanna

(Suez Cement) lamented that the lack of a U.S.-Egypt FTA
continues to push Egypt's trade towards Europe and away from
the U.S. They praised the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ)
program and advocated expanding it to upper Egypt, though
they acknowledged that increasing Egyptian textile exports to
the U.S. would be a sensitive issue in the U.S. textile
lobby. Karim Ramadan (Microsoft) praised the historic role
of USAID in Egypt and asked that it continue with a focus on
education and health, areas in particular need of development
in Egypt.
SCOBEY
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD1998, CODEL SCHIFF MEETS WITH PPP

LEADER ZARDARI:
Discussing cables
2008-05-30 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO7381
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1998/01 1511603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301603Z MAY 08
Friday, 30 May 2008, 16:03

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: CODEL SCHIFF MEETS WITH PPP LEADER ZARDARI:
POLITICAL MOVES AND BALANCING AID
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: On May 26, Codel Schiff -- U.S. Representatives Adam Schiff (D-
CA) and Allyson Schwartz (D-PA) -- met with Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Co-
Chairman Asif Zardari, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, NSA Ambassador
Mahmud Ali Durrani and Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Husain Haqqani. Zardari
thanked the Codel for USG support of credible national elections. As he has
previously, he committed Pakistan to the war on terror, insisting this was
Pakistan’s fight. He argued more needed to be done by the U.S. and international
community to promote economic development in the frontier. Building on that
point, Zardari suggested a new blend of USG assistance, increasing aid to
“civilian forces” like the police and promoting civilian engagement. He warned
that public opinion was unalterably against President Pervez Musharraf and that,
for the sake of the new GOP, Musharraf needed to contemplate an “honorable
exit.” End summary.
“We are because of you.”
------------------------
¶2. (C) Meeting May 26 in Islamabad, U.S. Representatives Schiff and Schwartz
met with PPP leader Zardari and his foreign policy team. Zardari thanked the USG
for its support of credible parliamentary elections, which brought his party to
power: “We are here because of you.” Zardari noted that his late wife, Benazir
Bhutto, maintained close relations with many of member of Congress, and he
encouraged more codel visits to Pakistan to improve mutual understanding.
Pakistan’s War
--------------
¶3. (C) As he has before, Zardari stressed that the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
was “Pakistan’s war.” The fall of Bhutto’s second government was financed by
Osama bin Laden, he claimed, noting that she and her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
were assassinated by religious extremists. But counterterrorism initiatives
lacked popular Pakistani support, Zardari lamented, and terrorism fostered
profiteers who had an interest in the struggle continuing.
¶4. (C) Zardari argued that Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif
had “walked into the vacuum” as opposition leader when Bhutto was assassinated
just weeks before national elections. For stability, however, the PPP continued
to cooperate with the PML-N at the federal and Punjab provincial levels.
¶5. (C) Zardari described the general distrust of the U.S. by the public and in
political circles, “fearing you will leave us again.” Post 9/11, however, he
believed this was no longer an option; the USG would have to make a commitment
of decades, calling for a Marshall Plan for Pakistan. There were already success
stories, noting that his progressive PPP even won a National Assembly seat from
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
¶6. (C) Zardari advocated attacking the root cause of radical insurgency:
economic under-development. He lobbied the Representatives to quickly take up
and pass reconstruction opportunity zone (ROZ) legislation. There should be U.S.
tax breaks for companies producing “made in Pakistan” products, noting that
Pakistan’s textile industry would be more competition to other countries than to
U.S. manufacturers. Without creating more jobs, Pakistan just could not match
the taliban’s reported USD 300 per month to tribals in the frontier regions. The
tribals, though, wanted peace, Zardari claimed.
A New Blend
-----------
¶7. (C) Asked if he felt USG assistance over the past seven years had been
military heavy, Zardari noted that democracy promotion had been the smallest
component of aid. He quickly added that military aid was still badly needed but
more should also go to “civilian forces,” e.g., police. USG assistance should
support social development, e.g., more higher education scholarships to
Pakistanis studying in the
ISLAMABAD 00001998 002 OF 002
U.S. All in all, he wanted to see more civilian engagement than military-to-
military exchanges. Zardari also said he wanted the U.N. (with support from the
U.S. and other western countries) to establish a compensatory fund for the
families of the victims of terrorist acts.
On Musharraf
------------
¶8. (C) Transitioning, Zardari blamed President Pervez Musharraf for not taking
enough responsibility for the GWOT in Pakistan; the public, instead, believed
Pakistanis were dying for the U.S. Zardari then said, “Anti-U.S. feelings will
go away when the old faces go away,” adding that the USG should no longer rely
on just Musharraf in fighting radicalism.
¶9. (C) Zardari admitted that his public statements in the last week had been
more anti-Musharraf. He was afraid that he and his party were losing popular
support, while Nawaz was able to pretend to be the populist by supporting
restoration of the pre-November 3 judges. “But he doesn’t want the Chief Justice
(Iftikhar Chaudhry) back in, just Musharraf out.” Zardari revealed that he hoped
to discuss privately with Musharraf the possibility of an “honorable exit” and
believed Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Ashfaq Kayani would stay out of such
political discussions.
¶10. (C) Zardari feared, however, that Musharraf was misguided by “smooth-
talking advisors,” who were protecting their own personal interests. The public
was against the President, the institution and the man, adding the PPP needed to
“change the face of Pakistan” or it too would be kicked out of power. “We won’t
act without consulting with you,” Zardari concluded.
¶11. (U) Codel Schiff did not clear this cable.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08PARIS957, YOUR JUNE 14-16 VISIT TO PARIS
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7670
OO RUEHBC RUEHBW RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0957/01 1401441
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMRE/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE PRIORITY 2002
RUEHSR/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG PRIORITY 0574
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR STAPLETON
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2018

TAGS ECON, FINR, KPAL, NATO, OVIP, PGOF, PREL, PTER, SENV,
AF, CH, CO, FR, IR, IS, IZ, LE, LG, RS, SR, SU, YI
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 14-16 VISIT TO PARIS
PARIS 00000957 001.2 OF 008
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)
SUMMARY
---------------------------
¶1. (C) Mr. President, you will arrive in France as Nicolas Sarkozy begins the
second year of a five-year term as President. You will meet a Sarkozy chastened
by the experience of a first year marked by a sharp drop in his political stock
at home, but during which he nevertheless reclaimed French leadership in Europe
and moved France closer to the U.S. Sarkozy was elected in May 2007 on a
platform of fundamental domestic reform, promising to unleash France’s economic
potential and to adapt the country to globalization. He has undertaken a range
of domestic reforms but the results have been somewhat disappointing -- to
supporters who advocated more daring implementation of a more ambitious set of
measures, and to a public that expected an immediate positive impact in
household purchasing power. Though the public by and large continues to support
Sarkozy’s reform effort, his personal popularity has plummeted, mostly as a
result of his “unpresidential” parading of his personal life and his weakness
for glitz -- an image he is now seeking to repair.
¶2. (C) Sarkozy was not elected on a foreign policy platform, but this is where
he has thus far left his clearest mark, repositioning France to work alongside
the U.S. to meet common challenges and leading Europe to its next institutional
advance in the form of the Lisbon Treaty. While stressing France’s independence
of action, Sarkozy has sought to enlarge French influence by working
constructively with the U.S., setting aside France’s Gaullist vocation of
tempering the United States’ “hegemonic” position in world affairs. This
“repositioning” (Sarkozy’s term) vis-a- vis the U.S. is seen most clearly in
Sarkozy’s articulation of the stakes for France, NATO and the West in
Afghanistan, his commitment of more troops to NATO’s stabilization efforts
there, and his declared intention to re-join NATO’s integrated military command
structure in the context of an invigorated European effort on defense. Your
visit provides an opportunity to support and give further impetus to Sarkozy’s
refashioning of the U.S.-French relationship, and to demonstrate to the French
public that Sarkozy was right in positing that a closer relationship with us
increases France’s influence without undermining its independence. A discussion
of France’s approach to key international issues closes out this message. END
SUMMARY.
SARKOZY’S LEADERSHIP: FRANCE

------------------------------
¶3. (C) It remains to be seen if Nicolas Sarkozy will prove able to reform
France economically and socially, unleash its competitive potential, and help it
embrace globalization. Sarkozy was elected president in May 2007 on a wave of
public recognition of the need for such change and enthusiasm for Sarkozy as the
person to bring it about. After a year in office Sarkozy has undertaken many of
the across-the-board reforms he promised, but the effect -- particularly with
regard to the critical issue of purchasing power -- has yet to be felt by the
French public. Widespread disappointment with the meager results of reform,
along with dismay at Sarkozy’s penchant for a flashy, “unpresidential”
lifestyle, has driven down Sarkozy’s approval ratings, now stuck below forty
percent. Notwithstanding his personal unpopularity, Sarkozy’s reform policies
still enjoy broad public support. It remains to be seen if he can summon
sufficient authority to implement a package of reforms that will produce the
desired impact by the end of his term. Sarkozy believes he can: You will be
meeting an embattled, but determined president, who remains primarily focused on
delivering what he promised in his campaign -- modernizing and economically
liberating France -- and who is determined to succeed, deploying the
considerable, largely unchecked powers of the French Presidency.
¶4. (C) Sarkozy’s first year in office is the story of how a spectacularly
successful presidential candidacy gave way to a
PARIS 00000957 002.2 OF 008
spectacularly unpopular presidency. The collusion and antagonism between Sarkozy
and the media are key, persistent themes of this story. For the first six months
of his administration (May - October) Sarkozy enjoyed the longest political
honeymoon and best polls of any French Presidency on record. He dominated the
French political landscape, personally driving all government policies and
setting the tone for the media’s coverage of his national and international
presidential activities. Then (from November through February), in a major
miscalculation in image management, Sarkozy paraded for media coverage his
billonaire-life-style affair with former supermodel and current First Lady Carla
Bruni-Tedeschi, whom he married within weeks of meeting her following his
divorce from his second wife, Cecelia Sarkozy. The media that he had drawn in to
project himself as a hyper-energetic, no-nonsense reformer dedicated to solving
the problems of ordinary French people, took its vengeance, portraying Sarkozy
as a vulgar, insecure celebrity-worshipper focused only on himself and his place
in the limelight. The ensuing, widespread sense among the public that Sarkozy
didn’t really care about the problems of ordinary people sent the president’s
popularity plummeting. (His cause was not helped either by the embarrassing
week-long visit to Paris last fall by Libyan leader Qadhafi, whose
pronouncements and antics chipped away the notion that Sarkozy’s approach to
such leaders and to human rights issues would be markedly different from his
predecessor’s -- and contrasted sharply with Sarkozy’s earlier public
pronouncements.)
¶5. (C) Since March Sarkozy has sought to reassure his partisans and the country
that he remains committed to reform, despite setbacks, and that he has drawn
appropriate conclusions concerning the visibility of his private life. Sarkozy
re-fashioned his image, hewing somewhat more closely to public expectations for
French presidents as soberly distant, near-regal figures who officiate at civic
rituals. This return of a more traditional presidency has coincided with Prime
Minister Fillon’s emergence from under the shadow of Sarkozy as a national
leader in his own right and of the Fillon government’s ministers finding firmer
footing as policymakers and implementers of reform. In a prime-time television
appearance in April, Sarkozy re-launched reform, promising his continued,
personal engagement. However, any return to the political dominance Sarkozy once
enjoyed will be very difficult, will take time, and will depend largely on
showing results -- reforms that enhance the prosperity and opportunities of
ordinary citizens. In sum, his first year in office has highlighted three
Sarkozys who will likely continue to co-exist through the end of his term: the
hyper-activist reformer and commanding political figure, the self-absorbed and
frenetic individual, and the statesman, matured by the exigencies and burdens of
office, who perseveres to achieve his leadership vision.
SARKOZY’S LEADERSHIP: U.S.-FRANCE

-----------------------------
¶6. (C) France remains a world power and a leader of Europe. With global
military and diplomatic reach, it generates significant economic wealth and
still enjoys envied cultural prestige. Even though he was not elected on a
foreign policy platform, Sarkozy’s most significant achievement thus far is his
re-positioning of France to work alongside the U.S. to solve problems, removing
the Gaullist imperative of keeping a critical distance from Washington. From the
outset of his presidency, Sarkozy was intent on improving relations with the
U.S. and, more broadly, bringing France back -- as he put it in a key foreign
policy address -- to full membership in the “the West’s family” of democratic
nations. Sarkozy considers the re-positioning of France alongside the U.S. -- no
longer advocating alternative poles to American leadership -- will increase
France’s influence as we together address the grave challenges facing the
international order. Sarkozy identifies those challenges as religion-based
political extremism, nuclear proliferation, non-inclusion of the world’s poor in
economic integration, and environmental catastrophe. In addition, he sees
bringing France and the U.S. together as historically fitting and proper. This
stems
PARIS 00000957 003.2 OF 008
both from Sarkozy’s full appreciation of the significance for France of
liberation from Nazi occupation in World War II and from his personal
identification with American social values, in particular, individual
opportunity and achievement.
¶7. (C) Sarkozy’s leadership in reinvigorating the bilateral relationship was

marked both by powerfully symbolic gestures and concrete actions. Sarkozy’s
trips to the U.S., including a vacation in New Hampshire last August and an
official visit in November, clearly signaled the renewal of trust and friendship
between the U.S. and France. Sarkozy said, in the opening of his November 7
speech before a joint session of Congress, “Friendship, first and foremost means
being true to one’s friends” and France and the U.S. are friends that “have
always stood side by side, supported one another, helped one another, fought for
one another’s freedom.” Figuring prominently among Sarkozy’s gestures that
signaled a new French understanding of key U.S. policies were the dispatch,
after your meeting with him in Kennebunkport, of his foreign minister to Iraq
and his own Christmas Eve visit to Afghanistan.
¶8. (C) At the Bucharest Summit, when you last met with him, Sarkozy repeated
his intention to “renovate” France’s relationship with NATO and to increase its
commitment of troops under NATO command in Afghanistan. He was vague, however,
as to the exact timing of NATO re-integration, and he understated the size of
the French reinforcement for Afghanistan, announcing only the 700-person
battalion that will be sent to RC-East. He did not publicly mention the
additional 300-350 troops France will send to Kabul in July when it assumes RC-
Capital command there (or the possibility of dispatching special operations
forces sometime later). Sarkozy’s public caution on NATO and Afghanistan
reflects his sensitivity to recent criticism that he is aligning France across
the board with the U.S. It also demonstrates how his current unpopularity has
weakened his ability to brave the opprobrium of the Gaullist conservatives,
including many in his own administration. Sarkozy’s commitment to a more
Altanticist France is not in question. But he does have to factor in the
political caution of many around him (including Prime Minister Fillon) and the
continuing strength of the Gaullist consensus among the public at large.
Finally, a largely powerless Socialist Party-led opposition has found a voice
criticizing Sarkozy over Afghanistan and NATO, even if it does not have the
political muscle to throw him off course.
WHAT WE CAN DO FOR HIM

-------------------------
¶9. (C) You and Sarkozy have brought about an important shift on the world
scene: France and the U.S. are acting together in a way they were not before his
election on May 6, 2007. Giving Sarkozy full credit for his leadership and
bolstering his stature as a world leader of vision and consequence, would be the
best way to solidify France’s new orientation. We have sought French Government
support on a range of issues over the year since Sarkozy became President. The
French have responded more positively than in the past, consistent with the
Sarkozy-directed shift to a closer and more harmonious working relationship.
Your visit would be the best opportunity to show the French we value that
relationship and wish to build on it in such a way that it serves our collective
and individual interests. Your praise of France’s efforts to improve the
relationship will have greatest impact if it is coupled with an acknowledgment
of its legitimate role in the resolution of the issues that matter most to the
French -- beginning with Lebanon, Palestinian-Israeli peace, Iran and Kosovo.
The greater the specificity in describing a French role, the greater the impact.
This would also be an opportunity to express your support for Sarkozy’s vision
of an effective Europe, as you did in Bucharest, by endorsing the further
development of the EU’s defense capabilities alongside NATO -- demonstrating
that closeness to the U.S. and sensitivity to U.S. priorities pay off and result
in more, not less, influence for France.
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

PARIS 00000957 004.2 OF 008
------------------------
¶10. (U) Discussion follows of France’s approach to key international issues and
how the visit might be used to advance our bilateral cooperation toward the
achievement of our policy objectives.
¶11. (S/NF) IRAN: The French are the most tough-minded of our allies, and
Sarkozy has more than erased the doubt in France’s position stemming from
Chirac’s ill-advised public equanimity about a likely Iranian nuclear
capability. Sarkozy’s hard line has negatively impacted on France’s bilateral
relationship with Tehran, and France has paid a commercial price, although the
Iranians, more than the French, are the ones seeking to preserve some sort of
discreet channel between Paris and Tehran. France has hammered away at other EU
countries concerned about protecting their economic interests to implement
measures to enforce UN sanctions and complementary EU sanctions. Despite the
overall positive French position on Iran, they were very upset over what they
considered our maladroit handling of the release of the NIE last fall on Iran’s
nuclear program. This, in their view, greatly complicated the P-5 plus 1’s
efforts to pass UNSCR 1803 and maintain a solid front in the face of Iranian
intransigence. The French share our skepticism about ElBaradei and the IAEA.
Given an unchanged French estimate of Iran’s nuclear capabilities (perhaps more
influenced by Israel’s), Sarkozy will listen carefully to your views on the way
forward with Iran. He and many other French policymakers share our concerns
about the regional threat Iran poses in the Gulf, Iraq, and Lebanon.
¶12. (C/NF) NATO: President Sarkozy,s closest advisors have made clear that he
has already made the decision for France to rejoin NATO,s integrated military
command. However, he faces opposition and reluctance, including from within his
own party, as many prominent French policy makers cling to the self-image of an
independent France as symbolized by its singular position in NATO. The grand
bargain -- a full return to NATO in return for a U.S. embrace of an enhanced EU
role in European defense ) is viewed as essential to make the move politically
palatable to the broader French public. For this reason, President Sarkozy was
deeply grateful for your support at Bucharest. French officials are preparing to
make European defense a priority of the EU presidency in the second half of this
year, and are tentatively citing the 60th anniversary NATO summit as the target
date for a French announcement on reintegration. As noted above, a further
statement during the visit of U.S. support for a strengthened European defense
would be welcome as Sarkozy seeks to move forward on NATO. The French continue
to doubt Georgia’s and Ukraine’s readiness for MAP, but have not completely
closed the door to a NATO Ministerial decision granting MAP to one or both of
them in December.
¶13. (C) AFGHANISTAN: At the Bucharest NATO summit, Sarkozy publicly announced
700 new troops for Afghanistan, a supplemental battalion for RC-East. As noted,
in July France will also be adding some 300-350 troops to bolster the French
presence in Kabul, as France assumes command of RC-Central beginning this
summer. Finally, a deployment of Special Forces may also still be on the table,
although not before the July reinforcement of France’s command presence in
Kabul. Although still the largest increase announced at Bucharest, Sarkozy
understated France’s additional contribution in the face of rising public and
political opposition. (Most polling shows only a minority of the French public
supports increased deployments to Afghanistan, and there is little public
appreciation of the stakes involved.) To increase support for Afghanistan, the
French government is co-hosting the Afghanistan support conference, to take
place on the eve of your visit. The conference will follow up on the 2006 London
donor,s conference and address broader questions of counter-narcotics, effective
distribution of aid, good governance and anti-corruption efforts. Your public
statements need to address the widespread perception that the international
effort in Afghanistan is failing and explain why success there must be a
European imperative.
PARIS 00000957 005.2 OF 008
¶14. (C) IRAQ: French reluctance to commit military troops to Iraq remains a
constant, as does France’s hesitation to increase bilateral assistance or
engagement as long as the security situation and prospects for national
reconciliation are seen as fragile. The French have, however, begun to re-
engage, opening an embassy office in the Kurdish city of Irbil (which they have
suggested would be used as a national center for training and assistance). FM
Kouchner participated in the last two “neighbors” meetings as a means of
encouraging Arab states to shore up diplomatic and other relations with Baghdad.
France staunchly backs UNAMI and the idea of the UN leading international
reconstruction in Iraq. The French have not, however, had much success achieving
a significant change of view within the EU and may use their upcoming presidency
to push harder. Commercial ties are growing, but only slowly. The French are
eager to talk about Iraq, but we need to do more by way of a sustained and
realistic dialogue. Iraq Coordinator David Satterfield started such a dialogue
last December, but we should consider intensifying it and making it more of an
interagency undertaking, with State and DoD in the lead. French concerns about
Iran’s role in radicalizing Shi’a elements in Iraq and elsewhere is something we
should factor into these discussions.
¶15. (C) LEBANON/SYRIA: They French Presidency learned its lesson from its
failed attempt to work with Syria late last year to secure election of a new
president in Lebanon. France has resisted repeated Syrian appeals to resume that
effort or start a new one and the French have publicly blamed Syria for the
continued impasse. However, they are out of ideas as far as how best to move
things forward and have adopted the public line that the only diplomatic
initiative in play is the one the Arab League (with Syria’s assent) adopted. The
recent fighting in Lebanon saw the French at once eager to work with us but
determined to seek as a priority the minimum necessary to calm the situation and
resume dialogue among the parties; the safety of their UNIFIL contingent weighed
heavily in their policy deliberations. The current crisis has underscored a key
divergence in the French approach from ours, i.e., the degree to which it
supports the majority March 14 movement as well as the Lebanese government.
Repeatedly, the French have asserted that they support the government led by PM
Siniora but do not accept that the movement behind him, which they see as one
unstable faction among many, deserves the same full support. Maintaining a
channel to Hizballah, which Sarkozy and Kouchner have called a terrorist
organization despite French reluctance to designate it as such, is another
reason the French refuse to “take sides” in a way that would put pressure on
Hizballah despite their firm view that March 8 and the Syrians are responsible
for Lebanon’s political stalemate. Despite frequent tactical disagreements at
the UN, we and the French largely share the same view that it is vital that the
UN investigation into the many political assassinations in Lebanon lead as
rapidly as possible to indictments and prosecution. Your visit offers an
important opportunity for policy coordination.
¶16. (C) ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE: As always, France remains eager to play an

important role in bringing peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Under
Sarkozy, the French needling of the U.S. and Israel has largely disappeared from
the government’s daily script. The French hope that Sarkozy’s warm embrace of
Israel (unprecedented over the past fifty years), and his strategic
rapprochement with the U.S., have increased its credibility as a partner in
peace-making. It was in this context that the French offered to follow up the
Annapolis conference with a donors conference in Paris. Sarkozy, who is an
unabashed admirer of Israel but keen that Palestinians are treated justly, will
listen carefully to what you have to tell him about your recent visit to the
region and how his own Middle East trip at the end of June can reinforce your
message to the parties.
¶17. (C) KOSOVO: France recognized Kosovo,s independence immediately, but is

hesitant about full implementation due to the potentially destabilizing role of
Serbia (and Russia) in
PARIS 00000957 006.2 OF 008
the region. It is important to reassure Sarkozy that, while we must proceed with
full implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, we agree with France on the
importance of Serbia in maintaining regional stability, and that U.S. policies
will remain consistent with our vision for Euro-Atlantic integration of the
entire Western Balkans, including both Serbia and Kosovo.
¶18. (C) EU PRESIDENCY: France will chair the European Union from July to
December 2008. As President of the European Council, Sarkozy will be the most
visible face of the EU and will have a major opportunity to advance French
policy priorities. Sarkozy’s goals for France’s presidency include strengthening
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), in which he will seek to increase
European defense capabilities in parallel with normalizing France’s role in
NATO. Sarkozy’s other priorities include building a European consensus on energy
and environment, immigration, and agricultural policy, as well as developing the
Union for the Mediterranean. France seeks to create a comprehensive, cohesive
European energy policy, promoting energy security along with environmental aims
such as reduction of greenhouse gases and promotion of renewable energies.
Similarly, a common European pact on immigration would help EU member-states
present a consistent front to those seeking asylum or immigrant visas. Sarkozy
also wants to set the stage for a revision of the EU Common Agricultural Policy,
which provides French farmers with important subsidies. The French EU presidency
will also inherit ongoing initiatives, such as the internal process of
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, or simplified EU treaty, for which Sarkozy
takes credit. France will also during its presidency help shape EU responses to
crises or other foreign policy issues that may emerge. The presidency will thus
raise Sarkozy’s global visibility, increase his influence, and give him an
opportunity to improve his image as a statesman both overseas and domestically.
We enjoy good communication with the French on their EU presidency preparations,
and such openness will remain key during their presidency. Transparency
regarding defense capabilities is particularly important as we seek, with other
NATO allies, to ensure that ESDP development is carried out in harmony with
NATO. Sarkozy continues to oppose Turkey’s entry into the EU, in line with
French public opinion, but he has not sought to bring the issue to a head.
France will seek to use its influence as EU President to break through the
Turkey-Cyprus impasse on NATO/EU cooperation.
¶19. (C) UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: This new organization, Sarkozy’s
brainchild, will be established at a Paris summit meeting on July 13. Built on
existing cooperative structures, it is intended to bring the EU member-states
together with countries from around the Mediterranean basin to work on concrete
economic, environmental and infrastructure projects. The focus on specific
projects is likely to be a productive approach, for which we can signal our
interest and support. Though the U.S. would not be eligible, nor seek to join
the Union for the Mediterranean, we could eventually participate in specific
projects or work in tandem with them. Sarkozy significantly revised his initial
vision for the Union to allay the concerns of Germany and other European
partners that a new cooperative body could split or otherwise weaken the EU. The
linkage of the Union for the Mediterranean to pre-existing structures that have
by most accounts proven ineffective, coupled with a lack of public-sector funds
for the new initiative, may mean the new organization’s impact will be less than
intended.
¶20. (C) TERRORISM: Fighting terrorism remains among the GOF,s top priorities.
France is one of the few countries in Europe that &gets it,8 and remains
dedicated to increasing its capabilities ) in both defense and intelligence.
France has been a target of terrorism for decades and is Al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb’s (AQIM) number one foreign target. The improvement of our bilateral
relationship over the past year has meant more substantive discussions on many
of our common threats. The visit is an opportunity to signal to Sarkozy that the
U.S. appreciates our increased C/T cooperation and
PARIS 00000957 007.2 OF 008
would like to see that collaboration expand further.
¶21. (C) FARC HOSTAGES/BETANCOURT: Sarkozy raised the profile of the Betancourt
issue during the election campaign and over the first year of his Presidency,
hoping to accrue political credit for succeeding where his predecessors had
failed. Instead he has only raised the Betancourt’s value to the FARC as a
prisoner. The French continue to search for possible options to negotiate a
release of Franco-Colombian hostage Ingrid Betancourt (and other hostages). In
an attempt to increase international concern over Betancourt,s health and
possibly secure a hostage release, the French Government sent a medical mission
to Colombia in early April. The FARC rejected this effort, saying that any
release would have to be coordinated in advance with them. Foreign Minister
Kouchner visited Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela at the beginning of May in an
effort to find new solutions to the hostage issues; however, Kouchner told
journalists after his return that he is not optimistic that Betancourt will be
released. The French believe the Colombian airstrike on March 1 which killed
senior FARC member Paul Reyes may have derailed ongoing efforts to free
Betancourt. Sarkozy may raise his concern that the Colombian military might
undertake additional operations -- that could threaten the safety of Betancourt
-- and he may well seek your assistance in securing Betancourt’s release given
perceived U.S. influence with President Uribe.
¶22. (U) CLIMATE CHANGE: Ninety percent of the French public considers climate
change as one of the gravest issues facing mankind and many still cannot
understand why the U.S. failed to accept the Kyoto Protocol. When Sarkozy was
elected President, he challenged the U.S. to assume a leadership role. Over the
past year, the French have begun to appreciate our active engagement on this
issue. Following the U.S. proposal for a Major Economies Meeting process to
further the UN climate process, the French at first expressed a mixture of
skepticism and interest. They are now fully on board, with France hosting the
third Major Economies Meeting (and the first to be held overseas) in mid-April,
where Sarkozy made a major address. France anticipates additional productive MEM
sessions leading up to the summer’s Leaders Meeting. This does not mean that the
French share all U.S. positions in the MEM. For example, they thought our
medium-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction target (capping emissions at 2025
levels) much too modest. France will seek strong language on climate change in
the upcoming G-8 statement, in addition to the language on climate change in the
Leaders Statement under the MEM process. This would be an opportunity to
sensitize Sarkozy and the GOF further to the seriousness and breadth of U.S.
efforts.
¶23. (C) DARFUR/AFRICA: Sarkozy came to office in 2007 with an ambitious agenda
for Africa, including an international conference on Darfur that the French
hosted shortly after he became president. The French have focused on stabilizing
Chad and the Central African Republic as their response to the broader Darfur
problem. They were responsible for obtaining European approval of the French-
proposed EU peacekeeping mission in those countries, intended to complement UN
peacekeeping in Darfur. The French provided essential support to our Embassy in
Chad and to Americans in-country during the rebel attacks in February 2008.
Concurrently, the French have been working to modernize relations with Africa,
seeking to develop a more business-like model free of the trappings of the
colonial and immediate post-colonial eras. Their reflexive suspicion of U.S.
competition in Africa has diminished, especially as China’s presence and
influence has increased.
¶24. (C) CHINA: Sarkozy has tried to balance domestic political pressure to take
a tough stand on Chinese human rights violations with competing economic
interests and a strategic approach to China that favors engagement, over
isolation or alienation. He has yet to rule out boycotting the opening
ceremonies of the Olympics and has said that as France will hold the EU
Presidency during the Olympics he will consult with EU partners on the decision.
While France
PARIS 00000957 008.2 OF 008
continues to support lifting the EU arms embargo against China, it is unlikely
that it will press this issue as there is little EU support, which the
Tibet/Olympics controversy has only further dampened.
¶25. (C) RUSSIA: Sarkozy has been decidedly pragmatic in his relations with
Russia, though his advisors say he enjoys a good personal rapport with Prime
Minister Putin. The Sarkozy government has consistently been firmer than its
immediate predecessor in criticizing Russian international provocations (CFE,
Georgia) as well as domestic human rights abuses. That said, Sarkozy continues
to see his relationship with Moscow through the prism of needed cooperation with
Russia on Iran and other major international issues, and the French are
sensitive to the energy security concerns of Germany and other European
partners. We should assure Sarkozy that we are equally conscious of Russia,s
critical role in certain areas, but stress that it is not in our collective
interest to submit to deal-making with an increasingly authoritarian and
unpredictable regime in Moscow.
¶26. (C) International Economy: Elected on a platform of economic reform,

President Sarkozy has taken steps to make France,s labor market function more
efficiently and to create a more auspicious policy environment for business. But
Sarkozy,s economic instincts are Gaullist and populist, rather than free-market.
While the French government has generally been a helpful interlocutor during
recent global financial turmoil, Sarkozy has blasted &financial capitalism8 and
speculators, insisting on a need for the &moralization8 of capitalism. He has
shown a willingness to defend French national corporate champions, most recently
letting it be known that French bank Societe Generale would not be for sale to
foreigners in the wake of a large-scale trading scandal. His minister of
agriculture has used the recent spike in global food prices to call for the
strengthening -- not liberalization -- of administrative oversight of food
markets through the EU,s Common Agricultural Policy. He speaks enthusiastically
about defending EU &community preferences8 and mentions the Doha round only in
terms of defending agricultural interests (despite the considerable potential
gains for the service-oriented French economy). And he allows populist views to
prevail on agricultural biotechnology by maintaining a WTO-inconsistent ban on
MON810 corn. The French are extremely concerned about exchange rates and their
competitiveness with a weak dollar. When Prime Minister Fillon visited
Washington in May he was fishing with FRB Chairman Bernanke and Secretary
Paulson for any hints that the USG might agree to some sort of exchange rate
management or intervention. Our message to President Sarkozy should underscore
that reducing market distortions and maintaining open economies will be
essential to meeting common economic challenges and fostering long-term growth.
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 08CAIRO1637, CODEL KERRY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

MUBARAK
Discussing cables
08CAIRO1637 2008-07-31 10:10 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO0166
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1637/01 2131008
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311008Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001637
SIPDIS
NSC FOR PASCUAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018

TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL PHUM AU EG IR IS SU
SUBJECT: CODEL KERRY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey, for reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: On July 2, Senator Kerry and the Ambassador

discussed regional developments with President Hosni Mubarak,
including Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Israel-Palestine.
Mubarak said that Egypt was working to find a solution in
Sudan, but preferred to do so "quietly." Mubarak warned
against a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. While he
called Iranians "liars" and said they sponsor terrorism, he
opined that no Arab state would join the U.S. in a formal
defense alliance against Iran for fear of retaliation.
Mubarak expressed frustration with the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, and was particularly disparaging about the
lack of Palestinian unity. End summary.
-------------------
AU "Soft" on Mugabe
-------------------
¶2. (C) In a 60-minute meeting with President Mubarak in Sharm

El-Sheikh, Senator Kerry began by asking for Mubarak's views
on the discussions at the African Union Summit, which had
concluded in Sharm El-Sheikh the previous day. Mubarak said
he had been at the Summit until late in the evening and was
tired. He reported that some member states had condemned
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, while others told him to
form a national unity government and find a role for the
opposition parties. Mubarak said he couldn't prevent Mugabe
from attending the conference in Egypt because Zimbabwe is a
member of the African Union. He said the British were behind
this "big fuss" and that the pressure from other African
leaders was "sufficiently soft that Mugabe can do what he
wants."
-------------------------------
Sudan: Quiet Diplomacy Is Best
-------------------------------
¶3. (C) In response to Senator Kerry's query about the

situation in Sudan, Mubarak said the issue was not discussed
publicly at the AU summit. He also said "this issue could
have been worked out" if it were not debated so publicly
because "two tribes always work things out." Mubarak noted
Egypt's attempts to "try and help the (Sudanese) people"
through the Egyptian hospital in Sudan and the efforts of
EGIS Director Omar Suleiman to advise on North-South
negotiations.
------------------------------
Iraq: Don't Pull Out Too Soon
------------------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to Iraq, Senator Kerry asked Mubarak if he had

changed his opinion of Prime Minister Al Maliki after Iraq's
successful stabilization efforts in Basra and Sadr City.
Mubarak said he "I am not critical. He came to Cairo. I gave
him my phone number but he hasn't called us." He noted that
Egypt offered to host and train Iraqi forces, but that the
offer had not been acted upon by the Iraqis. He said the
U.S. "cannot withdraw until you strengthen the armed forces
and police. Until then you have to stay."
-------------------
Beware The Iranians
-------------------
¶5. (C) Mubarak's top concern for the stability of Iraq and
the region is Iran. He believes that "as a result of the
invasion of Iraq, Iran is spreading everywhere." He urged the
U.S. to be wary of what Iran says. "They are big, fat liars
and justify their lies because they believe it is for a
higher purpose." He said he believes this opinion is shared
by other leaders in the region. Nonetheless, he opined that
no Arab state will join the U.S. in a defense relationship
vis-a-vis Iran out of fear of "sabotage and Iranian
terrorism." He said Iran's sponsorship of terrorism is
"well-known but I cannot say it publicly. It would create a
dangerous situation." Mubarak said that sanctions are the
best hope for containing Iran, but Arab states won't dare to
endorse them.
-----------------------------------
Not Optimistic on The Peace Process
-----------------------------------
¶6. (C) On the Middle East Peace Process, Mubarak said he sees
no progress between Syria and Israel and doesn't expect any
progress between Israel and the PA leadership. He said that
"Palestinians are quarrelling" and Hamas and other factions
will reject any agreement made by Abu Mazen. Senator Kerry
CAIRO 00001637 002 OF 002
suggested the parties appeared to be close in some areas. In

response, Mubarak reiterated he doesn't believe the many
Palestinian factions will reach agreement and, thus, they
only serve to undermine Abu Mazen's efforts.
¶7. (C) This cable was not cleared by CODEL Kerry.

SCOBEY
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD2524, SCENESETTER FOR PM GILANI'S

VISIT TO WASHINGTON
Discussing cables
08ISLAMABAD2524
O 251326Z JUL 08
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM GILANI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani

will be anxious to prove that he is committed to fighting
"Pakistan's war" on terrorism and will outline the GOP's
partial response to the July demands presented by CJCS
Mullen/DDCIA Kappes. Gilani will publicly support the
coaliton's "negotiations first" counter-terrorism strategy
and defend Pakistani sovereignty in the face of reported
plans for unilateral U.S. action. Privately, he will agree
that force is sometimes necessary and assert he is prepared
to use it. However, coalition strains and governance
gridlock are limiting Gilani's ability to coordinate either
security or economic policy. He likely will repeat requests
for "actionable intelligence" and suggest the need for
increased U.S./ISAF operations on the Afghan side of the
border. We should maintain pressure for specific
counter-terrorism (CT) action and condition future Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance on Pakistani agreement to
training that will increase its counter-insurgency
capabilities.
¶2. (C/NF) Summary continued. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

(PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif has used his "go Musharraf go"
campaign to become Pakistan's most popular leader today. To
bolster his sagging Pakistan People's Party (PPP) popularity,
PM Gilani may ask for quiet support of a dignified exit
(resignation) for President Musharraf; in contrast, Musharraf
has asked that we reaffirm U.S. support for him as President.
Musharraf continues to debate dissolving the National
Assembly, a step we believe will lead to widespread unrest
and increase calls for his departure.
¶3. (C/NF) Summary continued. Gilani likely will ask for

faster delivery of Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
reimbursements, endorse the Biden/Lugar bill to double
economic aid to Pakistan, and support passage of
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation. He will
welcome offers of food security and energy assistance to help
overcome rising food and fuel inflation and rolling power
blackouts. He may ask for support to convince Riyadh to
agree to Pakistan's request to defer $5.9 billion in oil
payments. Gilani fully supports efforts to repair strained
relations with Afghanistan and India. End Summary.
Filling a Leadership Vacuum

---------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani is well-meaning,

pro-American and anxious to convince us that he is committed
to fighting "Pakistan's war" against terrorism. The
challenge is turning good intentions into sustainable action.
Gilani presides over a fragile coalition mired in governance
gridlock over the issue of President Musharraf's future. The
real centers of power -- PPP Co-Chair Asif Zardari and PML-N
leader Nawaz Sharif -- sit outside government fighting for
political supremacy. Gilani supports what has been improving
Ministry of Interior CT cooperation, but he has limited power
to force the Army and the intelligence services
(Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)) to battle a growing
militant insurgency. His visit to the White House may well
empower him to do more. With the withdrawal of Nawaz
Sharif's economic ministers, the coalition lacks the
expertise to tackle spiraling debt, food and fuel inflation,
capital flight, and rolling blackouts.
¶5. (C/NF) Gilani will be seeking public assurances that the

U.S. supports Pakistan's new civilian government, but the
uneasy Zardari-Nawaz marriage of convenience may not last
much longer. When the coalition breaks apart, Zardari will
need to bolster his slim parliamentary majority with other
partners. President Musharraf believes his party can be one
of those partners, and we agree. But his "go Musharraf go"
campaign has made Nawaz Sharif the most popular leader in
Pakistan today. Zardari and Gilani fear they cannot
politically afford to continue working with Musharraf and may
raise this in Washington. In contrast, Musharraf has asked
that the USG make it clear to Gilani that the U.S. continues
to support him as President. Chief of Army Staff General
Kayani prefers to remain out of politics, if for no other
reason than a reluctance to take on twin security and
economic crises. We believe he will support Musharraf's
resignation with dignity, if the prospect of impeachment
becomes real.
¶6. (C/NF) Musharraf continues to debate the possibility of

dissolving the National Assembly and imposing a technocratic
government; we believe this scenario will provoke unrest and
increase calls for Musharraf's departure. We should support
Gilani now and through a coalition breakup. Nawaz currently
does not have the votes to bring down the coalition.
Fulfilling Promises
-------------------
¶7. (S/NF) We have learned since 9/11 that Pakistan

responds, periodically, to U.S. pressure on
counter-terrorism; we should continue to press for action on
specific agenda items. The GOP has responded to the CJCS
Mullen/DDCIA Kappes visit in July by arresting several
Taliban shura members in Quetta, signed an agreement to
install cellphone towers in the tribal areas (FATA), is
initiating an Army operation in North Waziristan, and we
expect they will allow another B-300 surveillance aircraft to
operate. These steps will help disrupt cross-border attacks
and improve our intelligence capabilities.
¶8. (S/NF) However, the GOP has not targeted Siraj Haqqani
or his network; nor have they arrested Commander Nazir or
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. These militants are responsible for
much of the 40 percent increase in cross-border attacks on
our troops in Afghanistan this year. The Army/ISI can do the
job, but they cling to "old think" -- the belief that it is
better to manipulate militants through infiltration, payoffs
and "divide and conquer" strategy than fight extremists on
the battlefield. They fear military action would provoke a
tribal war they cannot control, but the GOP strategy has
failed and the government is losing territory to extremists
every day. While acknowledging that elements of ISI may be
out of control, Musharraf and Kayani remain reluctant to
replace ISI Director Nadeem Taj.
Bolstering CT Strategy
----------------------
¶9. (C/NF) Gilani will proudly explain the GOP's

three-pronged CT strategy: political engagement; economic
development; and force when needed. He likely will claim
recent (minimal) Frontier Corps action in the tribal areas
(Hangu and Bara) and (weak) coalition concensus as evidence
of GOP resolve to execute that strategy. We should
acknowledge Pakistani sacrifices in the war on terror.
Gilani believes the coalition must build popular support for
military action, and General Kayani agrees. But we should
stress that militants are exploiting the coalition's
"negotiations first" policy to plan and launch attacks
against Pakistani and U.S. targets.
¶10. (S/NF) Gilani will repeat GOP requests for "actionable

intelligence" and may suggest that the U.S. and ISAF beef up
border patrols and stop the drug trade in Afghanistan that
finances arms and militant operations. We should respond
that the GOP knows better than we do the location of Haqqani,
Nazir and Hekmatyar; most al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries
are in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. If Gilani suggests
improved regional (especially Gulf) intelligence sharing, we
should welcome that initiative. Zardari has just proposed to
us a September conference hosted by the UAE with Pakistan,
India, Afghanistan, the U.K., the U.S., and NATO observers to
discuss the situation in the tribal areas and along the
border. This idea has merit, too.
¶11. (C/NF) Gilani will thank the U.S. for its five-year
$750 million FATA development program and may ask for more.
Despite security challenges, USAID is implementing small
projects in five of the seven FATA agencies that will
eventually create 120,000 short-term jobs for young Pashtuns
who otherwise would be tempted to join the Taliban. USAID
is developing a program to preposition relief packages to
deliver (in the GOP's name) to villages after military
action; we should encourage the GOP to increase its own
civil-military programs to provide relief as part of its
counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy.
¶12. (C/NF) Largely because of pride, the Pakistani Army

remains reluctant to accept COIN training for itself or the
badly trained and under-equipped Frontier Corps. We should
tell Gilani that future FMF support will be conditioned on
the GOP's willingness to accept COIN and close air support
training. We should assure Gilani that we will continue
current efforts to train and equip para-military forces like
the Levies and push him to accept pending training for the
Frontier Corps. Pakistan now has six military officers
working in the tripartite Torkham Border Coordination Center
(BCC); we should press for Gilani's concurrence to identify
two BCC sites in Pakistan. Gilani may raise the Pakistani
request to use FMF for F-16 mid-life upgrades; we currently
are seeking Congressional support for this request.
Fixing the Economy

------------------
¶13. (C/NF) Economic growth for the current fiscal year is

expected to be 5.8 percent, well below the target of 7.2
percent. The fiscal deficit is projected to be 7 percent of
GDP versus a target of 4 percent; GOP borrowing from the
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has reached an all-time high of
USD 8 billion. Pakistan's trade deficit rose to USD 17
billion, up from USD 11 billion last year, as lackluster
export growth fell far short of increasing imports. Savings
and foreign investment both declined. Pakistan's rupee has
lost 16.8 percent of its value since January and is at record
lows. We support approval of a pending USD 500 million World
Bank loan for Pakistan, conditioned on a coherent plan for
reducing food and energy subisidies. Gilani may ask for
speedier delivery of Coalition Support Fund reimbursements
(approximately USD 1 billion per year) and endorse the
recently introduced Biden/Lugar bill to double economic aid
to Pakistan.
¶14. (SBU) Not a single megawatt of electricity has been

added to the national grid since 2000, despite population
growth and economic expansion. Industrial production is
threatened by blackouts and unemployment is rising. Petroleum
and electricity subsidies account for the bulk of the fiscal
deficit and have continued to rise with skyrocketing
international oil prices. The GOP is paying USD 554 million
per month for subsidies on petroleum and will attempt to
reduce these subsidies despite the intense popularity of such
measures. Energy accounts for 29.3 percent of Pakistan's
imports, and growth in exports cannot cover the increases in
international commodity prices. Saudi Arabia is considering
a Pakistani request to defer $5.9 billion in oil payments;
Gilani may request help in convincing Riyadh to agree. USAID
will launch a three year program to assist with energy policy
issues and energy efficiency and we are offering to fund a
USGS mapping survey to identify commercial mineral deposits
and potential energy sources. Gilani will attend in
Washington a World Bank investment roundtable focused on
developing Pakistan's Thar coal field reserves.
¶15. (U) Gilani will welcome the USG offer of food

assistance; he estimates that Pakistan needs help obtaining
3.5 million metric tons of wheat to stave off shortages this
year. Pakistanis have suffered monthly double digit food
price inflation since September 2007. Over 100 million
Pakistanis live on less than 2 dollars per day, including 25
million living on less than one dollar per day. The World
Food Program recently identified Pakistan as one of 40
countries at risk of food insecurity and recently raised its
estimate of at-risk individuals from 60 to 77 million, or 48
percent of Pakistan's population.
Repairing Regional Security

---------------------------
¶16. (C/NF) Zardari strongly supports improved ties with

India, irrespective of progress on Kashmir. Gilani called
Indian PM Singh this week and has agreed to meet with both
Singh and President Karzai in Sri Lanka following the
Washington trip. Gilani has approved the list of Pakistani
participants to the mini-jirga with Afghanistan. India and
Pakistan initiated the fifth round of their Composite
Dialogue in July and agreed to expand confidence building
measures in Kashmir. Gilani may ask for more pressure on
Congress for passage of Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
legislation which would benefit both Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
¶17. (C/NF) However, increased allegations of ISI involvement

in the July 7 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul have
undermined regional relations. India and Pakistan are
investigating the incident; we are working with Kabul to
restart Pak-Afghan economic and military meetings cancelled
in the wake of the bombing. If asked, Gilani will state that
Pakistan will not impede approval of the India-IAEA
Safeguards Agreement. But Pakistan clearly would like
similar USG assistance to develop its own civilian nuclear
capability to meet growing energy demand. Negotiations
continue on the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
¶18. (C/NF) We were disappointed that the Islamabad High

Court increased personal freedoms for Pakistani nuclear
scientist AQ Khan; if asked, Gilani will say that the GOP
continues to closely monitor Khan's activities.
PATTERSON
NNNN
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD2586, EMBASSY LEGAL ATTACHE NAMED

IN CASE INVOLVING
Discussing cables
2008-07-31 2010-11-30 Embassy
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002586
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY LEGAL ATTACHE NAMED IN CASE INVOLVING
ALLEGED BAGRAM DETAINEE
Classified By: CDA Frank Archibald, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Islamabad attorney Javed Jaffrey filed a habeas corpus petition
July 29 on behalf of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani national who allegedly has
been held and mistreated at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility since 2004.
The court July 30 ordered Interior Ministry Secretary Shah to report on her
alleged detention on September 9. End summary.
¶2. (C) Islamabad attorney Javed Iqbal Jaffery (who also represents Pakistani
nuclear scientist AQ Khan) filed a habeas corpus petition with the Islamabad
High Court (IHC) July 29 on behalf of Aafia Siddiqui a Pakistani national. There
have been a spate of press reports about Siddiqui following a July 6 press
conference in which UK journalist Yvonne Ridley accused the U.S. of holding and
perhaps torturing an unnamed woman in solitary confinement since 2004 at the
Bagram Theater Internment Facility. The IHC ordered Interior Ministry Secretary
Kamal Shah to report on Siddique’s status, but for now the court exempted the
other respondents, who include the Embassy’s Legal Attach, President Musharraf,
and former President Farooq Ahmad Leghari. The IHC adjourned the case until
September 9.
¶3. (C) According to press reports, Jaffrey claims in the petition that U.S.
operatives kidnapped Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, with her three children, in 2004 as
part of an al Qaeda hunt. It also charged that the U.S. moved her to the Bagram
Theater Internment Facility with the help of Pakistani authorities. Jaffrey also
petitioned the IHC to ask the respondents whether Siddiqui had been killed in
detention. If she is alive, Jaffrey wants her presented before the Court and
given compensation for the illegal detention.
¶4. (C) On July 19 the Senate Functional Committee on Human Rights called on the
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to address the issue of any
detained Pakistani women in Bagram or Guantanamo Bay. Previously the MFA had
denied knowledge of the alleged detention of any Pakistani woman.
¶5. (C) Comment: It is unclear who is paying Jaffrey and/or orchestrating this
campaign on Siddiqui’s behalf. Siddiqui has family living in Karachi and noted
politicians, including Imran Khan, continue their vocal support for her cause.
Bagram officials have assured us that they have not been holding Siddiqui for
the last four years, as has been alleged. End comment.
ARCHIBALD
Viewing cable 08LONDON1771, LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADER NICK
CLEGG OUTLINES THE
Discussing cables
08LONDON1771
09:09 23:11 RN London
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EO 12958 DECL: 06/30/2018

TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, UK
SUBJECT: LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADER NICK CLEGG OUTLINES THE
PARTY’S FOREIGN POLICY
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Nick Clegg, MP and leader of the Liberal Democrats, called
for the UK to adopt the UN’s “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine in his first
major foreign policy address. In his speech, titled “Terms of Intervention” and
delivered at Chatham House on June 23, Clegg enumerated criteria that should
dictate Britain’s overseas military involvement and reasserted his support for a
more cohesive European Union. He explained that despite his personal support for
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should not ignore the Treaty,s referendum defeat in
Ireland and plow on with its implementation, but neither should the EU let the
“no” vote stand as an obstacle to the development of a stronger EU. Clegg
attacked the Labour government on a variety of issues, alleging that it had
misallocated defense spending and it had lacked candor with the British people
about commitments required in Iraq and Afghanistan. He added that it is time for
the UK to reassess its military policies with regard to both countries, and
called for an immediate withdrawal of British troops from Iraq and increased
military and technical support for Afghanistan. Bio info at para 8. End summary.
Criteria for Liberal Interventionism

------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Clegg,s primary message was the UK,s need to adopt a doctrine of what
he called “liberal interventionism,” similar to the UN’s concept of
“Responsibility to Protect.” This doctrine, explained Clegg, calls for the UK to
become involved in foreign conflicts only if a) the cause is just and as a last
resort, b) intervention is well intentioned, c) military action is proportional
and sanctioned by legitimate authority, and d) there exists a reasonable chance
of success. Clegg argued that the UK must adapt its military and strategic
resources to the post-Cold War world, and mentioned the need to focus more on
supporting troops in the field as opposed to spending money on “outdated”
weapons systems such as the Typhoon fighter jet and Trident missile system.
Iraq and Afghanistan

--------------------
¶3. (SBU) Clegg briefly touched on Iraq, and reaffirmed the Liberal Democrats,
position that troop levels must be drawn down. He said that the “unjustified”
invasion of Iraq has severely damaged the UK,s moral authority, and will make it
difficult to institute his “liberal interventionist8 policy proposals.
¶4. (SBU) Clegg argued for more aid and assistance to be sent to Afghanistan,
underscoring his belief that failure there would lead to greater instability in
the region and a proliferation of narcotics production. Moreover, he called for
the Brown government to be more forthright with the British people about the
costs and length of involvement that will be required to secure a stable
Afghanistan.
Zimbabwe
--------
¶5. (SBU) Clegg also touched on Zimbabwe, and explained that, despite the
pressing humanitarian concerns, Western military involvement would be
counterproductive, in part because there is no regional support for
intervention. Instead, he supported UN involvement, and called on South African
President Thabo Mbeki to curtail electricity supplies to the country.
Europe
------
¶6. (SBU) Clegg argued that the UK must take a stronger role in Europe. He sees
in French President Nicolas Sarkozy an unlikely ally in the development of
stronger French-UK military coordination, and explained that while the
development of an EU military capability cannot be allowed to undermine NATO,
the EU should still possess a military force strong enough to act unilaterally
if necessary. He also said that, despite the now gloomy prospects for ratifying
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can still move forward. It is time, he explained, to
stop “tinkering with the machine and put it to use,” and called for Britain to
be more involved in major EU decision-making, instead of merely criticizing such
decisions from the sidelines.
LONDON 00001771 002 OF 002
Comment
-------
¶7. (C/NF) Since becoming leader of the Liberal Democrats, Clegg’s general
foreign policy tone has softened. His earlier hard-line rhetoric against the war
in Iraq and on extradition/rendition issues has given way to a slightly more
thoughtful and measured approach. These issues have lost some of their domestic
vote-getting potency and therefore Clegg and others have turned to new topics.
In taking the reins of the Liberal Democrat party, Clegg is restrained by the
responsibilities that his leadership role imposes on his rhetoric, though he has
not yet succeeded in imposing complete discipline on the members of his own
party when it comes to their public comments on foreign policy subjects.
¶8. (C/NF) Clegg himself spoke confidently and passionately in his address about
the UK’s need to become involved in a more unified EU. He appeared quite
knowledgeable in response to questions about the International Criminal Court
and UK military spending, though slightly less sure of himself when asked about
Darfur and Burma. Having only assumed the leadership of the Lib Dems last year,
he appears to still be broadening his understanding of, and comfort level with,
international issues.
Bio Note
--------
¶9. (C/NF) Clegg, like many Liberal Democrats, is individually articulate,

charismatic, and personable. Since taking over the leadership of the Lib Dems,
he has become more nuanced and realistic in his approach to domestic and foreign
affairs. While he used to focus on Iraq and rendition in Parliament, earning
quick applause from his Lib Dem colleagues, he now focuses on domestic issues
that matter more to the voting public.
¶10. (U) Clegg serves as the Member of Parliament for Sheffield Hallam. He was
first elected to British Parliament in 2005, and was elected the leader of the
Liberal Democrats in October 2007. From 1999 until 2004, Clegg was a Member of
European Parliament, and served as Trade and Industry spokesman for the Alliance
of Liberal Democrats for Europe. Prior to working in politics, Clegg worked as a
journalist and as an aid/relief project manager. He has academic degrees from
Cambridge, the University of Minnesota, and the College D’Europe.
Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit
ed_Kingdom
TUTTLE
Viewing cable 08LONDON1777, FOREIGN SECRETARY MILIBAND

SUBMITS RENDITION
Discussing cables
08LONDON1777 2008-07-03 11:11 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy London
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UK
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY MILIBAND SUBMITS RENDITION
STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard LeBaron for

reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S/NF) Foreign Office Director for Defence and Strategic

Threats Simon Manley informed Poloff July 2 that the Foreign
Office would submit Foreign Secretary Miliband's written
statement on rendition to Parliament July 2, for entry into
Parliamentary records July 3. Manley said the statement (see
Para 2) had been cleared by "State and (GPRO)." There are no
plans for an oral statement, but questions from MP's are
likely over the next week and the statement will likely
attract considerable press attention as well as skepticism
from NGOs and op-ed writers.
FS Miliband's Written Statement on Rendition

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Begin Statement: Terrorist Suspects (Rendition)
On 21 February I made a statement to the House regarding new

information we had been passed by the US Government regarding
rendition. Contrary to earlier assurances that Diego Garcia
had not been used for rendition flights, US investigations
had revealed two occasions, both in 2002, when this had in
fact occurred. Since February, I have corresponded with
Secretary Rice on this issue and our officials have continued
to work through the details and implications of the new
information.
I promised the House that, as part of this of this (sic)

process, my officials would compile a list of flights where
we had been alerted to concern about rendition through the UK
or our Overseas Territories. The list which they have
compiled, containing 391 flights, reflects concerns put to us
by hon. Members, members of the public, multilateral
organisations and non-governmental organisations. Inclusion
on this list does not represent an official endorsement of
any allegations about a particular flight. On the contrary,
US government flights as with other government flights occur
regularly for a variety of purposes. Our intention was to
collate in one place those concerns that had been put to us
directly. The list was passed to the US on 15 May. I
undertook in February to publish the list and have today
placed a copy in the library of the House and published it on
the FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk).
The United States Government received the list of flights

from the UK Government. The United States Government
confirmed that, with the exception of two cases related to
Diego Garcia in 2002, there have been no other instances in
which US intelligence flights landed in the United Kingdom,
its Overseas Territories, or the Crown Dependencies, with a
detainee on board since September 11, 2001.
Our US allies are agreed on the need to seek our permission

for any future renditions through UK territory. Secretary
Rice has underlined to me the firm US understanding that
there will be no rendition through the UK, our Overseas
Territories and Crown Dependencies, with a detainee on board
since September 11, 2001.
Our US Allies are agreed on the need to seek our permission

for any future renditions through UK territory. Secretary
Rice has underlined to me the firm US understanding that
there will be no rendition through the UK, our Overseas
Territories and Crown Dependencies or Airspace without first
receiving our express permission. We have made clear that we
would only grant such permission if we were satisfied that
the rendition would accord with UK law and our international
obligations. The circumstances of any such request would be
carefully examined on a case-by-case basis.
Our intelligence and counter-terrorism relationship with the
US is vital to the national security of the United Kingdom.
There must and will continue to be the strongest possible
intelligence and counter-terrorism relationship between our
two countries, consistent with UK law and our international
obligations. (End Text)
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TUTTLE
Viewing cable 08OTTAWA918, COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT

THREATS,
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08OTTAWA918.
08OTTAWA918 2008-07-09 18:06 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Ottawa
nytimes.com
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018

TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IR PK AF CA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT THREATS,
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
REF: A. OTTAWA 360

¶B. OTTAWA 808
¶C. OTTAWA 850
¶D. OTTAWA 878
OTTAWA 00000918 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Canadian Security Intelligence Service

(CSIS) Director Judd discussed domestic and foreign terror
threats with Counselor of the State Department Cohen in
Ottawa on July 2. Judd admitted that CSIS was increasingly
distracted from its mission by legal challenges that could
endanger foreign intelligence-sharing with Canadian agencies.
He predicted that the upcoming release of a DVD of
Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr's
interrogation by Canadian officials would lead to heightened
pressure on the government to press for his return to Canada,
which the government would continue to resist. Judd shared
Dr. Cohen's negative assessment of current political,
economic, and security trends in Pakistan, and was worried
about what it would mean for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
Canada has begun formulating an inter-agency Pakistan
strategy, and CSIS had agreed to open a channel to Iran's
intelligence service which Judd has not yet "figured out."
(Septel will cover Dr. Cohen's discussions regarding Pakistan
and the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan.) End summary.
¶2. (S/NF) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen

and CSIS Director Jim Judd in Ottawa on July 2 discussed
threats posed by violent Islamist groups in Canada, and
recent developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (CSIS is
Canada's lead agency for national security intelligence.)
Director Judd ascribed an "Alice in Wonderland" worldview to
Canadians and their courts, whose judges have tied CSIS "in
knots," making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent
terror attacks in Canada and abroad. The situation, he
commented, left government security agencies on the defensive
and losing public support for their effort to protect Canada
and its allies.
Legal Wrangling Risks Chill Effect

----------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Responding to Dr. Cohen's query, Judd said CSIS

had responded to recent, non-specific intelligence on
possible terror operations by "vigorously harassing" known
Hezbollah members in Canada. According to Judd, CSIS'
current assessment is that no attack is "in the offing" in
Canada. He noted, however, that Hezbollah members, and their
lawyers, were considering new avenues of litigation resulting
from recent court rulings that, Judd complained, had
inappropriately treated intelligence agencies like law
enforcement bodies (refs A and C). The Director observed
that CSIS was "sinking deeper and deeper into judicial
processes," making Legal Affairs the fastest growing division
of his organization. Indeed, he added, legal challenges were
becoming a "distraction" that could have a major "chill
effect" on intelligence officials.
¶4. (S/NF) Judd derided recent judgments in Canada's courts

that threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence-
Qthat threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence-
and information-sharing with Canada. These judgments posit
that Canadian authorities cannot use information that "may
have been" derived from torture, and that any Canadian public
official who conveys such information may be subject to
criminal prosecution. This, he commented, put the government
in a reverse-onus situation whereby it would have to "prove"
the innocence of partner nations in the face of assumed
wrongdoing.
¶5. (S/NF) Judd credited Prime Minister Stephen Harper's

minority Conservative government for "taking it on the chin
and pressing ahead" with common sense measures despite court
challenges and political knocks from the opposition and
interest groups. When asked to look to the future, Judd
predicted that Canada would soon implement UK-like legal
procedures that make intelligence available to "vetted
defense lawyers who see everything the judge sees."
OTTAWA 00000918 002.2 OF 003
Terror Cases and Communities Present Mixed Pictures

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶6. (C/NF) Judd commented that cherry-picked sections of the

court-ordered release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and
Canadian citizen Omar Khadr (ref D) would likely show three
(Canadian) adults interrogating a kid who breaks down in
tears. He observed that the images would no doubt trigger
"knee-jerk anti-Americanism" and "paroxysms of moral outrage,
a Canadian specialty," as well as lead to a new round of
heightened pressure on the government to press for Khadr's
return to Canada. He predicted that PM Harper's government
would nonetheless continue to resist this pressure.
¶7. (C) The Director mentioned other major cases that also
presented CSIS with major legal headaches due to the use of
intelligence products in their development: Momin Khawaja has
been on trial for his role in an Al Qaeda UK bomb plot since
June 23 in the first major test of Canada's 2001
Anti-Terrorism Act, and Canada's ability to protect
intelligence supplied by foreign government sources (ref D);
the trial of the first of the home-grown Toronto 11 (down
from 18) terror plotters, which is also now underway; and,
the prosecution of Global Islamic Media Front propagandist
Said Namouh, who was arrested in Quebec in 2007 for
conspiring to conduct bombings in Austria and Germany.
¶8. (C) Judd said he viewed Khawaja and his "ilk" as

outliers, due in part to the fact that Canada's ethnic
Pakistani community is unlike its ghettoized and poorly
educated UK counterpart. It is largely made up of traders,
lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others who see promise for
themselves and their children in North America, he observed,
so its members are unlikely to engage in domestic terror
plots. He said that therefore CSIS main domestic focus is
instead on fundraising and procurement, as well as the
recruitment of a small number of Canadian "wannabes" of
Pakistani origin for mostly overseas operations.
Pakistan and Afghanistan

------------------------
¶9. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Counselor Cohen briefed his

recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar, noting his alarm at
the degrading economic, political, and security situation
there, and its implications for Pakistan, Afghan, and
regional stability. Judd responded that Dr. Cohen's sober
assessment tracked with CSIS' own view of Pakistan, and that
"it is hard to see a good outcome there" due to that
country's political, economic, and security failures, on top
of fast-rising oil and food prices. Canada does not have an
explicit strategy for Pakistan, Judd said, but Privy Council
Deputy Secretary David Mulroney (who leads the interagency on
Afghanistan) now has the lead on developing one (septel).
Dr. Cohen remarked, and Judd agreed, that it would be
necessary to avoid approaching Pakistan as simply an adjunct
to the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan.
¶10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on

Q10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on
Afghanistan, Judd asserted, due in part to Karzai's weak
leadership, widespread corruption, the lack of will to press
ahead on counter-narcotics, limited Afghan security force
capability (particularly the police) and, most recently, the
Sarpoza prison break. He commented that CSIS had seen
Sarpoza coming, and its link to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan,
but could not get a handle on the timing.
Iranian Outreach
----------------
¶11. (S/NF) Judd added that he and his colleagues are "very,
very worried" about Iran. CSIS recently talked to Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after that
agency requested its own channel of communication to Canada,
he said. The Iranians agreed to "help" on Afghan issues,
including sharing information regarding potential attacks.
However, "we have not figured out what they are up to," Judd
confided, since it is clear that the "Iranians want ISAF to
bleed...slowly."
OTTAWA 00000918 003.2 OF 003
¶12. (U) Dr. Cohen has cleared this message.
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at

http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS
Viewing cable 08RIYADH1134, SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM

MEETING
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRH #1134 2040500

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220500Z JUL 08 ZDK CTG #00732
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 9639
RUEHRH/CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0733
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0023
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T RIYADH 001134
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/RA RMANGIELLO AND RNEPHEW, AND

NEA/ARP BMCGRATH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018

TAGS: MNUC PGOV PREL SA TRGY KNNP IR
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM MEETING
REF: A. SECSTATE 74879

¶B. RIYADH 43
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) On July 21, Pol Counselor delivered demarche on the

upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers meeting
scheduled for Tehran from July 27-30 (Reftel A) to Saudi MFA
Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali
Alwahbi.
¶2. (S) Alwahbi informed us that Saudi Minister of State for

Foreign Affairs (MFA Deputy Secretary equivalent) Dr. Nizar
bin Obaid Madani would lead the Saudi delegation. He assured
us Saudi Arabia did not want the NAM meeting to become an
Iranian propaganda event, adding he had seen the proposed
agenda and did not expect it to develop in such a manner.
Alwahbi agreed Iran's continued nuclear enrichment was a
grave SAG concern with regional security implications (Reftel
B).
¶3. (S) Alwahbi strongly advised against taking military

action to neutralize Iran's program. Rather, establishing a
US-Iranian dialogue was the best course of action, asserting
that the USG opening an Interest Section or re-opening our
Embassy in Tehran would be positive step. Alwahbi was
heartened by the USG's initiative for Under Secretary Burns
to meet with the Iranians last week in Geneva. He added
that, in his view, Iran's position was "shifting" and wanted
to avoid escalation of tensions. He noted his belief that
the Russians had recently been effectively pressuring Iran to
be less provocative. Alwahbi concluded that he expected Iran
to keep tensions relatively low at least until after the US
presidential election.
¶4. (S) COMMENT. These comments are typical of Saudi MFA

bureaucrats who take a pacific stance towards Iran, but
diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice we have
gotten from senior Saudi royals. END COMMENT.
GFOELLER
Viewing cable 08STATE79112, S) FLIGHT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN

BETWEEN DPRK
Discussing cables
O 231500Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2033

TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL AF CH KG KZ TI TX UZ
SUBJECT: (S) FLIGHT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN BETWEEN DPRK

AND IRAN
REF: ASTANA 1286
Classified By: ISN Acting DAS Kenneth W. Staley,

Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d)
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 2.
¶1. (S) Posts are requested to approach appropriate-level host

nation officials regarding a planned North Korean flight to
Iran of proliferation concern and encourage them to deny
overflight for the aircraft or require that it land and be
subjected to inspection before proceeding. Posts may draw
from background, objectives, and talking points/non-paper
below as appropriate.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶2. (S//REL AFGHANISTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN,

TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN): Posts should encourage host
governments, as partner nations in the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and consistent with their obligations under
UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and 1747, to deny overflight or to insist
that the aircraft land for inspection before proceeding.
¶3. (S//REL CHINA) Embassy Beijing should encourage China,

consistent with its obligations under UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and
1747, to deny overflight or to insist that the aircraft land
for inspection before proceeding.
¶4. (S//REL KAZAKHSTAN) Our information currently does not

indicate a North Korean intent to overfly Kazakhstan,
suggesting that GOK, per REFTEL, has denied the DPRK,s
request. Embassy Astana is requested to express appreciation
for GOK,s proactively notifying us of the DPRK overflight
request and urge them to deny any such request if they have
not already done so. Post may share the below non-paper with
GOK, as appropriate.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶5. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) The USG has received
information that a flight of proliferation concern between
North Korea and Iran is scheduled to occur in late July.
¶6. (S//REL AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, TAJIKISTAN) Our

information does not currently indicate a North Korean intent
to route the flight over Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, or
Tajikistan. We are, however, providing them this information
in the spirit of our cooperation under PSI, and to ask them
to deny overflight or inspect the aircraft in the event the
North Koreans re-route the flight.
¶7. (S) Embassies should note that bullet #1 is for Beijing

only, bullet #2 is for all recipients except Beijing, and
bullet #3 is for Astana, Kabul, and Dushanbe only. The rest
of the non-paper is for all recipients.
------------------------
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------
¶8. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) Begin talking
points/non-paper:
-- (S//REL CHINA) We would like to raise with you a North

Korean flight of proliferation concern that may request
overflight of your territory as it transits to and from Iran.
-- (S//REL AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN,

TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) In the spirit of our cooperation
under the Proliferation Security Initiative, we would like to
raise with you a North Korean flight of proliferation concern
that may request overflight of your territory as it transits
to and from Iran.
-- (S//REL AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, TAJIKISTAN) While our

current information indicates that this flight will not cross
your territory, we are providing it to you in the spirit of
our cooperation as PSI partners and in the event that the
flight,s schedule is changed and you do receive a North
Korean overflight request.
-- (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) We are concerned that
this chartered, round-trip passenger flight may be carrying
DPRK personnel involved in ongoing cooperation with Iran on
ballistic missiles.

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) As you know, the
transfer by North Korea of WMD components or delivery
systems, certain military goods, and related materials
including spare parts, is prohibited by UNSCR 1718. UNSCR
1718 also prohibits transfers from or to North Korea of
technical training, advice, services or assistance related to
WMD, their delivery systems, and certain conventional arms.
Iran is prohibited from obtaining WMD, delivery systems,
related components, and related technical assistance and
training under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747.

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) We therefore request
that overflight permission be denied or made contingent on
inspection of the aircraft to ensure that any cargo or
passengers it carries are not arriving in Iran in violation
of UNSCR 1718, 1737, 1747 or other UN resolutions.
Alternately, if this aircraft requests a fueling stop in your
country, we request that you grant this permission and
promptly search the aircraft upon its arrival for evidence of
prohibited items or activities.

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) Information about the
flights are as follows. The outbound flight from the DPRK is
expected on or about July 31, 2008. The aircraft is a North
Korean-registered Il-62, flight JS-621, scheduled to depart
Pyongyang on 28 July at 0001Z and land in Tehran at 0940Z.

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) From North Korea, the
flight is scheduled to pass into Chinese airspace at or about
0025Z and leave Chinese airspace for Kyrgyzstan at 0600Z.
From there, the flight is scheduled to pass over Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan and arrive in Iranian airspace at or around
0825Z.

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) The return flight,
JS-622, is scheduled to depart Tehran on 31 July at 1330Z and
arrive at Pyongyang at 2220Z.

TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) From Iran, the flight
is scheduled to pass into Turkmenistan airspace on or about
1440Z and pass over Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, entering
Chinese airspace from Kyrgyzstan at 1655Z. From there the
flight is scheduled to re-enter North Korean airspace on or
around 2200Z.
END POINTS.
-----------------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND POC
-----------------------------
¶6. (U) Please report delivery of demarche and any immediate

response by July 24.
¶7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information

is Tom Zarzecki, (202) 647-7594
7594 end_of_the_skype_highlighting, zarzeckitw@state.sgov.gov.
Please slug all responses for EAP, NEA, ISN, SCA, and T.
Washington appreciates Posts, assistance.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text

Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD2802, IMMUNITY FOR MUSHARRAF LIKELY
AFTER ZARDARI’S
Discussing cables
2008-08-23 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO7190
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2802/01 2361412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231412Z AUG 08
RUEHIL/ODRP ISLAMABAD PK PRIORITY
Saturday, 23 August 2008, 14:12
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/23/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: IMMUNITY FOR MUSHARRAF LIKELY AFTER ZARDARI’S
ELECTION AS PRESIDENT
REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 2742 (B) ISLAMABAD 2741
¶1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and Chief of
Army Staff Kayani, Ambassador pressed for quick action on immunity for former
President Musharraf. Zardari and Gilani said flatly that they were committed to
providing immunity, but not until after the presidential election (now scheduled
for September 6). Pushing immunity now, they believed, could jeopardize
Zardari’s candidacy. Kayani expressed concern that if immunity becomes tied up
with the ongoing debate over the judges’ future, it may never happen. Zardari
plans to continue to slow roll action on the judges’ restoration but remains
confident that Nawaz Sharif will not walk out of the coalition. Nawaz’s
deadlines for action on the judges continue to pass unfulfilled; the next one is
scheduled for August 27. The decision by the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)
August 20 to back Zardari for President has strengthened Zardari’s hand against
Nawaz. Nawaz is left with the option of walking out of the coalition but having
little prospect of forcing a new general election in the short term. Zardari is
walking tall these days, hopefully not too tall to forget his promise to Kayani
and to us on an immunity deal. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Ambassador met with Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari on
August 23, with PM Gilani on August 21, and with COAS Kayani on August 20.
¶3. (C) Zardari told Ambassador August 23 that he was committed to indemnity for
Musharraf. Ambassador stressed that only the promise of indemnity had persuaded
Musharraf to step down as President. We believed, as we had often said, that
Musharraf should have a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the
country. Zardari cited a British anecdote about the Spanish empire and said
“tell the most powerful man in the world that there is no way that I would go
back on what I have said.” Zardari noted that he already had firmly committed to
the U.S., the UK, and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani that indemnity for
Musharraf would be forthcoming. Ambassador urged him to do it quickly. Zardari
said flatly that to do it before he was elected President would lose him votes,
but he would do both the legislation and a presidential pardon as soon as he was
elected. Zardari revealed that former President Musharraf had approached Chief
Justice Dogar about issuing a restraining order against the impeachment motion,
but Dogar had refused. Zardari also alleged that Musharraf had planned to
replace COAS Kayani if Dogar had blocked the impeachment. 4. (C) Zardari said he
was trying to keep Nawaz in the coalition and was candid that he planned to tie
up the judges issue for a long time. He said the parliament would debate the
restoration of the judges; Chief Justice Dogar would then submit some rulings on
the restoration of the judges; all this could take months. In the meantime, he
was trying to persuade former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to become Governor
of Balochistan. (Note: In a move clearly orchestrated by Zardari, the Governor
Magsi of Balochistan resigned on August 20, making it possible to offer the
position to Chaudhry.)
¶5. (C) Zardari said he did not think Nawaz would leave the coalition, but he
admitted the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz had become increasingly testy. He said
that he had already agreed with Nawaz to curtail the powers of the President and
then allow Nawaz to be eligible for a third term as Prime Minister; both
measures would require constitutional amendments. Zardari revealed that he also
had leverage over Shahbaz Sharif, who through paperwork snafus, had been
technically elected illegally for a third term as Chief Minister. This, too,
would have to be resolved in parliament, Zardari said. “So I can give them
something they want,” noted Zardari, “that’s what politics is all about.”
Kayani Worried
--------------
¶6. (C) After an August 20 meeting with visiting S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey,
Kayani asked Ambassador to stay behind and discuss his concerns that Zardari was
delaying
ISLAMABAD 00002802 002 OF 003
Musharraf,s immunity bill. Kayani had heard the large meeting of coalition
partners (chaired August 19 by the newly returned Bilawal Bhutto) had discussed
mostly the judges. Then they decided to take a 72-hour “break” to consult party
members.
¶7. (C) As post earlier reported (Reftels), Kayani said he took Zardari,s
commitments to now ex-President Musharraf as the most important argument in
persuading him to resign. Zardari made very specific commitments to Kayani. Now,
for Zardari to delay, it makes him (Kayani) look bad within his own institution
“and I have to bring the Army along with me.” Kayani also noted that the delay
does nothing for Zardari,s reputation for trustworthiness. If this issue gets
conflated with the judges and with Zardari,s own desires to be President, it
will become too complicated to pass, Kayani said.
Gilani on Immunity, Bajaur, Subsidies
-------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Ambassador met with PM Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik for
thirty minutes August 21, after a graduation ceremony for U.S. trained members
of his protective detail. He had been briefed about PDAS Camp’s discussion with
Ambassador Haqqani.
¶9. (C) Gilani said the PPP was going to provide immunity for ex-President
Musharraf, but timing was important. They were afraid that putting forward
immunity legislation would lose them votes for Asif Zardari,s presidential
campaign. Ambassador pressed on this issue, saying that Musharraf would never
have agreed to resign without the promise of immunity. He assured Ambassador
that he and the party did not want vengeance. Regarding immunity, Gilani said
“many will say that we have done a deal with America, but still I understand
that we have to do it.”
¶10. (C) Regarding the ongoing military operation on Bajaur (in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas), Gilani assured Ambassador that it will continue “to
its conclusion,” i.e., until all the militants were driven out. Gilani said the
next step would be to go after Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. Gilani wanted
President Bush to know that over 500 militants had been killed in the operation
and that the GOP had reached out to NATO (during General Kayani’s recent visit
to Afghanistan for a tripartite meeting). He said Pakistan would do everything
possible to encourage cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries.
Gilani noted that Pakistan was using its F-16 aircraft to fight the militants
and thanked the U.S. for providing funding for the F-16 mid-life upgrades.
However, Gilani pleaded for urgent U.S. assistance in providing relief for
displaced people around Bajaur and noted that fighting was spreading to
neighboring Mohmand Agency.
¶11. (C) Malik suggested we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the
Bajaur operation. The PM brushed aside Rehman,s remarks and said “I don,t care
if they do it as long as they get the right people. We,ll protest in the
National Assembly and then ignore it.” (Note: The strike has been front page
news, but the media is reporting that the targets were nests of Arab fighters.)
¶12. (C) Gilani said it would be almost politically impossible to reduce fuel
subsidies (raise prices) in the short term along the lines Deputy Secretary
Kimmitt had suggested to the Finance Minister. The coalition had restoration of
the deposed judges, immunity for Musharraf, and the election of the new
president on their plate. They were already taking enormous heat for previous
fuel price increases.
¶13. (C) Comment: Nawaz may increasingly be considering leaving the coalition in
the center and consolidating his hold in the Punjab because he cannot engineer a
new general election in the short term. The addition of MQM’s support leaves
Nawaz with less leverage over Zardari in the current coalition. The fight over
Iftikhar Chaudhry probably is based on Nawaz’s expectation that Chaudhry would
rule in both Nawaz’s and Shahbaz’s favor in pending court cases
ISLAMABAD 00002802 003 OF 003
challenging their ability to run as candidates in the National and Punjab
Assemblies respectively. Until he can sit in the National Assembly, Nawaz cannot
be Prime Minister.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08MUSCAT565, OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN
EXPANSIONISM
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08MUSCAT565.
08MUSCAT565 2008-08-07 07:07 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Muscat
VZCZCXRO5264
DE RUEHMS #0565/01 2200743
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 070743Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000565
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018

TAGS: PREL PARM IR MU
SUBJECT: OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) Minister of the Royal Office and head of the
Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
Lieutenant General Ali bin Majid al-Ma'amari, reviewed Oman's
view on Iran from a security perspective, highlighting Omani
awareness of Iran's deceptive tactics and expansionist
ideological desires in the region. During an introductory
meeting with NAVCENT commander VADM William Gortney,
accompanied by the Ambassador, General Ali addressed the
Iranian nuclear file, security in the Strait of Hormuz, and
Iranian interference in the region. Ali Majid's suspicious
view of Iran stands in stark contrast to conciliatory if not
obsequious public comments of Omani Minister Responsible for
Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi regarding Iran and its role
in the region. End summary.
Won't Oppose Further Sanctions on Iran

--------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Characterizing Oman's preference for "frankness
and clarity," General Ali began his comments on Iran by
noting the reality of Iran as a nearby neighbor, which
influenced Oman's relations with Iran. Toward the end of the
discussion, he compared Oman's normal relations with Iran to
the relations of other GCC members with Iran. Throughout the
meeting, he frequently touched on the theme of how different
Oman was from other GCC member states, whose real intentions
and positions often eluded Omani comprehension.
¶3. (S/NF) The Iranian nuclear issue stood at the forefront

of the General's mind. He described the nuclear file as an
international issue, noting that resolution of this issue
should be dealt with through international bodies such as the
UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Oman would respect decisions of these groups
and play its role in the international community. Oman would
not oppose imposition of further measures against Iran by the
international bodies; however, Oman did not want to play an
active role in advocating for such measures itself.
Iranian Intentions Clear: Stall for Time

-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Ali Majid stated that Oman was aware of Iranian
stall tactics in the talks over the nuclear issue. Instead
of responding by the August 5 deadline, the Iranian side
offered a new initiative for talks, confirming reports from
the U.S. and others that Iran indeed is trying merely to buy
time. Letting the 5 August deadline pass in responding
positively to the P5 1 proposal made the Iranian intention to
stall "very clear to Oman." The Ambassador noted that the
U.S. has been working with allies around the world, and
especially within the EU, to further restrict Iranian
economic activity in an effort to influence Iran's position
on the nuclear file. General Ali agreed that sanctions to
date were having an impact on the Iranian economy, despite
Iran's public denials. Moreover, he said, Iran believed the
U.S. would never attack Iran, a belief that encouraged Iran
to persist in its stall tactics. Nevertheless, he advocated
a non-military solution as the best option for the U.S., and
suggested that over the long term, establishment of U.S.
relations at some level with the Iranian government might
enable the U.S. to better influence the Iranian government
and people.
Empty Threats Against the Strait

--------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's question about
recent Iranian statements threatening the Strait of Hormuz,
Ali Majid dismissed the threats as "empty words" and perhaps
a feeble attempt to up its bargaining leverage vis a vis the
P5 1. VADM Gortney echoed the Ambassador's comments that
such rhetoric negatively impacted the world's view of Iran
and ultimately would undermine Iran's standing in the
international community. On this same issue, the General
expressed his pleasure with the White House press statement
on August 5 responding to the IRGC commander's comments
regarding closure of the Strait, agreeing that Iranian
closure of the strait would be suicide (i.e., more harmful to
Iran's own economic interests). He also commended the U.S.
for not escalating the rhetoric but instead putting Iran's
comments into proper perspective.
Iraq and Iranian Expansionism
MUSCAT 00000565 002 OF 003
-----------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Prior to delving into the nuclear issues, Ali
Majid acknowledged that Iranian interference in Iraq
prevented achievement of a stable security environment there.
He allowed that, at a minimum, Iran indirectly supported
Shi'a militia in Iraq. Elaborating on his theme of "Iranian
expansionist" ideology, he noted that the Iranian national
radio broadcast commenced with the prelude "the voice of the
Islamic Republic from Tehran." Focusing on "from Tehran," he
astutely raised Omani concerns that such language revealed
Iran's true intentions: a "greater Islamic Republic" with
Tehran at its center. He further speculated that Iran wanted
to give the impression that the Islamic Republic might
already encompass "Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and even the Gulf."
¶7. (S/NF) Ali Majid linked the nuclear issue and the
interference in Iraq by speculating that a resolution might
entice Iran into ceasing its interference in Iraq. He
offered a rhetorical question on whether Iran was serious
about challenging the major powers or is it posturing in the
media for domestic consumption. He conceded that he truly
did not know the answer, but that with Iran's continued
attitude on the nuclear issue, the security situation in Iraq
would remain unresolved. Citing Oman's preference for a
non-military solution, he nevertheless acknowledged that a
nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to war with Iran posed "an
extremely difficult dilemma for all of us."
Playing to Their Domestic Audience

----------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Acknowledging Iran's revolutionary zeal, the
General attempted to put Iranian public statements in
perspective when he described as exaggerations those comments
by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmed-I Nejad or other Iranian
figures, particularly regarding military capabilities.
"Countries that believe they have some specific military
weapons advantages usually keep them secret," he averred. He
asserted that in the end, all power resided with Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
¶9. (S/NF) Ali Majid portrayed Shi'a ideology as another

factor complicating possible military conflict with Iran.
Iranian leaders would not balk at sacrificing a quarter of
their 60 million citizens in a military conflict. The Shi'a
tradition of martyrdom spanned 14 centuries. The annual
self-flagellation of Shi'a over 1,400 years served as an
example of this martyr psychology. Beyond its Shi'a
ideology, pride in its Persian national identity compelled
Iran to demand international recognition and respect.
¶10. (S/NF) Returning back to comments about GCC countries,

General Ali singled out Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as three
Gulf countries that probably would want the U.S. to strike
Iran. However, he urged the U.S. to determine whether such
voices were speaking on the basis of logic or emotion. He
likened private entreaties of these countries to the U.S. for
military action on Iran to the Iraqi opposition in exile
providing the U.S. false information on Iraq that led to the
invasion of Iraq. At the beginning of the meeting, Ali Majid
had noted that, in contrast to Oman, other GCC members did
not always speak with candor or clarity, leaving Oman to
question the real motivations or intentions of its GCC
brethren.
¶11. (S/NF) Punctuating his comments about Iran's

irrationality, Ali Majid pointed to Libyan leader Colonel
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's recent comment that "Iran is crazy" not
to pay attention to the history of Yugoslavia and Iraq, whose
ignoring of U.S. pressure resulted in their collapse.
Interestingly, he referred to Qadhafi's transformation from
pariah to emerging member of the international community by
noting that Qadhafi had once been "our enemy."
Oman in a "Strategic Relationship" with the U.S.

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶12. (S) Shifting from Iran, Ali Majid underscored Oman's
"strategic relationship" with the U.S. and highlighted Oman's
cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism issues. He
described Oman's zero tolerance for extremism and refusal to
negotiate with terrorists as a policy established at least
since 1970 (the year of the Sultan's assumed power). Oman
has been and continues to prepare itself to confront
terrorism, he said, as it is not exempt from the plotting of
terrorists. While Oman is "encircled by problems" --
specifically mentioning Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan --
MUSCAT 00000565 003 OF 003
Oman remains vigilant in preventing such problems from

reaching the Sultanate. On the topic of Oman's partnership
with the U.S., he harkened back to when the Soviets had
sought a warm water port during the time of their invasion of
Afghanistan and were rebuffed by Muscat as an example of how
"Oman has stood at the side of the U.S." He also highlighted
the irony that now the world faced "not the Soviets but the
Taliban." He quickly followed this by noting that the U.S.
would be wise to support talks with moderate members of the
Taliban, which Oman encouraged as a way toward achieving
security in Afghanistan.
¶13. (S/NF) Participants in the meeting included VADM
Gortney, the Ambassador, the admiral's executive officer,
Embassy Muscat's OMC Chief, and GRPO (notetaker). Sayyid
Munthir bin Majid al-Sa'id, head of the Royal Office Liaison
and Coordination Service participated as notetaker and
translator for General Ali.
Comment
-------
¶14. (S/NF) In light of recent, more conciliatory statements
by Minister Responsible for foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi,
Ali Majid's blunt assessment of Iranian intentions comes as
refreshing reassurance of the official Omani position on
Iran. While careful to flag Oman's longstanding preference
for a non-military solution to the Iran question and, less
directly, Oman's inability to actively confront Iranian
obstinacy, the Sultanate nevertheless maintains a clear-eyed
view of Iran, its increasingly threatening behavior and the
potential repercussions for the region. His comments
regarding attitudes and perceptions of fellow GCC members
were startling as they would appear to confirm oft stated
views of GCC counterparts of Oman as the sometimes "odd man
out" in the GCC. Ali Majid's comments suggest that while not
entirely comfortable with this, the Omanis acknowledge it.
Ali Majid, as the Sultan's top security official and advisor,
is known for taking a more hard-line view of matters relating
to regional security. However, given his closeness to the
Sultan and his status as a member of the inner-most circle of
the Sultan's confidants, such views to a senior U.S. officer
can be assumed to accord with those of Qaboos.
GRAPPO
Viewing cable 08PARIS1568, FRANCE’S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY:

PART II (FRENCH
Discussing cables
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EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2018

TAGS PREL, PINR, ECON, MARR, PHUM, XA, FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE’S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART II (FRENCH
IMPLEMENTATION AND AFRICAN REACTIONS)
REF: PARIS 1501
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/ d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: France’s new Africa policy has received mixed reviews from
Africans uncertain as France moves away from the “France-Afrique” model. Some
Africans seem to accept the outlines of the new policy, some have expressed
misgivings about replacing the familiar with the unknown, and some have pushed
back, with the French having to make their own adjustments in both tone and
substance. Meanwhile, the French continue to refine their policy and to
implement it, with a few notable stumbles along the way, such as the Bockel case
involving Gabon. They have tried to give fresh impetus to difficult relations
with countries such as Angola, Rwanda, Djibouti, and Madagascar, with mixed
results. In broader terms, the French are also working to put in place revamped
structures, particularly their military presence in Africa (Part III, septel),
to reflect the new policy.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Reftel describes “France-Afrique,” the model that dominated France’s
Africa policy for most of the 20th century. Believing that globalization, the
fading of colonial and post-colonial sensibilities, and economic and political
realities called for a new model, President Nicolas Sarkozy initiated change
soon after taking office in May 2007. He announced a new policy based on
transparency, accountability, arms-length dealings, a calculation of interests,
and a dialogue among equals. He sought to strip relations of what he viewed as
sentimental and historical relics of the colonial era, which had stifled
relations and fostered an unhealthy cycle of dependency and paternalism. Both
sides would henceforth conduct relations crisply, efficiently, and openly. This
cable discusses African reactions to Sarkozy’s policy and French steps to
implement it. Part III (septel) focuses on structural changes the French are
making as part of the new policy, centered on France’s military presence in
Africa.
Pre-Election Image Problems

---------------------------
¶3. (C) Sarkozy’s new Africa policy may have been a disquieting change in course
for Africans, yet not a surprise to them. Many Africans were wary of Sarkozy
before he took office. As Interior Minister, a job he held twice under President
Chirac, Sarkozy was well known for his no-nonsense law-and-order views. At
Interior, Sarkozy made remarks that raised flags about his sensitivity toward
France’s minorities, particularly those with origins in Africa, either the
Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa. In June 2005, after the killing of a young boy in
a troubled Paris suburb with a high number of minorities, Sarkozy said he would
clean the area out “with a Karcher,” referring to a German high-pressure, water-
hose cleaner. At the time of the November 2005 riots in France, Sarkozy
described the rioters as “voyous” (thugs) and “racaille” (scum, rabble), the
latter term generating strong critical responses from France’s minorities and
from others worried about their Interior Minister’s (and possible next
President’s) views on ethnic issues.
Immigration and Africa

----------------------
¶4. (C) Sarkozy compounded these concerns during a visit to Mali and Benin in
May 2006 as Interior Minister. Shortly before the trip, he had proposed changes
in France’s immigration laws, which became the focal point of his visits and
prompted demonstrations against him in both countries. Malians and Beninois
perceived as anti-African his proposals for tightening the system then in place.
During the trip, Sarkozy contrasted his vision of relations with Africa with
that of Chirac, and defended his immigration bill as a harbinger of a “new
relationship” with Africa, “cleaned up, simplified, and balanced away from the
slag of the past.” In Benin on May 19, 2006, he stated: “We must get rid of this
network from another time, these officious emissaries who have no mandate other
than the one they invent for
PARIS 00001568 002 OF 007
themselves. The normal functioning of institutions should prevail over the
officious networks that have produced so much that is bad.” Africans criticized
the substance of his immigration proposals while the French press noted archly
that Sarkozy was obviously campaigning for the Presidency and saying things
normally within the French President’s proper domain.
¶5. (C) Immigration remains an important sub-theme to Sarkozy’s Africa policy,

and is one of the hottest of hot-button issues in France. Advocates of stricter
controls fear the prospect of floods of Eastern Europeans and migrants from all
corners of Africa, the Arab world, and the Mediterranean entering France and
then benefiting from its generous social programs and taking jobs, without
assimilating and becoming “French.” Sub-Saharan Africans are a visible, and to
some French, an unwelcome presence in France’s urban areas, with much social
commentary from left and right on their long-term effect and their ability to
integrate and assimilate. Some wonder whether a French national sports team can
really be “French” with so many players of Arab or African origin
(notwithstanding the recent successes of French teams of diverse origins).
¶6. (C) Upon becoming President, Sarkozy installed close associate Brice
Hortefeux as Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-
Development, a ministry that had never previously existed. Combining issues
relating to immigration, integration, and, especially, “national identity” into
a single executive body raised eyebrows among some observers, who believed that
creating such a ministry not only indicated the priority Sarkozy placed on these
matters but also carried overtones of the appeal Sarkozy made to right-wing,
nationalist voters (i.e., Le Pen’s National Front camp) during the final stages
of his campaign duel with Socialist Segolene Royal.
¶7. (C) Sarkozy and Hortefeux have emphasized the benefits that a reformed
immigration policy would provide Africans. The French have concluded agreements
with several African countries establishing new procedures. One such agreement
is with Gabon, concluded on July 5, 2007, during a visit by Hortefeux. The
accord (1) facilitates travel between the two countries by business persons,
professionals, family members, and those with medical needs; (2) enlarges
employment possibilities for Gabonese in certain professions desiring to
establish themselves in France; (3) extends residency permits for French in
Gabon to five years; (4) prescribes procedures for treating clandestine
entrants; and (5) increases bilateral cooperation in countering fraudulent
documents. The agreement, which on its face provides advantages to both sides,
nonetheless became part of a France-Gabon spat that included other issues, as
described later in this message.
¶8. (C) Some Africans have disapproved of another part of Sarkozy’s immigration
policy -- the program to test DNA to verify kinship as a basis for immigration.
Legislation for such a program was initiated when Sarkozy was at Interior and
has since been enacted after overcoming legal and political obstacles. African
reaction has been negative, with one article -- from Mali in October 2007 --
capturing Africans, dismay: “We have known, since the Second World War, after
the success of our ancestors, the Senegalese riflemen, in the liberation of
France from the hands of Nazi Germany, that our compatriots along with so many
other Africans have no longer been welcome on the banks of the Seine. But to go
so far as to examine the blood of people to control the migratory flow
represents an unqualified case of cynicism and lowers France to the level of
nations where racism gains more and more ground.”
¶9. (C) The DNA testing program appears to be going forward. In June 2008,
Hortefeux announced during a visit to Cape Verde that France would begin its
first pilot program there in September. Cape Verde is one of nine countries
(with Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guinea,
Madagascar, and Pakistan) where France plans to start
PARIS 00001568 003 OF 007
the program in the September 2008 timeframe. Cape Verde authorities reportedly
responded that they “took note of this demarche of consultation” but chose not
to comment on this “unilateral French decision.” Hortefeux said that “our new
immigration policy is understood and shared by our African friends.”
Dakar, July 2007

----------------
¶10. (C) With his stints at Interior, his provocative remarks, and the outline
of this new immigration policy as backdrops, Sarkozy went to Dakar in July 2007.
He had just won favorable reviews for organizing an international conference on
Darfur in June, one of his first acts as President, which ostensibly
demonstrated his interest in Africa. On July 26 at the University of Dakar, he
delivered the first of three speeches outlining France’s new Africa policy. He
did so carrying a fair amount of baggage, certain to face a skeptical, if not
hostile, audience. Consistent with his aggressive image, he gave a hard-hitting
speech, which, as noted reftel, was written by Special Advisor Henri Guaino and
not cleared through normal MFA and Presidency channels. The Dakar speech is
worth examining because it was the public introduction to Africans on their turf
of both Sarkozy as President and of the policies he planned to pursue. That the
speech was not vetted by GOF staff perhaps lends it an air of authenticity that
would have been absent had it been sanitized.
¶11. (C) In the Dakar speech, Sarkozy said: “I did not come to erase the past,
which can’t be erased. I did not come to deny either the faults or the crimes,
for there were faults and crime.... I have come to propose, to the youth of
Africa, not to have you forget this tearing apart and this suffering, which
cannot be forgotten, but to have you overcome and surpass them.... Africa bears
its share of responsibility for its own unhappiness. People have been killing
each other in Africa at least as much as they have in Europe.... Europeans came
to Africa as conquerors. They took the land and your ancestors. They banned the
gods, the languages, the beliefs, the customs of your fathers. They told your
fathers what they should think, what they should believe, what they should do.
They cut your fathers from their past, they stripped them of their souls and
roots. They disenchanted Africa.”
¶12. (C) Sarkozy said that the colonist “took but I want to say with respect
that he also gave. He constructed bridges, roads, hospitals, dispensaries,
schools. He rendered virgin land fertile, he gave his effort, his work, his
knowledge. I want to say here that not all the colonists were thieves, not all
the colonists were exploiters.... Colonization is not responsible for all of
Africa’s current difficulties. It is not responsible for the bloody wars
Africans carry out with each other. It is not responsible for the genocides. It
is not responsible for the dictators. It is not responsible for fanaticism. It
is not responsible for the corruption, for the lies. It is not responsible for
the waste and pollution.... The problem of Africa, and permit me as a friend of
Africa to say it, is there. The challenge for Africa is to enter more into
history. It is to draw from within itself the energy, the strength, the desire,
the willpower to listen to and to espouse its own history. The problem of Africa
is to stop always repeating, to stop always trotting out, to free itself from,
the myth of the eternal return, to understand that the Golden Age, which Africa
never stops longing for, will never come back because it never existed.”
¶13. (C) Many African critics viewed the speech as condescending and
paternalistic, two aspects of France-Afrique Sarkozy said he wanted to banish.
Prominent Africans faulted Sarkozy’s ideas, including then-AU Commission
Chairperson Konare, who said: “This speech was not the kind of speech we were
hoping for.... It reminded us of another age, especially his comment about
peasants.” Konare was referring to a passage that critics found
PARIS 00001568 004 OF 007
especially demeaning: “The drama of Africa is that the African man has not
entered enough into history. The African peasant, for millennia, lives with the
seasons, where the ideal life is to be in harmony with nature, and he knows only
the eternal recycling of time marked by the rhythm of repetition without end of
the same gestures and the same words. In this imagination, where everything
always recycles, there is no place for either human adventure or for the idea of
progress.”
¶14. (C) South Africa President Mbeki, one of the few African leaders to react
favorably, reportedly wrote to Sarkozy: “What you have said in Dakar, Mr.
President, indicates to me that we are fortunate to count on you as a citizen of
Africa, as a partner in the protracted struggle to achieve the renaissance of
Africa within the context of a European renaissance and the rest of the world.”
Perhaps not coincidentally, Sarkozy chose Cape Town as the site for the third
speech in his Africa policy series (to the dismay of francophone Africa),
identified South Africa as a strategic partner, and, upon France’s assuming the
EU Presidency in July 2008, sponsored, as one of the Presidency’s initial acts,
the first EU-South Africa Summit (in Bordeaux on July 25). As Presidential
Advisor Romain Serman has observed, one of Sarkozy’s operating principles is
“reward the good, punish the bad.”
Reining Him In and Slowing Him Down

-----------------------------------
¶15. (C) After Dakar, Sarkozy went to Gabon, where elder statesman and France-
Afrique supporter President Bongo received him with full honors. Sarkozy
reportedly hesitated before going; visiting a France-Afrique stronghold, site of
a French military base, and source of valuable commerce (especially petroleum)
could smack of the old-style courting and role playing he claimed he wanted to
forego. In the end, he relented: “Omar Bongo is the dean of African heads of
state and, in Africa, being the dean, that counts.” Bongo offered full pomp and
circumstance, with festive crowds chanting “vive la France, vive Sarkozy, vive
l’amitie franco-gabonaise,” and banners proclaiming this friendship prominently
displayed. To some observers, the message was clear: “You say that France-
Afrique is a thing of the past but, if Africans really are equal partners, we
have some say in the matter as well, and we say that France-Afrique is not in
all respects so bad.” Sarkozy reportedly did not expect that kind of visit or
that Bongo would offer a different reality.
¶16. (C) Sarkozy has in other ways shown himself to be out of step, with his
bedside manner needing fine-tuning. Presidential Advisor Remi Marechaux says
that when Sarkozy is confident on substance or at ease with an interlocutor, he
speaks freely without relying on briefing material. This occasionally causes
problems when he strays from “official” policy, with others then steering the
discussion back on course. When he is less familiar with an issue or with an
interlocutor, he will read talking points verbatim, with little attempt to
disguise what he is doing, sometimes thumbing through briefing books looking for
information while his interlocutor is speaking.
¶17. (C) Sarkozy does not like to waste time and likes to get to the point,
perhaps to excess. When President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea met with Sarkozy
in November 2007, support staff on both sides were tardy in settling into place.
Sarkozy did not wait and launched into his talking points as the staff filed
into the meeting. Sarkozy engaged in no small talk and the meeting was over in
minutes, to the bewilderment of his visitors. Our contacts at the Presidency
indicate Sarkozy has since made an effort to be more “diplomatic,” but one
wonders whether he would ever dare to treat a Western head of state in such a
cursory manner, under any circumstances.
¶18. (C) Flush with his early success at helping liberate Bulgarian medical
workers long detained in Libya on dubious
PARIS 00001568 005 OF 007
charges, Sarkozy decided to intervene personally in Chad after the Zoe’s Ark
effort to smuggle supposed Darfur orphans to France was discovered and the
perpetrators detained. Sarkozy went to Chad early in November 2007 and
negotiated the release of some of the detainees. After returning to Paris, he
thought of going there again to free those still in custody but decided against
it. He was advised not to make a second trip as France could not afford having
him set a precedent by personally rushing off and responding to and managing a
relatively low-level crisis. Chad President Deby no doubt appreciated the visit
Sarkozy did make, which probably increased Chad’s leverage, as Sarkozy had put
his own prestige in play.
Bongo Up, Bockel Down, France-Afrique Still Kicking

----------------------------
¶19. (C) Jean-Marie Bockel became State Secretary for Cooperation and
Francophonie (reporting to the Foreign Minister) when Sarkozy took office.
Bockel, a Socialist, is a veteran politician and Mulhouse’s mayor since 1989,
and was Commerce Minister 1984-1986. On January 15, 2008, he gave an interview
to Paris daily Le Monde, stating boldly (and perhaps rashly) that “I want to
sign the death certificate of France-Afrique.” Asked why it seemed that not much
had changed despite Sarkozy’s promise of a new Africa policy, Bockel said:
“France-Afrique is moribund.... It’s not a question of morale, but helping with
development. For, because of the faulty governance in certain countries, our
policy of cooperation, despite its many forms, doesn’t allow for progress
commensurate with our effort.”
¶20. (C) Continuing, Bockel said that ineffectiveness prevailed because “bad
governance, the wastage of public finds, the carelessness of certain
administrative and political structures, the predation of certain leaders --
everybody knows these factors or supposes them. In total, of USD 100 billion
annually in aid for Africa, USD 30 billion evaporates. Certain countries have
important petroleum resources, but their populations don’t benefit. Is it
legitimate that our aid is distributed to countries that waste their own
resources? We must re-examine conditionalities, to evaluate the effectiveness of
our aid.”
¶21. (C) Bockel’s comments did not sit well with some Africans, notably Gabon
President Bongo. A slow-moving French judicial investigation of the holdings in
France of certain African leaders, among them Bongo, was in progress even before
Sarkozy went there in July 2007. The investigation reportedly indicated that
Bongo owned or was involved in the ownership of 33 properties in France,
including a Paris mansion valued at 18 million euro (currently, about USD 27.15
million). The French press picked up this case and did some investigating and
reporting of its own. The Gabonese took umbrage, with their MFA stating its
intention to “reflect” on the course of Franco-Gabonese relations and mentioning
a “cabal” and a “plot against Gabon and its president.”
¶22. (C) Relations took a turn for the worse when, early in March 2008, France
expelled two Gabonese for apparent visa/residency problems. Gabon immediately
responded, noting that “there are many French in Gabon in irregular situations.
They can be taken to the border if, during police controls, they don’t justify
their presence with proper documentation.” Gabon then raised the reciprocity
provisions of the immigration accord signed the previous July (para 7, above).
The noise level, mostly on Gabon’s side, increased.
¶23. (C) And then the noise suddenly stopped, after the March 18 announcement
that Bockel would no longer be Secretary of State for Cooperation and
Francophonie, to be replaced by Alain Joyandet. Although officially denied, it
was commonly accepted that Bockel had to go in order to make peace with figures
such as Bongo. Media reports on the French holdings of African leaders also
seemed to disappear at that time and so did the investigations. For his part,
PARIS 00001568 006 OF 007
Bockel issued a “no regrets about anything I said” statement, as he trundled off
to his new job as Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs.
¶24. (C) The Bockel case is significant because it shows that “killing” France-
Afrique is easier said than done; that France-Afrique has a life of its own,
with vested interests on the African side that the French perhaps underestimated
when deciding on the new policy; that African leaders can manipulate France-
Afrique for their own ends as well as the French can or could; that a clever,
skillful leader like Bongo can fight far above Gabon’s weight and humble a
French politician of Bockel’s stature; and that France should take care in not
trifling with Africans (which is what Sarkozy said in Dakar that France would no
longer do). Bold talk of “signing France-Afrique’s death certificate” ended with
Bockel’s departure and has not resurfaced. Bongo made his point.
Wins, Losses, Draws, and ???

----------------------------
¶25. (C) Sarkozy indicated that implementation of his new policy would take
place on a clean slate, that he would not be a prisoner of the past or the
problems that existed prior to his presidency. Bongo partly refuted that notion.
The Sarkozy government has tried to improve problematic relations from earlier
times, with only limited success.
-- ANGOLA: Relations were long frozen because of the Falcone Affair, the complex
arms trafficking case that dates to the Mitterrand and Chirac eras. French
commercial activities in Angola after the scandal broke have continued without
much hindrance but political relations have been very limited. Frustrated that
the Falcone issue continued to influence relations and with an eye toward
expanding business with resource-rich Angola, Sarkozy broke the ice with a short
meeting with President Dos Santos during the September 2007 UNGA, and followed
up with a visit to Angola on May 23, 2008. One shared issue of concern is the
trial in France of some 42 defendants (including high-profile figures such as
Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, President Mitterrand’s son and a former “Mr. Africa”
at the Presidency) and what that trial may reveal in terms of Angolan
culpability in the affair. Angolans now appear ready to handle whatever dirty
laundry the trial brings to light. Although still at an early stage, Sarkozy’s
outreach to Angola seems promising, and should be considered a “win” for both
sides.
-- RWANDA: Relations, precarious even before the 1994 genocide, collapsed in

November 2006 when then-anti terrorism Judge Bruguiere issued an investigative
report that implicated President Kagame and other senior Rwandans in the events
of 1994. The Rwandans immediately broke relations with France. The French have
since tried to improve relations, arguing that neither side should hold the
other hostage over events dating to 1994 and before. They stress that France’s
judiciary (i.e., a judge such as Bruguiere) enjoys an independence that renders
it immune from internal GOF attempts to influence it. Seeking reconciliation,
Foreign Minister Kouchner met with President Kagame on January 26, 2008, in
Kigali. Despite French optimism that the two sides can “compartmentalize” the
genocide issue, Rwanda is not amenable to doing so, landing another hammer blow
with the August 2008 report accusing French officials at the highest levels of
complicity in the genocide. With relations getting worse and not better, Rwanda
must be considered a “loss.”
-- DJIBOUTI: The Borrel Affair, involving the 1995 death of French judge Bernard
Borrel, who was working on assignment in Djibouti when he committed suicide (or
was killed), continues to cloud relations. Both sides long considered his death
a suicide but Mrs. Borrel was convinced he was murdered for having found
evidence of Djiboutian wrongdoing. She filed several legal proceedings in
France; one resulted in the March 2007 conviction in absentia of two senior
Djiboutian figures for witness tampering.
PARIS 00001568 007 OF 007
-- DJIBOUTI (cont,d): Despite periodic upheavals, the two sides managed to

isolate the case until the convictions, which took place a few weeks before
Sarkozy’s inauguration. Soon after becoming President, Sarkozy met with Mrs.
Borrel and the GOF abruptly shifted position, saying that Borrel’s death was not
a suicide but the result of foul play. It is not clear if the shift stemmed from
a new evaluation of the evidence or from Sarkozy’s desire to ally himself with
Mrs. Borrel, whom the French public and media have viewed sympathetically.
Djiboutians protested, countering that Borrel, if not a suicide, died because of
involvement in a pedophile ring. Relations seemed destined to deteriorate but
then France provided important help to Djibouti during its June 2008 border
dispute with Eritrea. France’s military base in Djibouti so far has not been a
bargaining chip in the Borrel case. Relations with Djibouti, while delicate,
seem to be holding in place, with both sides enjoying a “draw.” That said, the
Borrel issue remains unresolved and its unfolding will likely continue to affect
relations.
-- MADAGASCAR: To these wins, losses, and draws, one must add an abject
“surrender” -- Sarkozy’s agreeing to Madagascar President Ravalomanana’s recent
request that then-Ambassador to Madagascar Gildas Le Lidec be replaced after
some six months at post. Ravalomanana reportedly thought that Le Lidec was
“unlucky,” citing negative developments in other countries that coincided with
Le Lidec’s postings. One of France’s most experienced diplomats, Le Lidec had
been ambassador in Japan, Cambodia, C.A.R., DRC, and Cote d,Ivoire before
Madagascar, where he announced his departure at this year’s July 14 fete. When
asked, most GOF contacts shake their heads and sigh, making muted comments about
Sarkozy’s bending backward too far to placate Ravalomanana and ending a veteran
public servant’s honorable career by humiliating him. Whether Le Lidec’s
dismissal represents a one-off or signals a new-found intention on Sarkozy’s
part to please African leaders remains to be seen.
One Year Later
--------------
¶26. (C) Over a year into Sarkozy’s five-year term, his Africa policy has
yielded positive results for both French and Africans but has not been the
clean-sweeping “out with the old, in with the new” success he was first seeking.
In our view, he underestimated the scope of the challenge and overestimated his
abilities as a relative outsider bringing his fabled dynamism to the task. He
was tone-deaf to some of the dynamics developed over decades of France-Afrique
and his pace and rhythm (let alone his policies) did not accord with that of
many African counterparts. In saying openly that he wanted to end France-
Afrique, Sarkozy inadvertently gave it a new spark of life, as Bockel learned
the hard way.
¶27. (C) Nonetheless, the energy that Sarkozy is imparting stands in favorable
contrast to the stagnation characterizing Africa policy during Chirac’s final
years. Sarkozy’s main shortcoming concerning Africa may be that in his haste to
end an admittedly shopworn policy, he launched himself into doing so without
having completely integrated the lessons that were to be learned from it.
¶28. (C) Part III, the final segment of this series (septel), will explore other
aspects of France’s implementation of its new Africa policy, focusing on its
military posture in that region.
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce
STAPLETON
Viewing cable 08ANKARA1643, TURKEY: CHARITY FUND SCANDAL

PROMPTS PM ERDOGAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2572
DE RUEHAK #1643/01 2590427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150427Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018

TAGS: PGOV SCUL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CHARITY FUND SCANDAL PROMPTS PM ERDOGAN
BATTLE WITH PRESS TYCOON
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A very public and ugly battle has erupted between Prime
Minister Erdogan and the Dogan Group. The conflict dominated the news this week
after Erdogan lashed out at business and media mogul Aydin Dogan for reporting
on allegations in a German court that the German-based Deniz Feneri Charity
laundered funds to individuals in Turkey who are close to Erdogan and the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP). The charges focus public attention on
widespread allegations about corruption in the AKP, a key vulnerability for the
party. Still, Erdogan seems indifferent to reporting on the scandal in other
media outlets, and has turned his wrath solely on the Dogan Group with competing
charges about corruption linked to a zoning deal for the Istanbul Hilton.
Erdogan launched a milder campaign against the Dogan group in Febuary for
carrying “pornographic” photos of women on its front pages, but the latest
attack is a significant escalation of tensions. Erdogan has not been this
truculent since long before the AKP court closure case; ironically, the new
scandal has fed speculation that a second closure case could result. END
summary.
It Only Took A Spark

--------------------
¶2. (SBU) On September 1 the first court case against Deniz Feneri convened in
the Frankfurt Regional Court. By September 5, German Prosecutor Kerstin Lotz
publicly stated that the Turkish Government “tried to intervene in the case and
wanted suspects released.” The next day, CHP leader Deniz Baykal announced on
NTV, a non-Dogan media outlet, that “Mehmet Gurhan, International Director at
Kanal 7, acknowledged he took money from the German Deniz Feneri and passed it
to PM Erdogan.” Baykal implied that he Prime Minister and his party were direct
recipients of funds embezzled from the charity. Dogan's three flagship papers –
Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Radikal – quickly picked up the story the next day with
screaming, front-page banner headlines.
¶3. (U) In response, Erdogan publicly charged Dogan with corruption regarding a
zoning application for new residences at the Istanbul Hilton. Dogan responded to
the allegation by declaring: “The German judiciary claimed that the Prime
Minister was involved in this case. The main opposition party leader announced
this on NTV, but I am having difficulty understanding why I stand accused of
reporting this in my papers.” In a second attack, the Prime Minister announced
that Dogan had not been granted permission by the Turkish Board of Television
and Radio (RTUK) to use an additional TV terrestrial frequency that he had
purchased. Dogan denied Erdogan's charges and accused the Prime Minister of
trying to stifle any press criticism of himself.
Tango with Turkey's Rupert Murdoch

-------------------------
¶4. (C) Dogan Media Holdings owns several mainstream daily newspapers and three
major television stations. Although relations between Erdogan and Dogan have
never been particularly warm, a detente of sorts has existed for most of the
Erdogan administration. Dogan media players were only moderately critical of the
Government, and the Goverment did not put undue pressure on Dogan's other
business interests. Long before the public barbs, a familiar behind-the-scenes
tango was taking place. Because of the Turkish media ownership structure, media
owners use their press resources to curry favor with the Government on behalf of
their own businesses. They also punish governments that, in their view, do not
give them a sufficient cut of Government largesse. With control of 30-40 percent
of the nation's media, Dogan is a major player in this game. Two years ago, the
goverment fined Dogan's Petrol Offisi $200 million for tax evasion. This appears
to have been the spark that ignited the current tensions.
Erdogan Spokesman on the Media: Feed the Beast or Else
Ankara 00001643 002 of 002
----------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (C) PM Spokesman Akif Beki contends, “It's a media habit. They want
something; they don't get it, so they attack.” He defended RTUK's refusal to
allow Dogan to use his recently purchased terrestrial television channel by
arguing that this station would have put Dogan in control of more than 50
percent of the media. Beki also believes this fight will not last long. “Dogan
is wrong,” he argued, because he is “printing allegations being adjudicated in a
German court as (if they are) pure truth.” AKP Vice Chairman Nihat Ergun made
the same point to us in a September 11 meeting at the Parliament. (COMMENT:
Although Beki contends that Erdogan's criticism is justifed and that the Prime
Minister has actually shown admirable restraint, there are suggestions of a
deliberate political move against Dogan. Several weeks ago, Minister of Trade
Simsek told a group of investors in London to sell their Dogan stock because
Dogan “won't be around much longer.” END COMMENT) Indeed, after Erdogan's
attacks began last week, Dogan stock fell 8 percent. And although Dogan Holding
showed a profit last year, several media and business sources have indicated the
lack of government tenders and contracts is beginning to hurt the massive
conglomerate.
¶6. (SBU) Last fall the editorial stance noticeably shifted at Dogan's flagship
newspaper, Hurriyet. The paper became more critical of the government. xxxxx
described for us several factors which he said led to the shift. Among them was
the Petrol Offisi case, a decision by the Government not to issue a valuable
Ceyhan oil refinery tender to Dogan, and a blistering speech Erdogan made to a
closed AK Party meeting where he called Dogan a crooked businessman. The last
item was taken personally by xxxxx because Dogan has supported Erdogan in his
press on certain issues in the past.
Comment
--------
¶7. (C) This battle could be seen as just a very direct and personal fight
between two titans. However, coming on the heels of other recent accusations of
corruption in the AKP, the Dogan attacks may represent a broader shift in
Government-media relations. Such shifts have been seen with other governments in
the past. In earlier cases, however, the media did not generally escalate
attacks until a government appeared at the end of its life, like sharks smelling
blood in the water. With Erdogan's approval ratings still over 50 percent, it
will be difficult to maintain such a criticism level absent hard evidence and
actual convictions. Still, only six weeks after the conclusion of the AKP
closure case, it is striking that media coverage is predicting the AKP could
face closure again if these or additional corruption charges are substantiated.

Wilson
Viewing cable 08SHANGHAI422, SHANGHAI SCHOLARS EXPRESS

CONCERN OVER DELAY IN SIX-PARTY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08SHANGHAI422.
2008-09-26
08SHANGHAI422 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Consulate Shanghai
06:06
VZCZCXRO2065
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0422/01 2700640
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R 260640Z SEP 08
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
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RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1437
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1408
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1592
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1431
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1239
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7789
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000422
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2033

TAGS: CH KN PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER DELAY IN SIX-PARTY
TALKS
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Chief, U.S.

Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: xxxxx are concerned about

the current impasse in the Six-Party Talks, but each varies in
his diagnosis of its causes and prescriptions for U.S. policy.
xxxxx claims that a debate has emerged within the Chinese
leadership over the merits of quick U.S. delisting, as a result
of Pyongyang's allegedly incomplete nuclear declaration. These
xxxxx agree that, for the moment, none of North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il's three sons is likely to be tapped to succeed him.
xxxxx, North Korea in August questions
the World Food Program's (WFP) forecast of an imminent famine
there. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) xxxxx Korean politics and the

ongoing Six-Party Talks. xxxxx.
Deadlock over verification

--------------------------
¶3. (C) xxxxx are concerned about the current
impasse in the Six-Party Talks, but each varies in his diagnosis
of its causes and prescriptions for U.S. policy. xxxxx
view, Washington is primarily responsible for North Korean
foot-dragging. Under the "action for action" framework, xxxxx
argues, the United States promised to remove North Korea from
the State Sponsors of Terror list and Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA) restrictions in return for a complete nuclear declaration
from Pyongyang. After forty days, it became legally possible for
Washington to delist the North Koreans in August, but this did
not occur. xxxxx continues, the United States seems to want
international inspectors to be able to access North Korea's
nuclear sites virtually "at whim," and to meet with its nuclear
scientists. These conditions have given Pyongyang "an excuse for
their present inaction." xxxxx North Korea is "truly
disappointed" with this development -- its leaders believe "they
did something" and are owed something in return -- and, xxxxx
opinion, it is "difficult for the other Six-Party states to
blame them."
¶4. (S/NF) xxxxx, on the other hand, dissents from this view.
According xxxxx, the nuclear declaration North Korea submitted
in May was incomplete. xxxxx claims that critical information
about secret underwater nuclear facilities located on North
Korea's coast. For this reason, a debate has emerged within the
Chinese leadership over the merits of quick U.S. delisting, xxxxx
continues. One camp believes that continued momentum in the
Six-Party Talks is critical to their success, and has concluded
that Washington must adopt a more flexible attitude. The other
camp, however, has taken the incomplete nuclear declaration as
evidence that the regime in Pyongyang is truly "a ticking time
bomb," and regard Washington's tough stance on verification as a
potential opportunity to finally deal with a persistent regional
irritant.xxxxx does not believe the United States should delist
North Korea yet, though he argues Washington needs to find some
token action it can take now to demonstrate its good faith.
¶5. (C) xxxxx is confident that, if the United States

removes North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terror list and
the TWEA -- even absent progress on a verification protocol --
its negotiators will act quickly to reciprocate and permit some
form of verification. That North Korea has been labeled a state
sponsor of terror is "an ongoing source of embarrassment" for
the regime, xxxxx argues, and Washington must not underestimate
its "desire for face." xxxxx agree that, despite North
Korea's recent moves to apparently renew its activities at the
Yongbyon nuclear complex, including its removal of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals on equipment, Pyongyang's
threats are largely for show. As part of the Six-Party process,
the regime has already taken significant steps toward nuclear
disablement, xxxxx out, so North Korean leaders cannot
Shanghai 00000422 002.2 of 003
actually accomplish very much in the short term.
Kim jong-il's health

--------------------
¶6. (C) Regarding Kim Jong-il's (KJI) purported ill health, xxxxx
admit they have been unable to divine what has actually
happened, noting such information is "top secret" even to North
Koreans. xxxxx claims that KJI has a long history of recreational
drug use that has resulted in frequent bouts of epilepsy and
contributed to his poor health overall. xxxxx recalls
hearing an unconfirmed report that, in the last several weeks, a
team of five Chinese physicians traveled to Pyongyang, perhaps
to tend to KJI. xxxxx cautions against reading too much into what
he considers "pure speculation." Even if KJI suffered some
medical emergency, illness "does not necessarily mean he is
dying or has lost political control, or that regime collapse is
somehow imminent."
¶7. (C) At the present time, xxxxx considers it "likelier than not"
KJI remains in charge and is making political decisions. xxxxx is
less certain, quoting reports that long time consort and former
secretary Kim Ok may be caring for Kim and overseeing policy on
his behalf. KJI puts a lot of confidence in Kim Ok, notes xxxxx,
recalling that she was a member of the North Korean delegation
led by General Jo Myong-rok that visited the Clinton White House
in October 2000.
Contenders for future leadership

--------------------------------
¶8. (C) There is consensus among xxxxx that, at least

for the moment, none of KJI's three sons is likely to be tapped
to succeed him. xxxxx considers the two youngest sons, Kim
Jong-chol and Kim Jong-un, far too inexperienced and incapable
of effective governance. xxxxx, observing that KJI's
oldest son, Kim Jong-nam, is "too much of a playboy," Kim
Jong-chol is "more interested in video games" than governing,
and Kim Jong-un is simply too young. Additionally, KJI had been
groomed for many years to replace his father and former North
Korean leader Kim Il-Sung before the latter passed away. In
contrast, xxxxx, none of the sons has received similar
preparatory treatment.
¶9. (C) The most likely scenario for succession, xxxxx,

is a group of North Korean military leaders, including civilians
with close military connections, taking the helm from KJI. xxxxx
also believes the military is probably best situated to run the
country, at the present time. Still, if KJI remains in charge
for another five or ten years, Beijing might then prefer to see
Kim Jong-nam -- who is more of a known quantity than an ad hoc
lineup of civil-military elements -- rise to power, xxxxx.
¶10. (S)xxxxx that Kim Yong-nam (KYN) -- the president of

North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly and second in command --
seems the likeliest candidate to lead a new regime. In recent
months, KYN has received foreign leaders and represented North
Korea at many of the same events KJI would normally attend. xxxxx
also reports that a younger brother of KYN's currently heads the
Propaganda Department -- a position once held by KJI during his
ascent to power -- while another relative runs North Korea's
intelligence outfit. KYN is over 80 years old, xxxxx, so
even a caretaker leadership role that fell to him would be short
lived. xxxxx, it is interesting that KYN's family is
seeded in the same "power positions" long considered important
by the current ruling Kim family.
Perils and promise of external exposure

---------------------------------------
¶11. (C) xxxxx that North Korea is struggling to resolve the

contradiction between its need for international engagement and
desire to maintain ideological purity. Objectively speaking,
exposure to the outside world -- its ways of thinking and
quality of life -- is necessary to the regime's survival, xxxxx
points out. From Pyongyang's perspective, someone who has seen
the world as KJI's sons have might best be equipped to undertake
reform in North Korea "on his own terms." At the same time, the
regime has traditionally feared external influence, valued
ideological purity, and prized ongoing closeness to the regime
in its prospective cadres. As a result, xxxxx, those who
Shanghai 00000422 003 of 003
have traveled internationally are often marginalized within the

insular North Korean leadership or ousted altogether. In this
respect, xxxxx, the regime actually resembles China
during its ideological heyday. It is "no coincidence" that Zhou
Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who both had overseas experience, were
later the victims of purges at home, xxxxx.
A glimpse beyond the yalu

-------------------------
¶12. (C) xxxxx extremely poor quality of the main road into Rajin, despite
its role as the key route into that city, one of North Korea's
special economic zones (SEZ) during the 1990s (the Rajin-Sonbong
SEZ) that is also equipped with a harbor. xxxxx recalls watching a
television news program commemorating a North Korean military
holiday that coincided with his stay, and found it strange that
only "still photo footage" aired of KJI reportedly visiting a
military unit that day.
¶13. (C) xxxxx not have the opportunity to engage ordinary

North Korean citizens -- he spoke "only with his minders" -- but
remembers observing many people walking on the streets, riding
bicycles, and generally appearing healthy and happy. xxxxx
recognizes that xxxxx took him only to a small corner of
North Korea, he claims he saw "no signs of starvation" during
this time. xxxxx skeptical of the World Food Program's
(WFP) recent assessment that North Korea may soon be hit by a
harsh famine, perhaps its worst since 1997. xxxxx,
argues that whatever happens regarding the food situation, a
famine will certainly not threaten the regime's political
stability, asserting that North Koreans will sooner "die
quietly" of starvation than defy Pyongyang.
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) Although difficult to verify xxxxx, our discussions suggest a variety
of Chinese opinions
regarding how best to approach the North Korean nuclear dilemma.
Consensus on the subject continues xxxxx.
Camp
Viewing cable 08BISHKEK1095, CANDID DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE
ANDREW ON THE KYRGYZ
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08BISHKEK1095.
08BISHKEK1095 2008-10-29 12:12 2010-11-29 23:11 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bishkek
VZCZCXRO8787
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHEK #1095/01 3031207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291207Z OCT 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001095

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEE)
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI)
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS PREL, ECON, KG
SUBJECT: CANDID DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE ANDREW ON THE KYRGYZ
ECONOMY AND THE “GREAT GAME”
REF: BISHKEK 1059
BISHKEK 00001095 001.4 OF 004
Classified By: Amb. Tatiana Gfoeller, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 28, the Ambassador participated in a two-hour brunch
to brief HRH the Duke of York ahead of his meetings with the Kyrgyz Prime
Minister and other high-level officials. She was the only non-subject of the
United Kingdom or the Commonwealth invited to participate by the British
Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic. Other participants included major British
investors in Kyrgyzstan and the Canadian operator of XXXXXXXXXXXX. The
discussion covered the investment climate for Western firms in the Kyrgyz
Republic, the problem of corruption, the revival of the “Great Game,” Russian
and Chinese influence in the country, and the Prince’s personal views on
promoting British economic interests. Astonishingly candid, the discussion at
times verged on the rude (from the British side). END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) British Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic Paul Brummell invited the
Ambassador to participate in briefing His Royal Highness Prince Andrew, the Duke
of York, ahead of his October 28 meetings with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor
Chudinov and other high-level officials. The Prince was in Kyrgyzstan to promote
British economic interests. Originally scheduled to last an hour over brunch,
the briefing ended up lasting two hours, thanks to the super-engaged Prince’s
pointed questions. The Ambassador was the only participant who was not a British
subject or linked to the Commonwealth. The absence of her French and German
colleagues was notable; they were apparently not invited despite being fellow
members of the European Union. Others included major British investors in
Kyrgyzstan and the Canadian operator of the Kumtor mine.
“YOU HAVE TO TAKE THE ROUGH WITH THE SMOOTH”
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) The discussion was kicked off by the president of the Canadian-run
Kumtor mine, who described at length his company’s travails of trying to
negotiate a revised mining concession that provides a greater stake in Kumtor’s
parent company to the Kyrgyz government in exchange for a simplified tax regime
and an expanded concession. He was followed by the representative of the British
owner of Kyrgyzneftigas, who explained his company’s role in Kyrgyz oil
exploration and production, as well as doing his share of complaining of being
harassed and hounded by Kyrgyz tax authorities. One example he gave was that a
Kyrgyz shareholder was now suing the company, saying that his “human rights”
were being violated by the terms of his shareholders’ agreement.
¶4. (C) The Prince reacted with unmitigated patriotic fervor. To his credit, he
diligently tried to understand the Kyrgyz point view. However, when participants
explained that some Kyrgyz feel that they were “unfairly” led in the 1990s to
sign unfavorable contracts with Westerners, he evinced no sympathy. “A contract
is a contract,” he insisted. “You have to take the rough with the smooth.”
“ALL OF THIS SOUNDS EXACTLY LIKE FRANCE”
----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) After having half-heartedly danced around the topic for a bit, only
mentioning “personal interests” in pointed fashion, the business representatives
then plunged into describing what they see as the appallingly high state of
corruption in the Kyrgyz economy. While claiming that all of them never
participated in it and never gave out bribes, one representative of a middle-
sized company stated that “It is sometimes an awful temptation.” In an
astonishing display of candor in a public hotel where the brunch was taking
place, all of the businessmen then chorused that nothing gets done in Kyrgyzstan
if President Bakiyev’s son Maxim does not get “his cut.” Prince Andrew took up
the topic with gusto, saying that he keeps hearing Maxim’s name “over and over
again” whenever he discusses doing business in this country. Emboldened, one
businessman said that doing business here is “like doing business in the Yukon”
in the nineteenth century, i.e. only those willing to participate in local
corrupt practices are able to make any money. His colleagues all heartily
agreed, with one pointing out that “nothing ever changes here. Before all you
heard was Akayev’s son’s name. Now it’s Bakiyev’s son’s name.” At this point the
Duke of York laughed uproariously, saying that: “All of this sounds exactly like
France.”
¶6. (C) The Prince then turned to the Ambassador for an American take on the
situation. The Ambassador described American business interests in the country,
which range from large investments such as the Hyatt hotel and the Katel
telecommunications company to smaller investments in a range of sectors. She
stated that part of the problem with business conditions in Kyrgyzstan was the
rapid turnover in government positions. Some reacted to their short tenures in a
corrupt manner, wanting to “steal while they can” until they were turned out of
office. While noting the need for greater transparency in doing business, she
recounted that she had hosted the American Chamber of Commerce’s Members Day
last week (attended by the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Minister of Trade and
Commerce) which had been widely attended and a resounding success (see reftel).
She then described the beneficial impact on the Kyrgyz economy of the Coalition
Air Base at Manas Airport.
“YOU HAVE TO CURE YOURSELF OF ANOREXIA”
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) With a mock groan, the Duke of York then exclaimed: “My God, what am I
supposed to tell these people?!” More seriously, he invited his guests to
suggest ways Kyrgyzstan’s economic prospects and attractiveness could be
improved. Everyone agreed that in his talks with the Prime Minister and others,
he should emphasize the rule of law, and long-term stability.
¶8. (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador’s point about rapid government turnover,
they urged him to impress upon his hosts the importance of predictability and
the sanctity of contracts in order to attract more Western investment. At the
same time, they pointed out that none of this was necessary to attract Russian,
Kazakh, or Chinese investments. It appeared to them that the Kyrgyz were
satisfied with their level and on the verge of “not bothering” with making the
necessary improvements to attract Western investments. Returning to what is
obviously a favorite theme, Prince Andrew cracked: “They won’t need to make any
changes to attract the French either!” Again turning thoughtful, the Prince
mused that outsiders could do little to change the culture of corruption here.
“They themselves have to have a change of heart. Just like you have to cure
yourself of anorexia. No one else can do it for you.”
PLAYING THE GREAT GAME (BY EXTENSION THE AMERICANS TOO)
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶9. (C) Addressing the Ambassador directly, Prince Andrew then turned to
regional politics. He stated baldly that “the United Kingdom, Western Europe
(and by extension you Americans too”) were now back in the thick of playing the
Great Game. More animated than ever, he stated cockily: “And this time we aim to
win!” Without contradicting him, the Ambassador gently reminded him that the
United States does not see its presence in the region as a continuation of the
Great Game. We support Kyrgyzstan’s independence and sovereignty but also
welcome good relations between it and all of its neighbors, including Russia.
¶10. (C) The Prince pounced at the sound of that name. He told the Ambassador
that he was a frequent visitor to Central Asia and the Caucasus and had noticed
a marked increase in Russian pressure and concomitant anxiety among the locals
post-August events in Georgia. He stated the following story related to him
recently by Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev. Aliyev had received a letter from
President Medvedev telling him that if Azerbaijan supported the designation of
the Bolshevik artificial famine in Ukraine as “genocide” at the United Nations,
“then you can forget about seeing Nagorno-Karabakh ever again.” Prince Andrew
added that every single other regional President had told him of receiving
similar “directive” letters from Medvedev except for Bakiyev. He asked the
Ambassador if Bakiyev had received something similar as well. The Ambassador
answered that she was not aware of any such letter.
¶11. (C) The Duke then stated that he was very worried about Russia’s resurgence
in the region. As an example, he cited the recent Central Asian energy and
water-sharing deal (septel), which he claimed to know had been “engineered by
Russia, who finally pounded her fist on the table and everyone fell into line.”
(NOTE: Interestingly, the Turkish Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic recently
described her analysis of the deal to the Ambassador in strikingly similar
language. END NOTE.)
¶12. (C) Showing that he is an equal-opportunity Great Game player, HRH then
turned to the topic of China. He recounted that when he had recently asked the
President of Tajikistan what he thought of growing Chinese influence in Central
Asia, the President had responded “with language I won’t use in front of
ladies.” His interlocutors told the Prince that while Russians are generally
viewed sympathetically throughout the region, the Chinese are not. He nodded,
terming Chinese economic and possibly other expansion in the region “probably
inevitable, but a menace.”
RUDE LANGUAGE A LA BRITISH
--------------------------
¶13. (C) The brunch had already lasted almost twice its allotted time, but the
Prince looked like he was just getting started. Having exhausted the topic of
Kyrgyzstan, he turned to the general issue of promoting British economic
interests abroad. He railed at British anti-corruption investigators, who had
had the “idiocy” of almost scuttling the Al-Yamama deal with Saudi Arabia.
(NOTE: The Duke was referencing an investigation, subsequently closed, into
alleged kickbacks a senior Saudi royal had received in exchange for the multi-
year, lucrative BAE Systems contract to provide equipment and training to Saudi
security forces. END NOTE.) His mother’s subjects seated around the table roared
their approval. He then went on to “these (expletive) journalists, especially
from the National Guardian, who poke their noses everywhere” and (presumably)
make it harder for British businessmen to do business. The crowd practically
clapped. He then capped this off with a zinger: castigating “our stupid (sic)
British and American governments which plan at best for ten years whereas people
in this part of the world plan for centuries.” There were calls of “hear, hear”
in the private brunch hall. Unfortunately for the assembled British subjects,
their cherished Prince was now late to the Prime Minister’s. He regretfully tore
himself away from them and they from him. On the way out, one of them confided
to the Ambassador: “What a wonderful representative for the British people! We
could not be prouder of our royal family!”
COMMENT
-------
¶14. (C) COMMENT: Prince Andrew reached out to the Ambassador with cordiality
and respect, evidently valuing her insights. However, he reacted with almost
neuralgic patriotism whenever any comparison between the United States and
United Kingdom came up. For example, one British businessman noted that despite
the “overwhelming might of the American economy compared to ours” the amount of
American and British investment in Kyrgyzstan was similar. Snapped the Duke: “No
surprise there. The Americans don’t understand geography. Never have. In the
U.K., we have the best geography teachers in the world!” END COMMENT.
GFOELLER
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3183, TASKINGS FOR IDP/REFUGEE

INFORMATION
Discussing cables
2008-10-06 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO8885
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SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018

TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PREF, PK
SUBJECT: TASKINGS FOR IDP/REFUGEE INFORMATION
¶1. (U) This is a joint cable from Embassy Islamabad and Embassy Kabul.
¶2. (C) In recent weeks, Embassy Islamabad and the Regional Refcord in Embassy
Kabul have received requests, both orally and through e-mails, from the DAO and
USSOCOM (and its XXXXXXXXXXXX contractor) requesting information on camps along
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border which are housing Afghan refugees and/or
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
¶3. (C) The requests apparently are in response to a ‘Coliseum tasker’ from
SOCOM regarding IDP/Refugee camps and NGO activity. They have requested
information on camp names and locations, camp status, number of IDS/refugees and
ethnic breakdown, and NGO/humanitarian relief organizations working in the
camps. DAO apparently has been instructed to reach out to UNHCR (which is not an
agency of the USG but of the United Nations), USAID, and State. The purpose of
the request for information remains unclear; some e-mails have suggested that
agencies intend to use the data for targeting purposes; others indicate it would
be used for “NO STRIKE” purposes.
¶4. (C) We are concerned about providing information gained from humanitarian
organizations to military personnel, especially for reasons that remain unclear.
Particularly worrisome, this does not seem to us a very efficient way to gather
accurate information.
¶5. (C) Posts would appreciate clarification of the origin and purpose of this
tasker. Regardless, SOCOM, DIA or anyone else desiring such information should
send a front channel cable to the appropriate Embassy or to DNI’s
representative, the COS in Embassies Islamabad and/or Kabul.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3248, PAKISTAN'S PARLIAMENT BEGINS

TERRORISM DEBATE
Discussing cables
2008-10-13 2010-11-30 Embassy
http://www.spiegel.de
VZCZCXRO4586
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2018

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S PARLIAMENT BEGINS TERRORISM DEBATE
Classified By: CDA Jerry Feierstein, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
¶1. (C) Summary. The October 8-9 closed joint session of

parliament convoked by President Zardari to address the
security situation has been widely praised as a good first
step in convincing Pakistan's elected leadership to take
ownership of the fight against extremism; this effort now
should be extended to reach the general public. Director
General of Military Operations LtGen Pasha's briefing to the
group consisted largely of graphic video and other footage
demonstrating what one parliamentarian called the inhumane
and anti-Islamic nature of the militants. Pasha reportedly
blamed India, Russia and the UAE for supporting Baloch and
Taliban militancy and defended Pakistani sovereignty against
incursions by U.S. forces, but reportedly he also spoke
positively about what he termed the U.S. use of drones,
noting the vast majority of those killed in drone attacks
were foreign fighters or Taliban.
¶2. (C) The joint session has been extended by another four
days, beginning October 13 when Information Minister Sherry
Rehman will present the GOP's strategy to fight extremism.
The session increasingly promises to be a lively debate with
the Interior, Defense, Finance and Foreign Affairs Ministers
lined up to answer parliamentarians' questions. NSA Durrani
shared with Charge October 10 a draft of that presentation
that follows classic counter-insurgency strategy. It does
say the GOP has not given the U.S. a green light to do
cross-border operations, but uses that as a launching pad to
attack the presence of foreign militants and their violations
of Pakistani sovereignty. It goes on to call on the tribes
to eject the foreigners and support the government and offers
them development assistance if they come around.
¶3. (C) Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Nawaz

Sharif attended the briefing but left it to his Opposition
Leader Chaudhry Nisar to criticize the government, mostly on
procedural terms so far, by demanding that the civilian
government explain their strategy and how it differs from
that of the former Musharraf government. End Summary.
¶4. (C) President Asif Zardari convoked a joint session of

parliament on October 8 to be briefed by the military on the
current security situation. This was the third time in
Pakistan's history that a joint session of parliament was
formed as a committee of the whole to hear outside testimony
(the first was in 1974 to discuss religious riots; the second
was in 1988 to debate whether to sign the Geneva peace accord
on Afghanistan). Chief of Army Staff General Kayani attended
but newly promoted LtGeneral Pasha delivered the military's
brief as Director General of Military Operations (Pasha moved
over to become Director of Inter-Services Intelligence on
October 10).
¶5. (C) Lending a sense of urgency to the proceedings, on

October 9, suicide bombers attacked an Anti-Terrorism Unit of
Islamabad Police injuring a dozen and set off a roadside bomb
in Dir, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) killing 12. Also
on October 9, a bearded man in a burqa was arrested at
Islamabad airport on suspicion of terrorism; across Pakistan
there have been numerous hoax bomb threats since the
September 20 Marriott bombing. On October 10, over 60 (the
death toll is still rising) members of an anti-Taliban jirga
were killed in Orakzai, Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), and in Bajaur, FATA, the Taliban beheaded four elders
of the Charmang tribe. Also on October 10, the Taliban blew
up the house of another Awami National Party leader in Dir
and kidnapped a nazim (mayor) in Swat, NWFP. Earlier in the
week, explosions at several juice shops in Lahore were
blamed, not on the Taliban, but on conservative groups
reportedly seeking to discourage "immoral" behavior (the bars
were allegedly trysting places for unmarried couples). These
attacks followed the October 2 suicide bombing targeting
Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan in Wali Bagh,
NWFP, and the October 7 attack on a Pakistan Muslim
League-Nawaz parliamentarian in Bhakkar, Punjab. Overall,
there have been 40 suicide bombings in Pakistan so far in
¶2008.
¶6. (C) The joint session was held "in camera" without press
but parliamentarians have been providing bits and pieces of
information about the briefing, which was followed by a
question and answer session. The original Q&A session,
Islamabad 00003248 002 of 003
scheduled for 30 minutes, lasted over four hours. The

parliament then convened in joint session on October 9 to
continue questions; it agreed to meet for another four days
beginning October 13, when Information Minister Sherry Rehman
will brief the group on the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
strategy to tackle terrorism.
¶7. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx that Pasha's
briefing consisted in large part of videos and photos of
Taliban and other terrorist organization activities that
demonstrated the militants were both inhumane and un-Islamic.
At several points, xxxxxxxxxxxx said female parliamentarians asked
the Army to stop showing disturbing footage, including a gory
beheading. Members were told that India has established nine
training camps along the Afghan border, where they are
training members of the Baloch Liberation Army. According to
xxxxxxxxxxxx Pasha also claimed that India and the UAE (reportedly
due to opposition to construction of the Gwadar port) were
funding and arming the Baloch. Pasha also claimed that the
Russian government was directly involved in
funding/training/supporting the insurgency.
¶8. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said Pasha briefed members on what he termed

USG drone incursions and missile strikes. According to
xxxxxxxxxxxx , Pasha praised the U.S. for its support through these
methods and showed statistics to parliamentarians that
demonstrated the vast majority of those killed in these
attacks were either foreign fighters or Taliban. xxxxxxxxxxxx
believed that the military had made a good-faith effort to
portray USG activities as positive. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx
Pasha barely mentioned the threat from local Taliban leader,
Baitullah Mehsud.
¶9. (C) Other parliamentarians at a dinner hosted October 10

by Charge for SCA/PB Director Hartley, including Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) Senators Babar Awan and Enver Baig,
Pakistan Muslim League Assembly member Donya Aziz, Awami
National Party Senator Haji Muhammed Adeel, FATA
parliamentarians Shaukat Ullah and Munir Khan Orakzai and
Muttahdia Quami Movement (MQM) leader Farouq Sattar, were
less impressed by Pasha's brief. They all said the brief was
a good beginning, but characterized it as being largely
descriptive and adding little information they did not
already know. They noted that Pasha, unsurprisingly,
defended Pakistan's sovereignty against U.S. incursions.
They agreed that Pasha had defended Pakistan's relationship
with the U.S. but did not share details from the briefing
about foreign fighters killed in alleged U.S. drone attacks.
¶10. (C) Both the FATA parliamentarians and MQM said during
the Q&A session they pointed out that not all terrorists were
tribals and that the GOP needed to address growing extremism
in the Punjab. They noted that Punjabis increasingly are
moving to fight with militants in FATA and that there is
growing Talibanization of Karachi.
¶11. (C) Also attending the dinner was Pakistan Muslim

League-Nawaz (PML-N) Information Secretary Ahsan Iqbal.
Iqbal echoed comments made publicly by PML-N Opposition
Leader Chaudhry Nisar; both denigrated the briefing as being
merely descriptive and called for the civilian government to
explain its strategy to fight the militants. Nisar asked how
the GOP's strategy differed from that of the former Musharraf
government. Nisar told the press "It is noteworthy that no
suicide attack had taken place before the country became an
ally of the U.S. in the war on terror." PML-N leader Ishak
Dar told the press that it was imperative that a joint
session of parliament be apprised of all agreements executed
with the U.S. Interestingly, Nawaz Sharif, who attended the
joint session, did not comment on it publicly. Several
newspaper editorials criticized the PML-N leaders for jumping
the gun on their criticism before the session was complete.
¶12. (C) Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman at a news

conference October 12 claimed his party had the vision to
lead the country of the present crisis. He blamed the entire
military leadership, not just former President Musharraf, and
demanded they explain the agreed-upon rules of engagement
with U.S./ISAF coalition forces in Afghanistan. He
reiterated his view that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan was
the root cause of Pakistan's problems in the tribal areas and
said foreign troops must leave Afghanistan for the sake of
Islamabad 00003248 003 of 003
peace in the region. He also said his party had serious

reservations about the ongoing military operations in Bajaur.
¶13. (C) The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party and the Pukhtunkhwa

Milli Awami Party, both of which oppose use of force in the
tribal areas, boycotted the session. JI leader Qazi Hussain
has this week been leading a largely ignored "train march" to
protest GOP policies in the FATA.
¶14. (C) We expect Sherry Rehman will brief the now

established GOP strategy of: (1) political engagement, but
not with terrorists; (2) economic development; and (3) use of
force when necessary. National Security Advisor Durrani
provided Charge October 10 with a draft of the GOP's
presentation to the joint body, which follows classic
counter-insurgency strategy. It does say the GOP has not
given the U.S. a green light to do cross-border operations,
but uses that as a launching pad to attack the presence of
foreign militants and their violations of Pakistani
sovereignty. It goes on to call on the tribes to eject the
foreigners and support the government and offers them
development assistance if they come around.
¶15. (C) Comment: The long-promised joint session is a

welcome first step in bringing Pakistan's elected leadership
on board with the government's counter-terrorism strategy.
The session is being extended to accommodate a great deal of
pent-up opinion and emotion that has amassed over the past
few years when the leadership kept parliament in the dark on
security issues. The government understandably wants to keep
as much of that emotion contained in a closed-door session as
possible, and surprisingly little of the briefing content has
been leaked to the press. At some point, however, there
needs to be a public airing of views and concerns if the GOP
is going to increase public acknowledgment that this is
Pakistan's war.
¶16. (C) Comment cont'd: In other welcome developments, at

least one Pakistani group (perhaps bankrolled by the owner of
the bombed Marriott Hotel in Islamabad), Yeh Hum Naheen (Say
No to Terrorism) has been placing newspaper and TV ads in the
Urdu and English language press; the group's aim is to
collect the largest number of signatures ever on an
anti-terrorism petition. We understand the Information
Ministry is responsible for placing other anti-terrorism ads
in recent days. On October 11, Information Minister Malik
spoke at an anti-terrorism seminar organized in Lahore, again
as part of a long-promised outreach campaign by GOP ministers.
Feierstein
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3418, AMBASSADOR CONVOKED OVER U.S.

ATTACKS
Discussing cables
2008-10-29 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO8092
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Wednesday, 29 October 2008, 13:28

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PTER, PREL, TFIN, ETRD
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CONVOKED OVER U.S. ATTACKS
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: On October 29, Pakistani Acting Foreign Secretary Khalid Babar
convoked Ambassador to raise several recent hot-button issues. In response to a
Pakistani Senate resolution, Secretary Babar raised protests against alleged
U.S. attacks inside Pakistani territory. He reiterated MFA requests to
repatriate Aafia Siddiqi and pushed back on pending 1267 cases. The protests
were largely pro forma but the meeting is already being reported in Pakistani
press as MFA’s “strong protest” against U.S. violations of sovereignty. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) On October 27, the Pakistani Senate passed a resolution strongly
condemning alleged attacks by U.S. drones in Pakistani territory. The Senators
called upon the GOP to convey this protest to U.S. and NATO/ISAF authorities. In
response, Acting Foreign Minister Khalid Babar convoked Ambassador to register
their ongoing complaints. Babar repeated previous GOP statements condemning the
violation of territorial integrity and also reiterated that such attacks
undermine political solutions in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Ambassador noted
the ongoing and successful military cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan.
¶3. (C) Babar also raised concern about Dr. Aafia Siddiqi’s repatriation and the
whereabouts of her two young children. Ambassador made it clear that U.S.
authorities do not know the whereabouts of the children, who have never been in
U.S. custody, and noted that the Pakistani Embassy has been given full consular
access to Siddiqi. Babar was aware that Siddiqi is currently being assessed for
mental fitness to stand trial in the U.S., but noted that the MFA had been
required to report to the Islamabad High Court on a case demanding that the GOP
repatriate Siddiqi.
¶4. (C) Babar lastly raised the issue of 1267 case statements, particularly four
new cases including that of former Director General of ISI Hamid Gul. Babar
requested that the case statements include more verifiable evidence so that the
GOP would not block them. He suggested that more intelligence sharing early in
the process would expedite these cases and highlighted cases regarding terrorism
financing where technical evidence might be shared. Additionally, he suggested
that the cases be disaggregated to allow the easy one to go forward faster. By
submitting the 1267 cases in a block, the GOP refuses them in a block as well
even if some would pass independently.
¶5. (C) Comment: Despite the MFA’s media statement, Babar delivered his concerns
in a pro forma manner. We have told the MFA repeatedly that there currently is
no legal basis to repatriate Siddiqi, and we have no idea on the location of her
other two children.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08LONDON2556, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS STEALS THE
THUNDER FROM
Discussing cables
08LONDON2556 2008-10-07 12:12 2010-11-30 23:11 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy London
VZCZCXRO0185
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INFO RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1134
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE/UK

NSC FOR BRADLEY
EO 12958 DECL: 10/07/2018

TAGS PREL, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS STEALS THE THUNDER FROM
THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE
REF: LONDON 2496
¶1. Summary and comment. (C) The Conservative Party’s fall conference, which
closed the UK political party conference season on October 1, ended with a
whimper rather than the expected bang. Turmoil in the world’s financial markets
overshadowed Tory leader David Cameron’s attempts to portray his party as the
government in waiting. Following the initial vote in the House of
Representatives against the Bush Administration’s financial recovery plan on
September 27, Conservative Party Leader David Cameron adroitly moderated his
tone and the conference’s agenda in an attempt to avoid charges of partisanship.
Cameron departed from the conference organizers’ planned program to deliver an
emergency statement on September 30 in which he promised to cooperate fully with
the Government’s attempts to shore up the UK’s financial markets, offering his
party’s full support to help the Brown Government address the crisis, in a
deliberate contrast to what the UK media described as political partisanship in
the U.S. In the event, the Tory party high command’s initial fears at the start
of conference -- that with a double digit opinion poll lead over a tired looking
Labour Government, the Conservatives might end up looking hubristic and over-
confident - proved unfounded as Cameron battled to keep his conference in the
headlines, and his party looking relevant as the eyes of the public and media
turned to PM Brown at a time of financial turmoil.
¶2. (C) Comment cont. Conservatives were pleased that their unified front
contrasted starkly with Labour’s conference the preceding week, which had been
punctuated by in-fighting and an obsession with the faltering leadership of
Gordon Brown, but Cameron had to leave Birmingham troubled that PM Brown’s jibe
at the Labour party conference -- “now is no time for a novice” -- has gained
traction with the voters and given Labour a bump in the polls. Cameron attempted
to rebut the charge in his keynote address (ref), but it is clear the
inexperience charge is a winner for Labour and that voters, though tired of
Labour, are not yet sold on Cameron. Although both parties got what they needed
from their annual conventions, Gordon Brown will be the more relieved of the two
men that media coverage of the financial crisis has taken the spotlight off his
continuing leadership difficulties and off the Conservative Party’s attempts to
position themselves as the next Government. End Summary and comment.
Conservatives Worry About Over Confidence...at First

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) The Conservatives gathered for their annual fall conference in
Birmingham with high hopes. Under the banner slogan, “Plan for Change,” this was
to be the Party’s chance to lay out its plans to govern, providing the UK media
and public with the “meat of its policies” and an opportunity to present itself
as a credible alternative to Labour. Polls before the conference found that
although voters were definitely tired of Labour and wanted change, there were
still lingering doubts about Tory policies and ability to govern. Conservative
politicians were under strict instructions from the Tory high command not to
turn off voters by appearing too cocky or overconfident. But with a sustained
double digit opinion poll lead over Labour, that was always going to be
difficult. Cameron’s fears of appearing “to take victory for granted” soon
disappeared, however, as financial markets continued to implode. The UK media
turned its attention back to Prime Minister Brown, as the only man in a position
to actually influence events, and the conference slogan was quickly dubbed
“Change of Plan” by wags in the media as Cameron was forced into a radical and
nimble rewrite in order to keep the press interested in events at Birmingham.
¶4. (C) It all had started off so differently: on the first day of the
conference, speeches to conference delegates as well as a succession of meetings
with MPs revealed that although Conservative troops might be sticking to their
strict instructions not to appear too cocky in front of a watchful press, this
would not stop them from “sticking the boot” to the government. Shadow
chancellor George Osborne’s tax proposals were the main topic of conversation on
the first day. He hoped to repeat his success of the previous year when his
unexpected and highly popular announcement that inheritance taxes would be
radically increased had shaken the Labour Government so much that Gordon Brown
canceled his plans to call an early election. This time round, Osborne pleased
the party faithful with his announcement that any future Conservative Government
would freeze council tax levels (a local taxation) for its first two years. Both
the
LONDON 00002556 002 OF 003
party’s vice-chairman, Oliver Letwin MP, and the editor of the popular website
“Conservative Home,” Tim Montgomerie, told us that Osborne’s tax announcement
was very popular with party members and would be a good plank for the next
campaign.
¶5. (C) By the second day of the conference, the mood had changed dramatically
following events in Washington. David Cameron clearly needed to change the
narrative to keep the media focus on his conference and to nimbly avoid charges
of partisanship. In one swipe, Osborne’s tax announcement was wiped off the
front pages (although on closer inspection of the small print, much of the media
dismissed Osborne’s plans as unworkable anyway) and even at the conference
itself, the main topic of conversation became events in the U.S. Julie
Kirkbride, Conservative MP and spouse of former Shadow Northern Ireland
secretary, Andrew Mackay, summed up the conference’s real focus by the second
day when she told poloffs, “we’re all looking at what you’ll do.”
Changing the Narrative and the Narrator

---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) In an adroit reaction to world events, Cameron succeeded in keeping the
spotlight trained on his conference by giving an unplanned emergency statement
on the economy on September 30, in which he pledged full support to the
Government, “in stark contrast,” he added, to the partisanship of politicians in
D.C. Later, in a private meeting, a Cameron insider told poloffs that the
decision had been taken that it should be Cameron who delivered the speech
rather than shadow chancellor George Osborne as private party polling indicated
that the public feel Osborne lacks the necessary “gravitas.” Somewhat unfairly,
party officials thought, polling indicated that Osborne was seen as lightweight
and inexperienced, in part due to his high-pitched vocal delivery. This party
insider also revealed that Brown’s charge that Cameron was a “novice” at a time
of crisis had gained significant traction with voters. Internal Tory spot
polling had found, worryingly for the Conservatives, that contrary to the
general consensus, if an election were held the next day, Gordon Brown would be
re-elected, albeit with a vastly reduced Labour majority.
Tories Still Oppose 42 Day Detention Bill

-----------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Outside the conference hall, Shadow Home Secretary Dominic Grieve was
outspoken in his criticisms of the Government, and scornful of Government plans
to continue to push through legislation increasing the time suspects can be
held, without charge, to 42 days. The legislation has already passed through the
Commons after a very close vote and will be voted upon in the Lords this month,
where it is certain to be amended, requiring another vote in the Commons.
Grieve expressed doubt that the legislation would pass a second time in the
Commons.
Tories on Foreign Policy

------------------------
¶8. (C) In further meetings on the margins of the conference hall, David
Lidington, Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister for the Middle East, briefed poloffs
on his recent visit to Iran which he summed up as “great people, terrible
government.” Keith Simpson, another member of Hague’s foreign affairs team who
referred to his shadow portfolio as covering “the rest of the world,” and a
strong supporter of the Atlantic relationship, said that Cameron’s reaction to
world events, and his attempts to moderate the partisan tone of conference, were
“spot on,” as did Shailesh Vara, the Conservative Party’s Deputy leader. Vara
was equally frank about the party hierarchy’s instructions not to appear cocky,
and the “ban on champagne” at receptions in order to avoid charges of hubris -
instructions which had proved unnecessary as the financial news darkened
throughout the week.
Cameron’s Closing Speech
------------------------
¶9. (C) The conference wound up with a keynote speech by Cameron that, in
subsequent press reporting, was viewed as well-judged and providing sufficient,
if undetailed, policy discussion to allow the Tories to challenge the Labour
claim Cameron is a flash in the pan. He addressed early, and head on, Gordon
Brown’s central criticism that with the world in economic chaos, “now is no time
for a novice” by arguing that what matters more than experience is “character
and judgment” (ref). If Cameron’s aim was to convince the public that he has
serious policies and will bring changes, then he
LONDON 00002556 003 OF 003
succeeded in the eyes of much of the press. Cameron may have faced criticism
that his speech failed to lay out, in specifics, the party’s plans for
government but no doubt he is trying to avoid the fate of previous leaders who,
having set out a detailed platform far in advance of any general election, later
had their best ideas taken by the Labour Government.
ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Viewing cable 08LONDON2651, USDP EDELMAN’S OCTOBER 15

MEETINGS IN LONDON
Discussing cables
P 211703Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0149
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2018

TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, UK, ECON, KNNP, MOPS, PTER, AF, FR,
GG, PK, RS, UP
SUBJECT: USDP EDELMAN’S OCTOBER 15 MEETINGS IN LONDON
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. The UK is pessimistic about Pakistan, especially in light of

President Zardari’s poor leadership and the bad economy, although they praise
efforts by Pakistani President Zardari to cooperate with Afghan President
Karzai, UK senior officials at the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Cabinet Office told DOD Under Secretary for
Political Affairs (USDP) Eric Edelman and CENTCOM J5 Major General Robert
Allardice during October 15 meetings in London. The officials stressed the
importance of maintaining public support for efforts in Afghanistan as
casualties mount there. They agreed that financial pressure has had an impact
on the Iranian regime. The UK needs a SOFA in Iraq and may require U.S. support
to obtain one. HMG supports NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and
Ukraine but, in an effort to maintain allied unity, is preparing a compromise
“Bucharest Implementation Plan” for the December NATO Ministerial that will
contain the elements of a MAP. HMG has been “pleasantly surprised” by the
pragmatism of the French EU Presidency. According to the Chief of the Defense
Staff Jock Stirrup, the MOD did not welcome the unexpected cabinet reshuffle
that replaced Defense Minister Des Browne with John Hutton, but Stirrup
described the new Defense Minister as “keen on defense, keen on his job.” End
Summary.
¶2. (SBU) USDP Edelman and Major General Allardice met with UK officials in
London October 15 on a broad range of issues including Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Iraq, Iran, and Russia/Georgia. At the MOD, Edelman and Allardice met with the
Chief of the Defense Staff Jock Stirrup and Policy Director John Day; at FCO
with Permanent Under Secretary for Security Affairs Peter Ricketts; and at the
Cabinet Office with Foreign and Security Adviser to the Prime Minister Simon
McDonald and the Cabinet’s Deputy Head of the Foreign and Defense Policy
Secretariat Margaret Aldred.
Bleak Situation in Pakistan -- But a Few Glimmers

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶3. (S/NF) Although UK interlocutors were generally pessimistic about Pakistan’s

prospects, including the government’s ability to manage the financial crisis,
they expressed cautious optimism about President Zardari’s efforts to cooperate
with Afghanistan President Karzai. McDonald noted that Prime Minister Brown
wants to “encourage communications” between Zardari and Karzai since he
“believes that if the top levels can work well together, the lower levels” will
follow suit. Ricketts, who had just returned from a visit to Pakistan, praised
Zardari’s efforts to reach out to Karzai.
¶4. (S/NF) Ricketts characterized Zardari as having “not much sense of how to
govern a country...I fear he talks and talks but not much happens.” Ricketts
stated that HMG would “like to believe in Zardari...he says the right things,
but he faces big challenges,” including the economy, which “is in a really bad
way.” Stirrup stated that Pakistan is “arguably worse” now than a month ago,
asserting that although Zardari has “made helpful political noises, he’s clearly
a numbskull.” Real progress in Pakistan requires “a government with stability
and self-confidence” with a goal beyond “hanging on to power.” Stirrup stated
that a major obstacle to progress is an “enormous strand of deep anti-
Americanism among the public” although such views have diminished considerably
among the political classes. According to Day, Zardari’s principal strategy
appears to be asking for “lots of development aid...and meanwhile circumstances
on the ground are getting worse.” Day described Zardari as a “more positive and
stable leader than we’d feared and his relations with Karzai are a plus,” but
Zardari “does not know what to do and is waiting for someone to provide him a
solution.” McDonald also deprecated Zardari’s “passing the hat quite
energetically” and stated that during a recent meeting with British officials he
presented a “specific shopping list.” Despite “encouraging first signs” when
Zardari took office, it has become clear he is “not running the country.”
¶5. (S/NF) McDonald acknowledged U.S. concerns about former Premier Nawaz
Sharif, including ties to Islamists, but asserted that “he’s indicated he’s
willing to change and some in the system believe he has already done that.”
Although Sharif’s “moment may not come for a couple of years” he is in line to
be Pakistan’s next President, McDonald said. Ricketts observed, however, that
many members of the opposition are “publicly irresponsible” although some, like
Sharif, are “reasonable in private.”
¶6. (S/NF) Stirrup agreed that “clear intelligence” has demonstrated that U.S.
Predator drone strikes in Waziristan have had an impact on terror networks.
Ricketts noted that cross border operations are “resonating hard” in Pakistan’s
political world, but Ricketts and other interlocutors concurred that the
Pakistani leadership was not presently troubled by U.S. Predator strikes that
kill “Arabs” and Taliban, although Stirrup cautioned that such attitudes could
change.
¶7. (S/NF) Stirrup asserted that General Ahmed Pasha’s recent appointment as
head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the army spy agency, by Pakistani
Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani (former ISI head) reflects Kayani’s efforts to “get
control of the ISI” and make sure that Zardari won’t control the ISI. Stirrup
claimed that HMG has urged Zardari and civilian leadership to get control over
ISI but “when we put pressure on the Pakistanis they rearrange the furniture.”
Ricketts’ described Pasha as “Kayani’s man,” but also noted that during his
recent trip to Pakistan “everyone spoke highly” of Pasha.
Afghanistan: Getting the Message Right

--------------------------------------
Q (C/NF) Several interlocutors expressed concern that rising casualties in

Afghanistan could result in waning public support in allied countries for the
mission there. McDonald stated that in Great Britain the “electorate wants some
movement” in Afghanistan; public sentiment could turn against the “good war” as
casualties mount, he asserted. Consequently, the public in allied countries
requires “a realistic narrative” that explains the goals in Afghanistan. Stirrup
noted that JCS Chairman Mullen’s October 9 Congressional testimony, in which he
predicted that 2009 would present increased challenges in Afghanistan and that
“trends across the board are not going in the right direction,” was “headline
news” in the United Kingdom.
¶9. (C/NF) “Security is our top concern, but we need political progress,” in
Afghanistan, Stirrup emphasized. Ricketts asserted that “we’re holding our own”
in the fight against the Taliban and that a uniquely military solution is not
sufficient, as we “need to find social and economic solutions.” Part of the
problem, he continued, is that in Afghanistan the “perception of security is
diminishing” and “fear of Taliban reprisals” impede progress. Consequently,
efforts to build civil-military links are crucial to building stability,
Ricketts stated.
¶10. (S/NF) Day stated that HMG continues to feel “deep frustration” with
Karzai, wryly adding that “I remind people that we -- the international
community -- selected him.” For all Karzai’s faults, Day continued, the real
question concerning Karzai’s future is whether there is a “constitutional
alternative.” One dire possible scenario would be “failed elections (in 2009)
with Karzai having reduced legitimacy and with violence attributed to the
campaign.” Stirrup remarked on the importance of ensuring “respectable
elections.” McDonald stated that building up the Afghan National Army to the
goal of a well-trained force of 122,000 soldiers plus 12,000 in training would
take a long time. Aldred wondered whether one solution might be to follow
Pakistan’s model and “give the army some sort of economic benefit.” Some
interlocutors shared their disappointment at the performance of UN envoy Kai
Eide. Ricketts qualified his critique of Eide with the observation that he had
“weak back up” from the UN system.
Iran: Bigger Carrot, Bigger Stick?

----------------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) All UK interlocutors agreed that fiscal pressure against Iran has
had an impact on the regime and that the international community needs to keep
up the pressure, even if immediate changes are unlikely. Ricketts observed that
“pressure on Iran’s financial sector” coupled with falling oil prices have been
effective and that the “squeeze” against Iran should continue. According to
Ricketts, “Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khameini) feels that (President)
Ahmadinejad has not delivered...and the bourgeoisie in Tehran is openly
dismissive of Ahmadinejad,” also concluding that he has not delivered.
Therefore, we must “plug along” with sanctions and “our advice is to increase
the size of the carrot and the stick” in dealing with Iran. He raised the
possibility of the United States opening a “visa section” in Tehran, suggesting
that “lines of people around the block” queuing for visas would send an
“effective message” to Iran’s leadership.
Iraq SOFA: UK Looks to U.S. for Help

-------------------------------------
¶12. (C/NF) McDonald stressed that the UK could not have an “orderly transition”
of its forces in Iraq without a SOFA to provide a legal framework and the UK
seeks to “piggyback” on the U.S.-Iraq SOFA. Day noted that Prime Minister Brown
seeks a “low key transition” of British forces in Iraq. Stirrup emphasized that
“from a military perspective a UK soldier cannot show up in an Iraqi court,”
expressing concern that he was “not sure the SOFA will get through the Iraqi
system.” USDP Edelman provided an update on the progress of the U.S.-Iraq SOFA
and reassured his interlocutors that the U.S. and UK shared similar concerns on
jurisdiction issues.
Avoiding a “Wretched Row” over MAP

----------------------------------
¶13. (C/NF) McDonald stated that HMG rejects the view of “some partners who want
to get back to business as usual with Russia.” He continued that Prime Minister
Brown shares President Bush’s emphasis on the “importance of allied unity on the
Georgia crisis.” Although the UK supports MAPs for Georgia and Ukraine, HMG does
not believe the Alliance will agree on MAPs at the December 2-3 NATO
Ministerial. Consequently, HMG is “working up a Bucharest Implementation Plan”
that will contain the elements of a MAP but would not be “as frightening a word
as MAP” to some allies. McDonald stressed that such a plan would help cement
Alliance unity and he said he would raise it with NSA Hadley during his meeting
with him in Washington in a few days. Day characterized the plan as “like MAP,
but without the name,” also noting that “the risk of allied disunity is huge.”
Ricketts affirmed HMG’s support for a Georgian MAP, but allies should seek a
compromise in order to maintain unity and “avoid a wretched row.” Aldred
observed that, depending on the result of Ukraine’s elections, Ukraine may not
have a government come the ministerial, temporarily mooting the question of a
MAP for Ukraine.
France: EU Presidency -- and NATO

----------------------------------
¶14. (C/NF) Ricketts stated that HMG has been “pleasantly surprised” by the
pragmatism of France’s EU Presidency. Day remarked that the current French plan
to reintegrate into NATO’s military command is the third such effort. “I am not
sure France understands the implications of what they need to do to provide
officers and staffers for NATO integration.”
The New DefMin...

------------------
¶15. (S/NF) Stirrup offered a preliminary assessment of new Defense Minister

John Hutton, who replaced former DefMin Des Browne in the October 3 cabinet
reshuffle. He stated that the reshuffle was unexpected at the MOD and that
Defense was the only portfolio Hutton would accept when Peter Mandelson replaced
Hutton as Business Secretary. Citing “political considerations” that dominated
the Cabinet reshuffle, Stirrup opined that it was “disappointing from our
perspective that so little thought was given to what was best for (the Ministry
of) Defense” since “we did not need a change” at the MOD. However, “we were
lucky we got who we got,” since Hutton is a military historian who is “keen on
defense and keen on his job.”
¶16. (U) USDP Edelman cleared this message.

ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
NNNN
End Cable Text
Viewing cable 08LONDON2765, CONSERVATIVE PARTY CAUGHT FLAT-

FOOTED BY BROWN’S
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0357
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHLO #2765/01 3051533
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311533Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EEB PDAS NELSON, MSAKAUE

TREASURY FOR MURDEN, CARNES
EO 12958 DECL: 10/30/2018

TAGS ECON, EINV, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: CONSERVATIVE PARTY CAUGHT FLAT-FOOTED BY BROWN’S
QUICK MANEUVERS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS, SAYS SENIOR TORY MP

REF: A. LONDON 2666 B. LONDON 2603
Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Mark Tokola for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) PM Brown’s relatively deft performance (ref b) in handling the economic
crisis over the past month has caught the Conservative Party off-guard, and the
Tories’ response to the crisis has been regrettably tepid, Michael Fallon, Tory
MP and senior Tory member of the Treasury Committee, House of Commons, told
emboffs October 29th. The Conservative Party felt the absence of a strong Shadow
Chancellor and, the party’s counter-proposals to Labour’s plans have been “all
over the place.” Fallon particularly criticized Shadow Chancellor George
Osborne’s op-ed piece in the October 28 Daily Telegraph, as a “weak”, almost
laughable, response to the economic crisis. While Brown was enjoying higher poll
numbers because of his perceived solid handling of the crisis, Fallon argued
that once the recession worsens and the public feels its effects, Brown would no
longer be immune from criticism, and from being held accountable for the
failures of an economic system that he supervised for ten years as Chancellor of
the Exchequer.
¶2. (C) Fallon said that Brown should be held responsible for the weakness of
the Tripartite Committee, which he implemented and which failed to identify
problems in their incipient stages -- and then which failed to respond
effectively. The Committee - which consists of Her Majesty’s Treasury, the Bank
of England, the Financial Services Authority - is charged with maintaining
financial stability. When Northern Rock Bank failed, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Alistair Darling was new to his job, and the FSA was in the closing stages of
being led by outgoing chairman Sir Callum McCarthy (Lord Adair Turner took over
in September). It would be too harsh to criticize their performance then, Fallon
said, given the changes in leadership, but the Tripartite Committee’s reaction
since then and particularly over the summer to the crisis has been inadequate.
Gordon Brown has had to be the architect of the rescue plan for which, Fallon
said, he gleefully has taken responsibility. One problem with the Committee
during the time of the Northern Rock failure was that the three leaders of the
Committee viewed each other with distrust, wanted to keep the others’
institutions at arms’ length, and even, Fallon contended, disliked each other.
As a result, there had been minimal coordination among the three. Fallon himself
said he personally dislikes Turner as a rather “soul-less technocrat,” but that
he was highly competent and the right person for the job. Fallon argued that the
Tripartite Committee structure should be disbanded, and that the Bank of England
should be given greater authority and the mandate to ensure financial stability,
on the order of the mandate of the Federal Reserve Bank. In his view, the FSA
should be responsible for business practices, not financial stability.
¶3. (C) The economic crisis was not near its end, Fallon remarked, saying that
he expected even greater shocks in the near-future. He was most concerned about
the lack of disclosure about the toxicity on banks’ balance books. Once the
extent of the toxicity was revealed, he said he expected many more banks to
fail. Fallon said the Tories reluctantly acquiesced to the need for
recapitalization of some banks, but that this bail-out had to be limited in
nature. But what would the government do -- can it do -- when faced with more
bank failures? he wondered. The government’s rescue plan has raised the risk of
moral hazard and the costs of more bank failures would be too high to fund.
Fallon also criticized the Labour Government for not having a plan to extricate
itself from banks that the government has recapitalized. If there was no
timetable for government divestment, there was no incentive for investors to
purchase the remaining shares. Furthermore, he argued, the banks could be
subject to pressures to fund politically expedient, but not commercially
profitable projects, the longer they were owned in whole or part by the
government. Fallon said that further drastic steps may be required as the crisis
unfolds. For example, he could imagine a nationalized insurance company.
Comment
-------
¶4. (C) Fallon’s comments to us reflected Conservative frustration -- and some

grudging admiration -- for Prime Minister Brown’s skill, so far, in seizing the
high ground during the economic crisis. The image Brown projects of “a
LONDON 00002765 002 OF 002
serious man for serious times,” and a “leader born for this hour,” has worked so
far. The Conservatives, on the other hand, came across as weak junior partners
while taking the tack of supporting the Labour government in a time of crisis;
and are now coming across as confounded and confused now that they are trying to
go on the attack -- so far not being able to articulate an alternative to
Brown’s actions. Meanwhile, the scandal that has enveloped Shadow Chancellor
George Osborne has not helped (ref a).
ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Viewing cable 08MUNICH355, GERMANY/BAVARIA: CSU HOPES FOR
FRESH START WITH NEW AND
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08MUNICH355.
2008-10-31 2010-11-28 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Consulate
08MUNICH355
14:02 18:06 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Munich
VZCZCXRO0414
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHMZ #0355 3051435
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311435Z OCT 08
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MUNICH 000355

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV EINV INRB GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY/BAVARIA: CSU HOPES FOR FRESH START WITH NEW AND
YOUNGER FACES IN CABINETAND A DYNAMIC SECRETARY GENERAL
¶1. (SBU) Newly-elected Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer

(Christian Social Union - CSU) elevated youthful, female, and fresh
faces in the presentation of his surprising cabinet choices on
October 30. In a canny move, he also chose 36-year-old Bundestag
member Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg as CSU Secretary General. This
makes zu Guttenberg effectively the spokesman, television
personality, and advisor to the CSU leadership. He is also a Berlin
player, serving as the CSU's main foreign policy expert and member
of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. (Note: While zu
Guttenberg likely will choose to retain his Bundestag seat, his
office at CSU headquarters in Munich told us said it is not clear
whether he will remain on the Foreign Affairs Committee or switch to
a committee oriented toward domestic affairs. End note.)
Seehofer's choice underlines the CSU's claim to be more than just a
regional party, particularly in view of the 2009 European Parliament
and federal elections. The group (para 4 below) needs to appeal to
skeptical citizenry if the CSU hopes to do better in European and
Bundestag elections in 2009.
¶2. (SBU) Complicating Seehofer's and the new cabinet's task is the
new presence of three members of the coalition member Free
Democratic Party (FDP) (one is a State Secretary), who will make
their own attempts to strike a favorable profile. In all, Seehofer
replaced sixteen of the eighteen cabinet positions with eight
newcomers. He could be accused of ageism since he dismissed all CSU
cabinet members over 60 years old, thus drastically reducing the
government's age average below 50. Five cabinet members are women.
Notably, the Landtag also elected its first female President, the
64-year-old Barbara Stamm.
¶3. (SBU) The new Bavarian cabinet will consist of the following
members, all CSU unless otherwise noted as FDP:
-Minister President: Horst Seehofer, 59, Upper Bavaria, elected on

October 27 (new);
-Minister of Economics and Deputy Minister President: Martin Zeil
(FDP), 52, Upper Bavaria (new);
--MOE State Secretary: Katja Hessel (FDP), 36, Middle Franconia
(new);
-Minister of Interior: Joachim Herrmann, 52, Middle Franconia (the
incumbent);
-MOI State Secretary: Bernd Weiss, 40, Lower Franconia (new);
-Minister for Labor and Social Affairs: Christine Haderthauer, 47,
Upper Bavaria (new, formerly General Secretary of the CSU);
--State Secretary: Markus Sackmann, 47, Upper Palatinate (new);
-Minister at the Bavarian State Chancery: Siegfried Schneider, 52,
Upper Bavaria (new);
-Minister for European and Federal Affairs: Emilia Mueller, 56,
Upper Palatinate (new);
-Minister of Finance: Georg Fahrenschon, 40, Upper Bavaria (new);
--MOF State Secretary: Franz Josef Pschierer, 52, Suabia (new);
-Minister of Environment: Markus Soeder, 41, Middle Franconia
(new);
--MOEnv State Secretary: Melanie Huml, 33, Upper Franconia (new);
-Minister of Agriculture: Helmut Brunner, 54, Lower Bavaria (new);
-Minister of Justice: Dr. Beate Merk, 51, Suabia;
-Minister of Science: Dr. Wolfgang Heubisch (FDP), 62, Upper Bavaria
(new);
-Minister of Culture and Education: Ludwig Spaenle, 47, Upper
Bavaria;
--MOC&Ed State Secretary: Dr. Marcel Huber, 50, Upper Bavaria
(new).
(NOTE: Diplopedia has biographies on German political figures at:

xxxxx and then search for Germany
Biographies.
¶4. (SBU) Comment: Seehofer's cabinet is mainly remarkable for its

youthful representation. We view the surprise nomination of
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg as Secretary General as a clever move,
particularly in view of the CSU's claim of being more than just a
regional Bavarian party. Zu Guttenberg is a foreign policy expert,
a transatlanticist and a close and well-known friend to the United
States and Mission Germany.
¶5. (U) Consulate General Munich coordinated this report with

Embassy Berlin.
¶6. (U) Track Munich reporting at at

xxxxx
Crockart
Viewing cable 08RPODUBAI49, SOURCE REMOVED] OUTLINES IRC’S
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08RPODUBAI49.
08RPODUBAI49 2008-10-23 09:09 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Iran RPO Dubai
VZCZCXRO2176
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0049/01 2970920
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230920Z OCT 08
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0001
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0240
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0272
RUEHWW/BAGHDAD GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0001
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0304
Thursday, 23 October 2008, 09:20

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000049
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS PINR, PINS, PGOV, PREL, IR, IZ, ZP
SUBJECT: [SOURCE REMOVED] OUTLINES IRC’S
AUXILIARY ROLE [DETAILS REMOVED] IRGC, MOIS
DUBAI 00000049 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (c), (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 18.
¶2. (S) Summary and Background: IRPO officer met with [SOURCE REMOVED] on
October 15 and 20, 2008 to discuss [DETAILS REMOVED] his knowledge [DETAILS
REMOVED] Iran’s Ministy of Information and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). [NAME REMOVED] stated that, in addition to its
standard relief role, the IRC has [DETAILS REMOVED]President Ahmadi-Nejad’s
election in 2005 ultimately infused the IRC with a more hardline leadership.
[DETAILS REMOVED]
---------------------------------
¶4. (C) During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, [NAME REMOVED] stated Iran’s
military used ICR cover to enter Iraq and inspect Iranian prisoners of war held
in Iraq. Subsequently, in the Balkan war, the IRC provided cover to intelligence
agents, [DETAILS REMOVED]
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] With the war underway, [NAME REMOVED] says the number
of Qods officers seeking IRC cover increased and was between ten and 30.
[DETAILS REMOVED] The only actual IRC officers in Iraq were the [DETAILS
REMOVED].
¶6. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] knew none of the purported IRC members, and concluded
that they were not legitimate IRC relief workers and alleged that someone else
must have been signing their professional certificates. [NAME REMOVED] recalled
being told that IRC identification cards had become more important after US
forces had detained Iranian officers carrying IRGC identification cards.
¶7. [DETAILS REMOVED]
Ahmadi-Nejad’s Election and the IRC
-----------------------------------
¶8. (S) Per the IRC’s regulations, following his election in 2005, President
Ahmadi-Nejad was able to appoint four members (out of 16) of the IRC management
group. These four [NAMES REMOVED] were opposed to the IRC’s leadership and
eventually requested its president, Dr. Ahmad Ali Noorbala, to resign. [DETAILS
REMOVED] He did so in January 2006 [DETAILS REMOVED] Most of the incoming
managers were members of the IRGC or the MOIS. [NAME REMOVED] said that pre-
existing members now considered the IRC an agent of the IRGC.
¶9. (S) [NAME REMOVED] further elaborated on the presence of MOIS officials in
the IRC and other government agencies. All government agencies include an MOIS
representative [DETAILS REMOVED] [NAME REMOVED] Prior to Ahmadi-Nejad, the IRC
official in this position was the sole MOIS representative; afterwards, [NAME
REMOVED] said 40 officers at headquarters and 100 officers at the provincial
officers came from the MOIS.
¶10. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] in line with Ahmadinejad’s government-wide directive,
that all employees pass a counterintelligence course. [NAME REMOVED] indicated
that such a course violated the principles of the IRC because Red Cross/Red
Crescent organizations are supposed to be independent from the state.
¶11. (S) In addition to the personnel moves, [DETAILS REMOVED] The IRC under Dr.
Noorbala had resisted the IRGC’s request to take responsibility for relief and
rescue operations. [DETAILS REMOVED] the IRGC’s Basij forces to assume
responsibility for relief and rescue. [DETAILS REMOVED]
12.(S) In 2007, the IRC’s budget was granted an additional $200 million to
acquire helicopters. The IRC, [DETAILS REMOVED] ordered 20 Russian MI-17
helicopters. Five of these were delivered to the IRC, the remaining 15 went to
the IRGC. A similar helicopter order was planned for 2008. (Note: [NAME REMOVED]
indicated that [NAME REMOVED] is the only Iranian entity allowed to import
helicopters and that it is owned by the IRGC and MOIS.)
13.(S) [NAME REMOVED] has invested in three Iranian companies backed by the IRGC
and Defense Ministry. The first, owned by the Defense Ministry, produces
chemical weapons protective equipment; it had been defunct prior to the infusion
of IRC funds. The second, owned by the IRGC, produces pre-fabricated military
commands and mobile hospitals. The third, owned by the Defense Ministry,
produces armored personnel carriers.
14.(C) Finally, the IRC [DETAILS REMOVED] began building health clinics in
Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Kazemayn, and Basra and awarded the construction
contracts to IRGC companies, despite the IRC’s own staff of qualified engineers.
[NAME REMOVED] said the clinics would be used for treatment but also as
warehouses for military equipment or military bases if needed. He noted that the
Iraqi Red Crescent and Iraqi Ministry of Health were not happy with this
activity.
Facilitating IRGC Support to Hezbollah
--------------------------------------
¶15. (S) The IRC again facilitated the entry of Qods force officers to Lebanon
during the Israel-Hezbollah war in summer 2006. Although [NAME REMOVED] did not
travel to Lebanon during the conflict, he reiterated that the only true IRC
officers dispatched to Lebanon were [DETAILS REMOVED] all others were IRGC and
MOIS officials. [NAME REMOVED] further said that the IRC shipments of medical
supplies served also to facilitate weapons shipments. He said that IRC [DETAILS
REMOVED] had seen missiles in the planes destined for Lebanon when delivering
medical supplies to the plane. The plane was allegedly “half full” prior to the
arrival of any medical supplies.
¶16. (S) [NAME REMOVED] also allowed the transfer of an IRC hospital in southern
Lebanon to Hezbollah. [NAME REMOVED] said that Hassan Nasrallah had asked
Supreme Leader Khamenei to allow Hezbollah to run the hospital during Dr.
Noorbala’s tenure as IRC president. Although Khamenei acquiesced, Dr. Noorbala
prevented the transfer until his own departure. The hospitaL [DETAILS REMOVED]
is under Hezbollah control. [NAME REMOVED] is allegedly close to Nasrallah and
is also trying to create a network of medical clinics in Lebanon.
¶17. (S) Comment: [NAMES REMOVED] are examples
of figures nominally within the Iranian government establishment
who have taken courageous stands against IRGC and MOIS
incursions into Iranian governance. Such figures are key to our
ability to understanding and countering the malign activities of
these organizations regionally
Comment: [DETAILS REMOVED]
PALESTINIAN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08STATE116392.
R 311525Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2033

TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPAL PREL PTER XF
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN
ISSUES
REF: A. 08 STATE 001379

¶B. 08 STATE 64936
Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: This cable provides the full text of the
new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on
Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages
Department personnel at post to assist in compiling
Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of

reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and
sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide
participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and
update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues.
The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and
collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans
(MSPs).
¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National

Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was
established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If
needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and
the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following
each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often

is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose
agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD's
issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting - including on

Palestinians:
¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State

collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email
and other means is vital to the community's collection
efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for
dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are
encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as
information becomes available.
¶B. (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should

include as much of the following information as possible:
office and organizational titles; names, position titles and
other information on business cards; numbers of telephones,
cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact
information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc
or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings;
internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses,
web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers;
frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other
relevant biographical information.
¶3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline - priority issues:

¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process
1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations
with Israel (SRCC-1)
2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1)
3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process
(SRCC-1)
4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1)
5) Role of International Community in the Peace
Process (SRCC-1)
¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance

1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1)
2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1)
3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1)
4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1)
5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2)
6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1)
7) US, Regional, and International Foreign
Policy (FPOL-4)
¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control

1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and
Response (TERR-2)
2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security
Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2)
3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces
(CINT-5)
4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4)
¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism

1) International and Indigenous Terrorist
Activities (TERR-2)
2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian
Terrorists (TERR-2)
3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1)
4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2)
¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure

2) Demographics (DEMG-3)
3) Water Management (ENVR-4)
4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5)
5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3)
¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions

1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on
the Peace Process (LEAD-1)
2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1)
3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1)
4) Military Response to Palestinians and
Terrorism (FMCC-2)
5) Settlements (SRCC-1)
6) US and International Community (FPOL-3)
¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications

Systems (INFR-3)
¶4. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD - Full text -- reporting and

collection needs under priority areas listed in paragraph 3
above:
¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process
1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with

Israel (SRCC-1).
--Key positions, negotiating strategies, red lines, and
points of flexibility of Fatah-affiliated Palestinian
Authority elements, HAMAS, and other Palestinian parties
concerned with the peace process, conflict resolution, and
future dealings with Israel.
--Negotiating positions for Palestinian talks with Israel on
bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Palestinian
Authority control in Jerusalem, right of return of
Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the
West Bank, and East Jerusalem, exchanges of territory,
borders and security, and "end of claims".
--Attitudes of the general public toward Palestinian-Israeli
talks.
--Attitudes of Palestinian security forces toward peace
negotiations with and attacks on Israel inside Israel and the
Palestinian territories.
--Details of all formal and informal channels, used by the
Palestinian leaders to discuss peace steps with Israel.
--Palestinian perceptions of and relations with Israeli
leaders and negotiating counterparts.
--Palestinian positions on negotiations with Israel regarding
water, transportation and energy infrastructure issues,
access to the Israeli economy, and safe passage between areas
of Israeli and Palestinian control.
2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1).

--Details regarding final-status arrangements on issues of
security, borders and border crossings, and refugees.
--Information regarding final-status agreements on water,
economics, legal matters and prisoners, infrastructure and
environment, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty,
governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").
3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process

(SRCC-1).
--Palestinian leadership and citizen perceptions regarding
the US role and efforts to influence the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process.
--Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US
positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
Palestinian efforts to galvanize regional and international
support to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli
peace negotiations.
--Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities
related to US policies and programs on the peace process
including extent of support for US and other counterterrorism
efforts.
4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1).

--Palestinian perceptions of the policies of regional
neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya
and other Arab states and Iran) regarding a
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.
--Views and perceptions of regional neighbors on the impact a
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement would have on
neighboring Palestinian populations.
--Palestinian views of other countries' plans and efforts to
support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
--Palestinian perceptions of plans and efforts by individual
regional neighbors to facilitate or hinder the development of
institutions needed for a free and democratic Palestinian
state.
--Palestinian views about plans and efforts of Syria or
Lebanon to resolve border disputes with Israel.
5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process

(SRCC-1).
--Palestinian perceptions about policies, plans, efforts and
support for strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli
issues from European Union members, especially France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia and multilateral
bodies, including the Quartet (United States, European Union,
United Nations, and Russia), the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, the Arab League, and the United Nations.
--Palestinian views on amounts and uses of international
assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority as part of
bilateral or multilateral negotiations.
¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance
1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1).

--Status and relative strength of factions within the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and internal
decision-making processes of these factions.
--Relations between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and
its factions.
--PLO and HAMAS finances and sources of funding.
--Evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Palestinian
Authority in governing areas under Palestinian Authority
control; status of political reform and influence of
President.
--Indications of challenges to Palestinian Authority rule.
Extent of popular loyalty to Palestinian Authority
leadership.
--Information on municipal government structures, independent
local power bases, and relationships between the Palestinian
leadership and local leaders.
--Plans and intentions of the Palestinian Authority to
consider or reject the formation of a new Palestinian
National Unity Government.
--Details on efforts of HAMAS to exert influence over
Palestinians to consolidate their support.
--Attitudes, plans, and tactics of Islamist and secular
groups to determine or affect the choice of a successor to
the current Palestinian Authority President.
--Level of Palestinian support for HAMAS elected officials.
--Palestinian perceptions of the Palestinian legislative
council and its ability to exercise power.
2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1).

--Plans, intentions, and willingness to sustain efforts to
reform the security forces.
--Relations between the security forces and foreign security
services, especially for cooperation, training, information
sharing, and funding including efforts to target terrorist or
extremist threats to the peace process.
--Changes in the senior leadership of the Palestinian
Authority security forces, including the general intelligence
organization (Mukhabarat) and the Preventive Security
Organization (PSO).
--Leadership dynamics and power relationships among the
Palestinian Authority security forces; relations between
civilian leaders and security forces commanders.
--Level of responsiveness of security forces to civilian
control.
--Decision-making processes and rules of engagement of the
security forces in specific security situations.
--Organizational structure of the Palestinian Authority
security forces.
--Command, control, communications, and intelligence
infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces.
--Information on personnel strength, budget, weapons,
training, force readiness, targeting, tactics,
transportation, and logistics of the Palestinian Authority
security forces.
3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1).

--Goals and strategies of Palestinian officials in the West
Bank and Gaza to insure/undermine the viability of a
democratic Palestinian state.
--Plans and intentions of Palestinian President to call
elections.
--Role of the Prime Minister.
--Identification of key advisers to the Palestinian Authority
President and Prime Minister and their respective areas of
influence.
--Decision making processes within the Palestinian Authority
leadership, including the roles of key ministries and the
views of their leaders on priority issues for the government.
--Palestinian leadership attitudes toward and perceptions of

the US.
--Status of the current Palestinian Authority president's and
prime minister's health.
--Identification of possible successors to the current
Palestinian Authority president, views of these possible
successors, and those of other Palestinian leaders outside
the government, on Palestinian-Israeli issues and information
on the relationships of these possible successors with key
Palestinian groups and Israel.
4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1).

--Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority leadership and HAMAS
efforts to resolve issues related to reconciliation or to
continue competition.
--HAMAS reaction to peace negotiation efforts. Relationship
between the Palestinian leadership, to include the
Presidency, and HAMAS officials in Gaza and rejectionist
elements.
--Leadership plans and efforts in Gaza and the West Bank to
unify or maintain the division between the two territories.
--Efforts by the Palestinian Authority leadership to involve
HAMAS elected officials in negotiating strategies for the
peace process.
--Details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by
Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members.
--Biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA
and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young
guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.
5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2).

--Economic decision-making processes within the Palestinian
Authority government and plans and actions to implement
economic reform, liberalization, and development.
--Palestinian Authority budget allocations and funding
streams.
--Details about employment data and government plans and
efforts to increase employment.
--Plans by Palestinian officials and Palestinian businessmen
in the West Bank and Gaza for coping with economic downturns
caused by political problems.
--Data on Palestinian trade with Israel and Jordan.
--Data on the impact of border closures and
Palestinian-Israeli violence on economic development,
including on the livelihoods of Palestinians with jobs in
Israel or Jordan.
--Information on levels of financial savings by Palestinians
and their ability to withstand prolonged economic hardship.
--Palestinian efforts to develop trading relationships with
non-Israeli buyers and attract foreign investment.
--Plans and efforts to seek funding from international relief
organizations.
--Palestinian plans and efforts to develop and exploit
natural gas reserves off the coast of Gaza.
--Plans to develop or expand energy infrastructure, including
petroleum and natural gas storage/distribution facilities and
electric utilities.
--Financial flows from Diaspora Palestinians and the
motivations for such investment.
--Information on close ties between business families and
politicians.
--Corrupt practices by businessmen and politicians.
--Trends in the business practices of local Palestinian
businessmen, such as changes in enterprise ownership and
control mechanisms and shifts in contract bidding methods.
--Plans and efforts to counteract Israeli closure policies.
--Palestinian perceptions regarding fulfillment of aid
pledges from Donors' Conference.
6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1).

--Plans and intentions of leaders of the Palestinian
Authority to encourage political openness, protect civil
liberties, and promote fiscal transparency.
--Plans and actions of Palestinian Authority to implement
judicial and financial reforms.
--Details about the Palestinian justice system and
Palestinian attitudes towards the Palestinian Basic Law and
Sharia/Islamic law.
--Capability and commitment of Palestinian officials and
organizations to maintain order and confront threats posed by
extremist and terrorist groups, clans, and criminal
organizations.
--Details of plans and programs intended to promote and
maintain public order.
--Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups
on Palestinian plans, policies and actions aimed at promoting
the rule of law and public order.
--HAMAS and other Palestinian efforts to apply Sharia and
promote Islamic alternatives in civil society.
--Details on HAMAS' social welfare network to include
hospitals, education systems, textbooks, libraries and social
services in the Palestinian territories and their funding
sources in the region and worldwide; efforts by PIJ and other
Palestinian organizations to provide similar services and
details of their sources of funding.
--Financial systems used by HAMAS charities in Europe to move
funds to the Middle East.
--Popular attitudes towards HAMAS and other organizations
that provide social services.
--Views and attitudes of the younger generation on HAMAS and
their control of municipalities as well as their social
service programs.
--Evidence of control of the media by Fatah-affiliated
Palestinian Authority or HAMAS to influence the Palestinian
population.
--Details on development of political parties, labor unions,
and/or worker groups.
7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy

(FPOL-4).
--Efforts by the Palestinian Authority to gain support for
its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues
from the US.
--Palestinian Authority's objectives and strategies on key
issues in US-Palestinian relationship and views on future of
US relations.
--Information on Palestinian Authority negotiating positions
before discussions with the US and views of Palestinian
officials after discussions with the US.
--Popular attitudes toward and perceptions of the US.
¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control
1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and

Response (TERR-2).
--Palestinian counterterrorism and internal security
policies, plans, attitudes, commitment and actions in dealing
with extremists and terrorist groups, and clans.
--Actions, ability and willingness of the Palestinian
security services in the West Bank and Gaza to thwart
terrorist attacks and maintain public order.
--Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities
regarding support to and cooperation with US counterterrorism
efforts.
--Cooperation between Palestinian security and intelligence
services and Israeli counterparts on terrorism, including
targeting efforts, technical operations, surveillance,
interrogation, capture and prosecution of known terrorists.
--Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups
on Palestinian counterterrorism plans, policies and actions.
--Views of Palestinian Authority President, his advisers,
Palestinian Authority security chiefs and senior Palestinian
officials toward the US and its counterterrorism policies;
perceptions of US expectations for Palestinian cooperation in
counterterrorism campaign.
2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security

Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2).
--Ties between the security forces and Palestinian Authority
leaders and other groups, including Palestinian political
parties, militias, and rejectionist and terrorist groups.
--Participation by Palestinian Authority security forces
personnel in attacks against Israeli targets outside Israel
and the Palestinian Territories.
--Links between intelligence services and terrorist groups.
--Locations of neighborhoods controlled by rejectionist and
terrorist groups.
--Indications of cooperation between Palestinian intelligence
services and terrorist groups.
3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5).

--Plans, intentions, key focus and rivalries of senior PA
security force officials, including the General Intelligence
Organization (Mukhabarat), the Preventive Security
Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), the
National Security Force (NSF), and the Civil Police, as well
as HAMAS's Security Support Force in the Gaza strip.
--Command, control, communications, and intelligence
infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces.
--Indications of counterintelligence operations conducted by
the security forces against foreign intelligence services
operating in or through Palestinian Authority areas.
--Information on signals intercept capabilities and targets,
decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection
hardware, and intercept operation successes.
--Plans and efforts to illicitly collect classified,
sensitive, commercial proprietary, or protected technology
information from US companies or government agencies.
--Counterintelligence organization plans, efforts, and
abilities, and warning of their use against US personnel.
Details on security forces' penetrations of Palestinian
rejectionist groups including electronic penetrations.
--Technological capabilities, targets, and activities of
Palestinian security forces.
--Unit deployments and locations, infrastructure and
facilities of Palestinian Authority security forces.
--Details on processes used by Palestinian Authority security
forces to acquire weapons and equipment, either legally or
illegally.
--Intentions by Palestinian security force leaders or rogue
elements to use new capabilities against Israel or the US.
4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4).

--Indications of levels of corruption among Fatah-affiliated
Palestinian Authority and/or HAMAS leaders.
--Individuals, governments, organizations, routes, and
methods involved in arms smuggling, human
trafficking/smuggling, money laundering and corruption in
financial transactions in support of illegal activities.
--Information on illegal weapons transactions with Israelis.
--Activities of Palestinian gangs and irregular militia
forces' involvement in crime and terrorism.
¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism
1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities

(TERR-2).
--Structure and internal dynamics of HAMAS militant wing (Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Battalions), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and
Popular Resistance Committees, Army of Islam, and other
terrorist groups with a presence in the Gaza Strip or the
West Bank, including leadership, membership, decision making
processes, command and control, and factions.
--Popular support for rejectionist groups.
--Tactics, techniques, and operating methods of Palestinian
terrorist groups, including tradecraft, counterintelligence
measures, recruitment activities, underground facilities,
operational tasking, and travel, infiltrations into Israel,
disinformation, denial and deception techniques, and
training.
--Plans and intentions for, and extent and details of
Lebanese Hizballah activities in Palestinian areas or within
Israel, including retaliation for the deaths of Hizballah
senior military leaders.
--Relationship between Palestinian terrorist groups and
al-Qa'ida, and indications of interest by Palestinian
terrorist groups to work with global jihadists.
--Indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups in
the acquisition or use of chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons, longer range missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs).
--Communications systems used by senior leaders of
Palestinian terrorist groups to direct and control
subordinates and field operatives.
--Use of Inmarsat, fax machines, cellular telephones, and
computer communications, including the Internet, to conduct
terrorist activities.
2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian

Terrorists (TERR-2).
--Evidence of Palestinian popular support for Palestinian and
other terrorist groups; Palestinian public perceptions of
rocket attacks against Israel.
--Contacts and relations between Palestinian terrorist groups
and other terrorist or rejectionist groups, especially
Lebanese Hizballah, al-Qa'ida, and elements of the Arab
population in Israel; influence of Islamic militants.
--Extent and nature of control, sponsorship, and financial
support of Palestinian terrorist groups by Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, or other
countries.
--Plans and intentions, capabilities and motivations of
Palestinian terrorist groups and/or their state sponsors to
conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian,
or other western or allied targets.
--Encouragement from state sponsors to conduct attacks
against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western
or allied targets.
--Support mechanisms for Palestinian terrorist or
rejectionist groups, including identities of key individuals
and mechanisms for procuring and moving funds and weapons.
--Smuggling between Gaza and the outside world, including
routes and methodologies; information on weapons shipments
into territories via tunnels, and maritime means for
terrorist use.
--Contacts and relations between HAMAS militants, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees,
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC), Lebanese Hizballah, Fatah al-Islam (FAI),
and other known or emergent terrorist or rejectionist groups
in the region, and elements of the Palestinian Authority.
--Attitudes and motivations of the Palestinian Authority
leadership regarding the activities of HAMAS, al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades and other terrorist or rejectionist groups.
--Evidence of Palestinian Authority's, or PA senior
officials' prior knowledge of, funding of, authorization of,
or participation in popular unrest, violent outbreaks, or
terrorist acts.
--Financial support to NGO's from foreign governments, to
include Venezuela and Turkey.
--Contacts and cooperation between NGOs and terrorist groups,
especially HAMAS charities and any political/humanitarian
entities suspected of passing funds to militants.
3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1).

--Details about Islamic reformer, oppositionist and militant
(activist) leaders, organizations, adherents, and supporters,
including objectives, plans and strategies, tactics, and
efforts to achieve goals.
--Plans and efforts of internal or external Islamic activists
to affect governance in Palestinian areas.
--Islamic activist plans and efforts to develop political
parties or organize opposition to the governing authorities.
--Relations and cooperation among internal and external
Islamic activists.
--Cohesion and divisions within and among Islamic activist
groups.
--Influence of religious leaders on Islamic activist leaders,
adherents, and supporters.
--Islamic activist influence on national leadership, military
and security services, educational institutions, government
agencies, and NGOs.
--Islamic activist use of public media, including the use of
internet web forums, to achieve strategic, tactical and/or
operational objectives.
--HAMAS ownership of broadcasting stations. Government plans
and efforts to support or defeat Islamic activist efforts.
--HAMAS contacts or connections with Muslim Brotherhood in
other countries.
--Details of HAMAS connections to HAMAS external leadership
in Damascus; HAMAS financial ties to external funding offices
such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2).

--Indications of Americans (officials, tourists, or
residents) becoming targets of any terrorist groups operating
in or near Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
--Palestinian terrorist groups' perceptions of US
vulnerabilities and their perceptions of how the United
States would respond to attacks against the homeland or US
interests overseas.
--Palestinian authorities' response to terrorist threats and
attacks against the US interests, persons or facilities.
--Policies, plans, and efforts regarding cooperation by
Palestinian or Israeli officials with the US and regional
neighbors concerning US POW/MIA accounting and recovery
efforts and capabilities to assist or cooperate in recovery
efforts.
¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure
1) Human Rights (HRWC-3).

--Palestinian data and perception of the humanitarian impact
of Israel's closure of Gaza and lack of freedom of movement
in the West Bank due to security checkpoints, the barrier,
and other obstacles to free movement.
--Details about HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority's
facilitation of humanitarian operations in the West Bank and
Gaza.
--Information on treatment of prisoners or detainees from
opposition groups.
--Palestinian intelligence and security forces' attitudes
toward and participation in torture, and other human rights
violations.
2) Demographics (DEMG-3).
--Population data for Palestinian areas and Palestinian
Diaspora.
--Details about, and changes to, key demographic indicators,
such as birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, and
internal migration.
--Palestinian leadership's view of demographic trends; use of
data in consideration of two-state solution.
--Palestinian officials' efforts to deal with the 'youth
bulge' and resultant educational, training, and employment
challenges.
--Efforts by Palestinian Authority or HAMAS officials or
institutions to co-opt the youth.
3) Water Management (ENVR-4).

--Plans and intentions of Palestinian officials in West Bank
and Gaza to confront environmental issues, particularly
problems with water and waste management.
--Palestinian perceptions of efforts to mitigate the impact
of power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil
services.
--Palestinian strategies and efforts regarding water
management and protection of infrastructure against attack.
--Details about annual water use, and renewable surface and
groundwater reserves.
--Cooperation and disputes with other states regarding
regional water resources to include the aquifers.
--Details about plans and efforts to augment supplies from
non-conventional sources, such as desalination plants.
4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5).

--Information on the effects of Palestinian-Israeli violence
on public health conditions in Palestinian-controlled areas.
--Details about prevalence, and outbreaks of infectious
disease to include HIV and avian flu H5N1.
--Palestinian Authority plans and efforts to prevent and
manage outbreaks.
--Statistical information on the incidence of chronic and
infectious disease among various population groups (Gaza,
West Bank, Bedouin, urban, agricultural areas, and so forth).
--Details about location and level of contaminants in air,

water, food, and soil, including threat to health from
accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial
chemicals.
--Military and civilian medical capabilities and
infrastructure.
--Details about HAMAS and other Palestinian groups' medical
assistance to Palestinians.
5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3).

--Information on location and condition of power plants,
roads, hospitals, waste treatment facilities and financial
institutions in the Palestinian areas.
--Information on Palestinian access to fuel for power plants.
--Palestinian perceptions of efforts to deal with impact of

power shortages and efforts to mitigate power shortages on
sewer treatment and other civil services.
¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions
1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace

Process (LEAD-1).
--Government of Israel (GOI) leadership's negotiating
positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the
Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with
supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other
Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process.
--Israeli leaders' perceptions of and relations with
Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts. Evidence
of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by
the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with
Palestinian leaders.
--Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the
impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations
with the Palestinians.
--Israel's decision-making process for launching military
operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks.
--Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to

terrorist attacks.
--Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing
the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors
toward the US and its counterterrorism policies. Israeli
thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics,
including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and
conduct of the peace process and negotiations.
2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1).

--Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians
on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli
control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees
to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east
Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and "end of claims".
--GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water
rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues,
access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage
between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal
matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty,
governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").
--Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs,
toward Israeli-Palestinian talks. Efforts by opposition
parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence
government positions on the peace process.
--Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace
negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and
movement, in particular, access and movement with economic
consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and
movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages.
3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1).

--Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of
military strengths and vulnerabilities.
--Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists,
including the potential for conflict with their state
sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon.
--GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in
interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final
status issues.
--Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the
context of final status issues.
--Israeli views on a future regional security pact.
--GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian
intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves.
GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security
fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and
external influences on decision-making.
--GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with
Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement
unilateral security measures over Israeli- and
Palestinian-controlled areas.
--Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information
on Israel's treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees,
including interrogation methods.
--Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli
population emigration from Israel.
4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism
(FMCC-2).
--Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway
or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants
in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including
targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground
and air units.
--Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars.
--IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against

Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
Lebanon.
--Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli
views of security.
--IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against
Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel's northern border or
inside Lebanon or Syria.
--IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale,
and operational readiness.
--IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting
conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and
counterterrorist operations.
--Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the
territories on IDF readiness.
5) Settlements (SRCC-1).
--Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition
to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpost
growth and construction.
--Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement
establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology,
motivations and who they claim to represent.
--Divisions among the various settlement groups.
--Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies.
Settlers' relationship with the Israeli political and
military establishment including their lobbying and
settlement methods.
--Golan settlers' views of any potential peace agreement with
Syria.
--Support for settlers within Israeli society.
--Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more
active.
--Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli
government regarding, security fences and settlements.
6) US and International Community (FPOL-3).

--Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach;
indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies
and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the
US.
--Attitudes of key political and military officials
concerning the state of the relationship with the US.
--Plans to influence views and positions of academics,
journalists, and business, religious and professional
organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship.
--Views of and responses to role of the Quartet.

--Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the
UN and other international fora.
--Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies
and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and
European Union countries; relations with Russia, China,
Turkey, Pakistan and India.
¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems
(INFR-3).
--Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and
planned upgrades to national telecommunications
infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government
and military authorities, intelligence and security services,
and the public sector.
--Details about command, control, and communications systems
and facilities.
--National leadership use of and dependencies on a dedicated
telecommunications infrastructure.
--Details about national and regional telecommunications
policies, programs, regulations, and training.
--Information about current and planned upgrades to public
sector communications systems and technologies used by
government, military personnel, and the civil sector,
including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones,
very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile
radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,
international connectivity, use of electronic data
interchange, and cable and fiber networks.
--Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular
communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular
phones and their operating systems, to include second
generation and third generation systems.
--Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication
purposes, including planned system upgrades.
--Details about internet and intranet use and infrastructure,
including government oversight.
--Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications
service providers and vendors.
--Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled
telecommunications equipment and technology.
--Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art
telecommunications equipment and technology.
--Details about information repositories associated with
radio frequency identification (RFID)-enabled systems used
for passports, government badges, and transportation systems.
--Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and

e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
RICE
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3586, GILANI TO CODEL SNOWE: HELP US

HIT TARGETS
Discussing cables
2008-11-13 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO9963
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #3586/01 3181134
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131134Z NOV 08
Thursday, 13 November 2008, 11:34

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, MOPS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: GILANI TO CODEL SNOWE: HELP US HIT TARGETS
¶1. (C) Summary: Codel Snowe met November 11 with Pakistan’s Prime Minister
Yousuf Gilani. Gilani thanked the USG for its support in helping transition the
country to a full democracy and congratulated the U.S. on its recent election.
Gilani reiterated that the struggle against extremism was “Pakistan’s war,”
which had claimed many more Pakistani lives than those of all NATO troops
combined. He requested more intelligence sharing from the USG, arguing that the
Pakistan Army would then hit the targets. U.S. drone attacks were
counterproductive in winning the public’s support, Gilani argued. Terrorist acts
were also hurting the country’s economy and driving away international
investments. Gilani claimed good relations with neighbor Afghanistan but
complained about the lack of GOA cooperation on a biometric border control
system. Gilani made specific requests for gunship and heavy-lift helicopters,
night-vision equipment, bullet-proof vehicles, and real-time satellite
information. End summary.
A Closer Relationship
- - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) The Ambassador, U.S. Senators Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Sheldon
Whitehouse (D-RI), as well as Congressional Staff Eric Pelofsky and John Maguire
met November 11 with PM Yousuf Gilani, Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar, Interior
Advisor Rehman Malik and National Security Advisor Ambassador Mahmud Ali
Durrani.
¶3. (C) PM Gilani thanked the U.S. Senate for its support of his country’s
democracy. He credited the USG for Pakistan’s relative free and fair elections
on February 18. Pakistan’s women had taken on increased leadership roles
throughout the new federal and provincial governments, he claimed. Gilani
recounted his two meetings with President Bush this past summer and noted that
he has also met with candidate (now President-Elect) Barack Obama. He extended
congratulations on the recent U.S. elections. Gilani looked forward to a closer
relationship with the U.S., ranging from intelligence sharing to educational
exchanges.
¶4. (C) Gilani pressed the USG to share all credible, actionable threat
information; “we will hit the targets ourselves,” he promised. Gilani added that
drone strikes not only violated Pakistani sovereignty, but also fed anti-U.S.
sentiment, making harder his own public case that the struggle against
extremists was “Pakistan’s war.” Instead, there was popular pressure on elected
officials like himself to forcefully respond to alleged U.S. border incursions,
which were “an embarrassment” for the GOP. The “trust gap” should be filled with
joint actions, he argued, and, while he might be criticized for such bilateral
cooperation, he believed he could effectively convince the public that those
targeted were responsible for Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the killing of
innocents at schools, shopping centers and police stations.
¶5. (C) Gilani stated, “we have the will but not the capacity.” He claimed the
GOP was seeing success in separating militants from the tribals and in
supporting local militias (lashkars). The police, Frontier Constabulary and
Frontier Corps should be given personnel carriers, weapons, bullet-proof
jackets, and training, Gilani urged. The Army, Gilani continued, needed real-
time satellite information, gunship and heavy-lift helicopters, and night-vision
equipment.
¶6. (C) “What more proof do you need from us that we are allies against
terrorism?,” Gilani asked; after all, Pakistan had lost more soldiers (and
civilians) than coalition countries combined, he claimed. Pakistan had also
taken an economic hit because of its front-line status in the war on terror.
International investment had dried up and domestic capital was being transferred
out, he worried. He did thank, however, the “Friends of Pakistan” for their
support for an international financing program.
¶7. (C) Senator Snowe reiterated USG support for Pakistan’s return to democracy
and noted the degree to which Pakistanis had suffered in the war on terror.
Pakistan was a “key
ISLAMABAD 00003586 002 OF 002
ally,” she added, and both countries must agree on a “common approach to our
common enemy.” A new U.S. administration was an opportunity for a “reassessment
of our joint strategy.” Snowe also noted the high opinion in the U.S. and within
the USG for Pakistan’s new civilian administration, the Army’s Kayani, and
Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) Pasha, and pointed to the establishment of
border coordination centers as positive developments.
Afghanistan
- - - - - -
¶8. (C) “A stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interests,” Gilani said. He had
reached out to Afghanistan’s President Karzai (as well as India’s PM Singh) in
his first days in office, against the advice of his Foreign Ministry, he noted,
which wanted the neighbors to visit here first. All sides needed to “get past
petty matters” in order to tackle the terrorism “destroying us all.”
¶9. (C) Pakistan supported the Paris Donors’ Conference to aid Afghanistan and
was moving forward with bilateral talks and jirgas. Gilani noted the continued
strain of 3.5 million Afghan refugees inside his country. He complained,
however, that Afghanistan had only one border checkpoint to every 10 of
Pakistan’s. Also, the GOA had not agreed to biometric-based controls at the
border crossings.
¶10. (C) Gilani asked the U.S. to release to GOP custody Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a
Pakistani arrested in and deported from Afghanistan on charges of assaulting a
U.S. law enforcement officer. Gilani argued that the needs of her family and
reports of her being ill provided humanitarian grounds for such a transfer. He
also argued that her case whipped up mass popular support, diverting his
government’s attention from the counterterrorism mission.
¶11. (U) Codel Snowe did not clear this cable.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3716, PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR

IN MUMBAI
Discussing cables
O 281201Z NOV 08
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MUMBAI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
FBI WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
EO 12958 DECL: 11/28/2018

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IN, UK, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR IN MUMBAI
Classified By: Gerald Feierstein, CDA, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary. President Zardari, PM Gilani and FM Qureshi have made all the
right public statements condemning the November 27-28 militant attacks in
Mumbai; Gilani has agreed to an Indian request and is sending ISI Chief MG Pasha
to India to participate in the investigation. Interior Minister Malik told
Charge that Zardari is meeting with appropriate cabinet members November 28 to
discuss further possible GOP reaction, and NSA Durrani forwarded via Charge a
message to NSA Hadley focusing on the need to jointly fight militants that
threaten both Pakistan and India. The UK Embassy in Islamabad advises they have
reporting that confirms involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which reportedly plans
additional attacks in India. The UK High Commission is suggesting to London that
they press the GOP for quick, credible action in the form of arrests of LeT
leaders to prevent a feared Indian backlash. The UK believes that New Delhi will
be pressed politically to respond, at a minimum with increased proxy action in
Balochistan, and at a maximum with attacks on LeT training camps in Kashmir. The
UK is seeking to coordinate its message with the U.S. and notes that FM Miliband
will see the Secretary on December 1.
¶2. (S) Post notes there is as yet no direct evidence of GOP involvement in the
attack, although the press is reporting that India has captured at least one
militant of Pakistani origin. We believe the UK here is overreacting but agree a
coordinated message urging concrete GOP action against LeT would be welcome. If
the militant plan was to ensure that the Pakistan Army would not shift troops
from the eastern border to the tribal areas, the horrific Mumbai attacks may
have succeeded. End Summary.
¶3. (C) President Asif Zardari and PM Gilani both condemned the Mumbai attacks
on November 27. Zardari called Congress leader Sonia Ghandi and termed the
killing of innocent people a “detestable act” and asked her to convey his grief
and sorrow to the people of India and to the families of those who had lost
their loved ones. Gilani called PM Manmohan Singh and said “I and the people of
Pakistan want to share the pain of the people of India and its government” and
called for concerted efforts to make the region a peaceful place. FM Qureshi,
who was in India to inaugurate the fifth round of the Indo-Pak Composite
Dialogue, noted that he had offered to set up hot lines between the two
intelligence chiefs to strengthen their joint anti-terror mechanism. He warned,
however, against jumping to conclusions and pointing fingers regarding
responsibility.
¶4. (C) Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Mahmud Durrani called Charge
November 28 and asked that the following points be passed to Washington:
-- Pakistan is extremely sorry about the events that have transpired in Mumbai;
-- This is a threat that both India and Pakistan are facing together and they
need to fight it together; -- President Zardari spoke to Manmohan Singh this
morning (he spoke to Sonia Gandhi yesterday)’ -- Prime Minister Gilani also
spoke to the Indian PM; -- The Indians have asked the GOP to send ISI officers
to India to participate in the investigation; the GOP has agreed; -- India and
Pakistan need to avoid being dragged into the militant’s agenda.
¶5. (C) Charge spoke with Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who reported that
Zardari was convening a meeting November 28 to discuss the Pakistani reaction to
the Mumbai attacks; Malik promised a readout of the meeting. the Pakistani press
carried FM Mukherjee’s November 28 press conference in which he followed up on
PM Singh’s comments about a “foreign” hand to say there was prima facie evidence
of involvement by Pakistanis in the attacks. Later the press reported that the
GOA has one attacker of Pakistani origin in custody. The press also confirmed
that Gilani accepted the Indian request to participate in the investigation and
is sending ISI Chief MG Pasha to India (date still uncertain) to lead the
Pakistani delegation.
¶6. (S) British High Commission officials in Islamabad told Polcouns November 28
that HMG has evidence the attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT), which was planning more attacks. The UK officials noted that after the
attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the GOI halted the Composite Dialogue,
but this time speculated they will feel the need to respond with force rather
than diplomacy. They fear a response could include, at a minimum, increase GOI
covert activities in Balochistan or even an aerial bombardment of LeT camps in
Azad, Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The UK mission here is proposing that Foreign
Secretary Miliband call Zardari and Qureshi and their Chief of Defence Staff
call Kayani with the message that Pakistan must act now to take proactive steps
to “rescue” the Indo-Pak relationship, suggesting that Islamabad should act
before New Delhi demands more. The UK mission is suggesting to London that the
UK call for credible actions, perhaps to include arresting senior LeT leaders
and “permanently closing down the infrastructure of the militancy.” The UK is
seeking to coordinate its message closely with the U.S. and notes that Miliband
is due to see the Secretary on December 1.
¶7. (S) Polcouns noted that, as yet, there was no evidence linking a presumed
LeT attack to ISI or the GOP. The UK Polcouns agreed they had no smoking gun
but, nevertheless, believed that the pressure on India to react strongly would
be impossible politically to avoid. He admitted that UK concern was being driven
in part by the presence of up to half a million UK citizens living in AJK.
¶8. (U) Pakistani media reacted predictably with denials of Pakistani

involvement and demands for proof before accusations were made. Dawn TV, echoing
the print media, highlighted statements issued by the President and the Prime
Minister that “both countries are victims and must join together to combat a
common enemy,” and that “the two countries must not fall into the trap of the
militants.” Zardari is reported to have told Singh that he recognized he was the
first to call him after the Marriott hotel attack in Islamabad. Dawn reports
officials saying “the blame game must not begin,” but its own commentators say
the blame game is underway. Local print media November 28 mostly reported the
event in straight stories with editorials condemning both the attacks and Indian
accusations. Some speculated the attacks were meant to undermine Zardari’s
outreach to India and juxtaposed the attacks against modest progress in the
Composite Dialogue meetings on counter terrorism issues.
¶9. (S) Comment: For now, we believe the UK Embassy here is overreacting but
agree it would be helpful if the GOP could get out ahead of the New Delhi
reaction and take proactive measures against LeT leaders.
¶10. (S) If the militant’s plan was to force the Pakistani Army to re-focus on
its eastern border and eliminate any chance (however slight) of moving forces
from the Indian border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), then
their plan may have succeeded. The Mumbai attacks likely torpedoed any prospect
of Indian CBMs on Kashmir in the immediate future. The decision to send ISI MG
Pasha to India, however, is a good sign that both sides are trying to prevent
these horrific attacks from undermine all the progress made on bilateral
rapprochement.
FEIERSTEIN
NNNN
End Cable Text
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3733, PAKISTAN: MUMBAI SITUATION

UPDATE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2922
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DE RUEHIL #3733/01 3361104
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011104Z DEC 08
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR MGN01 MUMBAI TASK FORCE
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018

TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: MUMBAI SITUATION UPDATE
¶1. (C) Ambassador has returned and will see Chief of Army Staff General Kayani
at 3 pm local time. Zardari is unavailable for meetings today.
¶2. (C) UK PM Gordon Brown is trying to call President Zardari today.
¶3. (C) NSA Durrani advised DCM that Zardari is meeting this evening with all of
the Pakistani military chiefs to bring them up to date on the Mumbai reaction.
Given recent disconnects between civilian and military leaders, this is a
welcome step.
¶4. (U) PM Gilani has called for an All Parties Conference on December 2 to
discuss Indo-Pak relations in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. Invitees will
include Zardari, NSA Durrani, Interior Minister Malik, Foreign Secretary Bashir,
and political party leaders plus representatives from the Azad, Jammu and
Kashmir Assembly. Gilani plans a press conference after the meeting.
¶5. (U) Gilaini has canceled his planned trip to Hong Kong today. It is not
clear if either Zardari or Gilani will attend the planned tripartite meeting in
Ankara with President Karzai on December 5.
¶6. (U) The press announced that the President, PM and Chief of Army Staff had
agreed on a three-pronged policy to handle the situation:
--foster domestic political unity --plead Pakistan’s case and clarify Pakistan’s
position (nfi) to the world --continue doing business with India at various
levels
¶7. (C) Post continues to monitor GOP military activities. COAS Kayani told
Ambassador December 1 that the Pakistani military has not increased is alert
levels, but we have reporting indicating they are taking some measures to
increase readiness. We have no/no indications it has moved any troops to the
Indian border.
¶8. (S) We received a readout from the UK Embassy on their meetings/calls over
the weekend. High Commissioner Brinkley and UK COS met President Zardari on
Sunday, November 30; during the meeting FM Miliband called Zardari. UK passed
the same Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) info to Zardari that they previously had passed
to ISI.
¶9. (S) Zardari’s response was positive; he said ISI had to follow up and this
was an opportunity. He criticized the Indians for statements that pushed
Islamabad to make a defensive response and “made my job harder.” Zardari said he
thought it was not possible that terrorists could have launched attack boats
from Karachi and the operation could not have been implemented without insider
help from Indians.
¶10. (C) In the conversation with Miliband, Zardari said he saw the attacks as
an “opportunity to strike at my enemies.” The attack, he said, was aimed as much
at Pakistan as at India, but India had reacted in an unfortunate way. Miliband
said that public messaging would be particularly important to link the Mumbai
atrocity with Zardari’s own campaign against militants.
¶11. (C) Zardari told Miliband that “my people” had not brought specific
information to him about the individuals named in the information passed to ISI
(on the day before). Miliband said that LeT needed to “feel the full force of
the law.” Zardari responded by saying he was setting up special courts, was
contacting all political parties, and would take action (nfi) immediately.
¶12. (C) Miliband described ISI MG Pasha as a welcome “new broom” and expressed
UK support for ISI reform. Zardari said the new ISI leaders were
“straightforward” and their roles were proscribed by the constitution, but it
would take time for real conversions. Brinkley and Miliband pressed for
ISLAMABAD 00003733 002 OF 002
Pasha to go to India. Zardari gave Brinkley a long answer about various levels
of directors in ISI but finally confirmed that the Army had vetoed the decision
to send Pasha. Zardari told Miliband that it might be possible to send NSA
Durrani, as he outranked Pasha. It would not be possible, said Zardari, to send
Pasha immediately as Zardari needed to work public opinion first.
¶13. (C) Zardari commented that he had a gut reaction that the attacks were the
beginning rather than the end and went on to talk about Muslim-Hindu differences
and attempts to split India. He urged the UK to push back on New Delhi and calm
the situation. Miliband said they would do so, but India needs to see real
action from Pakistan. India was asking for short-term actions, and this could
buy some time for the GOP.
¶14. (C) Miliband later called FM Qureshi and said the UK would be sure he saw
the intelligence passed to ISI. He pressed that India needs actions not words
from Pakistan. Qureshi said he would follow up on the intelligence but
reiterated the GOP request for the UK to counsel restrain on the part of the
Indians.
¶15. (C) High Commissioner Brinkley also called on Chinese Ambassador to

Islamabad Hui over the weekend. Zardari had called Hui, and Hui said he had met
with Kayani but did not share much in the way of information gleaned from the
meeting. Hui was cagey on how much or what kind of assistance China has provided
to help with Pakistan’s economic crisis. On the Friends of Pakistan, Hui
expressed continuing skepticism that the group did not have a clear enough
mandate, is not focused, and will turn into a “talk shop.” Hui was noncommittal
when Brinkley raised concern about China’s reported decision to assist Pakistan
build two additional civilian nuclear reactors (Chasma II and III).
¶16. (C) See septel for special media reaction. Overall, the Pakistani public
remains in denial about any culpability for the Mumbai attacks and believes
India is unfairly and prematurely accusing Pakistan. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD3783, FM BRIEFS DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON
MUMBAI; GOI EMBASSY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO9399
OO RUEHBI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #3783/01 3401040
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051040Z DEC 08
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3772

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018

SUBJECT: FM BRIEFS DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON MUMBAI; GOI EMBASSY
DRAWS DISTINCTION BETWEEN ISI AND CIVILIAN LEADERS
¶1. (S) Summary. FM Qureshi briefed the diplomatic corps December 2 on the GOP
reaction to the Mumbai attacks. He complained about the negative effect of
Indian media hype and announced that Pakistan was proposing a joint
investigation led by the two National Security Advisors. He reiterated that
Pakistan stands ready to assist this investigation and bring the perpetrators to
justice. The two intelligence chiefs, he said, could meet “in due course.” He
urged the corps to use its influence to counsel restraint. He also announced
that the Secretary would visit December 4. Following the meeting MFA Additional
Secretary Chaudhry said that ISI reported the phone numbers of the individual
about whom the U.S. and UK had passed information were not working numbers.
¶2. (C) The Indian Polcouns said the GOI policy was to distinguish between the
Pakistani civilian government, which India believed was not involved in the
attacks, and the ISI. “We are not yet ready to give ISI a clean chit,” he said.
He emphasized the India had not mobilized its troops and denied there had been
any phone call from FM Mukherjee to President Zardari, insisting that India had
made no threats against Pakistan and was awaiting the results of the
investigation. Based on the interrogation of the Pakistani militant arrested in
Mumbai, India was “absolutely certain” that the attacks had been planned and
launched in Pakistan. There would be a “pause” in the Indo-Pak relationship; the
extent of that pause depended on the Pakistani response. The best place to start
would be the repatriation of fugitives, as requested in the latest Indian
diplomatic note.
¶3. (C) Separately, PM Gilani briefed all Pakistani political party leaders on
the situation. In a press conference after the meeting, Gilani said Pakistan had
proposed a joint investigation of the Mumbai attacks, the whole nation was
united to defend Pakistan, there was complete coordination between Pakistan’s
armed forces and its government. He also warned against trading blame and called
for both sides to exhibit seriousness and patience. The Indian High Commissioner
called on Pakistan Muslim League-N opposition leader Nawaz Sharif; afterwards,
Sharif told the press the GOI had not blamed the GOP or any of its institutions
for the incident in Mumbai. End Summary.
Qureshi Briefs the Diplomatic Corps
¶4. (C) FM Shah Mehmood Qureshi briefed the diplomatic corps December 2 on the
GOP reaction to the Mumbai attacks. Qureshi explained the MFA had organized the
briefing “considering the media hype and some irresponsible journalism on the
Indian side.” He reiterated the GOP commitment to improve relations with India,
noted recent successful meetings on the Composite Dialogue and between the two
Interior Ministries, and described the positive atmosphere during his recent
trip to New Delhi. Emphasizing that he had remained in India even after the
bombing to express condolences and condemnation, Qureshi described the attacks
as “ghastly, tragic and inhumane.” But he lamented that the Indian media began
accusing Pakistan instantaneously; he repeated his mantra that the two sides
must avoid the blame game and join hands against a common enemy.
¶5. (C) Qureshi said that when he returned from India on November 29, he
received a demarche from the GOI. (Note: Qureshi told us previously that India
in the demarche said the attacks had been planned and launched in Pakistan.)
Qureshi then read the text of the GOP’s response. Pakistan condemned the Mumbai
attacks in stringent terms, offered condolences to the victims and their
families, and assured India of its utmost cooperation to bring the perpetrators
to justice. Terrorism was a major challenge for both countries, and they should
enhance their cooperation and coordination to fight terrorism through sustained,
multi-year cooperation. Pakistan is proposing a joint Indo-Pak investigation
headed by the two National Security Advisors. They stand ready as soon as
possible to assist in bringing the perpetrators to justice. The respective
intelligence chiefs could meet in due course. This response was sent to India on
December 1.
ISLAMABAD 00003783 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Qureshi said he had received a second diplomatic note late on December
1; they were in the process of reviewing it and would respond appropriately.
(Note: The Indian Polcouns in Islamabad advised Polcouns December 2 that in the
note, the GOI requested the extradition of Masood Azhar, the head of the defunct
Jaish-e-Mohammed and wanted for the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, Dawood
Ibrahim, a mafia-style don with links to the 1993 bombings in Mumbai, and for
Pakistan to “shut down” Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the new name
for the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) organization.)
¶7. (C) Qureshi announced that the Secretary was coming to Islamabad after
visiting India. He noted that he had been in contact many of his counterparts,
including the UK, Italians, Chinese, Emiris, and EU/Solana and would try to call
the French and Canadians. Noting again that the Indian press was reporting all
sorts of false information, including reports of troop mobilization, cuts in
air/rail links and suggestions that ambassadors had been recalled, Qureshi asked
the diplomatic corps to use its influence and restraint to calm the situation.
¶8. (S) After the meeting, MFA Additional Secretary for South Asia Aizaz
Chaudhry told Polcouns that the GOP was relieved that the GOI had not made any
specific allegations of official government involvement; the problem was with
the Indian press. He noted that he had met with ISI and reported that the phone
numbers of the individual that the U.S. and UK had shared with ISI were no
longer working. Personally, Chaudhry agreed that the GOP would have to take
steps against LeT, and he had recommended that course of action to Queshi.
¶9. (C) The Spanish ambassador advised that the UK, France, Germany, Spain and
Italy were forming a sub-group within the EU led by President Sarkozy, who
planned to call the Indian and Pakistani leaders on December 2 to urge India not
to demand too much and urge Pakistan to deliver on the Indian requests. The
Turkish DCM confirmed that Zardari would travel to Ankara December 4 for
tripartite meetings with President Karzai.
Indian High Commission: Distinction between Civilians and ISI

¶10. (C) Separately, the Indian Polcouns P. Kumaran in Islamabad told Polcouns
that the GOI was making a distinction between the civilian government, which
they firmly believed had no involvement in the attacks, and the military/ISI.
“We are not yet ready to give ISI a clean chit,” although he said the GOI was
making no accusations, yet, of direct ISI involvement. Based on its
interrogation of the Pakistani terrorist arrested during the attack, the GOI is
“absolutely certain” that the attacks originated in Pakistan. The individual
arrested admitted he was trained in Karachi and said he came from a village
(Faridkat) near Multan, in the Punjab. They also confiscated a satellite phone
and traced calls to Lahore, Jalalabad and LeT training chief Muzammil.
¶11. (C) “We are still investigating,” said Kumaran, and “at some stage” we
would like the ISI chief to visit and see what we can do together. He flatly
denied there had been any phone call from FM Mukherjee to President Zardari. He
emphasized that India has issued no war warnings to Pakistan and had not
mobilized its forces. There would, however, be a “pause” in the relationship;
the length of that pause would depend on what actions the Pakistanis took.
During anti-terrorism bilaterals, the GOI had given the names of 19-20 fugitives
to the GOP that they wanted arrested. A good place to start rapprochement,
according to Kumaran, would be for the GOP to start turning over some of these
fugitives.
Indian HC Meets Nawaz Sharif

¶12. (C) Kumaran confirmed that the Indian High Commissioner called December 2
on Pakistan Muslim League-N leader Nawaz Sharif, saying that the Indian Embassy
had a policy of “staying in touch” with Nawaz. He did not have a readout of the
meeting, but the press quoted Nawaz as saying the Indian government had not
blamed the GOP for the incidents in Mumbai
ISLAMABAD 00003783 003 OF 003
and commented that the Indians should not jump the gun before investigating
thoroughly. Otherwise, Nawaz used the opportunity to criticize President
Zardari, announce the PML-N would start a campaign against Chief Justice Dogar
(over allegations he secured a higher test score for his daughter in exams), and
criticized the government for not implementing the joint parliamentary
resolution on extremism and giving former President Musharraf VIP treatment.
PM Holds All Parties Meeting

¶13. (SBU) Following a meeting called to brief all the political parties on the
Indo-Pak situation, PM Gilani issued a press statement saying: the GOP extends
its hand of cooperation to India and are willing to jointly investigate the
recent events; both sides should exhibit seriousness and patience; this was not
a time for trading blame; the whole nation is united to defend Pakistan and
there is a complete coordination between Pakistan’s armed forces and its
government; and there is no fear of war because we are in touch with our
friends.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 08MUNICH423, GERMANY/BAVARIA: GERMAN

COALITION PARTIES
Discussing cables
08MUNICH423 2008-12-23 08:08 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Munich
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000423
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2018

TAGS: PGOV GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY/BAVARIA: GERMAN COALITION PARTIES
QUARRELING
REF: A. MUNICH 355

¶B. MUNICH 351
Classified By: Consul General Eric Nelson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) The Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU),

dangerously weakened, is attempting to sharpen its profile
among Bavarian and national voters, by pursuing an aggressive
economic campaign that diverges from that of its sister
party, Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democrats. The CSU is
finding plenty of opportunities to profile itself locally and
nationally in addressing the challenges presented by the
financial crisis. For one, Bavarian Minister President
Seehofer has threatened to boycott the January 5 "coalition
summit" if Chancellor Merkel does not bend to the CSU's
recipe for responding to Germany's economic downturn through
a tax reform proposal. Merkel needs a strong CSU showing in
Bavaria to achieve her goal of a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition after
the 2009 national elections, but the CSU's strategy could
build tensions between the sister parties. How the CDU-CSU
divisions play out could influence national economic policy
as well as how the upcoming campaign will shape up in the
months to come. End Summary.
CSU SALTING THE CDU'S SOUP

--------------------------
¶2. (SBU) The CSU still holds Chancellor Merkel partly

responsible for the CSU's poor outcome in the September 2008
state elections. Merkel failed to support the CSU, for
example, on the tax deductibility of commuting costs, one of
the CSU's key issues that the CDU had rejected until the
latest ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court that agreed
with the position of the CSU. Erwin Huber, former head of
the CSU, said "the CDU should have listened to us instead of
Finance Minister Steinbrueck (SPD) on this sensitive issue."
¶3. (C) Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Secretary General of the

CSU (PROTECT), told the Consul General on December 17 that
the CSU is "heating up the debate" and will meet on January 4
"to map out a strategy for the 2009 election campaign,"
adding, "We want to be more like the party was under Edmund
Stoiber and Franz Josef Straus (both legendary former
Minister Presidents)." Or, as Hartmut Kotschyk (CSU party
whip in the Bundestag) put it to the P/E Chief recently, "We
want to be the salt in their soup."
¶4. (C) Zu Guttenberg and Koschyk reviewed possible

approaches the CSU would take with its platform for 2009.
a) Taking a hard line against EU membership not only for

Turkey but also for Ukraine. The CSU could lump Turkey and
Ukraine together so neither country could feel singled out
for bad treatment. The CSU's new foreign policy spokeswoman
in the Bundestag, Dorothee Baer, told Berlin PolMC that this
would be a focus of the CSU's campaign for European
Parliament elections in June 2009.
b) Insisting on more EU "subsidiarity." The CSU wants more

respect for national and regional and local prerogatives in
governance and administrative control, such as allowing
restrictions on bioengineered seeds.
c) Strengthening and refocusing the economy. The CSU wants

a renewed commitment to human over financial capital as a way
to address what Koschyk called "a believability problem among
the rank and file Germans for the market economy." Zu
Guttenberg complained that "Merkel was not being assertive
enough on the economy," echoing recent statements by Horst
Seehofer, Bavarian Minister President (CSU). However, he
also admitted that he could understand her approach since he
found her to be "personally conservative" and "not one to be
in the front on bold initiatives." He expected she was
"trying to maintain her options in 2009" as well as "trying
to stay close to the coalition Social Democratic Party (SPD)."
BAVARIA'S PRESIDENT CUTTING A MEAN FIGURE

-----------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Finally, MP Seehofer has criticized the CDU in

public around Bavaria, in Berlin, and in the media, which
reported that CDU leaders viewed his actions as
"unpredictable" because he made proposals that strayed from
MUNICH 00000423 002 of 002
the coalition's party line. He criticized the Chancellor's

economic course, for example, arguing that Germany needed a
larger and more meaningful program than the Chancellor had
supported. Seehofer preserved the independence of Bavarian
control over the Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) by
rejecting the Federal rescue package in an attempt to use
only Bavarian resources. And, he pushed for immediate tax
deductions, not just some time after the election.
COMMENT: CREATING INDIVIDUALITY WITHOUT KILLING EACH OTHER

--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶6. (C) Chancellor Merkel and the CDU need a strong and
cooperative Bavarian CSU partner in order to win the 2009
Bundestag election. Down in Bavaria, the CSU must get
stronger, too, and is fighting for its uniqueness as a
regional party with national and international credentials.
Although the ultimate goals are compatible, the CSU
necessarily must set itself apart from the CDU to prove
itself to skeptical locals who knocked the CSU off its high
horse in the last election. The challenge for both parties
is to allow the CSU to profile itself without killing the
relationship, and each other's chances, with an overly
aggressive factional campaign.
¶7. (U) Track Munich reporting at

xxxxx
NELSON
Viewing cable 08NEWDELHI3044, MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE:

DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08NEWDELHI3044.
Embassy New
08NEWDELHI3044 2008-12-02 15:03 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL
Delhi
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003044
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/02/2018

TAGS PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PREL, PINR, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE: DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER
UNITED MESSAGES
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025 B. NEW DELHI 3024 C. NEW DELHI 3018 D. MUMBAI 550
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Diplomatic missions in Delhi have agreed to offer a more
sympathetic message to the Indians rather than pound on the government for its
massive intelligence failure. Evidence that Pakistani-based extremist group
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) was the culprit is still not out in the open, although
the question being asked now is whether Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was directly involved in the attack. Dipomatic
missions in Delhi are praising Delhi for its restraint while advising Pakistan
that now is the time to collaborate. End Summary.
Offering Only Sympathy and Support

----------------------------------
¶2. (C) At a 2 December meeting with counterparts from the Australian, British,
Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions, these diplomats communicated details
of the controlled approach their respective missions in Delhi have taken in
their responses to India’s reaction to the Mumbai attacks. They concluded that
any offers of assistance should be made carefully to avoid being interpreted by
the Indians as politically motivated or attempts to monitor their actions.
Delhi-based missions are taking extra care at this stage to not get sucked into
the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.
¶3. (C) The EU (diplomatic mission heads) are scheduled for a strategic dialogue
with India on 5 December to discuss what type of support India would feel
comfortable receiving; in addition, the EU plans to send to Delhi a counter-
terrorism coordinator in January.
¶4. (C) The French Ambassador, according to the British High Commission, called
the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors (unbeknownst to other EU partners)
to discuss assistance to the Indians. President Sarkozy is expected to call
Prime Minister Singh to express his sympathy and to offer cooperation at a
suitable level.
¶5. (SBU) The Australian Prime Minister in his speech to his parliament said
Australia “stands with India at this time” and offered any assistance that their
“friends” in New Delhi may require. He stressed the importance of tracking down
those responsible for the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks, singling
out LeT as an separatist militant group which has been a threat to India for a
long time, but saying it is too early to speculate on who the perpetrators were.
The Million Dollar Question

---------------------------
¶6. (C) While Indian press continues to pin blame on Pakistan, observers and
diplomats in Delhi are asking the same question: was the ISI behind the Mumbai
attacks? While there are clear links between the attacks’ perpetrators and the
extremist group LeT, and likewise, there are links between LeT and the ISI,
there is no clear evidence yet to suggest that ISI directed or facilitated the
attacks, according to the British High Commission.
Demarching the Indians and Pakistanis

-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) A British diplomat told us that UK Foreign Secretary Miliband urged
restraint to External Affairs Minister
NEW DELHI 00003044 002 OF 002
Mukherjee when they spoke on 1 December. The call took place only after many
delays on the GOI’s part. Mukherjee apparently disavowed any interest in raising
tensions further, but insisted that Pakistan must take action in response to
India,s demands. Our contact stressed that the UK had been very direct in
presenting India and Pakistan with specific information regarding those
responsible for the attacks. She also noted that the list of names the Indians
had put on the “Most Wanted Criminals List” that had been passed to Islamabad
included figures such as fugitive crime lord Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed
Chief Maulana Azhar, who had been on prior lists the Indians had submitted. In
her view, this took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai
attacks.
¶8. (C) Narayanan, according to British diplomats, delivered the message that he
understands Pakistan’s civilian government has no control over the ISI or the
army. He said India is not blaming the Pakistani government. The Indian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is still waiting on the Pakistanis to provide the name of the
ISI Director they plan to send as well as a date.
¶9. (C) The Australian High Commission delivered the message to the Pakistanis
that this is a watershed and cooperation with the Indians now is crucial. The
Australians have praised the Indians for the past restraint they have shown
toward Pakistan and offered assistance, which was “politely denied”, according
to an Australian diplomat.
Zardari Cornered
----------------
¶10. (C) An official in the Pakistani High Commission in Delhi told Poloff that
he held the Indian press responsible for any deterioration in the Indo-Pak
relationship. Following the Indian press coverage which misrepresented the
potential visit of the ISI Chief and complicated potential cooperation between
the two governments, this diplomat said Zardari’s options became more limited
and the GOP felt it had no other choice than to backpedal on its initial offer,
made before the Mumbai attacks, to send its ISI Chief to India. MULFORD
Viewing cable 08STATE128877, RESPONSE TO SAUDI REQUEST FOR
RECOMMENDATIONS ON
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08STATE128877.
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TO AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
SIPDIS
SECRET//REL SAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018

TAGS: EFIN IR KNNP PARM PINR PREL
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SAUDI REQUEST FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ON
HOW TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON IRAN
REF: A. RIYADH 1667
¶B. STATE 115523
Classified By: ISN PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, REASONS 1.4(b) AND (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4.
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶2. (S//REL SAU) During the week of 13 October and in

response to ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia
McNerney's encouragement to help increase pressure on Iran to
change course, Saudi MFA Undersecretary for Multilateral
Affairs, Prince Turki Bin Mohamed Bin Saud Al-Kabeer
requested U.S. recommendations on specific actions Saudi
Arabia could take (REF A). Washington would like to provide
the following non-paper to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA),
which contains suggestions on how to further enhance Saudi
Arabia,s non-proliferation efforts with regard to Iran.
¶3. On October 16, 2008, the Financial Action Task Force

(FATF) issued its fourth warning of the serious threat posed
by Iran's lack of a sufficient anti-money laundering and
counterterrorist financing regime (REF B). During the same
plenary meeting, FATF also separately issued guidance on the
steps that countries should take to implement UNSCR 1803's
call for vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in
Iran, in order to avoid such activities contributing to
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. These two
actions by the FATF, combined with the already widely held
view that Iranian financial institutions play a key role in
Iran's proliferation efforts, merit immediate action by
countries to mitigate these illicit finance risks.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶4. (S//REL SAU) Washington requests Embassy Riyadh approach

Prince Turki, or other appropriate senior KSA officials, to
discuss this issue and provide U.S. recommendations. Post
should pursue the following objectives:
-- Present the non-paper at paragraph 5 to KSA officials.
-- Urge host government to issue a public statement that

advances the October 2008 FATF statement on Iran, and
encourage all regional partners to do the same.
-- Encourage host government to carefully monitor any

financial and commercial activity with Iran within KSA to
ensure that Iran does not pursue illicit transactions via the
KSA.
-- Encourage host government to use its influence in the GCC

to invigorate further actions by regional partners to enhance
vigilance over financial and commercial activity with Iran,
as is called for by the Financial Action Task Force and
UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.
--------
NONPAPER
--------
¶5. (S//REL SAU) BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR SAUDI ARABIA
During Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney's visit

to Saudi Arabia on 15 October 2008, she raised the issue of
Iran's nuclear program and the need to increase pressure on
the Iranian regime to address international concerns
surrounding its nuclear activities. Undersecretary for
Multilateral Affairs Prince Turki Bin Mohamed Bin Saud
Al-Kabeer requested suggestions on steps the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia could take in this regard.
We believe your government should consider taking action on

the following key priorities:
-- National Financial Measures
-- Export Control Implementation
-- Express Resolve on the Iranian Threat, and
-- Full Implementation of UNSCRs, particularly 1803.
Your vigilance thus far demonstrates your government,s

recognition that real action must be taken to protect the
region,s security by preventing Iranian proliferation. We
believe that if your government implemented the actions
suggested in this paper, it would not only allow you to
exercise influential leadership with regional neighbors, it
would significantly increase the pressure on Iran to
cooperate with the international community and address its
concerns.
We would like to present to you the following recommendations

and the United States is prepared to work with the KSA to
assist with the incorporation of these measures into Saudi
Arabia's nonproliferation system.
National Financial Measures:
-- We urge the Saudi Government to issue a public statement

that advances the October 2008 Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) statement on Iran. The Saudi statement should
recommend heightened vigilance and the implementation of
preventive measures, per FATF,s October statements, by all
countries with respect to the financial transactions with
Iran given the significant vulnerability that Iran poses to
the international financial system. A statement like this
from your government would send a clear message to your GCC
partners that the risk arising from Iranian banking
transactions is real and that action must be taken to protect
the region,s banking system and prevent Iranian
proliferation.
-- On October 16, the FATF issued its fourth warning of the

serious threat posed by Iran's lack of a sufficient
anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regime.
In contrast with prior FATF actions on Iran, this statement
marked a significant escalation in concern about the
terrorism finance threat emanating from Iran and ratcheted up
the call for preventive measures that should be implemented
by FATF members and other jurisdictions to protect their
financial sectors from this risk.
-- During the October plenary meeting, FATF also separately

issued guidance on the steps that countries should take to
implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1803's call for vigilance over the activities of financial
institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in
Iran, in order to avoid such activities contributing to
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
-- Iran uses deceptive tactics and front companies to

disguise its proliferation activities. The U.S. recommends
that Saudi Arabia highlight this fact with its domestic
businesses and GCC partners.
-- We also recommend that you reduce Saudi Arabian Industries

Corporation (SABIC) activities in Iran,s petrochemicals
market. The U.S. also proposes that Saudi Arabia suspend
Iran-GCC free trade area talks until Iran accepts the P5 1
incentives package.
-- U.S. Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 is an authority that

allows the U.S. to block the assets of WMD proliferators and
their supporters and thereby deny them access to the U.S.
financial and commercial systems. The U.S. recommends that
Saudi Arabia explore the creation of a similar legal
authority.
Export Control Implementation:
-- Saudi Arabia should begin work on drafting a comprehensive

export control law and adopt a comprehensive control list
that meets international standards, including the standards
set by the four multilateral export control regimes
(Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear
Suppliers Group, and Wassenaar Group).
-- A comprehensive export control system will give Saudi

Arabia the ability to ensure that its trade is secure and
will encourage high technology investment.
-- The United States is prepared to support Saudi Arabia in

this regard, including through our Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) Program.
Express Resolve on the Iranian Threat:
-- Saudi Arabia should exercise leadership with neighbors in

the region and publicly by expressing concerns about Iran,s
continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and
destabilizing activities in the region.
-- We would appreciate public expressions of support for the

P5 1 dual track process including encouragement for Iran to
accept the incentives package.
-- Saudi Arabia should exercise its influence with China, in

particular, to persuade China to reduce its growing
energy/economic cooperation and weapons purchases. Such
efforts by China run contrary to the spirit of the UNSCRs and
the P5 1 dual track strategy. A high level Saudi delegation
could communicate to China Saudi concerns about the threat
posed by Iran,s actions.
Full Implementation of UNSCRs:
-- Full implementation of UNSCRs 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),

and 1803 (2008), through vigilance and action against Iran,s
efforts to circumvent sanctions are key components to
maintaining pressure on Iran.
-- A useful step would be for KSA to vigorously implement

UNSCR provisions such as freezing financial assets and
imposing travel restrictions on designated entities and
individuals, prohibit dual-use exports, call for inspections
of IRISL and Iran Air Cargo shipment, and exercise vigilance
over any activities of financial institutions in KSA with
Iranian domiciled banks.
-- As a reference, the U.S. 60-day report on implementation

of UNSCR 1803 can be found at:
www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/memberstatesrep orts.shtml
END NONPAPER FOR SAUDI ARABIA
------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------
¶6. (U) Post should report results within seven business days
of receipt of this cable. Please address replies for ISN,
IO, T, TREASURY, and NEA/IR. Please include SIPDIS in all
replies.
----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------
¶7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up

information is Nicole Menkhoff, ISN/RA, 202-736-4277
begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 202-736-4277 end_of_the_skype_
highlighting,
MenkhoffN@state.sgov.gov and Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI,
202-647-5408 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 202-647-
5408 end_of_the_skype_highlighting, McGeehanKJ@state.sgov.gov.
RICE
Viewing cable 08STATE134490, S) LETTER FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY

NEGROPONTE
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018

TAGS: ETTC MASS OPDC PARM PREL AM
SUBJECT: (S) LETTER FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
REGARDING 2003 ARMENIAN ARMS PROCUREMENT FOR IRAN
REFS: A. YEREVAN 657, B. State 97802
Classified By: EUR/FO DAS Garber, Reasons 1.4 (b),

(c), and (d).
¶1. (U) Please deliver the following letter from Deputy Secretary
Negroponte. There will be no signed original. Embassy should also
propose discussions with the Government of Armenia in coming weeks.
Suggested dates and team composition will be provided septel.
Embassy Yerevan is requested to report response.
¶2. (Secret/Rel Armenia) Begin Letter:

Dear Mr. President:
We value our positive relationship with your government,

as we explore a range of shared interests, especially an agreement
on Nagorno Karabakh and normalization of Armenia's relations with
Turkey. At the same time, we are dismayed by a serious and,
indeed, deadly - arms re-export case.
Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary Fried, Deputy Assistant

Secretary Bryza, and Ambassador Yovanovitch have raised with you our
deep concerns about Armenia's transfer of arms to Iran which
resulted in the death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
Notwithstanding the close relationship between our countries,
neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this
case. By law, the transfer of these weapons requires us to consider
whether there is a basis for the imposition of U.S. sanctions. If
sanctions are imposed, penalties could include the cutoff of U.S.
assistance and certain export restrictions.
To avoid such sanctions, it is essential that you present

compelling evidence that your government is now in partnership with
us to ensure such transfers do not occur in the future.
To convince the United States that this will not happen again,
we seek a written agreement from Armenia, memorializing its intent
to implement measures that will prevent Armenia from becoming a
source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups involved with
terrorism and/or weapons proliferation. Such measures include:
-- Reform the Armenian Export Control Commission so its members are

full time employees who exclusively work on export controls;
-- Establish, at each point of entry into Armenia, Armenian teams

dedicated to detecting and interdicting dual-use commodities and
other contraband;
-- Periodically accept unannounced visits by U.S. experts to assess

the work of the teams;
-- Harmonize Armenia's export control legislation with that of the

EU;
-- Update and make public Armenian export control lists,

incorporating the control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement,
Missile Technology Control Regime, and other international control
regimes;
-- Ensure that Armenian-based brokers do not facilitate arms related

transfers; and
-- Consult with the United States on transfers to countries that are

not member states of NATO or the EU, or participating states of the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
We are prepared to send a team as early as possible in the New

Year to discuss this proposal further. It is my hope that we can
work together to forge a positive outcome which provides your
government the opportunity to strengthen Armenia's export controls
and for my government to assist you in this effort.
Sincerely,
John D. Negroponte
End text of letter.

¶3. (S) Background: In 2003, Armenia facilitated Iran's purchase of
rockets and machine guns. In 2007, some of these weapons were
recovered from two Shia militant attacks in which a United States
soldier was killed and six others were injured in Iraq. The
Secretary discussed our concerns with President Sargsian on the
margins of the UN General Assembly, but he denied any transfer
occurred. The direct role of high-level Armenian officials and the
link of the weapons to an attack on U.S. forces make this case
unique and highly troubling. These transfers may provide a basis
for sanctions pursuant to U.S. legal authorities. We propose a
series of steps that Armenia will need to take to prevent future
transfers, which will be weighed in the consideration of sanctions.
We hope to use the threat of sanctions as a tool to generate
Armenian responsiveness so that we will not be forced to impose
sanctions measures.
¶4. (S) The Deputy Secretary is writing to President Sargsian and

indicating that a team will be sent to Armenia to seek written
agreement that Armenia will take steps to ensure that it does not
become a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of
concern. The team will also present additional information that
will make clear why the United States is convinced that the
transfers happened and make it unreasonable for Sargsian to continue
his denials. We anticipate that the team will travel to Yerevan in
the coming weeks, to provide sufficient time for the incoming
Administration to be briefed on the situation.
¶5. (S) Objective: Our objective is to prevent Armenia from

becoming a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of
concern, without derailing a possible Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
Embassy Yerevan should seek to convey the seriousness with which the
United States views this issue and emphasize that the transfer of
arms to Iran and subsequently to terrorists in Iraq, in particular
transfers that resulted in the death of an American serviceman,
cannot be overlooked by the United States.
¶6. (U) Please contact EUR/PRA Matt Hardiman and ISN/CATR Margaret
Mitchell with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case
and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN and EUR.
RICE
Viewing cable 08TELAVIV2760, U/S LEVEY REASSURES GOI THAT NO

MOMENTUM WILL BE
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR LEVEY, S.

ATHENS FOR PURCELL, A.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018

TAGS: KTFN EFIN ECON KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY REASSURES GOI THAT NO MOMENTUM WILL BE
LOST IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR FINANCE
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1.(S) In a visit to Israel on 16-17 November, Treasury Under

Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart A.
Levey, reassured GOI officials that no momentum would be lost
in USG efforts to combat terrorist financing or to pressure
Iran during the transition to a new US administration in
January. In meetings with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni,
Mossad Director Meir Dagan, National Security Council
Chairman Dani Arditi, and others, U/S Levey emphasized recent
U.S. designations against the Union of Good, the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and the recent
revocation of Iran's "U-Turn" license. In response to GOI
officials' pressure to have the U.S. designate the Central
Bank of Iran (CBI), Levey underscored the importance of
international, multilateral concurrence for such an effort to
be a success.
2.(S) Israeli officials were keen to outline an "escalation"

in CBI programs that they believed pose a danger to the
international financial system. Several key Israeli officials
identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI, as a key
figure in masterminding new ways to help the Iranian
commercial and banking sectors circumvent sanctions. Levey
promised to continue pushing the Gulf states on adopting
stronger regulation until the last day of his appointment.
3.(S) Mossad Chief Meir Dagan informed Levey that sanctions

were beginning to have a negative effect on Iran's regime.
NSC Chairman Arditi also told him that the PA was performing
well in its renewed fight against terror finance in the West
Bank. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- -----
GOI CONCERNED ABOUT COUNTER TERROR FINANCE POLICY CONTINUITY
--------------------------------------------- -----
4.(S) National Security Council (NCS) Chairman, Dani Arditi,

in a November 16 meeting with U/S Stuart Levey, asked whether
Levey thought his efforts would continue into the next U.S.
administration. Even though he said he planned to resign as
required in January, Levey told Arditi that he believed the
Obama team would be committed to continuing the ambitious
program against terrorism finance that he has shepherded over
the last several years. Saying counterterrorism finance was
not a partisan issue in the U.S., Levey subsequently
confirmed these sentiments to Foreign Minister (FM) Tzipi
Livni and Mossad Director Meir Dagan in separate meetings
that occurred on the following day, November 17.
----------------------
IRAN/NON-PROLIFERATION
----------------------
5.(S) On November 16, Levey outlined for Ministry of Foreign

Affairs Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon
Bar, and Senior Deputy Director General Yossi Gal positive
developments in the Iran effort. He told them that Treasury
had been very successful in curtailing business with Iran by
most "major players". Levey said that expanding the
non-proliferation strategy into insurance, and putting
pressure on Iran's oil refining capacity and Liquid Natural
Gas (LNG) industry were next steps being pursued. He also
reported that the recent IRISL designation has been unusually
effective.
CBI's Reza Raei Masterminds New Methods

---------------------------------------
6.(S) During their November 16 meeting, Arditi told Levey

that the Israeli intelligence community has continued to see
an escalation in CBI efforts to help designated Iranian
commercial banks circumvent international and U.S. sanctions.
The NSC Chairman presented several recent examples of CBI
behavior that he characterized as unusual for a central bank.
Arditi identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI for
Foreign Exchange Affairs, as the mastermind of these new
TEL AVIV 00002760 002 OF 004
efforts.
7.(S) Meir Dagan subsequently told Levey that the CBI had
engineered a way for the UN-designated Iranian bank Sepah to
conduct foreign business transactions through use of the
Iranian Postal Bank. Bank Melli, a USG-designated bank, had
also purchased shares in investment funds as a way to escape
the effects of the sanctions, according to Dagan. Using these
methods, Melli and Sepah have been able to fabricate a method
of providing correspondent-like banking services to
designated Iranian banks that find it increasingly difficult
to deal in foreign currency. Arditi named the "Persia Equity
Fund" as one such financial instrument being used by Melli.
Levey commented that any such investment fund or financial
instrument could be listed as a derivative designation of
Melli if enough evidence could be shown linking the two
organizations. Levey told Meir Dagan that he was in favor of
pursuing a designation of Raei if GOI allegations were
accurate.
No International Support for Designation of the CBI

--------------------------------------------- ------
8.(S) Arditi and subsequently, Dagan, asked Levey whether the

USG was considering a designation of the CBI. Although
Treasury had looked into the possibility, said Levey, a
designation of the CBI would be ineffective without a
multilateral effort. International support for such an effort
simply did not yet exist, Levey explained. He told Dagan that
we need to build support by sharing info about the CBI's
illicit conduct, similar to the support we built for cutting
off the U-turn license. Levey said that it would be better to
focus on limiting other central and commercial banks'
business with the CBI. Noting that the banking industry
relies heavily on reputation, Levey told Arditi that the
right strategy is to continue exposing the illicit activities
of Iranian banks and banking officials.
European Banks' Business with Iran

----------------------------------
9.(S) MFA interlocutors revisited the progress of European

banks in non-proliferation efforts. In a November 16 meeting
with Yossi Gal, Senior Deputy Director General, and Alon Bar,
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Gal raised
concerns that Italy and Germany were falling short in their
commitment to enforce sanctions within their banking sectors.
Gal told Levey that the MFA was planning a visit to Italy in
December, but was unsure whether its attempt to persuade the
politicians would filter down to action within the
bureaucracy. Gal expressed the same concern about the banking
sector in Germany, saying that resistance from the
bureaucracy and the private sector often undermined attempts
by political figures to improve German regulation. Bar and
Gal encouraged Levey to join the GOI in pressing the
governments and banking sectors of Germany and Italy to do
more.
Cautious Optimism on Gulf States

--------------------------------
10.(S) On the status of UAE efforts to stem Iranian finance,

Levey told Gal and Bar that he was optimistic about the
country's efforts. Among other examples, he mentioned that
the UAE had decreased the number of visas it was issuing to
Iranian nationals and that Emirati ministers were receptive
to his requests for increased banking regulation.
11.(S) FM Livni told Levey that Israel continues to encourage

the Gulf states to more publicly outline their actions
against Iranian finance within their banking sectors despite
the countries' reasons for keeping such actions secretive.
She asked Levey to join in this effort. Levey affirmed that
the USG was encouraging sanctions in all sectors and posited
that the Iranians were beginning to feel the pressure. Livni
asked if the declining price of oil was becoming leverage in
the efforts to thwart Iranian financial efforts. Levey said
that it was and that the Iranian private sector was becoming
more vocal in its criticisms of the government.
12.(S) Levey outlined for his GOI interlocutors recent
TEL AVIV 00002760 003 OF 004
efforts by Treasury to broaden its sanctioning of Iran to the

shipping, insurance, and reinsurance industries. He cited the
designation of IRISL as a positive first step and mentioned
that Treasury had found willing partners in Europe and the UK
to further efforts in this area.
Effect of Sanctions on Iran

---------------------------
13.(S) Dagan told Levey that the economic problems Iran is

experiencing as a result of sanctions are encouraging debate
within the regime. He said that in order to preserve the
revolution, some key figures have begun to consider the need
for change. The pressure is on, Dagan said, but he could not
estimate when Iran would hit the brink. He noted that the
lower cost of oil at the moment would likely prompt Iran to
increase its production, thereby encouraging more business
through the CBI. With oil prices low everywhere, however,
Dagan and Levey agreed that Iran was a less attractive place
for investment. Levey told Dagan that the present low oil
prices provide a critical opportunity to convince other
members of the international community to apply more
pressure.
14.(S) Livni asked Levey if there was a risk of Iran

regaining a foothold in certain markets as a result of the
world financial crisis. Levey said that the market turmoil
has worked to the USG's advantage: the crisis has made
financial institutions even more risk-averse, thereby
lessening Iran's attractiveness even further. Additionally,
while Iran's banks are isolated, its economy is not.
U.S. Engagement with Iran

-------------------------
15.(S) FM Livni asked Levey during their November 17 meeting
why the USG was considering a rapprochement with Iran through
a U.S. Interests section in Tehran. She questioned whether
the tactic would have a net positive outcome when measured
against the negative perceptions such a move would be bound
to create. Levey told Livni that this was a question better
posed to the State Department, but that her concern was the
central issue being debated by policy makers in Washington.
In Levey's previous meeting with MFA officials Bar and Gal,
he said that engagement with Iran would not work without
leverage, indicating that sanctions would need to be in place
no matter what the USG decides to do.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
STEMMING PALESTINIAN TERROR FINANCE: GOI PLEASED WITH PA'S
PROGRESS
--------------------------------------------- -------------
16.(S) Levey told Arditi that Treasury's recent designation

of the "Union of Good" was proof of the USG's commitment to
continue to work against Hamas and Palestinian terrorists.
Levey said, however, that while the USG supported efforts at
thwarting terrorism in the territories, the USG wished to
keep humanitarian goods flowing to the needy within the
population.
17.(S) Arditi told Levey that Palestinian Authority (PA)

efforts at stemming terrorism within the territories were
going quite well. He said the PA's positive efforts
"surprised" his staff and that he "never thought" the PA
would do so well. Levey said that Treasury coordinated with
Prime Minister Fayyad on the Union of Good designation and
was pleased to hear that PA efforts were held in high regard
by the GOI.
18.(S) When Levey inquired about efforts to prevent

correspondent banking relations in Gaza from being severed,
Arditi said that the Postal Bank "was on the agenda". Arditi
lamented that the services provided by the Postal Bank would
not be as good because of its small size and limited
capacity. He expressed his hope that the central bank
governor would be able to delay the commercial banks'
decision to end their relationship with the Palestinians
until a permanent solution was ensured.
19.(S) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Stuart
TEL AVIV 00002760 004 OF 004
Levey.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 08USNATO453, ALLIES FIND BRIEFING ON AFGHANISTAN
NIE “GLOOMY,”
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #08USNATO453.
08USNATO453 2008-12-05 08:08 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Mission USNATO
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000453

NOFORN
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DEPARTMENT FOR RPM, SCA/A, SCA/PB
EO 12958 DECL: 12/04/2018

TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, NATO, PTER, PINR, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: ALLIES FIND BRIEFING ON AFGHANISTAN NIE “GLOOMY,”
BUT FOCUS ON RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SITUATION
USNATO 00000453 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires W. Scott Reid III. Reasons 1.4 (b), ( c), (d).
¶1. (S/REL NATO) Summary. National Intelligence Officer (NiO) for South Asia,
Dr. Peter Lavoy, briefed NATO Permanent Representatives on the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for Afghanistan on November 25. He said the NIE
describes a grim situation in Afghanistan and predicts that negative trends will
continue through 2009 if five inter-dependent regional challenges in South Asia
are not addressed: defeating al-Qaida in Pakistan, creating stability in
Afghanistan, creating stability in western Pakistan, creating stability in
Pakistan as a whole particularly in the economy, and improving the bilateral
India-Pakistan relationship. Permanent Representatives called Lavoy’s report
“unrelentingly gloomy,” but appeared to agree with his assessment that
Afghanistan is “winnable,” especially if NATO takes several immediate concrete
steps to improve the situation. End summary.
--------------
KEY CHALLENGES
--------------
¶2. (S/REL NATO) NiO Lavoy opened his briefing to a November 25 informal meeting
of NATO Permanent Representatives (PermReps) by saying the situation for 2009 in
Afghanistan looked bleak unless the international community addressed five
inter-dependent regional challenges: -- Defeating al-Qaida in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan; -- Creating stability in
Afghanistan; -- Creating stability in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province,
Baluchistan Province, and the FATA; -- Creating stability in Pakistan as a
whole, with particular emphasis on Pakistan’s economy; and -- Improving the
bilateral India-Pakistan relationship.
¶3. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy described FATA as the command and control center for al-
Qaida worldwide, and said a few hundred senior and mid-level trainers, planners,
and operators reside there. Despite al-Qaida’s presence in the FATA, he
continued, it plays a surprisingly insignificant role in Afghanistan, where the
numbers of foreign fighters remain relatively low. Al-Qaida is more disrupted
than at any time since October 2001, but the organization is damaged, not
broken. The international community cannot afford to let pressure off al-Qaida,
because it has demonstrated an ability to reconstitute itself in the past, and
could easily reverse-migrate back to Afghanistan if the Taliban were to regain
control. Lavoy emphasized that the consequences of failing in Afghanistan and
permitting al-Qaida to shift its center of gravity to Afghanistan would pose a
threat to all nations inside their own borders.
----------------------
SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
----------------------
¶4. (S/REL NATO) Turning to Afghanistan, Lavoy underlined that there are more
significant factors than al-Qaida that contribute to the bleak security
situation. The Afghan government has failed to consistently deliver services in
rural areas. This has created a void that the Taliban and other insurgent groups
have begun to fill in the southern, eastern, and some western provinces. The
Taliban is mediating local disputes in some areas, for example, offering the
population at least an elementary level of access to justice. Provincial
governors appointed due to close ties to Karzai have proven ineffective, often
putting certain tribes or sub-tribes at unnatural disadvantage while promoting
others. The Taliban have effectively manipulated the grievances of disgruntled,
disenfranchised tribes to win over anti-government recruits. Responding to a
question, Lavoy said Karzai reflects the tribal fragmentation of Afghanistan.
If there could be more balance of resources at the district level instead of
channeling all money and efforts through Karzai, we could have greater success
improving government linkages to the population.
¶5. (S/REL NATO) The Taliban has become more militarily effective and is
demonstrating more sophisticated infantry, communications, and command and
control techniques. Their marksmanship is more precise, and their explosives
more lethal than in previous years. For these reasons, Lavoy noted, violent
attacks initiated by insurgents rose 40 percent over the past year, matching a
three-year trend for drastic annual increases in insurgent attacks. Norwegian
and Turkish PermReps asked about the source of expertise and financing that is
allowing the Taliban to become militarily proficient, especially if the number
of al-Qaida senior and mid-level personnel is low. Lavoy responded that the
opium economy is the number one domestic funding source for Pakistan-oriented
and Afghan Taliban organizations. He added that insurgents have proven
themselves highly adaptable, and many fighters’ veteran status has contributed
to opposing forces’ improved abilities.
¶6. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy pointed to the growing professionalism and performance of
the Afghan National Army (ANA) as a good news story, but noted that ISAF has a
40 percent deficiency in numbers of trainers needed to constitute a projected
Afghan Army force strength of 134,000 troops. There is a similar training
deficiency for Afghan National Police (ANP) development, he said. Police are
seen in many provinces as a predatory force plagued by systemic problems beyond
lack of professionalism, equipment, and training. Extortion of bribes from the
populace remains common practice, often to supplement provincial government
coffers. While there are cases where police are doing better, the ANP needs more
resources.
¶7. (S/REL NATO) Even if the international community rectifies training gaps in
Afghan army and police development, Lavoy concluded, efforts would be
insufficient if Pakistan remains a safe haven for insurgents. Similarly, solving
the safe haven in Pakistan is necessary but insufficient to “win” in
Afghanistan, without simultaneously addressing the severe governance,
development, and access to justice gaps.
-------------------------------
PAKISTAN’S PRECARIOUS SITUATION
-------------------------------
¶8. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy commented on two causes of instability in western

Pakistan that could cause Pakistan to completely lose control of its Pashtun
territories over the next few years. Traditional Pashtun tribal authority has
broken down since the anti-Soviet jihad period, and is no longer capable of
resolving social harmony at the community level. Pakistan has also promulgated a
policy of neglect of Pashtun areas and still lacks a strategy to deal
holistically with social problems of illiteracy, unemployment, and disaffected
youth. Both of these situations play to the advantage of insurgent and extremist
groups.
¶9. (S/REL NATO) Although Pakistan now identifies both al-Qaida and the Taliban
as existential threats, Lavoy said, Pakistani government institutions still
support the Taliban in two key ways. They permit the Quetta Taliban Shura (the
Taliban leadership council) to operate unfettered in Baluchistan province.
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) provides intelligence and financial support to
insurgent groups - especially the Jalaluddin Haqqani network out of Miram Shah,
North Waziristan - to conduct attacks in Afghanistan against Afghan government,
ISAF, and Indian targets. PermReps questioned the rationality of Pakistan’s
support for the Taliban, which Lavoy explained in three ways. First, Pakistan
believes the Taliban will prevail in the long term, at least in the Pashtun belt
most proximate to the Pakistani border. Second, Pakistan continues to define
India as its number one threat, and insists that India plays an over-active role
in Afghanistan. Finally, Pakistani officials think that if militant groups were
not attacking in Afghanistan, they would seek out Pakistani targets.
¶10. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy said that after the storming of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque)
in July 2007, the Pakistani government had tried to sever ties with insurgent
groups that its government institutions had cultivated over three decades. When
militants sought al-Qaida support and launched a wave of attacks against
Pakistani government and security personnel, Pakistan realized it had lost
control of these insurgent groups. Pakistan rapidly approached the various
militant groups to reach domestic non-aggression deals. Lavoy claimed that the
Pakistani Army’s current operations in the FATA’s Bajaur Agency are directed
exclusively against insurgent groups that refused to cooperate, while the
Haqqani network remains untouched and continues a policy of cross-border
attacks. Urging militant groups to be outwardly focused, he said, is perceived
by Pakistani officials as a method to safeguard internal security. In addition,
Pakistan has (probably correctly) assessed that it is only capable of targeting
several groups at a time, which leads to a policy of appeasement of other groups
in the meantime.
¶11. (S/REL NATO) Ongoing Pakistani Army operations in Bajaur Agency are missing
a counterinsurgency strategy to assist the population post-conflict, Lavoy said.
The army requires the population to flee, fights the remaining insurgents, then
uses air power to raze all structures associated with militants (tunnels, homes,
infrastructure, etc.). The most urgent need for humanitarian international
assistance to Pakistan is in Bajaur, where up to 300,000 residents have been
displaced. Pakistan needs to be able to repatriate these citizens and
effectively rebuild in the wake of operations. It is critical, Lavoy said, that
the Pakistani Army succeed in Bajaur Agency. There is a rapidly changing
perception in Pakistan’s military that coordination with ISAF is critically
important.
¶12. (S/REL NATO) Amidst the problems on the frontier, the Pakistani economy is
in tatters, Lavoy continued. The International Monetary Fund’s pledge of USD 6.7
billion will only address the immediate balance of payments crisis, but will not
alleviate under- or un-employment for over a third of the population Pakistan’s
population is becoming less and les educated, the country lacks sufficient
energy and clean water resources to serve its population, an there is minimal
foreign investment. Lavoy addd that despite pending economic catastrophe,
Pakstan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rae than any other country in
the world.
----------
IRAN’S ROLE
-----------
¶13. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy responded to PermReps’ questions about Iran during the
discussion. He said Iran calibrates its posture in Afghanistan. It provides
welcome development and social services assistance in western provinces and
generally acknowledges the Taliban as a long-term threat. However, it also
provides some lethal support to the Taliban, hedging bets that the Taliban might
prevail.
------------------------
POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNS
------------------------
¶14. (S/REL NATO) Moving to a more optimistic topic, Lavoy mentioned that
political signals from India may indicate a trend of toned-down rhetoric against
Pakistan. He said that although India believes without doubt that ISI supported
the Haqqani network in orchestrating the Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul that
killed over 40 people in July, Indian diplomats and politicians showed restraint
in public statements. According to Lavoy, political leaders also seem to realize
that India’s past tactic of using military pressure to influence Pakistani
government to reign in militants may no longer work, especially if insurgent
groups are operating against or independently of ISI. Despite this positive
political development, Lavoy said India could do more to assuage what one
PermRep called “Pakistani paranoia.” The Indian military continues “cold start”
exercises on the Kashmir border, confirming the Pakistanis’ worst suspicions, he
added. India would ideally move forces back from the border.
¶15. (S/REL NATO) On Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Lavoy characterized

Karzai’s relationship with Pakistani President Zardari as trustful and allied at
a political level. He pointed out that the Pakistani Army remains deeply
distrustful of the Afghan president - and of Zardari himself. Lavoy suggested
that Pakistan could benefit from creating a civilian-military national security
board, because politically progressive ideas on regional engagement with both
India and Afghanistan have not permeated the Pakistan military. Helping Pakistan
reorient its national defense policy away from India and toward
counterinsurgency, he said, could help refocus the Pakistani military to be more
successful.
--------------------
PERMREPS’ DISCUSSION
--------------------
¶16. (S/REL NATO) The Secretary General (SYG) thanked Dr. Lavoy for presenting
the “expose” on the regional situation in South Asia. Several PermReps noted
that “the feel-good factor of the briefing was pretty low,” and the report was
“chilling” and “unrelentingly gloomy.”
¶17. (S/REL NATO) Several PermReps were interested to know how the NIE affects
the ongoing National Security Council strategic review. Ambassador Volker
responded that the NIE forms a baseline analysis to inform USG officials as they
formulate and evaluate policy options and recommendations for the incoming
administration.
¶18. (S/NF) The Canadian PermRep agreed the importance of a vastly larger and
more competent ANA force, and proposed that up to 200,000 troops might be
necessary. The Belgian Ambassador proposed that NATO may need to prioritize ANA
training as ISAF’s number one priority in coming months (Note: Belgium stood in
the way last week of enabling the ANA Trust Fund to expand its mandate to accept
national contributions to sustain ANA troops. End note). Belgium added that
delegations will need help crafting messages for their capitals. He said that
parliaments could make generating resources for a long-term commitment even more
difficult if PermReps used the NIE assessment to imply we have little control
over many regional and systemic factors causing instability in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
¶19. (S/REL NATO) The Turkish PermRep said this briefing, while pessimistic in
tone, was timed perfectly, and urged the NAC to craft strong messages for the
SYG to deliver during an upcoming trip to Pakistan. He commented that in the
absence of effective Afghan government leadership, international efforts will
make little difference. The Polish PermRep said the report highlighted the
renewed importance of Pakistan to
NATO, and an urgent requirement for NATO to put added pressure on Pakistan.
--------------------
WHAT SHOULD NATO DO?
--------------------
¶20. (S/REL NATO) Ambassador Volker suggested three specific areas where NATO
could help improve the regional situation. He said the Alliance needed to ask
itself how it can better engage at the provincial and district level; how NATO
and ISAF should facilitate better contact among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
India; and whether it should encourage nations to commit resources to help
Pakistan deal with displaced people and repopulate the FATA post-conflict.
¶21. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy endorsed these ideas, and added that despite the
troubling picture in Afghanistan in 2008, Afghanistan is “winnable,” and the
international community can help Pakistan turn a corner. The formula is to
enhance security, exhibit good governance emanating from Kabul but active at the
district level, and empower the tribes to have a stake in development at the
lowest levels. These recommendations are logical extensions of the current
strategy but require reorganization of resources. He concluded:
-- NATO should consider shifting the ISAF center of gravity to the district
level. -- The international community needs to engage tribes without arming
them, and reinvigorate the traditional tribal system by instilling confidence in
the population. Securing the people will go a long way to improve their
willingness to resist the Taliban. -- The ANA needs to be stronger and is the
best tool. It will cost more resources and require more ingenuity. -- Anything
NATO can do (including strong messages the SYG can carry to Pakistan on an
upcoming trip) to encourage closer military-to-military cooperation would be
helpful. -- Elections are a critical event and must be successful. September is
the right time so that we have enough time to organize to secure the Pashtun
population. -- 2009 is the key year to influence Pakistan and Iran to halt
lethal assistance to the Taliban by showing Afghanistan’s neighbors that the
Taliban will not prevail. The international community should be relentless in
pressuring Pakistanis on this issue. -- The international community should put
intense pressure on the Taliban in 2009 in order to bring out their more violent
and ideologically radical tendencies. This will alienate the population and give
us an opportunity to separate the Taliban from the population. REID
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA34, BRAZIL,S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY--

STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT
Discussing cables
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TAGS: PREL MARR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY--STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT
REF: A. 08 SAO PAULO 268 B. 08 BRASILIA 175 BRASILIA 00000034 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason: 1.5 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
On December 18, President Lula signed the National Defense Strategy, concluding
a fifteen month drafting exercise. The document was principally drafted by
Minister for Strategic Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and it provides a
security policy framework that places defense in the context of the government,s
broader goal of national development. The strategy is built on the presumption
that it is in Brazil,s interest to be "independent," that is able to project its
military power as it wishes, able to produce its own military hardware and able
to control strategic economic sectors, including space, cybernetics and nuclear
power. Much of the document focuses on the future roles and structures for
Brazil,s armed forces -- including updating equipment, promoting deployability
and enhancing peacekeeping capabilities. It also devotes considerable space to
issues such as nuclear energy, reducing imports and national civilian service
that are only indirectly related to how Brazil,s armed forces will defend the
country, but are crucial when defense is viewed in the context of a vision of a
broader strategy for Brazil,s development into a world power. By linking reform
of the security sector with the government,s broader development vision, the
strategy places the military, for the first time since the end of military rule
in 1985, into a prominent place on the national agenda and strengthens its case
for increased resources. Comments on the strategy,s provisions for the Brazilian
military will be reported septel. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
¶2. (SBU) On September 7 (Brazilian Independence Day) 2007, President Lula

tasked Minister for Strategic Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger to produce a
National Defense Strategy paper within one year. Although Unger announced he had
completed work on September 7, 2008, the new strategy was not signed by
President Lula and published until December 18, reportedly because of concerns
from the armed services that their inputs were not incorporated. The resulting
document clearly includes many service priorities, especially in the area of
equipment modernization, but the main focus of the document is less to outline
future roles and structures for the military than to provide a context for the
role of the defense sector in the Brazilian state. The Defense Strategy is
available online via the MOD website: www.defesa.gov.br/eventos temporarios/2008
/estrategia defesa nacional.pdf in Portuguese. An English version will be
transmitted to Washington agencies when available.
¶3. (C) The Defense Strategy as approved by the government and signed by the
President reflects the government,s overall priority: Brazil,s "development"
into a modern world power and sets conditions for the Defense sector,s role in
this development. In creating this strategy for the defense sector to contribute
to development, Unger goes beyond a normal plan for restructuring the security
sector to meet anticipated challenges and cites two other "axes" for work:
strengthening defense industry and maintaining required military service in the
context of a national service obligation. In the three main areas of the
strategy (military reform, defense industry and national service), the document
underlines the importance of acquiring control of the latest technology and of
enhancing the role of the central government.
INDEPENDENCE ------------
¶4. (C) The strategy for defense and development is built around the concept of
"independence." In the government,s vision, Brazil should be able to control its
own security and not have to go outside its own borders in order to equip its
security forces. The strategy allows for "strategic partners," but these are
seen as countries willing to transfer to Brazil technologies that will make
Brazil more independent, not as collaborators in security operations. Similarly,
where Brazil currently does not have the capability to produce defense
equipment, it should, according to the document, seek to purchase the
appropriate articles from foreign suppliers, but with the aim of allowing for
domestic production. This point is clearly illustrated by the prescriptive
language on acquisition of modern fighter aircraft which rejects the "extreme
solution" of simply buying foreign-made planes and calls for the Air Force to
either 1) purchase aircraft of which Brazil can then produce its own upgraded
variant, or 2) purchase a minimal number of foreign planes which then can be
augmented by domestic production of the same model.
COMMENT: Given the relatively small number of aircraft to be ultimately acquired

by the Air Force, neither option makes economic sense, but Unger places a
greater importance on "independence" than military capability or efficient use
of resources. END COMMENT.
¶5. (C) The strategy also repeatedly cites three sectors as being of critical
importance for the independent development of the Brazilian state: space,
cybernetics and nuclear, calling for Brazil to "control" these technologies. The
strategy calls for enhanced Brazilian space launch capacity, satellite
monitoring and surveillance and for Brazil to deploy its own GPS-type system.
Cybernetics is listed as important for communications and information
processing. Although, the strategy document acknowledges that as a member of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil will not have nuclear weapons, it then
states that for this reason, Brazil must therefore pursue nuclear power
development as an element of security that is important for Brazil,s
development. This stated connection to defense of the country serves as
justification for inclusion of nuclear power as a strategic industry, albeit one
whose importance is more relevant to development than security. (NOTE: Nuclear
energy is, in fact, one of the strategic industries enumerated in GOB,s latest
Industrial Policy, published in May - see ref c. The other Industrial Policy
strategic sectors are defense industry, information technology, nanotechnology,
biotechnology, and healthcare industry.)
MILITARY RESTRUCTURING ----------------------
¶6. (C) The heart of the defense strategy is its plan for the restructuring of
the Brazilian military. Specific comments on plans for each service and the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) will be reported septel. Much of the restructuring
strategy was contributed by the services and provides practical answers to key
strategic questions about how Brazil will see to its own security over the next
generation. Among the conclusions are that Brazil must focus on the three key
areas of monitoring/controlling large areas, strategic mobility and military
presence to provide security. These areas contribute to the services,
requirements for airlift, better communications, satellite reconnaissance and
maritime domain awareness. The strategy notes the necessity of developing better
joint service cooperation and the capabilities to conduct joint operations and
the need for a professional civil service component in the Defense Ministry.
There is also a clear understanding that a country with pretensions to world
power status will be asked to make greater contributions to United Nations
peacekeeping operations. (Brazil currently ranks just below Uruguay in regional
UNPKO participation.) The strategy therefore recognizes that as Brazilian
capabilities increase, so should peacekeeping deployments.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY ----------------
¶7. (SBU) The strategy paper,s most important goal for defense industry is to
use the need to modernize the armed forces to acquire new technologies with
applications for national development. To do so, the Government of Brazil is
encouraged to offer tax incentives and legal benefits to these industries (tax
and financing benefits are already provided under the May 2008 Industrial
Policy). Unger also clearly states that commercial considerations, i.e.
increased trade, must be considered subordinate to the country,s "strategic
interest." Therefore, efficient use of resources and deployment of effective
military capabilities are less important than stimulating domestic defense
industries which are optimistically viewed as having future export potential.
According to the strategy, industrial partnerships with non-Brazilian entities
are advantageous as a means to reduce dependence on foreign purchase -- when
the main role in the partnership is played by the Brazilian side.
¶8. (SBU) In exchange for support for the growth of defense industries, the
strategy proposes that the central government gain "special powers" over such
industries, including through so-called "golden share" arrangements - government
vetoes over designated corporate actions. Several press reports carried the
story that the MOD would be seeking special taxes on private businesses that are
perceived as benefiting from security (e.g. Petrobras) to pay the costs of their
defense, but such a proposal is not included in the final document.
NATIONAL SERVICE ----------------
¶9. (C) The strategy states that "the basis of national defense is the
identification of the nation with the armed forces and the armed forces with the
nation." For this reason, mandatory military service is viewed as essential for
the future. The strategy states explicitly that the armed forces must "limit and
reverse the tendency to lower the proportion of draftees and raise the
proportion of professionals." Consistent with the overall goal of encouraging
the Brazilian government,s vision of national development, military service is
viewed primarily as a means of unifying the population and fostering greater
social equality. The strategy document states specifically that its objectives
include forcing higher socio-economic classes to provide a larger proportion of
military draftees and opening more places in military academies to students from
more diverse backgrounds.
¶10. (C) The means by which the strategy plans to democratize the armed forces
will be a new form of national service. All young people will have to be
available to the military which would be able to select the best qualified as
its recruits. Everyone else would go into a "civil service" which would receive
basic military training and be available for mobilization in the case of a
national emergency of some sort. The strategy does not, however, provide any
information as to what sort of national emergency would require the mobilization
of potentially millions of poorly trained young Brazilians or how the basic
training of about three million civil service members per year will be managed
by the limited number of military professionals available.
REGIONAL FOCUS --------------
¶11. (C) One of the most notable elements of the strategy has been the focus on
the defense of the Amazon region. While the document notes that this region
faces ongoing security challenges from uncontrolled borders and potential
instability in neighboring states, it also indulges in the traditional Brazilian
paranoia concerning the activities of non-governmental organizations and other
shadowy foreign forces that are popularly perceived as potential threats to
Brazil,s sovereignty. The strategy calls for greater use of mobility and
monitoring technology to improve security in the Amazon region and for the
shifting of forces north as needed to improve security there.
¶12. (C) The strategy also calls for improved defense relations with other South
American states, especially through the development of the South American
Defense Council, although it notes that a main purpose of the council will be to
enhance Brazil,s defense industrial base through exports to its neighbors. The
strategy concedes that Brazil will require greater capacity for participation in
international peacekeeping, although increasing Brazil,s deployments should be
linked to restructuring of international organizations to give developing
countries more important roles in their leadership.
COMMENTS --------
¶13. (C) The first sentence of the strategy portion of the document reads:
"National defense strategy is inseparable from national development strategy."
This point is key for understanding the document,s purpose and why it was tasked
to the Ministry of Strategic Planning and not the Defense Ministry. Not a
defense strategy per se, the strategy is a set of ideas for how Brazil,s
military, defense industry and national service can contribute to the goal of
development. Nowhere in the strategy is the goal of development defined, but it
seems to point toward a generally understood vision of Brazil as a major world
power (with a UN Security Council seat), with strong state institutions and
without threats to its security -- a situation described as "Brazil,s proper
place." By linking reform of the security sector with the government,s broader
development vision, the strategy places the military, for the first time since
the end of military rule in 1985, into a prominent place on the national agenda
and strengthens its case for increased resources.
¶14. (C) While the restructuring plans generally are consistent with the goal of
a modern, more capable military, (leaving aside such politically popular white
elephants as a nuclear powered submarine), the strategy document is silent on
how resources will be found to cover the costs of expensive new hardware
including aircraft carriers, satellite constellations and fighter production.
Even ballpark estimates by embassy staff of possible modernization costs are far
in excess of current defense budgets. The defense strategy as a whole is in some
measure designed to address this question by linking defense to overall
development goals, but it is likely that defense expenditures will not be
increased to the degree required to fulfill the shorter term goal of equipping
the armed forces with cutting edge technology produced in Brazil.
¶15. (C) The other two "axes," defense industry and national service, have less
to do with improving the military than with integrating national security with
national development. Some of the specific proposals in these areas (e.g.,
propping up inefficient industries, increasing conscription) actually could
reduce the effectiveness of the military and divert resources from
modernization. The emphasis on societal benefits over professionalism in
military service is consistent with the views of a President and other
government leaders who started in politics under the military government of the
1970s and 80s and want to ensure that the military,s capacity to become involved
in politics remains circumscribed. The socialist background of Lula,s Workers,
Party is clearly evident in the efforts at social engineering through mandatory
national service at the cost of more effective defense.
¶16. (C) Perhaps the most significant Brazilian comment on the defense strategy
has been the lack of comment. Most of the coverage in the Brazilian press relied
on official press releases, in some cases, for example reporting inaccurately
that the strategy would include the possible taxing of private business to pay
for defense. Other coverage focused on a few headlines, including the
construction of a nuclear submarine, possible redeployments of forces to the
Amazon and protection of maritime oil fields. This may have been, in part, a
reflection of the timing of the release as most Brazilians were heading away for
the holidays. Embassy contacts do not seem to have read the document and regard
it as a summation of already-known government views on defense. The document,s
legal status is also unclear. By signing, President Lula seems to have adopted
it as national policy, but as many of the recommendations are non-concrete and
would require further action to develop, it remains to be seen how much will be
implemented. While Lula seems to pay attention to what Unger has to say, the
degree to which the strategy,s recommendations are implemented will be
a good barometer of the Minister for Strategic Planning,s real influence.
¶17. (C) Even if some of the more grandiose plans (nuclear submarines, universal
military service) are never realized, there remains a great deal that Brazil can
do consistent with the new defense strategy that will help it develop a more
capable modern military. Focusing on deployability and using technology to help
monitor the northern regions of the country are the optimal solutions to
Brazil,s strategic problem of controlling a vast, unpopulated territory. These
plans create opportunities for U.S. business to partner with Brazilian
counterparts and for the U.S. armed forces to engage in increased cooperation as
Brazil,s military seeks to modernize (See ref b). We should, however, expect
that engagement with Brazil will increase only gradually, particularly while the
current government is in power. The strategy document looks at strategic
partnerships primarily in terms of defense trade and technology transfer, but we
should seek to open up the concept to include real security cooperation in areas
of mutual interest. Such cooperation, however, must be gauged to be consistent
with the Brazilian government,s vision of defense as a means of national
development. SOBEL
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA35, BRAZIL,S DEFENSE STRATEGY --

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
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TAGS: BR PREL MARR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S DEFENSE STRATEGY -- MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
REF: A. BRASILIA 34 B. 08 BRASILIA 93

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reason: 1.5 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ref a reported on the strategic aspects of Brazil,s new Defense
Strategy document, signed by President Lula on December 18. While the main
purpose of the strategy as written by the Minister for Strategic Planning, was
to place Brazil,s military and defense sector in the framework of a broader
vision of national development (reported in ref a), the document also contains
policy guidance for the Defense Ministry and the three services that give a
clearer view of how Defense Minister Jobim and senior military leaders see these
institutions developing over the next generation -- into a more flexible, modern
force with joint operational capabilities. The restructuring of the Brazilian
military can be seen as a compromise between setting conditions for a its role
in a broader plan for national development and the goal of having a modern,
effective military. After more than twenty years outside the political
mainstream, and twenty years of minimal resources, the Brazilian military is now
making a case for its modernization. As it does so, opportunities will exist for
improving the U.S.-Brazil security partnership. END SUMMARY.
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE -------------------
¶2. (SBU) In its nine-year history, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense has been
under resourced and has had difficulty in providing effective civilian control
over the armed forces. The Defense Strategy seeks to ameliorate this situation
by calling for the employment of better-prepared civilian Ministry officials in
place of some of the military personnel who now predominate. The Ministry will
have the lead on developing implementing arrangements for the Defense Strategy
and is tasked with issuing instructions for the activities of the Armed Forces
during peacetime. The Strategy also recognizes the importance of the Armed
Forces becoming more "joint" in their operational capabilities and tasks the
Ministry with encouraging more inter-service cooperation. As noted in ref a,
sources in the Defense Ministry and Ministry for External Affairs told Embassy
personnel that a principal reason for the delay in final approval of the
strategy was to ensure inclusion of the services, comments. As the section on
each service differs markedly in terms of focus and style from the others, it is
likely that the interagency agreement reached to allow the strategy document to
go forward was to add in services, submissions to the document. The chapters on
the services all seek to make a case for increased resources and modernized
equipment but are not always successful at spelling out the strategic vision for
the potential security threats or contingencies to which many of the desired
upgrades would respond.
NAVY ----
¶3. (C) The Navy is tasked with control of the seas and rivers and denying their
use to potential adversaries. Its main tasks will be defense of oil facilities
and ports and assistance against transnational criminals. COMMENT: There is,
however, no information as to what possible threats to oil facilities the Navy
may be asked to counter, making it difficult, for example to evaluate the
strategy,s assertion that a nuclear submarine would be necessary to meet the
goal of protecting such facilities. END COMMENT. The strategy does recommend
increased Navy capabilities in two key areas: control of the rivers and power
projection in support of peacekeeping. Noting that lack of effective control of
the Amazon and Parana river systems undermines stability, the Navy will seek
more brown water assets, including patrol vessels and better reconnaissance
capability. While Brazil,s current peacekeeping effort is focused on Haiti,
there is an acknowledgement that Brazil will have to take a great share of the
global burden and should be able to deploy and support peacekeepers out of its
immediate region.
¶4. (C) The Navy,s wish list for equipment includes the expected nuclear powered
submarines. (See ref b for discussion.) The Navy also seeks patrol craft and air
patrol capabilities that will be important to effective monitoring of coasts and
river systems. Naval aviation is set to BRASILIA 00000035 002 OF 003 improve
through acquisition of aircraft and aircraft carriers, although the strategy
specifies that any naval aircraft should be produced in Brazil. Finally, the
Navy is charged with improving its search and rescue capabilities, including the
potential for international cooperation.
ARMY ----
¶5. (C) The Army,s strategic instructions focus on restructuring to make the
force more mobile and able to engage in non-traditional conflicts. To this end,
the Army plans to shift to a brigade model in order to have more deployable
units available. These "rapid action forces" are intended to give commanders the
ability to react to crises in remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities
that can be tailored to the situation. In support of such missions, the Army,s
acquisition priorities will be improved reconnaissance and communications,
helicopters, night vision and fire control technology. 6. (C) While mentioned
prominently elsewhere in the Defense Strategy, the Army chapter does not, unlike
the other services, raise the possibility of additional peacekeeping operations
as a future mission, possibly a reflection of the Army,s frustration with the
lack of an exit strategy in Haiti. The Army,s planning is also silent on the
major new task it will have in training up to three million potential reservists
per year should the strategy,s national service provisions be fully implemented.
AIR FORCE ---------
¶7. (C) Apart from the highly prescriptive section on fighter procurement
discussed in ref a, the Air Force chapter focuses on how to meet challenges in
joint operations, reconnaissance and communications. The Air Force,s highest
priority, aside from new fighters, will be on acquiring more airlift capability
so that one of the Army,s new brigades can be deployed rapidly at any time.
Other priorities include UAVs and improved satellite capability, particularly
through indigenous space launch. These priorities are underlined by a clear
directive to favor domestic industry where possible. The capability to build
aircraft (including UAVs and space launch vehicles) in Brazil is considered "so
important as to transcend discussions of equipment," a policy of sacrificing
capability in favor of domestic production.
COMMENTS --------
¶8. (C) As with the rest of the Defense Strategy, the sections on restructuring
of the Brazilian military are a compromise between setting conditions for a
military role in a broader plan for national development and the goal of having
a modern, effective military. After more than twenty years outside the political
mainstream, and twenty years of minimal resources, the Brazilian military is now
making a case for its modernization. Making the case, however, means that the
Defense Strategy must observe the conventional wisdom of Brazilian politics.
There is no threat, for example, to Brazil,s maritime oil deposits, but
Brazilian leaders and media have routinely cited oil discoveries off the coast
as an urgent reason for better maritime security. This concern has been merged
with Brazil,s twenty year quest to develop a nuclear submarine to give new
impetus to research on a small reactor for naval propulsion. While the Army
chapter of the strategy includes the seemingly mandatory caution about being
prepared to protect Brazil,s sovereignty against a country or group of countries
acting "on pretext of the supposed interests of humanity," it remains primarily
focused on more realistic security challenges. The political preoccupation with
imagined threats to sovereignty in the Amazon, however, serves the practical
purpose of tasking the military with developing greater capabilities to project
power into the region most likely to be affected by instability in neighboring
countries.
¶9. (C) A Brazilian military that is more capable and deployable can support
U.S. interests by exporting stability in Latin America and be available for
peacekeeping elsewhere. The plans by the Brazilian services, as evidenced in
those parts of the defense strategy likely contributed by the services, are
consistent with this interest, and, if implemented, will lead to Brazil
becoming a more effective security partner. There are however, serious questions
as to how much of these plans will see follow through, particularly with other
supposed strategic priorities, including national service, nuclear submarines
and government support to non-competitive defense industries, providing black
holes to suck in all available resources. SOBEL
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA93, BRAZIL'S LULA OFFERS BOLIVIA'S

MORALES TREATMENT FOR TUMOR
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TAGS: PREL PINR BO BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S LULA OFFERS BOLIVIA'S MORALES TREATMENT FOR TUMOR
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) In a conversation with Ambassador Sobel following the January 15, 2009
La Paz meeting between Brazilian President Lula and Bolivian President Morales,
Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) confirmed an earlier rumor
that Morales is suffering from a serious sinus tumor. Jobim told the Ambassador
that Lula had offered Morales an examination and treatment at a Sao Paulo
hospital. Although there have been been public reports that Morales needs
surgery for "acute sinusitis," and related otitis and headaches, according to
Jobim his problems in fact are caused by a serious tumor and the surgery will be
an effort to remove it. Treatment has been put off, however, until after the
constitutional referendum scheduled for January 25. Jobim, who attended the
meeting between Lula and Morales, commented that the tumor might explain why
Morales has seemed unfocussed and not his usual self at this and other recent
meetings. SOBEL
Viewing cable 09CARACAS26, VENEZUELAN SCIENTISTS SAY NUCLEAR
ENERGY PROGRAM
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SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN SCIENTISTS SAY NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM
POLITICAL HOT AIR
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4

(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In late 2008, Chavez once again made

statements regarding his plans to develop a nuclear power
program in Venezuela and went so far as to sign an agreement
with Russia's Rosatom on nuclear energy cooperation. Several
local nuclear physicists are skeptical arguing that nothing
came of the Venezuelan government's interest in nuclear power
in the 70's and nothing will come of it today. The
scientists argued the government has demonstrated little
interest in domestic nuclear research and the result has been
antiquated labs with only a handful of Venezuelan experts in
the field. Nevertheless, they did not discount the Chavez
Government's willingness to purchase a nuclear power plant
lock, stock and barrel from Russia if it could get the
financing, although they believe this unlikely given
Venezuela's looming economic crisis. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- --
RUSSIAN CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR PLANTS UNLIKELY
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) In November 2008, Chavez trumpeted that he had high

hopes for a nuclear reactor constructed with Russian
technology in the Venezuelan state of Zulia to be called the
"Huberto Fernandez Moran Nuclear Complex". On December 2,
Econoffs met with three scientists from Venezuela's only
fully functional nuclear physics research lab at public
University Simon Bolivar (USB). XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly
protect throughout,) noted Chavez' recent statements on
nuclear power were reminiscent of those he made in 2005.
XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that if Russia would offer Venezuela
enough credit for plant construction, Venezuela would be
happy to accept. XXXXXXXXXXXX, who after the
meeting identified himself as a Russian-educated scientist of
Cuban origin, added that the Russians are fully capable of
building adequate plants but they would take five to eight
years to complete and would cost billions of dollars. (Note:
Although the Director General of Rosatom State Nuclear
Energy Corporation signed an agreement to cooperate with
Venezuela on nuclear energy on November 26, international
press reports on December 8 indicated no Russian loans or
credits will be forthcoming for costly nuclear power projects
in part due to Venezuela's uncertain financial future. End
Note.)
--------------------------------------------- --------
VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT NOT SERIOUS ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶3. (C) The second in command at the lab, XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect
throughout,) said he has "heard this talk before in the 70's" when the
government
was much more serious about developing a nuclear power
program and even went so far as to identify several potential
sites for hypothetical reactors. XXXXXXXXXXXX was adamant that
"nothing came of it then, and nothing will come of it now."
There is only sporadic interest in nuclear power in
Venezuela, which, he noted, is rational given that Venezuela
is a petroleum rich state.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that behind every nuclear power

project is a team of strong scientists. Unfortunately, he
said, Venezuelan politicians are not talking to the
scientists. He agreed that the current discussion of
developing a domestic nuclear energy program in Venezuela is
only talk, as there are no serious scientists involved and no
project is underway. Even if the government of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) were serious, he
said, it would take 10 to 15 years to make substantial
progress towards developing a nuclear energy program using
domestic resources.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that his lab at USB has the most
domestic expertise and would be the most likely talent pool
if the GBRV was in the market for government advisors or
program heads. He added that the GBRV had recently
approached him about serving as a government advisor on
nuclear power, but he had declined citing his workload.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he hopes the government will tap the USB lab at
CARACAS 00000026 002 OF 003
some point to spearhead nuclear power research, with the

accompanying funding, as he agrees with President Chavez on
Venezuela's need to diversify its energy sources. He noted
that his scientists are currently collaborating with the
National Experimental Politech University of the Bolivarian
Armed Forces, UNEFA, on developing a course, as the military
seems to have a new interest in giving its cadets a nuclear
physics background. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX is hopeful this
collaboration might translate into more funding for his lab,
which currently looks more like a museum than a functioning
research center. End Note.)
--------------------------------------------- -
BARRIERS TO DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (C) The scientists argued that the GBRV's failure to

support serious nuclear research has resulted in antiquated
labs, restrictive policies that inhibit academic research,
and a dearth of experts in the field. They also noted lack
of uranium as another limiting factor. In May 2005 when
Chavez announced his plans to start a nuclear energy program,
media reports at that time indicated that according to
government research in the 70's, there might be three
substantial uranium deposits in Venezuela. XXXXXXXXXXXX, however,
was firm in his assertion that Venezuela has little uranium.
His friend, respected Venezuelan geologist, often jokes with
him that "yes there is a uranium mine, but no one knows where
it is." XXXXXXXXXXXX added that Venezuela has thorium which can
be mixed with other radioactive materials and might someday
replace uranium in nuclear reactions.
¶7. (C) In addition to a lack of natural resources, XXXXXXXXXXXX said

there is also a severe deficiency in "manpower". He claimed
that all of the scientists in Venezuela capable of running or
even assisting with a nuclear power program were in the room.
(Three scientists were present). He said he knew perhaps
130 former students that had the academic credentials, but
almost all of them were "either selling shoes or building
shopping malls." He said the USB lab is now focusing more on
health diagnostics as there is a commercial interest in such
research.
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also implied he was not impressed with the
quality of the government's staff in the sector. XXXXXXXXXXXX is his
former student. XXXXXXXXXXXX. While
the Directorate has its own lab, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he has personally
verified that none of its equipment works. He noted that the
Directorate is a purely bureaucratic operation where
scientists do not conduct research but rather attend numerous
conferences abroad. When work needs done, the Directorate
will occasionally bring in experts and contract out research
projects. As an additional example of the government's
failures in the sector, he cited Venezuela's sole, and now
defunct, reactor at the GBRV's Venezuelan Institute for
Scientific Research (IVIC). USB, he said, carried off pieces
of the 1950's era reactor several years ago for student
experiments.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX finished his list of serious challenges facing

the development of a Venezuelan nuclear power program by
complaining about his inability to get permission from the
USG to obtain equipment or even data from the US. He said
the Venezuelan government is even more difficult to work with
as it will not give him licenses to import any radioactive
material. XXXXXXXXXXXX has consequently taken to bringing in
undeclared material in his pocket. He stated he flew in with
a "source" from California in this manner even though the
University warned him he could end up in jail. He ignored
the warning saying the Venezuelan government does not seem to
be particularly interested in the fact that all of the
radioactive material in the USB lab is currently illegal
under Venezuelan law. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that anything students
or professors do with the radioactive material is also
illegal. After 20 years of his best efforts, XXXXXXXXXXXX has yet
to get GBRV approval for radioactive material handling
regulations he wrote himself based on manuals he obtained
from the Imperial College of London and a US university. In
another "illegal" practice, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that his scientists
regularly go scavenging for radium from old Venezuelan
hospitals that they store on the USB campus.
CARACAS 00000026 003 OF 003
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (C) In spite of Chavez' grand public statements, the

academic community believes the GBRV continues to demonstrate
that it is uninterested in, or unable to develop a domestic
nuclear energy program. It has instead hamstrung the efforts
of the handful of its scientists with an interest in the
area. Scientists seem inclined to agree with a member of
Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission who in 2005 was
quoted as saying "on a scale of zero to five, nuclear power
development within Venezuela does not reach one. It is not
only behind Brazil and Argentina, it is also behind Chile,
Mexico and Peru." Nevertheless, the USB scientists seemed
confident that if Venezuela one day finds a country willing
to sell its technology on credit, however unlikely given
Venezuela's looming financial trouble, the GBRV would be more
than willing to buy. Regardless of whether or not nuclear
power plants make sense in a petroleum rich country, high
profile projects that give the rest of the world cause for
concern hold a certain appeal for Chavez.
GENNATIEMPO
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD10, PRESERVING INFORMATION SHARING
Discussing cables
O 031247Z JAN 09
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
EO 12958 DECL: 01/03/2034

TAGS PREL, PTER, PK, IN
SUBJECT: PRESERVING INFORMATION SHARING
REF: A. NEW DELHI 10 B. FBI //1314/01907/366/0013//
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Post notes with some concern the report (Ref A) that the GOI Ministry of
External Affairs plans to release information from its investigation into the
Mumbai attacks next week to all countries that lost citizens and “that therefore
any information sharing will be overtaken by events.” Ref A says a sanitized
version will be released and “widely disseminated.”
¶2. (S) We believe it is premature for the Indians to be considering a broad

dissemination of information on the attack until the investigation has been
completed. In this regard, we note that the FBI has just presented a long list
of information it is still seeking from the Indians to advance its own
investigation. Most importantly, we believe there are still Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) sleeper and other cells in India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well
as many law enforcement leads which need to be pursued. To prevent another
potential attack, we need to keep channels of cooperation and information
sharing open. We are concerned that the Indians’ premature public dissemination
of this information will undermine essential law enforcement efforts and
forestall further Indo-Pak cooperation. Our goal is not only to bring the
perpetrators of this attack to justice, but also to begin a dialogue that will
reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.
3 (S) ISI Director General Pasha has just approved the sharing of tearline
information on Pakistan’s investigation with Indian intelligence, after
assurances from CIA that information would be tightly held in intelligence
channels only. Gaining GOP approval for this release was a significant step
forward for the Pakistanis. But as Ref A notes, “the question of information
sharing may be overtaken by events.” If Pasha is embarrassed by what is
essentially public dissemination without the Indians providing the results of
their own investigation to Pakistan, it will undercut Pakistan’s ability to
pursue its investigation, generate a public backlash in Pakistan, and could
undermine Pasha personally.
¶3. (S) Therefore, we believe Department should urge the GOI to delay the
release of information about their investigation until intelligence and law
enforcement sharing with the GOP (and with us) has been able to move forward.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD24, ZARDARI COMMENTS ON

INDIA/NAWAZ SHARIF
Discussing cables
P 051311Z JAN 09
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2034
SUBJECT: ZARDARI COMMENTS ON INDIA/NAWAZ SHARIF
¶1. (S) Summary: President Zardari told the Ambassador January 2 he would have
no choice but to respond militarily to an Indian attack. There was no more
politically sensitive issue in Pakistan than Kashmir, he said. Zardari had been
briefed by ISI Director General, LTG Pasha, on his meeting with the DCIA in
Washington, and he had concurred in the release of the “tearline” information to
be passed to the Indians. Zardari also discussed his increasing frustration with
Nawaz Sharif’s government in the Punjab, whom he believed had tipped off Jamaat
ul-Dawa (JUD) about the assets freeze ordered by the federal government. Zardari
discussed his concern about relations with India and his conviction that he (and
Chief of Army Staff General Kayani) represented the best hope for better
relations with India. Zardari needs additional resources for the police,
particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP), and he was looking forward to his upcoming trip to
Afghanistan. End summary.
¶2. (S) Ambassador called on President Zardari January 2 to discuss follow-up to
the Mumbai investigation. Zardari said he had been briefed by Lt. General Pasha
on his meeting with DCIA, and he had approved the release of “tearline”
information to the Indians. He wanted to emphasize he (and General Kayani) were
fully committed to better relations with India. He reminded the Ambassador that
it had only taken a “phone call” from the U.S. to ensure that Pakistan did not
oppose the U.S./India civil nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Zardari
emphasized he had no problem making decisions, recalling that we had asked him
to refuse the release of detainees in the context of “peace deals” when the Army
and ISI were pressing to do so. But he said there was no way that he could let
India attack Pakistan: many in the West did not understand the importance of
Kashmir in Pakistani public opinion.
¶3. (C) Zardari indicated clearly that he was disinclined to repeal with 17th
amendment (which gives the President the power to appoint the service chiefs,
judges, and the Election Commissioner.) He justified this on the grounds that
the initiative had to come from parliament. (Nawaz Sharif lately has been
pressing Zardari to fulfill his electoral commitment to repeal this amendment,
which codified Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order.)
¶4. (S) Zardari said that he was increasingly losing patience with Nawaz
Sharif’s government in the Punjab, and he believed that a confrontation was
looming. He said that Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz Chief Minister Shabbaz
Sharif had tipped off the JUD about the UNSCR 1267 mandated asset freeze,
resulting in almost empty bank accounts. (Information from MOI does indicate
that bank accounts contained surprisingly small amounts.) Zardari suggested
Lahore Principal Officer might mediate between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
Governor and Shabbaz Sharif who increasingly are publicly at odds. Ambassador
noted that his government had been “holding over Nawaz’s head” the Supreme
Court’s decision on Nawaz’s eligibility to run for office. Zardari replied,
“yes, but it doesn’t seem to be doing much good anymore.” Zardari dismissed
Nawaz’s ability to bring crowds into the street in the Punjab if his party was
removed from the Punjab government.
¶5. (S) Ambassador and Zardari discussed U.S. assistance issues, particularly in
regard to upcoming visits of A/S Boucher and CODEL Reed. As usual, Zardari asked
for additional support, particularly to fund additional police in FATA and NWFP,
which could hold territory after the army and the Frontier Corps moved out. He
said that he needed 100,000 police in each province. (There are now 48,000
police in NWFP.) And he needed equipment quickly. He said that he was going to
ask us to reprogram some of our funding, since “without security, none of the
other programs matter.”
¶6. (S) Zardari confirmed again at the end of the conversation that Pakistan
would not allow non-state actors to dictate state policy, but that the GOP would
respond if the Indians attacked. He recommended a report done in India which
indicated that Indian Muslims are treated poorly and are among the least
prosperous members of society. He said that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was
trying to whip up anti-Muslim sentiment. Morever, there were plenty of extremist
groups in India that could have assisted Lashkar-e-Taiba.
¶7. (C) Ambassador asked about Swat. He said flatly they did not have the troops
to hold it. Ambassador asked the status of Asfandyar Wali Khan, the head of
Awami National Party, who was ostensibly in charge of the NWFP government.
Zardari just rolled his eyes.
¶8. (S) Zardari said his trip to Afghanistan had been rescheduled for January 7.
He laughed about the rumors that civilian military struggles in Pakistan had
prompted the delay. In truth, he said, he did not like to fly in bad weather,
and he was worried about security. Ambassador had asked Interior Minister Rehman
Malik several times about the status of Brahamdagh Bugti who is in exile in
Afghanistan. (Readers will recall that the status of Mr. Bugti was a major
bilateral irritant between Afghanistan and the Musharraf government, since
Musharraf wanted Bugti “deported” to Pakistan by Karzai to “face justice” for
participation in separatist activities.) Zardari said he was going to ask Karzai
to keep him in Afghanistan: Bugti was now involved in conflicts for supremacy in
his tribe. Zardari said that government was drafting legislation to give the
Balochis more autonomy and political control.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD155, CENTCOM GENERAL PETRAEUS
MEETS WITH PAKISTAN COAS
Discussing cables
2009-01-24
12:12
VZCZCXRO4323
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0155/01 0241228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241228Z JAN 09
INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 0919
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 6641
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 5519
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/23/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MAR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: CENTCOM GENERAL PETRAEUS MEETS WITH PAKISTAN COAS
KAYANI
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary: (C) In a January 20 meeting with U.S. CENTCOM Commander General David
Petraeus, Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani reiterated his
need for support and asked for changes in the Coalition Support Fund process to
allow for more rapid reimbursement. Kayani repeated his concerns about
Pakistan’s IDP situation, which was undermining military operations, and
described candidly the deterioration in Swat and his ongoing operations in
Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. Kayani repeatedly expressed concern about the
inability of the GOP to “hold and build,” which General Petraeus described as
the “always unsuccessful clear and leave” strategy. Kayani said he was going to
exercise restraint with India, but would respond to an Indian attack. General
Petraeus raised the likelihood of an alternative shipment route for NATO through
central Asia, stressed the continued need for the route through Khyber, and
expressed appreciation for increased cooperation on the border with ISAF forces.
General Petraeus indicated that he thought increased measures to control
population movements would have to be put in place and assured Kayani of his
commitment to support Pakistan military development. Petraeus made clear that
the Pakistan military needed to focus on the extremists on the western border,
instead of the Indian threat. End summary.
¶1. (C) U.S. CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, accompanied by the
Ambassador, J5 Major General Robert Allardice and POLAD Michael Gfoeller, met
with Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani on January
20. Kayani was accompanied by his Director General Military Operations, Major
General Javed Iqbal, his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad Mustafa
Khan, and his Senior Aide, Brigadier Zubeir.
Musharraf’s Situation
---------------------
¶2. (C) In opening remarks regarding General Kayani,s likely move into the
official COAS residence, Kayani observed that former President Musharraf,s
situation seemed to be fine, even though he had been concerned earlier about
Zardari,s failure to grant amnesty to Musharraf. Kayani observed that amnesty
should have been granted immediately when Zardari assumed office, but it seemed
as if the situation had settled down and he was no longer as concerned about
President Musharraf,s legal situation. (Comment: Former President Musharraf is
visiting his family in the U.S. and also undertaking speaking engagements. The
construction of Musharraf’s house near Islamabad is well advanced, so he may be
able to move out of the COAS house in the next few weeks. End Comment)
Coalition Support Funds

-----------------------
¶3. (C) Kayani spoke candidly about the process of reimbursement of Coalition
Support Funds (CSF). He said it was important to avoid the impression that the
Pakistan military is “for hire.” Still, the military had little incentive to
provide the copious documentation, since only 40 percent of the money had been
returned to military coffers in the past. Kayani said the money had mostly
supported the federal government’s budget. The typical breakdown had been about
60 percent to the federal government, 40 percent to the military, but President
Zardari had told him recently that the entire amount would be reimbursed to the
military. Kayani suggested that the CSF reimbursement amount “mirror” the system
used for the UN’s reimbursement of peacekeeping expenses or establish a base
period and estimate the increase in military activity from that base. Petraeus
indicated that he believed that the prospects for the “Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act” also known as the Biden-Lugar legislation, which would provide
$1.5 billion for development activities, were positive, and there were plans
underway to fund Pakistan,s military needs.
IDPs: Humanitarian and Strategic Issue

--------------------------------------
ISLAMABAD 00000155 002 OF 003
¶4. (C) Kayani explained that his military budget had been flat lined, and
therefore had dropped sharply in real terms; military spending now represented
only 16 percent of the government’s budget. He said the Pakistan military needed
basic equipment like helmets, protective gear, and personnel carriers. Kayani
was particularly concerned about the status of internally displaced persons
(IDPs), who were displaced from their homes by fighting. This was not only a
humanitarian problem, but also a strategic one. Kayani said he had no capacity
to compensate civilians who had been injured or whose property had been
destroyed. “If we don,t do that,” Kayani said, “we will lose the battle for
public opinion.” Kayani said that the provincial government lacks the capacity
to help the IDPs. He emphasized the importance of carrying forward the Bajaur
operation. Kayani noted that at first he had thought the army “should stay out
of politics,” but it was increasingly obvious that the military would have to
become involved in the IDP situation. Ambassador noted that the international
community had also dropped the ball on providing relief for the IDPs and was now
rushing to catch up.
Swat Valley
-----------
¶5. (C) Kayani was clear that the GOP had lost control of the Swat valley. He
said the police had no ability to come in after the army to “hold” territory. He
recounted that half of the 600 police officers, supposedly from the NWFP’s elite
police units, destined for Swat had deserted, largely because there was no
command structure. Petraeus replied that the U.S. had confronted this same issue
in Iraq, describing it as a “clear and leave” strategy, requiring the retaking
of the same ground multiple times. Petraeus observed that the police are the
most vulnerable, since they are exposed in communities. Petraeus noted that
increased measures to control population movements would probably have to be put
in place throughout the country, which would require considerable manpower.
Frontier Corps
--------------
¶6. (C) Petraeus said that the Frontier Corps (FC) was working well with Special
Operations Forces, largely because of the leadership of the Frontier Corps
Inspector General Major General Tariq Khan. Petraeus noted that the 11th Corps
Chief of Staff Brigadier Amir was less cooperative with U.S. forces, and Kayani
took note of that. Kayani said he had concentrated on improving the Frontier
Corps and brought salaries and rations on a par with the regular army. He had
also extended to the FC a benefit package for the families of those killed in
the line of duty. Kayani added that FC successes in combat had understandably
increased morale. Kayani mused about the “glorification of terrorism”
(particularly the pictures of dead combatants in the press) and said Pakistan
needed press laws similar to those in the UK.
¶7. (C) Kayani and Petraeus agreed that some of the civilian/military projects,
which had been impeded at the 11th Corps, needed to be speeded up. Petraeus had
given instructions that Special Operations Forces would be deployed regularly
and constantly, and the U.S. “needed to move their soldiers in here, so they
could engage productively with the FC.”
Pakistan/India
--------------
¶8. (C) Petraeus said the most important threat to Pakistan was on the western
border and internally. Terrorists were an existential threat to Pakistan. Kayani
agreed. However, Kayani observed that he had postponed a missile test. The
Indians, he said, in contrast, had conducted one just a few hours before. Kayani
said he had no intention to resume missile testing as long as the current
tensions persisted. He promised to be transparent with allies about his plans
and had briefed us about his move of 6000 troops to the Indian border. Kayani
said he was determined to exercise restraint in his actions with India. He
recounted that he had taken no
ISLAMABAD 00000155 003 OF 003
action the evening that Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee had
supposedly called President Zardari and threatened to declare war. Kayani asked
to be alerted if the U.S. had any warning of another attack - he understood that
the Indians had been warned about the Mumbai attack. He mentioned that
discussion of the consequences of a follow-on attack made both India and
Pakistan hostage to extremists and increased the likelihood of an attack. “If
there is any clue about another attack,” he said, “please share it with us.”
Next Steps
----------
¶9. (C) Kayani returned to the issue of CSF at the conclusion of the
conversation, saying that he hoped to have the May CSF submission soon, but we
needed to develop a simpler way of handling CSF claims. Petraeus said he would
look at options quickly. Kayani and Petraeus agreed that progress had been made
on the Border Coordination centers and that additional communications capacity
needed to be added. Petraeus pressed Kayani on moving forward with setting up
the additional facilities inside of Pakistan.
¶10. (C) Petraeus said he was looking forward to welcoming Kayani to Tampa
during his February 2009 counterpart visit. Kayani said he hoped, after
consultation with the Prime Minister and the President, to bring a roadmap for
consideration by U.S. officials.
¶11. (U) This cable has been cleared by CENTCOM. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09LAPAZ96, BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF

VICTORY MATTERS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09LAPAZ96.
09LAPAZ96 2009-01-23 13:01 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLP #0096/01 0231326

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231326Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0330
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4679
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1617
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR ENVR BL

SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S REFERENDUM: MARGIN OF VICTORY MATTERS
REF: A. 08 LAPAZ 2606
¶B. LA PAZ 6
¶C. LA PAZ 11
¶D. LA PAZ 62
¶E. LA PAZ 90
Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d)
¶1. (C) Summary: With the January 25 constitutional

referendum rapidly approaching, all signs point to victory
for President Morales and his ruling Movement Toward
Socialism (MAS) party. Although the opposition has made
inroads into the MAS lead, most national polls point to
between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution (with one government poll showing 66 percent),
and the MAS appears set to leverage its considerable rural
base to victory. After a series of national news articles
raised questions about significant fraud in the August 2008
recall referendum, the National Electoral Court has taken
pains to advertise the electoral rolls as secure. However, a
recent poll shows less than half of the public shares the
court's confidence, and the opposition believes significant
electoral fraud is likely. While cheating seems unnecessary
to secure victory for the MAS, padding their lead would give
the party leverage in congressional negotiations regarding
legislation implementing hundreds of vague constitutional
clauses. Opposition leaders continue to fear the MAS will
use any stalemate in these negotiations to close congress and
institute rule by decree. At both the national and regional
levels, the margin of victory matters. A landslide for the
MAS nationally, or large victories for the opposition in the
eastern departments, could spark more conflict. End summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
MAS Victory Seems Assured
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) With the January 25 constitutional referendum rapidly
approaching, all signs point to victory for President Morales
and his ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party.

Although the opposition has made inroads into their lead,
causing the MAS to tone down its rhetoric, national polls
point to between 54 and 60 percent support for the proposed
constitution. (One government poll shows the "yes" vote
winning by 66 percent.) However, many polls downplay or
ignore the MAS' rural base. Almost as importantly, the MAS
seems prepared to take at least five of the nine departments,
including La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, and Pando, with
Beni a distinct possibility. If the MAS can win at levels
similar to their August 2008 referendum victory (i.e. 67
percent or more) and can make inroads into the "Media Luna"
or eastern half of the country, they will have much more
leverage in upcoming congressional negotiations over
implementing legislation.
- - - - - -
Polling Data
- - - - - -
¶3. (C) Polling data has varied widely over the past two
weeks, due to a combination of a tightening race and polling
methodologies (i.e. city vs. rural). Recent national polls
by Gallup and Apoyo within the last week show approval for
the constitution with a much slimmer lead than many expected,
ahead only 48 to 42 percent and 49 to 43 percent,
respectively. Ipsos and Mori both conducted polls of capital
cities and both found the "yes" vote ahead, with Ipsos
showing a 59 to 35 percent lead and Mori reporting 60 to 40
percent. However, our contacts tell us all these polls
partially or totally ignored the rural vote, where the MAS
has much of its base. A poll by Observatorio de Gestion
Publica, publicized by government-friendly Radio Patria

Nueva, marked the constitution's lead at 66 percent, versus
31 percent against. Some estimate a six percent "bump" when
the rural vote is included.
¶4. (U) Polls showing a breakdown
by city or region indicate
the constitution will easily win in at least four
departments: La Paz, Potosi, Oruro, and Cochabamba, likely
with at least 70 percent support in each. The MAS has a
distinct chance to capture both Pando and Beni as well. In
Pando, the Observatorio poll shows Pando department split
evenly, and the Ipsos poll shows the capital city of Cobija
supporting the constitution by a ratio of 64 to 36. Polling
data for Beni has been more scattershot, but although its
capital city of Trinidad is firmly against the constitution,
by as much as 88 percent, the larger city of Riberalta is
leaning for approval of the constitution. The Observatorio
poll shows Beni evenly split as a department.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rural and Indigenous Role
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (SBU) Although the opposition is making a mighty effort
across the country to rally against the constitution, the
forces of inertia seem to be conspiring against them,
particularly in the form of a largely uneducated rural base
in the Altiplano. Leading daily La Razon interviewed several
community leaders from the Altiplano, and their supporters,
and reported on January 18 that neither the leaders nor the
supporters had read the Constitution. Instead, the repeated

message was that rural communities would take their marching
orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution. According
to the Ipso poll of capital cities, only four percent of
respondents said they had read much or all of the
constitution, 45 percent of respondents said they have read
some, and 50 percent said they had read none of the draft
text. In the countryside, the number of those reading the
constitution is much lower. Post suspects disinterest, blind
faith in Evo Morales' political project, and illiteracy,
despite the Cuban literacy program, all play a role. In
addition, the sheer volume of the 411-article constitution
probably scares some potential readership away.
¶6. (C) However, despite the overall level of MAS dominance
among campesinos and indigenous voters, some opposition does
exist, albeit for a variety of reasons. The xxxxxxxxxxxx, has tried to rally
support against the MAS and the proposed constitution (Reftel
A). In a meeting with PolOffs, they lamented the way the MAS
had "cheated" and "fooled" campesinos into believing Morales
was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous
issues. Although they held a national meeting on January 17
and tried to reach out to the press, they sounded defeated
when they acknowledged that the MAS, through a combination of
funding and pressure on local social and business leaders,
held a "vertical control" in the countryside that would be
difficult to break. They also noted rural communities tended
to vote in blocks, supporting one political party until they
discarded it to vote en masse for another.
¶7. (C) Going in a completely different direction, some rural
social groups and far-left leaders, such as Achacachi Mayor
Eugenio Rojas and El Alto City Councilor Roberto de La Cruz

also publicly recommended voting against it because it was
seen as not revolutionary enough. They criticized the
government for making too many concessions to the opposition
during the constitutional compromise reached on October 21,
including the agreement to not make land reform retroactive.
However, they have a relatively small following, and some,
like de La Cruz, eventually reversed course as the projected
MAS margin of victory shrunk in January. Edgar Patana,
leader of the regional workers union (COR), other El Alto
union leaders, and the majority of social groups have
recommended voting for the constitution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Opposition Feisty, But Realistic
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) The opposition has not given up, but seems to be
battling
more to limit the margin of defeat than to win. In
Santa Cruz,xxxxxxxxxxxx
told EmbOff that polls show an overwhelming victory for the
"No" vote in Santa Cruz, but that he is worried about the
opposition's goal of winning in five of Bolivia's nine
departments (Reftel E). Although a current
privately-commissioned opposition poll showed the
constitution ahead by a margin of only five points, 39 to 34
percent (with 20 percent undecided), opposition alternate
xxxxxxxxxxxx doubted the opposition would be able to
win the referendum outright even under the most optimistic
scenario. He predicted that Morales would succeed in
personalizing the constitution as "Evo's constitution" and

leverage his cult of personality. Ultimately xxxxxxxxxxxx was more
concerned with the margin of the opposition's defeat and
discrediting the results of "any election that uses this
voter roll" (Reftel C).
¶9. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx has been
criss-crossing the country with opposition xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, campaigning against the proposed constitution, but
also building a foundation for a likely run for the
presidency. xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed opposition leaders put aside
jockeying to be the 2009 opposition unity presidential
candidate in the final days of the "no" campaign to "attack
the government from three sides:" the prefects (governors)
who been traveling around the Media Luna to show &they are
not afraid" of government threats to arrest them and
galvanize support in opposition departments, a group of three
presidential contenders to show opposition unity and
xxxxxxxxxxxx, who is used for more cerebral attacks on the CPE
and to &dismiss the governments mythology that they
exclusively represent the indigenous.8 xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that
opposition parties Podemos and MNR are playing a deliberately
muted role, recognizing that their unpopular association with
the &old regimes8 would play into MAS strategy. "Political
parties are bad words in Bolivia," xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx La
Paz-based group of mostly young professionals who focus on
issues and distance themselves from the party moniker. "We
need parties, but we need to start from scratch, without the
old leaders. This will take time."
¶10. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told

PolOff the opposition is chipping away at the MAS referendum
lead despite the government's leviathan advantage in
resources by de-personalizing the constitution and
"convincing people on the street that is not in their best
interests." Although he conceded the "no" campaign would
ultimately be a losing effort, he cited the emerging feud
between Morales and Church, corruption charges against
government officials, and the increasingly precarious economy
as emerging factors in December and January that created an
opposition "surge" after "we were so depressed" in the fall.
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that the government's newfound mobilization of
congressmen and deputies to challenge the opposition view on
television and radio shows is proof of government panic.
"Before they just thought they could ignore us (and win),"
said xxxxxxxxxxxx. "They said there was no opposition." xxxxxxxxxxxx
agreed, and added that this is playing into the opposition's
hands, because they "are forced to defend a constitution they
often know little about." According to xxxxxxxxxxxx has
been challenging MAS supporters to debate him during his
speaking tours and embarrassed Vice Minister of Social Groups
Sacha Llorenti in a January 20 debate when he started talking
in fluent Aymara. He asked the dumbstruck Llorenti what he
planned to do if the constitution passed, since all public
officials will be required to speak one of Bolivia's
indigenous languages. Later he challenged President Morales
to debate him in Aymara, which the president allegedly speaks
poorly.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Fraud, Doubts, and Questions
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (C) The National Electoral Court (CNE), which will
oversee and ratify the results of the referendum, has
undertaken a public relations campaign to assure the public
of the security of the election rolls, which came under
scrutiny after leading daily La Razon published a series of
articles questioning the validity of the August 10, 2008
recall referendum. Several contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx, told us the MAS padded their
August referendum victory by five to seven points through
fraud at several levels (reftel C). While many international
observers groups are expected to view the January 25
constitutional referendum -- including the European Union,
the OAS, the Carter Center, the UN, the CAN, the
South-American and Andean parliaments, and UNASUR (septel) --
the depth of the earlier fraud has muted the opposition's
confidence in observers' ability to ensure the results are
fair. Members of the Santa Cruz civic committee told EmbOff
that they have no faith in international observers. The
committee has met with the OAS team already and "told our
side of the story", describing the discoveries of tens of
thousands of false voter cards and the statistical signs of
fraud in areas that managed to vote 100 percent for President
Morales in the August 2008 referendum. However, the civic
committee said that the fact that international observers
blessed the August referendum means they do not expect an
honest review of the constitutional referendum. Civic
committee members also noted that small numbers of observers,
generally based in the city, will not be able to stop
widespread fraud in the countryside, which is where they
believe most of the August 10 fraud took place.

¶12. (C) In a press conference designed to bolster confidence
in the security of the electoral rolls, National Electoral
Court (CNE) President Jose Luis Exeni presented a PowerPoint
describing the bill of clean health given by the OAS. As
part of the presentation, he showed the number of voters
dropped from the rolls for not participating in prior
elections and the number added during this cycle. While all
departments projected to vote against the constitution had a
net reduction in the voter rolls, including 85,000 Crucenos
and 17,000 Benianos, MAS strongholds including La Paz
(38,000) and Potosi (16,000) saw substantial gains -- a
curious reckoning, considering population and migration
trends to the contrary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Pando At Center of Storm, Again
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) While it is possible the constitution could pass in
Beni, most opposition leaders tell us the MAS has set its
sights on lightly-populated Pando department as its best
chance to win in five departments. By winning the popular
vote and a majority of the departments, the MAS could more
credibly claim to have support throughout the country. Pando
has also traditionally aligned with the opposition, so a
breakthrough win there would send a strong signal that the
strength of the MAS continues to rise. And with fewer than
32,000 registered voters, or less than one percent of the
country's voting population, Pando is the most vulnerable
department to even small amounts of fraud or voter

registration changes.
¶14. (C) In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando
in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect
Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to
swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate. Besides
disabling the opposition's ability to campaign by arresting
many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown
changed Pando's electoral map by causing hundreds of
opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new
security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters
from the Altiplano (Reftel B). xxxxxxxxxxxx added
that in the run-up to the August 2008 referendum, Government
Minister Alfredo Rada facilitated the establishment of fake
identities via the police role in issuing national identity
cards (which can then be used to vote). (Reftel C).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
January 26: What Happens Next?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff December 31 that
a general election prompted by passage of the new
constitution requires a plethora of enabling legislation that
the opposition-controlled Senate will block, at least in the
forms likely to be proposed by the MAS (Reftel B). xxxxxxxxxxxx
said the new draft constitution is deliberately vague, which
grants MAS legislators wide discretion to "fill in the
blanks" with new implementing legislation. He also said the
Senate would clash with the government on assigning new
borders for electoral districts, needed for the general

election. xxxxxxxxxxxx added that Morales' MAS party is
already injecting "ridiculous" interpretations of the
constitution into a wide gamut of implementing legislation
that "the Senate cannot in good conscious agree to." He said
Senate rejection of MAS proposals provides a ready excuse for
Morales to dismiss congress for "rejecting the will of the
people" and then have President Morales rule by decree
(Reftel D).
¶16. (C) Despite the official government position that
President Morales will undergo treatment to correct a
deviated septum immediately following the referendum, several
contacts confirm that the problem is actually a tumor in the
pituitary near the sella turcica and that Morales will travel
to Spain for the operation. xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx told us Morales' first choice, Cuba, could not
perform the surgery. Article 238 is also of consequence to
the post-January 25 political landscape. It would establish
that all other government officials must stand down three
months before general elections expected in 2009, with the
notable exception of the president and vice president.
Besides providing the MAS the advantage of ruling during the
campaign, it also ensures leadership cannot pass to the
opposition-controlled Senate. It is unclear why the
opposition waited until the final week before the referendum
to complain about the article or why they accepted it during
marathon sessions in October to arrive at a "compromise
text," which, it should be noted, the opposition agreed to
under duress, with thousands of MAS-aligned protesters
surrounding the congress and threatening violence.

- - - -
Comment
- - - -
¶17. (C) It is likely there will be some amount of fraud in a
referendum the MAS seems likely to win legitimately anyway.
While it can be difficult to separate fact from fiction, the
Morales administration has a reputation of doing exactly what
they announce they will do. In this case, 66 percent seems
to be the target number, and the MAS is likely to pull out
all the stops to reach that level. With at least two-thirds
support across the country and a minimum of five of the nine
departments under his belt, President Morales would be able
to claim a political mandate to implement the constitution
quickly. Practically speaking, this will put great pressure
on the Congress, especially the opposition-controlled Senate,
to acquiesce in negotiations and accept MAS versions of
implementation legislation. If they do not, Morales and
others in the MAS have spoken of rule by decree. Using
similar logic, Morales could call for early elections to more
quickly advance the "democratic revolution" in Bolivia.
Early elections would also help the MAS avoid dealing with
the quickly-crumbling economy, which would likely be more of
an issue in December.
¶18. (C) Both sides seem to be angling over the margin of the
MAS victory, not the victory itself. While Morales continues
to predict a victory of up to 80 percent, Vice President
Garcia
Linera tried to manage expectations with a 66 percent
estimate on January 21. The margin matters. If the
constitution gets less than two-thirds support, many

observers feel this would represent a relative defeat,
especially when Morales himself has set such high
expectations. On the other hand, we are equally concerned
that large-margin victories in media luna departments could
lead opposition leaders to ignore the national results and
resume a course for autonomy on their own terms -- putting
them on a collision course with the national government. A
solid but not overwhelming MAS victory, perhaps around 56 to
60 percent, might be the best outcome to keep both sides from
claiming a strong mandate for extreme measures.
URS
Viewing cable 09PARIS119, FRANCE SEEKING COORDINATED EU

POSITION AS
Discussing cables
09PARIS119 2009-01-27 18:06 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Paris
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INFO RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI, EUR/ERA

NSC FOR KVIEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2019

TAGS: PREL KAWK KISL KPAO MOPS PGOV PHUM PTER FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE SEEKING COORDINATED EU POSITION AS
PREREQUISITE TO ACCEPTANCE OF GUANTANAMO DETAINEES ON A
"CASE BY CASE" BASIS
REF: A. SECSTATE 6516

¶B. BRUSSELS 79
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young for reasons 1.4 (B &
D).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In response to President Obama's January

22 Executive Order to close detention facilities at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (ref a), the French have publicly
given their support to at least review the idea of accepting
detainees deemed not to be a security risk. Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchner said on January 20 and again on January 26
that France "would consider positively" requests from
Washington to accept detainees from Guantanamo who wish to
come to France, on a "case-by-case basis, with a specific and
careful assessment of legal implications and security risks."
Philippe Errera, Advisor to Foreign Minister Kouchner, and
French Foreign Ministry DAS-equivalent for security issues
Martin Juillard said France prefers to have a coordinated EU
position before moving forward on the issue. Errera said the
goal is to bring the discussion to a political level, perhaps
headed by EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove,
in an effort to give broad political and legal cover to those
states wishing to accept detainees. Juillard said it is
unlikely the EU will provide a plan or a framework for
accepting detainees unless the USG makes an official request
to the EU presidency, now led by the Czech Republic. While
the French are eager to improve relations with the U.S. on
counter-terrorism, Juillard said the GOF wants two conditions
met: first, the U.S. must agree to resettle some of these
same low-risk detainees in the U.S., and; second, any
detainee being considered for resettlement in France must
express an explicit desire to be resettled in France.
Julliard noted a final decision on the matter would
ultimately rest with President Sarkozy. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) Pol MC met with Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs

Advisor to FM Kouchner, on January 26. Poloffs met with
French MFA DAS-equivalent for security issues Martin Juillard
on January 27. MFA security directorate officers
Jean-Mathieu Bonnel and Caroline Monvoisin, as well as North
America desk officer Bruno Asseray joined Juillard.
Common EU Position Sought That Would Permit Decisions by

Individual Member States
------------ ------------ -- --- -- --- --- --- --- -- -- --
-- -- -- -- -- --- -
¶3. (C/NF) In response to President Obama's January 22

Executive Order to close detention facilities at Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base (ref a), the French have publicly given their
support to at least review the idea of accepting detainees
deemed not to be a security risk. Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner said on January 20 and again on January 26 that
France "would consider positively" requests from Washington
to accept detainees from Guantanamo who wish to come to
France, on a "case-by-case basis, with a specific and careful
assessment of legal implications and security risks."
Philippe Errera, Advisor to Foreign Minister Kouchner, and
Foreign Affairs DAS-equivalent for security issues Martin
Juillard said France is working to obtain a common EU
position on Guantanamo, although decisions about accepting
detainees would remain with the individual member states.
Errera said the goal is to bring the discussion to a
political level, perhaps headed by EU Counterterrorism
Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove, in an effort to give broad
political and legal cover to those states wishing to accept
detainees. Errera noted that this was also necessary on a
practical level because members of the Schengen group of
countries must coordinate any such decision inasmuch as any
individual within their borders would be able to travel
freely to all of the other participating states. Errera said
that FM Kouchner was "more forward-leaning" on this issue,
but that they had been surprised by the harsh public reaction
across Europe to the idea of accepting "terrorists" on their
soil. Paris believes that a common EU position would provide
a broad framework for individual country action, just as it
did in an earlier case involving the relocation of
Palestinian fighters who had taken over the Church of the
Nativity in Bethlehem.
¶4. (C/NF) Furthering Errera's point from January 26,

Juillard noted that while the French believe it is necessary
PARIS 00000119 002 OF 002
to have a common EU clearing house to accept detainees, they

do not want to create a large bureaucracy that will prevent
flexibility in the process. Poloffs emphasized that
flexibility was a key factor and hoped France and the EU
would not support a process that would prevent interested
countries from taking detainees. Juillard said it is
unlikely that France would make a final determination on
their ability to accept detainees without some type of
process in place at the EU level. He also noted it is
unlikely the EU would provide a plan or a framework for
accepting detainees unless the USG makes an official request
to the EU presidency, now led by the Czech Republic.
EU Acceptance Conditional
-------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) While the French are open to the idea of accepting
those detainees who, according to U.S. authorities, do not
pose a security risk, the French believe it is necessary for
two requirements to be met: first, the U.S. must agree to
resettle some of these same low-risk detainees in the U.S.,
and; second, any detainee being considered for resettlement
in France must express an explicit desire to be resettled in
France. Julliard noted that a final decision on the matter
rests at the presidential level with the advice of the
Ministers of Foreign affairs and the interior.
No EU States Opposed, But Still No Consensus

--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Juillard said there were no indications that EU

members were blocking the idea of taking former detainees.
However, some countries have stated flatly they would not be
taking any Guantanamo detainees.
Desire to Improve Franco-American Relations

-------------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Juillard noted on three separate occasions that

part of France's calculation on the detainee issue is how
they can support the Obama Administration in a hope of
improving Franco-American relations. He continued that the
Franco-American counter-terrorism relationship was so far
good, but there was vast room for improvement and he hoped we
would work more closely in the coming months. Juillard was
quick to point out that at the end of their EU presidency in
December of last year, the French put forth the idea that the
EU should be considering the detainee issue which finally
took place on January 26.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09PESHAWAR2,
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09PESHAWAR2.
09PESHAWAR2 2009-01-03 09:09 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Consulate Peshawar
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PESHAWAR 000002

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/3/2019 TAGS: PTER MOPS ASEC PGOV PK
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Peshawar, Department of
State. REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) Summary
- - - -
¶1. (C) A senior Federally Administered Tribal Areas official told Acting
Principal Officer (APO) that nearly all girls’ schools in the FATA would be
closed by the January 15, 2009 deadline set by militants; since then, the
militants have relented marginally and allowed girls to attend school up to
grade four. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the GOP has given up on Swat, Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) for now. The current Khyber operation was launched to
counter local militants who had set up operations near Peshawar as well as to
secure truck convoys.
¶2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes the GOP does not understand the gravity of
the situation in FATA. The predominantly Shi’a town of Hangu may be attacked by
Sunni militants during Muharam celebrations. He believes that if the taliban
began to control the NWFP, they could not administer it and XXXXXXXXXXXX might
need to join their ranks just to survive. XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assessment is less
hopeful than most of post’s contacts but accurately reflects a growing pessimism
and frustration among some concerning the future of the FATA and NWFP. End
Summary.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX provided his assessment of the situation in the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
XXXXXXXXXXXX
Closure Of Girls Schools?
-------------------------
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said some girls schools will likely try to remain
technically open after the January 15 deadline set my militants for their
closure. However, the practical effect will be that almost all government girls’
schools and probably all private girls’ schools in the FATA will either close or
have no students attending them. He said this was because of the widespread fear
of the taliban XXXXXXXXXXXX. (Note: Since this meeting, the local militants have
agreed to allow girls to attend school up to grade four.)
Troop Redeployments
---------------------
¶5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the decision to pull troops out of Swat was
less about needed troops on the border with India as alleged in the press and
more about a decision by the GOP to “give up on Swat for now.” He asserted “we
have given the taliban the north of Swat, so why not give them the city of
Mingora too.” XXXXXXXXXXXX who has only anecdotal information about other troop
pullouts from FATA and the NWFP, opined that these would likely be “token as a
show of force for the India situation.”
Khyber Operation - FATA A Priority?
-----------------------------------
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated what other post contacts have told us, namely the
current operation in Khyber was about more than simply insuring the safety of
truck convoys between Peshawar and Torkham. Local unnamed militants had set up
kidnapping for ransom operations near Peshawar to fund their operations. He
claimed funding operations through kidnapping had become a major source of
revenue for the taliban in FATA, where previously they had relied more on
“outside funding.” He reasoned that this was an indication that the militancy
had become a true insurgency that had wider implications for Pakistan outside
the NWFP, but the GOP in Islamabad did not appreciate the gravity of the
situation. He asserted that “FATA as a federal priority has dropped of the list
since the India situation has come to light.”
PESHAWAR 00000002 002 OF 003
North Waziristan Location Of Hostages?
--------------------------------------
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX----------------
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he wanted to say in an unofficial capacity that he and
many others could accept Predator strikes as they were surgical and clearly
hitting high value targets. He mentioned that fear among the local populace in
areas where the strikes have been occurring was lessening because “everyone knew
that they only hit the house or location of very bad people.” He wondered why
the strikes did not seem to target more of the taliban which he reasoned was
needed. He said “our house is on fire and we need to take drastic actions.”
In Camera Session And ISI
-------------------------
¶9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that ISI, (Note: Pakistan’s military intelligence.
End note), during the in camera session of the parliament recently, had briefed
lawmakers and senior GOP officials concerning the virtues of some taliban
elements versus the “real militants.” They reasoned small numbers from some of
the militant groups could be useful in future operations in Kashmir or
elsewhere. XXXXXXXXXXXX said although not everyone present agreed with the
assertion it was this line of reasoning that contributed to his fear of the
future.
The Future
----------
¶10. (C) The future, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, was likely to include an attack
by Sunni militants on the predominantly Shi’a town of Hangu during the Muharam
celebrations. (Note. After Kurram, Orakzai Agency, where Hangu serves as the
administrative headquarters, has the second highest concentration of Shi’a in
the region, at almost 10 per cent. End note.)
¶11. (C) In six to twelve months, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted, a lack of focus from
Islamabad could leave the taliban in control of both FATA and NWFP. If that
happened, the taliban would need help administering the area. He said the
prospect was causing him and others to begin to figure out how to individually
survive the coming taliban. He said “for one I am thinking that the taliban
could capture the NWFP but they don’t know how to administer it so they might
need administrators like me and I might have to join the taliban at some point
to just survive.”
Comment
- - - -
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX’s concerns for the future are not widely expressed by
other post contacts, at least not in the dark terms he describes, but accurately
reflect a growing pessimism and frustration concerning the future of the FATA
and NWFP. Most view the current deteriorating security situation as reversible;
for example, XXXXXXXXXXXX is hopeful of being able to defeat the militants in
the short term. Others point to the relative successes of recent engagements in
Bajaur to support their view that the GOP can turn the tide in both the short
and long term.
¶13. (C) The new level of pessimism from XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Nevertheless,
it is disturbing that XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the militants are winning in both
FATA and NWFP. VIA
Viewing cable 09RIYADH181, SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN

AMBASSADOR ON IRAN'S
Discussing cables
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019

TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC IR SA RU
SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PLANS
Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE

REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron

Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy
Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with
Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral
Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a
joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed
exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki
on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if
Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the
Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit
the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a
deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded
that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for
Iran.
¶2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a

reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of
what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit
mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear
weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His
concern that the United States will negotiate a "grand
bargain" with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a
concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary &
comment.
¶3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador

Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki
turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, "On this issue, what
concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its
policy on enrichment." Iran needs to be convinced to enter a
dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi
Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at
Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring
an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi
shores, across open water.
¶4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only "Sure, I

agree!" before Prince continued, "The location is so
dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!" He
urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved
north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian
Sea would be much better, where there is water available for
reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain
any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more
troubling, he said, is Iran's pursuit of nuclear enrichment.
He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons,
other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do
the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in
the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.
¶5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran's desire to enrich

uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked
by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran's
desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region. Prince
Turki interjected: "And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy
in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and
desalination, but not with enrichment." He said that the
prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions
about their motivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"
¶6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that "some experts in Russia

believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years."
Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and
has "put forward initiatives" with Iran. Russia hopes to
discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future,
and he said that an "important delegation" would be coming to
Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi
leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation
would be welcomed, stressing that "we must work together to
get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its
nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence,
that is why I raise this with you." Amb. Gibinvish pledged
that "we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult
partners." At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil
Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince
Turki said "Please write this down. Whatever is discussed
with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any
RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002

negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the
interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it!
We should be told -- in advance! -- of what you plan to say."
RUNDELL
Viewing cable 09SEOUL59, ROK’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE

NEIGHBORS: NORTH
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09SEOUL59.
09SEOUL59 2009-01-12 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
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SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KS, KN
SUBJECT: ROK’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE NEIGHBORS: NORTH
KOREA, JAPAN, CHINA AND RUSSIA
REF: A. TOKYO 3114 (TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING) B. SECDEF DTG261447ZNOV08
(DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS) C. TOKYO 3416 (ROK-PRC-JAPAN TRILATS) D. SEOUL 1681
(ROKG ON CHINA) E. SEOUL 1700 (ROK-PRC SUMMIT) F. SEOUL 2461 (ROK-RUSSIA
STRATEGIC DIALOGUE)
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) Summary: As a presidential candidate, Lee Myoung-bak called for a
“creative reconstruction” of Korea’s foreign policy. In his February 2008
inaugural address, Lee criticized his two predecessors, saying, “At times over
the last ten years, we found ourselves faltering and confused.” He vowed to
trade ideology for pragmatism as Korea’s surest means of improving ties with its
neighbors, and he’s had some successes, especially with China and Russia, where
Lee was able to expand substantially economic and political ties. Lee’s efforts
on Japan and North Korea are more mixed. With Japan, the South Korean public was
not quite ready to accept fully Lee’s attempts to compartmentalize history
issues. Still, much progress was made in Seoul-Tokyo consultations on a variety
of issues ranging from North Korea to economic to even security issues. On North
Korea, Lee’s conservative agenda was predictably rebuffed by Pyongyang. However,
all signs are that President Lee is quite comfortable in sticking to
denuclearization and reciprocity as the basis of his North Korea policy,
especially as it enjoys considerable support. End Summary.
----
DPRK
----
¶2. (C) In a February 2007 speech that has widely come to be known as the “MB
Doctrine,” presidential candidate Lee Myung-bank firmed up his vision of his
administration’s North Korea Policy. Lee said his first priority would be to
abolish what he described as his predecessors’ “unprincipled and unilateral
policy of appeasement” toward the DPRK and replace it with a policy that offered
generous assistance in exchange for North Korea’s complete nuclear dismantlement
and Pyongyang’s accommodation of South Korea’s desire for family reunion,
accounting of welfare and whereabouts of POWs from the Korean War and several
hundred abductees after the war. Immediately upon taking office, the Lee
Administration also made it clear that it would review all commitments from the
two South-North summits -- June 2000 and October 2007. Senior Lee Administration
officials complained publicly that the October 2007 summit between Kim Jong-il
and President Roh Moo-hyun was arranged by Roh to favor the progressive
candidate in the presidential election two months later and that therefore
President Lee was not bound to fulfill promises amounting to billions of dollars
of aid to the North.
¶3. (C) The response from Pyongyang was predictably swift and severe. Using
threatening language not heard since the Kim Young-sam days, North Korea has
moved step by step to cut off inter-Korean relations. Initially, all inter-
Korean meetings were cancelled, with the North loudly proclaiming that food aid
from the South was neither needed nor wanted. Thereafter, Pyongyang implemented
a draconian restriction in December of North-South cross-border traffic,
stopping Kaesong tourism and severely limiting traffic to the Kaesong Industrial
Complex. As the Kumgang tourism had been stopped by the South over the July
shooting death of a Southern tourist, the net result has been a crippling blow
to the KIC and Kumgang tourism, the two proudest results of the Sunshine policy.
¶4. (C) With both sides dug in, the outlook for any quick improvement in inter-
Korean relations is slim to none. Much more likely is the continued
“psychological war,” as characterized by Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan in his
recent meeting with the Ambassador. President Lee is determined not to give in
to North Korean pressure. Our Blue House contacts have told us on several
occasions that President Lee remained quite comfortable with his North Korea
policy and that he is prepared leave the inter-Korean relations frozen until the
end of his term in office, if necessary. It is also our assessment that Lee’s
more conservative advisors and supporters see the current standoff as a genuine
opportunity to push and further weaken the North, even if this might involve
considerable brinkmanship. Also favoring the Lee Administration’s stance is the
the Korean public, which is calm to the point of apathy about the inter-Korean
situation.
-----
Japan
-----
¶5. (C) President Lee has made concerted efforts to improve relations with
Tokyo, which were significantly strained during the Roh Moo-hyun era over
history and territory issues. Lee sought to compartmentalize what he called
“disputes over the past”, stating in an early policy address that “South Korea
and Japan should...try to foster a future-oriented relationship with a pragmatic
attitude. Historical truth must not be ignored, but we can no longer afford to
give up our future relations due to disputes over the past.” Lee’s vision was to
look beyond the history-bound bilateral issues and create a Korea-Japan
partnership active in the regional and global arena on issues like the
denuclearization of the DPRK, strengthening of multilateral relationships, trade
and economics, and cooperation on projects like alternative energy, communicable
diseases, and poverty alleviation.
¶6. (C) So far, Lee’s efforts have yielded some success, although Blue House
officials would argue that results would have been far better had Tokyo shown
more courage, especially in dealing with the Takeshima/Dokdo issue. For example,
Lee pressed ahead with his plan to engage Japan on a more strategic regional and
global level. Lee made the decision that Korea would participate in the October
U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Policy Planning talks (Ref A) in Tokyo. He then
agreed to the U.S.-Japan-Korea Defense Trilateral Talks (Ref B) in Washington in
November, the first trilateral defense talks in six years. Lee also initiated
the first ever stand-alone China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit (Ref C) in
Fukuoka in December. Critics will of course point out that there were no
substantive results from these meetings, but the fact that the meetings were
held at all is a significant result.
-----
China
-----
¶7. (C) President Lee has openly courted the Chinese, and he has chalked up some
noteworthy successes. Less than one year into his term, Lee has already met with
PRC President Hu Jintao three times, quite unprecedented in the history of ROK-
PRC relations (Ref D); typically, in the past, the ROK could expect only one
visit in a PRC president’s ten-year term. Lee paid his first state visit to
Beijing in May 2008 and met Hu again in August when Lee traveled to Beijing for
the Olympics. Hu paid a state visit to Seoul August 25-26. President Lee made
the relations seem a two-way desire. A Chinese Embassy contact told us that
Beijing had been concerned that China-Korea relations would suffer because of
the emphasis Lee wanted to put on improving U.S.-Korea relations. Therefore,
China was pleasantly surprised that Lee was able to improve both bilateral
relationships simultaneously. Kim Heung-kyu, Professor of Chinese Security and
Foreign Policy at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said
Lee had effectively leveraged the U.S.-Korea relationship to improve relations
with China, which is eager for closer ties with Korea to check U.S. and Japanese
interests in the region.
¶8. (C) During Lee’s first visit to Beijing, he and Hu issued a joint statement
which upgraded the Korea-China relationship to a “strategic cooperative
partnership”. Our Chinese Embassy contact gave the clearest explanation of what
was now “strategic” about the ROK-PRC relationship: that China’s nomenclature to
describe its relations with Korea was upgraded according to a roughly five-year
schedule. In 1992, relations were normalized; in 1998, the first year of Kim
Dae-jung’s term as President, the Chinese upgraded the relationship to
“cooperative partnership”; in 2002, it was upgraded again to “comprehensive
cooperative partnership,” and now it is “strategic cooperative partnership.”
¶9. (C) Despite the name, Koreans have found substantive strategic discussions
with the Chinese frustratingly difficult. For example, Lee, unlike his immediate
predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, added North Korean human rights to
the Korea-China summit agenda in August, asking Hu not to repatriate North
Korean refugees against their will. Hu did not respond to Lee’s request (Ref E).
Also, we understand, Lee asked Hu what China thought about the North Korean
domestic political situation and whether Beijing had any contingency plans. This
time, Hu apparently pretended not to hear Lee. Still, the ROK did not come away
empty, because, despite initial Chinese objections, Lee was successful in
including in the summit joint statement a commitment “to promote dialogue and
cooperation in the field of international human rights.”
------
Russia
------
¶10. (C) Lee has largely continued the trend of his predecessors in upgrading
economic ties with Russia. ROK-Russia economic ties have grown more than 40%
annually for the past three years, with two-way trade exceeding USD 15 billion
in 2007. Much of the growth is due to Russia’s natural resources. For example,
Lee paid a state visit to Moscow in September and agreed to a contract for
Russia to supply Korea with 7.5 million tons of natural gas annually for thirty
years beginning from 2015, amounting to an estimated 20% of Korea’s annual
natural gas consumption. And despite doubts about North Korea’s cooperation, Lee
agreed in principle to Russia exploring plans for a pipeline through North Korea
to deliver the gas. The two countries also agreed to investigate the
possibilities for linking the inter-Korean railway to the trans-Siberian railway
system (Ref F).
¶11. (C) On his state visit, Lee also signed an agreement to upgrade the ROK-
Russia relationship to a “Strategic Cooperative Partnership”, the same term used
by China to describe this year’s upgrade to the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko Jae-
nam, of MOFAT’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Korea
proposed using the term “Strategic Cooperative Partnership” after China used the
term to describe the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko said Korea’s objective in using
the same terminology to describe the ROK-Russia relationship was to balance the
ROK-PRC relationship.
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) During a year in which President Lee faced considerable difficulty
advancing his domestic agenda, his foreign policy efforts, if not wildly
successful, at least did not get him into trouble. To a considerable degree,
relations with South Korea’s neighbors are driven by economic realities --
increased regional trade, investment, and tourism -- that mesh with Lee’s
pragmatic, non-ideological approach. Relations with North Korea were the
outlier, as the DPRK took pains in 2008 to demonstrate that it could live
without ROK assistance. STEPHENS
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI192, URGENT UAE REQUEST FOR AIR

DEFENSE -- FIVE PATRIOT BATTERIES
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI192
07:07 18:06 N Dhabi
P 240739Z FEB 09
INFO CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
CJCS WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000192
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS MASS IR AE
SUBJECT: URGENT UAE REQUEST FOR AIR DEFENSE -- FIVE PATRIOT BATTERIES
THIS YEAR
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: UAE Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces convoked
the Ambassador to request the urgent deployment of five U.S. patriot
batteries in the UAE as an interim measure until the UAE's own
batteries are operational (anticipated in 2012). The UAE belief that
an increasingly likely pre-emptive Israeli attack on Iran would
prompt quick retaliation on U.S. allies (foremost among them the very
proximate UAE) prompted the request. End summary.
¶2. (C) On 22 February 2009, Ambassador Richard Olson, Defense
Attache (DATT) Colonel Bret Rider and Chief, US Liaison Office (USLO)
Colonel David Sprague were summoned to the office of the Chief of
Staff of the UAE Armed Forces (COS), where they were met by the COS,
LTG Hamid Thani al Rumaithy, Director Military Intelligence and
Security (MISS) MGen Eissa al Mazrouei, Commander of the UAE Air
Force and Air Defence (AF&AD) AVM Mohammed Swaidan al Qamzi and the
COSs office director BGen Faris Mohammed al Mazroui.
¶3. (S) Following very brief pleasantries the COS bluntly commented:
"I need to be open and frank with you, there are changes in the
region that concern us." On behalf of his government, the COS then
made an official request of the US government to deploy between four
and five Patriot batteries to the UAE during calendar year 2009. He
requested these batteries remain in place until such time as they can
be replaced by the UAE's own nine batteries, currently on order.
¶4. (S/NF) The UAE would place three of the US batteries in and
around Abu Dhabi, one battery at the port of Jebel Ali, and a final
battery somewhere else in the northern emirates (presumably Dubai).
The COS noted previous studies on the placement of the batteries are
on file and will help guide final placement. The COS stated the
batteries would be used to protect critical military and civilian
targets.
¶5. (S/NF) The COS noted that Iran will continue doing its best to
keep the entire region unstable. Iran is recognized as Israel's
biggest threat in the region and Israel will attack Iran with little
or no notice. Following an Israeli attack, the UAE is convinced Iran
will lash out against those who "help Israel," or the allies of
Israel's friends, most significantly the UAE. The COS noted the UAE
has the Patriot system on order and expects to take delivery in 2012.
He went on to mention the pending deployment of a single Patriot
battery to protect Al Dhafra Air Base -- which should be operational
within the next 30 to 60 days. The COS noted the UAE operational
capacity will come too late and the single US battery will be too
little to stop Iranian missiles if they attack sooner rather than
later.
¶6. (S/NF) Hamid Thani senses indications and warnings the Israeli
government now being formed will likely attack Iran. He thinks the
new (Netanyahu) government will be very determined to eliminate the
threat of Iranian missiles, especially nuclear tipped ones, which
they fear may come raining down on Israeli cities. He also stated
Israel would be justified to take such action as it must protect its
citizens just as any nation has the duty to do. He feels that a
breakthrough in international efforts in regard to Iran's armament
programs may slow Israel's actions. However, the COS knows that
Israel must maintain all its options. He also knows the Iranians
have toyed with the international community for over ten years as
they built their capability. He stated the Israelis are also very
aware of Iranian tactics.
¶7. (S/NF) When pressed on what type of event may precipitate an

Israeli attack, the COS thought the delivery of the Russian S-300
system could be the catalyst. The COS stated very flatly that "I
don't trust the Russians, I've never trusted the Russians or the
Iranians."
¶8. (S/NF) The COS went on to request continued and expanded

intelligence sharing between the US and the UAE. He asked the DATT
what advance warning the US could expect of an Iranian attack. He
quickly added that he asks the same question of his MISS chief at
least twice a week and gets no answer -- as he knows there is no good
answer. (Note: The COS served as the MISS chief prior to becoming
COS and knows very well the capabilities related to predicting
Iranian actions. End note.)
¶9. (C) The meeting ended nearly as quickly as it began with both
sides wishing each other good will and great success during the
International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) opening later in the day
(immediately following this meeting all of the attendees departed
directly for IDEX). The COS met with and most certainly briefed the
President, Prime Minister and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (the de facto
Minister of Defense) as IDEX began.
OLSON
Viewing cable 09ANKARA226, ELDERLY AMERICAN SMUGGLED OUT OF

IRAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO8464
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAK #0226/01 0421303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111303Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1961
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1592
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0391
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 5366
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
Wednesday, 11 February 2009, 13:03

SIPDIS
Note - PII information removed from original message.
SENSITIVE
LONDON FOR GAYLE
BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
ASHGABAT FOR INGBORN
BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY
BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE
DUBAI FOR IRPO
EO 12958 DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS CASC, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PREL, SCUL, SNAR, SOCI, IR,
TU, IQ
SUBJECT: ELDERLY AMERICAN SMUGGLED OUT OF IRAN
Classified By: DCM;DOUG SILLIMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi appeared in the
Ankara Consular section around noon on January 9, 2009. Mr. Vahedi, age 75, told
Conoff he had paid smugglers $7500 to take him across the Iranian/Turkish border
after having been held against his will in Iran for seven months. Although
suffering some aches and pains, he appeared to be in good health after a
harrowing three-day journey from Tehran to Ankara that included a 14-hour
mountain climb on horseback in freezing temperatures. Embassy staff provided
immediate consular assistance and worked with Turkish authorities to prevent his
deportation back to Iran. Consular officers escorted Vahedi to the Ankara
airport where he departed on January 13. End summary.
----------
Background
----------
¶2. (SBU) On January, 7, Embassy Bern alerted posts in the region that American
citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi, DPOB xx/xx/1933 was trying to escape from
Iran and could possibly surface in Iraq. Vahedi, a dentist from Los Angeles,
instead appeared at the Ankara Consular Section around noon on January 9, 2009.
Although visibly shaken,Vahedi said he had no major physical problems, but he
did break down a few times when explaining his ordeal. He told Conoff that he
had enough medication and declined local medical attention preferring to wait
until he was back in the United States.
¶3. (SBU) Vahedi has been a resident, then citizen of the United States since
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Aside from this trip, he has only returned to
Iran once about ten years ago and did not encounter any problems on that visit.
At his wife’s urging to visit his parents’ gravesite in Iran, he traveled to
Tehran in early May 2008 where he spent four weeks with family and friends
without incident. However, after clearing customs at Tehran airport on June 6,
he heard his name called on the public address system with instructions to
report to a separate office. At this office, GOI authorities confiscated his
passport and told him he would not be leaving Iran. When Vahedi pressed as to
the reason, he was dismissed with instructions to follow-up at the Islamic
Revolution Court.
------------------------
Seven-Month House Arrest
------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Thus began a seven-month ordeal in which Vahedi appeared almost daily
at the court to request that his passport be returned. During this de facto
house arrest, Vahedi did contact Elizabeth Bucher, the Deputy Head of the
Foreign Interest Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran. He reported
that Ms. Bucher was very kind and helped him get his heart medications, but was
unable to help him depart the country. He lived with friends and relatives
staying only a few days with each to avoid them being implicated in his
problems.
¶5. (SBU) Vahedi believed his passport was confiscated for two reasons, the
first being simple extortion. It was made clear to him informally by the
authorities at the court that if he paid a $150,000 fine the process would move
more quickly. Secondly, he was told by GOI officials that he should use his
influence to pressure his American citizen sons to terminate one of their
business ventures. Vahedi’s sons are the owners of Concertino Productions, a Los
Angeles-based entertainment company that promotes, among other things, the
popular Persian pop singers Kamran and Hooman. In addition to American
performances, the duet has performed in Dubai and other middle-eastern venues.
According to Vahedi, while the singers are simply Persian pop singers, they have
gotten crowds riled up with occasional anti-regime rhetoric. Also included in
these performances are female dancers whose costumes would not raise an eyebrow
in most countries, but are perceived as immoral by the conservative elements
inside Iran.
¶6. (SBU) Vahedi did not trust that paying the fine would expedite the return of
his passport unless he also convinced his sons to cancel the next Dubai
performance of Kamran and Hooman. Vahedi spoke of a third party who was pulling
the strings within the Iranian government, particularly in regard to his son’
business. He repeatedly told the officials of the Islamic Revolution Court that
his children had lived in America all of their lives and as such he exerted no
control over their strong, typically American independent behavior.
---------------
No Empty Spoons
---------------
¶7. (C) Vahedi spoke bitterly about his former country, especially its lack of a
fair judicial system and widespread corruption. He told Conoff that all
government employees receive free sugar, rice, and cooking oil to ensure their
loyalty to the regime. He also said anyone with any authority lives by the “why
should I put an empty spoon into my mouth” philosophy. Vahedi reported that
regime spies were omnipresent including taxi drivers, hotel clerks, and
restaurant workers. He also said it was common knowledge that all new Iranian-
made cars had a “Khamenei tax” in the amount of $3100 that was earmarked for a
fund for South Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. At his daily appearances at the court,
he came to know the intimate details of the lives of many of the other visitors,
some of whom told Vahedi they had no idea where their loved ones were, or if
they were even alive. Vahedi also helped one woman whose drug-addicted husband
was incarcerated by paying her rent for the months he was there. Vahedi reported
seeing Iranian citizens watch helplessly as their family members were hauled off
in shackles without any official charges levied against them.
-----------------------
Picking the Best Option
-----------------------
¶8. (C) Vahedi realized that this situation was not going to change and alluded
to people who knew of his situation from his daily appearances at the court
approaching him with departure options. Vahedi said he studied the four most
common illegally used routes out of Iran. The first was crossing as a stowaway
on a merchant ship across the Persian Gulf into the UAE. Vahedi dismissed this
plan because he thought the heavy shipping traffic was too dangerous and they
risked being boarded by the Iranian Navy who were patrolling the area. The
second option was overland through Baluchistan but Vahedi could not obtain
enough facts about the execution of that plan to seriously consider that route.
The third choice was to enter Iraq heading to Karbala and try to make contact
with a member of the American military stationed there. Vahedi seriously
considered this option, but feared being discovered by the Iraqis before he
could make contact with an American soldier. That left only the last option:
over the mountains on horseback from Urmia to the Turkish border.
¶9. (SBU) In spite of temperatures hovering around zero degrees Fahrenheit,
Vahedi chose the early part of January because it coincided with the Shia
commemoration of Ashura and he thought it likely the police would be more
preoccupied. In the weeks prior to his departure, this 75-year old man trained
for strength and altitude by climbing in the hills north of Tehran. To protect
his family and friends from retribution by the GOI after his absence was noted,
he spoke to none of them of his escape plans. On January 7 Vahedi boarded a bus
from Tehran to Urmia, a city in the northern range of the Zagros Mountains in
West Azerbaijan, Iran. He used his California driver’s license as identification
at each of the approximately 20 stops the bus made. At Urmia, he and a pre-
arranged car and driver drove into the foothills of the mountains where he met
two men with a single horse who would escort him through the mountain to the
Turkish border.
-----------------
Over the Mountain
-----------------
¶10. (C) The two escorts were paid $5000 at the beginning of the journey and the
three set out as soon as it was dark. For all his planning, Vahedi did not have
clothing appropriate for the weather and had a very difficult time with the
cold. At one point during the 14-hour ride, the escorts had to physically hug
him to keep him warm. As an inexperienced rider hours into the climb Vahedi lost
his concentration and fell off the horse tumbling into the woods. He told Conoff
that at this point, he really believed he was going to die by freezing to death
on a mountainside. However, his only partially-paid escorts came to his aid and
put him back on the horse. Although he had thought he would be able to walk part
way, the altitude proved too much for him and his only choice was to remain on
the horse. Vahedi said that he believes they were following known dug smuggling
routes, evidenced by the way the horse knew exactly which way to turn. Vahedi
said the horse often led the escorts, even going off the normal path in what
seemed to be the wrong direction. Knowing that he escorts could also be trying
to smuggle drugs on this trip, he covertly went through the one pack they had
thrown on the horse and said he found nothing.
¶11. (SBU) Once over the Turkish border they were met on schedule by a man
Vahedi described as about 25 years old. During the handover, Vahedi paid out
another $2500 but was unsure how the three escorts split that payment. The
Turkish escort then brought Vahedi into a home where he was fed and given time
to rest and warm up. In the early evening he was driven to Van, a major city in
eastern Turkey, and waited there at the bus station for the 0200 bus to Ankara.
Vahedi said he maintained a very low profile and did not talk to anyone during
the 10-hour bus trip. He arrived at the Consular section around noon on Friday,
January 9.
--------------------
Deportation Conflict
--------------------
¶12. (C) As Vahedi had entered Turkey illegally, Conoff worked with GOT
officials to ensure his deportation back to America. Initially the Chief of the
Foreigner’s police within the Ministry of Interior in Ankara told Conoff that
because “we knew Vahedi was coming” he intended to deport him back to Iran. Post
is aware that Iranian and Iraqi citizens have been deported back to those
countries in a fairly brutal manner. According to UNHCR some have been taken by
bus in the middle of the night to the southern Turkish border and released.
Police have then allegedly shot into the air forcing the deportees to run across
the border into Iraq or Iran with no food or water to sustain them.
(13) (C) Post contacted Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who subsequently
exerted pressure on the Ministry of Interior to allow this 75-year old American
citizen to be deported back to the United States. Consular staff assured his
security during the four days it took to work through the departure arrangements
and accompanied him through the police and court proceedings and finally onward
to the airport. Vahedi told Conoff he had never done anything illegal in his
life and that he was ashamed to be seen in policy custody. Vahedi departed
Turkey at 4:00 p.m. on January 13.
-------
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) The problems Vahedi faced as a result of entering Turkey illegally
highlights the tough stand this government takes on illegal entry. This is
particularly true with Iranian and Iraqi nationals, even those who may also
carry American citizenship. Ensuring Vahedi’s return to the United States, vice
deportation to Iran required the intervention of the embassy’s front office.
Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at
Jeffrey
Viewing cable 09ANKARA321, DEALS WITH IRAN BENEFIT PM

ERDOGAN'S FRIENDS
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO5154
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0321 0581548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271548Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019

TAGS: PREL ENRG EPET TU IR
SUBJECT: DEALS WITH IRAN BENEFIT PM ERDOGAN'S FRIENDS
REF: 08 ANKARA 2028
Classified By: Economic Counselor Dale Eppler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (
D)
¶1. (C) On February 22, local press reported that Turkey and Iran had
established a joint venture company to develop gas in Iran and build a pipeline
to bring this gas to Turkey and Europe. This JV was established to further the
agreements reached in November 2008 and July 2007 MOUs between Turkey and Iran
(reftel). In trying to undercover more about this deal, we spoke with several
people. BOTAS Chairman Saltuk Duzyol said BOTAS was not included in the deal and
that the agreement was made with a private company but declined to specify it.
One of Energy Minister Guler's advisors, Musa Gunaydin, who is widely believed
to be behind the Minister's push to do business with Iran refused to discuss the
topic with us. xxxxx was more open. The Turkish company SOM Petrol has entered
into a joint venture with Iran, Demir said. The owner of SOM Petrol is Sitki
Ayan, a good friend of PM Erdogan. They both attended Istanbul Imam Hatip
(religious high school). Ayan is in the PM's circle of friends including Mustafa
Erdogan (PM's brother), Cihan Kamer (see para 2) and Mucahit Aslan. xxxxx.
According to our research, xxxxx is active in port construction, fuel
transshipments and other activities but doesn't appear to have any experience in
upstream oil and gas development.
¶2. (C) In 2007, Kartet, an electricity generation and exporting company, signed
a deal with Tavanir, Iran's state owned electricity company to import from Iran
1.4 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity to Turkey. Kartet applied to the
Turkish authorities (the Electricity Markets Regulatory Board, EMRA) to get an
electricity import license. In November 2007, a Turkish company called Savk
Electricity, owned by PM Erdogan's friend Cihan Kamer, received a license from
EMRA to import electricity from Iran. At that time, Kartet went public with the
dispute and claimed Savk action's were unethical and illegal. Kartet Istanbul
Managing Director Nuray Atacik told us on February 27 that Kartet had still not
received any response from EMRA and had basically given up on the project.
However, she added with a bit of glee, Savk Electricity has not been able to
realize the deal either. “The Iranians prefer us and don't want to do a deal
with a company that was forced on them,” Atacik said.
¶3. (C) Comment: If true, the PM's push of SOM Petrol to do the gas deal with
Iran could actually slow progress on the deal. It is clear from the Savk
Electricity case that Iran doesn't appreciate being assigned business partners.
There are other reasons why this deal is on the slow-track, including lack of
legal, regulatory and commercial framework for the deal and Iran's potential
pique at the February 26 announcement that BOTAS won a USD 750 million
arbitration case against Iran (although the award must still be accepted by
Iranian authorities). End comment.

Jeffrey
Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT218, TURKMENISTAN/IRAN: WEAPONS

FOUND HIDDEN IN IRANIAN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09ASHGABAT218.
09ASHGABAT218 2009-02-13 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Ashgabat
P 131259Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL DUBAI
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000218
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019

TAGS: IR PGOV PREL PTER TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN/IRAN: WEAPONS FOUND HIDDEN IN IRANIAN
EMBASSY SHIPMENT
Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) A Turkmen customs official told an Embassy LES on

February 13 that an Iranian Embassy diplomatic container with
AK-47's, sniper rifles and ammunition hidden in it had been
discovered one week earlier at the Serdar Uli (Gaudan)
customs point in Ashgabat, where vehicles and containers
arriving from or bound for Iran are inspected. The weapons
were reportedly hidden underneath two Turkmen carpets that
the Iranian Embassy was shipping to Iran.
¶2. (S/NF) The LES went to the Ashgabat Customs Point (a

different location) to inquire about an Embassy pouch
shipment arriving by truck, and an issue arose about opening
the Embassy's container for inspection. The customs
official, who is a close friend of LES, then brought up the
Iranian container incident. He said that a local shipping
employee of the Iranian Embassy had been present when another
official, acting on a "hunch that something was not right,"
opened the Iranian Embassy container. The customs official
told LES that the official who discovered the cache was
honored for his actions and received a promotion.
¶3. (S/NF) COMMENT: Turkmenistan imposes stringent controls

on the importation of any type of firearm, and Chiefs of
Missions' security detail are all unarmed. Even assuming
that the weapons in question were intended for the Iranian
Embassy's internal security, this would not explain the
presence of offensive weapons such as sniper rifles, in the
cache. The Embassy has no official confirmation about the
incident, which was, we note, relayed second-hand to our LES.
END COMMENT.
MILES
Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT248, TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH

AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT
Discussing cables
09ASHGABAT248 2009-02-24 04:04 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO0500
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHAH #0248 0550457
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 240457Z FEB 09
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000248
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019

TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM RS TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: TURKISH AMBASSADOR CONCERNED ABOUT
POTENTIAL SHIPMENTS OF URANIUM TO IRAN
Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4(B), (D), (E) and (F).
¶1. (C) The Turkmen Government announced earlier this month

that President Berdimuhamedov had signed a decree allowing
the state chemical concern "Turkmenkhimiya" to enter into a
contract with Ekomet-S of Russia for the transfer and burial
of radioactive waste. The waste was reportedly produced at
the Hazar chemical plant and at the Balkanabat iodine plant.
¶2. (S) In a meeting with the Charge on February 17, Turkish

Ambassador Huseyin Bichakli raised concerns about reports
that Turkmenistan and Russia plan to resume uranium
production in Turkmenistan. He said that he had learned from
sources that a Russian military delegation had visited
Turkmenistan in early January and visited the site of a
former "uranium" plant at Kizilkaya in Balkan Province. The
plant operated during the Soviet era. He said that the
delegation was also briefed on the planned North-South
railroad line from Russia to Iran, which includes a 700 km
stretch through Turkmenistan. Ambassador Bichakli said there
were rumors that the railroad would be used to transport
uranium processed at the currently inactive Turkmen uranium
plant to Iran.
¶3. (S) COMMENT: Ambassador Bichakli did not provide his

sources, but noted that for Turkmenistan to collaborate with
Russia to transport processed uranium to Iran, particularly
in a surreptitious manner, is inconsistent with its policy of
neutrality. Post will report any further information on this
issue. END COMMENT.
MILES
Viewing cable 09BERLIN168, GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS

IN TOWEL
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO8118
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0168/01 0420612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110612Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF PRIORITY 0187
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 7859
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG PRIORITY 0263
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 1988
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
STATE FOR EUR/AGS(SCHROEDER), EEB/IFD/OMA, AND DRL/ILCSR

LABOR FOR ILAB(BRUMFIELD)
TREASURY FOR ICN(KOHLER) AND OASIA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019

TAGS: EFIN PREL PGOV GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS IN TOWEL
BERLIN 00000168 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The sudden resignation of Economics Minister
Michael Glos (CSU) on February 7 caught Chancellor Angela
Merkel (CDU) and her party off guard at a time when
addressing Germany's economic downturn is paramount. To
minimize damage, the CSU quickly replaced Glos with its
Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, a decision
which continues to draw criticism from other parties as well
as from within the CDU due to thirty-seven-year-old,s
minimal background in economic policy. The shuffle reveals
strains between the CDU and CSU, and presents an opportunity
for Merkel's political foes to portray her as lacking control
as the country tries to deal with its worst economic crisis
since World War II. END SUMMARY.
INITIAL CONFUSION OVER RESIGNATION

----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Citing his age and intention to leave the cabinet
after the September 2009 elections, the sixty-four-year-old
Glos submitted his resignation as Minister for Economics and
Technology on February 7. Chairman of the Christian Social
Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party of Chancellor Merkel's
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and Bavarian Minister
President Horst Seehofer named Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg,
37, as his successor. Zu Guttenberg had been CSU Secretary
General for only three months following a major party
reshuffle. Glos explained his departure would allow the CSU
to campaign with a new minister in place, and help restore
trust in the CSU following its poor showing in the Bavarian
regional elections in September 2008. The timing of his
departure -- during the financial and economic crises --
however, was awkward. In addition, Glos submitted his
resignation to Seehofer instead of Merkel, which the media
has portrayed as a snub to the Chancellor. (NOTE: Bavarian
political reactions to be reported in ConGen Munich SEPTEL.)
ENTER THE YOUNG TURK

--------------------
¶3. (SBU) Under pressure to resolve an apparent power vacuum

at a key ministry, Seehofer, who as CSU Party Chairman had
the right to fill the slot, had to find a replacement for
Glos quickly. At a February 9 press conference announcing
the choice of zu Guttenberg, Seehofer said that he chose the
rising CSU star partly in order to have a minister
representing the northern region of Bavaria. He lauded zu
Guttenberg's international contacts and his presumed ability
to promote German exports. Seehofer denied reports that
before accepting the new post, zu Guttenberg had demanded the
high-level position of CSU Bundestag Spokesman and CDU/CSU
Caucus Chief in case the CDU/CSU lost the September
elections. For his part, zu Guttenberg welcomed the
opportunity to take on the economics portfolio. He described
Germany's "social market economy" as the "guiding principle"
of his economic thinking, and underscored the importance of
free trade. Zu Guttenberg also said he would work to lower
taxes for small- and medium-sized companies.
GLOS'S ROUGH RIDE

-----------------
¶4. (C) Glos had always been an awkward fit for the Economics
Ministry job, which he took on in November 2005. Glos did
bring intimate knowledge of federal politics to the job, but
was not an economist and had never shown strong interest in
the Economics Ministry's portfolio. Chancellor Merkel
instinctively turned to her Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck
(SPD) to coordinate the response to the financial crisis,
sidelining Glos. Glos's inability to overcome CDU and SPD
objectives and get additional tax cuts into the stimulus plan
may have cost the CSU the recent Bavarian elections, to the
dismay of Seehofer and others in the CSU.
¶5. (C) A devastating profile of Glos a few months ago in "Der

Spiegel," whose main points Ministry contacts did not
contadict, portrayed him as weak, out of touch with the
bureaucracy, bored with his job, and looking forward to a
nice sinecure for himself after retirement. In a farewell
BERLIN 00000168 002.2 OF 002
meeting with former Ambassador Timken in late November 2008,

Glos appeared under great strain and confessed to tremendous
frustration over his inability to influence Merkel on tax
cuts as part of the stimulus package.
NO LOVE LOST
------------
¶6. (C) SPD party stalwarts are giddy over perceived turmoil
in the CSU and the perception that Merkel is not in control
of developments. Chancellor-candidate Frank-Walter
Steinmeier (SPD) said the CDU/CSU lacked "orientation" in
their management of the economic crisis and called for "party
order and discipline." A CDU staffer expressed irritation
over Seehofer's handling of the shuffle, but she shed no
tears over Glos's departure. On zu Guttenberg, FDP economics
expert Rainer Bruederle commented to us that "as far as
economics is concerned, it seems to be enough these days for
the CSU to find someone who can read and write."
¶7. (C) The business community has mixed views. An IBM

lobbyist told Econoff that she regarded Glos as the only
"counterweight to Steinbrueck" on economic policymaking in
the Germany government. A contact from the German industry
association (BDI) conceded that Glos was "not the strongest
Minister in the Cabinet," adding that BDI had often wished
for someone in the position who was "more outspoken." On zu
Guttenberg, he conceded the new Minister was well-versed in
foreign policy and transatlantic issues, though young and
inexperienced.
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (C) Glos's resignation caught the CDU/CSU party hierarchy

off-guard at a time when everyone in Berlin and Munich was
concentrating on the Munich Security Conference. This
high-profile resignation opens the door to criticism of
Merkel,s handling of the economic and financial crises, as
well as Seehofer's leadership style. Zu Guttenberg's first
challenge will be to help resolve the debate between the
CDU/CSU and SPD over the stimulus package. His appointment
has been heavily criticized within the CDU, with some calling
him a mere "place holder" until the September elections,
raising questions about Merkel,s ability to steer her party
effectively through a long &super8 election year. If not
addressed, the SPD and the opposition FDP could emerge
strengthened by the affair, which has come at a very
inopportune time for Chancellor Merkel,s CDU and its sister
party, the CSU. END COMMENT.
¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with ConGens Frankfurt and
Munich.
Koenig
Viewing cable 09BISHKEK135, CHINESE AMBASSADOR FLUSTERED BY

KYRGYZ ALLEGATIONS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09BISHKEK135.
09BISHKEK135 2009-02-13 11:11 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bishkek
VZCZCXRO1478
DE RUEHEK #0135/01 0441151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131151Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0094
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000135
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KG
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR FLUSTERED BY KYRGYZ ALLEGATIONS
OF MONEY FOR CLOSING MANAS
REF: A. BISHKEK 96
¶B. BISHKEK 85
BISHKEK 00000135 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: During a meeting with the Ambassador

February 13, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yannian ridiculed the
idea, but did not deny categorically, that China would
provide Kyrgyzstan a $3 billion financial package in return
for closing Manas Air Base. Zhang said Kyrgyzstan was in
Russia's sphere of influence, and China had only commercial
interests here. He also complained bitterly about Chinese
Guantanamo detainees being shipped to Germany instead of
China. Zhang was very interested in whether the U.S. would
negotiate to keep Manas, and he advised just giving the
Kyrgyz $150 million a year for the Base. "This is all about
money," he said. End Summary.
LOSING THE ABILITY TO SPEAK RUSSIAN
¶2. (C) Ambassador met February 13 with Chinese Ambassador to

Kyrgyzstan Zhang Yannian. After opening pleasantries, the
Ambassador mentioned that Kyrgyz officials had told her that
China had offered a $3 billion financial package to close
Manas Air Base and asked for the Ambassador's reaction to
such an allegation. Visibly flustered, Zhang temporarily
lost the ability to speak Russian and began spluttering in
Chinese to the silent aide diligently taking notes right
behind him. Once he had recovered the power of Russian
speech, he inveighed against such a calumny, claiming that
such an idea was impossible, China was a staunch opponent of
terrorism, and China's attitude toward Kyrgyzstan's decision
to close Manas was one of "respect and understanding."
¶3. (C) Composing himself, Zhang inquired if maybe the Kyrgyz

had meant the trade turnover between the two countries, which
he claimed was about $3 billion a year. When disabused of
that notion, Zhang went on at length to explain that China
could not afford a $3 billion loan and aid package. "It
would take $3 from every Chinese person" to pay for it. "If
our people found out, there'd be a revolution," he said. "We
have 200 million people unemployed" because of the downturn
in exports, he said, and millions of disabled and others who
need help from the government.
A SLAP IN THE FACE
¶4. (C) When the Ambassador asked whether he would

categorically deny what the Kyrgyz officials had told her
about a deal with China, Zhang snapped that "releasing 17
from Guantanamo is an unfriendly act toward us." He then
went on at length about what a "slap in the face" it was to
China that the Uighur detainees were not going to be returned
to their homeland but instead shipped to Germany, where
reportedly they had already been granted refugee status.
While not stating a tit-for-tat reaction on Manas, he did
imply that the Guantanamo situation had made China look for
ways to hit back at the U.S. When the Ambassador inquired if
maybe the Chinese were favorably disposed toward closing
Manas because of their SCO membership, Zhang acknowledged
that the SCO had pronounced for closing Manas, but claimed
that "that was years ago and nothing has happened since." He
denied that the SCO was pressuring the Kyrgyz to close Manas.
RUSSIA: A GIFT FROM GOD FOR THE KYRGYZ
¶5. (C) The Ambassador then asked what Zhang thought about the
$2 billion plus Russian deal with Kyrgyzstan. After some
hemming and hawing, Zhang said it was "probably true" that
BISHKEK 00000135 002.2 OF 002
the Russian assistance was tied to closing Manas. Asked if

he had any concerns about the Kyrgyz Republic falling ever
deeper into the Russian sphere of influence and whether China
had any interest in countering this, he answered that
Kyrgyzstan was already in that sphere, and China had no
interest in balancing that influence. "Kyrgyzstan is
Russia's neighbor," he intoned (somewhat expansively, since
Kyrgyzstan does not share a border with the Russian
Federation -- though it does share a border with China).
"And when the Kyrgyz ask me about this, I always tell them
that a neighbor is a gift from God." As for China's
interests in the Kyrgyz Republic, he stated flatly: "We have
only commercial interests here. We want to increase
investment and trade. We have no interest in politics." He
claimed that some Kyrgyz had argued for China to open a base
in Kyrgyzstan to counterbalance Russian and American
influence in the country, but China has no interest in a
base. "We want no military or political advantage.
Therefore, we wouldn't pay $3 billion for Manas," he argued.
PERSONAL ADVICE: PAY THEM $150 MILLION
¶6. (C) Zhang asked the Ambassador whether the U.S. would
negotiate to keep the Base open. The Ambassador answered
that the U.S. side was evaluating its options. Zhang then
offered his "personal advice," "This is all about money," he
said. He understood from the Kyrgyz that they needed $150
million. The Ambassador explained that the U.S. does provide
$150 million in assistance to Kyrgyzstan each year, including
numerous assistance programs. Zhang suggested that the U.S.
should scrap its assistance programs. "Just give them $150
million in cash" per year, and "you will have the Base
forever." Very uncharacteristically, the silent young aide
then jumped in: "Or maybe you should give them $5 billion and
buy both us and the Russians out." The aide then withered
under the Ambassador's horrified stare.
¶7. (C) Commenting on the recent diplomatic corps lunch (Ref

B), Zhang noted that Russian Ambassador Vlasov had been in an
expansive mood and dominated portions of the meeting. "I
think that's when he found out that they'd reached a deal"
with Bakiyev to close the Base, he opined. Zhang, who is
doyen of the diplomatic corps, said he would be leaving
Bishkek soon, but did not yet know his next assignment. "In
our service," he said, "we don't know our postings until the
last minute."
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Zhang was clearly flustered when confronted with the
claims of Kyrgyz officials that they were negotiating a
financial deal with China in return for closing the Base.
While he ridiculed the notion of such a deal, he did not deny
it outright. Perhaps because of his being discomposed, he
returned several times to the topic of a possible revolution
in China if the economic picture does not improve and work is
not found for the millions of unemployed there. In our
experience, talk of revolution at home is taboo for Chinese
diplomats. While candid at times, the meeting ended on a
very cordial note.
GFOELLER
Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS269, GUANTANAMO: AMBASSADOR

WILLIAMSON CONFERS WITH EU
Discussing cables
09BRUSSELS269 2009-02-25 18:06 2010-11-30 17:05 CONFIDENTIAL USEU Brussels
VZCZCXRO2517
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0269/01 0561846
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251846Z FEB 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000269
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI, S/CT, EUR/ERA, INL, INL/PC, INL/AAE, L/LEI

DRL/MLGA
NSC FOR KVIEN
DOD FOR OSD/OFFICE OF DETAINEE AFFAIRS
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OFFICES OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2019

TAGS PREL, KAWK, KISL, PTER, EUN
SUBJECT: GUANTANAMO: AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON CONFERS WITH EU
OFFICIALS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 120 B. BRUSSELS 159 C. BRUSSELS 268
Classified By: USEU Political M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson and European Union (EU)
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove discussed de Kerchove’s
upcoming whitepaper for the EU Council on detainee issues and its relevance for
developing a common EU position on the topic. The two also spoke about which
governments are open to accepting detainees and how, if possible, to mitigate
member state concerns regarding detainees’ freedom of movement in the Schengen
zone. De Kerchove is in favor of an EU blessing of bilateral negotiations
between member states and the US on detainee transfers, and said there is an EU
precedent for placing travel restrictions on residency permit holders (one
possible solution to Schengen concerns).
¶2. (C) Williamson also met with the EU Parliamentarians responsible for the now
ratified EU Joint Resolution on Guantanamo, congratulating them on receiving
support from across the political spectrum. Separately, the Ambassador sat down
with Riina Kionka, Javier Solana’s Personal Representative for Human Rights. She
suggested a stronger public information campaign on the nature of the detainees
at Guantanamo, and expressed concern that EU Member States were under intense
Chinese pressure not to accept Uighur detainees. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------
De Kerchove’s EU Perspective
----------------------------
¶3. (C) On his tenth day of travels within the EU, Ambassador Williamson met in
Brussels February 17 with EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove.
The C/T Coordinator briefly discussed his upcoming whitepaper on detainee
issues, which was tasked to him by the EU Council. It will include 15 “non-
controversial” principles to guide EU consensus building, as well as lessons
learned from the Church of the Nativity resettlement (ref A), information on
previous U.S. policies and the new executive order, and potential resettlement
options outside and within the EU. Ambassador Williamson provided general
information on the number of released detainees who had reengaged in terrorism,
as well as the distinction between “cleared for release” and “cleared for
transfer” designations by the USG.
¶4. (C) On forming an EU position, De Kerchove indicated that a favorable

scenario would be a consensus agreement allowing individual members to accept
detainees, provided transfers are not forced on any unwilling EU member.
Williamson noted that the Czechs, in their capacity as EU president, were
committed to developing this consensus position. The two then went on to discuss
concerns over former detainees’ freedom of movement in the Schengen zone.
Williamson stated that it is a common concern among EU members, and floated the
possibility of former detainees having restrictions placed on their travel, a
stipulation that some of the detainees and their lawyers have consented to in
principle. De Kerchove replied that a precedent existed for such restrictions,
which he felt could help mitigate Schengen concerns of member states, though
they would be difficult to enforce in practice. The Ambassador cited the
February 26, 2009 Justice and Home Affairs Informal Meeting as an important
near-term milestone in building momentum towards an EU position. De Kerchove was
of the opinion that it was a bit early to expect an official position given the
complex nature of the issue. He had hoped discussions would occur first among
ambassadors within the Committee of Permanent Representatives, however the Czech
Presidency insisted on moving forward with discussions among Justice and
Interior Ministers.
¶5. (C) Conversation then shifted to the USG process moving forward. Williamson
described two parallel U.S. review processes; (1) review of the files of all 242
detainees at
BRUSSELS 00000269 002 OF 003
Guantanamo, and (2) review of policies involving detention, Guantanamo, and
related issues. Files must be collected from multiple departments, agencies, and
locations for review by an interagency team, including DOJ prosecutors and
representatives from the State, Defense, and Homeland Security departments, as
well as the intelligence agencies. The U.S. will prioritize cases of detainees
being considered for resettlement by EU governments.
¶6. (C) Williamson and De Kerchove agreed to consult further after the February
26 JHA Informal meeting and before anticipated travel by JHA Commissioner
Jacques Barrot, Czech Interior Minister Langer, and De Kerchove to Washington in
mid March.
-------------------------
“We need better pictures”
-------------------------
¶7. (C) During a subsequent meeting on February 17 with Riina Kionka, High
Representative Javier Solana’s Personal Representative for Human Rights,
Ambassador Williamson briefed on the process called for by the President’s
recent executive orders on closure of Guantanamo detention facilities, and
exchanged views on the state of play regarding EU-level efforts on acceptance of
Guantanamo detainees.
¶8. (C) While emphasizing that EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de

Kerchove had the lead on this issue, Kionka raised a few specific concerns and
ideas. She told us that Member States have been under intense pressure from
China not to accept Uighurs, and that some are concerned about possible
repercussions in bilateral and EU-level relations with China if they accept
detainees. She acknowledged that this pressure was not unusual from China, but
did not know if it would affect Member State decision-making.
¶9. (C) Kionka also highlighted the gap between public perceptions of the kinds
of detaines at Guantanamo and the reality that many ar very low risk. She felt
that this was a message the U.S. had to carry, and urged the administration to
“plainly” explain to Americans (and thus Europeans) that while some detainees
are very dangerous, many of them do not pose a serious threat. Kionka also
commented that whenever a European newspaper ran a story on Guantanamo, they ran
the typical picture of a hunched-over detainee in an orange jumpsuit. She said
that “we need better pictures” and urged us to turn the story around by showing
low-risk detainees in a better light.
---------------------
Parliamentary support
---------------------
¶10. (C) Amb. Williamson hosted a lunch for three Members of the European
Parliament (MEP) who were the principal authors of a recent resolution
supporting U.S. efforts to close Guantanamo and EU efforts to assist with
detainee resettlement. MEPs Ursula Gacek (EPP-ED, Poland), Baroness Sarah
Ludford (ALDE, UK), and Jan Marinus Wiersma (PSE, Netherlands) told us that the
results of the vote (542 in favor, 55 abstaining, 51 opposed) show the broad
bipartisan support that the EP has for European resettlement efforts. They said
that it was difficult to craft a text that all parties could support, but that
the EP felt it was important to express a “helpful” sentiment. Williamson
expressed appreciation for their efforts in securing passage of the resolution
and indicated that it sent a positive message to EU states considering
resettlements.
¶11. (C) The MEPs were careful to point out that the support was not
unqualified. Legal issues surrounding the admission of detainees into the
Schengen Zone needed to be resolved to the satisfaction of Member States not
accepting detainees, they said. MEP Ludford, known to be somewhat outspoken,
drew criticism from her colleagues when she spoke of her personal opinion that
Member States who participated in alleged CIA
BRUSSELS 00000269 003 OF 003
rendition operations to Guantanamo had a particular ethical responsibility to
accept detainees if it would contribute to the closure of the facility. She
noted that the EP would adopt a resolution on CIA flights at that week’s plenary
session.
¶12. (U) Ambassador Williamson has cleared on this telegram.
MURRAY .
Viewing cable 09CAIRO231, SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN

FM ABOUL GHEIT
Discussing cables
09CAIRO231 2009-02-09 16:04 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Cairo
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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019

TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS QA IR SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has

been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was
first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including
President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's
immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the
President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians
believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous
Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit
likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to
influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets.
He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the
region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some
pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for
Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the
candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for
Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights
(specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or
democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to
discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling;
Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and
counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely
eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective;
and our military-to-military relationship is durable but
stuck in a force-on-force mindset.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane,

with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian
failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign
pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you
and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen.
You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional
leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring
about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to
continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a
permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and
conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more
effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling
across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul
Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza
Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful
Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US
intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator
Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose
our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe
a word they say." End summary.
------------------------
Respect and Appreciation
------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East

Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during
his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that
he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians
have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and
at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to
force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul
Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a
ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You
should ask him what the current state of play is between
Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the
future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and
vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react
well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very
often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's
self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is
contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues,
including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
-----------------------------------------
Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about

the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic
political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their
role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the
only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all
Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers
them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he
sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the
CAIRO 00000231 002 OF 004
June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the

leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto
national security advisor with direct responsibility for the
Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to
intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the
Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long
truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to
the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started
those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a
year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to
bring about their political goal of Palestinian
reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government
headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
----------------
Gaza and Tunnels
----------------
¶5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza
is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a
well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat,
a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008
border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and
more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt,
unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza
border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most
smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground.
The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as
honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant
colony.
¶6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's

bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence
forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas
is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the
Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long
criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms
smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining
and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter
arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded
tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and
requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray
machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and
explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this
EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate
with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent
militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from
crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity
in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President
Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."
¶7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be
perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and
they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that
foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to
counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from
our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into
Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with
Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do
not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able
to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the
Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing
and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to
open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during
the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent
medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all
other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at
Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only
reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is
under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.
¶8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic

and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms
smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza
and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While
in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with
technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling
success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to
smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate
economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza
borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to
smuggle.
----------------------------------
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
----------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he

CAIRO 00000231 003 OF 004
wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors

Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to
accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum
on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the
lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to
him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he
will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.
-------------
Iraq and Iran
-------------
¶10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting

members of Congress how he warned former President Bush
against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a
wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian
misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in
Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to
continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the
greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans
to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange
accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian
ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for
Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic,
referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing
them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He
sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and
liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and
its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear
capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution."
Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not
oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did
not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be
keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards
Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit
carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more
interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again;
President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the
Syrians at this time.
------------------------
U.S. Assistance to Egypt
------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago --

Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance
to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest
understanding of the state of play with the FY2009
appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning,
the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF
in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09,
a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because
they need the money (they say), but because it shows our
diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my
view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program
aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to
demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a
strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been
unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in
Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt
accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program
funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a
serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to
resolve them as soon as possible.
¶12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian

political and military leadership feel that they have been
"short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3
billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and
which they contrast with increases to our military assistance
to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in
international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef
Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's
policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a
developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for
your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.
---------------------------------
Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
---------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public

chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition
Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal
affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak
takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we
raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that
we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and
CAIRO 00000231 004 OF 004
distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with

Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
the outspoken political science professor and democracy
activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of
spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming
Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s
Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only
criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press
Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE
to stop arresting other less prominent political activists.
Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his
sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to
lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization
and human rights concerns. You might note that although you
and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt
could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues
from the agenda.
------------
Farouq Hosny
------------
¶13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international

campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq
Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and
the African Union have already publicly stated their
commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have
the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul
Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to
actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next
Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year
that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to
put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's
merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to
narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S.
objections have been to statements Hosny has made that
"Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from
others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable
remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must
provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or
Muslim.
SCOBEY
Viewing cable 09DJIBOUTI113, DJIBOUTI APPROVES BLACKWATER FOR

COMMERCIAL COUNTER-PIRACY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09DJIBOUTI113.
09DJIBOUTI113 2009-02-12 16:04 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Djibouti
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000113
SIPDIS SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SBU DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
CJTF-HOA AND AFRICOM FOR POLAD
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-02-12

TAGS: PREL PHSA MOPS BEXP DJ SO XA
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI APPROVES BLACKWATER FOR COMMERCIAL COUNTER-PIRACY
OPERATIONS
REF: a) LONDON 62 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti;
REASON: 1.4(D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. U.S. security firm, Blackwater Worldwide (BW), has
received permission from the Government of Djibouti to operate an
armed ship from the port of Djibouti, to protect commercial
shipping from pirates off the coast of Somalia. Blackwater's
U.S.-flagged ship is expected to arrive in early March, and will
have a crew of 33 AmCits, including three 6-man armed teams who
will operate in continuous shifts. The Djiboutian Navy will secure
Blackwater's weapons (i.e., .50-caliber machine guns) while ashore
in Djibouti. Blackwater does not intend to take any pirates into
custody, but will use lethal force against pirates if necessary; it
is developing an SOP that is currently under legal review and will
be shared with the USG. Blackwater's counter-piracy operation does
not have any clients yet, but Blackwater expects business to
develop following a public launch in Djibouti in March with GODJ
officials. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On Feb. 8, ex-FSO Robert Emmett Downey, Blackwater

Worldwide's Development Manager for Africa, provided the following
update to Amb. Swan, DCM, and Bob Patterson (TDY from Embassy
Nairobi):
a) Hassan Said Khaireh--triple-hatted as Djibouti's national

security advisor, head of the security/intelligence service, and
director of President Guelleh's Military Office--has given BW
permission to operate its armed ship in Djibouti. BW met with
Hassan Said on Feb. 7, following an earlier meeting in WashDC
between BW's CEO Erik Prince and Cofer Black with Djiboutian Amb.
to the U.S. Robleh Olhaye. This is the only such arrangement so
far that BW has made with a host government in the region, but BW
will likely engage Oman and Kenya in the future (e.g., in the event
of a mechanical malfunction, the only facilities capable of
repairing BW's ship are located in Mombasa.) Within the USG, BW
has briefed AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and Embassy Nairobi officials.
b) BW's ship is the 'McArthur," a U.S.-flagged 183-foot ex-NOAA

vessel. While it has landing space for two helicopters, it will
have an unarmed UAV, but no helicopters (which BW considers too
expensive). The ship will be armed with .50-caliber machine guns,
and is able to protect a 3-ship convoy. The Djiboutian Navy will
secure BW's weapons, once ashore, and will inspect BW's weapons
lockers. According to Downey, BW's business concept--having its
armed ship escort other ships requiring protection--is consistent
with recent IMO/industry recommendations discouraging the carriage
of firearms, or the presence of embarked armed security teams,
aboard commercial ships themselves (e.g., see reftel, on the 85th
session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee). The 'McArthur' will
dock in Djibouti for 36-72 hours every 30 days, to replenish its
stores. According to Downey, BW is the only such firm with its own
ship.
c) All personnel on BW's ship will be U.S. citizens: comprising 15

crew and 18 armed security personnel (three 6-man teams who will
operate in continuous 8-hour shifts). These 33 "operators" will
rotate every 60 days. For medical contingencies, BW has
arranged--through its local agent in Djibouti, Inchcape
(London-based international shipper with numerous business
activities in Djibouti)--access to Bouffard, the French military
hospital in Djibouti. The 'McArthur" will arrive in Djibouti in
early March, after transitting Gilbraltar and Acaba, Jordan. BW
CEO Erik Prince plans to travel to DJ for its public launch.
d) Downey underscored BW's emphasis on compliance with U.S. laws,

including defense trade controls: BW has a VP for export
compliance, and depends on the USG (DOD) for contracts. BW's ship,
the 'McArthur", will have video cameras to record BW counter-piracy
activities.
e) BW has no intention of taking any pirates into custody. While

the French have previously put pirates ashore in Puntland, Downey
said BW had no plans to do so, either in Somalia or Kenya (noting
that Kenya's bilateral PUC agreements with the USG and HMG were
government-to-government). BW will share its SOP with Embassies
Djibouti and Nairobi once approved; SOP is currently under legal
review, as there is "no precedent for a paramilitary operation in a
purely commercial environment." While asserting that international
maritime law allows the use of lethal force against pirates, BW
DJIBOUTI 00000113 002 OF 002
also recognizes the need to respect international humanitarian

obligations. Of concern, for example, is whether BW would be
responsible for assisting injured pirates, if doing so endangered
BW's ability to protect its client(s).
f) BW's local agent in Djibouti is Inchcape. Bruno Pardigon,

general manager of the newly formed "Djibouti Maritime Security
Services" (DMSS), will provide BW with a license, following
completion of an MOU with DMSS. Downey was unsure whether DMSS was
a parastatal or a quasi-government agency of the GODJ. [COMMENT:
Pardigon is favorably known to the Embassy as a French-Djiboutian
businessman and marine conservationist who runs a diving operation
in Djibouti.] While Downey will remain in Djibouti until March
2009, BW has no plans now to establish an office in Djibouti.
g) While protection is estimated to cost less than $200,000 per

trip, BW's Djibouti operation has no contracts yet for clients.
Downey commented that the shipping industry may assess that piracy
is declining: only 3 ships were pirated in January 2009; there are
at least 4 foreign naval vessels currently docked in Djibouti
conducting counter-piracy operations; and the EU's Operation
Atalanta is providing military escort of ships.
¶3. (U) COMMENT. Djibouti's decision to permit Blackwater to begin

counter-piracy operations follows ongoing GODJ efforts aimed at
addressing the piracy threat. Djibouti recently hosted an IMO
conference on Somali piracy that, inter alia, recommended Djibouti
serve as a center for maritime training. Numerous foreign military
counter-piracy operations are based in Djibouti--involving units
from Spain, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and other EU members.
Japan (septel) and Korea are also considering military deployments
to Djibouti to support counter-piracy efforts. Djibouti is a
founding member of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS) and has offered to host the group's planned
Counter-Piracy Coordination Cell.
¶4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Blackwater's presence in Djibouti would

make it one of the largest U.S. businesses operating in the
country. As the host of the only U.S. military base in Africa, as
well as a country with extensive commercial port facilities,
Djibouti has a commercial interest in supporting foreign investors,
including U.S. contractors. Blackwater executives seek to involve
both Djiboutian and USG principals in a high-profile March 2009
launch; Post would appreciate Department's guidance on the
appropriate level of engagement with Blackwater, while also
fulfilling the USG's commercial advocacy responsibilities to
support U.S. firms. END COMMENT.
SWAN
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD270, CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS

KAYANI AND ISI
Discussing cables
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TAGS: PREL PTER MARR PGOV PK
SUBJECT: CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI
PASHA
¶1. (S) Summary: Senators Biden and Graham met with Chief of
Army Staff (COAS) Kayani and Director General of ISI LTGen
Pasha on January 9 to underscore bipartisan support for the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Senator Biden emphasized the
need for the American people to see results soon in
Afghanistan, and he wanted to be sure the U.S. and Pakistan
had the same enemy as we moved forward. Senator Biden sought
Kayani's views about what kind of Afghanistan would represent
success for Pakistan.
¶2. (S) Kayani said the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same
page, but there would be tactical differences. Cooperation
with U.S. military, with whom he had excellent relations, had
improved. Kayani stressed the military's support for
Pakistan's civilian government. He described his campaign in
Bajaur and plans to confront the insurgents in the rest of
the tribal agencies. Kayani said he urgently needed help for
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Kayani was candid that
the government has essentially abandoned the Swat valley.
Senator Graham emphasized the need to prosecute the
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leaders involved in the Mumbai attacks
and to incorporate the tribal agencies into Pakistan's legal
system. End summary.
¶3. (S) Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Senator Lindsey

Graham (R-SC), accompanied by Ambassador and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Staff Director Antony Blinken, met with
COAS Kayani and DG ISI Pasha January 9 for ninety minutes.
Senator Biden asked Kayani to describe his view of a stable
Afghanistan.
¶4. (S) Senator Graham added his presence emphasized

bipartisan support for Pakistan. (He had just visited
Pakistan three weeks ago.) Senator Graham said he was going
to support the Biden-Lugar bill, but he needed to convince
his constituents of the value of investing in schools in
Pakistan instead of South Carolina. Pakistan needed to
prosecute those involved in the Mumbai attacks and be seen as
a country that observed the rule of law.
¶5. (S) Kayani replied that Pakistan and the US had a

convergence of interests. Kayani's goal was a peaceful,
friendly and stable Afghanistan. Kayani said he had no
desire to control Afghanistan. In fact, he said, anyone who
wanted to control Afghanistan was ignorant of history, since
no one has ever controlled it. Kayani noted there had been
confusion about the policy of "strategic depth" but for him
"strategic depth" meant a peaceful Afghanistan "on his back."
But the Pashtuns have to be accommodated, Kayani added.
Biden asked if Kayani made a distinction between the Pashtuns
and the Taliban. Kayani replied that the Taliban were a
reality, but the Afghan government dominated by the Taliban
had had a negative effect on Pakistan.
¶6. (S) Kayani recalled he told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

Admiral Mullen that the U.S. needed realistic expectations of
what the Pakistani military could achieve and that these
expectations had to be clearly articulated. Kayani described
his campaign in Bajaur and his plans to confront the
insurgents in other tribal agencies, but he repeatedly said
he had capacity problems, particularly regarding equipment.
Kayani said he needed urgent support for the 150,000 people
displaced from the fighting. He said the military had
undertaken hundreds of sorties in Bajaur, and the population
of Bajaur was so far supportive of the military efforts.
Senator Graham mentioned the success of the CERP program in
Iraq and Afghanistan which had put money in the hands of
commanders for urgent community needs.
¶7. (S) Kayani recounted the situation in Swat in which the

provincial government had made accommodations with the
militants, requiring the army to retake the area repeatedly.
Kayani also said the population, once it saw the army pull
out, was far less likely to support it the second time
around. The military had to be followed by civilian agencies
or the local support would diminish.
¶8. (S) Kayani said military efforts needed the political

support of the civilian government. He recalled that when
ISLAMABAD 00000270 002 OF 003

the Federal Investigative Agency headquarters in Lahore had
been hit by suicide bombers, the citizens of Lahore had
demonstrated against the government rather than against the
suicide bombers. While the army had sent the message in
Bajaur that it meant business, there had to be follow-up
support from the civilian agencies. Kayani said as his
campaign moved through the tribal agencies, the army should
ideally need to use diminishing force. When they have to
fight for the same ground repeatedly, it becomes increasingly
difficult and demoralizing to the troops.
¶9. (S) Senator Biden asked Kayani if he had the capacity and
could obtain sufficient resources, would he then move against
Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Commander Nazir, and
the Haqqanis? Senator Biden asked Kayani if he were prepared
to move into the Waziristans.
¶10. (S) Kayani replied that Bajaur had been the "hardest nut
to crack" militarily: the Pakistani military had undertaken
an operation in South Waziristan last October, but the army
had moved out because of the elections. The Pakistani
military had also had a fort in the middle of Waziristan
which had been cut off by militants. Kayani said he was
painfully aware that the army had to retake South Waziristan
since ninety percent of the suicide bombers came from
Baitullah Mehsud. "He has to be cut down to size," said
Kayani.
¶11. (S) But, Kayani said, the Pakistani military could not
fight everyone at once. They would have to go after Mehsud
and Nazir sequentially (a point Pasha confirmed). Biden said
it was important to be in agreement on this issue. Pasha
said the United States and Pakistan needed to have confidence
in each other. Pasha said he was hurt about the inference
that he did not have a relationship of trust with CIA. He
had gone to Washington for a frank talk with CIA Director
Hayden and he often briefed, and sought the advice of, the
RAO Chief in Islamabad. Senator Biden repeated he was not
going to revisit the past. Pasha replied that there was no
reason for ISI to be protecting "these people" and he had no
interest in saving them.
¶12. (S) Senator Biden said he needed to know that the

situation had changed. Senator Biden said he understood that
the Pakistani military lacked capacity, but would the
situation change if they had additional resources? It was
important to know if we had the same enemy: the U.S. needed
to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan's part
of the bargain.
Graham added that "General Musharraf had cut deals, but those
deals didn't work out."
¶13. (S) Kayani repeated there had been considerable

cooperation on the technical level with U.S. forces. But
this did not mean that there would not be differences of
opinion on tactics. On Afghanistan, Kayani stressed )
"past, present, and future" -- we are on the same page.
¶14. (S) Regarding LeT, Kayani said Pakistan would not allow
small groups to dictate state policy. Pakistan had not
waited for evidence and they had moved immediately. The
information they had now was based on confessions. Pakistan
needed Indian cooperation to move the investigation forward.
Kayani also insisted that any information available about
upcoming attacks be shared with Pakistan. He understood that
information about the attack had been provided to India but
not to Pakistan. He said repeated discussion about "the next
attack and all bets were off" only provided an incentive for
another attack. Biden said that what was important was
Pakistan's action against LeT and similar organizations.
Senator Biden said he would share what he had heard with
Admiral Mullen and emphasized the need for results.
¶15. (S) General Kayani said he appreciated the Senators'

frank response. He repeated his need for help with IDPs.
Senator Biden said the system of reimbursement through
Coalition Support Funds would be reexamined. Kayani said
that the military had only received about $300 million of the
$1 billion ostensibly reimbursed for military expenses. He
was not implying that the money had been stolen, but had been
used for general budget support.
ISLAMABAD 00000270 003 OF 003
¶16. CODEL Biden has cleared this message.

PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD284, PRESIDENT ZARDARI DISCUSSES AQ

KHAN RELEASE
Discussing cables
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TAGS: PREL PGOV PK KNNP PARM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ZARDARI DISCUSSES AQ KHAN RELEASE
REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 267 (B) ISLAMABAD 280
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: President Zardari assured the Ambassador on

February 8 that A.Q. Khan would remain under house arrest and
not engage with the media. Minister of Interior Rehman Malik
also insisted that Khan would be prohibited from talking to
the press and politicians, and his movements would be
curtailed. Zardari and Malik speculated to the Ambassador
that Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) party leader Nawaz
Sharif was about to run A.Q. Khan for the Senate on his
party,s slate. The Pakistani Government claims that they
were trying to establish a legal basis for Khan,s detention,
as he had been restrained previously by the Ministry of
Defense "for his own security." However, the timinig of the
court decision obviously took Zardari by surprise, reflecting
the GOP,s persistent lack of coordination and message
control. Now the government is trying to catch up. End
Summary.
¶2. (S) President Zardari assured the Ambassador on February 8

that A.Q. Khan would not talk to the press and would remain
under strict control. Ambassador conveyed that the release
of A.Q. Khan, the world's most serious nuclear proliferator,
aggravated by Khan,s press conference on his front lawn
thanking Zardari and Interior Minister Rehman Malik for his
release, was a very unfortunate signal to send to the world.
For the United States, it was particularly unsettling coming
on the eve of Ambassador Holbrooke,s visit and as the U.S.
Congress considered assistance and trade bills for Pakistan.
The U.S. was seeking a commitment that A.Q. Khan would stay
out of the press and his movements would be restricted as
before. Zardari argued that referring Khan,s detention to
the Islamabad High Court was designed to prevent Khan from
receiving a Senate ticket from PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif.
"Where would I have been then?" Zardari said. Zardari said
he would be sure that the police who were stationed at
Khan,s house would not "pamper him."
¶3. (S) Minister of Interior Rehman Malik also reassured the

Ambassador and DCM in several phone calls and meetings that
A.Q. Khan would be kept under wraps; he would not talk to
reporters or politicians, and his movements would be strictly
controlled. Malik reported that President Zardari, who
heard about the court decision from the Ambassador and then
Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Haqqani and not his own
ministers, had been annoyed about being blindsided. Malik
told us that there had been no previous legal basis for the
Khan detention. (Note. This is true. The head of
Pakistan,s nuclear "Strategic Plans Division" Lt. General
Kidwai has often told us that there was no legal basis for
the Khan detention except to provide for his own security.
End Note) Malik said repeatedly that the press conference
had "gotten out of hand" and the press had rushed to Khan,s
house even before the decision was announced. xxxxx End
Note.)
Media Reaction
--------------
¶4. (U) Unsurprisingly, Khan's press conference was widely
covered by the electronic and print media. All papers ran Dr.
Khan's "triumphant" photograph above the fold showing him
waving to the media and public supporters at his residence.
Stories included the international reaction with particular
emphasis on the U.S., U.K., France, and India expressing
"concern" about the decision and declaring Khan "a danger for
world peace." Articles and editorials questioned how free
Khan actually was and speculated on the contents of the
secret Annex A. The Urdu press noted that "people came out on
the roads, raised slogans in favor of Dr. Khan, and
distributed sweatmeats." Urdu editorials unanimously praised
the decision and protested the "Hue and Cry Over Release of
Dr. Khan" (Islam), "Pakistan's Rejection of Charges of
Nuclear Cooperation" (Jang), and "Maltreatment of Dr. A.Q.
Khan at U.S. Behest Does not Befit Us" (Jang). Dr. Khan,s
gratitude toward the Government of Pakistan was underscored
in a widely reported quote that he is "grateful to the
President, the Prime Minister, and the Interior Advisor
Rehman Malik."
Islamabad 00000284 002 of 002
¶5. (U) FM Qureshi and the MFA issued the official reaction
for the GOP; their remarks were aimed at minimizing foreign
reaction by repeating all that Pakistan has done to recover
from Khan's misdeeds: dismantle his network, assist the IAEA,
build up its export controls, and strengthen its nuclear
security. Qureshi noted that the government maintains the
right to appeal the court's decision. The English Daily
Times editorial on Sunday argued that Khan's release will not
make the government more popular and may cause problems with
the international community. English language Dawn suggested
the real proliferation problem was not Khan's network, but
the discriminatory nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
¶6. (S) Comment: The Islamabad High Court is firmly under the
control of the government, so it would appear that this was a
planned move by some government element, probably Rehman
Malik in a too clever by half move that was not coordinated
with Zardari. Malik, who has aspirations to become Deputy
Prime Minister (or even Prime Minister) often has good
political judgment, but he failed badly this time. There was
not even a hint publicly that Nawaz Sharif ever intended to
nominate A.Q. Khan for a Senate seat. Moreover, the new court
decision would not make Khan's nomination any less probable.
This fiasco demonstrated yet another example of amateur,
uncoordinated governance in Islamabad, and Nawaz will waste
no time in exploiting this misstep. We will continue to
monitor Khan's freedoms to determine if the GOP is
implementing the restrictions that they promised to continue
imposing on Khan.
Patterson
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD289, ZARDARI’S PLANNED APPROACH TO

HOLBROOKE
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SUBJECT: ZARDARI’S PLANNED APPROACH TO HOLBROOKE
¶1. (C) Summary. During a February 8 meeting with the Ambassador, President
Zardari outlined Pakistan’s need for additional assistance, a message that would
figure prominently in his meeting with Special Representative Holbrooke. Zardari
outlined the steps he would follow to restrict A.Q. Khan (septel) and reported
that the Supreme Court would likely declare Nawaz Sharif ineligible to run for
the National Assembly. Zardari believes the international community is not
adequately supporting Pakistan’s internally displaced persons and police
programs in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Zardari reiterated again that he and Chief of
Army Staff General Kayani get along well, although he said he was very realistic
about the power of the army “given our history.” Again, Zardari said that he
supported stronger ties with India. He also continues to have serious concerns
about his personal security. End summary
¶2. (C) Ambassador called on President Zardari on February 8 to discuss the
upcoming visit of Special Representative Holbrooke. Zardari said he would raise
with Ambassador Holbrooke Pakistan’s commitment to fighting insurgency, which he
expected to get much worse when the GOP really engaged the militants. He would
also discuss the need for trade access (Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
legislation) for Pakistani products and economic assistance. Zardari said he
would not dwell on assistance issues, although he was considering some
formulations in which he would invest his own funds for development projects in
FATA and NWFP. He realized the United States could not easily provide aid given
the current economic climate. Still, as the conversation progressed, Zardari was
very worried about the lack of international support for the internally
displaced persons and for the police/law enforcement in NWFP and FATA. Zardari
said several times that the Special Representative’s visit provided an
opportunity to “reset the agenda” with the United States.
¶3. (C) Zardari told the Ambassador “not to worry” about his relations with
Prime Minister Gilani. Ambassador said she was not worried, but she believed
that the Embassy (and many others) had not been paying enough attention to the
PM, and we were going to try to rectify that. The PM was lashing out because
everyone saw him playing second fiddle to the President. However, as a
longstanding political leader and Sufi saint, he served a valuable role in the
Pakistan People’s Party.
¶4. (C) Zardari said he had excellent relations with Afghan President Karzai,
but was under no illusions about his forthrightness. Zardari said that he was
going to work with Karzai, and he did not see any better options in Afghanistan.
¶5. (C) Zardari was clearer than in previous meetings about his intention to
move against Nawaz Sharif and predicted the Supreme Court would declare Nawaz
ineligible to run for the National Assembly. Zardari claimed Nawaz had planned
to run A.Q. Khan on a Pakistan Muslim League-N slate, so it was better to
confront Nawaz sooner rather than later. Zardari said he had been ready to make
a deal with Shahbaz Sharif that would provide for a constitutional amendment to
increase the retirement age for the justices - presumably bringing back the
former chief justice as a justice -- but Shahbaz had been uncooperative. Zardari
said he was convinced that Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani would never
support Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister.
¶6. (C) Zardari said he was struggling over who would be named Chairman of the
Senate after the Senate elections, now scheduled for March 4. Zardari said the
best candidate would be law minister Farouk Naek, but Ambassador asked who would
then be Law Minister. “That’s the problem,” said Zardari, “we don’t have enough
good people.” He said that Information Minister Sherry Rehman “was dying for the
job,” but the conservative religious party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, which would
still have thirty votes in the Senate, would never vote for a woman as Senate
President. Zardari said he was probably going to pick someone from NWFP or FATA
so he would have regional balance.
ISLAMABAD 00000289 002 OF 002
¶7. (C) Zardari said he was going to replace NWFP Governor Ghani soon. He had
not done so to date, as picking a replacement brought with it multiple political
problems. He suggested Frontier Corps Inspector Major General Tariq Khan.
Ambassador tried to discourage that idea, indicating that Khan was desperately
needed in the ongoing fight. Zardari was also considering various names for
National Security Advisor, including former Ambassador to the UK and the U.S.,
Maleeha Lodi (“the party doesn’t trust her”) and retired COAS and Ambassador to
the U.S. Jehangir Karamat (“probably too old and, as a former COAS, Kayani would
always have to defer to him.”)
¶8. (C) Ambassador saw Zardari at Bilawal House in Karachi. Zardari’s father is
in poor health and Zardari was reluctant to leave Karachi. The conversation
turned to security in the neighborhood and his personal security. Zardari said
his vulnerability was one reason it was important to select a competent
President of the Senate. (If the president dies or resigns, the President of the
Senate would step in as President until the indirect election for President
could be held.) Zardari revealed that, if he was assassinated, he had instructed
his son Bilawal to name his sister, Faryal Talpur, as President.
¶9. (C) Bio Note: Embassy officers have been very impressed with Talpur, who is
extremely energetic and well respected. Kayani once told the Ambassador that she
would be a better president than her brother.) Zardari described his sister as
“tough and committed.” Her nineteen year old son had committed suicide and her
husband, Zardari said, had never really recovered from his son’s death. They
also had a daughter who had also been emotionally damaged by her brother’s
death. The Talpurs had then adopted a child from the Afghan refugee camp, but
passed the now six-year old off as their own since it was considered “un-
Islamic” to adopt in some circles. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD365, SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL
KAYANI’S VISIT TO
Discussing cables
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TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL KAYANI’S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
¶1. (S) Summary. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani’s February 20-
27 visit to Washington comes on the heels of the government’s loss of control
over Swat, continued Pakistani Army/Frontier Corps operations in the tribal
areas, and still-simmering Indo-Pak tensions in the wake of the Mumbai attacks.
We expect Kayani will request increased intelligence sharing (real-time SIGINT
and ISR), help to modernize his helicopter fleet, increased support for civilian
law enforcement, and financial compensation for Pakistanis displaced by combat.
He likely will complain about delays in Coalition Support Fund payments, suggest
that U.S. policy on strikes in the tribal areas be amended, and request
information about plans for a U.S. troop surge in southern Afghanistan.
¶2. (C) We should recognize growing Pakistani casualties in the fight against
militants, praise Kayani’s support for the civilian democratic government in
Islamabad, re-iterate the long-term U.S. commitment to support Pakistan, and
thank him for agreeing to send his intelligence chief and director of military
operations to the Holbrooke/Riedel U.S.-Pakistan strategic review meeting in
Washington. We should also thank Kayani for the GOP’s effort to ensure that
U.S./NATO continues to deliver fuel and dry goods through Pakistan for our
forces in Afghanistan.
¶3. (C) But we need to lay down a clear marker that Pakistan’s Army/ISI must
stop overt or tacit support for militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander
Nazir, Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with an agreement
to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was ISI Chief from 2004-2007, does
not want a reckoning with the past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local
taliban, we need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to retake the
area after the “peace deal” inevitably fails.
¶4. (C) We should press for Pakistani prosecution of the Mumbai suspects,
encourage expanded USG training of Army and Frontier Corps forces, raise the
prospect of embedding U.S. military observers/advisors with the Frontier Corps,
support a prioritized needs-based FMF request that builds COIN capability, ask
Kayani to explain how Pakistan plans to back U.S. efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan, and probe for what Indian action would allow him to redeploy troops
from his eastern front to support increased combat in the Pak-Afghan border
area. Suggested talking points and bio are included at paras 28-30. End Summary.
Supporting Democratic Governance

--------------------------------
¶5. (C) The civilian government headed by Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected
one year ago, is now stable. President Zardari’s elected position is politically
secure and Gilani has a majority in parliament. The Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces and
effectively control all three branches of federal government. Opposition leader
Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83%
approval rating compared to Zardari’s 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does
not have the votes to bring down the government.
¶6. (C) Zardari is cementing leadership alliances so he can avoid another
election until he receives international assistance to address food and fuel
inflation, electricity blackouts and high unemployment. Pakistan has met its
first-quarter targets under a $6.7 billion IMF Standby Agreement but the economy
remains too weak to support the Pakistani military’s appetite for expensive
weapons systems (particular F-16s).
¶7. (C) President Zardari and Kayani are the key decision-makers in Pakistan;
they have developed a respectful if not entirely trusting working relationship.
Kayani has gone out of his way to publicly defer to Zardari because he needs
political support to wage successful military
ISLAMABAD 00000365 002 OF 006
operations. After eight years of military rule under Musharraf, Zardari is re-
shaping civilian-military relations in the shadow of Pakistan’s history of
repeated military coups. It is in USG interests for the Zardari/Gilani
government to complete its full five-year term, and we should praise Kayani’s
efforts to support civilian democracy.
¶8. (C) Kayani may advocate for pending legislation (Kerry-Lugar) in the U.S.
Congress to triple non-military assistance to Pakistan and robust USG support
for an IMF/World Bank Donors’ Conference to provide $4 billion in social safety
net programs to compensate for IMF-imposed budget cuts. We anticipate that
Special Representative Holbrooke will attend a Donors’ Conference in April.
Kayani may request additional U.S. support for civilian law enforcement; in
addition to the over $40 million of equipment and training delivered to the
Frontier Corps, we are providing $15 million in additional equipment for the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police and are working to re-program another
$55 million in FY2009. There is a FY2009 supplemental request pending for
another $95 million for the police.
¶9. (C) Kayani will request cash to assist more than 300,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled fighting in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat, NWFP. Through USAID, State/PRM and DOD, we already
have provided over $10 million in assistance and are preparing to respond to new
UNHCR/ICRC/World Food Program appeals for Pakistan. Of particular interest will
be U.S. plans to continue/expand the delivery of $2 million in (CERP-like)
assistance from DOD through the Frontier Corps to IDPs in support of Kayani’s
counter-insurgency strategy.
¶10. (C) Security concerns are limiting our ability to operate, but today USAID
contractors are building schools and wells, hiring workers for short-term jobs,
training teachers and increasing the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to deliver
services that demonstrate the writ of government in FATA.
The Big Strategic Questions

---------------------------
¶11. (S) Zardari and Gilani agree that Pakistan’s biggest threat comes from a
growing militant insurgency on the Pak-Afghan border. The military and ISI have
not yet made that leap; they still view India as their principle threat and
Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict with India. They continue
to provide overt or tacit support for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group,
Commander Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign policy
tool.
¶12. (S) The single biggest message Kayani should hear in Washington is that
this support must end. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan’s own interests
and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where Haqqani is
killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the region--where Mumbai
exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still
threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers.
¶13. (S) Kayani will want to hear that the U.S. has turned the page on past ISI
operations (he was ISI chief from 2004-2007). We should ask for his views on
what political end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy support
for militants and probe for what would be required by India to allow him to
redeploy forces from the Indian border for the fight in FATA. The reality is
that, without a redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly
trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.
Pakistani Will. . . .
---------------------
¶14. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in
Bajaur and Mohmand, FATA. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama
bin Laden has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits “the militants are
ISLAMABAD 00000365 003 OF 006
after me and my job.” The bad news is that the militants increasingly are
setting the agenda.
¶15. (C) The government’s anti-terrorism strategy is based on “dialogue,

deterrence and development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter
militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic
fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a
disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government
insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.
¶16. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort
approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to
negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari’a law with the Taliban.
This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings,
closure of girls’ schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the
desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which
included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a
population that simply wants the fighting to end. Under international pressure,
Zardari has not yet signed off on the deal pending assurances it really will
deliver peace; a similar negotiation in 2008 failed.
¶17. (C) Kayani, who supported the Swat deal, will argue that he does not have
the forces to battle on multiple fronts, so he is picking his battles and
negotiating to preserve later options. We should push back hard, noting that it
will be difficult for international donors to support a government that is not
prepared to go all-out to defend its own territory.
. . .vs Capability
------------------
¶18. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against formidable militants, Pakistan’s
Frontier Corps (FC) and military finally have begun to accept more USG training
and assistance in support of counter-insurgency (COIN). Kayani will appreciate
U.S. recognition of the casualties his men have suffered, and this is an opening
we should exploit to press for expanded FC and special forces (SSG) training.
Kayani remains leery of too large a USG military footprint in Pakistan, but to
win he must be able to fight without creating the level of civilian casualties
his forces’ blind artillery and F-16 bombardments are now producing. We are
responding to Pakistan Air Force requests for Close Air Support training to
improve the precision of F-16s they are using in FATA. We should probe for the
possible introduction of U.S. military observers/advisors to improve the COIN
capability of this 1940’s force.
¶19. (S) Kayani will repeat his requests for increased intelligence sharing,
notably SIGINT, in support of ongoing military operations in FATA. Pakistan has
agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and
this month we will expand real-time tactical/target-focused intelligence sharing
through the Torkham BCC. We continue to work on delivering Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial capability (two B350-ERs) that
Kayani has raised with all his high-level visitors.
¶20. (C) The Bush administration’s commitment to provide Pakistan with $300
million annually in FMF expires in 2009, and we need to come to agreement with
Pakistan on how to restructure its FMF program to meet its long-term COIN needs.
The Pakistan military has requested $1B per year for five years (FY10-14) in
FMF.
¶21. (C) Kayani may request additional U.S. support for Pakistan’s F-16 program,
the flagship symbol of post-9/11 re-engagement. We are about to send to Congress
notification for an additional $142 million in FMF support for one part of this
complex program. But we do not believe Pakistan can afford to complete a $2
billion plus program to buy 18 new F-16s, upgrade 35 older aircraft, upgrade a
new base, and fund a munitions package. Given the funding and production
ISLAMABAD 00000365 004 OF 006
line implications of either bailing out the GOP or canceling the program, U.S.
agencies are reviewing our options.
¶22. (C) We could not agree more with Kayani on the need to modernize Pakistan’s
helicopter fleet; on any given day, they have perhaps 2-3 attack helos flying in
support of COIN operations. We now are delivering spare parts for their Cobra
and Bell 412s, overhauling and upgrading their MI-17s, and assessing ways to
improve overall helicopter maintenance.
U.S. Strikes
------------
¶23. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has eliminated 10 of the top
20 al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan over the last year. However, the strikes have
put increasing political pressure on the Pakistani government, which has
struggled to explain why it is allowing an ally to violate its sovereignty. The
GOP so far has denied recent media reports alleging that the U.S. is launching
the strikes from bases in Pakistan. Kayani knows full well that the strikes have
been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at
foreign fighters in the Waziristans. He will argue, however, that they undermine
his campaign plan, which is to keep the Waziristans quiet until the Army is
capable of attacking Baitullah Mehsud and other militants entrenched there. In
recent meetings with Special Representative Holbrooke, a variety of Pakistani
interlocutors (and now the press) suggested that the U.S. work jointly with
Pakistan and target Mehsud or other militants who are killing Pakistanis.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶24. (C) Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination across the border has
improved dramatically in recent months. This includes exchanges of tactical
intelligence that allows NATO forces to block passes in support of Pakistani
operations and has helped lower attacks on U.S./NATO forces. In recent meetings
with ISAF Commander McKiernan, Kayani raised concern about the effect of a U.S.
troop build-up in southern Afghanistan, which could push militants and refugees
across the border into Balochistan and prompt an influx of foreign fighters.
Pakistan currently has only one Army brigade and perhaps 15 Frontier Corps wings
stationed along the vast and largely unpopulated Pak-Afghan border in
Balochistan.
¶25. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on U.S./NATO convoys last year,
Pakistan has made efforts to secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which
U.S./NATO trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for our forces
in Afghanistan. The troop surge will require us to send additional supplies
through the Chaman (Balochistan) border crossing in Afghanistan; CENTCOM is now
evaluating ways to improve delivery of supplies through Pakistan.
India
-----
¶26. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian
military strike, the GOP needs to continue to show progress on prosecuting those
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. India has
welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges against the key masterminds of
Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian response to requests for additional
information (forensics, ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support
prosecution.
Nukes
-----
¶27. (S) Although he has remained silent on the subject, Kayani does not support
Zardari’s statement last year to the Indian press that Pakistan would adopt a
“no first use” policy on nuclear weapons. Despite increasing financial
constraints, we believe that the military is proceeding with
ISLAMABAD 00000365 005 OF 006
an expansion of both its growing strategic weapons and missile programs.
Pakistan’s strategic assets are under the control of the secular military, which
has implemented extensive physical, personnel and command and control
safeguards. Our major concern has not been that an Islamic militant could steal
an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP facilities could
gradually smuggle enough fissile material out to eventually make a weapon and
the vulnerability of weapons in transit. Despite a court decision to “free”
nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan, the GOP continues to assure us he remains under
significant travel and media restrictions.
¶28. (S/Rel Pak) Suggested Talking Points:

-- (S/Rel Pak) What is in the past is behind us. What we seek going forward is
an all-encompassing bilateral relationship based on what we can accomplish for
the future. We recognize your sacrifices and are well-aware of the trust-deficit
that exists on each side. We must both work to overcome it.
--(C/Rel Pak) We appreciate your efforts to support stable civilian democracy in
Pakistan and are working to provide a democracy dividend that improves both
economic conditions and the law and order situation.
-- (S/Rel Pak) We must succeed in Afghanistan. What is your vision for what
constitutes an acceptable outcome?
-- (S/Rel Pak) We want more Pakistani forces deployed to the western border to
fight the militants. What conditions are necessary for you to reposition forces
from the eastern to the western border?
-- (S/Rel Pak) It is time to cut your ties to extremist groups/proxy forces and
urge the permanent severing of ties. Such ties hinder trust and our ability to
move forward together.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Our security relationship must move beyond the provision of
equipment, and we seek opportunities to expand training throughout the military.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Our ability to deliver sustained security assistance also depends
on the Administration securing Congressional approval. Congress is likely to
prioritize assistance to counterinsurgency-related equipment and training, as
well as align its support with Pakistani performance in the field.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Strikes in the FATA are succeeding in eliminating the enemy
senior leadership and collateral damage has been minimal. We are working to
provide you with tactical battlefield intelligence to support your operations in
FATA.
Bio Notes
---------
¶29. (U) General Ashfaq Kayani was born in Punjab in 1952, grew up in a working-
class family and is the son of a former junior officer. He was commissioned in
the Pakistan Army after graduating from the Pakistan Military Academy in 1971.
His long career has included command at every level from Company to Corps. He
has served in key staff positions, to include Military Assistant to the Prime
Minister under Benazir Bhutto from 1988-1990, Director General of Military
Operations (DGMO), 2000-2003, Director General, Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) from 2004-2007, and Vice Chief of Army Staff in 2007. In November 2007, he
became Chief of Army Staff (COAS). He is the only officer ever to have served as
both DG-ISI and COAS. His term as DGMO coincided with the intense military
standoff with India of 2001-2002.
¶30. (C) C) In interactions with post, Kayani is often direct, frank, and
thoughtful. He has fond memories of his IMET training at Fort Leavenworth and
values his personal relationships, particularly with U.S. military leaders.
Kayani is married and the father of two children, a son and a
ISLAMABAD 00000365 006 OF 006
daughter. An avid golfer, he is President of the Pakistan Golf Association. He
smokes heavily and can be difficult to understand as he tends to mumble.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD385, FOCUSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN

STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
Discussing cables
2009-02-21
12:12
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
CLASSIFCATION MISMATCH ERROR IN PARAGRAPH 8, 9, 10
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018

SUBJECT: FOCUSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
ISLAMABAD 00000385 001.3 OF 003
¶1. (C) Summary. As Foreign Minister Qureshi and his team arrive in Washington
for coordination on the Holbrooke/Riedel strategic review, Post offers the
following thoughts on issues for strategic engagement. In the coming weeks, Post
will detail our suggestions on how to expand political, economic, security, and
intelligence engagement with Pakistan from the current $2 billion annually to $4
billion beginning in FY2011. End Summary.
¶2. (C) As we work to prevent Pakistan-based attacks on the U.S. and its forces,
we should be clear that al-Qaida (AQ) now wants more than just a safe-haven in
Pakistan, and defeating a growing witches’ brew of AQ, Taliban, local extremists
and criminals will be a long 10-15 year fight. President Zardari has summed it
up by saying, “the militants now are after me and my job.” The militant takeover
of Swat in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) is the most striking example
of how far and how fast the government is losing control over its territory. As
the fight continues, we expect AQ to increase both its offensive and defensive
operations to protect its equities. It simply has nowhere else to go.
Understanding Swat
¶3. (C) Talks continue between Tehrik Nizam Shariat Mohammed (Movement for
Shari’a or TNSM) leader Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah, who
works with the Tehrik-e-Taliban movement headed by Baitullah Mehsud. The Army
appears unwilling or unable to control the area, and the population is fed up
with both indiscriminate Army shelling and taliban-imposed terror. So, the Awami
National Party (ANP) and the Army are trying a new version of a failed strategy.
Through Sufi Mohammad, the NWFP provincial government is trying to split the
population from Fazlullah’s taliban by offering adherence to a form of Shari’a
law, interpreted locally as swift justice. The NWFP offer on Shari’a has not
been signed by President Zardari and is conditioned on establishment of peace in
Swat. The Army has not withdrawn from its positions, and it insists it will not
withdraw until peace is established.
¶4. (C) Few Pakistanis believe the deal will hold for more than two-three weeks.
A similar deal failed in 2008; Post does not believe that Sufi has the clout to
deliver. Fazlullah’s taliban are not going to lay down their arms--they have
already violated their alleged cease-fire. ANP’s weak argument is that even a
failed deal will expose Fazlullah’s real intentions; the Army’s view is that the
deal at least buys them some time to regroup forces. Post’s concern is that by
signaling its willingness to surrender, the deal has made it even harder for the
inevitable Army re-engagement in Swat. While talks continue, however, we are
working through State/USAID/DOD with UN agencies and ICRC to get relief supplies
to the beleaguered Swati population. We also are working with the Ministry of
Interior to provide the NWFP police with short-term support (salary
supplements/death benefits, hardening police stations) while we implement a
longer-term plan to deliver additional equipment and training needed to back up
Army action.
Establishing Trust
¶5. (C) The Pakistani team will come hoping, once again, to forge long-lasting
ties with the U.S. As Vice President Biden has noted, however, the relationship
for too long has been transactional in nature. It also has been based on mutual
mistrust. Pakistan hedges its bets on cooperation because it fears the U.S. will
again desert Islamabad after we get Osama Bin Laden; Washington sees this
hesitancy as duplicity that requires we take unilateral action to protect U.S.
interests. After 9/11, then President Musharraf made a strategic shift to
abandon the Taliban and support the U.S. in the war on terror, but neither side
believes the other has lived up to expectations flowing from that decision. The
relationship is one of co-dependency we grudgingly admit--Pakistan knows the
U.S. cannot afford to walk away; the U.S. knows Pakistan cannot survive without
our support.
Supporting Democracy/Defeating Extremism
ISLAMABAD 00000385 002.3 OF 003
¶6. (C) Militants will exploit either weak civilian government or a return to
military rule that lacks popular legitimacy, so we should help the
Zardari/Gilani government complete its full five-year term in office. We can
work with Nawaz Sharif if he wins the next election, but Zardari is our best
ally in Pakistan right now, and U.S. interests are best served by preventing
another cycle of military rule. Qureshi will remind us that the GOP needs an
international democracy dividend in the form of economic aid, improved
governance, and effective law enforcement.
¶7. (C) We can respond first by offering robust U.S. support at the IMF/World
Bank Donors’ Conference in April. We now are providing approximately $2 billion
annually to Pakistan, including: $1.2 billion in Coalition Support Fund
reimbursements; $150 million to improve socio-economic conditions in FATA; $300
million in ESF aid for the rest of Pakistan; over $10 million for internally
displaced persons fleeing combat in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat; $300 million (not
yet received); and an imminent $15 million in aid to the NWFP police.
¶8. (C) If approved and financed, the Kerry-Lugar legislation will enable us to
triple non-military aid to $1.5 billion per year. We will plan in FY 2010 to
spend over $100 million to augment civilian police and $873 million to build
counter-insurgency capability. This means giving police protective vests and
rapid reaction capability, teaching the military how to coordinate ground and
air operations and helping the Army keep more than two attack helicopters in the
air at one time. We can build trust, address the issue of alleged U.S. strikes,
and help Pakistanis target militants through enhanced DOD-based intelligence
cooperation at the Torkham Joint Coordination Center. We need to help the GOP
implement an effective strategic communications plan.
Changing Mindsets
¶9. (C) President Zardari and PM Gilani recognize Pakistan’s greatest threat has
shifted from India to militancy concentrated on the Pak-Afghan border but is
spreading to NWFP and beyond. The Army and ISI, however, have not turned that
corner. We should press the GOP on the need to stop using militant/tribal
proxies as foreign policy tools. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan’s own
interests and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where
Haqqani’s network is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the
region--where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create
Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers.
However, we should preface this conversation with a pledge to open a new page in
relations. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, who headed ISI from 2004-2007, in
particular wants to avoid a reckoning with the past, and we will not shift
Pakistani military/ISI policy without his support.
¶10. (C) Given recent events in Swat, the Army needs to decide if it is truly
prepared to commit the troops and suffer the casualties required to win and
accept the training needed to shift from a conventional war with India to a
COIN-based strategy along the Pak-Afghan border. We should probe the team for
what Pakistan needs from India to enable it to redeploy badly-needed Pakistani
forces from its eastern to its western border.
Making Afghanistan a Success

¶11. (C) We should ask what kind of government Islamabad can accept in Kabul and
how Pakistan plans to help the U.S./NATO succeed in Afghanistan. The team will
be concerned about the effect of a troop build-up in southern Afghanistan across
from Balochistan, where Pakistan has meager forces to defend a long and
unpopulated border. We should discuss the reality that the U.S. will be doubling
cargo shipments through Pakistan (both the Torkham and Chaman crossings) in
support of our troop build-up in Afghanistan.
¶12. (C) As ISI General Director Pasha has said, “we can’t kill all the
militants.” Qureshi, noting recent comments by Defense Secretary Gates, will
suggest it is time to review efforts to reach out to Taliban “reconcilables” on
both sides
ISLAMABAD 00000385 003.2 OF 003
of the border. If this initiative progresses, we should consider establishing a
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan for Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant fighters.
Thinking Regionally
¶13. (C) Pakistan’s principal strategic focus remains fixated on India,

Afghanistan as strategic depth in the fight against India, and the core Kashmir
issue. However, the current civilian and military leadership is the most pro-
Indian that New Delhi is likely to see, and we should not allow Mumbai to derail
rapprochement. Both sides should resume Composite Dialogue negotiations, re-
establish back-channel negotiations, and increase trade across both the Wagah
border and the Kashmir Line of Control.
¶14. (C) This presumes that Pakistan, with continued USG pressure, proceeds with
prosecution of the Mumbai suspects. Pakistan also needs more clearly to shut
down its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba militancy in Kashmir. Qureshi will want to
hear a USG commitment to press the Indians to respond to the GOP’s list of
follow-up questions on the investigation. We should encourage Islamabad to send,
and New Delhi to receive, a Pakistani police investigatory team to collect
evidence in support of successful Mumbai prosecutions.
¶15. (C) Qureshi likely will repeat Zardari’s pleas for USG intervention with
Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf states to deliver oil at concessional prices;
to date, our efforts have been rebuffed but the upcoming Donors’ Conference
would provide another avenue to press for assistance.
¶16. (C) We should leverage China’s interest in a stable Pakistan by urging its
continued support at the Donors’ Conference but reminding Beijing that efforts
to block 1267 designations and give Pakistan two unsanctioned civilian nuclear
reactors are not helpful. Zardari would like to accept Iran’s offer of financial
assistance but we doubt he will proceed without U.S. blessing.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD415, SHARIFS DISQUALIFIED FROM
OFFICE
Discussing cables
2009-02-25
15:03
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Wednesday, 25 February 2009, 15:14

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, KJUS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SHARIFS DISQUALIFIED FROM OFFICE
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 378 B. ISLAMABAD 141 C. LAHORE 11 D. LAHORE 9 E. 2008
LAHORE 221
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Gerald Feierstein for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled February 25 that
both Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif from the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-
N) party are ineligible to hold public office. President Zardari told Charge
that he had temporarily appointed PPP Governor Taseer as Chief Executive pending
an election to replace Shahbaz, that the government would consider additional
legal appeals, and that he did not expect significant political fallout from the
Court’s decision. The street reaction will be “in the hundreds, not the
millions,” claimed Zardari. Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif told Principal Officer
Lahore that the decision, which they claimed was entirely Zardari’s, was a
declaration of war; they would not seek legal appeals and instead would take
their battle to the streets. In a press conference, Nawaz revealed that Zardari
had offered to drop the case in exchange for PML-N agreement to extend the
tenure of the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; he called on
Pakistanis to come out into the streets to protest.
¶2. (C) Even before the press conference, there were sporadic demonstrations in
Punjab, particularly Lahore, and Islamabad/Rawalpindi; we expect additional
demonstrations tomorrow. Both Embassy and Consulate Lahore held EAC meetings and
sent LES staff home early to avoid traffic problems. Following the decision,
PML-N certainly will participate in the lawyers’ march, planned to begin in
Karachi on March 12 and end on March 16 in Islamabad with a proposed sit-in.
¶3. (C) The decision comes as no surprise as Zardari has been telling us for
weeks that he was going to move against Nawaz. This was a controversial move
within the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and one that PM Gilani tried to
forestall two days ago in talks with Shahbaz that apparently were not blessed by
Zardari. Before moving, Zardari expanded the coalition’s seats in the National
Assembly and worked out deals in three of four provinces to ensure the PPP will
increase its seats in upcoming Senate elections.
¶4. (C) The ruling will open up the battle for control of the Punjab Provincial
Assembly and prompt renewed rounds of inter-party negotiations. If Zardari is
right and the street reaction remains modest, we expect little real political
change to emerge from this Court decision. If Nawaz’s gamble pays off and he can
bring significant crowds into the streets, the Army could possibly be called out
to maintain law and order. We expect a renewed rush of predictions that this
will prompt the Army to replace Zardari; certainly, the military will consider
the Court decision as unnecessary and ill-timed, but we still have no
indications the military would move to oust Zardari or pave the way for a PML-N
government. With the ongoing debacle in Swat and a high-level Pakistani
delegation in Washington, few will challenge the perception of the bad timing of
this move. It also demonstrates, disappointingly, that Zardari continues to play
politics while his country disintegrates. End Summary.
The Decision
- - - - - - -
¶5. (SBU) On February 25, a three-judge panel of Pakistan’s Supreme Court
effectively ruled that both opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leaders
Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif were disqualified from holding public office. The
judges issued an oral ruling from the bench, dismissing all of the appeals by
Sharif proxies; one anti-Sharif petition was not struck down. The Sharifs
themselves had refused to appeal the original rulings against them, questioning
the legitimacy of this Court, which took oath of office under Musharraf’s
November 2007 provisional constitution order (PCO). To settle ruffled political
feathers when the LHC decision was announced, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
government
ISLAMABAD 00000415 002 OF 004
decided to represent the Sharifs in an appeal to the Supreme Court.
¶6. (SBU) By dismissing the pro-Sharif appeals, those original, adverse rulings
stand, Attorney General Latif Khosa told PolOff February 25. The Lahore High
Court (LHC) ruled in June 2008 that Nawaz was disqualified to run for a National
Assembly seat because of his previous hijacking and corruption convictions. The
LHC held that Nawaz had not proven the Musharraf administration pardoned these
convictions instead of simply commuting the prison sentence.
¶7. (C) There is continuing confusion over Shahbaz’s case. The Lahore Elections
Ruling Officer decided in December 2007 that Shahbaz was disqualified to run for
a Punjab Provincial Assembly seat because of a previous loan default. According
to Khosa, today’s decision automatically throws out the later decisions by the
Ruling Officer, as well as by the Lahore Election Tribunal, allowing Shahbaz to
run in a June 2008 by-election. PML-N spokesman Ahsan Iqbal, however, told
Polcons that the disqualification was based on a technical fault when Shahbaz
failed to announce which seat he would claim from his victories in the June by-
election. In any case, Shahbaz is disqualified from serving in the Punjab
Provincial Assembly, and this is the prerequisite for being Chief Minister.
PPP Reaction
------------
¶8. (C) The decision was no surprise; Zardari advised Ambassador weeks ago that
he felt he had to move to rein in Nawaz (Ref ). However, in a phone call,
Zardari--just back from his latest trip to China--told Charge February 25 that
he had “nothing to do with the decision” and had been surprised by Shahbaz’s
disqualification. He noted that the Court had ruled against the government,
which had been representing the Sharifs. He said he had ordered PPP Punjab
Governor Taseer to temporarily take over the Punjab government until new
elections for a Chief Minister could be held. He expected the PPP would have a
candidate and thought the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party would also be
interested in running a candidate.
¶9. (C) Asked about any further legal steps, Zardari indicated the government
might consider going back to the Lahore High Court to appeal the decision. He
said he was not concerned about political fallout, as the initial reaction had
been for hundreds, not millions, of people in the streets. Interior Minister
Malik told Charge essentially the same thing and reiterated that the government
had not anticipated that Shahbaz would be disqualified.
¶10. (C) After the ruling, AG Khosa today noted to PolOff that the PML-N could
always negotiate with the PPP to amend the qualification/disqualification
provisions of Pakistan’s Constitution. Information Minister Sherry Rehman told
PolCouns, however, that the decision was “unsettling” and the reaction “would be
volatile.” PPP parliamentarian Farah Ispahani (Zardari confidant and wife of
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani) told PolCouns February 25 that
today’s Court decision “is not the end of the story.” The GOP might even appeal
the decision. (Note: There is a provision for “review” of Supreme Court
decisions but only by the same bench.)
¶11. (C) Ispahani confided that Zardari would take further actions to ensure the
March 12-16 lawyers’ march/sit-in “would not cause problems.” She hinted at
proposals affecting former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Shahbaz Sharif.
Asked why Zardari chose now to move on this long-stalled decision, Ispahani said
the PPP-led GOP “had no choice” because Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani had entered
into discussions with Shahbaz on February 23. “We are very unhappy with the way
Gilani has gone off the reservation” while Zardari was in China, she said.
According to unconfirmed press reports, Gilani had assured Shahbaz that the PPP
would not try to remove the Sharifs from power in Punjab and suggested Chaudhry
might lead a new “Constitutional Court,” proposed by the 2006 PPP/PML-N Charter
of Democracy.
PPP Moves in on the Punjab
ISLAMABAD 00000415 003 OF 004
--------------------------
12.(C) Despite Gilani’s assurance to Shahbaz earlier in the week, Zardari is
already moving in on the Punjab government. In addition to temporarily (for two
months) appointing Governor Taseer as Chief Executive pending an election to
replace Shahbaz, he has fired the Punjab Chief Secretary and replaced him with
Kamran Lashari, a long-time PPP supporter. MOI Malik told Charge that the Punjab
Inspector General of the Police technically was not fired but since he was so
close to the Sharifs, he has voluntarily vacated the office. Both the Chief
Secretary and IG Police are federal appointees.
Opposition Reaction
-------------------
¶13. (C) Principal Officer Lahore met February 25 with Shahbaz and Nawaz Sharif
(septel) to hear their reaction. The Sharifs pre-briefed what Nawaz said in his
press conference, namely that they laid the decision at Zardari’s door and it
was not in the interests of Pakistan’s democracy. As proof of Zardari’s
complicity, Nawaz revealed to PO and later in his press conference that Zardari
had offered Shahbaz a “business deal” -- if the PML-N would agree to extend
Supreme Court Justice Dogar’s tenure and agreed to stop attacks on the PPP, then
Zardari would drop the Supreme Court cases against the Sharifs.
¶14. (C) Shahbaz told the PO that this was now “war” with the PPP, and the PML-N
would take their battle directly to the streets. The Sharifs would not appeal
the decision in Musharraf’s PCO courts. PML-N would not resign from the Punjab
Assembly and might run its own candidate for Chief Minister. If they did, PML-N
could succeed without the support of the PML.
¶15. (C) In Nawaz’s press conference, he carefully tried to create friction
against Zardari on several levels. He said the PML-N did not blame the PPP rank
and file for this decision, expressed concern that it was a “slap in the face”
to Punjabis, and declared there was no chance of rapprochement with Zardari. He
suggested that Zardari was obsessed with concern that a reinstated Chief Justice
Chaudhry would declare invalid the National Reconciliation Order that absolved
Zardari of corruption charges. He said it would be “catastrophic” if Pakistanis
did not take to the streets to protest this decision, and he affirmed that the
PML-N would fully participate in the March 12-16 lawyers’ long march.
¶16. (C) PML-N Spokespersons Ahsan Iqbal and Siddiq-ul-Farooq declared, “We do
not recognize this court.” Iqbal went even further, charging Zardari with
“assuming the mantle of Musharraf,” a theme we expect the PML-N to press in the
coming days. Religious Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party leader Qazi Hussain disavowed
the Musharraf court. The leader of Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
party, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, declared the Court’s decision was “nothing to
be happy about” but noted that the PML would respect the decision. The Pakistan
Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) had named an
“independent observer” to watch the case; PILDAT issued a statement questioning
whether justice had been served with this verdict.
Public Reaction
---------------
¶17. (C) The public’s reaction was swift. Sporadic demonstrations began in
Lahore, and other cities throughout Punjab saw large crowds. In Lahore, streets
were blocked with tire fires and PPP posters were torn down. PO Lahore reported
a tense mood as well as limitations on movements around the city. The Islamabad
Police briefly shut down Constitution Avenue around official buildings to warn
against spontaneous demonstrations. The capital’s Abpara Market did attract
about one thousand, according to RSO, and the airport road was shut down by
crowds tearing down PPP posters and throwing rocks. As of this writing, the
airport road remains closed and airport operations are uncertain. Both Embassy
Islamabad and Consulate Lahore held EAC meetings and allowed LES staff to depart
early. Several bar associations have
ISLAMABAD 00000415 004 OF 004
called for strikes. and we expect additional demonstrations in the coming days.
U.S. Reaction
-------------
¶18. (C) Zardari asked Charge for a readout of PO Lahore’s meeting with Nawaz;
Charge said that the PO had conveyed the U.S. position that this was an internal
matter for the Pakistani government. In his press conference, Nawaz
characterized the visit as a courtesy call. PML-N spokesman Ahsan warned
Polcouns that Pakistanis would assume the U.S., as a firm supporter of Zardari,
had supported the decision and urged that we issue a statement expressing
concern.
¶19. (C) Comment: The decision comes as no surprise; Zardari has been telling us
for weeks that it was coming and that he felt he could control the reaction.
Before making this move, he coaxed the Muttahida Quami Movement party into the
coalition to renew Gilani’s majority in the National Assembly (Ref B). He also
successfully sealed a power sharing deal in three of the four provinces over
seats in the upcoming Senate elections (Ref A) to ensure the PPP will have a
majority in the Senate.
¶20. (C) The game now will be controlling the street, and Zardari has about two
weeks if he is to make any repairs to reduce the impact of the March 12-16
lawyers’ march. If Zardari is correct and the street reaction is muted, we
expect the Court ruling to have no immediate impact on PPP rule. If Nawaz’s
gamble -- to provoke enough protests to require the Army to come out and restore
order -- pays off, we may see a different dynamic. So far, we still have no
indication the Army has any interest in ousting Zardari or ushering in a PML-N
government.
¶21. (C) Zardari may indeed win the short-term tactical battle against Nawaz. In
the longer term, however, Nawaz is playing his cards well and now has grounds to
compare what he will term Zardari’s high-handed rule to that of Musharraf. Many
in the PPP disagreed with the decision to challenge Nawaz, so Zardari has
further alienated party faithful. This decision and promises of additional deals
for the former Chief Justice or Shahbaz demonstrate, disappointingly, that
Zardari remains focused on political machinations rather than the militant
threat in Swat and the tribal areas.
FEIERSTEIN
Viewing cable 09KUWAIT110, THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMEDY FOR

TERRORISTS:
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09KUWAIT110.
09KUWAIT110 2009-02-05 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXRO3981
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0110/01 0361636
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P 051636Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000110
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2029

TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KU IR
SUBJECT: THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMEDY FOR TERRORISTS:
"LET THEM DIE."
REF: KUWAIT 0095
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: During a February 3 meeting in their

ongoing dialog on US-Kuwait CT cooperation, Kuwaiti Minister
of Interior Shaykh Jaber al-Khalid Al Sabah discussed with
Ambassador US and Kuwaiti efforts to locate and apprehend
terror financiers (including Mohammed Sultan Ibrahim Sultan
Al-Ali, aka Jawad/Abu Umar), applauded improved liaison
information exchange, expressed skepticism Kuwait would ever
develop a rehabilitation center for former GTMO detainees and
other extremists supporting jihad, and suggested the US
should release current GTMO detainees back into Afghanistan,
where they could be killed in combat. He sardonically
questioned why US NAVCENT forces had gone to the trouble of
rescuing foundering Iranian hashish smugglers two weeks
earlier, saying "God meant to punish them with death and you
saved them. Why?" Characterizing the previous Saturday's
provincial elections as a "huge success," Shaykh Jaber
expressed his belief that President Obama and the US had the
tools necessary to successfully confront all challenges. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador called on Shaykh Jaber February 3 to

review progress on our CT liaison relationship and to seek
the Interior Minister's support for operational concepts
aimed at intercepting individuals involved in the
exploitation of traditional smuggling routes in the northern
Gulf to move would-be jihadists and their
financier/facilitators between Kuwait and Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Shaykh Jaber began the meeting by applauding
the "huge success" of the provincial elections in Iraq and
expressing his confidence in the ability of President Obama
and the "super power" US to address current challenges.
¶3. (S/NF) Ambassador noted she'd met recently with VADM
McCraven, now JSOC commander for this region, and that they'd
discussed alternative approaches to staunching the flows of
terror financing, given the constraints of Kuwait's current
legal and political systems. Offering his support for these
approaches ) and underscoring that he was as concerned about
terrorist influences from Saudi Arabia as from Iran, given
the loose border controls -- the Minister expressed his
understanding of what he characterized (fairly) as improved
information exchange between our services, while
acknowledging the ongoing deficiencies in Kuwait's legal
system that stymie effective prosecution and restraint of
these individuals once captured.
¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador noted recent press reports that

self-confessed jihadi recruiter and financier Mohammed
al-Bathali had been released on a 500 dinar bond after being
sentenced to three of a possible five years imprisonment for
"inciting jihad against a friendly state." (Reftel) At the
same time, Kuwait's Ambassador to the US, Shaykh Salem Al
Sabah, had approached S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson to
inquire after the status of Kuwait's four remaining GTMO
detainees. Ambassador clarified that President Obama's
announcement of our determination to close the detention
center at Guantanamo did not mean we no longer had security
concerns which would be factored into any release scenarios;
the Kuwaiti detainees were nasty, unrepentant individuals and
Kuwait's record had been tarnished by the example of former
GTMO detainee al-Ajmi, who'd allegedly blown himself up in
Mosul following his release to the Kuwaiti authorities.
Ambassador asked the Interior Minister the status of the
rehabilitation center Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed
Al Sabah had mentioned in his September 18th conversation
with then-Secretary Rice in Washington. Ambassador noted
that we were aware of the stories of Saudis who'd gone
through SAG rehabilitation centers only to re-emerge with Al
Qaeda in Yemen; nonetheless, the GOK had to take steps to
show its seriousness in changing and controlling the
behaviors of extremists within its society.
¶5. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber replied with an anecdote: Following

the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm, General
Schwarzkopf had raised the issue of "rehabilitating" Kuwaitis
who'd been exposed to the brutality of war so that they could
re-integrate into society. Shaykh (Ret,d General) Jaber had
replied: "But you are thinking of the Vietnam model, where
young war veterans came home to empty apartments or anonymous
urban environments. That is not who we are. We are a small,
close-knit society and everyone knows each other. No one
will feel alienated: those who can heal will heal naturally
with family; those who cannot heal in that environment will
never heal." Relating this to the current topic, Shaykh
KUWAIT 00000110 002 OF 002
Jaber told the Ambassador: "You know better than I that we

cannot deal with these people (i.e. the GTMO detainees). I
can't detain them. If I take their passports, they will sue
to get them back (Note: as happened with Al-Ajmi. End
note.) I can talk to you into next week about building a
rehabilitation center, but it won't happen. We are not Saudi
Arabia; we cannot isolate these people in desert camps or
somewhere on an island. We cannot compel them to stay. If
they are rotten, they are rotten and the best thing to do is
get rid of them. You picked them up in Afghanistan; you
should drop them off in Afghanistan, in the middle of the war
zone."
¶6. (S/NF) Ambassador then raised with the Minister developing

an SOP for dealing with incidents such as the recent rescue
by US NAVCENT forces in the northern Gulf of seven Iranian
smugglers whose boat was foundering while engaged in
smuggling hashish. In the event, the Omanis had agreed to
repatriate the Iranians but we nonetheless needed to think
about dealing with similar episodes in future in expeditious
fashion. The initial response of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard had
been to refer the matter to the Minister of Interior, via the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador noted our
supposition that the Kuwaiti Coast Guard must have had
similar experiences with Iranian smugglers who needed
repatriation to Iran. Smiling broadly, the Interior Minister
deflected the question, saying "God wished to punish them for
smuggling drugs by drowning them, and then you saved them.
So they're your problem! You should have let them drown."
In any case, he added, the Kuwaitis generally sent the
Iranians back to Iran in their own boats so there had not
been a question of physically handing them over.
¶7. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador noted that the Minister had

created the position of Special Advisor to Shaykh Jaber for
Kuwait Security Services (our GRPO liaison counterpart) and
assigned Shaykh Salman Sabah al-Salem al-Humoud Al Sabah to
that role. Ambassador asked whether the Minister believed
there was any appropriate liaison relationship between the
Embassy and Shaykh Salman, to which the Minister replied in
the negative. Finally, the Ambassador invited the Minister
to join her in attending the US Ambassador's reception
February 24 at the IDEX event in Abu Dhabi, as part of our
efforts to boost the relationship.
¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Minister was as frank and pessimistic as

ever when it came to the subject of apprehending and
detaining terror financiers and facilitators under Kuwait's
current legal and political framework. Ongoing tensions
between parliament and the PM and his cabinet make any
changes highly unlikely any time soon. The remaining GTMO
detainees remain a particularly thorny issue for the
leadership here, who privately recognize the downsides of
taking custody and readily acknowledge their inability to
manage them but who remain under strong domestic political
pressure to "bring their boys home." Telling was the fact
that press accounts of the Ambassador's February 3 meeting
with the Minister (which was one-on-one with a notetaker) and
her meeting two days earlier with the MFA U/S focused solely
on the GTMO issue, although it was discussed only marginally.
END COMMENT.
********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES
Viewing cable 09LONDON290, S) FCO WELCOMES EXECUTIVE ORDERS
ON DETAINEE
Discussing cables
09LONDON290 2009-02-03 10:10 2010-11-30 17:05 SECRET Embassy London
VZCZCXRO1559
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHLO #0290/01 0341016
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031016Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000290
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI, L/PM AND EUR/WE/UK

DOD FOR OFFICE OF DETAINEE AFFAIRS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2019

TAGS PTER, KHLS, PREL, PINS, PHUM, KAWK, MOPS, KISL, EUN,
UK
SUBJECT: (S) FCO WELCOMES EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON DETAINEE
POLICY; WILL SHARE UK EXPERIENCE RESETTLING DETAINEES WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS,
BUT NOT TAKE MORE DETAINEES
REF: A. STATE 6516 B. MILLS/RICCI 01/29/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, Jr. for reasons 1.4 ( B) and
(D).
¶1. (S) Summary. The UK Government “strongly welcomes” the executive orders
concerning Guantanamo Bay and U.S. detainee policy, according to Robert
Chatterton-Dixon, Head of the Foreign Office’s Counter Terrorism Policy
Department. The UK is not willing to resettle any further detainees in the UK --
beyond the two detainees with UK residency ties, Binyam Mohammed and Shaker
Amer, that are the subject of current bilateral discussions -- but has offered
to share with other European governments the UK’s experience and advice on
resettlement of detainees. End summary.
HMG Welcomes the Executive Orders

---------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Drawing from ref A, PolCouns met with Chatterton-Dixon and senior
members of his department on January 29 to discuss UK reaction to the Guantanamo
Bay executive orders and UK views on resettlement of Guantanamo detainees. HMG
was very pleased with the orders, Chatterton-Dixon stressed, and HMG lawyers are
closely reviewing them and their implications for future detainee policy. He
acknowledged that there had not been an official HMG statement welcoming the
orders, but put that down to the travel schedule of the appropriate ministers.
Foreign Office press lines, used in response to press queries, had praised the
orders as “a welcome new chapter” and this was “certainly the view across HMG.”
Chatterton-Dixon speculated that the orders would be raised the next time the
Foreign Secretary addressed the Commons and at the time the Foreign Secretary
would make clear the UK’s positive reaction.
Still Difficult Legal Issues Ahead for Both Governments

--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶3. (S) Chatterton-Dixon cautioned, however, that there were still serious legal
issues ahead for HMG and USG regarding detainee policy. He noted that twelve of
the detainees who have returned to the UK have brought a combined action in the
UK courts charging named HMG officials with “malfeasance in the use of their
public office” because of their involvement in the detainees’ incarceration at
Guantanamo Bay. Chatterton-Dixon said that the Home Office, not the Foreign
Office, had the lead on this case, but it was likely to raise similar issues
concerning access to classified information as had been raised in the Binyam
Mohammed case. He noted that the Executive Orders would provide “reassurance” to
the Court hearing the Binyam Mohammed case, but that court and others would be
looking to the results of the inter-agency panels before concluding that legal
and human rights issues raised by the defendants were now moot.
Inter-Agency Panels May Want to Consult with HMG

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶4. (S) Polcouns used ref A guidance to respond to questions concerning whether
the USG was considering resettling detainees in the United States and the legal
authorities under which detainees were now being held. Chatterton-Dixon,
although noting that he understood the focus of the inter-agency groups
established under the Executive Orders was on U.S. policy and legal authority,
suggested that the policy group examining broad U.S. policy on detainee issues
still might find it useful to consult with other governments on an international
legal regime to govern terrorist combatants.
HMG Will Not Take Any More Detainees

------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Reconfirming a message Prime Minister Brown’ Foreign Policy Advisor had
conveyed to Ambassador Tuttle and DCM a few days before (ref B), Chatterton-
Dixon told PolCouns that HMG was not willing to take any additional detainees
for resettlement in the UK, beyond the two detainees with UK connections that
are currently the subject of bilateral discussions -- Binyam Mohammed and Shaker
Amer. HMG had already resettled over a dozen detainees and the UK’s available
security resources to monitor any additional detainees were already stretched to
the limit, he explained. The decision to accept more detainees had been taken at
the
LONDON 00000290 002 OF 002
“ministerial level,” he added, and after cabinet discussion, so it was not one
that Chatterton-Dixon believed was subject to revision.
¶6. (S) The question of other EU Member governments accepting detainees was,
ultimately, for individual governments to decide in consultation with the USG,
Chatterton-Dixon said. He said that HMG was not opposed to the EU discussing
what steps it could take to assist individual governments that decide to accept
detainees. He understood the next step following the discussion on detainees at
the January 26-27 EU GAERC meeting was for EU Ambassadors in Brussels to meet
and propose possible steps that could be taken to assist Members which choose to
accept detainees, as well as proposals to address the legal issues that were
raised concerning the detainees’ possible freedom of movement across EU borders.
HMG Will Share Its Experiences with Other Governments

--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶7. (S) HMG has offered to provide other European governments considering
resettlement of detainees advice on the UK’s experiences, both legal and
security, in resettling detainees. Chatterton-Dixon did not know of any
government that had yet taken up the British offer, in part he speculated,
because to do so would “show a government’s cards” about its willingness to take
detainees. He thought that most governments were still at a point at which they
did not want to reveal to other EU capitals their willingness to resettle
detainees, waiting to find out if others would step forward first. “I would
expect Washington will learn first which countries are willing, before we do.”
¶8. (SBU) Chatterton-Dixon stressed that HMG appreciates the USG keeping it
informed of future developments related to the Executive Orders and the work of
the inter-agency panels.
ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW405, RUSSIA DELAYS DELIVERY OF S-300S TO

IRAN?
Discussing cables
09MOSCOW405 2009-02-18 15:03 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO5612
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INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0137
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0268
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0161
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0052
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0286
S E C R E T MOSCOW 000405
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC MCAP MARR MOPS PARM PINR PTER
IR, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA DELAYS DELIVERY OF S-300S TO IRAN?
REF: A. BEYRLE-BURNS FEBRUARY 18 E-MAIL

¶B. MOSCOW 357
Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) In response to media reports surrounding the visit of

Iranian Defense Minister Najar to Moscow February 16-18 that
Russia would move ahead with the delivery of the S-300 air
defense missile system to Iran, Ambassador expressed strong
concern to DFM Ryabkov February 17 (ref A). Ryabkov replied
that Moscow had "gotten the message." This followed
Ambassador's demarches on the issue the previous week to
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko and PM FP
Advisor Ushakov, as well as U/S Burns' and NSC Senior
Director McFaul's expressions of strong concern regarding the
possible completion of the delivery with FM Lavrov (ref B),
Prikhodko and Ushakov.
¶2. (SBU) Late February 17, news daily Kommersant reported

that Rosoboronexport spokesman Vyacheslav Davidenko said that
Russia and Iran were "unlikely to agree on deliveries of the
S-300 air defense missile system" during Najar's visit.
Davidenko reportedly said that "nothing has changed as to the
deliveries of S-300 to Tehran" and that "things were unlikely
to change" after Naijar's visit. Press reports February 18
followed up, saying that Russia had "deferred" its plan to
sell S-300's to Iran "in an effort to improve Moscow's
relations with the new Obama Administration." They cited
Rosoboronexport General Director Isaikin's comment that "if
the president and government of the Russian Federation make a
decision, Rosoboronexport must implement it." Isaikin said
Russia had not delivered the system to Iran, but was ready to
do so "if ordered." Daily Izvestiya also reported that DFM
Ryabkov said that Russia "saw to it that its military
cooperation is transparent and in keeping with international
law."
¶3. (C) Israeli DCM Yuval Fuchs told us February 17 that FM

Lavrov was in Israel over the weekend and assured the GOI
that Russia was not supplying any S-300 missiles to any
countries in the Middle East. According to Fuchs, Lavrov
failed to give any heads up to the GOI about Najar's visit
this week. Fuchs added that Rosatom head Sergey Kiriyenko
and Deputy FM Aleksey Borodavkin will make separate trips to
Iran later this month. Kiriyenko will travel to discuss
Iran's nuclear facility at Bushehr, while Borodavkin is going
for consultations.
¶4. (C) Comment. Russian officials appear to have stepped

back, at least temporarily, from announcing a delivery of the
S-300's, but pressure will remain within the military and
security services to move forward as much for financial
reasons as for political or foreign policy considerations.
The prospect of more constructive U.S.-Russian relations may
have tempered the GOR response, but we will continue to be
told that Russia retains its "right" to proceed with an arms
sale that does not violate national or international regimes.
For better or for worse, the delivery of S-300's have become
a barometer of our bilateral relations.
BEYRLE
Viewing cable 09MUNICH25, YOUTHFUL POLITICIANS SHAKE UP

GERMAN STATUS QUO
Discussing cables
2009-02-13 2010-11-28 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Consulate
09MUNICH25
06:06 18:06 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Munich
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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ECON ETRD PGOV PREL INRB GM
SUBJECT: YOUTHFUL POLITICIANS SHAKE UP GERMAN STATUS QUO
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.
REFS: A) BERLIN 169 B) 08 MUNICH 355 and previous
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (37) is Germany's new and

youngest-ever Economics Minister, assuming a portfolio for which he
is not wholly suited academically (REF A) but which he could master
using his proven personal and political skills. If he is successful,
he could become the poster child for renewal of Horst Seehofer's
Christian Social Union (CSU), now struggling to convince voters that
it is modern and savvy enough to succeed and not the hide-bound
regional redoubt of conservatism that lost big in Bavaria last fall
(REF B). (Biographical data at paragraph 8.) End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) Supporters and detractors focus on the same qualities in

the precocious zu Guttenberg: his youth, charisma, foreign policy
experience, and upward momentum. Supporters say he will be
effective because he understands modern challenges, is well known on
both sides of the Atlantic, and is effective. Detractors say he has
too little experience in general and that his foreign policy
expertise is wrong for the Economics Ministry during an economic
crisis.
¶3. (SBU) Zu Guttenberg has a proven record of beating the

expectations of politicians and the public. He unexpectedly
contested and won the Chairmanship of the CSU in Upper Franconia, a
region of Bavaria, in 2007. After becoming party general secretary
just three months ago, he used warmth, charisma and direct
engagement to win over party members in the provinces who were
skeptical of his allegedly cool and aristocratic bearing (see bio
notes below at paragraph 8).
------------------------------------------
Politicians Curious; Private Sector Upbeat
------------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Zu Guttenberg could add some gloss to the cabinet by

concentrating in a high-profile way on the business side of the
economy, leaving high finance to Peer Steinbrueck (Social Democratic
Party, SPD). This might be a good strategy. Senior contacts at the
Bavarian Economics Ministry told the Consulate political specialist
that "they are enthusiastic about zu Guttenberg." Although he would
not really have time to master the difficult ministry within the six
months he has before the Federal Bundestag election, they believed
zu Guttenberg was "smart, with a quick mind, and that he would
definitely make himself far more visible than Glos ever did."
Embassy contacts in Berlin have echoed these sentiments and think zu
Guttenberg is well-suited to capitalize on opportunities with the
new US Administration. He seems to get on well with Chancellor
Merkel. Moreover, business representatives and the private sector
have given the new man an early round of applause. For example,
Employers' Association President Dieter Hundt said zu Guttenberg's
international experience, political clout, and contacts would all
help him promote the interests of employers. Representatives from
Industry and Chambers of Commerce expressed the expectation that zu
Guttenberg would support medium-sized business and strengthen
transatlantic economic ties, based on his own experience in his
family's enterprises. Zu Guttenberg's tasks are manifold:
Implementation of the savings package worth 100 billion Euros;
negotiate with companies that have asked for state money, such as
Continental and car manufacturer Opel; find a solution for Hypo Real
Estate bank; and tackle a wealth of questions with regard to energy
and ecology. Chancellor Merkel will want zu Guttenberg to strike a
balance between being seen as a hands-on minister and preventing the
election campaign from being fought over the financial crisis,
something that could weaken Government prospects.
----------------------------------------
THE NEW CSU - MORE ATTRACTIVE TO VOTERS?
----------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) With this appointment, Bavarian Minister President Horst

Seehofer, also CSU, extended his radical rejuvenation strategy of
the party to the federal level. Michael Glos was the last senior
CSU politician from the preceding Edmund Stoiber generation. "zu
Guttenberg is young, very young - but that is exactly what I want in
the process of renewal," said Seehofer. The CSU faces potentially
existential challenges in the races for the German Federal and
European Parliaments and Seehofer obviously believes that only fresh
faces can lead the party into a brighter future. After taking
office as Bavarian Minister President last fall, Seehofer replaced
all members of the cabinet over 60 years of age with considerably
MUNICH 00000025 002 OF 002
younger people, including more women. Seehofer's departure as

Federal Agriculture Minister enabled him to install 44-year old Ilse
Aigner as his successor. With zu Guttenberg gone to Berlin, Seehofer
has appointed two from the younger CSU generation to replace him -
Alexander Dobrindt, a relative unknown 38-year-old Bundestag deputy,
and Dorothee Baer, the 30-year-old who was just recently promoted to
foreign policy spokesperson of the CSU Bundestag caucus. Seehofer
knows that the June 7 European Parliament elections and the
September 27 national elections are the tests to see whether
Bavarians go along with his new CSU.
-------
Comment
-------
¶7. (SBU) The SPD may hope to profit from the replacement of Michael
Glos with the relatively inexperienced zu Guttenberg; this may prove
difficult. Glos was from the start considered one of Merkel's
weakest ministers, and his departure removes a favorite target of
his political opponents. It will be far more difficult to score
points by attacking his successor, who is a skilled debater. In the
middle of a serious economic and financial crisis, zu Guttenberg's
challenge will be to convince the electorate in Germany that the
CDU/CSU remains the party best able to cope with economic
challenges. It may not hurt that the new CSU Secretary General,
Alexander Dobrindt, has previously served as economic spokesman of
the CSU caucus. The economy will no doubt be the overriding issue
in the unfolding election campaign.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
Biographical Data: Germany's Youngest Minister, a Baron
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶8. The 37-year-old Karl-Theodor von und zu Guttenberg was CSU

Secretary General for only 100 days. His nomination to Federal
Economics Minister had not been on his agenda; however, he said, it
was "an honor he could not reject." zu Guttenberg, descendent of a
nobility line dating back to the year 1149, comes from a family with
a strong political background: His grandfather was a Parliamentarian
State Secretary under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, his father is a
famous conductor, and his grand-uncle supported NS resistance
fighter Count von Stauffenberg and was executed by the Nazis. His
father left the CSU when then-Minister President Streibl cancelled
his participation in a demonstration against anti-Semitism (he later
rejoined the party). Zu Guttenberg is a man of considerable
rhetorical skills, which in 2007 resulted in his election to CSU
district chairman of Upper Franconia over his rival, party whip
Hartmut Koschyk. Ever since he became a member of the Bundestag in
2002, he has proven a quick study, making himself a name as foreign
and security policy expert. He draws from a rich network of
international contacts, in Europe as well as in the U.S. Right
before the February 6-8 Munich Security Conference, he chaired a
roundtable on foreign policy issues, attended, among others, by
Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, Deputy Secretary James
Steinberg, and USNATO Ambassador Kurt Volker. He is not without an
economic background. For a few years, he worked as investment
banker in New York; until 2002, he served as managing director of a
family business. He also helped prepare a medium-sized company,
Rhoen Hospitals, to enter the stock market. He speaks fluent
English. His wife, Stephanie, is also of noble lineage. They have
two daughters. Diplopedia reference:
http://diplopedia.state.gov/index.php?title=
Karl_Theodor_Freiherr_zu_Guttenberg
¶9. (U) Consulate General Munich coordinated this report with Embassy
Berlin. Track Munich reporting at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Germ any.
Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI288, INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY: “HUGE

STAKE” IN SPECIAL
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09NEWDELHI288.
09NEWDELHI288 2009-02-17 08:08 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO3921
DE RUEHNE #0288/01 0480827
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000288

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY: “HUGE STAKE” IN SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE’S SUCCESS
Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon
and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke on February 16, Menon:
-- stated that India “has a huge stake” in the Special Representative’s success
in his new role and promised to support Holbrooke’s efforts publicly to
alleviate negative media speculation about the Special Representative’s mandate;
-- gave his assessment that the intentions and capabilities of the Pakistan Army
were the key determinants of Pakistan,s internal situation and the cause of
friction between India and Pakistan; -- said that India wishes to collaborate
closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan, and offered support for U.S. views on the
suitability of an August 20 election date; -- suggested that after consulting
internally, he may travel to Washington to provide GOI input into the U.S.
review of Afghanistan policy; and -- provided a brief on the GOI’s initial
reaction to Pakistan’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke,
accompanied by Ambassador, met February 16 with Indian Foreign Secretary
Shivshankar Menon. Also in attendance from the U.S. side were Paul Jones, Deputy
for Holbrooke; Ashley Bommer, Representative Holbrooke’s assistant; and an
Embassy notetaker; the Indian side also included Joint Secretary (Americas)
Gaitri Kumar and Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) TCA Raghvan.
Holbrooke explained his responsibilities as Special Representative and
emphasized the importance of Indian views in the formulation of the new
administration,s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. He also provided Menon with a
brief readout of his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan
¶3. (C) Menon cited the numerous times he had worked both publicly and privately
with Holbrooke in the past, and said he was very happy to see Holbrooke in his
new incarnation. The Indian government, too, was pleased with Holbrooke’s
appointment, he stated, adding “We have a huge stake in your success in this
role.” He agreed with Holbrooke’s assessment that in regard to the problems in
Afghanistan and Pakistan “you can’t solve one without the other.”
¶4. (C) The Indian government was aware of the suspicions the media had created
about Special Representative Holbrooke’s mandate (i.e., that it included
Kashmir), Menon said. While the media would always speculate, Menon promised
that the GOI would publicly support Holbrooke’s efforts, adding that it would
repeat the message “India has a huge stake in your success” in its public
comments.
¶5. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated
over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a
civilian government to worries over security and the economy. The U.S. has
influence, however, “where it matters most,” Menon said, referring to the
Pakistan Army, arguing that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to
the capacity and intentions of Pakistan’s military. Not only must Pakistan’s
army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut
its links to jihadi organizations, who have gone global over the past five
years. Supporting Pakistan’s army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that
changing its operating assumptions would be more effective. Menon noted that the
Indians had felt last week’s meeting at the Munich Security Conference between
National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and General Petraeus had been especially
productive.
¶6. (C) Menon pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks,
India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilize
Pakistan’s civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and
travel relations. However, Pakistan’s Army continued to make things difficult
for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for
terrorist groups.
NEW DELHI 00000288 002 OF 002
Menon noted that India, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, had consciously not
built up troops on the border with Pakistan, as it had following the 2001 attack
on its Parliament.
¶7. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Holbrooke noted that the focus now was on the
elections. He lauded India for the effective contribution it had made to
Afghanistan reconstruction, which Menon said is now up to $1.5 billion. Menon
acknowledged Pakistani suspicions about India,s intentions in Afghanistan and
explained that India has made numerous efforts over the past few years to try to
allay Pakistan’s concerns, only to be rebuffed. Menon said that he, as High
Commissioner, had offered to President Musharraf to sit down and explain exactly
what India was doing in Afghanistan, without even asking for a reciprocal
explanation from Pakistan, but that Pakistan officials -- not just Musharraf --
“have avoided it in every way.”
¶8. (C) India has no interest in any specific candidate in Afghan elections,
Menon stated, but believes the upcoming election process should not add to
instability. Equally important is that the election process is credible,
therefore making Afghanistan’s democracy credible. Menon noted that Afghan Lower
House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni was currently in Delhi, and said India
supported the Election Commission,s proposal for August 20 polling. Menon stated
that the GOI was also planning to tell Qanuni that controversy over the exact
date of the election should not be allowed “to bring the house down,” adding
that to do so would only be in the Taliban’s interest. Holbrooke urged Menon to
tell Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. (Note: Menon offered to brief
Post on the Qunani meeting, and Post will report septel on any readout provided.
End Note.)
¶9. (C) Responding to Holbrooke,s brief of the Afghanistan policy review
currently underway in the USG, Menon said he would consult with his government
on what would be the best way for India to provide input. He suggested that,
after consultations, he would like to travel to Washington for high level talks
with the new team. Menon assured Holbrooke, that on the issue of Indian
cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan, we could be assured that India wished
to work closely with us.
¶10. (C) Menon asked if the U.S. was considering including Iran in a Core Group
on Afghanistan. Holbrooke referred to his interview with Tolo TV where he
emphasized the need for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors to be part of the
solution, but said no policy decisions had been made. Menon said he believed a
contact group did not have to be formally set up yet, but rather if we “let it
cook,” it would form itself. Menon noted the interest China has had in such a
group for the past two years, and added that Iran has been signaling to India
for the last four months that it was interested.
¶11. (C) Menon offered an initial GOI assessment of the Pakistani response to
India’s dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks. Saying that it was “remarkable
that we got this far,” Menon thanked the U.S. for its role in pressing Pakistan
to act. Still, Menon maintained, Pakistan has further to go to bring justice to
the perpetrators of the attack, and it is not clear whether Pakistan will
continue on this positive track or, citing the Daniel Pearl case, recede when
public pressure wanes. Menon also speculated that many of the “30 questions”
submitted by Pakistan were added after the investigation by politicians in
response to domestic pressures. “We haven’t reached the point of no return yet”
for Pakistan’s government to positively conclude the investigation, Menon
stated. Menon also offered that he did not believe the Mumbai attacks themselves
would play a major role in India’s upcoming elections, because efforts to
capitalize politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any
political party.
¶12. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. MULFORD
Viewing cable 09BAKU175, IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-

BUSTERS, AND
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09BAKU175.
09BAKU175 2009-03-06 09:09 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Baku
VZCZCXRO1853
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #0175/01 0650955
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 060955Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000175
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019

TAGS: PREL ETRD SNAR ECON AJ TU RU IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER
REF: A) BAKU 139 B) BAKU 132 C) BAKU 80 D) 2008 BAKU

917
Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D)
Summary
---------
¶1. (S) According to widespread rumor, many Iranians in Baku

are involved full- or part-time in Iranian regime-related
profit making, sanctions-busting, money laundering, and
similar activities. Activities range from assisting Iranian
interests "on the side" of pursuing private activities, to
working primarily for Iranian government entities. These
Iranians' formal businesses in Azerbaijan include factories,
construction companies, trading companies, and shops, some of
which may be hollow companies hiding illicit or semi-licit
activities. Some are also said to be significant actors in
obtaining spare parts and equipment for the Revolutionary
Guard, raising revenues and managing money for it and/or
regime figures, or managing Iran-origin narcotics
trafficking. The list is a "sampler" of the types of
personnel and activities singled out to Iran watcher by
multiple sources as actively involved in Iranian
regime-supportive financial and procurement activities. The
list suggests the extensive and complex interconnection of
Iranian figures and activities that reportedly support
Iranian security organizations and regime figures. End
Summary.
¶2. (S) Baku Iran watcher received the information below from
a wide variety of independent Iranian and Azerbaijani sources
(strictly protect), including Baku-based Iranian students,
business figures, and human rights activists; a Tehran-based
Iranian exporter; a prominent businessman working in Iran;
the Executive Director of AmCham in Azerbaijan; an
Azerbaijani oil company executive; and a local partner in a
leading international management consulting firm. In almost
all cases the information below was related/confirmed
separately by at least three of the above sources.
¶3. (S) Please note that, while serious efforts have been
made to cross-check the information below and ignore
"indirect" claims, Iran watcher has no independent ability to
verify these allegations. Although some of these figures are
well known in Baku and/or among the resident Iranian
community, Baku Iran watcher has never met any of them. The
information below should be interpreted in this context.
¶4. (S) Begin List:
¶A. (S) Jamal Allavi. Three Iranian sources claimed that

Allavi is a close relative of the ex-Mayor of Ardebil, and a
former colleague/friend of President Ahmedinajad. He now
runs several Iranian companies (mostly trading), and is the
head of a provincial cooperative organization "Tavanee
Marzneshinan Fedayan Velayat," entitled to export and import
items with reduced restrictions. Allavi has a house in Baku
and frequently travels on business to Azerbaijan, Russia,
China, and Kazakhstan. He uses his businesses as a cover for
procuring and importing military spare parts and other items
needed by the Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security
forces, bribing customs officials as necessary. A fourth
Iranian source noted that, while he did not know Allavi, the
company name is a "giveaway" of Revolutionary Guard/regime
connections.
¶B. (S) FNU "Lotfi". Runs a large artificial leather factory

in Ardebil ("Kharkhaneye Charmeh Masnui)", and other
businesses based in Iranian Azerbaijan. He is a close
associate of Jamal Allavi (entry "A" above), with whom he
cooperates in smuggling activities. He is an officer in the
Revolutionary Guard (possibly retired), and his businesses
are actually Revolutionary Guard-owned. He travels to
Malaysi, Singapore, Dubai, Turkey, and Iraq as well as
zerbaijan on Revolutionary Guard business. He als assists
Revolutionary Guard and/or Iranian intelligence operations by
"getting for them what they need," including communications
equipment and technical information.
¶C. (S) Adil Sharabiani. An Iranian currency exchange dealer

with "close links" to Tehran. He was formerly a manager of
BAKU 00000175 002 OF 004
Bank Melli Iran, and currently has a close business

relationship with the Xalq Bank, a medium-sized bank in Baku.
He came to Azerbaijan after going bankrupt in Iran under
murky circumstances. He is wealthy and reportedly works
closely with the Iranian "Foundation for the Oppressed"
(Banyadeh Mostazafan), overseeing its business and investment
activities in Azerbaijan, and advising the management of the
Foundation-owned Darya Soap Detergent company in Azerbaijan
(headed by one "Farzandeh"). He also assists another Iranian
foundation that is providing financial assistance to
Azerbaijani refugees from Karabagh with up to 300 Manat per
family per month (about $350).
An Iranian contact said that a friend had recently witnessed

Sharabiani delivering five million dollars in cash "from
Iran" to the Bank of Baku that was not entered on the books.
The Iranian source did not know whether the money represented
a personal payment to Sharabiani or a disbursement entrusted
to him for some other purpose. The anti-regime source
alleged that Sharabiani "periodically" makes such deliveries
to the Bank. An Iranian businessman separately told Iran
watcher that Sharabiani has "very good relations" with the
Iranian government, and is widely assumed by other Iranians
to be assisting both regime organizations and individual
regime/clerical figures in investment and money laundering
activities.
Note: The Xalq Bank was established using former staff of the
Bank of Baku (see 'E" below). It is one of the most popular
Baku banking venues in Azerbaijan for Iranian businesses and
Iranians in Iran. Two other popular banks for Iranians are
the "Royal Bank of Baku," owned by an Iranian-American (ref
C), and the "Bank of Baku." End Note).
¶D. (S) Kamal Darvishi. This individual and his three

brothers were famous fighters during the Iran-Iraq war.
Kamil rose to the rank of General in the Revolutionary
Guard, and formerly had important Teheran-area security and
intelligence duties. He and his brother Keyoumars began
coming to Azerbaijan regularly ten years ago. Although from
a very poor family, they are both extremely wealthy. Kamal
owns several road and other infrastructure construction
companies in Iran, and formerly effectively controlled much
of this sector in Iran (according to a Teheran businessman,
"no roads in Iran could be built without him or his friends
as a partner.)"
Darvishi formerly ran the "NASR" company, an alleged

Revolutionary Guard-controlled business in Iran. Some of his
business activities and networking reportedly aroused
suspicion, resulting in his official "retirement" from the
Revolutionary Guard. In recent years Darvishi has developed
a close business relationship/friendship with Azerbaijan
Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and with
Mammedov's assistance has won at least eight major road
construction and rehabilitation contracts, including
contracts for construction of the Baku-Iranian Astara
highway, the Baku-Guba highway, and the BaQ ring highway.
(Comment: We assume Mammedov is a silent partner in these
contracts. Mammedov's immediate family owns Azerbaijan's
largest commercial development company, and he is notoriously
corrupt even for Azerbaijan. Iran watcher has heard many
allegations from Azerbaijani contacts of creative corrupt
practices involving highway construction here. End Comment).
Iranian business and student contacts asserted that Darvishi

maintains close relations with the Revolutionary Guard and
Iranian intelligence. Two noted that he travels freely
abroad, in violation of ten-year legal limitations on
personal foreign travel by retired senior Revolutionary Guard
officers. An Iranian student reported that Darvishi is
recruiting among Iranian students in Azerbaijan for work in a
new company he is establishing here.
¶E. (S) Jamsheed "Jushkar" Mahmudoglu. He and his brothers

are Iranian Azerbaijanis who have obtained Turkish
citizenship. They are large shareholders in the Bank of
Baku, which is sometimes presented as a "Turkish bank." They
are originally from Tabriz, where the family were wealthy
gold and currency dealers who lost their business after the
Iranian Revolution. The family fled to Turkey and ultimately
BAKU 00000175 003 OF 004
obtained Turkish passports. Their business deals in

Azerbaijan and Iran are frequently entwined with the Oromi
brothers, another former Tabrizi-now-Turkish family active in
Azerbaijan and Iran. They and the Oromis set up the Silsila
General Trading company in Dubai under the aegis of the NAB
Group. In Iran they jointly own a company which produces
boilers on license from a German company (Bosch). In
Azerbaijan they cooperated in the establishment of the Baku
Electronics company and the Bank of Baku (the latter in
partnership with the family of former Minister of Economic
Development Farhad Aliyev, see below). Unlike the Oromis,
Jamsheed reportedly remains a major shareholder in this bank.
Two Iranian sources repeated "rumors" that this son is

working with a son of Ayatollah Rafsanjani in several
business ventures. Jamsheed has relations with prominent
Azerbaijani and Iranian business and government figures, and
allegedly does favors for Iranian government personnel,
including facilitating of desired foreign items and money
laundering. The President of AmCham in Baku (protect)
confirmed that Jamsheed is a major bank shareholder, and
originally from Iran. She nd other sources opined that the
bank is one of he more "professionally run" in Baku.
(Comment: The bank is known for its relations with Turkish
companies. The Bank of Baku was formerly controlled by the
brother of Farhad Aliyev, a former Azerbaijani Minister of
Economic Development who is currently jailed. According to a
prominent Azerbaijani business consultant (strictly protect),
Aliyev's position has been divided between the Azerbaijani
Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and the Head of
Presidential Security, Vahid Akhundov. End Comment).
¶F. (S) Shahram Oromi. An Iranian Azerbaijani who obtained

Turkish citizenship after the Iranian revolution.
Nonetheless, he attended university in Iran, graduating from
Iran Azad university (1993). He and his brothers Nadir and
Bahram established the "Turkish" NAB Foreign Trade company
(Deesh Ticaret Limited Sherkati) in 1988. The company
(headquartered in Istanbul) does extensive trading between
Turkey and the Middle East and Iran. It is active in
Azerbaijan, and also present in Russia and other CIS
countries. Since 1995 this company has been the distributor
of Hyundai cars in Azerbaijan, and a member of the family is
reportedly the Agent for Samsung in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The consultant describes the Oromi brother's business mode as
based on "establishing insider monopolies or advantages via
relations with powerful government individuals and their
relatives" in the various countries in which they operate,
"using bribes, 'gifts,' or offers of a share in their
business."
The Oromis helped set up the Bank of Baku (see item "E'
above), and Shahram served in various positions (ranging from
Chief of the Financial Audit Department to Chairman) between
1999-2007, however they have recently sold most of their
shares in this bank to influential Azerbaijanis. The Oromi's
allegedly work cooperatively in areas requested by senior
Iranian figures, and several of their businesses may
facilitate regime (or regime member) interests. Shahram was
and remains close to former Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan
Ahmed Qazai.
¶G. (S) "Asgar" LNU (commonly known in Baku as "Agaya Asgar).

His private company is located at #16 Gorbanov Street in
Baku, next to the Nizami metro station. His formal business
is Iran-Russia timber and wood products export/import via
Azerbaijan. A native of Iranian Azerbaijan, Asgar has an
Azerbaijani wife and has lived in Baku for several years.
He works closely with political officers based at the Iran
Culture House (ref B). His wife is the cousin of the
Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov, and
Mardanov's brother is one of his business partners. Irada
Afetgizi, an Iranian who helped organize an anti-Israel
"Islamic world" conference held at the Baku Media Center in
2007, works in his office. Asgar owns two homes in Baku and
hosts visiting Iranian clerics and relatives of Iranian
regime officials and senior Revolutionary Guard officers. He
has close ties to Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard
organizations and individuals, and assists them in business
activities. He often travels to Moscow.
¶H. (S) Jabrail Naveed "Azerbaijani." A famous "fixer" for
BAKU 00000175 004 OF 004
Iranians in Azerbaijan (hence his nickname). He was head of

the Iranian Trader's Association in Azerbaijan until that
organization closed in the late 1990's. An Iranian
manufacturer and exporter from Tehran who has known the
family for years (strictly protect) noted that "he is very
wealthy, but doesn't flaunt it." He said that Naveed's wife
formerly worked in Iran as an officer in Bank Melli, where
she facilitated loans to unqualified regime bigwigs and their
cronies.
Three contacts separately claimed that Naveed has facilitated

Iran-related energy business ventures with the State Oil
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and illicitly exports (falsely
labeled) Pelite and other oil drilling materials and
chemicals and propane gas. Naveed also reportedly owns the
"Pingvin" iron workshop in Azerbaijan. The Tehran
businessman said that Naveed helps facilitate import of
sanctioned products into Iran from Russia and elsewhere via
the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchevan, and said that he
himself is one of "many" legitimate Iranian exporters who
have been pressured into cooperating in this activity.
Naveed is a close friend of the head of Baku's Husseiniya
("Iranian") mosque, Mullah Ogagnejad, and oversees the
mosques' administration. Ogagnejad is a son-in-law of the
late Ayatollah Meshkini, and the personal religious
representative of Ayatollah Khameini in Azerbaijan (ref B).
¶I. (S) Safa Naveed. Son of Jabrail Naveed (above). A

graduate of Baku's Kavkaz university, he is currently a
Revolutionary Guard officer working at the Iranian Embassy in
Baku. He is a leadliaison with Iranian students in
Azerbaijan. AnIranian student described Safa's duties as
"spyig on" Iranian students in Baku, and an Iranian
businessman who has known the family for years told Iran
watcher that Safa Naveed has frequently boasted to him about
his and Iran's knowledge of what goes on in Azerbaijan,
extensive information networks here, and "ability to get
anything it needs." One contact described Safa as
"fanatically anti-Western."
¶J. (S) Asgar Jabbari. One of the "two Asgars" widely known
among Iranians in Baku (see "F" above). Son of the late
"Mullah Natiq," a famous hard-line orator during the Iranian
revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Jabbari's wife is from
Azerbaijan, he owns a house here, and travels back and forth
regularly between Iran and Azerbaijan. His main official
business is exporting Iranian marble from Isfahan, where he
works with a large factory, which is actually a Revolutionary
Guard front company (Note: Iranian marble is commonly used in
Baku residential and office-building construction, which has
been undergoing a boom here until recently. End Note.)
Jabbari has close business relationships with senior Iranian
government officials, and carries out business activities and
buys real estate on their behalf. (Note: Jabbari's name is
of Arabic origin, but is more likely to imply religious piety
than Arabic heritage. End Note).
¶K. (S) Sabir Shaheen. Though reportedly mild-mannered and

well dressed, Shaheen is a well known mafia-like figure from
Iranian Azerbaijan who reportedly acts as a "liaison" between
the Iranian and Russian/Azerbaijani narcotics traffickers.
Although he officially operates a marble store on Baku's Karl
Marx street, the store is generally closed and Shaheen
himself is generally seen holding court at restaurants and
cafes along 28 May Street. (Note: Iran reportedly has one of
the highest per capita rates of heroin addiction in the
world, and heroin and other narcotics trafficking from Iran
to Russia and Europe via Azerbaijan has skyrocketed over the
last two years. See ref (D).
End List.
DERSE
Viewing cable 09BAKU179, IRANIAN SOURCE NAMES "U.K.-

REGISTERED" COMPANY AS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09BAKU179.
09BAKU179 2009-03-06 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Baku
P 061232Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PIORITY
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 012
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T BAKU 000179
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/7/2019

TAGS: ETTC ETRD ENRG UE UK TU AJ IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN SOURCE NAMES "U.K.-REGISTERED" COMPANY AS
IRAN SANCTIONS-BUSTER POSSIBLY SUPPORTING BUSHEIR PROJECT
Classified By: POLECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D)
¶1. (S) A well-connected Iranian businessman who owns a

Baku-based oil services company told Baku Iran watcher that a
company called "INSULTEC," owned by UK citizens of Indian
origin, has secretly provided cladding, thermal insulation,
and ancillary equipment to the government of Iran in a
variety of shipments via Turkey and the U.A.E. According to
the Baku source, whose company operates in Russia,
Kazakhstan, and the U.A.E. as well as Azerbaijan, the
materials allegedly sent by INSULTEC in falsely labeled
containers were of type that could be used in nuclear reactor
construction. Citing old Iran and Dubai based business
friends allegedly familiar with the issue, the source said
that INSULTEC has maintained a sanctions-evading relationship
with Iranian government companies for some time. Source said
that the company was officially headquartered in the U.K.,
and has offices in Germany, the USA, and elsewhere, its
manufacturing base and the bulk of its staff are in India.
¶2. (S) Perhaps more disturbingly, the source (who had just
returned from ten days in Dubai) said that he had been
informed by an Iranian friend who had collaborated in the
activity that INSULTEC recently helped facilitate a shipment
from the UAE to Iran consisting of twelve containers
(possibly labeled "insulation") of unknown material that may
not have actually originated with INSULTEC. The source sai
he was told by his friend that the shipment went by ship to
Bandar Abbas and was trucked immediately to a final
destination in Busheir. The friend told source that another
Iranian destination was falsely listed in the shipping
documents, presumably to hide the actually intended
destination of Busheir.
¶3. (S) The Baku businessman is a UK-educated engineer from a

prominent Pre-Revolution Isfahan family, and formerly owned a
large factory in Iran. He is a former national fencing
champion of Iran. former President of the Iran Fencing
Association, and Vice-President of an Azerbaijan sports
association. He has been based in Baku for more than ten
years, working primarily as a sub-contractor to BP and the
Cape Industrial Services company. While his oil services
company includes an insulation division that may be in
competition with INSULTEC, source has provided "inside"
information on many other Iranian issues (including
comprehensive data on the status of new Iranian oil refinery
construction) that does not relate to his private interests
in any way.
¶4. (S) Note: A quick google check revealed several companies

with the name INSULTEC in the title - these may or not be
affiliated. Based on the information provided by source
(currently in Iran, where he frequently travels), one
possible candidate could be "INSULTEC Chitral Ltd." End
Note.
DERSE
Viewing cable 09BEIJING560, PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S.

IRAN POLICY,
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO9112
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0560/01 0631255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041255Z MAR 09
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034

TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
OFFERS HELP IN TALKING TO IRAN
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.

Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China is keen to understand the direction of

U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and is
willing to facilitate dialogue between the two sides,
according to an MFA official. China remains committed to the
P5-plus-1 process but values its bilateral engagement with
Iran. Nonetheless, the Iran should not take for granted its
economic relations with the PRC. Despite PRC urging that
Iran respond positively to American overtures, initial rounds
of direct talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue would
be difficult, the official suggested. The official said that
it is too soon to contemplate what actions should be taken
should Iran develop a nuclear weapon. An academic contact
suggested that there is no "point of no return" on Iran's
development of nuclear technology and that the Iranians
believe they are in a strong bargaining position should some
form of new diplomatic engagement emerge. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations and the

international community's efforts to deal with the Iran
nuclear issue with Deputy Director Xu Wei of MFA's West Asian
Affairs Department Iran Division March 3. PolOff also met
with Li Guofu, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies
at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International
Studies (CIIS) February 27.
China Seeks Clarity on Policy Review

------------------------------------
¶3. (C) MFA's Xu Wei told PolOff that China was closely
following the ongoing review of our Iran policy. He said
that China believed that the United States maintains a
leadership role in the Middle East and that the results of
the review will have an impact on Chinese engagement with the
region. He said that Beijing hoped for more clarity from the
United States on policy adjustments resulting from this
review, adding that China had been left to guess at how U.S.
policy might change on a very important set of shared
concerns. In the meantime, Xu stressed, China's overall
policy toward Iran had not changed, and China would continue
to emphasize the importance of stability in the Middle East
and its opposition to the development of nuclear weapons in
the region. Xu noted that additional clarity was especially
important because China perceives several voices in the USG
with different viewpoints on Iran speaking publicly on the
issue.
PRC Committed to P5-plus-1, Willing to Facilitate Talks

--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶4. (C) Xu stressed the need to resolve the nuclear impasse

through dialogue, and added that China remained committed to
the P5-plus-1 process, as indicated in its support for the
recent P5-plus-1 joint statement on Iran. He said that China
sincerely hoped that the outcome of our Iran policy review
would be direct U.S.-Iran talks, and offered China's
assistance in creating a channel for communication with the
Iranians.
Official: PRC Effective at Communicating with Tehran

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶5. (C) China and Iran continued to enjoy "good" relations in

both the political and economic realms, Xu said, but this did
not indicate that China supports all of Tehran's policies.
He said that China had developed strong communication with
the Iranian regime and used these channels to express to the
Iranian leadership the concerns of the P5-plus-1 and the Gulf
Cooperation Council over nuclear proliferation. Beijing
sought to persuade Iran to play a positive role in the
region, and Chinese communication with Tehran to that end was
effective, Xu said, adding that Iran's cooperation with the
IAEA and the P5-plus-1, though limited, was due in part to
Chinese intervention. China had made clear to Iran that
PRC-Iran economic cooperation should not be interpreted as an
indication that China is not serious about concerns over
nuclear proliferation or about working with the international
community to deal with the nuclear issue.
Talking to Iran Would Require Patience

--------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Xu said that the U.S. policy review had generated
debate within Iran over how to respond, especially over the
possibility of direct dialogue. China was urging the Iranian
regime to respond positively to American overtures, but Xu
said that based on his experience working on Iranian issues,
he believed the leadership will find it difficult to show a
BEIJING 00000560 002 OF 003
positive attitude in public. Xu counseled patience, saying

that he was concerned that expectations in the United States
on how Iran would respond may be too high. Still, he said
that the issues involved were too important for the United
States to fail to press forward with dialogue even if any
such discussions are difficult.
"Too Soon" to Contemplate Weaponization Concerns

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶7. (C) Pressed on how China would respond if Iran developed

nuclear weapons, Xu said that China took proliferation
concerns seriously and opposed such a development. However,
he indicated that China did not yet see Iranian development
of nuclear weapons as an immediate concern, noting that China
was willing to "wait and see how far Iran can go" in
developing nuclear technology before it would change its
position. He added that it was still too soon to contemplate
what actions should be taken should the Iranians develop a
nuclear weapon.
¶8. (C) CIIS's Li Guofu echoed this approach, saying that

while China followed the Iranian nuclear program closely,
China was not 100-percent convinced that Iran is pursuing
nuclear weapons. He indicated that observers who believe
there is a "point of no return" in Iran's technical
development of nuclear weapons were incorrect, because the
problem was fundamentally a political one and not technical.
He said that Iran was moving ahead with its nuclear program
without a clear internal position on whether it would want to
weaponize the technology, but added that Iran hoped to bring
the technology to the point where it could produce a nuclear
weapon in a short period of time. He stressed, however, that
in his view, a complicated series of steps remained between
the current level of technology and the point of
weaponization, including the necessity for a nuclear test.
Such a test, he indicated, would have a profound effect on
the political questions facing the international community.
U.S. Needs to Offer "Something Real"

------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Li said that direct U.S. engagement with Iran would be
complicated by the reality that there is little the United
States can offer at present that would persuade Tehran to
change its behavior. As the regime's confidence in its own
domestic legitimacy has grown, the value to the regime of
normalized relations with the United States has decreased.
Similarly, security guarantees would mean little to an
Iranian Government convinced that it can already ensure its
own security. Li stressed that the U.S. side would need to
be prepared to make concessions in any engagement, and would
need to offer "something real." Li sugested starting with
demonstrating a position of "mutual respect."
Iran Remains Suspicious of U.S. Intentions

------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Based on his conversations with Iranian

policy-makers, Li said, Iran remained suspicious of U.S.
intentions. He suggested that dialogue with Iran should have
a "symbolic" beginning to avoid a false start. He said that
the two sides should first agree on principles not directly
related to the nuclear issue. He suggested that if the
Iranians show a willingness to suspend uranium enrichment,
the United States should be prepared to follow up immediately
with new cooperation. He stressed that the Iranian
leadership regarded itself an important player on the
regional issues that concern the United States, especially
efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.
IRI Official: Nuclear Weapon Would Be "Disastrous"

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶11. (C) Li reported that he was told by a Deputy Foreign

Minister in Tehran that Iran considers itself a regional
power, but understands that if Iran were to develop a nuclear
weapon, the United States would likely deploy nuclear weapons
to the Persian Gulf region, which would be "strategically
disastrous" for Iran. He said that the official had told him
Iran wants to develop "nuclear capability" as a symbol of its
status as a regional power. The official told Li that Iran
was nevertheless willing to open a dialogue with the United
States.
Other Challenges to Opening a Dialogue

--------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Li said that the atmosphere had improved for

developing new engagement with Iran, but obstacles remained.
BEIJING 00000560 003 OF 003
The regime in Tehran continued to see opportunities for

changing Iran's engagement with the world under the new U.S.
administration, and there was debate in Iran on how best to
respond. Serious debate among the Iranian people on the need
for a nuclear program had yet to take place, Li stressed,
although the notion of weaponizing the results of the nuclear
program continued to generate debate among the Iranian
leadership. Li stressed that the Iranian leadership
continued to dismiss the notion of U.S. military action in
response to its ongoing nuclear development and was convinced
that suspension of uranium enrichment is not necessary for
starting a "new process" with the United States.
Election Politics also a Factor

-------------------------------
¶13. (C) Li said that this year's presidential election in

Iran would be an important factor in the chances for
meaningful talks with the United States. Noting that the
candidacy of former President Khatami posed the first real
challenge of the campaign to incumbent President Ahmadinejad,
Li stressed that Khatami would not have been able to announce
his candidacy without explicit approval from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Unlike previous elections, other
reformist candidates had since dropped out of the campaign,
Li said, improving Khatami's chances. Still, the hard-liners
had acted to overcome their internal divisions in light of
the Khatami candidacy, and Ahmadinejad remained "likely" to
be re-elected. Li argued that the top-level blessing of the
Khatami candidacy indicated that the Supreme Leader deems
Khatami reliable enough and would not expect bold reforms
even if Khatami were elected. In the meantime, Li suggested,
Ahmadinejad might feel the need to demonstrate his hard-line
credentials in the run-up to the June election.
PRC to Iran: Don't Take Economic Cooperation for Granted

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶14. (C) Li said that China continued to value development of

its economic ties with Iran in order to maintain economic
growth. He noted that Chinese officials told their Iranian
counterparts that they are frustrated with the lack of
progress on the nuclear issue, progress which would create a
foundation for new investment in the energy sector.
According to Li, to prod the Iranians to show progress on the
nuclear issue, the Chinese had warned them not to take
China's economic interests in Iran for granted. Furthermore,
China's dependence on Iranian energy is decreasing given
recent improvements in Sino-Saudi relations (as evidenced by
President Hu's recent travel there) and their potential to
bring about increased Chinese access to Saudi energy
supplies.
PICCUTA
Viewing cable 09BERLIN345, SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S

BILATERAL MEETING
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO8237
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN M. KOENIG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2034

TAGS: GM MARR NATO PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH CHANCELLOR MERKEL ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT
BERLIN 00000345 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
¶1. (S/NF) Chancellor Merkel will be focused on a productive,

substantive meeting when you visit Baden-Baden April 3.
Germany holds the greatest untapped potential in Europe for
our transatlantic agenda; unlocking it will take sustained
effort by the Administration, and the payoff will not be
immediate. What is most on Merkel,s mind is her political
future, six months before national elections, with her poll
numbers wobbling and her coalition increasingly
dysfunctional. Germany,s capacity to act is constrained by
(1) the short-term demands of domestic politics (about which
we can do little), (2) the slow pace of change in public
support for a German leadership role (a focus of our
engagement), and (3) the constant demands of the economic
crisis. Your meeting provides an opportunity to map out key
priorities with Germany for the remainder of Merkel,s
current term and beyond.
---------------------------------
Merkel,s Own Crisis -- Leadership
---------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Merkel is methodical, rational, and pragmatic --

qualities that propelled her to stratospheric levels of
public support early in her tenure, when she presided over a
recovering economy and a successful presidency of the
European Union. The past year has been less kind, and the
almost exactly equal split in the German electorate between
left and right is re-emerging as elections approach. Merkel
now faces a &Gordian knot8 of rising unemployment, economic
crisis, and domestic political dissatisfaction at a time when
she can least afford a wrong move. The effectiveness of
Merkel,s &Grand Coalition8 government is declining as her
Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Social Democratic (SPD)
partners begin in earnest their campaigns for the September
2009 election. The Chancellor,s edge over the rival SPD,
led by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, is
diminishing. When cornered, Merkel can be tenacious but is
risk averse and rarely creative. This suggests she will
remain a very circumspect Ally until the election.
¶3. (C/NF) The collapse of German exports and industrial

activity has shocked Chancellor Merkel and her advisors.
They had thought Germany would escape the worst of the world
recession thanks to its competitive position in emerging
markets. In the New Year, Merkel and Finance Minister Peer
Steinbrueck (SPD) rushed a relatively robust stimulus program
through the Bundestag that is timed to counter a surge in
unemployment just before the September elections. Like most
Germans, they doubt further deficit spending will generate
lasting growth, and fear too large a stimulus may cause
stagflation at home and dangerous new global imbalances.
Merkel and Steinbrueck remain bitter at the brush-off they
allegedly received during the last administration when they
advocated tighter financial oversight. Tougher regulations,
they insist, are essential to restore confidence in the
banking system and get credit flowing again, thus creating
the pre-conditions for a sustainable recovery.
¶4. (C/NF) Hoping to escape responsibility for the economic

crisis, Merkel has issued public critiques of U.S. recovery
policy that exaggerate the differences between Washington and
continental Europe. In fact, Germany faces many of the same
difficult choices as the U.S. The Chancellor is expected to
put forward a further stimulus package later this year. Her
government has bailed out big banks while holding firm on
state aid to ailing firms like Opel. The conventional wisdom
in Germany is that Opel could be rescued with minimum state
aid if only it could be separated from GM, but in fact there
is no viable business plan for the firm to stand on its own.
The Chancellor is surrounded by bad options: an
interventionist approach would further alienate economic
conservatives in her CDU (who are already defecting in droves
to the free-market FDP); if she does nothing, Steinmeier and
the SPD will harvest the goodwill of centrist voters for
trying to save Opel. Merkel has not been above shifting
responsibility to the USG and General Motors, which she and
BERLIN 00000345 002.2 OF 002
the German media unfairly blame for bleeding Opel dry. In

the end, Merkel,s government will likely be forced to prop
up at least parts of the automaker.
--------------------------------------------
Increasing Political Caution during Campaign
--------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Merkel and Steinmeier are pragmatists; on foreign

policy, in particular, there is more that unites them than
divides them. But the centrifugal forces of the election
campaign and the growing mistrust between the CDU and SPD
make it increasingly difficult for them to agree on any big
ideas about Germany,s role in the world or its relations
with the United States. Buffeted by events, Merkel is
struggling to define a convincing vision for &her8 Germany;
&competence8 is the sole component at this point. She is
blessed that Steinmeier, her principal competitor, faces even
greater difficulties. His party has lost its bearings in the
Grand Coalition and is plagued by internal divisions.
Steinmeier himself is a technocrat and a latecomer to
electoral politics -- his shortcomings on stage are
significant. Steinmeier has tried to make up ground on
Merkel by publicly identifying himself with the new U.S.
Administration. However, his ability to deliver on policy
initiatives without the Chancellor,s political support is
limited.
¶6. (C/NF) Afghanistan is an example. Merkel has been

cautious throughout her chancellorship and has doggedly
resisted real or perceived pressure for Germany to take on a
larger military role. She and Steinmeier both have supported
the Comprehensive Approach, but the Chancellor,s CDU, in the
face of public skepticism, is reluctant even to consider
increasing police or civilian support. Steinmeier and the
SPD have been more forward-leaning, but they cannot deliver
on their own. You should emphasize that at the moment the
U.S. is not seeking significant additional military forces
from Germany, but that every member of the international
community will need to do much more (e.g., training security
forces and providing civilian assistance) if we are to be
successful.
---------------------------------------
Policy Opportunities on Russia and Iran
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Germany should play a central role with the U.S.
in defining a coordinated western Russia policy that resets
the relationship without retreating from our values. The
winter gas crisis made Germans rethink Russia,s reliability
as a supplier, but the lack of alternatives and the
desirability of gas as a clean energy source have left the
government resigned to dependency on Russia in the
near-to-medium term. On energy as well as Georgia, neither
Merkel nor Steinmeier has identified areas where German
policy steps could help create a more persuasive set of
incentives for Russia to integrate further into rules-based
relationships and institutions. Meanwhile, Germany is
concerned about threats to economic and social stability in
Central and Eastern Europe, but prefers EU and IMF approaches
to limit its share of the bill.
¶8. (C/NF) Both Merkel and Steinmeier welcomed your Nowruz

address to the Iranian people and government. They support
the U.S. investment in the diplomatic track and agree that
Germany and the EU need to invest in the economic pressure
track. Germany,s close ties to Israel include an imperative
to defend Israel,s right to exist and to play an active role
in international non-proliferation efforts toward Iran.
Merkel will be looking to the meeting to gain a better
understanding of how you see the USG Iran policy unfolding
and what role we need Germany to play.
¶9. (U) Mr. President, Mission Germany is honored to support

you on your first overseas trip as President, and we look
forward to welcoming you in Baden-Baden.
Koenig
Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS179, PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN

DISCUSS A NUCLEAR
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09DAMASCUS179.
09DAMASCUS179 2009-03-10 10:10 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Damascus
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NSC FOR MCDERMOTT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019

TAGS: PHUM IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS IZ TU SY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN DISCUSS A NUCLEAR
IRAN, PEACE PROCESS, TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Cardin, in a February 18 meeting with

President Bashar al-Asad, FM Muallim, Presidential Advisor
for Political and Media Affairs Shaaban, and Ambassador to
the U.S. Mustafa conveyed U.S. concerns regarding Iran's
pursuit of a nuclear weapon, Syrian human rights abuses, the
Israel-Syria peace process, upcoming Lebanese elections, and
Syrian support for terrorism. Senator Cardin encouraged the
SARG to address these issues in order to lay the groundwork
for a more productive future dialogue. Asad argued Syria
essentially shared the same position as the U.S. on the
majority of these issues, but Syria's approach toward solving
these problems was clearly different. Asad said the U.S.
needed to look at the larger regional political picture, as
Syria did, if it truly wanted to find satisfactory
resolutions. On Iran, Asad maintained IAEA monitoring would
ensure Iran's pursuit of nuclear power for civilian purposes
only. Regarding human rights, Asad stated Syria was making
progress, but the CODEL needed to understand this issue in
the larger context of Israel's aggression in Gaza, the
suffering of Palestinian refugees, and terrorist attacks on
Syria. Asad rejected the notion that Syria facilitated the
transit of foreign fighters into Iraq, pointedly asking the
CODEL what interest would he have in doing so? The upcoming
elections in Lebanon, Asad surmised, would not change the
composition of the government dramatically nor Syria's
determination to continue the process of establishing a full
diplomatic presence in Beirut. On future Israel-Syria peace
negotiations, Asad was more vague. He offered no specifics
on re-opening talks, but expressed Syria's desire for the
process to continue with U.S. involvement. Finally, in
response to the CODEL's repeated concerns about Syrian
support for Hamas and Hizballah, Asad remarked that these
were democratically elected organizations in the Palestinian
Authority and Lebanon; dealing with them was simply part of
the reality of politics in the Middle East. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------
The Opening Gambit: Human Rights
--------------------------------
¶2. (C) Following a warm exchange of pleasantries in which

Senator Cardin thanked Asad for sending Imad Mustafa to the
U.S. as Syria's Ambassador ("He's in our offices so much
we've thought of charging him rent!"), Senator Cardin noted
the CODEL had come to Syria for two major reasons: (1) As a
fact-finding mission with an eye toward reinvigorating the
Syria-Israel peace process; and (2) to learn more about the
Iraqi refugee situation. Senator Cardin added "there are new
opportunities . . . The U.S. has a new president who wants to
work" with countries in the region. Regarding Syria, he
said, "there are areas of major concern," one of them being
Syria's human rights record. Senator Cardin told Asad he
could give specific examples of citizens jailed for their
political views. Asad responded, "we are a country in
process of reform. We aren't perfect. You are talking about
12 people out of 20 million. It's a process. We are moving
forward, not fast, but methodically." (NOTE: Asad's mention
of "12 people" refers to the 12 members of the Damascus
Declaration National Council convicted in October 2008 and
sentenced to two and a half years in prison. END NOTE).
¶3. (C) Asad admitted Syria had very strong security laws, but
argued they were necessary to protect the nation. The
members of the Damascus Declaration had been convicted for
their "contact with an individual in Lebanon who had invited
the U.S. to attack Syria. This is against our law." Senator
Cardin replied he realized this was a domestic issue; he was
not asking Syria to be exactly like the U.S., but Syria
should nonetheless adhere to widely accepted international
standards. Senator Cardin argued that "when the U.S. is
challenged, you see it on the front page of the newspaper"
and that such challenges were an important part of a national
dialogue. "You do not see this (freedom of expression)
anywhere in the region," Asad chuckled in reply, "let's talk
about Saudi Arabia."
¶4. (C) Widening the human rights conversation beyond the

scope of Syrian prisoners of conscience, Asad admonished the
CODEL for focusing on 12 individuals without taking into
account half a million Palestinian refugees in Syria alone,
and the continued suffering of people in Gaza. "Human
rights," Asad philosophized, "is related to the whole
upgrading of society. This will produce new laws." In a
final bid to put the subject of human rights to rest, Asad
stated he was a popular president and that if he were working
against his people, he would not enjoy such popularity.
"Don't worry about human rights, we're moving forward," he
said.
¶5. (C) Turning to conflict and reform in the region, Asad

observed many societies in the region (including Syria) were
experiencing a shift in political alignment to the right. As
a result, the process of political reform had become
increasingly difficult. Asad warned that countries, like
Lebanon and Algeria, which had strived for rapid reform in
the past, had only set the stage for more conflict. In the
case of Algeria during the 1980s, Islamists had tried to use
a sudden political opening to gain power and this had sparked
a conflict lasting twenty years. Similarly, Asad continued,
Lebanon's reform process and the May 29 elections had been
the cause of the subsequent sectarian violence. Asad
contended the real issues were "peace and fighting
terrorism."
-------------------------------
The Middle Game: A Nuclear Iran
-------------------------------
¶6. (C) Senator Whitehouse raised Iran, agreeing with Senator

Cardin's assessment of the new political terrain and
asserting: "We have a moment of opportunity for new
policies." Whitehouse cautioned Asad that it was also "a time
for choices." The manner in which the U.S. would proceed
depended on "honest, sustained cooperation in the region," he
said. The senator emphasized the time-frame for this
cooperation was quite short. The one thing that could bring
it to a premature close would be Iran's development of
nuclear weapons. "If Iran insists," Senator Whitehorse
stated, "it will create an atmosphere challenging for
negotiations."
¶7. (C) Asad swiftly responded, "we're not convinced Iran is

developing nuclear weapons." He argued Iran could not use a
nuclear weapon as a deterrent because nobody believed Iran
would actually use it against Israel. Asad noted an Iranian
nuclear strike against Israel would result in massive
Palestinian casualties, which Iran would never risk.
¶8. (C) Second, he continued, the IAEA had reported no

evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran existed.
Arguing Syria and the U.S. were actually closer than they
realized on these issues, Asad said Syria adamantly opposed
any "weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East. But as
signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) both Iran and Syria had the right to pursue
nuclear power for civilian purposes. Asad asserted demands
for Iran to "stop" its nuclear program were unproductive and
a violation of its rights under the NPT. Instead, he said,
"the argument should be about how to monitor their program,"
as outlined in the NPT. "Without this monitoring," Asad
warned, "there will be confrontation, and it will be
difficult for the whole region." Asad leaned slightly
forward and said: "Let's work together on this point."
¶9. (C) Senator Whitehorse replied, "I hope monitoring is

enough," noting the difficulty of such a project in a closed
society such as Iran. Asad responded an international system
for monitoring was in place and should be followed. Senator
Cardin interjected, "we believe Iran's goals are the opposite
of what you describe. We think they want to change the
equation" (of power in the region). Asad asked the CODEL to
put aside this point of view and focus on monitoring. Senator
Cardin said, "we agree on monitoring, but we think Iran
should give up its nuclear ambitions." Asad reiterated

monitoring was the best institutional way to control Iran's
nuclear program. Senator Wicker challenged Asad's assertion
Iran was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons and that
monitoring alone would work. Asad replied his impression was
that Iran's program was for peacful purposes with the caveat
"we have no evidence as we are not in Iran." Senator Wicker
advised Asad the international community assessed otherwise;
the question now was what the appropriate response to Iran
should be. "Everyone wants to avoid a military reaction," he
noted, "but it was the clear view of the former
administration and is the clear view of the current
administration that something will have to be done." Asad
observed "you have my impression. Everything you mention is
guessing. Monitoring will make everything clear."
¶10. (C) Representative Moore argued that while monitoring was

a mechanism appropriate to "nation states," it would not be
effective in controlling Iran's military proxies, Hamas and
Hizballah. She stated both Syria and Iran provided financial
support to the two groups and there was no way to rule out
categorically the possibility that Iran might provide nuclear
material to Hizballah. "The ability of the international
community to monitor Iran on NPT is understood. It's the
role of the proxies that is the problem," she said. Asad
replied, "if you don't trust the mechanisms of the NPT, let's
cancel it." He maintained these proxies "would go away" if
there was a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. He
asked who had created these proxies? "We didn't and Iran
didn't. How were they created? By conflict because Lebanon
was occupied by Israel. It's normal to have resistance.
This is the reality we have to deal with."
--------------------------
Testing The Flank: Lebanon
--------------------------
¶11. (C) Senator Wicker asked Asad to give his prognosis for
the upcoming Lebanese elections, the prospect of Syria
sending an ambassador, and whether Hizballah would disarm.
In a tone of resigned pessimism, Asad replied that the
Lebanese elections would not make much of a difference. In
Lebanon, he explained, any party can get a "veto third."
Asad maintained the key issue was whether the Lebanese would
vote along political lines or sectarian lines. If the latter
occurred, then Shi'as would elect Shi'as, Christians would
elect Christians, and so on, which would result in conflict.
"If you don't have consensus, you will have civil war. This
is how it has always been in Lebanon," he said. Conflict in
Lebanon would preclude normal relations between the two
countries.
¶12. (C) On the subject of a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon,

Asad characterized the delayed appointment as being part of a
deliberate political process. Asad pointed out Syria had
opened an embassy and staffed it, actions they would not have
taken if they did not fully intend to send an ambassador.
Asad argued an appointment like this was a political step
requiring the proper timing. He added "we know who and when,
but we're not going to announce it today." Senator Wicker
deftly rejoined "we could make news!" eliciting laughter from
everyone, including Asad.
¶13. (C) Regarding the disarmament of Hizballah, Asad argued

"Hizballah has no specific interest in Israel besides
securing Lebanon's borders and preventing threats to
Lebanon's integrity, like Israel's daily violations of
Lebanese airspace." Asad noted Hizballah was the most
powerful political party in Lebanon, was democratically
elected, and if peace in the region were to be achieved, "the
small things" with Hizballah and Hamas would disappear.
"Let's talk about the peace. This is the big picture that
will solve everything." Asad likened the U.S.'s approach to
Hizballah to trying to patch an old suit when a new suit was
needed. Senator Cardin countered that peace would very
likely go forward if Syria would stop the arms flow to
Hizballah. The senator noted many countries thought Syria
was concerned about possible repercussions with Iran if it
were to take the initiative on stopping arms to Hizballah.

Asad responded Syria had been in negotiations with Israel
with no concern for Iran's opinion. He told the story of how
Iranian President Ahmedinejad called him just before the
Annapolis conference and implored him not to send anyone,
that it was a "bad meeting," but that they sent a
representative anyway. "I told him I know it (Annapolis) is
just a photo op. But I am sending someone anyway. We do
what we think is good for our interests; it's not dependent
on Iran," he contended.
------------------------------
A New Tempo: The Peace Process
------------------------------
¶14. (S) Senator Tom Udall asked what message Asad wanted the
CODEL to deliver to the new administration. Asad replied he
saw two key common interests between Syria and the U.S.:
peace in the region and combating terrorism. Asad argued
Syria had been at the forefront of fighting terrorism ever
since it put down the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. He claimed
that in the mid-1980s, Syria had sent a delegation to Europe
to articulate the need for a coalition to fight terrorism,
but nobody had listened. Asad said Syria wanted to know when
the U.S. would adopt a new approach toward terrorism, adding
that "it's not a question of how much you can destroy, but
how much dialogue you can make." The Europeans, Asad
continued, knew more about the region than the U.S. and he
urged the CODEL to turn to them for guidance. Asad stated
the U.S. and Syria shared a common interest on "70 percent"
of the issues at hand, the difference was all in "point of
view, principles, culture, and approach." Keen to press the
topic of engagement, Asad attempted to refute the idea that a
new dialogue would only make Syria stronger: "No, you make
yourselves stronger because you have interests in the region."
¶15. (C) Agreeing that dialogue was crucial and an essential

component of the Helsinki Commission, Senator Cardin advised
Asad that if he were serious about engagement, he would expel
Hamas leaders from Syria. Asad replied, "What if Hamas
supported peace?" Senator Cardin explained Hamas was a
symbol--it launched rockets into non-military areas and this
was the definition of terrorism. Asad replied Hamas was an
uninvited guest; it was really the very Muslim Brotherhood
organization Syria had combatted through the 1980s. "If you
want me to be effective and active, I have to have a
relationship with all parties. Hamas is Muslim Brotherhood,
but we have to deal with the reality of their presence."
Senator Cardin pointed out not expelling Hamas sent a signal
to the international community that Iran, given its support
for Hamas, might be making the decisions in Damascus.
--------------------------------
En Passant: The DCS, ACC and ALC
--------------------------------
¶16. (C) When confronted with Senator Cardin's observation

that the SARG's closure of the Damascus Community School
(DCS), the American Culture Center (ACC), and the American
Language Center (ALC) had hurt Syrians more than Americans,
Asad assured the CODEL that this was merely a public
relations gesture on his part. "We were attacked by the U.S.
army," Asad replied, "Seven civilians were killed. I had two
choices: fight the U.S. army or do something symbolic. It's
something temporary. You'll open it next year." Senator
Cardin told Asad he understood "symbolic gestures, but not
when they hurt your own people."
------------------------------
The End Game: Foreign Fighters
------------------------------
¶17. (C) "What interest does Syria have in letting foreign

fighters go to Iraq?" Asad pointedly asked in response to
Representative McIntyre's question about why Syria had not
done more to monitor and staunch the flow of transiting
fighters across the Syria-Iraq border. Asad continued: "Can
you stop the immigration of Mexicans into the U.S.? No. All
borders are porous. There is no army on the border; you

don't have soldiers on the border. Do your homework. My job
is to protect my people, not your soldiers. We have
terrorists. Two months ago there was a car bomb in Syria and
that car came from Iraq." (NOTE: We assume Asad is referring
to the September 27, 2008 car bomb attack against a SARG
military facility, though Syrian Military Intelligence has
reportedly stopped several cars rigged with explosives since
then. END NOTE). Asad noted that the lack of cooperation
with military forces in Iraq contributed to the problem.
With Turkey, he said, the border was more complicated and the
terrain worse, but because Syria enjoyed better cooperation
it was less porous.
¶18. (C) Asad recounted how when (then NEA A/S) William Burns
and representatives from the Army and CIA came to Damascus,
"we said we were ready to cooperate. We took the delegation
to the border, then after they left we waited for a proposal,
but nothing came of it. They didn't want to cooperate." Asad
added Syria lacked the financial and technical means, such as
night-vision goggles, to tighten its control of the area.
Asad then said, somewhat contradicting himself, that 80
percent of controlling the border was about controlling the
country. Representative McIntyre asked, "but are you willing
to monitor (the border)?" The president demurred, "this is a
different problem," at which point Ambassador Mustafa
interjected with "I will brief you on the details."
¶19. (C) The three main objectives Asad felt the U.S. and
Syria should work on were (1) Eliminating WMD in the region;
(2) pursuing a shared interest in a stable Iraq; and (3)
working for peace and combating terrorism. Asad re-affirmed
that Syria was not an enemy of the U.S., "I have saved
American lives." In 2002, Asad explained, he passed
information to the King of Bahrain about an imminent attack
on American citizens. Ambassador Mustafa added that then
Secretary of State Colin Powell had sent the Syrian
government a letter expressing his gratitude for its
assistance. If the U.S. wished for similar coordination in
the future, Syria could not begin security cooperation
without concomitant political cooperation, Asad stated.
¶20. (C) COMMENT: Beginning with the visit of President Carter

last December, President Asad's exposure to U.S. politicians
has steadily increased. This encounter was a good example of
how Asad has been able to hone his responses to U.S.
accusations that Syria is a bad actor in the region. At no
point in the conversation did Asad ask about the appointment
of a U.S. ambassador to Syria or economic sanctions, which
suggests to us that he is doing everything possible to avoid
the appearance of being the supplicant, despite the Syrian
press's heavy focus on Syria's desire to see an end to
sanctions and the appointment of a U.S. ambassador.
¶21. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We have heard anecdotally that

Asad was not pleased with the tenor or substance of his
meeting with the CODEL. The SARG is reportedly interpreting
the group's position on Iran, Iraq, Hizballah, and human
rights to be a continuation of, rather than a departure from,
the previous Administration's policy toward Syria. We note
that the CODEL's discussion with Asad was frank but cordial.
Senator Cardin and the CODEL members aired U.S. policy
concerns publicly from their perspective as elected
legislators in press remarks, framed in the context of their
desire to explore whether cooperation with Syria is viable.
The Syrian press and many of our interlocutors have come to
view re-engagement with the U.S. as a fait accompli, as
something long-overdue and very much owed to Syria. Asad's
displeasure with the CODEL may be his first recognition that
U.S.-Syria bilateral relations will require more on his end
than originally anticipated. END COMMENT.
-------------
Participants
-------------
¶22. (SBU) U.S.A.:

Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)

Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS)
Senator Tom Udall (D-NM)
Representative Mike McIntyre (D-NC)
Representative Gwen Moore (D-WI)
Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly
Mr. Fred Turner, Chief of Staff, CSCE
Mr. Alex Johnson, PSM, CSCE
Ms. Shelly Han, PSM, CSCE
Mr. Eric Pelofsky, PSM, SIC
Notetaker Anthony Deaton
Syrian Arab Republic:

President Bashar al-Asad
Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim
Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs Dr.
Bouthaina Shaaban
Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa
Unidentified female notetaker
Unidentified male palace staffer
¶23. (U) Senator Cardin did not have a chance to clear this
report as of March 10.
CONNELLY
Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS179, PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN

DISCUSS A NUCLEAR
Discussing cables
09DAMASCUS179 2009-03-10 10:10 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Damascus
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #0179/01 0691040

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101040Z MAR 09
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000179
H PASS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR, NEA/IPA

NSC FOR MCDERMOTT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019

TAGS: PHUM IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS IZ TU SY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ASAD AND CODEL CARDIN DISCUSS A NUCLEAR
IRAN, PEACE PROCESS, TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Cardin, in a February 18 meeting with

President Bashar al-Asad, FM Muallim, Presidential Advisor
for Political and Media Affairs Shaaban, and Ambassador to
the U.S. Mustafa conveyed U.S. concerns regarding Iran's
pursuit of a nuclear weapon, Syrian human rights abuses, the
Israel-Syria peace process, upcoming Lebanese elections, and
Syrian support for terrorism. Senator Cardin encouraged the
SARG to address these issues in order to lay the groundwork
for a more productive future dialogue. Asad argued Syria
essentially shared the same position as the U.S. on the
majority of these issues, but Syria's approach toward solving
these problems was clearly different. Asad said the U.S.
needed to look at the larger regional political picture, as
Syria did, if it truly wanted to find satisfactory
resolutions. On Iran, Asad maintained IAEA monitoring would
ensure Iran's pursuit of nuclear power for civilian purposes
only. Regarding human rights, Asad stated Syria was making
progress, but the CODEL needed to understand this issue in
the larger context of Israel's aggression in Gaza, the
suffering of Palestinian refugees, and terrorist attacks on
Syria. Asad rejected the notion that Syria facilitated the
transit of foreign fighters into Iraq, pointedly asking the
CODEL what interest would he have in doing so? The upcoming
elections in Lebanon, Asad surmised, would not change the
composition of the government dramatically nor Syria's
determination to continue the process of establishing a full
diplomatic presence in Beirut. On future Israel-Syria peace
negotiations, Asad was more vague. He offered no specifics
on re-opening talks, but expressed Syria's desire for the
process to continue with U.S. involvement. Finally, in
response to the CODEL's repeated concerns about Syrian
support for Hamas and Hizballah, Asad remarked that these
were democratically elected organizations in the Palestinian
Authority and Lebanon; dealing with them was simply part of
the reality of politics in the Middle East. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------
The Opening Gambit: Human Rights
--------------------------------
¶2. (C) Following a warm exchange of pleasantries in which

Senator Cardin thanked Asad for sending Imad Mustafa to the
U.S. as Syria's Ambassador ("He's in our offices so much
we've thought of charging him rent!"), Senator Cardin noted
the CODEL had come to Syria for two major reasons: (1) As a
fact-finding mission with an eye toward reinvigorating the
Syria-Israel peace process; and (2) to learn more about the
Iraqi refugee situation. Senator Cardin added "there are new
opportunities . . . The U.S. has a new president who wants to
work" with countries in the region. Regarding Syria, he
said, "there are areas of major concern," one of them being
Syria's human rights record. Senator Cardin told Asad he
could give specific examples of citizens jailed for their
political views. Asad responded, "we are a country in
process of reform. We aren't perfect. You are talking about
12 people out of 20 million. It's a process. We are moving
forward, not fast, but methodically." (NOTE: Asad's mention
of "12 people" refers to the 12 members of the Damascus
Declaration National Council convicted in October 2008 and
sentenced to two and a half years in prison. END NOTE).
¶3. (C) Asad admitted Syria had very strong security laws, but
argued they were necessary to protect the nation. The
members of the Damascus Declaration had been convicted for
their "contact with an individual in Lebanon who had invited
the U.S. to attack Syria. This is against our law." Senator
Cardin replied he realized this was a domestic issue; he was
not asking Syria to be exactly like the U.S., but Syria
should nonetheless adhere to widely accepted international
standards. Senator Cardin argued that "when the U.S. is
challenged, you see it on the front page of the newspaper"
and that such challenges were an important part of a national
dialogue. "You do not see this (freedom of expression)
anywhere in the region," Asad chuckled in reply, "let's talk
about Saudi Arabia."
¶4. (C) Widening the human rights conversation beyond the

scope of Syrian prisoners of conscience, Asad admonished the
CODEL for focusing on 12 individuals without taking into
account half a million Palestinian refugees in Syria alone,
and the continued suffering of people in Gaza. "Human
rights," Asad philosophized, "is related to the whole
upgrading of society. This will produce new laws." In a
final bid to put the subject of human rights to rest, Asad
stated he was a popular president and that if he were working
against his people, he would not enjoy such popularity.
"Don't worry about human rights, we're moving forward," he
said.
¶5. (C) Turning to conflict and reform in the region, Asad

observed many societies in the region (including Syria) were
experiencing a shift in political alignment to the right. As
a result, the process of political reform had become
increasingly difficult. Asad warned that countries, like
Lebanon and Algeria, which had strived for rapid reform in
the past, had only set the stage for more conflict. In the
case of Algeria during the 1980s, Islamists had tried to use
a sudden political opening to gain power and this had sparked
a conflict lasting twenty years. Similarly, Asad continued,
Lebanon's reform process and the May 29 elections had been
the cause of the subsequent sectarian violence. Asad
contended the real issues were "peace and fighting
terrorism."
-------------------------------
The Middle Game: A Nuclear Iran
-------------------------------
¶6. (C) Senator Whitehouse raised Iran, agreeing with Senator

Cardin's assessment of the new political terrain and
asserting: "We have a moment of opportunity for new
policies." Whitehouse cautioned Asad that it was also "a time
for choices." The manner in which the U.S. would proceed
depended on "honest, sustained cooperation in the region," he
said. The senator emphasized the time-frame for this
cooperation was quite short. The one thing that could bring
it to a premature close would be Iran's development of
nuclear weapons. "If Iran insists," Senator Whitehorse
stated, "it will create an atmosphere challenging for
negotiations."
¶7. (C) Asad swiftly responded, "we're not convinced Iran is

developing nuclear weapons." He argued Iran could not use a
nuclear weapon as a deterrent because nobody believed Iran
would actually use it against Israel. Asad noted an Iranian
nuclear strike against Israel would result in massive
Palestinian casualties, which Iran would never risk.
¶8. (C) Second, he continued, the IAEA had reported no

evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran existed.
Arguing Syria and the U.S. were actually closer than they
realized on these issues, Asad said Syria adamantly opposed
any "weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East. But as
signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) both Iran and Syria had the right to pursue
nuclear power for civilian purposes. Asad asserted demands
for Iran to "stop" its nuclear program were unproductive and
a violation of its rights under the NPT. Instead, he said,
"the argument should be about how to monitor their program,"
as outlined in the NPT. "Without this monitoring," Asad
warned, "there will be confrontation, and it will be
difficult for the whole region." Asad leaned slightly
forward and said: "Let's work together on this point."
¶9. (C) Senator Whitehorse replied, "I hope monitoring is

enough," noting the difficulty of such a project in a closed
society such as Iran. Asad responded an international system
for monitoring was in place and should be followed. Senator
Cardin interjected, "we believe Iran's goals are the opposite
of what you describe. We think they want to change the
equation" (of power in the region). Asad asked the CODEL to
put aside this point of view and focus on monitoring. Senator
Cardin said, "we agree on monitoring, but we think Iran
should give up its nuclear ambitions." Asad reiterated

monitoring was the best institutional way to control Iran's
nuclear program. Senator Wicker challenged Asad's assertion
Iran was not seeking to develop nuclear weapons and that
monitoring alone would work. Asad replied his impression was
that Iran's program was for peacful purposes with the caveat
"we have no evidence as we are not in Iran." Senator Wicker
advised Asad the international community assessed otherwise;
the question now was what the appropriate response to Iran
should be. "Everyone wants to avoid a military reaction," he
noted, "but it was the clear view of the former
administration and is the clear view of the current
administration that something will have to be done." Asad
observed "you have my impression. Everything you mention is
guessing. Monitoring will make everything clear."
¶10. (C) Representative Moore argued that while monitoring was

a mechanism appropriate to "nation states," it would not be
effective in controlling Iran's military proxies, Hamas and
Hizballah. She stated both Syria and Iran provided financial
support to the two groups and there was no way to rule out
categorically the possibility that Iran might provide nuclear
material to Hizballah. "The ability of the international
community to monitor Iran on NPT is understood. It's the
role of the proxies that is the problem," she said. Asad
replied, "if you don't trust the mechanisms of the NPT, let's
cancel it." He maintained these proxies "would go away" if
there was a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. He
asked who had created these proxies? "We didn't and Iran
didn't. How were they created? By conflict because Lebanon
was occupied by Israel. It's normal to have resistance.
This is the reality we have to deal with."
--------------------------
Testing The Flank: Lebanon
--------------------------
¶11. (C) Senator Wicker asked Asad to give his prognosis for
the upcoming Lebanese elections, the prospect of Syria
sending an ambassador, and whether Hizballah would disarm.
In a tone of resigned pessimism, Asad replied that the
Lebanese elections would not make much of a difference. In
Lebanon, he explained, any party can get a "veto third."
Asad maintained the key issue was whether the Lebanese would
vote along political lines or sectarian lines. If the latter
occurred, then Shi'as would elect Shi'as, Christians would
elect Christians, and so on, which would result in conflict.
"If you don't have consensus, you will have civil war. This
is how it has always been in Lebanon," he said. Conflict in
Lebanon would preclude normal relations between the two
countries.
¶12. (C) On the subject of a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon,

Asad characterized the delayed appointment as being part of a
deliberate political process. Asad pointed out Syria had
opened an embassy and staffed it, actions they would not have
taken if they did not fully intend to send an ambassador.
Asad argued an appointment like this was a political step
requiring the proper timing. He added "we know who and when,
but we're not going to announce it today." Senator Wicker
deftly rejoined "we could make news!" eliciting laughter from
everyone, including Asad.
¶13. (C) Regarding the disarmament of Hizballah, Asad argued

"Hizballah has no specific interest in Israel besides
securing Lebanon's borders and preventing threats to
Lebanon's integrity, like Israel's daily violations of
Lebanese airspace." Asad noted Hizballah was the most
powerful political party in Lebanon, was democratically
elected, and if peace in the region were to be achieved, "the
small things" with Hizballah and Hamas would disappear.
"Let's talk about the peace. This is the big picture that
will solve everything." Asad likened the U.S.'s approach to
Hizballah to trying to patch an old suit when a new suit was
needed. Senator Cardin countered that peace would very
likely go forward if Syria would stop the arms flow to
Hizballah. The senator noted many countries thought Syria
was concerned about possible repercussions with Iran if it
were to take the initiative on stopping arms to Hizballah.

Asad responded Syria had been in negotiations with Israel
with no concern for Iran's opinion. He told the story of how
Iranian President Ahmedinejad called him just before the
Annapolis conference and implored him not to send anyone,
that it was a "bad meeting," but that they sent a
representative anyway. "I told him I know it (Annapolis) is
just a photo op. But I am sending someone anyway. We do
what we think is good for our interests; it's not dependent
on Iran," he contended.
------------------------------
A New Tempo: The Peace Process
------------------------------
¶14. (S) Senator Tom Udall asked what message Asad wanted the
CODEL to deliver to the new administration. Asad replied he
saw two key common interests between Syria and the U.S.:
peace in the region and combating terrorism. Asad argued
Syria had been at the forefront of fighting terrorism ever
since it put down the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. He claimed
that in the mid-1980s, Syria had sent a delegation to Europe
to articulate the need for a coalition to fight terrorism,
but nobody had listened. Asad said Syria wanted to know when
the U.S. would adopt a new approach toward terrorism, adding
that "it's not a question of how much you can destroy, but
how much dialogue you can make." The Europeans, Asad
continued, knew more about the region than the U.S. and he
urged the CODEL to turn to them for guidance. Asad stated
the U.S. and Syria shared a common interest on "70 percent"
of the issues at hand, the difference was all in "point of
view, principles, culture, and approach." Keen to press the
topic of engagement, Asad attempted to refute the idea that a
new dialogue would only make Syria stronger: "No, you make
yourselves stronger because you have interests in the region."
¶15. (C) Agreeing that dialogue was crucial and an essential

component of the Helsinki Commission, Senator Cardin advised
Asad that if he were serious about engagement, he would expel
Hamas leaders from Syria. Asad replied, "What if Hamas
supported peace?" Senator Cardin explained Hamas was a
symbol--it launched rockets into non-military areas and this
was the definition of terrorism. Asad replied Hamas was an
uninvited guest; it was really the very Muslim Brotherhood
organization Syria had combatted through the 1980s. "If you
want me to be effective and active, I have to have a
relationship with all parties. Hamas is Muslim Brotherhood,
but we have to deal with the reality of their presence."
Senator Cardin pointed out not expelling Hamas sent a signal
to the international community that Iran, given its support
for Hamas, might be making the decisions in Damascus.
--------------------------------
En Passant: The DCS, ACC and ALC
--------------------------------
¶16. (C) When confronted with Senator Cardin's observation

that the SARG's closure of the Damascus Community School
(DCS), the American Culture Center (ACC), and the American
Language Center (ALC) had hurt Syrians more than Americans,
Asad assured the CODEL that this was merely a public
relations gesture on his part. "We were attacked by the U.S.
army," Asad replied, "Seven civilians were killed. I had two
choices: fight the U.S. army or do something symbolic. It's
something temporary. You'll open it next year." Senator
Cardin told Asad he understood "symbolic gestures, but not
when they hurt your own people."
------------------------------
The End Game: Foreign Fighters
------------------------------
¶17. (C) "What interest does Syria have in letting foreign

fighters go to Iraq?" Asad pointedly asked in response to
Representative McIntyre's question about why Syria had not
done more to monitor and staunch the flow of transiting
fighters across the Syria-Iraq border. Asad continued: "Can
you stop the immigration of Mexicans into the U.S.? No. All
borders are porous. There is no army on the border; you

don't have soldiers on the border. Do your homework. My job
is to protect my people, not your soldiers. We have
terrorists. Two months ago there was a car bomb in Syria and
that car came from Iraq." (NOTE: We assume Asad is referring
to the September 27, 2008 car bomb attack against a SARG
military facility, though Syrian Military Intelligence has
reportedly stopped several cars rigged with explosives since
then. END NOTE). Asad noted that the lack of cooperation
with military forces in Iraq contributed to the problem.
With Turkey, he said, the border was more complicated and the
terrain worse, but because Syria enjoyed better cooperation
it was less porous.
¶18. (C) Asad recounted how when (then NEA A/S) William Burns
and representatives from the Army and CIA came to Damascus,
"we said we were ready to cooperate. We took the delegation
to the border, then after they left we waited for a proposal,
but nothing came of it. They didn't want to cooperate." Asad
added Syria lacked the financial and technical means, such as
night-vision goggles, to tighten its control of the area.
Asad then said, somewhat contradicting himself, that 80
percent of controlling the border was about controlling the
country. Representative McIntyre asked, "but are you willing
to monitor (the border)?" The president demurred, "this is a
different problem," at which point Ambassador Mustafa
interjected with "I will brief you on the details."
¶19. (C) The three main objectives Asad felt the U.S. and
Syria should work on were (1) Eliminating WMD in the region;
(2) pursuing a shared interest in a stable Iraq; and (3)
working for peace and combating terrorism. Asad re-affirmed
that Syria was not an enemy of the U.S., "I have saved
American lives." In 2002, Asad explained, he passed
information to the King of Bahrain about an imminent attack
on American citizens. Ambassador Mustafa added that then
Secretary of State Colin Powell had sent the Syrian
government a letter expressing his gratitude for its
assistance. If the U.S. wished for similar coordination in
the future, Syria could not begin security cooperation
without concomitant political cooperation, Asad stated.
¶20. (C) COMMENT: Beginning with the visit of President Carter

last December, President Asad's exposure to U.S. politicians
has steadily increased. This encounter was a good example of
how Asad has been able to hone his responses to U.S.
accusations that Syria is a bad actor in the region. At no
point in the conversation did Asad ask about the appointment
of a U.S. ambassador to Syria or economic sanctions, which
suggests to us that he is doing everything possible to avoid
the appearance of being the supplicant, despite the Syrian
press's heavy focus on Syria's desire to see an end to
sanctions and the appointment of a U.S. ambassador.
¶21. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We have heard anecdotally that

Asad was not pleased with the tenor or substance of his
meeting with the CODEL. The SARG is reportedly interpreting
the group's position on Iran, Iraq, Hizballah, and human
rights to be a continuation of, rather than a departure from,
the previous Administration's policy toward Syria. We note
that the CODEL's discussion with Asad was frank but cordial.
Senator Cardin and the CODEL members aired U.S. policy
concerns publicly from their perspective as elected
legislators in press remarks, framed in the context of their
desire to explore whether cooperation with Syria is viable.
The Syrian press and many of our interlocutors have come to
view re-engagement with the U.S. as a fait accompli, as
something long-overdue and very much owed to Syria. Asad's
displeasure with the CODEL may be his first recognition that
U.S.-Syria bilateral relations will require more on his end
than originally anticipated. END COMMENT.
-------------
Participants
-------------
¶22. (SBU) U.S.A.:

Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)

Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS)
Senator Tom Udall (D-NM)
Representative Mike McIntyre (D-NC)
Representative Gwen Moore (D-WI)
Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly
Mr. Fred Turner, Chief of Staff, CSCE
Mr. Alex Johnson, PSM, CSCE
Ms. Shelly Han, PSM, CSCE
Mr. Eric Pelofsky, PSM, SIC
Notetaker Anthony Deaton
Syrian Arab Republic:

Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim
Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs Dr.
Bouthaina Shaaban
Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa
Unidentified female notetaker
Unidentified male palace staffer
¶23. (U) Senator Cardin did not have a chance to clear this
report as of March 10.
CONNELLY
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD454, SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR
MUELLER
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7359
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0454/01 0620220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030220Z MAR 09
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9925
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1170
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 6855
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/02/2034

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER
¶1. (C) Summary: Mission Pakistan warmly welcomes your arrival in Islamabad. You
are arriving in the midst of largely self-inflicted political turmoil following
the Supreme Court’s decision to disqualify from public office Nawaz and Shahbaz
Sharif, political rivals of President Asif Zardari. Zardari engineered the
Sharifs’ disqualification and followed that with placing his party’s governor in
power in the Punjab provincial government to replace Shahbaz Sharif. At the
moment, there are multiple efforts to reconcile Zardari with the Sharifs and to
elect a replacement for Chief Minister Punjab. Unless the Punjab issue is
resolved by March 12, a planned lawyers’ demonstration-that is backed by the
Sharifs--could become violent. You thus will find your interlocutors distracted
by domestic politics at a time when the GOP is struggling to meet IMF-imposed
fiscal targets and militants are increasing their control over both the tribal
areas and Swat, a once idyllic tourist destination 90 miles from Islamabad.
¶2. (C) You will be meeting with key interlocutors in our efforts to press the
GOP for prosecution of the Mumbai detainees, assistance in effecting the release
of kidnapped Americans John Solecki and David Rohde, and expanding law and order
cooperation. The issue of FBI access to the Mumbai suspects remains very
sensitive; a decision to send an investigative team to New Delhi currently rests
on whether/how India responds to Pakistan’s 32 requests for additional
information. President Zardari has over-reached in this current political
crisis, but he remains secular, pro-American and our best ally in Pakistan right
now. He likely will assure you that he has established a new anti-terrorism
court that will deliver convictions on Mumbai. Zardari will request additional
USG support for the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police; we will brief you
on our train and equip plans for this critical part of our counter-terrorism
strategy.
¶3. (C) DG ISI Pasha, whom you met in last week’s bilateral and trilateral
strategic review in Washington, continues to profess a determination to end
ISI’s overt and tacit support for proxy forces in the tribal areas, Afghanistan
and Kashmir. Interior Minister Malik is Zardari’s point man on law and order and
also serves as a political negotiator. Malik is very supportive of the U.S., but
he wants to control every key issue personally, making it difficult for his
staff to take any decisions without his approval. Intelligence Bureau (IB)
Director General Suddle was personally selected for the job by Zardari; after a
bungled attempt to place ISI under the Ministry of Interior, Zardari brought IB
firmly under his control. Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) Director General
Tariq Khosa is a well-respected cop, but he must work through MOI Malik. End
Summary.
Domestic Situation
------------------
¶4. (C) The civilian government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime
Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, has been fairly stable. However,
President Zardari has been preoccupied with his political rival former Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif. On February 25, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that both
Nawaz and his brother Shahbaz Sharif are ineligible to hold public office;
Zardari followed that decision by appointing his party’s governor to rule in the
Punjab (Pakistan’s most important province) pending elections to replace Shahbaz
Sharif as Chief Minister. This has sparked country-wide protests and general
political unrest. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan
(with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari’s 20% in the latest IRI poll),
but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. Instead, Nawaz
Sharif is using popular outrage at the Supreme Court decision and “governor’s
rule” to launch street protests. Zardari may win the short-term tactical battle
against Nawaz; however, Nawaz is gaining ground by comparing Zardari’s high-
handed rule to that of former President Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif is inspiring
street demonstrations to coincide with a lawyers’ “Long March” on March 12-16.
The chance for violence and chaos is likely during continued street protests.
¶5. (C) Although we do not believe Pakistan is a failed

ISLAMABAD 00000454 002 OF 004
state, we nonetheless recognize that the challenges the state confronts are
dire. The government is losing more and more territory every day to foreign and
domestic militant groups; deteriorating law and order in turn is undermining
economic recovery. The bureaucracy has settled into third-world mediocrity, as
demonstrated by corruption and a limited capacity to implement or articulate
policy. The court and legal system is slow to the point of inertia due to almost
non-existent case management. These problems extend to law enforcement agencies,
where the police are underpaid, lack technical capacity, and face stiff
political pressures.
Security
---------
¶6. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in
the FATA and have just declared victory after a six month long battle in the
Bajaur Agency. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden
has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits “the militants are after me and my
job.” The bad news is that the militants increasingly are setting the agenda.
The government’s anti-terrorism strategy is based on “dialogue, deterrence and
development;” however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the
financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fallback has been
to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic
that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will
negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.
¶7. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort
approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to
negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari’a law with the Taliban.
This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings,
closure of girls’ schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the
desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which
included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a
population that simply wants the fighting to end. In just a few short weeks, the
deal is already proving to be an unpalatable one, with the militants demanding
more ground and continuing violence against the civilian government.
¶8. (C) The military’s decision in 2008 to strike a deal with Pakistani Taliban
leader Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan helped to reduce the number of
suicide bombings in Pakistan but gave Mehsud free rein to infiltrate his forces
throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He has exploited
sectarian tensions and sent his fighters into Bajaur via Afghanistan to attack
government positions. This has eroded Chief of Army Staff General Kayani’s
strategy to gradually regain control of the FATA agency by agency. Rival
Pakistani Taliban leaders Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Gul Bahadur have formed a
new alliance which they claim will focus on cross-border attacks. As recent
media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful in disrupting
al-Qaida operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In the past year, 10 of the top
20 al-Qaida operatives, including those responsible for the East Africa embassy
bombings in 1998 and tied to Islambad’s Marriott bombing, have been eliminated.
Police/Law Enforcement
----------------------
¶9. (SBU) Although Pakistani security forces are now engaged in active combat
against extremists, they lack the capability to deal with militants and criminal
activity in the FATA and NWFP. The resulting decrease in security is impeding
our efforts to implement development projects in support of critical U.S.
national goals of eliminating terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and stabilizing
Afghanistan. While there is a need for Pakistani military action now to deal
with the large number of heavily armed militants operating in the border areas,
the long-term solution to ensuring law and order throughout the country lies
primarily with the civilian law enforcement agencies, not the military. To
strengthen civilian law enforcement, State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) expanded program in 2009 involves two
tracks, the first focusing on establishing a gendarmerie style force in NWFP
suited for
ISLAMABAD 00000454 003 OF 004
engaging and defeating heavily armed militants and criminal gangs. The second
track involves expanding the current ICITAP, DS/ATA and other efforts in
providing specialist and advanced training to specific elements of the Pakistani
police establishment.
¶10. (SBU) In conjunction with INL’s police program, the Department of State’s
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) will focus on providing expanded
training and consultation opportunities to the NWFP, Balochistan, and federal
areas to expand rapidly the GOP’s antiterrorist capabilities. This expanded
training will focus on building tactical, technical, and investigative skill
sets in specialized Pakistani law enforcement agencies. Training for these and
other units will focus on “hard skill” tactical training (i.e. protecting VIPs,
quick reaction forces, explosives detection/disposal) most urgently needed by
the GOP given the deteriorating security environment that it confronts. There
will also be an expanded effort to develop national and provincial-level
forensics and investigative capabilities and anti-kidnapping procedures. ATA was
instrumental in establishing and funding the FIA’s Special Investigative Group
(SIG). In 2007, ATA offered to fund expansion of the SIG by 100 officers and pay
salaries for the new officers; we still await an official response from MOI.
¶11. (C) Through the Rewards for Justice program, the USG is ready to assist
Pakistan in establishing a National Safety Hotline, through which MOI can
collect information from Pakistani citizens on terrorists and planned/executed
terrorist incidents in Pakistan. The GOP would serve as the public “front” of
the Rewards program; all U.S. funding and cooperation would remain discreet. The
GOP would serve asthe conduit for any eventual reward payments, and a DOD MIST
team has developed a media campaign in support of the Rewards program. The GOP
will provide daily logistical and administrative support; RSO will provide to
administrative personnel to assist in collecting the tip information.
Visa Processing
----------------
¶12. (C) Post-9/11 changes to improve U.S. border security have dramatically
increased the length of time it takes Pakistani citizens to obtain U.S. visitor
visas. The local press and many politicians repeatedly criticize delays in visa
processing and difficulties encountered at U.S. ports of entry, often citing
them as examples of U.S. bias against Pakistan. On a practical level, the delays
impair U.S. efforts to train law enforcement and military personnel, and to
promote exchanges and academic programs with civilian authorities. While the USG
does not comment on the reasons for the delay, Pakistan authorities know that an
interagency security clearance process, which includes the FBI, is the main
factor. You may hear complaints about this issue during your meetings in
Islamabad, as well as calls for more effort on the U.S. part to improve the
process.
Mumbai
------
¶13. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian
military strike, the GOP needs to continue to show progress on prosecuting those
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. On February
12, the GOP filed official charges against 13 suspects, including LeT leaders
Javed Iqbal Laqvi, Zarrar Shah, and Abu al-Qama. Currently the Federal
Investigative Agency (FIA) has at least 7 of these suspects in custody; and they
face charges under Pakistan’s penal code, cyber crimes regulations, and the
Anti-Terrorism Act. India has welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges
against the key masterminds of Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian response
to requests for additional information (32 questions, including request for
forensics, ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support prosecution. Based
on the Indian response, Pakistan will consider sending an FIA team to New Delhi
to follow up; we should encourage that team to go to New Delhi and continue to
press for additional closures of LeT camps and Jamaat-ud-Dawa “charitable”
activities, particularly in Punjab. The issue of FBI access to the Mumbai
detainees remains a politically sensitive one you will want to raise directly
with MOI Malik.
ISLAMABAD 00000454 004 OF 004
Kidnapping Cases
----------------
¶14. (S) The Embassy appreciates ongoing FBI support to resolve a significant
number of kidnapping cases involving Amcits in Pakistan. We will update you on
current efforts to secure the release of UNHCR representative John Solecki and
New York Times reporter David Rohde. A video of Mr. Solecki was released on
February 13 which was accompanied by a statement demanding the release of Baloch
prisoners in the hands of the government. The Baloch Liberation United Front
(BLUF - a previously unknown group) is holding Solecki and made fresh demands on
March 1 that all incarcerated women be released within 72 hours or BLUF will
kill Solecki. The GOP continues to insist that Brahamdagh Bugti, a Baloch
separatist leader, is responsible for the kidnapping.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD478, NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST

ALLIANCE
Discussing cables
09ISLAMABAD478
P 041421Z MAR 09
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034

TAGS: PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: NEW WAZIRISTAN TERRORIST ALLIANCE
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Baitullah

Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed a new
militant alliance on February 23. The new alliance
recognizes Taliban leader Mullah Omar as its leader, and its
goal is to fight the planned U.S. troop surge in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani militant leaders will maintain their
independent militants groups but will now facilitate
cooperation in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan. It is
too early to say how effective this new alliance will be in
launching cross-border attacks against U.S./NATO forces in
Afghanistan, but it does give the largest and most powerful
Pakistani Taliban leaders unfettered access across North and
South Waziristan. Formation of the alliance demonstrates
that the GOP's tribal "divide and conquer" strategy is not
working, at least not to our advantage. Civilian leaders are
concerned about the continuing loss of government writ in the
Waziristans after this agreement, but Pakistan's security
forces may see few downsides to an alliance that focuses its
attacks outside of Pakistan. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) On February 23, Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) leader

Baitullah Mehsud signed a deal with two powerful rival
Taliban commanders Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz
Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan. The three, according to
press reports, have formed a new group called Shura
Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Unity Council), that they
claim will unite them against external forces trying to
divide the multiple Taliban groups based in Pakistan. They
have formed a 13-member shura to run the affairs of the new
alliance. The militants named Mullah Omar as their supreme
leader, but the group did not choose a leader of its
operational shura. According to a joint public statement,
the militant leaders praised Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar
as defenders of Islam and Muslims. The spokesman for
Baitullah Mehsud, Mufti Waliullah, said that the three
Taliban commanders would now operate from a single platform
under the new alliance. Currently Baitullah Mehsud controls
the eastern portion of South Waziristan, which is populated
largely by Mehsud tribesmen. Maulvi Nazir is based out of
the Ahmedzai Wazir area of South Waziristan on the agency's
western border with Afghanistan. Hafiz Gul Bahadur leads his
Utmanzai Wazir militants from Miram Shah, North Waziristan.
¶3. (C) The formation of the new alliance follows Baitullah

Mehsud's December 2007 formation of TTP as an umbrella group
to better coordinate pro-Taliban activities. The creation of
the TTP was the merger of various Pakistani militant groups
operating under disparate commands in different tribal
agencies. The TTP alliance runs as a loose federation rather
than a strictly controlled organization. Each of the
militant leaders maintains a degree of autonomy and Baitullah
Mehsud, as the strongest leader of Pakistani Taliban, lends
his support and coordination to the various TTP subcommanders
in places such as Bajaur and Swat. Nazir, who broke openly
with Mehsud in the spring of 2007 (see para 6), was not a
part of TTP. Bahadur, who had jockeyed with Mehsud for the
title of pre-eminent local militant leader in the
Waziristans, had maintained some distance from the TTP label
before now.
¶4. (C) The new Mujahideen Unity Council will likely be

another loose federation with each Taliban commander
maintaining his own authority. Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) Secretariat Additional Chief Secretary
Habibullah Khan expressed concern to Peshawar Principal
Officer in a February 24 meeting that this new body provides
all three militant leaders with unfettered access to all of
South and North Waziristan. Baitullah Mehsud will be a main
beneficiary of this new access, giving his fighters easier
entry to the Afghanistan border through Maulvi Nazir's
Wazir-held territory. Before the deal, Mehsud had limited
access to the border from his portion of South Waziristan
because he was blocked either by Maulvi Nazir or Gul Bahadur.
While the alliance will not work as a tight top-down
militant organization, it will facilitate access and
coordination of various Pakistani Taliban as they cross into
Afghanistan.
¶5. (C) While Khan had no hard facts, he detected the hand of
the Haqqani network in bringing these rival commanders
together. The new coordination, he feared, will allow the
Taliban to focus on sending militants across the border into
Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani also claimed in the press
that he had convinced the three rival Taliban leaders to
meet. Sirajuddin and his father Jalaluddin Haqqani lead much
of the Taliban militancy in eastern Afghanistan. Sirajuddin
often travels to the tribal areas of Pakistan, North
Waziristan in particular, and has served as a mediator
between these rival Taliban leaders.
¶6. (S/NF) In the past, the Pakistani government has supported
Maulvi Nazir in an attempt to counter Baitullah Mehsud in
South Waziristan. In the spring of 2007, an open break
between Nazir and Mehsud took place over the presence of
"Uzbek" fighters in South Waziristan. The disagreement
culminated in an operation in which Pakistani security forces
fought alongside Nazir's followers to oust Uzbeks from the
area. While Nazir appeared to draw on genuine local anger
and desire to remove "Uzbeks," his activities as an al-Qaida
facilitator and promoter of cross-border attacks have always
complicated Pakistani efforts to sell this episode as a
"success" story. A South Waziristan-based contact told
Principal Officer Peshawar on February 24 that Mehsud and
Nazir are showing signs of getting past old disagreements and
that "Uzbeks" are re-appearing in growing numbers in the
area.
¶7. (SBU) According to Pakistani newspapers, Ahmedzai Wazir

elders of South Waziristan, who are concerned about the new
alliance and the possibility of "Uzbeks" coming back into
their territory, questioned Maulvi Nazir about the deal with
rival Mehsud. At a meeting in Wana, South Waziristan Maulvi
Nazir assured the elders that each militant group will
continue to have its own independent status and remain
sovereign in their own territory. Nazir explained that the
alliance was formed "only to act together against the United
States" because the Taliban was concerned about the troop
surge in Afghanistan, according to Pakistan press reports.
The elders publicly cautioned Nazir that they would turn
against him if this new deal brought any harm to their areas.
¶8. (C) While he did not touch on a possible ISI role in

brokering this new alliance, Habibullah Khan noted that
pressure has been building on the Pakistani military in the
Waziristans. The Pakistani military and then Northwest
Frontier Province Governor Orakzai quietly entered peace
deals with North Waziristan commanders in December 2007 and
with Baitullah Mehsud in February 2008 in order to achieve
relative peace. Those agreements came after a series of high
profile attacks on the military in the Waziristans, including
the kidnapping of over 250 security forces by Baitullah
Mehsud and Jan 2008 fighting at Ladha Fort in South
Waziristan. While violence directed at the military in the
Waziristans has been minor in the last few months, Peshawar
observers regularly note that the military remains concerned
with its ability to keep a lid on trouble in these two
agencies. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani believes the
respite offered by this latest agreement is necessary for his
stretched forces to continue fighting in Bajaur and Mohmand
agencies. However, the relative quiet in South and North
Waziristan has allowed Baitullah Mehsud to increasingly send
his fighters in other parts of the FATA and Northwest
Frontier Province, including Swat.
¶9. (C) Khan also noted with deep dismay that this
announcement demonstrates that these militant commanders see
themselves in a strong enough position to form an alliance
that takes them one step closer to a formal territorial
takeover of the Waziristan as an "Islamic Emirate." South
Waziristan contacts also commented that there is an
increasing presence of Punjabi militants from Jaish-e
Muhammad in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. (Comment:
A development if accurate that is almost certainly of concern
to the Pakistani military. It is significant that Baitullah
Mehsud's strength and open militancy are drawing fighters
from places such as southern Punjab.)
¶10. (C) As this new alliance formed, Mullah Omar ordered

militants in North and South Waziristan to immediately stop
their attacks on Pakistani security forces, according to
press reports. Omar said in a letter to the militants, "If
anybody really wants to wage jihad, they must fight the U.S.
and NATO troops inside Afghanistan." The letter also stated
that Omar was responsible for the agreement between Mehsud,
Nazir, and Bahadur, and that after this agreement "the
attacks on Pakistani security forces by the local Taliban
will decrease if not end completely." Mullah Omar continues
to exert considerable influence on the militants in South and
North Waziristan. Halting attacks against Pakistani forces
may increase the militants' safe haven space in Pakistan,
allowing the militants to cross the border to attack NATO
forces in Afghanistan.
¶11. (C) Comment: It is too early to predict how effective

this new alliance will be in launching cross-border attacks
on U.S./NATO forces, but its formation will provide the group
with unfettered access to Afghanistan across North and South
Waziristan. It is another indication that the GOP's tribal
divide and conquer strategy against militants is not working,
at least not to our advantage. Pakistan's security forces,
however, may see limited downsides to an arrangement that
focuses militant attacks outside of Pakistan.
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD516, LITTLE MOVEMENT ON

RECONCILIATION
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7081
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0516/01 0710428
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 120428Z MAR 09
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 5932
Thursday, 12 March 2009, 04:28

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
SUBJECT: LITTLE MOVEMENT ON RECONCILIATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 506 B. ISLAMABAD 508
¶1. (C) Summary. In a last-ditch effort to reduce tensions with the Sharif
brothers ahead of the start of the lawyers’ march on March 12, President Zardari
offered Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of
Senate leader if PML would form a government with the Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) in Punjab but will do little to pacify Nawaz Sharif or the lawyers.
Shujaat is considering the deal, which will be sealed by the March 12 vote in
the Senate; it could end governor’s rule in Punjab--if Shujaat can keep the PML
forward block in line. Other compromise efforts have failed, although the UK
High Commission is probing for the various parties’ positions in advance of a
possible HMG mediation effort. After seeing Interior Minister Malik and Awami
National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan, Ambassador will see Shujaat March 11
and the Sharifs on March 12.
¶2. (C) Amid reports of possible targeted killings and Mumbai style attacks
during the march, the GOP began arresting Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) members and some civil activists. Interior Minister Malik
assured Ambassador he had no plans to arrest the Sharifs or key civil society
leaders like Aitzaz Ahsan, but caveated this by saying he might have to arrest
Imran Khan or others “who did not obey the law.” Lawyers and JI activists
already have begun infiltrating Islamabad; if a significant number of
demonstrators cannot enter the capital, we expect protests in multiple areas,
especially in Punjab, beginning March 12. Accordingly, we are issuing a Warden
Notice March 11.
¶3. (C) During Ambassador’s fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) General Kayani on March 10, he again hinted that he might, however
reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation
sharply deteriorates. He mentioned Asfundyar Wali Khan as a possible
replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP
government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring
Nawaz Sharif to power. We do not believe Army action is imminent. We do believe
Kayani was laying down a clear marker so that, if he has to act, he can say he
warned the U.S. in advance and gave us ample opportunities to pressure both
sides to back down. Kayani is trying to leverage what he considers predominate
U.S. influence over Zardari, instead of seeking a direct confrontation that
could provoke an unhelpful civil-military clash.
¶4. (C) Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring at victory on all fronts; today, he
recognizes he must compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over
his shoulder at the Army. Even if the lawyers’ march fizzles--and it may--Nawaz
retains the high moral ground in public opinion and can continue attacking a now
weakened Zardari. We should encourage Zardari to continue efforts to ease
tensions and ask the Saudis and the UAE to weigh in with their respective
allies. This could be a protracted process. End Summary.
Mediation/Confrontation/Collapse
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) There are three political scenarios in play as tensions between
President Zardari and the Sharif brothers rise ahead of the start of the
lawyers’ march on March 12: mediation/accommodation, which resolves the Sharifs’
disqualification from holding public office, ends governor’s rule in Punjab and
addresses the judicial issue; confrontation, which leads to violence and
possible Army intervention; and a fizzled march that sets the stage for
continued conflict.
Mediation/Accommodation
-----------------------
¶6. (C) On March 11, Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan
described to Ambassador and Polcouns his
ISLAMABAD 00000516 002 OF 004
mediation efforts with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman over the past
week. Zardari, he asserted, agreed to request a review of the Supreme Court
decision disqualifying the Sharifs, said that after a positive outcome to that
review Shahbaz Sharif would be reinstated as Chief Minister Punjab, and agreed
to a conference to discuss restoring the judiciary. In return, Nawaz should
delay the lawyers’ march.
¶7. (C) Nawaz reportedly agreed but then changed his mind and demanded reversal
of the court decision, an end to governor’s rule in Punjab and reinstatement of
the former Chief Justice. Under pressure, Nawaz relented and agreed to the
judicial conference idea but offered only to ask the lawyers to consider
postponing the march, and said all this had to be accomplished in a day.
Asfundyar noted that it was impossible to demand a immediate review of a Court
decision that had not been formally issued. He told Nawaz that he would win the
next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a
political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfundyar,
Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge.
¶8. (C) Asfundyar said that Zardari was surrounded by advisors who were not
politicians, so he was not being encouraged to compromise; Nawaz’s chief advisor
was Chaudhry Nisar who, with the Sharif brothers disqualified, stood the best
chance of being the next PML-N Prime Minister. Nawaz had provoked the Court by
launching a campaign over the doctored exam scores of the Chief Justice’s
daughter, and this had prompted the ruling against Shahbaz. Asfundyar attributed
the crisis 70 percent to Nawaz and 30 percent to Zardari. In Asfundyar’s view,
there was an absence of trust on both sides, and what was needed was a cease-
fire in which to conduct reasonable negotiations. If the march fizzled, there
could be time to work out a compromise; if the march sparked violence, there was
“nothing to do but pray.”
¶9. (C) Asfundyar welcomed the idea of UK mediation but said it was the U.S.
view that counted most. He also urged that we contact the UAE to pressure
Zardari and the Saudis to pressure Nawaz to back off. ANP had seen PML-N members
distributing cash envelopes to a stream of supporters this week; like Zardari,
Asfundyar said he believed the money was coming from the Saudis. Asfundyar was
open to continue mediating if asked. He reminded Ambassador that Zardari had
offered him the job of Prime Minister immediately after the February 2008
elections.
¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, UK High
Commissioner Brinkley said he had received approval to approach the various
sides, discern their bottom lines, and report back to London. HMG had not yet
decided whether to take on any role of mediator or guarantor. The UK planned to
make a public statement today urging the parties to resolve their differences
democratically and eschew violence. Brinkley was scheduled to see PM Gilani and
possibly Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif on March 11, and Chief of Army Staff General
Kayani and Asfundyar Wali Khan on March 12.
¶11. (C) Late on March 11, the PML confirmed press reports that the PPP had
reversed course (Ref B) and now had offered Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of
leader of the Senate if PML agreed to join PPP in a coalition government in
Punjab. Shujaat will meet PM Gilani later March 11; on March 12, the newly
constituted Senate would vote on a party leader. If the deal goes through, it
would end governor’s rule in Punjab but it is unclear if a PPP-led government
will reduce tensions. It remains unclear, however, if Shujaat can hold on to his
28-35 member “forward block” of Nawaz supporters to seal this deal. Without the
PML forward block, the PPP cannot form a government.
Confrontation
-------------
¶12. (C) In a March 11 meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, Interior Minister
Malik described his efforts to mediate with the lawyers to convince them to hold
a peaceful march outside of Islamabad, but he said the lawyers so far have
spurned the GOP’s proposals. Malik plans to block roads into Islamabad
ISLAMABAD 00000516 003 OF 004
beginning March 13. Ambassador warned that efforts to arrest the Sharifs or
high-profile activists like Aitzaz Ahsan would not be well received in
Washington or elsewhere. Malik denied he had any intention of arresting the
Sharifs or Aitzaz but qualified this by saying “unless they do not stop, but I
will tell you first. I have to maintain law and order.” He said he might have
to arrest Imran Khan and some JI activists. (Note: On March 10, Punjab police
began arresting 200-250 JI student activists and low-level PML-N workers.
Mission contacts report many activists already are going underground. Neither
the Sharifs nor Aitzaz Ahsan have been arrested. Geo TV News, which the GOP has
criticized for being anti-government, disappeared from cable TV. See septel for
updates.)
¶13. (C) Malik said he had received serious threat information regarding a
Mumbai style attack in Karachi on March 13-14 by the Jandallah group that
previously had attacked the U.S. Consulate. There were also reports of a
proposed targeted killing, against whom was unclear. JI leaders were giving
their students “black coats” so they could look like lawyers and already were
infiltrating Islamabad. Malik expected crowds of at least 4,000-5,000 in the
capital, even with road closures.
¶14. (S) In four conversations with Ambassador this week, Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) General Kayani hinted that, however reluctantly, he might have to urge
Zardari to resign, if conditions deteriorate. He did not offer any red lines.
Kayani indicated that Asfundyar Wali Khan or someone else broadly acceptable
might be an appropriate replacement for Zardari. We do not believe Army action
is imminent, but we do believe Kayani was laying down a marker that, if he had
to intervene, the U.S. had been forewarned and given many opportunities to avoid
intervention by pressuring both Nawaz and Zardari. Kayani made it clear that
regardless of how much he disliked Zardari, he distrusted Nawaz even more. The
scenario Kayani hinted at was one in which he would pressure Zardari to resign
(and presumably leave the country). This would not be an official Army “coup;”
it would leave the PPP government led by Prime Minister Gilani in place and
preclude the need for elections that likely would bring Nawaz to power.
¶15. (S) Kayani hinted at disquiet among his corps commanders who believe
Zardari is corrupt and has not been paying enough attention to Pakistan’s
economic and security challenges. ISI DG Pasha highlighted to Ambassador his
concerns about Zardari’s alleged corruption on the flight to the U.S. for the
strategic review, and we have multiple sources demonstrating Army complaints
about Zardari. Kayani believes the U.S. has the most influence over Zardari, and
he knows we are Pakistan’s most important ally, especially for increasing the
capacity of the Pakistani Army. Kayani told Ambassador he has talked directly to
Zardari, but he does not appear to have conveyed the seriousness of Army
concerns about Zardari or the security situation vis a vis the march. (Note:
Kayani may be seeking to avoid a confrontation that would prompt Zardari to make
a disastrous decision to try and oust the COAS.)
A Fizzle
--------
¶16. (C) At this point, everything appears to rest on the outcome of the
lawyers’ march. PML-N does not have a proven reputation for putting
demonstrators on the streets, although JI does. By applying the road
closure/detention tactics that worked for Musharraf in 2007 to stop pro-Nawaz
demonstrations, the government might be able to avoid a serious clash this time.
But if a policeman fires into the crowd or a terrorist attacks protesters, all
bets are off.
¶17. (C) There is also the likelihood that the march will not occur as
scheduled. Blocked from Islamabad, there could be multiple flash points in the
Punjab, early demonstrations in Islamabad, and a series of confrontations with
the police. This could be a protracted clash of wills.
¶18. (C) Comment: Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring victory in the face after
negotiating a PPP win in Senate elections, setting Nawaz up for an entirely
legal
ISLAMABAD 00000516 004 OF 004
disqualification, and looking toward successful Friends and Donors meetings that
would provide the financial support needed to bolster his sagging popularity. By
over-reaching to make a grab for Punjab without doing his homework on vote
counting in Punjab, Zardari now needs to compromise with the Sharifs and might
well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the march fizzles, Nawaz
retains the high moral ground in the public’s eyes and will use it to continue
attacking a weakened Zardari. Zardari needs to win back the military’s
confidence.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL83, US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN

REFUSED THE US
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09ISTANBUL83.
09ISTANBUL83 2009-03-03 06:06 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXRO7492
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIT #0083/01 0620654
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030654Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000083
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY;

ASHGABAT FOR TANBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH;
DUBAI FOR IRPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM IR
SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US
BADMINTON TEAM
REF: IRPO DUBAI 95
Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: A trusted contact claims he was told by a

close advisor to Iranian President Ahmadinejad that Iran
denied visas for the planned February 4, 2009 visit of the US
women's badminton because of the USG's "bad faith" in
announcing the visit earlier than Iran had requested.
According to the contact, Supreme Leader Khamenei only agreed
to the visit after Ahmadinejad urged him to do so, and only
on the understanding that no public announcements would be
made until after the team's arrival in Iran. Instead, the
USG announced the visit on February 2, as the team was
awaiting Iranian visas in Dubai. The regime wanted to
maintain full control of media coverage of the event, to
avoid a replay of the 1998 US wrestling team visit, when
Iranian crowds were filmed waving American flags and cheering
the US team. The regime believed the USG issued the early
announcement to create a similar dynamic, and now Khamenei
and Ahmadinejad feel "burned." Comment: If accurate, this
scenario underscores the challenges to building trust with a
regime that feels an obsessive fear of losing control over
both the process and substance of possible engagement with
the USG. End Summary.
¶2. (S) "A first test": A trusted contact of ConGen
Istanbul's Iran Watcher who recently returned from a visit to
Tehran recounted a detailed explanation he said he received
from a close advisor to President Ahmadinejad over why Iran
refused to issue visas in early February to the US women's
badminton team. In comments that track with IRPO Dubai's
reftel reporting, our contact says he was told that Supreme
Leader Khamenei was initially opposed to allowing the visit,
but President Ahmadinejad urged him to accept it. Even
though planning for this cultural exchange began before the
Obama administration took office, the regime including
Ahmadinejad believed this represented an important early
gesture by the new administration to build confidence and
show respect, and therefore a "first test" whether Iran could
work effectively with the Obama administration.
¶3. (S) Maximum GOI control: According to the presidential

advisor, the Iranian side insisted on a "carefully
calibrated" sequence of timing as a key requirement for
allowing the visit to proceed. Iran believes it had a clear
understanding with the USG (working through the US and
Iranian badminton federations, which in Iran's case took
instructions directly from the President's office) that
announcement of the badminton team's travel to Iran and
participation in the Fajr Tournament would be embargoed until
the tournament's opening ceremony on February 5. Iran
demanded this condition because Iran's leaders still remember
with discomfort the 1998 US wrestling team's visit to Iran,
when -- because of what Iran now sees as a failure on its
part to insist on airtight control over media coverage of the
event -- Iranian and international press broadcast scenes of
Iranian crowds cheering wildly as the US team entered the
arena carrying an American flag and continued to cheer the US
team during its matches, sometimes even waving American flags
in support. Khamenei demanded that there be no possible
repeat of such a scene within Iran. Given that the badminton
tournament was a women's sporting event and women's sports
are not televised in Iran, the regime felt confident it could
maintain full control over the event itself, allowing press
coverage only of the opening and closing ceremonies. To
maximize its control, the regime insisted on an embargo over
any announcement or media coverage of the US team's
participation until the team's arrival, i.e., after the team
had been issued visas in Dubai and flown to Tehran. This
important detail was explicitly agreed between the sports
federations, representing (in Iran's view) an understanding
between the highest levels of the USG and GOI, the
Ahmadinejad advisor insisted to our contact.
¶4. (S) "We were burned": Thus, when surprised regime

leaders saw the February 2 State Department announcement of
the badminton team's participation in the Fajr Tournament,
according to our contact, they immediately assumed "bad
faith" on the part of the USG, concluding that this was an
deliberate effort by the administration to gain advantage
over the GOI and undercut the regime's control of media
coverage of the event. The regime's immediate response,
ordered by Khamenei, was to refuse to issue the visas. As
the Ahmadinejad advisor explained to our contact: "Battles
of this nature, when foreign visitors come to Iran to
participate in sensitive or symbolic events, must be on our
terms and under our full control. We had an understanding
ISTANBUL 00000083 002 OF 002

with the U.S. over how this would proceed, and we were
burned." He added that Ahmadinejad, having personally
persuaded a reluctant Khamenei to allow the visit, felt
particularly aggrieved, and speculated to his close advisors
afterwards that this was evidence of "anti-Iranian influence"
among recently appointed foreign policy officials in the USG.
In typical Iranian fashion, GOI spokesmen blamed the
cancellation on other factors, including (from the MFA) the
"time consuming process" of visa issuance and (from Keyhan
and other conservative mouthpieces) the USG's failure to
condemn Israel over Gaza. But according to our contact,
Tehran assumes Washington "fully understands the real reason"
for the cancellation.
¶5. (S) Comment: Although it may seem far-fetched that such

a non-political exchange visit would be cancelled over a
seemingly mundane detail like the timing of the press
announcement of the visit, in Iran's case this scenario is
entirely plausible. If accurate, this scenario highlights
the challenges to building confidence with a regime that
feels an obsessive fear of losing control over either the
substance or process of possible engagement with the USG.
Indeed, this underscores that to Iran the process of
negotiations may often be as critical to demonstrating
"goodwill" and to ensuring eventual success as the substance
of the negotiations. This scenario also illustrates the
regime's rigid expectation that, with regard to early
confidence-building measures from the USG (especially
involving CBMs likely to generate press coverage), the GOI
must feel fully in control over how such measures play out,
and that at the first sign of any deviation from what it
believes is an agreed process, its first instinct --
reflective of its acute fixation on self-preservation -- will
be to shut the process down and blame the other side. End
comment.
WIENER
Viewing cable 09LONDON604, LIBERAL DEMOCRATS LOOK AHEAD TO

THEIR ELECTION
Discussing cables
09LONDON604
15:03 23:11 N London
VZCZCXRO4257
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLO #0604/01 0681522
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091522Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 03/09/2019

TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: LIBERAL DEMOCRATS LOOK AHEAD TO THEIR ELECTION
STRATEGY, POSSIBLE COALITION PARTICIPATION, AND OFFER THOUGHTS ON U.S.-UK
RELATIONS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b/ d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary and comment: Emboffs attending the Liberal Democrats’ (Lib
Dems) Spring Conference heard much in corridor conversations about the Party’s
strategy for the next general election (which must occur no later than June
2010) and whether participation in an electoral coalition made strategic sense
for the Party:
- The Coalition Calculus - Labour is “competition,” but the Conservatives are

“opposition:” Most Lib Dems are instinctively hostile to the Conservatives and
would not agree to join a Tory-led governing coalition, should the next election
produce a hung parliament or an offer from either party to join in a governing
coalition. Propping up an “exhausted” Labour party led by Gordon Brown is seen
by most Lib Dems as “political suicide” because it undercuts the Lib Dems’
appeal as a party of political change. For now, an informal arrangement that
does not commit the party to working with either Labour or the Tories in a
future government is seen as the approach likely to give the Lib Dems the most
policy influence, although a formal coalition with Labour under new, non-Brown
leadership has not been ruled out.
- Amplify Cable’s Voice on the Economy: Party members are pleased Lib Dem Deputy
Vince Cable has become a national voice on the economic downturn and is now
garnering retroactive praise for his Churchillian warnings over the past few
years about the instability of the UK financial system. The Lib Dems are now
working to broaden his credibility so it spills over to the party as a whole and
translates into electoral gains.
- The Death of Cameron’s Son Changes Election Strategy: The Lib Dem counter-
Conservative strategy in the next election was to attack Tory leader David
Cameron as “fake” and “out of touch” with real life. The passing of Cameron’s
son Ivan has eliminated the ability to use that line of attack, according to Lib
Dem members, as well as muted the willingness of the UK media to discuss
“character attacks” against Cameron. Attacks on the Conservatives will now have
to take a different course and most likely be about the issues.
On UK-U.S. relations, the Lib Dems welcome the USG’s recent “constructive
engagement” with Russia, Iran, and Syria. Several party members saw allowing
Prime Minister Brown to be the first European -- though not the first world
leader -- to visit the U.S. was a way “to let the (UK) down lightly” in favor of
what they expect will be a more multilateral U.S. approach to foreign affairs
under the Obama administration and one less focused on bilateral relationships
with traditional allies. Lib Dems supported new USG focus on climate change and
hoped that it will translate into deliverables in Copenhagen.
¶2. (C/NF) Summary and comment con’t. Although the Lib Dems do not have an
electoral issue that can strongly define them as a Party for UK voters in the
next election, as the party’s opposition to the Iraq war did in the 2005
election, the Party also does not come to the next election with the same
baggage that Labour and the Tories both carry with many voters. Distrust over
the Conservatives’ ability to handle the economy while ensuring social equality
remains strong with many voters, and discontentment with Labour’s failure to
stop the economic downturn continues to grow. Against this backdrop, the Lib
Dems hope to gain electoral ground as a party of change, especially amongst
blue-collar workers who are frustrated with Labour and distrustful of the
Tories. End summary and comment.
Coalition Calculus: Labour is Competition, Conservatives are Opposition

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶3. (C/NF) The Lib Dems’ agenda-light, March 7-8 Spring Conference in Harrogate
garnered a brief up-tick in national media coverage for the party; conversations
outside the conference hall focused heavily on the party’s electoral strategy in
the next general election. Lib Dem front bencher Norman Lamb explained to Poloff
the party’s thinking about participation in any possible governing coalition,
should neither Labour nor the Conservatives win an outright majority in the next
election: “We see Labour as our competition, and the Conservatives as our
opposition.” Most Lib Dems, he said, are instinctively and ideologically against
a coalition with the Conservatives, including “right-wing members of the party
like myself.” On the other hand, “propping up” Labour under Prime Minister Brown
- after an election in which the
LONDON 00000604 002 OF 003
voters have significantly reduced its number of seats - is “political suicide,”
especially since the Lib Dems’ main campaign message is a call for change. If
there is no clear majority in Parliament after the next elections, Lamb said the
Lib Dems stand to gain the most by an informal arrangement whereby the Lib Dems
could select and negotiate support for various policies, as they do not see the
benefit of a more formal coalition arrangement. Lamb admitted, however, that a
coalition with Labour under new, non-Brown leadership had not been ruled out.
And Our Leaders Just Don’t Get Along
------------------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Lamb said that Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg and Tory chief David Cameron
do not get along personally. Lamb said Clegg thinks Cameron is dismissive of him
and Clegg refused an “aggressive” invitation to dine at Cameron’s house.
Upgrading Cable
---------------
¶5. (C/NF) Chief Economic Advisor and Speech Writer Chris Saunders told us that
Lib Dem Deputy leader Vince Cable has become a national voice on the economy, in
part because he is now seen as one of the few UK political leaders who warned
about the weaknesses in the UK financial regulatory system before the downturn
began, but acknowledged that it is unclear if the broader public associates
Cable with the Lib Dems or sees him as a lone voice. In order to translate the
public’s recent faith in Cable’s views on the economy into support for the
broader party, the Lib Dem leadership plans to work improving Cable’s Lib Dem
“branding.”
A New Strategy Is Required to Attack Cameron

--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Both Saunders and Nick Clegg’s Speechwriter and Policy Manager Polly
Mackenzie said that Cameron’s clear vulnerability was the public perception that
he is “fake” and “out of touch” with real life. The Lib Dems strategy had been
to attack Cameron on these lines and make much of his insulated, upper class
persona. However, the death of Cameron’s son Ivan not only eliminated these
vulnerabilities in the eyes of the public but also made the media skittish about
character attacks that Cameron does not have experience of real life. Mackenzie
said the Lib Dems are still recalculating, but their attacks on the
Conservatives will have to be focused on the issues, especially the enduring
perception that the Conservatives cannot be trusted to run the economy and
ensure social equality. Saunders and Mackenzie agreed that Labour would like to
hold off calling for general elections until Spring 2010 in the hope that the
media’s undeclared but apparent gentle approach with Cameron after his son’s
death will have subsided.
U.S. - UK Relations
-------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Lib Dem Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Ed Davey, his Deputy Jo Swinson,
and Development Spokesperson Michael Moore all welcomed the USG’s “new
constructive engagement” in foreign policy, especially with regards to Russia,
Iran, and Syria. Swinson said the appointment of a Presidential Climate Change
Envoy was “a good thing” and hoped it would mean serious deliverables at the
Copenhagen conference.
¶8. (C/NF) Moore said the USG’s decision to host Prime Minister Gordon Brown as
the first European leader in Washington was a way “to let the (UK) down lightly”
in favor of a new Administration preference for multilateralism. Moore thought
relations between the U.S.-UK would remain very warm, but that the USG would
likely pursue foreign policy objectives through multilateral institutions rather
than through coalition building and its traditional partners. (Embassy comment:
Former Democratic Party chairman Howard Dean’s presence at the Lib Dem
conference, as well as his delivery of a keynote address on liberal politics,
gave the conference a decidedly more pro-American tone than past Lib Dem
conferences have had. End comment.)
Focused on Domestic Issues, but No Clear Message Yet

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶9. (C/NF) With UK voters’ focusing on education, health care, and the UK’s
sharp economic downturn, the focus of this year’s conference was on domestic
issues, not foreign policy, in stark contrast to previous conferences where the
Lib Dems have been able to raise their profile, and their support among UK
voters, by defining themselves in opposition to
LONDON 00000604 003 OF 003
Labour’s foreign policy on Iraq and involvement in the rendition of terror
suspects. Party leader Clegg’s main speech closing the conference appealed
directly to voters dissatisfied with Labour and the Conservatives, telling them
they should look to the Lib Dems for change and new answers: “If you feel let
down by Labour and see the Conservatives will never be a party of change, turn
to the Liberal Democrats.” Clegg positioned the Lib Dems as an alternative party
that would replace the “failed policies of Thatcher, Major, Blair, and Brown.”
Commenting on the current financial crisis, Clegg called on Britain to break
with the past and embrace a new political order - though a new order he never
successfully defined -- by supporting the Lib Dems, the only party, Clegg said,
open to new thinking on how to guide the country out of economic ruin. Clegg
ended by calling on voters to take a “leap of faith” with the Lib Dems. A leap,
however, that the UK media’s reporting on the conference argued might still be a
jump too far for most voters as long as the Lib Dems continue to lack a
galvanizing issue or policy that demonstrates “new thinking” and would justify
turning away from the UK’s two main parties.
ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Viewing cable 09PARIS381, S/WCI OFFICIALS DISCUSS GUANTANAMO

BAY DETAINEES
Discussing cables
09PARIS381 2009-03-16 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO3359
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0381/01 0751623
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY AD40E4BD MSI7190-632)
P 161623Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000381
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR MISSING NOFORN CAPTION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS KAWK KISL KPAO FR
SUBJECT: S/WCI OFFICIALS DISCUSS GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES
WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS
REF: PARIS 264
PARIS 00000381 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: Acting POL MC W. William Jordan for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: France accepted four former Guantanamo Bay

(GITMO) detainees with claims to immigration status in France
in July 2004 and an additional three in March 2005. Ministry
of Interior contact Christophe Chaboud noted that, unlike
other European countries visited by Washington officials (UK
and Albania), the majority of detainees repatriated by France
are still considered a security risk and are treated as such.
With the exception of the one detainee released without
prejudice (out of seven detainees repatriated), the French
intelligence service actively monitors the others and judges
they have not ceased association with persons tied to
extremist activities. France is still working to advance the
detainee issue within the EU and is considering accepting
detainees (reftel). French MFA DAS-equivalent for security
affairs Martin Juillard and Laurent Pic of Prime Minister
Fillon's office stressed that an EU common position would be
of "clear interest" to the USG, warning that countries might
attempt to "cherry pick" detainees if a framework were not in
place. Juillard added that a common approach would also
create a more fluid process for moving detainees. France
would appreciate as much information as possible from the USG
to help push the issue within the EU and in securing French
public support. Pic noted the mid-March meetings in
Washington with EU Vice President Jacques Barrot and the
Czech minister of interior could help to resolve many of
these issues. END SUMMARY.
French Approach to Detainee Reintegration

-----------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) France accepted four former detainees with claims

to immigration status in France in July 2004 and an
additional three in March 2005. In a March 10 meeting with
Ministry of Interior contacts Christophe Chaboud, Phillippe
Hanin and Francois Thuillier, and Ministry of Justice
official Philippe Tran Van, Chaboud noted that, unlike the UK
and Albania, the majority of detainees repatriated by France
are still considered a security risk and are treated as such.
Of the seven detainees originally repatriated, only Mustaq
Ali Patel was released without prejudice. Chaboud explained
that Patel was a religious fundamentalist who had been held
by the Taliban and was not deemed to be a threat. The six
other former detainees were held in custody and tried. Five
were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from one
to one and half years. Chaboud explained that while all six
of the detainees were considered extremists, only five had
trained in terrorist training camps. An appeals court
overturned the conviction of the five on February 24, saying
the security services who interviewed the defendants at GITMO
did not have the legal authority to do so. Although the
court case is ongoing and it is unclear if the reversal will
stand, the French security services will continue to monitor
the former detainees regardless of the final outcome of the
legal battle. The French intelligence service explained that
they actively monitor the repatriated detainees. Philippe
Hanin said that France still considers the six former
detainees a security risk. When pressed, Hanin added that
the detainee of greatest concern is Brahim Yadel, whose
history of large wire transfers has worried investigators
(Yadel was also suspected of plotting to attack the 1998
football World Cup in France).
EU Common Position: Still in Process

-------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) French MFA DAS-equivalent for security affairs

Martin Juillard and Laurent Pic of Prime Minister Fillon's
office clarified the evolving EU approach to a common
position for accepting Guantanamo detainees. While an EU
common position has still not been established, France has
been working with EU partners since January 2009 to formulate
a position that would take into consideration security
issues, especially for Schengen countries (reftel). Pic
noted that previous EU acceptance of Palestinians from the
Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem (reftel) could serve as a
useful precedent for granting residency permits within the
Schengen system. Pic added that the discussions within the
EU are still quite difficult; the French are looking for ways
to put in place a procedure for accepting detainees while not
pressuring countries that are unwilling to resettle them.
¶4. (S/NF) Juillard explained that an EU common position would

be of "clear interest" to the USG to avoid "cherry picking"
by EU countries willing to accept detainees as well as
creating a more fluid process for moving detainees. That
said, Pic noted that there were some EU members --
unspecified -- still resistant to the idea of accepting
detainees. For this reason the GOF would appreciate as much
PARIS 00000381 002.2 OF 002
information as possible from the USG to help push the issue

within the EU and to secure French public support. Some of
the EU debate over a common position, Juillard said, needed
to focus on forming some procedures to create contingency
plans when a detainee's first choice of accepting country is
refused by that country. Perhaps, he suggested, the GOF, EU
and USG could work together collectively to craft a mechanism
for other EU countries to help fill the void. Juillard and
Pic noted that the idea of a clearing house (reftel) as part
of a common position was intended to provide a data-sharing
mechanism rather than as a forum for collective
decision-making, which the French believe would hinder the
decision-making process.
Increased Coordination and Additional Issues

--------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Juillard said the GOF needed to know the status of
the USG's review process. He noted that since Prime Minister
Fillon and Foreign Minister Kouchner announced that France
would consider accepting detainees (reftel), French public
opinion has continued to sour. France realizes that the
issue will be a tough sell to the French public, so any help
the U.S. can provide to assist the GOF with selling the idea
to the French public would be greatly appreciated. Another
"sensitive" concern for the French is the possibility of
extradition of former Guantanamo Bay detainees as well as
prosecutions and detentions, Juillard said. In addition, the
French would like to have more information on reintegration
procedures so that detainees did not resume terrorist
activities. Such procedures could be legal and financial.
Before France could consider accepting detainees, the GOF
would like to interview the detainees in such a way that
would "not cause" legal problems, Juillard said. Pic said
France and the EU hope many of these issues will be resolved
during the mid-March meetings in Washington with EU Vice
President Jacques Barrot and Czech Minister of Interior
Langer.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09PARIS410, SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT’S

BILATERAL MEETING
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #0410/01 0791607

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201607Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D’AFFAIRES MARK PEKALA
EO 12958 DECL: 03/20/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, NATO, FR, AF, RU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT’S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT SARKOZY ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
¶1. (S/NF) Key points:

-- Your visit comes at a historic time. Nicolas Sarkozy is the most pro-American
French President since World War II and is, at the moment, arguably the most
influential leader in Europe. Sarkozy,s goodwill and your prestige give us an
unprecedented opportunity to cement the positive changes he has already made and
to strengthen the relationship for years to come.
-- Sarkozy is unquestionably the driving force in all of French foreign and
domestic policy. A pragmatist and an activist, he can be brilliant, impatient,
undiplomatic, hard to predict, charming, innovative, and summit-prone. He
strongly believes that it takes political leaders to slice through the &Gordian
knots8 that bureaucracies can often be unable to resolve. He has no qualms about
jettisoning policies that, from his perspective, have outlived their usefulness.
-- Your personal rapport with Sarkozy will be a factor in the overall
relationship, and he is eager for a genuine friendship in addition to a working
relationship. He was disappointed not to have been the first EU leader invited
to Washington.
-- Expect Sarkozy to pitch big ideas on everything from the financial crisis to
the Middle East peace process. In turn, he will respond well to your bold,
inventive proposals.
-- Sarkozy should get a clear sense of your priorities and, as appropriate, red
lines. Sarkozy wants to get off on the right foot with you and will respect your
goals.
End key points.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
EARLY FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: RETURN TO EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP AND THE ALLIANCE WITH
THE U.S.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶2. (C/NF) Since the beginning of his Presidency in 2007, Sarkozy has targeted
his foreign policy efforts on re-establishing France,s image as a leader in
Europe (and the world), following the debacle of France,s “no” vote on the EU
constitution in 2005. Through personal intervention, often at the cost of
ruffling the feathers of his German and British rivals, he sought to make the EU
a more dynamic and active world player. His personal intervention and leadership
during the Georgia crisis, the economic crisis, and the Gaza fighting won
grudging acceptance and even approval from European leaders who, even though
offended by his brash dominance of the limelight, recognized that he was making
the EU an effective player. He pursued a similar campaign to return to the heart
of NATO and the Atlantic alliance. He focused French and European attention on
strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), taking advantage
of crises in Africa and off the Somali coast to cobble together effective
responses with a European imprimatur. At the same time, he stage-managed a year-
long review of France,s security posture for the 21st century, which will re-
allocate resources across the French military and use money saved to modernize
its equipment. These efforts culminated in a forced political march toward a
domestic debate and a (successful) Parliamentary vote, not only on France,s full
reintegration into NATO but on the totality of Sarkozy,s foreign policy.
-----------------------------
MOVING FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN
-----------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) With France,s full return to NATO assured, Sarkozy will want to want
to show that France and Europe have a more effective voice in decisions,
particularly on Afghanistan (where French leadership can galvanize other allies
to do more). Sarkozy is a strong supporter of the allied action in Afghanistan,
but there is little popular support for the policy or public understanding of
the threat. Sarkozy,s recent appointment of Pierre Lellouche to mirror
the role of SRAP Holbrooke is a positive signal that France will be engaged and
active; at Sarkozy,s behest, Lellouche is seeking to organize a gendarme
training unit in Afghanistan, in advance of the NATO Summit. But France is
constrained by issues of operational tempo and the financial crisis, as well as
by concerns about the strategy, goals, and time-line for success in Afghanistan.
¶4. (S/NF) Sarkozy, who plans to visit Afghanistan and Pakistan in May, will
likely delay any announcement of increased commitment, civilian or military,
until after that trip. Ironically, announcement of increased U.S. force
participation has lifted some of the urgency from our allies, including France.
Your discussion will be important to help Sarkozy demonstrate to his public that
the U.S. is consulting with him before acting and that there is a new strategy
that will be better coordinated and more effective. Addressing the summer Afghan
election plans -- and pledging better coordination among allies in theater,
while pressing for a stronger civilian commitment -- will be key to securing
increased French participation. French officials view Pakistan as intrinsically
linked with the challenges and issues in Afghanistan. However, France is a
relative newcomer to Pakistan and relies heavily on the U.S. and United Kingdom
for information and analysis. France has proposed regular trilateral
consultations with France, the UK, and the U.S. to better coordinate our
policies in the region.
-----------------------------------------
SEEKING A GREATER ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Sarkozy shares most of our strategic objectives in the Middle East,
from achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace to preserving Lebanon,s independence
and sovereignty to dissuading Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
When he differs with us on tactics, he is not -- as was sometimes the case with
previous French leaders -- being difficult simply for the sake of appearing
distinct from the U.S. To the contrary, Sarkozy,s approach is fueled by
pragmatism; to get results, he has abandoned policies that, from his
perspective, have outlived their usefulness and launched others (e.g., engaging
Syria) that have sometimes put him out in front of Washington. He views our own
effort at talking to Damascus with a certain sense of vindication and would
respond well if you were to ask his assessment of Syrian President Bashar al-
Asad. Be prepared to hear that the glass is half-full. Although Sarkozy feels
stung by Asad,s failure to send an ambassador to Beirut as promised, he and his
advisors have opted to downplay this failure and remain convinced that engaging
Syria has paid dividends. As for Lebanon, Sarkozy hosted Lebanese President
Sleiman in Paris March 16-18 for a state visit timed to bolster Sleiman in
advance of Lebanon,s parliamentary election. Whatever the election outcome,
France wants to see another unity government in Beirut -- not out of love for
Hizballah and its allies, but to avoid subjecting Lebanon to additional fighting
that Hizballah would almost certainly win and which could also spark a more
serious regional crisis.
¶6. (S/NF) By the same token, Sarkozy sees no credible alternative to

Palestinian reconciliation. He agrees with the ideals expressed in the Quartet
Principles, but assesses that the status quo hurts Fatah and the Palestinian
Authority more than Hamas. He would welcome any initiative to repackage the
Quartet Principles -- indeed, he allowed FM Kouchner to propose that the EU take
a less dogmatic approach on engaging Hamas -- in a way that allows the
international community to work with the next Palestinian government. Sarkozy
respects Special Enjoy Mitchell but may tell you, as he told Secretary Clinton,
that Mitchell is &too wise.8 Sarkozy favors bold steps and has not abandoned his
idea of convening a Middle East peace summit. Though he understands that the
timing is not optimal, you can expect him to press for action. He is also keen
to take up President Asad,s offer that the U.S. and France co-sponsor a
resumption of Syrian-Israeli negotiations. On Iran, Sarkozy is the toughest of
the EU leaders, yet he harbors no illusions about the likelihood of further UNSC
movement at the moment; he will likely suggest that you postpone engaging Tehran
until after Iran’s upcoming presidential election.
--------------------------------
RUSSIA - DIALOGUE, NOT ISOLATION
--------------------------------
¶7. (C) Sarkozy came to power determined to do away with the personal diplomacy
of previous French presidents and to take a hard look at French interests in the
relationship with Russia. However, during the Georgia crisis that erupted at the
start of the French EU presidency, he fell back again on his penchant for
personal engagement and testing the word of his counterparts. While wary of
Russian intentions in Georgia, Sarkozy has made clear his belief that Georgia
and other areas of disagreement with Russia are best handled through diplomatic
engagement and not through isolation. He has thus pushed for talks on a
partnership accord between Russia and the EU to proceed (they are currently on a
very slow track) as an inducement for better Russian behavior. Sarkozy has also
sought to engage and cultivate Russian President Medvedev, over Prime Minister
Putin, in the apparent hope of strengthening relative moderates in Moscow.
¶8. (C/NF) Like other French officials, Sarkozy is looking for some indication
of where we want to take U.S.-Russian relations and how we concretely intend to
“reset” the relationship. While Sarkozy surprised aides and allies by responding
positively to Medvedev,s initiative to renegotiate Europe,s security
architecture, his gambit that this should take place inside the OSCE (where the
focus will be on Russian behavior and not the structure of the western
alliances) seems to have won some traction. Sarkozy may warn of the political
consequences, including in foreign policy terms, of a steady deterioration of
socio-economic conditions in Russia caused by the financial crisis. He might
also couple any advocacy of sustained engagement with Moscow with criticism of
the feckless and divided leaderships, as he sees them, in Georgia and Ukraine.
----------
AND BEYOND
----------
¶9. (C/NF) Sarkozy is trying to activate French policy and influence elsewhere
but with less success. In Latin America, he sees Brazil,s Lula as a key partner
with a shared interest in helping transform Cuba. His Asia policy is a shambles.
The Chinese are still seething that Sarkozy vacillated about attending the
Olympics last August and met with the Dalai Lama in Gdansk in December. The
Japanese have told us they feel neglected, particularly compared with the
attention lavished by Sarkozy,s predecessor. And Sarkozy,s determination to turn
around French Africa policy is still a work in progress )- but one where we and
France can continue to cooperate closely. Sarkozy will also be interested in
your onward travel to Turkey, where bilateral relations have long been soured by
France’s and Sarkozy,s opposition to full EU membership.
---------------
ECONOMIC ISSUES
---------------
¶10. (C/NF) President Sarkozy sees the current crisis as vindication of the
French model of state interventionism in the economy. Although domestically he
has set in motion reforms designed to open the economy to more market-friendly
forces, his Gaullist instincts, never dormant, have been on prominent display
during the crisis. In the run-up to the G20 London Summit, he and his government
have used the United States as public foil to rally support for tighter global
regulation of the economy. He boasted repeatedly of having “imposed” the initial
G20 meeting in November on Washington and generally has downplayed U.S.-
supported work on crisis-related issues in the Financial Stability Forum and
elsewhere.
¶11. (C/NF) With EU partners, he has had mixed success in pushing for a more
robust state role in defending industry, a case he often makes by invoking vague
arguments that “the Americans do it, so we should, too.” He gets more traction
in Europe from his government’s support for regulating trade based on &societal8
preferences (against U.S. agriculture for example) or a priniciple of European
preference. You will have had the chance to discuss economic issues in
London, but a reminder to President Sarkozy that our economic relationship is
central to our broader partnership would be timely.
------------
DOMESTICALLY
------------
¶12. (C) Sarkozy dominates the French political landscape. As in foreign policy,
he is the driving force. He charged into office in 2007 pledging to reform
everything from labor laws to the university system. But the sharp economic
downturn has slowed many of these ambitious initiatives, and Sarkozy,s approval
ratings languish between 40 and 45 percent, never having recovered from an early
wave of bad publicity about his personal foibles. His energetic, occasionally
impulsive leadership style has been a lightning rod for criticism, as has his
propensity to rely on a relatively small group of advisors. Nonetheless, Sarkozy
remains fully in command of the politics, policy, and direction of France; he
will continue to do so at least until the 2012 presidential election.
¶13. (U) Mr. President, everyone at Embassy Paris (and, indeed, all of France)
looks forward with great excitement and profound pride to welcoming you to
Strasbourg next month.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09RIYADH447, COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER

BRENNAN’S MEETING WITH
Discussing cables
O 221014Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
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NSC FOR JBRENNAN AND JDUNCAN; STATE FOR S/WCI
EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2019

TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN’S MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427
Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)
¶1. KEY POINTS

-- (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism adviser John
Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and Ambassador Fraker to his private
palace March 15 for a 90-minute discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations,
counterterrorism cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and
Iraq.
-- (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama expressing
a personal message of friendship, appreciation for our close and collaborative
relationship and concern over the disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.
-- (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes
before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a
one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia.
-- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and
held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki
remains in office.
-- (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King said he had
“one request”: that it was “critically important to restore America’s
credibility” in the world.
U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS
¶2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the U.S./Saudi alliance
must remain strong, and assured the King of President Obama’s wishes for a long
and healthy U.S./Saudi relationship, and the President’s personal commitment
that Saudi Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he
appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for President Obama.
“We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood together” in Kuwait and Iraq, the
King continued, and Saudi Arabia valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a
difficult issue that requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
have done it for 70 years over three generations. “Our disagreements don,t cut
to the bone,” he stated.
¶3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush Administration is now in the
past, the King said. Both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent
President Bush didn,t take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and
they found their problems “compounded.” The King said, “we are ready to consult,
provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of the region
and we know it well.” Brennan responded that President Obama wants to listen,
and asked what advice the King would offer to President Obama. Abdullah said his
one piece of advice was that restoring U.S. credibility in the world was
critically important. Brennan responded that this was an important issue for
President Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will restore
our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to
do.
¶4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President Obama looked forward to
seeing the King at the G-20 summit in London. “Thank God for bringing Obama to
the presidency,” the King answered, which has created “great hope” in the Muslim
world. “May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued, “May God
protect him. I’m concerned about his personal safety. America and the world need
such a president.”
¶5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS COMPLETE: Abdullah said “as a
friend” that “it was a mistake” to limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S.,
since “this damages bilateral relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi
Arabia.” The King noted there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third
of whom were in the U.S., and “others would have gone” but for the difficulties
in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many years very senior
Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had studied in the U.S. He
then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel al Jubeir (who was
interpreting for the King) had studied in the U.S. and was “half American” as a
result. He also said he was aware of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker’s
efforts to improve the visa situation “even though there were people in
Washington who fought him.” Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia
who studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the United
States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow of students.
DETAINEES
¶6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained that President Obama had
made a commitment to close Guantanamo to eliminate the potential propaganda
benefits its existence provided to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right
thing to do. Brennan reassured the King, however, that President Obama would
remain strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter from
President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo. Brennan
noted that he had met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to
discuss at length The issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that
he would be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as the
issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be resolved. Brennan
praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism partner, and that the MOI was
doing a wonderful, courageous job in countering the terrorist threat to the
Kingdom. Returning to the subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that
the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in Yemen from growing
even more dangerous. The King replied that having Somalia next door to Yemen
only adds to the danger. Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of
the Interior security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years.
Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing cooperation between
our countries had never been better and that MbN deserved the credit. In an
unusual concession, made at the conclusion of their conversation, the King said,
“be assured I am fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed
bin Nayef.”
¶7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: “I’ve just thought of something,” the King
added, and proposed implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing
information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with
Bluetooth. This was done with horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan
replied, “horses don,t have good lawyers,” and that such a proposal would face
legal hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an
extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate officials when
he returned to the United States.
IRAN
¶8. (S) A “HEATED EXCHANGE”: The King noted that Iranian FM Mottaki had been
“sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few moments ago.” The King described
his conversation with FM Mottaki as “a heated exchange, frankly discussing
Iran’s interference in Arab affairs.” When challenged by the King on Iranian
meddling in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that “these are
Muslims.” “No, Arabs” countered the King, “You as Persians have no business
meddling in Arab matters.” The King said the Iranians wanted to improve
relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki an ultimatum. “I will give you
one year” (to improve ties), “after that, it will be the end.”
¶9. (S) “SPARE US YOUR EVIL”: The King expressed hope the U.S. would review its
Iran policy and “come to the right conclusion.” Brennan responded that President
Obama was personally reviewing U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King’s
thoughts. Abdullah asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like
organizations in African countries, observing that the Iranians don’t think they
are doing anything wrong and don’t recognize their mistakes. “I said (to
Mottaki) that’s your problem,” recounted the King. Abdullah said he would favor
Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He described Iran not as “a
neighbor one wants to see,” but as “a neighbor one wants to avoid.” He said the
Iranians “launch missiles with the hope of putting fear in people and the
world.” A solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement,
the King said, but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. “Iran’s goal is
to cause problems,” he continued, “There is no doubt something unstable about
them.” He described Iran as “adventurous in the negative sense,” and declared
“May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil.” Mottaki had tendered an
invitation to visit Iran, but Abdullah said he replied “All I want is for you to
spare us your evil.” Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: “We
have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they
cannot be trusted.”
¶10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said “three years ago” Iranian Supreme
Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar Velayati with a letter asking for
Abdullah’s agreement to establish a formal back channel for communication
between the two leaders. Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was
established with Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact.
In the years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.
¶11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded that the Saudis lived in a
dangerous neighborhood with Iran across the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a
long border with Yemen, and with a number of other troublesome countries nearby.
Brennan noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together. The
King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the region. He further
stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in this sensitive region, but
that we should not take matters lightly. Brennan noted that President Obama is
fully aware of the dangers in the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to
remain involved in constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s
counsel in dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if
that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that we had our
eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not nave to the dangers Iran
posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could not be allowed to succeed in its
destabilizing activites. Brennan observed that the President had ordered a
complete review of U.S. Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the
President,s letter that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its
destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan
further observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and that
together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear ambitions. “That
is important,” responded the King. Finally, Brennan said the President wanted
the King to know he had a good friend in the White House who would be willing to
assist in any way that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he
appreciated the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama,
and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and would remain
friends as our disagreements were minor.
¶12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the Iran discussion
and the King’s meeting with Mottaki.
IRAQ
¶13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed the importance the U.S.
attaches to achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The King replied that this
was “in the hands of God,” though he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to
both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The King also pointed out that “some say the
U.S. invasion handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought
Saddam Hussein.”
¶14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had “no confidence whatsoever in
(Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views.” The
King affirmed that he had refused former President Bush’s entreaties that he
meet with Maliki. The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki’s term of
office, and the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for
reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of them. For
this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. “I don,t trust this man,”
the King stated, “He’s an Iranian agent.” The King said he had told both Bush
and former Vice president Cheney “how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?”
Maliki has “opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power,
the King said, and he was “not hopeful at all” for Maliki, “or I would have met
with him.”
AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST
¶15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times animated,
entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his encounters with Iranian leaders
(septel), and throwing up his hands in complaint when asked if he spent time
with his horses: “I see them on television when they race,” he said. “I love
horses,” he exclaimed, “every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have
a very calm and restful sleep.”
¶16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to Brennan,s praise for the
King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his commitment to advancing rights as
reflected by his recent appointment of the first female (deputy education)
minister, the King said “Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special,
only what I thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by God.”
¶17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:

Saudi Arabia -- Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
al-Saud -- HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant
Minister of the Interior -- Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)
U.S. -- John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism -- Ambassador Ford Fraker -- Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes
Issues Clint Williamson -- John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism --
Shaun Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI -- Embassy control officer/notetaker
¶18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.

FRAKER
Viewing cable 09RIYADH496, SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR BOND'S

APRIL 6-8 VISIT TO
Discussing cables
09RIYADH496 2009-03-31 14:02 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Riyadh
nytimes.com
P 311432Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
DEPT FOR H(SHANE) AND H/RGF(LANG)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON SA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR BOND'S APRIL 6-8 VISIT TO
SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
¶1. (U) The Embassy welcomes your visit to the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia. This message provides a brief overview of key
current issues in U.S. - Saudi relations, tailored to the
particular issues that your Saudi interlocutors will likely
raise with you.
¶2. (C) You will be arriving six days after an Arab League
Summit in Doha. Despite the Saudis pulling out all the
diplomatic stops to ensure the summit conveyed publicly a
sufficient degree of Arab unity, Libyan leader Muammar
Qadhafi's eccentric outburst showed that deep fissures still
exist. This was the second such embarrassment in the past
three months showing the Arabs to be badly divided on
regional security issues after public disagreements at the
Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait in January.
U.S. Saudi Relations on the Mend
---------------------------------
¶3. (C) As you will hear, Saudi foreign policy calculations

are driven by a deep fear and suspicion of expanding Iranian
influence. While U.S.-Saudi relations have improved
dramatically since their post-9/11 nadir, differences remain
over U.S. Middle East policies. The Saudis have three
principal issues areas of concern about U.S. policies:
--(C) As the author of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, King

Abdallah risked his personal prestige to advocate a
comprehensive Middle East peace as the "strategic option" for
the Arabs, only to be frustrated by what he saw as U.S.
reluctance to engage over the next seven years.
--(C) Similarly, in the Saudi view, we ignored advice from

the King and Foreign Minister against invading Iraq. In the
words of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal,
"military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has tilted the
(regional) balance of power towards Iran."
--(C) Finally, the U.S. debate over whether and how to engage
Iran has fueled Saudi fears that a new U.S. administration
might strike a "grand bargain" without first consultating
Arab countries bordering the Persian Gulf.
Appointment of Prince Nayif

---------------------------
¶4. (C) Saudi King Abdallah issued a royal decree appointing

his half-brother, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin
Abdalaziz, as second deputy prime minister March 27. The
position had been vacant since Abdallah became King in 2005.
Though the previous two crown princes held Nayif's new
position prior to being formally tapped as heirs to the
throne, this appointment does not necessarily mean Nayif is
"Crown Prince in Waiting," because King Abdallah created a
committee -- the Allegiance Council -- to select the King's
successor.
¶5. (S) The King was likely driven by expediency. Crown

Prince Sultan is for all intents and purposes incapacitated,
and the King needed to travel abroad. Someone had to be left
in charge and Nayif, by virtue of his seniority among the
sons of Abdalaziz and his position as Minister of Interior,
was by tradition the leading candidate for the job.
Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayif (MBN) told the
Ambassador that his father's appointment should not be seen
in the light of succession, but as "an administrative
necessity."
Internal security
------------------
¶6. (C/NF) With our assistance, Saudi Arabia has largely

defeated terrorism at home. The Saudis are now arguably our
most important counterterrorist intelligence partner. They
established tighter controls on charities and the
transporting of cash to disrupt terrorist finance. We have
signed an Information Sharing Agreement with the Kingdom and
started to exchange Airline Passenger Information and
Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) data to help track terrorist
suspects and facilitate legitimate travel. We can say
clearly that Saudi Arabia is now part of the solution, not
the problem.
¶7. (S/NF) The Saudi leadership remains greatly concerned

about the vulnerability of its energy production facilities,
and has put MBN of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in charge
of efforts to acquire the capability to defend this key
infrastructure. He is looking primarily to the U.S. to build
this capability through an initiative formalized in May 2008
when Secretary Rice and Prince Nayif signed a TCA creating
the Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
We have established an inter-agency, DOS/DOD/DOE, security
advisory organization, the Office of Program
Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI), to implement this
bilateral security agreement. King Abdullah has made the
protection of Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure a top
security priority, with MBN fully empowered to achieve this
objective.
Rehabilitation Program
----------------------
¶8. (S/NF) We estimate that at least 1,500 former extremists

have passed through the Interior Ministry's rehabilitation
program for extremists (1,200 through the prison rehab
program and 300 through the care center), including 119
Guantanamo returnees, with an overall recidivism rate of 8-10
percent. Despite the front page treatment of former
Guantanamo detainee Sa'eed al-Shihri's appearance in Yemen,
the real story of the Saudi rehabilitation program is one of
success: at least 90 percent of its graduates appear to have
given up jihad and reintegrated into Saudi society. The
recidivists are the exception, not the rule. The Ministry
takes a dynamic approach to the rehab program and will look
for ways to strengthen it by learning from these incidents of
recidivism.
¶9. (S/NF) We know less about recidivism among non-Guantanamo

detainees since they were arrested here for activities inside
Saudi Arabia and as such their cases are an internal Saudi
matter. However we believe a small minority of these have
re-engaged in violent extremist activity, and MOI tells us
former Guantanamo detainees were harder to rehabilitate than
this other category.
The Peace Process after Gaza

----------------------------
¶10. (C) King Abdullah stated the Saudi position bluntly in

the opening session of the January Summit in Kuwait: Israel
should realize that the choice between peace and war will not
be available indefinitely, and the Saudi-authored Arab Peace
Initiative, currently on the table, will not remain there
forever. However, the Saudis have made no move to withdraw
the plan yet. Saudi and Arab public opinion have reacted
strongly to the Israeli offensive on Gaza, creating intense
pressure on Arab governments to act. The Saudis fear
instability and increasing Iranian influence could result,
and believe that there is a limited window of opportunity for
action.
Iran
-----
¶11. (S) Iran remains the strategic threat at the forefront of
Saudi security concerns. Senior U.S. officials visiting the
Kingdom recently have heard the King expound at length about
the great danger that Iran poses to the region. In general,
the Saudi leadership has begun to look at all regional
security issues through the prism of their fears about
growing Iranian influence. They see Iran's activities as
dangerously provocative, not only in Iraq, but also in
Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, parts of Africa, and southeast Asia.
King Abdullah met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki
earlier this month, and subsequently informed the NSC's John
Brennan that he had had a "heated exchange" with Mottaki,
upbraiding him that "Persians" have no business meddling in
"Arab" affairs and threatening that he would give Iran no
more than a year to repair its relations in the region.
Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin told Brennan the
"Shi'a crescent has become a full moon," implying that the
Saudis are surrounded by Iranian intrigues.
¶12. (S) On Iranian nuclear activities, the Saudi view is that

nations have the right to a peaceful nuclear program, but
that Iran does not have the right to do what it is doing.
The Saudis want to see a peaceful solution to the Iran
nuclear problem but they also want reassurance that Saudi
interests will be factored into any deal struck with Iran.
Afghanistan
------------
¶13. (S/NF) We have been encouraging the Saudi government to

be more active in support of the Karzai government, in
particular by helping to train, or to fund the training of,
Afghan security forces. Saudi Arabia has been helpful in
providing assistance, but we would like them to do more. One
area in which Saudi diplomacy has been forward leaning is in
offering to help mediate between the Afghan government and
the Taliban.
Pakistan
---------
¶14. (C) The Saudis are extremely concerned about Pakistan's

political fragility, and have worked hard, through their
embassy in Islamabad, to bring the Pakistani factions
together. Saudi relations with Pakistan have been strained
because the Saudis don't trust Zardari and see him and other
leading Pakistani politicians as corrupt. Zardari visited
Saudi Arabia last November for talks with King Abdullah on
Saudi support for the "Friends of Pakistan" initiative and
oil subsidies. The visit was an opportunity for Zardari to
persuade skeptical Saudis that he can be a trustworthy
partner in managing one of Saudi Arabia's most important
regional relationships, but his trip appears not to have
resulted in new Saudi assistance or other commitments. The
Saudis say they have been holding back economic and political
support pending evidence that the political situation in
Pakistan is stabilizing.
FRAKER
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV654, ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF
STATES FOCUS ON
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #0654/01 0781437

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191437Z MAR 09
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5680
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0904
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0651
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0930
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0001
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000654
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS ON
IRAN, PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON
REF: TEL AVIV 605
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle
East Yacov Hadas provided PolCouns March 16 with an overview
of Israel's relations with several of the Gulf states. Hadas
described Israel's relations with the Gulf as a function of
the Gulf Arabs' fear of Iran, but also as due to the Arabs'
belief in Israeli influence in Washington. Fleshing out some
of the points he had made earlier to NEA Acting A/S Feltman
(reftel), Hadas described Qatar's shift toward the radical
camp in the region as a "game" linked to Qatari rivalry with
Saudi Arabia. Hadas believes Qatar is feeling pressure from
Israel, Egypt and the Saudis, adding that he has been invited
to visit Doha for talks about how to resume normal
Qatari-Israeli ties. Hadas noted that while the Omanis are
generally correct in their dealings with Israel, they appear
not to recognize the seriousness of the threat from Iran. He
said that while the UAE is increasingly hostile to Iran, it
remains unclear how far they are willing to go in terms of
increasing financial pressures on Tehran. Hadas said the
Gulf Arabs feel that the U.S. does not listen to them and
therefore sometimes try to pass messages through Israel.
While he agreed that progress on the Palestinian track would
make it easier for the Gulf states to be open about their
ties to Israel, he cautioned that the Gulf states use the
peace process as an "excuse not to take action" against Iran
or in support of the PA. End Summary.
¶2. (C) PolCouns called on Deputy Director General for the

Middle East Yacov Hadas March 16 to follow up on Hadas' March
4 discussion with Acting A/S Feltman of Israeli-Gulf
relations. Beginning with Qatar, Hadas said there were signs
that various pressures on the Qataris were starting to have
an effect. Hadas noted that Qatar could only get its
humanitarian relief supplies into Gaza through Israel.
Qatari diplomats assigned to their Gaza consulate also had to
cross through Israel since Egypt would not allow them to
enter Gaza from Rafah. For now, the Israelis are not
allowing either Qatari assistance or personnel to cross into
Gaza. Hadas noted that he had been invited to visit Doha to
discuss reopening the Israeli trade office, which he saw as a
positive sign. He added that the Qataris needed to
understand that they could not expect to restore cooperative
relations with Israel without agreeing to reopen the trade
office.
¶3. (S) While Hadas was critical of the Qataris' treatment of

Israel since the Gaza operation, he stressed that he thought
Qatar's policies were not a matter of a shift in ideology
toward the radical camp, but linked to their rivalry with the
Saudis and, by extension, with Egypt. In private settings,
Hadas noted that the Qatari leadership harbored "no
illusions" about Iran. Prince Hamad had told the Israelis in
October 2006 that he believed Iran was determined to develop
a nuclear bomb no matter the cost. According to Hadas, Hamad
complained at the time that he felt the U.S. would not listen
to him and tended to believe what it heard from Iran.
¶4. (S) Hadas reiterated the point he had made to Feltman

regarding Oman, calling the Omanis the "most problematic" of
the Gulf states in terms of their view of Iran. With regard
to Omani contacts with Israel, Hadas said they were
"correct," but the Omanis never fulfilled their commitment to
open an Israeli office in Muscat. He said Oman has "its own
definition" of what poses a threat to the Gulf, partly due to
Oman's geographical location. He did not think Oman would be
willing to join the rest of the GCC against Iran.
¶5. (S) Hadas agreed that the UAE was increasingly hostile to
Iran, but there remained a question as to how far they were
prepared to go. The UAE has extensive trade and financial
relations with Iran, including money laundering, and it was
unclear whether they were ready to use these relations as
leverage. Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdallah has developed
good personal relations with Foreign Minister Livni, but the
Emiratis are "not ready to do publicly what they say in
private." (Note: It was clear from Hadas' remarks that
Israel's channel to Saudi Arabia does not run through the
Foreign Ministry.)
¶6. (S) Hadas said the Gulf Arabs believe in Israel's role
because of their perception of Israel's close relationship
with the U.S. but also due to their sense that they can count
on Israel against Iran. "They believe Israel can work
magic," Hadas commented. When considering a trilateral
U.S.-Israel-GCC partnership, Hadas suggested we bear in mind
that Iran's nuclear program is the primary source of concern
to the U.S. and Israel, while the Gulf Arabs also worry about
Iran for a host of historic and sectarian reasons.
¶7. (C) PolCouns noted that Arabs say that progress on the
Palestinian track would make it easier for them to publicly
engage Israel. Hadas countered that while peace with the
Palestinians is an Israeli interest and important in its own
right, it should not be the sum total of Israel's relations
with the Arab World. Arab League Secretary General Amre
Moussa had invented the "never-ending hurdle race" in which
Israel could never do enough to deserve a positive response.
The Israeli-Palestinian track should not serve as an excuse
for the Gulf to avoid action, whether against Iran or through
practical steps to support the Palestinian Authority.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI347, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE
REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI347
12:12 18:06 N Dhabi
VZCZCXRO9925
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAD #0347 0951254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051254Z APR 09
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR S, S/SRAP HOLBROOKE AND S/SAGSWA ROSS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: 03/24/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM MOPS IR AF PK AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP
HOLBROOKE
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a March 24 meeting with Special

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) expressed his grave
concerns about the Iranian threat to the region. MbZ said the
Iranian response to the Nowruz message was primarily for domestic
consumption, but that the Iranian leadership is concerned that
dialogue with the West represents a regime threat. He said Iran
would obtain a nuclear weapon unless the regime could be "split from
inside" before nuclear capability was achieved. Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed argued for continued Gulf consultation in
conjunction with any U.S. efforts to engage Iran. (Other topics
reported septel.) End Summary.
NOWRUZ STATEMENT
----------------
¶2. (S/NF) MbZ began by telling Amb. Holbrooke that Khamenei's

response to President's Nowruz statement was designed to send a
message to the millions of Iranians who saw the statement on the
Internet that there will be no debate on engagement with the United
States and/or the West. MbZ opined that Khamenei had to deliver the
message personally as an Ahmedinejad response would have fueled
domestic debate. Commenting that Khamenei was conveying Iran's
fundamental lack of trust in the United States, MbZ said the Iranians
want an apology "for everything from Carter to Bush." He added that
the uncharacteristic speed of Khamenei's response indicates the
extent of the perceived threat that improved relations with the West
might represent to the leadership's control over the country.
Specifically, the Iranian regime fears the United States will demand
the renunciation of its nuclear program, which would be politically
impossible.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS A CERTAINTY, UNLESS REGIME FALLS

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (S/NF) MbZ told Holbrooke he was "100 percent" convinced Iran will
complete its nuclear weapons program. He candidly stated his
personal belief that negotiations with Iran were irrelevant and a
military solution would only delay the program, not derail it. MbZ
said that there was a "third way" between these unacceptable options:
Iran is domestically very fragile, and the only way to prevent it
from acquiring nuclear weapons was to "split them from inside."
¶4. (S/NF) Turning to his concerns about an armed confrontation, MbZ

said war with Iran would only harm the UAE. He is deeply concerned
that the current Israeli government will initiate military action
without consultation. An Israeli attack on Iran would have little
impact on Iran's capabilities, but MbZ was certain Iran would
respond. MbZ argued that the leadership believes its own lies, which
were "proven" by Iran's success in Basra. Today's conventional
Iranian weapons would target the Gulf, while Iran continues to expand
its missile program with the hope of reaching the West.
CONSULT US
----------
¶5. (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
(AbZ) stressed the importance of a continuation of the P5 plus 1 plus
GCC plus 3 coordination on Iran. AbZ said that such consultation in
2008 "agitated" Iran, but sent a message to Russia and China and
European allies that the Gulf is seriously concerned about Iranian
hegemony. Iran's regional hegemony and nuclear program are two
issues that the West cannot tackle separately. AbZ noted that
countries in the region ("some friends") are concerned that the
United States, especially under the current administration, would
engage Iran at the expense of ties with the region. AbZ said the
President's Nowruz message supported this theory. He concluded, "The
more you engage Iran, the more you must engage the Gulf states."
(Ambassador Olson's comment: Abdullah's reference to "friends" was
Emirati politesse - the UAE is deeply concerned that we are preparing
to trade, and is interpreting the Nowruz greeting in that way.)
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message.

OLSON
Viewing cable 09AMMAN813, WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT,

JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09AMMAN813.
09AMMAN813 2009-04-02 05:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Amman
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020549Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
S E C R E T AMMAN 000813
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2029

TAGS: PREL PINR IR JO
SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
OF CAUTION
REF: A. STATE 25892

¶B. 08 AMMAN 3329
¶C. AMMAN 668
¶D. 08 AMMAN 3189
¶E. 08 AMMAN 2660
¶F. 08 AMMAN 3372
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for

evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S.
engagement with Iran. Jordan's leaders believe such
engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining
Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support
for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic
aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to
counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its
radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a
"two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes,
and making sure that Iraq's political and security
institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when
the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does
proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in
advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End
Summary.
Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian

officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose
tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and
undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional
moderates. Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and
Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian
territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant
to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region. While
Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will
convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they
can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that
make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its
championing of the Palestinian cause.
¶3. (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence

derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver"
while moderates are not. The main failure of moderates as
cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and
dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a
viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next
to Israel. The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle
East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way:
"Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking
advantage of helpless people." From Jordan's perspective,
the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to
final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to
deal with shared security concerns about Iran.
¶4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has
been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its
political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections.
The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having
benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street
enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the
Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008
described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won
last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that
put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the
Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the
only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by
extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand
over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah
lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for
continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison
d'etre and probably domestic support.
¶5. (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political

stability over the past year in particular have served
somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference.
The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national
rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader. During
the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM
Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to
appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni
Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential
bulwark against Iran (Ref B). Positive trends
notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress
that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense,"
and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could
be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).
Prepare for Iran to Disappoint

------------------------------
¶6. (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as

dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a
powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows
how to deal effectively with Iran. Foreign Minister Nasser
Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks
with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them
forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived
acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.
¶7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that
dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the
U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no
circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear
weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran,
or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives
won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David
Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would
have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless
thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would
pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).
¶8. (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director

of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted
that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in
inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels. He urged
the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after
the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest. They know where
they are going and what they are doing." He doubted there
would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June
elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be
practical due to religious and ideological considerations.
He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners,
many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.
Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out

---------------------------------------
¶9. (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian

leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab
interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.
Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a
stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and
reach their own separate peace with Tehran. King Abdullah
counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that
direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just
deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a
backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp. The Prime
Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform
the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict"
and that this strategy was already working with Syria and
Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in
September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that
the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a
hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange
for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).
¶10. (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging

Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the
King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake
both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be
done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F).
International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar
Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as
follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the
region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal
to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy
review. He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work
together to determine what deliverables are required from
Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also
to set clear redlines. (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying
to work with its friends in the region to develop a
joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize.
End Note.)
¶11. (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward

engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided
forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain
anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their
expense. Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional
ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing
benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited
and short-lived. Re-engagement could trigger a review of
Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like
Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last
year. When asked periodically whether by engaging with
Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,
official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets

with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively
engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged.
End Comment.
Visit Amman's Classified Website at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft
Viewing cable 09ASTANA677, KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT’S ANTI-

CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0008
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DE RUEHTA #0677/01 1121143

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221143Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1521
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1084
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0998
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2615
Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 11:43

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000677
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SOCI, KCRM, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
-- SWEEPING EFFORT OR SELECTIVE TARGETING?
REF: A. 08 ASTANA 0680 B. 08 ASTANA 1309
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kazakhstani authorities recently launched a well-publicized
anti-corruption campaign that has resulted in the arrest of several high-ranking
individuals, including the Minister of Environment and a Deputy Minister of
Defense, and in convictions of a number of others. The campaign appears to have
the full support of President Nazarbayev, who has repeatedly called on the
government and the ruling Nur Otan party to battle this “most serious evil.”
Political analysts and civil society leaders remain skeptical, however, that the
government’s clean-up efforts will bring permanent results. Most see the
campaign simply as evidence of a power struggle among elite groups within the
Kazakhstani government and doubt that any of the “biggest fish” will be
affected. END SUMMARY.
GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
¶2. (SBU) The Kazakhstani authorities recently launched a well-publicized anti-
corruption campaign that seems to be aimed at the higher echelons of the
government and has already brought down several senior individuals. Over the
past two months, the Agency for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption (also
known as the Financial Police) launched investigations against several
government officials on suspicion of corruption and abuse of power. The list
includes Minister of Environment Nurlan Iskakov and two of his deputy ministers,
the director of the Astana City Construction Company and one of his deputies,
the Chairman of the Water Resources Committee, and the Director of the Astana
Health Department. All of the officials have been removed from their positions
and are currently in detention or under house arrest pending the outcome of
investigations against them. Investigations have also been launched against
numerous mid-level officials and officials in local government, and two regional
governors -- for South Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan oblasts -- have been
replaced and are under investigation. In addition, on April 13, the Committee
for National Security (KNB) detained Deputy Defense Minister Kazhimurat
Mayermanov on suspicion of abuse of office (i.e., corruption) in connection with
government contracts with two Israeli defense firms to design and manufacture
new artillery systems.
¶3. (SBU) Several high-ranking government officials were charged or prosecuted
for corruption-related crimes in an earlier “wave” last year. In August 2008,
Yuriy Tleumuratov, the Chairman of the Financial Control Committee at the
Ministry of Finance, and Ruslan Yusupov, an office director in the same
committee, were arrested and charged with bribery and abuse of power. (NOTE:
Then-Tax Committee Chairman Nurlan Rahkmetov resigned shortly thereafter,
stating that ethics rules demand he share responsibility for the wrong-doings of
his subordinates. Some commentators suggested, however, that he had been
directly involved in the crimes. END NOTE.) In November 2008, Zhaksybek
Kulekeyev, the former chairman of the national railroad company Temir Zholy, was
convicted of accepting bribes and abusing his authority (see ref A).
¶4. (SBU) Perhaps the most high-profile official convicted of corruption-related
crimes is Serik Burkitbayev, the former head of KazMunaiGaz and a one-time
advisor to President Nazarbayev (see ref B). Burkitbayev was tried in a closed
trial and convicted on March 24 for abuse of power, misappropriation of
property, and embezzlement. His case, however, is surrounded by political
intrigue -- Burkitbayev was at one point a close associate of Rakhat Aliyev,
Nazarbayev’s exiled former son-in-law, and some press reports have suggested
that his conviction was the result of his links to Aliyev rather than his
corrupt dealings. Some media accounts claimed that Burkitbayev provided Aliyev
with the eavesdropping equipment he apparently used to record embarrassing
conversations among senior government officials which were later uploaded to the
Internet. Aliyev himself publicly criticized the conviction and vowed to bring
the attention of the international community to the case.
ORDER COMES FROM THE TOP
¶5. (SBU) The anti-corruption drive certainly has the highest backing. On April
1, President Nazarbayev commended Financial Police head Kairat Kozhamzharov for
his anti-corruption efforts and told him to continue the fight “irrespective of
people’s status and connections.” Nazarbayev has repeatedly called on the
government and the ruling Nur Otan party to battle this “most serious evil,” and
there is evidence that his words have been taken to heart. Following the
President’s criticism of the “corrupt state” of the Shymkent Medical Academy,
the Health Ministry reorganized it, shutting down all but three faculties and
transferring close to three thousand students to other institutions. The
Ministry of Interior (MVD) recently announced that in response to “goals set
forth by the President,” the Ministry will reorganize its hiring and promotion
processes to increase transparency. And the Ministry of Education publicly
committed to cleaning up corruption at schools and universities.
BIG FISH OR SMALL FRY?
¶6. (C) Despite the high publicity surrounding the round-up of corrupt
officials, independent analysts remain skeptical that the government’s clean-up
efforts will bring permanent results. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us on April 7 that
arrests of individual “wayward” officials will have little effect unless
systemic corruption -- “the gray economy in government services” -- is
addressed. Evidence of corrupt dealings could be dug up against numerous high-
level government officials, argued XXXXXXXXXXX, so the decision about which
officials to bring to justice becomes a purely political one. He predicted that
the campaign will bring down the level of corruption in the short-term -- “some
will think twice” -- but will have little effect on the system as a whole.
¶7. (C) Political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the recent convictions more as a
sign of intra-elite warfare than evidence of a concerted anti-corruption effort.
As evidence, he pointed to the cases of Kulikeyev and Burkitbayev, both of whom
XXXXXXXXXXXX believes were convicted on marginal evidence. XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the
anti-corruption effort as little more than a fight for property in uncertain
economic times -- “the accused are the unlucky losers.”
¶8. (C) Civil society activist XXXXXXXXXXXX also describes the discredited
officials as “the weak links in the chain” and believes that the “real sharks”
are continuing to operate with impunity. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the criminal
investigations themselves are hardly transparent and some, like the
investigation against former Vice Minister of Environment Alzhan Braliyev, are
border-line illegal. (NOTE: A contact of our Public Affairs Section who knows
Braliyev personally questioned the veracity of the evidence against him and
maintained to us that he is “taking the fall” for his boss, former Minister of
Environment Nurlan Iskakov. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that several of Bralieyev’s
associates and friends are coming together to fund his defense. END NOTE.)
XXXXXXXXXXXX ascribed the recent “fury of activity” to new management at the
Financial Police. Kozhamzharov was appointed in December 2008 and was given what
XXXXXXXXXXXX believes were express orders from President Nazarbayev to clean up
the government, “within reason, of course.”
OPPOSITION LEADERS SEE EFFORTS AS “FUTILE”
¶9. (C) Key opposition leaders also voiced skepticism about the efficacy of the
anti-corruption efforts. XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the campaign as “selective
punishment” that will not touch the highest echelons of the government.
XXXXXXXXXXXXdescribed it as a power struggle between leading elite groups “with
corruption used as an excuse.” XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the campaign was
aimed at eliminating the competition of Nazarbayev son-in-law Timur Kulibayev,
who XXXXXXXXXXXX believes has been selected as his successor. (COMMENT:
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view appears to be a bit off base, since Kulibayev’s strongest
competitors as potential Nazarbayev successors -- such as Astana Mayor Imangali
Tasmagambetov -- have not been affected by the anti-corruption campaign. END
COMMENT.) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Kazakhstan’s endemic corruption problems can
only be addressed through appropriate changes to legislation -- “all else is
futile.”
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Corruption is endemic among Kazakhstani officialdom, as it is
across the CIS. Blessed with strong tax revenues, government salaries are high
in Kazakhstan compared to its neighbors -- for example, Prime Minister Masimov’s
salary is over $50,000 a year -- but most senior officials live lifestyles that
require much higher incomes. In many instances, they receive profits from
businesses registered in the names of their spouses or other relatives. In other
cases, they’re stealing directly from the public trough. The officials taken
down by the anti-corruption campaign are thus just a tiny fraction of those with
dirt on their hands. The ongoing anti-corruption campaign does appear to be
targeting some officials who have gone too far -- and don’t have adequate
protection from above to ward off the law enforcement authorities. In other
cases, however, it seems likely that officials no more corrupt than any one else
have been targeted by rivals taking advantage of the anti-corruption campaign to
bring them down. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD1103, IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR

PRESSURING IRGC-QF
Discussing cables
09BAGHDAD1103 2009-04-24 16:04 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1103/01 1141618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241618Z APR 09
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR

NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2029

TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MOPS ECON ETRD IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF
REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150

¶B. 07 BAGHDAD 488
¶C. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds

Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting
traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as
well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian
economic and cultural outreach. Iraqis and their government
have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against
malign Iranian influence in the last year. Working with the
Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity
through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while
we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through
explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally.
However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1,
all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral
warnings carry less weight. As Coalition Forces continue the
period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on
the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF. We intend to
support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic
engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security
partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through
the ISF. End summary.
-----------
Background:
-----------
¶2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum

which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of
Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to
send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on
Iran. In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial
Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who
claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic
status. They were suspected of operations aimed at killing
Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B). The
original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni
(of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah
office), escaped and fled to Iran. The Iranian government
immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and
shuttered its "consulates" in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until
mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open.
Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications
for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq. In 2008 the
Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these
applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they
would be targeted by Coalition Forces.
¶3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians
applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting.
Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have
possible ties to the IRGC or Iran's Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS) (ref C). The MFA has informed us that it
denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but
we have not been able to verify such claims. In January
2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian
diplomats already in country before the vetting process
began. Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.
--------
Strategy
--------
¶4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible

draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands
that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be
self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign
activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
Engagements with political and security leadership at the
national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and
security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of
IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they
need to defend their own interests. The following are
diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public
information options which either the GOI can pursue
unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF
activity in Iraq.
---------
Diplomacy
---------
BAGHDAD 00001103 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA

to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers. We may also
consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool,
albeit one with more consequences -- the "persona non grata"
designation. The MFA may be reluctant to take this step
because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and
the dispute would inevitably become public. Since the fall
of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with
Iran.
--------------------
Security Partnership
--------------------
¶6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq

is critical, yet complex. We can encourage the Iraqi Army to
take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with
Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity
at the local level. We intend to continue to strengthen our
partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who
have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata'ib
Hizbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. While the US combat mission
will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring
and other bilateral military-to-military programs and
engagements. Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi
interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from
AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through
training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the
MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other
sources as well.
---------------
Border Controls
---------------
¶7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help

limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and
scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from
Iran into Iraq. While the DBE currently has a strong
commander, Major General Mohsen Abdul Hasan Lazim, corruption
at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to
do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the
supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective.
The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks
travelers' biographic data, is already in use at many land
and air POEs around Iraq. Additional training at sea ports,
airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect
smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other
contraband. An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained
at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his
name was flagged in PISCES. In January 2009, KRG's Minister
of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for
the system at two more land border entry points the KRG
shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.
¶8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in

operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq. Current guidance
states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is
processed through PISCES. On occasion however, travelers
will pay a small "fee" to enter or exit without going through
PISCES. If a potential match is found to someone on the
"stop list," the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the
screen and conduct a secondary inspection. INIS notifies the
GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed.
PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the
Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will
continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown.
Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated
Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay
in Iraq after their departure.
¶9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in

countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14. A
DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National
Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat
carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh.
The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)
and other military equipment. MND-S said it was the first
time the DBE had reported success against this type of
smuggling.
--------------------
Intelligence Sharing
--------------------
BAGHDAD 00001103 003 OF 003
¶10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to

stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the
Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented.
Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the
Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National
Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often
work in opposition. The USG could further assist Iraqi
intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral
US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further
providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the
involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to
extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive
relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing
appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also
assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence
infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and
counter the IRGC-QF. INIS currently interacts closely with
the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA). The establishment of a
Defense Attach's Office at the Embassy will also help
facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by
Chief of Mission.
-------------------
Public Information
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI
leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact
on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as
public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq's
political and economic sectors. Provincial elections
demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political
liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly
sensitive to it. Continued USG assistance in uncovering and
publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will
make the country a much more inhospitable environment for
IRGC-QF operatives.
-------
Comment
-------
¶12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown
of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to
expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional
dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision
making. Without the ability to conduct unilateral military
action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage
our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military
partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure. Many USG
agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this
critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter
IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid.
BUTENIS
Viewing cable 09BEIJING1176, XXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,

Discussing cables
09BEIJING1176 2009-04-30 13:01 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO3320
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1176/01 1201307
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301307Z APR 09
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034

TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health
Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on “one China,
very broadly interpreted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX working lunch hosted by
the Charge d’Affaires. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he would ask for appropriate meetings
in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit.
XXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming
visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-
engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended
period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran,
Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington and had told Tehran
that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in
the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, XXXXXXXXXXXX asked to see a list of items
that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given
that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.
¶2. (S) Summary Continued: XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s “core
interests” of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could “derail”
bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human
rights cases, to which XXXXXXXXXXXX replied with standard language about
Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China
of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; XXXXXXXXXXXX promised to
assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained
American journalists; XXXXXXXXXXXX said China would. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed
concern over building “momentum” on UNSC reform and asked the United States not
to be “proactive” on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences
regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate
General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each
other’s practical needs including residential leases and asked for
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXX
agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship
and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.
TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA

--------------------------
¶3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World
Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was “one step forward” toward
better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through
consultations based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said
at a XXXXXXXXXXXX working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. Cross-Strait
relations were “improving,” and as they did, China hoped the United States would
feel “less burdened, frustrated and nervous,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. The Charge
congratulated XXXXXXXXXXXX on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of
concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would
continue to take steps to increase mutual trust.
IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS

-------------------------------
¶4. (C) The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed on the importance of high-level
meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and
upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead’s
visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama
told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between
our two militaries forward. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that State Councilor Liu
Yandong’s visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been
productive. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Liu came away “very impressed” by her interaction
with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to “follow up” on the issues they
discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of
both countries.
¶5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo
Member and CCP Organization Department
BEIJING 00001176 002 OF 005
Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could
postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied
that the visit of Li, a “future leader of China,” was “very important,” so China
hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior
leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor
Liu. The Charge urged XXXXXXXXXXXX to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of
the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that
the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental
issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi’s visit as a type of “state visit,”
XXXXXXXXXXXX replied. Nevertheless, given her “tight schedule,” the Speaker
would likely “not have time” to visit Tibet, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
¶6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this
year,XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China
relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other
bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind,
both sides should be “careful” and act in ways that benefit the long-term
interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several
times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after
which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our
work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President’s visit
to China in mind.
G-20: DATES AND TOPICS

-----------------------
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that, XXXXXXXXXXXX he would ask to meet with NSC’s
Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate
meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the
next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.
¶8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had
been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted.
Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of
international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London
Summit, XXXXXXXXXXXX felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective:
Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence
Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.
¶9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX had succeeded in
boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial
institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation
period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman:
A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20
economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;
B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not “break
their promises as soon as they returned home”;
C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New
Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and
D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an
alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
¶10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that a stable U.S.
dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in “destabilizing the
system.” The system, however, was “not perfect and needs reform.” He said China
had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further,
XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR.
Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, XXXXXXXXXXXX
noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change.
¶11. (U) Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
will be reported septel.
VFM HE’S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK

---------------------------------------------
BEIJING 00001176 003 OF 005
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his
upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and
Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX hoped to hold “informal
consultations” in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not
just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to
discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our
common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to
engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a “spoiled
child” in order to get the attention of the “adult.” China therefore encouraged
the United States, “after some time,” to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this
regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, XXXXXXXXXXXX
observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen
Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, if the Six-Party
Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to
find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or
even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to
reinforce Pyongyang’s bad behavior.
¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in
Washington. Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington. China had
told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing
a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab
countries “jittery,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said, this should be a matter the United
States could “manage.” What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in
the region again.
¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The
Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money
for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors’ Conference, China still had an
opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and
Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for
U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the
proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.
TIBET AND TAIWAN AS “CORE INTERESTS”

------------------------------------
¶15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and
Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had
heard “rumors” that the Dalai Lama would attend a “seminar” in the United States
in late September or early October, and that President Obama was “likely” to
meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate
our respective positions on Tibet, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the critical question was
whether both sides would agree to “take care” of each other’s “core interests.”
When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral
relationship, they could be viewed either as “obstacles” or as “core interests.”
It did not matter whether one side “liked or disliked” such matters; rather, in
a “mature, close and important” bilateral relationship such as ours, the
question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The
United States had its core interests, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, such as U.S. naval
vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to “step
down” over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public.
Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa,
and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no
meeting with President Obama.
¶16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core
issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our
two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve
our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China.
Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate,
and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S.
officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were
serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the
situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address
Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in
productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being
contemplated.
BEIJING 00001176 004 OF 005
¶17. (C) Another issue that could “derail” relations was arms sales to Taiwan,
XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially
advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible “very
important” and “potent” arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters
and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a “very serious issue” for
China, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to
our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made
available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible
defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments
aimed at Taiwan.
HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG

---------------------------------------
¶18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status,
location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo
and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, as a sign of the
“maturity” of our bilateral relationship, he had “repeatedly” listened to our
concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled “according to
law” and in accordance with China’s legal/judicial system. Such cases were
“sensitive” and should be handled “carefully,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said, pledging that
he nevertheless would look into the cases “to the extent possible.”
NORTH KOREAN “GUESTS”

---------------------
¶19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from
China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assistance in doing so. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he would look into the
matter.
U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK

---------------------------------
¶20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American
journalists detained in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that the United
States could “rest assured” that China would do so.
UNSC REFORM
-----------
¶21. (C) China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security
Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China
wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be
“proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General
Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,”
XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States
would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to
accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the
Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do
not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States
believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and
openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while
no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent
membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council
that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN
budget.
COCA II: AVOIDING A “TRADE WAR”

--------------------------------
¶22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of
Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had
begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked XXXXXXXXXXXX to speak with the
appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done.
The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with
MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou
complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May
for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having
moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in
BEIJING 00001176 005 OF 005
Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties.

XXXXXXXXXXXX said this situation sounded like a “trade war.” The Charge asked
XXXXXXXXXXXX to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed real progress had been made and differences
narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not
want a “trade war” over COCA II issues. He pledged to “look into” the matter.
PICCUTA
Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS536, IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER BRIEFS
EU ON PRIORITY
Discussing cables
09BRUSSELS536 2009-04-08 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN USEU Brussels
VZCZCXRO2503
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBS #0536/01 0981223
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FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000536
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR P, S/SAGSWA, NEA/IR, ISN, EEB/ESC, S/CT, L, EUR,

INL
TREASURY FOR TFFC, TFI, OIA
EU POSTS FOR IRAN WATCHERS AND TFCOS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019

TAGS: ETTC KNNP PARM KTFN PTER EFIN KCRM KJUS KHLS
UNSC, IR, PINR, EUN, KPAL, KPAO
SUBJECT: IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER BRIEFS EU ON PRIORITY
TARGETS
REF: A. A. BRUSSELS 205

¶B. B. BRUSSELS 41
¶C. C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1468
¶D. D. BRUSSELS 101
Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 1.4 (b), (d),
(e).
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: During a March 2-3 visit to

Brussels, Daniel Glaser, Acting Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes,
assured an uncertain European Union that the United States
remains committed to the dual track approach to Iran and said
we would welcome additional EU designations targeting Iran's
proliferation and sanctions evasion activities. Delivering
an unprecedented classified briefing to over 70 Middle East
and nonproliferation experts from all 27 EU states and
institutions, Glaser encouraged the EU to move forward on
specific designations to support the current international
framework targeting Iran's illicit conduct through financial
measures.
¶2. (C) EU Member States and officials uniformly praised the

U.S. information-sharing on sanctions and the U.S. policy
review. Capturing the predominant sentiment, the Czech
Presidency expressed gratitude for AA/S Glaser's presentation
and confirmation that further EU measures "would be
consistent with the U.S. policy review" as a signal the EU
"are all waiting for, as this plays an important role in EU
considerations." However, some EUMS were uncertain whether
they should move forward on pending designations before the
completion of the policy review. During the briefing and on
its margins, member states' concerns emerged over national
economic interests, unintended consequences (e.g., hurting
average Iranians, sanctions efficacy, Iran's regional role,
lawsuits, and international unity). Glaser's separate
consultations with representatives from the Council
Secretariat and Commission, and Ambassadors of the Czech
Republic (Presidency), UK, France, Germany, Spain, and
incoming EU-Presidency Sweden are reported septel.
¶3. (C) The content, tone, and timing of AA/S Glaser's

briefing impressed an appreciative EU audience as a sign of
the new U.S. Administration's seriousness about engagement
with Europe. The EU is predisposed to respond positively to
the new Administration's policy on Iran and wants its views
taken into account during the policy review stage.
Glaser's presentation kept the good feelings going, but also
helped bring EU experts down to earth in terms of specific
tasks on which the EU could usefully focus now. We hope the
briefing provides a basis for further USG lobbying in
individual EU Member States in capitals on pending EU
designations. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
-------------------------------
U.S. Message: EU Should Act --
2009 The Critical Year
-------------------------------
¶4. (S) On March 3, the Czech EU Presidency convened a formal

meeting of the EU-27 Iran and non-proliferation experts
(COMOG/CONOP) to receive a classified briefing from a U.S.
interagency delegation led by AA/S Glaser on measures in the
financial and transport sectors to counter Iran's illicit
conduct. The session lasted a little over an hour (40 minute
presentation followed by 30 minutes of Q/A). Given intense
EU interest and in order to set the political context for the
detailed technical briefing on specific U.S. designations
that followed, AA/S Glaser noted that the U.S. policy review
on Iran had not yet finalized, but it was already clear that
BRUSSELS 00000536 002 OF 004
the USG would remain committed to a dual track approach to

resolving the nuclear issue. Consequently, the United States
would welcome EU actions now to reinforce existing UNSCRs.
The EU should act quickly to designate additional high
priority proliferation targets.
¶5. (S) To be sure, "engagement" would be an important aspect

of a comprehensive strategy to dissuade Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. However, "engagement" alone is unlikely to
succeed. Diplomacy's best chance of success requires all
elements combining pressure and incentives to work
simultaneously, not sequentially. Our shared challenge is to
work together in finding the right mix of measures. Time was
not on our side. The international community must urgently
choose between several bad options facing us in 2009; none of
these options were without cost. Glaser pointed out that the
dynamic nature of the international financial system required
that targeted financial sanctions against Iran must be
continually adjusted to maintain, let alone increase,
pressure on Iran. Over time, targeted Iranian entities were
finding ways to evade sanctions via front companies and
facilitators. Without continuous active management on the
part of the international community, the measures taken thus
far would be rendered merely symbolic gestures.
¶6. (S) Glaser stated that the EU had an important, but

time-sensitive, opportunity to help diplomacy succeed by
targeting illicit Iranian conduct that contravened UN
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The international
framework for moving forward was already in place, under the
auspices of the UNSCRs and the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). ; we should continue to support and operate within
this framework. Glaser urged the EU not to Underestimate its
influence on the actions of other key countries and regions.
Priority Designation Targets
-----------------------------
¶7. (S) AA/S Glaser's formal presentation provided U.S. views

and specific intelligence on financial and transport entities
under active EU consideration for designation, including Bank
Mellat, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), Bank
Saderat, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL),
and Iran Air (the only entity not yet U.S.-designated, which
AA/S Glaser explained remains a potential target).
Separately, several EU contacts found our case against Bank
Mellat, EDBI and shipping companies to be particularly well
formulated.
----------------------
EU Audience, Reactions
----------------------
¶8. (C) All 27 EU Member States (EUMS) attended the Czech

Presidency-hosted classified briefing on March 3 in Brussels.
Indicative of the EU's high level of interest, all but
Slovakia sent their capitals-based nonproliferation working
group ("CONOP") technical expert in addition to their Middle
East regional expert (mixture of capitals- and
Brussels-based). This was the first time the USG was
welcomed to address this combined EU expert working group,
which meets ad hoc to decide on revising EU nonproliferation
measures against Iran. Permanent institutional staff
covering Iran, sanctions, and nonproliferation attended from
the EU's Commission and Council Secretariat. The EU's
Situation Center (SitCen), the community's intelligence
coordination unit, also sent several representatives.
¶9. (C) Capturing the main sentiment in the room, the Czech
Presidency expressed gratitude for AA/S Glaser's presentation
BRUSSELS 00000536 003 OF 004
and confirmation that further EU measures "would be

consistent with the U.S. policy review" as a signal the EU
"are all waiting for, as this plays an important role in EU
considerations." The Czechs and several others noted that
U.S. information-sharing was conducive to closer
transatlantic cooperation on Iran policy, predicting this
would directly influence internal EU debate on pending
designations of entities and individuals supporting Iran's
proliferation.
¶10. (C) Betraying some smaller EU states' resentment of the

EU-3 countries' (UK, France, Germany) prerogatives within the
Council on Iran policy, Cyprus pointedly thanked the U.S.
delegation for sharing information with the entire EU "so all
can take an informed decision," rather than being asked to
take action through a "leap of faith" when some EUMS have
information but the rest do not. "We also welcome that you
are stressing the dual-track approach," Cyprus added.
(Comment: The Cypriot intervention notwithstanding, the
Czechs took considerable risk just in hosting the U.S.
presentation. The EU remains prickly over direct U.S.
participation in their internal discussions and processes,
particularly after the bitter divides over Iraq. The Czechs
suffered some pushback prior to the event. End Comment.)
¶11. (C) At the conclusion of the briefing, a handful of
smaller EUMS raised concerns routinely featured in the EU's
ongoing internal debate over next steps. (Note: The EU-3 and
Italy refrained from speaking during the briefing in apparent
deference to the rest of the membership who do not enjoy
routine access to U.S. senior Iran policymakers. End Note.)
Unintended Consequences?
------------------------
¶12. (C) Poland, Cyprus, and Portugal asked about the impact
of current sanctions against Iran on the elite, the broader
population, and the deteriorating economy. Is the U.S.
concerned that further moves could trigger an anti-Western
backlash? Could we target political elites without
victimizing or burdening the general population? While
expressing support for targeted measures, Portugal and Cyprus
worried that strengthening sanctions before Iran's June
presidential elections could prove counterproductive by
radicalizing the electorate and leading to Ahmadinejad's
re-election. Cyprus flagged comments by Iranian human rights
activist Shirin Ebadi against sanctions and stressed that it
want to encourage Iranian moderates. Portugal asked whether
the United States has considered Iran's role in the region,
e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East.
¶13. (C) AA/S Glaser concurred that these are all important
questions, but pointed out that the international community
must choose among a set of bad options in a very compressed
timeframe. The international community must convey an urgent
sense of seriousness -- both to Iran and to other interested
regional stakeholders in order to change strategic
calculations and maximize the chance of a diplomatic success.
By law, U.S sanctions target those engaged in illicit
conduct, including proliferation and terrorist financing.
Targeting the Iran's access to the international financial
system offers the best chance of reducing harm to the average
population.
¶14. (C) As to the impact of sanctions, Glaser noted that

disaggregating the effect of international sanctions and
Iran's own disastrous economic policies would be nearly
impossible. Moreover, sanctions must be examined in the
context of an overall policy approach and not in isolation.
A more useful indicator is the perception of Iran's
BRUSSELS 00000536 004 OF 004
decision-makers, who view sanctions as problematic, raising

business costs, and necessitating evasive behavior: the
elite are reacting as if sanctions are having an impact.
Russia and China?

-----------------
¶15. (C) The Netherlands asked for U.S. views on the roles of
Russia and China. Cyprus referenced the importance of P5 1
unity to ensure Iran did not circumvent sanctions and promote
efficacy, adding "UN backing is the best way." AA/S Glaser
agreed, but argued that we were already required to implement
existing UNSCRs. This situation demanded a nimble response
to changing conditions, including deceptive practices by
designated entities. The U.S. closely consults Russia and
China, who must play their parts.
What Should the EU Do? Will U.S. Answer the Mail?

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶16. (C) The Netherlands asked what the U.S. explicitly

wanted from Europe in the diplomatic ("political") track, and
whether we plan to respond to the Iranian President's earlier
letters (to former President Bush). AA/S Glaser referred the
Dutch to State on matters of diplomacy. On the sanctions
front, he noted that the U.S. policy review should not be a
reason for the EU to stop reviewing its existing sanctions
for appropriate next steps. Given the tight timeframe, it
would be helpful for the EU to make similar designations to
those already included under existing U.S. sanctions
authorities.
The Saderat Problem

-------------------
¶17. (S//NF) In his presentation, AA/S Glaser noted UNSCR

1803 and EU Common Position identification of Saderat for
proliferation concerns, but explained that our domestic
designation falls under U.S. counter-terrorism authorities.
Although not raised by Member States in the formal briefing,
several EU contacts (UK, France, Germany, Council Secretariat
and Czech Presidency) had raised concerns that the EU would
not be able to act upon the U.S. basis for designation of
Bank Saderat (support for terrorist activity). The EU Common
Position imposing measures against Iran is strictly limited
to proliferation as a legal basis for inclusion on the list.
Support for terrorist financing is not grounds for inclusion.
(Comment: As the additional U.S. information presented was
exclusively limited to terrorist financing concerns, some
EUMS are questioning whether a sufficient proliferation basis
exists for Saderat's inclusion under EU Iran sanctions. The
EU does not/not yet have consensus to include Saderat in the
next round. End Comment.)
¶18. (U) AA/S Glaser has cleared this message.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
MURRAY
.
Viewing cable 09CAIRO746, ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS

CHIEF SOLIMAN
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2019

TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PARM KPAL IS IR SO EG SU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points:
- (S/NF) During an April 21 meeting with Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Egyptian
General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman explained
that his overarching regional goal was combating radicalism,
especially in Gaza, Iran, and Sudan.
- (S/NF) On Gaza, Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian

attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and "stop" arms smuggling
through Egyptian territory.
- (S/NF) Soliman shared his vision on Palestinian

reconciliation and bringing the Palestinian Authority back to
Gaza, saying "a Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be
calm."
- (S/NF) On Iran, Soliman said Egypt was "succeeding" in
preventing Iran from funneling financial support to Hamas
through Egypt. Soliman hoped that the U.S. could encourage
Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and stop interfering in
regional affairs, but cautioned that Iran "must pay a price"
for its actions.
- (S/NF) Egypt is "very concerned" with stability in Sudan,

Soliman said, and was focusing efforts on convincing the
Chadean and Sudanese presidents to stop supporting each
others' insurgencies, supporting negotiations between
factions in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). "Egypt does not want a divided Sudan,"
Soliman stressed.
----
Gaza
----
¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said radicalism was the "backbone" of

regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza
posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national
security. Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian
attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling
through Egyptian territory. "Egypt is circled by
radicalism," he continued, expressing concern over
instability in Sudan and Somalia as well. Egypt's own
successful campaign against radicalism in the 1990s provided
a useful lesson in how to counteract extremist groups by
reducing their ability to operate and raise funds, in
additional to educating people on the dangers of extremism.
Soliman noted that only the Muslim Brotherhood remained and
the Egyptian government continued to "make it difficult" for
them to operate.
¶3. (S/NF) "We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame

public anger," Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict
put "moderate (Arab) regimes" in a corner. To prevent
another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on
Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between
Hamas and Israel. On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the
ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to
Gaza, as "Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm."
The problem, however, is that the PA cannot return to Gaza
without Hamas' acquiescence. Soliman said the PA must return
before the January 2010 Palestinian elections, or else Gazans
would be afraid to vote for moderates.
¶4. (S/NF) Stability in Gaza also depends on giving people a

more "normal" life, Soliman continued, saying Israel must be
convinced to regularly open the border crossings for
legitimate commercial activity. The current system - where
Egypt informs Israel of a humanitarian shipment and Israel
waits two days before accepting or rejecting the shipment for
transfer to Gaza - does not adequately meet people's needs.
¶5. (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman said he

expected the factions to return to Egypt on April 26 to
discuss his proposal on establishing a high committee
comprised of the various factions. The committee would be
responsible for preparing for the January 2010 elections,
monitoring reconstruction, and reforming the security
services in Gaza. On reconstruction, the committee would
issue licenses for companies eligible to participate on
projects, but the PA would decide who receives the money for
private and government contracts. Arab governments would
assist with reforming the security services and could base
security assistance out of Egypt. Soliman doubted that Hamas
would agree to the high committee, but said it was important
CAIRO 00000746 002 OF 002
to keep Hamas and Fatah talking, so they would not resort to

violence.
-----------------------
Iran, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Iran is "very active in Egypt," Soliman said.

Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a
month, but he said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing
financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt. Iran has
tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam
Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money
from reaching Gaza. Soliman said the Egyptian government had
arrested a "big Hezbollah cell," which was Hezbollah's first
attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt. Iran was also
trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he
claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza. So
far, he continued, Egypt had successfully stopped Hamas from
rearming. Soliman noted that in six months, MOD will have
completed the construction of a subterranean steel wall along
the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent smuggling. He warned,
however, that people will find an alternative to the tunnels
to smuggle arms, goods, people, and money. Admiral Mullen
expressed appreciation for Egypt's efforts to combat
smuggling, adding that he hoped Egypt felt comfortable enough
to ask for additional border security assistance at any time.
¶7. (S/NF) Egypt has "started a confrontation with Hezbollah

and Iran," Soliman stressed, and "we will not allow Iran to
operate in Egypt." Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear
message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will
interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun
recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria. Soliman hoped the U.S.
would "not walk the same track as the Europeans" in regards
to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on
one issue at time, like Iran's nuclear weapons program. Iran
must "pay the price" for its actions and not be allowed to
interfere in regional affairs. "If you want Egypt to
cooperate with you on Iran, we will," Soliman added, "it
would take a big burden off our shoulders."
-----
Sudan
-----
¶8. (S/NF) Egypt is very concerned with stability in Sudan,

Soliman said, but asked for the U.S. to be "patient" with the
Sudanese government and give Egypt time to help the Sudanese
government deal with its problems. He applauded the
appointment of Special Envoy Gration and recent U.S.
statements on Sudan. Soliman said Egypt was focused on three
areas for promoting stability in Sudan: 1) repairing the
relationship between Chadean President Deby and Sudanese
President Bashir and stopping their support for each others'
insurgencies 2) supporting negotiations between the various
factions in Darfur, and 3) implementing the CPA. Soliman
encouraged a larger role for French President Sarkozy in
mediating between Chad and Sudan. He said that Southern
Sudan "feels no benefits from unity," and Egypt is trying to
bridge the "physiological gap" between north and south itself
by providing humanitarian assistance. "Egypt does not want a
divided Sudan," he stressed. Admiral Mullen replied that
Egypt's leadership on Sudan was critical and looked forward
to increased cooperation between Egypt and Special Envoy
Gration.
------------------
Piracy and Somalia
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Admiral Mullen stressed that piracy was an

international crime that needed an international solution,
especially on support for trying captured pirates. The U.S.
did not want Somalia to become the next safe haven for
al-Qaeda after Pakistan, he stressed. Soliman replied that
there were not enough ships in the region to provide adequate
security against pirate attacks and recommended that the
international community, through the UN Security Council,
focus counter piracy efforts on the Somali shore.
¶10. (U) Admiral Mullen did not have the opportunity to clear
before his departure.
SCOBEY
Viewing cable 09CARACAS442, CUBAN MEDICAL PERSONNEL FLEE

VENEZUELA
Discussing cables
09CARACAS442 2009-04-06 21:09 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Caracas
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RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 7971
SIPDIS

EMBASSY BOGOTA FOR REF CORD (SHIGGINS)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO G/TIP (BFLECK)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2034

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KTIP VE CU
SUBJECT: CUBAN MEDICAL PERSONNEL FLEE VENEZUELA
CARACAS 00000442 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Fernandez,

Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Caracas notes a significant number

of Cuban medical personnel applying to be paroled into the
United States under the Significant Public Benefit Parole
(SPBP) for Cuban Medical Professionals outside of Cuba
(CMPP). During Consular Section interviews in March, Cuban
Medical personnel affiliated with Chavez's Barrio Adentro
program complained of poor working conditions, inadequate
medical supplies, and of constantly being watched and
monitored by coworkers. As result of the Government of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) clamp down on Cubans
attempting to flee the island through Venezuela, recent
asylum seekers have complained of having difficulty in
exiting Venezuela and being forced to pay exorbitant bribes
to GBRV officials when attempting to leave the country
en-route to Miami. End Summary.
-----------------------------
CUBANS DOCTORS FLEE VENEZUELA
-----------------------------
¶2. (S) The Consular Section at US Embassy Caracas began

accepting applications for SPBP on August 18, 2006. To date,
the Embassy has received paperwork and forwarded to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applications for 739
Cuban asylum seekers, of which 69% or 510 were approved, 91
were denied and 138 are pending. Since February of 2009, DHS
has notified Post that 73 Cuban Medical Personnel Program
(CMPP) applicants have been approved for parole through the
CMPP.
¶3. (S) In 2006 and 2007 Embassy Caracas facilitated travel

to Miami for program applicants through the issuance of
transportation letters authorizing Cubans to board US bound
aircraft. By October 2007, Venezuelan immigration officials
began refusing to board defecting Cubans on onward flights to
Miami in an unpredictable and ad-hoc manner. To enhance
fraud protection due to insecurity of the travel letter, (one
letter was used by an imposture), Post sought and received CA
approval to issue YY visa foils instead of transportation
letters. Having a visa foil in their passports has
facilitated the departure of most parolees. The Consular
Section began issuing YY visa foils in February 2009 to
approved Cuban Medical Parolees. Of the 73 approved CMPP
applicants in 2009, 43 have been issued YY visa foils, 39
have successfully passed through immigration and boarded
their flight to Miami, and two have confirmed plans to travel
in the near future. Thirty approved applicants have not yet
confirmed travel plans because they currently are unable to
travel, do not have the financial resources to leave
Venezuela, or have been forced to return to Cuba. Two
applicants were unsuccessful in their attempt to leave
Venezuela from the Barcelona (Venezuela) airport. Note: Most
CMPP applicants departing from the Caracas airport have been
successful in boarding their flight to Miami. Following the
approval of parole by DHS, CMPP applicants must enter the US
within 60 days. End Note.
-------------------------------
CUBAN MEDICS CLAIM MISTREATMENT
-------------------------------
¶4. (C) The majority of the CMPP applicants interviewed by

Post were originally conscripted to work in social programs
such as Mission Barrio Adentro, a GBRV sponsored program that
provides health care to city slums and rural communities, or
similar GBRV poverty reduction programs in medicine, sports,
and the arts. In its annual 2008 report, the Caracas based
human rights NGO PROVEA estimated that 14,345 Cuban medical
professionals were originally assigned to work in Venezuela
following the inauguration of Barrio Adentro in December
¶2003. Currently only about 8,500 Cubans are estimated to be
employed in social programs across the country. While some
CMPP applicants told Consular officials they volunteered to
come to Venezuela, many others have complained of being
forced (or directed) by Cuban authorities to work in
Venezuela under President Chavez's social mission programs
for a period of 1-3 years.
CARACAS 00000442 002.2 OF 003

¶5. (C) Many CMPP applicants have reported that upon arrival
in Venezuela, Barrio Adentro Mission officials have
confiscated the passports of program participants to prevent
their fleeing the mission. According to one applicant who
was interviewed on January 27, 2009, the coordinator of the
Cuban medical mission (Barrio Adentro 2, Aragua state) had
been holding his and his other colleagues' passports since
April 2008, when another Cuban had abandoned the mission, as
a "means of preventing other desertions." The applicant did
not receive his passport back until he went on a scheduled
vacation in September 2008 to Cuba. Upon his return to
Venezuela in October 2008 he was not required by mission
authorities to turn over his passport a second time. The
CMPP applicant received Significant Public Benefit Parole on
March 2, 2009, was issued a YY visa foil, successfully fled
Venezuela, and arrived in Miami on March 16, 2009.
¶6. (C) During Consular section interviews in March, Cuban

medical personnel affiliated with Chavez's Barrio Adentro
program complained of extremely poor working conditions, low
pay, limited medical supplies, and of constantly being
watched and monitored by co-workers. According to one doctor
who successfully fled on March 10, "All the effort I put into
my work is not recognized by anyone... I am not well paid and
only make 715 BsF (332 USD) a month in Venezuela, I want to
change my life." The doctor told Consular Officers that he
is forced to attend to 250-300 patients a week and "can only
use obsolete and inferior Cuban medicine". A rehabilitation
therapist who successfully fled on March 16 opined, "I feel
politically manipulated. The system is closing my chances
and I want to be a better professional. I have a lack of
equipment and medicine in my job. I want to be a free man.
I want to be a surgeon specialist." On March 30 one CMPP
applicant, who managed to escape his mission for several
hours and was clearly anxious to return before his supervisor
realized he was gone, told Poloff "They are always watching
us, checking in with us at random times, asking what we are
doing and calling us on our cell phones." While noting that
he has not received any physical threats so far during his
time in Venezuela, he commented "It is a psychological battle
that we must endure every day."
----------------------------------------
CORRUPTION, DESPERATION, GBRV CLAMP DOWN
----------------------------------------
¶7. (S) The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela (GBRV) began clamping down on Cubans attempting to
flee the island via Venezuela in 2007. While many applicants
have successfully fled Cuba through Venezuela, others have
been detained upon attempting to depart and presumably
deported to Cuba. Recent asylum seekers have complained of
having to pay exorbitant bribes (usually around 1,000 USD) to
Venezuelan customs officials when attempting to exit the
country en-route to Miami.
¶8. (S) As recently as March 24 a Cuban couple attempted to

board a flight from Barcelona (Venezuela) to Miami after the
US Embassy issued YY visa foils for their onward travel. The
couple paid over 4,600 USD to "a contact" to assist them in
clearing GBRV immigration. After their flight was delayed and
a shift change occurred at the airport, the couple was
questioned by Venezuelan immigration authorities who turned
them over to the National Guard. The military later
contacted Cuban officials. The couple was eventually moved
to a hotel by Cuban "security" and told they would be
deported to Cuba. The CMPP applicants later escaped their
captors and fled to the US Embassy, where a local contact
picked them up and reportedly took them into hiding. The
traumatized couple told US Consular officers the Cuban
"police" who detained them were also "Barrio Adentro Mission
officials". According to the female CMPP applicant, the
"Cuban police" threatened to rape her and beat up her
boyfriend. Note: Recent CMPP applicants have reported to
Consular Officers that after leaving Barrio Adentro,
occasionally some Venezuelans are willing to help Cubans who
are in hiding. Little is known about the individuals who
assist Cuban medical personnel once they abandon Chavez's
"missions." End Note.
¶9. (S) Comment: Due to the risk CMPP applicants have of

being stopped by GBRV authorities prior to boarding Miami
CARACAS 00000442 003.2 OF 003
bound aircraft, some Cuban parolees have considered (or are

considering) undertaking a cross border overland trip to
Bogota. While Post does not advise parolees on which route
(if any) is less risky, the issuance of YY visa foils by Post
has reduced the probability of GBRV immigration officials
detecting a parolee prior to his or her departure. Post
believes, however, that it is only a matter of time before
GBRV immigration officials become alert to the YY visa foils
and are able to further tighten the GBRV's clamp down on
Cubans planning to abandon the social missions and flee the
country. With the February approval of 73 applicants by DHS,
(over 25 applicants have been issued YY visa foils in the
past two weeks alone), and more cases pending approval, Post
continues to meet the demand of Cuban medical personnel
hoping to flee Venezuela rather than face the prospect of
returning to Cuba. End Comment.
Viewing cable 09LONDON860, CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER ON

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
Discussing cables
09LONDON860
15:03 23:11 N London
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00
DODE-00 DOEE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 EAP-00 DHSE-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 FO-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 NSCE-00
NIMA-00 PM-00 GIWI-00 SCT-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00
SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 NCTC-00 ASDS-00 CBP-00 R-00
SCRS-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 SCA-00 SAS-00
FA-00 SWCI-00 /000W
------------------50B38D 091507Z /38
P 091551Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND SCA
EO 12958 DECL: 04/06/2019

TAGS MARR, PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK, AF, IN, UK
SUBJECT: CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER ON AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
REF: LONDON 720

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Richard LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met April 3 with British Conservative Party leader
David Cameron and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne to offer an overview of USG
policy in the region and to urge HMG (under possible future Conservative
leadership) to engage more on Pakistan and to use British influence more
effectively to help tackle corruption, underpin democratic institutions and
civil society, as well as encourage greater Pakistani military attention to its
western border with Afghanistan. Cameron characterized the large population of
British Pakistanis with strong expatriate ties to their home country as not pro-
Taliban but certainly radicalized by the Iraq war and militant about Kashmir; he
also criticized HMG’s counter-radicalization strategy with UK Muslims. Cameron
agreed that HMG needed to get UK-Pakistan relations “right” and broadly agreed
that any request to a Conservative-led UK government for British troop increases
in Afghanistan would likely find the Conservatives, in line with their current
policy, receptive but seeking conditions. End summary.
UK Should Play a Larger Role

----------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Special Representative Ambassador Richard Holbrooke discussed U.S.

and UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan April 3 with Conservative Party leader
David Cameron and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne. Charge and Poloff McNicholas
attended the meeting, as did Cameron’s Chief of Staff Ed Llewellyn. Holbrooke
gave an overview of the challenges that the UK and U.S. faced in the region and
stressed the need to pay more critical attention to Pakistan in order for us
collectively to combat terrorism and radicalization and to strengthen democratic
institutions there. Noting the striking connections between the UK’s large
Pakistani community and its home country (e.g., the large number of flights and
remittances between the two countries and abiding ties between
families/communities in the UK and Pakistan) and the strong influence Britain
continues to enjoy in Islamabad, Ambassador Holbrooke urged Cameron to
capitalize on this -- should the Conservatives come into power -- and exercise a
stronger role for the UK in Pakistan. Foreign Secretary David Miliband had
played a positive role in the recent Zardari-Sharif crisis and there were more
opportunities for the UK to examine its relationship with Pakistan and use its
influence more effectively. One means, Holbrooke said, was to focus on
increasing UK assistance to Pakistan. Holbrooke stressed that the fight against
corruption in Pakistan was critical as average Pakistanis considered corrupt
leaders more of a concern than the Taliban.
¶3. (C/NF) Additionally, Holbrooke underscored that it was crucial for Pakistan
to focus troops on its western border region; after the Mumbai terrorist attack
the GOP had shifted 7,000 troops east to the border with India and had not yet
redeployed them to tackle the more serious cross-border activity on the border
with Afghanistan. He added that one objective of his and Admiral Mullen’s trip
was to chip away at the mistrust between the two countries.
UK Pakistani Community: Not Taliban, but Radicalized

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶4. (C/NF) Cameron, whose Conservative Party currently has a significant lead in
UK opinion polls (see reftel), indicated that his foreign affairs team was
thinking constructively about Afghanistan and Pakistan and preparing a
Conservative government policy for the region. He and his shadow cabinet were
focused on asking “constructive” questions in Parliament, and his party was
keenly interested in President Obama’s strategy for the region. Cameron noted
that most of the approximately one million UK citizens of Pakistani origin
(mostly Punjabis and Kashmiris) living in the UK were not pro-Taliban but had
been radicalized by the Iraq war and were militant over Kashmir. The
Conservative Party leader agreed that HMG “must get UK-Pakistan relations right”
and stressed the Conservatives’ commitment to this goal should they assume power
in the next election.
¶5. (C/NF) On the radicalization of British Pakistanis, Cameron said the UK had
“gotten it wrong domestically,” and was critical of the UK government’s
“Prevent” counter-radicalization pillar (part of HMG’s broader CONTEST
counterterrorism strategy). He argued that PM Brown’s policy had been too
willing to engage with radicalized but non-violent Muslim groups. Cameron argued
that there should be no difference and that both groups should be treated the
same and sanctioned if they advocated violence. “We let in some crazies,”
Cameron said, “and didn’t wake up soon enough.” Cameron singled out XXXXXXXXXXXX
as groups that the government should not be dealing with as conduits to the
Muslim communities.
Conservatives Would Entertain More UK Troops

--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Cameron said that if the Dutch and Australians were to reduce their
military presence in 2011, the Conservatives (when in government) could be
expected to fashion a policy along the lines of the questions they had been
posing to PM Brown in Parliament; that is, to be responsive to requests for
increased troops if other conditions were addressed, such as the provision for
more helicopters and a clear strategy for continued UK engagement in
Afghanistan.
¶7. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke cleared this cable.

ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1108, WAITING AND WATCHING: NORTH

KOREA AFTER CURRENCY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2039
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1108/01 1191330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291330Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
CSE C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000004
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION

TAGS: PREL RU UNSC KNNP KN
SUBJECT: WAITING AND WATCHING: NORTH KOREA AFTER CURRENCY
REFORM
REF: 09 SHENYANG 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. For

Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On December 15, EAP DAS David Shear and ConGen
staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a major player
here in Chinese-North Korean economic exchanges. XXXXXXXXXXXX
attributed the DPRK,s recent currency reform to several
factors: controlling rampant inflation, preventing 'hot
money' flows, leveling the wealth gap between workers and
traders, controlling domestic currency, and most importantly,
uncovering potential political opposition. As a result of the
reform, commerce has come to a halt. The leadership, as part
of an ambitious 2012 development strategy, hopes for the
restoration of relations with the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
believes that current plans assume Kim Jong-il will be around
for some time and that Kim Jong-un will be his successor. The
recent recall of DPRK scholars, students and scientists from
China following the defection of a North Korean exchange
student, for example, suggests increasing levels of paranoia.
END SUMMARY.
GIVE ME GOOD REASON

-------------------
¶2. (S/NF) On December 15, EAP DAS David Shear and Consulate
Shenyang staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX visits
Pyongyang frequently. Admitting he is unsure of the exact
value of Chinese investment into North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
the number to be many billions of renminbi. Chinese
companies, like their ROK counterparts, use North Korea as a
processing zone, primarily in the mining and seafood
industries. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK leadership's 2012
target for achieving 'strong-country' status should form the
principal basis for analyzing recent political developments,
including the currency reform measure.
¶3. (S/NF) The most important reason for the recent DPRK currency
reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is to uncover political opposition,
particularly against Kim Jong-il's younger son. Controlling
inflation, leveling the wealth gap, controlling domestic
currency and access to foreign currency, are all part of this
strategy. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the third son, Kim Jong-un,
favored the currency revaluation, and that going forward Kim
Jong-un leans toward a Vietnamese-style of economic reform.
Opposition to the currency exchange, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, might
reveal who opposes the ascension of Kim Jong-un to
leadership. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kim Jong-il's support of the
currency reform points to his favoring the third son; those
opposing the revaluation, also oppose the third son. XXXXXXXXXXXX drew
parallels to the 2009 nuclear tests, which he said were
also influenced by succession plans. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the first
son, Kim Jong-nam, opposes his younger brother's reform
plans and favors a Chinese-style of economic opening.
¶4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the number of factions competing for Kim
Jong-il's attention have made it increasingly difficult for
Kim Jong-il to listen to anyone. As a sign of Kim Jong-il's
paranoia, he recently recalled all students, scholars, and
scientists in China following the defection of an exchange
student in Northeast China. He did this despite the need for
Chinese knowledge, production skills, and technology to
achieve the country's goals for 2012. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
that current instability will settle and the government will
move ahead with reform, fully expecting Kim Jong-il to be
around for sometime to come. The reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, may
not be toward a more open economy. Rather, with currency
reform giving the regime the ability to control domestic
currency, reforms will lead to tighter control over the
economy.
¶5. (S) Prior to revaluation, one dollar equaled 3500 won. To

put that in perspective, the average worker in Pyongyang
earns 3000-4000 won per month. XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that according to
the DPRK Embassy, the official exchange rate following reform
is now one dollar equals 129 won. For the common person,
SHENYANG 00000004 002 OF 002
besides suffering from a significant cut in won-based

savings, supermarkets and department stores that deal in won
have suspended activity as they wait to see what impact
currency reform will have on commodity prices. Thus, it has
become difficult to purchase day-to-day needs. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed
out, if commodity prices rise, the economy will be ruined.
However, if prices settle as a result of reform, and assuming
constant wages, the economy will be okay as workers once
earning one dollar a month will now earn nearly 20 dollars.
¶6. (S) Traders, who earn many times more than the average
wage-earner, have been unaffected by the reform in monetary
terms, as savings are held mostly in euro and dollars. Since
the revaluation, only stores dealing with foreign exchange
have been open and prices in these stores have increased
400-500 percent. For example, a TV that cost RMB 4000 now
costs RMB 20,000. Many of these stores raised prices in
anticipation of the reform, with the expectation that prices
would then fall. However, prices have not fallen. Many of the
stores that raised prices prior to reform have since been
closed by the government, their goods confiscated. Thus, even
traders who have not lost money from revaluation now have
nothing to buy. Chinese traders along the North Korean border
have also been affected by currency reform even though most
trade is done in euros and dollars. As is the case within
North Korea, people are waiting and watching to see what will
happen to prices. In the meantime, nobody wants to sell
anything.
NOT A CRISIS YET BUT CLOSE

--------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX does not believe the DPRK is in crisis mode at this
time. As he said, the people are used to this sort of thing.
He saw the currency reform as being part of a broader
conflict within the government as it moves forward in the
next several years. Since 2002, the DPRK has allowed some
economic reform, without expressing strong support or
opposition. As he put it, the government has been waiting and
watching to see what would happen.
CHINA, the U.S., and EVERYTHING

-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said many in the DPRK believe the Chinese do not
understand their country. While neither the Chinese nor the
DPRK are likely to criticize the other in public, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that in private the DPRK has disparaged the Chinese for not
including North Korea on its list of 147 tourist destinations
or 137 investment destinations. These omissions and the
disparate Chinese actions on regional development projects
clearly indicate that North Korea is not a priority for the
Chinese. For instance, while China recently elevated the
long-beleaguered Changchun-Jilin-Tumen River development plan
to a national level project, the DPRK left the Tumen River
Development Plan, as it sees no benefit (REFTEL). Relations
between the two countries were getting so bad, in fact,
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang two months ahead of
schedule.
¶9. (S/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, North Korea has set an ambitious

target of developing a strong country by 2012. As part of
this project, it is planning to build 100,000 residential
apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. In order to encourage
Chinese investment, the DPRK is offering Chinese investors
mining and ocean rights for their injection of cash into the
project. A former Consul General of the North Korean
consulate in Shenyang, recently spent two weeks in Beijing
attracting about RMB 12 billion for this project and planned
to come to Shenyang following his time in Beijing.
¶10. (S) Restoration of relations with the United States is

another important part of the DPRK's reform plans. He said,
however, that North Korea looks forward to an ongoing cycle
of ups and downs in negotiations and that it counts on the
U.N. to be slow in implementing sanctions. As he said, he
believes that once things settle down, North Korea will show
China and the U.S. "its bottom card."
WICKMAN
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1111, FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE
DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH
Discussing cables
09MOSCOW1111 2009-04-29 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO2069
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #1111/01 1191349
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291349Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 001111
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KACT IR RS
SUBJECT: FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN WITH
CODEL LEVIN
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. Foreign Minister Lavrov told visiting Codel

Levin April 15 that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. Noting that Moscow was waiting for concrete
proposals, including specific language, from the U.S. on a
post-START treaty agreement, Lavrov said he recognized that
the U.S. would not want to address the link between offensive
and defensive weapons in the post-START negotiations, but it
would be important to have such a dialogue in the future.
Russia was interested in developing a joint missile defense
system (MD) with the U.S., but we should start "from
scratch," with joint threat assessments, determination of
necessary resources, and best location for MD assets. Lavrov
rejected a quid pro quo in which the U.S. would discontinue
its MD plans for eastern Europe in exchange for Russia
pressuring Iran to end its nuclear weapons program,
emphasizing that each issue should be considered separately.
He acknowledged that Moscow was concerned about Iran's
longer-range missile development and said Russia would be
prepared to undertake a "dual-track" approach towards Iran's
nuclear program; offering incentives to Tehran, but keeping
in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework. He
reconfirmed that Moscow had suspended the sale of S-300's to
Iran "for the moment." In a follow-on meeting, DFM Sergey
Ryabkov stressed that while Russia was interested in working
with the U.S. on MD, it would be difficult for Russia to join
a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland and the Czech
Republic, and urged that if the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities. Ryabkov
emphasized that "no one can deliver Iran to the U.S., except
the U.S. itself," and argued that, while the S-300 sale was
"frozen," the "less Moscow heard from Washington about it,
the better." End summary.
¶2. (C) In a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in

Moscow April 15, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Carl Levin (D-MI), together with SASC members Bill
Nelson (D-FL) and Susan Collins (R-ME) emphasized that they
were united in their hope that the U.S. and Russia could
strengthen their cooperation to address common challenges.
Noting the Senate's Constitutional role in ratifying treaties
and providing advice and recommendations on foreign policy
issues to the President, Senator Levin raised missile defense
(MD) as an issue that had divided the two countries, but
should unite them. He suggested that if Russia and the U.S,
could work together on MD, it would send a powerful message
to those who might threaten us, including to Iran.
¶3. (C) FM Lavrov welcomed the Senators' visit, and noted that
it was timely, coming two weeks after the first meeting
between Presidents Obama and Medvedev. He highlighted the
important role "Parliaments" play in building constructive
relationships and expressed the hope that the U.S. and Russia
could overcome the "inertia" that had characterized the
relationship in the past.
Arms Control, NPT

-----------------
¶4. (C) Lavrov said that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. The U.S.-Russia agenda was positive, even though
we had differences. Moscow hoped the U.S. Administration
would submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for
ratification, and would reconsider sending the "123"
Agreement to the Hill. He welcomed President Obama's remarks
supporting nuclear weapons reductions, saying that such
reductions were not just a matter of security for the U.S.
and Russia, but carried a political message that would be
important for the 2010 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). While characterizing the elimination of nuclear
weapons as "a noble goal," Lavrov said it was not "an
immediate project." We needed to have some clear proposals,
which would give others a clear idea of the way forward. He
suggested that the next stage after the post-START
negotiations should consider how to engage others, such as
the UK, in discussions of further reductions, as well as
looking at tactical nuclear weapons.
¶5. (C) There was "a lot to do" on non-proliferation issues,

Lavrov said, including Iran and North Korea. Pakistan was a
concern, and we should think about engaging them as well as
India and Israel. The U.S. and Russia had cooperated to
MOSCOW 00001111 002 OF 005
address the danger of non-state actors acquiring nuclear

material though programs such as the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UN Security Council Resolution
¶1540. The U.S. and Russia should also look at ways to
strengthen the NPT regime, including how to universalize the
Additional Protocol. We should also work on issues like fuel
supply, the Nuclear Fuel Center Russia had started, and
programs like the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
Post-START
----------
¶6. (C) Lavrov expressed appreciation for the Senate's

confirmation of Rose Gottemoeller as A/S for VCI, noting that
the U.S. and Russia had a lot of work to do to achieve a
follow-on agreement to the START Treaty. The issue would be
discussed at the meeting between DVBR Director Anatoliy
Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller in Rome on April 24, as well as
in his meeting with the Secretary in Washington in May. The
teams would report to the Presidents in July, and hope to
reach a framework agreement by the end of the year. He said
that while the Presidents in their statement April 1 had
endorsed reductions below the Moscow Treaty limits and had
agreed to use many of the verification procedures of the
START Treaty, Moscow was waiting for more concrete proposals
from the U.S., including specific language.
¶7. (C) Lavrov highlighted the April 1 Joint Statement's

reference to the link between offensive and defensive
weapons, saying that the balance between the two that had
existed in the Soviet Union had been thrown off kilter when
the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. He stressed that he
recognized this did not mean the U.S. would support
addressing the linkage during the post-START negotiations,
but it was important to have a discussion on it at some point
in the future.
Missile Defense and Iran

------------------------
¶8. (C) Senator Levin said the SASC was interested in
exploring the possibility of U.S. and Russia working together
on MD. The U.S. was focused on the threat from Iran, but he
recognized that Russia may have a broader perspective.
However, we were both opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, which
would be able to put pressure on other countries in the
region. The U.S. also perceived the possibility of an
Iranian long-range missile as a threat. He noted that press
reports indicated that Medvedev had told Henry Kissinger and
the Hart-Hagel Commission that he was concerned that the
Iranian nuclear program was more of a threat than Russia had
previously believed. (Lavrov emphatically corrected this,
saying Medvedev had expressed concern about Iran's missile
launch). Noting that the U.S. had made commitments to Poland
and the Czech Republic, Senator Levin said the U.S. would
need to consider how to keep those commitments and include
Europe in a common MD program with Russia.
¶9. (C) Agreeing that MD should unite the U.S. and Russia,
rather than divide us, Lavrov said Russia was interested in
developing a MD system with the U.S., but the U.S. proposals
for an MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic ("3rd
Site"), disrupted the balance between the U.S. and Russia's
nuclear potential. He stressed that then-President Putin's
Kennebunkport proposal for a cooperative MD effort using
Russian resources, joint analyses and determinations of the
threat, and data exchange centers, was still on the table.
He welcomed President Obama's statement that if the Iran
nuclear issue were resolved satisfactorily, there would be
less need for the 3rd Site, but took care to emphasize that
Russia did not support a quid pro quo between Russia helping
to get Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and the U.S.
discontinuing its deployment in eastern Europe. These two
issues should be dealt with separately, on their own merits,
Lavrov stressed.
¶10. (C) Noting that the Congressional Budget Office had

presented three alternatives on the MD project, Lavrov said
this showed there were issues with the proposal. Hastening
to add that Russia did not endorse any of the three
alternatives, Lavrov commended the Administration's intent to
review them, noting this was the difference with the new
Administration: it was willing to listen and take the time to
analyze the alternatives, instead of saying "this is what
MOSCOW 00001111 003 OF 005
must be done; everyone must say yes sir."
¶11. (C) In response to Senator's Levin question why Russia

was not more concerned about Iran's missile capabilities,
since Russia was closer to Iran, Lavrov said Moscow was "not
complacent; we are closer." But whenever Russian negotiators
had protested to the U.S. side that the proposed radar could
cover Russia up to the Urals and the interceptors could reach
Russian territory, the U.S. response had simply been that the
system "was not aimed at Russia." As Medvedev and Putin had
said, "when there is something risky on the ground, you need
to take it into account." Russia had warned it would need to
take countermeasures if the 3rd site was deployed, and that
it would put missiles in Kaliningrad. Noting that Moscow
would announce soon just how much it had withdrawn from
Kaliningrad, Lavrov said he hoped the U.S. and Russia could
find common ground on MD.
¶12. (C) Lavrov cautioned that Russia did not perceive Iran in
the same way as the U.S. Iran for Russia was "much more than
a country which might cause concern in the international
community." Russia opposed Iran getting a nuclear weapon,
because Russia did not want any more "members of the nuclear
club," but Iran and Russia were historical and traditional
partners and neighbors, with a "rich bilateral agenda."
Lavrov said he was certain Iran wanted to have a full nuclear
fuel cycle and would negotiate from that basis. It was
unfortunate that the U.S. had not accepted the proposals a
few years before when Iran only had 32 centrifuges; now they
had over 5,000. Nonetheless, Russia wanted Iran to cooperate
fully with the IAEA and implement, and eventually ratify, the
Additional Protocol. As agreed to in the E3-plus-3
statement, Russia wanted Iran to prove the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program, in a verifiable way.
¶13. (C) Lavrov commended the new U.S. approach to Iran,

welcoming President Obama's readiness for the U.S. to engage
"fully" in talks with Iran. Willingness to discuss "all" the
issues was a welcome step, and one which Russia had been
advocating for several years, Lavrov said. Iran wielded a
lot of influence in the region, including on Afghanistan,
Iraq, Hizbollah, Hamas, Gaza, etc. Iran had long been
concerned about Israel, and saw Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons
competitor. Putin had asked Ahmadinejad during a meeting in
Tehran a few years before why he made such anti-Israeli
statements, but Ahmadinejad had not responded, only saying
that Iran was "not doing anything in the nuclear sphere
different from Brazil." Putin had replied that Brazil was
not in the Middle East. While Iran wanted to dominate the
region and the Islamic world, which was of concern to Arab
governments, the U.S. should realize that the "Arab Street"
considers Iranian leaders to be heroes.
¶14. (C) Noting that Russia was watching events in Iran

closely, Lavrov said Moscow would be prepared to undertake
the "dual-track approach," first offering incentives to Iran,
but keeping in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework.
The Administration's new approach "give us a much better
chance than we had in the past. We will do everything we can
to make it work," Lavrov said.
¶15. (C) Senator Nelson said he was encouraged by the FM's

remarks, noting that it might be possible to consider
cooperating on use of Russia's radars at Gabala and Armavir.
He said he hoped Lavrov was right that Iran would be deterred
from building a nuclear weapon, but he was skeptical. The
best deterrence might be for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate
on MD.
S-300 Sales
-----------
¶16. (S) Senator Levin said that Russia had taken a practical
and pragmatic step with the suspension of the sale of S-300
missiles to Iran, Senator Levin said. This helped make
Israel less nervous, and sent a message to Iran that the U.S.
and Russia were working more closely together on Iran issues.
Lavrov acknowledged that Russia was not supplying the system
"for the moment," but reiterated the usual mantra that
Russia's S-300 contract with Iran did not violate any
international or national laws or arms control regimes, and
that the S-300's were a defensive system only. He added that
nothing Russia had sold Iran had been used against anyone,
whereas U.S. weapons provided to Georgia had been used
MOSCOW 00001111 004 OF 005
against Russian soldiers. This did not mean the U.S. did not
have the right to sell weapons to Georgia, but Moscow did not
want a repeat of the August 2008 conflict. Overall, he said,
the Iranians had legitimate security concerns. They had been
attacked more than once by their neighbors, and saw
Pakistan's nuclear status as "competition for regional
leadership."
¶17. (S) In a follow-on meeting with DFM Ryabkov, Senator

Levin asked whether Iran believed the S-300 sale was canceled
or just suspended. Ryabkov replied that a contract existed,
and it was impossible to break a contract without
consequences. He repeated that Moscow had taken U.S. and
Israeli concerns into account, and at present Russia was not
providing any components of the system to Teheran. Thus, it
was "obvious the degree to which Iran was dissatisfied with
this," he said. But, the contract was not canceled, it was
merely "frozen," Ryabkov stressed. He argued that "the less
we hear from Washington about this, the better."
--------------------
¶18. (C) Senator Collins expressed appreciation for Russia's

allowing transit of non-lethal equipment to ISAF in
Afghanistan, and asked how the U.S. and Russia could work
together to counter terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Lavrov said Pakistan was a place were "a lot of problems
start for Afghanistan," and questioned the term "moderate
Taliban." He said the people on the UNSCR 1267 Committee
list should be "blacklisted for as long as possible," but for
anyone else, as long as they renounced terrorism, cooperated
with the Kabul government, and refrained from extremist
activity, it would be all right to deal with them.
Ryabkov Meeting
---------------
¶19. (C) In a follow-up meeting with DFM Ryabkov immediately

afterwards, Ryabkov cited the non-paper Lavrov had given the
Secretary in the Hague on March 31, and said there was
already a good basis to cooperate with the U.S. on MD.
Progress had been made in the NATO Russia Council on theater
missile defense, and Moscow believed there was more that
could be done there. But he reiterated Lavrov's position
that bilateral discussions would need to start from scratch.
He disagreed with Senator Levin's statement that the system
could not have a significant impact on Russia's nuclear
capabilities. He noted that Russia was more concerned about
the radar than the interceptor sites, because the former
could see the location of Russia's strategic forces, but even
with the interceptors, nobody could predict what would be at
those sites in 10 years' time. In response to Senator's
Levin's asking whether the deployments couldn't be limited by
an agreement, Ryabkov acknowledged that was a possibility,
but stressed that the radar could still be used with other
U.S. MD assets. The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic
were part of a global MD architecture, which, when linked
together, could almost "knock Russia out."
¶20. (C) Ryabkov stressed that while the U.S. and Russia were
not adversaries now, "intentions could change," whereas
"capabilities" were much harder to change. He noted that the
countries in eastern Europe saw the 3rd site as more of a
geo-political issue, bringing them closer to the West, than
as a response to a potential threat from Iran. "We are not
in a zero-sum game and we do not want to use your possibly
legitimate security concern as a geo-political pawn," Ryabkov
argued. Noting a link to the post-START negotiations,
Ryabkov said the greater the reductions in number of warheads
each side could possess, the more strategically important MD
became. He added that it would be politically difficult for
Russia to join a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland
and the Czech Republic. If the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities.
¶21. (C) In response to Senator Levin's question whether it

would be possible to develop a joint radar system with
Russian radars at Gabala, Armavir, and Moscow, connected to
U.S. AEGIS and THAAD systems, Ryabkov responded that he had
not considered such an idea before and would need to think
about it. Such a system, he noted, would become strategic,
and would lack the X-band capability of the radar proposed
MOSCOW 00001111 005 OF 005
for the Czech Republic, since all the systems cited were
early-warning radars only, but it could be an option.
¶22. (C) Ryabkov said Russia hoped it would be possible to

have a "meaningful dialogue" with Iran, and noted that
President Obama's remarks had had a strong impact in Teheran
and the Arab world. But it was still difficult to predict
how Teheran would react. He characterized the P5-plus 1
(E3-plus-3) statement as "very promising," but claimed
experience showed Iran would not make concessions under
pressure. He emphasized that it was "very clear that no one
can deliver Iran to the U.S., except the U.S. itself."
Civilian Space Cooperation

--------------------------
¶23. (C) In response to Senator Nelson's question about

prospects for increased civilian space cooperation and what
would happen when the U.S. was fully dependent on the Soyuz
spacecraft to reach the International Space Station, Ryabkov
said he saw no difficulty with meeting the U.S.'s needs, and
said we should both be forward-leaning. He noted that
RosCosmos had suggested to NASA that Russia cooperate on
development of the U.S.'s new spacecraft, but the idea had
not been pursued. Ryabkov proposed we discuss the issue
further with RosCosmos and said Moscow favored closer
cooperation with the U.S. and Europe in this area. While it
was not linked to MD, the more progress we could make on MD,
the better able we would be to move forward on other issues.
¶24. (U) Codel Levin did not clear this cable.

BEYRLE
Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI177, IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE--

WINDOW ON IRAN--APRIL 22,
Discussing cables
09RPODUBAI177 2009-04-22 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Iran RPO Dubai
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DE RUEHDIR #0177/01 1121100
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FM RPO DUBAI
INFO RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0034
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 11:00

NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 4/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ECON, ETRD, KDEM, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE--WINDOW ON IRAN--APRIL 22,
2009
DUBAI 00000177 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) Game of Attrition.
Ahmadinejad’s defeats on the budget and his plan to distribute cash payments to
lower-income Iranians show that power centers, such as the Majles, are actively
working to pressure the President prior to the June election, according to
[Source removed]. These power centers are also stepping up their lobbying of
Supreme Leader Khamenei to get his backing to stall or overturn some
Presidential authorities. This game is increasingly being played out in the
media, where the sides openly attack each other, and where the President’s
public defenses are weakening his hand and depleting political capital that he
would prefer to save for the bigger fights ahead. The cash payment plan could
have garnered AN additional votes, but he continues to “work the rounds” in the
provinces and maintain his base of support where it really matters. By June, the
current policy debates will matter less, and it is too early to consider these
moves decisive to AN’s electoral prospects, according to the economist. Comment:
If these power centers can get increased backing from Khamenei, we may see some
interesting fireworks in Iranian press in the coming weeks. As IRPO has
previously reported, identifying the power centers responsible for AN’ setbacks
on economic policy last month is difficult but could include a broad spectrum of
political factions.
¶2. (S/NF) [Name removed] said the MOIS will sometimes help assemble charges
against defendants, direct cases to particular judges, and order judges to rule
a particular way. Structurally, he said the Revolutionary Courts are similar to
other courts, fall under the Judiciary’s authority, and are theoretically
supposed to follow the same law. Defendants are allowed to have lawyers during
their trials, can defend themselves, and can appeal decisions. Asked about
Roxanna Saberi, [Name removed] said he was aware of her case, but had no
specific information on it. Comment: The Revolutionary Courts’ lack of
transparency and seemingly baseless decision making make [Name removed]
allegations plausible and perhaps probable. [Name removed] work in the judiciary
branch as a public prosecutor [Location removed] also gives his assertions some
credibility, but he did not work in the Revolutionary Courts. His accusations
are more likely to reflect the legal community’s assumptions rather than first-
hand knowledge of MOIS influence. [Name removed] was also notable for the depth
of his anti-regime sentiment, which probably colors his impressions of the
Revolutionary Courts.
¶3. (S/NF) Mousavi’s Economic Program. Moderate presidential candidate Mir
Hussein Mousavi announced his economic program to the Iranian press this week,
emphasizing economic growth and job creation from a rejuvenated and expanded
private sector. Mousavi criticized AN’s halting steps at privatization, calling
them “the institutionalization of non-productive government management.”
Stability in government policies and a strict adherence to the planning
documents of a restored Management and Planning Organization (MPO) and the “rule
of law,” are other key planks. The best talking point in the plan, “social
justice doesn’t mean equal distribution of poverty,” challenges AN’s key
economic goal by inserting economic growth into the equation and highlighting
his poor economic management. Mousavi’s plan only briefly mentions subsidy
reforms, stressing the need to implement them gradually, after careful
preparation. Comment: Mousavi’s plan mentions Article 44 of Iran’s constitution,
which defines the role of the state, cooperative, and private sectors in Iran’s
economy, but his emphasis on a strong private sector may open the plan to
criticism that it is in conflict with the constitution. Mousavi also threatens
to withdraw Iran’s Fifth Five Year Development Plan, currently being drafted, if
AN submits it to the Majles before the election. An IRPO contact [Source
removed], didn’t expect the plan to be finished until later this year.
¶4. (S/NF)[Name removed] said Iran’s Ministry of Commerce has approved the
creation of an Iran-Americas Chamber of Commerce in anticipation of improved US-
Iran ties. Although the chamber’s primary focus is the US, due to political
sensitivities, it will not be called an Iran-US chamber. [Name removed] made the
following points:
-- Khamenei instructed Ahmadinejad to base the Fifth Five Year Development Plan
on a draft from the Expediency Council. Hosseini alleged that both the
Expediency Council and the president submitted drafts of the plan to Khamenei
and Khamenei favored the Expediency Council’s version.
-- The current year will be positive for Iranian businesses. Hosseini,
admittedly in contrast with many of his colleagues, is optimistic because the
election allows Iran the opportunity to remove Ahmadinejad and because he
believes economic ties with the US will be a positive shock to the Iranian
economy.
-- Khamenei moderated his support for Ahmadinejad following Khatami’s decision
to exit the contest. Hosseini predicts Mir Hossein Mousavi will win the
election.
-- The TCC meetings are more productive than the ICCIM meetings. The TCC has a
monthly meeting with government representatives, including ministers; the TCC
members prepare for the meetings and, typically, complain a great deal during
the meetings about government policy. Although the government is not always
responsive to their complaints, following a recent meeting, the oil minister
appointed a committee to resolve the TCC’s concerns. Participants in ICCIM
meetings, which include representatives from the provincial chambers, are
typically unprepared.
--Iranians seeking an export license must be a member of a chamber of commerce
and both the Ministry of Commerce and a chamber must approve the export license.
Comment: [Name removed] seems well placed to comment on economic and political
developments in Iran. However, his assertion that the Expediency Council
submitted a draft of the next Five Year Development plan is unusual because
normally the president’s office drafts the plan and submits it to the Majles.
The early involvement of the Expediency Council may reflect Rafsanjani’s concern
over Ahmadinejad’s economic policies. Khamenei in a letter to Ahmadinejad in
January outlined the general policies to be included in the plan; it is possible
the letter is based on a plan from the Expediency Council.
¶5. (S/NF) IRIG Suspicion Extends to Its Own Official Delegations: [Source
removed] hinted to IRPO local staff that official Iranian delegations can be
scrutinized as much as exchange groups headed to the US. [Name removed] implied
that IRIG officials had carefully vetted members of the IMF delegation.
Separately, he told conoff, sotto voce, that the IRIG had only decided to allow
some delegation members to travel two weeks ago, although their visa
applications had been ready much earlier, and that was why they were late in
applying. Comment: The delay in submitting the
DUBAI 00000177 003.2 OF 003
visa applications may have been simple bureaucratic inefficiency, although [Name
removed] indicated he strongly believed that security agencies were scrutinizing
members of the delegation before permitting them to travel. RICHARDSON
Viewing cable 09SANTIAGO324, VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 27

MEETING WITH
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09SANTIAGO324.
09SANTIAGO324 2009-04-03 22:10 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Santiago
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 000324
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019

TAGS: OVIP BIDEN JOSEPH PREL ECON PGOV SOCI UK PK
AF
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 27 MEETING WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN
SANTIAGO 00000324 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Simons for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (U) March 28, 2009; 8:30 am; Vina del Mar, Chile.
¶2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Joseph Biden, Vice President
Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor to the
Vice President
Brian McKeon, Deputy National Security Advisor to
the Vice President
Brian Harris (notetaker), Political/Economic
Officer, U.S. Embassy Guatemala City
United Kingdom
Gordon Brown, Prime Minister
Thomas Fletcher, Private Secretary to the Prime
Minister
Stuart Wood, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister
Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for
International Development
¶3. (C) Summary: During a bilateral meeting on the margins

of the Progressive Governance Leaders Summit in Chile, Vice
President Joseph Biden and British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown discussed the economic crisis in terms of the upcoming
G-20 Summit and Afghanistan and Pakistan. On economic
issues, Brown pressed Vice President Biden to push the
Germans to move forward with $250 billion in special drawing
rights (SDRs) for the IMF, to use IMF gold sales to support
poorest countries and to take the initiative to restart
sectoral negotiations related to Doha. On Pakistan and
Afghanistan, Vice President Biden noted our increased troop
commitment to Afghanistan and the need to lower expectations
as to what is achievable in Afghanistan given enormous
governance issues. End Summary.
-------------------------
TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
-------------------------
¶4. (C) PM Brown opened the meeting by thanking Vice

President Biden for recent statement on revising the
supervisory structure for the G-20.
¶5. (C) Vice President Biden asked whether capital flight

from developing countries would be high on the G-20 agenda
and noted that Argentinean President Fernandez has requested
additional assistance without the usual IMF conditionality.
Brown responded that he was worried about capital flight,
particularly in Eastern Europe. The current financial crisis
will test whether Eastern European nations have developed
sufficiently strong institutions since the fall of communism
to withstand the downturn politically and socially as well as
economically. It is a test of whether freedom can be
successfully combined with economic stability. IMF
conditionality has long been an area of contention for Latin
America and it is not surprising that Argentina would ask for
preventative funds without conditions.
------------------------------
BROWN PRESSES ON IMF AND TRADE
------------------------------
¶6. (C) Prime Minister Brown delivered several requests on

economic issues to Vice President Biden. The first was the
need to secure financing for an additional $250 billion in
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for the IMF to help vulnerable
economies withstand the economic downturn. Brown commented
that his understanding was this was an amount that the
administration could support without the need to consult
Congress. U.S. support on the issue would be particularly
helpful with the Germans who, as yet, do not support
additional SDRs. Parallel discussions were going on with
China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and several other Gulf nations to
secure $400 billion in additional financing. Rapid approval
of the IMF portion would help catalyze these parallel
negotiations.
¶7. (C) PM Brown also noted that the IMF was being forced to
sell gold to raise funds to pay its administrative staff.
There had been far fewer loan programs this decade than in
the 1990s. The result was reduced revenue from countries
repaying loans and a consequent budget shortfall. There is a
SANTIAGO 00000324 002.2 OF 003
pending sale of $11 billion in IMF gold that should be used

to help the poorest countries rather than pay IMF staff. The
U.S. position had been that interest from gold reserves could
be devoted to IMF programs, but that capital sales should
not. PM Brown asked Vice President Biden to reconsider this
position.
¶8. (C) PM Brown said successfully concluding the Doha round

would be difficult but the Obama administration should agree
to deal with environmental and labor commitments outside the
formal trading framework in relevant institutions such as the
ILO. Brown suggested that if the United States allowed
resumption of the next round of sectoral discussions, it
would create momentum for the rest of the world, including
India, to re-engage in the discussions. Opening new sectoral
discussions on Doha would garner the Administration
international support without needing to make difficult
political compromises or commitments for the time being.
¶9. (C) UK Secretary of State for International Development

Douglas Alexander said it was important to find a way to move
forward on the Doha Agreement. Trade discussions are like
riding a bike, i.e., you have to keep moving forward or you
fall down. If we do not proactively move forward and
eventually come to a successful conclusion to the Doha round,
the United States could be blamed in some quarters. The Doha
round was meant to be the &development8 round of
negotiations with significant aid from donor nations
contingent upon the agreement's successful conclusion. If it
did not pass, some governments that stand to lose aid, such
as Brazil, would likely blame the United States.
¶10. (C) Vice President Biden did not commit on any of these
issues but noted that labor interests in the United States
were not satisfied and were looking to the Administration to
establish its labor &bona fides.8 In a year, he said,
movement on economic and trade issues would either be easier
or impossible depending on the direction of the world
economy.
--------------------
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
--------------------
¶11. (C) Turning to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vice President

Biden described the importance of combating terrorism and
noted the different elements of the Obama administration's
policy. First, the focus in Afghanistan is on Al Qaida. The
Obama administration will not make an open-ended commitment
to building freedom and democracy in Afghanistan because it
is not realistic. Second, there is no real possibility of
defeating Al Qaida without also dealing with Pakistan.
Third, he recognized that the United States cannot solve the
problem on its own. The whole world needed to engage.
¶12. (C) Vice President Biden said he worried that NATO

countries in Europe underestimated the threat from the region
and viewed the problem as an economic development issue
rather than a security issue, despite the fact that Afghan
opium is primarily exported to Europe and Europe has been the
victim of several terrorist attacks originating from the
region. Vice President Biden described the complex nature of
the security problem in Afghanistan, commenting that
&besides the demography, geography and history of the
region, we have a lot going for us.8
¶13. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the current U.S.
commitment of 63,000 troops to Afghanistan is the result of a
vigorous internal policy debate and would not be sustainable
politically for more than two years without visible signs of
progress. After two years, the extraordinary cost of
maintaining a robust military presence in Afghanistan would
make additional commitment increasingly difficult. After
Afghan elections the Administration intends to review the
situation again. Currently there is little capacity for the
Afghan government to execute many of the functions of
government. In many areas of the country, local officials
have close to no knowledge of how to govern or even basic
knowledge of payroll or budget. Part of the reason the
Taliban is strengthening is since the Taliban has the local
capacity to settle basic disputes quickly while central
government courts can take six to eight months to process a
case.
¶14. (C) The idea of a strong rule of law under a centralized
SANTIAGO 00000324 003.2 OF 003
Karzai government was not realistic. New policy towards the

Taliban should reflect the reality of the Afghan government's
lack of capacity. Our policy should first aim to stabilize
the urban areas and surrounding rural communities and then
seek to exploit divisions within the Taliban, co-opting
moderate elements rather than simply defeating militarily all
elements of the Taliban.
¶15. (C) On Pakistan, Vice President Biden commented that it

was difficult to convince Pakistan to commit to developing
its counter-insurgency potential. The threat from India
leads Pakistan to devote the bulk of its defense spending to
conventional warfare capabilities. However, something must
be done in the meantime. We need to develop our relationship
with Pakistan beyond its current transactional nature to a
long-term strategic partnership. We should begin with $1.5
billion per year in economic assistance that is unconditional
and supplement that with military assistance that is
conditioned on the modernization of its command structure and
active action in the field to combat insurgents. It would be
difficult to convince Congress to support such a plan,
particularly the unconditional civilian component.
¶16. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the United States
wants to empower the UN and wants active European
participation in resolving the threats in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. With the exception of the UK and a few others,
very few Europeans are taking action. Germany completely
dropped the ball on police training but NATO countries should
continue to provide assistance that is within their capacity
to deliver.
¶17. (C) Brown agreed that there was a significant terrorist

threat emanating from the region. More than 30,000
Pakistanis travel back and forth to the UK each year and
two-thirds of the terrorist threats that UK security forces
investigate originate in Pakistan -- including one on-going
investigation. The roots of terrorism in Pakistan are
complicated and go beyond the madrasas to, in some areas, a
complete societal incitement to militancy. Zedari's
commitment to combating terrorism is unclear, although he
always says the right things.
¶18. (C) Brown agreed on the need for a shared commitment and
noted that the only way to reduce the threat and eventually
draw down NATO's commitment to the region was by increasing
the capacity of Afghanistani and Pakistani security services.
Dividing the Taliban would greatly reduce its effectiveness,
though doing this made the Iraq problem look easy by
comparison.
¶19. (S) Vice President Biden commented that Zedari had told
him two months ago that ISI director &Kiyani will take me
out.8 Brown thought this unlikely and said that Kiyani did
not want to be another Musharraf, rather he would give
civilian leadership scope to function. However, he was wary
of the Sharif brothers and Zedari.
¶20. (U) The Office of the Vice President cleared this

message.
SIMONS
Viewing cable 09SEOUL672, MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND

NATIONAL DEFENSE
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019

TAGS: PGOV KN KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of

the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile
military rhetoric over the last several months are related to
the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the
DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to
XXXXXXXXXXXX A second priority was to achieve improved
Relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only
potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
Military Statements and the NDC
-------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that the

Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level
announcements over the past several months (such as the March
8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the
four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen
since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military
asserting control over the country, because the military
could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the
Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a
phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show
that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had
to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a
law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic
disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression."
There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the
DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and
wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down
this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG
was not particularly worried about the specific threats to
the South contained in the statements because they saw the
statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any
case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were
to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.
¶3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim
Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008
stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed
stronger leadership." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that before the stroke, KJI
was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he
suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become
obsessed with creating political stability to allow an
orderly succession, though XXXXXXXXXXXX did not claim to know who was
next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch
the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of
KJI's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the
renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that
would pave the way for succession.
¶4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from
8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired
National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first
established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had
since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had
the lead on succession, XXXXXXXXXXXX believed. KJI brother-in-law
Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for
succession preparation, not only because he was married to
KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim
Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having
effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall
2008 recovery period.
¶5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National

Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh
Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative
terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who XXXXXXXXXXXX
thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and
special operations institutions under his control at NDC.
One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department,
which Oh has headed since 1989. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also referred to an
April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that
"Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External
Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been
moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control,
saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was
evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which

formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during
the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming
more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the
South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the
succession period. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed that changes to the
DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would
also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to
frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a
"strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK
authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically
and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic
side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
¶6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order

meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed
conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well
aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and
would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK
knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would
prevent it from achieving surprise, so XXXXXXXXXXXX was reassured that
no direct military provocation was imminent.
-----------------------
Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the
above situation, XXXXXXXXXXXX answered indirectly, saying that the
main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to
maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was
the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S.,
because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security
and economic problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this push for improved
relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S.
as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities'
agenda. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement
with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance
for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration
had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress;
and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second
chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming
for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to
create the need for dialogue.
¶8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what

happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX was convinced that
the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while
seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his
recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even
keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating
further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about
land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was
potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached
carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative
and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal
steps. Like other ROKG officials, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the need
for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues
related to North Korea.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that China would seek to prevent

U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a
smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S.,
China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK
nuclear weapon test.
-----------
Mt. Kumgang
-----------
¶10. (C) As an aside, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented on the July 2008 shooting
death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that
KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact
with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed,
so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten
discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those
exercise periods.
STEPHENS

AFRICAN GREAT
Discussing cables
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R 161411Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2034

TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KDEM KHIV ZF XA CF RW BY
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: AFRICAN GREAT
LAKES (DROC, BURUNDI, RWANDA)
REF: A. 08 KIGALI 00830--05/DEC/2008

¶B. 08 STATE 122706--19/NOV/2008
¶C. 04 STATE 101403--06/MAY/2004
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS, REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new
National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on African Great
Lakes (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued
DOS reporting of biographic information relating to DROC,
Burundi, and Rwanda (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supersedes the NHCD contained in Ref
C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs announced in Ref B focused on
African Great Lakes. The review produced a comprehensive
list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and
collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide
update plans to collect information on African Great Lakes.
We thank Kigali for its Ref A input. The priorities should
also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage
reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission
Strategic Plans (MSPs).

¶C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to

Department channels. We appreciate Ref A response from
Kigali.
¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:

dissemination to the IC.
¶B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the

following information as possible when they have information
relating to persons linked to African Great Lakes: office and
organizational titles; names, position titles and other
information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell
phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information,
such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic
format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and
intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site
¶I. Regional Issues
¶A. Democratization and Political Stability

1) Leadership Dynamics (DEPS)
2) Rebel and Militia Groups (SRCC)
3) Democracy and Governance (DEPS)
4) Political Opposition (DEPS)
¶B. Military and Security
1) Military Developments (FMCC)
2) Weapons Procurement (FMCC)
3) Police and Paramilitary Forces (CINT)
5) Support to US Military Contingency Planning
(HREL)
6) Terrorism (TERR)
¶C. Societal Challenges
1) Refugees (DEMG)
2) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC)
3) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH)
4) Food Security and Agriculture (FOOD)
5) Economic Stability (ECFS)
¶D. External Relations
1) Regional Relations (SRCC)
2) International Relations (FPOL)
¶E. Overarching Issues
1) Media Structure and Availability (INFR)
2) Information Systems and Telecommunications
Infrastructure (INFR)
II. Country-Specific Issues
¶A. Mineral Resources (ENVR)

¶B. Genocidal Legacy Issues (HRWC)
¶A. Democratization and Political Stability
1) Leadership Dynamics (DEPS)

-- Leadership dynamics and decision-making processes of key
civilian and military officials; influence of corruption and
patronage in decision-making.
-- Status of relations among top leaders of African Great
Lakes countries, especially Kigali and Kinshasa, and Kampala
and Kinshasa.
-- Plans and intentions regarding political succession,
including post-election transitions; indications of coup
plotting.
-- Leader influence on popular opinion and popular sentiments.
-- Influence on government leadership of religious
organizations, interest groups, ethnic groups, and military.
-- The role of military, intelligence, and security services
in national policy decision-making and their control of
government institutions and parastatals.
-- Leadership policies and actions that cause or respond to
political instability or economic deterioration.
-- Leadership financial resources and personal relationships.
-- Government and public views about and evidence of impact
of corruption and crime on internal stability and development.
-- Information on political stability, sources of
instability, and nature of challenges to effective governance.
-- Government plans and efforts to respond to threats to
political stability; strategies for addressing underlying
discontent.
-- Changes inside key ministries and security forces,
including personal dynamics, tribal politics and factions.
-- Details on identities, motives, influence, and relations
among principal advisors.
-- Biographic and biometric data, including health, opinions
toward the US, training history, ethnicity (tribal and/or
clan), and language skills of key and emerging political,
military, intelligence, opposition, ethnic, religious, and
business leaders. Data should include email addresses,
telephone and fax numbers, fingerprints, facial images, DNA,
and iris scans.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO,

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
2) Rebel and Militia Groups (SRCC)
-- Efforts by rebel or militia groups or non-state

actors--especially entities such as the FDLR that contain
Rwandans who participated in the 1994 genocide--to obtain
control of or greater participation in national or local
government; to obtain control of natural or financial
resources; to integrate into the Congolese armed forces
(FARDC) or to cooperate with the FARDC in the exploitation of
economic resources.
-- Extent of political influence of rebel or militia groups.
-- Attitudes toward implementation of regional peace accords.
-- Organization, leadership, order of battle, training,
strategies and tactics of armed groups and factions,
including those integrated into government.
-- Efforts by rebel or militia groups to recruit government
forces or demobilized troops/fighters.
-- Indications of shifting alliances and factions.
-- Indications of political and social infrastructure
development by rebel and militia groups, including
fundraising, recruitments, weapons and repair parts
procurement, and propaganda.
-- Public sympathy or antipathy toward rebel and militia
groups.
-- Evidence of influence or pressure on, or support for,
rebel or militia groups from foreign governments, non-state
actors, and Congolese diaspora.
-- Infiltration and resupply routes used by rebel and militia
groups.
-- Evidence that drug trafficking, evasion of the Kimberly
Process, or other criminal activities, including cyber crime,
are used to finance the activities of rebel and militia
groups.
-- Evidence and impact of the presence of troops from
neighboring countries and their proxy forces in Congo,
particularly the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF).
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 5; CONGO,

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5
REGIONAL REBEL GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS
WHO CARRY OUT ATROCITIES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ALLIED
DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF), DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION
OF RWANDA (FDLR), LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)-PRIORITY- 4
3) Democracy and Governance (DEPS)
-- Leadership views, intentions, and actions on democratic

reforms, to include free press, treatment of opposition
political or ethnic groups, respect for human rights, respect
for rule of law and independent judiciary, and fair elections.
-- Extent/effectiveness of government control over national
territory and over cross-border flows of people and goods.
-- Progress of or obstacles to disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants into
a civilian society.
-- Structure, interaction, and role of administrative,
judicial, and legislative organs, including indications that
they are overshadowed by personal politics.
-- Information on effectiveness or abuse of the electoral
system or judiciary, including government procedures to
maintain the integrity and secrecy of the ballot during each
phase of balloting and vote reconciliation.
-- Details on all aspects of the electoral process, to
include election laws, electoral procedures, election
monitoring, balloting, and election equipment.
-- Details on corruption in government institutions and
efforts to reduce it.
-- Signs of ethnic, religious, or generational polarization
and role of ethnic, regional or class distinctions in access
to decision-making and natural or financial resources.
-- Information on government improvements in infrastructure,
including in remote regions.
-- Ability and efforts to adhere to/evade the Kimberly
Process, and to combat illicit finance.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
-- Activities, plans, and intentions of political opposition

parties and individuals; sources of funding and support.
-- Government attempts to stifle political opposition.
-- Alliances or factions, and evidence of links to foreign
governments or armed groups.
-- Political opposition party leadership, organization,
agendas, membership, and level of influence on civil society
and military; leadership biographic data.
-- Opposition party regional and ethnic support areas, family
and financial networks, key patrons and clients, and internal
alliances and rivalries
-- Opinions of ethnic, religious, and other groups on the
government and political opposition.

¶B. Military and Security
1) Military Developments (FMCC)
-- Military capabilities, intentions, and actions in support

of or against existing political leadership or government
activities.
-- Progress of or obstacles to the integration of former
government, rebel, and militia fighters into a new armed
force; loyalty of units integrated from former armed
opponents.
-- Impact of ethnic, political, regional, or tribal divisions
within the military and other security forces on morale,
readiness, placement of leaders, and support for the
government.
-- Indications of military involvement in human rights
abuses, recruiting of children, criminal or corrupt activity,
or anti-government insurgency.
-- Loyalties, cohesion, discord, rivalries, competing agendas
or ambitions, and signs of dissension within military
leadership, officer corps, and ranks; evidence of
corruption/criminal activity in the military or security
forces and effects on preparedness.
-- Extent and effects of ethnic and political divisions
within the military and between the military and political
leadership.
-- Attitudes toward AFRICOM; willingness to cooperate with
AFRICOM.
-- Ability and willingness to cooperate with forces from
neighboring countries and deployed peacekeeping forces to
manage threats.
-- Personnel strength levels, force structure, doctrine,
modernization plans, training, discipline, professionalism,
morale, order of battle, logistics, combat effectiveness, and
capabilities of military services.
-- Details on military facilities, such as airfields and army
camps, and on military equipment, including numbers,
operational status, and procurement/refurbishment activity.
-- Details about military relations with other countries,
especially China, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and other former Soviet bloc countries.
-- Details about foreign military assistance and training.
-- Attitudes toward and impact of US military training.
-- Details on defense budget by function and service.
-- Development and implementation of mechanisms for civil
control of the military.
-- Public attitudes towards the military and other security
forces.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO,

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
2) Weapons Procurement (FMCC)
-- Details of arms acquisitions and arms sales by government

or insurgents, including negotiations, contracts, deliveries,
terms of sale, quantity and quality of equipment, and price
and payment terms.
-- Transfer of strategic materials such as uranium.
-- Information on insurgent groups' weapons and material
entry and transshipment points, routes, and destinations.
-- Indications of smuggling and weapons and weapons repair
parts trafficking.
-- Factory markings and paint/color schemes on all
arms/weapon systems and their munitions acquired or produced
locally.

3) Police and Paramilitary Forces (CINT)
-- Non-military security force loyalties, leadership,

capabilities, organization, size, locations, and ethnic
composition.
-- Roles and missions of various units.
-- Evidence of splits within police and paramilitary forces.
-- Evidence of contact and cooperation with rebel groups.
-- Ability to maintain local security without intervention or
assistance of military forces.
-- Reports of misconduct, human rights violations, or
involvement in illegal/illicit activities, or the misuse of
foreign training funds or equipment.
-- Evidence of conflict between security forces and the
military.

4) GRPO can provide text of this issue and

related requirements.
5) Support to US Military Contingency Planning

(HREL)
-- Details on developments that could prompt US contingency

planning for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) or
humanitarian assistance.
-- Host nation support for evacuation or humanitarian
assistance by US forces (AFRICOM), including host nation
ability and willingness to protect US citizens and/or
facilities.
-- Government plans and capabilities to cope with
emergencies, including civilian and military response, or to
request or accept assistance from the US, UN, or others.
-- Government or other organizations' plans to work with UN
and international donor and NGO groups in relief and
reconstruction efforts, resettlement programs, and
development assistance.
-- Details on obstacles to aid distribution and
implementation of humanitarian aid programs.
-- Details of emergency infrastructure, including locations,
descriptions, and capabilities of military, police, and fire
response resources.
-- Location and description of third-country diplomatic and
aid/NGO facilities, and of leaders' residences and alternate
locations.
-- Information on the character and severity of existing or
potential future humanitarian crises resulting from natural
disasters or from internal or regional violence.
-- Description and locations of potential evacuation sites,
hospitals, hotels, government installations, religious sites
and shrines, civilian institutions including schools and
stadiums, diplomatic facilities, educational and medical
facilities, and culturally significant sites.
-- Evacuation routes, including chokepoints and potential
impediments.
-- Volcanic activity on the Congo (Kinshasa)/Rwanda border.

6) Terrorism (TERR)
-- Individuals and organizations supporting international

terrorism, including legitimate businesses and financial
transactions, money laundering, drug trafficking, logistical
support, cyber crime, and document forgeries.
-- Extent to which ethnic, tribal, religious and regional
fragmentation could serve to attract international terrorist
groups.
-- Evidence of transit and safe haven by transnational and
regional terrorist groups.
-- Vulnerability of populace to Islamic extremism.
-- Evidence of domestic terrorist groups.
-- Indications of funding from Gulf-based financiers or NGOs.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS: HIZBALLAH
(LEBANESE)-PRIORITY 1
REGIONAL REBEL GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS
WHO CARRY OUT ATROCITIES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ALLIED
DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF), DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION
OF RWANDA (FDLR), LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)-PRIORITY- 4
¶C. Societal Challenges
1) Refugees (DEMG)
-- Government plans, policies, and efforts regarding refugees

and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
-- Government capability and willingness to absorb, register,
assist, and protect refugees and IDPs.
-- Government capability and willingness to protect and
assist NGO and aid agency personnel.
-- Plans and intentions of rebel forces to cooperate, hinder,
or manipulate aid for refugees and IDPs.
-- Indications of rebel or militia forces infiltrating
refugee camps or groups, or using such camps/groups to mask
their activities.
-- Public attitudes for or against repatriation of IDPs or
refugees.
-- Information on neighboring country efforts regarding
refugees and IDPs.
-- Number, location, and size of refugee and IDP areas (to
include hospitals, churches, and other de facto IDP areas as
well as traditional camps); transit routes used by refugees
and IDPs.
-- Numbers, age, gender, ethnicity, general health and
security conditions, nature and extent of critical needs of
refugees and IDPs.
-- Factors driving refugee movements; links between refugee
movements and political and economic stability.
-- Indications that the inability of returning refugees to
reclaim their land is contributing to instability.
-- Details of cross-border criminal activity, including
travel routes and nodes, transshipment sites, communications,
and financial facilitators, especially for human smuggling
and trafficking.
-- Attitudes toward women; women,s legal rights, especially
rights to education, work, land ownership, and inheritance.
-- Process and effects of migration and demographic shifts
within and among regional nations, including movement from
rural to urban areas and youth bulge.
-- Details about geographic distribution of population and
internal migration.
-- Information on population density, population growth, age
breakdowns, economic and housing characteristics, ethnic and
religious affiliations, occupations, literacy, educational
attainment, access to electricity, water, and sanitation.

2) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC)
-- Plans, intentions, and actions of rebel and militia

groups, federal and state government officials, military,
intelligence and other security services, to commit human
rights violations, including mass killings, extra judicial
killing, forced disappearance, torture, sexually based
violence, arbitrary arrest, police brutality, and persecution
of minorities and ethnic factions.
-- Indications that policies targeting civilians could be
perceived as strategically advantageous to a government,
rebel, or militia group.
-- Indications of leaders, failure to instill discipline
within armies, rebel groups, or militias that could lead to
human rights violations and abuses.
-- Ethnic/regional tensions that might fuel genocidal
activity, including scapegoating or calls for violence
against noncombatants of a particular ethnic, regional, or
political group by government, rebel, or militia groups.
-- Indications of mobilization or force posturing directed
against civilians.
-- Threats against or denial of access to media, foreigners,
or NGOs to areas of concern.
-- Support for or response to activities of international
criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal
Court.
-- Ability and willingness of all levels of government to
promote human rights.
-- Details on government policies, procedures, and efforts
regarding prevention of human rights abuses, including
efforts to marginalize specific groups of people.
-- Efforts of the police and military to uphold or violate
human rights.
-- Government intentions to follow through on investigations
and prosecution of human rights abuses.
-- Indications that ambiguity between civilians and
combatants could lead to violence against civilians.
-- Plans and activities of the government to use food, or
other government-controlled commodities, as a political tool.
-- Evidence of attacks or planned attacks on peacekeepers and
humanitarian aid workers; limitations on the activities of
NGOs.
-- Evidence that humanitarian aid agencies are preparing for
an increase in the number of civilian casualties or refugees.
-- Evidence that truth and reconciliation activities or war
crimes trials are increasing or decreasing tension or
fostering or alleviating instability.
-- Landmine or explosive remnant of war (ERW) casualties and
evidence of mine stockpiling; government intentions to clear
landmine/ERW areas.

3) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH)
-- Government plans, policies, and capabilities to prevent,

control, and treat existing and emerging disease outbreaks,
particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio, and
avian influenza.
-- Details of infectious diseases and general health
conditions including number of cases, percentage, fatalities,
dates, and areas of occurrence. Also if possible, provide
historical data in order to compare recent data collection.
-- HIV statistics, including percentage of military, police
force, and orphans that are HIV positive.
--Information concerning the influence of traditional healers
on infectious diseases as well as endemic health issues.
-- Details on drug resistant strains, including malaria,
HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, and tuberculosis.
--Information concerning maternal and child health, in terms
of access to prenatal care, statistics on the types of
pregnancy-related poor outcomes related to infant and/or
maternal morbidity/mortality, and access to well-baby clinics.
-- Access to care information, including regions and
populations with access to advanced levels of care and those
without basic prevention and treatment needs.
-- Information on medical professionals, including number of
personnel by type (nurse, physician, midwife, etc.), medical
specialty, and location (urban or rural).
-- Education and training requirements for medical
professionals; locations of institutions where training is
available.
-- Information on medical facilities/hospitals, including
capabilities, personnel, training, equipment, etc. Disaster
response capability/plan.
-- Details about contaminated food, water, air, and soil and
the effect on health. Toxic industrial chemical
contamination, including types of industrial facilities,
chemicals on site, and products being generated.
-- Details on water, food, and vector-borne diseases,
including location, prevalence, and virulence.
-- Government efforts to protect the population from zoonotic
(animal to human transmission capable) diseases; details on
the stockpile and storage of vaccines.
-- Information on drug addiction treatment facilities.
-- Information on mental health issues, including the
government,s willingness to report, the types and severity
of mental health problems, and access to care.
-- Chronic disease information, including types and access to
treatment, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease.

4) Food Security and Agriculture (FOOD)

-- Government policies, plans, intentions, and actions
regarding food security and food safety, and willingness to
cooperate with UN and other donor agencies.
-- Nutritional status of population, including refugees.
-- Indications that rising food prices are adversely
affecting nutritional status and/or contributing to
instability; use of subsidies or export/import bans.
-- Yields and prospects for cash and subsistence crops;
changes in agricultural practices, such as cropping patterns
and crop selection; use/availability of seeds and fertilizers.
-- Government acceptance of genetically modified food and
propagation of genetically modified crops.
-- Status of structural adjustments and infrastructure
improvements to increase agricultural producer income and
reduce migration to urban areas.
-- Information on surface and groundwater resources, to
include sources, treatment, distribution and storage.
-- Indications that deforestation, desertification, erosion
and degradation of soils are affecting agricultural output.
-- Food contamination affecting population health.
-- Indications of invasive species, especially those
affecting food security or development.
-- Indications of water table degradation, decreases in lake
levels below historic norms, or evidence of territorial
disputes associated with declining water resources or quality.

5) Economic Stability (ECFS)
-- Overall economic status, including government plans and

will to implement free-market reform, to ensure consistent
regulations, and to uphold the rule of law on economic issues.
-- Government plans and intentions to address economic
effects of war and conflict, such as shortages of fuel,
electric power, and food; unemployment; and wage arrears,
particularly the inability to pay troops.
-- Fiscal policies and investment strategies, financial and
commercial links within and outside the region, status of
foreign currency reserves, and positions on bilateral and
multilateral economic issues and negotiations.
-- Details of Chinese trade, aid, and investment activities.
-- Public and expert perceptions of the effect on economic
performance of corruption among government and business
elites and of the competence of economic administrators.
-- Policies and actions to attract foreign investment; plans
and intentions of foreign nationals or companies to invest or
start up new business ventures.
-- Government strategy and objectives for engagement with
international financial institutions--World Bank, IMF,
African Development Bank--for loans, grants, debt management,
and restructuring.
-- Details on economic assistance needs and requests,
including donors, projects, and effectiveness of current or
proposed aid.
-- Status of raw materials industries, including plans to
develop/exploit resource deposits.
-- Government plans and objectives regarding land
reallocation; effects of land reallocation on indigenous
population, commercial farmers, militant interest groups, and
its impact on foreign investment.
-- Indications of ethnic/regional tensions over resources,
such as land and water.
-- Details on and public perception of economic growth,
including youth employment prospects.
-- Statistics on economic indicators, including remittances.
-- Details, capabilities, and potentially required repairs
and upgrades of infrastructure and lines of communication,
such as airfields, landing zones, river ports, rail lines,
roads, bridges, medical facilities, and electric power,
petroleum, and water facilities.

¶D. External Relations
1) Regional Relations (SRCC)
-- Policy toward and relations with regional states,

particularly with regard to ongoing conflicts, support for
foreign dissidents, border incursions, peace negotiations,
refugee assistance and repatriation, trade, aid, and security
agreements.
-- Government views and perceptions about activities and
intentions of regional organizations, such as the African
Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and other
regional organizations.
-- Activities of mercenaries or private security firms in
assisting military forces or insurgencies; mercenary or
private security firm involvement in trafficking activities.

2) International Relations (FPOL)
-- Government leader views and policies toward the US,

AFRICOM, and international organizations; plans and
intentions to support or oppose US positions in international
fora.
-- Public and private attitudes toward the US, AFRICOM, and
US policies.
-- Foreign alliances and activities, especially those
involving China and Iran.
-- Agreements and concessions negotiated with foreign states
and non-state actors for military, paramilitary, or economic
assistance.
-- Government views and perceptions about activities and
intentions of non-regional nations and organizations,
particularly China, Iran, France, UN, and the European Union
(EU).
-- Perceptions by the civilian population towards the UN,
particularly improvements or failures of UN efforts to
address human rights abuses by peacekeeping forces.
-- Plans and efforts of countries or organizations to
arbitrate or influence conflict resolution.
-- Efforts to enforce or circumvent sanctions against Iran,
North Korea, and terrorist groups.
-- Political will and intentions of governments to
participate in or support peacekeeping operations sponsored
by regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, or by the UN, US,
France, or other.
-- Willingness to contribute forces to African Union (AU)
Standby Brigade Forces (e.g. EASBRIG) and/or the will to
provide meaningful participation in CEEAC - Economic
Community of Central African States)
-- Government plans, intentions, and capabilities to provide,
train, equip, transport, maintain, supply, and fund
international peacekeeping forces, including providing
command, control, communications, and intelligence.
-- Military willingness and capability to train with other
nations in programs such as the US Africa Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and Joint Combined
Exercise for Training (JCET) programs, and to participate in
peacekeeping operations.
-- Local population relationship with foreign peacekeeping
forces.
-- Capabilities, attitudes, and behavior of peacekeepers from
or stationed in regional nations, including understanding of
and adherence to human rights standards.
-- Government cooperation regarding rescue/recovery of
US/allied POW/MIAs and detained/kidnapped US/allied citizens.

¶E. Overarching Issues
1) Media Structure and Availability (INFR)
-- Government, public, and private perceptions of status of

press freedom.
-- Evidence of media control or manipulation, in particular
to incite unrest, by government, opposition groups, non-state
actors, and other groups.
-- Details on print and broadcast media, including name,
content, ownership, target audience, staff, broadcast
frequency and power.
-- Internet availability and use.
-- Extent of, access to, and identity of, foreign television
and radio broadcasts, and news publications.
-- Changes to the UN commitment to provide media services in
the eastern Congolese provinces.

2) Information Systems and Telecommunications

Infrastructure (INFR)
-- Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and

planned upgrades to, national telecommunications
infrastructure and information systems, command and control
systems, networks, and technologies used by government,
military, and private sector.
-- Details about foreign assistance (especially Chinese) for
improvements to the national telecommunications grid.
-- National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated
telecommunications infrastructures and information systems.
-- Details about national and regional telecommunications
policies, programs, regulations, service providers, vendors,
and training.
-- Details about internet and intranet use, infrastructure,
and government oversight.
-- Plans and efforts to acquire U.S. export-controlled
telecommunications technology.
-- Details about information repositories for Radio Frequency
Identification-enabled systems used for passports, government
badges, and transportation systems.
-- Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and

II. Country Specific Issues
¶A. Mineral Resources (ENVR)
-- Details on mining of diamonds, copper, cobalt, uranium,

other minerals, and oil extraction: number and location of
mines, production statistics and revenue generated, and
extent of control given to China and other foreign
governments, companies or consortiums; export statistics.
-- Details on mineral, oil and other resource exploitation by
rebel groups and foreign elements to include type and
location of resources exploited, and revenue generated
through sales, customs duties, taxation, and access control.
-- Government ability/willingness to deal with environmental
abuses.
COUNTRIES: CONGO, DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC-PRIORITY 5H
¶B. Genocidal Legacy Issues (HRWC)
-- Government attitudes and intentions toward Tutsi

survivors, Tutsis operating outside the power elite, Hutus,
returning Hutu fighters/refugees, and Twa.
-- Indications of increased ethnic tensions that could spark
renewed violence.
-- Government plans and intentions to counter ethnic violence
or genocide; identification of government officials
encouraging violence.
-- Information on policies concerning human rights,
democratization, political inclusion, reconciliation, land
ownership and tenancy, and political prisoners.
-- Public attitudes toward traditional judicial courts
(gacaca) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
-- Information on participation in human rights abuses,
including extra judicial killings by Rwanda Defense Forces
(RDF); paramilitary, including local defense forces; police,
security forces; or Tutsi civilians against Hutus.
-- Divisions within President Kagame's inner circle and his
party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
-- Public attitudes toward the FDLR and subgroups; links
between those groups and supporters outside the Great Lakes
Region.
-- Information about identification, location and arrest of
such leaders.
COUNTRIES: RWANDA- PRIORITY 4
CLINTON
WEST AFRICA
Discussing cables
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AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY PRAIA
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DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY ABUJA
AMCONSUL LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2034

TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON CD CV GA ML MR NG SG UV
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: WEST AFRICA
SAHEL REGION
REF: A. 08 STATE 124337

¶B. 04 STATE 179667
Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).
National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the West
Africa Sahel region (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request
for continued DOS reporting of biographic information
relating to the West Africa Sahel region (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref
B and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs focused on the West Africa
Sahel region (Ref A). The review produced a comprehensive
list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and
collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide
update plans to collect information on the West Africa Sahel
region. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to
help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including
formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).




relating to persons linked to the West Africa Sahel region:
office and organizational titles; names, position titles and
other information on business cards; numbers of telephones,
cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact
information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc
or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings;
internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses,
web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers;
frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other
relevant biographical information.
This directive covers eight countries of Sahelian West

Africa: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. The coastal countries to the
south (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin) are covered separately in
the West Africa Littoral directive.
¶A. Security
1) International Terrorism (TERR)
2) Response To Terrorism (TERR)
3) Military (FMCC)
4) Support for U.S. Military Contingency Planning (HREL)
5) Insurgent and Separatist Groups (SRCC)
6) Relations With The United States (FPOL)
7) Drug Trafficking (DRUG)
8) Peacekeeping (SRCC)
¶B. Governance
1) Leadership (LEAD)
2) Government Stability and Support For Democracy (DEPS)
3) Human Rights (HRWC)
¶C. Socio-Economic Issues

1) Agriculture and Food Security (FOOD)
2) Foreign Aid and Relations (FPOL)
3) Criminal Activities (CRIM)
4) Health and Infectious Diseases (HLTH)
5) Population and Refugee Issues (DEMG)
6) Economic Institutions and Initiatives (ECFS)
7) Environmental Issues (ENVR)
¶D. Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure

(INFR)
¶A. Chad: Sudan/Darfur Issues (SRCC-2)
¶A. Security
1) International Terrorism (TERR).

-- Details, presence, and activities related to al-Qa'ida in
the land of the Islamic Maghreb and other terrorist-related
individuals and organizations.
-- Plans and intentions for operations against U.S. or
allied personnel or interests.
-- Links to weapons of mass destruction or related
materials.
-- Presence and activities of fighters returning from Iraq
and Afghanistan.
-- Information on organizations, leadership, personnel,
tradecraft, intelligence and counterintelligence
capabilities, financing, front companies, recruitment, and
training.
-- Weapons and methodologies, particularly for improvised
explosive devices.
-- Details about local support networks, particularly for
transshipments.
-- Details about couriers operating in, or originating
outside of, the region.
-- Presence and activities of non-North African fighters in
the region.
-- Indications that international terrorist groups are
seeking to take advantage of political, ethnic, tribal, or
religious conflict.
-- Health, biographic, biometric, and assessment information
on leaders.
NIPF Priority for TERR

Chad: 1, Mali: 1, Mauritania: 1, Niger: 1
NIPF Priority for Non-State Actors for TERR

Al-Qa'ida and Sunni Affiliates: 1, Hizballah (Lebanese): 1,
Jama'at Tablighi: 3
HUMINT Priority for TERR

Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Senegal: 5H
2) Response To Terrorism (TERR).

-- Capability, willingness and intent of countries to
cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts and
policies, and to conduct counterterrorist operations.
-- Details about CT legislation, organizations,
capabilities, equipment, operations, tactics, and limitations.
-- Data regarding the impact of U.S. and multilateral
economic sanctions
-- Policies, attitudes, and actions regarding U.S. and other
western CT training.
-- Military and security forces' attitudes towards CT
training and operations.
-- Interaction and interoperability of security and military
forces with foreign CT forces.
-- Public attitudes towards CT policies and activities.
-- Plans to deploy biometric systems to enhance domestic
counterterrorism efforts.
NIPF Priority for TERR

NIPF Priority for Non-State Actors for TERR

Al-Qa'ida and Sunni Affiliates: 1, Hizballah (Lebanese): 1,
Jama'at Tablighi: 3
HUMINT Priority for TERR

3) Military (FMCC)
-- Plans, intentions, status and details of the national
defense policy and strategy.
-- Military relations with other countries, including
training exercises.
-- Capabilities, disposition, vulnerabilities, and readiness
of forces.
-- Details about military personnel, units, equipment, and
tactics.
-- Plans and efforts regarding military reform, procurement,
and modernization.
-- Government cooperation regarding U.S. POW/MIAs and
detained U.S. citizens.
-- Evidence of coup plotting in military ranks.
-- Evidence of criminal activity in military ranks and
impact.
-- Extent and effects of ethnic, religious, and political
factions within the military.
-- Public attitudes towards the military and other security
forces.
-- Details of covert arms acquisitions and arms sales.
NIPF Priority for FMCC

Chad: 3, Mali: 4, Mauritania: 4, Niger: 4, Senegal: 4
HUMINT Priority for FMCC

Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H
4) Support for U.S. Military Contingency Planning

(HREL).
-- Plans, intentions, and capability of host governments to
support evacuation or humanitarian assistance by U.S. forces,
including host nations' ability and willingness to protect
U.S. citizens and/or facilities.
-- Internal developments that could prompt U.S. contingency
planning for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or
humanitarian assistance.
-- Host government's emergency management capabilities and
points-of-contact.
-- Details about infrastructure, medical facilities, and
communication networks.
-- Geocoordinates and description of third-country
diplomatic, humanitarian aid, and non-governmental
organization (NGO) facilities.
-- Evacuation routes, including official/unofficial
checkpoints, chokepoints, and potential impediments.
NIPF Priority for HREL

Chad: 3, Niger: 5
HUMINT Priority for HREL

Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H,
Mauritania: 5H, Senegal: 5H
5) Insurgent and Separatist Groups (SRCC).

-- Plans, intentions, and capabilities of separatist,
insurgent or radical opposition groups or organizations to
influence or destabilize host country government.
-- Clandestine efforts to subvert peace accords and
reconciliation efforts.
-- Plans and intentions relating to U.S. citizens and
military personnel in the region.
-- Leadership, organization, recruitment and training,
tactics, sources of financing, and Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, and Intelligence capabilities.
-- Goals and attitudes toward peace accords and
reconciliation efforts.
-- Links to foreign governments and non-state actors in
foreign countries.
-- Public support for groups.
-- Links to international terrorist groups.
-- Health, biographic, biometric, and assessment information
on leaders.
NIPF Priority for SRCC

Chad: 2
HUMINT Priority for SRCC

Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 4H, Senegal: 5H
6) Relations with the United States (FPOL).

-- Plans and intentions of government and government
leaders concerning relations with the United States,
including plans and efforts to support or oppose U.S.
policies and efforts in international fora.
-- Decision-making, policies, plans, negotiating strategies,
and efforts, particularly regarding Burkina Faso.
-- Impact of relations with China on relations with the
United States.
-- Public opinion about U.S. actions in Africa, particularly
regarding the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation foreign aid program.
-- Response to U.S. policies regarding the Sahel region, the
Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the global war on
terror.
-- Impact of trade relations with India and Brazil on
relations with the United States.
HUMINT Priority for FPOL

Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The Gambia: 5H,
Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
7) Drug Trafficking (DRUG).

-- Government plans and intentions regarding drug production
and trafficking.
-- Use of transportation networks for drug production,
trafficking, or storage.
-- Details about types of drugs trafficked and associated
transportation networks and seizures.
-- Details about front companies, financial institutions,
and money flow.
-- Links to international terrorist groups.
-- Links to drug producers outside of region, particularly
Latin American cocaine cartels.
-- Links to regional or international drug distribution
networks.
-- Law enforcement and judiciary capabilities to combat drug
trafficking and production.
-- Drug traffickers' efforts to corrupt or undermine law
enforcement and government.
-- Presence, use, or transshipment of precursor chemicals
and associated equipment for drug production.
-- Information about terrorist or insurgent groups' income
derived from the drug trade, including drug types and
quantities.
-- Information on impact of drug trafficking and use,
particularly on public health and crime, and supporting
internal statistics.
NIPF Priority for DRUG

Senegal: 5
HUMINT Priority for DRUG

Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H
8) Peacekeeping (SRCC).
-- Governments' plans and intentions to participate in or
support peacekeeping operations and funding allocated/spent.
-- Military and security forces' willingness and capability
to train with other nations and participate in peacekeeping
operations, and details of peacekeeping experience.
-- Military and security forces' capabilities and
willingness to accept international military assistance and
joint training.
-- Perception of troops' performance during peacekeeping
operations.
NIPF Priority for SRCC

Chad: 2
HUMINT Priority for SRCC


requirements.
¶B. Governance
1) Leadership (LEAD).
-- Key issues of concern to national and opposition
leadership, particularly dynamics and decision-making
processes of key civilian and military officials and of
ruling political parties, including coup plotting.
-- Attitude toward political opposition.
-- Personal financial resources, financial institutions
used, and personal relationships.
-- Biographic data, including opinions about the United
States.
HUMINT Priority for LEAD

2) Government Stability and Support For Democracy

(DEPS).
-- Internal or external threats to government stability,
democracy, or rule of law, including government efforts to
address these threats.
-- Government control over national territory and borders,
including areas where government authority is weak or absent.
-- Commitment to representative government and democratic
reforms, particularly during election cycle.
-- Laws, policies, and prospects for political succession
and elections.
-- Details on corruption and anti-corruption measures.
-- Drivers of, and responses to, political instability or
economic deterioration.
-- Details on administrative, judicial, and legislative
organs and related decision-making.
-- Signs of ethnic, religious, or generational polarization
and impact on decision-making.
-- Political and social infrastructure development in remote
regions.
NIPF Priority for DEPS

Chad: 4, Mauritania: 5, Senegal: 5
HUMINT Priority for DEPS

Niger: 5H
3) Human Rights (HRWC).

-- Details of human rights abuses by intelligence and
security services, military, paramilitary, police, or other
officials, or by insurgent, separatist, or other groups.
-- Details of government efforts and capability to prevent
or respond to abuses.
-- Government reaction to foreign and domestic criticism of
alleged human rights abuses.
-- Details of alleged disenfranchisement or enslavement of
individuals or groups, including government complicity or
inaction.
-- Government relationship with international peacekeeping
and aid organizations.
NIPF Priority for HRWC

Chad: 2, Mauritania: 5, Niger: 5
HUMINT Priority for HRWC

Senegal: 5H
4) Political Opposition (DEPS).

-- Plans, intentions, and role of opposition parties in
political system, including intention to use extra-legal
means to depose government.
-- Activities, plans, intentions, and sources of funding and
support.
-- Leadership, organization, agendas, membership, and level
of influence.
-- Plans and intentions related to the election cycle.
-- Alliances, factions, and evidence of links to foreign
governments or insurgent/separatist groups.
-- Opinions of ethnic, religious, and other population
groups towards the government and political opposition.
NIPF Priority for DEPS

Chad: 4, Mauritania: 5, Senegal: 5
HUMINT Priority for DEPS

Niger: 5H
¶C. Socio-Economic Issues
1) Agriculture and Food Security (FOOD).

-- Government plans and actions regarding agricultural
output, food security, and food safety.
-- Willingness to cooperate with U.N. and other donor
agencies on food-related issues.
-- Details about food prices and food trade and public
reaction to increasing food prices.
-- Indications of environmental factors affecting
agricultural output.
-- Government policies and initiatives to increase
agricultural producer income.
-- Status of, and prospects for, cash and subsistence crops.
-- Indications of invasive species affecting food security
or development.
-- Details about manipulation of food aid by government or
warlords to enhance power.
NIPF Priority for FOOD

Chad: 5
HUMINT Priority for FOOD

2) Foreign Aid and Relations (FPOL).

-- Governments' and leaders' views on foreign nations and
international organizations, particularly China, Iran, and
India.
-- Foreign alliances, aid, and activities, including those
withheld from public view.
-- Details on international trade issues and economic
assistance needs and requests.
-- Governments' actions and intentions regarding existing
U.S. Status of Forces Agreements and the Rome Convention's
International Criminal Court (Article 98).
HUMINT Priority for FPOL

3) Criminal Activities (CRIM).

-- Details of corruption and cross-border criminal activity,
including weapons trafficking, human trafficking, alien
smuggling, illicit finance, and cigarette smuggling. --
Government and law enforcement plans and intentions to combat
criminal activity.
-- Organizations, activities, methodologies, alliances, and
vulnerabilities.
-- Cooperation with terrorist or insurgent groups.
-- Key investors, facilitators, beneficiaries, and corrupt
officials.
HUMINT Priority for CRIM

4) Health and Infectious Diseases (HLTH).

-- Details of infectious diseases and general health
conditions, including number of cases, percentage of
population affected, fatalities, dates, areas of occurrence,
and impact.
-- Government policies, plans, and efforts for disease
prevention and identification.
-- Nutrition-related health of population, including
refugees.
-- Vaccination practices, capabilities, and response related
to drug-resistant and Emerging and Re-Emerging Diseases,
particularly polio and tuberculosis.
-- Effect of HIV/AIDS or other diseases on military,
government, or economic performance.
-- Public attitudes towards disease prevention and treatment
programs.
-- Indications of infectious plant, animal, or zoonotic
diseases (animal to human transmission) with potential
economic or public health consequences.
-- Details about contaminated food, water, air, and soil.
-- Information on medical facilities, including capabilities
and training.
NIPF Priority for HLTH

Chad: 4
HUMINT Priority for HLTH

5) Population and Refugee Issues (DEMG).

-- Population movements in the region, and governments'
involvement and response.
-- Indications of actual or potential refugee movements
within or into the region.
-- Locations and conditions of refugee camps and informal
refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) gathering
sites and transit routes.
-- Government capability and willingness to assist refugees
and IDPs.
-- Health and demographic statistics of refugees and IDPs.
-- Dynamics and impact of migration and demographic shifts.
-- Efforts to repatriate refugees.
NIPF Priority for DEMG

HUMINT Priority for DEMG

6) Economic Institutions and Initiatives (ECFS).

-- Policies, strategies, and efforts to improve economic
growth.
-- Leadership views on economic, trade, and fiscal policies
and regulatory enforcement.
-- Identities and roles of governments' economic
policy-making and regulatory bodies/officials.
-- Macroeconomic statistics regarding trade, budget, balance
of payments, and national economies, including reliability or
manipulation of data.
-- Public perception of economic conditions, including youth
employment prospects.
-- Nature and extent of underground banking systems.
-- Details on economic assistance needs and partnerships,
and effectiveness of aid.
-- Financial data transmission systems and accounting
methods.
-- Details of natural resource development activities,
including financing.
HUMINT Priority for ECFS

7) Environmental Issues (ENVR).

-- Details of plans and efforts by governments, NGOs, and
others to combat deforestation and desertification, including
the Great Green Wall project.
-- Governments' willingness and ability to manage
exploitation of natural resources and respond to natural and
man-made environmental disasters.
-- Capability and willingness to protect nearby sea lanes,
and fishing grounds and other Exclusive Economic Zone claims.
-- Negotiating positions at international environmental
meetings.
-- Government and public perceptions regarding environmental
issues.
NIPF Priority for ENVR

Niger: 5
HUMINT Priority for ENVR

Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Senegal: 5H
¶D. Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure

(INFR).
-- Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities,

and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications
infrastructure and information systems, command and control
systems, networks, and technologies used by government,
military, and private sector.
-- National leadership use of, and dependencies on,
dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information
systems.
-- Details about national and regional telecommunications
policies, programs, regulations, service providers, vendors,
and training.
-- Details about internet and intranet use, infrastructure,
and government oversight.
-- Plans and efforts to acquire U.S. export-controlled
telecommunications technology.
-- Details about information repositories for Radio
Frequency Identification-enabled systems used for passports,
government badges, and transportation systems.
-- Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and
NIPF Priority for INFR

Chad: 4
HUMINT Priority for INFR

¶A. Chad: Sudan/Darfur Issues (SRCC-2).
-- Details about Sudanese-backed insurgency in Chad and

Chadian-backed insurgency in Sudan and related population
movements.
-- Indications of actual or potential refugee or IDP
movements, especially Sudanese and Central African Republic
refugees.
-- Human rights abuses against refugees currently located in
Chad.
-- Government's political will and intention to engage
Sudanese-backed separatists.
-- Military capability to combat Sudanese-backed separatists.
-- Role of international institutions in stabilizing
domestic uprising.
-- Details about Chadian insurgents' relationship with the
Government of Sudan.
-- Details about the government's relationship with Sudanese
insurgents in Darfur.
-- Presence or activities of international terrorist groups
in insurgencies.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV936, CODEL KYL'S MEETING WITH PRIME

MINISTER NETANYAHU:
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0626
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0936/01 1180813
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280813Z APR 09
SIPDIS
H PASS TO CODEL KYL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KNNP KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: CODEL KYL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU:
WHAT WILL THE U.S. DO ABOUT IRAN?
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Kyl, accompanied by the Ambassador,

called on Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu April 6 in the
first official U.S. meeting with Netanyahu since he formed a
government. The main topics of discussion were stopping
Iran's nuclear program and Netanyahu's approach to
peace-making with the Palestinians. On Iran, Senator Kyl
raised ways to increase the effect of sanctions, including
possible legislation targeting Iranian imports of refined
petroleum. Adopting a forceful stance, Netanyahu asked
repeatedly what the U.S. plans to do if sanctions and
engagement fail to stop Iran's program. Calling Iran's
development of a nuclear bomb a world-changing event,
Netanyahu said all other issues become insignificant by
comparison. On the Palestinians, Netanyahu reviewed his
intent to pursue a three-track approach with political,
economic, and security aspects. While noting that his
government is conducting a review of Israeli policy toward
the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted that there is agreement
within the government and among 80% of Israelis that the
Palestinians should be able to rule themselves, but with
limits imposed by Israel's security requirements. Netanyahu
said the only difference between his position and that of
opposition leader Tzipi Livni is over the name of the goal,
i.e. the two-state solution. In response to comments by
Senator Sessions that the Palestinian Authority needs
functioning courts and jails as well as police, Netanyahu
agreed but said he had not yet focused much on Palestinian
governance issues. Netanyahu said he wants to show the
Palestinians the benefits of peace, but with the proviso that
if Iran goes nuclear, peace will fail. Predicting that his
government would pleasantly surprise many critics, Netanyahu
concluded that he hopes to come up with a common approach
with President Obama. End Summary.
¶2. (U) CODEL Kyl, consisting of Senator Jon Kyl (R, AZ);
Senator Jeff Sessions (R, AL); Representative Jane Harman (D,
CA); Representative John Kline (R, MN); and Representative
Chris Carney (D, PA), called on Prime Minister Benyamin
Netanyahu April 6. The Ambassador, Congressional staff, and
Pol Couns (notetaker) participated in the meeting. Netanyahu
was joined by National Security Adviser Uzi Arad, Spokesman
Mark Regev, Policy Adviser Ron Dermer, former chairman of the
Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Kadima MK
Tzachi Hanegbi (Senator's Kyl's counterpart in the
U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on National
Security), and the Israeli Embassy in Washington's
Congressional liaison officer. The meeting was the first
official U.S. face to face contact with Netanyahu since he
formed his government.
What Will the U.S. Do About Iran?

---------------------------------
¶3. (S) After a brief discussion of the world economic crisis,

Senator Kyl raised Iran, noting the "sobering" briefings the
CODEL had received from senior Israeli defense and
intelligence officials the previous day. Kyl said the
Congress is looking at legislation that would target Iran's
imports of refined petroleum products, adding that there are
only four or five companies that supply refined petroleum to
Iran and the U.S. has considerable leverage over most of
them. Kyl added that Israeli experts had told the CODEL that
they thought such legislation would be helpful. Netanyahu
said nothing is slowing the progress of Iran's nuclear
program. The Prime Minister asked what will happen to the
Middle East if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon? If such a
prospect is unacceptable, what will the U.S. do as Iran
reaches the nuclear threshold? What will the U.S. do if
Pakistan is taken over by Islamic radicals?
¶4. (S) Representative Harman told Netanyahu that no one in

the CODEL disagreed with his analysis, but the U.S. should
give engagement an opportunity to see if it works. If it
does not, at least it would show the world that the U.S. had
tried. She added that Congress supports engagement on a
bipartisan basis. Senator Kyl added that the Europeans tried
to engage Iran for five years but it did not work. President
Obama will pursue engagement, but Kyl said he doubted it
would be successful. We should consider what to do in the
mean time. Netanyahu responded that the U.S. should move
quickly. Engagement should have a short time limit and a
specific goal, for example talk to the Iranians for four to
twelve weeks and make clear that the U.S. goal is an end to
their nuclear program. Leaning forward, Netanyahu repeated
his earlier question: "What will you do if it does not work?"
TEL AVIV 00000936 002 OF 003
¶5. (S) Netanyahu said that learning to live with a nuclear

Iran would be a big mistake which would lead to a different,
more dangerous world. While he noted that he could not say
for certain that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against
Israel, if Iran had a bomb Israelis would have to ask that
question every day. This is a historic moment, and leaders
have a responsibility to make decisions. All other issues
are insignificant by comparison. For a third time, Netanyahu
asked, "What are you going to do?"
Netanyahu's Approach to the Palestinians

----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Senator Kyl asked the Prime Minister about his view of
the two-state solution. Netanyahu said he plans to engage
the Palestinian Authority quickly and will not tie political
talks with the Palestinians to developments with Iran.
Reviewing a now familiar formula, Netanyahu said he will
approach the Palestinians on parallel political, economic and
security tracks. Political talks would aim at achieving an
agreement within certain limits, the economic approach would
promote foreign and Arab investment and joint projects with
Israeli partners, while the security track would continue to
build up the PA's security forces. In order to do any of
this, Netanyahu noted, he will need a Palestinian partner.
¶7. (C) Representative Harman observed that the CODEL had

visited units of the PA's National Security Forces and the
Presidential Guard. PA Prime Minister Fayyad said he was
happy with the PA's security forces, and they want to take on
increased responsibility for security in Jericho and Jenin.
Netanyahu replied that Israel would be happy to let them do
more, but it is not clear what Hamas will do next. If Hamas
forces a confrontation, Israel will have to initiate further
military action in Gaza. Israel did not want to go back into
Gaza, but it will do what is necessary to protect its people.
¶8. (C) Netanyahu said his government is reviewing Israel's

policy toward the Palestinians. There is a consensus in the
government and among 80% of the Israeli public that the
Palestinians should be able to govern themselves. The only
limits on Palestinian sovereignty would be elements that
affect Israel's security. A Palestinian state must be
demilitarized, without control over its air space and
electro-magnetic field, and without the power to enter into
treaties or control its borders. Netanyahu concluded that he
and opposition leader Tzipi Livni "only disagree about the
name," i.e. the two-state solution.
¶9. (C) Senator Sessions noted that people everywhere want law
and order. Palestinians not only need to deal with
terrorism, they also need a functioning legal system. Moving
from a lawless system, the Palestinian Authority is showing
some pride, but police are not enough, they need courts and
jails that work. Economic development is impossible in a
lawless society. Netanyahu agreed this was a valid point and
uncharacteristically admitted that he had not focused much on
Palestinian governance. He added that international
assistance should provide funding for jails and courts. It
is possible to create crime-free zones and begin economic
development "in bubbles" which would then be expanded.
Senator Sessions noted that Lt. General Dayton is focused on
this issue. Representative Harman commented that "bubbles"
in the West Bank would not be enough, Palestinians need law
and order everywhere.
¶10. (C) Netanyahu said the "classic rhetoric" of the peace

process has been that if Israel withdraws, all will be well.
Now, however, if Israel withdrew from the West Bank, Hamas
would take over. Economic development would not be a
substitute for a political settlement, but it would change
the environment and show Palestinians the benefits of peace.
Israel has been trying to "build a roof without a foundation"
and it has not worked. Netanyahu said there was one proviso:
If Iran gets a nuke, peace efforts will fail.
¶11. (C) Netanyahu pointed to the example of Jordanian King

Hussein, whom he termed Israel's best Arab ally and a man
deeply committed to peace. Yet when Saddam Hussein took
Kuwait, King Hussein got on board with the Iraqis. In the
event of a nuclear Iran, "all the Arabs will become Qatar."
We should therefore move in parallel to work for peace with
the Palestinians while acting to stop Iran. Netanyahu said
he thought his government would pleasantly surprise many of
its critics. He concluded the meeting by saying that he
wants to coordinate Israel's positions with the U.S. and
hopes to come to a common position with President Obama.
TEL AVIV 00000936 003 OF 003

¶12. (U) CODEL Kyl has cleared this cable.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09BEIJING1247, BEIJING-BASED G-5 CHIEFS OF MISSION

ON DPRK, GTMO
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO9500
DE RUEHBJ #1247/01 1281039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081039Z MAY 09
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4559
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1774
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2578
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2029

TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KIRF ECON CH FR JA GM UK
SUBJECT: BEIJING-BASED G-5 CHIEFS OF MISSION ON DPRK, GTMO
UIGHURS, SINO-JAPAN RELATIONS, DALAI LAMA
Classified By: Acting DCM William Weinstein. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) At the regular meeting of G-5 Ambassadors in Beijing

May 8, French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that State
Councilor Dai Bingguo told visiting former French President
Chirac that the West would not gain from more sanctions on
North Korea. Dai reportedly said that "the lever of economic
development" had not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks
and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was "the only way to make
progress." German Ambassador Michael Schaefer reported that
Germany had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some
Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo and had been subsequently
warned by China of "a heavy burden on bilateral relations" if
Germany were to accept any detainees. Japanese DCM Kunio
Umeda reported that Premier Wen Jiabao was "tired and seemed
under a lot of pressure" during his meeting with visiting
Prime Minister Taro Aso, while President Hu Jintao was
"relaxed and confident." According to UK DCM Chris Wood,
China had requested the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to
transit London or meet with any government officials. Wood
reported that local authorities in Gansu Province had
detained a British Consul, reflecting the authorities' angst
over foreigners traveling to the Tibetan regions of the
province. End Summary.
Participants
------------
¶2. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis hosted German Ambassador

Dr. Michael Schaefer, Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda, UK DCM Chris
Wood and Acting DCM May 8 for the regular gathering of
Beijing-based G-5 Chiefs of Mission.
Chirac's Visit to China, DPRK, Africa

-------------------------------------
¶3. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that President Hu

had not mentioned Tibet in his meeting with visiting former
French President Jacques Chirac. State Councilor Dai Bingguo
had told Chirac that the West would not gain from more
sanctions on North Korea and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was
"the only way to make progress" in Six-Party Talks. Dai
reportedly said that North Korea wanted to open up
economically and that the "lever of economic development" had
not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks. Dai suggested
to Chirac that, given China and France's "conflict of
interests" in Africa, the two countries should have a
dialogue on Africa.
Germany and Guantanamo Uighurs

------------------------------
¶4. (C) German Ambassador Schaefer said the German State

Secretary had informed China of the U.S. request to accept
some Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo, noting that Germany
had not made a decision regarding the Uighurs. He noted that
no German state had yet agreed to accept the detainees.
Ambassador Schaefer said China had not officially demarched
Germany but had warned Germany that accepting any Uighur
detainees would "put enormous pressure on Beijing and a heavy
burden on bilateral relations."
Sino-Japanese Relations
-----------------------
¶5. (C) Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda reported that PM Taro Aso,
who had visited Beijing April 29-30, had said Premier Wen
Jiabao was "very tired and seemed under a lot of pressure"
from dealing with the economic crisis, while President Hu
Jintao had seemed "confident and relaxed." PM Aso had
requested China not implement its planned compulsory
certification of IT products in China, while Premier Wen had
insisted the law was consistent with China's WTO commitments.
Dalai Lama
----------
¶6. (C) UK DCM Chris Wood reported that China had requested
the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to transit London but
softened the demarche by requesting that government officials
not meet the Dalai Lama if he were to transit the country.
French DCM Nicholas Chapuis said China's demarche was part of
BEIJING 00001247 002 OF 002
a campaign to limit the Dalai Lama's travel and noted that

the Beijing city government had threatened to break its
sister-city relationship with Paris if the Dalai Lama were to
receive an honorary citizen award from the French capital.
Ambassador Schaefer said Germany had not received such
demands from the Chinese, in spite of the Dalai Lama's
frequent trips to Germany.
Harassment of UK Embassy Staff in Gansu

---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) UK DCM Wood said UK Energy and Climate Change

Secretary Ed Miliband had recently visited Gansu Province and
had been accompanied by a British journalist from "The
Guardian." According to Woodward, local Chinese authorities
had briefly detained a British Consul to express displeasure
with the accompanying journalist, who had stayed in Gansu
without the authorities' permission after Secretary Miliband
had departed. "Local goons" had come to the traveling
delegation's hotel and threatened to follow a UK Embassy
female staffer (but did not). In addition, a British
"Financial Times" reporter in Sichuan had been harassed by
local authorities who were apparently upset by the
journalist's interest in reporting on schools destroyed
during the Sichuan earthquake.
Climate Change
--------------
¶8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science

Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on
climate change. In the lead up to Copenhagen, China would
not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be
constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package of
action items related to nuclear power, renewable energy and
reforestation. Wood said his impression was that China could
be induced to do more on climate change.
Rule of Law
-----------
¶9. (C) Ambassador Schaefer reported that German Minister of

Justice Brigitte Zypries recently had visited China to attend
a three-day rule of law dialogue on social security and
pensions that was attended by 45 Chinese lawyers and judges.
Schaefer said Germany and China would have another dialogue
on a proposed law on regulating lawyers, noting that the
Chinese Government was looking to give lawyers "more space"
without giving up control.
PICCUTA
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1119, KAYANI IS “DESPERATE” FOR

HELICOPTERS
Discussing cables
2009-05-25 2010-11-30 Embassy
VZCZCXRO1959
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1119/01 1450349
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250349Z MAY 09
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2019

TAGS PREL, PTER, MARR, PK
SUBJECT: KAYANI IS “DESPERATE” FOR HELICOPTERS
¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request. In a two hour conversation with Ambassador
May 23, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was “desperate”
for helicopter support as he had only five MI-17s operational. Kayani insisted
that Pakistani technicians were capable of doing required helicopter
maintenance. There are two ways for the Pakistani military to acquire additional
helicopters relatively quickly: (1) a lease, and we understand a waiver to
enable the USG to lease MI-17s now needs only congressional notification; and
(2) procurement through Pakistan’s FMF account, which also requires a waiver. We
expect Pakistan to prefer the first option. Post acknowledges the frustration of
dealing with the Pakistani military, but it is critical to our interests that
they receive help as soon as possible to clear Swat and move on the Waziristans,
the heart of cross-border operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Post
recommends that we request expedited congressional notification of the MI-17
waiver. In the meantime, we continue to seek Cobra helicopter spare parts. End
Summary and Action Request.

¶2. (C) In a two hour conversation May 23 (septel) Chief of Army Staff General
Kayani told Ambassador he was “desperate” for helicopter support. He said he
could not move against North and South Waziristan until he had more lift. At
that moment, he said he had five MI-17s operational. (This is a lower number
than others have told us.) As has been previously reported, Kayani wanted U.S.
support to lease MI-17 helicopters, and he needed spare parts for the Cobra
helicopters. Ambassador said she wanted to “clear the air” about some of the
offers of U.S. assistance that had gone unanswered, such as the helicopter
maintenance contract and the ISR platform.
¶3. (C) Kayani said he did not need U.S. help on maintenance: the Cobras were
twenty-five years old and had been maintained by Pakistani technicians. But he
needed the U.S. Government to stop the constant stream of leaks from Washington.
These always made it appear as if he were taking steps in response to U.S.
demands. He said he had been successfully moving troops from the eastern border,
but this was undermined by the drumbeat in the U.S. press that he was taking
this action in response to U.S. demands. The U.S., he said, is always trying to
press on him sophisticated U.S. systems, which the Pakistani military had
neither the ability nor the funds to manage. Domestic political support for
current combat operations would be eroded by a bigger U.S. military presence, he
said.
¶4. (C) Embassy understands that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) waiver that enables the USG potentially to procure
or lease MI-17s has just been approved by the Department, and the only remaining
hurdle is the Congressional notification. The notification process needs to be
expedited. The Mission is considering options to assist Pakistan Army in
procuring or leasing MI-17s. If the supplemental is passed, our preferred option
is to use the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) to lease nine
MI-17s. A U.S. controlled lease of this kind allows us to include necessary
maintenance (which any contractor is likely to stipulate) and provides leverage
over use of the helicopters in order to ensure the helicopters are applied in
counter-insurgency activities. The nine MI-17s the Pakistanis have requested
would be leased for the duration of ongoing overhauls of nine Pakistan Army MI-
17s and would, in effect, be a 1-for-1 backfill of those helicopters in
overhaul.
¶5. (C) Alternately, if the supplemental is not passed in time, the Mission can
advise the GOP to use its FMF to buy or lease MI-17 helicopters. If the GOP
chooses to use its FMF for this purpose, the Mission will need to obtain an
Offshore Procurement (OSP) waiver from DOD, with State Department and Department
of Treasury concurrence, and an agreement with the GOP specifying the conditions
on how they intend to use these new MI-17 helicopters, The terms of the
agreement will specify use of the helicopters in support of counter-terrorism
and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and portions of Balochistan. Further, if
a purchase, the agreement will require a comprehensive
ISLAMABAD 00001119 002 OF 002
maintenance and logistics package in conjunction with the helicopters.
¶6. (C) Finally, we will require access to the helicopters above and beyond
normal End Use Monitoring standards in order to certify the helicopters’ use in
COIN operations. The Mission’s assessment is that because the Pakistan military
has not forecast the use of FMF for helicopter procurement, the opportunity cost
of using FMF to procure helicopters makes it unlikely that the GOP would choose
to do so quickly. In any case, we are fully prepared to assist the Pakistan
Army to address the maintenance issues of the MI-17 helicopters if it so
desires. If, as General Kayani indicates, only five MI-17s are operational, we
can produce the equivalent of ‘new’ helicopters by assisting the Pakistan Army
to repair the helicopters that are non-operational.
¶7. (C) Other helicopters in Pakistan’s aviation fleet face equally troubling
operational readiness and availability issues. We are searching for and
acquiring specific critical spare items for Cobra helicopters as quickly as
possible, and have provided an agreement to resume work on eight Pakistani
Cobras now in the U.S. Despite the urgency of the existing situation in the NWFP
and FATA, we are waiting for the GOP to sign letters of agreement on Cobra spare
parts.
¶8. (C) Comment: Embassy is aware that U.S. engagement with the Pakistani
military has been frustrating. Transparency is often non-existent. Offers of
assistance go unanswered or are overruled at headquarters, even as Pakistan’s
maintenance and training are inadequate. Still, the success of our own troop
surge in Afghanistan and the stability of Pakistan’s government depend on
rolling back the terrorist threat in Swat and eliminating the terrorist
safehavens in the Waziristans. The inability of the GOP to control North and
South Waziristan has enabled terrorists to operate throughout the country.
Kayani confided to an American visitor recently that he would not be able to
move to Waziristan until late summer. While that movement will not be determined
solely by the availability of helicopter support, it is certainly the case that
the availability of helicopters will be a key factor in making the decision to
go.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1152, U.S. REMOVAL OF PAKISTAN

RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL ON
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO3997
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1152 1471632
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271632Z MAY 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP MNUC PK
SUBJECT: U.S. REMOVAL OF PAKISTAN RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL ON
HOLD
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told Poloff on May 26 that the

recent spate of media attention on Pakistan's nuclear
security has led the GOP to delay an important
nonproliferation effort, the removal of U.S.-origin
highly-enriched uranium spent fuel from a Pakistani nuclear
research reactor. The GOP agreed in principle to the fuel
removal in 2007, but has been slow in scheduling a visit by
U.S. technical experts to discuss logistical and other
issues. In recent months, the Strategic Plans Division and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs both indicated progress on the
matter and a proposed visit for late May was under review.
However, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, a recent GOP interagency review
of the program concluded that the "sensational" international
and local media coverage of the security of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons made it impossible to proceed at this time.
If the local media got word of the fuel removal, "they
certainly would portray it as the United States taking
Pakistan's nuclear weapons," he argued. The visit will have
to be delayed for 3-4 months or until the political climate
makes it more conducive to hosting a U.S. visit, he stated.
¶2. (S) Comment: As noted in previous post reporting, the GOP

is extremely sensitive to media focus on Pakistan's nuclear
program. In a sign of their growing defensiveness, the
Foreign Office Spokesman took significant time out of his May
21 press conference to address nuclear security, stating
categorically, "there is simply no question of our strategic
assets falling into the wrong hands." To a question about
reported offers of U.S. help with nuclear security, he
responded, "we do not need this assistance." With the
postponement of the nuclear fuel removal, it is clear that
the negative media attention has begun to hamper U.S. efforts
to improve Pakistan's nuclear security and nonproliferation
practices. End Comment.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09RIYADH670, SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE'S
MEETING WITH SAUDI
Discussing cables
09RIYADH670 2009-05-17 16:04 2010-11-30 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Riyadh
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRH #0670/01 1371606

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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 2489
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4741
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 1648
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000670
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER AF PK SA YM
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH SAUDI
ASSISTANT INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAYEF
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)

¶1. KEY POINTS:
-- (C) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met in Riyadh May 16 with

HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN), Saudi Assistant Minister
of the Interior.
-- (C) Holbrooke emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan

should be treated as a closely inter-related problem. He
stressed U.S. desire for stronger cooperation and a common
U.S./Saudi approach to Pakistan based on economic assistance,
encouraging cooperation between Pakistani political factions,
and transforming the Pakistani army to fight a
counterinsurgency war.
-- (C) MbN noted the Saudis viewed the Pakistan army as the
strongest element for stability in the country. In reply
Holbrooke emphasized U.S. support for Pakistan's democracy
and said the U.S. opposed a military coup. MbN said he
agreed.
-- (C) MbN described Yemen as a dangerous failed state and a

growing threat to Saudi Arabia because it attracts Al-Qaeda
(AQ), said Yemeni President Saleh is losing control, and
outlined a Saudi strategy of co-opting Yemeni tribes with
assistance projects.
-- (C) MbN strongly supported President Obama's decision to

oppose release of photographs of U.S. detainee
interrogations, saying release would provide a boon to AQ,
and would be "the favor of their life."
PAKISTAN MUST NOT FAIL
¶2. (C) Holbrooke thanked the Prince for Saudi Arabia's $700
million pledge at the April 17 Pakistan donors'
conference in Japan. He said he had not come to make demands
or requests but simply to begin a consultative process. The
fact that three U.S. special envoys (Senator Mitchell, Dennis
Ross, and now Holbrooke) have visited Saudi Arabia
demonstrates the importance President Obama places on
U.S./Saudi relations and the Saudi role in the region.
Afghanistan and Pakistan were a major problem the new U.S.
administration had inherited.
¶3. (C) Success in Afghanistan was essential for U.S.

security as well as security in Europe and the Middle East,
Holbrooke continued. The U.S. might be able to live with
some degree of instability in Afghanistan, but not with an
unstable Pakistan, because of Pakistan's nuclear arms,
fragile politics, and relationship with India. He asked if
Saudi Arabia shared this conclusion. MbN said "Absolutely,"
a comment echoed precisely in Holbrooke's subsequent meetings
with King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal
(septels). It's clear that Saudi Arabia has a "unique"
relationship with Pakistan, Holbrooke said. He noted that
over 800,000 Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia. Saudi
Arabia was especially important to Nawaz Sharif, the most
popular politician in Pakistan. These were reasons why what
happened in Pakistan was of direct concern to both the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia.
¶4. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shared a
common purpose on Pakistan but not yet a "common
collaboration." The purpose of his visit was thus to begin a
dialogue on Pakistan and seek a common policy. Neither the
U.S. nor Saudi Arabia could afford to let Pakistan fall
apart. There were three important issues to address:
-- Pakistan desperately needs economic assistance;

-- Even though the Saudis preferred Nawaz Sharif, Sharif and
Zardari need to be persuaded to work together;
-- The Pakistan army needs to restructure itself to fight
today's war against the Taliban rather than yesterday's war
against India.
If Pakistan fell apart, Holbrooke said, the consequences for

Saudi Arabia would be "unimaginable,"
especially if Pakistan's nuclear weapons fell into unfriendly
hands. ("God forbid!" interjected the Prince.)
"Under your leadership," Holbrooke told the Prince "Saudi
Arabia has defeated terror, but if Pakistan falls apart, the
result would be catastrophe."
¶5. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. wanted to expand the

U.S./Saudi relationship concerning Pakistan. Saudi Arabia
could do a lot for Pakistan, he added, noting that economic
and social conditions in Pakistan created fertile ground for

extremism. Zardari had many faults but he was democratically
elected, so the U.S. tries to get him and Sharif to work
together. Meanwhile, Holbrooke said, money for the Taliban
flows in from the region.
¶6. (C) MbN said a vacuum in Islamabad would be dangerous.

He described Pakistan army Chief of Staff General Kayani as a
"decent man" who wanted to restore dignity to the army, and
sought consensus support of all the civilian factions. The
army was the Saudis' "winning horse," MbN said, but it needed
to prepare to fight the current war against terror.
Pakistani soldiers needed to be proud of their service, and
not hide their identity as soldiers when they were off duty,
MbN said. He had told Kayani that Pakistani troops needed to
feel they were fighting for Pakistan and not the U.S. The
Pakistani army had a "golden opportunity" because now
Pakistan faced an external enemy. MbN emphasized that the
army was Pakistan's "best bet" for stability. There were
800,000 Pakistanis and over one million Indians living in
Saudi Arabia, MbN said, and millions more visited the
Kingdom to make the Hajj pilgrimage, so anything that
happened in Pakistan, or between Pakistan and India, was a
threat to stability in Saudi Arabia.
¶7. (C) Holbrooke said he knew Kayani, with the Director of

Pakistan's intelligence service (ISI), and
General Pasha, and also Musharraf. He recalled the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia had decided to support Musharraf in
the aftermath of 9/11. This had been the right decision at
the time but Musharraf had been a disappointment. The U.S.
supported democracy in Pakistan, not any individual leader.
Holbrooke repeated that the U.S. supported Zardari because he
was elected, and emphasized that the U.S. was "100 percent
opposed" to a military coup in Pakistan. MbN assured that
Saudi Arabia would not support a coup either.
¶8. (C) He noted the U.S. agreed that corruption in Pakistan

was an issue, but the U.S. had decided it was more
important to help Pakistan. Attaching onerous conditions to
assistance was a mistake, Holbrooke said. Since the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia agreed on Pakistan's importance, the question
was how to start working together. MbN answered that
U.S./Saudi security cooperation should stay as it is, since
it had "never been better" despite past tensions. Each side
knew its own business best, and the focus should be on
obtaining results. MbN characterized Saudi cooperation with
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies as "one team."
¶9. (C) Holbrooke reiterated that terrorists in Pakistan were

not under enough pressure and pressed the point that
U.S./Saudi cooperation on Pakistan needed to rise to a higher
level. MbN replied that he had asked King Abdullah
for permission to maintain a "security channel" with the U.S.
to remain open at all times to facilitate information
exchange regardless of other issues in bilateral relations.
The Prince added that the King despised the corruption he saw
in Pakistan and this colored his views toward that country.
"WE HAVE A PROBLEM CALLED YEMEN"
¶10. (C) Moving to a new subject, the Prince said "We have a
problem called Yemen." AQ has found fertile ground
there, he said. The geography was similar to Afghanistan,
and many Yemenis were more sympathetic to AQ's goals than
were the Afghans. Yemen is also closer to AQ targets and
recruiting grounds in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had detected
a pattern of individuals coming to the Kingdom for Hajj or
Umrah and then traveling south to Yemen ("it's only 400
miles," he noted) for training before returning to their home
countries. Saudi forces have arrested Egyptians and
Algerians, among others, who were attempting to do this.
¶11. (C) MbN described Yemen as a failed state that is "very,

very, extremely dangerous," and required focus. The Huthi
tribes were Takfiri and Shi'a "like Hizballah South," he
said. This was a threat forming around Saudi Arabia that
required action now. The Saudis would like Saleh to be a
strong leader, MbN said, but "his vision of Yemen has shrunk
to Sana'a," and he was losing control over the rest of the
country. Saleh's old advisors were gone and now he relied on
his son and other younger men who did not have good
connections with the Yemeni tribes. In contrast, Saudi
Arabia had good connections with the tribes, MbN said.
¶12. (C) MbN said the Saudis had established a bilateral

council with Yemen that met twice a year to consider
assistance projects. The Saudi representatives were the
Crown prince and the oil minister (Note: Crown Prince

Sultan has been incapacitated by illness for at least he past
year; it is not clear whether the bilateral council
has continued to meet in his absence.) Saudi assistance to
Yemen was not in the form of cash payments, MbN said, since
cash tended to end up in Swiss banks. Instead the Saudis
backed projects in the tribal areas of Yemen where AQ was
hiding. The idea was that when Yemenis saw the concrete
benefits of these projects they would push their leaders to
eject the extremists. Saudi Arabia was counting on this
strategy, MbN said, to persuade Yemenis to see extremists as
criminals rather than heroes. Holbrooke replied that the
U.S. understood Saudi concerns about Yemen, and would work
with the Saudis to address the problem there.
TERRORISTS STOLE OUR FAITH
¶13. (C) Turning to another issue, MbN recalled that the day
following President Obama's inauguration, White House
counterterrorism advisor Brennan had telephoned to assure him
the new president was committed to continuing the war on
terror. "Terrorists stole the most valuable things we have,"
said the Prince. "They took our faith and our children and
used them to attack us." It had not been easy to see Saudi
involvement in 9/11 and other terrorist incidents, he said.
AQ was smart in wanting to hit both the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia. AQ's strategic goal was to hurt the U.S. and to take
control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.
¶14. (C) MbN claimed that in 2003 radicals were present in

"90 percent" of Saudi mosques. The current Saudi leadership
had decided it needed to be on the front lines of the
struggle against terrorism, that the task could not be left
to the next generation, since AQ gained momentum every time
it succeeded. The Saudis realized they could not fight back
without public support, he said, and developed a strategy of
working with families of suicide bombers and other extremists
who had been killed. This approach involved providing
support to the families and telling them their sons had been
"victims" and not "criminals." This gave the families "a way
out" and
provided a public relations advantage to the government. "If
you stop five but create fifty" new radicals, "that's dumb."
MbN said. The Saudis measure their success against extremism
by looking at levels of terrorist recruitment the number of
successful operations, and they see a growing rejection of
extremist violence. The Prince related an anecdote about an
anti-terrorist operation in which the officer commanding
Interior Ministry forces had discovered his cousin was the
leader of the terrorists inside a surrounded building. MbN
said he had offered to relieve the officer, but the latter
had refused, and had insisted on leading the attack. The
officer succeeded in defeating the terrorists while capturing
his cousin alive.
¶15. (C) Saudi Arabia was not yet free of terrorism, MbN
said. Thus it remained important to defeat the terrorists on
the ground, in the media, and ideologically. The Saudis
wanted to do this in cooperation with the U.S., the Prince
said. Time was the key, and it was "not in our favor," he
added, so "we need to work fast."
¶16. (C) On terrorist financing, MbN said "We are trying to

do our best." Saudi Arabia has millions of visitors,
especially during Hajj. The Saudis are making arrests, but
are not making this public. Instead, the Saudi goal is to
make the public aware that donations could go to the wrong
places. MbN said that "if money wants to go" to terrorist
causes, "it will go," and that terrorist attacks were
inexpensive, "but let's make it harder." Holbrooke asked
what the Saudis would do with Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia who
financed terrorism. The Prince replied the suspects would be
tried in Shari'a courts with Wahhabi judges so that the
results of the judicial process could be used to condemn
extremist ideology.
A BIG FAVOR TO AL-QAEDA
¶17. (C) Holbrooke explained that President Obama had decided

to oppose release of 2000 photographs of U.S.
interrogations of terrorist suspects on grounds of national
security, and asked what the Saudi public reaction would be
to publication of these photos. MbN responded "You bet!" it
would be bad for security, and noted that following
publication of the first Abu Ghraib photos, Saudi authorities
had arrested 250 individuals trying to leave Saudi Arabia to
join extremist groups in Afghanistan. Release of more
pictures would give AQ "the favor of their life," said the
Prince. Saudi Arabia had fought very hard to defeat AQ on

the Internet, but he couldn,t see how to fight 2000 new
photos.
¶18. (U) Meeting participants
U.S.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXX
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XXXXXXXXXXXX
Saudi Arabia
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX
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¶19. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.

RUNDELL
Viewing cable 09STATE47326, SBU) QUESTIONS ON REMOVAL OF ANTI-

AMERICAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0101
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #7326 1282021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 082009Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO IRAN COLLECTIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2034

TAGS: PINR IR
SUBJECT: (SBU) QUESTIONS ON REMOVAL OF ANTI-AMERICAN
SLOGANS AND ART FROM TEHRAN'S BUILDINGS (C-NE9-00993)
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIR., INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (C/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN

CONFIRMING A REPORT REGARDING AN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT DECISION
TO REMOVE ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND ART FROM TEHRAN'S
BUILDINGS. THIS DECISION WAS REPORTED IN AN AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE (AFP) ARTICLE ON 7 APRIL AND THE US-BASED IRAN TIMES
ON 17 APRIL 2009. THESE CHANGES COULD REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT
INDICATOR ON TEHRAN'S VIEWS TOWARDS ENGAGEMENT WITH THE US
AND FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE EFFORT AND GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE DECISION, POSTS' TIME AND RESOURCES
PERMITTING, WOULD BE VERY VALUABLE.
¶A. (U) WHAT, IF ANY, ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND MURALS ARE

CURRENTLY BEING REPLACED IN TEHRAN, INCLUDING THOSE IN AZADI
SQUARE AND THE "DOWN WITH AMERICA" MURAL ON KARIM KHAN
AVENUE? WHAT, IF ANY, PLANS ARE THERE TO REPLACE SUCH MURALS?
¶B. (U) IF THERE ARE PLANS TO REPLACE THE MURALS, WHO

AUTHORIZED THEM? WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE MURAL
REPLACEMENT PLAN?
1) (U) THE AFP ARTICLE MENTIONS MOHAMMAD REZA SHARIF KAZEMI

AS THE CITY OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT, WHAT IS HIS
POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT?
2) (U) HOW MANY MURALS WILL BE REPLACED?
¶C. (U) WHAT, IF ANY, PLANS ARE THERE TO EXTEND THE MURAL
REPLACEMENT TO CITIES BESIDES TEHRAN?
¶D. (U) HOW WIDELY HAS THE DECISION TO REMOVE THE ART BEEN
PUBLISHED IN IRANIAN PRESS?
¶E. (U) WHAT HAS BEEN THE REACTION OF THE IRANIAN

PUBLIC/PRESS TO THE DECISION?
¶F. (U) WHAT, IF ANY, ROLE HAS TEHRAN MAYOR QALIBAF PLAYED
IN THIS DECISION? TEHRAN CITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN CHAMRAN?
PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD? SUPREME LEADER KHAMENEI? RELIGIOUS
LEADERS IN QOM?
¶G. (U) WHAT, IF ANY, DEBATE IS THERE AMONG GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS ON THIS EFFORT? WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS OF
INDIVIDUAL LEADERS (PLEASE IDENTIFY) EITHER FOR OR AGAINST
THE PLAN?
¶2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-NE9-00993 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF

REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1060, REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH

IDF INTELLIGENCE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO3194
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DE RUEHTV #1060 1331220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131220Z MAY 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019

TAGS: PREL MPOS KNNP IR IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF YADLIN
Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida),

accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM
Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG
Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009. MG Yadlin focused his
discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of
Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian
nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM
was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington.
In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been
provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and
Mossad on Iran's nuclear program. The intelligence presented
included assessments of the current status of the Iranian
program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the
international community; and outcomes of engagement. The
differences that exist between the intelligence community in
interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the
relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also
presented. MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented
its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08
May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will
be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington.
Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined
that the PM appears determined on Iran.
¶2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the

differences in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG
Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group
and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile
program and a fissile program, there was no justification for
a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted
its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but
reinvigorated the program in 2005. He expressed that some in
the US agree with this and others do not. He went on to
explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate
Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.
¶3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more
precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and
timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the
position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its
current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what
Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and
sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to
produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for
several bombs. MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to
produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right
time in the future and that there are some who will always
doubt it despite the evidence.
¶4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of

engagement. MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement,
and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago
expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives
in engagement. He feels there needs to be an agreed upon
deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if
engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any
chance. He also expressed strongly that engagement should
have already started. MG Yadlin outlined four possible
outcomes of engagement. Two good outcomes would be the
Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement
that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts
to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater
cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran
playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of
engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain
a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler
went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that
the President may have better leverage with the American
public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted
and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people
need to consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG
Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a
third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees
things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can
not remove the military option from the table. Rep Wexler
stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised
by the President's acceptance of all possible options in
regards to Iran.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT757, IRAN POST-ELECTION: [Source removed]

CALLS
Discussing cables
09ASHGABAT757 2009-06-15 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ashgabat
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Monday, 15 June 2009, 13:08

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000757
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS IR, TX, PGOV, PREL, PHUM
SUBJECT: IRAN POST-ELECTION: [Source removed] CALLS
RESULTS A “COUP D’ETAT;” SAYS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD DEMAND A RECOUNT
ASHGABAT 00000757 001.2 OF 002
Classfied By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) In a conversation today with Iran Watcher, a [Source removed] in
Ashgabat labeled the announcement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in Friday’s
presidential election a “coup d’etat,” and called Iran’s incumbent President
“another Pinochet.” [Name removed] said that based on calculations from
Mousavi’s campaign observers who were present at polling stations around the
country and who witnessed the vote counts, Mousavi received approximately 26
million (or 61%) of the 42 million votes cast in Friday’s election, followed by
Mehdi Karroubi (10-12 million). According to his sources, Ahmadinejad received
“a maximum of 4-5 million votes,” with the remainder going to Mohsen Rezai. He
said that more than anything else, the huge turnout of voters on Friday was a
reflection of the Iranian electorate’s overwhelming “anti-Ahmadinejad”
sentiments.
PRECINCT RESULTS OBSCURED
¶2. (C) [Name removed] said that in a clear departure from established electoral
rules and practice in Iran, including the procedures followed in the 2005
presidential election and last year’s legislative elections, the authorities
embargoed the results from individual precincts and announced instead that they
must be conveyed directly to the central election authorities, who would
announce the overall results after all the votes were counted. The Iranian
authorities knew, he said, that attempts to falsify individual precinct counts
could be countered by observers from the Mousavi and the other campaigns, so in
order to engineer a “lopsided” Ahmadinejad victory, they had no choice but to
conceal the precinct results. In his words, “People know who they voted for and
the observers know who won in each precinct.”
ARAB REACTION: A HUGE DISAPPOINTMENT
¶3. (C) [Name removed] said that Iranians are puzzled by the muted reaction thus
far of the U.S. and EU governments, as well as “very disappointed” by the number
of Arab rulers who have sent messages to Ahmadinejad congratulating him on his
“victory.” He said that the international community should acknowledge the
illegitimacy of the election and demand that the Iranian authorities release and
account for the results from each precinct. He said the IRGC (Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps) was behind the “coup.” Even Supreme Leader Khamenei,
he said, to whom the IRGC owes allegiance, is “not totally in control” of the
IRGC. Citing the IRGC’s warnings against a “velvet revolution” in the days
leading up to the election, it would appear that the IRGC has taken on “a life
of its own.”
IRANIAN DIPLOMATS GET 4TH OF JULY INVITATION INSTRUCTIONS
¶4. (C) During a visit to the Iranian Embassy in Ashgabat last Friday to vote,
[Name removed] said that, without exception, “everyone he spoke to” who was
there to cast their ballot said they were voting for Mousavi. [Detail removed]
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: “OUR ONLY OPTION”
¶5. (C) [Name removed] said that the Iranian authorities, particularly the IRGC,
are “merciless” and, “unlike the government in 1979,” will use any level of
force necessary to put down Iranians who attempt
ASHGABAT 00000757 002.2 OF 002
to demonstrate or force an annulment of the election. Instead, he said, the most
effective means to counter the results will be in the form of peaceful, civil
disobedience. “The people need to act in concert and ‘shut down the country.’”
“If no one goes to work and the government cannot function,” he said, “this will
cause them to think again.”
6 (C) COMMENT: During our conversation our interlocutor recalled the words of
his father [detail removed] during the lead-up to the 1979 revolution. He said
that his father warned him against joining the revolution and to “watch out for
the Islamists.” “Once they get power,” he had said, “they’ll never relinquish
it. People are going to be sorry.” END COMMENT. MILES
Viewing cable 09ASTANA982, KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE AMBASSADOR
COMMENTS ON KEY FOREIGN
Discussing cables
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000982

SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, EUR/CARC, EAP/CM, EAP/K, EEB/ESC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS PREL, ECON, EPET, AF, GG, RS, IR, KN, ZK, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON KEY FOREIGN
POLICY ISSUES
REF: ASTANA 0678
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 5, Chinese Ambassador Cheng Guoping hosted the
Ambassador for dinner at the restaurant on the 23rd floor of a striking new
hotel built in Astana and owned by the Chinese National Petroleum Company.
During a fascinating, wide-ranging, three-hour tour d’horizon, the Chinese
Ambassador discussed his government’s policy -- and occasionally made personal
comments -- on human rights, smart power, President Obama, Afghanistan’s
reconstruction, Russia’s policy in Central Asia, Georgian President Saakashvili,
Iran’s upcoming presidential elections, North Korea’s nuclear tests, Central
Asia’s energy resources, the Manas air base, and the proposed international
nuclear fuel bank. The Chinese Ambassador clearly enjoyed the free and easy,
open-ended conversation and invited the Ambassador to meet again, at the
restaurant, in the near future. Guoping was joined by an unidentified policy
advisor and an interpreter, to whom he addressed his remarks in soft whispers
throughout the evening. END SUMMARY.
CHINA’S MFA “SCARED” BY PELOSI’S VISIT
¶2. (SBU) Guoping was relaxed, wearing short sleeves and no jacket, and clearly
eager to engage and entertain his American guests. He began the evening by
referring to the recent visit to Beijing of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Without
openly acknowledging or discussing the twentieth anniversary of the June 4,
1989, Tiananmen Square protests, Guoping said the government was prepared, and
also fearful, for the Speaker to raise human rights and democracy issues during
her visit. “She had the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) scared to death on the
eve of her visit,” Guoping said, half-jokingly.
PRAISE FOR SMART POWER
¶3. (SBU) Without prompting, Guoping praised President Obama’s leadership style
and approach to foreign affairs. He singled out the President’s “effective
management” of the financial crisis, for example, calling his decisions to
stimulate the U.S. economy “bold and courageous.” He called the President’s June
4 speech in Cairo - which Guoping was able to download in Mandarin from the
Department’s website - “a milestone for the use of smart power.” Guoping said
the President’s willingness to employ both military and cultural assets would
prove to be a “very effective” approach to foreign affairs. He observed that
statesmen require both in order to achieve their policy objectives and said the
Administration’s use of “smart power is a very good idea.”
IRANIAN ELECTIONS
¶4. (SBU) Guoping perceptively connected the Cairo speech to upcoming elections
in Iran. “This speech is very timely,” he said. “I predict that it will
influence Iran’s presidential elections, and will be particularly beneficial for
reformers in Iran.” He said that President Obama has already played a positive
role in rebuilding U.S. relations with Iran and again stressed the importance of
the upcoming elections. “The reformists have a chance,” he said. Guoping
suggested that it would be impossible for Iran to ignore President Obama’s
overtures for long. “They cannot remain in the background of these global
changes in foreign policy. If they do, they will become even more isolated than
they already are. And ultimately, if Iran doesn’t respond, President Obama will
have to change his policy. Iran might be the last country standing for extremism
in the Muslim world,” he said.
FOCUS ON THE TALIBAN
¶5. (SBU) About Afghanistan, Guoping said the Taliban is the real enemy of the
United States and the “basis for terrorism in South Asia.” He argued that the
United States must first “eradicate the Taliban in order to defeat terror in
Iraq” and said the Administration’s emphasis on Afghanistan was a shrewd policy.
“You have enlisted the help of all governments in the region to assist
ASTANA 00000982 002 OF 004
with the rebuilding of Afghanistan, saying that to do so is to play a part in
the war against terrorism. No one is able to say openly that they do not want to
combat terrorism, so you have made it very difficult to refuse to help.”
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
¶6. (C) In particular, Guoping said that the Northern Distribution Network to
transport non-lethal supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan has enabled many
countries to participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. He said that the
Chinese government is aware of the U.S. government’s request to transit non-
lethal supplies via China and said “we are actively researching this suggestion.
In essence, it would mean that the People’s Republic of China would be
supporting a NATO military operation, which would be an interesting
development.” Guoping confided that China’s MFA and its Ministry of Defense have
different opinions on the subject, although he said he expected a decision soon.
“My own personal opinion,” he said, “is that we will do the right thing and
cooperate with NATO and the U.S. government in Afghanistan.” Guoping said this
would be an appropriate issue to raise in the context of the President’s visit
to Beijing in July.
RUSSIA’S POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
¶7. (C) Guoping said that Russia is experiencing “severe difficulty” now because
of the global financial crisis. He suggested that the government of Russia is
eager to improve relations with the United States now because Moscow is
concerned that the economic downturn will begin to affect the political
stability of the country, “even the stability of the Kremlin.” Guoping said that
Russia does not want or need any foreign policy problems right now; “they need
to focus on their domestic, economic affairs.” Guoping also said that Russia
would like more support from the United States for its insistence on a
privileged sphere of influence in Central Asia, in exchange for greater
cooperation in Afghanistan. “Russia is convinced that they must dominate Central
Asia and the Caucasus. They believe they have vital, strategic, historical
interests in the region,” Guoping said. When pressed by the Ambassador to
express his own opinion, Guoping said, “I personally do not agree that Russia
should be granted a special sphere of influence in the region, but that is their
view.”
ON GEORGIA
¶8. (C) On Georgia, Guoping said he expects Russia to use military force to
overthrow Georgian President Saakashvili. He did not elaborate or offer any
specifics, but merely observed that Russia has already established military
bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and is likely to remain there for the
foreseeable future. Guoping worked in Georgia for four years and understands
well the history and culture of its people. He observed that South Ossetia has
strong cultural ties to Russia, but said it is likely that the Ossetians will
ultimately press for greater independence from Russian influence.
¶9. (C) In unusually blunt language, Guoping said Saakashvili is “not a mature
statesman. He overreacted to Russian provocations and gave Russia the
opportunity to take Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” Guoping suggested that
Secretary Rice’s July 2008 visit to Georgia before the war in August 2008, might
have indirectly encouraged Saakashvili to take military action. He said his
understanding was that Saakashvili briefed Secretary Rice on his plans to
mobilize Georgian armed forces and when she did not directly object, Saakashvili
mistook that as a sign of U.S. support. Guoping said, “Clearly, Russia baited
and cheated Georgia. But Saakashvili was impressed with his earlier success in
Batumi (Adjara) and he thought he could involve the United States in the war.”
Guoping said he expects former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze to become
Georgia’s next president. “She is much more mature than Saakashvili. He won’t
stay long,” he said.
NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR TESTS, DOMESTIC POLITICS
¶10. (C) Guoping seemed genuinely concerned by North Korea’s recent
ASTANA 00000982 003 OF 004
nuclear missile tests. “We need to solve this problem. It is very troublesome,”
he said, calling Korea’s nuclear activity a “threat to the whole world’s
security.” China opposes North Korea’s nuclear testing and is working to achieve
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, according to Guoping. When asked
about the reunification of Korea, Guoping said China hopes for peaceful
reunification in the long-term, but he expects the two countries to remain
separate in the short-term. Guoping said the domestic political situation in
North Korea is “very complex” and suggested that Kim Jong-il’s reported decision
to anoint his youngest son as his successor was driven more by Kim’s
deteriorating health than any carefully planned strategy. “They had no time to
plan for this,” he said. Guoping said the “military really governs” North Korea
and controls domestic politics and foreign policy. He suggested that Kim Jong-
il’s announcement was designed to send a message to the military and the great
powers that he is really in charge and in control. Guoping said China’s
objectives in North Korea were to ensure they honor their commitments on
nonproliferation, maintain stability, and “don’t drive [Kim Jong-il] mad.”
CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY
¶11. (SBU) Turning to a discussion of energy resources and energy security in
Central Asia, Guoping said that Russia owns and controls most of Central Asia’s
pipelines, “but it cannot prevent the ultimate diversification of export
routes.” He said that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are close to
Russia, but they nevertheless understand that they must seek and develop
alternatives. He predicted that they will soon “break the Russian monopoly” on
the export of hydrocarbons from the region and said the oil and gas pipelines to
China now under construction will be “very important” in that regard. Guoping
said that Kazakhstan’s oil pipeline from Atasu to Alashankou would be completed
in July and will initially carry 200,000 barrels per day (bbl/d), but will soon
be expanded to 400,000 bbl/d. He said China would encourage Western oil
companies to ship their production eastward. He was aware of plans to ship
Kazakhstani oil across the Caspian Sea by tanker and said China had no
objections to the project, which they considered “strictly commercial.” When
asked about China’s recent $10 billion loan to Kazakhstan, Guoping confirmed
that $5 billion was earmarked for investments in the energy sector, including
the purchase of 50% of MangistauMunaiGas, while the remaining $5 billion would
be delivered to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan as a “soft loan that the
government would be free to use as it likes.”
POTENTIAL PARTNERSHIP WITH U.S. OIL COMPANIES
¶12. (SBU) Guoping said China sees “great potential for an energy partnership
with U.S. companies in Central Asia,” including the development of onshore
resources in Turkmenistan. He said that the Chinese MFA is very interested in
pursuing these opportunities and suggested that this would be worth including in
the China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue. “This is very reasonable,” he said,
adding, “Our government would actively support such a proposal.” The Ambassador
noted that Chevron is already working with Chinese companies in western China.
ON NAZARBAYEV
¶13. (SBU) Commenting on President Nazarbayev, Guoping called him a “wise and
mature statesman,” who has presided over a period of remarkable stability and
economic growth. He praised President Nazarbayev’s foreign policy skills and
added that China’s MFA has “great respect” for President Nazarbayev and holds
him in high regard.
MANAS AIR BASE
¶14. (C) Referring to the Manas air base, Guoping said that the government of
Kyrgyzstan has tried to show similar sophistication in balancing the interests
of the great powers in the neighborhood, but has been much less successful. He
said that according to his information, the United States is prepared to pay an
additional $50 million a year to the government of Kyrgyzstan “to make them
think
ASTANA 00000982 004 OF 004
about” keeping the base open. He said he has seen a subtle shift in U.S. policy
in the region, adding, “You’ve also made important progress in Uzbekistan. We
ourselves have noticed a change in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy over the last
year, especially toward Russia.”
NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
¶15. (C) Guoping did not appear to be well briefed on the subject of the IAEA-
administered international nuclear fuel bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat
Initiative. He was aware of Russia’s earlier proposal to host a fuel bank, but
he seemed surprised when told that Kazakhstan has announced its intention to
host an IAEA-administered fuel bank on its territory. Indeed, he went so far as
to question the accuracy of the Ambassador’s information that Iranian President
Ahmadinejad supported Kazakhstan’s proposal during his state visit to Astana in
April. “We are still conducting research on this idea,” Guoping said, subtly
indicating his unwillingness - or inability - to discuss the subject further.
¶16. (C) COMMENT: In the past six months, the Ambassador and Guoping have
established a relaxed, open, and even frank relationship. Guoping prefers to
meet the Ambassador in the U.S. Embassy or in a public place, having explained
previously that he believes his own Embassy’s temporary quarters are thoroughly
bugged -- by whom, he doesn’t say. CNPC built the high-rise, pagoda-roofed
Beijing hotel as a gift to Astana. The marble lobby is impressive, if a bit too
totalitarian-austere. The hotel was supposed to have opened in January, and we
are not convinced that it is now fully open for business. We were the only
guests in the restaurant, although an untouched full buffet was laid out. The
revolving restaurant provides a spectacular panorama of Astana, and the empty
steppe beyond, but it seems to revolve at varying speeds and sometimes can be a
bit too fast on a full stomach and after a few glasses of wine. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
Viewing cable 09BAKU478, IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN

BALUCHISTAN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09BAKU478.
09BAKU478 2009-06-12 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Baku
VZCZCXRO7600
DE RUEHKB #0478/01 1631211
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121211Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0001
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
Friday, 12 June 2009, 12:11

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000478
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, SNAR, ENRG, ELTN, AJ, PK, TU, TX, IR
BAKU 00000478 001.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN
REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN’S
MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH
IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
REF: A) KARACHI 145 B) 2008 BAKU 917
Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROBERT GARVERICK, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Summary
--------
¶1. (C) “Iran view from Baku” is the first in an occasional series from Embassy
Baku Iran Watcher that will report on short and/or partially documented items of
interest to Iran information consumers, but not necessarily warranting separate
cables. This cable includes information on reported increasing security problems
in Iranian Baluchistan, including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad
links; a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the dangers of
stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent quadrupling in first quarter 2009
(compared to first quarter 2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited
heroin; and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by industry
participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and Gas show. End Summary.
Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical businessmen, have told
Baku Iran watcher that the recent suicide bombing of a Sh’ia mosque, and
subsequent attack on a campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi
violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been building steadily
over several years. According to one source, the Iranian security forces may be
losing effective control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted that
the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored and influenced by similar
events on the Pakistani side of the border (recently described in ref(a)).
¶3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of completion of the
long-planned improved rail link between Pakistan and Iran, designed to run
through or near Baluchi territory on both sides of the border. The current rail
connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan, Iran is in poor
condition and has low freight-carrying capacity. Moreover, according to reports
it has recently been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other disruption
by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also traversing Iranian and Pakistani
Baluchi areas was originally supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009,
with container train service beginning in August. According to Iranian sources
in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be achieved, and regular use of the Iran-
Pakistan railway for significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable
future.
¶4. (S)[Source removed] quoted the Ministry source as saying that in 2008 Iran
asked Pakistan to establish a new, “more secure and modern” route, but that
Pakistan has so far refused. The source added that Tehran is rife with rumors
about the increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that many
guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are no longer occupied at
night due to the increased danger of attack.
¶5. (C) Another source, [Source removed] blamed the Ahmadinejad administration
for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices (including harassment of Sunni
clergy and congregations and raids on Sunni mosques) and other “arrogant”
crackdowns over the last few years. He claimed that these practices, combined
with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,
BAKU 00000478 002.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN REDUCING BORDER SECURITY;
GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN’S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-
ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
and few government services, has increased anger among Baluchis, and
identification of the central government as an “enemy.” He cited the appointment
of Ahmadinejad ally Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as
a typical insensitive blunder, calling him a “stupid, brutal, Sunni-hater.”
(Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in 2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End
Note).
GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S. military general
officers, the GOAJ’s Special Assistant to the President for Defense, General
Vahid Aliyev, related that he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with
(unnamed) high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not provide details,
Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian General raised alleged “foreign-
sponsored” efforts to foment unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including
Iranian Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the Iranian
population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev asserted that “there have been
four attempts by Iranian Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred
years, all of which were crushed” by the Iranian state. As an example, Aliyev
cited the Soviet effort during World War II to establish a breakaway “Republic
of South Azerbaijan.” The Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a “Truman-
Stalin Agreement,” which Aliyev depicted as a cynical “betrayal” of
collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the resulting repression
by Tehran resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more
into Soviet Azerbaijan.
¶7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev appeared to be implicitly
signaling that outside fomenting of unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by
the GOAJ. Aliyev similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with Iran
will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of refugees entering the
country. (Note: The three other “failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles” cited by
Aliyev presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional Revolution,
Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah’s centralization policies in the 1920’s, and
efforts by senior Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in
the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).
GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise
--------------------------------------------- -
¶8. (C) According to [Source removed], export of narcotics from Iran into
Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According to statistics provided
to Baku Iran watcher on June 3, 2009 by the UNODC-sponsored counter-narcotics
“Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center” (CARICC)
headquarters in Tashkent, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e., heroin derived from
Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan
nearly quadrupled during the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first
quarter of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin had been
fully processed in labs and was “ready for market.” Total heroin seizures in
Azerbaijan during the first quarter of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the
first quarter of 2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was
officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire year. In contrast,
reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin heroin during the first quarter of 2009
amounted to nearly 59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of
heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.
Projected Problems in Iranian Gas Links
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) The annual Baku Oil and Gas Show, held June 2-5, brought a variety of
energy company executives and pundits to Baku, though no senior officials from
Iran. An American
BAKU 00000478 003.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN REDUCING BORDER SECURITY;
GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN’S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-
ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
interlocutor told Baku Iran Watcher on the side of the show that a [Source
removed] had confided to him in a private conversation on June 4 that he viewed
near-term implementation of the Iranian-Pakistani gas link project as “very
unlikely.” The downbeat comment by the [Source removed] was made despite the
recent signing in Istanbul by President Ahmadinejad and President Zardari of an
Iranian-Pakistani MOU committing to the gas project. According to this source,
[Source removed] indicated that he had several reasons for this opinion, but the
only one he elaborated was that “the Pakistanis don’t have the money to pay for
either the pipeline, or the gas.”
¶10. (C) Meanwhile, during a panel discussion at the conference on the future
prospects of Caspian gas, several commentators noted the difficulty of doing
business in “unpredictable, overly bureaucratic” Iran, and the alleged
historical “unreliability” of Iranian gas supply contracts previously reached
with Turkey and Turkmenistan. For example, panelists recounted that, after long
negotiations, Iran has four times failed to sign separate Liquid national Gas
contracts at the last minute. Two panelists claimed that Iran has repeatedly
diverted gas supplies to meet domestic needs, thereby interrupting its
contractual gas exports - and has not paid contractual penalties for these
violations.
¶11. (C) A [Source removed] asserted bluntly that Iranian political leaders are
totally focused on domestic needs and personal jockeying, and are simply not
interested in hearing about the value of optimizing foreign gas exports. The
only exception, he claimed, is their interest in the notional prospect of
annually exporting ten billion cubic meters (bcms) of gas to Europe. He
attributed this interest to a conviction that such a deal will significantly
increase Iran’s political leverage in Europe and substantially insulate it from
future European pressure - a perception he characterized as revealing, and
“typically” unrealistic.
DERSE
Viewing cable 09BEIJING1634, CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK

Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0731
DE RUEHBJ #1634/01 1680645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170645Z JUN 09
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2034

TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV CH KN KS
SUBJECT: CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b/d
).
Summary
¶1. (C) In a June 16 luncheon in honor of visiting Hong Kong

CG Joe Donovan hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that
China liked a U.S. proposal described by Ambassador Bosworth
here on June 5 to put all issues related to the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into a package for
negotiation. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the United States holds the
key to bringing the DPRK back to the negotiation table and
suggested that succession concerns in North Korea might be
causing Kim Jong-il to escalate tensions with the United
States so that his successor, perhaps Kim Jong-un, could then
step in to ease pressure. XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that China experts
believe the DPRK has been processing highly enriched uranium
but asserted that the program was only in an initial phase.
XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that ROK envoy to the Six-Party Talks had not
offered any new ideas during his June 9 visit to Beijing and
that Japan's focus on the abductee issue continued to cause
concerns at the MFA. End Summary.
Chinese Protests to DPRK Have Had No Effect

-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) In a June 16 luncheon hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX made
clear that the PRC viewed recent provocative actions by the
DPRK as having gone too far. He assured the Charge that
Chinese officials had expressed Chinese displeasure to North
Korean counterparts and had pressed the DPRK to return to the
negotiation table. Unfortunately, XXXXXXXXXXXX added, those protests
had had "no effect." "The only country that can make
progress with the North Koreans is the United States," he
maintained. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, although China had assured North
Korean leaders that the United States was ready to have
bilateral talks with them, the North Koreans had insisted
that any message from the United States to the DPRK should be
delivered directly, not through China. XXXXXXXXXXXX took this as
further evidence that only by having direct talks with the
United States would North Korea return to the Six-Party
Talks.
China Likes a Package Approach

------------------------------
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that China viewed favorably the
USG proposal of putting all facets of a possible Korean
Peninsula denuclearization agreement into one package. XXXXXXXXXXXX
characterized Chinese and U.S. core interests in a nuclear
free Korean Peninsula as "shared." He reminded his hosts
that Punggye, the site of the DPRK nuclear test, was near the
Chinese border and that any accident there could have had
dire consequences for Northeast China. XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that
China was as concerned as the United States about
proliferation from North Korea. The only difference in the
China and U.S. positions, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained, was "the United
States was the key while China was only in a position to
apply a little oil to the lock."
Building Trust
--------------
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that building trust between the DPRK and
the United States would be difficult. In North Korea's view,
XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, the destruction of its nuclear capability was
an irreversible step while decisions by the United States
could be easily reversed. When CGs Donovan and Goldberg both
pointed out that trust was a two-way street and that North
Korea had not evinced a great deal of it, XXXXXXXXXXXX was evasive.
When pressed whether he believed the DPRK had been
reprocessing highly enriched uranium (HEU), XXXXXXXXXXXX said yes,
adding that Chinese experts believed the enrichment was only
in its initial phases and that any DPRK HEU program would not
be "very useful."
Domestic Concerns in North Korea Influence Talks

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that domestic politics in North Korea

were in a large way responsible for Pyongyang's recent
actions. He was dismissive of DPRK justifications for the
nuclear test as a response to the UN Security Council
BEIJING 00001634 002 OF 002
Presidential Statement critical of North Korea's April 5

Taepo-Dong 2 launch. "Kim Jong-il was obviously planning the
nuclear test at the same time as the missile launch so his
justification for the test makes no sense," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. XXXXXXXXXXXX
opined that the rapid pace of provocative actions in North
Korea was due to Kim Jong-il's declining health and might be
part of a gambit under which Kim Jong-il would escalate
tensions with the United States so that his successor,
presumably Kim Jong-un, could then step in and ease those
tensions.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that he
kept abreast of Western media reports about North Korea.
XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that U.S. experts should not assume North
Korea would implode after Kim Jong-il's death. He said that
PRC analysts concluded that the regime would still function
normally and discounted strongly any suggestion that the
system would collapse once Kim Jong-il disappeared.
ROK has no new ideas - Japan can only scuttle talks

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ROK Six-Party Talks envoy Wi Sung-lac
had met with VFM Wu Dawei on June 9 but had offered nothing
new. "The South Koreans have plenty of ideas, but we've
heard them all before," he complained, adding that the ROK
government was too close to the situation in North Korea to
be objective. Turning to Japan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Japan's
obsession with the abductee issue reminded him of a Chinese
expression for an individual who was too weak to make
something work, yet strong enough to destroy it.
Participants
-------------
Charge Dan Piccuta

Joe Donovan, U.S. Consul General Hong Kong
Robert Goldberg, Consul General Guangzhou
Mark Lambert, Regional Unit Chief
Jim Brown, interpreter
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
PICCUTA
Viewing cable 09BEIJING1761, PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON

UNSCR 1874 AND
Discussing cables
nytimes.com
O 260714Z JUN 09
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
CIA WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
OSD WASHDC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001761
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034

TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KNNP MOPS EFIN KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874 AND

POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR CHINA AND WASHINGTON
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling.

Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Chinese scholars in recent conversations with PolOff

said that Pyongyang's response to UNSCR 1874 had been "tepid"
so far and that North Korea's domestic political situation
did not appear to be tense. The DPRK had not anticipated
such a strong reaction to its nuclear test from the
international community, especially from China and Russia.
Several contacts insisted that the Six-Party Talks were "not
dead yet" and remained a good framework to discuss the DPRK
nuclear issue. Although Seoul and Tokyo would likely urge
Washington to take a harder line on the DPRK, Chinese
scholars urged the United States to take the lead on
resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and not be "led by
the nose" by its treaty allies. One contact proposed a
U.S.-PRC-Russia trilateral dialogue to generate new ideas on
the future of Northeast Asia. In light of the threat posed
by North Korea, a former MFA official said China should
strengthen its export control regime and target materials
related to uranium enrichment activities. He also urged
Washington and Beijing to have a discussion about
strengthening the monitoring of illegal financial activities
during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. End Summary.
UNSCR 1874
----------
¶2. (C) Pyongyang's response to UN Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR) 1874 so far, including the June 13 Foreign Ministry
statement and the June 15 mass rally in Pyongyang, had been
"surprisingly tepid," claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations during a XXXXXXXXXXXX
discussion. Pyongyang's
threats to weaponize plutonium and begin enriching uranium
were "empty threats" and it was clear that North Korea had
run out of leverage. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the DPRK had
miscalculated and had not anticipated that there would be
such a strong reaction to its nuclear test from the
international community, including China and Russia.
Pyongyang, he added, was "scared" of U.S. military pressure.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted in a XXXXXXXXXXXX conversation with PolOff

that senior North Korean leaders, including officials from
the influential National Defense Commission, were noticeably
absent from the Pyongyang rally protesting UNSCR 1874 that
had been attended by tens of thousands North Koreans. This
signaled to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the domestic situation was not that
tense.
¶4. (C) Pyongyang, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, was unhappy with China's support
of Resolution 1874. China would have no problem implementing
UNSCR 1874 but would do so in its "own way," he added. XXXXXXXXXXXX
suggested that China's enforcement would elicit a reaction
from Pyongyang, and recalled that the DPRK Embassy had
complained to him previously about China's strict enforcement
of UNSCR 1718, especially with regard to inspection of
possible dual-use items. Regarding new restrictions placed
on individual North Koreans, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern that it
would be difficult for Chinese host organizations to confirm
the details of every individual North Korean participating in
a visiting delegation.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX,

urged the United States and other nations not to go beyond
the scope of the resolution. He noted to PolOff in a XXXXXXXXXXXX
conversation that PRC President Hu Jintao had sought to have
a balanced response to the nuclear test by supporting
Resolution 1874 but had failed to fully please Washington or
Pyongyang.
Future Nuclear or Missile Tests?

--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Pyongyang would not conduct a third nuclear test
unless absolutely necessary, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. He
predicted that North Korea was more likely to conduct a
missile test, but noted that missile tests were extremely
expensive for the regime. North Korea's recent nuclear and
missile tests had been possible because the country had had
two consecutive years of good harvests, he speculated.
Six-Party Talks: "Not Dead Yet"

-------------------------------
¶7. (C) Several contacts insisted that the Six-Party Talks

remained a good framework to discuss the DPRK nuclear issue.
The Six-Party Talks were not "dead yet," said XXXXXXXXXXXX. He urged the United
States not to set any
preconditions on the DPRK returning to negotiations. The
United States should be willing to talk to the DPRK so that
Pyongyang did not become "desperate." The long-term
objective was still denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
and the medium term aim was to prevent more missile and
nuclear tests and a regional arms race, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
Washington Should Take the Lead

-------------------------------
¶8. (C) Several contacts urged the United States to take the
lead on resolving the DPRK nuclear issue. Several suggested
it was essential that Washington not be "led by the nose" by
Tokyo and Seoul. XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that, for understandable
reasons, the ROK and Japan tended to take a harder line on
North Korea. While the real threat to South Korea posed by
the DPRK nuclear test and missile launches was minimal, he
acknowledged the psychological threat the tests posed to the
ROK, especially to its economy. While Washington should
certainly consult with Tokyo and Seoul, it should be wary of
being pushed by its allies to take a more strident position.
"Harsh enforcement" of UNSCR 1874 might push Pyongyang to
retaliate, cautioned XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶9. (C) China was reluctant to be at the forefront of attempts

to resolve this issue, assessed XXXXXXXXXXXX. Recalling
Beijing's failure to prevent the first DPRK nuclear test in
2006, XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that China had a credibility issue. He
expressed hope that Washington could come up with a bold
proposal to break the current deadlock.
¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the importance of China-U.S.

cooperation and suggested that if Washington wanted to engage
in bilateral talks with Pyongyang, Beijing could help
facilitate the engagement and be a mediator. XXX also
suggested a possible U.S.-PRC-Russia trilateral dialogue on
the future of Northeast Asia as a useful mechanism noting
that all three countries were members of both the Six-Party
Talks and the P5.
Sustainable Security
--------------------
¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that Sino-American cooperation on the

DPRK issue presented opportunities to address more
fundamental issues such as the concept of "sustainable
security." XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the United States, despite having
invested energy, money, and lives on the global war on
terror, had not necessarily increased the security of the
American people. In the long-term, Beijing and Washington
needed to find ways to guarantee the strategic security of
other countries, including North Korea. Doing so would
require less investment and offer greater security returns,
he suggested, emphasizing that military power alone would not
resolve the DPRK issue. Peaceful multilateral processes,
such as the Six-Party Talks, would be more effective, he
concluded.
Strengthen Export Controls and Financial Sanctions

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said China was happy to see the adoption of
UNSCR 1874, but he questioned the effectiveness of the
counterproliferation and financial sanctions on the DPRK
regime. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK had a limited stock of
plutonium, possibly enough for two more bombs, and did not
appear to have a working uranium enrichment program yet.
Thus, he concluded, Washington and Beijing should focus on
preventing the further development of the DPRK's uranium
enrichment program. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that China strengthen its
export control regime and target materials that North Korea
might need for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.
XXXXXXXXXXXX advised that the current level of risk posed by North
Korea's provocative behavior was "affordable" since North
Korea did not have any HEU in the pipeline or have a
sustainable source of fissile material. However, once
Pyongyang developed its HEU capabilities, the situation would
become much more dangerous and difficult to resolve, warned
XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶13. (C) On financial sanctions, XXXXXXXXXXXX urged the United States

and China to have a discussion about strengthening the
monitoring of illegal financial activities, possibly
including terrorism finance, corruption, and proliferation
finance during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).
It would be more effective, cheaper and less risky to
intercept financial transactions for proliferation-related
materials, especially since North Korea only had a few
financial outlets, than to enforce the interdiction of
contraband goods, suggested XXXXXXXXXXXX. The global financial
crisis had spurred international cooperation on financial
matters and Washington and Beijing should take advantage of
this opportunity to enhance the monitoring of illegal
financial transactions. He emphasized that this type of
monitoring should be done on a global scale, and not simply
targeted at the DPRK, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
PICCUTA
NNNN
Viewing cable 09CARACAS728, VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF

SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6727
DE RUEHCV #0728/01 1621724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111724Z JUN 09
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
SIPDIS

COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
TREASURY FOR RJARPE
NSC FOR RKING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2019

TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EINV ENRG TRGY EMIN PTER
PINR, ASEC, MOPS, PARM, VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR
COOPERATION WITH IRAN/RUSSIA
REF: A. CARACAS 26
¶B. LA PAZ 806
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A plain-spoken nuclear physicist told

Econoff that those spreading rumors that Venezuela is helping
third countries (i.e. Iran) develop atomic bombs "are full of
(expletive)." He said Venezuela is currently unable to
provide such assistance particularly as the Chavez
administration "does not trust scientists." He added that
Venezuela's nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia
finalized May 4 is pure political theater as Venezuela is
incapable of cooperation with Russia on the development,
design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors. Also
contrary to the agreement with the Russians, to the knowledge
of the scientific community, there is no exploration or
exploitation of uranium, ongoing or planned, in Venezuela.
The scientist contended that, even if the Venezuelan
government used all Cuban scientists, exploring for
commercially viable uranium deposits in Venezuela would
require a large taskforce and news of such an effort would
leak quickly. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------------
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT POLITICAL THEATER
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoff

June 3 that the agreement between Venezuela and Russia on
nuclear cooperation has no real substance. The agreement,
signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2008,
but approved and formally issued by Venezuela's National
Assembly May 4, lays out cooperation between the Venezuelan
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and Russia's Rosatom in the
following areas: 1. Basic Nuclear Research; 2. Controlled
Thermonuclear Synthesis; 3. Development, design, construction
and operation of nuclear reactors; 4. Industrial production
of inputs and components for nuclear reactors; 5. Exploration
and exploitation of uranium and thorium; 6. Infrastructure
development for nuclear energy; and 7. the development of a
legal framework in the sector.
¶3. (C) In a previous conversation with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect

throughout) on December 2, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the only part of the Russian
agreement
that had any potential might be the exploration and
exploitation of thorium, as he believes Venezuela has
significant deposits of that resource (Ref A). XXXXXXXXXXXX
emphasized that as to the rest of the agreement, meaningful
cooperation is not possible. All Venezuela is currently
capable of, he argued, is the purchase of finished materials
and technology.
--------------------------------------------- -----
URANIUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION NOT HAPPENING
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX bluntly discounted the idea of cooperation with

the Russians on uranium exploration and exploitation, as well
as rumors that Venezuela is providing Venezuelan uranium to
assist other countries (i.e. Iran) with "atomic bombs."
(Note: International press reports citing an Israeli Foreign
Affairs Ministry document leaked May 25 alleged that Bolivia
and Venezuela are supplying uranium to Iran. For a similar
perspective from La Paz on the dubiousness of this claim, see
Ref B.) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that former Venezuelan President of the
Inter-American Commission on Atomic Energy Julio Cesar
Pineda's May 8 statements to the press about Venezuela having
more than 50,000 tons of uranium were "funny" and "not too
clever."
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in the states of Merida and Trujillo,
there might be uranium deposits ranging between 60 parts per
million (ppm) and 2,000 ppm, with 200 ppm being the minimum
for an economically viable deposit. He contended that no one
could be sure, however, since the last meaningful study
CARACAS 00000728 002 OF 002
concluded in 1976. He noted that his lab has conducted a

"yellow cake" experiment with a few milligrams of Venezuelan
uranium, but that it is impossible to extrapolate or even
guess at the amount of uranium in Venezuela from such limited
testing.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that currently, as with all nuclear

related materials, if Venezuela had a need for refined
uranium, it would make much more economic sense to simply buy
it rather than try to produce it itself. For political
reasons, however, the government could decide to refine
uranium anyway, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that no
Venezuelan scientists would be involved in such a decision as
the Chavez administration "does not trust scientists."
Nevertheless, he added, there is no indication of any
interest on the part of the government to resume uranium
exploration or exploitation.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the last uranium exploration effort
involved multiple labs and more than 30 scientists. Such a
major undertaking would not be easy to hide for long, he
said, even if the government avoided using Venezuelan
scientists and opted instead for a 100 percent foreign team
consisting primarily of Cuban members. Additionally, there
are only three labs in Venezuela that could measure whether
or not uranium concentrations are high enough to exploit.
All three labs, including the one at USB, XXXXXXXXXXXX reluctantly
admitted, either have broken equipment or no nitrogen. None
of the three, he said, could currently participate in such a
study.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (C) Although rumors that Venezuela is providing Iran with

Venezuelan produced uranium may help burnish the government's
revolutionary credentials, there seems to be little basis in
reality to the claims. Similar to the conclusions drawn by
La Paz in Ref B, it is highly unlikely that Venezuela is
providing Venezuelan uranium to third countries. At one
point, Venezuela may have been able to make good on Chavez's
claims that it would purchase multi-billion dollar nuclear
power plants from the Russians, but even that type of
"nuclear cooperation" is doubtful due to the Venezuelan
government's current financial difficulties.
CAULFIELD
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1364, SCENESETTER FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR JONES
Discussing cables
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INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, EAID, MARR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JONES
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your visit. Your arrival
comes at a moment when Pakistan’s political leaders, and its people, are united
in support of the military campaign to confront extremist militants in Malakand
(including the Swat valley) and South Waziristan, where the offensive has just
begun. Popular support for the offensive is broad but thin. Pakistan’s military
has begun its assault in South Waziristan with the goal of capturing or
eliminating taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose prominence among Pakistani
extremist groups has risen during the last two years. After losing strength in
his spring match-off with opposition leader (and former Prime Minister) Nawaz
Sharif, President Zardari has regained much of his political capital by
garnering national support for the military campaign.
¶2. (C) The USG is providing the lion’s share of international humanitarian
assistance being provided to the internally displaced who fled the taliban and
the military offensives in Malakand. Some eighty percent of the displaced are
staying with relatives or in rented accommodations. The GOP and international
humanitarian assistance organizations have so far been able to manage provision
of assistance to the roughly two million IDPs. The GOP would like the IDPs to
return as areas are cleared. But the longer term challenge of building a capable
civilian police force and a robust economy mirrors the needs spread across the
nation. The campaign in South Waziristan will play out differently; we expect
fewer IDPs, more casualties, and less access for the international humanitarian
assistance organizations.
¶3. (C) In the longer term, the GOP is confronted with a weak economy and a lack
of government authority (or government provided security) in much of the country
apart of the Punjab. We are planning how to spend USG funds to support
Pakistan’s civilian institutions, bolster budgetary support, strengthen the
military’s COIN capabilities, build the capacity of the police, and target
impoverished areas where youth are susceptible to militancy and extremism.
¶4. (C) Pakistan is digging its way out of an economic crisis that came to a
head in the fall of 2008, caused by poor policy choices which were compounded by
the global economic crisis and high international commodity prices. To set the
stage for longer-term prosperity, the government must undertake difficult
structural reforms such as eliminating subsidies (electricity, wheat) and
broadening tax base.
¶5. (C) Nuclear cooperation on security issues has decreased after wstatements
made in the press about purported U.S. plans to seize nuclear facilities
surfaced. Despite Zardari’s own inclination to improve relations with India, his
need to keep the military on his side (and/or his perceived rebuke from Indian
PM Singh in Russia) have kept him from agreeing to meet again with Singh in
Egypt. While we grant large amount of aid to Pakistan and its military, even
with the arrival to office of the well-perceived President Obama, America is
viewed with some suspicion by the majority of Pakistan’s people and its
institutions. End Summary.
Domestic Politics
-----------------
¶6. (C) The government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister
Yousaf Gilani, elected in 2008 after eight years of military rule, is stable.
The Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the
four provinces. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan
(with an 83 percent approval rating compared to Zardari’s 20 percent in the
latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government.
¶7. (C) Zardari signed Shari’a law in Swat, which precipitated the taliban’s
emboldened attempt to dominate Swat and bordering areas. He also overplayed his
hand when Nawaz and Shahbaz were declared ineligible by the Court. This exposed
him to the force of Nawaz’ ability to bring the populace into the street during
the (lawyer’s) “long march.” Having managed to stay in office by restoring the
Chief Justice and maintain civil order during that period, Zardari has recovered
through his so far successful (if not robust) management of relations with the
Pakistan Military and by
ISLAMABAD 00001364 002 OF 006
piggy-backing on the popular support for the military’s offensive against the
taliban.
¶8. (C) While Nawaz is preparing for the next election and appealing directly to
the street, a court case considering voiding past convictions against him is
winding its way through the Supreme Court. Even though Zardari retains the
Presidency, Nawaz can be seen as the real winner of the “long march” stand-off:
he demonstrated his popular support; stood firm in his demands; saw the Supreme
Court leadership reinstated; and, affirmed his right to run in the next
election. During the events leading up to the “long march” there was talk that
the Army might feel compelled to step in. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani is
determined that a civilian government succeed, however, and while he mistrusts
Zardari he despises Nawaz.
¶9. (C) While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American, anti-
extremist and eager to be seen as working with the USG. Zardari runs the show on
the civilian side, although he is not a popular leader and admits himself that
he came to high office without previous direct experience as an elected
politician. Secular and westernized, Zardari sees himself as viewing the world
the way Americans do; this same image works against him with the public.
¶10. (S) Zardari is less likely to make public announcements chastising the USG
for its policies in, and toward Pakistan (including on USG drone activity) than
other senior GOP officials. His public (and private) lament is that Pakistan has
the will to combat terrorism, but the USG has been miserly in providing
resources. In his own fashion, this is Zardari’s version of the widely held view
that Pakistan has made great sacrifices at the behest of America, for little
return and less recognition.
¶11. (C) Prime Minister Gilani has shown strong leadership skills in building
Parliamentary coalitions at times of national crisis and in the absence of
public leadership by President Zardari. Gilani has stiched together all party
Parliamentary sessions that have forged cross-party unity on the need to tackle
terrorism and to endorse the military offensives against Pakistani extremists
(often referred to as “miscreants”). He gave the impassioned address to the
public May 7 asking the Pakistani people to support military action in Swat and
surrounding agrees; a defining moment that marked the beginning of the sea
change in public attitudes toward the taliban and granted legitimacy to the
military’s actions.
¶12. (C) Gilani was also instrumental in bringing the “long march” crisis to a
peaceful resolution, and was the senior GOP official (not Zardari) who announced
the reinstatement of the Supreme Court Justice. Like Foreign Minister Qureshi,
Gilani comes from the religiously important Multan and is a Sufi saint. His
English is somewhat halting and conversation with him can be opaque. He pays
great attention to protocol and is an attentive listener, however, when he
believes he is being treated as a friend and equal. Reports of Zardari/Gilani
tensions are probably exaggerated.
Economic and Structural Challenges

----------------------------------
¶13. (C) Pakistan is digging its way out of an economic crisis that came to a
head in the fall of 2008, caused by poor policy choices which were compounded by
the global economic crisis and high international commodity prices. The
government sought relief from the International Monetary Fund, and signed a $7.6
billion agreement with them in November 2008. Under the terms of this agreement,
the GOP has curtailed borrowing from the central bank and greatly cut back its
expenditures, bringing its fiscal deficit down from over 7 percent of GDP to 3.4
percent. The market has responded to these reforms, and foreign exchange
reserves, which had fallen to dangerously low levels, have rebounded and the
value of the rupee has stabilized.
¶14. (C) However, to set the stage for longer-term prosperity, the government
must undertake more difficult structural reforms such as eliminating
unaffordable subsidies (electricity, wheat) and broadening its tax base. The
belt-tightening of the past eight months has caused growth to
ISLAMABAD 00001364 003 OF 006
slow, however, and it is estimated to be 2 percent for the current fiscal year,
down from original predictions of 4.5 percent. The challenge in the coming year
will be to stimulate the economy while maintaining a level of fiscal discipline.
The situation is complicated by the financial burden of caring for large numbers
of internally displaced persons and by the need to significantly step up
civilian law enforcement personnel, especially in NWFP, FATA, but also around
the country. The GOP is heavily dependent on donor assistance to pay for its
development and humanitarian assistance budget, at least for the foreseeable
future.
The Swat Military Campaign and IDPS

-----------------------------------
¶15. (C) The military’s effective campaign against taliban in Bajaur last fall
was limited in geographical scope. Rumors that taliban leaders were sitting in
Swat festered, and the government entered into a series of ill-advised and half-
hearted negotiations with extremist leaders residing in the region. These
resulted in Zardari’s eventual signing of the Nazm-e-Adl regulation in April,
which the government sold as meeting the local population’s demand for “speedy
justice.” Politicians were at pains to explain that Swat, as a princely state,
had an historically different history and custom and that the deal did not mark
an abdication of government authority or an open door to harsh (by Pakistani
standards) interpretation of Shari’a law. The wide-spread release of a video
showing taliban flogging a young woman in a public square brought doubts about
taliban intent home to the public.
¶16. (S) Zardari, meanwhile, argued privately that he had to sign the deal in
order that the GOP be seen to have been willing to try everything before turning
the military against its own people. The shocking flogging video circulated at
the same time as suicide bombers and terrorist gunmen took on targets including
police stations and main boulevard checkpoints in Lahore and Islamabad. In the
rural areas, they blew up Mosques and shrines. Public opinion about the taliban,
that it was part of the social fabric of parts of the country and if left
unperturbed would not damage public life, started to shift. Once the taliban
moved out of Swat, where extremists had overrun the streets and beheaded well-
known journalists, the view that the Nazm-e-Adl deal had been breached by the
taliban grew. PM Gilani gathered cross-party support in Parliament and appealed
to the public to support a military campaign in Swat.
¶17. (C) After military operations started in May in Swat and neighboring areas,
some two million Pakistani citizens moved out of the area and became internally
displaced. (The wealthier families of Swat departed a year earlier as taliban
violence against the feudal elite and the threat of it forced them to retreat to
Islamabad and elsewhere.) Senior GOP officials would be the first to say that it
was the hospitality of the Pakistani people which kept the IDPs clothed, fed and
sheltered in the first instance. Best estimates are that 80 percent of the
displaced have been taken in by Pakistanis, not necessarily relatives. NGOs and
the UN are serving the population not in camps. A combination of military-run,
community volunteer, and UN agency directed camps are sheltering the other IDPs.
¶18. (C) We have reports of some IDPs returning, including several hundred
thousand in Bajaur and up to half the populations in parts of Buner; families
traveling with livestock can be witnessed returning to the Swat area via roads
leaving Islamabad. However, we do not have hard figures on returns: lack of
security, and families’ desire to receive the GOP return fund of USD 312 are two
of the reasons IDPs have yet to return. Operations in Malakand, though ongoing
in some areas, are said to be in the “mopping-up phase” (even as officials
acknowledge that sporadic “spot” fighting is likely to continue for another six
months.)
¶19. (C) All of the big international humanitarian organizations are present in
Pakistan. Like our own approach to staffing the Consulate, even the recent
terror attacks in Peshawar (in which UN officials were killed) have not
dissuaded them. Most humanitarian organizations have withdrawn their
international staff to Islamabad; leaving
ISLAMABAD 00001364 004.2 OF 006
local staff to implement programs at the camps and in communities. Security
continues to be an issue, even in areas the Army has declared “cleared.”
Economic Recovery Key

---------------------
¶20. (C) The USG and the GOP are in agreement that the key to maintaining
security (and keeping extremists from reemerging) is in economic recovery and
improving civilian authority -- not least in law enforcement. Prime Minister
Gilani calls this the “hearts and minds” campaign necessary to maintain the
gains won by the military campaign and to maintain popular support for those
campaigns. The GOP is confronted with a weak economy and a lack of government
authority (or government provided security) in much of the country outside of
the Punjab, and even in the south of the prosperous Punjab we have seen an
increasing trend to extremism among youth.
¶21. (C) We are planning how to spend USG funds to support Pakistan’s civilian
institutions, bolster budgetary support, strengthen the military’s COIN
capabilities, build the capacity of the police, and target impoverished areas
where the youth are susceptible to militancy and extremism. What the GOP calls
“hearts and minds” we see as part of our broader objective of helping the GOP
build an effective COIN capability and policy by using USG resources where the
GOP is particularly exposed. The GOP will need to focus on recovery,
rehabilitation, and reconstruction if it is to hold its recent gains.
Establishing (or reestablishing long-languishing) government authority and
services poses one of the greatest challenges to the GOP. Economic development
is the key to Pakistan’s success in implementing a broad-ranging
counterinsurgency policy.
Waziristan
----------
¶22. (S) Pakistan’s military has begun its assault in South Waziristan with the
goal of capturing or eliminating taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose
prominence among Pakistani extremist groups has risen during the last two years.
We expect the military campaign in Waziristan to be tougher than in Swat, with
the military willing to use air power to an extent it was not in the “settled
areas.” The military strategy is three pronged: isolate Baitullah by putting
intense pressure on the Mehsud tribe; incite inter-tribal violence (the leader
of the Bhittani tribe has already come out publicly against Baitullah); make
deals with other militants to refrain from supporting Baitullah against the GOP.
We have some indications that the separation of Mehsud tribe peoples is already
underway.
¶23. (S) The 2007-2008 blockade of the Mehsud area, which was initially quite
severe, produced approximately 200,000 IDPs. However, we expect the attack from
the military to be more fearsome by an order of magnitudes; meaning much higher
casualty rates and less access for the humanitarian relief agencies. Some
“shaping operations” designed to contain and weaken Baitullah Mehsud’s sphere of
operations were undertaken in advance of the campaign.
¶24. (C) The GOP is wary of international scrutiny through the United Nations
which may embroil it in charges of being in breach of international humanitarian
law. The USG has made no judgment on this issue, but the GOP would be well-
served by seeking to uphold Geneva Convention standards during the conflict,
regardless of its own judgment that the military offensives represent domestic
law enforcement activities.
Military Cooperation
--------------------
¶25. (S) The campaigns in Malakand (including Swat) and now in Waziristan, have
demonstrated Pakistan’s will to fight extremism. Faced with its weaknesses
against a formidable enemy, the Frontier Corps has accepted USG training (if on
a limited and highly-controlled basis), and that has given us new access and
opportunities to improve Pakistani counter-insurgency capability. Pakistan has
agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and we
have expanded intelligence sharing through the Torkham
ISLAMABAD 00001364 005.2 OF 006
BCC. The military remains reluctant to expand the U.S. military footprint, but
we now have the basis for increased cooperation. USG efforts to provide Mi-17
helicopters have meant an exponential increase in the Pakistan Military’s
ability to deploy helicopters in its ongoing campaign against extremists.
¶26. (S) The campaign itself may prove, over time, to be an event that builds
trust and increases U.S./Pak military cooperation. Military and civilian
authorities underscore, however, that gains made in the campaign will only be
supported by the public if they are perceived as having been made by Pakistan
alone.
Nuclear Security
----------------
¶27. (S) Since A.Q Khan’s proliferation activities came to light in 2004,
Pakistan has sought to rehabilitate its image as a nuclear technology bazaar.
The GOP passed laws regulating exports of sensitive technologies and
criminalizing proliferation, established an export control mechanism, joined the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and strengthened its National
Command Authority and security apparatus to govern and protect its nuclear
weapons. U.S. support has been instrumental to Pakistan’s improved
nonproliferation practices. U.S. experts have trained Pakistani counterparts in
a wide variety of topics ranging from technology controls to physical
protection, provided critical equipment, and encouraged Pakistan’s adherence to
international nonproliferation instruments.
¶28. (S) Over the last two months, however, local and international media
reporting on U.S. and international fears that terrorists would acquire
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has put the GOP on the defensive. These concerns
centered on the proximity of some nuclear sites to territory under attack by the
taliban, the rumored dispersal of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, and the
vulnerability of weapons and nuclear materials in transit. The GOP is
particularly neuralgic to suggestions that its nuclear weapons could fall into
terrorist hands and to reports of U.S. plans to seize the weapons in case of
emergency. As a result, Pakistan has begun to pull back from some
nonproliferation engagement with the USG, including refusing high-level
discussions and delaying implementation of some programs. One effort to remove
jointly spent nuclear fuel from a Pakistani nuclear research reactor, for
instance, has been put on hold for 3-4 months, or until such time as the media
attention has abated.
India
-----
¶29. (C) President Zardari is personally in favor of improving Pakistan’s
relations with India, but efforts early in his tenure (including on opening
trade between Indian and Pakistan-held Kashmir) were overcome by the Mumbai
terror attacks and India’s reaction to what it perceived as Pakistan’s
complicity in them and by the Pakistan Military’s lack of approval for such
initiatives which Zardari can not take on his own. Zardari is conscious that he
must not be perceived as reopening negotiations on Kashmir now if he wants to
keep Pakistan’s military focused on the western campaigns -- and not its
institutional enemy, India.
¶30. (C) The June 16 meeting between President Zardari and Indian Prime Minister
Singh in Russia was marred by what the Pakistani side viewed as Singh’s
“rudeness” in telling the press (in front of Zardari) that he was only charged
with speaking to the President about the use of Pakistani soil by terrorists
aimed at India. PM Gilani will attend the NAM Summit in Egypt in July, instead
of Zardari, thus obviating what the GOP had initially said would be the next
opportunity for the leaders to meet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests
that only USG pressure will cause the GOI to reestablish the “Composite
Dialogue” -- the bilateral forum meant to develop a series of confidence
building measures between the two nations.
America
-------
ISLAMABAD 00001364 006.2 OF 006
¶31. (S) While we grant large amounts of aid to Pakistan and its military, even
with the arrival to office of the well-perceived President Obama, America is
viewed with some suspicion by the majority of Pakistan’s people and its
institutions. We are viewed at best as a fickle friend, and at worst as the
reason why Pakistan is attacking its own (although this view may be changing as
the popular picture of the true nature of the taliban has shifted in the last
several months). While the Army remains fixated on India as Pakistan’s mortal
enemy, the common man (and most importantly the youth) is just as likely to
point to America as the nation which has twisted Pakistan’s collective arm,
leaving it weak. Much of the financial support and technical advice we give to
the GOP is delivered privately and in a low-key fashion: our goal is to
strengthen Pakistani institutions and demonstrable ties to the USG have the
opposite effect in the public mind. GOP officials are prickly about issues of
sovereignty. They too can’t be seen as reliant on U.S. largess. How to support
the civilian government, strengthen its institutions, economy, and military
capacity to engage in COIN, without further provoking antagonism toward the
U.S., remains a central challenge. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD1438, NSA JONES' JUNE 25 MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT ZARDARI
Discussing cables
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TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM EAID PK
SUBJECT: NSA JONES' JUNE 25 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In their June 25 meeting in Islamabad,

National Security Advisor General James Jones and President
Zardari discussed: Pakistan's military offensive against
extremists; GOP capacity to fight terrorism; the nature of
extremism in Pakistan; drones; Iran; Afghanistan; Zardari's
conversation with Indian PM Singh in Russia; and the positive
trend of U. S. Pakistan relations.
End Summary.
¶2. (C) National Security Advisor General James Jones,

Ambassador, and delegation from the National Security Council
met President Zardari and a GOP delegation at the Presidency
on June 25. Pakistan's military campaign in Malakand and
Waziristan had been positively noted in the U.S., said Jones,
which welcomed the display of resolve. The trendline in
relations between the U.S. and Pakistan was positive, said
Jones. Zardari rejoined that the most important component of
the relationship was the goodwill expressed by the USG toward
Pakistan; his own tenure in office (ten months) was short and
his popularity not high, but goodwill from America was
central to his and Pakistan's future.
¶3. (C) Pakistan was united, said Zardari: the people have
the will to support the military in its campaign to stop the
taliban/extremists operating in the country. He cautioned
that the fight against militant extremism would be a long
one, lasting not months but many, many years and that lack of
vigilance on the GOP's part would be devastating. As
confident as he was of the military's resolve -- this time
-- to fight Pakistani militancy, he was equally convinced
that any failure to maintain pressure on the militants after
showing such resolve would have grave consequences.
¶4. (S) President Zardari thanked the U.S. for its assistance
while stating he needed "a battalion of helicopters" to fight
the extremists now, and in the future. He also made repeated
pleas for drones to be "put in Pakistan's hands" so that
Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including
collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism.
Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge
and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
¶5. (C) Journalist Bob Woodward (traveling with the NSA Jones
delegation) joined the meeting later and asked Zardari why he
had sharpened his attack on the extremists in the last six
months. "Organization," replied Zardari, who noted he had
been in office a short time and had used the first four
months to prepare. Pointing to the death of his
father-in-law Zulfikar Bhutto and assassination of his wife,
Benazir, Zardari said he had been confronting extremism (or
the ideology from which it was birthed) for more than thirty
years. His wife had been targeted for assassination as early
as 1988, when she was viewed as a symbol of feminism and all
that it represented. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of
which he was the head (like the Bhuttos before him) had
always been ousted from power by the military, said Zardari,
which previously had been aligned with fundamentalism.
¶6. (C) Jones asked Zardari how he viewed relations in the

region and told Zardari President Obama's own policy toward
Iran would have to be reexamined given events unfolding
there. Whatever had happened during the election, Iranian
leadership could not pretend nothing had occurred and return
as if there had been no shift.
¶7. (C) Zardari noted that several tri-lateral forums had

been created in the region with the ostensible purpose of
supporting Afghanistan. He counseled that the USG must
"cooperate with Turkey, and Iran," acknowledging at the same
time that the GOP too was perplexed and disappointed by what
had happened in Iran. As to Afghanistan, he said all
countries had to be encouraged -- even if (as in the case of
Russia), only to be urged not to meddle. Zardari accused
India of providing the precursor chemicals necessary to
produce heroine, which he said was funding the taliban in
Afghanistan.
¶8. (C) Asked by NSA Jones, what was the best that could be
hoped for in Afghanistan, Zardari spoke of substituting
hybrid corn for poppies, even if at a subsidized price, to
ISLAMABAD 00001438 002 OF 002
wean farmers from the opium trade. He said China might be

interested or persuaded to invest in the venture. Zardari's
vision was to use that corn for ethanol production; he
welcomed the indication of interest shown by National
Geographic CEO John Fahey, and invited him to return to
Pakistan for a briefing on the concept.
¶9. (C) More broadly, Zardari praised the industriousness of

the Pashtun people. Currently they were "very good warriors,"
but they were also natural entrepreneurs and the hardest
working people of Pakistan. If their entrepreneurial power
could be unleashed, the problems "in the Pashtun belt" would
largely be resolved.
¶10. (C) Over the medium term, Pakistan had to built its
economy so that is could pay its own expenses to combat
extremism, added Zardari, who thought this possible if
exports could be increased three-fold. (He said he would
raise the issue with National Security Council Senior
Director Lipton in his upcoming visit to Pakistan.) He
thanked the USG for all it was doing to aid Pakistan and
asked for more financial assistance.
¶11. (C) Zardari signaled that there had been some progress
in his talks with Indian PM Singh in Russia, even though he
had noted earlier that India's military capacity was ten-fold
Pakistan's. He regretted not being able to meet Singh at the
upcoming Sharm el-Sheikh summit but, he said, "unfortunately,
PM Gilani had already announced he would be going to Sharm"
(sic). In his meeting with Singh, said Zardari, he had
underscored that "there could not be a better political
moment" to improve relations across the board. India was a
mature democracy and an ancient nation, said Zardari. "Singh
is an excellent economist," he said, but Zardari was not
convinced the Indian Prime Minister understood the
constraints under which Zardari was operating. Helping Singh
to understand them was of import, hinted Zardari. NSC Senior
Director Don Camp said the Indian perspective was to question
GOP activism and to ask what it had done to quash terrorist
organizations. NSA Jones reminded Zardari how important it
was to ensure there was not another Mumbai-style attack.
Zardari reiterated that Singh was unaware of what it took to
"change the mind-set of Pakistan's "establishment," given
Pakistan's short history of fragile democratic regimes
toppled by the military.
¶12. (U) NSA Jones has cleared this cable.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09LONDON1385, COMMMONWEALTH ON FIJI, SRI
LANKA, NIGERIA, QUEEN’S
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6603
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DE RUEHLO #1385/01 1621532
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RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0491
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0287
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RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0192
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RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0659
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2019

TAGS PREL, EAID, PHUM, PINR, NI, CE, FJ, NZ, CA, MY, UK
SUBJECT: COMMMONWEALTH ON FIJI, SRI LANKA, NIGERIA, QUEEN’S
SUCCESSION, AND THE VALUE TO USG OF COMMONWEALTH ENGAGEMENT
REF: LONDON 580
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (C) Summary. During a June 11 discussion with Poloff, Commonwealth Political
Director Amitav Banerji offered electoral commission capacity-building as an
area where the USG and Commonwealth could be strategic partners; said a
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) would soon discuss and likely
recommend full suspension of Fiji; noted concern about the human rights
situation in Sri Lanka; and indicated the Commonwealth is keeping a watchful eye
on Nigeria because of the constitutional crisis that could ensue if President
Yar’Adua dies. While noting that it was not actively being dicussed, Banerji
acknowledged that succession of the Head of the Commonwealth would have to be
dealt with when Queen Elizabeth passes, as there is no rule stipulating that the
British monarch is the head and no procedure for selecting a new head. End
Summary.
USG Engagement
--------------
¶2. (C) Commonwealth Secretariat Director of Political Affairs Amitav Banerji

reiterated to Poloff Commonwealth SYG Kamalesh Sharma’s desire for “strategic
engagement” with the USG on June 11. Noting the important role of electoral
commissions in conducting credible elections, Banerji said Sharma hopes to
create a network of electoral commissions across the Commonwealth, whereby newer
commissions in fragile democracies could receive guidance and support from
commissions in more established democracies. He offered this initiative as an
example of where the USG and Commonwealth have mutual interests and where the
USG could use the Commonweath’s technical electoral commission capacity-building
capability and independent, “baggage free” status to promote democracy abroad.
Fiji
----
¶3. (C) Noting that the Commonwealth had past the deadline set at the May CMAG
meeting to re-consider full suspension of Fiji (reftel), Banerji said he was
very “frustrated” that CMAG had not yet met to discuss Fiji, especially as the
Commonwealth’s credibility could be damaged by not taking a decision as
indicated at the last meeting. He said CMAG had not met purely for scheduling
reasons, and that the Secretariat hopes to hold the meeting by the end of the
month, though he was not confident it would be possible. He thought CMAG would
move for full suspension of Fiji, intimating there had been difficult
discussions at the previous CMAG meeting on Fiji with New Zealand pushing hard
for full suspension and Malaysia wanting to ensure that Fiji did not withdraw
from the Commonwealth to pre-empt a full suspension a la Zimbabwe.
Sri Lanka
---------
¶4. (C) Banerji said that the human rights situation in Sri Lanka during and
after the recent military offensive had been raised “informally and off the
record” by the UK during the last CMAG meeting, forcing a difficult conversation
with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, as Sri Lanka is currently a member of
CMAG. Banerji said the Commonwealth continues to watch the situation in Sri
Lanka and noted that Sri Lanka’s offer to host the next Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting (CHOGM) had been turned down over concerns about lending
international credibility to the Government’s actions.
Nigeria
-------
¶5. (C) The Commonwealth is also keeping a watchful eye on Nigeria, Banerji
noted, as it is “punching well below its weight” and President Yar’Adua’s sudden
death has the potential to prompt a constitutional crisis. The Commonwealth
would like to see Nigeria more active in the region and in the Commonwealth
across the board. Banerji noted that Yar’Adua did not make a single intervention
at the last CHOGM, contrasting sharply with former President Obsanjo
LONDON 00001385 002 OF 002
who had been active in Commonwealth affairs.
Succession of the Head of the Commonwealth

------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Banerji acknowledged that succession of the Head of the Commonwealth
would have to be dealt with when Queen Elizabeth passes, as there is no rule
stipulating that the British monarch is the head and no procedure for selecting
a new head. He acknowledged that heir-apparent to the British Crown, Prince
Charles, does not “command the same respect” as the Queen and said the
Commonwealth was trying quietly to get him more involved in Commonwealth
affairs. Banerji noted Marlborough House, the Commonwealth Secretariat’s current
location, was a royal property, owned and funded by the British Royal Family,
and mused that may be a factor in the discussions. He noted that succession was
not actively being discussion within the Commonwealth.
ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Viewing cable 09MADRID604, SPAIN: S/GC DAN FRIED ...

Discussing cables
09MADRID604 2009-06-24 13:01 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Madrid
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SIPDIS
FOR EUR/WE, NEA, S/GC, INR

PASS TO NSC FOR RASMUSSEN, BRADLEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2024

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS KAWK KISL KPAO SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: S/GC DAN FRIED ...
Viewing cable 09MADRID614, SCENESETTER FOR DHS. SEC.

NAPOLITANO'S JULY 1
Discussing cables
09MADRID614 2009-06-26 14:02 2010-11-30 12:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Madrid
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PASS TO MARC FREY, DAVE GORDNER, KIKO CORTI, MIKE
SCARDAVILLE OF DHS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2024

TAGS: PREL PINS PTER PINR KHLS KCIP KCRM SP PGOV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DHS. SEC. NAPOLITANO'S JULY 1
MEETINGS IN MADRID
MADRID 00000614 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)
¶1. (C//NF) Madam Secretary, Embassy Madrid warmly welcomes

your visit, which comes on the heels of your June 24 meeting
with Spanish Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba in
Washington (Ref A). While one of the highlights of his trip
was signing the bilateral accord on Preventing and Combating
Serious Crime, one of the centerpieces of your Madrid trip
will be to sign an MOU to formalize the DHS Immigration
Advisory Program (IAP) at Madrid's Barajas Airport and a
declaration of intent for our two governments to work toward
concluding an agreement on Cooperation in Science &
Technology for Homeland Security Matters. You will hold
meetings with President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, his
Second Vice President, Elena Salgado, who also serves as
Minister of Economy and Finance, and Interior Minister
Rubalcaba. The Embassy also will co-host a reception in your
honor, which will give you and your delegation an opportunity
to meet a range of additional senior-level officials in the
Spanish Government. Your visit will help to highlight the
importance that the USG places on the overall bilateral
relationship and the numerous programs that the DHS is
working on with our Spanish hosts. While the focus of your
trip will be on discussing bilateral issues, your
interlocutors may express GOS interest in preliminary
discussions to increase collaboration on justice and home
affairs issues during Spain's upcoming stint as President of
the European Union (EU) during the first half of 2010.
//US-SPAIN RELATIONS//
¶2. (C//NF) U.S.-Spain relations are strong and based on

shared global interests. Spain is a valued US partner and an
important geostrategic player that has achieved a remarkable
transformation since the end of the Franco dictatorship 30
years ago. It is one of the leading democracies in Europe,
and has the ninth-largest economy in the world. Spain is an
important friend and ally, and we value its cooperation
against terrorism and a range of other security issues.
Since the U.S. presidential election in November, a strong
atmosphere of goodwill has emerged in Spain for closer
bilateral cooperation. As a gesture of this goodwill, the
GOS presently is considering accepting some of the detainees
currently held at Guantanamo (GTMO, see Ref B). In
Washington, Rubalcaba publicly stated that Spain may accept
as many as five detainees. Spain is an important NATO ally,
a key player in the EU, and during January-June 2010 will
hold the EU's rotating Presidency. XXXXXXXXXXXX, judicial, and information-
sharing
efforts, at least with us. The USG and GOS signed the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6)
information-sharing agreement in 2007. XXXXXXXXXXXX. The DHS/ICE office within
Embassy Madrid has
worked with GOS counterparts over the past year on successful
running of the IAP and in operations targeting bulk-cash
smuggling at Barajas Airport. Spain also is a founding
member of the Proliferation Security Initiative and an active
member in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
As per Ref C, Spain currently is being considered for
MADRID 00000614 002.2 OF 004
membership in the G-8 Partnership Against the Spread of

Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Spain also allows
us the use of two military bases that are critical transit
points between the U.S. and Iraq and Afghanistan. One recent
irritant in bilateral relationship is are the efforts by some
investigating judges - invoking "universal jurisdiction" - to
indict former USG officials for their allegedly involvement
in torture at GTMO (Ref D).
¶3. (SBU) Your visit to Madrid and Rubalcaba's visit to

Washington are but the latest in a series of high-level
exchanges, including a presidential bilateral on the margins
of the U.S.-EU Summit in Prague in April, a meeting between
National Security Adviser Gen. Jones and King Juan Carlos I
in Florida in February, and Foreign Minister Moratinos's
February meeting in Washington with Secretary Clinton. At
the end of May, U.S. Transportation Secretary LaHood became
the first cabinet-level visitor to Spain on behalf of the
Obama Administration. While you are in Madrid, Defense
Minister Carme Chacon will be in Washington during June 30 -
July 2 for discussions with Secretary Gates, among other
meetings (Ref E).
//THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT//
¶4. (SBU) In office since 2004, Zapatero won reelection to a

second term in March 2008, but his center-left Spanish
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) is seven seats shy of a
majority in the 350-seat Congress. XXXXXXXXXXXX. Unemployment is over 17%, the
highest rate in the EU, and it is expected to reach 20%
sometime in the next year. Although popularity ratings for
Zapatero and the Socialists are low, the conservative
opposition Popular Party (PP) has struggled to capitalize on
this. The PP, hampered by internal divisions, also has been
dogged by corruption accusations. Nevertheless, Zapatero
suffered his first serious political reverse since winning
reelection when his party lost power in March 2009 regional
elections in Galicia. Zapatero shuffled the cabinet April 7
as a response to criticism of the GOS' inability to resolve
the economic crisis and with an eye to the June European
Parliament elections. The most prominent change was the
replacement of the Second Vice President/Minister of Economy
and Finance. Even so, the PP secured more seats than the
Socialists in the June 7 European Parliament elections,
another sign that Zapatero needs to focus on the economic
situation.
//YOUR MEETINGS//
¶5. (S//NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX. He may even take credit, as in the case of

adjustments in U.S.-Cuba policy, for shaping USG views. He
is not innately ill-disposed to the USG. For him, foreign
policy is subordinate to domestic political interests, and
the U.S. relationship is just one more element to be viewed
XXXXXXXXXXXX.
MADRID 00000614 003.2 OF 004
currently a wave of goodwill for President Obama in Spain,

which is the answer to Zapatero's prayers in that it enables
him to engage the USG without being dinged by the traditional
anti-U.S. sentiment among his socialist base. XXXXXXXXXXXX. Zapatero
does not speak English, though we think he may understand it.
¶6. (C/NF) You will recall Interior Minister Rubalcaba - who

has wide-ranging responsibilities on security, law
enforcement and intelligence issues - as very capable and
serious but also charming. XXXXXXXXXXXX. He is known for his
intelligence, discretion, hard work, and mastery of detail,
as well as his negotiating prowess. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
You and Minister Rubalcaba are scheduled to sign
an MOU formalizing ongoing cooperation on the DHS's
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) at Madrid's Barajas
Airport, where a successful pilot program recently was
carried out. You are also scheduled to sign a declaration of
intent for our two governments to work toward concluding an
agreement on Cooperation in Science & Technology for Homeland
Security Matters. Rubalcaba also is likely to continue his
Washington discussions with you on the US-EU transatlantic
agenda, border control issues, CSI, document falsification,
money laundering, and an alert system in case of the theft of
arms or explosives for terrorist purposes. He may discuss
further his recent proposal for an exchange of liaison
personnel to have officials present in each others'
headquarters. In addition to the preceding topics, you may
also wish to raise trafficking in persons, illegal
immigration, Frontex issues, and Special Interest Alien
Smuggling through Madrid-Barajas Airport en route to the
United States. Rubalcaba speaks English but prefers to have
an interpreter present during discussions of some technical
aspects of his portfolio.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXX. Elena

Salgado is the Second Vice President and Minister of Economy
and Finance. She was moved up from being Minister of Public
Administration in April, as part of the broader cabinet
shuffle intended to highlight an intensified GOS effort to
combat the impact of the global economic crisis on Spain.
Rubalcaba reportedly was an influential figure in supporting
her appointment. XXXXXXXXXX. She previously served as Minister
of Public Administration (2007-09) and Minister of Health
(2004-07). The Spanish Government in 2006 unsuccessfully
nominated Salgado as a candidate for the Presidency of the
World Health Organization. Salgado also has extensive
private sector experience in consulting and
telecommunications industries. Salgado, born in 1949, has
degrees in industrial engineering and economics. Salgado
would be an appropriate GOS official with whom to discuss
CSI, money laundering and bulk-cash smuggling, and the USG's
MADRID 00000614 004.2 OF 004
relationship with Spanish Customs. Salgado speaks English.

CHACON
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1488, ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW

Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1697
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IS SY GG RS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Israeli FM Lieberman's June 2-3 visit to

Russia appears not to have broken new ground diplomatically,
but cemented Moscow's impression that the Russian-speaking
Lieberman is one of their own. The trip included meetings
with Medvedev and Putin, as well as a lengthy discussion with
FM Lavrov, during which Lieberman indicated that Israel was
not considering a military strike on Iran. Both sides agreed
to hold off on scheduling the Moscow ME conference until
after President Obama's visit to Moscow, and Lavrov quizzed
Lieberman on a possible U.S. plan to bring together Israeli
and Palestinian leaders. Lieberman rebuffed Lavrov's calls
for Israel to ease the pressure on Gaza and halt settlement
expansion, while Lavrov agreed to consider Lieberman's
request for Russian officials to visit the Israeli soldier
held by Hamas. Lavrov said that "nothing new" could happen
on Iran until the U.S. opened its dialogue with Tehran, and
repeated Russian concerns about the need to reach a
negotiated settlement with this "important neighbor." He
reiterated that Russia had not transferred S-300s to Iran,
but also had to consider its contract to provide the missiles
to Tehran. Lavrov thanked Israel for limiting military sales
to Georgia, but thought other countries were supplying
offensive weapons to Tiblisi, which could be emboldened to
start "another adventure." The FMs discussed expanding
bilateral economic ties, and Lavrov raised Russian concern
that Israel was partaking in "historical revisionism" that
sought to blame Russia for the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s.
End summary.
Behaved Like an Old Friend

--------------------------
¶2. (C) Israeli DCM Yuval Fuchs told us that FM Lieberman's

June 2-3 visit to Russia ran the gamut of international and
bilateral issues, from the peace process to the payment of
Soviet-era pensions to Russian speakers living in Israel.
His visit centered upon a two-hour June 2 meeting with FM
Lavrov that Fuchs characterized as a standard presentation of
views, during which "nothing breathtaking" was said.
Lieberman had a hectic day that began with a meeting at
Medvedev's home on the outskirts of Moscow, then the Lavrov
meeting at the MFA, a flight to St. Petersburg on a chartered
plane to see Putin, and dinner with Lavrov upon returning to
Moscow. On June 3, Lieberman had breakfast with former FM
Igor Ivanov (a personal friend), meetings with the heads of
the Duma and Federation Council international affairs
committees, discussions with Russian Jewish leaders, and a
press conference. He then departed Moscow for Minsk.
¶3. (C) Fuchs explained that Lieberman conducted his meetings

in Russian, shared stories about Moscow, and smoked, creating
a comfortable atmosphere with his Russian interlocutors. The
Israeli FM "behaved like an old friend" commented Fuchs, who
thought that the Russians acted as if they already knew him,
although it was too early to say whether this personal
diplomacy would have a measurable effect on already strong
Russia-Israel relations.
Lavrov-Lieberman
----------------
¶4. (C) Fuchs said that during the meeting with Lavrov, the
GOR's planned Moscow ME conference was not a central topic
for either side. Lieberman stressed the importance of
coordinating such efforts with the U.S., and said it would
not be appropriate to set the timing of a conference until
after President Obama's visit to Moscow. Lavrov agreed, and
said that Moscow did not want to hold a conference that would
not produce results. Lavrov asked Lieberman if Israel was
aware of an idea supposedly floated by S/E Mitchell to bring
together Israeli and Palestinian leaders; Lieberman said no.
¶5. (C) Lavrov pressed Israel to open checkpoints into Gaza,

and suggested posting international monitors to allay Israeli
concerns regarding smuggling. When Lavrov argued that Hamas
had stuck by the Gaza cease-fire, Lieberman retorted that
Hamas would break the cease-fire when it believed doing so
suited its needs. Lavrov also pressed Israel to freeze the
settlements, leading Lieberman to respond that "life goes on"
and settlement expansion was necessary to accommodate growing
communities.
¶6. (C) Fuchs said that Lavrov criticized the U.S. on several
fronts, telling Lieberman that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was
a "present" to Iran, and the U.S. decision to isolate Syria
was a "setback" for a comprehensive ME settlement.
Furthermore, the U.S. failure to "listen" to Russia, which
MOSCOW 00001488 002 OF 002
advised against Palestinian elections, had allowed Hamas to

come to power and eventually take over Gaza, thereby
strengthening Iran's position in the region.
Syria
-----
¶7. (C) Lavrov thought that the Turkish-led negotiations

between Israel and Syria had been positive, and said that
during his recent visit to Damascus, the Syrians indicated
that they were ready to renew talks either through Turkey or
Russia so long as they would include the future of the Golan
Heights. Lavrov said that he raised with Hamas leaders the
need to allow visits to captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Lieberman asked if Russian officials could visit Shalit, and
Lavrov directed DFM Saltanov to explore this possibility.
Iran
----
¶8. (C) Lavrov predicted that "nothing new" would happen with
Iran until after the U.S. began its dialogue with Tehran,
although he thought there was a better chance to get a "clear
answer" from Iran on P5 1 proposals under the current U.S.
Administration. He reiterated that Russia did not believe
there existed hard evidence that Iran's nuclear program had a
military dimension, and thought it transparent enough to
detect whether resources were directed to military uses.
¶9. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian interest in reaching a

negotiated solution to the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear
program, and the need for the West to normalize relations
with Tehran, a close Russian neighbor with which it shared
the Caspian and its resources. He raised Russian concern
that an Israeli attack on Iran would cause instability in the
region and an influx of refugees into the Caucasus. Fuchs
said that Lieberman responded that Israel "was not talking
about such a response" and understood that an attack would
cause a "chain reaction" within the region. Lieberman made
similar statements suggesting that Israel was not considering
attacking Iran during his press conference.
¶10. (C) Lavrov reiterated that Russia and Iran had signed a
deal to provide S-300s, but that Russia had not transferred
any weapons. The GOR did not intend to provide regionally
destabilizing weapons, but also had to take into account how
it would be perceived by others if Moscow failed to fulfill
its contract with Tehran.
Georgia
-------
¶11. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian appreciation for Israeli

steps to limit arms sales to Georgia to defensive weapons,
but raised concern that other countries were supplying
offensive weapons. He was also concerned that the recent
military exercises Georgia conducted with NATO might push
Tiblisi to undertake "another adventure".
Bilateral Issues
----------------
¶12. (C) Fuchs said that much of the discussion between Lavrov
and Lieberman focused on expanding bilateral ties, especially
in the economic sphere. They also touched upon parochial
issues of concern to Lieberman and his constituents, such as
the payment of pensions owed by the Soviet Union and Russia
to Russian-speaking Israelis.
¶13. (C) Lavrov raised Russian concern with "historical

revisionism" regarding the Soviet Era and Second World War,
which, he said, was particularly acute in Eastern Europe but
was also present in Israel. He cited Israel's official
recognition of the Holodomor, the 1930s famine that occurred
in Ukraine. Lieberman explained that by recognizing this
tragedy, Israel had not said Russia was guilty of causing it,
nor that it was an act of genocide.
BEYRLE
Viewing cable 09PARIS762, EUR A/S GORDON’S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH

FRENCH NSA
Discussing cables
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2024

TAGS PGOV, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON’S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH FRENCH NSA
LEVITTE
Classified By: Charg d’Affaires Mark A. Pekala, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a June 3 meeting with A/S Gordon, French NSA-equivalent
Jean-David Levitte previewed the agenda for the POTUS-President Sarkozy bilat at
Normandy. He noted that Sarkozy hoped to use the occasion to announce the
appointments of two French general officers to high-level NATO positions. On
Russia, Levitte expressed concern that Moscow was trying to whittle away at the
commitments it made during the Georgia crisis, especially the presence of
international monitors. He noted that Russia was “testing” the Europeans through
manufactured crises (e.g., the natural gas crisis) as it tried to reassert
control over its traditional sphere of influence. “We need to tell them to be
careful, because your behavior risks changing the relationship (between Russia
and the West),” said Levitte. Gordon observed that while it was comparatively
easy for the U.S. and France to maintain a united front in dealing with Russia,
the same was not true for all of our European partners. Levitte agreed, adding
that the Germans were somewhat divided over how to respond to President
Medvedev’s proposals. He emphasized that Russia should pay a political price if
it refuses to allow international observers to remain in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Turning to Nagorno-Karabakh, Levitte said there was an opportunity to
improve the situation, which in turn might facilitate improvement in Turkish-
Armenian relations. On Iran, Levitte noted that the French would pass two
messages to Iranian FM Mottaki, who was due in Paris later that same day: First,
that things “will end badly” if Iran presses forward with its nuclear program;
second, that Iran faces “a historic opportunity” with the U.S. that it must not
miss. End summary.
Participants
------------
¶2. (S/NF) Jean-David Levitte was accompanied by Damien Loras, French Presidency
Adviser for the Americas. EUR A/S Gordon was accompanied by CDA Pekala and
Poloff (notetaker).
POTUS-Sarkozy Bilat
-------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Levitte began by explaining the French decision not to invite the
Germans to the June 6 D-Day commemoration. “It’s my fault,” said Levitte, who
said that President Sarkozy had initially been keen to invite German Chancellor
Merkel to participate. “I pointed out to the President that if Merkel came, then
Sarkozy would be obligated to invite the heads of state of Italy, Poland, and
the Czech Republic as well.” Moreover, all of those leaders would have to be
given an opportunity to speak as well, which would lengthen an already long
ceremony. The cases of the UK and Canada were exceptional, he added, because
both Gordon Brown and Stephen Harper were in such political trouble at home that
the survival of their governments was at stake.
¶4. (S/NF) As for the substance of the POTUS-Sarkozy bilat, Levitte previewed
the proposed agenda: Iran, the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan/Pakistan,
Russia and its neighbors, and finally a broad discussion of economic issues
under the rubric of the G-20 (e.g., the economic crisis, regulation, preparation
for the next G-8 meeting, the price of gasoline, and climate issues). Levitte
stressed that Sarkozy hoped to announce (preferably in person to the press, but
possibly through a written bulletin) on June 3 the names of the two French
general officers -- the chiefs of staff of the French Air Force and Navy --
receiving high level NATO commands in Norfolk and Lisbon.
Russia/Georgia
--------------
¶5. (S/NF) Turning to relations with Russia, Levitte suggested that Moscow
misconstrued U.S. policy on Georgia. Russian officials seemed to interpret U.S.
efforts at improving the atmosphere for talks as a license to walk away from
commitments that Sarkozy had extracted from Russia at the height of the Georgia
crisis. In specific, Russian obstructionism indicates Moscow’s opposition to the
presence of international monitors in Georgia and the breakaway territories.
While Levitte conceded that Western relations with Russia should not hinge
solely on the Georgian question, he nevertheless pointed to the continued need
for a firm, united Western front. He noted that Russia was “testing” the
Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g., the natural gas crisis) as it tried
to reassert control over its traditional sphere of influence. “We need to tell
them to be careful,
PARIS 00000762 002 OF 003
because your behavior risks changing the relationship (between Russia and the
West),” said Levitte. Gordon agreed that U.S./EU could not afford to be naive in
engaging with Russia, and stressed the need for the U.S. and Europe to draw the
same red lines in dealing with Moscow. He observed that while it was
comparatively easy for the U.S. and France to maintain a united front, the same
was not true for all of our European partners. Levitte concurred. He added that
the Germans were somewhat divided over how to respond to President Medvedev’s
proposals. Alluding to the differences between FM Steinmeier and Chancellor
Merkel, Levitte said: “It’s as if they have two foreign policies.” He emphasized
that Russia should pay a political price if it refuses to allow international
observers (e.g., UNOMIG and OSCE) to remain present in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia: namely, increased Western assistance to Georgia.
¶6. (S/NF) Levitte returned to the question of international observers, saying

that the West should push Russia hard in New York and Geneva to let the
observers stay. “They (the Russians) will accept it if we stay strong,” Levitte
noted, adding that the Russians must understand that they will pay a price for
changing the status quo.
¶7. (S/NF) On NATO expansion, Levitte and Gordon discussed the relative merits
of giving Membership Action Plans (MAP) to other Balkan countries but not to
Georgia and Ukraine. Levitte suggested that the Russians would see such a policy
as “a gift,” yet he agreed that NATO needed to decide whether to continue with
MAP for Ukraine and Georgia or find an alternative mechanism. Levitte proposed
eliminating the MAP program altogether, as “each country arrives at membership
through its own unique path anyway.”
Nagorno-Karabakh
----------------
¶8. (S/NF) Levitte said he saw a historic opportunity to make progress on

Nagorno-Karabakh and -- although the two are not formally linked -- relations
between Turkey and Armenia. Gordon agreed that progress between the latter two
was unlikely without movement on Nagorno-Karabakh, a reality the Armenians
understood but had difficulty accepting. Levitte suggested that the U.S. and
France remain in contact on this issue, with an eye toward a possible meeting on
the margins of the informal ministerial at Corfu. On the question of Turkey’s
admission to the EU, Levitte said that the Turks themselves had signaled that
the important thing was for the process to continue. Levitte said the French
fully agreed, since the EU membership criteria served as an engine for
modernizing Turkey.
Iran
----
¶9. (S/NF) As for the June 3 visit of Iranian FM Mottaki to Paris, Levitte said
that Mottaki would be received at the Elysee later that same afternoon. Levitte
portrayed Mottaki’s visit as the result of Iranian in-fighting after Iranian
President Ahmadinejad took umbrage that Ali Akbar Velayati, Supreme Leader
Khamenei’s diplomatic advisor, had been received in the past by Sarkozy. He
noted that the French had already postponed Mottaki’s visit once as a result of
Ahmadinejad’s anti-Semitic rant at the Durban II conference in Geneva, which had
prompted the French Ambassador and other EU representatives to walk out of the
session in protest. Levitte predicted that Mottaki would have nothing meaningful
to say, whereas the French would deliver two messages to the Iranians: First,
that things “will end badly” if Iran presses forward with its nuclear program;
second, that Iran faces “a historic opportunity” with the U.S. that it must not
miss. Levitte pledged that France would “remain the toughest” U.S. ally when it
came to imposing sanctions on Iran, adding that the French had no illusions
about how difficult it would be to get the Russians and Chinese to support
tougher measures. He suggested that October would be the time to begin drumming
up international support for new sanctions, and acknowledged that the Russians
would likely try to extract concessions from the West on Georgia and missile
defense in exchange.
Cuba/GTMO
---------
¶10. (S/NF) Levitte said that the new Administration’s policy on Cuba was great.
“How can we help?” asked Levitte, who noted that Sarkozy would travel to the
Caribbean in late June. He added that former French Culture Minister Jack Lang
was serving as Sarkozy’s point man on Cuba, and met with Raul Castro during a
recent visit to Havana. “Your open-handed
PARIS 00000762 003 OF 003
policy is producing some interesting movement inside (the regime),” Levitte
summarized.
¶11. (S/NF) Turning to the fate of the Guantanamo (GTMO) detainees, Levitte said
that France’s acceptance of a first GTMO returnee was not intended to be a one
time gesture. To the contrary, the French saw it as the beginning of a process,
and they were currently evaluating other candidates as well. However, France
would not accept any detainees who posed a threat to French security and would
only consider taking those with a legitimate tie to France. Levitte noted that
Congressional opposition to the President’s plan to close GTMO had given French
authorities less room for maneuver on this subject, as the French public
wondered why France should accept detainees who were too dangerous to be
transferred to the United States.
¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09PORTAUPRINCE575, DECONSTRUCTING PREVAL
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09PORTAUPRINCE575.
2009-06-16 2010-11-30 Embassy Port Au
09PORTAUPRINCE575 CONFIDENTIAL
18:06 16:04 Prince
O 161802Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
INFO HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY
AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000575
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR LAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019

TAGS: PGOV HA KBIO
SUBJECT: DECONSTRUCTING PREVAL
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
Summary and Introduction

-------------------------
¶1. (C) Haitian President Rene Preval has now completed three
years of his five year presidential mandate. Widely touted as
the "transitional president" poised to lead Haiti into a new
era of democracy and economic prosperity, he has had only
modest success thus far. Haiti's problems are indeed
daunting, and redressing them will take much more than a
five-year term. However, Preval's particular world view, his
personality and often indecisive and uncommunicative
leadership style, coupled with Haiti's deeply divided
political class and the devastating events of 2008, have
conspired to defer, if not derail, forward movement here.
¶2. (C) That being said, Preval remains Haiti's indispensable

man. Legitimately elected, still moderately popular, and
likely the only politician capable of imposing his will on
Haiti - if so inclined - Preval's role over the next 18
months is critical. Dealing with Preval is a challenge,
occasionally frustrating and sometimes rewarding. He is wary
of change and suspicious of outsiders, even those who seek
his success. Managing Preval will remain challenging during
the remainder of his term yet doing so is key to our success
and that of Haiti. We must continue to find creative ways to
work with him, influence him, and encourage him to recapture
the activism of his first year in office. Until he does,
political change and economic progress, so necessary to
Haiti's future, is likely to be incremental at best.
The Politics of Personality

----------------------------
¶3. (C) Preval's attitude towards his presidency has been

shaped by both experience and personality. As Aristide's
Prime Minister and successor, he was overshadowed by the more
charismatic ex-priest. At our first meeting, Preval recounted
that he was "the last stop after Tabarre (where Aristide
lived) when visitors came", bitterly reminding me that many
USG visitors barely had time to see him when he was
president. Those slights still rankle. A retiring, complex
personality, the president shares little. His inner circle
has greatly constricted during the past two years, with key
advisors including Bob Manuel, all but dropping out. His
involvement with his fiancee, financial advisor Babette
Delatour has colored many of his other relationships,
according to friends, and caused an estrangement of sorts
with his sister and one of his daughters.
¶4. (C) Even those close to Preval concede that his

chameleon-like character makes dealing with the president
difficult. One close advisor calls it "the roller coaster
that is Rene Preval." Personally engaging - even seductive -
when he so wishes, Preval can be equally harsh with
colleagues and others. Ministers, close advisors and others
have felt the sting of his tongue, both in public and in
private. Stubbornly holding to ideas long past their shelf
life, he rarely welcomes dissenting opinions. His courting
of Taiwan in 2006, which almost led to the Chinese blocking
renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2006, is a case in point.
Preval is highly disinclined to delegate power or authority
and even the smallest detail comes to his office for
decision, a situation which has caused stress in his
relationships with both his current and former prime
ministers. Planning Minister Bellerive described to me a
recent Cabinet meeting where the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet presented a development plan for the long-suffering
northern tier of the country. Preval ridiculed the idea and
when confronted by a united ministerial front, walked out of
the cabinet meeting and told his advisors to strike the
proposal from the agenda.
¶5. (C) Uncomfortable in formal settings such as summits and

international conferences, Preval seeks personal
"relationships of trust" with his interlocutors. Often
unable to articulate exactly what he wants - except in the
broadest of terms - Preval tends to view issues in black and
white. Nonetheless, he expects a positive - and prompt
response. That is particularly true of his dealings with the
international community. He remains skeptical about the
international community's commitment to his government's
goals, for instance telling me that he is suspicious of how
the Collier report will be used. He measures success with the
international community - and the U.S.- in terms of positive
response to his priorities, rather than according to some
broader international benchmarks of success.
¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Preval's stubborn and cautious nature

has sometimes borne fruit. In his first year in office, he
was widely praised for reaching out to Haitians of all
political stripes and for attempting to bridge Haiti's
massive political divides. He has shrewdly coopted major
political rivals into his personal cabinet over the past two
years and has, through patient diplomacy managed to get
fractious parliamentary groupings to sit around the table
working on issues ranging from the budget to privatization to
the current minimum wage crisis. He believes strongly that
without his intercession, the international community would
have ignored the impact of the 2008 hurricanes on Haiti, and
that his early efforts at negotiation and discussion with the
gangs of Cite Soleil (which he often reminds me that I
criticized at the time) set the stage for the successful
MINUSTAH operation to clear the area.
A Narrowing Circle?
------------------
¶7. (C) Preval's seeming isolation in the palace during the

past year is striking. Close friends report that they have
little contact - and even less influence - with him. A
businessman who was key to Preval's election said the last
time that he talked to Preval, the president brushed him off.
Shunning newspapers and radio, he has a friend in New York do
a daily press summary for him; otherwise he freely admits
that he neither reads nor listens to the news, either local
or international. He uses one or two cell phones but rarely
shares the numbers with his colleagues. He uses his email to
communicate with family and close friends, but prefers to
talk on the telephone. He seldom leaves the palace except to
travel to his residence each evening and to the retreat he
has bought for his fiancee in the mountains above Port au
Prince.
The Health Issue

----------------
¶8. (C) Preval's occasionally erratic behavior over the past

year has again sparked widespread rumors that he is suffering
from the effects of his past prostate cancer or that he has
resumed drinking. There is no indication that he is taking
medicine that affects his judgment or temperament, but he has
ignored suggestions from his inner circle, including that of
Delatour, that he do complete medical check-up in the U.S. He
has not been to Cuba for follow-up tests in more than a year.
Preval has increased his alcoholic consumption and often
attends a Petionville night club with friends, but during our
social interaction I have never seen him drink to excess.
Nonetheless, reports of heavy drinking are circulating
widely.
An Agenda deferred: Elections, Constitutional Reform, and

Drugs
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶9. (C) Preval has said that his agenda for his remaining
years in office focuses on three interconnected issues:
elections, constitutional reform, and drugs. He came late to
the election issue, originally suggesting that the partial
Senatorial elections be combined with the lower house polls
scheduled for fall. He backed down in the face of
international pressure, but also as he came to realize that
he would have little success - or support - if he moved on
constitutional reform without a fully functioning senate.
Given the delays in moving this election forward, he no
longer believes that he will see an overhaul of the
constitution. He now expects to focus on two critical
constitutional issues, dual nationality and government
decentralization. He has angrily denied charges that he
manipulated the electoral process through the CEP and its
decision to exclude Lavalas to undermine an already weak
legislature.
¶10. (C) Preval's focus on comprehensive constitutional reform

over the past year raised concerns about his ulterior
motives. Many in Haiti's political class drew the conclusion
that Preval was seeking a third term. The President's
refusal to explicitly reject that possibility created
confusion and uncertainty, but I view this development as
highly unlikely. Nonetheless, concerns about Preval's
intentions, coupled with deteriorating relations with
parliament, and his cavalier treatment of major political
parties has undermined consensus on constitutional reform and
he seems now resigned to more limited changes.
¶11. (C) Preval's fixation on drug trafficking reflects both a

growing frustration with the inflow of drugs into the
country's political process and irritation that his
government is unable to address something that could indeed
pose a personal threat to his future after the presidency.
Shunning all GOH responsibility for the problem, he looks to
hand it over to us. He has yet to believe that we take his
concerns seriously, and that has colored much of his dealings
with us beyond the counternarcotics agenda.
A not-always-helpful world view

-------------------------------
¶12. (C) Although Preval's presidency started off well, with

the new president reaching out across the political spectrum
in an effort to create a new political culture in the
country, those efforts have now essentially stalled. The
President, whether by inclination or design, has not fully
developed a vision of Haiti's future. By turns determined or
distracted, Preval is often reluctant to use the levers of
power given to him by the office of the presidency. In one
telling instance, he held off going public in the April riots
until the presidency appeared to hang in the balance.
Skeptical of friends from abroad, and cynical about his own
political class's ability to effect change, Preval believes
that it is best only to speak out after the deals are done.
Pressing him to be more expansive and communicative has been,
in my experience, counterproductive. At the same time, he is
reluctant to let anyone else pick up the slack, and as a
result, the political vacuum in Haiti is often filled by
those who do not necessarily have the nation's best interests
at heart.
¶13. (C) There are those who argue that the April, 2008 riots
so badly shook Preval's world view that he has become
reluctant to act. We believe this is too simplistic an
explanation. Preval was indeed unprepared for the riots in
the street, but he used them to press some key objectives,
including the removal of then-Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard
Alexis. More to the point, I believe that the President's own
style and outlook, his often unilateral decision-making
style, his propensity to micromanage, and his essentially
cynical (and often justified) view of the Haitian political
process were, I believe, reinforced by what he saw in April,
and he is looking for ways to ensure he is not caught
unawares again.
¶14. (C) Preval's old friends suggest that in many ways he

remains the radical student who broke with his conservative
father and spent his university days in the political
maelstrom of 1960s Europe. While this may overstate the
case, Preval remains essentially a nationalist politician in
the Haitian sense of the word - suspicious of outsiders
intentions and convinced that no one understands Haiti like
he does. He often takes actions, such as publicly dismissing
the results of the Washington Donors Conference or stalling
elections, which could be construed as working at cross
purposes with the U.S. Preval clearly believes that he can
walk a fine line without losing U.S. or international
community support. Here, however, he runs a risk. Although he
briefly lived in the U.S., Preval does not truly understand
Americans or the Washington policy environment - and he often
ignores advisors who do.
The After-Life
--------------
¶15. (C) Close friends speculate that many of Preval's actions

during the past year - his rapprochement with Alexis and the
Neptune faction of Lavalas, his obsession with constitutional
reform, his anger over drug trafficker Guy Philippe, even his
reactions to the April riots - stem from his very real fear
that politics will prohibit him from returning to private
life in Haiti after his presidency. Thus, they argue, his
overriding goal is to orchestrate the 2011 presidential
transition in such a way as to ensure that whoever is elected
will allow him to go home unimpeded. Based on our
conversations, this is indeed a matter that looms large for
Preval. He has said to me on various occasions that he is
worried about his life after the presidency, that he would
not survive in exile. His concerns seem real, given Haiti's
history, albeit somewhat overblown at this point in time.
What It Means for Us

---------------------
¶16. (C) Preval and I entered on duty in our respective

positions at pretty much the same time and we have enjoyed an
interesting, if not always harmonious, relationship during
the past three and a half years. During that period, I have
found him somewhat isolated, less open to ideas and advice,
and more reluctant to use the tools of his office to advance
his agenda than in his first year in office. Some say that
he is reverting to the do-nothing persona of his first term
as president. Like much about Preval, the reality is somewhat
more complicated. What is clear to me, however, is that
Preval has yet to truly provide the strong, consistent
leadership that Haiti's current circumstances demand. In
other places, we could find ways to circumvent or overcome
these weaknesses. Not so in Haiti. Given Haiti's strong
tradition of presidential rule, the blurred constitutional
lines of authority, and his own reluctance to delegate
authority, I believe that Preval - and only Preval - will
continue to set the rhythm and scope of change in Haiti. And
while we may argue with him about pace and priorities, we
will have to adapt to his rhythm. Dealing with Preval has
never been easy. Yet he remains Haiti's indispensable man and
he must succeed in passing this country to a new leadership
in 2011. We therefore must continue to find creative,
consistent ways to reinforce and maintain our engagement - at
all levels of the USG - with Preval and to press him to move
forward the important agenda of change that remains as yet
unrealized here.
TIGHE
Viewing cable 09SINGAPORE529, DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S

MAY 30, 2009
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09SINGAPORE529.
09SINGAPORE529 2009-06-04 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Singapore
R 040908Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529
EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029
TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,
KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.
¶2. (SBU) Participants:
United States
-------------
The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L.
Shields, CDA (Notetaker)
SINGAPORE
---------
Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to
MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA
¶3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister
Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in
addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China
and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear
weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing
sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has
collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s
answer was that “they can survive on their own.” The Deputy Secretary noted that
the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach.
If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and
Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” MM Lee also offered
views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations.
End Summary.
China and North Korea
---------------------
¶4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan
Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual
international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the
meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in
addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China
and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear
weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees
as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China
would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a
North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that
has collapsed, he stated.
¶5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s
Delphic answer was that “they can survive on their own.” MM Lee said he
interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership
would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing
ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power,
they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so
isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not
trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given
China’s interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary
noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its
approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the
ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK
persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not
proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities
outside Iran, and oil wealth.
¶6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an
impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The
Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the
prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a
buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few
years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new
leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.
¶7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he
would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They
might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the
USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a “flabby
old chap” for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee
noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese
occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them
food, clothing and medicine.
¶8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German
unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is
“nothing there” in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has
already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke.
The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or
grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is
calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the
United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to
take over the North, MM Lee said.
Chinese Economy
---------------
¶9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis
has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from
place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM
Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued
prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35
percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest
in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight
percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a
focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for
three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies
for at least a year, he said.
¶10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the
Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore’s 50 percent level.
Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70
percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to
a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily,
if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside
because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to
facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing
Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy
Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter
the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped.
China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March
when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.
Taiwan
------
¶11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee
said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic
position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his
pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three
links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his
eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to
show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is
more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics,
Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge
as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and
accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest
of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not
matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with
Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off,
he said.
¶12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the
‘92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in
office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that
happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S.
fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is
what they want, MM Lee said.
¶13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan
stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will
help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the
Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to
invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win
re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is
promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the
traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for
vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World
Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent
Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if
it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian
Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area
linked with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping
----------
¶14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping
would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded
affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When
the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi
is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s
influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no
more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop
him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.
Wang Qishan
-----------
¶15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection
with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou
Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang
handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the
Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is
looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee
said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting.
This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s
meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how
Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.
China’s Rise
------------
¶16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the
Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and
Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not
stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other
countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those
two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent
annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP,
not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the
population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and
in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is
known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he
stated.
¶17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of
military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical
means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on
imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working
with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open
sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and
is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.
Build Ties with Young Chinese
-----------------------------
¶18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build
ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the
United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there,
it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they
may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and
Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point
alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America’s advantage is that it
can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China
still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted
that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring
fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American
professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing
that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different
civilization. In the future, China’s leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from
American universities, he predicted.
¶19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.
Visit Embassy Singapore’s Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
SHIELDS

BULGARIA
Discussing cables
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 VIN-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 COME-00 CTME-00
INL-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 DS-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00 OIGO-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 FRB-00 H-00 TEDE-00 IO-00
JUSE-00 LAB-01 L-00 CAC-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 CDC-00
VCIE-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OIC-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00
GIWI-00 PPT-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 IRM-00 DPM-00
NCTC-00 CBP-00 BBG-00 R-00 EPAE-00 DSCC-00 DRL-00
G-00 CARC-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SRAP-00 /001R
R 162139Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SOFIA
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2034

TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON BU
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: BULGARIA
REF: STATE 18756
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Bulgaria
(paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS
reporting of biographic information relating to Bulgaria
(paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref
C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs focused on Bulgaria. The NHCD
sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting
and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide
update plans to collect information on Bulgaria. The
priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the
Embassy manage reporting and collection, including
formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).

¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often

is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose
agencies participated in the review leading the the NHCD,s
issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist
by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage
relevant reporting through their own or State Department
channels.
¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on

Bulgarians:

dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are
encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as
information becomes available.

relating to persons linked to Bulgaria: office and
¶3. (S/NF) Bulgarian NHCD outline -- priority issues:
¶A. National Leadership and Governance

1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4)
2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H)
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H)
¶B. Energy Security and Foreign Relations
1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H)
2) Russia (FPOL-4H)
3) European Union (FPOL-4H)
4) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors
(FPOL-4H)
5) The United States (FPOL-4H)
6) International Organizations and Other Foreign
Relations (FPOL-4H)
¶C. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal
Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5)
3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H)
¶D. National Security
2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H)
3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness
(FMCC-4H)
4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-3)
5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H)
6) Information to Support US Military Operational
Planning (INFR-5H)
¶E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems
(INFR-5H)
¶A. National Leadership and Governance
1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4).

Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and
strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including
advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government,
non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact
of corruption and crime on governance, internal development,
financial stability, intelligence and security services,
weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment.
Details about organized crime groups, including leadership,
links to government and foreign entities, drug and human
trafficking, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes,
including child pornography. Details about cyber crime.
Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details
about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs,
production, identification of trafficking groups and
individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and
routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement
plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities.
Government efforts to cooperate with international partners
to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of
government documents, such as passports and driver licenses.
Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber
criminals. Details about law enforcement organizations and
capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges,
and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice.
Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use
biometric systems.
2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H). Objectives,

strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of
national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership
objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives,
influence, and relations among principal advisors,
supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures,
including differences under varying circumstances. Relations
among national government entities, including president,
premier, ministers, national security and defense council,
intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor
general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials,
including off-budget financial flows in support of senior
leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and
government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency.
Public support for or opposition to administration, as well
as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain,
and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability,
personality, financial, health, and biometric information
about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H).

Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts
to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of
law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership,
and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding
political, judicial, economic, social, and educational
reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including
through media manipulation. Popular attitudes about
Bulgaria,s evolving political, philosophical, and regional
identity. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of
significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties
and blocs. Details about internal workings of major
political parties. Strength and vitality of political
parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups,
including domestic and foreign support.
¶B. Energy Security and Foreign Relations
1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and

efforts to diversify energy sources and develop,
rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including
investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power,
flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details
about financing strategies, and openness to foreign
investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and
implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared
and secret energy agreements with Russia, Iran, other Caspian
basin countries, and others. Details about national energy
policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their
relations with other national leaders. Views about and
responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Bulgarian
dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption
and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on
key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency,
impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations.
Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
2) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts

regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic
issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade.
Details about personal relations between Bulgarian leaders
and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership,
intelligence officials, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities
to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose
Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies.
Leadership and public views about relations with Russia.
Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic
objectives in the region, and Bulgaria,s vulnerability to
Russian coercion and influence. Views about Russian attempts
to exploit historic and current ties in order to influence
internal developments and advance Russia's interests in
Bulgaria and throughout the region.
3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives

behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts
regarding the European Union (EU). Leadership and public
views about levels of influence among European states,
including relations between states and EU institutions as
well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in
Europe. Evidence of Bulgarian mismanagement of EU funding,
and government efforts to ensure transparent management of
financial aid. Details about formal and informal alliances
between Bulgaria and other EU states, including plans and
efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and
efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and
non-state actors to influence EU policies. Response to
Russian efforts to influence EU policies through Bulgaria.
Plans and efforts, including investment strategies, regarding
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and
efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding
specific EU policies and decisions.
4) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors

(FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with Black
Sea and other regional neighbors. Plans and efforts to
jointly respond to challenges regarding counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and illegal
migration. Plans and efforts regarding cooperative
agreements, especially Black Sea FOR, Harmony, Enhanced Black
Sea Security Proposal, and Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Zone. Bulgarian participation in US-sponsored programs
designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy
civil-military relations, and effective management of
military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian
influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and
other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with
regional neighbors on energy security. Details about
disputes with neighbors. Relations with, and military
deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote
democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and
efforts regarding Macedonia and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and
efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.
5) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies,

and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations
regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with
the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional
policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to
support or oppose US positions in international fora.
6) International Organizations and Other Foreign

Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national
objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in
international organizations. Details about relations with
China and nations that are hostile to US interests.
¶C. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal

Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development

(ECFS-5). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial
crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Plans and
efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group
of Eight, and international financial institutions, including
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club.
Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to
exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and
efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary
and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to develop national
infrastructure, and private sector and market institutions,
including financial system. Plans and efforts to adopt
international investment norms, protect intellectual
property, and support entrepreneurs, especially in small and
medium businesses. Plans and efforts to attract foreign
investment. Plans and efforts to protect foreign investors
from government corruption and inefficiencies. National and
regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic
and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight,
monetization, and gray economy. Role and attitudes of
Currency Board regarding fiscal and monetary policy. Plans
and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic
policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles,
interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of
private businessmen in economic planning. Published and
non-published national budget, including oversight and
associated banks and financial institutions. Details about
major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply
with IMF agreements.
2) Money Laundering (MONY-4). Government plans and

efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation,
enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including
methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated
individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell
corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as
lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank
accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money
laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement
in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an
influence-gaining measure.
3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights

(DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and
efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities,
especially Roma and Turks. Public attitudes toward
minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details
about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate,
mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and
migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth
rates, including through promotion of immigration.
¶D. National Security

requirements.
2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H).

Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for
force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending
levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative
implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support
for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments
to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area
operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and
methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5
security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or
long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Bulgarian soil,
NATO commands in Bulgaria, and out-of-country deployments of
Bulgarian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO
enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of
the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence,
and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to
protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and
concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and
strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies,
plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security
cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding
any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness

(FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including
agreement and disagreement among civilian and military
leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare
threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and
capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral
relationships, including out-of-area operations,
multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and
efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US
military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and
mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding
force structure, military reform, and modernization,
including future roles, strengths, and compositions of
military services. Details about military cooperation with
other nations. Details about defense industry, including
plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and
actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and
facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of
major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition
of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and
paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by
service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of
battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance,
training, exercise participation, support for international
peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned
officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and
morale. Civil-military relations. Offensive and defensive
cyber warfare policies, plans, efforts, and capabilities.
Indications of national-level denial and deception program,
including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and
activities. Location, mission, organization, associated
personnel, funding, development, and use of underground
facilities and other hardened structures, including for
protection of command and control networks, civil and
military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and
transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key
facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details
about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans
and efforts to help other states develop underground
facilities and other hardened structures.
4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-3).

Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure
military export regime, including details about monitoring
end user activities and imposing penalties for violations.
Organizational readiness and capability of border police and
customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to
adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts
to implement legislation and enforce effective export
licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with
the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Bulgaria as
weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons
transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes,
methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications.
Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engaged
in sales of weapons or technologies, especially to states
that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities.
Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties
and arrangements.
5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H).

Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities,
and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition
to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on
international terrorism. Government willingness, capability,
and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to
combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize
terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and
protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other
critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and
intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons,
facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to
acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives,
strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links
to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or
medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel
documents, telecommunication methods and modes,
transportation, funding, finance and business operations,
money laundering, security, recruitment, and training.
Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for
terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit
drug and other criminal trade.
6) Information to Support US Military Operational

Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency
planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and
humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status,
vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical
infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and
communications. Civilian and military medical and life
science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical
research and development, including new vaccines,
therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics,
about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza,
tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune
deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis.
Locations and levels of chemical and radiological
contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and
types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite.
Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites,
police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic
facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to
support, including provision of security for, relief
operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained,
captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war
and missing in action.
¶E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems

(INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and
capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national
telecommunications infrastructure and information systems,
networks, and technologies used by civilian and military
government authorities, including intelligence and security
services. Details about command and control systems and
facilities. National leadership use of, and dependencies on,
dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information
systems. Details about national and regional
telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and
training. Information about current, and planned upgrades
to, public sector communications systems and technologies,
very small aperture terminals, trunked and mobile radios,
pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,
interchange, and cable and fiber networks. Information about
wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities
and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating
systems, to include second generation and third generation
systems. Details about the use of satellites for
telecommunication purposes, including planned system
upgrades. Details about Internet and Intranet use and
infrastructure, including government oversight. Details
about foreign and domestic telecommunications service
providers and vendors. Plans and efforts to acquire US
export-controlled telecommunications equipment and
technology. Plans and efforts to export or transfer
state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology.
Details about information repositories associated with radio
frequency identification enabled systems used for passports,
government badges, and transportation systems. Official and
personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of
principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1177, CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET

WITH DEFENSE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO8024
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1177/01 1530619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020619Z JUN 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS IR KWBG IS
SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER BARAK
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of
May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led
by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both
delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who
conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's
concerns about Iran. End summary.
Peace Process
-------------
¶2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by
apologizing for being late due to what he described as an
"internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding
the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming
speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between
the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and
explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on
how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other."
Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in
wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the
Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do
not agree with this course of action.
¶3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation
that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the
Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it
takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak
noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no
stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if
efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must
be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he
personally had no objection to "two states for two nations,"
and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel.
Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side
in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.
¶4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the

need for a regional approach to the peace process. He
supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for
the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He
stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the
U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is
"serious in its efforts toward peace."
¶5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West

Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to
review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian
Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement,
a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before
a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been
extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security
Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and
commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.
¶6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the
Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and
that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He
explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah
prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to
assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not
surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers
from both. He stressed the importance of continued
consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO
community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid
publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of
kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Iran/North Korea
----------------
¶7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI
believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong.
He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when
faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He
noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and
described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second
wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak
asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea
would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the
USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."
¶8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be

removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North
Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a
credible military option, he said. Barak said he was
TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002
personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an

acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm
shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear
proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing
states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia,
India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats.
Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.
¶9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental
differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program,
Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged
differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is
similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in
which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following
the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as
the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a
result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world
rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear
weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt
should be lower as the costs are higher.
¶10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess,

not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid
any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and
North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring
nuclear weapons while defying the international community.
He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively
low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea.
Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring
its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an
irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window
between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that,
he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable
collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should
Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or
terrorist groups would not be far behind.
Pakistan
--------
¶11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in

both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private
nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning
"with everything changed" following a potential Islamic
extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran
might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby
exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and
Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal
chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States
had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others
would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S.
faces a perception of weakness in the region.
¶12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1184, CODELS ACKERMAN AND CASEY

MEETINGS WITH PRIME
Discussing cables
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP IR KWBG EG IS
SUBJECT: CODELS ACKERMAN AND CASEY MEETINGS WITH PRIME
MINISTER NETANYAHU
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b),(
d)
¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Ackerman and Casey met separately May
26 and 27 with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The Prime
Minister discussed his visit to Washington, focusing on his
discussions of Iran, a regional approach in support of
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and his approach to the
Palestinians and settlements, including his opposition to a
complete freeze on settlement construction. Netanyahu said
he was pleased with President Obama's approach to engagement
with Iran and on a regional component to peacemaking. On the
Palestinians, he reiterated his view that the Palestinian
Authority (PA) must declare its recognition of Israel as a
Jewish state, and also reviewed his thinking on the
importance of security for Israelis and his support for
increased Arab private investment in the West Bank. On
settlements, Netanyahu said he would take action against
illegal outposts and would not build new settlements or
confiscate more Palestinian land, but he insisted that he
would not support a complete freeze on construction, and
noted that his advisers would try to close the gap with the
U.S. on this issue. Members of the CODELs pressed Netanyahu
on the importance of finding ways to strengthen PA President
Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, as well as to address
humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza. End summary.
Washington Visit
----------------
¶2. (S) Prime Minister Netanyahu told CODEL Ackerman that he

did not feel boxed in politically and that his coalition in
fact reflects the demands of the Israeli public to address
their concern about security. While some argue that
agreements bring security, Netanyahu said Israel's experience
of the past fifteen years proved that neither agreements nor
unilateral withdrawals brought security. Netanyahu said he
had told President Obama that while he would not condition
negotiations with the Palestinians on halting Iran's progress
toward a nuclear weapon, if Iran obtained such a weapon it
would destroy any progress made toward peace. He added that
Egyptian President Mubarak and Jordanian King Abdullah were
in complete agreement with him on that point.
¶3. (S) For the sake of both security and peace, the first
task is to stop Iran's nuclear program. Netanyahu noted that
the President had assured him that by the end of the year,
the U.S. will decide whether engagement is working and that
the goal is to stop Iran's program. The President told him
that all options remain on the table, a point confirmed by
Secretaries Clinton and Gates. Netanyahu said he and Mubarak
agreed that a nuclear Iran would lead others in the region to
develop nuclear weapons, resulting in the biggest threat to
non-proliferation efforts since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This "nightmare scenario" is well understood in Washington,
he said.
¶4. (C) Turning to peace efforts, Netanyahu said the

President is bringing a fresh approach to regional peace
whereby the Arabs would enhance the Israeli-Palestinian
track. It will be especially important to get the Saudis on
board, he added. On the two-state solution, Netanyahu noted
that the President had stressed his support for two states.
He had told the President that Israelis did not want to rule
Palestinians. Netanyahu said he was prepared for
"arrangements" with the Palestinians that would entail some
limits on their sovereignty such as no Palestinian army, and
Israeli control over borders, airspace, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. Netanyahu asserted that seventy to
eighty percent of Israelis are ready to make concessions for
peace but they do not believe they have a Palestinian partner
since Hamas is in control of Gaza and Iran has a base on
Israel's border. How can there be peace without a new
situation in Gaza, he asked.
¶5. (C) Turning to settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had

told the President that both Israel and the Palestinians had
unfulfilled Roadmap commitments. Without elaborating, he
noted that there were written and oral understandings between
President Bush and Prime Ministers Sharon and Olmert on the
Roadmap. In Gaza, Israel dismantled twenty-seven settlements
but got six thousand rockets from Hamas in return.
Support the PA
--------------
¶6. (C) Chairman Ackerman commented that President Abbas and

Prime Minister Fayyad are necessary for progress, and noted
that both Israel and the U.S. will be in trouble if they are
replaced. Something needs to be done to help them stay in
power. They need material support but also the promise of
TEL AVIV 00001184 002 OF 003
statehood. Foreign investment in the West Bank would give a

real horizon as well. Netanyahu agreed, saying Gulf Arab
investors had been successful in transforming their own
societies and could make a great contribution to the
Palestinians. He added that he wanted to bring Gulf
investors into the West Bank since they would change reality
for the Palestinians but also give Israelis confidence.
Ackerman responded that this was a great idea, but it should
come from Abbas, not Israel. The more credit Abbas can take
for steps forward, the better.
¶7. (C) In response to a question about the PA security

forces' capabilities, Netanyahu commented that he supports
the PA's desire to keep Hamas at a distance. A national
unity government without Hamas' acceptance of the Quartet
conditions would serve Hamas' interests, adding that Israel
has a common interest with the PA to prevent a Hamas takeover
of the West Bank. Netanyahu said there is a steady flow of
Iranian weapons to Gaza through Sudan or Syria and then by
sea, but he said Egypt's performance in stopping the tunnels
has improved now that Cairo understands that the Iranian arms
pipeline is a direct threat to Egypt as well.
¶8. (C) On the economic side, Netanyahu said he wants to

establish a joint plan with the PA to improve conditions in
the West Bank. He cited Cyprus as an example of economic
prosperity leading to reduced political tensions. Sen.
Lautenberg pushed Netanyahu to &put Israel,s best face
forward8 in the West Bank, and to work with the PA on water
issues, conservation and health, where Israel could
contribute a great deal and there are many opportunities to
build cooperation that would benefit people. Netanyahu
responded that his ministerial committee on improving the
lives of Palestinians in the West Bank met earlier in the day
and that he is committed to overcoming the turf wars and
excessive caution that have undercut development efforts in
the West Bank in the past. He said the GOI is looking at
creative ideas, such as how to facilitate tourism to Jericho,
advance projects in water and agriculture, in addition to
promoting business (note: he estimated that there are 100
projects Israel is examining in the West Bank). &It is
beyond belief8 what can be done in the West Bank, he said,
but he hoped the PA would engage with Israel on these
efforts. Netanyahu added that the fact that there had not
been any large anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank
during Operation Cast Lead meant that Palestinians in the
West Bank want a better life, not confrontation with Israel.
¶9. (C) Representative Ellison, noting that he is the first

Muslim to be elected to Congress, said he visited Gaza in
February and met with NGO representatives who could deliver
assistance without the credit going to Hamas. He urged
Netanyahu to consider opening the Gaza crossings, adding that
Gazans he had met told him they want peace and would like to
get their jobs back in Israel. Netanyahu responded that he
is looking at ways to balance Israeli security with enabling
Gazans to have a normal life. The flow of money and weapons
to Hamas remains a problem since Hamas is extending the range
and payload of the rockets it possesses. In response to
Representative Ellison's comment that Israel should allow
USAID to return to Gaza, Netanyahu said he thought that it
might be a good thing to have USAID operate in Gaza.
Settlements and Outposts

------------------------
¶10. (C) Netanyahu said that illegal outposts were a legal

question and his government would enforce the law. The
outposts should be removed through dialogue with the GOI if
possible, but it should be done in any case. Regarding
settlements, Netanyahu said he wants to work with the U.S. on
the basis of the understandings reached with the Bush
Administration, i.e. that Israel will not build new
settlements or seize more land, but if families grow, they
will still have the right to build within existing settlement
boundaries. Now Israel is hearing that the U.S. wants no
construction at all. Israelis consider this position to be
unfair, he said. The question is whether the U.S. is seeking
a geographic or a demographic restriction on settlements.
¶11. (C) Netanyahu commented that Israel needs a common

understanding with the U.S. The U.S. position should be
"reasonable," since opposition to a total freeze cuts across
political parties in Israel. This is more of an issue with
the U.S. than with the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted,
arguing that the PA will go along if there is an
understanding between Israel and the U.S. He noted that
Israeli officials were meeting with U.S. officials on this
issue, adding that there could be an understanding if the
U.S. wants one. Netanyahu commented that he understood there
should be no land seizures, but he could not tell settlers
TEL AVIV 00001184 003 OF 003

not to have children. In response to a question about GOI
incentives to settlers, Netanyahu's adviser Ron Dermer said
the Olmert government had already removed them. Netanyahu
said this was an issue that Israel could discuss further with
the U.S.
Iranian Threat
--------------
¶12. (S) Chairman Ackerman said that in his meetings with

Arab leaders, he found them all concerned about Iran. They
said it would helpful to resolve the Palestinian issue, but
Israel-Palestine is not the main threat to the region.
Netanyahu, following a similar comment during his meeting
with CODEL Casey, responded that there are no Arab leaders
who would tell the U.S. to wait on Iran until there is a
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Ackerman also
explained that the U.S. will try engagement in order to
prevent an unwise and premature use of force. We will
tighten sanctions at the same time, for which we need the
support of the international community, Ackerman explained.
Netanyahu noted that Ahmadinejad had said he would not stop
Iran's nuclear program. President Obama had been clear in
his comments to Netanyahu that U.S. engagement would be
results-oriented and not open-ended. If engagement did not
work, the U.S. would gain the moral high ground, which would
help make economic pressure more effective. Ackerman agreed
that more pressure was needed and said we need to figure out
what the Russians and others want. Netanyahu said that in
contrast to North Korea, the Iranian nuclear and missile
programs were direct threats to Israel, Europe and U.S.
interests in the Gulf, and he emphasized that the program was
not defensive in nature. In response to a question from
Representative Jackson-Lee, Netanyahu encouraged quick action
on a bill in the Congress to pressure foreign oil companies
not to sell refined petroleum to Iran. This might not be
enough to stop Iran's program but it would send a strong
signal. Netanyahu also urged that the U.S. demand that Iran
stop all uranium enrichment since enrichment is the main
element of their program. He commented that Iran might try
to use the talks with the U.S. to continue or accelerate
their enrichment process. Netanyahu cautioned that he was
skeptical of the idea that the Iranian leadership could
change. They have a dangerous worldview, a violent
theocracy, but it may be possible to move them if they find
the U.S. strong and determined. Iran, he commented, is bent
on becoming a global and not just a regional power.
¶13. (U) CODELS Ackerman and Casey did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09TUNIS399, ICRC: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN MOI
FACILITIES A
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09TUNIS399.
09TUNIS399 2009-06-18 17:05 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tunis
P 181758Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
INFO MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T TUNIS 000399
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/MAG (SWILLIAMS, MHAYES, JPATTERSON)

DRL: KMCGEENEY, S/WCI: ARICCI
DOD/OSD:ALIOTTA, DOJ/ODAG:MSTRANSKY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2028

TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER KDRG TS
SUBJECT: ICRC: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN MOI FACILITIES A
CONCERN
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) The International Red Cross Committee Regional

(ICRC) Delegate Yves Arnoldy told the Ambassador ICRC
priorities in Tunisia are overcrowding in general and
treatment of prisoners in MOI facilities. The ICRC has a good
working relationship with the Ministry of Justice, but the
Ministry of Interior will take more time. He confirmed that
the ICRC has access to some notified MOI facilities and was
trying to get information about non-notified facilities. He
also said, if offered the chance to make a recommendation
about the transfer of Tunisian detainees held in Guantanamo
back to Tunisia that he, "would not like to be in the
Ambassador's place." End Summary.
---------------------
Guantanamo Detainees
---------------------
¶2. (S) The Ambassador met recently with ICRC Delegate Yves
Arnoldy to obtain an update on the organization's activities
in Tunisia and the region.
¶3. (S/NF) Discussing the Guantanamo detention facility, the

Ambassador stressed President Obama's intention to close the
facility by the end of the year. He said the question of
transferring the Tunisian detainees back to Tunisia was under
review in Washington and asked what Arnoldy would recommend
if he had the opportunity. Arnoldy responded, obliquely
saying, it was a difficult decision and he "would not like to
be in the Ambassador's place." He asked to be kept informed
about the status of any potential transferees because ICRC is
in touch with their families in Tunisia and will keep them
informed. ICRC will also be testing a video conferencing
capability soon to improve communications between detainees
still in Guantanamo and their families.
---------------
ICRC Activities
---------------
¶4. (S/NF) Arnoldy said the ICRC is focused on the long-term

in Tunisia. It was only allowed access to prisoners in 2005.
It is a question of building trust, which takes time, but
relations have reached an, "interesting level with solid
ground for development particularly with the Ministry of
Justice." The ICRC has two tracks it is working on,
overcrowding in general, and treatment of prisoners in
facilities under MOI control.
------------------
Relations with MOJ
------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Arnoldy said the ICRC relations with the Ministry
of Justice are cooperative. He had direct contact whenever
he needed it with his interlocutors up to the Minister, and
there were clear signs of political will to cooperate on
prison inspections. The MOJ is ready to take advantage of
the resources ICRC has to offer and is becoming interested in
a dialogue on wider issues of justice. He could see
possibilities to develop activities with the MOJ beyond just
treatment of prisoners to a more strategic, structural level,
including training of staff and exchange of ideas with other
national systems. When asked by the Ambassador if he could
confirm if the MOI had access to prisoners held in MOJ
facilities he said he could not add any information to this,
but then added, that certain ministries have the ability to
affect the MOJ system.
-------------------
Relations with MOI
-------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Arnoldy characterized ICRC relations with the MOI

as "needing improvement." The ICRC is taking a step-by-step
approach and the level of dialogue has made some progress
since the beginning. However, changing treatment is a
long-term issue that will entail changes in the MOJ's
attitude and "mentality." The ICRC is seeking to improve the
dialogue and develop the basis for adding more substance.
Arnoldy confirmed that the ICRC has access to "notified" MOI
facilities and was trying to get information about
"non-notified" facilities.
----------------------
Relations with the MFA
----------------------
¶7. (C) Arnoldy said he has to double track his meeting

requests with the Ministry of Justice via diplomatic note to
the MFA however the MFA does not block or delay his requests.
He noted that his relationship with the MFA had declined
somewhat after the departure of Hatem Ben Salim who was the
Secretary of State for European Affairs until 2008.
------------------------
NGO Reports of Treatment
------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked Arnoldy for his impression of

the reliability of information on treatment of prisoners
provided by NGOs and others without direct access to the
prisoners. He asked if the ICRC questioned their public
statements about treatment. Arnoldy said, it is difficult
for NGOs and others to know exactly what is happening and
third hand sourcing has its problems. Not everything they
say is accurate, but it is a source of information. They
often give him tips that he can follow-up on or verify and
sometimes they do have good sources, especially through
contact with prisoners' families.
------------------
Regional Activities
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked for an overview of the ICRC

office's regional activities, which Arnoldy is responsible
for, in brief:
-- Libya - Relations are difficult. Arnoldy has a hard time

visiting Libya because of his Swiss passport and the strained
relations between Libya and Switzerland. ICRC depends on
Tunisian staff going to Libya or Libyans coming to Tunisia.
-- Mauritania - The ICRC has signed a headquarters agreement
with Mauritania upgrading their status to a mission but the
office will still answer to the Tunis office. There are
approximately 1,200 prisoners in Mauritania.
-- Morocco - ICRC has a presence in Morocco but does not

have any diplomatic status. Therefore the Morocco office
focuses on issues of international humanitarian law. The
rest of ICRC activities are handled through the Tunis office.
Morocco is the biggest file in the region, concerned mainly
individuals who "disappeared" as a result of the Western
Sahara conflict. ICRC is discussing up-grading its status
with the government of Morocco, it is just a question of
time. When they reach an agreement, ICRC will likely open
several offices in Morocco which will not be dependent on the
Tunis office.
¶10. (U) Arnoldy expressed the ICRC's appreciation for USG

support for the organization. The ICRC depends on donors to
support it so it can react quickly in a crisis and not wait
until it has confirmed funding before taking action.
-------
Comment
-------
¶11. (S/NF) Arnoldy was as frank as he could be given the

confidentiality policy of the ICRC. It was clear that he was
not positive about the prison conditions in the MOI
facilities nor about the MOI's attitude toward cooperating
with the ICRC. He did say however, that some progress had
been made in the ICRC-MOI dialogue but that it would take
time. Given that ICRC is the only international organization
with reliable access to the prisons, we have to give weight
to their comments, even if cryptic.
Godec
Viewing cable 09TUNIS415, GOT ASKS EUROPEANS NOT TO TAKE

TUNISIAN GUANTANAMO
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09TUNIS415.
09TUNIS415 2009-06-23 15:03 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tunis
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PASS DOD/OSD:ALIOTTA, DOJ/ODAG:MSTRANSKY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019

TAGS: PHUM PREL KDRG PTER TS
SUBJECT: GOT ASKS EUROPEANS NOT TO TAKE TUNISIAN GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES
REF: A. TUNIS 407

¶B. TUNIS 339
¶C. TUNIS 32
¶D. 08 TUNIS 1137 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S/NF) A senior MFA official convoked the German, Italian

and Spanish Chiefs of Mission June 19 to inform them the GOT
wants the Tunisian detainees in Guantanamo Camp returned
home. According to the European COMs, the implicit message
was that their governments should not accept the US request
to take Tunisian detainees. The COMs have informed their
capitals, but have no response yet. In a meeting June 22, a
small group of Ambassadors (including the German and Italian
COMs) discussed the MFA demarches. Among the Ambassadors,
views differed on the risks to Tunisian prisoners, but some
said there is a possibility of torture or mistreatment for
anyone accused of terrorism. End Summary.
-------------------
EUROPEANS DEMARCHED
-------------------
¶2. (S) Following FM Abdallah's meeting on Guantanamo

detainees with Ambassador Godec on June 18 (Ref A), the MFA
convoked German Ambassador Horst-Wolfram Kerll, Italian
Ambassador Antonio D'Andria and Spanish Charge Santiago
Miralles Huete to separate meetings on June 19.
¶3. (S) In the meetings, MFA Secretary of State for Maghreb,

Arab and African Affairs Abdelhafidh Hergeum delivered a
demarche similar to that given to Ambassador Godec,
specifically:
-- Tunisia wants its citizens in Guantanamo returned,
-- Tunisia does not torture and has signed the Convention
Against Torture,
-- Tunisia's image would suffer if the detainees were sent to
other countries.
The implicit message from Hergeum, according to the European
COMs, was that their countries should not agree to the US
request to accept Tunisian detainees. The three officials
have informed their capitals but have no response. According
to the German Ambassador, the Tunisian Ambassador in Berlin
has delivered the same demarche to the German MFA.
-------------------
AMBASSADORS' MEETING
-------------------
¶4. (S) On June 22, Ambassador discussed the GOT demarche

with Ambassador Kerll, Ambassador D'Andria, UK Ambassador
Chris O'Connor, French Ambassador Serge Degallaix, and
Canadian Ambassador Bruno Picard. Ambassador Godec reviewed
the Foreign Minister's demarche with the German and Italian
Ambassadors then detailing the demarches they had received.
¶5. (S/NF) The Canadian Ambassador noted the GOT has offered,
as evidence that it does not torture, the case of Imam Said
Jaziri who was repatriated from Canada to Tunisia despite
allegations that he would be mistreated. The Canadian
Ambassador said the comparison between Jaziri and the
Guantanamo detainees is "crap", explaining that Jaziri was a
petty criminal and not accused of terrorism. The Canadian
government reviewed Jaziri's case carefully and decided he
could be transferred since he did have links with terrorism.
The Canadian decision, Picard suggested, might well have been
otherwise if Jaziri had been accused of terrorism.
¶6. (S/NF) The Italian Ambassador said Italy had had few
problems with individuals they had transferred to Tunisia.
The Italians have been in contact with their families and
lawyers and have not heard any serious complaints. Why, he
asked, would the GOT want to mistreat or torture transferred
Guantanamo detainees?
¶7. (S/NF) Ambassador Godec noted that there are credible
reports of one of the first two transferees being mistreated,

including information from the lawyer, the family and
statements in open court. Moreover, there are credible
reports of Ministry of Interior officials mistreating
detainees and prisoners in other cases. He added that
contrary to GOT claims, the ICRC cannot visit all Tunisian
prisons as it does not have access to non-notified MOI
facilities. The UK Ambassador opined that the GOT uses
torture as a form of punishment.
¶8. (S/NF) The Canadian Ambassador said the GOT's statements

that it does not torture are "bullshit." The Canadian
Ambassador (protect) said he had direct, first hand evidence
of torture/mistreatment of a prisoner that lasted several
months. The Canadian and German Ambassadors agreed that
anyone in Tunisian prisons on terrorism charges is at risk of
mistreatment or torture.
¶9. (S/NF) The Ambassadors concluded the discussion with

several noting that Tunisian diplomatic assurances regarding
appropriate treatment of prisoners is of value, but that a
follow-up mechanism is required to ensure commitments are
kept.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (S/NF) The GOT clearly and strongly wants the Tunisian
detainees in Guantanamo returned home. As we suggested in
Ref A, Washington agencies may wish to consider whether to
offer to return the Tunisian detainees if the GOT agrees to
permit US access to the first two transferees and ongoing
access to any future transferees. Such an understanding
would need to include a mechanism to address the problems
that may arise. While there is no absolute guarantee against
mistreatment, such an understanding would provide transferees
additional protection. Whether the GOT would accept such an
arrangement is another matter. We are not optimistic, but it
is worth considering. If Washington decides to continue with
efforts to transfer the Tunisian detainees to third
countries, we need to officially inform the GOT at a
high-level and soon.
Godec
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI736, CROWN PRINCE SOUNDS ALARM ON

IRAN
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI736
12:12 18:06 N Dhabi
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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019

TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON IR AE
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE SOUNDS ALARM ON IRAN
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (U) This cable contains an action request in para 12.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary. On July 15, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner

joined Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan
(MBZ) and Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan (ABZ)
for a dinner covering a range of regional issues. MBZ expressed
serious concern over Iran's regional intentions and pleaded for the
U.S. to shorten its decision-making timeline and develop a "plan B."
He encouraged the U.S. to clearly communicate 'red lines' to the
Iranian Government, on nuclear and regional stability issues, with
direct consequences for transgressions. He painted to a nuclear Iran
as an existential threat to the UAE and invoked the well being of his
grandchildren while urging the U.S. to act quickly. MBZ asked for
close coordination between the U.S. and UAE to deal with the Iranian
threat. End Summary.
¶3. (S/NF) Secretary Geithner asked the Crown Prince for his views on
the situation in the region, particularly in Iran. Geithner
described the U.S. strategy on Iran, including our intention to move
forward with multilateral financial sanctions while waiting for Iran
to decide on its engagement with the U.S. He also conveyed
appreciation for the important support that UAE provides to other
regional trouble spots.
¶4. (S/NF) MBZ described a nuclear armed Iran as absolutely untenable.

He pointed to Iran's relentless ambitions to restore regional
hegemony as evidenced by destabilizing interference in Iraq, Lebanon,
Afghanistan and Palestine. He believes that 'all hell will break
loose' if Iran attains the bomb, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and
Turkey developing their own nuclear weapons capability and Iran
instigating Sunni - Shia conflict throughout the world. He said Iran
is surrounding Israel - driven by ideological conviction - and will
threaten Israel's existence should it go nuclear. At the same time,
he described Iran's ambitions as reflecting a desire to restore
Persia's great-power status, rather than driven by religious
convictions.
¶5. (S/NF) MBZ differentiated the long term threat posed by Iran from
other menacing states like North Korea or Syria. Where these other
regimes were ruled by small cadres of corrupt 'old guard' officials,
the Iranian regime has raised its next generation to carry out its
designs for hegemony. As such, the world will be dealing with Iran's
destabilizing ambitions for decades. MBZ assesses that the Iranian
regime has emerged from the recent election strife stronger and more
resolute.
¶6. (S/NF) While careful not to suQY.JQoWoRth Iran,

MBZ described a near term conventional war with Iran as clearly
preferable to the long term consequences of a nuclear armed Iran.
Without timely and decisive action by the United States, MBZ believes
that Israel will strike Iran, causing Iran to launch missile attacks
- including hits on the UAE - and to unleash terror attacks
worldwide. In his view, 'the map of the Middle East' would change.
He expects widespread civilian conflict to erupt as Iran sparks Sunni
- Shia violence worldwide (including the Eastern Province of Saudi
Arabia which he sees as the greatest vulnerability, along with Iraq,
in the Arab world). He speculated that such an event could unfold
within six months time and resolved that the UAE is prepared to
defend itself. He believes that an Israeli strike will not be
successful in stopping Iran's nuclear program, and therefore we need
to plan.
¶7. (S/NF) Regarding the recent election in Iran, MBZ cautioned that
Mir Hossein Musavi is no different than Ahmedinejad when it comes to
their nuclear ambitions, 'same goal, different tactic.' In this
respect, he regards Musavi as more dangerous than his competitor, as
at least Ahmedinejad was 'an open book.' He reminded Secretary
Geithner that Musavi and his advisors are part of the same group that
took the U.S. Embassy in 1979.
¶8. (S/NF) MBZ questioned Europe's basic understanding of the threat

posed by Iran, and wrote off their resolve to deal with the
situation. He was appalled by 'top European diplomats' that were
unconcerned by the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. He
shared his theory that Russia was trying to instigate conflict
between the U.S. and Iran as a means to weaken the U.S. and drive up
oil prices. He suggested we could use Russia's narrow views to help
persuade Russia to join international actions against Iran.
¶9. (S/NF) MBZ stated that financial sanctions would never be
sufficient to stop Iran, but allowed that the U.S. should continue
with such measures to demonstrate to the Arab world that we tried
everything. He pledged continued cooperation and support for
international sanctions and encouraged further action in the UN and
EU, as well as the U.S.
¶10. (S/NF) MBZ suggested that the key to containing Iran revolves
around progress in the Israel/Palestine issue. He argued that it
will be essential to bring Arab public opinion on board in any
conflict with Iran and roughly 80% of the public is amenable to
persuasion. To win them over, the U.S. should quickly bring about a
two state solution over the objections of the Netanyahu government.
He suggested working with moderate Palestinians that support the road
map, and forget about the others as there is no time to waste.
¶11. (S/NF) Foreign Minister ABZ urged the U.S. to make better use of
its allies in the region and engage Russia and China in a productive
way on this issue wherever possible. He urged clear and forceful
messaging to Iran and more regional gatherings (i.e. P+5+1 and GCC+3)
to increase pressure and isolation.
¶12. (S/NF) ACTION REQUEST: MBZ would like to visit Washington in late
July to discuss Iran with President Obama and other senior officials.
Treasury and Embassy recommend continuing the dialogue with MBZ as
soon as possible.
¶13. (SBU) This cable has been cleared by Andy Baukol, Department of
Treasury Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs.
GREENE
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI744, UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD)

JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI744
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DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: 07/21/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
QA, AE
SUBJECT: UAE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE (GSD) JULY 20 PLENARY SESSION AND
COS DIALOGUE
ABU DHABI 00000744 001.2 OF 004
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B

AND D.
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) In a July 20 plenary session of the GSD with a large UAE
delegation, accompanied by a smaller session with the UAE Chief of
Staff, the immediate focus was largely on Iran. Participants
reiterated the good defense cooperation that the U.S. and UAE enjoy,
while noting the need to improve coordination further to deal with
real and urgent threats in the region. In this regard, the UAE put
the threat of Iran's potential reaction to a "likely" Israeli attack
on its nuclear program at the center of scenarios to be considered.
Other issues, to include Yemen, counter-proliferation, Pakistan, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and extremism were also addressed, but
even these were often seen through the prism of Iranian intentions.
¶2. (S/NF) This message begins with the Chief of Staff's urgent plea
on "munitions" to deal with an unpredictable Iran, followed by a
synopsis of GSD plenary proceedings. A list of UAE participants is
included at para 20. End summary.
Chief of Staff Presses for Munitions:

Urgent about Iran's unpredictability
------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) In a brief session with principals only, Chief of Staff

Hamad Thani al-Romaithi (who also participated in the MbZ dinner and
was on his way to Lebanon later July 20) said the UAE cannot act
alone in the region and needs coherent plans -- especially to deal
with the unique threat of Iran. How to deter Iran without provoking
it is a challenge. Ambassador al-Otaiba emphasized how the proximity
of the UAE to Iran magnifies the threat perception; the CoS said UAE
military planning had to consider worst-case scenarios.
¶4. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said the USG did not disagree with the UAE
evaluation of Iran's objectives, but that we need to work to prevent
them from achieving those objectives. Diplomacy is only one tool.
The USG wants to help provide the UAE with defensive capabilities and
our troop presence here should help act as a deterrent to Iran. We
don't want to signal that we will give up on diplomacy, yet in
parallel to that effort we intend to keep the pressure on Iran. We
appreciate the candor of our defense engagement with the UAE. We are
dealing with an unpredictable foe and need to take all precautions.
¶5. (S/NF) The CoS said Iran will remain a threat in any case, as its
objectives are constant. He added that if the Israelis strike, Iran
may lash out at the UAE and around the Gulf -- one can conceive of
many possible scenarios from missile strikes to attacks on isolated
islands to the exploitation of 130,000 Iranians living in the UAE.
The UAE therefore seeks ongoing support from the region's "main
actor," the U.S., and desires close defense coordination. The UAE's
friends in the GCC, on the other hand, are not always realistic in
their approach to Iran, he said, citing Arab misinterpretation of
"brotherly" Iraqi intentions with regards to Kuwait back in 1990.
¶6. (S/NF) ASD Vershbow said that our message to Iran is that threats
against our allies will not go unanswered. We need to be prepared in
case deterrence does not work, with the realization that with or
without nuclear weapons Iran seeks to be a dominant power in the
region. This is a very interconnected region, asserted the CoS. "If
I was in the Israelis' shoes, I would attack, to reduce the nuclear
threat." The first reaction may be that the Iranians launch missiles
against targets in Israel and then the Gulf, he added. Air Chief
Sweidan added that the UAE needs munitions on a tighter timeline than
previously assumed -- with urgent needs in 2010, 11, and 12. He said
the UAE Armed Forces could receive munitions from the U.S. inventory
and then replenish them later (he supplied the same list of
requirements as was relayed some months ago, noting that they had
only received a "political" answer to that inquiry thus far).
ABU DHABI 00000744 002 OF 004

¶7. (S/NF) The CoS was appreciative of Patriot deployments, progress
on command and control systems, and movement toward more effective
shared early warning, but lamented that other pieces of the air
defense puzzle require immediate attention. Ambassador al-Otaiba
reiterated the need to "borrow from U.S. inventories" to meet urgent
timelines. A/S Vershbow said we were leaning far forward for the UAE
on THAAD, for example, and would continue to look into opportunities
to assist, including filling gaps before UAE-purchased systems were
delivered.
¶8. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of close defense coordination,

the CoS noted that in the event of an attack the UAE may have no time
to react. Taking the fight to Iran may require "passing over U.S.
aircraft carriers," for example, so we need to be in lock-step at all
phases of preparation and operation.
Introductory remarks
--------------------
¶9. (C) The Plenary session of the U.S.-UAE Gulf Security Dialogue
(GSD) convened July 20 at the Armed Forces Officers' Club, with newly
promoted Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih
al-Kaabi stating that the "small but significant" Gulf region makes a
large contribution to global peace and development and seeks enhanced
cooperation with the U.S. He cited UAE troops in Afghanistan, U.S.
use of UAE bases, a robust intelligence exchange, strong
counter-terror efforts, and improved border control as evidence that
the UAE shares common goals with the U.S. Citing the "high
importance" of strong relations among GCC members, he thanked the
U.S. for its role in the defense relationship and wanted to learn
more about U.S. strategies vis-a-vis Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Palestine.
¶10. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow, leading the U.S.

team along with Assistant State of State for Political-Military
AffairsShapiro, expressed confidence in the strength and future of
the bilateral relationship, anchored by common strategic interests.
Recounting shared priorities, he noted that the GSD was being taken
to a new level as we seek strategic synergy in facing real threats
like Iran -- which we are obligated to defend against. He called for
a more multi-lateral approach to counter-proliferation and cited the
need to prepare missile defenses. He lauded the UAE decision to host
LEADING EDGE 2009 and cited the 123 agreement with the U.S. as the
high standard on civil nuclear cooperation. The responsible drawdown
of U.S. troops in Iraq also calls for continued UAE support, he
emphasized, as Iraq seeks to assume responsibility for its own
security and integrate into the region. The UAE's advanced fighter
squadron, growing air defense net, participation in RED FLAG, and
leadership of CTF 152 are all indications of a maturing defense
capability.
¶11. (C) A/S Shapiro emphasized the USG desire to ensure regional
stability, counter extremism, curb WMD proliferation, and tackle the
inter-related challenges of the region holistically. He focused on
the threat from Iran, stressing that the USG was attempting a
diplomatic solution -- if possible -- and would proceed in
consultation with our friends in the region. Recounting the basic
components of our Iraq policy, he also highlighted the need to
strengthen the institutions of government in Lebanon and build
capacity within the Palestinian Authority.
UAE offers threat analysis: all Iran

------------------------------------
¶12. (S) The UAE's presentation of the primary regional threat
assessed that Iran's leadership "genuinely believes that it has
emerged victorious from its clash with the U.S.," with gains made in
Iraq, an expanding "Shi'a tide" in the region, an ongoing nuclear
program, missile modernization, and continued provocation of
resistance in Gaza. While Israel was able to neutralize to some
degree threats on its flanks in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008/9),
ABU DHABI 00000744 003 OF 004
Iran's main goals of regional influence were not inhibited. The UAE
assessment continued that Israel may act on its perception that only
"extreme" (and unlikely) UNSC action or unilateral Israeli military
action can slow Iran's nuclear goals. As Iran continues to reject a
political solution, the UAE must prepare for the fallout should
Israel act on its fears. With that, the briefer introduced a slide
on Iran's capabilities, with missile sites in the south of Iran and
concentric circles showing their likely range all covering UAE
territory.
¶13. (S) Iranian promotion of "Shi'ism," coupled with sleeper cells

in the region, magnify the threat articulated by the UAE. If
attacked, it may seek to obstruct shipping in the Gulf and control
(more) islands over which it does not have legitimate sovereignty.
Working in alliance with al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi'a, Iran
is poised to do damage of an unpredictable nature if/when provoked.
In sum, Iran continued as the traditional focus of the threat
briefing offered by the UAE at GSD sessions. Other regional concerns
noted in lesser detail included Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and piracy.
Strategic Cooperation
---------------------
¶14. (C) In further briefings, the UAE team highlighted good

operational cooperation with the U.S. and offered a review of the
maturing Critical National Infrastructure Agency (CNIA) which is
taking charge of security on land, along the coast, and off shore --
with an initial focus on Abu Dhabi but an intent to serve as a
federal agency. The U.S. Coast Guard and NYPD were cited as partners
in the growing CNIA mission, with a U.S. promise of first-time
"Nuclear Security Training" in the near future.
¶15. (S) The UAE delegation received a draft "UAE National Defense
Strategy and U.S.-UAE Comprehensive Defense Strategy" document
outlining key priorities in the defense relationship (a document
proposed by UAE Ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba). Without
immediate comment on the substance of the USG draft, al-Kaabi said
the UAE would reply via embassy channels and looked forward to
continuing the dialogue.
Q&A on Iran, Yemen

------------------
¶16. (C) When the floor was open to general discussion, two topics
dominated: Iran and Yemen. The UAE asked whether the USG had any
new information since the December 2007 NIE regarding Iran's nuclear
weaponization program; the U.S. team noted that a new estimate was in
progress but it was premature to comment. The DMI representative
also noted that Iran exploits crises for its own advantage, making
the defusing of crises like Palestine and Lebanon imperative if we
are to keep Iran in check. In the case of Palestine, he added
optimistically, it is time to "cut to the chase" and deal with final
status issues; Lebanon is also ripe for progress, he suggested,
without a drawn out process.
¶17. (S) On Yemen, the UAE said it shared a U.S. concern that a
"failed state" could emerge on the Arabian Peninsula, with terrorist
partners and Iranian influence further poisoning the mix. A
collapsed Yemen "gives us Afghanistan," said Commander of the Air
Force and Air Defense Major General Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi, and
then it presents a long-term threat to the region. He said the UAE
was coordinating economic development support for Yemen while also
trying to assist with political reconciliation. He noted the dangers
of "another Somalia." ASD Vershbow hoped the UAE could help secure a
unified GCC approach to Yemen, as time is running out on the
seccession question and Yemen cannot afford a "two front" war with
both seccesionists and the Al-Houthi insurgency. In a brief
discussion of Pakistan, all agreed that Islamabad needs to focus
resources to fight insurgency rather than obsessing with India as its
potential military foe.
ABU DHABI 00000744 004 OF 004
Positive Conclusions
--------------------
¶18. (C) Enhanced U.S.-UAE cooperation to counter troublesome

financial flows and cash smuggling -- solidified during a recent
visit by Treasury Secretary Geithner -- was noted by the Charge as
another area of productive engagement. Both sides also put in very
positive words about the role of the Air Warfare Center which has
become a proud center of excellence for the region.
¶19. (S) In closing, al-Kaabi raised Iran yet again, noting that its
leadership is not likely to change fundamentally and therefore the
threat is likely to continue. He looked forward to ongoing
discussion of the defense strategy discussed earlier as we continue
to pursue a common vision.
¶20. (SBU) UAE delegation:
--- Staff Major General Ali Hamad Subaih al-Kaabi, Deputy Chief of
Staff
--- Staff Major General (Pilot) Hamad bin Suweidan al-Qamzi,
Commander of Air Force and Air Defense
--- Staff Colonel Abdullah Saeed al-Hamoodi, Intelligence and
Military Security
--- Lt. Colonel (Dr.) Albadr Shareef al-Shatri, Intelligence and
Military Security
--- Staff Brigadier General Khalfan al-Kaabi, Ground Forces
--- Staff Colonel (Pilot) Salim Saeed, Ground Forces
--- Staff Lt. Colonel Abdullah al-Yamahi, Directorate of Joint
Operations
--- Brigadier General (Dr.) Humaid Ali al-Kitbi, Purchasing
Directorate
--- Staff Colonel Saeed Rashid al-Shihi, CNIA
--- Staff Brigadier General Mohamed Murad al-Baloushi, Air Forces
--- Colonel (Engineer) Ahmad Sultan, Air Forces
--- Staff Lt. Colonel Engineer Jamal Mohamed al-Ameri, Air Forces
--- Major Juma Sultan, Air Forces
--- Staff Major (Pilot) Ali Saleh, Air Forces
--- Major (Pilot) Abdullah Sultan al-Mazroui, GSD secretariat for
plenary
¶21. (U) The GSD traveling party approved this message .
GREENE
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI754, S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER

WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI754
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FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA
E.O. 12958: 07/22/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
QA, AE
SUBJECT: (S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND
PM A/S SHAPIRO
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B

AND D.
REF A SECRETARY'S LETTER TO MBZ ON PUMA HELICOPTERS

REF B SECSTATE 76108
¶1. (S) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ, also
Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces and de facto defense
chief) hosted a July 19 executive session of the Gulf Security
Dialogue in Abu Dhabi (July 20 plenary with UAE uniformed officers
reported septel). The U.S. delegation was led by Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow and
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro. MbZ called for advanced U.S.-UAE joint military
coordination and faster delivery of FMS items to respond to a
worst-case scenario in Iran. As with other senior U.S. officials
(but with increasing alarm and a shortening time frame), MbZ focused
on the Iranian threat and his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
strike on Iran is likely in a matter of months. ASD Vershbow assured
MbZ of the U.S. commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that
this visit was his first since taking his new position - reflecting
the importance we place on the relationship. Discussions also
centered on UAE military and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
and Pakistan and the peace process. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) hosted a
working dinner with U.S. Gulf Security Dialogue delegation the
evening of July 19. The U.S. Delegation was led by Assistant
Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Alexander Vershbow and included RADM William Payne, Ambassador, and
DCM. The UAE was represented by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Hamad Thani al-Rumaithi, Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba,
Under Secretary of the Crown Prince's Court Mohamed al-Mazrouei,
Deputy Chief of Staff Ali Hamad al-Kaabi and Air Force Chief Mohammed
Swaidan al-Qamzi.
Joint Planning for Worst-Case Scenario in Iran

--------------------------------------------- -
¶3. (S) In a three-hour working dinner, MbZ focused primarily on his
overarching concern -- the threat from Iran, stressing as he has with
other senior U.S. officials that U.S. engagement with Iran will
ultimately fail and that he fears a surprise (Israeli pre-emptive
strike on Iran) in a shorter timeframe than USG estimates (he fears
it could happen this year). ASD Vershbow assured MbZ of the U.S.
commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that his trip to the
UAE was his first since taking on his new position, reflecting the
importance we place on the relationship.
¶4. (S/NF) MbZ reiterated his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive

strike against Iran was increasingly likely, saying he was convinced
the Netanyahu government was prepared to act against Iran, and that
he agreed with Israeli intelligence assessments regarding how close
Tehran is to achieving its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian response
to a pre-emptive strike, predicted MbZ, would be attacks on U.S.
allies in the region, foremost among them the UAE; Iran may also
unleash terrorist cells against western interests around the world.
ASD Vershbow explained that the USG assessment differed in timeframe
-- we do not anticipate military confrontation with Iran before the
end of 2009 -- stressing, however, that denying Iran's nuclear
ambitions and stemming its efforts to achieve regional hegemony were
foremost among U.S. international security concerns.
¶5. (S) In response to MbZ's position that ultimately engagement

efforts with Iran would fail, both ASD and A/S made clear than while
the USG continues to press for a diplomatic solution, the offer of
engagement is not opened-ended and will not come at the expense of
Gulf security.
ABU DHABI 00000754 002 OF 004
¶6. (S) Referring to the Iran Region Presence Office (IRPO) in Dubai,
MbZ asked "how's that office doing?" He did not demonstrate any
particular concern or sensitivity regarding IRPO activities in UAE.
MbZ said that the Iranian regime was in trouble internally and would
move swiftly to oppress post-election opposition. As for Rafsanjani,
MbZ said he was a "survivor" who would not succeed in a leadership
bid because he will not act unless he is one-hundred percent sure he
will win. Again turning to his primary security concern, MbZ
suggested that Tehran would likely accelerate its nuclear program to
draw attention away from its internal weakness and to foment
nationalism among its citizenry. "Time is not on our side", he said,
hinting that a move should be made against Iran and "the sooner the
better."
Russia
------
¶7. (C)ASD Vershbow briefed MbZ on the positive outcome of POTUS's

recent talks in Moscow. MbZ said that he had met with Putin in June
and he did not believe Russia saw a nuclearized Iran as a challenge
to its interests, nor did Putin appreciate the threat of regional
proliferation in response to an Iranian bomb. He encouraged the U.S.
to continue to press the Russians saying he believed if the Russians
came over to our side, (with regard to tougher sanctions), the
Chinese would follow. MbZ said his he would travel in late July to
Beijing, where he will surely press the Chinese on Iran. ASD
Vershbow suggested he urge the Chinese to send Iran a message by
diversifying its oil imports away from Iran.
Afghanistan - Neighbors Not Doing Enough

----------------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) MbZ complained that Arab regimes are not doing enough to
help in Afghanistan. He said that as of one month ago, he surveyed
the region and found that only Oman had funded its Tokyo conference
pledge of $2 million. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
particular for not doing their part, saying that the Saudis clearly
did not see how important it was to their own interests.
¶9. (S/NF) MbZ criticized other regional leaders for playing both
sides and for "dating" Iran. MbZ compared the current situation to
pre-WWII Europe saying, "Ahmedinejad is Hitler," and neighboring
capitals believe erroneously that they can prevent Iranian
retaliation by playing nice or signing agreements with Tehran. "They
think the are backing the winning horse," MbZ explained, emphasizing
that if they think that by appeasing Iran they will avoid Iranian
retaliation "then they are seriously mistaken, Sir."
National Defense Strategy

-------------------------
¶10. (S) Throughout the discussions, MbZ repeatedly called for

coordinated military planning for the worst-case scenario of an
unpredictable Iranian response to an Israeli strike, stressing that
U.S.-UAE preparations must begin now well before commencement of
hostilities. Both sides agreed that improved coordination was a good
idea, with ASD Vershbow utilizing the opportunity to push for a UAE
national defense strategy. (Note: GSD July 20 plenary meeting
reported septel. End Note.)
Pakistan - 14 Additional PUMAs

------------------------------
¶11. (C) Passing a letter from Secretary Clinton thanking the UAE for
its transfer of 14 U.S.-origin PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, A/S
Shapiro thanked MbZ for the UAEG's partnership and regional
leadership in providing assistance to Pakistan as well as its
long-term participation in the coalition in Afghanistan. MbZ updated
the delegation on delivery status, saying that 10 of the promised 14
ABU DHABI 00000754 003 OF 004
had been delivered and the remaining 4 would shortly follow. He

added that efforts were underway to find and purchase additional
helicopters, announcing (for the first time that we have heard this)
the UAE's intentions to provide Pakistan with an additional 14 PUMAs.
Humanitarian Aid for CT

-----------------------
¶12. (C) In the context of defeating AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
MbZ called for Arab and Muslim regimes to do more to stem terrorist
financing, whether it means closing down charities, business
interests, "whatever is necessary." He also pointed to the
zealousness of Arab fighters vice Afghani nationals. Nine-five
percent of Arab fighters go to Afghanistan knowing they are going to
die for ideological reasons. Afghan nationals, on the other hand,
are more practical. "This makes one of them [Arabs] more valuable to
AQ than ten or more Afghan fighters." Afghanis, MbZ pointed out,
have tribes, families, homes -- therefore the best way to counter
local extremism in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, is
to improve the quality of life.
¶13. (SBU) MbZ described UAE humanitarian commitments of $300 million

to build "model villages" in Afghanistan, complete with housing,
hospitals and schools. He invited the USG to join the UAE, Germany
and France in this effort. A/S Shapiro stressed the urgency of the
displaced persons crisis in the Swat region of Pakistan, suggesting
the UAE consider housing aid in this region. MbZ replied "Why not?
We will try to help wherever needed."
MbZ on Pakistani Leadership

---------------------------
¶14. (S/NF) MbZ shared his assessment of the current Pakistani

leadership saying President "Zardarni is dirty but not dangerous,"
while Prime Minister Sharif is "dangerous but not dirty -- this is
Pakistan. Sharif cannot be trusted to honor his promises. MbZ
continued that a new personality may emerge but for the time being
the UAE position was to play a helpful role by supporting the PM.
Lebanon - Support for LAF and PM Hariri

---------------------------------------
¶15. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated our request that the UAEG assist the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by funding the purchase and transfer of
some of 56 U.S.-origin tanks from Jordan to Lebanon, noting our
appreciation of the UAE's earlier funding of the first 10 tanks.
This would help capitalize on the positive outcome of the elections
and help reduce Hezbollah's (and Iran's) influence in Lebanon.
Promising to look into what the UAE could do to help with this
matter, MbZ asked if we had made the same request to Doha. ASD
replied that we had and that he would do so again when he arrived in
Qatar July 20.
¶16. (C) Reiterating his favored theme of the generation gap in

regional leadership (UAE having already passed the baton to the
younger generation), MbZ praised Lebanese PM Saad Hariri, saying he
was a good man. "He feels very threatened at the moment (presumably
by the Syrian regime), and it is important we do not lose him." A/S
Shapiro agreed, pointing to U.S. security assistance as proof of our
concern and suggested that the UAE support U.S. efforts to strengthen
Lebanese government institutions as the best opportunity to build GOL
stability and security.
July 18 Nasrallah Speech

------------------------
¶17. (S) MbZ pointed to Hezbollah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's July 18

speech, saying he believed it reflected a change in Hezbollah's tone
due to calculations that its Iranian backers were currently in a
weakened state post-Presidential elections. MbZ said that Nasrallah
is likely suffering from decreased financial support, at least for
ABU DHABI 00000754 004 OF 004
the next six months.
Behavior Change in Syria - I Think Not

--------------------------------------
¶18. (S/NF) Vershbow pointed to recent progress with Syria on border

control issues to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq as a
small step forward in effort at eliciting behavioral change from
Damascus. MbZ showed no confidence that Syria could be separated
from the Iranian camp. "If you want my opinion," replied MbZ, "I
think not." He advised that Syria had a lot of options and that,
judging from past behavior, the regime would continue hedging on key
regional issues (Iran, support for Hezbollah, peace process) for the
foreseeable future.
Praise for Bahraini Crown Prince

--------------------------------
¶19. (C) MbZ said that a two-state solution was the only option for
solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. MbZ praised the Bahraini
Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa for his "courageous"
(July 17) editorial in the Washington Post (ref B), commenting that
not enough Arab countries we on the right side of this issue.
¶20. (U) ASD Vershbow and A/S Shapiro cleared this message.
Viewing cable 09BEIRUT818, LEBANON: PM SINIORA TO PETRAEUS:

PUSH SYRIA TO GET
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09BEIRUT818.
09BEIRUT818 2009-07-20 14:02 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
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OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MASS MARR MOPPS LE SY IR
PK, AF
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA TO PETRAEUS: PUSH SYRIA TO GET
BACK IN ARAB FOLD
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora told visiting

Commander General of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) General
David Petraeus and the Ambassador June 30 that he was "quite
satisfied" with the outcome of Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary
elections. Siniora said that the Lebanese had voted for the
state and its institutions and confirmed that Lebanon could
practice its democracy without outside interference -- if
given the opportunity. He also thanked the United States for
sustained military assistance. General Petraeus
congratulated Lebanon on the peaceful conduct of the
elections and expressed hope that a cabinet would be formed
soon. Siniora continued that Lebanon was encouraged by and
supportive of President Obama's efforts to reach a
comprehensive Middle East Peace, but cautioned that
Palestinian resettlement should not come at the expense of
Lebanon. Siniora encouraged the U.S. to push Syria to
respect the sovereignty of other states (namely Lebanon) as a
way to bring Syria back into the Arab fold, rather than
continuing to align itself with Iran. General Petraeus hoped
that the obvious cracks in the Iranian system (illustrated by
the demonstrations that followed the Iranian elections) would
distract Iran from malign ambitions in the region. He also
briefed Siniora on U.S. military assistance in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Meeting General Petraeus at his downtown Beirut

residence, Siniora was accompanied by his senior advisor Rola
Noureddine. General Petraeus and the Ambassador were
accompanied by Colonel Bjarne (Michael) Iverson, Executive
Officer; Colonel Mike Bell, Director - Commander's
Initiatives Group; Sadi Othman, Cultural Advisor and
Translator; Ali Khedery, Advisor; Lieutenant Colonel Dave
Wilson, Lebanon Desk Officer, Embassy Defense Attache
Lieutenant Colonel James Lantz, Office of Defense Cooperation
Chief Colonel Joshua Berisford and an Embassy notetaker.
LEBANON: A "MODEL"
FOR THE REGION
-----------------
¶3. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora welcomed the

one-day visit of the Commanding General of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) General David Petraeus to Beirut on June
¶30. Siniora expressed his thanks for sustained U.S. military
assistance to Lebanon and asserted that U.S. security
assistance had contributed to the positive outcome of the
June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections. Siniora said he was
"quite satisfied" that the majority March 14 coalition had
shown that its majority was decisive and not "fictitious," as
it had been described by others after the previous elections
in 2005. He described the electoral outcome as vote for the
state and its institutions. Siniora said that although
Lebanon was not the most important country in the world and
despite minor irregularities in the conduct of the elections,
Lebanon had shown that it could be a model of diversity and
democracy -- without outside interference -- in the region.
¶4. (C) General Petraeus congratulated Siniora on winning his

own electoral campaign and the Lebanese people for conducting
peaceful elections. In addition, he expressed hope that the
new cabinet would be formed soon. Siniora predicted the
government formation would likely "take some time" because of
debate about "blocking third" veto power for the opposition.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE:

NOT AT THE EXPENSE
OF LEBANON
------------------
¶5. (C) Siniora said that Lebanon was encouraged by and
supportive of President Obama's commitment to achieving a

comprehensive Middle East Peace. He said the U.S.
administration's recognition of the centrality of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was an opportunity to push the
Arab Peace Initiative forward and to finally achieve a
resolution. The Israelis, however, were being uncooperative,
he accused. In his June 14 speech, Israeli PM Benjamin
Netanyahu had said "yes" to a two-state solution with but
added "a thousand no's," Siniora analyzed. The ultimate fate
of Palestinian refugees, could not come at the expense of
Lebanon, Siniora cautioned. (Note: Lebanon has 12 Palestinian
rfugee camps. The GOL maintains that the Palestinins
should have the "right of return" and is agaist permanent
resettlement ("tawteen") in Lebanon. End note.)
SYRIA
-----
¶6. (C) Syria, Siniora said, has geopolitical significance.

He said Lebanon desired a mutually respectful relationship
with Syria and lauded the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Lebanon and Syria as a good first step.
However, other issues, such as border delineation and the
presence of PFLP-GC military camps, supported by Syria, on
the border, remain. Siniora commented on the signs of
increased U.S. engagement with Syria, but he advised the
United States to be careful not to give any rewards to Syria
without Syria taking action first. Most importantly, the
U.S. should not allow Syria -- or other states in the region
-- to use Lebanon as a platform or battleground; engagement
with Syria should not come at the expense of Lebanon, Siniora
said.
¶7. (C) General Petraeus assured Siniora that the U.S.

administration understood Lebanon's concerns. He told
Siniora that Syrian President Bashar Asad had invited him to
visit several times, but the time was not yet appropriate.
Syria, he added, continues to allow Al Qaeda-affiliated
facilitation networks to operate from its territory and allow
the transit of suicide bombers into Iraq. General Petraeus
added that the U.S. would like to see Syria return to the
Arab world and develop closer ties to the western world,
rather than continue to align itself with Iran.
IRAN
----
¶8. (C) On Iran, General Petraeus said that the crisis

following Iran's June 12 presidential election had revealed
significant cracks in the Iranian system. He said the
announced outcome of the election and subsequent
demonstrations showed that the "urban street" and the "young
street" were not supportive of Iranian Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Candidly, the U.S. would like these
events to distract Iran for awhile from its other ambitions,
such as pursuing its nuclear program, General Petraeus said.
Although, it was too early to determine whether the current
crisis had any significant impact on Iran's ability to
support Hamas, Hizballah, or limit its ability to train and
support foreign fighters in Iraq, he added. Siniora agreed
that there were definite cracks in the Iranian system and the
internal divisions should be exploited. However, Siniora
warned against Israel taking any military action against Iran
saying such action would only make the regional situation
worse.
¶9. (C) General Petraeus responded that it was not the U.S.
desire to see outside force used against Iran. Nonetheless,
he observed, there was a phenomenon in the Gulf states where
leaders were worried someone would strike Iran's nuclear
weapons program, while also worrying that someone would not.
Iran, he continued, had become CENTCOM's best recruiting
tool, and the number of partnerships and U.S. military
assistance agreements with Arab partners in the Gulf had
increased significantly.
PAKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN
------------
¶10. (C) Turning to other international developments, Siniora

said he had heard a rumor that Pakistan was ready to sell
some of its nuclear stock to other countries. General
Petraeus responded that this was almost certainly a rumor,
but he refused to discount the possibility that Gulf states
may "start shopping" if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon
capability. He added that during his recent visit to
Pakistan, it was clear that for the first time the Pakistani
military viewed the Taliban and other extremist groups as an
existential threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani people,
General Petraeus continued, were hugely supportive of its
military's efforts to fight against this extremist threat.
There were some early signs of some success from Pakistani
operations.
¶11. (C) In Afghanistan, the U.S. was increasing its troop

levels by 38,000 from the beginning of 2009 and doubling the
number of its helicopters, General Petraeus said. The war in
Afghanistan would be tough, and not easily won. One key will
be the ability of the Afghan government to "step up" to
provide governance and be seen to serve the people in areas
that have been cleared by Coalition and Afghan forces..
Afghanistan's presidential election was scheduled for August
20, General Petraeus added. It was likely, but not
guaranteed that current Afghan President Hamid Karzai would
win, he predicted.
¶12. (U) CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus has cleared this

message.
SISON
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES827, NOW WHAT? THE KIRCHNERS'

OPTIONS IN POST-ELECTION
Discussing cables
2009-07-15 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
18:06 16:04 Aires
VZCZCXRO8303
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R 151828Z JUL 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2029

TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON AR
SUBJECT: NOW WHAT? THE KIRCHNERS' OPTIONS IN POST-ELECTION
ARGENTINA
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Tom Kelly for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
.
¶1. (C) Summary/Introduction. More than two weeks have

passed since Argentina's ruling first couple lost badly in
mid-term congressional elections. It has taken President
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) and her husband Nestor
time to process the meaning of the debacle and respond.
Though the GOA has taken some significant steps over the past
two weeks, including a Cabinet shuffle, the signals that the
Kirchners and their associates have sent have been decidedly
mixed. It may be another month before their new strategy is
fully discernible.
¶2. (S/NF) In the past two weeks, Mission personnel have

talked to dozens of political analysts, economists,
businesspersons, and politicians about the Kirchners' likely
course. Most analyses posit three possible scenarios:
radicalization, reform, or the status quo. While there are
serious, smart people who believe that the government will
lurch simply left or right over the coming months, we, and
most of our contacts, believe that the government will behave
in the future much as it has in the past. We think a tepid
move toward reform is more likely than radicalization because
the country's ascendant forces support the former, not the
latter. At the same time, we doubt that Kirchner-led reform
will be ambitious. The best that can be expected from this
weakened government is a "reform-lite" agenda that seeks to
recapture political space without significant policy
concessions. This cable examines the three scenarios in
depth; identifies evidence in support of each one, as well as
indicators to watch for that might clarify the Kirchners'
future intentions; and evaluates the scenarios' likelihood.
A separate message will critically examine another possible
political outcome - that CFK will fail to reach the end of
her term. End Summary/Introduction.
---------------------------
The Radicalization Scenario
---------------------------
¶3. (C) In the first (and least likely) scenario, the

Kirchners react by turning hard left, attempting to reverse
their fortunes through a radicalization of their regime that
would propel them unambiguously into the Bolivarian camp led
by Hugo Chavez. This approach is referred to locally as
"deepening the model." Key elements of this approach would
include:
-- Economy: Further nationalization of private companies

and/or intensified attempts to manage their behavior; a
partial default on sovereign debt instruments; and a
confirmation of Internal Commerce Secretary Guillermo Moreno
as the executor of NK's dirigiste economic policy; increased
influence by labor unions.
-- Governance: Abandonment of the Peronist party in favor of

"transversality," in which the Kirchners consort with any and
all who offer their fealty; use of the government budget and
other means to punish Peronist governors and other
politicians deemed disloyal; pursuit of restrictive media
legislation; increased resort to executive decrees.
-- Foreign Policy: Closer identification with Hugo Chavez

and his Bolivarian allies; increasing criticism of USG
policies.
-------------------------------
Evidence of a Shift to the Left
-------------------------------
¶4. (C) There is a significant group of observers (including

political analyst Rosendo Fraga and Deutsche Bank Managing
Director Marcelo Blanco) who subscribe to this school of
thought. They do not lack evidence. Erstwhile Kirchner
allies in the private sector, including Bank Association
chief Jorge Brito and Argentine Industrialist Association
head Hector Mendez, tell us that they are disgruntled with
the Kirchners and lack influence on them. Their loss seems
to be union boss Hugo Moyano's gain. He flexed his muscles
last week, compelling the GOA to withdraw a subcabinet
nomination in the Health Ministry that threatened his unions'
financial interests and installing the son of his attorney as
head of Aerolineas Argentinas (septel).
¶5. (C) On the political front, Nestor Kirchner resigned his

position as head of the Peronist Party the day after the June
28 election. Since then, rumors have proliferated of a new
"transversal" approach that elevates Kirchner loyalists and
hard-line ideologues like "piquetero" street activists and
BUENOS AIR 00000827 002 OF 005
the "Carta Abierta" intellectual group. Kirchner showed up

last week at an open-air meeting of "Carta Abierta," his
first public appearance since his June 29 resignation as
Peronist-in-chief. Last week's cabinet shuffle only
strengthened the hands of the loyalists, with no new blood
and the replacement of the reform-oriented Sergio Massa with
Kirchnerista Anibal Fernandez as Cabinet Chief.
¶6. (C) Some of the GOA's post-election foreign policy moves

can also be read to support the radicalization thesis. The
most obvious was CFK's spur-of-the-moment trip to Central
America (via the OAS in Washington) in a hastily conceived
effort to restore Manual Zelaya to power in Honduras. Only
Ecuador's Rafael Correa and Paraguay's Fernando Lugo
accompanied CFK and OAS Secretary General Insulza on the
ill-fated Mission. Wittingly or not, she seemed to side with
hasty Bolivarian efforts to force the issue in Honduras
rather than to wait for mediation to take its course. A more
careful leader, Uruguay's Tabare Vazquez, let it be known
that he declined CFK's invitation to join her aboard Tango
One.
¶7. (C) There was one other foreign policy-related event that
may suggest a leftward turn. Kirchner congressional ally
Patricia Vaca Narvaja recently wrote a letter to U.S. Speaker
of the House Nancy Pelosi asking for the USG to declassify
all information at its disposal regarding the Argentine
military dictatorship. The Kirchner government has often
seemed obsessed with refighting the "Dirty War" of the 1970s
and early 80s, and the request could be construed as a
prelude to another rhetorical offensive against the USG for
its "support" of military regimes in the region.
(Alternatively, it could be a routine request consistent with
the government's longstanding interest in settling Dirty
War-related human rights cases.)
--------------------------------
The Verdict: "Red Dawn" Unlikely
--------------------------------
¶8. (C) Despite all of the above, we view the radicalization

scenario as the least likely of the three paths that the
government will take, with a probability of less than five
percent. Even if the Kirchners prefer this approach in their
heart of hearts, circumstances in the wake of the election
give them virtually no margin to implement it. Immediately
after the election, many of the most powerful forces within
the governing coalition began clamoring for more moderate
policies, a more inclusive approach to governance, and
(especially) a larger share of government finances. These
Peronist governors and mayors fared far better than Nestor
did, and they are in no mood to take orders from the
Kirchners. As a source close to Buenos Aires Governor Daniel
Scioli told the CDA, "There are no captive politicians after
these elections." The private sector is similarly
emboldened. As Industrialist Association (UIA) chief Hector
Mendez told us that "deepening the model won't happen. We
just won't allow it." Finally, the anti-Kirchner opposition
is clearly ascendant. These groups will fight GOA efforts to
march Argentina further to the left. Given the current
political climate, they should have the votes to hold the
Kirchners at bay even before the new Congress is seated in
December.
¶9. (C) Nor do we believe that Argentina's foreign policy is

becoming more Bolivarian. The GOA has become much less eager
to criticize the USG directly since Barack Obama became
President. CFK wears her affection for our
Commander-in-Chief on her sleeve. In addition, as mentioned
in the next section (para 16), there is new evidence of
concrete GOA efforts to support U.S. foreign policy
objectives in multilateral fora, at least behind the scenes.
¶10. (C) There is another external factor that makes

Argentina's embrace of Bolivarian politics unlikely -- the
growing influence of Brazil here. The local IDB rep,
Brazilian Daniel Oliveira, told econoff recently that
"Argentina has become as important to Brazil as Mexico is to
the United States." With a US$31 billion trade relationship
and more than US$10 billion in Brazilian investment flowing
into the Argentina economy since 1997, Brazil is strongly
engaged here, and is not shy about defending its interests.
The local press has reported that Lula worked the phones in
July 2008 to prevent the Kirchners from abandoning power in
the wake of their failed attempt to push a tax increase on
agricultural exports through Congress. Lula and his
associates will remain an important moderating influence on
the Kirchners.
¶11. (S/NF) Although we think this scenario's likelihood is
BUENOS AIR 00000827 003 OF 005
limited, it bears mention that it is also the most likely to

lead to political crisis, confrontation, escalating violence,
and CFK's failure to reach the end of her term. We explore
how such a downward spiral might play out, and the likelihood
of this calamitous scenario, in a separate report.
-------------------------------------------
Scenario Two: The Kirchners Embrace Reform
-------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Some observers expect (and many more hope) that the
Kirchners will reinvent themselves, pursuing a reform-minded
agenda that mollifies Peronist governors, defangs the
opposition, and wins over new foreign friends. A larger
group believes that a rebellious Peronist establishment will
put them on that course, whether they like it or not. Key
policy features of such an approach would include:
-- Economy: Interventionist-in-Chief Guillermo Moreno is

dismissed, clearing the way for a normalization of the state
statistical institute INDEC (and thus a return to
methodological integrity in the national accounts); GOA makes
deals with the Paris Club and private bondholders left out of
the 2005 debt swap deal and normalizes its relationship with
the IMF, starting with an Article IV Consultation; progress
on outstanding ICSID judgments against Argentina.
-- Governance: CFK rules more inclusively, coordinating

policies with governors and looking for common ground with
the opposition in the current and next Congress. Government
rolls back agricultural export taxes as a down-payment on its
new conciliatory approach. NK reduces his public profile.
-- Foreign Policy: Concrete steps benefiting the United

States and non-Bolivarian governments in the hemisphere,
coupled with distancing from Chavez and his allies.
¶13. (C) Proponents of this scenario's likelihood have plenty
of recent evidence to back them up. There is clearly ferment
in the government's approach to economic policy, with a new
Economy Minister on board, powerful (and heretofore
pro-Venezuelan) Planning Minister Julio De Vido now reputed
to be an advocate of pragmatic moderation, and prestigious,
market-oriented advisors (specifically, former Central Banker
and IMF official Mario Blejer) said to be poised to join the
government. The government sacked its statist, corrupt
Transportation Secretary Ricardo Jaime days after the
election, and rumors abound that Moreno, the icon of "market
repression" economics, has become such a political liability
that his days in the government are numbered. Well-placed
sources within the government confirm that change is in the
air. Top Kirchner aide Carlos Zannini indicated that the GOA
would focus almost exclusively on changes on the economic
policy front this month, and influential Buenos Aires
Province Vice-Governor Alberto Balestrini told the CDA last
week that the GOA would roll back agricultural export taxes
on wheat and corn soon.
¶14. (C) Nor is there any doubt that the political center of
gravity has shifted dramatically in Argentina since the
election. Most of the country's 16 Peronist governors have
reportedly expressed their desire for market-oriented
changes, at least privately. Some former allies, like
ambitious Chubut Governor Mario Das Neves, have broken ranks
with the Kirchners and openly criticize them. Even loyalist
governors like Chaco's Jorge Capitanich have publicly called
for straightening out INDEC and other changes. Faced with
this onslaught from ostensible allies, CFK announced on July
9 (as she has before) that she would convoke the country's
main political and private sector leaders to a process of
dialogue. The following week, she modified the proposed
process to accommodate opposition demands.
¶15. (C) The GOA's political position is further weakened by

the prospect that it will suffer defections from its ranks in
the current Congress. Of course, the next Congress that
takes office December 10 will be more independent, with the
government losing majorities in both chambers. This will
make it easier for reform-minded groups to push the Kirchners
into accepting elements of their agendas. As Balestrini told
us, the GOA will need to renegotiate and compromise in order
to rule.
¶16. (C) The GOA has taken a few subtle foreign policy moves
that could be construed as harbingers of a closer
relationship with the United States. After he received a
call on the issue from Secretary Clinton, FM Jorge Taiana
convinced CFK to change the voting instructions of the
Argentine delegation to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, which enabled U.S.-supported candidate Yukiya Amano
BUENOS AIR 00000827 004 OF 005
to win election after a month-long impasse. In a more

prosaic but perhaps symbolically important development, the
CDA received a warm note from CFK expressing regret for her
failure to attend the Mission's Independence Day celebration
and offering best wishes. We had never before received such
a note from either Kirchner.
-------------------------------------
The Verdict: Don't Bet On A New Leaf
-------------------------------------
¶17. (C) While the reform scenario has gained credence over
the past week, driven primarily by economic policy news and
rumors, we remain skeptical that Nestor and Cristina will
turn into a latter-day incarnation of Ozzie and Harriet,
dispensing moderation and good sense wherever they turn.
Neither Kirchner seems inclined to admit error, even tacitly,
by shifting course so abruptly. A senior official at the
Central Bank told us that Nestor will resist reformist
policies because they would be interpreted as a sign of his
weakness and even irrelevance. If changes come, he argues,
they will come at a time of his choosing. A reformist path
may also strike the Kirchners as politically risky,
distancing them from their most fervent supporters in the
working class, poor "villas," and intelligentsia in deference
to sectors that are at best disloyal and at worst openly
hostile to them.
¶18. (C) The "forced reform" variant of this scenario seems

somewhat more likely, but not by much. For it to work, one
of two things must happen. Either the Peronist governors
will need to set aside their rivalries and effectively
advocate for a more robust approach to reform than seems
likely, or the bickering, often inept opposition will need to
get its act together and engage the Kirchners as a united
front. Much depends, for example, on whether dissident
Peronists coalesce behind Senator Carlos Reutemann, who has
emerged as a frontrunner for the Peronist presidential
nomination in 2011, and whether Vice President Julio Cobos
can gain some traction in pulling together support from the
Radicals, Civic Coalition, and Socialists. If either of
these two groups works cooperatively over the coming two
months, it is possible that positive changes can come to
Argentina before CFK leaves office in 2011. We don't think
that will happen, however, and estimate the two reform
scenarios' combined probability at no more than twenty
percent.
---------------------------------
Scenario Three: Muddling Through
---------------------------------
¶19. (C) In the third scenario, the Kirchners do not

definitively opt for reform or radicalization. Maintaining
the short-term focus that has characterized their six years
in power, they muddle through as best they can, trying to
salvage their political futures or at least to reach the end
of CFK's term in 2011. There may be some positive changes in
this scenario -- one analyst dubs it "reform-lite" -- but the
electoral setback does not ultimately result in a dramatic
course correction. In the words of economist Nicolas
Dujovne, the Kirchners will pursue a strategy of "minimum
reforms, but without collapse." Under this scenario, the
following might happen:
-- Economy: Lots of policy zigzagging without a clear

direction; Moreno stays, or leaves and is replaced with
another hard-liner; new, "reform-minded" Economy Minister
Boudou changes little, like the Cabinet's previous reformist
also-rans Martin Lousteau and Sergio Massa.
-- Governance: Cooption of some Peronist governors and
mayors, punishment of others considered to be disloyal.
Stalemate on legislation in Congress. Top-down dialogue
process initiated without intention to compromise.
-- Foreign Policy: Some private gestures to the USG, but

little movement towards resolution of long-term sources of
friction; no palpable distancing from Chavez's camp or
modification of the GOA's "independent" foreign policy.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
For Evidence That Nothing Has Changed, Buy a Newspaper
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶20. (C) This status-quo scenario is the clear frontrunner

among our contacts. There is fresh evidence to support it in
every day's harvest of newspapers. The two dominant news
stories since the election, CFK's botched trip to Honduras
and the GOA's response to the H1N1 epidemic here, both
BUENOS AIR 00000827 005 OF 005
suggest that the government's improvisational style and

closed decision-making process remain intact. This in turn
will mean that GOA policies are more likely to develop in
response to the first couple's whims than to a coherent
design. It also means that the government bureaucracy is
unlikely to save the Kirchners from the consequences of their
impulses. For example, CFK went ahead with her ill-advised
trip to Washington and Central America earlier this month
against the advice of her Foreign Ministry. She ended up
achieving no more than Nestor did in December 2007 when he
participated in the Chavez-organized "bungle in the jungle"
in Colombia, in which Nestor and others sat helplessly in the
jungle for days in the futile hope that the FARC would
deliver hostages to them.
¶21. (C) The opacity of decision-making at the GOA's apex

means that the government will continue to meander hither and
yon, regardless of whether or not it has definitively chosen
a particular direction. The GOA's performance in dealing
with H1N1 flu is a case in point. Although many public
health officials in the GOA are working around the clock to
contain the challenging problem, the government's lack of
internal communication made it look hapless. For example,
upon alighting on Argentine territory after her Central
American jaunt, CFK denounced "fear-mongering" media reports
of 100,000 flu cases in Argentina -- information that had
come from her own health ministry. (The 100,000 number
referred to all flu cases, not just H1N1 flu.) The poor
coordination continues. Over the past weekend, the Mission
found itself in the middle of an unsightly (non-public)
dispute between the federal Ministry of Health and its
counterpart in the Province of Buenos Aires (governed by
Kirchner ally Daniel Scioli) over the destination of
CDC-donated Tamiflu doses, with each accusing the other of
bad faith and subterfuge.
--------------------------------------------- ------
The Verdict: More of the Same, But Good Can Happen
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶22. (C) Like most of our contacts, we think that this untidy
scenario is the most likely outcome. We don't expect the
Kirchners to change, but given the magnitude of their defeat
in the mid-terms, we don't expect the Peronist establishment
or the opposition to back down, either. The Kirchners may
even be able to prevail if their rivals and opponents fail to
unite. Prolonged stalemate on most of the "big" policy
issues seems the most likely outcome of a collision between a
closed, reform-adverse, and politically weakened regime and
disparate political groups that believe that they have a
mandate for reform.
¶23. (C) This does not mean, however, that no positive change
in this scenario is possible. The Kirchners could take steps
for ulterior motives that turn out to have beneficial
consequences. This has already happened in the post mid-term
era, when Transportation Secretary Ricardo Jaime departed
office soon after the election. One of our contacts
characterized the Kirchners' willingness to cut the
notoriously corrupt official loose as the beginning of a
purge designed to distance them from the shadiest elements of
their regime in an effort to reduce the likelihood that they
themselves could end up in prison. Whatever the reason,
Jaime's removal could lead to policy improvements in the
transportation sector.
¶24. (C) Nor does it mean that the USG should ignore the
Kirchner regime or give up on it as hopeless. CFK may not
have a grand scheme in mind for her remaining two years in
power, but she clearly would like to associate herself with
President Obama's star power. The intensity of this desire
opens all kinds of opportunities for us, as it did in
Argentina's decisive IAEA vote. As the Kirchners struggle
for political relevance or at least survival, they will be
looking for success stories -- and we should be on guard for
opportunities to induce them to do the right thing. Even if
the Kirchner government is unlikely to resolve every single
outstanding bilateral issue to our satisfaction, we think
that cultivation of the GOA -- CFK in particular -- can lead
to beneficial outcomes for U.S. interests bilaterally,
regionally, and multilaterally.
KELLY
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES853, S/NF) ARGENTINA: WILL CRISTINA

FINISH HER TERM?
Discussing cables
2009-07-22 2010-11-30 Embassy Buenos
16:04 16:04 Aires
VZCZCXRO3809
DE RUEHBU #0853/01 2031647
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221647Z JUL 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2039

TAGS: PGOV ECON AR
SUBJECT: (S/NF) ARGENTINA: WILL CRISTINA FINISH HER TERM?
REF: BUENOS AIRES 0827
Classified By: CDA Tom Kelly for reasons b, d.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary/Introduction. The devastating setback

dealt by Argentine voters to the government in the June 28
mid-term elections has restored to respectability last year's
fashionable political forecast -- that Cristina Fernandez de
Kirchner (CFK) will not reach the end of her term as
President in 2011. Like last year, some of this conjecture
is little more than wishful thinking by the government's
opponents, but not all of it. The ruling couple's political
weakness, erratic behavior, looming economic challenges, and
Argentina's history of truncated presidential terms lead some
serious observers to worry about the government's staying
power. A larger group of observers, this Mission included,
believe that CFK will probably make it to the end of her
term, if only by muddling through (reftel). In this report,
we evaluate the main arguments behind the proposition that
the Fernandez de Kirchner government will fall and explain
why we and others think that, at present, that scenario
remains unlikely. End Summary/Introduction.
Kirchner Vulnerability: A New Phenomenon

-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The Kirchners' political weakness is still a

relatively new phenomenon, dating back to their mishandling
of last year's farm protests. In the run-up to the October
2007 presidential elections, public approval ratings for
outgoing President Nestor Kirchner (NK) went as high as 77%,
as Argentines credited him for the country's remarkable
economic recovery after its 2001-02 economic meltdown.
Buoyed by her husband's popularity, Cristina Fernandez de
Kirchner (CFK) easily won the presidency in the first round
of the 2007 election. With 45% of the vote, she outdistanced
her nearest opponent by more than twenty percentage points
and doubled the vote received in 2003 by NK, who was then the
little-known governor of remote Santa Cruz. The ruling
couple's considerable political capital dissipated last year
as a consequence of their confrontation with the farm sector.
CFK and NK's plummeting poll numbers, their sudden inability
to stay ahead of the curve, and their abandonment by many of
their allies set the stage for a humiliating Senate defeat of
government legislation that would have ratified the export
tax increase at the heart of the controversy one year ago.
¶3. (S/NF) This political rout led to speculation in 2008

that CFK might fail to reach the end of her term -- which
would make her the first elected Peronist president since the
restoration of democracy in 1983 to meet that ignominious
fate. We even spotted the graffitied question "Se Kae?"
(roughly translated, "Kollapsing?") on a few Buenos Aires
walls last year. Much of the speculation was fed by the
government's most bitter opponents. Diego Guelar, a foreign
policy advisor to Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri, told a
visiting congressional staffer last August that "this
government won't last 60 days" -- just minutes after his boss
had said that it would. But there was concern within
government circles. A former aide to Buenos Aires Province
Governor Daniel Scioli confided to us recently that he and
other colleagues had urged Scioli to break ranks with the
Kirchners last year over the farm controversy. Scioli said
he wouldn't because "If I do, they'll fall, and I'm no coup
monger." During the farm crisis, the MFA even took the
unusual step of registering its concern with the Embassy.
Foreign Minister Taiana's Chief of Staff Alberto D'Alotto
(protect) told a Mission contact in May 2008 that the MFA was
"very concerned" about the government's staying power.
The Prophets of Doom

--------------------
¶4. (S/NF) In the end, the Kirchner government survived the

farm crisis and made it into 2009. With its defeat in the
June 28 mid-term election, the speculation has returned,
though it has not reached last year's fever pitch. (A large
majority of analysts do not/not feel that it is the most
likely scenario.) Those who predict an early exit for the
Kirchners tend to stress to varying degrees the following
factors that, in their view, make a Kirchner collapse more
likely:
-- Political: The Kirchners' opponents smell blood after the
June 28 election and are waiting for the right moment to
remove them, abetted by a public that abhors weak leaders;
-- Psychological: The Kirchner psychodrama is contributing to

a series of bad decisions that will lead to the first
couple's political demise; and
BUENOS AIR 00000853 002 OF 005
-- Economic: The ruling couple's post-election turn to the

left dooms them to botch an increasingly difficult economic
situation, sweeping CFK from office.
Se Kae: Political Arguments and Scenarios

-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) There are some influential political analysts

(Rosendo Fraga, and with less certainty, Manuel Mora y
Araujo) who believe that this country's political volatility
will cause CFK's fall from power. Mora y Araujo argues that
Argentine society abhors weak political leadership. If
Argentines sense that their ruler is enfeebled, he argues,
they tend to collectively say "that's enough." The
consequent withdrawal of support makes the damaged ruler
vulnerable to overthrow by the scheming political class. The
governor of Tierra del Fuego told the CDA that Argentines
were "absolutists" in how they viewed politicians as either
winners or losers, with no gray areas in between.
¶6. (C) Echoing a commonly heard refrain, pollster Doris

Capurro adds that the Argentine press, particularly the
dominant Clarin media group, often serves as "Coup Central."
Clarin, she said, fomented Fernando de la Rua's departure
from power in 2001, and its owners are fierce critics of the
Kirchners. For their part, most politicians have focused on
jockeying for future position, but a few important ones
sometimes seem to be circling prey. Civic Coalition leader
Elisa Carrio said soon after the GOA's mid-term loss that "if
Cristina doesn't react within a week, she's going to have
problems governing." Along the same lines, Radical leader
Gerardo Morales said a few days ago that "if the (current)
dialogue falls apart, the Government will have so little
margin for error that anything could happen." Over the
weekend, dissident labor leader Luis Barrionuevo said plainly
that "I see Julio Cobos finishing Cristina's term."
¶7. (SBU) Fraga argues that the history of Argentina's

post-dictatorship democracy does not bode well for the
Kirchners. Over that 25-year period, three elected
governments lost mid-terms. The two that were led by
Radicals (Alfonsin in 1987 and de la Rua in 2001) did not
survive; the one headed by a Peronist (Menem in 1997) made it
to the term's end. But Fraga thinks that the Kirchners
should take little comfort from Menem's survival. Unlike the
Kirchners, Menem never lost control of the Congress nor his
hold over the Peronist party. Economist Carlos Melconian
adds that in 1997 "the economy was doing fine, and economic
policy remained on autopilot until the presidential elections
two years later."
¶8. (C) Fraga thinks that the Kirchners will fail to change
course, leading to the gradual deterioration of their already
dire political situation. He pointed out that with Manuel
Zelaya's overthrow in Honduras, CFK (with approval ratings
around 28%) is now the elected Latin American president with
the lowest popularity rating in her country. According to
Fraga, the December 10 seating of the victors of the June 28
election will create a Congress with the power to remove CFK
from office. (Note: Impeachment and removal from
presidential office would actually require two-thirds support
in each chamber of Congress, which the opposition -- even
after December 10 -- will not have.) Fraga believes that
Peronists and forces close to Vice President Julio Cobos will
conspire to remove CFK from office to replace her with Cobos.
Fraga describes the scenario as perfect for Peronists -- it
removes the Kirchners from the scene, follows the
Constitutional line of succession, and saddles Radical Cobos
with the burden of taking the tough political decisions
needed to govern Argentina in an economic downturn. For the
non-Peronist opposition, the scenario seems less attractive
-- a senior Radical politician has described it to us as a
trap -- but Fraga maintains that the ambitious Vice President
has already decided to accept power in such a circumstance.
¶9. (C) As for the Kirchners, Fraga claims that they

(especially Nestor) may see this scenario as their best
long-term bet if their political situation deteriorates
further. They would portray CFK's forced removal from
office, in this view, as an illegitimate usurpation of the
democratic order, enabling them to escape to a sympathetic
foreign country as democratic martyrs. They would then hope
that the situation under Cobos would degenerate into
political and economic chaos, helping to set the stage for
their eventual political comeback. For Fraga, this strategy
explains CFK's deep interest in the coup against Manuel
Zelaya, which took place on the same weekend as her electoral
setback. It also, he says, means that she will not resign,
regardless of how bad the political situation.
BUENOS AIR 00000853 003 OF 005
Psychodrama: Behavioral Arguments

----------------------------------
¶10. (S/NF) Other observers stress psychological factors in

their prediction of an impending democratic crisis. This
school of thought has two variants: that strongman NK is too
set in his uncompromising ways to adapt, or that he (or he
and CFK) are becoming increasingly erratic and incapable of
governing. As a well-connected banker told us, the Kirchners
could recover by altering course and embracing a more
moderate and consensus-driven course, but NK in particular is
incapable of change. Instead, in this view, he will embark
on a disastrous jeremiad against internal "traitors" whom he
blames for the electoral defeat, leading the government off a
cliff. In support of this view, Fraga argues that Nestor's
personality "cannot change," but that Argentine public
opinion has. It no longer wants an obdurate fighter as it
did when NK took office in 2003; these days, Argentines want
consensual leadership that the Kirchners cannot and will not
provide.
¶11. (S/NF) According to the second variant, Nestor has

indeed changed. In fact, he's gone crazy. Jorge Brito, once
known as "Nestor's banker," seems to believe this theory,
confiding to the CDA that NK appears increasingly obsessive
and disinclined to listen to advice. "He used to listen to
me," Brito recalled, "but now he doesn't bother." Another
banker told us that "Nestor has basically had a nervous
breakdown."
Economic Arguments: Surf's Up

-----------------------------
¶12. (SBU) Some economists and financial market participants

stress that economic factors are most likely to lead to the
Kirchners' downfall. In the words of economist Carlos
Melconian (a Macri ally), "whenever Argentine governments
that came out weakened from mid-term elections faced a
deteriorating economic situation, the result was an economic
policy that aimed at 'surfing' the economic waves. However,
the surfing strategy may have to be aborted halfway: the
economy may collapse before the date of the presidential
elections, as was the case in the Alfonsin-Menem transition
between 1987 and 1989." In other words, unless CFK's
government raises its economic policy game, it may face the
same bleak fate as the Alfonsin and de la Rua governments.
¶13. (C/NF) But the prospects for more sensible economic

policies seem slim, prompting some to suggest that the GOA
will be overwhelmed by the economy's many problems. The
GOA's economic policy team is an object of derision among
serious economists here. Miguel Broda complains that
"there's not a single serious macroeconomist on the whole
Economy Ministry staff." Banker Brito described the GOA to
us as "made up of people who can't even add or subtract." He
was particularly scathing about Guillermo Moreno, the
Internal Commerce Secretary who serves as NK's
Interventionist in Chief, whom he called a "psychopath" who
"thinks he's a genius" but "is as dumb as the rest of them."
Mario Blejer, a former Central Bank chief and IMF Officer who
reportedly turned down an offer to take over the Economy
Ministry a few weeks ago, told the CDA that the problem is
Nestor's control over GOA economic policy. According to
Blejer, "Nestor knows nothing about economics, and to make
matters worse, he thinks he does, so he doesn't listen to
advice." This leads to an economic policy framework
described by another former Central Bank president as
"autistic."
¶14. (C/NF) These economy-focused pessimists disagree on what

the precipitating cause of a government collapse might be.
The financial community's leading bear, Deutsche Bank
Argentina's president Marcelo Blanco, focuses on the
possibility of another sovereign default, noting that the GOA
faces several challenging payments in the near-term future,
starting with more than US$ two billion in "Boden 2012"
payments that come due in August. (According to Blejer,
another US$10.5 billion in debt payments awaits the GOA in
2010.) Blanco told econoff that he thought there was a "high
probability" that the economy will spin out of control
post-election and the Kirchners will ultimately be unable to
govern.
¶15. (C/NF) Political analyst Jorge Castro stresses the

government's fiscal situation as the Kirchners' Achilles
heel. The GOA, he argues, is ungovernable without a fiscal
surplus. If the central government's fiscal accounts fall
into deficit, he said, the government could collapse. The
Kirchners, in particular, have relied on their discretionary
BUENOS AIR 00000853 004 OF 005
control of federal revenue sharing to keep governors and

mayors in line. If the GOA starts suffering cash flow
problems, it could encounter political turbulence and have to
contend with rebellious governors. Brito worries that
radicalization of the regime's economic agenda could be the
straw that breaks the camel's back. If NK pursues more
radical economic measures, such as pursuing new
nationalizations, he told us, the GOA's core of support would
shrink from 30 to 15% percent of the population, setting the
stage for its abrupt demise. Another economist, Orlando
Ferreres, suggests that in such a scenario the Peronists
would be the ones who depose CFK, reasoning that "no one is
more conservative than a frightened Peronist."
Why We Think CFK Will Make It to 2011

-------------------------------------
¶16. (C/NF) This recompilation of many arguments making the

rounds about the durability of CFK's regime is not intended
to create the impression that the government is doomed. At
the Mission, we believe that CFK will remain president until
December 2011, and that remains the opinion of most of our
interlocutors here -- a motley crew that includes
anti-Kirchneristas like Eduardo Duhalde and Mauricio Macri,
press moguls like Clarin managing director Jose Aranda, and
former Kirchner Cabinet chief Alberto Fernandez. We recently
wrote a cable (reftel) on the reasons why we thought that a
muddling-through scenario was most likely. Rather than
recapitulating all of those arguments here, we outline the
main political and economic factors supporting the contention
that CFK will remain president until 2011.
¶17. (C/NF) Our best-connected contacts in the political

establishment tell us that the focus is on the 2011
presidential election, not coup plotting. A key Macri aide
tells us that the main contenders for the 2011 election --
his boss, Carlos Reutemann, and Hermes Binner, to name a few
-- have predicated their planning on CFK making it to the end
of her term. None find taking the reins at a time of
economic crisis particularly appealing, and CFK's premature
departure could undermine their respective strategies for
making it to the Casa Rosada in 2011, when the economy should
be stronger. The preferences of these frontrunners are
critical, because in the wake of the June 28 elections, they
influence other political actors.
¶18. (C/NF) To further complicate the lives of would-be coup

plotters, CFK is a Peronist. The fractious Peronist
establishment, though undoubtedly disgruntled with the
Kirchners, is unlikely to end CFK's term if those efforts
could redound to the benefit of non-Peronist politicians.
Political analyst Mora y Araujo notes that, since 1983,
Peronist presidents have proven far harder to dislodge from
office before the end of their term than non-Peronists. We
would also point out that the Kirchners' forte is tactical --
they are generally more nimble and adroit than their rivals
and opponents. That said, NK is also a high-stakes gambler,
often betting heavily on the element of surprise in dealing
with his adversaries. Given his penchant for
unpredictability, he could easily over-play his hand one of
these days, and one of his "surprise" moves may backfire on
him.
¶19. (C/NF) The fear factor also plays in CFK's favor.

Opposition politicians from both the right (Mauricio Macri)
and center-left (Radical leader Oscar Aguad) tell us that
Argentines remember the chaos that followed Fernando de la
Rua's departure from office in December 2001, and are not
anxious to repeat the experience. Macri told a visiting U.S.
Senate staffer last year that Argentines would be "happy" for
the Kirchners to fall ("if this glass of water was the
Kirchners, everyone would fight to push it over") except for
one thing -- they fear that the government's collapse would
risk a return to bedlam. Argentines also seem impassive or
unmoved by outrageous cases of corruption or other
developments that elsewhere would have caused major scandals
("valijagate" comes to mind), making us wonder what it would
take to get people into the streets.
Most Think that the Economy Won't Push CFK from Office
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶20. (C) Most of Argentina's best economists think that the

economic situation will not force the Kirchners from office.
Many post contacts believe that the peso exchange rate is a
barometer for popular confidence in the government. The fact
that the GOA has been able to manage a deliberate, controlled
devaluation of the peso for over eight months without a major
run on the dollar, even after the June 28 electoral setback,
argues for a stable outlook. The notion that the economy
BUENOS AIR 00000853 005 OF 005
will bring the Kirchners down ultimately rests on the premise

that the government will lack the funds to meet its internal
and external obligations. For over two years we have been
hearing dire forecasts of an impending, overwhelming fiscal
crunch just around the corner. However, two of our best
contacts -- Javier Alvaredo, General Manager of BICE Bank,
and Juan Carlos Barboza, the Central Bank's foreign exchange
chief -- tell us with some confidence that the GOA will be
able to meet its obligations. On the external debt payments
front, both of them said independently that the GOA will have
enough funds to meet debt payments in 2009 and 2010. They
argue that 2010 will be easier than 2009 because no GDP
warrant payment will come due (there is a big one in December
2009). The market, as measured by country risk ratings and
bond indices, does not seem spooked.
¶21. (SBU) Our contacts also tell us that the GOA is unlikely
to run out of money before CFK's term ends. A contact in the
Economy Ministry's Finance Secretariat insists that the GOA
will meet its 2009 financing needs from public sector
resources (e.g., the recent nationalization of private
pension funds, which gives the GOA a huge pile of money to
work with); inflows from International Financial Institutions
like the World Bank and IDB; and liability management
(buybacks, exchanges, etc.).
¶22. (SBU) There is also room for adjustment on the

expenditure side. Economist Daniel Marx notes that the
government's decision to move the mid-term election to June
28 means that its pre-electoral spending spree was relatively
brief this year, which will make it easier for the new
Economy Minister Amado Boudou to reduce outlays for the
balance of this year and next. Marx thinks that social
spending and subsidies will plummet now that the election is
over, easing fiscal pressure on the government (though he
admits that other pressures, such as transfer payments to the
provinces demanded by increasingly assertive and desperate
governors, will increase).
¶23. (C/NF) Ultimately, popular support for, or tolerance of,

the Kirchners rides on Argentines' relative sense of
well-being. Barring another bout of hyper-inflation or
government confiscation of savings or sudden uptick in
unemployment, many Argentines are disinclined to rock the
boat for now. Argentina is no stranger to nationwide general
strikes that have paralyzed the country; it is a huge boon
for the Kirchners that, for now, the bulk of organized labor
(historically co-dependent on the Peronists) remains in their
pockets.
¶24. (C/NF) Finally, time is probably on the Kirchners' side.

Though the economy is currently in bad shape, Argentina's
impressive human capital and natural resources will drive an
eventual rebound. Argentina's debt levels are manageable,
its return on capital high, and it enjoys several strong
sectors (agriculture, mining, high tech) as well as a
relatively competitive industrial sector and decent market
size. This means that if the Kirchners make it to the middle
of next year, with the external environment improving and
some attractive presidential candidates in the mix for the
2011 race, the proximity of the post-Kirchner era may by
itself reverse capital inflows and jump-start a robust
recovery -- which paradoxically could significantly reduce
the chances that CFK will be removed from office prematurely.
A Word on the Psychological Theory

----------------------------------
¶25. (C/NF) As for the argument that the ruling couple's

precarious psyches will lead to their fall from power,
suffice it to say that this argument is highly speculative
and anecdotal. Few people maintain that the president and
her husband, both well into their fifties, have changed much
over the past two years. As Fraga notes, it is Argentina
that has changed, not them. That seems like a good (partial)
explanation for why the Kirchners fared poorly and misplayed
their hand in the mid-terms, but it does not necessarily mean
that it will prevent CFK from reaching the end of her term.
After all, the Kirchners have been abrasive, impervious to
outside advice, and even paranoid through more than six years
of presidential power, and they're still in the Casa Rosada.
As long as the political establishment remains focused on the
next presidential race and the economy doesn't suffer a
meltdown, we expect that's where the Kirchners will stay
until December 2011.
KELLY
Viewing cable 09CAIRO1349, GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH
EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Discussing cables
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RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM MASS IR IZ KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
REF: A. CAIRO 1227
¶B. CAIRO 746
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points:
-- (S/NF) During a June 29 meeting with CENTCOM Commander

General Petraeus, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and
ongoing efforts on Palestinian reconciliation.
-- (S/NF) On Iraq, Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were

taking a "new position" on supporting Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki following the Iranian elections and described Egypt's
plans to increase cooperation with the Iraqi government.
-- (S/NF) Soliman believed that the Iranian elections and

Hezbollah's electoral defeat in Lebanon presented a "good
opportunity" to reduce Iranian regional interference,
including by improving Syria's relations with the Arab world.
-- (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman was

pessimistic that an agreement would be reached, but promised
that Egypt would "not give up" and would continue efforts to
undermine Hamas, including by preventing money and guns from
entering Gaza.
----------------------------
Iraq: Extending an Arab Hand
----------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said Arab countries were looking for ways
to support Prime Minister Maliki during this "crucial time"
for Iraq. General Petraeus thanked Egypt for supporting the
Iraqi government, including by nominating a new Ambassador to
Iraq (ref A) and encouraging other Arab countries to "hold
out a hand in friendship." On President Mubarak's
instructions, Soliman explained, Egypt plans to increase
cooperation with Iraq on a wide variety of political,
security, and economic issues.
¶3. (S/NF) Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were taking a

"new position" on Iraq following the Iranian presidential
elections. He believed that Iranian leaders would "change
their attitude" towards neighboring countries and "supporting
terrorism" abroad, and would focus instead on domestic
issues. Iran cannot afford to "challenge the international
community now," Soliman opined. The challenge, Soliman
explained, was to "bring Iraq back to the Arab world" and
foster support for Maliki. According to Soliman, President
Mubarak told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia "not to search for
another man," but should instead accept Maliki as Iraq's
leader and support him.
---------------------------------------------
Iran: Elections Present Opportunity for Arabs
---------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Soliman stressed that Egypt suffers from Iranian

interference, through its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, and
its support for Egyptian groups like Jamaatt al-Islamiyya and
the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt will confront the Iranian
threat, he continued, by closely monitoring Iranian agents in
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any Egyptian cells.
Improving relations between Syria and the Arab world would
also undermine Iran's regional influence. Soliman noted "a
little change" in Syria's attitude on engaging with the Arab
world, adding that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia shared this
view and planned to visit Damascus soon "to help change
Syria's attitude."
¶5. (S/NF) Soliman anticipated that Hezbollah's recent defeat

in the Lebanese parliamentary elections would force the group
to "remain quiet for sometime" as they rebuild domestic
support and counter the perception that Hezbollah is a "tool
of outsiders." With Iran itself focusing on domestic issues,
he continued, it was a "good time to make changes" in Lebanon
and reduce Iran's influence. Egypt will support a Saad
Hariri government and the Lebanese army, Soliman emphasized.
¶6. (S/NF) Soliman said that Iran heeded Egypt's warning

against meddling in domestic affairs (ref B) and supporting
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He received a "very
positive message" from Iran's intelligence chief indicating
that Iran would not interfere in Egypt. Egypt planned to
"remain quiet inside Iran" for the time being, but would
continue to recruit agents who "will do what we ask," if Iran
insists on interfering in Egypt. "We hope Iran will stop
CAIRO 00001349 002 OF 003
supporting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other cells"

within Egypt Soliman said, "but if not - we are ready."
Soliman said Iranian President Ahmadinejad wanted to attend
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Egypt July
11-16. If he did attend, President Mubarak would meet with
him and clearly explain that Iranian interference in "Arab
issues" was unacceptable. "We are ready for good relations
with Iran," Soliman noted, but only if Iran ceased
interfering and supporting terrorists in the region.
¶7. (S/NF) Because of domestic problems, Soliman believed that

Iran would seek better relations with the Arab world and
suspend its nuclear program for a period of time to avoid a
"war." He also anticipated Iran would try to strike more of
a "balance" between supporting its Hezbollah and Hamas
"tools" and trying to build better relations with the Arabs.
Soliman expressed concern that Iranian influence in Iraq
would spread after the re-deployment of U.S. troops out of
Iraqi cities and the eventual drawdown. General Petraeus
noted that 130,000 U.S. troops remain and that the drawdown
would be gradual. He expressed confidence that Iranian
influence could be contained if Arab countries moved
aggressively to support Iraq.
----------------------------------
Palestinian Reconciliation, Israel
----------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Soliman explained that Egypt's three primary

objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in
Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. On Gaza, Soliman said
Egypt worked closely with Israel to coordinate humanitarian
assistance shipments and was encouraging the Israelis to
allow more assistance into Gaza. Soliman said he was still
seeking a "tahdiya" (calm) agreement between Hamas and
Israel, but noted that Israel's lack of a Gaza strategy and
desire to keep Hamas under pressure made any agreement
difficult. On undermining Hamas, Soliman said Egypt has
"stopped" money and arms from entering Gaza. "Hamas feels
they are losing their capabilities," Soliman said, as they
are unable to re-arm using the tunneling network under the
Egypt-Gaza border. The pressure, especially from Egypt's
success at dismantling Hamas' funding mechanism, may render
Hamas "more flexible" than before.
¶9. (S/NF) Palestinians must believe that Abbas is capable of

securing a Palestinian state, Soliman stressed. He noted
recent positive developments in the West Bank, including
improvements in the Palestinian security forces and the
lifting of some Israeli roadblocks to facilitate commerce and
movement. He expressed concern, however, that continued
settlement activity, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's
recent "radical" speech, and insufficient economic
development in Palestinian areas were undermining the chances
for resuming peace negotiations. Soliman added that
President Mubarak may invite Nentanyahu and Abbas to Cairo if
efforts to re-start negotiations became "blocked."
¶10. (S/NF) Soliman briefed General Petraeus on his efforts to

facilitate Palestinian reconciliation. Reconciliation
remains elusive, he noted, as neither Hamas nor Fatah really
want an agreement. The Palestinian factions were currently
in Cairo, he said, for discussions on releasing detainees.
Talks were at an impasse, however, as Hamas had suspended
reconciliation talks until Abbas released all Hamas detainees
in the West Bank, which Soliman said Abbas would never
accept. Soliman also doubted that a reconciliation agreement
would be reached by July 7 as Egypt previously announced, and
anticipated that talks would be suspended for one-two months.
Despite the challenge and frustrations, Soliman promised
that Egypt would "not give up" on Palestinian reconciliation.
"It is hard," he continued, "but I am always optimistic. I
consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing patience."
-------------------
Syria, Yemen, Afpak
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Soliman hoped Syria would improve its

relationship with the Arab world and the U.S. and stop
serving as "Iran's lifeline" in the region. He also stressed
that Syria must cooperate with Iraq to improve border
security and stem the flow of foreign fighters. Soliman also
called on Syria to drop its insistence that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved before Syria will
reach an agreement with Israel on the Golan Heights.
¶12. (S/NF) Soliman expressed concern over instability in
CAIRO 00001349 003 OF 003
Yemen and said Egypt was trying to help President Saleh,

including by providing information on Iranian and Qatari
support to the al-Houthi insurgents. General Petraeus noted
U.S. efforts to improve Yemen's capacity to combat
extremists. On Pakistan, General Petraeus said he was
encouraged by the Pakistani military's operations in the Swat
Valley and Northwest Frontier Province, including their focus
on holding and rebuilding effected areas. Soliman credited
the Pakistani government for doing a better job of convincing
people that extremists pose a real threat to Pakistani
national security. On Afghanistan, General Petraeus stressed
the importance of arresting the downward spiral of violence
and improving governance after the September 20 national
elections.
¶13. (U) General Petraeus cleared this cable.

SCOBEY
Viewing cable 09MANAMA442, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

VERSHBOW AND
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09MANAMA442.
09MANAMA442 2009-07-26 08:08 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Manama
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000442
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019

TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR AF IZ QA BA
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW AND
AMBASSADOR ERELI MEET WITH KING HAMAD OF BAHRAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 22 meeting with Assistant Secretary

of Defense for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow, and the U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Adam
Ereli, King Hamad of Bahrain was unwavering in his support
for United States policies in the Gulf, welcomed any new
requests the U.S. may need from Bahrain, voiced strong
support for U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and said he
was ready to play a positive role toward Israel. However, he
voiced strong "annoyance" at Qatari behavior, particularly
the recent visit of Qatar's Chief of Staff of its Armed
Forces to Iran, as well as Qatari rebuffs to Bahraini
requests for natural gas. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) King Hamad warmly welcomed Ambassadors Vershbow and

Ereli and began the meeting by thanking the United States for
the staunch support we provide Bahrain. He reminded the
Ambassadors that Bahrain is a long-time U.S. ally, remains
firm in its support of U.S. efforts in the Gulf, and greatly
values our bilateral relationship that is of significant
importance to Bahrain's interests. He said Bahrain will do
anything to work together with the U.S. He was particularly
praiseworthy of the bilateral defense relationship,
commenting that the superb advice Bahrain's Defense Forces
(BDF) receive from the U.S. has resulted in the BDF being one
of the cleanest organizations in Bahrain's government. The
King also noted that the equipment received through the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) process was of high quality
and operationally effective, and he was also proud of the
strong relations established with U.S. 5th Fleet.
¶3. (C) Ambassador Vershbow thanked His Majesty for hosting

the Military Consultative Committee that was currently
meeting in Manama and for his country's support to U.S.
interests. He noted that the U.S.-Bahraini relationship was
very strong and mutually beneficial and affirmed to the King
that the U.S. and Bahrain shared a similar vision in the
region despite its many challenges.
--------------------
Afghanistan and Iraq
--------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to Afghanistan and Iraq, King Hamad said the
upcoming deployment of Bahrain's Ministry of Interior (MoI)
security unit to provide fixed site security in Afghanistan
would provide great experience to MoI personnel and allows
Bahrain to show its flag and demonstrate support for the
Coalition. He stated that U.S. involvement in Afghanistan
provided a golden opportunity for the Afghan people to build
their country's security forces as well as their education,
medical, science and trade programs and ministries. The King
added that U.S. efforts should be touted more in the media.
He quoted President Eisenhower, saying the "U.S. is
soldiering for peace and not waging war" and he understood
that the U.S. was not seeking to rule over Afghanistan or
Iraq. He is convinced that the U.S. is in both places to
help the Afghan and Iraqi people and he was appreciative of
our armed forces personnel performing their duties in places
so far from home. King Hamad noted some instability in Iraq,
but thought overall, Iraq was on a positive slope. ASD
Vershbow thanked the King for his comments and said it was
important that the world hears his, as well as similar
explanations, of U.S. policies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
¶5. (C) Commenting on Bahrain's participation in coalition

maritime operations and efforts against terrorism and piracy,
King Hamad said he had recently told his Parliament that,
"Ships are sailing to defend the region and why don't we join
them? If we don't join, we will miss an opportunity." His
remarks acknowledged Bahrain's past and current participation
in Combined Task Force (CTF) 152 and its anticipated
participation in CTF 151.
---------------------------------
Annoyed and Concerned about Qatar
---------------------------------
¶6. (C) The King voiced concern about what is happening in the
region and stated that he would like to see a stronger Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) as a deterrent against future
threats and to provide more security in the region. King
Hamad flatly stated that Bahrain is not happy with Qatar. He
took particular exception to the recent visit to Iran by
Qatar's Chief of Staff, MG Hamad al Attiyah. He noted that
during the visit, the two sides released a statement agreeing
to joint training exercises, intelligence exchange and
MANAMA 00000442 002 OF 002
reciprocal visits of military staff and units. "This is

going too far," King Hamad fumed. It's one thing to have
trade and commercial exchanges, he noted, but to welcome
Iranian military units on the territory of a GCC member state
is "a strategic matter." He went on to say that Iran is the
number-one threat in the region; any country should be
cautious about exchanging military information with Iran, and
no GCC country should allow an Iranian military unit or
personnel to land on its shores. The King stated that he
would like to show Qatar some type of unhappiness for its
actions with Iran.
¶7. (C) The King said it is rumored that MG al-Attiyah may

retire as the Qatari CHOD and perhaps this influenced his
decision to visit Iran. (NOTE: In a separate meeting with
ASD Vershbow and State P/M Assistant Secretary Shapiro,
during their July 20-21 visit to Doha, MG al-Attiyah did
state that his visit to Iran was long planned but perhaps
ill-timed to coincide with recent post-election activities in
Tehran; since it was previously planned, he had not wanted to
cancel his visit. END NOTE.) King Hamad added that Qatar's
behavior "is an annoyance, but it was too early to be angry
at them." King Hamad went on saying he "would like our
brother in Saudi Arabia to send a note telling Qatar not to
play like this."
¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow affirmed U.S. displeasure with Iranian

behavior, particularly its nuclear program, and stated the
U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons.
He told the King we were disappointed with the timing of the
Qatari CHOD's visit, but hoped the Qataris could persuade
Iran to engage with the U.S. to end its nuclear program,
rather than seeking a confrontation with the international
community.
-------------------------
Plug for the Crown Prince
-------------------------
¶9. (C) ASD Vershbow said he appreciated the Crown Prince's

recent op-ed published on the Middle East which he understood
bore the King's stamp. He said the Crown Prince's points
about Arab countries seizing the opportunity at hand and
setting aside past differences to move forward on the peace
process was right on mark. King Hamad responded that
Bahrain supported U.S.-led efforts to make peace and agreed
that the Arab world needed to contribute positively to this
effort. Returning to Qatar, King Hamad noted that Abdul Bari
al Atwan, the editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab daily "Al Quds
al Arabi," had written a widely-read article critical of the
Crown Prince's op-ed. Qatar is a major financial backer of
al Quds al Arabi, the King remarked, and he clearly saw the
hand of Doha behind Abdul Bari's attack. Continuing on this
theme, King Hamad said there were two major issues that made
him angry with regard to Qatar. The first was the Iran
issue; the second was gas. For years, Bahrain has been
asking to buy Qatari gas, but their response has always been
that Qatar exports were maxed out and it was not prepared to
enter into new supply contracts. These rejections
notwithstanding, the King asserted that he had recently
learned that Qatar has inked a new supply deal with Mexico
and will increase gas supplies to England. He was at a loss
to understand Qatari behavior.
---------
On Israel
---------
¶10. (C) Commenting on Bahraini initiatives with Israel, King

Hamad said Bahrain continues to do its best to make Bahrain's
position clear to Israel and the world, and expressed thanks
for President Obama's recent detailed letter. He was taking
his time in drafting a similarly detailed response, and would
share his response with Ambassador Ereli when it was ready.
King Hamad said he looks forward to cooperating more with the
U.S. on key regional issues and specifically referenced the
soon to be executed moves of P-3 aircraft to Isa Air Base and
DoD's location of its forward Near East South Asia (NESA)
Center to Manama. ASD Vershbow and AMB Ereli thanked the
King for his strong support for U.S. policies and encouraged
Bahrain to continue its constructive behavior and leadership
in the Gulf.
¶11. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.
ERELI
Viewing cable 09PARIS933, FRANCE OPEN TO EXAMINING SIX NEW

GUANTANAMO
Discussing cables
09PARIS933 2009-07-09 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Paris
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE OPEN TO EXAMINING SIX NEW GUANTANAMO
DETAINEE FILES
PARIS 00000933 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Classified by Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In a July 2 meeting with Eric

Chevallier, Special Advisor to the Foreign Affairs Minister,
Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the
Guantanamo Detention Facility (S/GC), summarized the results
of his efforts to negotiate the resettlement of Guantanamo
detainees and thanked France for agreeing to consider six new
detainee files. Chevallier stressed that France would review
the cases in a positive light. Speaking on instruction, he
also said that France would not be able to respond until more
is known about the attitude of Congress toward accepting
detainees on U.S. soil. Chevallier agreed that a favorable
decision allowing the resettlement of Guantanamo detainees in
the United States is not a "pre-condition" but characterized
it as extremely important and not far from being a
pre-condition. He also noted that establishing a good
precedent with Schengen members by providing France with
information to share on the previously transferred detainee
Boumediene would likely assist the process for obtaining
Schengen visas in other detainee resettlements in Europe.
¶2. (SBU) Chevallier was joined by Deputy Director of the

Foreign Minister's Office, Michele Boccoz; MFA Deputy
Director for the Office of Transnational Threats, Martin
Julliard; MFA Assistant secretary-equivalent for
International Organizations, Sylvie Bermann; Deputy Assistant
secretary-equivalent for Human Rights, Jacques Pellet; Deputy
Director for the North Americas Office, Bernard
Regnauld-Fabre; and External Relations for the European Union
desk officer, Fatih Akcal. Charge Pekala, Pol/Min Counselor
and note taker also attended. End Summary.
Six New Detainee Files: Potential Impact of U.S. Decisions

--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶3. (C/NF) S/E Fried introduced the dossiers of six

detainees that the U.S. would like France to consider taking,
pointing out that several of them have court-ordered releases
and noting that we have presented some of the cases to other
European governments. Chevallier expressed appreciation for
the new information and assured Fried that, following the
Obama-Sarkozy meeting in June and the resettlement in May of
Algerian Lakdar Boumediene, France will look at the files in
a positive light. However, speaking on instruction, he
cautioned that France will not be able to provide an answer
until more is known about the attitude of Congress toward
accepting some of the detainees on U.S. soil. A positive
decision by Congress, Chevallier continued, would boost the
prospects for selling detainee resettlement to the French
public and to other European countries. When pressed by
Fried, Chevallier responded that the congressional decision
is not a "pre-condition," but also said "it is not far from
that." He emphasized that the U.S. decision "is part of
France,s political assessment" and "is extremely important"
to France,s final decision. At the same time, Chevallier
confirmed that France would not intervene negatively in U.S.
discussions with other countries, for example, Spain, Italy,
and Portugal, that are moving ahead with resettlement. In
closing discussions on the files,Fried suggested French
officials visit Guantanamo to interview the detainees and
talk to the defense lawyers to inform their decision and aid
in the selection of future candidates and to make any
requests for further information through intelligence liaison.
Request to Share Boumediene's File with Schengen Partners

--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶4. (C/NF) Chevallier confirmed that Schengen partner states

now have to share the files of detainees with their Schengen
partners per the agreed EU framework. If no state opposes, a
Schengen visa will be issued; however, if one or more partner
states oppose, then only a national visa can be granted.
Refusal to grant a Schengen visa would also have an impact on
the social services and type of residence status offered to
former detainees. Chevallier would like Boumediene to be the
first test case, as he is a lower risk detainee. Fried
agreed to provide a revised file that can be shared with EU
partners. Chevallier regretted the EU decision to put this
issue under the purview of Interior Ministers, saying it
would have been easier to manage under Foreign Ministers.
Fried concluded his discussion with
Chevallier by noting that U.S. procedures in detainee
transfers have changed somewhat. New congressional
legislation now requires notification of transfer 15 days in
advance and notification of the transfer arrangements. The
U.S. plans to meet this requirement in the future through an
exchange of diplomatic notes.
¶5. (C/NF) Chevallier,s expert on this issue, Martin

Julliard, asked about the financial payments the U.S. is
PARIS 00000933 002.2 OF 002
providing to Bermuda and Palau upon their acceptance of the

Uighur detainees. Fried clarified that U.S. funds are
intended to cover reimbursable expenses only and are minimal.
Julliard said that his office has been monitoring French
public opinion on the resettlement of Boumediene and cited
the use of tax money for detainee resettlement as one of the
top three concerns. Fried made no commitment, but
said he would be willing to discuss this further if it
becomes necessary symbolically for France.
¶6. (C/NF) Comment: French authorities remain proud of their

lead role in opening the way to resettlement of some
detainees in Europe and are committed to looking favorably at
the six new detainee files. However, a U.S. decision to
accept or reject taking detainees on U.S. soil is clearly
part of the calculation as they also assess French domestic
reaction to resettlement.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09PARIS1046, IRAN: EU DIPLOMATS TO ATTEND
AHMADINEJAD
Discussing cables
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFOR
09PARIS1046 2009-07-31 15:03 2010-11-29 12:12 Embassy Paris
N
VZCZCXRO1400
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL FR
SUBJECT: IRAN: EU DIPLOMATS TO ATTEND AHMADINEJAD
INAUGURATION
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, for

¶1. (C/NF) European Union members will send low-ranking
diplomats to the first of two inauguration ceremonies for
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but they will not inform the Iranians of
their plans, according to French MFA Acting Middle East
Director (Assistant-Secretary equivalent) Jean-Christophe
Paucelle. If the Iranians find out beforehand that the EU
will not send Ambassador-level representation, Paucelle told
poloff early July 31, then they may rescind the invitations
to the August 3 event, as they did in similar circumstances
prior to former President Khatami's inauguration in 1997.
"It's hard to keep a secret when 27 nations are involved,"
Paucelle noted, "but we are trying." Only the Swedish EU
Presidency will be represented by an Ambassador, Paucelle
said.
¶2. (C/NF) All EU members will, however, send their

Ambassadors to the August 5 inauguration ceremony in the
Iranian Parliament. Paucelle adopted a defensive tone when
explaining this decision, which he said was finalized in
Brussels the morning of July 31. He admitted this issue had
generated tense and fractious debate among European foreign
ministers. "We are caught between two conflicting
objectives," Paucelle explained. "On the one hand, we want
to communicate that we do not approve of this illegitimate
election. On the other hand, we need to be realistic: the
power is in the hands of Khameini and Ahmadinejad, including
the nuclear file, and we must negotiate with those in power.
You are in the same position." Paucelle insisted that the EU
will continue to respect what he described as "the Durban red
lines." "We will walk right out if Ahmadinejad denies the
Holocaust or declares that his regime will destroy Israel."
(NOTE: Paucelle admitted that since non-Muslims had never
before received an invitation to the inauguration ceremony
presided over by the Supreme Leader, EU diplomats in Tehran
have never entered the building where the event will take
place, and so they are not sure how they will stage their
walk-out, logistically, should they need to do so. They are
worried that the doors may be locked. END NOTE.) Paucelle
also reported that the German Ambassador will return from his
vacation on August 4 to ensure that he will miss the first
ceremony and attend the second one along with his EU
counterparts. The British Ambassador will attend as well,
even without credentials. "The Iranians are desperate for
recognition and so they have disregarded their usual devotion
to protocol -- and their anti-British vitriol -- on this
occasion."
¶3. (C/NF) Paucelle said that the case of detained French

citizen Clothilde Reiss has also influenced the EU decision
to attend the inauguration ceremonies. "We think she may be
released soon, and we don't want to create another irritant,"
Paucelle said. "There are enough already." He reported that
the French have reason to believe Reiss may form part of a
group of detainees likely to be released on the August 7
anniversary of Imam Mahdi. Paucelle noted that a letter
released July 29 by Ahmadinejad supported the idea of
granting clemency to post-election protesters during Mahdi
celebrations. "The Iranians will need to take face-saving
measures, and so she will likely transfer to house arrest or
some other status," Paucelle said. He added that, of course,
she may not be released at all next week, but the French
remain optimistic that she will soon be out of prison.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09PESHAWAR147, FATA: PLAYERS IN WAZIRISTAN - A PRE-
OPERATION PRIMER
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09PESHAWAR147.
09PESHAWAR147 2009-07-13 10:10 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Consulate Peshawar
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RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0871
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PESHAWAR 000147
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2019

TAGS: PTER PINR MOPS PK AF
SUBJECT: FATA: PLAYERS IN WAZIRISTAN - A PRE-OPERATION PRIMER
REF: A) PESHAWAR 144; B) ISLAMABAD 1464; C) ISLAMABAD 1385; D) ISLAMABAD 1358;

E) IIR 6 802 0086 08
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate

Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: As the government of Pakistan has worked to
prepare for its upcoming ground operation in South Waziristan
Agency (SWA) against Baitullah Mehsud (ref C) and the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), it has narrowed the focus of
its operation by attempting to keep neutral the two other major
militant leaders in the area and building two other more minor
leaders up against Baitullah. The government has worked through
jirgas led by Deobandi clerics associated with the Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) to isolate Baitullah and his lieutenants;
as the operation has become more imminent (and to JUI-F leader
Fazlur Rehman's chagrin), these jirgas have been sidelined.
Tribal maliks, though included in those jirgas, are too cowed to
play anything other than supporting roles, and the SWA Political
Agent, while talented, is rarely able to even enter SWA due to
security concerns. Political actors will continue to work
around the edges, but they are ceding the field to the military
and militants for the foreseeable future. End summary.
Baitullah Mehsud and His Lieutenants

------------------------------------
¶2. (C) 35-year-old Baitullah Mehsud has been the most

prominent militant in Waziristan since the death of Wazir leader
Nek Mohammad in 2004 and the most notorious militant in Pakistan
since his announcement of the formation of the TTP and
assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. He has
undisputed control over the Mehsud home areas of northeastern
SWA and significant influence in areas with Mehsud diaspora
populations such as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan districts. Since
the formation of TTP, an umbrella group whose expressed aim is
to overthrow the government of Pakistan and secure its FATA
safehaven in order to support cross-border attacks into
Afghanistan, Mehsud and his allies had established significant
levels of effective control in part or all of Kurram, Orakzai,
Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur agencies, as well as in Swat,
Shangla, Buner, and Lower Dir districts prior to recent military
operations. In all of these areas, Consulate contacts and
Pakistani press have reported a strong presence of Mehsud
tribesmen and allied Uzbek militants supporting local elements
fighting against the government.
¶3. (C) Qari Hussain has long been Baitullah's most feared
lieutenant from Waziristan; a post contact in the NWFP
parliamentary assembly included him as one of six militants
whose death would prove that the Pakistani government was
"serious" about finally getting tough on militants. He was
notable over the period 2006-8 for claiming the most extreme and
offensive actions taken by the TTP, particularly in the wake of
the government's July 2007 operation against the Lal Masjid in
Islamabad. These actions included suicide bombings throughout
the NWFP, the kidnapping of FC personnel, and an attack on the
Tank family residence of the Political Agent for Khyber Agency
which killed many of his relatives and guests, among them
surrendering women and girls, violating one of the strongest
taboos under Pashtun tribal law. Baitullah disavowed most of
these activities, though they generally directly benefited him.
In late 2008, after the conclusion of the most recent peace deal
in SWA, Baitullah "exiled" him to North Waziristan because of
his poor image; he recalled him to SWA recently. Hussain may
have been killed in an air strike on a post-funeral meeting on
June 23 in South Waziristan.
¶4. (SBU) Hakimullah Mehsud, a first cousin to Baitullah, has

come to prominence more recently, initially commanding TTP
forces assisting Sunni militants who were fighting Shi'a
militants in Kurram agency and neighboring Hangu district. His
activities quickly spread to Orakzai, where he masterminded an
October 2008 suicide bombing of a jirga that killed over fifty
tribal maliks and broke virtually all organized resistance to
TTP control in most of the agency. By early December 2008, his
men in Khyber were launching regular raids on trucking depots
around Peshawar and burning hundreds of trucks containing
supplies for American forces in Afghanistan. A Pakistani
military operation in Khyber in January 2009 reduced TTP
effectiveness operating out of that agency, but Hakimullah
continued to plan and execute attacks out of his base in Orakzai
PESHAWAR 00000147 002 OF 005
prior to returning to SWA in late May, reportedly with large

numbers of those under his command and in preparation for the
upcoming SWA operation.
Misbahuddin Mehsud and Turkestan Bhittani - GOP Surrogates

--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶5. (C) Misbahuddin Mehsud, the 23-year-old younger brother
of the recently assassinated Qari Zainuddin (ref C), is
Zainuddin's apparent successor as leader of a group of Mehsuds
independent of Baitullah who have engaged in tit-for-tat
assassinations and street battles with the TTP in the areas of
Tank and Dera Ismail Khan over the past several months.
Zainuddin was generally considered raw and untested; his close
familial relation (first cousin) to deceased militant leader
Abdullah Mehsud and the clear Pakistani government backing given
to him, however, had made him the pole around which
anti-Baitullah militants had coalesced. Misbahuddin is even
more untried. He is reportedly more poorly educated and rougher
of manner than Zainuddin (Misbahuddin's nickname is Tofan,
meaning "storm" and referring to his temper).
¶6. (C) Turkestan Bhittani, a 40-year-old soldier who retired

from the South Waziristan Scouts (Frontier Corps) in 1998 to
fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan, was an ally of Baitullah
Mehsud until 2007. Following his break with Baitullah, he
formed a militia composed primarily of members of the Bhittani
tribe. The Bhittani, whose population lives primarily in the
area along the border between SWA and Tank and controls access
between Mehsud territory and the settled areas to the east, has
a history of feuds with the Mehsuds; relatively few Mehsuds are
settled in Jandola and the other Bhittani-dominated areas around
it. A June 2008 incident in which TTP-affiliated Mehsuds
overran the town of Jandola and carried off thirty Bhittani
tribesmen and killed over twenty of them (including many close
relatives of Turkestan) solidified Bhittani tribal opposition to
the TTP. As Qari Zainuddin's group gained mass over recent
months, Turkestan allied his own, longer-lived group to it, and
this alliance seems unlikely to change with Zainuddin's death.
A Bhittani contact told us that it was Turkestan's firm control
of F.R. Tank that allowed Qari Zainuddin space to grow his
group; Turkestan had and continues to have a strong personal
interest in assisting any group that would weaken the TTP.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur - Siding with the TTP

---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a senior militant commander in

North Waziristan Agency (NWA) and erstwhile rival of Baitullah
Mehsud for the title of "leader" of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, is an
Utmanzai Wazir in his late 40s. Despite considerable effort by
the Pakistani government to keep him on the sidelines and an
initial period in which his quiescence appeared to indicate that
he would stay out of the fight, Bahadur allowed and then claimed
a series of escalating ambushes of Pakistani military convoys
June 26-28. His spokesman then announced on June 29 that the
February 2008 peace deal with the government that Bahadur had
hitherto more or less respected was now a dead letter due to
continued drone strikes in and Pakistani military operations
near NWA (ref B). (Note: Consulate contacts told us that
Bahadur had faced pressure from lieutenants to confront the
Pakistani military.) The government responded with airstrikes
against his positions on June 30, but reiterated its commitment
to the peace deal. A low-level conflict has ensued since, with
occasional minor attacks by militants on Pakistani military
installations.
Maulavi Nazir - Neutral?

------------------------
¶8. (C) Maulavi Nazir, the senior militant commander in

southern and western SWA, is an Ahmadzai Wazir in his 30s. Our
contacts from and in SWA consider Nazir to have been the
Pakistani government's man ever since his 2007 campaign against
Baitullah Mehsud ally Haji Omar and associated Uzbek militants
residing in Ahmadzai areas of SWA, though Nazir signed on to the
February 2009 alliance with Baitullah. Like Bahadur, he has
remained silent about the upcoming operation; on July 2, he told
PESHAWAR 00000147 003 OF 005
a jirga that he would maintain neutrality. A well-connected

Ahmadzai Wazir who resides part-time in Wana told us that Nazir
will stay out of the fight unless a spillover from the campaign
creates significant casualties among Ahmadzai Wazir militants or
civilians. In such a circumstance, Nazir would come under
considerable pressure to retaliate proportionately. This is a
plausible eventuality. According to a Consulate contact in SWA,
since the beginning of June, an Ahmadzai lieutenant of Nazir in
the Angoor Adda area of SWA (near the Afghan border) has
repeatedly detonated roadside bombs against Pakistani military
vehicles, killing several soldiers and wounding dozens of
others. More recently, over the past two weeks rockets have
been fired from Ahmadzai Wazir areas toward Pakistani military
installations in and around Wana. The Pakistani army has
retaliated in each instance by shelling militant positions in
the areas from which attacks have been launched.
The Haqqanis - Staying Out of the Fight

---------------------------------------
¶9. (S) Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, Afghans

who are based primarily in NWA, are involved primarily in the
fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Jalaluddin, a
former anti-Soviet mujahid from the Zadran tribe who had been
aligned with Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis), is now in his 70s and is
considered by our contacts to have a close relationship with
Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. Sirajuddin, in his
30s, runs day-to-day affairs for the Haqqani network. This
Taliban group operates primarily in Khowst and Paktika provinces
but is also suspected of having a hand in some of the most
audacious Taliban attacks in Kabul, including the July 2008
bombing of the Indian embassy there. The Haqqanis have
generally taken the stance that attacks against Pakistan's
government are illegitimate, and they have worked to keep
militant leaders in Waziristan focused on the war in Afghanistan
- without success in the case of Gul Bahadur. They appear to be
hunkering down as well; a Consulate contact in the inner circle
of the NWFP's ruling Awami National Party (ANP) says that they
have moved their families out of the agency and to Rawalpindi
(ref A).
Maulana Fazlur Rehman and the Deobandis - The Would-Be Mediators

--------------------------------------------- -------------------
¶10. (C) The opening moves to the government's SWA campaign

have occasioned a flurry of jirgas aimed at mediating between
the Pakistani government and the various militant leaders.
These jirgas have been very similarly composed: led by elected
officials or prominent mullahs (and usually both), they have
been composed in equal measure by maliks from the affected areas
and prominent mullahs active in the region but outside of tribal
structures. The most active jirga, which has been shuttling
between the Pakistani government and Baitullah Mehsud, has been
led by Senator Saleh Shah, a Deobandi cleric in his thirties
from SWA (but not a Mehsud or Wazir) who leads two madrassas,
one in the Tirarzia tehsil of SWA (north of Wana, in the Mehsud
area) and the other in the Mehsud-settled Murtaza area of Tank.
In his absence (when the Senate is in session), jirga leadership
has generally fallen to Maulana Esamuddin Khan, a Mehsud
Deobandi cleric who has led a madrassa in Makeen, the heart of
the area controlled by Baitullah. Maulana Mirajuddin Qureshi,
another Mehsud Deobandi cleric who is a former National Assembly
member, has also played a leading role. Over the past two
weeks, activity by this jirga has tailed off as military
operations have increased their pace.
¶11. (C) Saleh Shah, Esamuddin, and Qureshi (along with fellow
repeated jirga leaders Noor Mohammad among the Ahmadzai Wazirs
and Maulavi Nek Zaman among the Utmanzai Wazirs) are affiliated
with the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam party faction under the
direction of Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). Fazlur Rehman,
whose hometown is nearby Dera Ismail Khan, has positioned
himself and his party as a primary mediator between the
government and militants; his affiliates have been mediators in
each of the five peace agreements concluded in the Waziristans
since 2004. His decreasingly oblique criticisms of Pakistani
military operations in Swat and the surrounding Malakand
PESHAWAR 00000147 004 OF 005
division and his more direct criticisms of a follow-on

Waziristan operation have kept pace with the increasing drumbeat
of official talk about Waziristan. Fazlur Rehman's upset at the
prospect of such an operation may in part be a reaction the
political support that his party continues to carry there
(significantly greater than that enjoyed by his party in
Malakand), but it also reflects the fact that the beginning of
such an operation will represent the eclipse of his affiliates'
mediating role in favor of force wielded by parties outside of
his control.
The Maliks - A Non-Factor

-------------------------
¶12. (C) The peace jirgas of the past two months, led and
partially staffed by Deobandi clerics, have generally been
filled out by Mehsud maliks (tribal elders). Our contacts from
SWA have uniformly dismissed them as entirely cowed by Baitullah
and irrelevant in mediation; the deaths of over three hundred
other Waziristan maliks over the past four years appear to have
sapped them of the willingness to confront Baitullah in any way
and rendered them essentially placeholders in the jirgas for
sake of form. Asked if there were any maliks of sufficient
stature to chart an independent course at all, one contact
responded with a Pashtun proverb in which a prince, queried on
how he kept his kingdom under control, replied by silently
chopping off the tops of all of the tallest poppies in the field
where he was walking.
Shahab Ali Khan - The Absentee Political Agent

--------------------------------------------- -
¶13. (C) Shahab Ali Khan, a Bannu native in his mid-30s, was
appointed Political Agent (PA) of SWA in September 2008. He has
been in district government service for just over ten years;
before his current posting, Khan had most recently served as
District Coordination Officer in the sectarian strife-ridden
Hangu district from 2007. Shahab Ali has been described by his
peers and locals as a good negotiator in an agency where many
consider such skills a necessity, and he most recently played a
secondary role in the release of the kidnapped students from
Razmak Cadet College. He reportedly holds conservative views
and is pious. His youth is noted by his colleagues, though it
is not his greatest handicap: effective militant control over
virtually all of "his" agency makes it difficult to travel
outside of Wana and makes life dangerous even in that city. He
reputedly spends most of his time in Tank.
The Division Commanders - A Mixed Bag

-------------------------------------
¶14. (C) The commanders of the three Pakistani military

divisions that will bear the brunt of the fight in Waziristan
come from widely varying backgrounds. The Seventh Division,
headquartered in Miram Shah, NWA, is commanded by Major General
Navid Zaman. Zaman, a Punjabi from Rawalpindi, spent several
successful years as a staff officer at Pakistan's General
Headquarters (GHQ) prior to assuming command in October 2008.
The Ninth Division, headquartered in Wana, SWA, is commanded by
Khalid Rabbani. Rabbani, who has previous experience as a
brigade commander in the FATA, was most recently assigned as
Pakistan's Defense Attache to Libya and Algeria, which face
counterinsurgency challenges of their own. He left that
position at the end of 2007 and was given command of the Ninth
Division at roughly that time, making him the longest-serving of
the three in their current capacities (ref E). The Fourteenth
Division, headquartered in Tank, is commanded by Major General
Ijaz Chaudhry, of whom less is known; he assumed command of the
division in September 2008.
Comment
-------
¶15. (C) Baitullah Mehsud and the military are the predominant
actors in South Waziristan. However, as the government plays
out a strategy of divide and rule, the alliances, feuding, and
maneuverings of other militants as well as tribal and political
PESHAWAR 00000147 005 OF 005
figures bears watching in assessing the direction that

operations in South Waziristan will take. End comment.
TRACY
Viewing cable 09SEOUL1171, A/S CAMPBELL’S MEETING WITH ROK

UNIFICATION
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #1171/01 2050738

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240738Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Friday, 24 July 2009, 07:38

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, KN, KS
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL’S MEETING WITH ROK UNIFICATION
MINISTER HYUN IN-TAEK
Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 20 meeting, Unification Minister Hyun In-taek
outlined Kim Jong-il’s health and succession concerns, key figures and the
current state of the DPRK for A/S Campbell. Although Kim Jong-il (KJI) remained
firmly in control of the regime for now, he was unlikely to live beyond 2015. On
succession, Hyun observed the current succession preparations for Kim Jung-un
were “rushed,” and anticipated additional “fireworks” (either a third nuclear
test or missile launches) at the end of the current 150-day campaign, scheduled
to end in mid-October. North Korea would return to dialogue afterwards. North
Korea is suffering from severe food shortage and devastating economic crisis
caused by lack of foreign aid, economic foundation and decent harvest. The
situation is worse than the 1996/ 1997 crisis, because the economic uncertainty
is taking place during, not after, a power transition period. Desperate for
cash, Hyun believed North Korea would sell nuclear technology to potential
buyers. North Korea desired to be a “strong state,” ideologically, militarily
and economically. Nuclear power would allow two of the three: ideological and
military strength. The role of the DPRK Foreign Ministry diminished after Kim
Gae-kwan failed to “deal with the United States.” The Kaesong Industrial Complex
(KIC) remained a source for cash for the DPRK; it was also a potential window of
opportunity for inter-Korean cooperation, and at the same time a potential
political liability for both Koreas. Hyun believed North Korea after KJI’s death
would look very different than the current state and require economic assistance
from South Korea and the United States. Hyun also underscored the importance the
U.S.-ROK cooperation and believed a unified Korea should be nuclear free. END
SUMMARY.
--------------------------
KJI’s Heath and Succession
--------------------------
¶2. (C) While KJI’s overall political power remained “firm and strong,” his
health was weakening, Hyun said. South Korean analysts believed that KJI was
unlikely to live more than 3 to 5 years, although he seemed to be doing better
lately. MOU had not discovered any firm basis for rumored pancreatic cancer,
reports of which stemmed from a Japanese press article with a Beijing source.
Wang Jiarui, Director for PRC Communist Party International Liaison Department,
told Hyun that when he had met with KJI in January, Wang could not detect any
scars on KJI’s head from his widely reported surgery after suffering a stroke.
Also, KJI did not look as though he would die soon when he attended the 15-year
commemoration of the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, on July 8. KJI remained
for the entire duration of the celebration -- over three hours -- and met with
his staff for about 20 minutes after the event.
¶3. (C) Hyun observed that the current, “rushed,” pace of succession preparation
in the North was noteworthy. “Semi-officially,” Hyun said, the transition had
started, with some power and authority already transferred to the youngest son,
Kim Jong-un, who had already been recognized publicly as a “young commander” and
a “brilliant star.” The current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-
October, was to provide a boost to a smoother transition. Hyun said he expected
further nuclear and/or missile tests in October; perhaps, after that, North
Korea would return to the nuclear talks.
--------------------------------
Return to Dialogue After October
--------------------------------
¶4. (C) Hyun said it was only a matter of time before North Korea returned to
the nuclear talks; the only question was when. North Korea faced a severely
degraded economy, serious food shortages, and a shortage of foreign currency. It
could resist for a while, but not for a long time. The Five Parties, therefore,
should focus on how to manage the return of North Korea to the negotiations. If
the return was not well managed, there would be poor results. The United States
and South Korea must apply patience and pressure.
--------------------------------
The Current State of North Korea
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) According to Hyun, North Korea now faced a very difficult economic
situation, similar to the conditions in
1996 and 1997. Hyun pointed out that North Korea “produces nothing” and had “no
meaningful trade” with the outside world. On food, Hyun said that North Korea
was now asking private ROK entities for food assistance. Hyun confirmed that the
ROKG did not send food aid or fertilizer to the DPRK from 2008 to present.
Having also refused U.S. food aid, the DPRK was severely suffering, and the food
situation would not improve soon, Hyun said. Since early July, North Korea had
suffered from unusually heavy rainfall, which would have a devastating effect on
the harvest this year.
¶6. (C) On inter-Korean trade, Hyun cited data from the Korea Development
Institute (KDI), which showed a sharp decrease in inter-Korean trade over the
past six months. Moreover, inter-Korean projects such as Mt. Kumkang and Kaesong
city tours, major sources of cash, had dried up completely because they were
closed in July and December 2008. The remaining, legitimate, cash flow for the
North is now the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), from which the North receives
about USD 35 million for its 40,000 workers. Hyun believed that North Korea
could, and would, sell nuclear technology, and even plutonium.
¶7. (C) Hyun assessed that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests were to earn
“one big deal” with the United States. North Korea wanted to be recognized as a
nuclear state. North Korea’s goals were to become ideologically, militarily, and
economically a strong state. Aiming to achieve “strength” in all areas by 2012,
the year when North Korea will “enter the gateway to become a strong and
prosperous nation,” according North Korean schedule. Hyun said the ideological
goal was already achieved through Kim Il-sung’s Juche, or self-reliance,
ideology. The DPRK’s aim to become a military power was “nearly achieved,”
through the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In North Korea’s view,
ideological and military strength would come from becoming a nuclear power. When
North Korea would “gain strength” on all three fronts, it would also obtain the
recognition and respect from the rest of the world.
-----------
Key players
-----------
¶8. (C) Hyun identified Jang Sung-taek as the central figure in North Korea at
the moment, probably the second-in-command. However, Jang did not oversee
serious military issues, including nuclear and missile programs. On military
issues, key authority was held by the National Defense Committee. Among the
committee members, Hyun said Joo koo-chan was responsible for the rocket launch,
and Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were key decision makers within the
military. Other National Defense Committee members, such as Cho Myung-rok, who
had met President Clinton, were not doing well because of old age. Oh Kuk-ryul
and Kim Young-choon were also old, but remained active. According to Hyun’s
sources, Kim Young-choon suffers from bad hearing, but remained one of KJI’s
close confidants. Apparently, KJI called for Kim Young-choon twice on July 8, at
the celebration of the 15th anniversary of KIS’s death -- a clear sign of
influence. Hyun also identified Kim Jeong-gak as “very powerful,” but
underscored that KJI still controls “everything, including the military.”
-----------------------------------
Diminishing Foreign Ministry’s Role
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) In the past, the DPRK Foreign Ministry enjoyed some of influence and
power, as a check-and-balance element of the DPRK regime. Currently, that
balance system has broken down and the foreign ministry’s role has diminished
considerably. One reason for this downfall, according to Hyun, was the perceived
failure of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) where Kim Gye-kwan did “not deal with the
United States successfully.” Hyun said that the North Korean authorities
expected a lot from Kim Gye-kwan, but he had “failed to deliver.”
-------------------------------
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
-------------------------------
¶10. (C) Hyun saw the KIC as a window of opportunity for inter-Korean
development, especially in introducing South Korean capitalism to the North. Run
by South Korean managers and machines, the KIC provides glimpse of the South
Korean way of life to over 40,000 North Korean workers and their external
families. The workers’ change in appearance and way
of thinking was visible, Hyun said. The 40,000 KIC workers could spread the
South Korea’s way of life to their families, thus directly affecting some
150,000 people around Kaesong city. Hyun also noted that, the KIC was a divisive
issue in South Korea too. The North could use KIC to “divide” the South, Hyun
assessed, but still, Hyun said, most of South Korea, including the ROKG, did not
want the project to fail.
-----------
Way forward
-----------
¶11. (C) Hyun believed North Korea after KJI’s death would look very different,
requiring considerable economic assistance from South Korea, the United States
and international community. Hyun advised that in case of a sudden collapse in
North Korea, the ROKG and USG should move quickly toward unification of the
Korean peninsula. There was “no disagreement” among ROK agencies on this point,
Hyun said. The USG could expect “full cooperation” from the ROKG; unification
was the goal of South Korea. Hyun underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK
cooperation and stated that a unified Korea should be nuclear free.
¶12. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message. STEPHENS

THE UNITED
Discussing cables
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RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4533
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 6121
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3128
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5977
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8735
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 5526
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1046
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 8737
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RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 7784
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034

TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPKO KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
NATIONS
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United
Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued
DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the
United Nations (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and
reflects the results of a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations.
The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic
priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs
(paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as
they allocate resources and update plans to collect
information on the United Nations. The priorities should
also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage
reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission
Strategic Plans (MSPs).




relating to persons linked to : office and
STATE 00080163 002 OF 024

¶A. Key Near-Term Issues

1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1)
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1)
3) Somalia (FPOL-1)
4) Iran (FPOL-1)
5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
¶B. Key Continuing Issues

1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1)
2) Iraq (FPOL-1)
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1)
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3)
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response
(HREL-3)
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDN-5H)
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H)
8) Burma (FPOL-1)
¶C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations

1) Africa (FPOL-1)
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1)
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)
¶D. UN Security Council

1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1)
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
¶E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1)
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)
¶F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
¶G. Other Substantive Issues

1) Food Security (FOOD-3)
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4)
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H)
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4)
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4)
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H)
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)
STATE 00080163 003 OF 024

¶H. Intelligence and Security Topics
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1)
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information
Systems (INFR-5H)
¶15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is

the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland
Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense
HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the
Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence;
FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the
Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy
HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service;
OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the
Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects
information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's
requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID
is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the
U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative;
WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and
Arms Control Center.)
¶A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1).
-- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing
troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters,
to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union
(AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
-- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and
UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan.
-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID
Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the
Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups.
-- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan
(including Darfur).
-- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments
of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
STATE 00080163 004 OF 024
Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states
regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in
Afghanistan.
-- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or
member states affecting elections in Afghanistan.
-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed
at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian
assistance.
-- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat
leadership concerning Afghan political and economic
reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug
trafficking.
-- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to
secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization
(NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired
staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan,
Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: Taliban
International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1).
-- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace
the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union
(AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led
maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia.
-- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air
transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia.
-- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or
multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia.
-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and
Somali government or Somali opposition officials.
-- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia.
-- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training
Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance
for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint
Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by

Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons.
-- Positions and responses of member states to future
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director
General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and
relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.
-- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany
(EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran.
-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states,
especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran,
sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and
Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions.
-- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states,
coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning
sanctions against Iran.
-- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions
regarding Iranian sanctions.
-- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member
states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective
implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts
to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by
returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA.
-- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and
within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in
Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Iranian officials.

Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5,
to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or
sanctions under existing resolutions.
-- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to
address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or
proliferate nuclear weapons.
-- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a
nation in famine, and misuse of aid.
-- North Korean delegation views and activities;
instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean
WMD-related issues.
-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in
North Korea.
-- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with North Korean officials.
-- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North
Korean diplomats.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
¶B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1).

-- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on
UN Security Council (UNSC) reform.
-- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member
states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC
procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges.
-- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among
key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for
permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan
(the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group
(especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes
additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the
EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency.
-- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms.
-- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member
recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,

Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member
states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials
concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the
UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi
boundaries.
-- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for
Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally
displaced persons and refugees.
-- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US
positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including
reconstruction efforts.
-- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG,
Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in
Iraq.
-- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission.
-- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN.
-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed
at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian
assistance.

Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants

International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1).

-- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat
decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and
coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace
Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap.
-- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East
might be reconvened.
-- Developments within the UN system that would further the
Arab-Israeli peace process.
-- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans
and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals
and envoy negotiating strategies.
-- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US
positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special
envoys.
-- Indications member states or donor countries might scale
back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the
Middle East.
-- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on
the MEPP.
-- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority,
including its representative to the UN, to gain support in
the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its
strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues,
including from Russia and EU countries, especially France,
Germany, and UK.
-- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on
possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include
Syria/Lebanon border demarcation.
-- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of
the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and
regional competition for allocation.
-- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward
Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and
efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations.
-- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on
territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and
right of return.
-- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the
UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on
HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority
issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries,
especially France, Germany, and the UK.
-- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West
Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US
priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.
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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, UN
Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and
Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3).

-- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and
foreign NGOs to promote human rights.
-- Plans and intentions of member states toward the
International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other
UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights
issues.
-- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose
US policies in the UNHRC.
-- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s
government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance,
democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
-- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities,
and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human
rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about
appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.
-- Plans and perceptions of member states toward
establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human
rights abuses.
-- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and
resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states,
including those advancing democracy; women's rights,
particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and
1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or
those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries.
-- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions
designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in
the Muslim world.
-- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities
of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
(OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR
independence.
-- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding
reform and the role of the US.
-- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human
rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies.
-- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special
Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into
US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in
Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo.
-- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies,
especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,
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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council,

and the International Labor Organization.
-- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and
UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences,
particularly plans by developing countries to stymie
criticism of their human rights records through procedural
motions or influencing votes.
-- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to
sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting
freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing
"defamation of religion."
-- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon,
Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities
and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response

(HREL-3).
-- Information on the planning and execution of responses to
humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat;
indications US assistance may be requested.
-- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO),
and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate
activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including
environmental disasters.
-- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member
states on UNRWA.
-- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership.
-- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian
access to troubled areas, especially in light of security
concerns.
-- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS
coordinates, and number of personnel.
-- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security
Coordinator Headquarters and field offices.
-- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof
between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs.
-- Interoperability and willingness to work with US
coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness
to provide support despite security threats.
-- Indications of donor fatigue.
-- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by
UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute
programs to other agencies.
-- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls.
-- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective
UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
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governance.
-- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally
displaced persons.
-- Communications and logistics problems.

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities,
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health
Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMDN-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats
to international security from the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
-- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects
of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile
defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear
program.
-- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA
Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or
groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or
the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear
proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to
produce or use weapons of mass destruction.

Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms
Control Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H).

-- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to
respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or
state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or
security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities,
protectees, or installations.
-- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel
and/or missions and terrorist organizations.
-- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies
(subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about
measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas
facilities, operations, and personnel.
-- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO
personnel.
-- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at
the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas
UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York.
-- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and
disseminate threat information within the US and overseas.
-- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.

Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1).
-- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and
actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy,
and attempts to play a larger UN role.
-- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN
Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with
Burma and engagement with UN member states.
-- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust
in his Special Adviser.
-- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special
Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN.
-- Role of the UN in Burmese elections.
-- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in
Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Burmese officials.

Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia,
¶C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states
regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African
Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia.
-- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military
operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
-- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on
potential threats to peace and security.
-- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict
resolution and post-conflict capacity building.
-- UN expectations of US military involvement in African
peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN
willingness to establish, curb, or end missions.
-- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are
straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact
of current operations on future operations and readiness.
-- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to
expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the
form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or
in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and
timely UN-led multilateral intervention.
-- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the

UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa,
including by working with the AU or other regional
organizations and NGOs.
-- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain
influence in Africa via UN peace operations.
-- Information on extent of support and capabilities for
peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS).
-- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and
actual practice.
-- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches
unofficial communications of events; views on those
discrepancies.
-- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding
UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries.
-- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN
peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative
ability to contribute to such efforts.
-- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda
participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire,
Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia,
France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1).

-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states
regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa.
-- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN
peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in
areas of potential conflict.
-- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the
US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations
capabilities.
-- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat
toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues,
and US-sponsored initiatives.
-- Information on whether member states will utilize
references to the ICC to condition support for peace
operations.
-- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment
screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace
operations.
-- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military
forces, including surge capabilities.
-- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member
states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human
rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and

key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.

Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1).

-- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the
capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new,
complex military operations and civilian police operations.
-- Information on Secretariat or member views on or
initiatives for peace operations reform.
-- Information on the appointment of SYG special
representatives for new peace or political operations.
-- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of
engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping
activities, including transportation and communications
infrastructures and any available maps.
-- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and
materiel that countries are willing to contribute.
-- Information on interoperability of equipment and material
available for logistic support.
-- Information on turf battles between the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and
Department of Political Affairs over control of peace
operations.
-- Information on turf battles between logistic and military
sides of peace operations.
-- UN member views on reform of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations.
-- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to
follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders
vice UN field commanders.
-- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee
concerns within peace operations mandates.
-- Host government views and concerns about UN policies
toward that country.
-- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational
planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives.
-- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG) deployments.
-- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children;
national and UN responses.
-- Changes in ability of member states, especially member
states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace
operations, including for economic, social, and operational
reasons.
-- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,
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personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
¶D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1).

-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and
Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially
voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions
among the Perm 5.
-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose
US policies in the UNSC.
-- Specific views and positions of key member states on
US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for
the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates.
-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics
of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the
UNSC, especially those that do not include the US
(particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and
Caribbean Countries (GRULAC).
-- Differences in the positions of member states, differences
between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures
for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions
to delegations.
-- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states
joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups,
blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially
those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM,
G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC).
-- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups
regarding UNSC candidacy.
-- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent
Representatives, information on their relationships with
their capitals.

Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1).
-- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions
issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions
resolutions.
-- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate
sanctions.
-- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil

population.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
members.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
expert groups and their ability to support sanctions
monitoring.
-- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions,
especially from coalitions and regional groups.
-- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with
regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to
support sanctions implementation and to address violations.
-- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.

Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone,
¶E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1).

-- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his
influence on the Secretariat.
-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for
UN management.
-- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials
with SYG and other UN system agencies.
-- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues.
-- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key
officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee,
commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva,
Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special
assistants and chiefs of staff.
-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,
roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key
UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of
specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides,
heads of peace operations and political field missions,
including force commanders.
-- Relations between key UN officials and member states.
-- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include
preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support.
-- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban,
Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.

Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria,
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1).

-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for

UN management.
-- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the
Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint
Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement,
and corruption.
-- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the
OIOS mandate.
-- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations.
-- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS.
-- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in
UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement
measures to reduce corruption.
-- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the
Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN
agencies.
-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to
push for or block management reform proposals.
-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or
senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of
corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including
efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse.
-- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or
abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them.
-- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to
push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own
countries or those of their friends.
-- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP
Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field
staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN"
Program.
-- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group
platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues.
-- Developments in the implementation of the performance
based personnel system and contractor reform.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency
executive committees.
-- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on
the UN reform process.
-- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending
a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds
and programs.
-- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to
increase or control growth in the budget.
-- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the
scale of assessments.
-- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems.
-- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government
Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more
effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make
further progress on management reform.
-- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the
UN budget process.
-- Status and use of advanced information systems to
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streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China,

Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
¶F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1).

-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics
of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the
General Assembly, especially those that do not include the
US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC.
-- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts
to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions
or policy initiatives.
-- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it
relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth
Committees.
-- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to
secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized
agencies.
-- Lobbying by member states for committee membership
assignments or vice presidencies.
-- Information on current and likely future leadership of
regional groups, blocs, and coalitions.
-- Differences over positions between UN missions and their
respective capitals.
-- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs;
member views of issues that come before these committees.
-- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and
G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of
religion, or human rights issues.
-- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working
groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy.
-- Perceptions of member states of the viability and
potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus.
-- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC
Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan,
Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their
relationships with their capitals.

Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa,
Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
¶G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3).

-- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis.

-- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor
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to address regularly occurring food crises.
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Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa

Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan,
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health
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Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and
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international chemicals management, especially efforts of the
EU's management program.
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Basel Convention.
-- Status of efforts to set standards to promote
STATE 00080163 019 OF 024
environmental protection, including protection of forests,

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Uganda, Vietnam
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STATE 00080163 020 OF 024
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-- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
STATE 00080163 021 OF 024
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-- Information on deliberations in the UN and other
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policy positions and objectives of member states and key
figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted
in published declarations and studies.
-- Information on international health organizations,
relationships and interactions with countries and other
organizations, including relationships with regional offices
or subsidiaries.
-- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international
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STATE 00080163 022 OF 024
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International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health
Organization, WHO
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-- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of
terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and
definition of terrorism.
-- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism
Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)

Uganda, Vietnam
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H).

-- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose
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and future plans of the organization.
-- Member views on education initiatives.
STATE 00080163 023 OF 024

Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
¶H. Intelligence and Security Topics

requirements.

requirements.
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-- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN
decision-making.
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policies and activities on globalization, justice, human
rights, the environment, and
family/women/children/reproductive issues.
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displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR
and WFP.
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Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental
protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts.
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could involve sharing of confidential data.
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affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN
affiliation.
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Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO
affiliation for organizations supporting their policies.
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organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain
NGO affiliation with the UN.
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the UNGA.

Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information

Systems (INFR-5H).
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planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
STATE 00080163 024 OF 024

information systems, networks, and technologies used by top
officials and their support staffs.
-- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for
official communications, to include upgrades, security
measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V
P N versions used.
-- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials,
as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories
and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories;
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involving UN networks.
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systems and technologies by officials or organizations,
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interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide
interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and
fiber networks.

Uganda, Vietnam
CLINTON
Viewing cable 09TEGUCIGALPA645, TFHO1: OPEN AND SHUT: THE CASE

OF THE HONDURAN COUP
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09TEGUCIGALPA645.
2009-07-24 2010-11-28 Embassy
09TEGUCIGALPA645 CONFIDENTIAL
00:12 18:06 Tegucigalpa
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTG #0645/01 2050023

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FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000645
SIPDIS
WHA FOR A/S TOM SHANNON

L FOR HAROLD KOH AND JOAN DONOGHUE
NSC FOR DAN RESTREPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019

TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS HO
SUBJECT: TFHO1: OPEN AND SHUT: THE CASE OF THE HONDURAN COUP
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 578
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b and d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Post has attempted to clarify some of the

legal and constitutional issues surrounding the June 28
forced removal of President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya. The
Embassy perspective is that there is no doubt that the
military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired
on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and
unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch, while
accepting that there may be a prima facie case that Zelaya
may
have committed illegalities and may have even violated the
constitution. There is equally no doubt from our perspective
that Roberto Micheletti's assumption of power was
illegitimate. Nevertheless, it is also evident that the
constitution itself may be deficient in terms of providing
clear procedures for dealing with alleged illegal acts by
the President and resolving conflicts between the branches
of government. End summary.
¶2. (U) Since the June 28 removal and expulsion of President

Zelaya by the Honduran armed forces, the Embassy has
consulted Honduran legal experts (one cannot find a fully
unbiased professional legal opinion in Honduras in the
current politically charged atmosphere) and reviewed the
text of the Honduran Constitution and its laws to develop a
better understanding of the arguments being parlayed by the
coup's supporters and opponents.
-------------------------------
Arguments of the Coup Defenders
-------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Defenders of the June 28 coup have offered some

combination of the following, often ambiguous, arguments to
assert it's legality:
-- Zelaya had broken the law (alleged but not proven);
-- Zelaya resigned (a clear fabrication);
-- Zelaya intended to extend his term in office

(supposition);
-- Had he been allowed to proceed with his June 28

constitutional reform opinion poll, Zelaya would have
dissolved Congress the following day and convened a
constituent assembly (supposition);
-- Zelaya had to be removed from the country to prevent a

bloodbath;
-- Congress "unanimously" (or in some versions by a 123-5

vote) deposed Zelaya; (after the fact and under the cloak
of secrecy); and
-- Zelaya "automatically" ceased to be president the moment

he suggested modifying the constitutional prohibition on
presidential reelection.
¶4. (C) In our view, none of the above arguments has any
substantive validity under the Honduran constitution. Some
are outright false. Others are mere supposition or ex-post
rationalizations of a patently illegal act. Essentially:
-- the military had no authority to remove Zelaya from the

country;
-- Congress has no constitutional authority to remove a

Honduran president;
-- Congress and the judiciary removed Zelaya on the basis

of a hasty, ad-hoc, extralegal, secret, 48-hour process;
-- the purported "resignation" letter was a fabrication and

was not even the basis for Congress's action of June 28;
and
-- Zelaya's arrest and forced removal from the country

violated multiple constitutional guarantees, including the
prohibition on expatriation, presumption of innocence and
right to due process.
-------------------------------------------
Impeachment under the Honduran Constitution
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (U) Under the Honduran Constitution as currently

written, the President may be removed only on the basis of
death, resignation or incapacitation. Only the Supreme
Court may determine that a President has been
"incapacitated" on the basis of committing a crime.
¶6. (U) There is no explicit impeachment procedure in the

1982 Honduran Constitution. Originally, Article 205-15
stated that Congress had the competence to determine
whether "cause" existed against the President, but it did
not stipulate on what grounds or under what procedure.
Article 319-2 stated that the Supreme Court would "hear"
cases of official or common crimes committed by high-level
officials, upon a finding of cause by the Congress. This
implied a vague two-step executive impeachment process
involving the other two branches of government, although
without specific criteria or procedures. However, Article
205 was abrogated in 2003, and the corresponding provision
of Article 319 (renumbered 313) was revised to state only
that the Supreme Court would hear "processes initiated"
against high officials. Thus, it appears that under the
Constitution as currently written, removal of a president
or a government official is an entirely judicial matter.
¶7. (U) Respected legal opinion confirms that the removal of

a president is a judicial matter. According to a 2006 book
by respected legal scholar Enrique Flores Valeriano -- late
father of Zelaya's Minister of the Presidency, Enrique
Flores Lanza -- Article 112 of the Law of Constitutional
Justice indicates that if any government official is found
to be in violation of the Constitution, that person should
be removed from office immediately with the ultimate
authority on matters of Constitutionality being the Supreme
Court.
¶8. (U) Many legal experts have also confirmed to us that

the Honduran process for impeaching a President or other
senior-level officials is a judicial procedure. They
assert that under Honduran law the process consists of formal
criminal charges being filed by the Attorney General
against the accused with the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court could accept or reject the charges. If the Court
moved to indict, it would assign a Supreme Court
magistrate, or a panel of magistrates to investigate the
matter,
and oversee the trial. The trial process is open and
transparent and the defendant would be given a full right
of self-defense. If convicted in the impeachment trial,
the magistrates have authority to remove the President or
senior official. Once the President is removed, then the
constitutional succession would follow. In this case, if a
President is legally charged, convicted, and removed, his
successor is the Vice President or what is termed the
Presidential Designate. In the current situation in
Honduras, since the Vice President, Elvin Santos, resigned
last December in order to be able to run as the Liberal
Party Presidential candidate, President Zelaya's successor
would be Congress President Roberto Micheletti.
Unfortunately, the President was never tried, or
convicted, or was legally removed from office to allow a
legal succession.
-----------------------------
The Legal Case Against Zelaya
-----------------------------
¶9. (C) Zelaya's opponents allege that he violated the

Constitution on numerous grounds, some of which appear on
their face to be valid, others not:
-- Refusing to submit a budget to the Congress: The

Constitution is unambiguous that the Executive shall submit
a proposed budget to Congress by September 15 each year
(Art. 367), that Congress shall approve the budget (Art.
366) and that no obligations or payments may be effectuated
except on the basis of an approved budget (Art. 364);
-- Refusing to fund the Congress: Article 212 states that

the Treasury shall apportion quarterly the funds needed for
the operation of the Congress;
-- Proposing an illegal constitutional referendum: The

Constitution may be amended only through two-thirds vote of
the Congress in two consecutive sessions (Art. 373 and
375); a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution,
as Zelaya promoted, is therefore unconstitutional; however,
it is not clear that proposing a constituent assembly in
itself violates the constitution, only that any changes
ensuing from that assembly would be invalid;
-- Defying the judgment of a competent court: Zelaya

insisted on pushing ahead with his constitutional reform
opinion poll after both a first-instance court and an
appeals court ordered him to suspend those efforts;
however, while he clearly intended to follow through with
the poll, he never actually did it;
-- Proposing to reform unreformable articles: Since

Zelaya's proposed constituent assembly would have unlimited
powers to rewrite the constitution, it violated Article
374, which makes certain articles unamendable; once again,
though, Zelaya never actually attempted to change the
so-called "carved in stone" articles; it was only assumed
he intended to;
-- Dismissing the armed forces chief: The Supreme Court's

Constitutional Hall ruled June 25 that Zelaya was in
violation of the Constitution for dismissing Defense Chief
Vasquez Velasquez; the Constitution (Art. 280) states that
the President may freely name or remove the chief of the
armed forces; but the court ruled that since Zelaya fired
him for refusing to carry out a poll the court had ruled
illegal, the firing was illegal.
¶10. (C) Although a case could well have been made against
Zelaya for a number of the above alleged constitutional
violations, there was never any formal, public weighing of
the evidence nor any semblance of due process.
-----------------------
The Article 239 Cannard
-----------------------
¶11. (U) Article 239, which coup supporters began citing

after the fact to justify Zelaya's removal (it is nowhere
mentioned in the voluminous judicial dossier against
Zelaya), states that any official proposing to reform the
constitutional prohibition against reelection of the
president shall immediately cease to carry out their
functions and be ineligible to hold public office for 10
years. Coup defenders have asserted that Zelaya therefore
automatically ceased to be President when he proposed a
constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution.
¶12. (C) Post's analysis indicates the Article 239 argument

is flawed on multiple grounds:
-- Although it was widely assumed that Zelaya's reason for

seeking to convoke a constituent assembly was to amend the
constitution to allow for reelection, we are not aware
that he ever actually stated so publicly;
-- Article 239 does not stipulate who determines whether it

has been violated or how, but it is reasonable to assume
that it does not abrogate other guarantees of due process
and the presumption of innocence;
-- Article 94 states that no penalty shall be imposed

without the accused having been heard and found guilty in a
competent court;
-- Many other Honduran officials, including presidents,

going back to the first elected government under the 1982
Constitution, have proposed allowing presidential
reelection, and they were never deemed to have been
automatically removed from their positions as a result.
¶13. (C) It further warrants mention that Micheletti himself

should be forced to resign following the logic of the 239
argument, since as President of Congress he considered
legislation to have a fourth ballot box ("cuarta urna") at
the November elections to seek voter approval for a
constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution. Any
member of Congress who discussed the proposal should also
be required to resign, and National Party presidential
candidate Pepe Lobo, who endorsed the idea, should be
ineligible to hold public office for 10 years.
--------------------------------------------- -
Forced Removal by Military was Clearly Illegal
--------------------------------------------- -
¶14. (C) Regardless of the merits of Zelaya's alleged

constitutional violations, it is clear from even a cursory
reading that his removal by military means was illegal, and
even the most zealous of coup defenders have been unable to
make convincing arguments to bridge the intellectual gulf
between "Zelaya broke the law" to "therefore, he was packed
off to Costa Rica by the military without a trial."
-- Although coup supporters allege the court issued an

arrest warrant for Zelaya for disobeying its order to
desist from the opinion poll, the warrant, made public days
later, was for him to be arrested and brought before the
competent authority, not removed from the county;
-- Even if the court had ordered Zelaya to be removed from
the country, that order would have been unconstitutional;
Article 81 states that all Hondurans have the right to
remain in the national territory, subject to certain narrow
exceptions spelled out in Article 187, which may be invoked
only by the President of the Republic with the agreement of
the Council of Ministers; Article 102 states that no
Honduran may be expatriated;
-- The armed forces have no/no competency to execute

judicial orders; originally, Article 272 said the armed
forces had the responsibility to "maintain peace, public
order and the 'dominion' of the constitution," but that
language was excised in 1998; under the current text, only
the police are authorized to uphold the law and execute
court orders (Art. 293);
-- Accounts of Zelaya's abduction by the military indicate

he was never legally "served" with a warrant; the soldiers
forced their way in by shooting out the locks and
essentially kidnapped the President.
¶15. (U) The Armed Forces' ranking legal advisor, Col.

Herberth Bayardo Inestroza, acknowledged in an interview
published in the Honduran press July 5 that the Honduran
Armed Forces had broken the law in removing Zelaya from the
country. That same day it was reported that the Public
Ministry was investigating the actions of the Armed Forces
in arresting and deporting Zelaya June 28 and that the
Supreme Court had asked the Armed Forces to explain the
circumstances that motivated his forcible exile.
¶16. (C) As reported reftel, the legal adviser to the

Supreme Court told Poloff that at least some justices on
the Court consider Zelaya's arrest and deportation by the
military to have been illegal.
------------------------------------------
Congress Had no Authority to Remove Zelaya
------------------------------------------
¶17. (C) As explained above, the Constitution as amended in

2003 apparently gives sole authority for removing a
president to the judiciary. The Congressional action of
June 28 has been reported in some media as acceptance of
Zelaya's resignation, based on a bogus resignation letter
dated June 25 that surfaced after the coup. However, the
June 28 Congressional resolution makes no mention of the
letter, nor does it state that Congress was accepting
Zelaya's resignation. It says Congress "disapproves" of
Zelaya's conduct and therefore "separates" him from the
office of President -- a constitutional authority Congress
does not have. Furthermore, a source in the Congressional
leadership told us that a quorum was not present when the
resolution was adopted, rendering it invalid. There was no
recorded vote, nor a request for the "yeas" and "nays."
¶18. (C) In sum, for a constitutional succession from Zelaya

to Micheletti to occur would require one of several
conditions:
Zelaya's resignation, his death, or permanent medical

incapacitation (as determined by judicial and medical
authorities), or as discussed previously, his formal criminal
conviction and removal from office. In the absence of any of
these conditions and since Congress lacked the legal
authority to remove Zelaya, the actions of June 28 can only
be considered a coup d'etat by the legislative branch, with
the support of the judicial branch and the military, against
the executive branch. It bears mentioning that, whereas the
resolution adopted June 28 refers only to Zelaya, its effect
was to remove the entire executive branch. Both of these
actions clearly exceeded Congress's authority.
-------
Comment
-------
¶19. (C) The analysis of the Constitution sheds some

interesting light on the events of June 28. The Honduran
establishment confronted a dilemma: near unanimity among
the institutions of the state and the political class that
Zelaya had abused his powers in violation of the
Constitution, but with some ambiguity what to do about it.
Faced with that lack of clarity, the military and/or
whoever ordered the coup fell back on what they knew -- the
way Honduran presidents were removed in the past: a bogus
resignation letter and a one-way ticket to a neighboring
country. No matter what the merits of the case against
Zelaya, his forced removal by the military was clearly
illegal, and Micheletti's ascendance as "interim president"
was totally illegitimate.
¶20. (C) Nonetheless, the very Constitutional uncertainty

that presented the political class with this dilemma may
provide the seeds for a solution. The coup's most ardent
legal defenders have been unable to make the intellectual
leap from their arguments regarding Zelaya's alleged crimes
to how those allegations justified dragging him out of his
bed in the night and flying him to Costa Rica. That the
Attorney General's office and the Supreme Court now
reportedly question the legality of that final step is
encouraging and may provide a face-saving "out" for the two
opposing sides in the current standoff. End Comment.
LLORENS
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1688, PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO

ISRAEL
Discussing cables
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INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6300
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL
REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military

Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on
July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli
political-military relationship, and to discuss among other
issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI
interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to
review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress,
and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on
potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect,
the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on
August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential
F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to
express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to
Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss
U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns
over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any
policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher
sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to
other "options on the table." Other issues raised by GOI
officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control
system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides
agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November
in Israel. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director
General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos
Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu,
and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5
Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At
the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General
Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and
Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also
participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited
Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.
U.S.-Israeli Relationship
-------------------------
¶3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the

U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the
significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in
his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors
appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this
important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG
Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in
the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting
the number of misunderstandings in the future.
Qualitative Military Edge

-------------------------
¶4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining

Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that
Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate
Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and
prefers such sales originate from the United States instead
of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel
continues to stress the importance of identifying potential
risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for
this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the
official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S.
arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).
¶5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in

reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress.
A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an
assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not
releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to
the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and
welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such
comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the
report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated
the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it
was difficult to comment on the report's results without
reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that
respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the
QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.
¶6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that

moderate Arab countries could in the future become
adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in
the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the
MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar,
the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs
on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the
argument that these countries could become future foes.
Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession
concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a
perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and
Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel
moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a
fixture in the region.
¶7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos

Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President
Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was
ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military
led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and
exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy." He added that
there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women
are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel
"is too thin, too superficial." On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said
that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief
priority is the survival of the regime.
¶8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer

non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential
transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including
the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a
working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an
Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in
town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss
the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was
not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on
the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.
Lebanon
-------
¶9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the
opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the
LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections
represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and
its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese
institutions, including the army, was now more important than
ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far
demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems
transferred to Lebanon.
¶10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon

were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence
remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna
Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack
sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential
for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad
said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel.
However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was
certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict
with Hizballah.
¶11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research
argued there has been no dramatic change in the political
arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in
the elections. They said the fragile political situation in
Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an
unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be
tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a
reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy
Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces
tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a
Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA
DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from
investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing
by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese
and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations
had praised the GOI's restraint in these cases.
¶12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be

the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community
against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered
that the results were indicative of several factors,
including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable
opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah
might be a bit chastened following the elections, as
suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try
and undermine the March 14 coalition.
¶13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also

acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However,
he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the
Shi'ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF
must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about
ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also
said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt
smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.
¶14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation

measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an
"accidental engagement" by the IAF. Overall, he was
skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said
the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation
regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with
respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to
coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in
Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro
offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it
proved too difficult on short notice to bring together
interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF,
A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political
Military Group talks later in the fall.
Iran
----
¶15. (S) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI's

primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear
to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In
separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel's
preeminent priority is to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons
program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race
across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical
that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to

"establish a new empire" and pointing to Iranian support for
Hizballah and "Hamastan." Buchris added that the United
States' desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by
tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of
time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military
strike, Buchris said "all options must remain on the table,"
and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was
ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it
may be.
¶16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was
unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary
Clinton's July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on
Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran
-- but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S
Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to
engage will only help bolster international support for
increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain
situation following the Iranian elections -- it was unclear
at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our
offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the
engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United
States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later
this fall.
¶17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the

Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat --
we should take advantage of this commonality, he said.
During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors
expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the
Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated
for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear
and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that
assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel's QME,
but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well
as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also
helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie
with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.
¶18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special

envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not
believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris
that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary
Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran
has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special
envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S
Shapiro said -- in any case, much of the discussion will be
behind the scenes.
¶19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary

Clinton's trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States
would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab
countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already
conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy
Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised
the Secretary's Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that
the Secretary's comments did not indicate a new policy
approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions -- not as a concession -- and that
journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of
the statement than was intended.
¶20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia's potential sale of the

S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian
interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran,
and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the
system would not be delivered for political reasons.
However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this
political calculation should the United States continue to
pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to
put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue
alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
but he personally had doubts about their intelligence
capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the
Syrian nuclear project.
Peace Process
-------------
¶21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority

was doing a "good job" in the West Bank, noting respect for
Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control
of security -- giving them the chance to succeed was
important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of
United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training
the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be
difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah.
Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled -- Amos
Gilad said both sides are "more interested in swallowing one
another" than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions
with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have
not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred
to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell's efforts, but noted
Secretary Clinton's point that a stronger PA will offer an
alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton's
remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will
not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet
principles.
Export Control
--------------
¶22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief

Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an
improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for
improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli
export controls, including enhanced legislation,
cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and
increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780
registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing
licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219
returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey
Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on
export licenses, and explained the system's dispute
resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on
a particular case.
¶23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI
continues to seek assistance in closing export control
loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering
had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that
accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered
in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws,
and planned to raise it during the annual defense export
control working group to be held in Washington in October.
Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to
Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering
issues.
China
-----
¶24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated

that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national
interests with respect to exports to China. He noted,
however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007
a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated
end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same
exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently
stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the
bilateral statement of understanding with the United States.
While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any
requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to
obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often
found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the
Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day
turn-around on all export license requests -- which is not
possible, given the length of time required to obtain an
answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise
the issue in Washington.
JPMG
----
¶25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the
Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November.
GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the
calendar and propose dates.
¶26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.
********************************************* ********************
********************************************* ********************
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI862, SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
MEETING WITH SHAYKH
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI862
10:10 18:06 N Dhabi
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O 311005Z AUG 09
TO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2881
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR SRAP, S/SEMEP AND NEA.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2018

TAGS: PREL AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHAYKH
MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Mr President: Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed is looking forward

to renewing your acquaintanceship, established during his 2006 call
on you.
--------------------------------------------- ----
MbZ - The Man
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (C) Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, or MbZ in USG speak, is
the man who runs the United Arab Emirates. Officially he is the
Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (the most important
principality of the seven emirate confederation) and his only federal
title is Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; in fact he is
the key decision maker on national security issues. He will make
deferential noises about his "boss" (elder half-brother President
Khalifa, a distant and uncharismatic personage), but we assess that
he has authority in all matters except for final decisions on oil
policy and major state expenditures.
¶3. (C) Aged 47, MbZ is a leader not just in the UAE, but more
broadly in the Middle East, where he is seen as a particularly
dynamic member of the generation succeeding the geriatric cases who
have dominated the region for decades. He is a reformer, actively
seeking to improve the life of his citizens and the UAE's future
through better education and health care, and through economic
diversification, including investments in clean energy to prepare his
citizenry for a post-hydrocarbon future. He is proud of the fact
that despite having had the option of life of privilege, he rose
through the ranks of the UAE Armed Forces, earning his wings as a
helicopter pilot and retains a common touch that appeals to Emiratis.
--------------------------------------------- ----
MbZ and the Bilateral Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶4. (C) MbZ has staked his reputation, and his country's future, on
its relationship with the United States, especially since 1990, when
the UAE leadership saw that the United States was prepared to shed
blood in the interests of preserving international order and
stability in the Gulf. Since that formative experience, MbZ has
built armed forces (especially his Air Force) that are closely
aligned with the US. He is also a proponent of close economic,
commercial, and where possible political ties with the US. He has
generally tried to support us where he thinks we have been right
(Afghanistan), but also where he thinks we have pursued misguided
policies (Iraq). MbZ recognizes that partnership with the US is
fundamental to the UAE's continued success, but he also knows that
the relationship is controversial among his people, and that if the
US is perceived as an unreliable protector, his own power base will
erode.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶5. (C) MbZ sees Iran as the primary external threat to the UAE and
his regime. To his eyes, Tehran's threatening rhetoric, dominance by
proxy, and pursuit of nuclear weapons is reminiscent of Saddam in
¶1990. Moreover, the confrontations with Iran during the late 1980s
tanker wars, long forgotten in the West, are vividly remembered here.
MbZ is probably the most passionately anti-Iran of the Arab leaders,
and the UAE's position is solidly with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan
in seeing the principal threat to the region as coming from Iran.
MbZ is particularly concerned at the divisions among the Gulf Arabs,
and sees Qatar's and Oman's decision to accommodate, rather than
challenge, Iranian power as troubling.
¶6. (S/NF) While MbZ is a hard liner on Iran, there are

accommodationists within his own system, especially in Dubai, where
the Ruler, Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (Prime Minister of the UAE)
takes a position that is much closer to Qatar's. For this reason,
and because of the basic disparity in size and power between the UAE
and Iran, the Emiratis prefer to be seen as quietly supporting a
hard-line US position, rather than staking out their own views. MbZ
is skeptical that US engagement with Iran will be successful in
reversing Iranian positions on nuclear program, and believes that a
policy of engagement puts him in an awkward position, both
domestically and internationally. He will welcome thinking on next
steps on sanctions.
¶7. (S/NF) Regarding the nuclear issue, MbZ believes that the logic
of war now dominates the region. He regularly expresses his belief
that Israel will launch a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear
facilities, most likely within next six months. This reflects his
own assessment of the Netanyahu Government, but also, probably, what
Israelis are telling UAE in their private exchanges. For this
reason, one of MbZ's highest priorities is to finalize his integrated
air defense system (including THAAD and Patriots) and advance
bilateral contingency planning with the US. Because of Qatari and
Omani wobbliness, he is uncomfortable with multilateral (GCC)
military solutions. MbZ may float the idea of extending the US
nuclear umbrella to the Gulf as a way of shoring up an anti-Iran
coalition, and preventing a regional arms race.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Israel and the Arabs
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (S/NF) MbZ's pre-occupation with Iran (and his secondary concern
about Islamic fundamentalism) lead him to have a strategic view of
the region that is curiously close to the Israeli one. But domestic
politics flow the other way, and he feels constrained in what he can
say publicly. Also, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the UAE
still feels a need to hide behind Arab League and GCC consensus, and
in particular behind Saudi Arabia (even when, as is now the case,
bilateral relations with the Kingdom are rocky).
¶9. (S/NF) We should press MbZ to expend political capital in

resolving the century old Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue cries out
for leadership in the Arab world, not least so that the common
interests of moderate Arabs and Israelis in containing Iran can find
a political expression. So far, MbZ has not been prepared to run
real risks in this area, but we should press him to. He appreciates
the bold steps you have taken, and expects to be asked for help in
this area.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Afghanistan-Pakistan
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶10. (C) The discussion on Afghanistan and Pakistan should be an easy

one. The UAE has played a useful role since 2001, having deployed
Special Forces there since 2003, and recently sending a Battalion
sized task force during the elections. MbZ tried to organize a
pan-Arab force, but could not overcome the resistance of Moroccans
and Tunisians to send troops. In Pakistan, the UAE has been
supportive of Zardari and played a very useful role both as donor and
politically as one of the key members of the friends of Pakistan
grouping. MbZ agrees on the need to curtail Taliban financing, but
is frustrated by our seeming inability to generate actionable
intelligence.
--------------------------------------------- ----
CT/CP Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) The UAE has emerged as one of our principal partners in CT
Cooperation through intelligence channels, having rounded up a number
of cells over the past few years, and is moving toward cooperation
externally as well. In the counterproliferation area, the UAE has
interdicted 20 shipments over the past two years, including within
the past few days, seizing North Korean systems bound for Iran.
Domestic Export Controls have lagged somewhat, but the UAEG's
bureaucratic structure for implementing its export control laws is
finally emerging.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Conclusion
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶12. (C) MbZ views himself as one our closest partners in the Middle
East, and is keen to build on what has been an important aspect of
his life's work, a good relationship with the US. From my
perspective, our relationship with the UAE is one the most promising
and productive in the region.
OLSON
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2438, PRC/IRAN: SCHOLAR SUGGESTS U.S.

NEGOTIATE SE
Discussing cables
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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2029

SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: SCHOLAR SUGGESTS U.S. NEGOTIATE SE
CRETLY WITH IRAN
REF: BEIJING 1803
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.

4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The unstable post-election political climate

in Iran likely precludes the initiation of formal
negotiations with Iran on ceasing its uranium enrichment
program, according to a PRC scholar. Though Iran is sincere
in wishing to reach out to the United States on broader
bilateral issues, it remains wary of "falling into a trap" in
bilateral negotiations. Under these circumstances, the
scholar suggests, the United States should undertake "se
cret" talks with Iran that would entail a U.S. concession
allowing Iran some nuclear enrichment activities in return
for Iran's adherence to a strict IAEA safeguard agreement,
its cessation of support for Hamas and Hizbollah, and
cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. China has encouraged
Iran to enter into negotiations with the United States,
according to our contact, while the United States is involved
in regional conflicts where Iran could play a positive role.
However, the scholar stressed, pressing for additional
sanctions through the P5-plus-1 mechanism would be
counterproductive and put China in a "difficult position" of
having to side with either the United States or Iran. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the
MFA-affiliated China Institute for International Studies
(CIIS) and frequent media commentator on Middle East issues
Li Guofu told PolOff August 24 that though the unexpected
turmoil surrounding the June 12 Iranian election had
politically weakened both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, both they and
opposition candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi were "one side of a
coin" in that none of them supported the suspension of Iran's
uranium enrichment activities.
Post-Election Atmosphere Not Right for Negotiations

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶3. (C) Li argued that Ahmadinejad's congratulatory letter

sent to President Obama following the 2008 U.S. elections had
been a sincere indication of the Iranian leadership's
willingness to talk. Li said he had learned that former
Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati had discreetly
contacted USG officials prior to the June 12 presidential
election in Iran, agreeing to resume bilateral contacts after
the election concluded, but that the turmoil and the
lingering instability in Iran had prevented movement on that
initiative. Li reported that his contacts in Iran had
recently said that the Iranian political climate
post-election was still not stable enough for the leadership
to engage in public negotiations on the nuclear issue.
"Obama Factor"
--------------
¶4. (C) Li said an additional factor adding to the Iranian

leadership's reticence to reach out to the United States was
President Obama's positive image among the Iranian public.
("Obama is with us," was an example of public sentiment
reported to him by his Iranian contacts.) Despite the fact
that the leadership was satisfied with President Obama's
statements after the June election, Iranian leaders were wary
of "falling into a trap" in negotiations with United States.
Li suggested that Khamenei remained suspicious of the United
Kingdom, France and Germany based on the Iranian leadership's
perception that these countries had played a role in stirring
post-election turmoil.
Grand Bargain in the Works?

---------------------------
¶5. (C) Li stated that Iran agreeing to suspend uranium

enrichment unilaterally or completely was a "non-starter."
Li cited unnamed contacts in the United States "with close
access to policy-makers on Iran" to support his belief that
the United States would be willing to accept some
internationally-supervised uranium enrichment by Iran. This
would be a concession, Li said, that "the Europeans would
have great difficulty accepting." To make such a concession
diplomatically palatable, Li continued, the United States in
return would expect Iran's cessation of support for Hamas and
Hizbollah, among other terrorist groups in the region, and
its cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, Li
suggested, the United States would expect Iran to agree to a
stricter IAEA safeguard agreement that would control Iran's
nuclear activities and include terms that would be integrated
into the NPT as a basis for further safeguards governing all
BEIJING 00002438 002 OF 002
NPT signatory countries (reftel). He stated that before

agreeing to a low level of Iranian enrichment activity, the
United States would insist Iran implement a
six-to-twelve-month freeze on nuclear enrichment activities.
¶6. (C) Li stressed that any Iranian nuclear program

negotiations, which he believed would be lengthy, should be
"se cret" and seek to produce a "win/win" scenario for both
countries. Li stated that Iran had doubts about the USG's
ability to enter such a bargain, given U.S. political
pressures, and that to the Iranians, a signal of U.S.
sincerity to move forward might come through an unofficial
visit along the lines of Henry Kissinger's late June trip to
China to discuss North Korea sanctions or former President
Clinton's early August visit to Pyongyang to effect the
release of the two American journalists, which in his view
had allowed the atmosphere for negotiations with the DPRK to
improve. Li suggested that former President Clinton could
perhaps secure the release of the American hikers detained by
Iranian authorities. Li stated that the key element of a
Kissinger visit would be the former Secretary of State's
ability to have discreet, private and informal discussions.
China Urges Iran to Reach Out to the United States

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶7. (C) Despite U.S.-Iranian tensions, the PRC had encouraged

Iran to take advantage of current circumstances to mend ties
with the United States, according to Li, arguing that the
United States would be more open to making concessions now
because it was in a relatively weaker position tending to a
number of trouble spots around the world, including the
Middle East and South Asia, and needed Iran's help in Iraq
and Afghanistan. However, as the United States regained its
position of strength, according to Li, its willingness to
make concessions would disappear. Li reported that MFA West
Asian and North African Affairs Department Director General
Song Aiguo had affirmed to him recently that China "would do
whatever it could" to assist communication between the United
States and Iran. Asked whether Iran viewed China as a fair
broker, Li said, "Iran trusts nobody." While Iran understood
China's interests in Iran, the Iranian leadership believed
that when pushed to make a choice, China would side with the
United States over Iran.
P5 plus 1: A Show for Public Consumption

----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Li stated that the P5-plus-1 process "was for public
consumption" and that expectations of its success should be
minimal. Acknowledging the increasing pressure for
additional sanctions given Iran's current unresponsiveness to
offers of engagement, Li stated that pushing for additional
sanctions would play to the hard-liners' advantage in Iran
and not bring any change in Iranian behavior. In addition,
the prospect of imposing additional sanctions would put China
in a "difficult position" of choosing between its interests
vis-a-vis the United States and Iran, a choice it hoped to
avoid.
HUNTSMAN
Viewing cable 09DOHA502, ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09DOHA502.
09DOHA502 2009-08-10 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Doha
VZCZCXRO8648
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0502/01 2221157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101157Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000502
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019

TAGS: PREL MASS QA XF ZP ZR YM IR JO LE
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR
Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
(C) SUMMARY
-------------
¶1. (C) During their July 20-21 visit to Qatar, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security
Affairs, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and State
Political-Military (PM) Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro
held meetings with Qatar's military Chief of Staff, Major
General (MG) Hamad al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince Tamim bin
Hamad al Thani. MG al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince tried to
assure the Assistant Secretaries that Qatar used the Chief of
Staff's visit to press Iran to respond to U.S. offers of
engagement and to dismiss as "rubbish" Iranian efforts to
blame the election crisis on U.S. and UK special services.
The U.S. affirmed displeasure with Iranian behavior, and said
the U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear
weapons. ASD Vershbow suggested now was the time for Qatar
to distance itself from Iran and its proxies and urge Iran to
end its destabilizing behavior.
¶2. (C) MG al Attiyah and the Crown Prince repeated the
Qatari position that they felt the need to engage all their
neighbors and that Qatar could perhaps influence Iranian
behavior through its engagement. MG al-Attiyah also
expressed disappointment that the Large Aircraft Infrared
Counter Measure (LAIRCM) system is not available to be
installed on Qatar's recently purchased C-17 aircraft. ASD
Vershbow said he would look into the issue further and that a
formal response from the SecDef would be forthcoming. The
Chief of Staff also said no decision had been made on
fulfilling an earlier U.S. request to provide funding for the
refurbishment of Jordanian tanks being provided to Lebanon.
When ASD Vershbow requested that Qatar use its good offices
to help the U.S. in Yemen and induce a change in Hamas's
behavior, the Chief of Staff expressed irritation that
U.S.-Qatar friendship did not extend to issues of importance
to Qatar, such as LAIRCM. END SUMMARY
U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
-----------------------
¶3. (C) U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for

International Affairs Vershbow and Assistant Secretary of
State for Political-Military Affairs Shapiro, joined by
Ambassador, met July 20-21 over dinner and in a separate
office call with Chief of Staff (COS) Major General Hamad
al-Attiyah. The U.S. visitors thanked the COS for Qatar's
continued hospitality and support and for hosting our
presence at both Camp As Sayliyah (CAS) and Al-Udeid Air Base
(AUAB).
C-17 PURCHASE
-------------
¶4. (C) BG General al-Malki (Commander of the Fighter Wing and

Chairman of the Transport Committee) informed ASD Vershbow
that the first C-17 was on schedule for delivery and would
depart California on August 11 with an ETA at AUAB O/A August
¶15. In addition, BG General al-Malki mentioned his
disappointment at the delay of the pilot training program,
which will further delay the aircraft from becoming
operational. In response, ASD Vershbow reassured him that
USG would work to resolve the issue.
¶5. (C) COS al-Attiyah expressed his concern to ASD regarding

the C-17 LAIRCM. The COS stated that he was greatly
disappointed over USG disapproval of Qatar's application for
LAIRCM. Al-Malki pointed out that other nations had acquired
the system and that Qatar's exclusion added to his
frustration. The COS said he did not want to elevate the
matter to Qatar's civilian leadership. He believed that
Qatar's leaders would question the benefits of the
U.S.-Qatari military relationship if the concern were to be
raised.
¶6. (C) ASD Vershbow responded that a letter would be

forthcoming from SECDEF explaining that Qatar would be
receiving the same aircraft as received by the United States
Air Force (USAF). Vershbow further clarified that the LAIRCM
was an additional add-on, for which transfer to Qatar had
been disapproved. Vershbow recommended that Qatar pursue
other options, noting he was unaware that other nations had
access to the LAIRCM system for transport aircraft. ASD
Vershbow said he would look into the matter, adjust the
SECDEF letter as necessary and respond formally to the GOQ.
COS and al-Malki stressed Qatar's desire to use aircraft
jointly with the U.S. and Coalition Forces.
IRAN
----
DOHA 00000502 002 OF 003
¶7. (C) ASD asked the COS to recount his visit to the Islamic
Republic of Iran. COS briefed that his first visit to Iran
was short in duration. The Qatari delegation praised
President Obama's Cairo Speech while in Iran and urged the
Iranians to take steps to avoid isolating themselves
internationally. Further, the Qataris suggested that the
Iranians seek engagement and rapprochement. ASD Vershbow
said this was the right message, and those who have contacts
with Iran should use every opportunity to persuade Iranian
leaders to end their destabilizing behavior.
¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated the need for Iran to take
steps to convince the international community that it was not
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and to end its support
for Hamas, Hizballah, and other extremist groups. He said
we understand why Qatar, because of its close proximity and
its economic and political ties to Iran, felt the need to
engage with Iran. Qatar should help the Iranians to avoid a
conflict with the U.S. and the international community,
remarking that "friends do not let friends drive drunk."
¶9. (C) COS al-Attiyah responded that while Iran expresses a

desire privately to change its behavior, these could be
meaningless platitudes. The COS reiterated that the GOQ
opposes any Iranian pursuit of a military nuclear capability,
noting that it would destabilize the region. COS further
suggested that the USG continue its own dialogue with the
Islamic Republic. COS al-Attiyah closed the discussion by
making clear that, with respect to Iran, "while we're
neighbors, we're not friends." He summed up his recent visit
to Tehran as an overture to maintain open channels of
communication with Iran.
LEBANON
-------
¶10. (C) ASD asked if the GOQ had a response to an earlier

request to the Prime Minister by Secretary Gates to help fund
the transfer of 55 M1A1 tanks from Jordan to Lebanon. COS
said he was aware of the request, but that no decision had
been made. He added that he had discussed the issue during a
recent CHOD conference with Jordanian and Lebanese
representatives.
HAMAS
-----
¶11. (C) ASD Vershbow raised Qatar's ties with Hamas, and told
the COS that Hamas needs to be encouraged to rejoin the
Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process. He added that
there should be "no blank checks, no checks at all," for
Hamas. ASD suggested that Qatar was in a position to
influence Hamas; if Qatar helped bring about a change in
Hamas's behavior, it could enhance the U.S.-Qatar strategic
relationship. COS undertook to relay that message to the
Amir and Crown Prince. While the COS underscored that Qatar
wants a good relationship with the U.S., he noted there were
times when USG decisions sent a different signal, such as the
USG's decision on LAIRCM. COS al-Attiyah rhetorically asked,
"Are we friends or not?"
YEMEN
-----
¶12. (C) ASD Vershbow asked if Qatar, or the GCC as a whole,

would be renewing efforts to help solve the troubles in
Yemen, citing Qatar's previous mediation efforts. COS
al-Attiyah responded that GOQ had engaged Yemen in the past,
but noted that maintaining productive dialogue is difficult,
given Yemen's economic plight and decentralized tribal
society. The COS added that the GOQ was unsure how Yemeni
President Saleh plans to curtail the violence there. He also
noted that there is little military cooperation between the
Qatar Armed Forces (QAF) and Yemen, but that he would make
the GOQ leadership aware of the ASD's interest. The COS said
that the GCC had earlier presented a "unified package," but
its efforts in Yemen had failed. COS al-Attiyah recommended
that this subject be addressed at the Manama Dialogue in
December.
NSS and CIP

-----------
¶13. (C) ASD commended the COS on the upcoming

CENTCOM-GOQ-Naval War College effort to develop a National
Security Strategy. Qatar and others in the region need to
place more emphasis on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
added the ASD. COS al-Attiyah agreed and said he was looking
forward to this effort. (Note: OMC Qatar will escort an
interagency Qatari delegation back to Tampa August 11-13 to
DOHA 00000502 003 OF 003
begin this process.)
CLOSING REMARKS
---------------
¶14. (C) COS ended the discussions by stating that he valued

the U.S.-Qatar relationship. The GOQ was committed to the
friendship forged between the two nations, he said. COS said
he is looking forward to the P4 visit and expressed his
desire to invite the P4 to his beach house as schedules
permit.
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) Qatar clearly registered its disappointment in not

receiving LAIRCM for its C-17. We believe this could fester
into an open wound in the vital U.S.-Qatar security
relationship. The Chief of Staff is particularly sensitive
about the issue, since Qatar's senior leadership (the Amir
and Crown Prince) holds him responsible for maintaining a
close and productive U.S.-Qatar military relationship.
However, given the Qatari leadership's perception of the
Chief of Staff's inability so far to get LAIRCM, senior
leadership may start to question the Chief of Staff's
assurances about the strength of the U.S.-Qatar military
relationship. End Comment.
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary of

Defense Alexander Vershbow.
LeBaron
Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL336, C) IRAN: A XXXXX CONTACT SHARES

VIEWS FROM A RAFSANJANI BUSINESS ALLY ON KHAMENEI'S
CANCER AND RAFSANJANI'S NEXT STEPS
Discussing cables
09ISTANBUL336 2009-08-28 14:02 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXRO3507
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHIT #0336/01 2401409
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P 281409Z AUG 09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000336
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAKU FOR

HAUGEN; ASHGABAT FOR TANGBORN; BAGHDAD FOR POPAL; DUBAI FOR
IRPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2025

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS ECON ETRD IR TU
SUBJECT: (C) IRAN: A XXXXX CONTACT SHARES VIEWS FROM A RAFSANJANI BUSINESS ALLY
ON KHAMENEI'S CANCER AND RAFSANJANI'S NEXT STEPS
Classified By: Consulate General Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton;
Reason 1.5 (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: A XXXXXXXXXXXX businessman who represents the XXXXXXXXXXXX

company XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us a discussion he recently had with a
XXXXXXXXXXXX he described as close to Rafsanjani. The XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed
Rafsanjani told him Supreme Leader Khamenei has terminal leukemia and is
expected to die in months. As a result, Rafsanjani decided to stop challenging
Khamenei, and instead is preparing the ground to have himself appointed
Khamenei's successor. If he succeeds he will dismiss Ahmadinejad and call for
XXXXXXXa new election, according to the XXXXXXXXXXX. The XXXXXXXXXXXX told our
contact there was a growing “invisible general strike” in Iran, whereby hundreds
of thousands of workers were going to work but not really working, to show their
dismay at the election results. XXXXXXXXXXXX End Summary.
¶2. (C) We met XXXXXXXXXXX with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX recently returned

from meetings in Tehran with XXXXXXXXXXXX executives, including a Board of
Directors member named XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶3. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX is a strong Mousavi supporter

who expected to be a potential candidate for Minister of Industry in a Mousavi
government. XXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXX explicitly described the June 12
election results as massive fraud, a view he said was shared by almost all
business executives and company directors throughout Iran. He claimed the fraud
was perpetrated by “six or seven Sepah (IRGC) Generals” who were afraid the IRGC
would be sidelined if Mousavi won. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to XXXXXXXXXXXX that he
personally knew the director of information technology for the Interior
Ministry's election supervision office. XXXXXXXXXXXX described this official as
being involved in tabulating the vote count electronically XXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that this official was promptly arrested by IRGC
security agents, jailed, and eventually executed. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the
real tabulation results showed Mousavi winning 16 million votes in the first
round, with Karroubi coming in second place and Ahmadinejad lagging in third.
(Comment: These figures track with the supposedly genuine vote tally figures
circulated after the election by pro-Mousavi supporters.)
¶4. (C) Khamenei has cancer: XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that Rafsanjani
remains vehemently opposed to Ahmadinejad but is biding his time because of a
serious health crisis affecting Supreme Leader Khamenei: a terminal case of
“blood cancer” (leukemia). XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he heard from
Rafsanjani that Khamenei is likely to die within a matter of months. As a
result, Rafsanjani has stopped campaigning within the Assembly of Experts to
challenge Khamenei, and now is focused on “letting nature take its course.”
Following the Supreme Leader's passing, Rafsanjani will try to mobilize the
Assembly of Experts to appoint him as the new Supreme Leader. If he is
successful – though clearly he would face stiff opposition from Ahmadinejad
allies in that Assembly – he would then invite Ahmadinejad to resign and call a
new election. Because Rafsanjani, Mousavi, and their close supports are
anticipating this scenario, they are currently “laying low.” XXXXXXXXXXXX told
XXXXXXXXXXXX that he did not expect to see opposition leaders calling for any
further demonstrations or provocative activities in coming months that might
undercut Rafsanjani's efforts to position himself as a future Supreme Leader.
¶5. (C) “Invisible” general strike: XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX told him that
a growing portion of the Iranian workforce was ISTANBUL 00000336 002 OF 003
engaged in an “invisible general strike” against the regime to protest the
contested election result. He claimed that hundreds of thousands of Iranian
workers in all sectors (public and private) throughout the country had
superficially resumed their pre-elections routines and habits. They were going
to work every day, but once at work they were doing nothing or working at a bare
minimum pace. The realization that such an “invisible strike” could hurt the
regime almost as much as an overt general strike, but without the same risks,
was spreading. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted to XXXXXXXXXXXX that Iran's manufacturing
and industrial production levels, already strained, are starting to suffer even
more precipitously as this effort becomes more widespread. Seeking Commercial
Advice ————————
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX
Comment
——
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has proved to be a credible interlocutor in the past and
XXXXXXXXXXXX favorably predisposed to the United States. This is the first time
he shared observations from the XXXXXXXXXXXX. We cannot independently assess the
veracity of that information, but we note that rumors have long circulated that
Supreme Leader Khamenei has cancer and is in rapidly declining health. If true,
Khamenei's departure would indeed offer Rafsanjani a propitious opportunity to
exert control over the appointment of a successor, though such an event would
likely precipitate factional infighting extending well beyond the closed-door
confines of the Assembly of Experts. That Rafsanjani would be able to secure his
own appointment as Iran's next Supreme
ISTANBUL 00000336 003 OF 003
Leader in the event of Khamenei's near-term death is far from certain, and
indeed is only one of many potential succession scenarios that could unfold. The
observation about an “invisible general strike” is noteworthy, but we have not
heard similar descriptions from other contacts; we will query several Iran-based
contacts on it.
¶10. (C) As a businessman, XXXXXXXXXXXX's primary motivation in pursuing deals

with Iranian companies is, of course, the profit motive. But XXXXXXXXXXX, he is
a true believer in the idea that significantly expanding western commercial
relations with Iran would raise pressure on Iranian companies (and indirectly
the Iranian government) to reform their economic behavior and modernize the way
they do business, resulting – potentially – in a more moderately-behaved Iran.
From our perspective such a linkage is unlikely in the current political climate
in Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
WIENER
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL2246, COMPLAINTS TO GIROA ON PRE-TRIAL

RELEASES AND
Discussing cables
09KABUL2246 2009-08-06 05:05 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul
nytimes.com
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
S E C R E T KABUL 002246
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, INL, EUR/PRM, INR, OSD FOR

FLOURNOY, CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT KABUL FOR
COS USFOR-A
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF
SUBJECT: COMPLAINTS TO GIROA ON PRE-TRIAL RELEASES AND
PARDONS OF NARCO-TRAFFICKERS
REF: REFTEL KABUL 02245
Classified By: DEPUTY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE FOR REASONS 1.4

(B) AND (D)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On numerous occasions we have emphasized with

Attorney General Aloko the need to end interventions by him
and President Karzai, who both authorize the release of
detainees pre-trial and allow dangerous individuals to go
free or re-enter the battlefield without ever facing an
Afghan court. On July 29th, Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh
and Deputy Ambassador Frances Ricciardone demarched Attorney
General Muhammad Ishaq Aloko about our concern over pre-trial
releases and presidential pardons of narco-traffickers
(Reftel Kabul 02245) In Spring 2008, Post had previous
demarched National Security Advisor Rassoul about our concern
over pre-trial releases. Despite our complaints and
expressions of concern to the GIRoA, pre-trial releases
continue. END SUMMARY
¶2. (S) Transfers from Bagram Theatre Internment Facility

(BTIF) to the Afghan National Detention Facility (ANDF) began
in Spring 2007. During that year, there was only one
pre-trial release. In 2008, there were 104 pre-trial
releases, almost all of which took place after President
Karzai formed the Aloko Detainee Commission in April 2008.
From January to March of 2009, there were 12 pre-trial
releases; and 23 pre-trial releases between April and June
¶2009. So far in July 2009, there have been 10 pre-trial
releases.
¶3. (S) An August 2005 exchange of diplomatic notes between

the USG and the GIRoA provides the legal basis for the
GIRoA,s detention and prosecution of detainees transferred
into Afghan custody. Even though a multi-agency GIRoA
delegation under the Aloko Detainee Commission screens all
BTIF detainees who are transferred to the ANDF and assures
the USG that these detainees will be prosecuted in an Afghan
court, there have been 150 detainees released from the ANDF
without trial since 2007, including 29 former Guantanamo Bay
(GTMO) detainees. The total number of transfers to date from
BTIF to ANDF is 629 detainees, plus 41 from GTMO.
-------------------------------
PROTECTION OF NARCOTRAFFICKERS
-------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) In April, President Karzai pardoned five border
policemen who were caught with 124 kilograms of heroin in
their border police vehicle. The policemen, who have come to
be known as the Zahir Five,, were tried, convicted and
sentenced to terms of 16 to 18 years each at the Central
Narcotics Tribunal. But President Karzai pardoned all five of
them on the grounds that they were distantly related to two
individuals who had been martyred during the civil war.
¶5. (S) Separately, President Karzai tampered with the

narcotics case of Haji Amanullah, whose father is a wealthy
businessman and one of his supporters. Without any
constitutional authority, Karzai ordered the police to
conduct a second investigation which resulted in the
conclusion that the defendant had been framed. Daudzai told
DAMB he was ashamed,, of the president for his
interference in this case and the case of the Zahir Five.
¶6. (S) In another case, a CJTF investigation concluded that

26 kilograms of heroin seized from a vehicle search belonged
to Col. Jaweed, Chief of the Highway Police for Badakshan
Province. Jaweed is the nephew of a powerful member of
Parliament. Eventually, he was arrested and is currently
serving in Pol-i-Charkhi prison. But, there is credible, but
unconfirmed, intelligence indicating that President Karzai
has signed a letter pardoning Jaweed that has not yet been
delivered to the Supreme Court. Daudzai denied any
significant pressure in this case.
¶7. (S) Unconfirmed intelligence also indicates that President

Karzai is planning to release drug trafficker Ismal Safed,
who is serving a 19-year sentence in Pol-i-Charkhi. Safed is
a priority DEA target who was arrested in 2005 in possession
of large quantities of heroin and a cache of weapons. In
2008, DEA conducted an operation in which an undercover
officer purchased approximately three kilograms of heroin
directly from Safed. Daudzai told the Deputy Ambassador that
President Karzai will not pardon Safed, and that Post,s
concerns about this case will reaffirm President Karzai,s
decision not to interfere.
EIKENBERRY
Viewing cable 09KUWAIT760, GEN PETRAEUS AND KUWAITI DCOS ON

IRAN, IRAQ, CT,
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09KUWAIT760.
09KUWAIT760 2009-08-02 06:06 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXRO2565
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DE RUEHKU #0760/01 2140656
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020656Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000760
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/RA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS KU IZ
SUBJECT: GEN PETRAEUS AND KUWAITI DCOS ON IRAN, IRAQ, CT,
YEMEN AND JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES
REF: KUWAIT 724
Classified By: DCM Tom Williams for reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (S) CENTCOM Commander GEN David Petraeus, accompanied by

Ambassador, engaged in a wide-ranging exchange on the evening
of July 22 with Kuwaiti Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff
(DCOS) LTG Ahmed Khalid Al Sabah. Key Points:
-- (C) On Iraq, General Petraeus said the USG appreciates

Kuwait's robust aid for our Iraq efforts; Kuwait's security
remains a top U.S. priority, and we will coordinate closely
on force outflows from Iraq. The U.S. forces relied on
support from Kuwait for our efforts in Afghanistan as well.
Kuwait should remain open to engagement with Iraq as a means
to help resolve disputes between the two countries and help
Iraq achieve greater stability. DCOS Al Sabah responded that
Kuwait seeks to rebuild relations with Iraq and prefers that
negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait on international
disputes be under the UN aegis.
-- (S) On Iran, Kuwait's head of Military Intelligence said

the fate of Iran is in Supreme Leader Khamene'i's hands. He
must either compromise with Ayatollah Rafsanjani or continue
to support President Ahmadinejad. He assessed that the
public had crossed the "fear line," and continued protests
against the government were a possibility. He thought it
would be important to see the Supreme Leader's response to
protests. Continued unrest and government repression may be
the catalyst that provokes Iranian security forces to crack
down, align with the masses, or fracture.
-- (C) On CT, General Petraeus noted USG appreciation for

recent CT actions by Kuwait's Interior Ministry forces, and
said passage of comprehensive anti-terror legislation would
greatly facilitate further efforts.
-- (C) General Petraeus characterized the bilateral security

relationship as strong, and welcomed the upcoming Joint
Military Commission (JMC) in October, as well as Kuwait's
continued participation in joint military exercises.
Iraq
----
¶2. (C) GEN Petraeus thanked the GOK for its support for
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and its facilitation of U.S.
forces deploying and redeploying through Kuwait. He provided
his congratulations on the results of the recent
Parliamentary elections, noting in particular the election of
four U.S.-educated women, and said that it was encouraging to
see Kuwait's recent counter-terrorism progress. Petraeus
also thanked the GOK for its financial, reconstruction, and
moral support for Iraq during OIF. He urged that the GOK
continue to remain open to negotiate disputes between Iraq
and Kuwait, and hoped that such negotiations would be
concluded successfully. He assessed that with assistance
from its Arab neighbors Iraq would "muddle through" towards
stability. Though establishing Iraqi stability absorbs a
great amount of USG focus, he reassured the DCOS that Kuwaiti
security would remain a priority for the U.S., and also
promised that the U.S. would closely coordinate with the GOK
on working through the logistics of support for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq through Kuwait. GEN
Petraeus said Iraqi PM Maliki's visit to Washington would
provide an opportunity for discussion on issues of concern to
Kuwait, such as compensation, borders, and recovering the
remains of Kuwaiti prisoners still missing from the 1990
invasion and Iraqi occupation. General Petraeus briefed the
DCOS on levels of violence in Iraq, noting that the surge of
US forces, fighting side-by-side with Iraqi forces that now
number nearly 650,000, has contributed greatly to growing
stability. U.S. combat forces have completed their
withdrawal from Iraqi cities, although advisors and liaison
elements remain along with joint coordination centers in
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul that provide the Iraqis with access
to U.S. enablers and expertise.
¶3. (C) In response, the DCOS -- who was personally held as a
POW during the Iraqi invasion -- expressed a desire to
rebuild relations with Iraq, but, echoing the policy of the
GOK, said that all Kuwaiti-concerned negotiations with Iraq
should be conducted under the auspices of the UN. GEN
Petraeus informed him, that in a recent conversation with
Vice President Biden, he recommended that former Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General Staffan de Mistura
adjudicate the Iraq/Kuwait dispute.
KUWAIT 00000760 002 OF 002
Iran
----
¶4. (S) BG Abdulrahman al-Hadhood, Chief of Kuwaiti Military

Intelligence, in a frank discussion on Iran, asserted that
the future of Iran, and its relations with its regional
neighbors, is in the hands of Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah
Khamene'i. The direction in which Khamene'i will lead Iran
in this post-presidential election era will largely depend on
whether he forges a compromise with Ayatollah Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani or continues to pull the "puppet strings" of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Al-Hadhoud said the Iranian
public, in staging mass protests in the wake of the
elections, had "crossed the fear line." The next test for
Iran will be to face the future reactions of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and to what extent the
IRGC, the Basij militia, and the regular army are ordered to
maintain security. He questioned whether the IRGC would hold
ranks with Khamene'i or begin to sympathize with the Iranian
masses should further crackdowns be instigated, as happened
with the Iranian Army when it fractured and many joined the
mass student protests in the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Al-Hadhoud predicted that such a tripwire to tip the balance
would be the arrest of Presidential challenger Mir Housein
Mousavi. The DCOS also mentioned Kuwaiti understanding that
Iran was supporting Shi'a in the Gulf and extremists in
Yemen. GEN Petraeus asked for assistance in determining if
Iran was, in particular, supporting the al-Houthi in Yemen.
¶5. (S) GEN Petraeus assured the DCOS that the US military is
"very capable" and is fully prepared for various
contingencies should unrest escalate or Iran become more
unpredictable. He added that the US military is assisting
Gulf states in shoring up ballistic missile and counter air
defenses, as well as early warning systems in the eventuality
of an Iranian missile launch. He encouraged the GOK to
consider establishing a regional "Center for Excellence for
Air and Missile Defense," -- complementing the UAE's Gulf Air
Warfare Center -- which would focus on air and missile
defense and on the interoperability of systems such as the
PAC-III Kuwait now has deployed.
Counterterrorism
----------------
¶6. (S) GEN Petraeus congratulated the DCOS on the success of

GOK security forces in counterterrorism (CT) operations in
recent months, citing Kuwaiti crackdowns on individuals of
"mutual concern." He conveyed to the DCOS that passage of
comprehensive CT legislation would greatly facilitate further
cooperation in this critical area. General Petraeus observed
that Kuwait, based on its experience with extremists, should
recognize that such elements will ultimately turn to
targeting Kuwait.
Mil-Mil: Joint training and JMC
--------------------------------
¶7. (C) GEN Petraeus told the DCOS that the bilateral Defense
Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1991, renewed in 2001) had
proved mutually beneficial and that the USG is inclined to
renew it in 2011. He also said that he was looking forward
to the October JMC to discuss with Kuwaiti COS LTG Fahad
al-Amir Kuwaiti concerns over the FMS program and the
possibility of creating a regional air and missile
defense center of excellence in Kuwait. He also noted the
receipt and approval of a Kuwaiti request for an avionics and
weapon systems upgrade, and encouraged Kuwaiti participation
in joint military exercises like Eager Mace and Bright Star.
He also offered to help in the coordination of an Eagle
Resolve exercise, should the GOK desire to host it. In
addition, he encouraged Kuwait to send its special operations
forces to Jordan's King Abdullah II Special Operations
Training Center and its fighter-attack aircraft to the UAE's
Gulf Air Warfare Training Center.
¶8. (U) GEN Petraeus has cleared this cable.
********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
WILLIAMS
Viewing cable 09PARIS1097, IRAN: FRENCH COMMENTS ON DEALING

WITH HOSTAGES
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #1097/01 2241402

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121402Z AUG 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TAG)
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC FR
SUBJECT: IRAN: FRENCH COMMENTS ON DEALING WITH HOSTAGES
REF: PARIS 1046
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, for

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: President Sarkozy's Strategic Affairs

Advisor Franois Richier and MFA Middle East Director (A/S
equivalent) Patrice Paoli told Political Minister Counselor
in separate meetings August 11 that the French approached
their hostage situations in Iran by first seeking an
immediate, behind-the-scenes resolution before the Iranians
brought charges against their captives, and then, once that
approach failed, by adopting a two-pronged strategy: (1)
relentlessly publicizing the cases with repeated employment
of key words chosen carefully to put the Iranians on the
defensive, and (2) constant exertion of diplomatic and
political pressure, with the help of allies, in the form of
regular demarches in Tehran and convocations of Iranian
Ambassadors in European and Middle Eastern capitals. Paoli
and Richier predicted that the Iranians will advise us, via
the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet while waiting for Iranian
legal procedures to move forward. Ignore this warning, they
insisted, because silence will not expedite the process.
They argued that USG statements and actions can sway and even
mobilize public opinion within Iran. Whether or not we
choose to speak out, they warned, the Iranians will
energetically disseminate fabricated accusations. As the USG
seeks to engage the Iranians, Richier predicted it will be
difficult to determine which Iranian institution currently
has control of American hostages and, more importantly, which
one has the authority to decide their fate. The French still
have not identified a key broker within the Iranian
government with the power to resolve their own hostage cases.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Paoli and Richier also warned of

possible Iranian efforts to blackmail the USG. They may try,
for instance, to drag out the cases of the American and
French hostages through the US/EU late September deadline for
a response from the regime on the nuclear issue. Richier
said the French believe this familiar Iranian tactic --
hostage-taking as political blackmail -- will only increase
in the near future. The Iranians may also seek specific
exchanges, such as the release from French custody of Majid
Kakavand, an Iranian national whom the French arrested March
20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on the behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice on proliferation issues. Overall, as
the USG prepares to handle its hostage cases, the French
recommended we prepare for uncertainty. In the face of
unpredictable Iranian behavior, Paoli and Richier said that
constant pressure from foreign leaders and the media appears
to be the only means to accelerate decision-making in Tehran.
They also reported that the EU has no plans at the moment to
recall its Ambassadors from Iran. END SUMMARY.
STEP 1: SEEK BEHIND-THE-SCENES RESOLUTION

-----------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Franois Richier and Patrice Paoli told the Political
Minister Counselor that each time they learned of the arrest
of their citizens in Iran, the GOF sought their immediate
release through discrete but direct contact with Iranian
officials. (NOTE: Richier was accompanied by Mr. Lioutaud
from the Office of French National Intelligence Coordinator,
Bernard Bajolet (equivalent to our Director of National
Intelligence). END NOTE.) They hoped to act quickly enough
to prevent the regime from pressing formal charges. Once the
Iranians refused to release the prisoners, Paoli said, the
prosecutors publicized the charges and began preparations for
a public trial. A trial seems to be a pre-condition for the
release of foreign detainees in Iran, whom the French
described as "hostages" held in order to achieve political
goals.
STEP 2: USE THE MEDIA TO PUT IRANIANS ON DEFENSIVE

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (S) Once the quiet approach failed, the French launched a
relentless public relations strategy. They did not merely
wait for questions from the press; instead, they made
frequent pronouncements of their own about the hostages.
They publicized the cases with repeated use of key words
chosen carefully to put the regime on the defensive by
influencing Iranian public opinion. Paoli and Richier
emphasized the susceptibility of the Iranian population to
messages sent through the media. USG public statements can
sway and even mobilize public opinion within Iran, they
claimed, especially in the post-election environment.
¶5. (S) In their statements, the French repeatedly employed
key words to focus attention on the rights of detainees, and
on Iranian legal commitments to respect those rights, such as
"basic human rights," "good treatment," "Vienna Convention."
They also used words to refute the regime's false
accusations, like "innocent," "baseless," and "immediate
release." Paoli said the French have deliberately avoided
using the word "negotiation" when describing their contact
with Iranian leaders: "We demand only their immediate
liberation; we do not negotiate for the release of innocent
civilians." (NOTE: Paoli said he strongly regretted the
mistaken use of the word "negotiate" recently by a GOF
spokesman. END NOTE.)
¶6. (S) Moreover, the French predicted that the Iranians will
advise us, via the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet. They
will imply that the cases will be resolved more quickly if we
just wait for the Iranian legal procedures to move forward.
Ignore this warning, Richier and Paoli insisted. "Be vocal,"
Richier advised, "even more so if the Iranians ask you not to
be," because silence will not expedite the process. "They
are the masters of stalling tactics," Paoli said. Whether or
not we choose to remain silent about the cases, the Iranians
will launch a media blitz. They will energetically
disseminate fabricated accusations about their captives,
Richier predicted. Paoli and Richier both acknowledged that
an aggressive USG public posture involves risks as well, as
it will "increase the value" of the hostages to Iranian
leaders. Nonetheless, they said they still believe that
public pressure, on balance, will prove more effective than
behind-the-scenes engagement. Ideally, both public
statements and private discussions can take place
simultaneously.
STEP 3: CALL ON ALLIES (AND OTHERS) TO PRESSURE IRAN

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶7. (S) Paoli and Richier advocated the constant exertion of

diplomatic and political pressure on the Iranian regime.
Recognizing the central role of the wiss protecting power,
they suggested the USG enlist the help of other allies as
well, in the form of regular demarches in Tehran and
convocations of Iranian leaders in capitals around the world.
Paoli explicitly stated that France would be willing to
weigh in, if asked. Richier explained that the French
approached Syria almost immediately after they learned French
citizien Clotilde Reiss had been arrested on July 1. He then
previewed the presidential communiqu about the release of
the French Embassy employee, Nazak Afshar, in which the
French explicitly thanked the Syrians for their help. "Of
course we don't know if the Syrians did anything," Richier
admitted, "but we wanted to thank them anyway. It should at
least confuse the Iranians." He said the French did not/not
reach out to Russia and China for assistance, but he and
Paoli both argued that the support of EU and other countries
had a major impact on Iranian leaders. The French have
coordinated closely with the British, Richier said, though
primarily on the ground in Tehran. He suggested the USG
consider approaching other countries, including relatively
disinterested allies such as Brazil, and ask them to lean on
the Iranians. He also mentioned the potential impact of
blogs written by Iranian ex-patriates in the U.S.
GOOD LUCK FIGURING OUT WHO IS IN CHARGE IN TEHRAN

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (S) Richier predicted it will be difficult to determine

which Iranian institution currently has control of the U.S.
hostages and, more importantly, which one has the authority
to decide their fate. The French still have not identified a
key broker within the Iranian government with the power to
resolve their own hostage cases. They learned that the
deliberative procedures of Iranian institutions remain
unusually opaque.
BE PREPARED FOR POLITICAL BLACKMAIL

-----------------------------------
¶9. (S) Richier said the Iranians have in the past tried to
"blackmail" them, trading release of a French national for an
Iranian national. He warned of possible Iranian efforts to
blackmail the USG. The Iranians may try, for instance, to
drag out the cases of the American and French hostages
through the US/EU late September deadline for a response from
the regime on the nuclear issue. Richier said the French
believe this familiar Iranian tactic -- hostage-taking as
political blackmail -- will only increase in the near future.
¶10. (S) The Iranians may also seek specific exchanges, such
as the release from French custody of Majid Kakavand.
Without going into details, Richier said Kakavand had been
apprehended by the French and was under a U.S. extradition
request. He noted that GOF officials had briefed President
Sarkozy on this case and that the French are prepared to
continue holding him. (Background from Embassy Justice
Attache: Kakavand is an Iranian national whom the French
arrested March 20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on behalf of
the Department of Justice for extradition to the U.S. on
export control (proliferation) charges.) Then again, Richier
noted, it is possible that the Iranian agency or agencies
holding American citizens may not be aware of Kakavand, or
may have no interest in his release; it is simply impossible
to predict how their bureaucracies will behave.
¶11. (S) Paoli said the French knew the Iranians intended to
use the arrest of Clotilde Reiss and Nazak Afshar as a means
to punish the French for their criticism of Iran's recent
election results. More importantly, the Iranians hoped to
muzzle future French criticism: "They want to paralyze us,"
Paoli said, explaining that the Iranians had failed in this
attempt. Of course, he added, the regime also wanted to use
French and British hostages to validate their allegation that
foreign agents organized the mass post-election protests.
Paoli and Richier both reported that the Iranians continue to
harass and intimidate the local employees of their Embassy in
Tehran. They described the burden on resources required to
respond to each arrest: "The time we have had to devote to
this is absolutely ridiculous," Richier said.
ADAPT YOUR APPROACH FOR EACH HOSTAGE

------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Before offering accounts of the French experience

with hostages in Iran, Richier and Paoli were both at pains
to avoid offering any absolute advice. They noted
significant differences in the cases of Stephane Lherbier,
Reiss, Afshar, the Americans captured near the border with
Kurdistan, and other U.S.-Iranian dual nationals currently in
custody. Paoli said the French made a concerted, and
successful, effort to keep the case of Stephane Lherbier
"apolitical." (NOTE: Lherbier, a French fisherman arrested
by the Iranians in 2006, spent almost a year in prison prior
to his release in 2007. END NOTE.) Since the Iranians have
already accused the French and British hostages of espionage,
Paoli and Richier suggested the USG make strenuous efforts to
distance those cases from the situation of the U.S. hikers
currently in captivity. Moreover, in 2007, Iranian leaders
did not perceive the French as negatively as they do now,
which they said has further complicated the recent hostage
cases. Richier and Paoli both warned that the USG must make
every effort to dissuade the Iranians from politicizing the
case of the American hikers; thus far, they noted, Iranian
officials have not formally linked them to the case against
opposition members and the British and French hostages.
Richier reported that the French found the Iranian "system"
to be "perverse and complex but stable" in 2006, when seeking
the release of Lherbier. "Now it is still perverse and
complex," Richier said, "but unstable, and this makes
everything more difficult."
BRACE FOR UNCERTAINTY

---------------------
¶13. (S) Paoli stressed in particular the uncertain and

unpredictable nature of French dealings with Iran in hostage
situations. There are no procedural certainties, and the
timing of various steps appears arbitrary. Progress toward a
trial could take months, depending on variables such as the
political environment and the whims of key actors inside
Iranian institutions. "Anything is possible and we know next
to nothing," Paoli said, citing the recent arrest and quick
release of a French citizen who told Iranian provincial
police he was a researcher following the paths of the
dinosaurs. In the face of this uncertainty, Paoli and
Richier said that constant pressure from foreign leaders and
the media appears to be the only means to accelerate
decision-making in Iran.
¶14. (S) Paoli and Richier described their continuing

uncertainty about the case of Clotilde Reiss. They both
stopped short of confirming that she would soon be
transferred from Evin prison to the French Embassy in Tehran,
although they expressed strong optimism. Richier added that
this step will require the GOF to pay the Iranians a large
sum, to ensure that Reiss stays in the country pending
further legal action against her (reftel). Richier would not
say whether the French will permit the Iranians to take Reiss
back to court, or to prison: "We're focused on our short-term
objective right now -- getting her out of jail." He said
that the French worry the Iranians could decide to arrest in
the near future another one of the approximately 1,800 French
citizens living in Iran.
EU HAS NO PLANS TO RECALL AMBASSADORS

-------------------------------------
¶15. (S) Paoli noted that the EU relations with Iran are
extremely tense at the moment. He said the Iranians
currently refuse to receive the Swedish Ambassador, even in
his capacity as representative of the EU Presidency.
Nonetheless, barring extreme actions by the Iranians, such as
expulsion of one of the EU Ambassadors, Paoli predicted that
the EU will not/not decide to withdraw its Ambassadors from
Tehran. (NOTE: Deputy MFA Middle East Director (PDAS
equivalent) Jean-Franois Paucelle provided background on
this issue in an earlier meeting. He served as French Charge
d'Affairs in Tehran in 1997, after the EU withdrew its
Ambassadors to protest the assassination in Berlin, by
Iranian government agents, of four members of the Iranian
opposition-in-exile. European Embassies, after their
Ambassadors had departed, soon learned that Iranian officials
refused to receive European Charges d'Affaires, and so all
communication between EU members and Iran slowed down or
halted altogether. The Europeans also realized that the
politics of returning Ambassadors to Iran can become complex.
Following the withdrawal of their Ambassadors at present,
Paucelle said, the Europeans would need to determine ahead of
time when and under what conditions they would return.
Possible criteria range widely, from returning the
Ambassadors after the regime changes, as a long-term
deadline, to after the release of Clotilde Reiss, as the
shortest possible window. In addition, after the EU decided
to return its Ambassadors in 1997, the Iranians refused to
allow some of them to return, in an attempt to sow division
among EU members. This chastening experience, Paucelle said,
continues to inform EU discussions about whether or not to
recall their Ambassadors from Iran. END NOTE.)
¶16. (SBU) Post will continue to liaise with the GOF on

hostage issues and update Washington offices as events unfold.
PEKALA
Viewing cable 09RIYADH1121, SAUDIS CONDEMN ASSASSINATION

ATTEMPT, RALLY BEHIND
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO4632
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #1121/01 2430443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 310443Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001121
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDIS CONDEMN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, RALLY BEHIND
PRINCE
REF: A. RIYADH 1110

¶B. RIYADH 939
¶C. RIYADH 921
¶D. RIYADH 928
Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT

--------------------
¶1. (C) In the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt

targeting Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin
Naif (MbN) (ref A), King Abdullah and other officials
responded swiftly and decisively to reassure the public that
the Prince was well, and reaffirm the Kingdom's commitment to
combating terrorism. The press and the public universally
condemned the attack, characterizing it as a direct assault
against the Saudi state and Islam. A more measured reaction
in the blogosphere hints at how this most recent incident
might affect domestic debate on the proper approach to
dealing with domestic terrorism, with some calling for
continued leniency and emphasis on reform and others arguing
the Saudi government is being too lax. The attack seems to
have strengthened the already positive public reputation of
Prince Mohammed bin Naif, and many religious-minded Saudis
will see his miraculous survival, almost unscathed, as a sign
of Divine protection and blessing for his efforts against
Al-Qaeda and other extremists. For his part, Prince Mohammed
has told us the attack has only strengthened his resolve, and
convinced him that the Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy,
combining firmness with understanding, is effective and
should continue. End Summary and Comment.
OFFICIAL REACTION SWIFT AND DECISIVE

------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Official condemnation came from all quarters
immediately following the attack. The Saudi Press Agency
published photographs of King Abdullah and MbN, wearing a
bandage on his left middle finger, meeting at the hospital in
Jeddah. News channel Al-Arabiya played a tape of the visit
throughout the day in which the visibly concerned King
praised Allah for the Prince's safety and described the
attack as an attack against both Islam and the country:
"Thanks be to God that you are safe and nothing has happened
to you. Everything you might have suffered in the service of
your religion and homeland will not be for nothing, God
willing." MbN responded that this attack "would only
strengthen our resolve to root out the terrorists," and
admitted that he was at fault for failing to require a full
search of the bomber. Official reports note that the
would-be assassin was on a list of 85 wanted terrorists, that
MbN was aware of his planned attendance, and that he had been
expected to turn himself in at the event.
¶3. (U) Other prominent religious and political figures were

widely quoted in the press the day after the incident. The
Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia told Okaz newspaper the attack
was "not unexpected," and called the assailant "deviant" and
"corrupt to the core." Justice Minister Mohammed Al-Issa
"thanked Allah" for keeping the Prince safe. Interior
Ministry Spokesman Major General Mansour Al-Turki reaffirmed
the Ministry's commitment to fighting terrorism,
characterizing the attack as "an isolated incident" and
adding "those who think the war on terror is over in the
Kingdom are mistaken."
PRINCE FETED IN PAPERS, PUBLIC SHOCKED BY ATTACK

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶4. (U) All major Arabic and English dailies led with the
story, focusing prominently on MbN himself and his role in
the Kingdom's war on terror. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat dedicated the
first three pages of the August 29 edition solely to the
attack on the Prince and related subjects. Other papers
included lengthy biographical profiles of the Prince,
editorial cartoons dealing with the event, and even poems in
his honor.
¶5. (U) The articles and editorials show broad support for
MbN and, more generally, the fight against terrorism. Many
depicted the event as an assault on the Saudi state that
called for a patriotic response. Saudi journalist Dawood
Al-Shiryan wrote in Al-Hayat that the attack was "terrorism
as a political rebellion attempting to undermine the
authority of the state." Okaz called the attack "an attack
on the security of the nation...that should make everyone
alert and ready to fight." The August 29 editorial cartoon
in Al-Watan depicted a prone terrorist, wearing an explosive
belt and holding a detonator in each hand, dead and bleeding
RIYADH 00001121 002 OF 003
from a wound caused by the Saudi flag planted in his back.

In the same paper, a caricature accompanying a poem
celebrating the Prince as "Engineer of Love and War" shows
him carrying a shield resembling the Saudi flag.
¶6. (U) The public's reaction as portrayed in an Arab News
article was of "shock, disgust, and dismay," noting that the
timing of the attack during the holy month of Ramadan was a
particular source of ire. One student in Jeddah said "Yes,
there is frustration among a section of people regarding our
foreign policy, but what happened...is deplorable and utterly
un-Islamic." A Riyadh-based professional questioned whether
the Kingdom should continue with its rehabilitation programs,
saying these efforts had been "nullified" by the attack and
that the perpetrator had "betrayed our leaders." Others
called the attack "evidence that the government's anti-terror
tactics have been largely successful," and observed "panic in
the terror camp" and "frustration with the government's
continued success of hitting (terrorists) hard."
DIVERSE REACTION IN THE BLOGOSPHERE

-----------------------------------
¶7. (U) On his Saudi Jeans blog, Ahmed Al-Omran expressed

relief that the Prince was not seriously injured and hope
that the incident would not "add fuel to the fire" of the
debate between liberals and conservatives. He added, "this
is a time for solidarity and national unity, let us not ruin
it." A contributor to blog Al-Saha encouraged MbN to
continue to demonstrate openness and patience with
terrorists, not revert to iron-fisted policies. An informal
poll on the same website indicated strong support for the
Prince, with 58% of voters suggesting MbN should replace his
father as Interior Minister. Liberal blog Al-Tomaar said the
attack was the result of "spoiling terrorists and treating
them leniently," referring to the SAG's widely-touted
terrorist rehabilitation scheme (ref B).
CONTACTS RESERVE COMMENT

------------------------
¶8. (C) Post contacts were reluctant to comment substantively

on the attack over the phone, telling us that it was common
for royals to welcome well-wishers during Ramadan, that they
were relieved MbN was not injured, and that they wondered why
the man was not checked. When the subject was broached at a
meeting between PAS officers and Deputy Minister of Higher
Education Mohammed Alohali on August 29, however, he went
somewhat beyond the fulsome praise of MbN as "Qahir al
Erhaby" (conqueror of terrorism) that is the stuff of most
media commentary. "We know what we,re up against," said
Alohali, adding that dangerous extremists were still a threat
to the country. This, he said, was the reason the SAG was
pushing educational reform so hard.
TERROR, YEMEN ALREADY HOT TOPICS

--------------------------------
¶9. (U) Saudi soul-searching about the root causes and extent
of domestic terrorism has been evident since 2003, and the
August 20 announcement that 44 suspected Al-Qaeda militants
had been arrested in the Kingdom injected it with new vigor.
On August 22, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat columnist Husayn Al-Shubakshi
praised the Saudi security forces for their "pre-emptive,
focused, professional, and secret blows," and credited MbN
directly for the Ministry's success.
¶10. (U) In an August 27 piece in the same paper, columnist

Mshari Al-Zaydi also considered the arrests a success, while
citing the need to confront terrorism as an ideological
issue. That this new batch of terrorists was predominantly
Saudi, middle-aged, and well-educated challenged previous
assumptions that economic deprivation and youthful religious
zealotry were responsible for domestic terrorism, and
indicated that the government needed to rethink its approach.
"Saudi Arabia is now confronting a new virus that is
constantly evolving," he writes, adding "the ideological
doctor who is holding on to the surgeon's scalpel...is yet to
enter the operating theater."
¶11. (C) Although unvoiced in the gushing media paeans to

MbN, ordinary Saudis are wondering how this assassination
attempt came so close to fruition. According to today,s
edition of "Okaz," the suspect managed to make his way from
Yemen into Saudi Arabia some weeks ago, and finally rented a
furnished apartment in Jeddah. We anticipate that such
reports will inevitably spur some introspection into how well
the security services are patrolling the Asir region.
RIYADH 00001121 003 OF 003
ERDMAN
Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI316, IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN

THE ARAB WORLD?
Discussing cables
09RPODUBAI316 2009-08-03 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Iran RPO Dubai
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019

TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?
DUBAI 00000316 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran

Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
¶1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence
Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections,

Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the
demonstrations in Iran and the international community's
response to the government crackdown. Whereas in recent years
the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external
relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the
international implications of its nuclear program -- during the
post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time,
poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal
political system and explored its underpinnings more closely,
often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air
commentary. A number of these commentators have opined that
Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among
some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's
administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much
as they criticize many Arab governments. However, all of the
Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of
Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for
U.S. policy in the region. On the contrary, closer analysis
suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world
has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the
current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum
of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad.
ALL EYES ON IRAN
----------------
¶3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab

media's news coverage for the past seven weeks. The
demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and
have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera.
The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company
(MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that
Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12
election. Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a
dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region
between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a
native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni
Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold. Coverage of
Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news
reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab
blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the
demonstrations, the international community's response, and the
implications of these events for the Arab world. While Iran's
elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western
media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke
recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the
recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran.
THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE?
------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media

consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street
initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a
"benevolent dictator." Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the
media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and
unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world. The media
consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world,
albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset. Our
contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and
when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs
saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble
and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people
and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West
head on. However, both the intensely competitive campaign
period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the
official election results have led some moderate Arabs to
rethink Ahmadinejad's true disposition. The election, the media
consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his
astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world,
DUBAI 00000316 002.2 OF 003
Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic

mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption. Because of this
public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us,
Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the
Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the
level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya
executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the
election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the
Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was
now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed
Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to
Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei. While
conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final
say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear
program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street
views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic
Republic's decision-making system.]
POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of

the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab
governments have a limited ability to capitalize on
Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own
closets. Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that
Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt
would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities,
have remained noticeably silent. In his view, they realize that
any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful
dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of
their own citizens. He considers this public silence yet
another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to
counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his
popularity with the Arab street.
NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S.
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶6. (S/NF) All of the Arab commentators and news media figures
we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout
the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public
comments that could be perceived as interventionist. However,
the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between
criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S.
policies. The Syrian media consultant said that the heated
debates before the election, in which the three challengers --
Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad
for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to
Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S. This
distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on
the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab
commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side
with the U.S.
¶7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate

appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on
live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV
regarding regional issues, including events in Iran. Whereas
fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in
support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace
process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's
government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its
internal crackdown and regional ambitions. One Saudi
commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he
described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian
regional intervention, which he called pernicious and
destabilizing. A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran
accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when
there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not
intervene behind the scenes.
AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT
DUBAI 00000316 003.2 OF 003
----------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while

Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a
result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the
damage is not necessarily permanent. In his view, the Arab
street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to
support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and
public bravado. The bureau chief believed that, in the
perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional
issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing
on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most
prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora.
The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to
overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs.
In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a
segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most
Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that
the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election
crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their
positions one way or the other.
ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Once the dust settles on Iran's

post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals
with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation
agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of
his election. If the U.S. enters negotiations with
Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that
the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a
deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many
in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of
Arab regimes. Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad,
on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal
victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees
through steadfast resistance. Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from
grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle
to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement
with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially
lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and
anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with
Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president.
RICHARDSON
Viewing cable 09SEOUL1241, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S

VISIT TO KOREA
Discussing cables
nytimes.com
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHUL #1241/01 2180645

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Tokola.

Reasons 1.4 (b),
(d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Berman, welcome to Korea. The

alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is
strong, enduring, and strategically important. Your visit
follows the successful June 16 U.S.-ROK Presidential Summit
and adoption of the Joint Vision Statement. The Joint Vision
Statement was well-received here, both for its recommitment
to a continued strengthening of our security relationship
(including its affirmation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and
extended deterrence to the ROK), and for outlining what a
21st century U.S.-ROK relationship entails. To realize this
vision, we will need to continue to expand our cooperation,
both regionally and globally. Security in the region,
particularly in view of North Korea,s continued belligerent
posture and Kim Jong-Il,s declining health, is important to
Korean officials. Like us, the ROK supports the Six Party
Talks and remains adamant that we should not recognize North
Korea as a nuclear state. Your South Korean interlocutors
are very interested in how you view the proposed North Korean
contingency plan, and prospects for denuclearizing North
Korea.
¶2. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents
for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S.
(KORUS) FTA in Washington. Ratification of the FTA is seen
as a sign of America's strategic commitment in northeast
Asia. President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting
with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the
KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled
Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in
Korea,s National Assembly in late April. A full plenary
vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while
opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about
a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is
strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected
to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington.
The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of
the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to
understand the exact nature of their concerns, and to develop
recommendations for addressing them. To assist with this
review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in
this free trade agreement are able to fully express their
views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009,
requesting comments on the KORUS FTA. End Summary.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶3. (C) The ROK, with its vibrant democracy, free market,
high-tech economy, highly educated population, free press,
and ever-deepening people-to-people ties with the United
States, is a striking success story, including for U.S.
foreign policy. Our intensive engagement with the ROK since
its founding in 1948 exemplifies the importance of all three
pillars Secretary Clinton has outlined describing U.S.
foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. South
Korea's success is based on a shared commitment to defense,
as shown by the 28,500 U.S. troops still on the Peninsula,
the substantial development assistance the U.S. provided
after the Korean War, and our close diplomatic cooperation to
achieve a denuclearized North Korea and a more secure and
prosperous future for the region.
¶4. (C) Now a developed country with a tested democratic

system, South Korea increasingly has the capability as well
as the political will to assume larger regional and global
roles. Your visit will encourage your interlocutors to
become even more active partners with us on issues ranging
from human rights promotion to climate change to sea piracy
to counter-terrorism. We share values and strategic goals
with this highly capable ally; we need to give substance to
our shared aspiration to upgrade our bilateral relationship,
making it a global partnership.
----------------------
The Domestic Situation
----------------------
¶5. (C) President Lee, of the center-right Grand National

Party (GNP), began his single five-year term in February
2008, ending ten years of center-left control of the
Presidency. In April 2008 the GNP won a solid majority over
the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) in the unicameral
National Assembly. The GNP's success at the polls, however,
belied the lack of consensus among the South Korean public on
domestic political issues like media law reform, labor relations,
tax policy, and education. President Lee has
struggled with low approval ratings -- about 30 percent --
since taking office, especially following his decision to
re-open the Korean market to U.S. beef last year. In the
National Assembly, the GNP and DP have even lower approval
ratings than President Lee, resulting in a virtually
deadlocked domestic agenda.
¶6. (C) President Lee has remained publicly disengaged from

the squabbling in the National Assembly and is focusing
instead on foreign policy, resource diplomacy, and
international cooperative efforts on green growth, climate
change, and overcoming the economic crisis. He campaigned on
a pledge to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, and is widely
seen as having been successful. With China and Russia, he
has substantially expanded the ROK's economic and political
ties. He has attempted to overcome historical animosities
with Japan to advance Korea-Japan ties based on Korea's
pragmatic interests, but sensitivities to Japan's
colonization of Korea run deep. Looking wider, President Lee
is actively cultivating new ties with Southeast Asia, Central
Asia, and Europe.
¶7. (C) Former President Kim Dae-jung's health has been

failing and he is currently hospitalized in Seoul in
intensive care. The prognosis for President Kim, who was in
office 1998-2003 and who is 84, is not good.
------------
The Alliance
------------
¶8. (C) For over half a century the U.S.-ROK alliance has
provided the foundation for peace and prosperity in Northeast
Asia. The ROK has benefitted greatly; neither the economic
"Miracle on the Han" nor Korea,s democratic flowering would
have been possible absent a U.S. defense shield and economic
assistance and support. The U.S. too has benefited. USFK
(U.S. Forces in Korea) is our only troop presence in mainland
East Asia, and South Korea contributes billions of dollars to
USFK operating expenses.
¶9. (C) The Summit Joint Vision Statement offers a compelling

vision of expanding the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance
regionally and globally. On the Korean Peninsula, we are
also working to strengthen, further broaden, and
appropriately evolve the security relationship by
implementing three key bilateral transformation agreements
known as YRP, LPP and STP.
-- YRP: The Yongsan Relocation Plan will relocate the

headquarters of U.S. Forces (USFK) from the middle of Seoul
to a new, purpose-built war-fighting headquarters south of
the city, thereby giving back to the Koreans a large tract of
land historically associated with Japanese occupation which
they plan to turn into a central park. Progress on the
implementation of YRP continues but construction to prepare
U.S. Army Garrison ) Humphreys, the hub for the relocation,
continues on schedule but faces obstacles that require
President Lee,s and his administration,s support if we are
to meet the agreed 2014 completion date.
-- LPP: The Land Partnership Plan will consolidate over 100

U.S. military bases spread all across Korea into two key
strategic hubs south of the Han River, replacing an outdated
military footprint from the end of the Korean War with a
modern and better-positioned force posture. The ROK Ministry
of National Defense (MND) seeks to complete the LPP by the
end of 2015.
-- STP: The Strategic Transition Plan is the process under
which we are transferring wartime operational control (OPCON)
of South Korean forces from the U.S. military to the ROK
military by April 17, 2012. President Lee has emphasized the
need to keep the spotlight off of wartime OPCON transition
due to increased scrutiny by ROK domestic opposition groups
regarding the April 17, 2012 transition date (in the wake of
North Korea,s recent claimed nuclear test). We are
continuing to emphasize the process for close cooperation in
reviewing OPCON transition progress through the SCM and
management of messaging and public perceptions to highlight
the value of the restructuring.
¶10. (C) We must continue to emphasize the importance of

completing the two relocation elements of USFK
transformation, YRP and LPP. Those agreements, signed in
2004, did not come with appropriated funds. The Master Plan,
finished in 2007, lays out the cost and timeline but the ROKG
has yet to request funding from the National Assembly. Other
U.S. and ROK private sector initiatives are failing to fill
the funding gap. As a result, alliance transformation, which
was originally scheduled for completion in 2008, is facing a
delay of many more years. To avoid further delays, the ROKG
must make implementation of these moves a priority. For our
part, we must be clear and consistent in identifying our own
top priorities .
¶11. (C). The time is right to expand the areas in which the
U.S. and the ROK cooperate on global security issues. You
may want to raise the following areas where the ROK may be
ready to increase its global security role:
-- Afghanistan: The ROKG is planning to provide more

assistance and training in Afghanistan, including building a
new hospital and a training center in Bagram, and
contributing ambulances, motorcycles, and police trainers.
However, we need a lot more from the ROK, especially
financial support for the Afghan Army, for which we have
requested USD 100 million a year for five years, which is the
USG primary request of the ROK. The ROKG also is considering
sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to
Afghanistan, which we would welcome, but we also have
insisted that any such PRT include a military unit to provide
for its own security. Such a deployment (the PRT as well as
any other military assets, such as an ISR unit )
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) will need
National Assembly approval, which will pose difficult, but
not insurmountable, political problems for President Lee.
-- UN Peacekeeping Operations: The National Assembly is

deliberating on a bill that will allow the ROK military to be
deployed for peacekeeping missions without prior legislative
approval. In the meantime, the National Assembly in July
approved extending the ROK,s PKO deployment in Lebanon until
the end of December 2010. The ROK has contributed 367
soldiers for peacekeeping in Lebanon since 2007 and is
participating in eight other PKO operations around the world.
As of January 1, 2008 the ROK was the 10th largest provider
of assessed contributions to the UN PKO budget.
-- Combating Piracy off Somalia: The ROK is a member of the

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Additionally, the ROKG deployed a 4,500 ton class destroyer
equipped with a Lynx helicopter and rigid inflatable craft to
the Gulf of Aden to be part of the maritime security
operations of the combined maritime forces. The destroyer
carries up to 310 personnel.
-- Proliferation Security Initiative: In response to the

DPRK,s May rocket launch and nuclear test, the ROK on May 26
joined the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). In June the ROK participated in a PSI meeting in
Poland, and held a workshop in Seoul in July. The ROKG plans
to attend the next workshop in Sydney in September, and has
expressed interest in attending the interdiction exercises in
Singapore in October. PSI is an international, interagency
effort aimed at preventing or interdicting the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction using existing domestic laws
and established international agreements. The ROKG currently
is formulating an interagency strategy for its effective PSI
participation.
---------------------------
U.S.-ROK Global Partnership
---------------------------
¶12. (C) The ROK also wants to play a bigger role on other
global issues and the following are good areas for increased
cooperation:
-- Democracy and Human Rights: The ROK has demonstrated a new

readiness to address human rights concerns in the DPRK,
co-sponsoring the annual UNGA North Korea human rights
resolution in 2008 for the first time. In October 2008 the
ROK agreed to chair the first Senior Officials' Meeting of
the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership, a U.S.-supported
regional subset of the Community of Democracies.
-- Climate Change: Korea, the 13th largest per capita

emitter of greenhouse gases and the world,s 15th largest
economy in terms of GDP, is playing a constructive role in
discussions on global climate change. The ROKG shares the
U.S. view that that investment in new and renewable energy
sources not only can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but
also can create jobs, spur economic growth, and enhance
energy security. The U.S. Department of Energy is engaged in
a variety of collaborative R&D activities with Korea,
including in nuclear energy, fusion, gas hydrates,
"smart grids," and other new and renewable energy technologies, but
there is room to expand and strengthen our cooperation.
-- Development Assistance: Korea's overseas development

assistance program currently includes nearly USD 500 million
in Official Development Assistance (ODA), as well as a
roughly similar figure for North Korea (suspended). The ROKG
target is to triple ODA (as a percentage of GDP) by 2015.
With limited functional and regional capacity, Korea should
be receptive to policy discussions on ODA coordination.
-- Counter-Proliferation: The ROKG has told Iranian

counterparts at every opportunity that Tehran's uranium
enrichment activities are unacceptable and has supported the
P5-plus-1 incentives package.
-----------------------
FTA and Economic Issues
-----------------------
¶13. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents
for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S.
(KORUS) FTA in Washington. President Obama's statement at
the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find
a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety
in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the
committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in
late April. A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has
not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA
continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean
public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority
GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of
movement in Washington. The Obama Administration is
conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting
closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature
of their concerns, to develop recommendations for addressing
them. To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who
may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to
fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register
Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA.
¶14. (C) Korea is our seventh largest trading partner, with

total merchandise trade in 2008 of over USD 82 billion (and
more than USD 100 billion if services are included). The
U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in September
2007 that U.S. merchandise exports to Korea would expand by
USD 10-12 billion on an annual basis as a result of the FTA
and that services exports would also expand. The United
States has traditionally been the ROK's biggest trading
partner in the post-WWII era. One tangible sign of China's
growing importance in Asia and in Korea, however, is that
China displaced the United States as Korea's top trading
partner in 2004. By 2008, China-ROK merchandise trade
reached USD 168 billion, doubling the U.S.-ROK total. With
respect to North Korea, China accounts for nearly 50 percent
of that country's total trade. The growing economic and
political role of China on the Korean peninsula is one of the
most important motivations for Korea to enter into FTA
negotiations with the United States. Successive ROK
Governments have seen the ratification and implementation of
the KORUS FTA as symbolic of the U.S. will to remain fully
engaged in Northeast Asia in the face of increasing Chinese
influence.
¶15. (C) Korea also wants to conclude an FTA with the United
States because Korean economic reformers recognize that the
Korean economy needs to liberalize and open in order to
promote greater competitiveness vis--vis China and Japan.
South Korea has concluded a number of FTAs and launched
negotiations on others since the signing of the KORUS FTA
negotiations on June 30, 2007. The ROK has implemented FTAs
with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN (except investment).
The ROK has concluded negotiations with India and signing is
reportedly imminent. Negotiations are underway with Canada,
Mexico, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, New Zealand,
and Peru. In July, the ROKG announced that negotiations on
the EU-Korea FTA were concluded (but the agreement is not yet
signed). ROK media have been filled with stories of the
increasing economic weight of Europe in Korea as a result of
the FTA. The Board of Governors of the American Chamber of
Commerce has expressed concern that the EU-Korea FTA will
disadvantage the competitiveness of U.S. firms vis--vis
their European competitors in Korea.
¶16. (C) The reopening of the beef market was accomplished in
an April 2008 agreement separate from the FTA. Under this
agreement, the United States and Korea agreed to reopen
Korea,s market to U.S. beef and beef products in a manner
fully consistent with international standards and science.
In June 2008, following massive street protests in Seoul,
U.S. beef exporters and Korean beef importers reached a
temporary commercial agreement to only export beef and beef
products from cattle under 30 months of age, as a
transitional measure, until Korean consumer confidence
improves. While beef sales have not yet returned to past
levels due to Korea,s currency exchange fluctuations,
increased competition from Australian beef, and lingering
public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, the market is
open and we expect increased sales over the medium term.
Korea is also watching closely our ongoing negotiations with
other countries that have stricter restrictions on U.S. beef.
¶17. (C) On the global financial reform discussions, Korea is

a strong ally in the G-20 process (which it will chair in
2010). Korea is enthusiastic about the G20 as the global
forum for action on the global financial system. The ROKG is
concerned that European countries are advocating other
formulas for such discussions that would exclude Korea.
Within the G20, President Lee has called for a strong fiscal
response and refraining from protectionism as well as
necessary regulatory improvements. President Lee Myung-bak
has strongly argued that it would be premature to withdraw
the national fiscal stimulus packages at this juncture.
Korea sees itself as lining up on the U.S. side on almost all
G20 debates.
¶18. (C) The Korean economy is looking better and is

increasingly forecast to be one of the first major economies
to emerge from recession. The benchmark KOSPI stock index in
early August reached the highest level since mid-August 2008
and the won, the Korean currency, closed at 1218 per dollar
on August 4, the strongest level since October 14, 2008.
Most analysts foresee further strengthening of the won in the
months ahead. The picture looked far different last fall,
when the financial crisis hit Korea hard. A USD 30 billion
swap line extended by the U.S. Federal Reserve in October, as
the Korean won was plummeting and Korea looked to be on the
brink of a financial panic, helped Korea weather the worst of
the storm, and gained tremendous gratitude. The later
Japanese and Chinese swap mechanisms did not have the same
impact. In the closing months of 2008 Korea experienced
dramatic contraction of demand for its exports. The ROKG's
stabilization and stimulus packages mitigated the impact and
the weakened currency has generated a significant current
account surplus in recent months. Sectors of the Korean
economy facing restructuring challenges include construction,
shipbuilding, shipping and automotive. GM Daewoo, GM,s
Korean subsidiary, is negotiating with the Korea Development
Bank for a sizeable loanto restructure its operations.
-----------
North Korea
-----------
¶19. (C) Presidents Obama and Lee agreed to send a clear

message to North Korea that its provocations come at a price.
They also agreed on principles to deal with North Korea's
nuclear and missile threats, including commitments to
achieving the "complete and verifiable elimination" of North
Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well
as the ballistic missile program. Korean officials continue
to seek assurances that the United States will consult
closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the
United States will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear
state.
¶20. (C) North Korea policy is almost always the most

sensitive issue on the South Korean agenda. Fifty-five years
of alliance notwithstanding, the ROKG still fears being left
out or surprised by Washington's initiatives or policy
changes on North Korea. Simply put, the ROKG must be seen by
South Koreans as being informed and consulted on all USG
moves on North Korea. Korean officials see Washington and
Seoul as partners in forming and implementing policies toward
the North and consistently seek affirmation that Washington
will not allow Pyongyang to drive a wedge between us.
¶21. (C) There is virtually no chance of early improvement in

South-North relations; President Lee is determined to stick
to principle and to insist on a more reciprocal relationship
with the North, and Kim Jong-il will not give in for his own
domestic reasons. Importantly, South Koreans appear tired
of, but not particularly bothered by, the continuing
threatening rhetoric from the North, and therefore seem
largely comfortable with their government's stance.
Heightening tensions in the West Sea and missile launches
have created less public anxiety than might be expected. The
ROKG will welcome the opportunity to present with you a
united front of calm and determination toward the North,
combined with a call to return to the Six- Party Talks.
¶22. (SBU) The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the only

remaining joint economic project between North and South
Korea. (The other joint venture, Mt. Kumkang tours, was
closed on July 11, 2008, after North Korean security forces
shot a South Korean tourist to death.) Located in North
Korea, six miles north of the DMZ, the KIC opened in December
2004 and is home to 106 ROK-owned factories employing
approximately 40,000 North Korean workers (84 percent are
women age 20-39). Since late 2008, North-South tensions
regarding the KIC have increased. The DPRK closed the border
temporarily on multiple occasions, and has placed limits on
the number of South Korean employees allowed in the KIC. The
DPRK is demanding drastically higher wages for employees (up
from USD 55 to USD 300 per month), construction of additional
dormitories and an additional fee of USD 500 million for land
usage.
¶23. (SBU) North Koreans detained a South Korean Hyundai Asan

employee working at KIC on March 30, accusing him of defaming
North Korea and attempting to suborn a North Korean female
worker. In addition to securing the release of the ROK
citizen, South Korea's priorities at the KIC include
guaranteeing employee safety, freedom of access and
border-crossing, and increasing the number of North Korean
workers brought in from outside the Kaesong area. Although
the South Korean firms at KIC are concerned about the current
tension and complain of financial losses, only one company
has withdrawn from KIC to date.
¶24. (SBU) The DPRK and the ROK have held four rounds of
negotiations between April and July 2009 without any
breakthrough, with the most recent session taking place on
July 2. Both sides appear to be committed to continuing KIC
operations. The United States has consistently supported
North-South dialogue and expressed hope that the two sides
will resolve their disputes over the KIC.
--------
VWP/WEST
--------
¶25. (U) The ROK was included in the the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP) in October 2008. This step has been a success in
facilitating travel and improving people-to-people ties
between nations. As of the beginning of July, approximately
200,000 Koreans had applied for VWP approval using the ESTA
(Electronic Approval for Travel Authorization). More than 99
percent of the ESTA applications have been approved and we
continue to see an upward trend in ESTA usage.
¶26. (U) The WEST (Work, English Study, and Travel) program,
inaugurated in March 2009, allows qualifying college students
and recent graduates to enter the U.S. for up to 18 months on
J-1 exchange visitor visas that allow them to study English,
participate in professional-level internships and travel
independently. A group of 185 Korean students have already
travelled to the U.S. on the WEST program and a second wave
of 159 is preparing to depart. As of December 2008, there
were 110,000 South Koreans studying in the U.S. at all
levels, from elementary to graduate school. According to
Korean Ministry of Education data for 2007, 27% of all
post-graduate students choosing to study abroad chose to
study in the U.S.
---------------
The Bottom Line
---------------
¶27. (C) South Korea is a like-minded, energetic partner that

is ready, prepared, and wants to have a broader and deeper
alliance with the United States. Koreans would like the
alliance to be a lot more than a security arrangement. Yes,
they want more say, even a more equal relationship, but this
is only part of their motivation. Rather, they see that
their ties with the U.S. are deeper now than ever; witness,
for example, the two million-strong Korean American
community, and the enormous numbers of Koreans studying in
the United States. Above all, however, a very large majority
of South Koreans are convinced that the ROK and the United
States have shared values and shared strategic interests.
It's time to take the relationship to a new level of global
partnership, even as we deepen our cooperation on the Korean
peninsula.
-------------
Your Meetings
-------------
¶28. (C) You are scheduled to meet with President Lee

Myung-bak, National security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan, Foreign
Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, Speaker
of the National Assembly Kim Hyong-o, and Chairman of the
National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification
Committee Park Jin. Likely topics of discussion include:
-- North Korea: Your interlocutors may seek assurances that
the U.S. will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea
policy and that the U.S. will not recognize North Korea as a
nuclear state.
-- U.S.-ROK Alliance: Your interlocutors may stress the

importance of the U.S. commitment to the defense of the
Korean peninsula.
-- Global Partnership: Your interlocutors may gauge your

level of interest in ROK contributions to reconstruction and
stabilization of vital countries such as Afghanistan and
Pakistan; ROK peacekeeping in Lebanon; and anti-piracy
efforts off the coast of Somalia.
-- FTA: Your interlocutors will seek your views on the

prospects for Congressional approval of the agreement. The
Trade Minister will stress that the FTA represents a balance
of American and Korean interests and that the ROKG cannot
re-negotiate the text of the FTA.
STEPHENS
Viewing cable 09ULAANBAATAR234, MONGOLIA'S CONSULTATIONS

WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09ULAANBAATAR234.
2009-08-13 2010-11-29 Embassy
09ULAANBAATAR234 SECRET
08:08 21:09 Ulaanbaatar
O 130854Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
PACOM JIOC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
<<220571>>
8/13/2009 8:54
09ULAANBAATAR234
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
SECRET
O 130854Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
PACOM JIOC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KNNP MG
SUBJECT: MONGOLIA'S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN
S e c r e t ulaanbaatar 000234
State for eap/cm and eap/k; nsc for jeff bader
E.o. 12958: decl: 08/13/2034

Tags: prel, pgov, mops, knnp, mg
Subject: mongolia's consultations with dprk vice foreign
minister kim
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b)

and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: xxxxx. MFAT xxxxx led the Mongolian side, and the North
Koreans met with President Elbegdorj on the sidelines of the
consultation. xxxxx
little on the bilateral relationship with Mongolia. Key
themes on the part of the DPRK were the lack of criticism of
the United States, indications that the DPRK is seeking
bilateral talks with the USG on normalization of relations,
that the recent travel of former President Clinton to
Pyongyang has greatly improved the prospects for such talks,
that Mongolia would be an appropriate venue for these talks,
and that the Six Party Talks are no longer an option. End
Summary.
¶2. (S) xxxxx discuss Mongolia's annual bilateral

consultations with the DPRK. xxxxx was present at the
consultations and has been involved with Korean affairs as a
diplomat since 1985. xxxxx was candid in his meetings with
poloff, referring repeatedly and xxxxx the DPRK consultations.
-------------------------------------------
dprk delegation offers no criticism of u.s.
-------------------------------------------
¶3. (S) xxxxx indicated that VFM Kim met with MFAT State
Secretary Tsogtbaatar for the consultations and also held a
separate meeting with President Elbegdorj on the margins
Monday. The Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister was to lead
this latter meeting but was unable due to an obligation.
xxxxx said the meetings were notable for several reasons:
the DPRK delegation did not read from a prepared script, they
were not aggressive and made no criticism of the United
States, and they criticized China and Russia "three or four
times" for supporting recent UN Resolutions aimed at the
DPRK. What follows in paras 4 through 12 xxxxx
description to poloff of the DPRK's statements during the
course of the consultations:
----------------------------
dprk vfm on denuclearization
----------------------------
¶4. (S)xxxxx
said the DPRK is not a threat and was only interested in
self-protection. The Mongolian side expressed concern that a
nuclear DPRK could lead to a nuclear ROK, Japan, Syria, and
Iran, and urged that the Mongolian nuclear-free model could
serve as an example. xxxxx stated the United States would not
allow Japan or the ROK to go nuclear and that the DPRK is
committed to peace and denuclearization.
¶5. (S) The Mongolians offered the example of the Soviet Union
and the United States during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, when
the two allowed for nuclear inspections, leading to improved
trust and a reduction in the number of warheads. The
Mongolians stated that if they were in the DPRK's place now,
they would allow inspections, which would lead to mutual
confidence and improved relations. The DPRK side offered no
reaction to the suggestion.
¶6. (S) The DPRK side said what is most important is for the
United States and the DPRK to come up with a "common
language," a "non-aggression agreement," and establishment of
diplomatic relations. xxxxx stated if the sides can take such
measures, then denuclearization will be possible and easy,
and that relations with Japan and the ROK will normalize
thereafter.
¶7. (S) The Mongolian side counseled that recent

"provocations"xxxxx; another word
may have been used in the consultations) such as the missile
test meant that the present situation was very fragile, and
that the DPRK should be careful not to present the wrong
signal. xxxxx The Mongolians stated that even if one has
peaceful intentions, one can be seen as provocative.
--------------------------------
on bilateral talks with the u.s.
--------------------------------
¶8. (S) Regarding former President Clinton's recent travel to
the DPRK to secure of the release of the two journalists, Kim
said this action had been prepared for a long time, meaning
the groundwork for such a visit was already in place because
of the progress the United States and the DPRK made during
the Clinton presidency. Kim said forward motion stopped
during the Bush Administration but was now able to proceed
because of President Clinton's recent involvement in a
personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same
party, and because former First Lady Clinton is now the
Secretary of State. The North Koreans were expecting a
dialogue with the United States to start soon as an extension
of President Clinton's visit.
¶9. (S) Kim asked the Mongolians to support a U.S.-DPRK

dialogue xxxxx stated "there are no eternal enemies in this
world."
----------------------
on the six party talks
----------------------
¶10. (S) Kim took a "very hard line" on the Six Party Talks
according to xxxxx stating that the DPRK will never return
to the talks, that the talks were dead, but that the door has
not closed on an opportunity for negotiations. During
discussion of the Six Party Talks, Kim criticized Russia and
China for their support of recent UN resolutions aimed at the
DPRK. Kim said Japan and the ROK were natural allies of the
United States during the talks, and that Russia and China
ended up supporting the other three, so that the DPRK felt it
was five against one. Kim stated the real intention of the
Six Party Talks was to destroy the DPRK regime, and that at
present the DPRK wants to talk only to the United States.
------------------------------------------
vfm kim's meeting with president elbegdorj
------------------------------------------
¶11. (S) xxxxx provided insight into Kim's meeting with

Elbegdorj on August 10: Kim refrained from criticizing the
United States and stated the DPRK would be happy if the GOM
could support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue "in the international
arena." Kim said to Elbegdorj, "We are telling you all this
because Mongolia understand us." Kim reiterated the notion
that there is a "good personal understanding" between former
President Clinton and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il.
--------------------------------------
how about u.s.-dprk talks in mongolia?
--------------------------------------
¶12. (S) xxxxx further noted that a xxxxx in Ulaanbaatar xxxxx on the way to the
airport on August 11 that he had suggested to VFM Kim that it
would be good to host U.S.-DPRK talks in Mongolia, but that
Kim offered no reaction.xxxxx that the
timing was right to establish a regional security mechanism
whose organization the Mongols should spearhead.
Minton
Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT1182, IRAN: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
XXXXXXXXXXXX DIPLOMAT SHARES HIS PERSPECTIVE
Discussing cables
09ASHGABAT1182 2009-09-16 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO6903
RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAH #1182/01 2591118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161118Z SEP 09
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001182
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019

TAGS: IR PGOV PREL TX UNESCO
SUBJECT: IRAN: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? XXXXXXXXXXXX DIPLOMAT SHARES HIS
PERSPECTIVE
ASHGABAT 00001182 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Acting DCM Peter Eckstrom, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: XXXXXXXXXXXX's advised in a recent conversation with Ashgabat

Iran Watcher that the U.S. would be ill-advised to begin talks with Iran, that
it would be great disappointment to Iranians who have found hope in President
Obama's message of change. He called Iran's leadership “untrustworthy,” and
described the three main groups that he said are sustaining the regime: the
“clerical establishment, the paramilitaries and the Bazaaris (merchant class).”
XXXXXXXXXXXX finds little difference between any of the major figures in Iran,
including most members of the opposition. END SUMMARY.
A TRIANGULAR BASE OF SUPPORT
¶2. (C) In a XXXXXXXXXXXX conversation with Iran Watcher, XXXXXXXXXXXX described

his country's present political climate, stating that “nothing has changed” in
either the power structure or how major decisions are made in Iran. He described
the Iranian regime as a “total dictatorship,” whose continued survival depends
on a “triangular” power base made up of the clerical establishment, the
“bazaari” (merchants), and the “paramilitaries” (Revolutionary Guards and
Basij). He said the three groups are so enmeshed, so dependent on one another,
including through arranged marriages and business dealings, that the severance
of any one of the three from the others would cause the regime to collapse.
Supreme Leader Khamenei makes no decisions without consulting with son Mojtabah,
he said, who is reputed to be “running his father's office,” in close
consultation with Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and Kayhan editor-in-
chief Hossein Shariatmadari.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX compared the regime to the dictatorships of Hitler and
Mussolini, and said the only difference was that Iran, unlike Nazi Germany, has
had the “foresight” not to invade another country militarily, thereby
preventing, in his view, any “concerted or effective international response” to
its human rights violations or support for terrorism abroad. The demonstrations
that began after the June presidential election and continue still are the
manifestation of a youthful population that is “fed up” and demanding their
“most basic human rights.” He observed that the stress that thirty years of
repression is more and more causing the population to suffer from psychological
problems.
ENGAGEMENT?…NOT WITH THIS GOVERNMENT
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was adamant that for the U.S. to enter into direct talks
with Iran's leadership would be a mistake. Not only, he insisted, is the Iranian
leadership “untrustworthy,” and dominated by a group of “messianics,” who base
crucial decisions about domestic and foreign policy on a belief in the imminent
return of the “Missing” (Twelfth) Imam. More importantly, he said, so many
Iranians are pinning their hopes on President Obama's message of change, that
for the U.S. now to negotiate with a government that continues to repress and
violate the most basic rights of its citizens would be a huge disappointment, a
blow to their own aspirations for change in Iran.
THIS IS NOT 1980

¶5. (C) He said Iran is no longer the country or society that rallied around the
war effort when Iraq invaded them in 1980. On the contrary, he said, many people
he knows are actually saying things like, “Where is Israel? Why don't they just
attack us and put an end to this leadership?” He said, however, that new
sanctions on necessities such as fuel, would meet with immense public anger as
they would mostly affect those who rely on gasoline to commute or make a living.
ASHGABAT 00001182 002.2 OF 003 THE EDUCATION SYSTEM: A TOTAL MESS
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that if one counts both teachers and educators,
about a third of the country is part of the education system. He lamented the
government's “squandering” of its greatest national resource, the 70% of the
population who are under the age of 29, with what he called “substandard
schooling.” “Such a youthful population, properly educated and trained, could be
Iran's greatest asset,” he said. Twenty percent of the population is illiterate,
and the rest is comprised of two groups: those who are educated and informed
(i.e. the voters who supported Mousavi and Karroubi), and the other, lesser-
educated group more likely to follow the dictates of the government and the
clerical establishment.
DETAINEES RELEASED AFTER PAYMENTS OF CASH
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that people detained following the June election have
had to pay large sums to be released. He described the parents and grandparents
of Nazak Afshar, the French embassy local employee arrested and later released
in August, as financially “ruined” after having to pay $500,000 for her release.
“It took everything they owned,” he said, “they have absolutely nothing now.”
Those whose families have no assets at all “don't have a prayer” of getting out,
he said.
AHMADINEJAD OR MOUSAVI: SHADES OF GRAY
¶8. (C) In XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, the recent presidential election presented no

real choice to the Iranian public, just the “facade” of one, because Mousavi
“himself is an insider, part of the establishment,” and was even responsible as
prime minister during the 1980's for the creation of the dreaded “morality
police.” He said that the authorities made a big mistake in not allowing Mousavi
to win the election in accordance with the popular vote. “They could have
controlled him, nothing would have changed, but their actions have now unleashed
a frustration and an anger that they cannot control.” He is equally unimpressed
with former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani, whom he deems, “just as
interested in their personal fortunes over the interests of the people as
everyone else,” citing in particular the violent crackdowns on the student
population that took place during Khatami's presidency.
THE ANSWER?…STOP THE FLOW OF CASH
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the sanctions regime as ineffective. The infusion of
cash from abroad is keeping the Iranian regime afloat 30 years after the
revolution, including (indirectly, mostly through the UAE) from the U.S. and
Europe. Large amounts of money for investment in the markets, especially
Tehran's booming real estate market, is keeping the Bazaaris content. Investment
in the sale of commodities, for example, brings a return of 50% per year, he
said, and investors in real estate can double their money in just a few months.
“The Bazaaris are the key to everything, just as they were in 1979,” he said.
“To see an end to this regime, cut off the funds coming through Dubai. If the
regime loses the support of the Bazaaris, that will be the end of it.” He
considered it telling that, when the government attempted to impose a V.A.T.
last winter, merchants went on strike and the bazaars were closed for several
days. By comparison, he said, the bazaar has not closed once since the election
in June, even during the demonstrations and mass arrests that followed.

¶11. (C) BIO NOTE AND COMMENT: XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX does nothing to hide his disdain for Iran's theocracy. In
his view, it is a regime that is fundamentially flawed and incapable of
reforming itself, respecting basic human rights, or becoming a responsible
member of the international community. His scathing criticism is not directed
only at Iran, however. He also expressed disappointment at the UN, and what he
termed it's “shameful silence in the face of such blatant human rights
violations” in Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX. END COMMENT.
CURRAN
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2494, PRC/IRAN: CHINA IN WAIT-AND-SEE

MODE BILATERALLY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6005
DE RUEHBJ #2494/01 2441218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011218Z SEP 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2034

SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA IN WAIT-AND-SEE MODE BILATERALLY
BUT PUSHING FOR DIALOGUE

Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China is biding its time until the political
crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the
Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal
its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to
Tehran once the political situation has been resolved,
according to an MFA official. Our contact reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is
attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United
States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June
election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium
enrichment is an unattainable goal. China continues to urge
Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks,
and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme
Leader Khamenei. Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its
relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but
China refused. A Communist Party official told us that the
CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major
political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its
understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He repeated
China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and
suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade
the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue. He
dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle
East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province
would affect China's diplomacy with Iran. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations with MFA West

Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy Director Ni
Ruchi August 31. In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa)
Director Wu Baocai gave PolOff the Party's perspective on
Iran and the nuclear issue.
Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the
political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China
was still waiting for the situation to calm further before
re-engaging fully in bilateral relations. He argued that the
internal divisions that had played out in the June
presidential elections had existed well before the violent
aftermath of the June election. China had been aware of the
potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into
the street and had taken a cautious approach before the
election. He said that the Chinese government understood
that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated
divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that
the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the
current government and that China would continue with its
normal engagement with Tehran.
¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported,

with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no
timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in
Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power. He
noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors
had continued to take to the streets to express
dissatisfaction with the election. Ni reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S.
and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the
scope of this common interest was increasing.
Iran Keeping the Door Open?

---------------------------
¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the
Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations
despite the ongoing political turmoil. He claimed that
Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the
U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the
finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian
leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of
direct talks. Ni said that the election had caused the
Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy,
particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear
development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which
had also forced the leadership to consider how to move
forward.
China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every

level of their engagement to respond positively to the
P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment
BEIJING 00002494 002 OF 002
activities. He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to

their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United
States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during
the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an
important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1
offer. Ni said that China's message encouraging greater
engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader
Khamenei. He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to
respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had
reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent"
halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal.
Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions
would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment
activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the
unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear
program and the current government. Ni argued that the
regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened
position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1
on the nuclear issue.
Iran Seeks "Strategic Partnership" with an Unwilling PRC
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade
its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western
pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with
Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and
other countries. Ni said that China had so far refused to do
so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence
that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.
Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department

(CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu
Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to
increase its relations with six major political parties and
factions in Iran. He noted that links between the CCP and
Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in
relations between executive branches and far behind the
increase in economic links. He said that deepening
understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S. position
on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that
he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the
nuclear issue.
CCP Perspective on Iran Nuclear Program

---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned

through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking
military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed
that such a possibility was much lower in 2009. He noted
that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior
and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively
affecting the countries joining in the international effort
to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an
example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing
business with Iran. He said that he believed the
international community was unlikely to be able to persuade
Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested
the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to
persuade Iran to enter into dialogue. Wu reiterated China's
strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to
develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all
countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Iran Relations Unaffected by Xinjiang Violence

--------------------------------------------- -
¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other

parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's
diplomacy with Iran. While acknowledging that some
high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical
of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he
said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China
becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by
significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle
East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language
version of government-run CCTV.
HUNTSMAN
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1106, CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON"
MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1733
DE RUEHRL #1106/01 2521657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091657Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019

TAGS: GM PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR ANGELA "TEFLON" MERKEL TAKES LIMELIGHT
AS FDP WAITS IN THE WINGS
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO

R REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Less than two weeks after her party suffered losses
in two state elections, CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel found
her fighting spirit before 8,000 party faithful at a
September 6 election rally in Duesseldorf launching the "hot
phase" of the CDU/CSU electoral campaign. The CDU has been
shifting party tactics after its losses in the August 30
elections in Saarland and Thuringia, where the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) may now be in a position to form
coalitions with the Left Party. Merkel -- to great applause
-- focused in on the specter of a so-called red-red
government composed of the SPD and The Left Party. She
described the SPD as suffering from an "identity crisis," and
needing a vacation from political decision-making and time in
opposition. Along with the entire CDU leadership and
incumbent CDU/CSU Ministers-president, Merkel made her case
for a CDU/CSU coalition with the pro-business but socially
liberal FDP. She repeated the CDU/CSU's election mantra: "we
have the strength" throughout her speech, aiming to convince
the German electorate that a strong CDU/CSU is required for
Germany to emerge from its worst economic recession in
post-war history. CDU views on whether the issue of
Germany's role in Afghanistan would become a more prominent
campaign theme were mixed.
¶2. (C) With three weeks to go before the parliamentary

elections, all signs point to Chancellor Merkel returning to
office, although she and her party recognize that they face a
difficult campaign. It remains uncertain whether the CDU and
the FDP will gain enough support to form a majority
coalition. If not, another Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) is
very likely; other options require a three-party
constellation that would force the ill-suited Greens and FDP
to work together. But, there seems to be an almost one
hundred percent certainty -- given the SPD's chronic slump in
the polls and limited coalition options -- that SPD Foreign
Minister and Chancellor-candidate Frank Walter Steinmeier
will not become Chancellor. End summary.
MERKEL CASTS ASIDE SPD, EMBRACES FDP

------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Chancellor Merkel -- to rapturous cries of "Angie,

Angie" and a standing ovation -- took to the floor at her
party's September 6 rally before some 8,000 supporters
affirming that the CDU/CSU "have the best chance to win the
parliamentary elections" but also cautioning that "the
election's outcome has not yet been decided." On the one
hand, she praised her Grand Coalition government's record,
noting its success in countering Germany's economic and
financial crisis. On the other hand, she called for a new
CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP after the upcoming elections--
casting aside the SPD. She asserted that such a coalition
would anchor Germany in the "middle" of the political
spectrum and take the country out of its current economic
crisis faster. Merkel said: "Our country needs a government
that will support growth, security and work for everyone."
In a swipe at the SPD (COMMENT: Merkel never mentioned
Steinmeier by name. END COMMENT.), she said the party is
currently plagued by an "identity crisis," adding that, "The
SPD is devoid of any reality and is distraught." She asked,
"How can a party that achieved 10, 18, and 24 percent at the
recent state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saarland be
taken seriously?" Dismissing SPD warnings against a
so-called "black-yellow" (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition, Merkel said
that the country should be more worried about the SPD's plans
to form coalitions with The Left Party on the state and
federal levels. (Note: The SPD has warned that a
black-yellow coalition would represent wealthy Germany and
business interest at the expense of the middle and lower
classes.)
¶4. (U) CDU leaders also tried to cast the CDU at the state
level in a positive light after its poor showing in the
Saarland and Thuringia state elections on August, causing the
Minister President of the latter state to resign. Lower
Saxony's CDU Minister President Christian Wulff asserted that
the most prosperous and successful "Laender" (states) in
Germany are those ruled by the CDU/CSU and FDP. He cited
Berlin, governed by SPD Mayor Klaus Wowereit's Berlin (NOTE:
in Berlin the SPD rules with The Left Party. END NOTE), as
being the worst case. Hesse's Minister President Roland Koch
-- to great applause -- noted that he could not understand
how the SPD could possibly cooperate on a state or national
level with a Left Party that is "anti-American and
anti-European." (Note: In Saarland and Thuringia the option
BERLIN 00001106 002 OF 003
exists for the SPD to form a governing coalition with the

Left Party. END NOTE.)
CSU Truce with FDP?

-------------------
¶5. (C) CSU Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer threw

his party's support behind a CDU/CSU coalition with the FDP,
despite his well-publicized doubts about the FDP's real
coalition intentions after the parliamentary elections. Even
as Seehofer pronounced his support for the FDP in
Duesseldorf, however, media reports from Munich confirmed
that the CSU had decided to continue attacking the FDP. The
CSU has been buffing its economic bona fides by attacking the
FDP on its own themes while basking in the reflected glory
from popular Economics Minister zu Guttenberg, the new CSU
champion. Seehofer has publicly suspected that FDP Chairman
Guido Westerwelle -- in an attempt to enter government at all
costs -- might support a "traffic light" coalition with the
SPD and the Greens, although this political constellation
appears unlikely at present. In addition, Bavarian politics
trump national politics, especially during a time when the
CSU longs for the days when their party alone wielded
political power in Munich, rather than as it does today, in a
coalition with the FDP. Seehofer is also aware that the CSU
needs to be strong and the FDP proportionally more weak for
the CSU to win more and better ministerial posts in a
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. He did not use his appearance in
Duesseldorf to chide the FDP, to the great delight of those
pleading that recent CDU/CSU-FDP bickering had been harmful
and counter-productive during the campaign.
AFGHANISTAN - A DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN ISSUE?

----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) The September 4 air strike against two fuel tankers
near Kunduz, Afghanistan hit the press right before the
CDU/CSU rally. In light of the German media's frenzy, PolOff
asked the CDU's Head of International Relations Klemens
Moemkes whether Germany's ISAF commitment might emerge as a
potential domestic campaign issue. Moemkes noted that the
SPD could make Afghanistan an issue but this would be very
odd given Foreign Minister Steinmeier's support for Germany's
military role in ISAF. However, the prospect of Afghanistan
becoming a major theme clearly had the CDU's xxxxx
spooked. He told PolOff that it would be very difficult for
the Chancellor not to address Germany's role in Afghanistan
in the coming weeks. Given the German public's overwhelming
support for a withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan,
this was not an issue the Chancellor wanted to address in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections.
COMMENT
-------
¶7. (C) While it is all but certain that Chancellor Merkel

will return to office as Chancellor after the next
parliamentary elections on September 27, it is too close to
call whether she will achieve a coalition with the FDP.
Bavarian MP Seehofer's attacks on the FDP in Bavaria could
weaken that party there and further undermine the chances of
a coalition. The FDP wants the same but political bickering
over future ministerial positions and CSU attacks on the FDP
in Bavaria and on FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle suggest that
a possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will not be a marriage made
in heaven. Some FDP contacts admit that they harbor doubts
about the Chancellor's promise to form a coalition with the
FDP. They insinuate that in reality she may prefer another
Grand Coalition with the SPD, although Chancellor Merkel has
used every public opportunity to advertise for a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Backing down on this pledge would call into
question her reputation.
¶8. (C) Paradoxically, however, it is the CDU/CSU's relative

weakness in the polls (35-36 percent) that threatens a
possible CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP is clearly riding on
a high with double-digit successes in the state elections of
Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia, but this may not be enough.
The CDU refuses to engage in any self-introspection after its
defeats in Saarland and Thuringia and the party can really
only take comfort from the SPD's perennial weakness. The
fear in the CDU is acute that the Chancellor's high
popularity ratings may not be enough to ensure a comfortable
win for the CDU/CSU at the parliamentary elections.
¶9. (C) Merkel, once again, vehemently denies any intention

to form a Grand Coalition with the SPD but the electoral math
on September 27 may force her -- despite intense CDU/CSU
reservations, not to mention those of the German public -- to
look at the SPD as a partner. As for the SPD, Steinmeier is
BERLIN 00001106 003 OF 003
looking desperate. The SPD has failed to reach over 25

percent in the last six elections and Steinmeier's unlikely
path to the chancellorship is only possible if he reneges on
a campaign promise not to form a coalition with The Left
Party. This will not happen in 2009 but the CDU/CSU will not
tire of raising the fear of a red-red coalition in 2009 or in
¶2013. The Chancellor appears to be in a win-win situation
but three weeks on the campaign trail can be an eternity.
End comment.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1162, GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER?:

THE WORLD
Discussing cables
09BERLIN1162 Embassy Berlin
16:04 18:06 N
VZCZCXRO9293
DE RUEHRL #1162/01 2611602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181602Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER?: THE WORLD
ACCORDING TO FDP CHAIRMAN GUIDO WESTERWELLE
REF: BERLIN 594
Classified By: MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO

R REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C//NF) Free Democratic Party (FDP) Chairman Guido

Westerwelle may be on the verge of becoming Foreign Minister
and Vice-Chancellor in a Christian Democratic Union
(CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)-FDP government after the
parliamentary elections on September 27. He has a strong
craving for political power and recognition after spending
eleven years in opposition. Westerwelle previewed his
foreign and security policy objectives and views in a major
speech at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on
May 4, a speech for which the media nicknamed him "Guido
Genscher," playing on Westerwelle's ideological leanings and
close relationship with former FDP Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
¶2. (C//NF) Westerwelle's DGAP remarks provided us with a

glimpse of Westerwellian thought. They were short on
substance, suggesting that Westerwelle's command of complex
foreign and security policy issues still requires deepening
if he is to successfully represent German interests on the
world stage (see REFTEL). While he is a Transatlanticist,
Westerwelle questions the breadth of U.S. power and U.S.
calls for stronger German engagement. He also harbors
resentment that he has not been taken more seriously by the
Washington political establishment. (NOTE: Embassy will
report SEPTEL on more detailed foreign policy implications
for the U.S. of a Westerwelle-led MFA). END SUMMARY.
WESTERWELLE'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Westerwelle's most important foreign policy

priorities will be focused on global disarmament and arms
control. In remarks in Schwerin on September 17, Westerwelle
called again for the removal of all U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons -- within the context of negotiations with NATO --
from German soil. He was very critical of the Bush
Administration's Missile Defense plans but was quick to
praise President Obama's recent announcement on Missile
Defense, saying "this move created additional international
confidence." Westerwelle remains a committed
Transatlanticist but he has been consistently cautious of
committing German troops to out-of-area deployments.
Afghanistan was the exception. Westerwelle continues to
support Germany's ISAF mandate, but he has also indicated
that the FDP wants to bring German troops home from
Afghanistan as soon as possible provided the mission has been
successfully completed. Westerwelle and the FDP support
close engagement with Russia and see it as a "strategic
partner. Westerwelle has pursued close ties with Russia's
leadership during his eleven years in opposition. On Iran,
Westerwelle has talked about the need for dialogue but his
party's pro-business orientation makes him particularly
skeptical of sanctions and resistant to unilateral efforts to
cut back trade.
THE UNLIKELY FOREIGN MINISTER

-----------------------------
¶4. (C//NF) By his own admission, Westerwelle has never

seriously harbored a fascination for international affairs.
FDP Bundestag member Marina Schuster told PolOff recently
that foreign policy is not Westerwelle's "true love," but
that he will take this position due to its high profile and
as it is tied to the position of Vice-Chancellor. FDP
contacts tell us that he plans to remain a foreign policy
generalist, which suggests he will have plenty of time to wax
lyrical on domestic politics - to the potential detriment of
political harmony in a possible future CDU/CSU-FDP coalition.
He also finds very appealing the prospect of being one of
the only cabinet members besides the chancellor who can
choose his media advisors, which suggests that Westerwelle
will continue to place great emphasis on cultivating his
public image.
¶5. (C//NF) There is a contrast between Westerwelle's

increased public support and successful leadership of the FDP
versus the continued skepticism, often bordering on contempt,
shown by much of the German foreign policy elite toward him.
Opinion polls show that Westerwelle's public image has
improved substantially in the last year in particular. But,
as one well known foreign policy analyst in Berlin told
PolOff, he lacks the gravitas and is seen as too
BERLIN 00001162 002 OF 004
opportunistic to be trusted as foreign minister. At the

conclusion of his DGAP speech, several MFA desk officers
remarked to PolOff that they were not yet persuaded that
Westerwelle had the "foreign and security policy expertise
necessary" to become a successful Foreign Minister, although
they had no doubts about his ability to get up to speed
quickly. There was a consensus among desk officers --
driven, perhaps, by political bias -- that Westerwelle was
arrogant and too fixated on maintaining his "cult of
personality." Negative reaction to his DGAP speech reflects
the foreign policy community's skepticism of Westerwelle.
HE'S NO GENSCHER
----------------
¶6. (C//NF) Like Dan Quayle in 1992, Westerwelle wants to

compare himself to his mentor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, but in
the eyes of the foreign policy community, he is no Genscher.
Nevertheless, Westerwelle's world-views have to a large
extent been shaped by "Genscherism." British academic
Timothy Garton Ash described "Genscherism" as an attempt "to
maintain and improve Germany's ties with a wide range of
states, which were themselves pursuing quite different and
quite contrary objectives. This complex balancing act
involved saying somewhat different things in different
places." Genscherism also embraced a foreign policy "culture
of restraint," while emphasizing the models of "cooperation"
and "continuity" in German foreign policy, which Westerwelle
discussed in his May 4 speech at the DGAP. Genscher's
"culture of restraint" had a profound influence on
Westerwelle's thinking, thus making him very skeptical about
committing Germany's armed forces to overseas military
operations (NOTE: Afghanistan was an exception, although
with the caveat that Germany's area of responsibility there
would remain limited to the north and would concentrate on
police training and civil reconstruction efforts (SEPTEL).
END NOTE).
A TRANSATLANTICIST WITH A TWIST

-------------------------------
¶7. (C//NF) At the June 30 meeting, Westerwelle quickly

confirmed his Transatlanticist credentials. Westerwelle's
views on the United States' role in the world, however, also
defines his brand of Transatlanticism. According to
Westerwelle's political biographer Majid Sattar, Westerwelle
has never been able to shake his skepticism about how the
United States wields power in the world. Citing an exchange
with former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Burt
(1985-1989), Sattar recalls how Westerwelle forcefully
intervened in a discussion the Ambassador was having on U.S.
foreign policy during the Cold War to say: "But you are not
the police of the world." Sattar comments further that
Westerwelle was immune to any "transatlantic brainwashing."
Although Westerwelle used his DGAP speech to criticize the
United States under the Bush Administration for its excessive
focus on the War on Terror and unilateralism, saying that the
United States had lost its compass more than once,
Westerwelle quickly changed his tune when he talked about the
positive impact that President Obama has had on U.S. foreign
policy since his election.
¶8. (C//NF) Westerwelle also made clear that he believes

Germany needs to be more engaged in U.S. policy-making. He
criticized Chancellor Merkel for not having been more engaged
with Washington on issues of mutual interest, especially arms
control, when Washington has been engaged in extensive policy
reviews. He suggested that the FDP would quickly fill the
vacuum should they enter government.
WESTERWELLE TO WASHINGTON: WHAT ABOUT ME?

-----------------------------------------
¶9. (C//NF) Westerwelle has found it hard to conceal his

resentment toward Washington based on his feeling that
neither its top leadership nor the Embassy in Berlin had
courted him during his time in opposition. At a June 30
meeting between the former CDA and Westerwelle, he criticized
the Bush Administration for its failure to seek a political
dialogue with him. Also revealing was Westerwelle's slight
edge on his sense of humor, first charming us by inquiring
about Secretary Clinton's health after her elbow injury and
next joking that he would ask the Secretary if the Embassy
had conveyed his best wishes.
¶10. (C//NF) Partially due to his insistence on only

high-level meetings in Washington (and therefore limited
contact), Westerwelle remains a relatively unknown political
figure in the U.S., although he has traveled there many
times. Unlike his future potential cabinet colleague,
BERLIN 00001162 003 OF 004
Christian Social Union (CSU) Economics Minister Karl-Theodor

zu Guttenberg, Westerwelle has little professional experience
in the United States since he never made extensive efforts to
introduce himself to the Washington policy community.
Unfortunately, our attempts to reach out to Westerwelle were
often rebuffed with the excuse that he would only meet the
Ambassador. Only after extensive Embassy negotiations with
Westerwelle's staff were former CDA and PolOff able to secure
the June 30 meeting.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C//NF) One week before the parliamentary elections,

polls indicate that Westerwelle stands a good chance of
becoming Germany's next foreign minister, a position he has
been preparing for since 2002. If Westerwelle becomes
Foreign Minister, we can expect tough love diplomacy from
someone who prides himself in being our "close" friend, but
who in reality remains skeptical about the U.S. and its
foreign policy objectives. Westerwelle will be a friend, but
he will not hesitate to criticize us if vital German
interests are at stake or being challenged. Westerwelle's
prickliness toward the United States would likely be
neutralized by the long-sought attention from Washington he
would receive if he becomes foreign minister. Germany's
foreign policy elite will continue to view him with
skepticism. The factor that assuages some of this concern,
however, is that no one expects him to be able to match
Chancellor Merkel if he does become Foreign Minister, and
policy experts tell us that foreign policy influence is
likely to shift even further to the Chancellery. END COMMENT.
BIO NOTES
---------
¶12. (U) Dr. Guido Westerwelle was born on December 27, 1961
in Bad Honnef (near Bonn) to Dr. Heinrich and Erika
Westerwelle. Family members note that Westerwelle inherited
the unbridled, aggressive temperament of his father and the
calculated, deliberate, and hesitant cleverness of his
mother. His parents divorced when he was 8 years old, which
according to Westerwelle himself, left a scar on his
educational and physical development. After the divorce,
Westerwelle was raised by his father -- a lawyer -- and he
maintained a close relationship with his mother, also a
career lawyer, who lived nearby. Stefan and Henrik, Guido's
half brothers, one from each of his parents' previous
relationships, were older and soon left the house to live on
their own. Westerwelle grew up with his younger brother Kai;
they were very similar and both were considered active
extroverts who enjoyed debates. Westerwelle enjoys horses
and to this day he is an avid equestrian.
¶13. (SBU) Westerwelle is openly gay. He has said that this

was not a problem at home since he was raised to be
self-confident and his family was very liberal. In addition,
Bonn, where Westerwelle went to university was a liberal
town. Westerwelle officially came out rather quietly in the
political world in 2005 at Merkel's 50th birthday party when
he brought his partner, Michael Mronz, a sports manager, to
the party. Mronz is currently a steering board member of the
2009 Berlin World Track and Field World Championships.
Ironically, Westerwelle is conservative on gay rights. He is
keen to protect the special status of marriages and families
under German law. He opposes adoption by same sex couples
but says that he wishes he could have children.
¶14. (U) Westerwelle developed an early taste for politics,

being the editor of his high school newspaper. He caused a
school controversy when he named teachers who he felt did not
respect students who had transferred into the secondary high
school system from the grammar school system. As a result of
his story, many teachers developed a dislike for Westerwelle.
He further developed his political thinking when he attended
an event with Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Otto Graf Lambsdorff
during the 1980 parliamentary elections. It was at that time
that he decided to join the FDP and form an FDP youth group
in Bonn. Westerwelle eventually became a lawyer but his
younger brother Kai once said he had the impression that
being a lawyer was never his brother's real goal. His
understanding of the media and their use for his own
political purposes is envied by many politicians. He takes a
pro-active approach to overseeing his party's media
operations. In front of the camera, Westerwelle comes across
as serious, sharp, and calculating, and almost comical at
times with what is perceived as a very exaggerated presence.
In person, people say Westerwelle is very gallant, funny, and
sarcastic.
BERLIN 00001162 004 OF 004
¶15. (U) In his free time, Westerwelle enjoys attending

concerts and reading. He enjoys running, beach volleyball,
sailing, horseback riding, and mountain biking. He collects
paintings from New Leipzig School artists such as Neo Rauch
and Tim Eitel and is a fond collector of works by Norbert
Bisky and Joerg Immendorff. He enjoys vacationing in Italy
and Spain.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1167, DATA PRIVACY TRUMPS SECURITY:

IMPLICATIONS OF A
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0245
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1167/01 2640826
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210826Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, L, S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KJUS KHLS GM
SUBJECT: DATA PRIVACY TRUMPS SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF A
FDP VICTORY ON COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
REF: A. BERLIN 988

¶B. 2008 BERLIN 504
¶C. 2008 BERLIN 354
Classified By: Global Affairs Unit Chief Don Brown for Reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Current polling data suggest that the

Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party
(FDP) could receive sufficient votes in the September 27
national elections to form a governing coalition. The FDP
are strong defenders of citizens' privacy rights and these
views have led the FDP to oppose all of Germany's recent
counterterrorism legislative proposals, as well as voice
concerns about U.S.-German and U.S.-EU information sharing
initiatives. Throughout these debates, the FDP has favored
data protection measures over the need for governments to
strengthen security-related information sharing for
counterterrorism purposes. The FDP's strong views on
individual liberties and personal privacy could lead to
complications concerning law enforcement security cooperation
and data sharing. Were the FDP to join the government, we
expect they would closely scrutinize any proposals for
security officials to access and/or share information
concerning private persons with international partners,
including the USG. End Summary.
THE FDP AND DATA PRIVACY

------------------------
¶2. (C) The FDP defines itself as a independent pro-business

party, advocating low taxes, open trade, and minimal
government intervention in business and private life. The
party promotes European liberalism, championing freedom and
individual responsibility under a government "as extensive as
necessary, and as limited as possible." The FDP's limited
government viewpoint shapes their views on counterterrorism
policy. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and in
reaction to a number of terrorist plots uncovered in Germany,
successive German governments have passed a series of
legislative packages that have strengthened Germany's
counterterrorism legal frameworks and broadened the
investigative powers of law enforcement agencies. The FDP,
which was not a member of these post-9/11 governing
coalitions, regularly criticized these amendments for
infringing on citizens' personal privacy rights. The FDP's
criticisms of security-related data sharing agreements have
also extended to the U.S.-Germany bilateral "Pruem-like"
agreement to share personal information on serious crime and
terrorism suspects (ref C), the U.S.-EU Passenger Name
Recognition (PNR) initiative, and elements of the Visa Waiver
Program that involve sharing information on travelers.
FDP Objections to Counterterrorism Laws

---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) FDP parliamentarians and party leaders were strong

critics of the CDU/CSU - SPD government's introduction of two
new counterterrorism legislative proposals, the BKA Law and
the Terror Camp Law. Passed in 2008 and enacted at the
beginning of 2009, the BKA Law increased the investigative
powers of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA).
The most controversial aspect of the BKA Law was that it
permitted security officials to use a variety of technical
surveillance measures in terrorism investigations (Ref B).
Specifically, the law provides the BKA with the power to
conduct remote, on-line investigations of the computers of
terrorism and serious crime suspects. The FDP strongly
opposed these measures as an unnecessary invasion of privacy,
despite the limitation of on-line searches to only
life-threatening situations (or threats to the constitutional
order of the German state). These cases would require a
judge's advance approval and are expected to number just a
dozen cases per year. Nevertheless, FDP parliamentarian Max
Stadler called the measures "constitutionally questionable,"
and in a meeting with EMIN, Stadler feared that authorities
would carry out surveillance without sufficient evidence of
wrongdoing. FDP parliamentarian Gisela Piltz warned that the
law would turn the BKA into a "super spy agency resembling
the FBI." Former FDP Federal Interior Minister, Gerhart
Baum, blasted the law, saying it violated privacy rights,
freedom of the press, and the inviolability of private
residences.
¶4. (C) Earlier this summer, the government passed legislation

developed by the Justice Ministry that criminalized a range
of terrorism-related preparatory actions such as distributing
information on bomb-making and participating in para-military
training overseas (ref A). The law was developed in response
to the September 2007 arrests in Germany of three homegrown
terrorists who had attended an Islamic Jihad Union terrorism
training camp in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Justice Ministry officials and prosecutors have told EconOffs
that the new law has closed gaps in Germany's legal framework
that had previously prevented German prosecutors from
charging German citizens and residents with activities that
directly or indirectly supported terrorist groups. Prior to
the passage of the law, the FDP criticized the draft as
unnecessary, claiming that existing legislation was
sufficient to arrest and prosecute potential terrorists in
Germany. The FDP also criticized that law for allegedly
requiring prosecutors to be able to prove that individuals
who participate in training at overseas terrorist camps
actually intend to carry out attacks; that the law would
thereby permit the punishment for thoughts, rather than for
actions. Justice Ministry officials have indicated to
EconOffs that these criticisms are unfounded hyperbole and
that prosecutors will be able to build strong cases against
those who undergo training at foreign terrorist training
sites.
FDP Objects to U.S.-German Data Sharing Agreement

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶5. (C) Immediately following the March 2008 completion of the

U.S.-German data sharing agreement to enhance cooperation in
preventing and combating terrorism and other serious crime
(aka, the Pruem-like agreement, Ref C), FDP parliamentarians
began to express concerns regarding the agreement. FDP
members took particular aim at an article in the agreement
that calls for additional data protection measures to be
taken if special categories of personal data (such as ethnic
origin, political opinion, religion, trade union membership,
and sexual orientation) are transferred among law enforcement
agencies. (Comment: In our discussions with FDP
parliamentarians, we explained that negotiators did not
foresee that such information would need to be transferred
regularly and that the article was inserted as a means of
providing extra data privacy protections in the rare
occurrence that such information was pertinent to an
investigation. End Comment.) In meetings with EMIN, Stadler
and Piltz also expressed objections to the data retention
periods of the agreement, questioned which USG law
enforcement agencies would have access to the information,
and voiced a general concern about potential misuse of the
personal information (names, DOBs, addresses, passport
numbers, etc.) that would be shared by the agreement. Piltz
further claimed that the U.S. government as a whole lacked
effective data protection measures in comparison to Germany
and questioned why the USG does not have a overall federal
data protection commissioner as Germany does. (Comment:
Piltz' remark underscores the importance of ensuring German
officials receive information about USG data protection
policy. The April visit to Berlin by DHS Chief Privacy
Officer Callahan was useful in this regard, but more needs to
be done to ensure German officials understand U.S. data
protection policy. End Comment.)
¶6. (C) FDP leaders have also taken aim at U.S.-EU agreements
that include data sharing elements. Following the July EU
GAERC decision to give the Swedish EU Presidency a mandate to
begin negotiating a successor agreement governing USG access
to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) database of financial
transactions, FDP head Guido Westerwelle called the plan
"totally unacceptable" and said that the "plan must be
stopped." Parliamentarian Piltz, who is a member of the
Bundestag Interior Committee, has criticized the U.S.-EU
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data transfer agreement for
collecting "pointless" information on travelers and she
doubts whether the information collected under PNR would be
of any value to law enforcement officials. In meetings with
EconOffs, Piltz broadly spoke of governments, particularly
that of the U.S., accumulating large amounts of data on their
(mostly) innocent citizens. Piltz expressed concerns that
German commercial interests could be damaged when U.S.
authorities obtained PNR data on German business travelers
that might somehow be shared with American competitors.
Would the FDP be a reliable security partner?

---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) The FDP's voting record on counterterrorism

legislation and the views of leading FDP security policy
figures described here suggest that cooperation on security
matters, particularly those involving information sharing,
with a future German government that includes the FDP could
be problematic. At times, the FDP's fixation on data privacy
and protection issues looks to have come at the expense of
the party forming responsible views on security policy. The
FDP has been out of power for over 10 years and lack
experience tackling security issues in the Internet age. The
FDP appears not to fully grasp the transnational character of
terrorism today and terrorists' increasing use of the
Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize. Current Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU)
has repeatedly drawn attention to terrorist use of the
Internet, which he calls the "main medium of holy war against
the West - it is the communication platform, advertising
medium, distance university, training camp, think tank and
recruiting instrument for terrorists." Schaeuble understands
that combating terrorism in a globalized world requires
international cooperation and for security officials to use
modern technology. No FDP leader has displayed a similar
understanding of the need to find a proper balance between
personal freedoms and security measures; the FDP has all too
often found it politically expedient to cast these goals as
mutually exclusive.
¶8. (C) At election campaign rallies last week FDP Chairman

Guido Westerwelle criticized the on-line surveillance
measures contained in the BKA law and championed the FDP as
the sole party committed to data privacy and protection
issues. FDP parliamentarian Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger has been suggested as a possible
Justice Minister in a CDU/CSU - FDP government, a job she
previously held under Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU). Given
that she resigned as Justice Minister in 1996 after failing
to obtain support for her rejection of a CDU proposal to
expand the state's right to monitor private citizens, we
would expect her to closely scrutinize all bilateral and
U.S.-EU information sharing proposals. In particular, a
FDP-led Justice Ministry could well complicate implementation
of the bilateral Pruem-like agreement, prevent negotiations
on a HSPD-6 terrorist screening data sharing arrangement, and
raise objections to U.S.-EU information sharing initiatives.
¶9. (C) An MFA official working in the counterterrorism office

noted that one reason the FDP has been so vocal in opposing
Germany's counterterrorism legislative drafts, bilateral and
U.S.-EU security initiatives is due to the fact that they are
in the opposition. Pure political considerations dictate
that the role of the opposition is to oppose the governing
coalition's proposals. Following this line of reasoning,
were the FDP to join the CDU/CSU in a governing coalition,
the responsibilities of power would perhaps convince them to
take a more constructive approach to counterterrorism and
security issues. Furthermore, given that the FDP would be
the junior partner in the coalition, we hope that CDU/CSU
leadership would ensure that German legal frameworks are
adequate and that law enforcement and security officials
continue our current close cooperation and robust information
sharing on operational matters.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1176, MERKEL VS. STEINMEIER? WHAT DO THE

GERMAN
Discussing cables
13:01 21:09 N
VZCZCXRO1354
DE RUEHRL #1176/01 2651345
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221345Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR (KEETON)

TREASURY FOR ICN (KOHLER)
NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019

TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ENRG ETRD GM KJUS PGOV PREL
PTER, SENV
SUBJECT: MERKEL VS. STEINMEIER? WHAT DO THE GERMAN
ELECTIONS REALLY MEAN FOR U.S. INTERESTS?
REF: A. BERLIN 32
¶B. BERLIN 1002
¶C. BERLIN 1136
¶D. BERLIN 1138
¶E. BERLIN 1162
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS GEORGE GLASS FO

R REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) This is not a "change" election. The German public

does not see the September 27 parliamentary elections as
decisive, and on many foreign policy fronts, including
Afghanistan, arms control, and Russia, we do not foresee
significant or distinct policy differences between the two
most feasible coalition options. The most likely results of
the elections are a CDU/CSU-FDP (black-yellow) coalition or a
continued CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition. However, in some
areas there may be changes, including on Iran, tax policy,
and nuclear energy. More importantly, there may be a new
foreign minister who will likely need to get up to speed
quickly on such crucial issues as Iran, Afghanistan, and
NATO's strategic posture. Leaders from the CDU/CSU and FDP
promise a government more friendly toward the United States.
The near certainty that Angela Merkel will remain chancellor
argues for this, but the unpredictability of Foreign
Minister-aspirant and FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle may call
for focused diplomatic engagement with the new FDP political
actors (see REFTEL E for Post's comprehensive expose of
Westerwelle). END SUMMARY.
BLACK-YELLOW (CDU/CSU-FDP)?
---------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) It is virtually certain that Angela Merkel will

retain her position as Chancellor after this Sunday's
elections. But it is impossible to predict the final
composition of the next coalition given that about a third of
the electorate is still undecided and the polls show only a
narrow parliamentary majority for black-yellow. Chancellor
Merkel has repeatedly voiced her preference for a
black-yellow coalition and has promised to form one even with
a one-vote parliamentary majority. The FDP's Westerwelle has
echoed this sentiment as its first choice as well.
¶3. (C/NF) The SPD has almost no prospect of leading a

government and is only likely to remain in power as a
weakened junior partner in another Grand Coalition, should
the CDU/CSU-FDP come up short of a parliamentary majority.
The SPD has failed to gain much momentum, although it has
more recently risen a couple of points in the polls. It
continues to suffer from an inability to profile itself
against the CDU (or even a lack of desire to break with the
CDU in any significant way), with which it has been in
government for the past four years. Also unhelpful have been
a string of losses in local, state, and the June European
Parliament elections.
¶4. (C/NF) U.S. interests will not only be affected by the

composition of the next coalition but also which parties are
in the opposition. A CDU/CSU-FDP coalition would bring to
power a new set of top players at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Justice, Environment, and at either Economics or
Finance (as well as probably at least one other FDP-led
ministry with some turnover in CDU/CSU ministries as well).
The extent to which policy will change is less obvious,
however, because FDP Chairman and Foreign Minister aspirant
Guido Westerwelle has promised considerable continuity with
Steinmeier's approach to foreign policy. In addition, the
FDP's economic reform goals will face considerable resistance
from the Bavarian CSU as well as parts of the CDU. The lack
of coordination and consistency, including between the
Chancellery and MFA, that often occurs in German policy
making will continue to be a challenge for the United States.
¶5. (C/NF) A black-yellow coalition will face a more united

opposition led by an SPD that is likely to move left if it
leaves government and seeks to profile itself against the
Greens and the Left Party, based on the profiles of SPD
leaders waiting in the wings for Steinmeier and SPD Chairman
BERLIN 00001176 002 OF 006
Franz Muentefering to leave. German governments can operate

with narrow majorities due to strict party discipline (which
gets stricter the narrower the majority), but Merkel has not
shown much courage in using her considerable personal
popularity to push through policies that lack public support.
On Afghanistan, in particular, a black-yellow coalition may
seek to simply roll over the ISAF mandate unchanged when it
comes up for renewal in December, rather than risk a row in
the Bundestag over an increase in the troop ceiling, which
the Defense Ministry has concluded is necessary to deal with
the growing insurgency in the German north.
OR GRAND COALITION (CDU/CSU-SPD)?

---------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) However, another Grand Coalition cannot be

discounted, even though nobody professes to want it. It is a
historical fact that the center-right parties have not won a
parliamentary majority since 1994. Another Grand Coalition
would almost certainly be even more difficult for the CDU/CSU
and the SPD than the current one since both parties would be
eyeing each other with distrust and the expectation that the
government may not last an entire term. Further, Merkel's
position within her party would be weakened by what would be
viewed as her failure to achieve a coalition with the FDP
while the Free Democrats would continue to take advantage of
conservative dissatisfaction with the Grand Coalition's
disgruntled CDU voters.
¶7. (C/NF) The SPD leadership might be secretly relieved not

to lose their government posts, but its continued partnership
with the CDU/CSU would likely cause further bleeding of the
party's more leftist supporters to the Greens and Left Party,
further weakening its base. In addition, the SPD left-right
split might be exacerbated, with leftists tempted to
prematurely rupture the Grand Coalition to build a majority
red-red-green government where the SPD would hold the
chancellorship. CDU officials certainly believe -- and have
told the Embassy -- that they expect the SPD would seek to
replace a Grand Coalition with a red-red-green one some time
during the term. Even though Steinmeier has insisted that
any coalition agreement would be for the entire legislative
period, the distrust between the parties would remain. Plus,
if the SPD performs badly in the election, Steinmeier
literally may no longer be in a position to keep his word.
GERMANY'S NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER - WESTERWELLE OR STEINMEIER?

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶8. (C/NF) The election's most obvious impact on bilateral

relations will be in terms of a potential change in foreign
ministers. Our extensive experience with Steinmeier allows
us to comfortably predict how a Steinmeier-led MFA would
pursue German interests globally, and vis-a-vis the United
States. On the other hand, Westerwelle continues to remain
an enigma who has been unable to establish himself as a
significant voice on foreign affairs. The FDP's foreign
policy spokesman Werner Hoyer -- a well known foreign policy
analyst in Germany and internationally, including in the
United States -- has taken the lead here. When we asked
Hoyer this week what would change with Westerwelle, he
struggled to say anything. Westerwelle is a domestic
political animal with little appetite for foreign policy and
international affairs. He will, therefore, continue to be
dependent for foreign policy advice on his mentor, former
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher as well as on Hoyer
and whichever Ministry diplomats gain his trust (REFTEL E).
¶9. (C/NF) Westerwelle's attempt to position himself among

Germany's foreign policy elite with a speech in May at the
German Foreign Relations Council (DGAP) did not produce the
intended results and instead revealed his limitations on such
major issues as Middle East peace. If Westerwelle becomes
Germany's next foreign minister, his learning curve will be
steep. Germany's small foreign and security policy elite --
already skeptical of Westerwelle -- will resent his rise into
the second most powerful political office of the land. And
we will be faced with the question of how best to approach
someone who has clearly had a mixed relationship with the
United States. Despite Westerwelle's praise and respect for
the current Obama Administration, we should not forget that,
as part of the opposition, he has criticized the United
States for the last eight years, while at the same time
BERLIN 00001176 003 OF 006
offering very few ideas of his own on how to solve

international problems (see REFTEL E).
¶10. (C/NF) If Steinmeier is able to lead the SPD to a strong

enough showing to force a Grand Coalition, he certainly could
maintain his position as Foreign Minister. He would also
have the increased political clout provided by a mandate in
the Bundestag and his success in blocking a CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition. Obviously, there would be a high degree of
foreign policy continuity. Unlike Westerwelle, Steinmeier is
already on board with both sides of the U.S. approach to
Iran, and he has told the Ambassador that he supports
additional sanctions should Tehran fail to respond to U.S.
overtures. However, competition between Steinmeier and
Merkel over control of foreign policy will not end with the
election, and Steinmeier would likely try to focus on a few
key issues where he could differentiate himself and his party
from Merkel and the CDU, with arms control, Afghanistan, and
Russian relations being likely choices. Steinmeier wants to
work closely with Washington on these issues and is less
likely to surprise Washington than the Chancellery would be.
¶11. (C/NF) The goodwill that marked the first year of the
Grand Coalition is unlikely to be repeated in a second term,
particularly as Steinmeier contends with those in his own
party who would prefer a leftist coalition. If there is not
enough support for a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, then there would
likely be a numerical red-red-green majority in the
Bundestag. The strained communication that currently marks
Chancellery-MFA relations is likely to continue. Both
Steinmeier and Merkel are responsible realists, however, who
understand the need to work together on the big issues, as
was evident during the Russian invasion of Georgia, their
approach to the Middle East, and their reaction to the
international financial melt down. If new crises arise, the
two are likely to continue to put their own interests aside
long enough to speak with a single voice.
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN BLACK-YELLOW AND GRAND COALITIONS

--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶12. (C/NF) AFGHANISTAN (Some Change): Westerwelle is one of

the few German politicians who justifies the Afghanistan
deployment on the basis of "German national security
interests" and the FDP as a whole has been a consistent
supporter of the ISAF mandate. But with only a narrow
majority in the Bundestag and facing an SPD opposition ready
to accuse them of militarizing the German mission, a
CDU-CSU/FDP coalition ironically might be less willing (and
able) to push through necessary troop increases than a Grand
Coalition. On the other hand, there is likely to be no
difference between the two on the support for police
training, economic assistance and other civilian aid.
¶13. (SBU) ARMS CONTROL/NONPROLIFERATION (Little change):

Westerwelle proudly says that the motto of the MFA under his
leadership will be "peace through disarmament," thereby
seeking to be even more pro-arms control than Steinmeier.
Although Westerwelle has called for the removal of all U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons from German soil by 2013, it is
questionable whether he will manage to include this in a
coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU given their likely
resistance.
¶14. (C/NF) RUSSIA (No change): Like the SPD, the FDP sees
Russia as a "strategic partner" in addressing issues such as
Iran, energy, and Afghanistan and believes engagement and
assistance with modernization is the best way to address
Russia's democratic deficits. Like Merkel and Steinmeier,
Westerwelle has pursued close ties to Russian leaders,
including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Defense Minister
Ivanov, both of whom gave him high-profile meetings in Moscow
this past spring.
¶15. (C/NF) IRAN (Some change): Steinmeier has been a steady

supporter of US policy toward Iran -- both in terms of
dialogue and the need for increased sanctions if necessary,
while Westerwelle has spoken almost exclusively about the
need for dialogue. In addition, Westerwelle's FDP's
pro-business orientation makes it particularly skeptical of
sanctions and is also resistant to unilateral efforts to cut
back trade. Merkel will likely have to take a stronger role
in this issue to keep Germany's position from falling back to
BERLIN 00001176 004 OF 006
the least common denominator.
¶16. (C/NF) TURKEY (Some change): A black-yellow coalition

may result in a subtle, less favorable, shift in Germany's
policy towards Turkey with the exit of the SPD -- Turkey's
staunchest supporter -- from the government. Although FDP
foreign policy experts recognize that EU membership is an
important factor in encouraging additional domestic reforms
in Turkey, it has kept an open mind on the issue. However,
the FDP is more vocal than the SPD in its criticism of
Turkey.
¶17. (C/NF) MIDDLE EAST (Little change): Westerwelle's views

on Israel and Middle East peace may stem more from his past
experience in addressing criticism against Israel and his
interpretation of Germany's historical role toward Israel
than from his own Middle East policy or strategic
calculations. Some attribute Westerwelle's current
pro-Israel stance as the result of his having been burned
politically both domestically and in Israel in 2002. At that
time, Westerwelle defended an FDP politician, Juergen
Moellemann, who had published a brochure strongly critical of
then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's actions towards
the Palestinians. Some claimed the brochure was
anti-Semitic. While in Israel shortly thereafter,
Westerwelle was questioned by then-PM Sharon about what
Sharon referred to as a growing anti-Semitism in Germany and
Europe. In an August 2009 interview with "Der Spiegel,"
Westerwelle explained his decision to vote against Germany's
participation in UNIFIL with his view that Germany cannot
take a neutral position in the Middle East because of its
past. He noted that he had visited the Golan Heights in
Israel as a young man and was impressed with the
vulnerability of the country. Even more so than Steinmeier,
however, Westerwelle may seek a greater role for Germany and
the EU in the Middle East. In the "Spiegel" interview, he
called for the EU to launch an initiative to establish a
conference for security and cooperation in the Middle East.
We could expect both Steinmeier and Westerwelle to hold to
U.S. messages on the Middle East, with both competing with
the Chancellery for the lead on this issue.
¶18. (C/NF) GUANTANAMO (No change): Steinmeier would likely

take a more accommodating approach toward Germany accepting
some of the Guantanamo detainees than would Westerwelle, but
the key ministry in deciding this issue will continue to be
Interior. In either a black-yellow or another Grand
Coalition, Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU) could continue on as
Interior Minister, although there is some talk of his being
named as EU commissioner. Schaeuble has been very skeptical
of accepting detainees from a security standpoint. More
recently, he told the Ambassador that Germany would only take
detainees who will require no surveillance.
¶19. (SBU) ECONOMIC CRISIS/INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

(Little Change): All potential government parties share a
similar strategy; increase regulation and supervision of the
financial sector with differences at the margin. The SPD
advocates taxing share trades over 1000 euros and monitoring
private equity funds more closely, while the CDU/CSU and FDP
propose concentrating financial supervision under the
Bundesbank. A black-yellow government would result in a new
Finance Minister; if Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg remains at
the Economics Ministry, then the FDP might be given the
Finance Minister, with Hans-Otto Solms, an experienced and
cautious financial policy expert, the most likely replacement.
¶20. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE (No Change): There is little

difference between the parties on issues in play at the
upcoming UNFCCC's COP-15 in Copenhagen, and Merkel maintains
strong control over German policy in this area. There will
be a new Environment Minister should a black-yellow
government be formed, however, and it is unclear which party
would then control the Ministry. In previous CDU/CSU-FDP
coalitions, the CDU ran it but if the FDP does as well as
current polls suggest, it might make a play for the Ministry.
Current SPD Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel has had a
high profile in his party's Bundestag campaign and could
remain in place in a Grand Coalition.
¶21. (C) ENERGY (Some Change): The SPD insisted on

continuation of the previous government's plan to phase out
nuclear power plants during the last coalition negotiations
BERLIN 00001176 005 OF 006
and would stick to this position again. In contrast, the FDP

has been the party most open to nuclear energy, insisting
that the phase-out itself should be at least slowed down to
protect Germany's supply of energy. The CSU/CSU also wants
to extend the possible life of existing nuclear power plants,
provided they are safe, during a "transitional" period to
provide time for Germany to switch to greater reliance on
renewable sources. Recent controversies over the safety of
some nuclear power plants have made Merkel and even the FDP
less willing to press for reliance on nuclear energy.
¶22. (C/NF) DATA PROTECTION (Little Change): Data privacy has

been a second-tier campaign issue but does arise in debates
on domestic security policy. Another Grand Coalition could
leave Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries (SPD) in place; she
reluctantly agreed to the landmark data sharing initiative on
serious crime and terrorism suspects (the Pruem-like
agreement) due to privacy concerns. A CDU/CSU-FDP coalition
might return Sabine Leutheusser-Scharrenberger to the Justice
Ministry, which she headed from 1992-96 in the last
black-yellow coalition (she resigned her office after the her
party agreed to wiretapping legislation proposed by the
CDU/CSU). She or any FDP Justice Minister would likely
continue to see their role as the protector of civil
liberties and therefore they would carefully scrutinize all
bilateral and U.S.-EU data sharing initiatives.
¶23. (C/NF) COUNTER-TERRORISM/LAW ENFORCEMENT (Little change):

The CDU will likely remain in control of the Interior
Ministry regardless of the coalition, and Schaeuble, although
67, is likely but not certain to stay on for another term.
He has brought U.S.-German CT cooperation to an unprecedented
level, and no other German official has offered as much
cooperation (except on the issue of resettling Guantanamo
detainees where the focus on internal German security
supersedes his desire to work with Washington). Any possible
replacement -- Chancellery Chief Thomas de Maiziere has been
mentioned in the press -- is unlikely to have his authority
or expertise but will likely continue his policies.
¶24. (U) TRADE (No change): All five parties are committed to
open market but the SPD, Greens, and The Left Party want
environmental and social standards included while the CDU/CSU
stresses the need for protection of intellectual property and
the FDP worries about domestic subsidies and market access.
None of the parties wants to restructure the German economy
to reduce export-dependency and address global imbalances.
Other U.S. interests, such as concluding the Doha round of
trade negotiations, would not likely be affected by a change
in coalition.
¶25. (U) TAX POLICY (Some change): Tax policy is often cited
as the area where a black-yellow government would produce
change. The FDP proposes a radical overhaul of the tax
system to simplify the tax code and stagger the corporate
rate. CSU leader and Bavaria Minister-President Horst
Seehofer has been critical of the FDP plan, which he says
will run up the deficit and impose an excessive burden on the
public budget. Neither the CDU/CSU's nor FDP's tax proposals
are realistic, however, in light of budget deficits that are
expected to be more than 2 percent this year and 4 percent in
2010, just as mid-term targets for Germany's balanced budget
amendment kick in. Some sort of tax increase therefore is a
near certainty, perhaps in the form of an increase in the
value-added tax.
COMMENT
-------
¶26. (C/NF) Chancellor Merkel will continue to exert strong

influence on German foreign policy in an attempt to create a
political legacy in international affairs. This will be true
whether the MFA is led by Steinmeier or Westerwelle. We can
also predict that tensions between the Chancellery and MFA
will remain based on different coalition partners controlling
them. If Steinmeier returns to office, he will be a reliable
partner. Westerwelle is a wild card; his exuberant
personality does not lend itself to taking a back seat to
Chancellor Merkel on any issue. If he becomes foreign
minister, there is the possibility of higher profile discord
between the Chancellery and MFA. This may demand focused
diplomatic engagement by the USG with the new FDP political
actors. END COMMENT.
BERLIN 00001176 006 OF 006
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1197, WESTERWELLE'S SURGE CLINCHES

BLACK-YELLOW IN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO5783
DE RUEHRL #1197/01 2711128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281128Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE, INR (KEETON)

NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2019

TAGS: GM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE'S SURGE CLINCHES BLACK-YELLOW IN
GERMANY; MERKEL GAINS SECOND TERM
REF: A. BERLIN 1188

¶B. BERLIN 1186
¶C. BERLIN 1176
¶D. BERLIN 1167
¶E. BERLIN 1162
¶F. BERLIN 1138
¶G. BERLIN 1179
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Chancellor Merkel achieved her goal of a solid

parliamentary majority for her Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social
Union (CSU), and the pro-business Free Democratic Party
(FDP), but will have to contend with a self-confident FDP
that is likely to seek major concessions in terms of policy
and personnel. Nonetheless, the CDU/CSU's 33.8 percent
showing was its lowest since 1949, while the FDP's 14.6
percent was its strongest in the history of the Federal
Republic. The SPD crashed, while the Left Party and Greens
were able to score their highest results ever, with the Left
Party surpassing the Greens overall and overtaking the SPD in
the eastern German states by a wide margin. Merkel hopes
that coalition negotiations with the FDP will be "quick and
decisive," while FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle -- widely
expected to be the next foreign minister -- has emphasized
his intention to press for the party's goals of a fundamental
tax reform, more emphasis on education, and stronger
protection of civil liberties. Merkel and Westerwelle
already met privately election night (September 27) and
coalition negotiations should begin soon, most likely with
the goal of having a formal agreement with the selection of a
cabinet by the time the Bundestag convenes a month from now.
End Summary.
OVERALL TREND: MAJOR PARTIES IN DECLINE

---------------------------------------
¶2. (U) The results show the decline of the major parties --
particularly the SPD -- and the strengthening of a five-party
system. Preliminary results give CDU/CSU 33.8 percent
(versus 35.2 percent in 2005); the FDP 14.6 percent (9.8);
the SPD 23.0 (34.3); the Left Party 11.9 (8.7), and the
Greens 10.7 (8.1). The decline in the CDU/CSU percentage is
due particularly to the CSU's losses in Bavaria, where the
party suffered its worst Bundestag result ever at 42.6
percent, down from 49.2 percent in 2005, but it still won all
45 of its constituencies. These preliminary results give the
CDU 24 "surplus mandates" because of the high number of
constituency seats it won despite its low 33.8 percent second
vote showing (see REFTEL G).
¶3. (U) The new coalition should end up with control of both
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (Upper Council). Based on
the preliminary official results, the CDU/CSU will have 239
seats in the Bundestag (up from 226), which along with the 93
FDP Bundestag seats (previously 61) would give the new
government a solid majority. The SPD will have 146 seats in
the Bundestag (down from 222), the Left Party 76 (versus 54)
and the Greens 68 (versus 51). The Schleswig Holstein
election on September 27 also appears to have given the CDU
and FDP a parliamentary majority in that state. With CDU-FDP
governments there and in Saxony, where the two parties won a
majority on August 30, the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition will
soon have a majority in the Bundesrat and should be able to
gain its approval of future coalition legislation.
¶4. (C) Chancellor Merkel and her CDU/CSU Union are somewhat
disappointed by their party's results, but are publicly
emphasizing that the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition has met its
demise and will be replaced by a center-right coalition
composed of the CDU/CSU and FDP. "We achieved something
fantastic," said Chancellor Merkel, now facing a second
four-year term. "We achieved a stable majority in Germany
for a new government...We can party tonight, but there is a
lot of work waiting for us." An uncharacteristically
emotional Merkel -- clearly relieved by her victory --
promised to be the "Chancellor of all Germans" -- old and
young, entrepreneurs and workers -- and said the CDU/CSU
would be sufficiently dominant in the new coalition to
prevail "in questions that affect social balance."
¶5. (C) Despite her huge personal popularity, however, Merkel

led her CDU/CSU Union to its second poorest result in
history, leaving her vulnerable to future backstabbing within
BERLIN 00001197 002 OF 003
her party. Merkel -- while happy to be rid of the Grand

Coalition with the SPD -- now faces the challenging task of
entering a coalition with a party that could prove to be more
difficult to manage than the SPD. Merkel will start talks
with the FDP within days. It could, however, take up to the
end of October for the parties to forge the policy
compromises and work out the distribution of cabinet posts
necessary to seal a coalition deal.
FDP: THE REAL WINNER

--------------------
¶6. (C) The FDP will return to government after eleven years
in opposition, having achieved its best election results in
the party's history. Its leader, FDP Party Chairman Guido
Westerwelle, will most likely become Germany's next foreign
minister (see REFTEL E). At the FDP election celebration,
Westerwelle told his party faithful that "We want to be part
of the government. But this means responsibility, and we are
ready to take on this responsibility." Westerwelle said his
party would work to ensure that Germany gets a "fair tax
system and better educational opportunities" and that civil
rights would once again be respected. The FDP will be in a
very powerful position to demand a larger number of cabinet
seats in a new German government. They are likely to expect
to get at least the equivalent of what they have had in the
past: the foreign office, either justice or perhaps interior
(which they led from 1969-82), economics or possibly finance,
and at least one other ministry (in the past they have had
education and economic cooperation (i.e. development).
However, the FDP will find it difficult to negotiate a
coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU over the coming weeks,
especially in the areas of tax cuts (see REFTEL F) and civil
rights, including data privacy (see REFTEL D).
SPD: HARD ROAD AHEAD

--------------------
¶7. (C) It would be hard to exaggerate the dimension of the

SPD defeat. The party fell more than 11 points to its worst
result in the post-war period. Its share of the eastern
German vote was 19 percent, behind both the CDU and Left
Party, and the FDP came within striking distance of the SPD
in some western German states, including Bavaria, where the
SPD's 17 percent was just ahead of the FDP's 15 percent. The
SPD election-night party was like a funeral, and Steinmeier
and SPD party chairman Muentefering appeared grim-faced to
announce that Steinmeier would be the Bundestag caucus
chairman and thus unofficial leader of the opposition to the
new black-yellow government. Muentefering did not, as many
expected, announce his resignation but it is likely to come
by the time of the next party conference in mid-November.
¶8. (C) Exit polls show that the SPD lost more than a million
votes to former supporters who simply stayed home and
additional voters to the Left Party and Greens, and that the
public still blames it for the changes in unemployment
insurance and the retirement age enacted during the Schroeder
government and as part of the grand coalition. The SPD, with
only four minister-presidents and a shrunken parliamentary
caucus, will have to decide how to profile itself against its
two fellow leftist opposition parties, and the party left is
likely to press for coalitions with the Left and Greens at
the state level.
LEFT OVERTAKES GREENS

---------------------
¶9. (C) The Left Party -- under Oskar Lafontaine's and Gregor
Gysi's leadership -- can also claim electoral victory with
their party's best showing ever in a parliamentary election.
Having won 11.9 per cent of the total vote and 20 direct
mandates -- the largest number ever for one of the smaller
parties -- it will be difficult for Germany's other parties,
especially the SPD, to ignore The Left's steady rise in
popularity in east and west Germany (see REFTEL B). The
party successfully stole the SPD's thunder and was partially
responsible for the SPD's poorest showing ever in German
election history. The Left Party can now concentrate on
achieving the ultimate prize in German politics in 2013: a
governing coalition with the SPD and the Greens. Berlin SPD
Governing Mayor Klaus Wowereit has already said that this
year's election must be the last one in which the SPD
excludes the possibility of cooperation with the Left, and he
and other left-wingers in the SPD will likely fight to bring
the two parties closer together.
GREENS: HOW TO STAY RELEVANT?
BERLIN 00001197 003 OF 003
-----------------------------
¶10. (C) The Greens may have celebrated their first double
digit showing (10.7 per cent) in a parliamentary election,
but the party was unsuccessful in preventing a black-yellow
coalition or becoming the third strongest party in the
Bundestag (see REFTEL A). Party Co-Chairman Cem Oezdemir --
who failed to win his direct mandate and was too low on the
party list to win a seat in the Bundestag -- said that the
Greens would establish themselves as a "think tank for social
issues and for Germany as a whole." The SPD's disastrous
electoral result will remind the Greens that they may need to
reach out to the CDU if they are to remain a relevant
political power. For the foreseeable future, Oezdemir hinted
that his party would concentrate on achieving good results at
future state elections and plotting their return to power in
¶2013.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C) Chancellor Merkel's main campaign objective -- to

attract centrist support by out-positioning the SPD as the
best protector of Germany's social welfare state -- was
successful, although her CDU/CSU union suffered losses,
primarily because of the CSU. She will now have to find a
way to balance this promise with FDP demands for greater
reforms while dealing with the likely struggles between a
strengthened FDP and a CSU that is concerned about its
continued decline. The parties will now enter complex
coalition negotiations with pressure to complete them by the
time that the new Bundestag convenes in late October, these
talks have the potential to be very contentious. Merkel will
want to stamp her authority on the coalition agreement, while
Westerwelle will be a tough bargaining partner for Merkel as
he aims to extract the maximum amount of policy and personnel
concessions from the CDU/CSU. Finally, as a weakened SPD
moves into the opposition, it can be expected that it will
seek to continue the public debate on the major campaign
issues and begin to rebuild itself, a process that could
include its strong re-positioning to the left.
¶12. (C) What does a CDU/CSU-FDP victory mean for the United
States? On a practical level, Germany will have a new
foreign minister, most likely Guido Westerwelle, who has
enjoyed a difficult relationship with the United States
during his time spent in opposition (see REFTEL D).
Westerwelle will face a steep learning curve at the MFA, but
we should not expect him to play second fiddle to Chancellor
Merkel. The foreign and security policy rivalry between the
MFA and Chancellery during the Bush Administration will not
disappear. Indeed, they may be enhanced with Westerwelle's
attempt to profile and make an international name for himself
as quickly as possible, making it difficult for us to
identify who is in the lead on any given issue. Chancellor
Merkel and Westerwelle will be competing for attention; the
latter's flamboyant and outgoing style may give him a leg up
but Chancellor Merkel will be keen to assert her primacy in
international affairs, especially on economic and EU matters.
She has more government and foreign policy experience that
will come in handy in this future duel, and in an age of
international summitry, the Chancellor rather than the
Foreign Minister calls the shots. We should not
underestimate her desire to carve out a political legacy for
herself, especially in the international arena, and her
record of strong cooperation with Washington suggests that
her dominance is likely to have a net benefit for US
interests.
¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates General

Duesseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES1017, ARGENTINA: CFK'S NEW CABINET

CHIEF
Discussing cables
2009-09-10 2010-11-30 SECRET//NOFOR Embassy Buenos
09BUENOSAIRES1017
15:03 16:04 N Aires
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1017/01 2531523

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P 101523Z SEP 09
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2039

TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCOR ECON AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: CFK'S NEW CABINET CHIEF
REF: A. TDX-315/090481-08 AND TDX-315/042493-09

¶B. TD-314/65216-07
¶C. TD-314/67647-07
¶F. BUENOS AIRES 0980 AND PREVIOUS
¶G. TD-314/046516-08
¶H. 08 BUENOS AIRES 1550 AND PREVIOUS
¶I. 08 BUENOS AIRES 1478
¶J. 08 BUENOS AIRES 0322
¶K. TD-314/08212-07
¶L. TD-314/043023-09
¶M. TD-314/054350-09
Classified By: CDA Thomas P. Kelly for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
¶1. (S) Summary: Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de

Kirchner's (CFK) promotion of former Justice Minister Anibal
Fernandez (AF) to Cabinet Chief puts in place someone with
six years of experience working for the First Couple, first
as former president Nestor Kirchner's Interior Minister and
then as CFK's Justice Minister. By dint of his office's
physical proximity to the President's as well as his
portfolio's constitutional responsibilities, AF is in a
position to wield significant power and influence, and is
already playing a key role in shaping Casa Rosada politics,
policy, and message.
¶2. (S) AF has been the most accessible member of CFK's

Cabinet for the Embassy, but, unlike his two immediate
predecessors, he has also not been shy about vociferously
attacking the USG (or any other target) in order to defend
the Kirchners. Like many Argentine politicians, he is dogged
by corruption rumors, including ties to narcotrafficking,
according to unsubstantiated press and intelligence reports
(ref A). Additionally, he is suspected of directing
intelligence teams to clandestinely monitor the emails of the
administration's political opponents, according to separate
intelligence reports (refs B and C), and he has been linked
to reported CFK administration efforts to secure additional
votes illegally in Buenos Aires and Cordoba provinces ahead
of the June midterms. Despite the varied and persistent
accusations of corruption lodged against him, however, there
is no hard evidence. End Summary.
CFK Rewards Fernandez' Loyalty with Cabinet Chief Post

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶3. (C) Former Minister of Justice, Human Rights and Security

Anibal Fernandez (AF) became CFK's third Chief of Cabinet
since she assumed office in December 2007. A longtime
Peronist and a close ally of former President Nestor Kirchner
(NK), AF has worked over six years for the presidential
couple, since the first day of NK's term. He has been one of
the administration's most outspoken public defenders, first
while serving as NK's Interior Minister and later as CFK's
Justice Minister. Many viewed AF's promotion to Cabinet
Chief as a reward for securing in his hometown of Quilmes one
of the few significant Kirchner victories in the June 28
mid-term elections (ref E).
Origins of the Cabinet Chief Post

---------------------------------
¶4. (C) As Cabinet Chief, AF has considerable power and

influence. The authors of the 1994 constitutional reforms
intended the position to be a check on presidential power as
a watered-down prime minister, although in practice the
Cabinet Chief has become a presidential chief of staff,
spokesman, and all-purpose firefighter. The Cabinet Chief is
technically responsible for the collection of national taxes;
submitting the executive's budget request to Congress;
co-signing executive decrees; appointing administration
employees not designated by the President; and overseeing the
Cabinet's ministers. Additionally, the President's Cabinet
Chief is expected to report at least monthly to Congress,
alternating between the Lower House and the Senate. (Note:
The last two cabinet chiefs, Alberto Fernandez and Sergio
Massa, appeared before Congress less than once a year; Anibal
Fernandez will make his first such appearance this week.)
Under the Ks, Cabinet Chief Influence Grew

------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Under the Kirchner administration, the cabinet chief

position has grown in influence beyond its
constitutionally-proscribed powers. Since 2002, the
Argentine Congress has annually authorized economic
"superpowers" for the executive branch. Originally enacted
to address the 2001 financial crisis, these controversial
superpowers enable the Cabinet Chief to redistribute federal
funds coming from export taxes and tax collections above and
beyond budget estimates, at the President's discretion.
¶6. (C) The Cabinet Chief's influence ultimately depends on

his relationship with the First Couple. AF's immediate
predecessor, the media-friendly Sergio Massa, reportedly had
differences with NK over style and substance. Their tense
relationship soured even further with NK's poor showing in
Massa's hometown in the June 28 midterm elections (ref E).
Alberto Fernandez (not related to AF), who served as CFK's
and NK's first Cabinet Chief, was one of the few capable of
moderating the temperamental First Couple. But even he was
unable to walk the Kirchners back from their
take-no-prisoners approach to an extended conflict with the
farm sector, and he resigned in July 2008 out of frustration
(ref F). Amid a cabinet that does not speak much to the
media, Anibal Fernandez has long been one of the most visible
spokesmen for the Kirchners, and his influence over policy
and political decisions will likely grow in his new post.
Embassy Interaction with Fernandez

----------------------------------
¶7. (C) AF has been for us the most accessible and

forward-leaning member of CFK's Cabinet, welcoming USG law
enforcement training and cooperation (ref G). Again and
again, he has gone out of his way to rearrange his travel
schedule to meet with visiting U.S. officials and greet
Embassy officials at diplomatic events. Although he has
frequently told us that he is the most "pro-American" member
of CFK's Cabinet, we think this reflects his deep-seated
pragmatism rather than any abiding affinity for the United
States. Our positive working relationship with Fernandez,
for example, did not stop him from criticizing the United
States to protect the Kirchners, as he did during the 2007-08
suitcase scandal (ref H). Nonetheless, he was one of the
first Argentine officials to assure Embassy officials that
the suitcase scandal was "water under the bridge."
¶8. (C) More political hack than diplomat, AF is a

fiefdom-builder who loathes giving up control over strategic
resources. When he moved from the Interior Ministry to
Justice, for example, he took the internal security agencies
with him. Many believe that even now, as Cabinet Chief, AF
retains operational control over the law enforcement forces.
¶9. (C) Although AF confided to the Embassy's former LEGAT

that he was not in a position to micromanage the Ministry of
Justice at first, he said he immediately centralized control
once he got the lay of the land. As Chief of the internal
security forces, including the Border Patrol/Paramilitary
Police (Gendarmeria Nacional), Coast Guard, federal police,
and special airport police, AF quickly imposed a strict
vertical hierarchy where he discouraged information sharing
and commanded security chiefs to report directly to him. He
has boasted to Embassy officials that while his predecessor
at Justice, Alberto Iribarne, only signed a few ministerial
decrees, he signed hundreds. Judicial contacts have told us
that as Justice Minister, he even tried to pressure
provincial judges to advise him of any judicial assistance
requests from federal judges, but subsequently backtracked on
that position after judges complained that the directive
interfered with judicial independence. His micro-management
over even routine matters in his portfolio resulted in
bureaucratic backlogs for us. Naming participants to U.S.
training programs, the visits of Transportation Security
Administration teams to conduct airport/air carrier
assessments, and clearance for U.S. Federal Air Marshals all
required his personal approval. Once, when the DCM visited
Fernandez's Chief of Staff at Justice, Fernandez got wind of
the meeting while it was in progress, got into a car, and
stormed into the office, taking over the meeting while the
chief of staff clammed up.
¶10. (C) A pragmatic and politically savvy interlocutor, AF

prefers not to include his staff in meetings with Embassy
officials. Although he is always well-prepared, his speech
and demeanor can sometimes be crass. On more than one
occasion, he has taken obvious notice of an attractive
translator during a meeting with visiting U.S. officials.
Additionally, he has referred to the existence of local
"demand for young genitals" when explaining the challenges
his Ministry faces in fighting human trafficking for the
purposes of sexual exploitation.
AF Denies Drug Problem, Advocates Decriminalization

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶11. (C) Although he has not interfered with USG CN activity

here insofar as we can ascertain, AF has frequently denied
that drug trafficking is a major problem in Argentina,
despite evidence indicating that Colombian and Mexican drug
cartels operate in Argentina, and that Argentina leads Latin
America in cocaine consumption. AF insists that Argentina is
merely a transit point and continues to deny the existence of
drug labs in Argentina. In an October 2008 workshop on
Argentine narcotics policy, AF described press reports
claiming that drug cartels had established production
facilities in Argentina (ref I) as mere fiction. He is also
a long-time advocate for the decriminalization of drug use,
saying he dreams "of the day when drug addicts are sent to
rehab instead of prison." AF argues that the government
should stop focusing on small-time carriers in order to focus
on dismantling large drug trafficking networks (ref J).
¶12. (S/NF) According to late December 2006 intelligence

reporting (ref K), AF advised then Vice-President Scioli that
he should not make counternarcotics his number one campaign
issue when he ran for Governor of Buenos Aires province.
Reasoning that the narcotraffickers are well-organized with
the capacity to frame politicians, AF suggested that Scioli
pay only lip service to counternarcotics efforts. He argued
that Scioli should not assume the risks since drug-related
crimes would never be resolved.
Ties to Drug Trafficking?

-------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) Unsubstantiated press and intelligence reports

(refs A and M) suggest that AF may be financially profiting
from narcotrafficking. These reports state that AF's ties to
narcotrafficking date back to 1994 when AF was mayor of
Quilmes and allegedly directed a cocaine trafficking network.
The Embassy's DEA section has heard similar allegations from
contacts at the Argentine Counternarcotics Secretariat
(SEDRONAR), which has been at loggerheads with AF. SEDRONAR
contacts told poloff that AF personally called off an ongoing
drug investigation in Salta province near the Bolivian border
when he got wind of the investigation.
¶14. (S/NF) We have no information to corroborate these

allegations, and we are unaware of any formal legal complaint
against him on narcotrafficking charges. However, there are
two formal legal complaints pending against former
subordinates -- including Federal Police officials -- for
protecting or willfully ignoring various illegal brothels in
the Monserrat neighborhood (within a five-block radius of
Federal Police headquarters) in Buenos Aires City where the
sale of drugs is suspected.
Spying on the Opposition

------------------------
¶15. (S/NF) Intelligence reporting suggests that AF has not

hesitated to resort to questionable means to keep tabs on
political opponents. In mid-May 2007, AF, as Interior
Minister, allegedly directed a private intelligence team
composed of retired military and intelligence officers to
clandestinely monitor the emails of provincial and federal
government officials, business executives and journalists
suspected of working against NK's administration (ref B). In
September 2007, he reportedly used a private, unofficial
investigative team to read the emails and collect derogatory
information on then-gubernatorial candidates for Buenos Aires
province, Francisco de Narvaez and Juan Carlos Blumberg, and
Buenos Aires province Minister of Security Leon Arslanian
(ref C). According to intelligence reporting in November
2007, AF used two computer technicians to hack into
high-level email accounts, including Chief Justice
Lorenzetti's email (ref G). San Isidro judge Sandra
Arroyo-Salgado (wife of Alberto Nisman, the Special
Prosecutor investigating the 1994 bombing of the Argentine
Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA)) is investigating AF's
relationship with the two technicians, according to press
reports. (Note: These technicians in the past have been
associated with Argentina's State Secretariat for
Intelligence (SIDE) and sought asylum in Uruguay.)
¶16. (S/NF) AF reportedly may have played a tangential role in

illegally bolstering voter registration ahead of the June 28
midterms, according to a June 2009 intelligence report. He
supported efforts -- led by Interior Minister Florencio
Randazzo and Secretary of Intelligence Hector Icazuriaga --
to illegally procure national registry identification numbers
(DNIs) to register ostensible supporters and secure
additional votes in Buenos Aires and Cordoba provinces (ref
L).
Transparency
------------
¶17. (C) Although AF once bragged to the Embassy's former

LEGAT that he has a "transparent and honest style," he did
little as Justice Minister to fortify his agency's
anti-corruption efforts or enhance governmental transparency.
Admittedly, the MOJ's Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) was a
weak unit to begin with, but it made no headway during AF's
tenure. Contacts who work for the Cabinet Chief's government
accountability and transparency unit have expressed concern
that the GOA will become even less transparent under his
watch. They note that since AF took over as chief of the
internal security forces, criminal statistics are no longer
public information. Indeed, despite public alarm over rising
insecurity, AF refuses to acknowledge a rise in robberies and
kidnappings and instead has argued that insecurity is only "a
sensation fed by the media."
Corruption
----------
¶18. (C) Like many Argentine politicians, AF has been dogged

by rumors of corruption. In recent years, some Embassy
contacts have alleged that AF has a corrupt relationship with
the Japanese computer company, NEC. When AF was mayor of
Quilmes (1991-1995), he was charged with several counts of
corruption, becoming a fugitive for 48 hours. Although he
was later acquitted, he has continued to face accusations of
corruption from the opposition, and the allegations remain
fresh in the minds of some Argentines. When CFK named him
Minister of Justice, one judicial contact told us that many
in the judicial system considered the appointment "ironic"
and called AF the "fugitive from Quilmes."
Bio Data
--------
¶19. (SBU) AF began his political career in 1983, working

first as an advisor to the budget committee of the Buenos
Aires provincial Senate. From 1985 to 1987, he served as the
administrative secretary for the Peronist party (PJ) in the
Buenos Aires provincial Senate. He also simultaneously held
positions in the municipal councils of Quilmes and Florencio
Varela. In 1991, AF was elected mayor of Quilmes. In 1995,
he won a provincial Senate seat where he presided over the
Commission on Public Health and Control over Addictions. He
was named provincial government secretary in 1997, labor
secretary in 1999, and the province,s first labor minister
in 2001. AF served in former President Eduardo Duhalde's
cabinet as secretary general of the presidency in January
2002, and then as production minister in October of the same
year. He switched allegiance to NK in 2004 when the Peronist
party split into two factions - one that supported NK and
another that supported Duhalde. Since then, Duhalde
supporters have called him a traitor and the "first Kirchner
convert." In 2007, CFK tapped him to serve as her Justice
Minister and on July 7 she named him Cabinet Chief.
¶20. (SBU) AF was born in Quilmes, Buenos Aires Province on

January 9, 1957. A public accountant, AF received his law
degree while serving as Interior Minister. Although the
Kirchners stifled AF's ambitions to run for Governor of BA
province in 2007 when they tapped then Vice President Daniel
Scioli for the job, AF's power and influence within the
Kirchner Cabinet has steadily grown. He accompanied CFK to
the United States in July when she went to the OAS to discuss
the political crisis in Honduras. He also accompanied her in
May 2007 when she addressed the American Jewish Committee as
Senator and First Lady. During that visit, he met with the
U.S. Attorney General, FBI officials, and State Department
officers on TIP-related issues. AF lives in the trendy
waterfront Puerto Madero neighborhood in Buenos Aires City
with his wife and one son. A fan of technology, he carries
multiple cell phones and his office has six television sets
permanently tuned in to every local news channel. He speaks
limited English.
Comment: Handle with Care

-------------------------
¶21. (S) For USG officials, Anibal Fernandez has long been the
most readily accessible GOA cabinet member. That has
continued since he became Cabinet Chief, assuming more
importance than ever. Fernandez has far better access to the
ruling first couple than any other member of the Cabinet;
perhaps only reclusive Casa Rosada staffer Carlos Zannini has
more influence with the Kirchners. Given AF's importance,
accessibility, and the absence of hard evidence to
substantiate the allegations described above, we continue to
meet and work with him. At the same time, there are enough
rumors about Fernandez -- even in this rumor-plagued,
conspiratorial society -- to approach interactions with him
with some caution.
KELLY
Viewing cable 09CARACAS1181, THE CUBANS IN VENEZUELA'S PORTS

Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0019
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TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
USDOC FOR 4332 MAC/ITA/WH/JLAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019

TAGS: ECON PGOV ETRD EINV MARR CU VE
SUBJECT: THE CUBANS IN VENEZUELA'S PORTS
REF: CARACAS 1022 AND PREVIOUS
CARACAS 00001181 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Post has comfirmed that a wholly Venezuelan

government-owned company, Bolipuertos, is now charged with
the management of Venezuela's ports. Cuba's ASPORT has a 49
percent share in Puertos del Alba, a separate company, which
will reportedly be focused on business development. Contacts
in shipping circles, however, tell us that the Cubans are
active in the ports as "advisors" to Bolipuertos and were
instrumental in pushing for the take over of port operations.
Bolipuertos has taken over private warehouse operations at
three ports named in the original March 25 Decree (Guamache,
Maracaibo, Puerto Cabello) as well as a fourth -- La Guaira,
the port serving Caracas. Shipping contacts report rumors
that the government may nationalize stevedoring and customs
agent services. Insurance premiums have reportedly increased
35-40 percent since May. END SUMMARY.
BOLIPUERTOS & PUERTOS DEL ALBA

------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Post has clarified the issue of the management of

Venezuela's ports. Two companies of virtually the same name
have been decreed by the Government of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela (GBRV). The first -- Bolivariana de
Puertos S.A. (BPSA or Bolipuertos) -- was founded by Decree
on June 12, 2007. This company was to be a mixed
Venezuelan-Cuban company with Cuba's Grupo Empresarial de la
Industria Portuaria (ASPORT) having a 49 percent share. We
understand that this first Bolipuertos was never actually
registered as a company. The second Bolivariana de Puertos
(BP or Bolipuertos) was created by Decree No. 6,645 dated
March 25, 2009, to "maintain, administer and develop"
Venezuela's ports. According to that Decree, the Venezuelan
state holds 100 percent of the capital of the second
Bolipuertos which was assigned to the Ministry for Public
Works and Housing. Neither of these companies is Puertos del
Alba in which the Cubans have a significant investment.
¶3. (C) On July 29, 2009, as reported reftel, the GBRV

published another Decree in the National Gazette authorizing
the creation of Puertos del Alba, a state-owned company to be
charged with "modernizing, renovating, equipping, and
constructing" ports in Venezuela and Cuba. Cuba's ASPORT has
a 49 percent share in Puertos del Alba with the 51 percent
majority share remaining with Bolipuertos. A close Embassy
contact tells us that the intent of the GBRV is to "follow
the Cuban model" by installing a company (Bolipuertos) that
will run all aspects of port operations in Venezuela while
Puertos del Alba will act as its business development arm.
Other contacts assert that Bolipuertos retains Cuban
"advisors" on staff, but they do not believe that the Cubans
have formal managerial responsibility in the company. These
advisors, however, are believed to have urged the GBRV to
move ahead with taking control of the ports.
¶4. (C) The March 25, 2009, Decree creating (or re-creating)
Bolipuertos stipulated that it would be responsible for the
infrastructure of Puerto El Guamache (the Isla Marguerita
cruise ship port), Maracaibo Port, Puerto Cabello
(Venezuela's largest port), as well as that of "any ports to
be developed in the future." As reported reftels, a
subsequent Decree dated July 30, declared the immediate
nationalization of private warehouse operations at the three
ports named in the March 25 Decree as well as a fourth -- La
Guaira, the port serving Caracas. Our contacts in the
shipping industry tell us that it appears likely that
Bolipuertos will also take control of port operations at
Guanta, Palua/Puerto Ordaz, Guiria and Cumana.
PORT SERVICES STILL TROUBLED

----------------------------
¶5. (C) Operations in Puerto Cabello were interrupted for

four days following the take over of warehouse operations at
the beginning of August. Reports of significant problems
have continued since the resumption of operations. Former
Petroleum Chamber President Andres Duarte (protect
throughout) informed Econoffs that his stevedore company has
not been allowed to remove equipment from the port for
maintenance or weekend storage in what many believe is a
CARACAS 00001181 002.2 OF 002
precursor to the expropriation of stevedoring and other

terminal services. Another contact whose company provided
warehouse services at Puerto Cabello, directed Econoffs'
attention to another company, Venezolana de Exportaciones y
Importaciones, C.A. (VEXINCA), established by Decree No.
38954 dated June 17, 2008. According to this contact,
VEXINCA, which is run by the military as are the ports at
this point, is actively offering customs services to the
clients of private sector customs agents. Our contact
speculates that VEXINCA may eventually be designated as the
sole provider of customs services in Venezuela.
INSURANCE AND OTHER RISKS

-------------------------
¶6. (C) Duarte informed Econoffs that insurance premiums have

increased 35-40 percent since the May 2009 announcement of
the Marine Committee of the Lloyd's Market Association that
it had withdrawn maritime war-risk policy coverage for
Venezuela. Other local shipping contacts have confirmed a
bulletin that ran in a British shipping magazine in August
noting that it may be difficult to make claims against
Bolipuertos for robbery, damage etc. According to Duarte,
Norweigan and Panamanian owned ships that used to bring soda
ash to Venezuela have already been swapped out for older
vessels with much smaller cargo capacity that cannot maintain
the previous off-loading rate of 50,000 tons per day. Duarte
also confirmed that the GBRV will have to pay a higher
premium on refrigerated shipping containers to European and
Brazilian firms as Maersk will no longer send them to
Venezuela as it has been unable to retrieve them in the past
due to the chaos in the ports. It has also been reported that
shipping line Hamburg Sud will no longer serve Venezuela.
¶7. (C) COMMENT: Many observers note that decreased traffic
arising from the global recession has saved Venezuela's ports
from complete strangulation. The wilderness of stacked
containers at the ports has improved. However, few here
believe that the GBRV has the know-how or the logistical
experience to manage the ports even with the assistance of
Cuban advisors. There is speculation that some port
operations may ultimately be handed over to friendly
governments on a concessionary basis.
DUDDY
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2185, ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT

PAKISTAN SECURITY
Discussing cables
09ISLAMABAD2185
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O 101440Z SEP 09
INFO CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
USMISSION GENEVA
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
NSC WASHINGTON DC
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/07/2034
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PTER, MOPS, MASS, KJUS, PK
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN SECURITY
FORCES’ HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: ISLAMABAD 2074
Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d
¶1. (S/NF) A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of

human rights abuses by Pakistan security forces during domestic operations
against terrorists in Malakand Division and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. While it is oftentimes difficult to attribute with accuracy any
responsibility for such abuses, reporting from a variety of sources suggests
that Frontier Corps and regular Pakistan Army units involved in direct combat
with terrorists may have been involved. The crux of the problem appears to
center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and
have focused on the extra-judicial killing of some detainees. The detainees
involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan Army units. The
allegations of extra-judicial killings generally do not/not extend to what are
locally referred to as “the disappeared” -- high-value terrorist suspects and
domestic insurgents who are being held incommunicado by Pakistani intelligence
agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence Division (ISI) and Military
Intelligence (MI) in their facilities.
¶2. (S/NF) Revenge for terrorist attacks on Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps
personnel is believed to be one of the primary motivating factors for the extra-
judicial killings. Cultural traditions place a strong importance on such revenge
killings, which are seen as key to maintaining a unit’s honor. Senior military
commanders have equally and repeatedly stressed their concerns that the court’s
are incapable of dealing with many of those detained on the battlefield and
their fears that if detainees are handed over to the courts and formally
charged, they will be released, placing Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops
at risk. This fear is well-founded as both Anti-Terrorism Courts and the
appellate judiciary have a poor track record of dealing with suspects detained
in combat operations such as the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad and have
repeatedly ordered their unconditional release. Post assesses that the lack of
viable prosecution and punishment options available to the Pakistan Army and
Frontier Corps is a contributing factor in allowing extra-judicial killings and
other human rights abuses of detained terrorist combatants to proceed. There may
be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the
Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and
Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this
number will increase.
¶3. (S/NF) NWFP Police have also been implicated in the abuse and extra-judicial
killing of terrorist suspects that they believe responsible for attacks on
police stations and individuals in the run-up to the conflict. This is a
separate problem set from those detained in combat by Frontier Corps and
Pakistan Army units. The NWFP Inspector General of Police has publicly announced
the establishment of a Human Rights Unit within his office to prevent,
investigate, and punish human rights violations committed by his forces. As a
component of the police training program that we are now standing up for the
NWFP, post intends to offer assistance to the Inspector General of Police and
his new unit on education and prevention of human rights abuses and
investigations and prosecutions where abuses are suspected.
¶4. (S/NF) In an effort to stem extra-judicial killings and other human rights
abuses of these detained in combat by Pakistan security forces, post is
proposing a multi-pronged approach as follows:
Short Term:
-- Diplomatic Engagement: Continue to privately raise this issue repeatedly and
at the highest levels of the Pakistan government and military. Ensure that
expressions of concern over the alleged extra-judicial killings coupled with
calls for transparent investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution are
included in the talking points of all senior USG civilian and military visitors
in meetings with Pakistani civilian and military counterparts. Timeline:
Ongoing. Funding: None required.
-- Offer Assistance: Coordinate with the British High Commission on an offer of
assistance to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). To the
Defense Minister propose assistance in drafting a new Presidential Order that
would create a parallel administrative track for charging and sentencing
terrorists detained by the military in combat operations. Amendments to the
Anti-Terrorism Act are already well underway. To the COAS, propose bringing over
a team of American and British experts to evaluate the detainee issue and to
determine jointly what assistance is required from coalition partners. If COAS
agreement is forthcoming, bring over a team of American military lawyers to meet
with Pakistan military officials with a view to obtaining concurrence on
training in battlefield evidence collection, investigation and prosecution of
human rights abuses by military personnel, and assistance on drafting the new
Presidential Order proposed to the Defense Minister: Timeline: Meeting with COAS
and Defense Minister by end of September 09. Team deployed by October 09.
Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funding.
-- Evaluate Detainee Situation: Local Pakistan military commanders and FATA/NWFP
officials have approached various offices with request for assistance on dealing
with detained combatants under the guise of reintegration. Post proposes
bringing over a senior representative from INL’s prison reform office to lay the
groundwork for a visiting team that would conduct a formal assessment of
conditions and infrastructure/personnel/systems needs of the local prison system
for potentially housing these detainees. This report would form the baseline for
development of an assistance strategy to help the GOP address the issue.
Timeline: INL initial visit in September 2009. Followed by assessment mission in
October 2009 with report to be completed by November 2009. Funding: INCLE funds
will need to be reallocated.
Medium Term
-- Draft Ordinance: Get UK agreement to lead a team of British, and possibly
American, experts to work with the Pakistan Defense Ministry and Army to draft a
new Presidential Ordinance for the administrative prosecution and punishment of
terrorists detained in combat operations (this process is already underway in
Pakistan). Representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will need to agree to
participate in the drafting process. Post will approach the HRCP at an
appropriate time but will require Washington/Geneva assistance in obtaining ICRC
agreement. Adoption of the Presidential Ordinance would offer a credible way for
the Pakistan military/government to prosecute and punish terrorists detained in
combat operations. Timeline: Deploy team by December 09 with a view to
completing ordinance by April 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign
Assistance funds.
-- Pakistani JAG and Intelligence Officer Training: Offer Detainee Operations
training for Pakistan’s JAG and intelligence officers. This five-day course
would cover evidence collection on the battlefield, proper detainee handling,
interrogations, international humanitarian law, laws governing internal armed
conflicts, and war crime prosecutions. Timeline: Training courses to begin by
January 2010. Funding: IMET funds have been allocated for this training.
Long Term
-- Assist in Implementation of Ordinance: Provide training to Pakistan military
and Frontier Corps personnel on collection of battlefield evidence and its use
in prosecution. Coordinate with British on providing appropriate training for
personnel of administrative structure to be established through Presidential
ordinance. Timeline: Training courses to begin by May 2010. Funding:
Reallocation of existing IMET and other Foreign Assistance funding.
-- Prison Reform: Design and fund a prison reform program to
construct/rehabilitate existing federal/provincial prisons to accommodate
terrorists detained in combat operations both pre-trial and post-conviction.
Convince other donors to assist GOP in developing post-release programs to
reintegrate into their communities detainees deemed not fit for trial or those
who have served their sentences. Timeline: Launch prison reform program by
October 2010. Approach donors on reintegration by September 2010 through SRAP.
Funding: New INCLE funds will be needed.
¶4. (S/NF) Comment: Post fully recognizes that there is little that the USG can
do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial
killings taking place in the Malakand Division and FATA. However, it is our view
that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained
combatants and a credible detention facility under control of the Prisons
Department is established, the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish.
Post recognizes that much of this is dependent on goodwill within the Pakistan
military and civilian establishment that can easily erode if too much public
criticism from USG officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this
reason, post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent
possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy
outlined above. End Comment.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2295, REVIEWING OUR AFGHANISTAN -

PAKISTAN STRATEGY
Discussing cables
09ISLAMABAD2295
ACTION SCA-00
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O 231509Z SEP 09
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2034

TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: REVIEWING OUR AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN STRATEGY
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In response to queries posed by the National Security

Council, Embassy Islamabad believes that it is not/not possible to counter al-
Qaeda in Pakistan absent a comprehensive strategy that 1) addresses the
interlinked Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2) brings about stable,
civilian government in Afghanistan, and 3) reexamines the broader role of India
in the region. As the queries presuppose, the ending of Pakistani establishment
support to terrorist and extremist groups, some Afghan-focused and some India-
focused, is a key element for success. There is no chance that Pakistan will
view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for
abandoning support to these groups, which it sees as an important part of its
national security apparatus against India. The only way to achieve a cessation
of such support is to change the Pakistan government’s own perception of its
security requirements. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) Al-Qaeda can operate in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA) largely because the Taliban-related groups in these areas continue
to challenge the writ of the Pakistani government. Unilateral targeting of al-
Qaeda operatives and assets in these regions is an important component of
dealing with the overall threat. It is not/not, however, sufficient in and of
itself to force al-Qaeda out of the FATA, so long as the territory remains
largely ungoverned space. Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk
destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and
military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis in Pakistan
without finally achieving the goal. To be effective, we must extend the writ of
the Pakistani state into the FATA in such a way that Taliban groups can no
longer offer effective protection to al-Qaeda from Pakistan’s own security and
law enforcement agencies in these areas. We should be under no illusion,
however, that this effort will not require a multi-year, multi-agency effort.
¶3. (S/NF) Taliban groups in Pakistan and the regional threat posed by al-Qaeda,
however, cannot be effectively dealt with absent a broader regional strategy
that leads to stability in Afghanistan. Fear that the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan will end without the establishment of a non-Taliban, Pakhtoon-led
government friendly to Pakistan adds to the Pakistani establishment’s
determination not to cut its ties irrevocably to the Afghan Taliban. They fear
that withdrawals of NATO countries on a date certain from Afghanistan is only
the thin edge of a wedge that will be followed by other coalition partners,
including the United States. Discussions of deadlines, downsizing of the
American military presence, or even a denial of the additional troops reportedly
to be requested by Gen. McChrystal are taken as evidence that reinforces this
perception. General Kayani has been utterly frank about Pakistan’s position on
this. In such a scenario, the Pakistan establishment will dramatically increase
support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see either as
ultimately likely to take over the Afghan government or at least an important
counter-weight to an Indian-controlled Northern Alliance.
¶4. (S/NF) Most importantly, it is the perception of India as the primary threat
to the Pakistani state that colors its perceptions of the conflict in
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s security needs. The Pakistani establishment fears a
pro-India government in Afghanistan would allow India to operate a proxy war
against Pakistan from its territory. Justified or not, increased Indian
investment in, trade with, and development support to the Afghan government,
which the USG has encouraged, causes Pakistan to embrace Taliban groups all the
more closely as anti-India allies. We need to reassess Indian involvement in
Afghanistan and our own policies towards India, including the growing military
relationship through sizable conventional arms sales, as all of this feeds
Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and
Kashmir-focused terrorist groups while reinforcing doubts about U.S. intentions.
Resolving the Kashmir dispute, which lies at the core of Pakistan’s support for
terrorist groups, would dramatically improve the situation. Enhanced USG efforts
in this regard should be considered.
¶5. (S/NF) Money alone will not/not solve the problem of al-Qaeda or the Taliban
operating in Pakistan. A grand bargain that promises development or military
assistance in exchange for severing ties will be insufficient to wean Pakistan
from policies that reflect accurately its most deep-seated fears. The Pakistani
establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance
-- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national
security vis-a-vis India. The lack of faith in USG intentions in Pakistan and in
relation to India makes such a bargain untenable in the eyes of the Pakistani
establishment. Development assistance in the context of the Pakistani counter-
insurgency strategy must be accelerated and refined in order to extend the
government writ to the FATA, to stabilize regions at-risk for insurgent activity
and recruitment, and to offer incentives for those that desire to leave
terrorist groups. It can and should not/not be viewed as a pay-off for behavior
change by the Pakistani establishment.
¶6. (S/NF) In the final analysis there is no short-cut to dealing with the al-
Qaeda problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is inextricably linked to and
cannot be divorced from the Taliban problem in both countries. Nor can we hope
to develop a strategy for minimizing Taliban influence and thereby al-Qaeda
operational space in Pakistan’s FATA absent a strategy that brings about
stability in Afghanistan; the notion that precision or long-range counter-
terrorism efforts can suffice are equally illusory. Afghan instability by
definition leads the Pakistani establishment to increase support for the Taliban
and thereby, unintentionally, create space for al-Qaeda. No amount of money will
sever that link. Rather, we must reassess our regional approach and find ways to
reassure the Pakistanis that they can address their long-standing national
security objectives most effectively -- both to the east and to the west -- by
working closely with the U.S. PATTERSON
SECRET
Viewing cable 09JEDDAH343, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT BRENNAN'S
SEPT 5 DISCUSSION
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09JEDDAH343.
09JEDDAH343 2009-09-11 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Consulate Jeddah
O 111328Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T JEDDAH 000343
NOFORN
NEA/ARP; NSC FOR JOHN BRENNAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2029

TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT BRENNAN'S SEPT 5 DISCUSSION
WITH SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE NAYIF
REF: RIYADH 1178
Classified By: CG Martin R. Quinn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (S/NF) During CDA Richard Erdman's September 5 meeting

with Saudi Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior Prince Nayif bin Abdulaziz (reftel), John Brennan,
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, stressed USG condemnation of the August 28
terrorist attack on Assistant Interior Minister Prince
Mohammed bin Nayif (MbN) and strong USG support for Saudi
Arabia in combating violent extremism. Nayif emphasized that
the attack had in no way diminished the SAG's resolve to
eliminate terrorism -- despite the danger -- and described
SAG's multifaceted approach, which combines refuting
terrorist ideology, security operations, and rehabilitation.
The Prince also complained that Iran had breached its 2001
security agreement with KSA and was supporting aggression
against the kingdom; expressed frustration with European
nations for allowing terrorists to operate against KSA rather
than handing them over, and requested US intercession to
change this European policy. Both parties reaffirmed their
commitment to the US-Saudi relationship begun by FDR and King
Abdulaziz, especially the partnership between security
channels. End summary.
USG SUPPORT FOR SAUDI ARABIA

----------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) At a previously scheduled September 5 farewell call

on Prince Nayif, Charge introduced Mr. Brennan and asked him
to brief on Washington perspectives on current
counterterrorism challenges and efforts. Brennan opened by
conveying U.S. condemnation and concern over the August 27
attack on Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayif as
well as our great relief that he had survived the cowardly
attack. In this regard, he said he had brought a personal
letter from President Obama to Prince Mohammed expressing our
concern and best wishes. The U.S., he continued, greatly
admired and appreciated the courageous work being done by the
Ministry of Interior and the Mabahith against violent
extremism and terrorism.
SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT YEMEN

---------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) President Obama felt personally outraged by the

attack, Brennan said, and emphasized that it was critically
important that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia went forward in the
fight against violent extremism. Noting that he would be
visiting Yemen the following day, Brennan said he would
stress to President Saleh, in the strongest possible terms,
the importance of combating terrorism and resolving the
serious problems facing his country. Brennan also confirmed
to Prince Nayif that the USG was working very closely with
the Mabahith and would be discussing in the coming days how
to approach the threat coming from Yemen.
NAYIF: NO WEAKENING OF SAUDI RESOLVE AGAINST TERRORISM

--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶4. (S/NF) Thanking Brennan for USG support, Nayif emphasized

that the attack had not weakened SAG's resolve to eliminate
terrorism. Following the incident, he said, the King met
with MbN, who stressed that acts of terror "would not keep us
from working and doing our job." At the same time, the door
must always remain open to those militants who wanted to
return to society. These terrorists were attacking the
country as a whole and would not hesitate to attack anyone to
reach their goals. "Every Saudi official is at risk of
attack," he said. "Despite this, we are still willing to put
forth more effort against terrorism, which is more dangerous
than any illness." Fear of losing one's life was not a
reason to stop working. We had a duty to defend the country,
and it was preferable to die doing one's duty. "God
determined a person's fate and everyone will go back to God."
¶5. (S/NF) Nayif then described SAG's approach to terrorism as

including countering terrorist ideology, armed
counterterrorism operations, and a rehabilitation program for
militants who surrendered. The SAG has created a strategic
communications center where intellectuals and imams worked to
explain to the public that terrorists were working against
the true ways of Islam and attacking Saudi society. In
countering the spread of jihadist ideology, Nayif added, the
Friday mosque sermons -- delivered four times a month in the
country's more than 15,000 mosques -- were one of the most
effective vehicles.
¶6. (S/NF) Asked about the economic impact of the recent

attack, Nayif asserted that Saudi Arabia was better off than
any country in the region and among the best-situated
globally in terms of economic activity. Using a favorite
line, he said: "We know that capital is a coward and wants a
safe place." For this reason, people could invest with
confidence in the Kingdom, the economy was growing, and the
government was continuing its development plans. The economy
was thriving and the security situation was good despite
being among the countries most subject to terrorist attacks.
Saudi Arabia had thwarted more than 200 terrorist operations,
he said, and only 5 percent of planned attacks had actually
occurred. "We've achieved many things in protecting the
country and, God willing, we will achieve many more things
with our friends." Brennan praised SAG efforts to combat
terrorism: "I wish other countries in the world were as
willing and capable." Saudi Arabia, he stated, was on the
front line of terrorism, a model in preventing individuals
from being corrupted by the propaganda of Al Qaeda, and thus
instrumental in demonstrating to the West and the U.S. that
Al Qaeda was a perversion of Islam and did not represent the
true faith.
IRAN PROMOTING TERRORISM

------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Nayif complained that over the past two years Iran
has hosted Saudis (all Sunnis) -- including Osama bin Laden's
son Ibrahim -- who had contacts with terrorists and worked
against the Kingdom. SAG considered this aggressive action a
breach of the 2001 security agreement between the two
nations. The SAG has informed Iran through its ambassador
and the MFA, asking the GOI to hand over these Saudis. Nayif
recalled that after the operations in Khobar in 1996, the SAG
tried to open channels with Iran and tried to improve
relations during Khatami's presidency. He himself had met
personally with Iranian National Security Secretary General
Dr. Hassan Rohani (Iran's Supreme Council on National
Security) and had signed a security agreement in which Iran
promised to show respect and not take any actions inside or
outside Iran against the Kingdom. Brennan agreed that Iran
had the capacity to cause trouble, and assured the Prince
that the USG was very concerned and looking carefully at the
situation. President Obama's willingness to talk to the
Iranians did not mean he did not understand the problem.
Brennan emphasized the SAG's strong friends in the White
House, including President Obama, wanted to work very closely
with Saudi Arabia on this front.
FRUSTRATION WITH EUROPE

-----------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Nayif expressed frustration with the limited

cooperation of friendly European nations with whom the
Kingdom has security agreements. The governments, he
complained, shared information but did not take any action.
As a result, "terrorists roam around freely in their
countries," and the Europeans have not handed over
terrorists. For example, Ibrahim (Salih Mohammed Al-Yacoub),
a very important suspect involved in the Khobar bombing, was
in Europe. Saudi Arabia asked several nations to hand him
over as a terrorist who had acted against the Kingdom and the
United States. Nayif complained that while these European
countries were friendly, had good relations, and shared
interests with the Kingdom, he failed to understand why
Europeans harbored terrorists working against Saudi Arabia in
their countries. If there were people in Saudi Arabia
working against friendly countries, the SAG would intervene.
Nayif requested USG help in convincing Europe to work more
cooperatively. Brennan commented that we had similar
frustrations with some countries.
USG-SAUDI SECURITY TIES STRONGER THAN EVER

----------------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Throughout the two-hour meeting, Nayif highlighted

the importance of bilateral security cooperation, noting that
the level of professional exchange has been excellent. Nayif
commented that there has been success in exchanging
information, procuring the best, newest, most updated
technology and in finding and preventing terrorist acts
before they happen. The final goal, he stressed, was to stop
terrorists and "dry out their resources." Asked by Charge if
he meant terrorist financing, Nayif replied: "Yes. When we
say 'resources' we mean people, training, and money. We have
found huge sums of money on many terrorists we have caught."
Nayif expressed the hope that through joint cooperation Al
Qaeda as the source of terrorism in the Kingdom and
throughout the world could be destroyed. He added that the
support from U.S.-Saudi leadership in this area was
critically important to reach the goal. Nayif thanked
President Obama for supporting strengthened security ties
between the two countries and said that King Abdullah was
strongly committed to cooperating with the United States
against terrorism. Recalling the 1945 visit between FDR and
King Abdulaziz, Nayif declared, "We're acting upon what they
decided." Brennan responded that President Obama would be
pleased to hear that the Saudi commitment to our special
relationship remained stronger than ever.
¶10. (U) This message was cleared by Assistant to the
President John Brennan.
QUINN
Viewing cable 09LONDON2214, U/S TAUSCHER’S BILATERAL MEETINGS

IN LONDON WITH
Discussing cables
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INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 LONDON 002214
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EO 12958 DECL: 09/22/2019

TAGS PREL, PARM, KNNP, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, KN, PK, RS, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER’S BILATERAL MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH
RUSSIAN, CHINESE, AND FRENCH OFFICIALS
REF: A. (A) LONDON 2198 B. (B) LONDON 2199
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen
Tauscher and Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador
Susan Burk held bilateral consultations in London September 3-4, on the margins
of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear
Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs
Patrick Maisonnave. (Refs) All interlocutors agreed on the need for close P5
coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Government Summit and the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). French
interlocutors expressed a particular need for closer, more efficient P3
coordination. All interlocutors were supportive of the President’s proposed
Nuclear Security Summit. End Summary.
Russian Perspective -- NPT
--------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held
bilateral meetings in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference
on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He
Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. Ambassador
Burk opened the first meeting, with Russian DFM Ryabkov, by presenting an
outline of U.S. objectives for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review
Conference (NPT RevCon). DFM Ryabkov stated that Russia and the U.S. are “very
much in line with each other” regarding the NPT RevCon. He confirmed that
Russia seeks a P5 consensus with a results-oriented NPT conclusion. “We cannot
allow the NPT to fail,” he said. Ryabkov cited the “good experience of being
almost there” in terms of the chair’s recommendations from the third Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom). “We must focus while moving toward the NPT RevCon on
realistic deliverables in all areas,” he said, which means avoiding pretexts for
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to balk. Russia seeks to avoid “prescriptive
outcomes.” He expressed the view that the UK draft text was a good basis for a
P5 statement. Ryabkov said Russia would stress universal adherence to the NPT,
universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and negative
security assurances. He noted the importance of “progress” on CTBT ratification,
preferably before the end of the conference. He stated the importance of
developing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and control
mechanisms, and that negative security guarantees are key. Russia would think
positively about the development of a legal instrument.
Egypt
-----
¶3. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said the Egyptian position gives Russia “serious
concern.” Russia regularly engages with the Egyptians, but the Egyptians do not
seem to understand the gravity of the situation. Ryabkov expressed hope that the
U.S. would support ideas such as a special coordinator and comprehensive IAEA
coverage of facilities in the Middle East. He noted that Middle Eastern
countries need to ratify the CTBT. Russia has been in touch with Israel to see
if it would consider becoming part of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
which would “play well” with the Egyptians. U/S for Arms Control and
International Security Tauscher said she had been working with Egypt, including
with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, and would continue to do so in the coming
weeks. She said that some Egyptians consider their approach last year to be a
mistake, and that we were working to get Egypt and Israel to come together on an
approach that would command consensus. Ryabkov said Russia had not detected
reconsideration by Egypt, and promised to “explore”
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Tauscher’s suggestion that the U.S. and Russia meet jointly with the Egyptians
to show U.S.-Russia coordination and to explain concerns to the Egyptians.
Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said Russia was surprised by opposition to initiatives,
“both yours and ours,” at the most recent Board of Governors (BOG) meeting.
Russia will continue to push forward on its Angarsk idea. Russia will soon
circulate a draft agreement and will consult with the U.S and as many other
potential co-sponsors as possible to increase the chances of a positive outcome.
U/S Tauscher made clear the U.S. supports the Angarsk initiative and wants to
push it forward at the November Board as the first step; other steps could
follow using the Angarsk precedents. Ryabkov expressed appreciation for U.S.
expressions of support for Angarsk and asked the U.S. to make positive remarks
at the next BOG meeting.
“Creative Ways” to Present Arguments Needed
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said it is important in the lead up to the RevCon to find
“creative ways” to present our arguments, citing Egyptian skepticism. U/S
Tauscher agreed that we need to find better ways to get our narrative out, and
proposed that the two of them write an op-ed that could run in New York at the
time of the UNGA. Ryabkov responded that such a piece could make clear that the
U.S. and Russia stand together on fuel assurances. He said it was a “good idea,”
and they should look for the right occasion. Ryabklov also raised the 13 steps,
suggesting that some elements were “OBE” and the context was now different.
Nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction at the
National Security Council Laura Holgate briefed on plans for the Nuclear
Security Summit in April. Ryabkov expressed appreciation and said the summit
should seek a result that is both “political and technical,” which he
characterized as “a huge task requiring thorough preparation.” He stressed the
importance of early exchanges on summit preparations. He promised that Russia
would work to develop ideas by the Sherpa meeting or shortly thereafter.
However, the time frame is “extraordinarily short,” even if the summit is
postponed until April. The summit should seek a “defendable niche” that will not
take away from NPT, he said.
CTBT, FMCT
----------
¶7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher said the U.S. was carefully preparing for ratification
of the CTBT by the Senate, including a new study by the National Academy.
Another key priority for the U.S. is the FMCT. We were encouraged by the steps
in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May, but Pakistan has blocked
implementation. She said the P5 must work together to preserve the work plan in
January and commence actual negotiations. Ryabkov responded that Russia would
welcome early U.S. CTBT ratification. Russia had talked to the Pakistanis about
the FMCT, but DFM Ryabkov indicated that they were “quite evasive.” He urged the
U.S. to engage the Pakistanis. Tauscher said we would continue to do so and
encourage the rest of the P5 to do so as well.
Iranian Threat, Missile Defense
-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher proposed that Russia and the U.S. implement together the
understandings reached by the two Presidents in Moscow regarding missile
defense, joint threat assessment and the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC).
Responding to her proposal to send a team to Moscow to get Russia’s intelligence
assessment on the Iranian missile threat, Ryabkov said that missile defense
remains a difficult
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issue for Russia; the Presidential text was good guidance, but Russia needed
more time to consider the U.S. view regarding the missile threat from Iran and
issues of their missile technology. Russia has “objective data” and the
differences between the Russian and U.S. views are “considerable.”
¶9. (S/NF) Tauscher described the missile defense review underway in Washington.
Ryabkov expressed appreciation, and suggested that they revisit the joint threat
assessment and the JDEC after the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review has
been completed.
Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------
¶10. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher welcomed Head of Federal Atomic Energy Agency Sergei
Kiriyenko,s planned visit to Washington and the establishment of the working
group on nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation. She pressed for approval and
signature of the plutonium disposition agreement. DFM Ryabkov replied that the
situation with respect to plutonium disposition was the same as it was during
the President,s visit to Moscow. The issue of financing had precluded real
progress before the POTUS visit. Russia needs to figure out what is realistic.
There are no political constraints. Russia is disposing of highly toxic
materials. Ryabkov expressed interest in information about what the U.S. was
doing in that regard.
S-300 Air Defense Missiles
--------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov asked about the status of the Russia 123 agreement. U/S
Tauscher responded that some in Congress are interested in moving forward on the
123 agreement, and that further discussions could be held in October. It is
crucial that Russia not transfer the S-300 system to Iran if Congress is to
allow the agreement to come into force, she added. Ryabkov said Russia had a
valid contract for the sale of the S-300s, and acknowledged that Russia needed
to make a decision regarding the S-300 sale to Iran, an issue that has been the
subject of “utmost attention in many places.” Russia is in a position of growing
difficulty for not honoring its contractual obligations and, finances aside,
Russia is getting “no points in Iran.” Ryabkov said Russia understands the U.S.
and Israeli arguments and wants to be transparent on the topic, and noted that
the U.S. and Russian presidents have discussed it. The current situation is not
sustainable; Russia cannot hold up the sale indefinitely. At some point Russia
will have to make up its mind, Ryabkov said. Russia did not agree to sell
surface-to-surface missiles but has a contract to sell Iran air defense systems.
Votkinsk
--------
¶12. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia and the U.S. have different views on
whether continuous monitoring at Votkinsk should be continued in the Stategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on agreement. Russia considers the
importance of switching off the system to be quite high. The run-up to the end
date of START could create difficulties. U/S Tauscher stated that we have the
right to monitor until December 5, to which Ryabkov replied, “That goes without
saying.” Tauscher went on that we see merit in continuing with the Votkinsk
system in the new agreement. If the final decision is not to continue the
system, we are prepared to work out an arrangement that maintains our rights
through December 4. Contractors can box and ship the equipment; there are ways
to manage this, she said.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
-----------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia circulated its ideas on the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in Vienna on May 5. “We don’t want to
abandon the CFE regime altogether,” he said. Russia has the sense that NATO is
“becoming comfortable” with the current situation. Russia,
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however, does not want to return to the old treaty. CFE adaptation plus more is
required. Flank limitations are the core problem. Ryabkov said Turkey is not
that concerned about flank limitations but wants to keep the system for its own
reasons. There could be a chance to “move innovatively” regarding CFE, but the
current situation is unsustainable.
¶14. (S/NF) Ryabkov concluded by saying Russia wants someone on the U.S. side
who will deal with this issue on a regular basis with MFA Security and Arms
Control Director Anatoly Antonov. Russia wants to move forward and wants to
reinvigorate the Vienna process without undermining the bilateral process.
Australia Group
---------------
¶15. (S/NF) Ryabkov asked for a “fresh look” regarding the Australia group,
since the U.S. and Russia are now cooperating in many ways. U/S Tauscher said
she has seen no interest on the part of the other members of the Australia Group
in Russian membership given the concerns with respect to Russian implementation
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). Ryabkov responded that he thought they had dealt with those questions.
MANPADS -- Venezuela
--------------------
¶16. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked that Russia look further into the end-use
controls on Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) transferred to Venezuela
to ensure they do not wind up with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
(FARC). Ryabkov affirmed Russia’s commitment to ensure legitimate end-user
certificates and the ability to conduct inspections; this is true for MANPADS.
The information provided was fragmentary, he said. Russia concluded that the
factory marks on the munitions made it difficult to determine if they were part
of the equipment sold to the Venezuelan government. Ryabkov said Russia
understood the tense situation between Venezuela and Colombia.
Chinese Perspective -- CTBT
---------------------------
¶17. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher opened the discussion with Chinese Vice-Minister of
Foreign Affiars He Yafei with a description of U.S. preparations to seek
ratification of the CTBT in the Senate. VFM He asked “Are you there yet?”
Tauscher asked if China would follow with its own ratification, and He replied
that it is “likely” that China would follow if the U.S. ratified the CTBT.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
¶18. (S/NF) VFM He said China and the U.S. have many common interests and “we’re
flooded with issues.” President Obama’s Prague speech “caught the attention of
many.” The NPT is “important but we must improve on it” and must “start and
restart” issues of disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use. The Chinese
President’s vision is to study issues in the context of Chinese and U.S.
cooperation. “I have a mandate to work with you,” He said. Nonproliferation
issues have been dormant for a dozen years, but the context has changed. China’s
goal is a “serious reduction of the nuclear threat.” The time to act is now
since “we have a mandate and a consensus at the top level.”
P5 Consultation in Advance of the NPT RevCon
--------------------------------------------
¶19. (S/NF) VFM He said the P5 may not always see eye-to-eye but should closely
consult in the lead-up to the NPT RevCon. The P5 should “stand together” and
unite since the P5 countries are a “target.” He added that is important to
improve communications with non-nuclear states.
¶20. (S/NF) VFM He raised the issue of the Egyptian Middle East nuclear-free
zone. U/S Tauscher responded that the U.S.
LONDON 00002214 005 OF 007
was working hard with both Egypt and Israel to find a common approach and avoid
confrontation at the IAEA General Conference and the NPT RevCon. He said China
was prepared to support that effort. He added the P5 should carefully review
Iran and the DPRK but deal with them separately from the upcoming UNSC Summit
and the RevCon.
FMCT, Pakistan
--------------
¶21. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher outlined the problem caused by Pakistan in blocking
implementation of the CD program of work. She said the U.S. was talking to
Pakistan and arguing that Pakistan could make its points in the negotiations but
should not block the beginning of talks. VFM He agreed that the Pakistanis “have
concerns” regarding the FMCT negotiations. He said he understood Pakistani
“hesitancy,” as well as their “logic” and “illogic.” The solution is to address
the underlying problem, which is that India and Pakistan view each other as
enemies. Nuclear weapons are crucial to Pakistan. Indeed, a Pakistani military
leader said his army was no match for the Indian army. “India is the lynchpin”
to assuaging Pakistan’s fears and the U.S. could influence India. China has
resolved all border issues except those with India, He observed. In response to
Tauscher,s expression of appreciation for China’s efforts in the CD with
Pakistan, He said China would engage the Pakistanis.
UNSC Summit
-----------
¶22. (S/NF) VFM He said that the U.S. draft for the UNSC Summit was fairly good,
but that China had amendments. China’s Ambassador to the UN has authority to
negotiate on the draft resolution which, unfortunately, does not mention China’s
disarmament efforts, though the efforts of other P5 countries are noted. China
should get credit for, for example, its no first use policy. VFM He also said
that China has a different view on the proposed moratorium on the production of
fissile material. China supports a ban, but not a moratorium, which raises
questions concerning definition, how long, verification, and the like.
-----------------------
¶23. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on planning for the Nuclear Security
Summit in the spring. VFM He said China supports this initiative, which he
described as a “huge, daunting job.” He advised the U.S. to consider
establishing a “small, informal group to resolve issues” before the summit--
U.S., UK, China, Russia, and a few others--to make sure the major parties are
comfortable.
DPRK
----
¶24. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher mentioned Ambassador Philip Goldberg,s useful talks,
which would continue. She asked where the DPRK stood. VFM He responded that the
United States is the DPRK’s main preoccupation. The country views normalization
of its relations with the U.S. as the only way out of its current “mess.” China
believes the DPRK leadership is anxious about economic development but they
believe their security concerns override their economic concerns. Nonetheless,
there are signs the DPRK is reaching out. DPRK wants bilateral talks with the
U.S., not Six-Party Talks. China wants the Six-Party Talks to continue. The DPRK
wants “something in return” to restart the talks. VFM He asserted that China is
encouraging the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. China is also trying to
convince the DPRK not to go back on its promise to denuclearize. The DPRK leader
appears to be in good health and control.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan
---------------------------------------
¶25. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked about the status of civil nuclear cooperation
with Pakistan. VFM He responded that all
LONDON 00002214 006 OF 007
cooperation is for civil purposes, under safeguards, and that China is not going
out of that mode. It is not in China’s interest to proliferate nuclear
technology. Tauscher asked about Pakistan,s financial situation. VFM He replied
that Pakistan was hit hard by the financial crisis, but it is a largely agrarian
society that needs little cash to survive and is in no danger of going broke.
China is the only country that has given cash support to Pakistan, he said.
French Perspective -- P3 Coordination
-------------------------------------
¶26. (S/NF) In a final meeting, French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick
Maisonnave expressed a need to reinforce P3 coordination. Maisonnave noted his
disappointment at the current negotiating process in New York, stating that “P3
coordination could be more efficient.” U/S Tauscher agreed the P3 needed to
stick together and suggested frequent telephone calls. Maisonnave said he looked
forward to frequent phone contact among the three countries.
UNSC Summit
-----------
¶27. (S/NF) Regarding the September UNSC Heads of State Summit, Maisonnave
observed that it could be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve consensus on
specific language regarding the DPRK and Iran, but “a strong generic message
would help.” This was important to French political authorities. U/S Tauscher
agreed, and asked if there were other political messages France wanted to send.
DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Martin Briens said
France wanted the text of the Summit’s resolution to put the issue of nuclear
nonproliferation in a broader context. He suggested a short sentence asserting
that “we need to make progress on other forms of disarmament.” Briens said that
France wants a paragraph in the resolution setting out concrete measures against
proliferation. He also noted “some technical problems” that needed to be
resolved, such as issues surrounding the return of property and equipment.
Defining Language and Minimum Objectives
----------------------------------------
¶28. (S/NF) DAS-equivalent Briens noted the “political requirement” of sending a
message to Iran and the DPRK, of “not letting them off the hook.” Maisonnave
said that one red line for France was that there must be nothing in the final
text of the resolution that would weaken deterrence. He expressed support for a
“balanced result” and called for managing expectations. Maisonnave stressed the
importance of supporting access to civil nuclear energy. P3 consultations would
provide an opportunity to clarify goals and to “define minimum objectives.”
Briens said that when the P3 meets in early October, there would be an
opportunity to set “minimum goals” and “work on our statetgy.” The October 8-9
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Conference in Washington
would potentially be a good time for experts to meet, Briens said.
¶29. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher noted the importance of coordinating public diplomacy
messages. Brien concurred on the importance of better public outreach.
-----------------------
¶30. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on plans for the Nuclear Security
Summit. Maisonnave expressed support for the summit next spring and sought
details about timing and goals. He described it as an “excellent initiative” and
said that French officials would have their first planning meeting September 8.
Briens said that the summit would give political momentum and help provide
political will to reenforce nonproliferation mechanisms. Briens expressed “one
small caveat” about such mechanisms, citing French displeasure with the Global
Partnership and remarking that it provides a “huge benefit for Russia” by paying
for its
LONDON 00002214 007 OF 007
disarmament while Russia builds submarines. “Let’s leverage what we have rather
than spend money” at the summit, Briens said. Maisonnave expressed appreciation
for reassurance that the President’s summit would not be a pledging conference.
FMCT: P3 Coordination and Red Lines
-----------------------------------
¶31. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher provided an update on START negotiations,
Administration strategy regarding CTBT ratification, the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review, and Pakistan’s actions to
prevent the beginning of negotiations on the FMCT at the CD. Briens agreed that
Pakistan had been a problem regarding the FMCT. He added that France shares some
common interests with the U.S. regarding the FMCT but said that “we need to
discuss some technical details.” He stated that France would be reluctant to
agree to terms regarding transparency of fissile material stockpiles. He
underscored the importance of not raising expectations and stressed that there
are “sensitive issues that we must coordinate carefully with the P3” and discuss
in detail. He said that national experts should talk directly on sensitive
technical issues, and that France has some red lines that need to be discussed.
IAEA
----
¶32. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher encouraged support for the new IAEA Director General
Amano, saying we need to make him a success and make sure he has the budget to
do his job. Briens agreed that the U.S. and France should talk to DG Amano
regarding shared priorities, “and make sure he does the right thing.” He also
agreed that the U.S. and France should consult with each other regarding the
IAEA budget. The U.S. and France should also think about what can be done to
improve IAEA verification safeguards.
ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Viewing cable 09LONDON2225, CHANCELLOR DARLING ON BANKERS’
BONUSES, UK
Discussing cables
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TREASURY FOR MURDEN/SOBEL
EO 12958 DECL: 09/24/2019

TAGS ECON, EINV, PGOV, AGMT, UK
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR DARLING ON BANKERS’ BONUSES, UK
RECOVERY, AND LABOUR PROSPECTS
Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling told the
Ambassador during his September 23 introductory meeting that G20 governments
must continue to implement stimulus packages and avoid complacency. Darling
warned that if banks paid out large bonuses in 2010, they could provoke a
political backlash and draconian legislation that would have unintended
consequences. Governments needed to pressure the banks to exercise restraint.
The Chancellor was cautiously optimistic that the UK economy would return to
growth by year-end, but worried that the recovery remained fragile. Darling had
sharp words for the Conservatives, who were campaigning on budget cuts, but
unwilling to say what they would cut. He said that Labour was losing hearts and
minds more than the Conservatives were winning people over. The Ambassador
raised the issue of VAT charges on the London Embassy project and subsequently
briefed U/S Kennedy by phone. End Summary. Recovery is Fragile and Banker
Bonuses
Radioactive
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador said that the President was committed to a strong
framework for growth at Pittsburgh and asked the Chancellor for his expectations
from the G20 summit. Noting he was traveling to Pittsburgh early September 24,
Chancellor Darling stressed the importance of continuing stimulus packages and
avoiding complacency. Unemployment levels across the developed economies were
high, continuing to rise, and risks to growth remained real. He cited IMF
predictions that Germany could re-enter recession and expressed concern about
the potential for higher oil prices. He noted that high public sector debt
levels constrained governments, room for maneuver. On pay and bonuses, Darling
cautioned that banks needed to exercise restraint. With spring UK elections in
mind, he said that if banks announced large bonuses early in 2010, the pressure
for draconian legislation would be politically irresistible. He expressed
concern that a political backlash could produce legislation that had unintended
consequences and cited Sarbanes-Oxley as an example. He said governments needed
to persuade bankers not to do something stupid in the coming months. Cautious
Optimism on Recovery
-----------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) On the UK economy, the Chancellor remained cautious, but expected a
return to growth by the end of the year. But he cautioned that it would be
&foolish to announce victory.” He said that the UK’s heavy dependence on
services, and especially financial services, meant that UK growth would lag
behind other economies and depend on their growth. He added that if businesses
and the public see recovery, they will spend. U.S. Committed to Address Climate
Change
---------------------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) The Chancellor asked about the prospects for climate change
legislation. The Ambassador referred to the President’s September 22 speech at
the UN Climate Change Summit and highlighted his commitment to address climate
change through strong administrative measures and through legislation. Noting
the determination of White House and Congressional leaders, the Ambassador
expressed confidence that Congress would pass legislation. Labour Losing Hearts
and Minds
------------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) Responding to a question on the UK election, Darling said that the
Conservatives may think they can run a campaign on cutting spending without
specifying what they are going to cut, but this will become less and less
tenable. He said it is in the nature of the opposition to criticize without
offering up specifics. In the meantime, he said that Labour would &fight like
hell for re-election.” Darling was sanguine about Labour’s challenge ) &the
problem is not that the Conservatives are winning hearts and minds, rather that
we are losing them.8 He said that Labour needed to regain the confidence of the
public that they can win. VAT Exemption on New Embassy Unlikely
-------------------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) Ambassador raised the new embassy project at Nine Elms, noting that
the USD 1.2 billion project would spur redevelopment of a blighted area and
create jobs. He said that as a matter of principle, the UK should not impose
value-added tax on the construction of a chancery building. Darling responded
that the government could not exempt the project from VAT, citing the recession,
tight budget and elections. Ambassador noted that construction was projected
LONDON 00002225 002 OF 002
to start in 2012 and urged the Chancellor to work with him to find a solution.
ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Viewing cable 09PARIS1254, A/S GORDON'S MEETINGS WITH POLICY-

MAKERS IN PARIS:
Discussing cables
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018

TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP BH SM MK GR FR
SUBJECT: A/S GORDON'S MEETINGS WITH POLICY-MAKERS IN PARIS:
A TOUR D'HORIZON OF EUROPE AND AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary. During Assistant Secretary Gordon's visit

to Paris on September 11, he met with a number of French
policy-makers including: Elysee Diplomatic Advisors
Jean-David Levitte, Damien Loras, and Francois Richier,
Assistant Secretary equivalent for Continental Europe Roland
Galharague, and Acting Director of MFA Strategic Affairs
bureau Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel. Discussions focused on
Russia, upcoming developments in the Balkans (Bosnia,
Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo), elections in Germany and
Afghanistan, Turkey's EU Accession, NATO Enlargement and
Strategic Concept, and Georgia and Ukraine. End Summary.
-------------------------------------
AFGHANISTAN: A MAJOR PRIORITY
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Jean-David Levitte noted that while public opinion in

France is opposed to the war in Afghanistan, the situation
here is much calmer than in the UK, Germany, or Italy.
Angela Merkel's domestic political situation after the
incident in Kunduz was particularly fragile, so that was part
of the rationale behind the recent German-French-UK letter to
UN SYG Ban Ki Moon to propose an international conference on
Afghanistan by the end of the year. Levitte said that the
goal of the conference would be to accelerate and improve the
training of Afghan troops and police and to strengthen Afghan
state institutions, which will help reinforce the importance
of the international effort to skeptical publics. They are
now waiting for Ban Ki Moon's response. Levitte emphasized
that France remains "totally engaged" in Afghanistan with no
limits or caveats on its troops. This autumn, France will
complete a transfer of troops from Kabul to Kapisa and Surobi
provinces (a presence that will be reinforced on the ground
as France reassigns some sailors to other regional activities
and replaces them with ground troops). A/S Gordon assured
Levitte that the U.S. would soon be able to share the
elements of the McChrystal military review with Allies.
Levitte responded by praising General McChrystal and saying
that French forces have an excellent dialogue with him on the
ground. He added that Germany and the UK are determined to
stay in Afghanistan as needed, but we may need to convince
the Netherlands to remain, and that President Sarkozy had
recently reinforced this message in a meeting with Dutch PM
Balkenende.
-------------------------------------------
BOSNIA: FRENCH URGE TRANFER TO EU AUTHORITY
-------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Levitte noted that of the five major conditions

required to transfer authority in Bosnia from the UN High
Representative to an EU High Representative, four have been
fulfilled, and only the question of division of state
property remains. This final condition should not alone
"block all progress," especially as the current UN team in
Bosnia is no longer effective. France wants to see the
transfer of authority to a new EU team in November, as the
rapprochement to Europe is an effective "carrot" to encourage
the Bosniaks to continue progress in necessary reforms. A/S
Gordon agreed that the current system is not working well,
but noted that the international community will lose
credibility if we move forward before all the necessary
pre-conditions have been fulfilled. He added that the U.S.
agrees that some form of carrot is necessary to urge Bosnian
compliance. Levitte noted that they still have two months to
urge Bosnian progress before a final decision is made. In a
separate meeting, Assistant Secretary equivalent for
Continental Europe Roland Galharague said that "transition is
the number one objective," suggested the division of state
property will take much time to resolve, and urged the U.S.
to support early transfer of authority that would open the
door to Bosnian aspirations for greater integration into EU
institutions. He noted that the growing perception of
divisions between the US and Bosniaks on one side who favored
retaining the UN role and the EU and Serbs on the other
created unhelpful opportunities for manipulation. A/S Gordon
said this perception was inaccurate, but noted the U.S. is
sensitive to the political need for Bosniak leaders to sell
this decision to their publics. The USG needs to see a clear
path ahead for transition in order to support it.
-----------------------------------------
KOSOVO AND SERBIA
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Levitte noted that the EULEX mission is having

diplomatic problems with the Kosovar government and public
PARIS 00001254 002 OF 004
after signing two technical protocols with Serbia. They are

hoping to ensure continued calm as Kosovo heads into
municipal elections. A/S Gordon stated that the Kosovars
will have to accept the protocols but that it should be
clearly explained that these are technical agreements that
have no impact on Kosovo's independent status. Levitte also
criticized Serbian FM Jeremic, saying that he is doing
nothing to encourage Serb return or participation in Kosovo's
government. Levitte noted that Jeremic "makes big promises"
every time he comes to France, but doesn't follow through.
Levitte no longer meets with him and does not consider him to
be the "modern face of Belgrade" that he purports to be.
-----------------------------------------
MACEDONIA AND CROATIA
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Levitte expressed optimism that a new Greek
government would be "more solid" and allow greater
flexibility for progress in the Greek-Macedonian name
dispute. A/S Gordon agreed that either a more solid
Conservative government or a Socialist government would be a
stronger, more flexible partner in the negotiations. He
expressed hope that if the international community could
convince Macedonia to abandon the idea of a referendum and
get Greece to abandon the necessity of changing passports,
then progress could be made. On Croatia, Levitte observed
that the border issue with Slovenia is making progress. He
hoped that the upcoming September elections in Germany would
also allow the new German government to be more open to EU
enlargement to include the Balkan countries. Paris wants the
door to enlargement to remain open, even if the accession
process takes time.
----------------------------------------
CONCERNS ABOUT TURKEY
----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Levitte informed A/S Gordon that there had been no
change in the French position advocating a "privileged
partnership" between the European Union and Turkey, in lieu
of EU membership. However, he emphasized that France was not
preventing accession negotiations from progressing on all the
EU chapters that do not pre-suppose membership. There remain
plenty of chapters of the acquis to open, so if progress is
not being made, the fault lies with Turkish intransigence on
Cyprus. Unfortunately, Ankara is not completing the required
necessary reforms and progress has stalled. Levitte
anticipated a negative report this fall on Turkey's failure
to fulfill the Ankara Protocol. A/S Gordon said that Turkey
was caught in a vicious cycle and it is not completing
necessary reforms because the Turks do not believe that their
EU candidacy will be allowed to progress, and at the same
time, their negotiations are not progressing because they
aren't completing the required reforms. He noted that in the
latest German Marshall Fund polls in Turkey, fewer that 30%
of the Turkish public believes they will succeed in getting
EU membership.
¶7. (C) Levitte agreed, but noted that Paris hopes that it
will be the Turks themselves who realize that their role is
best played as a bridge between the two worlds of Europe and
Asia, rather than anchored in Europe itself. He stated that
Turkey is in a difficult position as it wants to enter the EU
but has refused to accept one of the other EU member states.
Levitte predicted that a worse case scenario would be if
Turkey finally manages to complete the acquis and end
negotiations and a public referendum is held in France which
is finally opposed to their membership. Despite all of these
problems, Levitte claimed that President Sarkozy is a friend
of Turkey and has visited the country at least 10 times in
his life.
-----------------------------------------
RUSSIA AND GEORGIA
-----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) A/S Gordon described the challenges and frustrations

of the U.S.- Russia relationship, which is based on finding
areas where we can work together on our common interest. He
noted progress at the July summit meeting on such issues as
START talks and transfer of lethal material through Russia to
Afghanistan. Galharague described Russia as a state with the
trappings of democracy but without any mechanisms for the
public to influence government decision-making. "The root of
the problem is the regime," he said. Presidential advisor
Loras added Russian leaders lacked sufficient, long-range
vision for their country and instead, focused on a six-month
time horizon and their business interests. Galharague
PARIS 00001254 003 OF 004
described the French strategy as finding a balance between

treating Russia as if it is too important or treating it like
an enemy. The French observed that some in Russia have
concluded their interests are served by keeping the west
"tied down in an Afghanistan quagmire" and by sustaining the
status quo in Iran. He elaborated that a solution that
thwarts Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and restores Iran as
a normal member of the international community could
undermine Russian regional and energy interests. Loras noted
of late the Russians have been unhelpful on Iran. Moreover,
they appear to have concluded they can pocket a projected
U.S. decision to scale back or abandon the Bush
administration's Missile Defense initiative without paying
any cost.
¶9. (C) Looking ahead on the energy front, Loras predicted

that substantial Russian under-investment in energy
extraction infrastructure was such that Russia would not be
able to meet European demand in four or five years. He
observed this created an opportunity for Russia to have even
more leverage over a Europe that has not prepared to
diversify its energy supplies. In response to a question on
Russia's decision to suspend negotiations on World Trade
Organization membership in favor of a customs union with
Kazakhstan and Belarus, A/S Gordon replied the U.S. would
continue a policy review on Missile Defense to take the right
decision based on the merits. On Russian actions regarding
the WTO, he said that Moscow's decision was likely supported
by Russians whose interests were not advanced by opening
markets. Galharague observed that failure to advance WTO
membership for Russia had negative implications for
EU-Russian trade relations as progress in this EU effort
pre-supposed progress on Russian accession to the WTO. Loras
reported the coming year will involve substantial
Franco-Russian interactions. This engagement would include a
visit by French Prime Minister Fillon to Russia in September,
a visit to France by Putin in November, a state visit to
France by Medvedev in March, and a Sarkozy visit to Russia in
2010 on the margins of the St. Petersburg forum. These
visits would occur under the auspices of reciprocal "Year of
France" events in Russia and "Year of Russia" events in
France.
¶10. (C) Levitte and A/S Gordon discussed the "dangerous"

precedent of ships being intercepted in Georgian waters.
Sarkozy Advisor Damien Loras noted that President Saakashvili
has a French advisor who has informed Paris that Georgian
ships have orders to respond if fired upon. This can
escalate and the French message has been to emphasize that
Georgia must not respond to provocation, as that would only
play into Russia's hands. Levitte stressed the importance of
maintaining the Geneva process, while noting that it may take
a generation before the Russian public will be able to accept
their loss of influence, from Poland and the Baltics to
Ukraine and Georgia. Unfortunately, the Russian tendency is
to view "good neighbors" as totally submissive subordinates.
On the other hand, Paris is closely watching Medvedev, who is
more frequently taking public stances in opposition to Putin.
Medvedev is more open to the occidental powers and more open
to modernization and rule of law issues that Russia must
face. A/S Gordon observed that President Obama had spent a
good deal of time with Medvedev on his trip to Russia, and
had specifically targeted Russian youth in his public
outreach event. In his meeting with Galharague and others,
A/S Gordon noted that the U.S. pursues a policy to support
Georgia in the face of Russian pressure without encouraging
President Saakashvili to act in ways that are unhelpful.
-----------------------------------------
IRAN: NEXT STEPS
-----------------------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Levitte noted that the Iranian response to the

overture of President Obama and the West was "a farce,"
although Russia had received it as a real initiative. The
current Iranian regime is effectively a fascist state and the
time has come to decide on next steps. Levitte stated that
this is why Paris is advocating a meeting of the EU3 PLUS 3
on the margins of the Pittsburgh G20 meeting. The French
hope to approve a two-paragraph statement laying out next
steps on negotiations or sanctions. He noted that German
Chancellor Angela Merkel shares the view of the French
President and is willing to be firm on sanctions, but that FM
Steinmeier was more cautious. The Iranian regime must
understand that it will be more threatened by economic harm
and the attendant social unrest than it would be by
negotiating with the West. Unfortunately, the P-3 cannot
remain passive until Russia and China finally lose patience;
PARIS 00001254 004 OF 004
this is why a high-level political meeting is important to

advance this discussion (and Levitte cited President
Sarkozy's frank and direct style, saying that he would
pinpoint Medvedev to explain his position). Levitte said
that he informed the Chinese FM that if they delay until a
possible Israeli raid, then the world will have to deal with
a catastrophic energy crisis as well. At the same time, the
debate over stopping the flow of gasoline into Iran will be
very sensitive and would have to take into account which
countries would be only too willing to step in and replace
European companies. Levitte informed us that they would like
President Sarkozy to talk to President Obama by telephone in
the coming days to discuss the G20 and Iran. The French are
proposing two possible windows to schedule the call.
----------------------------------------
NATO'S ENLARGEMENT AND STRATEGIC CONCEPT
----------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Levitte said that France was very pleased with the
selection of Madeleine Albright to chair the "Group of 12,"
which will launch the process of reviewing NATO's Strategic
Concept. Bruno Racine will be the French participant on the
panel, and Levitte stressed that there is already strong
agreement between France and the United States on the basis
of exchanges that he has had with NSA General Jim Jones.
Levitte noted that Paris agreed with Jones on suppressing the
Membership Action Plan (MAP), which had become an obstacle
rather than an incentive. A/S Gordon responded that we must
not change the process in a way that would be interpreted as
suggesting an end to NATO enlargement and eliminating MAP
might do that. Levitte agreed and added that French
President Sarkozy was "convinced" that Ukraine would one day
be a member of NATO, but that there was no point in rushing
the process and antagonizing Russia, particularly if the
Ukrainian public was largely against membership. The
Bucharest summit declaration was very clear that NATO has an
open door and Ukraine and Georgia have a vocation in NATO
(even if Georgia remains very unstable at the moment).
Levitte added that Paris was very pleased with the ceremony
on September 9 transferring the Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) to French General Stephane Abrial.
--------------------------------
VENEZUELA
--------------------------------
¶13. (C) Levitte observed that Venezuelan President Hugo

Chavez is "crazy" and said that even Brazil wasn't able to
support him anymore. Unfortunately, Chavez is taking one of
the richest countries in Latin America and turning it into
another Zimbabwe.
¶14. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon has cleared this message.

RIVKIN
Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI379, IRAN: KHAMENEI SAYS SYSTEM WILL

"ACT DECISIVELY" AGAINST
Discussing cables
09RPODUBAI379 2009-09-14 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Iran RPO Dubai
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000379
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: KHAMENEI SAYS SYSTEM WILL "ACT DECISIVELY" AGAINST
OPPONENTS
REF: DUBAI RPO 378
DUBAI 00000379 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence

Office, Department of State.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 11 Supreme Leader Khamenei gave the
main Tehran Friday Prayer sermon. In his comments Khamenei
sought to characterize his treatment of opposition in line with
the practices of both the first Shia Imam Ali and also with that
of his predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini. He said while criticism
within the framework of the existing political system was
acceptable, those fundamentally opposing the system and seeking
to harm the nation's security will be dealt with decisively. In
keeping with previous warnings about the "soft overthrow" of the
existing order, he cautioned against dissolution from within,
saying that the only way to prevent this was to remain true to
religion, revolutionary principles, and to Khomeini's teachings.
The recent Presidential election with its massive turnout
proved to the world that "regardless of whom the people voted
for" they still believed in the system. Referring to Iran's
position on the international stage, Khamenei said Iran took
pride in standing against the oppressive nature of its enemies
and that Iran wouldn't be cowed into relinquishing its rights,
"nuclear or non-nuclear." He called for a large turnout on the
September 18 Qods Day march in support of the Palestinian
people, although warning that this event should not be used to
"sow dissension," an implied reference to the fact that "Green
Path" oppositionists are reportedly seeking a massive turn-out
on this day as a show of strength.
¶2. (C) SUMMMARY (CONT): Although Supreme Leader Khamenei 's tone
was consistently mild, Iranian press and IRPO contacts have
interpreted this speech as a clear warning to the "Green Path"
oppositionist leaders to cease and desist, an interpretation
reinforced by the contemporaneous release of a Judiciary panel
report stating that Mehdi Karrubi's allegations of prisoner
abuse were both baseless and also politically motivated, and the
forwarding of this case to judicial authorities for possible
prosecution (reftel). END SUMMARY.
¶3. (U) On September 11, Supreme Leader Khamenei gave both Tehran
Friday Prayer Sermons (normally there are two, the first
covering ostensibly religious topics, the second focusing more
on issues of the day). As the date fell on the anniversary of
the martyrdom of Imam Ali, the first Shia Imam, the topic of his
first sermon was the government of Imam Ali. Although
putatively non-political in nature, Khamenei used this sermon to
set the stage for themes to which he would refer back in his
second, political, sermon. He pointed out the moral nature of
Imam Ali's government, adding that "when religion is separated
from politics, politics becomes immoral and secular." In an
implicit comparison with current times, he also stressed that
Imam Ali consistently preferred to be lenient in dealing with
those who opposed him, until and unless there was a threat to
the system, at which point he would act decisively.
TYPES OF CONFLICT
¶4. (U) In the start of his second, political speech, Supreme

Leader Khamenei said he wished to address his remarks to those
in Iran's political sphere. Dissension had been a feature of
the Islamic Republic since its founding. These conflicts have
had different causes, to include theoretical differences of
opinion, conflicts of interest and clashing personalities.
Referring implicitly to his comments on the management style of
Imam Ali, Khamenei said that Khomeini's normal method for
dealing with dissension and conflict was to use moderation and
leniency. In an implicit reference to Mir Hossein Mousavi and
Mehdi Karrubi, each of whom has referred back to his own
revolutionary credentials, Khamenei said that at times Khomeini
had to deal with conflicts even with those who had solid
revolutionary backgrounds, at the level of the Prime Minister
(i.e. Mousavi himself), President (Khamenei himself) and even at
levels above the President (a reference to Khomeini's dismissal
of Supreme Leader-designate Ayatollah Montazeri).
¶5. (U) Khamenei said the system didn't seek to stifle those who
"think differently" (note: 'digar andishan," a term used to
refer to the intellectual current associated, inter alia, with
the Khatami-ist 'Second of Khordad' movement). It was good for
Iran's officials to have critics point out weaknesses if those
DUBAI 00000379 002.2 OF 003
doing so act within and accept the basic principles of the

system, and the government will not move against such criticism.
¶6. (U) However, again drawing the link to Imam Ali, Khamenei
said that during Khomeini's time if there were danger of
infiltration of "harmful principles" into the system, and if
this conflict were in some way a threat to core principles,
Khomeini would then "act decisively." The regime, much like any
human being, had to defend itself against such an attack.
Linking his actions to those of Imam Ali and Khomeini, Khamenei
said that today also the regime will act if it senses that
someone is acting against its principles and security.
AVOIDING CORRUPTION FROM WITHIN
¶7. (U) In keeping with recent dominant public warnings about

"soft overthrow" and "soft wars," Khamenei turned to the theme
of corruption from within, both at an individual and societal
level. At an individual level, deviation from principles and
susceptibility to corruption were to be avoided at all costs, as
small slips and mistakes could lead to larger ones in a slow and
gradual process. The cure for such threats is self-awareness,
piety and the ongoing moral policing of friends and family. If
such impiety is happening to a government official the problem
is worse, as it affects society.
¶8. (U) At a societal and governmental level, deviation from

principles and susceptibility to corruption can happen in much
the same manner. The decay comes from within, and although on
the outside the society can still appear like an "Islamic
Republic," on the inside it could suffer degradation and decay.
In this regard, societal dynamics can either be positive or
negative. Positive dynamics means moving ever closer towards
justice and religion, which improves social, political and
economic conditions and also improves society's abilities to
stand up to one's enemies. But a society with negative dynamics
will have growing class and social differences and worsening
political and economic conditions. Instead of using freedom for
growth, such a decaying society will abuse freedom to pursue
corruption, sin and dissension. Such negative dynamics also
cause the society to "feel weak and retreat" in the face of
one's enemy, unilateral disarmament and relinquishing one's
rights, nuclear and non-nuclear, which is another sign of
societal decline.
ELECTION
¶9. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said the June 12 Presidential

election with its massive turnout was a glorious triumph for the
Islamic Revolution. The turnout demonstrated to the world that
the Iranian people believed in their system of government now
more than ever, "regardless of who voted for whom. After the
election, the enemy sought to create disturbances in order to
diminish Iran's achievement and weaken the peoples' confidence
in the system, but to no effect. There will be similarly large
turnout in future elections, Khamenei predicted, showing the
ongoing support of the people.
IRAN'S ENEMIES
¶10. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said all governments have

enemies, but what is important to note is the nature of one's
friends and enemies. Iran's friends are Muslim nations and
peoples throughout the world, and the oppressed of the world.
Its enemies are the thieves and oppressors of the world, and
Iran should not be scared to be the enemies of the U.S. and the
U.K. It was important for Iran to show strength in the face of
such enemies.
DUBAI 00000379 003.2 OF 003
QODS DAY
¶11. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said that many on the global
stage have tried to bury the issue of Palestine, but Iran has
prevented that, a fact which has upset "the U.S. and the
Zionists." He called for a massive turnout of support on the
September 18 Qods Day Rally in Tehran, and cautioned all that no
one should use this event to sow dissension, an implicit
reference to "Green Path" opposition plans to use this
authorized march as a show of its own strength.
¶12. (C) COMMENT: Although his tone was mild, Iran oppositionist
press in addition to IRPO interlocutors with ties to the "Green
Path" opposition have said that, in the words of one source,
"Khameni's speech was being viewed ominously in Iran,"
especially when viewed in conjunction with the contemporaneous
release of a Judiciary panel report stating that Mehdi Karrubi's
allegations of prisoner abuse were both baseless and also
politically motivated, and forwarding the case to judicial
authorities for possible prosecution (reftel). According to one
executive branch official, Khamenei's speech has made "the
specter of the arrest of Karrubi - and possibly even Mousavi at
a later stage" all the more probable.
¶13. (C) COMMENT (CONT): Contrary to Khamenei's assertions and as

evidenced by recent comments by IRGC Commander Jaafari, the
regime's interpretation of legitimate dissent has constricted
dramatically, with Jaffari equating "soft overthrow" with those
seeking to change Iran's behavior in any way. Certainly,
Khamenei seems to be trying to regain the high ground he
forfeited by descending so openly into the political fray, as
shown by his attempts to draw comparisons among himself,
Khomeini, and Imam Ali. Separately, the Supreme Leader's
formulation of "relinquishing ones rights, nuclear or
non-nuclear" as a sign of societal dissolution and immorality
indicates that Iran will continue to adhere to its hard public
line in advance of any future negotiations. Finally, it is also
worth noting that Supreme Leader Khamenei made no endorsement,
either explicit or implicit, of President Ahmadinejad, saying
only that the recent Presidential election was good due to the
turnout, "regardless of who voted for whom." END COMMENT.
EYRE
Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI389, IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS

RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER
Discussing cables
09RPODUBAI389 2009-09-24 14:02 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Iran RPO Dubai
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/24/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER
REF: RPO DUBAI 384
DUBAI 00000389 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyer, Director, Iran Regional Presence

Office, DOS.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Oppositionist hopes that Iran's clerical class
would mobilize to oppose Supreme Leader Khamenei's post-election
policies appear sharply diminished in the wake of the first
Assembly of Experts meeting since the June 12 Presidential
election. Not only did the Assembly, which has the power to
appoint, supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, give a
ringing endorsement of Khamenei's rule and his handling of the
post-election crisis, it did so in the conspicuous absence of
its Chair, Ayatollah Rafsanjani. Moreover, leaks of the
closed-door proceedings to the conservative press indicate that
at least two prominent members of this clerical deliberative
body excoriated Rafsanjani for his failure to support Khamenei
during the unrest. Despite his absence at the closure of the
Assembly of Experts meeting, Rafsanjani was compelled to
publicly endorse the closing statement while seated at the knee
of the Supreme Leader during a September 24 press conference.
END SUMMARY.
Assembly of Experts: A 'Deliberative' Body
2 (C) The Majles-e Khobregan, or Assembly of Experts (AOE), is a

Constitutionally-mandated deliberative body composed of 86
directly-elected senior clerics from across the country. By
law, the Assembly must meet for a minimum of two days twice a
year. Though theoretically vested with the power to appoint,
supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, in practical terms the
Assembly's only real responsibility is to appoint the Supreme
Leader's successor should he die or become incapacitated. As
such, the AOE's last noteworthy act was appointing current
Supreme Leader Khamenei after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1989
death. Every subsequent meeting has ended with the issuance of
a perfunctory statement lauding the Assembly's decision to
appoint Khamenei and praising his leadership. Nevertheless,
according to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Assembly can
find Khamenei unfit for office; accordingly, control of the AOE
remains a (potential) check on the Supreme Leader's otherwise
unbridled power.
¶3. (C) The Assembly is currently chaired by Ayatollah Ali Akbar

Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was re-elected to the two-year term of
Speaker in March 2009. At the time of his re-election, he
garnered 51 votes, an improvement over the 46 votes he received
in 2007, despite efforts by hardline conservative clerics, led
by Ayatollahs Mesbah-Yazdi and Ibrahim Yazdi, to unseat him.
First Meeting since the Election
¶4. (C) On September 22-23 the AOE convened for the first time
since Iran's disputed June 12 election. Rafsanjani opened the
sixth official meeting of this Fourth Assembly of Experts by
again cautioning that a "suspicious faction" is trying to create
rifts among Iran's leaders and by condemning the "atmosphere of
insults and dispute" that has prevailed since the June
presidential election. He also promised that "system insiders
of good will" are developing a plan to resolve Iran's domestic
political problems. His opening statement was followed by
reports to the body by Judiciary deputy Mohsen Ejei
(Intelligence Minister during the presidential election and its
aftermath) and Revolutionary Guards Commander Jaafari.
According to press reports, at least sixteen Assembly members
spoke.
¶5. (C) Though summaries of the closed-door proceedings released

by Rafsanjani's office did not reflect any discord among the
members and indeed indicated the body's support of him,
conservative Iranian press charged Rafsanjani's office with
'censoring' coverage of the proceeding, reporting that at least
two prominent members sharply criticized Rafsanjani for failing
to support the Supreme Leader after the disputed election. One
quotation prominently featured in conservative news outlets was
Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah al-Hoda rhetorically
asking Rafsanjani, "why after twenty years, have you remained
silent in the face of these unprecedented insults (to the
Supreme Leader)?"
DUBAI 00000389 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) More tellingly, Rafsanjani did not attend the second and
final day of the meeting, with recently retired former Judiciary
Head Ayatollah Shahrudi chairing in his absence. Hardline
conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (the same cleric who
replaced Rafsanjani as Qods Day prayer leader - reftel) read the
Assembly's final statement, which was an unqualified if not
fawning endorsement of the Supreme Leader himself and his "wise
policies" for quickly extinguishing the post-election "flames of
sedition." Khatami noted that Rafsanjani, despite his absence,
agreed with "every point" of the final statement, which also
credited Khamenei for dismissing the fraud allegations as part
of a plot to undermine the Islamic Republic. The final
statement was also noteworthy in its perfunctory congratulations
to President Ahmadinejad for his election victory, and its more
sincere admonishment of Ahmadinejad to scrupulously follow
Supreme Leader Khamenei's guidance.
¶7. (C) COMMENT: Following the disputed June 12 presidential

election, many speculated that the axis of a Rafsanjani
counter-attack would focus on rallying clerical support to his
cause. However, the rumored AOE "emergency session" never
convened, and absent such a meeting it remained unclear how much
support Rafsanjani had among this body that reflects the
political leanings of Iran's traditional senior clergy. Now
that the AOE has met, it is clear that the clerical cavalry
isn't coming over the horizon anytime soon. Furthermore, the
AOE final statement, seen in conjunction with the removal of
Rafsanjani as Qods Day Speaker (reftel), indicates in the
clearest terms yet that in the most severe crisis of his career,
Rafsanjani is unable to mobilize his once vast and influential
patronage network to achieve his political ends. And given that
Rafsanjani's presumed power is serving as at least a partial
deterrent to further regime moves against Mousavi, Karrubi and
Khatami, the results of this two-day AOE session bode ill for
the leadership of the oppositionist "Green Path of Hope." END
COMMENT.
EYRE
Viewing cable 09SEOUL1400, INTER-KOREAN RED CROSS TALKS ON

FAMILY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #1400/01 2440933

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010933Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI ECON KN KS
SUBJECT: INTER-KOREAN RED CROSS TALKS ON FAMILY
REUNIFICATION
Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The North Korean delegation to the August

26-28 inter-Korean Red Cross talks showed up armed with
instructions from Kim Jong-il (KJI) to agree immediately to
family reunions by Chusok (Korean Thanksgiving, October 2-3),
but was not prepared to negotiate additional reunions.
Ministry of Unification (MOU) xxxxx that,
angling for food assistance, the DPRK delegation asked
whether the ROKG brought a "gift," the ROKG responded that
such aid would be premature. In a separate meeting, an MOU
official described the mechanics of the family reunion
process, noting that the DPRK gathered its participants in
Pyongyang for a month of fattening up and indoctrination
prior to the family reunification. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
KJI: Green Light for Chusok Deadline, but Nothing Beyond
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶2. (C) xxxxx, who

recently returned xxxxx
xxxxx at Mount Kumgang. xxxxx, a seasoned MOU officer
who participated in previous negotiations with the DPRK, said
he was surprised that DPRK head delegate Choi Sung-ik was
unusually cooperative during this round of talks. Choi,
infamous throughout the ROKG for his gruff demeanor and tough
tactics, came to the table emphasizing he was authorized by
Kim Jong-il (KJI) to "meet the Chusok deadline." The North
Korean delegation, however, was not authorized by KJI to
discuss anything beyond October.
---------------------------
DPRK Asks About Food "Gift"
---------------------------
¶3. (C) According xxxxx, the DPRK delegation inquired whether

the South Korean delegation had brought a "gift," hinting
that they were expecting food aid. The ROK delegation
responded that it was "premature" for such an arrangement.
xxxxx noted that this was a big change, pointing out that
during the past 16 rounds of Red Cross negotiations, the ROKG
always asked for the family reunions and rewarded the DPRK
with rice and fertilizer aid. This time, however, the
reunion suggestion came from the DPRK and the ROKG did not,
and has no plans to, offer food aid.
---------------------------------------------
Atmospherics: Food Shipped in from Pyongyang
---------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Addressing atmospherics during the talks, xxxxx said the
two sides came to an impasse when the DPRK delegation pushed
hard for the resumption of Mount Kumgang tours. They argued
that KJI had given his oral guarantee that ROK citizens would
be safe and "nothing could be more secure" than KJI's word.
The ROK delegation pushed back, asking for a written
guarantee. The impasse was broken when the ROK side inquired
whether the resumption of Kumgang tours was a prerequisite
for the Chusok family reunions; the DPRK delegation said no.
(xxxxx added that he suspects some kind of amendment to
the 2004 security agreement for Mt. Kumkang tours will be
reached in the near future as a compromise. End note.)
¶5. (C) xxxxx, both delegations took turns hosting

dinner for the two nights they spent at Mount Kumgang. He
said the hotel and kitchen personnel were hired "in a hurry"
from nearby villages and food was shipped in from Pyongyang.
xxxxx noted that the ROK delegation was charged USD 50 per
person for hosting its 70-person banquet, a price that in
fact covered the tab for the banquet hosted by the DPRK
delegation the previous evening.
------------
Carrot Time?
------------
¶6. (C) xxxxx related that following the Red Cross talks, the
ROKG has been reviewing what, if any, "carrots" should be
offered to the DPRK for its string of conciliatory gestures.
According xxxxx, senior MOU officials recognize that North
Korea's goodwill is cyclical, but also want to acknowledge
that DPRK has done "all that it could do, except for
denuclearization," during the past few weeks. xxxxx said that
the ROKG was carefully observing developments in U.S.-DPRK
relations and emphasized that Seoul would come up with a
position "not too far" from Washington's position.
--------------------------------------------- -
Potemkin: Fattening Up the Reliable Relatives
--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (C) xxxxx walked us through the mechanics of what comes next
in the family reunion process. xxxxx explained that the two
Koreas exchanged a list of 200 names each on September 1; the
ROKG picked its families by lottery, the DPRK by political
reliability. xxxxx explained that each government would then
search for relatives of those on the lists. In the past, he
said, about half of the participating ROK families received
confirmation from the DPRK that their relatives were alive
and were then able to hold unifications. The rest of the ROK
families received death confirmations or the ambiguous word
"unconfirmed."
¶8. (C) xxxxx asserted that once the DPRK identifies

politically reliable family members to participate in the
upcoming reunions, they will be transported to Pyongyang and
then "fattened up" with regular meals and vitamins to mask
the extent of food shortages and chronic malnutrition in the
north. The "lucky" DPRK reunion participants will also be
provided with new clothing -- suits for men and traditional
Korean "hanbok" for women -- for the televised event. In our
earlier meeting, xxxxx had commented that MOU gives "pocket
and travel money" to ROK participants which they then pass on
to their North Korean relatives. xxxxx sighed that the
majority of the MOU cash is usually pocketed by North Korean
officials, who also force the North Korean participants to
return their new clothes.
Tokola
Viewing cable 09STATE96222, S) FRENCH FIRM SELLING INFRARED

DETECTORS TO
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0030
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #6222 2591534

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 161515Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2034

TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS FR CH IR
SUBJECT: (S) FRENCH FIRM SELLING INFRARED DETECTORS TO
CHINA
Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Deputy Director Matthew Hardiman

¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Paris. Please

deliver the points in paragraph 4 as soon as possible. These
points may be left as a non-paper.
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶2. (S/NF) We have information the French firm Sofradir and

its subsidiary Ulis continue to sell cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to a Chinese firm for incorporation into
thermal imaging systems. We believe the Chinese firm,
Zhejiang Dali Technology Company Ltd, is actively selling its
thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense entities. Iranian
military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems that rely
on high-grade French infrared detectors could increase the
threat to US and allied forces operating in the Gulf region.
We want to request the Government of France to act
immediately to terminate this activity by Sofradir and Ulis
so China cannot use French components to manufacture weapons
systems and sell them to Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism.
-------------------------
ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES
-------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Post is requested to approach appropriate host

government officials as soon as possible to pursue the
following objectives and to deliver the talking
points/non-paper in para 4 below:
-- Inform French officials we have information the French

firm Sofradir and its subsidiary Ulis continue to sell cooled
and uncooled infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali
Technology Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging
systems.
-- Stress that Zhejiang Dali Technology is actively selling

its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense entities and
that the use of high-grade French infrared detectors in this
technology could increase the threat to US and allied forces
operating in the Gulf region.
-- Ask the French government to investigate, share with us

the results of its investigation, and act to have Sofradir
and Ulis immediately terminate this activity.
-- Emphasize to French officials that infrared detectors are

critical components of high performance thermal imaging
systems and are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement,
Section 6.A.2.a.3.
¶4. (SECRET/REL FRANCE) BEGIN TALKING POINTS
-- In the interest of transparency and enhanced cooperation

on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the
following information:
-- We have information that the French firm Sofradir and its

subsidiary Ulis continue to sell both cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali Technology
Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging systems.
-- Our information indicates the Chinese firm is actively

selling its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense
entities.
-- Iranian military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems

that rely on high-grade French infrared detectors could
increase the threat to US and allied forces operating in the
Gulf region.
-- Infrared detectors (IRD) are sensors and critical

components of high performance thermal imaging systems. IRDs
are controlled under Wassenaar Arrangement, Section 6.A.2.a.3.
-- IRDs are used in the core assemblies for advanced

targeting pods, long-range reconnaissance systems, gimbaled
imaging systems in manned and unmanned airborne
reconnaissance and combat aircraft, Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensors, tank targeting systems, submarine periscopes,
and missile seekers.
-- Diversion of the subject components could be harmful to

our shared national security interests. If these IRDs were
included in the optical targeting mechanism for tanks and air
defense systems, they could potentially be used to degrade US
superiority in night combat operations.
-- We ask that you carefully consider the consequences of

such sales.
-- We also welcome any further information about this case

that may come to light in the course of any French
investigation into the matter.
END TALKING POINTS
---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------
¶5. (U) Post is requested to please report the results of its

efforts within seven business days following receipt of this
cable.
----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------
¶6. (U) ISN/CATR POC is Michael Rolleri

(RolleriMJ@state.sgov.gov; 202-647-0255
highlighting).
¶7. (U) Post's assistance is greatly appreciated.

CLINTON
Viewing cable 09STATE96550, ACTION REQUEST: POTUS EUROPEAN-

BASED MISSILE
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7942
OO RUEHSL
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0388
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1305
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3861
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1173
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1889
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0512
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2014

TAGS: EZ MARR PREL
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: POTUS EUROPEAN-BASED MISSILE
DEFENSE DECISION (CORRECTED COPY OF STATE 96519)
REF: STATE 96526
Classified By: T U/S Ellen O. Tauscher for Reasons 1.4 a,b,and d.
¶1. (U) (THIS CORRECTED COPY PROPERLY REFERENCES STATE 96526.)

This is an ACTION REQUEST. Please see paragraph 3. ALL
MATERIALS IN THIS CABLE ARE TO BE EMBARGOED FROM DELIVERY TO
HOST GOVERNMENTS UNTIL 25 MINUTES PRIOR TO A PRESIDENTIAL
STATEMENT RELEASED ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 AT 9:55 A.M.
(EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME - WASHINGTON, D.C.).
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The White House is expected to announce

a Presidential decision at approximately 9:55
a.m.(Washington, D.C.) on September 17 regarding a U.S.
European-based BMD adaptive regional architecture, which is
significantly different from the Bush Administration's plan
to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a BMD
tracking radar in the Czech Republic. END BACKGROUND.
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Addressee Posts are instructed to

deliver the talking points to Host Governments in paragraph 4
on Thursday, September 17, as a non-paper, but no earlier
than 9:30 a.m. (Easter Daylight Time - Washington, D.C.).
USNATO, Embassies in NATO Capitals (except for Embassies
Warsaw and Prague), Embassy Tokyo, Embassy Moscow, and
Embassies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates) are instructed also to deliver the tailored talking
points for NATO, Japan, Russia, and the GCC States in
paragraphs 5-8. Action Request addressees should attempt to
provide pre-notifications immediately prior to the public
announcement of the Presidential decision but not before 9:30
a.m. EDT; with the different time zones involved, Washington
recognizes that some notifications may not occur until after
the White House public announcement. Posts may draw upon the
Questions and Answers to be provided reftel for use with Host
Governments on an "if asked" basis, or as Posts determine is
appropriate. The Questions and Answers in reftel may be
drawn upon by Posts but should not/not be handed over to Host
Governments. Materials for public diplomacy (e.g., Fact
Sheet, Questions and Answers, and POTUS Statement) will be
provided to Posts septel. Posts please notify the Department
regarding date of delivery, recipients, and reaction, if any.
END ACTION REQUEST.
¶4. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS:
U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY - EUROPEAN DECISION
- The White House announced that the President has approved

Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's unanimous
recommendation for improved missile defenses in Europe
against the threat from Iran to our forces and families
deployed to the region and to our Allies.
- Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can

threaten its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey, and the
Caucasus and it is actively developing and testing ballistic
missiles that can reach more and more of Europe.
-- Our concern regarding Iranian missile capabilities is
further increased by the fact that our Intelligence Community
continues to assess that Iran, at a minimum, is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons.
- The new "Phased, Adaptive Approach" recommended by

Secretary Gates updates and revises the previous program for
missile defense in Europe based on two key findings of the
DoD review:
-- First, the threat from Iran's regional ballistic missiles
has developed more rapidly than previously expected. At the
same time, the threat from potential Iranian intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been slower to develop than we
STATE 00096550 002 OF 006
previously expected.
-- Second, our missile defense capabilities and technologies
have advanced significantly. Improved interceptor
capabilities, such as the currently deployed Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and advanced variants that are
already in development, permit a more flexible and capable
architecture.
- Therefore, the President has approved a Phased, Adaptive

Approach that is responsive to the current threat, but also
can incorporate new technologies quickly and cost-effectively
to adapt as the threat and our technologies continue to
change. It will unfold in phases:
-- The first phase will speed protection of U.S. deployed
forces, civilians, and families and our Allies in Europe
against the current threat from Iran by deploying proven
systems by 2011 ) about six or seven years earlier than the
previous program.
-- Subsequent phases will add advanced variant sea- and
land-based versions of the SM-3 and cover additional
territory in Europe should the Iranian threat expand.
-- In the fourth and final phase we will anticipate
augmenting our existing capabilities to defend the United
States against potential advances in Iran's ICBM capability
with advanced versions of the SM-3. This would be a similar
capability to that provided in the program of record.
- This improved approach removes the need for a Ground Based

Interceptor field in Poland and features a distributed
interceptor and sensor architecture that does not require the
single large, fixed radar originally planned to be located in
the Czech Republic.
-- Under the new approach, land- and sea-based missile
defense interceptors and sensors offer some flexibility to be
redeployed as the regional ballistic missile threat dictates.
This distributed network approach also will increase the
survivability of the system and provide more opportunities
for collaboration with Allies and partners.
-- We are beginning consultations with Poland, the Czech
Republic, and other Allies on the new approach, and will work
with our NATO Allies on determining locations for the sensors
and interceptors, and on integrating the Phased, Adaptive
Approach with their missile defense capabilities and with the
emerging NATO command and control network.
- Strong missile defenses will strengthen our efforts to find

a solution that brings Iran into compliance with its
international obligations: the more we can diminish the
coercive value of Iran's missiles, the less Iran stands to
gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing
capabilities.
- This set of recommendations comes from an ongoing

Congressionally-mandated review that is taking a
comprehensive examination of our global approach to missile
defense and is consistent with the Defense Department's
budget choices for fiscal year 2010:
-- For example, we added additional funding to field more
systems such as Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors.
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.

¶5. (S/REL NATO) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR USNATO AND
EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS (TALKING POINTS BELOW SHOULD BE
USED FOR ALL NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT FOR POLAND AND THE CZECH
REPUBLIC; WARSAW AND PRAGUE WILL RECEIVE SEPARATE TAILORED
TALKING POINTS TO BE DELIVERED ON SEPTEMBER 17 BY THE
FLOURNOY-TAUSCHER DELEGATION):
GENERAL
- NATO leaders have all agreed that ballistic missile

proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces,
territory, and populations.
- As a result, NATO has noted the significant contribution to

Alliance security by those Allies who possess, or are
STATE 00096550 003 OF 006
acquiring, missile defense capabilities.
- At the 2008 Summit, NATO leaders agreed to consider options

for a NATO missile defense system that would cover all
remaining areas of Allied populations and territory. To
date, those efforts have focused on missile defense systems
to protect deployed forces from shorter-range ballistic
missile threats.
- At the 2009 NATO summit, Heads of State and Government

tasked experts to examine the potential expansion of the
ALTBMD program ) which is designed to be the command and
control "backbone" for theater missile defense for deployed
forces.
- The United States now proposes a "Phased Adaptive

Approach," which will reinforce and strengthen on-going NATO
efforts. Specifically, we believe that the Phased Adaptive
Approach is fully supportive of the decision to pursue
options for a complementary NATO-wide multi-layered BMD
architecture, which currently is envisioned to use NATO's
command and control backbone architecture. This is a
flexible and cost-effective approach that leverages proven
technologies against a known threat.
- Most importantly, the Phased Adaptive Approach is designed

to work in concert with Allied efforts to provide protection
against ballistic missile attack for all NATO Allies,
reflecting the Alliance principle of indivisibility of
security.
- The Phased Adaptive Approach will provide our most proven

and operational missile defense capabilities in the
near-term, defending Allied territory sooner against the
current Iranian threat.
- U.S. missile defense efforts will of course be fully

interoperable with those of NATO.
- We propose that -- subsequent to Alliance discussions and

follow-on briefings in greater detail -- the Alliance examine
how we can integrate the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach with
NATO missile defense. This can be discussed further at the
upcoming defense ministerial in Bratislava.
- The Phased Adaptive Approach would serve to greatly
strengthen NATO's missile defense capabilities in the face of
a growing threat to Alliance security.
- We look forward to engaging the Alliance in political and

technical discussions in the weeks ahead.
FINANCING (if raised)

- We will work closely with Allies to examine broader
resourcing requirements for defense of Allied forces,
territories and populations, including the integration of our
Phased Adaptive Approach.
ROLE FOR NATO MEMBERS

- We have already consulted with the two Allies that had
agreed to host missile defense assets under the previous
plan. I want to reiterate that we are deeply appreciative of
their readiness to take difficult political decisions to
respond to the need to better protect allied territories and
populations against the threat of ballistic missiles.
- We intend to engage in active consultations at NATO on the

best way forward.
- The "Phased Adaptive Approach" is flexible and could be

integrated into a NATO territorial missile defense system.
There will be a requirement for Allies to host the sensors
and interceptors to be included in the Phased Adaptive
Approach. There are many possibilities, and we look forward
to continuing our NATO consultations.
- If pressed: At this time, I would prefer not to get into
STATE 00096550 004 OF 006
specific issues related to potential Host Nations. We have

many options in this flexible architecture ) sea- and
land-based, northern and southern Europe. We intend to
engage soon at NATO with Allies on those questions.
- We expect that Allied national systems or current NATO

systems will be able to integrate well with the overall
phased approach.
- Allied contributions can be interoperable with the Phased

Approach missile defense architecture to ensure they form a
cost-effective and comprehensive architecture.
GROUND BASED INTERCEPTORS

- If needed: The U.S. will continue to develop the GBI
technology for CONUS defense because domestically it remains
a cost-effective option. However, we have no plans to pursue
GBIs in Europe given the promise and track record of SM-3
technology.
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR NATO.
¶6. (C/REL RUSSIA) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA:
- The President's missile defense in Europe decision will

publicly be announced at 10:00 a.m. Washington, D.C. time.
The National Security Advisor, General Jones, will be
delivering a similar message to Ambassador Kislyak before the
announcement.
- The decision is the result of a long review process; new

information on the Iranian ballistic missile program drove
the decision.
- Iran has made more progress on short-range and medium-range

ballistic missiles, and less progress on ICBMs than
anticipated. Now the threat is greater to the Middle East and
to Europe, with a less immediate threat to the United States.
- We do not plan to deploy GBIs in Poland and we will not

base the European Mid-Course radar in the Czech Republic.
Instead, there will be an adaptive, phased approach.
- We believe that Iran plans to deploy hundreds of these

short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. Our old
plan was designed to intercept only small numbers of ICBMs.
- There is no doubt that Iran is developing these missiles to

arm them with a nuclear warhead. There is NO OTHER REASON to
spend so much time and effort into developing these missiles.
They are not useful weapons if only armed with a
conventional warhead.
- The new plan for European missile defense is better

designed to protect Europe from this Iranian threat that is
emerging. We intend to deploy the SM-3 interceptor which is
what we are deploying in the Middle East as well. SM-3s do
not have the capability to threaten Russian ICBMs.
- In the first stages of deployment, we also are seeking to

place these interceptors closer to Iran (from what I
understand, this is exactly the idea that President Putin
proposed to President Bush during their July 2007 meeting at
Kennebunkport, Maine).
- The new plan calls for radars and detection systems to be

deployed closer to Iran. These radars will not have the
capacity to track Russian ICBMs.
- With this decision behind us, we now want to move

aggressively to launch serious cooperation on missile defense
with Russia.
- As the President said during his meeting with President

Medvedev in April, we want to begin by standing up the Joint
Data Exchange Center (JDEC). The hope is to share data from
our respective early-warning systems.
STATE 00096550 005 OF 006
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR RUSSIA.
¶7. (C/REL JAPAN) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN:
- The U.S. greatly appreciates Japan's partnership in BMD; we

remain deeply committed to strengthening regional BMD
capabilities including operational cooperation, joint
research, and co-development.
- Recent North Korean provocations serve as a reminder of the

importance of our cooperative missile defense efforts, which
help underpin a strong U.S.-Japan Alliance and contribute to
regional stability.
- We remain committed to an effective defense of the U.S. and

our Allies against rogue ballistic missile threats, including
North Korea and, if it continues down its current path, Iran.
- As you are aware, the BMD Review has undertaken a

comprehensive examination of our approach to missile
defenses, including an in-depth look at our approach to
European missile defense and in other regions around the
world.
-- USG discussions with the MOD and MOFA over the last
several months made clear that you have particular interest
in the European missile defense analysis -- we understand
these strategic decisions have an impact in the Asia-Pacific
region and want to make sure you are fully informed of our
results.
-- Throughout the review process the U.S. recognized and
factored in Japanese concerns/equities especially those
related to our on-going discussions with the Russian
Federation.
- Although the BMD Review report is not due to Congress until

this January, we have already reached some important
conclusions. We have decided to move forward with discussing
results now so we do not delay deploying improved defenses
for ourselves or our allies.
OTHER CONSULTATIONS
- We would like to explain the President's decision to you

before our public announcement and before we speak with
Russia. We are discussing this new European approach with
Poland, the Czech Republic, and NATO, as we speak.
-- As a close and trusted ally, we consider it important to
share this information with you. However, in light of past
problems with information security, we must insist that you
take every precaution to ensure that this information will
not be leaked. Any leaks would have significant implications
for our European missile defense approach, and would be
damaging to our bilateral relationship. Should there be a
security breach elsewhere, it is important that our
governments not officially confirm leaked information if it
appears in the media before official release by the U.S.
Government.
THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH
- As you have seen, the new plan for European missile defense
will use the SM-3 interceptor, both land- and sea-based,
rather than GBIs included in the previous program.
- In many ways, your leadership and partnership in the

development of the SM-3 and in operational coordination have
been critical to our development of this new approach to
Europe. Just as we have cooperatively deployed proven and
transportable missile defenses to help defend against
ballistic missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region, we will
deploy those same technologies and capabilities in Europe.
- At this time, the new European approach is based on

U.S.-owned SM-3s. However, we will want to look at future
missile defense opportunities with NATO and our European
STATE 00096550 006 OF 006
allies that could include potential sales of a number of

missile defense capabilities. We would very much like to
work with Japan to make strategic decisions about whether and
how our jointly developed missile (i.e., the SM-3 Block IIA)
could be part of that future, and perhaps part of a future
networked global system of regional missile defense
architectures.
- We look forward to continuing our strong partnership on

missile defense and growing our cooperative activities.
BMD FOR JAPAN AND EAST ASIA
- As mentioned previously, the phased approach in Europe is

in many ways similar to the approach we have taken with you.
We believe that our current approach in the Asia- Pacific
region is sound and forms a model that we can draw upon
elsewhere. Naturally, we will re-engage with you soon on the
full findings of our BMD Review.
IF ASKED ABOUT BURDEN SHARING AT NATO:
- As you well know, this type of approach creates

opportunities for participation ) for example, in command
and control, sensors, and interceptors ) and enhanced
cooperation, similar to the type that we already enjoy. We
look forward to engaging with NATO soon about how our new
approach contributes to common defenses and how we can share
responsibilities in that effort.
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR JAPAN.
¶8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GULF COOPERATION

COUNCIL STATES (BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA,
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES):
- The USG has adopted a phased adaptive approach for the

ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe. The approach in
Europe complements the emerging BMD architecture in the Gulf,
which is currently defending against potential Iranian air
and missile threats to our partners and U.S. forces in the
Gulf region.
-- We are working to optimize limited assets to ensure that
programs in Europe will not be executed at the expense of our
friends and commitment to the defense of the Gulf Cooperation
Council.
-- BMD programs in Europe will not require a diversion of
U.S. assets from the Gulf.
- The United States has deployed BMD systems to the Middle

East to protect against the Iranian missile threat, including
AEGIS BMD presence in the Persian Gulf and two PATRIOT
batteries each in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.
-- These U.S. systems complement the indigenous BMD systems
in the region including PAC-II capability in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait, and Shared Early Warning capability with the UAE.
-- The USG is exploring the possibility of providing
additional BMD coverage to Gulf Cooperation Council nations
if the circumstances warrant.
-- The USG will continue to work with its Gulf partners to
develop regional, integrated air and missile defense systems.
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR GCC STATES.

CLINTON
Viewing cable 09STATE100153, EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM

ENRICHMENT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09STATE100153.
2009-09-25 2010-11-28 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Secretary of
09STATE100153
18:06 18:06 OFFICIAL USE ONLY State
UNCLASSIFIED STATE 00100153
O 251814Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9888
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100153
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: IR KNNP MNUC PARM
SUBJECT: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT
FACILITY IN IRAN
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph

3 for action.
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The United States is aware that

Iran has been secretly building another enrichment
facility, in addition to the one at Natanz. Some other
governments are also in possession of similar
information. The United States, France, and the United
Kingdom briefed the IAEA on Thursday, 24 September on
this facility. The United States remains committed to a
diplomatic resolution of international concerns with
Iran's nuclear program. These concerns are reinforced
by the existence of this facility. Immediate,
unconditional cooperation by Iran with the IAEA is
essential to address these concerns and to ensure that a
diplomatic process has a chance to succeed.
¶3. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to inform

senior host government officials of the existence of a
covert uranium enrichment facility in Iran using the
points contained in paragraph 4. Posts are NOT
authorized to provide a copy of the points. Washington
understands that, in a previous iteration of this
message, a non-paper was authorized. If points have
already been conveyed in writing, posts are instructed
to request discretion on the part of host government
interlocutors. If asked about coincidental claims by an
Iranian exile group of previously unknown nuclear
weaponization sites, posts should convey the following,
IC-cleared point:
-- We do not believe that these other sites that you

refer to are the Qom enrichment site. There are many
suspect sites, including these others, that we monitor.
¶4. (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
-- We have acquired substantial, specific information

that Iran has been secretly building another enrichment
facility ? in addition to Natanz.
-- The facility is located near the city of Qom, Iran,

and has been under construction for several years. The
facility is located in an underground tunnel complex on
the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Base.
-- Earlier this year, we developed information that gave

us increased confidence that the facility was a uranium
enrichment site.
-- The site is under the management of the Atomic Energy

Organization of Iran, but unknown to all but the most
senior AEOI officials.
-- The site is intended to hold approximately 3000

centrifuges but we do not know what type of centrifuge
Iran intends to employ there. We assess an enrichment
plant containing 3000 centrifuges is not adequate to
produce regular fuel reloads for civilian nuclear power
plants, which require a much larger number of
centrifuges.
-- Based on our understanding of the status of the
facility, we assess that Iran will not be able to begin
enriching uranium there before at least 2010. Iran is
continuing construction of support buildings at the
facility. Intelligence indicates that earlier this
year, Iran was installing the infrastructure required
for centrifuges.
-- Iran may claim that this facility is for civilian

nuclear fuel production. The Iranian government
continues to claim that it is not pursuing a nuclear
weapon. Yet this facility is too small to be viable for
production of fuel for a nuclear power reactor. It may
be well-suited, however, for a military purpose.
-- We are aware that some other governments are in

possession of similar information.
-- We learned this week that Iran has sent the IAEA a

letter indicating that it is constructing a pilot fuel
enrichment facility and that the "required
infrastructure has been established."
-- The letter provides no details and states that
STATE 00100153 002 OF 002
"further complementary information will be provided in

an appropriate and due time." We assume this new
enrichment facility is the facility that we and other
governments have been tracking.
-- We, the UK and France have briefed the IAEA on the

information that they have so that they can fully
investigate the facility. The President, with his UK
and French counterparts, plans to make an announcement
Friday morning in Pittsburgh.
-- We firmly believe that the existence of a new

centrifuge facility in Iran constitutes a serious
violation of Iran's international obligations.
-- Iran was required to suspend all uranium enrichment-

related activities in UN Security Council resolution
¶1737. This legally-binding requirement has been
reaffirmed in three subsequent UNSC resolutions.
-- When Iran decided to build this facility, it was

obligated to declare this to the IAEA. It failed to do
so.
-- What is clear is that Iran once again has engaged in

a deceit of the international community. The President
made clear that we are serious about using diplomacy to
find a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear
program, but in order to do so, Iran needs to be
transparent and truthful.
-- It is now time for Iran to prove to the international

community that it is willing to play by the rules. We
urge your public support on this matter as we head into
the October 1 meeting with Iran.
-- It will particularly important that Iran understand
that it must end the pattern of deception and once and
for all commit itself to full transparency. It is time
for Iran to come clean on the questions about its
weaponization studies and to implement the Additional
Protocol.
-- The Ministers of the P5+1 held a productive meeting

on the margins of the UN General Assembly. They stated
their expectation that Iran will be prepared to take
constructive steps when it meets with the P5+1 on
October 1st. In light of this new and troubling
information, the burden is clearly on Iran to prove the
exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. It
is essential that Iran accept that the process in Geneva
must be real an address their nuclear program. We are
prepared to engage in a real process but will not be a
party to a phony one.
-- We hope that we can count on your public support for

holding Iran to its international obligations.
END TALKING POINTS
¶5. (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive

responses. Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680
highlighting,
NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) is the Department's POC for
this cable.
¶6. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

CLINTON
Viewing cable 09ANKARA1472, SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY

Discussing cables
09ANKARA1472 2009-10-13 08:08 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
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RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
OSD FOR ASD VERSHBOW FROM AMBASSADOR JEFFREY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM PTER TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO TURKEY
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Sandy, Glad you'll be able to visit Turkey at this key
time. Your short visit will give you an opportunity to engage
with key Turkish leaders on, first and foremost in their
minds, missile defense. The Turks are keen to learn more
about U.S. plans, in particular what role the U.S.
wants/expects Turkey and others in Europe to play. The
Turkish General Staff (TGS) will be interested in our ideas
for HLDG reform, even if they may be slow to accept them.
¶2. (S) You know how broad our agenda is with Turkey. As you
will have a short time in country, I suggest you focus on a
few key issues.
Be sure to raise:
------------------
- Missile Defense, with emphasis on how the U.S. will look to
several Allies - not just Turkey - for help (para 3)
- Repeat our commitment to our intel and other support for
strikes against the PKK (para 5-6)
- Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan
(para 13)
- Float the idea of HLDG reform and ensure Guner knows we
expect him in Washington (para 4)
- Press for a realistic assessment of Turkey's view of the
threat assessment from Iran (para 10)
Watch Out For:

---------------
- Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras
11-12)
- Conflation of Turkey's exploration of air defense
capabilities with our Missile Defense needs (para 3)
Missile Defense
----------------
¶3. (S) The Turks will appreciate your update on U.S. missile
defense plans and in particular will expect you to have
specific ideas on how Turkey would contribute to the PAA.
While the top-level bureaucrats with whom you will meet will
understand the rationale for the PAA and will be ready to
explore ways Turkey can help, the political environment for a
request to base assets in Turkey is mixed, and Turkey's
perception of the Iranian threat to its territory differs
from ours. The GOT continues to tread a fine line in
managing its strong relationship with the U.S. and its ties
with both the Islamic world and Russia. The government must
be able to demonstrate that any missile defense program is
not specifically anti-Iran, nor blatantly pro-Israel.
¶4. (S) Likewise, it will want to ensure that Russia is not

opposed to Turkey's role. Also important will be clarity on
the degree to which this system is a NATO one, under NATO
Command and Control (C2). The PAA would presumably
complement Turkey's effort to establish a domestic missile
defense capability that would protect Turkey's major
population centers. The PAC-3 has been offered in response
to Turkey's air defense tender and you should highlight the
system's ability to be interoperable with any future NATO
command and control architecture.
HLDG
-----
¶5. (C) You will need to outline U.S. views to streamline and
alter the current HLDG format to make it into a more
substantive discussion. The Turks are shy to stray from the
status quo; you should emphasize why we feel this change is
necessary while underscoring that it is vitally important the
DCHOD Guner attend the upcoming HLDG in December, when
decisions about future dialogues will be agreed upon. (We
have learned that the new position of TGS number three, a
four-star slot held by General Balanli (with a focus on
hardware), might get the nod for the HLDG representative.
We've told Guner it should be his.) You should also be
prepared for the Turkish General Staff to raise the Shared
Defense Vision document, as they await a response to their
latest proposed text.
PKK
----
¶6. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK

have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
military action alone. Although the government's Democratic
(i.e., Kurdish) Initiative is not yet fully developed, the
government has increased social and economic support to
ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey, has dramatically broadened
the rights of Kurds to use their own language, and increased
educational opportunities as well. It is our view that the
TGS military success against the PKK, supported by our
intelligence--sharing operation, has given the civilians the
political space to explore this "opening." Turkish military
operations against the PKK continue, however, and on October
6 Parliament extended the government's mandate to conduct
cross-border operations against the PKK in Iraq for another
year.
¶7. (C) Our 2007 decision to share operational intelligence

was a turning point for the bilateral relationship, and
President Obama's declaration before the Turkish Parliament
of our continuing commitment to support Turkey's fight
against the PKK was warmly welcomed. This cooperation has
helped to improve our bilateral relationship across the
board. Turkey's military leaders value this intelligence and
the advice our military leaders give them. Our work has made
it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a
safe haven. Turkish causalities are still occurring,
however, and an increasing proportion are from IEDs. Due to
pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and the Turkish
General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year, the
government wants and has requested direct U.S. kinetic action
against the PKK; we have refused this request to date due to
our own rules of engagement. The GOT has also requested the
sale of armed MQ-9/Reaper UAVs, which will be a challenge to
fulfill (see para 10).
Northern Iraq
--------------
¶8. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the

political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's policy remains
focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the
continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
the KRG's healthy economy. It is also tied to turkey's new
opening to its own Kurds, by far the biggest and most
controversial domestic political issue here.
¶9. (S) The U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks

continue regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in
Erbil, established to share counter-PKK intelligence was
established over the summer. The Turks remain shy to share
data; they are not convinced that they can trust
Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information concerning
operations secret. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right
direction. Turkish military officials have become more
strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
against the PKK.
U.S. Drawdown through Turkey

-----------------------------
¶10. (S) Habur Gate and the Incirlik Cargo Hub -- vital to our
sustainment operations -- could be helpful in our drawdown if
other options prove too difficult. Minister of National
Defense Vedci Gonul suggested to Secretary Gates in June that
Turkey was ready to agree to the increased use of Incirlik
for this purpose. Using the surface route from Habur Gate to
Mediterranean ports (Iskenderun, Mersin) is also worth
exploring, and we may be able to involve Turkish commercial
shippers in support of the Northern Distribution Network. We
caution that the rough terrain, security environment, and the
cantankerous nature of the Turkish government bureaucracy
will challenge any U.S. operation. Nevertheless, we are
evaluating these options in cooperation with CENTCOM and
EUCOM partners.
Iran
------
¶11. (C) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and

international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
trade route to Central Asian markets. PM Erdogan himself is
a particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position. Turkey
believes international pressure against Iran only helps to
strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. However, it
continues to press Iran quietly to accept the P5 plus 1
offer. The GOT is a strong partner in our non-proliferation
efforts, with several significant results. Politically,
Turkey will try to position itself on Iran between wherever
we are and where Russia is. In a pinch or if pressed, the
Turks will slant to us.
UAVs and Attack Helicopters

----------------------------
¶12. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own

UAV capability. The administration has made clear at high
levels that we support this goal, and Turkey has pending
request to acquire armed Reaper UAVs. Ultimate approval for
armed Reapers is complicated due to MTCR obligations and Hill
concerns. However, even if those could be overcome, the
delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
intelligence support until they can replace it. We have not
made this commitment to date.
¶13. (C) Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to

a severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed
for its fight against the PKK Turkey has looked to us to
help them bridge the capability gap, asking to purchase
additional AH-1W Super Cobra aircraft. These aircraft are in
short supply in our own inventory, but Secretary Gates and
VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to support with request
within a few years (four each in 2011, 2012, and 2013). The
Turks took this as an affirmative, and recently started
pressing for delivery in 2010 instead of 2011.
----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey has commanded ISAF twice since its inception
and will take command of RC-Capital this November. Turkey
leads PRT Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan in
early 2010. Turkey has sponsored the "Ankara Process"
dialogue, one of several efforts to encourage constructive
communications between Kabul and Islamabad and is a leading
participant in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. Turkey
pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200 million
to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan. Because of
its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as
Foreign Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is
well disposed to act as an agent of the international
community's goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Constraining
Turkey's potential is a lack of resources. Our conversations
with Turkish interlocutors have helped us identify several
areas in which Turkey can be of particular help: education
and health, military training and support, economics,
counter-narcotics, and trilateral engagement. (Note: Turkey
will not support any CT operations in Afghanistan. They do
not believe there is a NATO/ISAF mandate to engage in these
operations, and they additionally have national caveats
preventing them from participating in NATO/ISAF CT
operations. The GOT also believes that ISAF should not/not
be engaged in the counter-narcotics fight, believing that
foreign fighters who engage in this fight just produces
antipathy against foreign forces in the local population. I
do, however, believe the GOT are willing to engage the
training of Afghan security forces.)
Caucasus
--------
¶15. (C) Turkey seeks to develop itself as a regional power

and recognizes that the Caucasus region, stymied in its
growth by frozen conflicts, could turn to Turkey for develop.
The signing of the Protocol document in Zurich on October 10
was a landmark for the region, and should serve as a starting
point for establishing bilateral relations and, ultimately,
the opening of its closed border. Nevertheless, future
relations will still be heavily linked to the 1915 "genocide"
issue and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey consistently warns
that any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
"genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
the devastating effect on our bilateral relationship --
including political, military, and commercial aspects --
would be unavoidable.
Political Environment
----------------------
¶16. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development

(AK) Party is squarely in the driver's seat, but fears an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief
of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
(represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
has seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military
involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
respective underlings.
Israel
-------
¶17. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
shore up his domestic right political flank at the expense of
this relationship. His outburst at Davos was the first in a
series of events the results of which we and his staff have
sought to contain. The latest of these was Exercise
Anatolian Eagle. Erdogan canceled Israel's participation
hours before the exercise was to begin. With an Israeli
strike - across Turkish airspace - against targets in Iran a
possibility, Erdogan decided he could not afford the
political risk of being accused of training the forces which
would carry out such a raid. Through some remarkable work
with Allies and with the inter-agency, we engineered a public
"postponement" of the international portion of the exercise,
but the relationship has begun to sour.
JEFFREY
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s

gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
Viewing cable 09ANKARA1549, ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TRACES HIS

PROBLEMS TO ERDOGAN
Discussing cables
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RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TRACES HIS PROBLEMS TO ERDOGAN
REF: ANKARA 1532
Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)
¶1. (C) During an October 26 call on the Ambassador, Israeli Ambassador Gabby
Levy registered concern over the recent deterioration in his country's bilateral
relations with Turkey and the conviction that the relationship's decline is
attributable exclusively to Prime Minister Erdogan. Levy said Foreign Minister
Davutoglu had relayed a message to him through the visiting Czech foreign
minister that “things will get better.” He had also fielded messages from senior
civil servants, xxxxx urging him to weather quietly Erdogan's harsh public
criticisms of Israel. The latter claimed Erdogan's repeated angry references to
the humanitarian situation in Gaza are for “domestic political consumption”
only.
¶2. (C) Levy dismissed political calculation as a motivator for Erdogan's

hostility, arguing the prime minister's party had not gained a single point in
the polls from his bashing of Israel. Instead, Levy attributed Erdogan's
harshness to deep-seated emotion: “He's a fundamentalist. He hates us
religiously” and his hatred is spreading. Levy cited a perceived anti-Israeli
shift in Turkish foreign policy, including the GoT's recent elevation of its
relations with Syria and its quest for observer status in the Arab League.
¶3. (C) Comment: Our discussions with contacts both inside and outside of the
Turkish government on Turkey's deteriorating relations with Israel tend to
confirm Levy's thesis that Erdogan simply hates Israel. xxxxx discusses
contributing reasons for Erdogan's tilt on Iran/Middle East isues, but antipathy
towards Israel is a factor.
JEFFREY
“Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s

gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey”
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2932, PRC/IRAN: PREMIER WEN PUSHES

RAHIMI ON DIALOGUE;
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7040
DE RUEHBJ #2932/01 2951203
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2034

SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: PREMIER WEN PUSHES RAHIMI ON DIALOGUE;
CHINA URGES COOPERATION WITH IAEA, P5-PLUS-1

Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of Shanghai Cooperation

Organization high-level meetings October 15, PRC Premier Wen
Jiabao urged Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza
Rahimi to move forward with direct talks with the United
States and offered PRC support to do so, according to an MFA
official. Wen reportedly reiterated that Iran had the right
to peaceful nuclear technology, but stressed China's
opposition to Iranian development of nuclear weapons. Our
MFA contact claimed that China recognizes the importance of
seizing the present opportunity and that the Iranian side did
as well. The PRC assesses that Iran's willingness to
negotiate over the nuclear issue comes from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
but the Iranian regime remains divided over the June election
and its aftermath. Our contact urged the U.S. to downplay
sanctions and seek positive, even if symbolic, benefits to
provide Iran in response to progress in the talks. China has
been pushing Iran to improve its cooperation with the IAEA
and assesses that Iran will make good on its offer to allow
inspectors into the Qom nuclear site. Beijing believes that
Iran's nuclear technology is not as advanced "as some
believe." Iranian Embassy officials in Beijing expressed
satisfaction to the Chinese with the outcomes of the October
1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran meeting and were particularly positive
on the bilateral meeting with the U.S. side, according to the
MFA. Our contact argued that a constituency within Iranian
society that advocates flexibility on the nuclear issue is a
force in politics, but that the government will need any
negotiations to accrue benefits to Iran given the strength of
the conservative camp. END SUMMARY.
Wen Pushes Iranian Vice President on Nuclear Issue

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) MFA West Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy
Director Ni Ruchi told PolOff October 21 that Premier Wen
Jiabao's October 15 meeting with Iranian First Vice President
Mohammad Reza Rahimi had been brief due to the press of other
issues at the SCO Summit. Ni said that the Chinese side had
raised the nuclear issue and urged Iran to cooperate with the
international community. Wen had pushed the Iranians to move
forward with direct talks with the United States and offered
Chinese support to do so. Wen had stressed that while Iran
had a right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, China
opposed Iran's development of nuclear weapons. Ni claimed
that Rahimi had responded positively on prospects for talks
with the United States and said that the Iranians were
considering how best to do move forward with dialogue.
Beijing Wants to Seize the Moment, as Does Tehran

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶3. (C) Ni emphasized the importance for China of the October

1 bilateral talks between the U.S. and Iran in Geneva. He
noted that China had a very positive outlook for improved
U.S. relations with Iran, a development that would be helpful
for progress on the nuclear issue. China recognized the
importance of seizing the present opportunity, Ni said, given
the poor long-term prospects for Iran to improve relations
with the international community should progress fail to
materialize in the near future. He said that the Iranian
side also understood the uniqueness of this opportunity and
the importance of demonstrating progress. He said that
Beijing assessed that Iran was willing to make a deal with
the U.S. on the nuclear issue, adding that this willingness
came from the Supreme Leader, and that President Ahmadinejad
was not the decision-maker on the issue. Ni cautioned,
however, that the Iranian regime remained divided over the
June election and its aftermath, complicating efforts by the
P5-plus-1 to negotiate with the regime.
Trust-Building a Priority for PRC

---------------------------------
¶4. (C) Ni stressed the need at present to find ways to

increase Iran's trust in the intentions of the P5-plus-1. He
urged the United States to de-emphasize the push for
additional sanctions and to seek positive, even if symbolic,
benefits to give Iran in response to progress in the talks.
He expressed concern that increased pressure from the
international community would strengthen the consensus of
hard-liners in the Iranian regime. Ni reported that Iranian
diplomats had claimed that while they had a high degree of
confidence in President Obama's intentions, they remained
suspicious about his ability to deliver on those intentions
given political realities in the United States. He argued
that China's political efforts to persuade Iran to negotiate
BEIJING 00002932 002 OF 002
in good faith represented an important contribution to the

P5-plus-1 effort to deal with the nuclear issue.
PRC Urges IAEA Cooperation, Downplays Technical Progress

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶5. (C) Ni said that China had been pushing Iran to improve
its cooperation with the IAEA and take a positive attitude in
order to allow the agency to develop trust in Iran's
intentions. Beijing understood that technical meetings at
the IAEA this week had achieved progress, Ni said, adding
that China hoped to see progress on the Tehran Research
Reactor fuel proposal. China assessed that Iran would allow
inspectors into the Qom site, Ni said. He stressed, too,
that Iran's nuclear technology was not as advanced "as some
believe," and that Iran's overall level of industrial
development represented a serious impediment to development
of nuclear technology and particularly to weaponization. He
noted that of the 5,000 centrifuges in Iran, less than half
were actually in operation.
Iranian Side Upbeat on October 1 Meeting

----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Ni said Iranian embassy contacts in Beijing had

expressed satisfaction with the outcomes of the October
meeting in Geneva, calling the event a "success." Though
concerned that sitting down with the U.S. would be "a
mistake," the Iranians had left the U.S.-Iran bilateral
meeting wanting to continue the process. Ni suggested that
some within the Iranian regime understood the need for a
change in political direction, particularly after the
difficult June election. He also reported that the Iranians
were putting renewed focus on creating an effective plan for
economic development.
MFA: U.S. Should Incentivize, Reward Iranian Progress

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (C) On direct U.S.-Iran talks, Ni urged the U.S. side to

make a clear statement abandoning the notion of regime
change. He suggested seeking a "cooperative partnership"
with Iran on shared concerns such as security in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and in doing so, recognizing Iran as a major
regional power. He recommended offering concrete and
immediate benefits, especially economic incentives and a
relaxation of existing sanctions, in response to positive
overtures by the Iranian side. These efforts could start
small, he added, but should be focused on sending a clear
signal of sincere intentions to Tehran.
Iranian Leadership Feels Street Pressure on Negotiations

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶8. (C) Ni reported that based on his travel to Iran,

considerable debate was taking place among ordinary Iranians
over the utility of the nuclear program. Many Iranians did
not see the use in having nuclear technology and saw it only
as a source of problems, while others saw value in the
possession of nuclear technology but were reconsidering this
view because of progress in talks with the United States. In
contrast, a more conservative constituency in Iran was
disinclined to make any concessions to the international
community on the nuclear issue. In light of this division in
society, Ni argued, the Iranian leadership would not make
concessions without meaningful and visible compensation.
HUNTSMAN
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2963, deputy secretary steinberg's meeting with xxxxx

Discussing cables
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E.o. 12958: decl: after korean unification

Tags: ovip (steinberg, james b.), prel, parm, pgov, econ,
etra, mnuc, marr, ch, jp, kn, ks, ir
Subject: deputy secretary steinberg's meeting with xxxxx
foreign minister he yafei, september 29, 2009
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.

4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 8:30 a.m.; St. Regis Hotel,
Beijing.
United states
Deputy Secretary Steinberg
Laura Stone (notetaker)
China
xxxxx
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) Summary: Deputy Secretary Steinberg explained U.S.

confidence-building and transparency objectives vis-a-vis
Iran that we planned to pursue at the October 1
P5-plus-1-plus-Iran Political Directors meeting. xxxxx
emphasized the importance of sustaining the
dialogue, expressed hope that U.S. domestic political
pressure would not lead the U.S. to pursue UN sanctions, and
affirmed the need for monitoring, supervision and benchmarks.
The Deputy Secretary rejected the idea that politics were
motivating U.S. Iran policy, and made clear the U.S. position
that we need to resolve, not just monitor and supervise, the
Iranian nuclear problem. On the upcoming POTUS visit, xxxxx
suggested that a joint statement reflect the balanced,
comprehensive nature of the relationship while also
addressing each country's "core" interests. xxxxx expressed
worry that the Copenhagen climate change meeting could
overshadow the trip. xxxxx welcomed the institutionalized
G-20, downplayed the importance of Premier Wen Jiabao's
announced October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang, and bemoaned the
U.S. 421 tire safeguards decision. End summary.
Iran
----
¶2. (S) The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives for the
October 1 P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting with Iran.
xxxxx outlined actions in support of the pillars of confidence
building and transparency that Iran needed to undertake to
establish its seriousness in addressing the nuclear issue.
On process objectives, the Deputy Secretary noted that the
nuclear issue would need to remain the primary subject in
follow-up experts meetings, although other agenda topics were
possible.
¶3. (S)xxxxx.
Based on Chinese communications with Iran, xxxxx, xxxxx
thought it would be difficult for Iran to refuse talks, since
entering into dialogue was the only way to diffuse tensions.
xxxxx was less certain about the prospect of Tehran giving up
its nuclear program. xxxxx asserted that because the
weapons program was "not quite there yet" and the facilities
were all dual-use in nature, Iran's assertions that the
program was for peaceful use were "50-percent true." The
key, according to xxxxx, was monitoring and supervision,
while establishing benchmarks that Iran should not cross.
¶4. (S) xxxxx suggested that the first objective of the

October 1 meeting with Iran should be to keep the dialogue
alive. xxxxx asked that the United States not reject Iranian
attempts to broaden the conversation or create the impression
that the talks were not making progress. Noting that
President Obama had told President Hu Jintao that resolving
the Iran situation was a pressing U.S. interest, xxxxx asked
how long the United States would remain patient in the face
of limited progress. xxxxx expressed hope that "domestic
political pressure" would not lead the United States to seek
new UN Security Council sanctions.
¶5. (S) The Deputy Secretary stated that domestic political

factors were not driving our approach to Iran, but rather a
Beijing 00002963 002 of 002
conviction -- shared by Britain and France -- of the need to

resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. The nuclear issue
needed to be discussed up front in talks; the process could
not stay alive without Iran committing to some
confidence-building measures. Monitoring and supervision
were not adequate, as the North Korean case had demonstrated.
POTUS Visit
-----------
¶6. (C) xxxxx asked that the upcoming POTUS visit reflect the
balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship, including
economic, security, cultural, economic and people-to-people
ties. A joint statement should not be too detailed and
should instead mirror the status of two of the world's most
important leaders. That said, the statement had to address,
in a positive way, both countries' "core" interests. xxxxx
expressed worry that the early-December Copenhagen climate
change meetings could overshadow the POTUS visit, and
recommended that China and the United States focus during the
visit on our respective national commitments in the realm of
climate change.
¶7. (C) xxxxx raised xxxxx proposal for a "humanities" MOU that
would cover people-to-people, cultural, and science and
technology exchanges, saying xxxxx hoped to make this one of the
"gems" of the visit. xxxxx suggested that the presidents sign
the clean energy and environmental protection MOU.
G-20
----
¶8. (C) xxxxx thanked President Obama for his leadership in

institutionalizing the G-20, which had created a
"comfortable" platform for countries like China and India to
play a larger role. xxxxx explained that there had been some
domestic criticism of President Hu's participation in the
G8-plus-5. xxxxx expressed hope that the United States would
coordinate closely with China as we established new rules for
the organization, and that it would not become an
organization that duplicated the United Nations or the G-8.
xxxxx expressed reservations about how fast the G-20 could
expand to handle issues beyond economics and finance, but
noted that if the organization was going to stay relevant for
leaders it's scope would have to grow. xxxxx specifically
mentioned the need for a coordinating mechanism on global
diseases and counter-terrorism.
North Korea
-----------
¶9. (S) xxxxx downplayed Premier Wen Jiabao's upcoming

October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang, stating "we may not like
them," but "they (the DPRK) are a neighbor," and the trip was
part of the 60th anniversary of relations celebrations. xxxxx
stated that the Premier would convey a strong message on the
need to denuclearize, to come back to the Six-Party talks,
and to not abandon the Six-Party Talks framework. xxxxx noted
that North Korea often tried to play China off the United
States, refusing to convey information about U.S.-DPRK
bilateral conversations. Clearly seeking a clarification for
the record, xxxxx asked if the United States were prepared
to accept a nuclear-armed but non-proliferating North Korea.
The Deputy Secretary stated this was not acceptable or
sustainable.
Tires
-----
¶10. (C) xxxxx lamented the United States' recent 421 tire
decision, and expressed concern that lawyers in the United
States were preparing additional cases on products such as
textiles. xxxxx opined that China and the United States relied
too much on "technical" negotiators.
¶11. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.

Huntsman
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2964, DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S

XXXXXXXXXXXX MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
Discussing cables
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TAGS: OVIP STEINBERG JAMES PREL MNUC SN CH KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S XXXXXXXXXXXX MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4

(b/d).
¶1. (SBU)xxxxx
U.S.
----
The Deputy Secretary
Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing
Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State
Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI
Amb. xxxxx
Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense
RDML Bradley Gerhrke, U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing
Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary
Ryan Hass, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker)
James Brown, Interpreter
China
------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶3. (S) SUMMARY: XXXXXXXXXXXX Deputy Secretary Steinberg stressed that the U.S.
remains committed to the Six-Party process and to
the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. The Deputy
Secretary emphasized the importance of continued, close
contact with the XXXXXXXXXXXX on North Korea and stressed that the
U.S. would not compromise its relations with China or other
Six-Party Talks partners in pursuit of bilateral contact with
the DPRK. The Deputy Secretary noted that the U.S. was not
willing make concessions to entice North Korea to abide by
its previous commitments. Ambassador DeTrani assessed that
the DPRK was ready to return to multilateral talks on its
nuclear program, but that it had not made a strategic
decision to abandon nuclear weapons. XXXXXXXXXXXX encouraged the
U.S. to engage in direct contact with the DPRK, which he felt
could spur the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. xxxxx
speculated that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il's deteriorating
health and his desire to cement a legacy provided an
opportunity for the resolution of the nuclear issue. In
order to protect the gains that had been made and also to
advance the Six-Party Talks, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, all parties had
to remain committed to the September 2005 joint statement on
denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated China's commitment to
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874 and offered a read-out
following Premier Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 visit to
Pyongyang. End Summary.
Positive U.S.-China Relations

-----------------------------
¶4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with XXXXXXXXXXXX for a

fifty-minute discussion on North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that
the Deputy Secretary would have an opportunity to meet with a
number of Chinese leaders during his visit, which spoke of
the importance that China attached to its relationship with
the U.S., as well as the respect that Chinese leaders held
for the Deputy Secretary. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the Deputy
Secretary's visit occurred on the heels of President Obama
and President Hu's September 22 meeting in New York. The two
Presidents had reached consensus on key issues in the
bilateral relationship, and now it was each side's
responsibility to work together to implement that consensus.
XXXXXXXXXXXX described himself as an outsider to U.S.-China
relations, and even as an outsider he had met the Deputy
Secretary three times over the past year, a fact that XXXXXXXXXXXX
said spoke volumes about the positive development of
U.S.-China relations.
U.s. Is the missing element

---------------------------
¶5. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX raised "The Red Cliff," a John Woo-directed
Beijing 00002964 002 of 005
movie about the Battle of Red Cliffs 1,801 years ago along
the banks of the Yangtze River, as a metaphor for the current
diplomatic situation with North Korea. At that time in
China, three states were in conflict. Two overmatched
southern states had joined forces to fight the
numerically-superior northern state. The two southern states
planned to use fire as a weapon to defeat the northern state,
but in order to do so, the southern states required an
easterly wind. The battle ensued in November, when the
prevailing winds normally came from the west. During the
battle, an easterly wind arrived, which enabled the southern
forces to use fire as a weapon to defeat the superior
northern forces. This story was an aphorism, XXXXXXXXXXXX
suggested. In the story, the southern forces had all of the
elements in place except for the crucial one -- the east wind
("dong feng"). The same was true with the Six-Party Talks.
There have been positive interactions among the parties to
the Talks, and the U.S. and China saw eye-to-eye on issues.
There was only one missing element: only the U.S. could
bring the east wind, XXXXXXXXXXXX declared.
XXXXXXXXXXXX rationale behind high-level visits to dprk

--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that XXXXXXXXXXXX President

Hu's Special Envoy, and Premier Wen Jiabao would pay a visit
October 4-6. The purpose of these visits was to persuade
North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. North Korea's
"supreme leader" called all of the shots. China sometimes
had sharp debates with North Korea at the working-level, but
when big matters were raised to the "supreme leader" for a
decision, they were often easier to resolve. That was why
China had sent XXXXXXXXXXXX and would send
Premier Wen to Pyongyang in rapid succession, according to
XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that his visits to Pyongyang had left
him with a clear impression that bilateral contact with the
U.S. was the issue most on the minds of North Korean leaders.
It was possible to revive the Six-Party Talks, but only if
the U.S. would engage North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that the U.S. was at
times capable of taking diplomatic initiative, and at
other times was cautious in its diplomatic approach. In this
instance, the U.S. had been overly cautious. China hoped the
U.S. would initiate contact with North Korea, which XXXXXXXXXXXX
stressed was crucial to re-convening the Six-Party Talks and
to the larger goal of denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
Chinese assessment of kim jong-il

---------------------------------
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il might have some
realistic ideas, and stated that Kim Jong-Il wanted to
engage the U.S. soon. Kim had been impressed by President
Clinton's visit, and had come away from his meeting with
President Clinton with an understanding that there were areas
for discussion with the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed his
personal feeling that if the U.S. made substantive contact
with North Korea, then positive progress on the nuclear issue
was within reach. The U.S. and China should not put off
resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue indefinitely, XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed.
¶9. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he had read a statement after

President Clinton's visit that suggested that Kim Jong-Il was
in good health, and speculated that the medical experts that
accompanied President Clinton to Pyongyang might have arrived
at a different conclusion. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that Kim Jong-Il
would like to resolve outstanding issues in the near future
because his health might not permit him to put off decisions
for too long. This dynamic created a favorable moment for
resolving the nuclear issue; it was important for the U.S.
and China to seize this moment and bring North Korea back to
the path of consultations and negotiations, XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed.
U.s.-prc shared assessment on North Korea

-----------------------------------------
¶10. (S) The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for XXXXXXXXXXXX insights
on North Korea and for China's decision to send senior representatives to North
Korea to press for the early
resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. and China shared
Beijing 00002964 003 of 005
common goals and a common assessment of the path forward on

North Korea. Both countries had the confidence to send
parallel messages to North Korea, and when we were able to
engage North Korea at high levels, it reinforced shared
U.S.-Chinese objectives. Regarding U.S.-DPRK contacts, the
Deputy Secretary suggested, China already understood from
Ambassador Bosworth's September 3 visit and our ongoing
bilateral contacts that the U.S. was prepared to have direct
contact with North Korea as a way to bring North Korea back
to the Six-Party Talks.
Learning the right historical lessons

-------------------------------------
¶11. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that some people carried
history forward through their own experiences. It was
important that the U.S. and China drew from their shared
history of dealing with North Korea to determine the best way
forward. The Deputy Secretary noted that the chief obstacle
to progress at the end of the Bush Administration had not
been a lack of U.S.-DPRK contact. In fact, the frequency of
direct contact became a source of criticism, with some
observers suggesting that the U.S. had too much direct
contact with North Korea and not enough coordination with
Six-Party partners.
¶12. (S) The Deputy Secretary observed that North Korea had
established a pattern of provocation followed by conciliation
to ameliorate pressure from the international community
resulting from its actions. It was imperative to break this
pattern, which was counter-productive to shared U.S.-Chinese
goals on North Korea.
Key elements to current approach

--------------------------------
¶13. (S) The Deputy Secretary asked XXXXXXXXXXXX what missing

element, or "easterly wind," would lead to a change in North
Korea's behavior and produce a different outcome than during
the 1980s and 1990s. The Deputy Secretary offered three
elements that could affect North Korea's decision-making.
¶14. (S) The first element was the unified position on North
Korea among the Six-Party Talks partners. The U.S. wanted to
ensure that if it proceeded to bilateral contact with North
Korea, such contact would not undermine in any way the strong
unity of approach among Six-Party Talks partners.
¶15. (S) The second key element was the strong unity of action
among Six-Party Talks partners, particularly in
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874. It
would be important for Six-Party Talks participants to
continue full implementation of this resolution, the Deputy
Secretary stressed.
¶16. (S) The third key element would be to articulate clearly
to North Korea precisely what steps the Six-Party Talks
partners expected the DPRK to take to irreversibly
denuclearize, while also making clear exactly what benefits
the DPRK would derive from such actions. The Deputy
Secretary acknowledged that significant work had already been
undertaken in this regard, but much more work was needed to
establish a specific, common understanding among Six-Party
Talks participants.
¶17. (S) The Deputy Secretary acknowledged that although he

was not certain whether these three elements would be enough
to convince North Korea at a strategic level to decide it was
better off without nuclear weapons, the U.S. was willing to
test the proposition. The U.S. was prepared to have
bilateral contact with North Korea to determine whether a
different outcome was possible now that the Six-Party Talks
participants held a clear, unified position.
U.S. Caution on bilateral u.s.-dprk contacts

--------------------------------------------
¶18. (S) The U.S. "caution" in re-engaging with North Korea

stemmed from its interest in ensuring that any contact would
be done on the clear basis that bilateral contact was not
about managing North Korea's nuclear program, but rather
about taking concrete measures to dismantle it, the Deputy
Secretary stated. North Korea had recently sent several
positive signals, including through xxxxx and State
Beijing 00002964 004 of 005
XXXXXXXXXXXX meetings, North Korean public comments that

walked back its previous rejection of the Six-Party Talks,
hints that there could be a new formation for international
talks on denuclearization, and statements that North Korea
understood the goal was denuclearization. Premier Wen
Jiabao's October visit would present another opportunity to
convey to North Korea that the Six-Party Talks partners
shared a common position.
¶19. (S) On the current status of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks,

the Deputy Secretary explained that there had been exchanges
in recent days through the New York channel on modalities for
bilateral contacts. The U.S. wanted to ensure that if direct
engagement occurred, the DPRK would participate at a high
level. This would be the only way to determine whether North
Korea was serious about engagement. While the U.S. was
prepared to have bilateral contact with North Korea, it was
not willing to engage in extended bilateral negotiations in
which an agreement would be reached outside of the Six-Party
Talks framework. The only way to ensure an effective
solution was to guarantee that all of the Six-Party Talks
partners' interests were brought into play, the Deputy
Secretary said, while also noting that Six-Party Talks
partners' interests were similar, but not identical.
Key question: kim jong-il's calculus

------------------------------------
¶20. (S) The Deputy Secretary suggested that the key questions
concerned Kim Jong-Il's motivations, specifically how he
viewed his interests, and how much emphasis he placed on
reaching a solution to the nuclear issue and normalization of
relations with the U.S. as part of his legacy. The Deputy
Secretary emphasized the need for continued, close dialogue
with China.
Dprk not clearly committed to denuclearization

--------------------------------------
¶21. (S) Ambassador DeTrani said that the U.S. assessed,

largely as a result of XXXXXXXXXXXX seemingly successful efforts, that the DPRK
was ready to return to multilateral talks on its nuclear program. The U.S.
further assessed that North Korea at a strategic level
had not committed to the goal of complete, verifiable,
irreversible denuclearization. North Korea wanted to be
accepted as a nuclear state with ICBM capabilities. The
DPRK's September 3 letter to the UN was indicative of this
point. In the letter, the DPRK acknowledged that it had
reprocessed spent fuel rods and extracted plutonium that was
being weaponized, and after six years of denial, admitted to
possessing a uranium enrichment program. A key question
would be whether North Korea would negotiate while UNSC
Resolution 1874 sanctions were still in place, Ambassador
DeTrani noted.
¶22. (S) Ambassador DeTrani observed that North Korea had

established a pattern of walking away from negotiations as a
sign of displeasure, such as its 13-month hiatus from the
Six-Party Talks after the U.S. had suggested it possessed an
HEU program and its similarly long absence in protest of
reports of money laundering through a Macau bank (BDA). In
both of these instances, the Six-Party Talks partners had
conceded something, after which the DPRK returned to the
Talks. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that if the
Six-Party Talks partners did not concede something, the DPRK
would be reluctant to move the Six-Party process forward.
Ambassador DeTrani emphasized the shared U.S.-China objective
in achieving progress in the Six-Party Talks building upon
the September 2005 joint statement that XXXXXXXXXXXX was so
instrumental in crafting.
China committed to 6-party talks, denuclearization

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶23. (S) The Six-Party Talks, on the whole, "have been

positive," XXXXXXXXXXXX declared. XXXXXXXXXXXX recounted that he had told North
Korean counterparts on numerous occasions that the
Six-Party Talks enabled the U.S. and North Korea to feel
comfortable with bilateral engagement. China supported
U.S.-DPRK bilateral engagement, and such contact would not
affect U.S.-China relations, XXXXXXXXXXXX assured, allowing that other Six-Party
Talks partners might not share the same view.
Beijing 00002964 005 of 005
¶24. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX affirmed that China was committed to getting

North Korea back to the negotiating table. In order to
protect the gains that had been made and to advance the
Six-Party Talks, all parties had to remain committed to the
September 2005 joint statement on North Korea's
denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed that in light of the
current situation, it might be necessary to refine the
statement, but nonetheless, the September 2005 statement had
to serve as the starting point.
¶25. (S) On North Korean denuclearization, XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with the U.S.
assessment that it would be difficult to obtain
North Korea's commitment. The U.S. should inform North Korea
that improved U.S.-DPRK relations depended upon verifiable
steps toward denuclearization. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with the U.S.
assessment that North Korea had not made a strategic decision
to forego its nuclear weapons program. North Korea was
looking in particular at its relations with the U.S. and was
not moved by Chinese representations of what steps the U.S.
would be willing to take. North Korea often insisted that it
was an independent country and did not like having China as a
go-between with the U.S., according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
China urges bilateral, multilateral combination

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶26. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX proposed that Six-Party Talks partners

consider using bilateral mechanisms within the Six-Party
Talks framework to improve relations with North Korea.
Through a combination of bilateral and multilateral channels,
it might be possible to persuade North Korea to abandon its
nuclear program. Because the opportunity to persuade North
Korea still existed, China would continue making vigorous
efforts in this pursuit. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that the Chinese
government was serious about UNSC Resolution 1874
implementation, adding that there had not been any change in
China's policy.
¶27. (S) The Deputy Secretary agreed with XXXXXXXXXXXX basic

conclusions, expressed appreciation for XXXXXXXXXXXXxxxx leadership on the North
Korea issue, and reiterated the U.S. interest in
continued close contact with China. xxxxx offered to
provide a briefing for the U.S. immediately following Premier
Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang.
¶28. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message.

Huntsman
huntsman
Viewing cable 09BEIJING2965, PRC: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S

SEPTEMBER 29,
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TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, PGOV, PARM, MNUC,
CH, KN, KS
SUBJECT: PRC: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S SEPTEMBER 29,
2009 CONVERSATION WITH STATE COUNCILOR DAI BINGGUO
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1 .4 (b/d).
¶1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 3:00 p.m.; Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound;
Beijing
U.S.
----
The Deputy Secretary Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing Joseph Donovan,
EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rear Admiral Charles Leidig,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI
Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amb. Sung Kim,
Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary Nancy Leou, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker) James Brown,
Interpreter
PRC
---
State Councilor Dai Bingguo Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei Guan Youfei, Ministry
of National Defense, Deputy Director, International Office Zheng Zeguang,
Director General, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department Zhang
Kunsheng, Director General, MFA Protocol Department Yang Houlan, Ambassador for
Korean Peninsula Issues Li Song, Deputy Director General, MFA Arms Control and
Disarmament Department Cong Peiwu, Counselor, MFA North American and Oceanian
Affairs Department
¶3. (S) SUMMARY: In a September 29 meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the
Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of persuading Pyongyang to return to
the path of denuclearization. Dai said that the U.S.-China relationship was off
to a good start under the new U.S. administration and urged the two countries to
avoid “setbacks.” During his recent trip to North Korea, Dai said, he met with
DPRK leader Kim Jong-il for two and one half hours and Kim appeared to be in
reasonably good health. Dai said he had urged Pyongyang to return to the Six-
Party Talks. Dai’s DPRK interlocutors had responded that they wanted bilateral
engagement with the United States first and that they would consider next steps,
including possible multilateral talks, depending on the outcome of U.S.-DPRK
bilateral talks. Dai said that Premier Wen’s October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang
would be another opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the
nuclear issue. On Iran, Dai said China and the United States had the same
objectives but that China would work on Iran in its own way. China believed
peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful resolution than sanctions
would, and, Dai urged, the United States should be more patient. D responded
that patience could not be unlimited in light of Iran’s continued enrichment
program in violation of UNSC resolutions. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that
China and the United States would work together to prepare for President Obama’s
November visit to China. Dai supported the idea of a “concise and substantive”
joint document to be issued in conjunction with the visit. End Summary.
Full Strategy to Address North Korea
------------------------------------
¶4. (S) The Deputy Secretary met with State Councilor Dai Bingguo for an eighty-
minute discussion on North Korea, Iran, and the U.S.-China relationship on
September 29. The Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of fashioning a full
strategy to address the DPRK nuclear issue and having a unified position among
Six-Party Talks partners and allies that would lead to an effective and
diplomatic resolution of the problem. He expressed support for Premier Wen
Jiabao’s October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang and said both countries should work to
persuade Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks and to reaffirm the 2005
Joint Statement. The United States was prepared to have meaningful, substantive
engagement with
BEIJING 00002965 002 OF 004
a senior North Korean official and would use the any bilateral discussion to
encourage Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. The Deputy Secretary
expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to implement UN Security Council
Resolution 1874.
U.S.-China Relations on Positive Track
--------------------------------------
¶5. (S) State Councilor Dai said that President Obama and President Hu had had
several opportunities to meet in recent months. After watching the two leaders
interact in New York, Dai observed, the two presidents appeared to be “old
friends.” Dai thanked the U.S. Government for its “careful arrangements” for
President Hu’s visit to New York, as well as for National People’s Congress
Chairman Wu Bangguo’s recent, successful visit to the United States. Dai
expressed appreciation to President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Treasury
Secretary Geithner for their personal contributions in making the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED) a great success. Dai was confident that the S&ED would
have a positive global impact and confided that China had already begun thinking
about the next round. The U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under
the new U.S. administration despite some “unpleasant things.” Dai urged the two
countries to keep up a good momentum in the bilateral relationship and to work
hard t o avoid “setbacks.”
Dai’s Visit to Pyongyang
------------------------
¶6. (S) Regarding his recent visit to Pyongyang, Dai briefly recounted his two-
hour meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. Dai said he was on relatively
familiar terms with Kim, because he had met with Kim on several occasions in his
previous role as Director of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee
International Liaison Department (CCID). Dai admitted that in contrast with his
discussion with Vice FM Kang (see below) his conversation with Kim was not as
direct and candid and joked that he “did not dare” to be that candid with the
DPRK leader. Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last
saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good
health and still had a “sharp mind.” Kim told Dai that he had hoped to invite
the Chinese official to share some liquor and wine, but that because of
scheduling problems, he would have to defer the offer to Dai’s next visit to
North Korea. Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being “quite a
good drinker,” and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol. Kim
said yes. Dai said he also met briefly with Kim Yong-nam, President of the
Supreme People’s Assembly, who invited him to attend the performance of a famous
Chinese opera, “The Dream of the Red Chamber.”
¶7. (S) Dai said that he had had frank and blunt discussions with DPRK First
Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju that totaled over two and one half hours. Dai
said he told Kang that denuclearization should be Pyongyang’s first choice and
that it was important for North Korea to return to Six-Party Talks. He had
stressed to Kang that the Six-Party Talks mechanism was useful and explained
that the ultimate resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue could not be resolved
without the participation of the Six Parties. According to Dai, Kang responded
that North Korea was still committed to the goal of denuclearization. Dai
believed that the North Koreans had not categorically denied the Six-Party Talks
and opined that under the right circumstances, it might be possible to revive
the Six-Party Talks process. Dai’s North Korean interlocutors had emphasized the
strong security threat it faced. The North Koreans told Dai that they wanted to
have dialogue with the United States first and that they would consider next
steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on their conversation
with the United States. North Korea held “great expectations for the United
States,” said Dai. DPRK officials had told Dai that North Korea viewed former
President Clinton’s visit to Pyongyang positively.
¶8. (S) Even though he had not had an opportunity to visit or observe any place
other than Pyongyang, Dai said, his impression of North Korea was that the
domestic situation appeared stable and normal. Dai opined that the DPRK
BEIJING 00002965 003 OF 004
appeared focused on two issues: improving its relationship with the United
States and developing its economy.
U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Engagement
------------------------------
¶9. (S) China was aware that the United States was considering possible re-
engagement with North Korea and supported U.S.-DPRK bilateral discussions, said
Dai. With bilateral dialogue, there was “no limit to how far you could go.”
China appreciated U.S. understanding and support for Premier Wen’s upcoming
visit to Pyongyang. President Hu had already informed President Obama of the
trip. Dai explained that it would have been “impolite” for China to not
reciprocate with a high-level visit to Pyongyang after DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il
had visited Beijing in March for the 60th anniversary celebration of Sino-DPRK
ties. Wen’s visit would provide an opportunity for China and North Korea to
exchange views on the nuclear issue, stated Dai.
¶10. (S) The Deputy Secretary thanked Dai for sharing his perceptions of the
North Korea nuclear issue and stressed that President Obama wanted to make clear
to the North Korean people and to Kim Jong-il that the United States did not
have any hostile intent toward North Korea. The United States was ready to move
forward to normalize relations with North Korea if Pyongyang moved toward
denuclearization. The Deputy Secretary expressed hope that North Korea would
agree to a meeting between Ambassador Bosworth and First VFM Kang Suk-ju to
achieve that goal.
Iran
----
¶11. (S) The Deputy Secretary said the United States valued the joint effort it
took to create the P5-plus-1 foreign ministers statement on Iran. He
acknowledged that the United States and Iran had a long and complicated history
of mistrust. The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives and stressed that
all sides had to take confidence-building steps that would lead to a diplomatic
resolution. Recent disclosures by Iran underscored the need to deal with the
issue urgently, and it was important that Iran give a strong signal during the
October 1 meeting that demonstrated it was ready for serious engagement.
¶12. (S) Dai responded that China and the United States saw eye to eye on the
Iran nuclear issue. Nuclear states should reduce their nuclear arsenal with the
goal of eventual elimination and should work to prevent other nations, including
Iran, from developing nuclear weapons. However, China and the United States had
different considerations on how we advanced these goals. With a history of
mistrust and mutual suspicion between the United States and Iran, it would not
be easy to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. Dai urged the United States to have
more patience, address Iran’s legitimate concerns, and work to identify and
expand on the positive areas in the bilateral relationship.
¶13. (S) Dai characterized President Obama’s policy to resolve issues through
dialogue and engagement as “wise.” Sanctions might work up to a point, but China
believed peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful resolution. Dai
warned that pressing too hard might risk antagonizing Iran. Iran was not a small
country, it had a long history and culture, and its people were not dumb. Dai
urged the United States to resolve the issue in a “smart” manner. One meeting
would not be able to resolve all problems, so the United States lower its
expectation for the October 1 meeting. China would work on Iran in its own way
and would urge Iran to seize the window of opportunity. Dai said China and the
United States had the same objective, but said that each country would play a
different role in achieving that objective.
¶14. (S) The Deputy replied that it was Iran that was “impatient” in its ongoing
program of uranium enrichment in violation of the UNSC resolutions. The U.S. and
the P5 1 would be more willing to be patient in discussions if Iran agreed to
suspend its enrichment and forgo its overall? program. This would create an
appropriate context for all sides to address underlying issues of concern.
BEIJING 00002965 004 OF 004
U.S. National Security Strategy
-------------------------------
¶15. (S) Noting the Deputy’s interest in “strategy” Dai asked whether the Obama
administration had an overarching national security strategy. the Deputy
Secretary said that the National Security Strategy, which would likely be issued
before the end of the year, would articulate the administration’s global
strategy. He noted that the Secretary had recently identified major themes
during her speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, including the importance
of global cooperation in confronting today’s challenges. In that context, the
U.S.-China relationship would play a core role. Dai said he looked forward to
reading the strategy paper.
President Obama Visit to China
------------------------------
¶16. (S) Dai said that President Obama had recently told President Hu that he
looked forward to having a “magnificent” visit to China. Asked how China could
help achieve this, the Deputy Secretary said the two countries should seek to
demonstrate to our peoples and to the international community how the U.S.-China
relationship would help address global challenges in areas such as public
health, nonproliferation and the environment. The two countries should seek to
demonstrate how U.S.-China ties were between the two peoples, not just between
the governments, diplomats and leaders. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that
China would work with the U.S. to prepare a successful visit. It would be
“great,” said Dai, if the two sides could agree on language for the joint visit
document that would be “concise, as well as substantive.”
Global Nuclear Security Summit
------------------------------
¶17. (S) Asked about U.S.-sought outcomes and goals for the Nuclear Security
Summit, the Deputy Secretary explained that President Obama had laid out the
three pillars of his nuclear policy during his Prague speech. The Nuclear
Security Summit was designed to focus on one of those pillars-the need to
safeguard nuclear material against theft or diversion. The risk of proliferation
had increased with the expansion of new nuclear power programs and with the
existence of unsecured legacy nuclear materials in former Soviet states. We
needed to have assurances that the peaceful development of nuclear power
programs and nuclear research did not pose proliferation risks.
The Same Boat
-------------
¶18. (S) The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China
would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever possible. “If we
expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will be larger and more
delicious.” Together, the two sides should work collaboratively for the good of
the world, especially since the two countries were “passengers in the same
boat.” Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each
other’s core interests and concerns.
¶19. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message. HUNTSMAN
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1271, WESTERWELLE FIRM ON REMOVAL OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Discussing cables
12:12 18:06 N
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PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1271/01 2821248

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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC MARR GM
SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE FIRM ON REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FROM GERMANY IN COALITION NEGOTIATIONS
REF: A. BERLIN 1162

¶B. BERLIN 1241
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor George Glass for reasons 1.

4 (b,d).
¶1. (C//NF) Summary: A well-placed FDP source said that on

the first day of coalition negotiations (October 5) between
the CDU, CSU and the FDP, FDP leader Westerwelle argued for
the removal of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons
from German soil. Interior Minister Schaeuble (CDU) asserted
that the weapons serve as a deterrent. Other foreign policy
issues discussed included support for Afghanistan and
Turkey's accession to the EU. Source said that Chancellor
Merkel (CDU) may push to complete the negotiations by October
18, but noted that the FDP is in no hurry. He provided
Emboffs with a list of the membership of the negotiations
plenary and working groups as well as timetable. Cabinet
composition will only be decided at the end of coalition
negotiations. End summary.
Westerwelle Firm on Removal of Nuclear Weapons

--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C//NF) Formal coalition negotiations between Guido

Westerwelle's Free Democratic Party (FDP), Chancellor
Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian
Social Union (CSU) on a coalition agreement began on October
¶5. FDP strategist shared with Emboffs and visiting Senior
Germany Desk Officer October 7 information on issues
discussed during the first two days of these negotiations as
well as the negotiations schedule and working group make-up.
Source serves as his party's notetaker for the negotiations
and has been a long-standing close Embassy contact.
¶3. (C//NF) Source said that on October 5 negotiations

included discussion on arms control in general and removal of
the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil.
He said that Federal Interior Minister Schaeuble argued that
the weapons serve as a deterrent to Iran. (Note: Regarding
Schaeuble, source commented that he is "neurotic" in that he
sees threats everywhere. He questioned whether Schaeuble's
influence is as great as it once was and whether he will stay
in his position. End note.) According to source,
Westerwelle asserted that nuclear weapons on German soil do
not serve as a deterrent against Iran since they could not
reach Iran. He said that Westerwelle underlined that
President Obama is moving forward toward a "nuclear-free
world" and that he wants Germany to be in the lead. Source
said that Chancellor Merkel quipped in response that Germany
is not that important in this regard -- the world would
hardly take notice if there were action on this matter.
According to source, Merkel wanted to avoid discussion of
this topic. Source also said that there was criticism of
Social Democratic Party Foreign Minister Steinmeier that he
did not respond adequately to President Obama's Prague speech
in which he discussed arms control. In response to Poloff
query, source said that the issue of removal of nuclear
weapons is very important to Westerwelle and that he could
well seek to include something specific in the coalition
agreement.
Turkey's EU Membership; Afghanistan; Transatlantic Relations

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶4. (C//NF) Source said that Turkey's accession to the EU was

also discussed, with general agreement that Turkey is not
ready for membership and could not fulfill membership
criteria. Source said that there was agreement that no
decision would have to be reached on this issue within the
next four years in any case. Westerwelle also spoke against
any type of automatic decision in favor of membership for
Turkey. There was also general agreement that the EU is not
ready for new members at this time beyond Croatia.
¶5. (C//NF) Afghanistan was also an issue, but source only

noted that there was general agreement on the need to
continue efforts in Afghanistan. Source also stressed that
the three parties support strong transatlantic relations and
continuity in foreign policy.
The Devil's in the Details; What's the Rush?

--------------------------------------------
¶6. (C//NF) Source assessed some differences in Merkel's and

Westerwelle's approach to the negotiations, although he also
noted that the atmosphere was "very friendly and relaxed."
He observed that Merkel preferred less detail and more
general provisions, whereas Westerwelle was interested in a
detailed agreement that would guide the coalition over the

next four years. In addition, source noted that Merkel is
trying to push the negotiations along since she would like to
have the new government in place before she travels to
Washington in early November and before the EU summit at the
end of October. Source indicated that Westerwelle might try
to use Merkel's desire for speed to his advantage in the
negotiations. While he did not indicate that the FDP would
prolong negotiations intentionally, he noted that the FDP was
in no hurry to complete them.
Ministries Divided Among Parties Last

-------------------------------------
¶7. (C//NF) Regarding the possible make-up of the cabinet,

source said that no decisions will be made until the end of
coalition negotiations and that the current membership of
working groups should not be seen as an indication of who
will end up in which ministry (see ref B). Source also said
that the coalition agreement may only say which ministerial
posts go to which coalition parties, without any names being
given. The names would only be provided later, perhaps after
the Chancellor is voted in by the Bundestag. Source noted
that only two positions are certain: Angela Merkel will be
Chancellor and Guido Westerwelle will be Vice Chancellor. He
added that Westerwelle will most likely also become the next
foreign minister. He then commented that during October 5
negotiations, Economics Minister zu Guttenberg demonstrated
his interest in foreign policy and Hermann Otto Solms (FDP)
showed he could play an increasingly important role in the
financial area. Source provided Emboffs with the names of
those serving in the plenary rounds of the negotiations and a
schedule of when those rounds will take place.
--Plenary Members from the CDU: Chancellor Merkel, Interior

Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, Chancellery Chief Thomas de
Maziere, Education Minister Annette Shavan, CDU/CSU Caucus
Chief Volker Kauder, CDU General Secretary Ronald Pofalla,
Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Juergen
Ruettgers, Minister President of Hesse Roland Koch, Minister
President of Lower Saxony Christian Wulff.
--Plenary Members from the CSU: Minister President of Bavaria

and CSU Chair Horst Seehofer, Economics Minister Karl-Theodor
zu Guttenberg, Head of CSU Bundestag group Peter Ramsauer,
CSU Secretary General Alexander Dobrindt, Bavaria State
Parliament President Barbara Stamm, Bavaria Plenipotentiary
Markus Soeder, Bavaria Finance Minister Georg Fahrenschon,
Bavaria Justice Minister Beate Merk.
--Plenary Members from the FDP: Party Chair Guido

Westerwelle, FDP Secretary General Dirk Niebel, Bundestag
Vice President Hermann Otto Solms, FDP Deputy Caucus
Chairperson Birgit Homburger, Lower Saxony Minister for
Economics Philipp Roesler, FDP deputy chair Rainer Bruederle,
Deputy Minister President for NRW Andreas Pinkwart, Deputy
Chairperson Bundestag Education Committee Cornelia Pieper,
Bavaria State Chairperson Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C//NF) Westerwelle has made the removal of nuclear

weapons from Germany one of his flagship issues in the
foreign policy arena and has raised this in various fora in
the past. It is not clear how hard he will push to have a
specific provision on this included in the coalition
agreement. Judging by source's description of the
discussion, Merkel would rather have a more general provision
regarding disarmament included and preferred to avoid
prolonged discussion on this issue.
¶9. (C//NF) The CDU/CSU is the only party that still supports
German participation in the NATO nuclear share and the
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany. While the
CDU/CSU leadership is willing to fight for the current
policy, it is concerned that the ongoing Nuclear Posture
Review could significantly change U.S. policy on the
deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe,
putting it at a significant political disadvantage vis-a-vis
the rest of the German political establishment. In fact,
senior Chancellery officials have already requested that they
be pre-notified about any possible change in U.S. policy (ref
C). We expect that in these coalition negotiations, the
CDU/CSU may hedge their bets against a possible U.S. policy
change by agreeing to language that commits the next
government to seek consultations on this issue at NATO, with
the caveat that any decision must be made by the Alliance as
a whole and must take account of the large number of Russian

non-strategic nuclear weapons oriented against NATO member
states. Post will seek meetings with source after the
plenary negotiation rounds to see if additional readouts are
possible.
¶10. (C//NF) FDP source is a young, up-and-coming party

loyalist, who has offered Emboffs internal party documents in
the past. Excited with his role as FDP negotiations
notetaker, he seemed happy to share his observations and
insights and read to us directly from his notes. He also
provided copies of documents from his "negotiations" binder.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1296, GERMANY COULD HAVE NEW COALITION

GOVERNMENT WITHIN
Discussing cables
15:03 18:06 N
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DE RUEHRL #1296/01 2891501

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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: GERMANY COULD HAVE NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN
TWO WEEKS
REF: BERLIN 1271
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor George Glass for reasons 1.

4 (b,d).
¶1. (C//NF) Summary: A well-placed Free Democratic Party

(FDP) source told Emboffs October 15 that Chancellor Angela
Merkel aims to finish coalition negotiations between her
Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, and
the FDP by October 18, but that the FDP viewed a completion
of October 23 to be more feasible. Either date would allow
the parties to hold conventions to approve the agreement
during the following days and enable the Bundestag to elect
Angela Merkel Chancellor on October 28, one day after the
first scheduled meeting of the new Bundestag. FDP source
said that in any case, the virtually certain future Foreign
Minister Guido Westerwelle would want to do the Chancellor
"the favor" of ensuring her election before her upcoming
visit to Washington on November 2. A worst case scenario --
and least likely -- is that she would be elected by November
8, source said, just prior to the November 9 fall of the Wall
anniversary. Source provided Emboffs with a list of the 15
mostly domestic-oriented points included in the FDP campaign
platform that it wants to see included in the coalition
agreement, including withdrawal of the remaining
non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil, the only one
addressing foreign policy (reftel). End summary.
¶2. (C//NF) Source provided Emboffs with a schedule of the

next days of the coalition negotiations. The schedule showed
that the various working groups of the negotiations would
each report to the plenary (see reftel) October 16-17, with a
smaller group of the plenary then meeting on October 17 to
iron out disputed issues and beginning discussions on
division of the ministerial portfolios between the parties.
Chancellor Merkel, source said, hopes to wrap up the
coalition negotiations on October 18 after a full-day plenary
session, a goal he described as "very ambitious but
possible." Source noted that the FDP was not as optimistic
that a conclusion could be reached as of October 18, and
scheduled three more plenary sessions for October 21, 22 and
¶23. He noted that it is feasible that a coalition agreement
could be concluded by that date and that the three parties
would then hold conventions to approve the agreement in the
days following.
¶3. (C//NF) This schedule would enable the Bundestag to then

elect Merkel as Chancellor October 28, the day after its
first plenary. Source noted, however, that the FDP has
alerted the party of three possible party convention dates:
October 25 -- if things go as plans, November 1 -- if
negotiations are prolonged, or November 8 -- worst case
scenario. Source said that it would not be "unattractive"
for Westerwelle to attend the EU Summit October 29-30. This
would be a good "debut" for Westerwelle, he added. In the
event negotiations are prolonged, source said that
Westerwelle would like to do the Chancellor "the favor" by
enabling her to be elected Chancellor before she travels to
Washington November 2.
¶4. (C//NF) About the actual negotiations, FDP source

provided Emboffs with 15 points from their election platform
that the FDP would like to see included in the coalition
agreement. The majority of the 15 points focus on domestic
economic and social issues, including structural tax reform,
amendments to the social welfare and pension systems, and
support for education. The points also include the goal of
ending what is termed "unnecessary and ineffective" measures
to censor the internet and preventing domestic military
deployments. The final point, and the only one that concerns
foreign policy, calls for "entering negotiations with our
allies" in order to achieve a withdrawal of nuclear weapons
stationed in Germany during the next legislative term.
(Note: In response to Emboff questions, source said that the
goal really is to develop a plan for the withdrawal of the
nuclear weapons. End note.) FDP source said that
conscription is a disputed issue that is still under
discussion. Regarding Turkey's EU membership, FDP source
said that the FDP would rather not include anything on this
subject in the agreement, arguing that it will not be at
issue during the next four years.
¶5. (C//NF) FDP source assessed that about 85 percent of the

issues will be decided during this coming weekend. The FDP
intends to keep the remaining 15 percent of the issues open
and use them as bargaining tools for decisions on the
division of ministerial portfolios. Regarding portfolios,
FDP source commented off the record that current Interior
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble had been trying to serve as the
CDU's "grey eminence," seeking to exert influence over many

of the working groups, beyond his own working group of
internal security. Source said that the FDP viewed his role
negatively, and that he was referred to within the FDP as "an
angry old man." He indicated that he hoped the CDU would
also view his role as counterproductive. Source, however,
noted that the agreement will only state which ministerial
portfolios each party will receive, without providing any
names. He stressed that it is up to each party to then
decide who will fill those positions.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1360, THE NEW GERMAN CABINET - AN
OVERVIEW
Discussing cables
09BERLIN1360
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SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR EUR/CE

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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV PINR GM
SUBJECT: THE NEW GERMAN CABINET - AN OVERVIEW
Ref: Berlin 1337, Berlin 1340, Berlin 1167
BERLIN 00001360 001.2 OF 004
¶1. (SBU) Chancellor Merkel's new Cabinet emerged early on October 24

after a month of intense media speculation about its make-up; it
contained several surprises. Perhaps the most unexpected
announcements were that of former Interior Minister Schaeuble as
Finance Minister and former Economics Minister Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg as the new Defense Minister. The Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) will run the Chancellery as well as six ministries and
have a minister without portfolio, the Free Democratic Party (FDP)
will hold five as well as the Vice Chancellorship, and the Christian
Social Union (CSU), three. The ministerial competencies and their
names remain unchanged. Following is a short description of
Merkel's new Cabinet, which was formally sworn in on October 28:
Chief of the Chancellery and Minister

Without Portfolio: Ronald Pofalla (CDU)
--------------------------------------
Pofalla, 50, takes over from Thomas de Maiziere as the Chancellor's

chief of staff. Pofalla is a lawyer and since 2005 served as CDU
Secretary General. He is known as a close confidant of Angela
Merkel. As Secretary General, he had been criticized as lacking a
public profile and not being aggressive enough. From 2004-2005 he
served as deputy caucus leader for economics and labor issues in the
Bundestag. Also within the Chancellery, Merkel's security and
foreign policy advisor Christoph Heusgen remains, as do Maria
Boehmer as Minister of State for Migration, Refugees and Integration
and Bernd Neumann, Minister of State for Culture and Media. Eckart
von Klaeden (CDU and a Merkel confidant) becomes State Minister in
the Chancellery for coordination with the federal states and
parliamentary contacts.
Foreign Affairs: Guido Westerwelle (FDP)

---------------------------------------
Westerwelle, 47, becomes Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor -- as

expected. Economic Assistance will not be included in the Foreign
office, but the FDP will also control that ministry. Minister of
State within the MFA will be Werner Hoyer, who already served in
that function under Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel from 1994-1998.
He also was Westerwelle's foreign policy adviser in the election
campaign. He will cover all divisions apart from "culture" and
"economics and sustainable development." The other Minister of
State is Cornelia Pieper, deputy FDP chairperson, who has no
experience in this field and will reportedly focus on cultural and
communication issues. Martin Biesel, Westerwelle's Bundestag chief
of staff, will become a State Secretary within the MFA to coordinate
the work of the FDP ministries with the Chancellery. Westerwelle
has described Biesel as his closest advisor.
Defense: Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU)

----------------------------------------
The CSU's rising star, zu Guttenberg, 37, seemed certain to remain

in the cabinet. However, there was speculation that his Economics
Ministry seat would be up for grabs. When Economics went to the FDP
and Finance to Schaeuble, zu Guttenberg's best fit was in Defense.
The DefMin job gives zu Guttenberg the opportunity to work on
foreign and security issues again, which was his main area of
interest as a parliamentarian. He is seen as a good and capable
replacement for Jung, who was widely criticized for being overly
cautious and inarticulate in explaining security and defense issues
to the German public. Zu Guttenberg is expected to improve the
Defense Ministry's image, prestige and weight within the cabinet
through his popularity and public relations talents. His
appointment has already boosted morale among working level officials
in the MOD, who believe that zu Guttenberg will make MOD a real
player once again in German security policy debates. He is a
transatlanticist and well known in Washington. He will likely give
the Defense Ministry a higher profile. He will retain the current
Parliamentary State Secretaries Thomas Kossendey (CSU) and Christian
Schmidt (CSU).
Interior: Thomas de Maiziere (CDU)

---------------------------------
De Maiziere, 55, a lawyer, is a confidant of Angela Merkel and has

served as her chief of staff in the Chancellery for four years. He
had been mentioned as a potential finance minister, but reportedly,
his personal preference was interior. He brings some experience to
the job, since he served as state interior minister in Saxony
2004-2005 and as state minister of justice 2002-2004. However, some
of the issues he will face as federal interior minister, namely
international terrorism, are topics he has less exposure to. De
Maiziere is known to be a consensus builder who works the
interagency process well and is a good problem solver.
BERLIN 00001360 002.2 OF 004
Finance: Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU)

---------------------------------
Merkel wanted a political heavy weight in this difficult position

during the financial and economic crisis. Schaeuble, 67, is an
experienced, strong and well established politician from Germany's
southwest, who is expected to fill his new role quite well. He has
by far the longest federal government experience in Merkel's
cabinet. Confined to a wheel chair since he was shot during a
campaign rally in 1990, the conservative politician from the German
southwest is not known as a close friend of Chancellor Merkel's. A
member of the Bundestag since 1972, he is pragmatic, copes well with
pressure, and is known for his fierce loyalty. He does not shy away
from confrontation and will be ready to pursue unpopular or
controversial measures. In light of his age and his political
standing, he does not have to fear any consequences for his future
career, which a younger candidate would take into consideration.
While he had to give up the Interior Ministry (which he reportedly
liked very much), he is being compensated by running one of the most
influential ministries in the cabinet. While he cooperated well
during the coalition talks, political observers would have expected
major clashes with FDP Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
over domestic security issues if he had remained in the Interior
Ministry.
Economics and Technology: Rainer Bruederle (FDP)

--------------------------------------------- --
Bruederle, 64, has been deputy caucus chief and economic spokesman
of the FDP in the Bundestag. He already served as economic minster
in Rhineland Palatinate 1987-1998, where he strongly promoted
wine-growers, trade, and small and midsize business. Since 1983 he
has been state chairman of the FDP in Rhineland Palatinate and
member of the national executive committee and since 1995 deputy
national party chairman. Hans-Joachim Otto and Ernst Burgbacher
(both FDP) will become State Secretaries within that Ministry.
Labor and Social Affairs: Franz-Josef Jung (CDU)

--------------------------------------------- --
Defense Minister Jung, 60, was unexpectedly switched to the Labor

and Social Affairs ministry. Jung had fallen victim to much
criticism during his tenure as Defense Minister and Merkel had been
pressured to replace him. Merkel, however, had to find another
cabinet post for Jung to maintain a proportional regional
representation in the cabinet - Jung's state of Hesse had to be
represented. Another reason for Merkel to keep Jung in the cabinet
in spite of his weaknesses and previous failures is his loyalty as a
minister.
Justice: Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP)

--------------------------------------------- --
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, 58, is FDP chairperson and caucus chief

in Bavaria. She successfully ran the 2008 FDP election campaign in
that state, where the FDP reentered the state parliament after 14
years of absence. She was the FDP's chief negotiator on Justice in
the coalition talks. She previously served as Justice Minister
under Chancellor Kohl from 1992-1996, but resigned in opposition to
legislation allowing electronic eavesdropping of private residences,
which was planned by her own government. She has a strong focus on
civil rights and data protection, and has been critical of what she
views are overly intrusive wiretapping and other electronic
surveillance measures (see ref C).
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women

and Youth: Ursula von der Leyen (CDU)
--------------------------------------
Von der Leyen, 51, a medical doctor and mother of seven, had
indicated a strong interest in moving to the health portfolio and
worked out that respective section of the coalition agreement for
the CDU. Merkel reportedly was not interested, however, in the CDU
controlling the health ministry in light of the necessary but
unpopular reforms and increasing costs of health care for citizens.
Since the health ministry went to the FDP, von der Leyen will remain
in her current position. In the past few years, von der Leyen has
successfully modernized the family policy of the CDU and thus its
image in this sector. She is one of Germany's most popular
politicians according to public opinion polls.
Health: Philipp Roesler (FDP)

----------------------------
Roesler, 36, is the youngest member of the cabinet and his

nomination was a surprise. He is sharp and dynamic and a rising
star of the FDP. He was state secretary general, state party
chairman and eventually economics minister in Lower-Saxony. He was
born in Vietnam and was adopted by a German family. Both Roesler
BERLIN 00001360 003.2 OF 004
and his wife are medical doctors, which gives him some practical
background for his new portfolio. Roesler negotiated the health
section of the coalition agreement for the FDP.
Environment, Nature Conservation and

Nuclear Safety: Norbert Roettgen (CDU)
-------------------------------------
Roettgen, 44, a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel had also been

named as potential chief of staff at the Chancellery. He has worked
closely with the Chancellor since her days as caucus chairman
2002-2005. Merkel reportedly appreciates his loyalty and analytical
talents. During the financial crisis he became one of her closest
advisors. While he does not have a reputation for expertise in his
new portfolio, Merkel obviously wanted to position many of her
confidants in the new cabinet. Environmental issues, especially
climate change, will figure prominently for Merkel.
Education and Research: Annette Schavan (CDU)

---------------------------------------------
Schavan, 54, will keep her current cabinet position. Even though
she did not have a prominent record, as a confidant of Angela
Merkel, it was assumed that she would stay on as a member of the
cabinet.
Transportation, Building, and Urban

Development: Peter Ramsauer (CSU)
-----------------------------------
Since November 2005, Ramsauer, 55, has served as head of the CSU
group in the Bundestag and deputy CDU/CSU caucus chief. As minister
for construction, housing and transportation, he will have a huge
budget to work with.
Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection:

Ilse Aigner (CSU)
-------------------------------------------
Aigner, 44, only became Minister for Agriculture and Consumer

Protection in October 2008. She came to this job as an expert on
research issues and new to the realities of production agriculture.
In her tenure, some parts of the German agriculture community have
been critical of her performance, particularly her close
relationship to Bavarian Minister President Horst Seehofer. The CSU
was interested in keeping this portfolio since agriculture continues
to play an important and tactical role in Bavaria.
Economic Cooperation and Development: Dirk Niebel (FDP)

--------------------------------------------- -----
Niebel, 46, has been Secretary General of the FDP since May 2005 and
belongs to the inner leadership circle of the FDP. He was named as
a potential minister since he made strong contributions to the
electoral success of the FDP. His actual expertise would have been
labor and social affairs. However, that portfolio went to the CDU.
The FDP sought in the coalition talks to have the Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) merged with the MFA, but
failing that, having control of both ministries goes a long way to
meeting its concern that BMZ development policy be in line with MFA
priorities, especially on key issues like Afghanistan. Media
commentary has focused on Niebel's lack of previous experience in
development assistance, and how he may essentially serve as a
department head under Foreign Minister Westerwelle.
Comment
-------
¶2. (SBU) With five ministries in the new cabinet, the FDP is
arguably one of the most powerful junior coalition partners in
recent German history in terms of both the number and quality of
their cabinet appointments. The Greens had three, mostly junior,
ministries in their coalition with the Social Democrats from
1998-2005. The FDP has one more than it had during its last
coalition with the CDU. This is due in part to the election outcome
in which the FDP had its strongest-ever performance, with 14.6
percent of the vote. CDU officials also describe the appointments
as partial compensation for the policy concessions the FDP made
during coalition negotiations. The CDU/CSU will have the popular
and competent Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg as Defense Minister,
balancing the FDP's control over Foreign Affairs and Development
Assistance. Zu Guttenberg -- a strong transatlanticist -- is
well-connected in Washington and already has a strong background in
foreign and security policy. There has been some criticism that the
new Cabinet does not have any representation from eastern states.
Merkel responded to the criticism reminding that in fact the
Chancellor herself counts as representing the East. End comment.
BERLIN 00001360 004.2 OF 004
¶3. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates Frankfurt,

Leipzig, Munich, Hamburg and Duesseldorf.
Murphy
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2427, AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI

AND PASHA ABOUT
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO4334
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2427/01 2801331
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071331Z OCT 09
Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 13:31

SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
KERRY-LUGAR
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar
bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6.
These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the
waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were
several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control
over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani.
DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps
Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill’s long-term commitment to Pakistan
and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only
requires certifications and “assessments;” and the bill does not apply to the
large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund
but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and
Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral
cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting
little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani
said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what
to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original
sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the
parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government
controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine
political support for the Army’s anti-terrorist effort.
¶2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four
weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised
against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador
will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief
Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much
publicized “clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the
Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.
¶3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the
back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani
did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this
time.
¶4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and
for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either
reintegration or reconciliation without it.
¶5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he
had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in
Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the
Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His
intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were
on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at
any time. End Summary.
¶6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss
the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General
McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting.
General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the
bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed
against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the
enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and
against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the
assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no
intention of taking over the government. “If I had wanted to do this, I would
have done it during the long march.8
¶7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had
caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers.
Pasha said they could not figure out why these “conditions” on assistance had
been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so
ISLAMABAD 00002427 002 OF 003
much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation,
despite the different situation on the ground.
¶8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a
requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major
victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan’s development.
The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised
if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but
President Bush had refused to sign it.
¶9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill
did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to
the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-
insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-
insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do
not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to
Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood
that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the
Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan
Counter-insurgency Fund.
¶10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement
about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how
to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden,
the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of
Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s
improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister
had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few
days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-
Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would
have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he
agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the
government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the
government to say it had been “informed” by the debate.
¶11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had
followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India
between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on
possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat
and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were
alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about
an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the
Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in
other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting
that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him.
He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility
of an attack on India.
¶12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel
with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign
Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign
Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador
should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it “left off:” he
was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters
yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and
Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan’s integrity and intelligence.
¶13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four
weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this
with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif
and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the
Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to
have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz
ISLAMABAD 00002427 003 OF 003
stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward
immediately. End Note.)
¶14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General
McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in
Afghanistan was the “perception that the US was winning.” There was no chance
for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2449, S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN

APPROVES EMBEDDING
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6340
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2449/01 2820725
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090725Z OCT 09
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/05/2034

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS
REF: ISLAMABAD 2116
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)(c), and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved
deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military
operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the
Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the
Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special
operations personnel with their military forces. The developments of the past
two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End Summary.
¶2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP that it approved
a request from the Army’s 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S.
SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to XXXXXXXXXXXX South Waziristan and
XXXXXXXXXXXX North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to
the 11 Corps’ XXXXXXXXXXXX. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about
our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP responded
positively.
¶3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the XXXXXXXXXXXX and would
include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video.
SOC(FWD)-PAK’s initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to
XXXXXXXXXXXX. In order to finalize our planning and obtain formal go-ahead from
CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information on the timing and purpose of
the 11 Corps’ planned military operations from Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir,
the Army’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).
¶4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S.
special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In
September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier
Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation
(reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a
precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.
¶5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a repeat
deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to XXXXXXXXXXXX. SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing
a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.
¶6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more
than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army
leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations
Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent
approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army
Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to
represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with
the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis
are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting
their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training
appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel
into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition,
the success of the initial deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the
follow-up requests for new and repeat support.
¶7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly politically sensitive
because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and
opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on
Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any
coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop
making requests for such assistance. End Comment.
ISLAMABAD 00002449 002 OF 002
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2523, TERRORISTS INCREASE ACTIVITY IN

ADVANCE OF
Discussing cables
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AID-00 A-00 ACQ-00 CCO-00
INL-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 PDI-00 DS-00 DHSE-00 EUR-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00
CAC-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00
ISN-00 OCS-00 NIMA-00 PM-00 GIWI-00 P-00 ISNE-00
DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 USSS-00
NCTC-00 ASDS-00 CBP-00 BBG-00 R-00 IIP-00 SCRS-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 SCA-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 FA-00
SRAP-00 PESU-00 SANA-00 /000W
O 161452Z OCT 09
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
AMCONSUL KARACHI
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2034

TAGS: PTER MOPS PK
SUBJECT: TERRORISTS INCREASE ACTIVITY IN ADVANCE OF
WAZIRISTAN OPERATION
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson. Reasons 1.4 b and d.

¶1. (S) Summary: With the Pakistan military preparing to
launch an operation against major terrorist safe havens in
South Waziristan, Pakistan's terrorist/extremist groups have
dramatically increased their militant and propaganda
operations in an effort to undermine public support. On the
operational side, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now
headed by an individual calling himself Hakeemullah Mehsud
appears to be cooperating both with elements of al-Qaeda and
with the Punjabi terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LJ). While this is not the first time that we have seen
cross-cooperation among these terrorist/extremist
organizations, the intensity of attacks -- five in a single
day on October 15 -- indicate that TTP has both increased its
cooperative outreach and its finances (as LJ does not work
for free).
¶2. (S) In addition, the recent attacks demonstrate that TTP

and its allies have the capacity to evolve and vary the style
of their attacks to exploit weaknesses in the Pakistani
security apparatus. The recent attacks involved both
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in the
North West Frontier Province and smaller attacks against high
profile installations by armed individuals in security forces
uniforms that can more easily penetrate Pakistan security
cordons in other parts of the country. There is information
to suggest that women/men clad in burqas are now part of the
mix of attackers. TTP has been clear in its propaganda that
these attacks are both in direct retaliation for Pakistan
government support for American initiatives in countering
violent extremism and because of the military's upcoming
Waziristan operation. TTP has gone so far as to promise an
end to the attacks and its fighters participation in jihad
against India, if the Pakistani government changes its
foreign policy and establishes an "Islamic" state. Despite
these threats, the Pakistan military continues its
preparations for an offensive in South Waziristan against the
TTP and their tribal allies to be launched in the next few
weeks. End Summary.
¶3. (S) Beginning with the attack against the Askari Bank in
Peshawar on September 26, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
has resumed its terrorist attacks in Pakistan's settled areas
that had largely ceased following the death of Baitullah
Mehsud. TTP's new campaign coincides with Pakistan military
preparations for an operation in South Waziristan, including
increased air strikes in Mehsud territory and with the
consolidation of leadership power within TTP in the hands of
an individual referring to himself as Hakeemullah Mehsud.
¶4. (S) TTP and its al-Qaeda allies, who have been providing
advice and logistical assistance to the organization in
exchange for shelter with the Mehsud tribe in South
Waziristan, appear to have timed their renewed spate of
attacks and the accompanying propaganda blitz to undermine
public confidence in Pakistan security forces just as
preparations for the South Waziristan operation were
increasing. The terrorists appear to have read in on modern
theories of asymmetrical warfare, including the tenet that
public support will help determine the outcome of the
struggle between government and anti-government actors.
General Kayani told us repeatedly that strong public support
was a key issue in his decision to move into Swat.
¶5. (S) TTP is not, however, acting alone in carrying out the
recent attacks. Al-Qaeda advice, support, and possibly
financing have long been a critical element in TTP's ability
to carry-out spectacular attacks in Pakistan's settled areas.
In addition, TTP has allied on and off with various other
Taliban-inspired terrorist and criminal groups in Pakistan's
North West Frontier Province, including Mengal Bagh and the
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM).
¶6. (S) In the recent attacks in the Pakistani Punjab, TTP

appears to have, as they did in 2008, hired the services of
Punjab-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). LJ,
which began as a violent off-shot of Deobandi sectarian
extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in the 1990s,
has steadily increased its target set from strictly Shias, a
minority in Pakistan, to any group which does not share its
strict, militant interpretation of Islam, including the
Pakistan government and western interests. Since 2001, LJ
has become essentially a "guns for hire" terrorist
organization, prepared to carry out attacks on any
non-Deobandi group in exchange for sizable cash payments.
The latest attacks are also tied directly to Ilyas Kashmiri,
who is affiliated with the anti-India terrorist group
Harakat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI). HUJI, along with other
anti-India groups including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), have increasingly shifted their focus
to include Pakistan government and western targets in
Pakistan and India. They are also actively collaborating
with Taliban groups, including TTP, sectarian extremist
groups such as LJ, and al-Qaeda.
¶7. (S) The recent attacks demonstrate that TTP and its allied
groups are capable of adjusting their tactics and practices
to counter Pakistan government security measures. TTP has
continued to use vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIED) against police and government installations in NWFP
-- where counter-measures are comparatively weaker. In
Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Lahore, TTP has started deploying
single suicide bombers or small teams of suicide bombers and
armed gunmen to target high-profile installations. These
individual suicide bombers or small teams have begun wearing
the uniforms of Pakistani security personnel, which are
easily available for purchase in any market and allow them to
bypass security screening checkpoints unchallenged. There is
information that women/men in burqas have also been part of
the mix of attackers. While casualty tolls in these attacks
are lower than in the VBIED explosions, their ability to
bypass security and penetrate into the General Headquarters
of the Pakistan Army, international organizations, and the
headquarters of the Federal Investigation Agency could have a
devastating impact on public and security force morale.
¶8. (S) It is also possible, however, that the terrorists have

not accurately assessed all quarters of Pakistani public
opinion. Most Punjabis were remarkably nonchalant about
violence in the tribal areas prior to the March attack on the
Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore. Consulate Lahore contacts
have fallen into two camps in reaction to the October 15 (and
earlier but also recent) attacks in the Punjab. One camp
does, indeed, bemoan the government's incapacity and speaks
pessimistically about the GOP's capacity to rally. Another
camp speaks passionately of the importance of the GOP's
civilian and military components joining to defeat the
terrorists, and restore normalcy to Pakistan, with some pride
in the GOP's accomplishments to date. The attacks seem to
have further invigorated this camp. Both camps insist that
the violent extremists represent neither Islam nor Pakistan.
Terrorist "messaging" is not having the desired impact in
Lahore. Even the anti-U.S., nationalist daily "The Nation"
spoke highly of the "martyred" security forces who lost their
lives in the October 15 attacks.
¶9. (S) In addition to the increase in attacks, TTP has

equally launched a propaganda effort to break public support
for the impending operation in South Waziristan. The thrust
of this propaganda effort has been that the attacks are in
retaliation for the Pakistan Army/government's policy of
supporting America's "war against Islam" in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. TTP has stressed that any action in Waziristan
is being carried out on instructions from the United States.
¶10. (S) TTP spokespeople have promised that the campaign of

attacks will end, if the Pakistan government abandons its
support of the United States policy. In one recent
statement, TTP even offered to send its jihadi forces to
Pakistan's eastern border with India if the Pakistan
government turned Pakistan into "an Islamic state." Such
propaganda messages are clearly designed to damage the army
and government's image in the general public and decrease
public and political support for what may be a prolonged
military operation in South Waziristan.
¶11. (S) Despite these attacks, we continue to receive solid

evidence that the Pakistan military is preparing to move
forward with some kind of operation in South Waziristan. For
the last several days, we have witnessed renewed air strikes
in the region designed to prepare the ground to facilitate
offensive maneuver. In addition, we have seen continued
movements of troops and supplies to tactical assembly areas
in South Waziristan and the positioning of Special Services
Group (SSG) personnel for reconnaissance activities, which
appear imminent. On October 16, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq
Pervaiz Kayani made an unscheduled call to ISAF Commander
Gen. McChrystal to advise that operations in South Waziristan
were imminent and to request that ISAF forces in Afghanistan
coordinate with the Pakistani military to prevent the escape
of militants across the border. Mission believes that the
start of major ground combat operations may still be several
days or more away as SSG reconnaissance and additional air
strikes are likely prior to the commencement of decisive
operations.
¶12. (S) Despite the positive indications that the Pakistan

Army intends to move into South Waziristan, post remains
uncertain as to the intended extent of the operation. There
is no question that the Pakistan Army intends to "punish" the
Mehsud tribe for its protection of TTP and to dismantle as
much TTP infrastructure in South Waziristan as possible. It
is also likely that the Pakistan Army will move against
al-Qaeda elements that are inter-mingled with the Mehsud
tribe and supporting TTP. It remains to be seen, however,
that given the short time frame before a harsh winter sets
into the Waziristans that the Pakistan Army is contemplating
a full-scale clearance operation. There is no indication
that the military intends to go after Commander Nazir,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network, or their allied
tribes -- all located in North Waziristan -- as part of this
operation. These elements that focus almost exclusively on
cross-border attacks into Afghanistan are not a high priority
for the Pakistan military, and, in the case of the Haqqanis,
it is not clear the Pakistani military could achieve a
decisive victory even if it wanted to do so.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09KABUL3068, AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR

WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
Discussing cables
09KABUL3068 2009-10-03 04:04 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kabul
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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM

STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019

TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
IN KANDAHAR
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y

ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: in a lengthy and cordial introductory meeting

with Kandahar Provincial Council Chief Ahmed Wali Karzai
(AWK) and Governor Tooryalai Weesa, Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) for the South Frank Ruggiero underscored
the need for improved governance in Kandahar, and highlighted
the importance of naming credible provincial governors and
district officials before the inauguration to send a positive
signal on good governance to the Afghan people and the
international community. Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged the
weakness of the government in Kandahar, and outlined their
proposals for local solutions, including the empowerment of
shuras of district elders for local dispute resolution rather
than the courts. AWK also emphasized large-scale
infrastructure projects rather than smaller cash-for-work
program, and his desire to see private security companies in
the province under one licensee. AWK discounted the role of
elections and their importance to Afghans. End Summary.
AWK Nervous but Eager to Share Views

----------------------------------
¶2. (C) SCR Ruggiero met with AWK and Governor Weesa on
September 28 in the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City. The
Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) Ben Rowswell also
attended the meeting, which was held in a wood-paneled room,
beneath a large photo of President Hamid Karzai. (Note:
While we must deal with AWK as the head of the Provincial
Council, he is widely understood to be corrupt and a
narcotics trafficker. End Note) AWK, dressed in a crisp
white shalwar kameez and pinstriped vest, appeared nervous,
though eager to express his views on the international
presence in Kandahar.
The Importance of Good Governance

------------------------------
¶3. (C) SCR emphasized the criticality of good governance in

the province, and said the United States would like to see
improvement in the post-election period. He said the United
States is ready to work with the GIRoA to strengthen key
provincial and district level governance, but we are only
willing to expend our resources in people and programs if we
have confidence those resources will pay off and make a real
difference.
¶4. (C) Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged there was a

credibility gap between the public and the government. Weesa
said it was a problem that in the 10 months he had been in
office, the government had not been able to deliver 24-hour
electricity to the people, and that 150 factories had closed
because of it. He said people looked to NGOs more than to
the government to deliver services, and he complained that
NGOs poach workers from the government by offering higher
wages. SCR emphasized the importance of naming credible
provincial governors and district officials before the
inauguration to send a positive signal on good governance to
the Afghan people and the international community.
¶5. (C) AWK suggested one way of fighting corruption in the

province would be to re-establish and empower district
shuras, instead of judges or police, to settle local
disputes. Currently there is only one judge for the five
districts around Kandahar City, he said, and a council of
local elders would be more effective at resolving land, water
and other disputes. (Note: there are a total of seven judges
for all 17 districts in the province.) "You can easily bribe
the chief of police or a judge,8 he said, &but you can't
bribe 50 elders." He said the provincial council, with the
support of the governor, could initiate the formation of
these district shuras, which would consist of 10-15 elders
elected by the people.
Infrastructure Priorities, Private Security Contractors and

Conflicts of Interest
--------------------------------------------- -----------------
¶6. (C) AWK said he had been in Kandahar almost continuously

since 1992, and that the U.S. reputation in the province was
built on the back of two key infrastructure projects done in
the 1950s and 60s. He said what would make a difference to
the population today would be similar large-scale,
labor-intensive projects that would provide jobs to the
people and keep them from being recruited by the Taliban.
AWK cautioned against the use of small scale projects and
KABUL 00003068 002 OF 002
additional cash-for-work programs; he stated that the use of

implementing partners does not allow expenditure of
development resources to reach villagers and other local
Afghans. Both he and Weesa added that it should be the local
elders who are empowered to distribute these jobs, not
officials or companies from outside.
Putting Private Security Under the Direction of the

Provincial Council
--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (C) In the same vein of providing "local solutions to

local problems," as he put it, AWK recommended a "local
solution" to the problem of providing security in the area.
He said that currently, there are many jihadi commanders with
militias who independently provide protection to convoys and
projects, but that a proposal before the Ministry of Interior
would bring all these commanders under one umbrella in
Kandahar, with one person given the license for the private
security sector. He said there would be a meeting Wednesday
(September 30) of all the security companies, under the
auspices of the Provincial Council, to appoint this
representative to send to Kabul. (Note: AWK is understood to
have a stake in private security contracting, and has
aggressively lobbied the Canadians to have his security
services retained for the Dahla Dam refurbishment. Both he
and the governor have tried to exert control over how
contracts are awarded in the province ) all of which could
be a significant conflict of interest in the province. End
Note.)
Elections: What's the Point?

---------------------
¶8. (C) In answer to a question from the RoCK and the SCR
about the credibility of the elections, AWK said democracy
was new for Afghanistan, and that people in the region did
not understand the point of having one election, let alone
two. "The people do not like change," he said. "They think,
the President is alive, and everything is fine. Why have an
election?"
Comment
-----
¶9. (C) The meeting with AWK highlights one of our major
challenges in Afghanistan: how to fight corruption and
connect the people to their government, when the key
government officials are themselves corrupt. Given AWK's
reputation for shady dealings, his recommendations for large,
costly infrastructure projects should be viewed with a
healthy dose of skepticism. Still, his observations about
the unintended consequences of how NGOs and other
international partners do their work, e.g. "poaching" of
government staff, track with some of our own concerns,
including about how to promote Afghan-led solutions. We will
continue to urge AWK to improve his own credibility gap as
well as that of the GIRoA.
EIKENBERRY
Viewing cable 09KABUL3161, PAKISTANIS AT KANDAHAR BORDER FLAG

MEETING -- THE
Discussing cables
09KABUL3161 2009-10-07 06:06 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003161
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGED CLASSIFICATION TO SECRET)
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM

STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 09/27/2019

TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, UK, AF, PAK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANIS AT KANDAHAR BORDER FLAG MEETING -- THE
QUETTA SHURA IS A FABRICATION
KABUL 00003161 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy CooQnator Hoyt Y ee for

reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. The high point of the September 29 Border Flag Meeting (BFM) in
Kandahar was the Pakistani delegation leader’s assertion that the Quetta Shura
is an unsubstantiated fabrication. This BFM was the first at which the 5/2
Stryker Brigade joined officials from Canadian Task Force Kandahar, the Afghan
Border Police, and the Pakistani military. The Canadians had a specific border
cooperation agenda, the Afghans were more interested in insurgent interdiction,
and the Pakistani side did not give either much importance. The next BFM on
November 17 will be one among several opportunities for the U.S. to give AF-PAK
border issues in the South -- especially reducing Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan
-- the serious attention that they deserve. End Summary.
¶2. (S) The high point of the September 29 Border Flag Meeting in Kandahar was
Pakistani delegation leader BG Sajjad’s assertion that the Quetta Shura is an
unsubstantiated fabrication. When pressed, Sejaad expanded on his position,
saying that the Americans had fallen victim to rumors and adding that Pakistani
security authorities have more than 80 patrols and checkpoints in Quetta every
day and every night, and if there were any Taliban leaders around they would
know about them. In a similar vein, he insisted that Taliban infiltration into
Afghanistan from Pakistan was negligible, and that the group should be more
concerned about terrorists and narcotics moving in the other direction. Recent
press reporting on U.S. concerns about the Taliban presence in Baluchistan did
not figure directly in the meeting.
¶3. (S) This BFM was the first in several months, and the first at which U.S.
representatives from the 5/2 Stryker Brigade, including the commander, joined
officials from Canadian Task Force Kandahar, the Afghan Border Police, and the
Pakistani military. TFK Commander BG Jonathan Vance chaired the meeting, and the
dynamics between the Afghan and Pakistani sides were so poor it was apparent
that the session would have degenerated into acrimony without his multiple
diplomatic interventions. The Canadian presentation was intended to advance
border cooperation and associated projects based on the Dubai Process, covering
the new Joint Border Coordination Center in Spin Boldak, progress with truck
surveillance equipment, satellite phones, and construction of a new border
facilities at the Weiche crossing to begin in 2010 (maybe).
¶4. (S) Afghan Border Police 3rd Zone Deputy Commander Col. Sharif was more
interested in insurgent interdiction, and credited Blackwater training for the
detailed list of seizures that included, among other things, 20 radios, 450
meters of wire, 800 detonators, and 62 prisoners. When Col. Sharif suggested
that combined AF-PAK border operations would be the best way to demonstrate true
willingness to cooperate, BG Vance reminded the group that policy was to focus
on communications and confidence building measures through the JBCC.
¶5. (S) The Pakistanis essentially rebutted each Canadian point with a complaint
or counter-point: 1) the Iridium phones were useless for cross-border
communications, because the system was always busy; 2) they would not send any
personnel for training on the Canadian-supplied truck surveillance equipment
until they received a timeline of when the equipment would be operational; 3) it
did not make sense to begin construction on a new border crossing facility when
the Afghans kept the current Friendship Gate locked, and all traffic had to go
around the side; and 4) the would make no commitment when Pakistani officers
would actually arrive to man the JBCC. For their presentation, the Pakistanis
displayed a map slide with 171 border stations between the southern edge of the
FATA and Iran to demonstrate the excellent control they maintain on their side,
along with another listing nine ISAF aircraft border incursions in the past two
months with exact duration and meters of penetration, for which they demanded an
accounting.
¶6. (S) The participants agreed in principle that the next BFM would take place
on November 17 in Chaman on the Pakistani side. The agenda is to include an
update on the JBCC, a 5/2 Stryker brief on their forces array near the, a TFK
operations and intelligence brief on Kandahar, and an accounting of ISAF air
incursions.
Comment
KABUL 00003161 002.2 OF 002
¶7. (S) The November 17 BFM will be one among several opportunities for the U.S.
to give AF-PAK border issues in the South the serious attention that they
deserve.
Bio notes
-------
¶8. (S) There were eight Pakistanis in the delegation, three regular army and
five Frontier Corps Pishin Scouts. BG Sejaad, who said he had been deputy zone
commander for two months, gave the impression that he spoke with the authority
of Islamabad when discussing terrorists and the Taliban. He also mentioned that
he had attended NBC training in Germany prior to the first Pakistan nuclear
tests. COL Shahzada, a Pashtu-speaking brigade commander from Quetta was the
next most senior officer. The Canadians said three ISI officers were among the
Pishin Scouts. EIKENBERRY
Viewing cable 09LONDON2303, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY’S
OCTOBER 10-11
Discussing cables
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, UK, KNNP, MOPS, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY’S OCTOBER 10-11
VISIT TO LONDON
Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C//NF) Summary. The Secretary’s visit to London comes on the heels of the
Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat political party conferences -- their
last before the UK elections which must be held by June 2010. The domestic
political situation remains in flux, but with the Conservatives enjoying a
consistent lead in the polls. A Conservative victory is not assured, however;
the Conservatives have done a better job of criticizing Labour policies than of
selling Conservative solutions. The cumulative contraction of the UK economy by
5.7 percent over the last five quarters has focused electoral discussions on
economic issues. The major foreign policy issues for the election are the UK’s
involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite
of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK’s role in
the EU, which Labour has been using as an example of the Conservatives’
“isolationist” tendencies on economic and foreign policy. Politically, PM Brown
and Foreign Secretary David Miliband will want the Secretary’s visit to
demonstrate the strength of their relationship with the U.S. administration in
order to counter domestic press speculation about a perceived decline in the
“special relationship” following Megrahi’s release and President Obama’s
reported “snubbing” of PM Brown’s requests for one-on-one meetings at the G-20
and UNGA. Some of the key issues of import to the UK Government are Afghanistan,
Iran, Pakistan, Northern Ireland, and non-proliferation. End summary.
The UK on Key Issues

--------------------
¶2. (S//NF) The Secretary’s meetings with PM Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary
David Miliband likely will focus on the following key issues:
-- Afghanistan - As the second largest force contributor in Afghanistan, the UK

has lost 219 soldiers since operations began in 2001. The up-tick in British
casualties in July and August 2009 has contributed to renewed public debate on
the UK’s engagement there. Public support for the war effort is tepid. Rather
than questioning the reasons for the UK’s presence in Afghanistan, many critics
instead have asserted that Brown has provided insufficient troops and equipment
(including helicopters) to get the job done. In his September 25 discussion with
the President, Brown said Afghan forces must shoulder a greater portion of the
burden and take more responsibility for their own affairs and asserted the UK
would not be “cutting out” of Afghanistan, though it lacks the capacity to
commit additional troops. Brown and Miliband made similar statements to General
McChrystal on October 1 and Admiral Mullen and Admiral Stavridis October 2, and
the PM’s Foreign Policy Advisor Simon McDonald has asked the USG to show
“understanding of the political pressures that the PM is under.” However, UK
military officials claim that 1,000 - 2,000 additional troops are available for
deployment. Brown, Miliband, and British military leaders would like other NATO
allies to assume a greater share of combat operations, stressing that the U.S.,
UK and a few other allies have borne the brunt of the fighting. The PM very much
wants to see strong U.S. leadership and is anxious to see the Administration’s
policy review completed soon.
-- Iran - The UK has privately shared with us that it is ready to proceed with
designations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Bank
Mellat under their Counter Terrorism Act powers, an action that requires
parliamentary approval. In the wake of the October 1 P5 1 meeting in Geneva,
however, UK officials are likely to want to consult with the U.S. on the best
timing for announcing the designation. UK officials may also raise the issue of
Nosratollah Tajik, former Iranian ambassador to Jordan, currently under arrest
in the UK and awaiting extradition to the U.S. on charges of procuring
restricted military items (night-vision goggles) for the Iranian government.
Tajik has exhausted all judicial appeals in the UK and all that stands in the
way of the extradition is approval by the Home Secretary. Before approving the
extradition, the UK wants to be sure the timing is right and will not interfere
with our joint efforts through the P5 1 to engage with Iran.
-- Pakistan - Because of immigration and economic ties, Pakistan has an

important domestic dimension for the UK and will feature in public debates in
the run-up to the UK’s 2010 elections. Following the Friends of Pakistan meeting
on September 25, the UK announced it will provide an extra GBP 50 million (USD
80 million) to improve infrastructure and security in Pakistan’s border areas.
However, UK officials later confirmed that these are not new funds and will
instead
come from the current GBP 655 million (USD 1 billion) already designated for
Pakistan aid. British leaders view a secure Pakistan as key to regional
stability. They recognize Pakistan’s now more effective response to the Taliban
and other extremists, but say more is needed.
-- Northern Ireland - Prime Minister Brown and Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun
Woodward will probably ask the Secretary to urge Northern Ireland First Minister
Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness to accept the
“Westminster Package,” regarding the devolution of justice and policing powers,
which was recently presented by Prime Minister Brown. HMG would like to reach an
agreement with the parties this week, before the Secretary’s arrival. HMG argues
that the proposal is a good deal for Northern Ireland. If the agreement is not
completed by the weekend, there is potential that some of the parties could seek
to draw in the Secretary. The best approach is to urge all parties to work
together patiently to reach agreement. An agreement would be a strong, positive
signal to potential investors.
-- Nuclear Non-proliferation - Both PM Brown and FS Miliband welcome U.S.

leadership on the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda, including the April
2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The UK firmly agrees with us on the
importance of close P5 and P3 cooperation in the lead up to next year’s Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. At UNGA, Brown emphasized that
the onus is on non-nuclear states to prove they are not developing nuclear
weapons. He also pledged the UK’s support for sponsoring a uranium bank and
offering civil nuclear power to non-nuclear states that fulfill their
responsibilities. He also announced that, subject to the sustained ability to
maintain continuous deterrence, the UK will consider reducing its fleet of
Trident nuclear-armed submarines from four to three. The move also is regarded
as a cost-cutting measure for a government facing significant fiscal challenges
in the coming years.
-- Defense Trade Treaty - The PM and FS Miliband may ask about the status of the
Defense Trade Treaty and when the Senate will ratify it. U/S Tauscher told UK
officials on September 30 that her goal is to have the Senate act on the treaty
by year’s end. U/S Tauscher and A/S Shapiro are working to counter the SFRC
staff’s belief that implementing legislation is necessary to enforce the treaty
and to address their concerns about Congressional consultations and
notifications.
-- Arms Trade Treaty - Miliband frequently raises with senior U.S. interlocutors
the possibility of negotiating an ATT. We continue to have doubts about the
possibility of negotiating an effective treaty, but are willing to move forward
on the condition that it will proceed on the consensus basis traditional for
multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiations.
-- Gary McKinnon Extradition Case - The PM will likely raise with the Secretary
(as he has with the Ambassador) the extradition case of Gary McKinnon. McKinnon
is a 43-year old computer hacker with Asperger’s Syndrome who is wanted for
prosecution in the U.S.; he is accused of hacking into U.S. government systems
in 2001 and 2002. McKinnon has gained enormous popular sympathy in his appeal
against extradition; the UK’s final decision is pending. The case has also
caused public criticism of the U.S.-UK extradition treaty. In August, PM Brown,
in a one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, proposed a deal: that McKinnon
plead guilty, make a statement of contrition, but serve any sentence of
incarceration in the UK. Brown cited deep public concern that McKinnon, with his
medical condition, would commit suicide or suffer injury in imprisoned in a U.S.
facility. The Ambassador has raised this proposal with AG Holder and would be
happy to brief the Secretary in more detail.
Domestic Politics in Flux in Run-up to Elections
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C//NF) The annual political party conferences currently underway have
thrust the UK into electoral campaigning mode, with the Labour, Conservative,
and Liberal Democrat parties all positioning themselves for the general
elections, which must occur before June 2010. The recent conferences have given
each party in turn an up-tick in the polls, though with the Tories consistently
enjoying a significant overall lead. PM Brown is unchallenged as leader of the
Labour Party, but remains embattled by the UK media. Many in his party question
if Labour can win the next elections with him at the helm despite his strong
showing at the Labour conference. Honing its campaign message, the Labour Party
plans to make
the elections about class divisions, highlighting Labour’s strong public
services record and its economic vision for Britain. At present, the major
foreign policy issues shaping the electoral debate are the UK’s involvement in
Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding
public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK’s role in the
European Union, which Labour has been using as an example of Conservative
economic and foreign policy “isolationist” tendencies.
¶4. (C//NF) Conservative leader David Cameron’s headline message to the media as
the Tory conference began October 5 was about the UK’s “twin crises” of debt and
unemployment and the Tory’s to-be-unveiled “big, bold, and radical” scheme to
“get Britain working.” The Tories’ platform during the June European and local
elections was based on keeping in focus bedrock issues such as the economy, job
creation, and health and education reform; casting Labour as profligate and
irresponsible; and portraying the Conservatives as the party of thrift,
responsible spending and transparency. Ireland’s “yes” vote on the Lisbon Treaty
has highlighted internal Conservative party divisions on the EU as the
conference gets underway. PM Brown and FS Miliband may ask the Secretary to
emphasize U.S. support for a “strong Europe” as a way to highlight Conservative
schisms.
¶5. (C//NF) In response to the summer 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal, which
has alienated some voters from the political class and the mainstream parties,
Cameron has been credited with reacting more decisively than Brown - a
performance that some political commentators have said demonstrated impressive
leadership, especially compared to Brown (who throughout his prime ministership
has had to fight accusations of indecisiveness). Keeping the public focused on
the economy, Cameron has said the Conservatives would be judged by their
response to the UK’s debt crisis and has called for an “age of austerity.” While
spending cuts are expected to be a large part of the future Conservative
program, neither Cameron nor Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne has
offered details on where government spending should be cut, beyond just saying
there will be a ten percent cross-the-board cut with only education and the
National Health Services remaining untouched. Many in the UK public remain
skeptical of the Tories’ unspecified plans for major cuts.
¶6. (C//NF) The UK’s relationship with the U.S. has also become a campaign
issue. During the fever pitch of UK media reporting on the release of convicted
Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, the Conservatives blamed Labour for
damaging the “special relationship.” The UK media has refused to let the issue
die, continuing its mischievous reporting of recent alleged USG snubs of senior
UK officials, particularly during UNGA.
Overview of UK Economy
----------------------
¶7. (U) The UK officially entered recession in the third quarter of 2008 and has
suffered a cumulative contraction of 5.7 percent over the last five quarters. In
July, the IMF forecast a further contraction of 4.2 percent in 2009 and growth
of 0.2 percent in 2010. HM Treasury expects a contraction of 3.5 percent in 2009
and growth of 1.25 percent in 2010. Unemployment stands at 7.8 percent, its
highest since 1995, and is expected to climb to more than 10 percent in early
2010. Unemployment is particularly acute among 18-to-24 year olds at 17 percent.
The economic downturn is taking a heavy toll on trade. According to U.S Commerce
Department and U.S. International Trade Commission monthly trade statistics,
U.S. goods exports to the UK declined by 21.7 percent from January to June 2009,
compared to the same period in 2008, and UK exports to the U.S. declined by 25.6
percent. Concerns about employment figures remain high, with unemployment rates
near eight percent and expected to peak just in advance of the parliamentary
elections.
¶8. (U) Public debt stands at GBP 800 billion (56.8 percent of GDP), its highest
level since records began in 1974, and up from 56.6 percent last month. However,
UK debt as a percentage of GDP is still lower than in the other G7 countries.
How to manage and finance the UK’s debt burden is a key issue dividing the two
parties, and is expected to emerge as one of the top economic issues during the
political campaign.
ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Viewing cable 09MANAMA611, AFCENT COMMANDER'S MEETING WITH

CROWN PRINCE
Discussing cables
09MANAMA611 2009-10-19 10:10 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Manama
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TAGS: PREL MARR IR AF BA
SUBJECT: AFCENT COMMANDER'S MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE
SALMAN FOCUSES ON IRAN
REF: MANAMA 599
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During USAFCENT Commander Mike Hostage and

CDA's October 12 meeting with Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin
Hamad al Khalifa, the CP assured them that Bahrain would keep
the pressure on Iran to live up to the commitments it made in
Geneva (reftel). Lt Gen Hostage explained that the threat
posed by Iran was leading the U.S. to pursue a Regional
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (RIAMD) strategy with GCC
countries. Shaikh Salman welcomed this and stressed that
Bahrain wanted to be part of the solution to the GCC's
defense integration challenges. Lt Gen Hostage and the
Charge thanked him for Bahrain's commitment to contribute a
small contingent for the effort in Afghanistan. End Summary.
IRAN AND REGIONAL AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE:

------------------------------------------
¶2. (S) On October 12, U.S. Air Forces Central (USAFCENT)

Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage and Charge d'Affaires called on
the Crown Prince. The CP commended COMAFCENT for now being
forward deployed to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar because it was
important to spend time with the U.S.' counterparts in the
Gulf. If more U.S. troops were added into Afghanistan, and
Iran tried to delay the process begun in Geneva, Shaikh
Salman commented that there would be tough months ahead for
the region. As the P5 1 pursued its carrot and stick
approach with Iran, Salman wondered if Tehran would pursue a
"tit for tat" in its military posture. Because of the lack
of sophisticated intelligence gathering among the Gulf
states, the CP observed that the press "plays a propaganda
war into our psyche." He decried Iran's interference in Iraq.
¶3. (S) Lt Gen Hostage explained that, because of the threat

posed by Iran to the region, his primary goal was to work on
establishing Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(RIAMD) between the U.S. and the GCC states. First, this
involved integrating the U.S.' own air and missile defense
assets (Navy Aegis, Army Patriots, etc.). Then he would
offer to link each Gulf state into a Shared Early Warning
(SEW) Common Operating Picture (COP), to the extent that each
government was willing to participate. The U.S. would share
the same picture to all, and each could add as much
information as it liked, while keeping data it did not wish
to share behind a secure firewall.
¶4. (S) The CP responded that this would be the largest game
changer because it would be a permanent fixture and would
affect Iran's ability to project power. He thanked the U.S.
for the two U.S. Patriot batteries stationed here and said he
would like to help further integrate the Gulf states into
RIAMD project because it would not be enough without
everyone's participation. He cautioned, however, that the
U.S. would have to lead the effort and it would have to be
bilaterally with each government, with a multilateral system
as the long-term goal. He asked whether and where the U.S.
would deploy a THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense)
system to the Gulf. Gen Hostage replied that the location
was not yet certain, but yes, THAAD would be deployed within
a year, and would prove to be a very capable mid-course
intercept system. Prince Salman worried that, in an attack
scenario, Iran would try to swarm and overwhelm specific
targets and we would all have to be ready for that.
¶5. (S) Lt Gen Hostage pointed to the Air Warfare Center in

the UAE as a Center of Excellence (COE). A COE for RIAMD
could be established there as well as a training vehicle to
help the Gulf states get comfortable with the technical
solutions so they could share information. Shaikh Salman
said he wanted Bahrain to be part of the solution. He noted
that Bahrain had been the first GCC government to participate
in Task Force 152 and it liked to be a leader. "Consider us
serious partners," he stated.
IRAN: TO DEGRADE OR DETER?

--------------------------
¶6. (S) Lt Gen Hostage asked for the CP's views of Iran's
willingness to deal in good faith with the P5 1. Shaikh
Salman said his views had not changed - Iran's behavior would
continue to be problematic. However, he speculated that the
reason Iran had changed course and cooperated with the P5 1
in Geneva was due to Russian President Medvedev's comment at
UNGA that sometimes sanctions were unavoidable. CDA pointed
MANAMA 00000611 002 OF 002
out that as the P5 1 pursued a dual track strategy of

engagement and preparing for sanctions, the GCC countries'
roles would be important. Confirming that Bahrain would do
what it could to keep the pressure on Iran, the CP lamented
that Gulf countries had few levers on China. He thought that
if Saudi Arabia were to sell more oil to China, it would help
provide some leverage.
¶7. (S) The CP asked whether Russia had shipped its S-300 air
defense system to Iran yet. Lt Gen Hostage said no. Salman
said he was sure that the international community would have
to wait until the next election in Iran to see real internal
changes. The regime was still in firm control and
Ahmadinejad was consolidating his power, even as the economy
was failing. The world would need a strategy led by the U.S.
"We are still a ways away from knowing whether force is
necessary," the CP stated.
BAHRAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶9. (C) The CP asked whether the U.S. was changing its goals
in Afghanistan to a strategy of reconciliation and power
sharing with some elements of the Taliban while targeting
senior Al Qaeda figures. Lt Gen Hostage said a way had to be
found to let the Afghans live in their, not our, version of
peace, but he wondered whether it could be done on our
timeline. Shaikh Salman counseled patience as with the
implementation of the surge in Iraq. Lt Gen Hostage and
Charge thanked him for Bahrain's commitment to contribute a
company from its security forces to provide inner perimeter
security at a coalition base in Afghanistan. Shaikh Salman
stated that his father King Hamad had approved a budget of
USD 13 million for the deployment the day before, so the
troops would have the necessary equipment.
¶10. (C) The CP asked whether the U.S. would still need to
deploy aerial refueling tankers to Isa Air Base. Lt Gen
Hostage related that AFCENT's problems with the Manas Air
Base (Transit Center) in Kyrgyzstan had been resolved.
HENZEL
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2529, ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30

VISIT TO MOSCOW:
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002529
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS IR AF UP GG
SUBJECT: ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30 VISIT TO MOSCOW:
BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE,
MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for

reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During consultations with GOR officials on

September 30, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for
International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow discussed
ways to implement bilateral cooperation in a number of key
areas of mutual interest. Both sides praised progress since
the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations during the first
Obama-Medvedev meetings, though both agreed that concrete
actions are necessary to realize true cooperation. ASD
Vershbow emphasized that the reset needs to be reciprocal and
noted that Iran would be a critical test case. Both sides
expressed interest in further cooperation on Afghanistan,
especially in the sphere of counternarcotics. While the
Administration's missile defense announcement has met with a
generally positive reaction in the Russian media, Duma and
Security Council representatives made clear they had
questions about the later phases of the new U.S. plan and
questioned whether the U.S. would be prepared for cooperation
going beyond information exchange. Russian interlocutors
acknowledged the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program, but
stressed Moscow's skepticism about sanctions. Throughout the
meetings, ASD Vershbow emphasized that Russia's efforts to
assert a regional sphere of influence posed a threat to the
reset in bilateral relations, and reiterated the U.S.
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and other partners in the
region. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) OVERVIEW OF MEETINGS: ASD Vershbow met with the
following GOR officials: Viktor Mikhaylovich Zavarzin
(Defense Committee Chairman of the State Duma), Aleksandr A.
Gorbunov (Chief of the Main Directorate for International
Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense), General
Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy (Deputy Secretary of the
Security Council and former Chief of Defense), Aleksey
Nikolayevich Borodavkin (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs),
and Grigoriy Borisovich Karasin (First Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs and State Secretary). He also met informally
with academic experts and pundits and gave an interview to
Interfax.
--------------------------------------------- ---
U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION -- WORDS ARE NOT ENOUGH
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C) At all meetings, ASD Vershbow and his Russian

interlocutors noted that U.S.-Russia relations since the
"reset" have been moving in the right direction, with
opportunities for increased bilateral cooperation in areas of
mutual interest. The Bilateral Presidential Commission and
associated working groups will be useful to inject momentum
into our work. However, ASD Vershbow stressed that words
alone or mere information exchanges are not enough, and the
reset must be reciprocal. Both sides need to take action to
implement agreements already concluded and to pave the way
for additional areas of work and to identify concrete
projects for cooperation. Mechanisms for enabling these
efforts need to be established (e.g., the Ministry of Defense
is currently undergoing a major organizational reform, which
has hampered efforts for implementing the previously approved
2009 military-to-military work plan, and both sides need to
ensure that planned events are conducted).
¶4. (C) ASD Vershbow agreed that next steps must be taken in
other areas where we have agreed to cooperate previously
(e.g., implementing a ballistic missile joint threat
assessment, a Joint Data Exchange Center, and the lethal
transit overflight in support of efforts in Afghanistan that
was agreed to at the July summit). The U.S. and Russia must
be united in addressing common threats, such as the nuclear
and ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea.
¶5. (C) During his meeting with MOD International Military

Cooperation Chief Gorbunov, ASD Vershbow emphasized that
transparency should be a major aspect of cooperation.
Vershbow observed that DoD has been very open with the
Russians about sensitive issues. For example, DoD has shared
information about efforts to help prepare Georgian troops for
deployment to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts;
however, the Russians have not reciprocated in this vein
(e.g., their Zapad 2009 and Ladoga exercises).
¶6. (C) Both Duma Defense Committee Chair Zavarzin and

Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy stressed that
they are ready to work on all areas of mutual interest on the
BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE,
MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION
condition that Russia's voice be heard. In particular,

Zavarzin cited the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
(1997-2002) in which Russia claims its views were ignored,
the NATO-Russia Council (the PJC's successor) in which Russia
"still did not have a full say," and Russia's interest in
working on anti-missile defense since 2000 which "did not pan
out." ASD Vershbow acknowledged that both NATO and Russia
bore responsibility for areas where cooperation was not
successful, but suggested that we need to look ahead rather
than debate the past.
--------------------------------------------- ------
RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY REFORM POSES CHALLENGES TO
MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (C) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) is in the midst

of major reform. International Military Cooperation Chief
Gorbunov described the main goal of the reform as the
creation of the "most effective military force in the world,"
despite existing limitations (e.g., demographics, large
landmass and borders, resources, and various threats along
the borders). He identified two distinct processes as part
of the reform -- building of the armed forces and control of
the forces. Today, Russia is focusing on building the
forces, including a large influx of civilian personnel in
management and specialist roles, improving pay/benefits of
service members, improving quality of equipment, and trying
to change decision-making processes at all levels. Gorbunov
emphasized that these changes are intended to make Russia a
strong competitor, but also a reliable partner.
¶8. (C) Gorbunov explained that the reform process is having

a significant impact on the Main Directorate for
International Military Cooperation (GUMVS) at the MOD. The
Foreign Liaison Directorate (UVS) is being closed on October
1, and a new International Liaison Directorate is being
created. Because of these changes, correspondence will be
slow over the next six weeks or so, which will impact the
Attache Corps in Moscow. Gorbunov offered his personal
assistance during this period.
¶9. (C) ASD Vershbow raised the Bilateral Defense

Consultations (BDC) which the U.S. had proposed for November,
and suggested the possibility of a broader dialogue between
the MOD and DoD on policy and strategy issues to complement
State-MFA exchanges. Vershbow explained that DoD's proposed
BDC topics (including confidence-building measures and
transparency, risk reduction and notification procedures,
expanded military technical cooperation, etc.) were carefully
considered, but we welcomed Russia's suggestions for
additional topics. Gorbunov responded that the MoD agrees
with the general notion of the BDC, but stipulated that the
General Staff needs to identify the right experts to address
topics to be discussed, and they plan to propose other topics
for consideration. He gave no indication as to when a
response would be provided.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
AFGHANISTAN: NARCO-TRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, ILLICIT FINANCE

--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶10. (C) ASD Vershbow's meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister

Borodavkin and MOD International Cooperation Chief Gorbunov
particularly focused on Afghanistan. Borodavkin mentioned
that Russia views Afghanistan not only as a threat, but as an
opportunity for cooperation with the U.S. and other countries
(e.g., NATO), and suggested that ISAF could play an important
role in fighting illegal drug trafficking. He recalled that
the U.S. and NATO had participated in the March 2009
conference held in Moscow at which counternarcotics was a top
priority.
¶11. (C) When asked by Borodavkin about whether more U.S.

troops will be sent to Afghanistan, ASD Vershbow explained
that General McChrystal's assessment is being reviewed at the
highest levels. He noted that while the situation in
Afghanistan has not gone as well as hoped over the past six
months, the U.S. cannot allow the Taliban to regain control.
Expansion and training of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), improving governance, and economic assistance are all
still essential components of the U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan and we will continue to seek cooperation in these
areas.
¶12. (C) Borodavkin introduced a number of proposals for

increased Russian contribution. He said that Russia would
like to launch cooperation with the U.S. on the economic
rehabilitation of Afghanistan and referred to a clause in the
July Summit Joint Statement that without economic
improvement, terrorism and other threats cannot be
eliminated. Borodavkin suggested tripartite cooperation
(Russia-U.S.-Afghanistan) to reconstruct the Soviet-era
Salang Tunnel to provide a much needed reliable
transportation route. The Russians have already undertaken a
technical study on this project and Borodavkin said that with
adequate resources, it would be a useful cooperative effort.
(Note: Borodavkin's staff confirmed that the MFA has
submitted a proposal to the State Department on the Salang
Tunnel.)
¶13. (C) Russia considers narco-trafficking to be its highest

priority vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Borodavkin said Russia is
ready to help the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Interior
Ministry in these efforts. He noted that Russia is already
providing counternarcotics training to the Afghans at the
Domodedovo Center, and mentioned Russian counter-narcotics
chief Ivanov's statement that he is ready to provide
increased assistance on bilateral and multilateral levels
such as NATO and the OSCE. Both Borodovkin and Vershbow
agreed that while the U.S. and Russia are currently working
together on this and the related issue of threat financing
through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, we need to
address these problems more forcefully. Illicit financing
has been raised at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and OSCE meetings, offering one area of possible cooperation.
¶14. (C) At his meetings at the MOD and MFA, ASD Vershbow
expressed appreciation for Russia's expression of interest in
providing weapons and equipment to the ANSF, and requested
that any such help be made in the form of donations with no
fees attached, as those charges would have to be paid for by
the U.S. He underscored that some of the equipment/weapon
donation requests provided to Russia are intended to support
counter-narcotics efforts, so the U.S. hopes Russia will be
able to provide this support. ASD Vershbow also asked that
Russia work with the Combined Security Transition Command -
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to ensure that ANSF priority
requirements are met and provided a list of requirements.
¶15. (C) Borodavkin said that Russia will be able to supply
limited numbers of weapons to the ANP as aid and will
consider selling more weapons to the ANP and the Afghan
National Army (ANA). He also expressed concern that there
are unlicensed (counterfeit) Russian weapons on the market,
which are of inferior quality. Gorbunov explained that
donating equipment and weapons to Afghanistan is a
presidential decision, which would entail President Medvedev
asking the military services to donate items from current
stocks.
¶16. (C) Borodavkin also asked ASD Vershbow's perspectives on

the European proposal for a conference on Afghanistan after
the new Afghan government is established. ASD Vershbow said
the U.S. saw merit in this idea as a means of seeking
additional international support for Afghanistan, but noted
that the timing of the initiative will depend on
Afghanistan's domestic politics; given the problems with the
Presidential elections, conditions were not yet right.
¶17. (C) Borodavkin mentioned the work of the Afghanistan

sub-working group under the Bilateral Presidential Commission
and stated that the Foreign Ministry is hoping that Amb.
Holbrooke can reschedule his planned visit to Moscow.
Borodavkin requested that ASD Vershbow pass on the invitation
to Amb. Holbrooke.
¶18. (C) ASD Vershbow also raised the lethal transit

agreement signed at the July summit in his meetings with
Gorbunov, Borodavkin, and Zavarzin. He underscored the
importance of a timely Duma decision now that the General
Authorization has been delivered. ASD Vershbow expressed
hopes that the inaugural flight of the agreement could take
place prior to Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Moscow
on October 12-14. Zavarzin thought the Duma would approve
the agreement without any problem; Borodavkin confirmed that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on the request,
but warned that they do not have the sole voice on this
matter.
---------------------------------------------
MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION: NEITHER CONCESSION
NOR THREAT TO RUSSIA

---------------------------------------------
¶19. (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the recent U.S. missile

defense decision during each of his consultations. In his
meeting with Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin, ASD
Vershbow observed that the Russian press may have been overly
positive in its assessment of the September 17 announcement,
focusing on the cancellation of the Program of Record rather
than the new MD architecture. While the new phased adaptive
approach to MD does not pose a threat to Russia, there will
likely continue to be missile defense elements in
central-eastern Europe, with an SM-3 site in Poland if the
Government of Poland agrees. However, the physical
characteristics of the new system are different from the old,
and the U.S. believes Russia has no basis for concern that
the system could threaten its strategic forces. The new
architecture will be more effective and be able to provide
protection to vulnerable parts of Europe more quickly.
Vershbow emphasized that the U.S. intends to be open about
the new architecture, citing information available through
congressional testimony and other open sources. The U.S. aim
is to make this a project for NATO because the system is
designed to protect all of NATO's territory (starting in
southeastern Europe, where the current threat is, but
eventually covering all of NATO).
¶20. (C) ASD Vershbow affirmed the U.S. also views missile
defense as an opportunity for cooperation with Russia against
a common threat, noting Secretary of Defense Gates' support
for cooperation on missile defense. Vershbow emphasized to
Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy
that we should begin by implementing the Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC), on which the Russians had postponed a decision
until after the U.S. missile defense announcement. Vershbow
told Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy that linking radars could
follow, which could then lead to broader areas of cooperation
that could be implemented either bilaterally or within the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) framework. He suggested that U.S.
and Russian experts explore concrete ways to implement
military technical cooperation, noting that such cooperation
would be mutually beneficial and would send a strong signal
to Iran that could help in resolving the nuclear issue.
¶21. (C) Zavarzin acknowledged that the Russian political

elite has no illusions about missile defense and understands
this was a U.S. decision with no quid pro quo expected from
Russia. Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy noted
that the system's planned capability to intercept ICBMs does
raise some of the same concerns Russia has had before.
Zavarzin agreed that we need to identify specific projects to
work on together, but that Russia wants to ensure its voice
will be heard. Both Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy stressed the
need to develop bilateral cooperation methods, potentially by
linking existing U.S. and Russian early warning systems to
gather and share information about threats. They also asked
whether the U.S. was prepared to go even farther, to include
joint technology projects, which would of greater interest to
Russia than information exchange.
---------------------------
U.S.-RUSSIAN UNITY ON IRAN?
---------------------------
¶22. (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the serious test that Iran's
nuclear program will pose to both Russia and the U.S. in the
coming months, noting that our interests coincide in many
ways, even if they are not identical. The U.S., he stated,
wants to see if diplomacy can succeed, but we need to be
realistic and be prepared for tougher measures if diplomacy
fails. Citing the recently exposed covert nuclear facility
and the recent missile tests, Vershbow described the
situation as urgent, and said that the U.S. was encouraged by
President Medvedev's recent comment that sanctions might
become necessary.
¶23. (C) ASD Vershbow mentioned that the Islamic world is

very concerned about Iran's nuclear program (e.g., several of
its Arab neighbors have asked the U.S. for Patriot missiles
and other measures to protect them against Iranian attack).
The ability of the U.S. and Russia to work together on the
Iran challenge over the next few months will be just as
important as our work on missile defense will be over the
next few years. ASD Vershbow stressed that if we fail to
stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, we could have a
"volatile, possibly explosive," situation in the Middle East.
¶24. (C) In their respective meetings, Duma Defense Committee

Chairman Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary
Baluyevskiy agreed that Iran is a concern, but said that
Russia continues to work closely with them and that sanctions
cannot be pursued until after diplomatic efforts have been
made. Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin expressed concern
that sanctions could be ineffective (citing past experience
in Iraq) and could have a negative impact on the wider
Islamic world.
----------------------------------------
RUSSIA'S "SPHERE OF PRIVILEGED INTEREST"
----------------------------------------
¶25. (C) ASD Vershbow stated in several meetings that our

interaction in the post-Soviet space continues to be a
sensitive issue and, if not handled carefully, could
undermine recent gains in bilateral relations. In this
regard, President Medvedev's proposed amendment to the law on
use of Russian forces overseas has raised many questions.
Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin said that Russia
will not interfere with the U.S. as it engages with nations
in the region, and that there is no cause for concern
regarding the legislation about use of Russian forces -- it
is intended to protect Russian citizens living in those
countries and that other countries have similar provisions.
¶26. (C) UKRAINE: ASD Vershbow spoke of his visit to Ukraine

immediately preceding his arrival in Moscow, and cited
Ukrainian concerns about Russian respect for Ukraine's
sovereignty and borders. Vershbow stated that the U.S.
continues to support the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances and Ukraine's freedom to choose its security
relationships, and encourages Russia to reaffirm its
adherence as well. He suggested that President Medvedev's
open letter to Ukraine had been counter-productive. The U.S.
favors close and mutually beneficial Russian-Ukrainian
relations -- this is not a zero-sum game.
¶27. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin said that Ukraine is

Russia's closest neighbor, and is a "key partner" in
international activities. Russia is not trying to influence
Ukraine, but wants a stable Ukraine and a secure
neighborhood. He also said that Russia cannot ignore
attempts to depict it as a major threat to Ukraine. Foreign
Minister Lavrov will be visiting Ukraine this week to meet
with Ukrainian Acting Foreign Minister Khandogiy and there
even is a possibility that Medvedev and Ukrainian President
Yushchenko will meet at a summit of CIS countries shortly
after that. Karasin said that Russia wants to deal with
Ukraine in a normal way and that Ukrainian citizens are the
ones to decide what they want.
¶28. (C) GEORGIA: Security Council Deputy Secretary

Baluyevskiy, Zavarzin, and Karasin asked why the U.S. is
providing military assistance to Georgia when it threatens
stability in the Caucasus region. This causes concern and
Russia cannot allow renewed aggression against Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. ASD Vershbow explained that as a matter of
principle, the U.S. will help Georgia protect its sovereignty
and independence, but stated that the U.S. is not rearming
Georgia, as Russia has repeatedly alleged. Since the August
2008 war, there has been no U.S. lethal assistance to
Georgia; DoD funds were transferred to the State Department
for humanitarian purposes. In the short term, the U.S. is
proceeding with great care and focusing on training,
education, and helping prepare Georgia to participate in
Afghanistan under the command of U.S. Forces. At the same
time, Georgia is a sovereign state with the right to
self-defense. We do not accept any arms embargo, and we may
provide weapons to Georgia in the future.
¶29. (C) Zavarzin made a point of saying that Russia does not
dispute Georgia's sovereignty, but it cannot allow new acts
of aggression; a regional consensus is necessary. Karasin
said that, in Russia's view, the current Georgian leadership
is irresponsible. ASD Vershbow reiterated that the U.S. had
made clear to Georgia that there is no military option
regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that the Georgians
need to take a long view on reintegration of the territories.
Karasin noted some successes in repairing relations since
last August, including the Geneva talks that enable the
Georgians to talk directly to the Abkhaz and Ossetians.
Vershbow said that stability in the Caucasus and creating
conditions to help improve Georgian-Russian relations is very
important to the U.S.
¶30. (C) Karasin mentioned the EU independent report on the

August 2008 conflict in Georgia, which had just been released
on the afternoon of September 30. ASD Vershbow mentioned
that he looked forward to reading the report and stressed
that even if we do not agree completely on the report's
findings, we need to look ahead and promote stability in the
region, including an international presence in the
territories. Karasin said that international presence in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be discussed with the Abkhaz
and the Ossetians (not the Russians). Russia has "bilateral
agreements" with them, and Russian border guards are
protecting them to help restore stability.
¶31. (C) Karasin asked whether the U.S. intends to establish

a military presence in Georgia by contributing personnel to
the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). This would be a serious
problem for Russia, as they believe it would send the wrong
message to President Saakashvili that he could use force
again. ASD Vershbow said there has been lots of speculation
on this subject that was not based on fact. If the EUMM did
make such a request in the future, the U.S. would consider
it, but this would likely involve civilian monitors.
Vershbow added that Russia needs to fully withdraw its forces
from positions beyond the line of the outbreak of hostility,
per the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, since this non-compliance
was a continuing source of tension. Karasin insisted that
Russia was in compliance, while acknowledging that the U.S.

does not see it that way.
------------
OTHER ISSUES
------------
¶32. (C) EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: In response to

Baluyevskiy's inquiry about President Medvedev's proposed
European Security Treaty, ASD Vershbow acknowledged there
could be ways to improve the effectiveness of existing
conflict-prevention mechanisms, but that the U.S. and most of
our allies did not see a need for new structures or a new
treaty. However, the U.S. is ready to engage with Russia on
this issue in the Corfu process and other fora.
¶33. (C) CENTRAL ASIA: Karasin inquired about the Manas

Transit Center and the numbers of U.S. military personnel
that would be deployed under the new arrangement. ASD
Vershbow said that he did not have precise figures. However,
in contrast with the previous agreement, security for the
facility is now being provided by the Kyrgyz, which reduced
the U.S. presence somewhat.
¶34. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this cable.

Beyrle
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2531, MEDVEDEV, PUTIN, AND RUSSIA'S IRAN

POLICY
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5383
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002531
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV, PUTIN, AND RUSSIA'S IRAN POLICY
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b)

and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite Russian President Medvedev's

September 24 remarks that sanctions against Iran might be
necessary, other government officials and experts here
caution that Russia will remain, for the time being,
reluctant to pursue a tougher line against Tehran. The
consensus among the Russian political elite is that
maintaining a dialogue with the Iranians and exhausting
diplomatic avenues is preferable to imposing sanctions in the
near term. While Medvedev as president is responsible for
controlling arms and nuclear technology transfers, Prime
Minister Putin remains closely identified with decisions on
Iran policy, including the sale of civilian nuclear
technology and weapons, which provides a boost to powerful
state enterprises. According to Deputy FM Ryabkov, Putin's
relative silence on Iran since Medvedev's statements does not
signal any difference between them on sanctions. End
Summary.
Medvedev on Sanctions: Few Official Echoes

------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Russian Government officials, including Prime Minister

Putin, have not yet echoed President Medvedev's public
statement that Russia would consider the imposition of
sanctions on Iran if the world community ran out of other
options. Asked about Russian views on the Qom revelation in
New York September 25, FM Lavrov adopted a strikingly softer
tone than in the just released Kremlin statement. He noted
that Iran had acted positively by notifying the IAEA about
its plans to construct a new nuclear facility, and complained
that some of Russia's "partner countries" in the P5-plus-1
had not shared information about the Qom facility earlier.
Lavrov stressed that Iran's cooperation with the world
community as a member of the NPT with non-nuclear status
could prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
¶3. (C) Before the most recent P5-plus-1 meeting in Geneva, PM

Putin said that Russia would not support "significant"
changes to its approach on Iran. Ariel Cohen, a senior
fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said Putin and Lavrov told
him in early September that they are opposed to tougher
sanctions and the use of force against Iran. Russian Deputy
Foreign Minster Sergei Ryabkov said September 29 that Iran's
recent proposals presented a "broad field for dialogue."
Ryabkov added that whether sanctions against Iran might
become inevitable was a "completely separate issue, one that
we are not yet ready to address." He stressed Russia's
position was to do everything possible to find a "diplomatic,
political solution to the Iranian nuclear problem."
¶4. (SBU) While expressing concern over Iran's missile

program, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin stressed
September 29 that Russia preferred political dialogue over
tough measures that could trigger an "arms race in the
region." Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey
Kislyak said September 24 that sanctions were not the way to
resolve the problem; rather, the point was how to find a
"political solution that would eliminate this problem." The
priority was to "start a serious dialogue with our Iranian
partners in seeking a way out of the situation."
¶5. (C) Russia's message to domestic audiences also remains

unchanged. Despite Medvedev's carefully worded comments on
sanctions in New York (called by one analyst here "a jewel of
diplomatic casuistry"), even prominent Russians with ties to
the Kremlin's domestic propaganda machine believe Russian
support for Western sanctions is highly unlikely. Medvedev
advisor Gleb Pavlovskiy, President of the Effective Policy
Foundation, and Maksim Shevchenko, President of the Russian
World Foundation, even spoke in favor of completing Russia's
frozen S-300 surface-to-air missile deal with Iran.
Interpreting Putin's Silence

----------------------------
¶6. (C) PM Putin's lack of public comment on the possibility

of Iran sanctions after President Medvedev's public statement
does not indicate disagreement between them on Iran, DFM
Ryabkov told Ambassador Beyrle October 3. Ryabkov repeated
his comments, made in Geneva during P5-plus-1 talks, that
Russia had not ruled out the possibility of sanctions, but
would begin to contemplate them only as an absolute last
resort.
¶7. (C) Most political commentators and analysts here have

been echoing the same statements. Tatyana Stanovaya of the
Center for Political Technologies thought that Medvedev's
seemingly more positive statement indicates no real
rapprochement with the U.S. on Iran. Rather, she said, his
words are carefully calibrated to indicate a welcoming of
U.S. willingness to use the P5-plus-1 format and engage in
actual discussions with Iranian officials.
¶8. (C) Nevertheless, Medvedev's New York comments and the

September 25 Kremlin statement mark a definite toughening of
Russian rhetoric on Iran. Pravoe Delo co-Chairman Georgiy
Bovt told us October 5 that Medvedev's use of the word
"sanctions" represents a policy change. Boyt cautioned that
Medvedev's words would probably resonate with only a distinct
minority of Russian society. He believes it will be hard for
Medvedev to sell Iran sanctions to the Russian bureaucracy
without the full support of Putin. At the Sochi Economic
Forum, Putin blasted the U.S. for not allowing the export of
certain high technology to Russia. Boyt thinks Russia might
ask for an easing of these restrictions in exchange for
supporting sanctions.
Sanctions: Economic Implications

--------------------------------
¶9. (C) Despite Medvedev's presidential authority over arms

transfers, Putin undoubtedly retains a critical, if not
decisive role over an issue with such significant domestic
economic implications as the transfer of nuclear technology
and armaments to Iran. Russia and Iran currently have
limited military cooperation, so the effect of any lost
revenue from arms sales to Iran would be small. While the
sale of S-300s to Iran, for example, would only net Russia
from USD 750 million to USD one billion, future military
sales could be considerably larger.
¶10. (C) Several years ago Iran was a stable source of hard
currency and this cash flow helped Russia preserve its
nuclear construction sector. The importance of Russia's
trade with Iran has decreased, but Russian exports to Iran
last year still exceeded USD 3 billion. In the currently
depressed Russian economy, that is not an insignificant
amount. In addition, great potential for future economic
gain to Russia exists via civilian nuclear technology sales
and increased military cooperation.
¶11. (C) As the world's largest exporter of oil and gas,

Russia also benefits significantly from the "instability
premium" embedded in world oil prices due to tensions with
Iran. Even a USD 5 per barrel instability premium would net
Russia almost USD 9 billion per year for oil and
approximately USD 2-4 billion from its gas exports. Finally,
given Iran's position as the second largest owner of gas
reserves, Russia's gas sector clearly benefits from the lack
of international investment in the development of Iran's
natural gas sector.
Life without Iran

-----------------
¶12. (C) Russia could profit from alternatives to its

continued support for Iran. For example, news reports
indicate that Saudi Arabia has offered to purchase the
Russian S-400 system for USD two billion in an effort to
force Moscow to back out of the S-300 deal with Iran.
Medvedev cited Arab League concerns about Russia's close
relationship with Iran when he stated that Russia's stance on
Iran might be changing.
¶13. (C) Israel also is clearly pushing Russia to take a

firmer stance towards Tehran, in light of recent press
reports that PM Netanyahu personally delivered a list of
Russian scientists who contributed to Iran's nuclear program.
Conversations with Israeli diplomats in Moscow indicate that
Israel believes there may be even more to Iran's program than
is now known to the GOR and Russian decision makers. They
hint that Israeli disclosures on Russian participation could
force Moscow into taking a harder line.
COMMENT
-------
¶14. (C) Success in moving Russia to support tougher actions

against Iran will require a coordinated strategy involving
our friends and allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The strategy may need to include the continuation of
diplomatic efforts like the P5-plus-1 process and perhaps
include new ways of engaging in dialogue with Iran. A
strategy created by a broad international consensus must
offer Moscow a series of options that will challenge the
stubborn mentality here that instinctively opposes common
cause with the West on Iran. Sanctions would have a major
impact on the Russian economy, and especially to the domestic
constituencies like RosOboronexport and RosAtom. The fact
that the economy and these key state-controlled enterprises
are part of Putin's portfolio only reinforces the certainty
that he will remain the key decision maker on any imposition
of sanctions. Key to the GOR's calculations would be any
politically salable alternatives that benefit them both
economically and politically. End comment.
Beyrle
Viewing cable 09PARIS1416, MARCH 2010 REGIONAL ELECTIONS

PREVIEW SARKOZY'S
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6133
PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1416/01 2941509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211509Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019

TAGS: PREL FR
SUBJECT: MARCH 2010 REGIONAL ELECTIONS PREVIEW SARKOZY'S
STRENGTH AT MID-TERM
Classified By: POL M/C Kathy Allegrone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: French regional elections scheduled for

March 2010 are shaping up as a measurement of President
Nicolas Sarkozy's strength at the mid-point of his term.
Despite rumors of malaise and dogged by a series of internal
political tempests including the Clearstream trial, rumors of
his Culture Minister's participation in sex tourism, and his
son Jean's appointment to a coveted business position amidst
charges of nepotism, no other political figure or party can
match the dominance of Sarkozy on the French political scene.
The opposition Socialists (PS) are in tatters, with Martine
Aubry, as Party Chairman, vying for control of the left
against her bitter rival, 2007 PS presidential candidate,
Segolene Royale. With Sarkozy's UMP controlling only two of
22 regions, and following their impressive victory in the
European elections last June, the center-right appears to
have nothing to lose. The debate has been how many more
regions will tip their way -- and what will constitute
victory. Regional councils play a role in the selection of
French Senators, and by extension that body can take on a
different complexion than the UMP-controlled National
Assembly. As the only national vote before the 2012
presidential and legislative races, all eyes view this round
of regional elections as a preview Sarkozy's reelection bid.
End Summary.
¶2. (U) Regional elections will be held in France in mid-March

2010 to elect local leadership for the 22 regions of mainland
France and four additional overseas regions. In 2005,
Socialists overwhelmed the UMP in the regional elections,
winning all but two regions. The huge Socialist victory was
viewed widely as a repudiation of then-President Chirac's
leadership. As the only nationwide elections before the 2012
presidential and legislative elections, "the regionals" are
viewed as a referendum on Nicolas Sarkozy's leadership and a
snapshot of parties' relative strength heading into 2012.
Mechanics
---------
¶3. (U) As elsewhere in Europe, regional elections in France
are a confusing system combining proportional and majority
voting. Like other elections in France, voters choose a
party list, or slate of candidates, representing various
parties. Any list winning 10% of the vote in the first round
of elections (likely to be on March 14 or 21, 2010), advances
to a second round of elections (one week later, thus either
March 21 or 28, 2010). Parties that win only 5% of the vote
may join efforts with other parties to advance to the second
round. If one party wins 25% of the votes, they win the
right to form the regional council; the remaining seats are
divided proportionally depending on the results of the second
round.
Sarkozy's Dominance, Despite Governing Woes

-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Regional councils finance education, transport and

other key infratructure, and are locked in a struggle with
national authorities over taxation. They also participate,
along with other municipalities, in the selection process of
French Senators, and will do so again in September 2011.
With only two regions controlled by conservative majorities
(in Alsace and Corsica), President Sarkozy would welcome
extending his political dominance to regional councils, to
match his lionized role in the executive and legislative
branches. But Sarkozy faces his own challenges, and the
press is abuzz about malaise in his administration, as well
as Sarkozy's "monarchial tendencies." Concretely, Sarkozy
first urged cabinet members to head the UMP ticket in various
regions. He then flipped and decided it was incompatible to
hold both jobs simultaneously. That decision forced three
ministers to opt out of running in regional races, and has
left the President's UMP party ill prepared for March,
scrambling to find suitable candidates. Sarkozy has also been
dogged by recent scandals, including his Culture Minister
Frederic Mitterrand's dalliance in possible sex tourism.
Mitterand chronicled his appetite for paying for sex with
young men in a 2005 book (that Sarkozy described as
"courageous") but subsequently publicly denied and condemned
"sexual tourism," and vigorously denied that any of his
actions extended to under-aged youth. Sarkozy has come in
for withering criticism when news broke that his 23-year old
son, Jean, an undergraduate law student, was to be named head
of the regional business authority of France's premier
business district, La Defense. Both the Mitterrand affair
and the apparent favoritism enjoyed by the younger Sarkozy
have given the president's opponents two potential campaign
issues, that could damage his party's chances in the upcoming
regionals.
PARIS 00001416 002 OF 002
Weakened Opposition Focused on Infighting

-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Despite the challenges facing Sarkozy, other parties

are far from fighting shape. The opposition Socialists (PS)
are locked in their own internecine struggle for dominance
between party leader, Martine Aubry, and 2007 presidential
candidate, Segolene Royal. Sarkozy confidant Alain Minc told
Ambassador Rivkin in September, 2009 that he was a close
friend of Aubry's whom he had known since their days at
France's Ecole Naitonale d'Administration (ENA), and that
Aubry told him she ran for the PS leadership in order to clip
Royale's wings. The PS is preoccupied with how to position
the party for the 2012 presidential race, either by forming a
broad left coalition, or moving into alliance with the
centrist Mouvement Democratique (MoDem) party.
¶6. (SBU) The PS faces a real challenge from its left, with
the Green party hoping to repeat their surprisingly strong
showing in European parliamentary elections. The Greens have
refused to run with PS in the first round of regional
elections and are counting on the growing profile of their 34
year old leader, Cecile Duflot to win in Paris. A Green win
in high-profile Paris would be a serious rebuke to the PS,
and if repeated elsewhere in France could precipitate Aubry's
ouster from her leadership role in the PS.
¶7. (SBU) MoDem will be challenged by a new group of

centrists called Nouveau Centre, which is largely allied with
Sarkozy's UMP. Neither party is expected to win any regional
contest, but there is an open question of where MoDem will
throw its support in a second round of elections. Their
electoral results will be watched closely as a barometer for
the 2012 presidential race, and whether MoDem will join
forces with the PS to create a united coalition to oppose
Sarkozy in 2012.
¶8. (C) The far right National Front (FN) will focus its
efforts in the Provence Alpes Cote d'Azur (PACA) region in
southern France, a traditional area of support. With his
party's finances in tatters and its traditional themes
co-opted by Sarkozy's UMP, this race likely represents Jean
Marie Le Pen's final campaign. He has passed the torch to
his daughter, Marine, who broke the Frederic Mitterrand
story, largely to energize her flagging campaign. Fearing
association with the FN, other mainstream political parties
were slow to criticize Mitterrand, although some PS leaders
eventually joined the chorus calling for his resignation.
¶9. (C) Comment: Although the Mitterrand story has largely

disappeared, it has been replaced since by the embarrassing
issue of Jean Sarkozy's likely election to head the La
Defense business district. Combined, these stories have
bolstered the impression that Sarkozy is operating in a zone
of monarch-like impunity, and his aides, according to an
article in Le Figaro, are unwilling to question the
President's views. UMP party leaders have turned to the
traditional canard of lashing out at the media for their
unfair attention, but they have just as quickly sought to
lower expectations for a strong conservative comeback in the
March 2010 elections. After losing 13 regions in 2005, UMP
election expert Alain Marleix said winning six back was a
possibility, but that estimate was lowered by UMP President
Xavier Bertrand, who said this week that a center-right win
in four would "be a miracle." Regardless of the result,
Sarkozy will head into 2012 enjoying an outsized role in the
French political firmament -- beloved by some, reviled by
others -- and the failure of the opposition to do anything
other than bicker amongst themselves spells a positive
forecast as Sarkozy eyes a re-election bid in two more years.
RIVKIN
Viewing cable 09PARIS1426, FRANCE: SCENESETTER FOR FBI
DIRECTOR MUELLER,S
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #1426/01 2951558

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221558Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7399
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER,S
VISIT
Classified By: Classified by Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Paris welcomes the visit of FBI

Director Mueller. The timing of this first trip is ideal,
with our bilateral relationship at its highest point in fifty
years. You will find your interlocutors energized by the
President,s visits to Paris and Normandy and they look
forward to getting a sense of your strategy for the next
year, and will want to know how they and other like-minded
European states can contribute to the success of your
efforts. END SUMMARY.
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) The Ministry of Interior directs a civilian force of
146,000 national police who operate with a force of 99,509
national gendarmes to maintain internal security. Sarkozy
merged the two primary internal intelligence agencies,
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and
Renseignements Gnraux (RG), in May 2008 to form a French
equivalent to the FBI. The goals of the merger include
removing interagency competition detrimental to France,s
counter-terrorism efforts, increasing operational capability,
and phasing out redundancies. Foreign intelligence agencies
now have a single internal intelligence interlocutor in
France, that should increase and simplify cooperation. The
organization is led by Bernard Squarcini, former deputy
director of the RG, and close friend of President Sarkozy. A
working group at the directorate general of the national
police has been meeting regularly to work out the new
structure of the merged intelligence service, including its
jurisdiction, size, and missions. The media reports that the
RG will no longer monitor public opinion, union activities,
and social conflicts, but details of on-the-ground changes in
responsibilities remain unknown. Frdric Pchenard,
director-general of the French national police is overseeing
the merger.
COUNTER-TERRORISM
-----------------
¶3. (SBU) France is one of a number of major European
countries combating terrorism at home and abroad, although it
has not suffered a significant terrorist incident in recent
years. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a
considerable threat to French interests, underscored by
statements made by al-Qaida senior leadership or AQIM itself.
Local Corsican separatists, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
(ETA) members and ultra-left anarchist factions have been
responsible for the majority of recent attacks and arrests of
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities
or membership of groups deemed terrorist. The number and
violence of ETA and Corsican attacks in France have continued
to drop, but France is at once a target as well as a
potential staging area for international Islamic terrorist
groups, including Kurdistan Workers party affiliates. France
remains on high alert and recognizes its continuing status as
a target of AQIM and of other extremist groups in France and
abroad.
¶4. (SBU) Loic Garnier was appointed in June to succeed

Christophe Chaboud as the head of the Ministry of Interior,s
Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT).
Superintendant Garnier was formerly chief of the criminal
brigade, the elite unit of the judicial police in Paris.
RADICALISM
----------
¶5. (SBU) In addition to undertaking operations to arrest and
prosecute terrorists, France continued programs to address
radicalization and extremism through the use of social and
economic incentives to reduce the susceptibility of at risk
populations.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
-----------------
¶6. (C) Now approaching the midpoint of his five year term,
President Sarkozy is comfortably riding the momentum
generated by a successful showing in last June's European
Parliament elections that weakened the UMP's primary
opponent, the Socialist Party. With the opposition in
disarray, Sarkozy hopes to extend his political power base by
scoring big in upcoming regional council elections in March
¶2010. Regional elections will be an important snapshot of
his presidency at mid-term, and the relative strength of
French political parties before the presidential and
legislative elections in 2012. In recent months, Sarkozy and
his majority UMP party have concentrated on joining forces
with a number of small political parties from across the
political spectrum to ensure his reelection. Sarkozy has
sought to lead on security and immigration issues, an issue
that brought him considerable notoriety during his tenure as
Minister of Interior under President Chirac.
Anti-immigration sentiment has been a rallying cry for the

extremist National Front.
MILITARY ISSUES
---------------
¶7. (SBU) In conjunction with specific gendarmes units used
for military operations, the army is responsible for external
security under the Ministry of Defense. France currently has
over 3,000 troops actively participating in operations in
Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom. The current
French commitment includes ground troops and air assets.
There is growing media discussion in France about the
McChrystal report, which advocates additional troops for
Afghanistan, and the Obama administration,s review of
policy. However, Sarkozy used an October 15/16 interview
with Le Figaro (focused on domestic issues and designed to
shore up his base), to state that France would send ¬ one
additional soldier8 to Afghanistan, although there may be
room for increased civilian engagement, especially if the
Afghan government is able to restore legitimacy in the wake
of the troubled August 20 elections. Unlike several other
significant European troop contributors through ISAF, the
French do not have overly restrictive rules of engagement and
have been a strong ally in the field. (Note: the
&European8 gendarme force Sarkozy proposed last spring will
finally begin to arrive in Afghanistan in December.)
DATASHARE
---------
¶8. (U) We do not have an agreement with France for Preventing
and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC). The French have
generally pointed to their privacy laws as an impediment.
The U.S. side has countered that our privacy laws are similar
and not a bar to enhanced datashare. The draft text of an
Agreement was shared with the French Ministry of Interior in
July 2009. U.S. Embassy Paris also transmitted a Diplomatic
Note to the French Foreign Ministry in August 2009 requesting
that in-depth discussions on both a PCSC Agreement and an
HSPD-6 agreement concerning terrorist watchlist data begin as
soon as possible. Despite the difficulties of getting
negotiations underway, U.S. law enforcement officials
describe cooperation with their French Government
counterparts as very good within the context of French
privacy restrictions.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
----------------------
¶9. (SBU) The constitution and law prohibit trafficking in
persons for all purposes. However, trafficking in women and
children for commercial sexual exploitation, forced labor,
and petty crime is a problem. Prostitution is legal.
However, the law prohibits procuring, aiding, assisting,
maintaining, publicly soliciting, or profiting from the
prostitution of another individual. Enforcement of these
laws varied, and criminal activity related to prostitution
remained a problem. The country was a destination for
victims, primarily trafficked from Africa (notably Cameroon
and Nigeria), Central and Eastern Europe (notably Bulgaria
and Romania), the former Soviet Union, and increasingly Asia
(notably China), for prostitution and domestic servitude. A
majority of the estimated 18,000 women in the country,s
commercial sex trade were likely victims of trafficking.
Traffickers operated principally in small criminal networks
characterized as &micro-trafficking networks8 that included
both citizens and foreigners. They used various methods to
recruit and retain victims including force, fraud,
identification document confiscation, cultural isolation, and
physical and psychological abuse. Several law enforcement
agencies were involved in combating trafficking. The
government cooperated bilaterally and with international
institutions such as the European Police Agency (Europol) to
investigate, track, and dismantle trafficking networks,
initiating more than 500 court cases for soliciting and
dismantling over 23 pimping networks in 2008. Authorities
worked with officials in other countries, particularly source
countries, to counter trafficking and identified 822 victims
during the year.
COUNTRY CONDITIONS
------------------
¶10. (U) France is a first-world western democracy with a
varied economy and one of the most diverse populations in
Western Europe. At least 20% of the French population of
approximately 65 million people has either a parent or a
grandparent who is or was not originally French. Most
European migrants who arrived before about 1970 have
integrated fairly effectively into French life; however, more
recent migrants and their families, many from the former
French colonies, have not been able to find a place in French
society as readily. Although there are no official
statistics, fully ten percent of France,s population is
Muslim, which have helped inform the country,s developed and
nuanced views from the Middle East Peace Process to

assimilation of minority populations. France continues to be
an asylum destination for immigrants attracted by France's
relatively generous social security, welfare and education
systems. Many migrants remain in France "without papers" to
work illegally (estimates range from 300,000 to 400,000
clandestine residents in 2008). The Government of France has
responded with a combination of integration and enforcement
measures.
¶11. (U) The worldwide economic crisis has increased the
unemployment rate to 7.8 percent in the fourth quarter of
¶2008. High unemployment among the young (especially
undereducated young men of foreign origin), public tensions
among those of different social and ethnic groups, and
inadequate low-income housing all contribute to political,
social, and economic criticism of the Sarkozy administration.
Good luck with your travels in the region. We look forward

to welcoming you again to Paris.
Best regards,
RIVKIN
Viewing cable 09PARIS1461, FRANCE-ISRAEL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

COVERS TURKEY,
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #1461/01 3021757
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291757Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL IS TU SY FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE-ISRAEL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE COVERS TURKEY,
PEACE PROCESS, SYRIA
REF: PARIS 1418
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone,

Reasons 1.4(b),(d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND: French participants in the

second annual Franco-Israeli Strategic Dialogue on October 28
noted profound disquiet among the Israelis about Turkey,
according to Frederic Bereyziat, Senior MFA Desk Officer for
Israel and the Peace Process. Bereyziat told poloff October
29 that the Israelis claimed the Turks have allowed
weapons-related material for Iran's nuclear program to
transit Turkey, with Prime Minister Erdogan's full knowledge.
In the lead up to this Strategic Dialogue, Bereyziat
reported, President Sarkozy called Prime Minister Netanyahu
directly on October 26, to urge him to establish an
independent investigation into the actions of the Israeli
Defense Forces in the Gaza conflict. Sarkozy told Netanyahu
that such a step would decrease pressure on Israel and its
allies stemming from the Goldstone Report, but Netanyahu
responded briskly: "No way." Franco-Israeli discussions on
the status of the peace process stumbled over a "profound
difference on tactics," according to Bereyziat, who also
reported the French intention to introduce a Resolution in
the U.N. General Assembly designed to prevent the Goldstone
Report from returning to the Security Council. Finally,
Bereyziat described a division within the Israeli delegation
about Syria's openness to the west, with some on the
delegation discounting benefits that might accrue to Israel
through the re-launching of negotiations, and others
supporting the French claim that Israel would put Syria in a
bind by suddenly expressing openness to negotiations over the
Golan.
¶2. (S/NF) BACKGROUND: As notetaker for the Strategic

Dialogue, Bereyziat was in a position to provide a
description of these discussions. When serving as the
Transatlantic Diplomatic Fellow in the French MFA, poloff
often met and worked with Bereyziat. He told poloff October
29 that the Strategic Dialogue may have been his last major
meeting for the MFA, as he is leaving the ministry for
personal reasons on November 10. END SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND.
SECOND ANNUAL FRANCO-ISRAELI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) Pierre Sellal, Director General of the French MFA,

and Yossi Gal, Director General of the Israeli MFA, led their
respective delegations in the second annual Franco-Israeli
Strategic Dialogue on October 29 in Paris. The "five to six
hours" of talks covered a wide range of issues, including the
peace process, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, according to
Bereyziat. The first bilateral Strategic Dialogue took place
in May 2008, approximately a year after President Sarkozy's
election. No such exchanges took place under President
Chirac, Bereyziat acknowledged, adding that the French now
hope to make it an annual tradition. He said the next
dialogue will take place late next year. (COMMENT: This new
tradition reflects Sarkozy's avowed attempt to create a more
balanced French approach to the Middle East by developing a
closer rapport with Israel. END COMMENT.)
TURKEY
------
¶4. (S/NF) The French participants in the Strategic Dialogue

noted profound disquiet among the Israelis about Turkey,
Bereyziat said. He reported that the Israelis claimed the
Turks have allowed weapons-related material for Iran's
nuclear program to transit Turkey, with Prime Minister
Erdogan's full knowledge. The French replied that Israel
would need to have clear and concrete proof of such activity
before leveling accusations. The Israelis replied that they
are collecting evidence which they will eventually publicize.
In the meantime, Bereyziat said, the Israelis explained that
they will not take strong public positions condemning what
they perceive as Turkey's recent strategic shift away from
western positions on the peace process, Iran, and Israel's
nuclear program. Erdogan's public comments about Israel's
nuclear weapons had particularly irked the Israelis,
Bereyziat explained, describing them as unprecedented by a
Turkish leader. Moreover, the Israelis blamed the Europeans,
and especially France, for this shift in Turkey's policy.
They said that if Europe had more warmly embraced Turkey,
then the Turks would not be taking steps to earn approval in
the Arab and Muslim world at the expense of Israel. The

French, in response to this accusation, "begged to differ,"
Bereyziat said.
GOLDSTONE REPORT, PEACE PROCESS, UAV TECHNOLOGY

--------------------------------------------- --
¶5. (C/NF) President Sarkozy called Prime Minister Netanyahu

directly on October 26, Bereyziat reported, to urge him to
establish an independent investigation into the actions of
the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza. Sarkozy informed
Netanyahu that such a step would decrease pressure on Israel
and its allies stemming from the Goldstone Report. Netanyahu
responded briskly: "No way." French officials emphasized
Sarkozy's point again during the Strategic Dialogue,
Bereyziat said, and the Israelis continued to reject his
advice. (See reftel for a description of earlier French
efforts to persuade the Israelis to take this step.)
Separately, to prevent the Goldstone Report from further
impeding the peace process, the French are now contemplating
a pre-emptive approach in the U.N. General Assembly,
according to Bereyziat. With this aim in mind, the GOF may
float a Resolution that would ensure the Goldstone Report
does not return to the Security Council. Bereyziat did not
specify further what this draft Resolution might contain.
¶6. (C/NF) Franco-Israeli discussions on the status of the

peace process itself resembled a "conversation of the deaf,"
Bereyziat said. "We have a profound disagreement on tactics,
but we obviously agree on the end goal." France has not,
however, taken any "punitive" measures following the Gaza
conflict, Bereyziat explained. He said that whereas other
European countries stopped selling Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) parts to Israel after the conflict, the French have
continued to do so. And Bereyziat reported that the French
and Israelis did agree on one important point related to the
peace process: Iran continues to play a destructive role in
the region, creating and prolonging conflicts.
SYRIA
-----
¶7. (S/NF) Bereyziat described a division within the Israeli

delegation about Syria's openness to the west. Some on the
delegation perceived Syrians as intransigent and discounted
the possible benefits that might accrue to Israel through the
re-launching of direct, or even indirect, negotiations.
Others, Bereyziat said, including military representatives
"with Ehud Barak's ear," supported the French claim that
Israel would put Syria in a bind by suddenly expressing
openness to negotiations over the Golan. This group of
Israelis believed Syrian leaders seek to free themselves from
dependence on Iran and to re-engage fully with the west.
RIVKIN
Viewing cable 09PRAGUE589, CZECH COMMENTS ON U.S.-CZECH

STRATEGIC COOPERATION
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09PRAGUE589.
09PRAGUE589 2009-10-02 14:02 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Prague
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000589
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2011

TAGS: PARM PREL EZ EUN
SUBJECT: CZECH COMMENTS ON U.S.-CZECH STRATEGIC COOPERATION
REF: CARNIE-QUANRUD E-MAIL DATED 10.01.2009
Classified By: Charge Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
(SBU) In response to delivery of USG non-paper on U.S.

Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, Czech MFA Political
Director Ivo Sramek noted that he is pleased that we are
having an ongoing dialogue and that we are all examining ways
to advance U.S.-Czech strategic collaboration. He did not
have substantive comments on the paper on October 1, although
he noted that the MFA is collaborating with the MoD to flesh
out the September 17 paper "Beyond the Missile Defense Review
- The Way Forward in Strategic Cooperation." Sramek noted
that this coming paper will add greater detail and
specificity to the original paper the Czechs handed over. He
also noted that he would be discussing it on October 2 with
FM Kohout and that they hope to be able to provide it to us
early next week. He noted that the approach in this coming
paper is in keeping with the Kohout-S dialogue in New York on
the UNGA margins, where the Secretary encouraged the Czechs
to "think broadly" about cooperation and not simply to focus
on military cooperation.
¶2. (C) Following this meeting, MFA Political Director Ivan

Pocuch told emboff that within the MFA and MoD this paper was
ready last week to hand over and that it was quite detailed
and focused on the strategic relationship. This paper,
however, was held up by FM Kohout who felt that it was much
too narrowly focused. Pocuch and his Deputy, Petr
Chalupecky, plan to press hard for this paper to be clearly
prioritized and focused before it is handed over to us. He
also stated that from his point of view it is most important
that we know that the Czechs wish to be involved in a
substantive way in this new security architecture, however it
evolves.
¶3. (SBU) Separately Defense Attache Wally Scales met with MoD
Director of Security Policy Ivan Dvorak and delivered this
paper. According to Colonel Scales, Dvorak commented on the
High Level Defense Group meeting to note that the first week
of November was fine for the Czechs and that they hoped to
see USG participation at the level of Under Secretary of
Defense Flournoy.
Thompson-Jones
Viewing cable 09ANKARA1583, WORKING ERDOGAN BACK INTO THE

FOLD ON IRAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7618
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC TU IR
SUBJECT: WORKING ERDOGAN BACK INTO THE FOLD ON IRAN
REF: ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)
Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: During an October 21 meeting with MFA

Undersecretary Sinirlioglu, the Ambassador challenged Prime
Minister Erdogan's recent dismissal of international
community allegations that Iran intends to acquire nuclear
weapons as "gossip." The Ambassador emphasized Iran will be
the single most important topic when Erdogan and POTUS meet
in Washington December 7. In contrast to Erdogan, President
Gul November 2 pressed Iran to be transparent with IAEA
inspectors. We will urge Gul and senior Turkish bureuacrats
to curb Erdogan's damaging defense of Iran's nuclear
activities. End Summary
¶2. (C) During an October 21 meeting with MFA Undersecretary

Sinirlioglu, the Ambassador challenged PM Erdogan's public
statement, made the previous day while he was in Tehran,
dismissing allegations of Iran's intent to acquire nuclear
weapons as "gossip." Holding a copy of President Obama's
Pittsburgh Summit comdemnation of Iraq's nuclear ambitions,
the Ambassador asked Sinirlioglu if "this was the 'gossip'"
to which Erdogan had referred. The Ambassador emphasized
that Erdogan's statement made Turkey vulnerable to
international community criticism should Iran balk on IAEA
inspection of its Qom reprocessing facility or second-party
reprocessing of its low-enriched uranium stockpile. Erdogan
was, in effect, allowing the Iranians to infer a weakening of
the international community consensus against them. The
Ambassador warned Sinirlioglu that Washington was now
wondering if it could any longer count on Turkey to help
contain Iran's profound challenge to regional peace and
stability.
¶3. (C) Implying Erdogan's use of the term "gossip" was

unconfirmed, Sinirlioglu claimed that the Turkish government
"fully supports the P5-plus-1." He asserted the prime
minister's principled opposition to nuclear weapons in the
region. He argued Erdogan's rhetoric is a tactical effort to
gain him credibility with the Middle Eastern street so he can
better place the anti-nuclear weapons message. Though Turkey
"doesn't believe in sanctions," Sinirlioglu said, "we will
support consensus" in the Security Council. The Ambassador
responded that Iran would be the single most important topic
of conversation when Erdogan and POTUS meet in Washington on
December 7.
¶4. (SBU) In marked contrast to Erdogan, President Gul

November 2 said Turkey is against nuclear weapons in its
region and the world, "especially in neighboring countries."
In remarks to reporters while enroute to Slovakia, Gul
reaffirmed Turkey's preference for diplomatic means (as
opposed to the use of military force) to compel Tehran's
adherence to its international obligations, but insisted that
Iran "...must be transparent and open to IAEA inspection in
order to overcome suspicions."
¶5. (C) Comment: Erdogan's recent comments on Iran's nuclear

program amount to a defense of Tehran's defiance of the
international community's will. His desire for a "good"
Washington visit is the goad we will continue use to try to
turn him back towards the international community consensus
on Iran. We will also emphasize to Erdogan's senior
bureuacrats and, when the opportunity arises, to President
Gul their interest in reining in Erdogan on Iran.
JEFFREY

Viewing cable 09ANKARA1594, TURKISH MEDIA REACTION

Discussing cables
09ANKARA1594 2009-11-05 11:11 2010-11-28 18:06 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
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RUEUITH/AFLO ANKARA TU
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001594
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/SE, EUR/PD, NEA/PD, DRL

JCS PASS J-5/CDR S. WRIGHT
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC KMDR TU PREL KPAO
SUBJECT: TURKISH MEDIA REACTION
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2009
Media Highlights: Clinton's Global Partnerships; Commentary on

Turkey-US-Iraq Relations; New Case Against Incirlik
Base Extensions; Sabah on USNATO Tour to Afghanistan; Another 'One
Minute' Crisis in Rize; Erdogan Makes TGS Demands; Erdogan on
Turkey's Foreign Policy; Erdogan Rejects Swine Flu; New Turkish
University for Kabul;
Clinton's Global Partnerships to Strengthen Muslim Ties

Turkish media outlets were lukewarm in initial reporting on
Secretary Clinton's new initiative to boost development around the
Muslim world. National broadcaster TRT-TV Online in "Obama's New
Beginning Plan," notes that "previously, in his June address in
Cairo, President Obama promised to seek a new start to troubled US
relations with the Islamic world." In "Hillary Clinton Offers US
Aid to Help Boost Muslim Ties," Islamic-oriented Today's Zaman notes
that "taken together the new package pales in comparison to the
billions of dollars in aid that Washington extends to governments
in the region, including both Israel and Egypt." In "New US
Initiative for the Islamic World," liberal Radikal says, "Secretary
Clinton, speaking at a development forum in Marrakesh, announced the
new US initiative with the world's Muslims, to promote
entrepreneurship, economic development and education." Mainstream
Aksam's online page headlines, "Clinton Holds Muslim Initiative in
Morocco," and notes, "Clinton said the programs would aim to
encourage scientific and technical collaboration, women's
empowerment and cooperation between faiths."
Pundits Take Note of Turkey-US and Turkey-Iraq Relations

Cuneyt Ulsever in mainstream Hurriyet evaluates Turkey's foreign
policy and says "I am sure Turkey will produce independent policies
in certain areas, but after Obama was elected as the President and
Davutoglu assigned as Turkish Foreign Minister, Turkey-US ties
started settling on a new axis. Within the framework of Obama's
multi-centered politics - which expects active participation from
the other countries - Turkey is playing for the role of the US
Representative in the Middle East. US wants to test Turkey in four
areas. First of all the US wants to know whether Turkey will take
over an active role in Northern Iraq or not. Secondly, will Turkey
be able to tame Iran under US' demands. The US also wants to know
whether Turkey will be able to take Syria to the US' side. And
finally, the US wants to test Turkey whether it will be able to save
Hamas and Hezbollah from Iran's influence. If Turkey passes all
these tests without losing or isolating Israel in the Middle East
completely, then Turkey will be considered successful, otherwise,
we'll go back to Bush Administration's period."
Sami Kohen in mainstream Milliyet compares current ties between

Ankara-Irbil, as compared to last year, and says because of Ankara's
rationalist and pragmatic strategies, Turkey has improved relations
with the Northern Iraqi Administration. He comments: "The Kurdish
Administration in Northern Iraq, with US pressure, supported Turkey
in its fight against PKK terrorism. And we came to today's point
through a series of diplomatic and political initiatives, supported
by the military. Good ties with Northern Iraq is necessary for
Turkey, especially after the US withdrawal from Iraq."
Turkish NGO Goes to Court Against the Use of Incirlik Airbase by the
US
Papers report that following an application by the Global Peace and
Justice Coalition, a Turkish NGO, the Council of State (Danistay)
prosecutor has demanded the annulment of a Council of Ministers
decision made in 2007 to extend the agreement with the US allowing
the use of Incirlik Airbase for another two years. The prosecutor
said the approval of the parliament was needed to extend the mandate
for using Incirlik AB. He noted that the parliament, and not the
Council of Ministers, was to decide whether to authorize a foreign
troop deployment in Turkey and to use Turkish facilities. Danistay
is expected to make a decision on the issue within a month,
according to papers.
Sabah Multipart Series on Afghanistan
ANKARA 00001594 002 OF 004
Mainstream-pro government Sabah's diplomatic correspondent Duygu

Guvenc went on a USNATO tour in October in Afghanistan, reporting on
the Turkish ISAF contributions and the challenges of civilian
infrastructure projects in a three part series. She leds off the
series with a frank assessment of Turkey's" tough mission" in
Afghanistan and how Turkey handles many projects there, including
the police force, education and health services. In addition to
ISAF cooperation, she also emphasizes that the future of Afghanistan
is in civilian hands, noting the need for teachers, engineers and
doctors. One part of the series takes a humorous look at life for
the ISAF forces there, from rock concerts to the delights of Afghani
bread. "Now, ISAF is looking for a way out from Afghanistan," she
observes and notes that "civilians hold the key for the troop exit
from Afghanistan."
Turkey-Israel: A Mini 'One Minute' Crisis in Rize and Calls for Gul
to Visit Israel
Hurriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Aksam, Haberturk, Cumhuriyet, Yeni Safak
and Zaman report the mayor of the Black Sea province of Rize, Halil
Bakirci, had an "unpleasant" exchange of remarks during a meeting
with visiting Israeli Ambassador, Gaby Levy. Mayor Bakirci told the
Israeli Ambassador that the attitude of Turkish people toward Israel
would not change as long as Israel continues its "expansionist
policies." "The people of Rize will defend themselves in the face
of such threats, but they will not kill babies," said Bakirci. Levy
responded by saying that Israelis did not have any other
alternatives for survival. He admitted that Turkish-Israeli
relations had entered a difficult period, but added that
Turkey-Israel bilateral relations had strong roots. According to
Turkish media, the mayor went on to express anxiety about the safety
of the Israeli tourists visiting the Black Sea region, who he said
were viewed with suspicion but constitute 70 percent of all foreign
visitors to the area.
Commentary Condemns: In mainstream Hurriyet, Chief Editor Ertugrul

Ozkok took aim at the Mayor, criticizing him for his warning that
"Israeli tourists should not come to Rize" and for voicing concerns
of Israel policies in Gaza. According to Ozkok, "if Ankara's harsh
language spreads internally and turns into warnings to an Ambassador
from a Mayor, then, it will be difficult for the Turkish foreign
policy to stretch when it is necessary."
Gul Should Visit Israel: In mainstream Aksam, columnist Utku

Cakirozer voices concern that the continuing diplomatic crisis will
damage Turkey and Israel's strategic interests. "The heaviest
portion of the bill will go to Israel, because Turkey is Israel's
only trustworthy ally in the Islamic world," he opines. "Foreign
Ministry officials in both countries and the Ambassadors in two
capitals, exert extreme efforts to ease the tensions, however, the
remarks of the politicians in both countries, do not help at all.
We believe that, at this point, President Gul can play the most
constructive role to eliminate the tensions. If President Gul pays
a visit to Israel, the relationship between Ankara-Tel-Aviv will
reach the much deserved strategic level again."
Erdogan Calls on TGS to Turn In Anti-Government Conspirators

Papers report Prime Minister Erdogan, on an alleged military plot
against his government, called on the TGS Chief General Ilker Basbug
to bring to justice the suspects who drafted the plan for fighting
fundamentalism. Erdogan wanted the army to hand over Colonel Dursun
Cicek, the author of the plan, and five other military officers to
the prosecutor. TV and print media also carry reports of a new
wrinkle in the Ergenekon crisis with the publication if a new
"military memorandum" on fundamentalism. Media report that last
night an unidentified officer e-mailed a copy of another secret TGS
memo dated April 2009, to the 'Ergenekon' prosecutor and media
outlets. The new memo indicates that 430 websites, including the
NYT, the New York Post, The Independent, ANF, DIHA, Bianet, the AFP
and the WP, were monitored. Wire services reported that 292 of them
were in Turkish and 138 in foreign languages. They were categorized
as "separatist," "fundamentalist," "nationalist," "extreme left,"
ANKARA 00001594 003 OF 004
"pro-EU" and "unbiased." The memo was signed by eight officers,

including Colonel Cicek. It was presented to then TGS Deputy Chief,
General Hasan Igsiz. The memo also listed the websites used by the
TGS for psychological warfare, say papers.
Erdogan: Turkey in Close Ties both with West and Islamic World
All papers report Prime Minister Erdogan on Tuesday told his ruling
AK Party group meeting that Turkey was "not shifting" its foreign
policy, but was only getting "normalized." Erdogan emphasized
Turkey was in close relationship both with the West and the Islamic
world. "Defending the rights and humanity in the face of the
Israeli atrocities in Gaza cannot be characterized as shifting
politics," said Erdogan.
Erdogan-Akdag Disagreement on Swine Flu Vaccines Lead to Confusion

All papers report Erdogan's controversial rejection of the swine flu
vaccination, just as swine flu vaccinations began in Turkey and the
death toll hit eleven. Health Minister Recep Akdag was vaccinated
in front of TV cameras as part of the nationwide swine flu
vaccination campaign. Prime Minister Erdogan, however, said he will
not get vaccinated, adding he did not agree with the health minister
that it should be compulsory. Akdag said the prime minister was not
in the group at risk for contracting the virus, and that citizens
would make their own choice about the vaccination. Erdogan's remarks
also led to confusion over the effectiveness of the vaccine, say
papers. Eyup Can in Hurriyet writes that the PM has more concerns
regarding the vaccination campaign which the public doesn't know.
"Otherwise," he says, " the PM would not be concerned that if
anything goes wrong with the campaign, his government would get all
the blame."
Turkey to Establish University in Kabul (Zaman)

Islamist-oriented Zaman reports Turkey would establish Mevlana
University in Kabul, upon demands coming from President Karzai that
Afghanistan's education needs be met. In the first phase, an
Education Faculty will be set up. Afghanistan will need 100,000
more teachers by the beginning of 2010, says Zaman. There is
currently eight Turkish schools in Afghanistan, including two high
schools for girls.
Upcoming events:
Q November 4: President Abdullah Gul will hold meetings with Prime

Minister Erdogan and army chief General Ilker Basbug.
Q November 4: British Foreign Secretary David Miliband will meet in
Ankara with the chief EU negotiator Egemen Bagis.
Q November 5-9: The 25th session of the Standing Committee for
Economic and Commercial Cooperation of OIC (COMCEC) will be held in
Istanbul.
Q November 8: Iranian President Ahmadinejad will come to Istanbul
for the OIC meeting.
Q November 6: Foreign Minister Davutoglu will go to Paris for an
official visit.
Q November 10: The AKP government plans to bring the "democratic
initiative" to the parliament for debates.
TV News (NTV)
Domestic
Q The government plans to debate the government's Kurdish

"democratic initiative" in the parliament on November 10, but
opposition CHP says the debates should not be held on the day when
Turkey commemorates the death of the founder of modern Turkey,
Ataturk.
Q DTP leader Ahmet Turk says his party will file a legal complaint
against an alleged military plot envisaging steps against the Kurds.
Q Farming Minister Mehdi Eker has briefed the parliament on a new

regulation related to genetically modified food.
ANKARA 00001594 004 OF 004
World
Q Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei says his country will not
be deceived into reconciliation with its arch foe, the United
States.
Q France and Germany urge Iran to accept a UN-brokered proposal to
enrich its nuclear fuel abroad rather than lose time by asking for a
further round of talks.
Q Four months after unrest in China's Xinjiang region, security
officials have launched a fresh campaign to track down accused
rioters.
Q The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled against the
use of crucifixes in classrooms in Italy, saying he practice ran
counter to the child's right to freedom of religion.
JEFFREY
Viewing cable 09ANKARA1654, TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM

DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
Discussing cables
nytimes.com
VZCZCXRO0653
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019

TAGS: KNNP PREL TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)
¶1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November

12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten
off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the
IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey.
El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same
morning. This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with
the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians
have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told
the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the
British. They have "more trust" in the U.S. The Iranians
would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the
Russians.
¶2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a
delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this
proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c)
continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He
said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible"
than others who are inside the Iranian Government.
Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from
some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would
succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is
interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.
¶3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if
the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance.
Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the
proposal but need to manage the public perception.
Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400
kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on
Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent
amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage
would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion,
after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for
the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu
said Baradei agreed to consider this.
¶4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General

Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest
to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island
and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he
could not give an official response to the proposal as this
is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much
skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU
has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos
out right away.
¶5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different

proposals. The first is Iran's request for fuel for its
nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still
need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment
capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it
will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow
room for negotiation.
¶6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative
consequences of sanctions or the use of military force,
Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the
consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a
spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this
risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with
the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours
Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.
¶7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can
be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent
public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this
issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but
contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately
presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The
PM's comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had
been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said
"no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to
cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak
bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended,
but only because Ankara is showing public messages of
friendship.
¶8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern
public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are
ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just
such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized
that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice"
and a "sense of vision" to the region. Turkey has provided a
"third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he
contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US). The result, he
said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region." We
ANKARA 00001654 002 OF 002
need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."
¶9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.
JEFFREY

Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD2992, IRAN'S EFFORTS IN IRAQI ELECTORAL

POLITICS
Discussing cables
09BAGHDAD2992 2009-11-13 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Baghdad
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002992
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT, NEA/IR AND NEA/I. NSC FOR

TALWAR, MAGSAMEN, PHEE AND VROOMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN'S EFFORTS IN IRAQI ELECTORAL POLITICS
REF: BAGHDAD 2288
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Iran is a dominant player in Iraq's

electoral politics, and is using its close ties to Shia,
Kurdish, and select Sunni figures to shape the political
landscape in favor of a united Shia victory in the January
election. A pro-Iran, Shia-dominated, and preferably
Islamist government, led by a united Shia alliance remains
Iran's top priority. Toward that end, Iran is seeking to
increase pressure on Maliki to join forces with the other
prominent Shia coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) led by the
Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). END
SUMMARY
¶2. (S) Iran is arguably the most influential regional power

seeking to shape and influence the outcome of Iraq's
election. This message offers an assessment of Iran's
efforts to shape Iraq's electoral politics in anticipation of
the national election in January.
Iran's Policy Goals and Tools

-----------------------------
¶3. (S) Iran's over-arching political objective for Iraq's

January election is the re-election of a Shia-dominated,
preferably Islamist, coalition led by Tehran's closest
allies, notably ISCI and the Sadrist Trend under the rubric
of the Iraqi National Alliance coalition (INA) (reftel).
Iraq, given its proximity to Iran and its shared Shia
heritage, represents a vital foreign policy priority for the
Iranian government's (IRIG) efforts to project its ideology
and influence in the region. An economically dependent and
politically subservient Iraq would foster greater strategic
depth for Tehran. Iranian president Ahmadinejad has referred
to Iraq in recent press statements as "a Shia base"
confronting the broader menace perpetrated by those opposed
to Iraq's identity and stability (i.e., Sunni states, the
West).
¶4. (S) Iran's approach to its bilateral relationship with

Iraq ranges from political micro-management to broad
strategic guidance emanating directly from Supreme Leader
Khamenei in Tehran. The IRIG recognizes that influence in
Iraq requires operational (and at times ideological)
flexibility. As a result, it is not uncommon for the IRIG to
finance and support competing Shia, Kurdish, and to some
extent, Sunni entities, with the aim of developing the Iraqi
body politic's dependency on Tehran's largesse. While exact
figures are unknown, Tehran's financial assistance to Iraqi
surrogates is estimated at USD 100-200 million annually,
with USD 70 million going to ISCI/Badr coffers.
¶5. (S) Since at least 2003, Brigadier General Qasem

Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), has been the point main directing
the formulation and implementation of the IRIG's Iraq policy,
with authority second only to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
Through his IRGC-QF officers and Iraqi proxies in Iraq,
notably Iranian Ambassador and IRGC-QF associate Hassan
Kazemi-Qomi, Soleimani employs the full range of diplomatic,
security, intelligence, and economic tools to influence Iraqi
allies and detractors in order to shape a more pro-Iran
regime in Baghdad and the provinces.
¶6. (S) Soleimani enjoys long-standing close ties with

several prominent GOI officials, including President
Talabani, Vice-President Adel Abdal-Mahdi (ISCI), Prime
Minister Maliki (Da'wa), former PM Jaafari, and more
recently, Speaker Samarra'i (Septel reports Iranian Speaker
Qrecently, Speaker Samarra'i (Septel reports Iranian Speaker
Larijani's November 4-7 visit to Iraq at Samarra'i's
invitation.). Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad, Speaker
Larijani, and former president Rafsanjani consult regularly
with visiting GOI officials as part of the IRIG's broader
"strategic" council of advisers seeking to influence the GOI.
¶7. (S) Iran's tools of influence include financial support

to (and pressure on) a cross-spectrum of Iraqi parties and
officials; economic development assistance, notably to
religious organizations; lethal aid to select militant Shia
proxies; and sanctuary to Iraqi figures fearful of USG
targeting or those seeking to revitalize their
political/religious credentials, most notably Moqtada
al-Sadr. This leverage also extends, to a lesser extent, to
select Sunni actors, including such public figures as Iraqi
Speaker Samarra'i, whose September visit to Tehran included
BAGHDAD 00002992 002 OF 003
meetings with several senior IRIG officials.
Pre-Election Jockeying
----------------------
¶8. (S) Predictably, Iran is actively lobbying and recruiting

Iraqis of various political stripes and affiliations,
including Sunnis, in the run-up to the election to ensure a
united Shia-led coalition government. Given the likelihood
of a Shia-led victory in the election, Iran appears more
concerned about the strength of a united Shia bloc in the
post-election phase of government formation. For Iran, a
"rebellious" Maliki pursuing a more nationalist vs. sectarian
agenda risks splitting the Shia vote, which in turn weakens
the Shia political bloc's negotiating strength during the
government formation period post-election. Iran's greatest
fear for the upcoming election is a fractured Shia coalition
that is unable to coalesce and thereby dominate the next
government. Iran's worst-case election scenario
(increasingly unrealistic) is a coup d'etat of former regime
elements hostile to Tehran.
¶9. (S) A weak Shia coalition before or after the election

would further undermine the INA and their pro-Iranian
entities, notably ISCI and the Sadrist Trend. The Kurds,
historically closer to ISCI, remain the important swing vote
and are unlikely to reveal their true coalition intentions
until after the election. As seasoned masters of the Iraqi
political chessboard, Kurdish leaders such as Talabani and
Barzani will likely exploit their political strength among
Shia/Sunni counterparts to protect and expand Kurdish
influence in a future government. Iran's historic ties to the
PUK, and to a lesser extent KDP officials, make the Kurds an
important element in ensuring a pro-Iranian Shia victory in
the election. INA officials are confident that the Kurds
will join their coalition, all but guaranteeing an election
victory. An unknown factor in national elections is the
Kurdish opposition party, Goran List, under the leadership of
former PUK Secretary General Nawshirwan Mustafa. Goran is
committed to unseating the PUK (and Talabani) in Suleymaniyah
province but needs financial backing to ensure its long-term
viability in the KRG and national politics. Iran could
conceivably alleviate Goran's financial woes, particularly
through its close ties with the Kurdish Jaff tribe, some of
whom are Goran members. However, doing so would undermine
the IRIG's valued relationship with Talabani, while also
proving exceedingly duplicitous, even by IRIG and KRG
standards.
¶10. (S) It is important to note that Iran's power in Iraq,

although extensive, is not without limitations. The IRIG's
greatest political roadblock remains the domineering
authority and religious credibility embodied in Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Despite his Iranian heritage, Sistani
is Iraq's most revered Shia religious (and political)
authority. A critic of Iran's "Velayet-e-Faqih" (rule of the
jurisprudent) system of theocratic governance, Sistani's
abstemious (aka Quietest school) approach to Shia politics
has kept him well above the political fray while at the same
time ensuring him significant impact on those rare occasions
when he pronounces on politics. For example, Sistani's
public support for an open list ballot was instrumental in
prompting ISCI, Sadrist Trend, Maliki's State of Law, and
other Shia parties to follow suit, despite Tehran's
preference for a closed list. Domestic political realities
will continue to force Shia political parties like ISCI, Dawa
Qwill continue to force Shia political parties like ISCI, Dawa
and Sadr Trend, with close historic ties to Iran, to balance
between support for a broader Iraqi-Shia agenda, as
championed by Sistani, and the alternative, championed by
Iran, that would subordinate Iraqi interests to Iran's
broader objectives (septel).
Soft vs. Hard Power

-------------------
¶11. (S) Following the GOI's crackdown on Iranian-supported

Sadrist militias in Basrah during the "Charge of the Knights"
operation in March 2008, Iran has calibrated its operations
in Iraq to encompass more "soft power" (economic, religious,
educational) support and investment as part of a broader
"hearts and minds" campaign. (NOTE: Iranian lethal aid to
militant proxies continues; however, on a less visible scale.
END NOTE). With annual bilateral trade estimated at USD 4
billion (up 30 percent since 2008) and comprised mostly of
Iranian imports (approximately 48 percent of Iraq's imports
are Iranian goods), the IRIG continues to jockey for economic
domination in Iraq through targeted development assistance,
focused largely on refurbishment of Shia religious shrines,
BAGHDAD 00002992 003 OF 003
and trade deals and bilateral agreements aimed at fostering

greater Iraqi economic dependency on Iran. This measure has
been successful, largely because of Iran's geographic
proximity and access to Iraqi markets that are otherwise
financially or politically less appealing to other states,
notably the United States, Europe, and other industrialized
nations. Turkey, on the other hand, remains Iran's biggest
economic competitor, particularly in the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG).
Implications for U.S. Policy

----------------------------
¶12. (S) COMMENT: Concerns about long-term U.S. influence,

albeit tempered by the withdrawal deadline, continue to
inform IRIG decision-making to ensure its strategic foothold
in Iraq. Iran views Iraq as a natural (and more junior)
strategic partner. As a result, Iran will continue to flex
its muscles to ensure it's strategic outcomes are met. This
should not lead to alarmist tendencies or reactions on our
part. The next Iraqi government will continue to cultivate
close ties with Iran given long-standing historical realities
that precede Iraq's ties with the United States. On the
other hand, Iran's influence in Iraq should not be
overestimated. As the GOI continues to gain its footing,
points of divergence between Tehran and Baghdad become
increasingly evident on such sensitive bilateral issues as
water, hydrocarbons, maritime borders, and political parity.
Some prominent Iraqi leaders, including those with close ties
to Iran (i.e., Maliki, Ammar al-Hakim) are increasingly
sensitive to being labeled Iranian lackeys.
¶13. (S) COMMENT CONT'D: Our objective in Iraq should be

less about countering all-things Iranian, and more about
developing viable alternatives and approaches that gradually
alter the GOI's political, economic, and social worldview.
Development of viable international alternatives in Iraq is
one of the most effective measures of countering Iranian
ambitions and, ultimately, integrating Iraq as a constructive
member of the international community. Specifically, our
ongoing efforts to bolster the GOI through capacity-building
and assistance within the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)
and to remove Iraq from Chapter VII remain our most valuable
tools in this regard. Given the value placed on the SFA by
the GOI and the Iraqi public, our ability to recognize,
enhance, and exploit the value of the partnership will
constitute an essential element of any effort to counter
"malign" Iranian influence.
HILL
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1393, GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER

FACES STEEP
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0005
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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RUKAAKA/USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE
RUEHRL/USDAO BERLIN GE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L

DHS FOR OIA SCARDAVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KHLS KJUS GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW INTERIOR MINISTER FACES STEEP
LEARNING CURVE
REF: A. BERLIN 1377

¶B. BERLIN 1167
¶C. BERLIN 988
¶D. 2008 BERLIN 1455
¶E. 2008 BERLIN 504
Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affai

rs for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany's new federal interior minister,

Thomas de Maiziere, is known for being a competent
administrator who performed effectively over the past four
years as the Chancellery Chief of Staff. De Maiziere is a
close confidant of Chancellor Merkel, their professional
relationship dates back to 1990, and he developed a
reputation as a reliable crisis manager and interagency
master over the past four years. Although de Maiziere
previously served as a state interior minister in Saxony, he
has less direct experience dealing with the international
security issues - most prominently counterterrorism - that he
will face as federal interior minister. Furthermore, de
Maiziere is not known for being ideological or outspoken. In
this respect, de Maiziere represents a marked change from his
predecessor, powerhouse Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had strong
views on security policy and was willing to endure
considerable criticism to achieve his policy goals. We do
not expect de Maiziere to push for further expanding law
enforcement powers of police and/or security services. De
Maiziere indicates that he intends to focus on integration of
foreigners into German society and will continue the
Ministry's Islam Conference, a controversial Schaeuble
initiative that had advanced the country's discussion on
immigration and discrimination issues. He also intends to
promote the further integration of former east and west
Germany. END SUMMARY
An Aristocratic Westerner Makes His Name in the East

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (U) De Maiziere, 55, is a lawyer by training who was born
and raised in Bonn, but has spent nearly the last two decades
in the eastern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony.
He is a descendent of the noble Maiziere-les-Metz family who,
as Huguenots, fled France for asylum in Prussia in the late
seventeenth century. De Maiziere's father, Ulrich, was
Inspector General of the German Armed Forces. His cousin,
Lothar, was the last, and only democratically elected,
Premier of the German Democratic Republic, who later served
as a minister in the Kohl government. As a staffer in the
offices of Berlin Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsacker, and
later Eberhard Diepgen, de Maiziere participated in the
negotiations on German reunification. After 1990, de
Maiziere worked to re-establish democratic structures in
eastern states starting first in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
From 1998 through 2005, de Maiziere served in Saxony as head
of the State Chancery, and as Finance, Justice and Interior
Minister. De Maiziere joined the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) as a student in 1972. De Maiziere won a direct mandate
in the September 27 national parliamentary election and is
now a member of the Bundestag representing the district of
Meissen in Saxony.
¶3. (C) De Maiziere first met Angela Merkel in 1990 and his
recommendation of her to his cousin Lothar de Maiziere is
said to have facilitated her entry into CDU politics.
Chancellor Merkel and de Maiziere are known to have a very
close professional relationship and to share a similar sober
and analytical approach to governing. De Maiziere is
reported to have performed well throughout his tenure as
Merkel's Chancellery Chief and Minister for Special Duties.
As Chancellery Chief of Staff, de Maiziere was known as a
consensus builder who understands and effectively works the
interagency process, sometimes requiring competing ministers

to resolve disputes among themselves. The Chancellor no
doubt appreciated de Maiziere's efforts to shield her from
these policy battles given her general propensity to stay
above the fray and to express an opinion on an issue only
when consensus has been reached at the cabinet level.
De Maiziere Faces a Steep Learning Curve

----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) De Maiziere's experience in eastern Germany helped him

gain new responsibilities for the Federal Interior Ministry:
the entire Department of Eastern German affairs has been
moved from the Transportation and Urban Affairs Ministry to
the Interior Ministry. In his remarks to ministry employees
on his first day in office, de Maiziere said that with this
move the interior ministry is now responsible for not only
immigrant integration, but also the integration of Eastern
and Western Germany and the cohesion of German society. De
Maiziere will continue the German Islam Conference, an
initiative started by his predecessor, which seeks to improve
the integration of Germany's Muslim population and open a
dialogue between the government and Germany's Muslim
community. The Islam Conference has met with some
controversy and came under scrutiny earlier this year when it
was discovered that some Muslim representatives were alleged
to have links with extremist groups.
¶5. (S/NF) De Maiziere has some familiarity with security

issues given that his duties in the Chancellery included
overall coordination of Germany's intelligence services. De
Maiziere was helpful in promoting cooperation between German
ministries and security services with USG counterparts both
during the 2007 Sauerland Islamic Jihad Union terrorist cell
case and following extremist threats surrounding the recent
national elections. De Maiziere's predecessor Wolfgang
Schaeuble spent considerable time dealing with the issue of
terrorism and working to update Germany's legal frameworks
and expand the mandates of law enforcement agencies to ensure
they had the capabilities to address the phenomena. In
contrast, de Maiziere said virtually nothing in public on the
issue of terrorism during his time in the Chancellery, and he
has not emphasized the topic since moving to Interior.
Therefore, there is some question concerning the depth of his
knowledge of the transnational character of terrorism,
radicalization pathways, and terrorists' increasing use of
the Internet and related technology to recruit, train and
organize, aspects of the issue that most affect Germany today.
¶6. (C) During his first day remarks to employees, de Maiziere

made the peculiar statement that "the Interior Ministry is
responsible for internal matters, and the Foreign Ministry is
responsible for issues external to Germany." This
characterization of the MoI's tasks contrasts sharply with EU
law enforcement integration initiatives under Schaeuble such
as the Pruem data sharing agreement. Observers are concerned
that de Maiziere's limited perspective could result in
diminished bilateral cooperation and mark a significant
departure from former minister Schaeuble, who placed a heavy
emphasis throughout his tenure on increasing security
cooperation with European and other international partners.
De Maiziere would benefit from learning about the benefits of
international cooperation first hand from his counterparts at
the G6 meeting in London this week, which DHS Secretary
Napolitano and senior DoJ representatives will attend.
(Note: The G6 is an informal grouping of the interior
ministers of Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Poland and the
UK. Schaeuble made a point of inviting the USG to G6
meetings that he hosted, a custom that UK Minister Jacqui
Smith is following for this week's London meeting. Ref D.)
Will de Maiziere be a Strong Security Partner?

--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (C) We do not expect de Maiziere to be aggressive in

pushing for expanded security powers. However, there is less
need for this as two recent legislative packages have already
strengthened Germany's counterterrorism legal framework (Refs
C and E). More relevant is whether de Maiziere will build on
Schaeuble's record of deepening U.S.-German security
cooperation, such as the successful negotiations of a
bilateral "Pruem-like" agreement to exchange information on
terrorism and serious crime suspects, as well as establish an
automated fingerprint checking system. Final implementation
of our agreement is awaiting resolution of some concerns
raised by a Green Party Justice Senator from Hamburg. We
will likely need support from de Maiziere to break this
impasse, but it is unclear whether de Maiziere is willing to
make the effort on an initiative that his predecessor
initiated and for which he received heavy criticism due to
data privacy concerns. On the issue of resettlement of
Guantanamo detainees, de Maiziere has yet to express a
viewpoint one way or the other.
¶8. (C) We anticipate that data protection and domestic

security issues will be a continuing theme that the new
coalition government of the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU)
and Free Democrats (FDP) will struggle with. During the
previous administration, the FDP regularly criticized former
interior minister Schaeuble for policies which the FDP
believed trampled on citizens' privacy rights (Ref B).
Germany's new Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
(FDP) believes that Schaeuble went too far in giving police
new powers of investigation, and she was successful in
committing the new government to modify a number of these
powers and introducing added data protection measures in the
recently completed coalition agreement (Ref A). The FDP has
found it politically expedient to cast personal freedoms and
security policy as mutually exclusive. In this debate, de
Maiziere's greatest advantage is that he is not Schaeuble.
As Interior Minister, de Maiziere is expected to support
existing laws and practices initiated by his predecessor, and
his reputation for reasonableness and consensus-building
should serve him well in these discussions.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1395, GM DECISION NOT TO SELL OPEL

GREETED BY SHOCK AND
Discussing cables
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RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #1395/01 3090620
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R 050620Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 8317
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 0339
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH 2211
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2086
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: ETRD ECON ELAB PREL RU GM
SUBJECT: GM DECISION NOT TO SELL OPEL GREETED BY SHOCK AND
ANGER IN GERMANY
REF: A. BERLIN 01131

¶B. BERLIN 01093
¶C. BERLIN 00390
¶D. BERLIN 00272
¶E. BERLIN 00214
BERLIN 00001395 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: ECONMIN Robert A. Pollard for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Just hours after Chancellor Merkel's historic

November 3 address to a joint session of Congress, General
Motors (GM) canceled its sale of Opel to Canadian auto parts
manufacturer Magna. The decision, which followed repeated
assurances from GM that it was a done deal, came as a
complete shock in Germany and dominated media coverage
throughout the day. Merkel herself was reportedly highly
upset over GM's flip flop. Ulrich Wilhelm, the Chancellor's
spokesman on Opel said the German government "regretted" the
decision, and reminded GM that it must now repay Berlin's 1.5
billion bridge loan to Opel by the end of the month, while
FDP Economics Minister Rainer Bruederle described GM's action
as "totally unacceptable." The cabinet was expected to
discuss the GM move on November 4. Opel's labor unions, which
had strongly backed the Magna sale because of its promise to
save jobs and keep plants open, announced that workers would
withdraw all concessions made under the terms of the Magna
deal and sta
rt a general strike at Opel plants on November 5. While
anger is widespread, there are already some voices outside
the government advocating acceptance of GM's announcement as
the only viable alternative to a total collapse of Opel. End
Summary.
Germany's Political Establishment Reacts with Anger

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶2. (C) Opinion across the political spectrum has been

uniformly negative. FDP Economics Minister Rainer Bruederle
blasted GM's behavior as "totally unacceptable." Juergen
Ruettgers, Minister President of Nordrhein Westfallen (CDU),
asserted that GM's decision showed "the ugly face of turbo
capitalism."
The leadership of the FDP, whose opposition to government
intervention in the Opel deal is well known, joined in the
condemnation of GM. A high-level source indicated that
Chancellor Merkel is furious over the GM move and refuses to
talk to GM's leadership. It is likely to be only a matter of
time before critics will call Merkel herself into account for
her strong support of the
now collapsed Magna deal. The Cabinet has been called into
session and is likely to confirm the withdrawal of all
financial support and a demand that GM repay the government's
1.5 billion Euro bridge loan by the end of the month.
¶3. (C) Jochen Homann, the Economic Ministry State Secretary

heading the German interagency working group on Opel, told
EMIN on November 4 that there was no possibility of further
German financial assistance to Opel in the foreseeable
future. The failure of the Magna deal and GM's reputation as
"an unreliable partner" would likewise complicate
negotiations with other governments seeking to preserve Opel
jobs and factories. Although no one directly blamed the USG,
the Germans are still having trouble understanding how GM
could act independently of Washington. Dr. Schubert, one of
Homann's lieutenants, complained to the Embassy that "if the
U.S. Government had GM under better control, this would not
have happened." It is now up to GM, he said, to submit a new
restructuring and financing plan, as their previous one is
out of date. Schubert was adamant that this time "there will
be no special treatment for Opel" and GM's plan would have to
go through normal channels.
Matched by Threats from Organized Labor

---------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) Klaus Franz, the head of Opel's Works Council,

announced on November 4 that Opel's 25,000 employees in
Germany will begin an indefinite strike on November 5 to
protest the GM decision. Franz called on all 55,000 Opel
workers across Europe to join in. Accusing GM of
"blackmailing" governments and workers in Europe to sign on
to its "unacceptable" restructuring Plan, he also revoked
prior labor commitments to contribute 388 million dollars in
foregone benefits to the Magna sale.
BERLIN 00001395 002.2 OF 002

¶5. (C) Oliver Burkhardt, head of the Metal Workers in NRW,
likewise condemned the decision as "bold and unfriendly," not
only to Opel employees, but to the German government.
However, Burkhardt conceded that he is waiting to see a long
term GM plan for Opel that relies on more than cost-cutting
and down-sizing. In contrast to Klaus Franz, Burkhardt
contended that non-German labor unions were "elated" over the
failure of the Magna deal (which was tilted against workers
in other countries) and doubted they would heed Franz's
strike call. He also predicted that the strikes in Germany
will be short-term and largely symbolic rather than actual
closures, adding "we are not going to close the door on a
solution with GM." Similarly, Fred Irwin - Citigroup's
country manager in Germany and the Chair of the Opel Trust
that oversaw the Magna negotiations - predicted that unions
will eventually reconcile with GM once they realize there is
no other choice.
While Despair Permeates Opel Executives

---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Opel managers such as Berlin Representative Uwe

Berlinghoff, who almost uniformly favored the Magna contract,
were also "taken completely by surprise" by the GM
announcement. Berlinghoff now expects GM to resurrect its
pre-Magna restructuring plans, including closure of plants at
Bochum (and Antwerp, Belgium) and the sale or closure of the
Eisenach plant. Berlinghoff also expected the German
government to cancel the expected 4.5 billion dollar loan
guarantee package, as "GM has demonstrated its lack of
credibility with German politicians."
Research and Development and IPR Could be Key

---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) German auto industry insiders have privately

identified compelling reasons why GM cancelled the Magna
deal. Among these are the importance of the GM/Opel Research
and Development facility in Ruesselsheim and its patents to
GM's development of small efficient cars in Europe, the U.S.
and elsewhere. GM was also reportedly skeptical that it
could adequately protect crucial IPR from Russian
exploitation because of the Sberbank/Gaz partnership with
Magna. Moreover, Magna had oversold its ability to penetrate
the Russian market. GM's announcement stressed its plans to
build on its already significant business in Russia while
retaining Opel and to work closely with Gaz without a Magna
partnership.
But Auto Leader Welcomes the Move

---------------------------------
¶8. (C) Dr. Norbert Reithofer, the CEO of BMW, told the
Ambassador on November 4 that GM's move would be welcomed by
the German auto industry. Reithofer was adamant that there
was no way BMW and the other German auto manufacturers would
have purchased auto parts from Magna once it became a direct
competitor as an auto manufacturer. In Reithofer's view,
Magna made the Opel purchase proposal in a moment of panic at
the height of the economic crisis, but now that a recovery is
in the offing, probably is not unhappy to see it dissolve.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Despite the considerable German ire aimed at GM, much
of it is aimed at GM's handling of Opel (in particular the
timing of the November 3 announcement), rather than its
business rationale for retaining its German subsidiary.
Thoughtful German opinion leaders, including former Economics
Minister zu Guttenberg conservatives in the German business
community, were equally critical of Berlin's strong arm
lobbying on behalf of Magna. An Opel Trust Board Member and
FDP politician Dirk Pfeil has already issued a statement
urging Berlin to provide 3 billion Euro in state aid to keep
GM afloat. Like it or not, the German governments will need
to seek an accommodation with GM to keep Opel alive.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1403, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY

CLINTON'S VISIT TO
Discussing cables
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P 051603Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREF MNUC AF RS IR KPAL KWBG GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO
BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10
Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Berlin warmly welcomes you to

Germany for the historic 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the
Berlin Wall. Berlin is hosting all four-powers and EU
leaders at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate to mark this occasion.
Your visit includes meetings with Chancellor Merkel and
Foreign Minister Westerwelle. Chancellor Merkel will likely
raise concern about General Motors' November 3 decision to
keep its German subsidiary, Opel, and Westerwelle may likely
raise his interest in removal of nuclear weapons from
Germany. You may wish to encourage from them:
-- Assurances that the proposed Afghanistan conference will

not slip past January and that Germany will go immediately to
the Bundestag if increases in contributions are warranted;
-- Support for including banking and insurance relations with
Iran in calculations for possible new sanctions, and no
backsliding on export controls;
-- Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S.
at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate;
-- Agreement to tone down the public rhetoric on Opel;
-- German prodding of Russia to engage constructively on
security issues and human rights.
Recognizing Germany's prominent and international role on

this occasion is important to Merkel. She is still trying to
get a sense of working with the new Washington Administration
and seems uncertain at times. Of course, Westerwelle is
learning the ropes and being watched by Merkel to see if he
can be an effective FM for her. Alternatively, Merkel may
look to new Defense Minister zu Guttenberg (CSU) to play an
alternative role on foreign policy. End summary.
Political Climate
-----------------
¶2. (C) The political divisions that marked the recent

election campaign, culminating in the October 28 swearing-in
of a center-right coalition led by Chancellor Merkel, will be
swept aside for your celebratory visit. Merkel just returned
from what she considers an exceptional visit to Washington,
which front-paged her address to Congress in every
publication. Merkel will be focused on setting her
priorities for the next legislative term -- she gives a major
state of the union-like address on November 10 on all issues
-- and will seek U.S. cooperation in promoting economic
recovery and growth (Opel, regulation), progress in
addressing climate change (Copenhagen), and strengthening
Germany's international profile (Afghanistan). Westerwelle
will have spent a total of some two days work in the foreign
ministry by the time your arrive. His ministry is not sure
what he wants yet.
Economic Climate
----------------
¶3. (C) Germany's export-driven economy is showing initial

signs of recovery from its deepest recession since WW II.
For the full year 2009, GDP will shrink around 5%, but should
show modest growth of 1% next year. Unemployment has
remained relatively low thanks to government-subsidized
programs, but is expected to rise next year. Given the
government's record budget deficit, there is heated debate
over the wisdom of the new coalition's proposed tax cuts,
intended to boost growth. Germany was pleased with the
outcome of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, but is keener on
the G-20's regulatory agenda than addressing global
imbalances.
¶4. (C) GM's sudden decision on November 3 to cancel the sale

of its European subsidiary Opel in a deal underwritten by the
German government shocked and angered Germans. Merkel's
chief economic advisor told the Ambassador November 4 that
Merkel was so furious at GM's about-face that she refused to
take a call from GM CEO Fritz Henderson. Merkel subsequently
called the President. Federal and state governments are
demanding that GM immediately pay back 1.2 billion Euros in
bridge loans they had extended to the car maker. What
particularly irked the Germans was that GM had failed to
forewarn them of their latest flip-flop after months of
laborious negotiations and a total of 4.5 billion Euros in
loans/guarantees in exchange for promises to retain most Opel
jobs and plants in Germany. (Merkel found out about the GM
decision just hours after delivering her address before
Congress.) The Opel story has dominated the news November
4-5. Opel workers are likely to strike in the next few days,
and politicians and others are citing the GM action as
another example of American "turbo-capitalism."
Berlin 00001403 002 of 003
Iran/Export Controls
-----------------------
¶5. (C) You should express appreciation for Merkel's strong

statement during her speech to Congress that there should be
"zero tolerance" for Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. You should stress the importance of German
support for EU measures or measures taken by "like-minded"
countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible
Iranian rejection of the engagement track. With Westerwelle,
it remains imperative that you raise the importance of P5 1
unity again. In addition, you should stress the particular
importance of continued German leadership on export control,
particularly in light of recent interdictions of Iranian arms
shipments. The new German coalition seeks to expand exports
by normalizing German export control policy (of arms and
dual-use items) with the EU. Germany contends that its
intention is to raise the EU to the German standard, but the
danger is that German standards could be watered down to an
EU lowest common denominator.
Arms Control/Disarmament
------------------------
¶6. (C) Westerwelle is on a bit of a tangent by publicly

calling for removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, although
he insists that Berlin will not act unilaterally. This gets
him attention and he then offers assurances that everything
must be done in the NATO context, but it distracts from other
issues. This is one of the few foreign policy positions that
distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU, and
Westerwelle may feel pressed to mention this. The MFA
emphasizes that Westerwelle's position does not necessarily
mean that Germany intends to cease participation in the NATO
nuclear share. Germany may be willing to maintain its fleet
of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear
weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Westerwelle also
understands that some Allies may want to maintain their
current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. Your meeting with
Westerwelle is a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines
or concerns we have before this effort gets too far down the
road. For its part, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD are
uncomfortable with Westerwelle's push and sees no reason to
tackle this issue right now.
Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops

-----------------------------------------
¶7. (C) FM Westerwelle has strongly defended German

engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as
vital to German national security interests. However, he
supports the Chancellor's recent decision to put off any
consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until
after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan
early next year, notwithstanding the significantly
deteriorated security situation in the north. The new
government sees the
conference as critical for setting a new framework and
benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan,
as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan
government in return. It is in our interest to capitalize on
the Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a
commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop
increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year,
if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then.
Within this context, it would be important to acknowledge
that Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian
development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic
supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD)
civilian police training program, which it joined in January
of this year.
Middle East
-----------
¶8. (C) You should thank Merkel for her strong statements
before Congress where she stressed the overarching importance
of Israel's security and a two-state solution. In general,
Merkel has been very supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle
East. She is now planning the second round of German-Israeli
government consultations, likely before the end of the year.
She may raise this with you and seek your advice on messages
to Netanyahu. We understand that Westerwelle may also be
planning to visit Israel. The MFA said that Westerwelle may
seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to
offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with
the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the
concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure
BERLIN 00001403 003 of 003
for the Middle East.
Reluctance with Overseas Deployments

------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Germany continues to wrestle with the issue of

overseas deployments. Westerwelle, and the FDP in general,
tend to be more skeptical than Merkel's CDU on this topic and
this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The
coalition agreement calls for a "gradual reduction" of German
participation in UNIFIL "with the perspective of bringing it
to an end." Similarly, the agreement calls for a "critical
review" of the "multitude" of parliamentary mandates for the
Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy
operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward
reducing them. It would be helpful for you to emphasize how
important we view Germany's contributions to these
international operations.
Russia/Energy Security
----------------------
¶10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian

bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs
of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of
former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his
relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to
continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good
relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement
and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal
with this difficult "strategic partner." Germany is Europe's
largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for
energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a
vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on
Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that
it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of
energy generation to gain greater energy security.
Climate Change
--------------
¶11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German

officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the
Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU
position towards the major emerging economies, particularly
China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national
actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our
commitment to domestic and international actions that will
allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German
leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change
legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations
for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement
next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the
Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically
binding framework -- and may be preparing the German public
for a less ambitious outcome.
Mission Germany
---------------
¶12. (SBU) Madam Secretary, the U.S. government presence in

Germany currently numbers 744 US direct-hire (USDH)
employees, 683 locally engaged (LE) staff, and 951 USG EFMs
and a State operating budget of $153 million annually. This
includes a Frankfurt cohort of over 500 USDH employees whose
responsibilities support USG operations globally. Berlin's
USG presence -- over 500 USDHs and LE staff -- is centered in
the new Chancery next to the Brandenburg Gate. The LE staff
includes many employees who have worked for the USG for over
30 years. Mission Germany is on the cutting edge of using IT
solutions xxxxx.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1433, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN

ON AFGHANISTAN,
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019

TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MNUC PARM KNNP GM IR RU AF
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,
MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, DETAINEES, RUSSIA, NUKES AND BALKANS
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellery National Security Advisor

Christoph Heusgen told EUR A/S Phil Gordon and Ambassador
Murphy in a November 10 meeting in Berlin that Germany
strongly preferred that the proposed international conference
on Afghanistan be held outside the country to make it easier
to press Karzai to commit to the necessary reforms. On the
Middle East, Heusgen thought Netanyahu had to do much more on
settlements if there was to be any hope of re-starting
negotiations. On Iran, Heusgen hoped for some conclusion by
early next month on whether the diplomatic track was going to
bear fruit so that this issue could be discussed at the
December 10 EU Summit. Heusgen said Germany was ready to
discuss taking Guantanamo detainees, but stressed the
importance of dealing directly with the Ministry of Interior
and keeping the negotiations confidential. While arguing for
being rhetorically supportive of the Medvedev European
Security proposal, Heusgen shared U.S. skepticism about a new
treaty and an OSCE Summit hosted by Kazakhstan. Heusgen
distanced the Chancellery from the proposal to remove all
remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, stressing
the need to get reciprocal cuts from the Russians. Also
discussed was CFE, the Macedonian name issue and Bosnia. END
SUMMARY.
AFGHANISTAN
¶2. (C) Heusgen confirmed that Germany would only announce

additional resources for Afghanistan after the proposed
international conference, which Chancellor Merkel and UK PM
Brown are now proposing for January 28 in London. He said
the conference is key because this is where the Germans
expect the Afghan government to make specific commitments to
improve governance and to gradually begin assuming
responsibility from the international community. President
Karzai had to be put under international pressure to perform
according to prescribed benchmarks. Toward that end, the
Chancellery felt strongly that the conference should be held
outside of Afghanistan and not on Karzai's "home turf."
Heusgen complained that the German and U.S. embassies in
Kabul are on "a different track" and pushing for a conference
in Kabul. It was important to "make up our minds" quickly on
the way ahead. If the conference slipped to February or
later, and the UK were no longer able to host it in view of
the upcoming parliamentary elections there, then Germany
would be willing to.
¶3. (C) Heusgen at first expressed concern that the U.S. would
undermine international leverage on Karzai by rolling out its
new strategy and resource commitments before he made any
reciprocal commitments to reform. Gordon assured him that
the formal U.S. roll-out would only come after the November
19 inauguration, where Karzai is expected to "say the right
things" in his inaugural address. Gordon also highlighted
the need to coordinate on the U.S. roll-out to avoid the
perception that the U.S. was "Americanizing" the
international effort in Afghanistan. It should be announced
as a common strategy and not as a U.S. strategy to which the
Allies then respond. Heusgen agreed in principle, but
indicated that Germany would stick to its approach of holding
back on any announcement of new commitments until after the
international conference.
MIDDLE EAST
¶4. (C) Referring to the Secretary's recent public statements

on settlements, Heusgen said that Germany "perceives this
differently" and thought Netanyahu needed "to do more" in
order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. With
Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli
authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be
"suicide" for President Abbas to move under the current
circumstances. Heusgen said he could not fathom why
Netanyahu did not understand this. He suggested pressuring
Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the
Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in
settlement activity. Gordon said that making a direct
linkage between the two would almost certainly be
counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out
to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making
it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC.
Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu
and "half of his cabinet" visit Berlin on November 30 for
bilateral government consultations.
IRAN
¶5. (C) Heusgen praised the U.S. for its patience with Iran,
BERLIN 00001433 002 OF 003
but noted that at some point, it would be necessary to move

to the second track in order to maintain credibility.
Heusgen said that he and his British counterpart agreed that
ideally, there would be some conclusion on this by early next
month so that the way ahead could be discussed by EU leaders
at their summit on December 10. Gordon agreed that there had
to be a time limit, noting that President Obama had given the
Iranians "by the end of the year" to respond favorably. He
also noted that the U.S. could support a Turkish role in the
proposed exchange of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel if
that would make it easier for Iran to accept the deal.
Gordon indicated, however, that Turkish PM Erdogan needed to
be careful about losing credibility in Washington if he
continued to make comments about Ahmadinejad being his
"friend."
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
¶6. (C) Heusgen noted that now that the Bundestag election was
past, Germany was ready to help on detainees, as it had
promised earlier. He advised the USG to work directly with
new Interior Minister de Maiziere, rather than going first to
MFA and the Chancellery, which had irritated de Maiziere's
predecessor and made him less willing to cooperate. In this
regard, he thought that it would be helpful if DHS Secretary
Napolitano made direct contact with de Maiziere. Heusgen
also suggested that the discussions be kept confidential
until MOI had come to a decision on which detainees to accept
and in which state they would be settled. Premature public
disclosure could doom the whole initiative. Heusgen said
that Uighurs would be "too difficult," but that Germany could
probably accept "2-3 others." (Comment: The reluctance about
Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the
Chinese government. End Comment.)
EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE OSCE SUMMIT
¶7. (C) Heusgen said that while the West should try to react
positively to whatever the Russians propose in advancing the
Medvedev European security proposal, nothing should be
accepted that would undermine current European security
institutions, including the OSCE. He shared Gordon's
misgivings about a proposed treaty. He was also skeptical
about the idea of an OSCE Summit in Astana, agreeing that
Kazakhstan's human rghts record and the lack of substantive
agenda items made it unattractive. Heusgen suggested that an
OSCE Summit be offered to the Russians on the condition they
solve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, which he said
Moscow could accomplish "in about a month."
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
¶8. (C) In response to Gordon's question about how the

government planned to take forward the commitment in the
coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining
nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the
Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been
forced upon them by FM Westerwelle. Heusgen said that from
his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw
"the 20" tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while
Russia maintains "thousands" of them. It would only be worth
it if both sides drew down. Gordon noted that it was
important to think through all the potential consequences of
the German proposal before going forward. For example, a
withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from
Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult
politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even
though it was still convinced of the need to do so.
CFE
¶9. (C) Gordon asked for Heusgen's views on a German CFE paper
that had been delivered to the State Department just a few
days earlier. Heusgen said he did not know anything about
it, claiming that he did not follow this issue closely or
"believe in it." He noted that MFA "loved this disarmament
business," which was okay, but it had to be balanced or the
"Russians will sit there and laugh."
MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE
¶10. (C) Gordon briefed Heusgen on the current state of the

negotiations, noting that the two key issues were the
geographic modifier and international usage. Heusgen noted
that the Chancellor knew PM Macedonian Gruevski through their
common membership in the European People's Party and would be
willing to engage him on this issue if that would be helpful.
BOSNIA
BERLIN 00001433 003 OF 003
¶11. (C) Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming
to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations. He
noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on
Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher. While
expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible
to turn Bosnia into a "working state," Heusgen agreed it was
important to keep trying.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1315, CHARGE DISCUSSES SECURITY

COOPERATION, FIGHTER SALE AND COLOMBIA WITH MOD JOBIM
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA, PM AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019

TAGS: PREL ETTC MASS BR
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES SECURITY COOPERATION, FIGHTER SALE AND COLOMBIA WITH
MOD JOBIM
REF: A. IIR 6 809 0087 10 B. IIR 6 809 0084 10 C. IIR 6 809 0079 10 Classified
By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a November 9 meeting, Charge Kubiske and Minister of Defense
Nelson Jobim discussed next steps in the United States-Brazil bilateral security
relationship, the potential sale of U.S.-origin fighter aircraft and regional
security. Jobim showed strong interest in furthering security cooperation by
signing the Defense Cooperation as soon as possible and completing an
information security agreement. Jobim told Charge that there would not be any
decision on fighters until sometime after his return from international travel
on November 23 and said that capability, technology transfer, benefit to
Brazil's industrial capacity and price would be the criteria for decision. He
offered no signs of encouragement that the U.S. bid would be chosen.
¶2. (C) Speaking of regional security issues, Jobim all but acknowledged
presence of the FARC in Venezuela, offered a suggestion for building Colombia-
Ecuador confidence along their border, and a possible border-monitoring
arrangement for combating the drug flow between Colombia and Brazil. Jobim
indicated concern about the contents of an USAF budget document which linked
U.S. military access to bases in Colombia with "unfriendly governments" as
evidence of a lack of understanding of Latin America. He believed that recent
inflammatory statements from Presidents Uribe and Chavez are aimed at domestic
constituencies on the eve of upcoming elections, and called a potential Uribe
run for a third term a terrible precedent for Bolivarian governments in the
region. Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia's public offer,
only two days later, to monitor border activities as a way to reduce tensions
between Colombia and Venezuela shows Jobim's influence. Despite the GOB's
tendency to blame Colombia for current tensions, its efforts to maintain peace
are sincere and should be encouraged. END SUMMARY.
Structuring the U.S.-Brazil Security Relationship

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C) Brazilian Defense Minister Jobim expressed support for moving forward
with U.S.-Brazil security cooperation, first by signing the Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA), then moving on to other arrangements, including a information
security agreement (GSOMIA). Jobim said he would see SecDef Gates at the
International Security Forum, November 20 in Halifax and could sign the DCA
there, if it were ready. If not, Jobim would like to sign before the December
10-11 Bilateral Working Group. Jobim also favored moving forward with an
information security agreement, saying he would be discussing the issue with the
Ministry for External Relations (MRE). (Note: Polmiloff discussed the
information sharing agreement with MRE pol-mil advisor Marcos Pinta Gama last
week. Pinta Gama was interested in moving forward as well and planned to consult
with the MOD. End note.)
FX-2 Fighter Competition

-------------------------
¶4. (C) Asked about the Fx-2 competition, Minister Jobim repeated previous
statements that the FX2 fighter competition would be based on capability,
technology transfer, benefit to Brazil's industrial capacity and price.
Technology transfer will be evaluated in terms of how it will contribute to
Brazil's future industrial capacity. The Charge reiterated and deepened advocacy
points in each of these areas, calling a decision to select the U.S. bid an
accelerator for an already growing U.S.-Brazil military and commercial
relationship. Jobim informed the Charge that he and President Lula will review
the Brazilian Air Force,s technical analysis of the three competing bids after
he returns from international travel November 23. Jobim will then make a
recommendation to President Lula. Lula, in turn, will make a decision and inform
the National Defense Council, for its concurrence. BRASILIA 00001315 002 OF 002
The U.S.-Colombia DCA and Regional Implications

--------------------------------------------- --
¶5. (C) Jobim said he was aware of the purpose of the Agreement giving the
United States access to Colombian bases, but the availability of an Air Force
budget memo over the internet, which cited "unfriendly countries" in the area
had complicated matters. He said the document showed "a complete lack of
understanding" of Latin America and said he had had to discuss the issue with
the President to urge "moderation" from Lula.
¶6. (C) Jobim then went into a lengthy discussion of security in the Andean
region, including Colombia-Brazil, Colombia-Venezuela and Colombia-Ecuador
dimensions with Colombia at the center of the region's potential instability. He
noted that both Presidents Uribe and Chavez have been making statements aimed at
domestic constituencies that have contributed to tensions between them. Jobim
also was critical of Uribe seeking a third term, a move which he thought set a
bad precedent for the "Bolivarists." Jobim stressed Brazil's "moderate approach"
and willingness to build confidence, in particular by providing aerial
surveillance of border regions and by sponsoring exchanges of information on
military movements in border areas. Asked about the presence of the FARC in
Venezuela, Jobim said that, were he to acknowledge its presence there "it would
ruin Brazil,s ability to mediate."
¶7. (C) COMMENT. Minister Jobim was eager to discuss security agreements and
animated about the regional issues, but was clearly not comfortable talking
about the FX-2 competition. While he has been prominent in the press in recent
days saying that "past problems" with USG "tech transfer" (in reality export
licensing) cases undermined confidence in USG assurances about the Super Hornet
sale, he did not raise this concern with Charge and avoided the opportunity to
discuss any lingering concerns he might have. In discussing the eventual FX-2
decision, he tried to downplay the importance of price but instead highlighted
contributions to Brazilian industrial capacity. Given that the Boeing offer
would integrate Brazilian companies with Boeing,s global business and thus
offers excellent potential for long-term economic gain, this should be good
news, and we pointed that out. However, President Lula may choose a different
means of evaluation. Brazil's 2008 Defense Strategy requires that purchase of
foreign made aircraft be made only if such purchase will lead to indigenous
production of more advanced aircraft. Should the political goal that Brazil
should someday export fighters to its neighbors -- even if market conditions
make this possibility remote -- trump Brazilian Air Force analysis of the
aircraft and real economic possibilities, Lula and Jobim will most likely favor
the French or Swedish offers, both of which highlight the possibility of export
production.
¶8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Within two days of the Charge's discussion with
Jobim, Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia went public with Brazil's
willingness to help ease Colombia-Venezuela tensions through border monitoring,
including aerial surveillance. This announcement shows Jobim's closeness to Lula
on security issues and once again highlights Brazil's desire to be the
continent's peacemaker. Although the GOB,s continued questioning of the intent
of the U.S.-Colombia DCA and insistence on painting Uribe as the primary source
of Andean tensions may limit the GOB,s effectiveness, we believe the GOB
genuinely seeks to reduce tensions, and we should encourage these efforts.
KUBISKE
Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS1580, SCENESETTER FOR BILATERAL

MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN
Discussing cables
09BRUSSELS1580 2009-11-24 14:02 2010-11-30 17:05 SECRET Embassy Brussels
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Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 14:00

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001580
SIPDIS
STATE FOR THE SECRETARY, EUR/WE, ISN, S/GC, AND AF/C
EO 12958 DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, ECON, BE, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN
LEADERS DURING THE SECRETARY’S DECEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO BRUSSELS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 1498 B. BRUSSELS 1493 C. BRUSSELS 1552
Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Madame Secretary, Embassy Brussels welcomes your visit to
Brussels on December 3-4 and your meetings with the in-coming Belgian Prime
Minister, Yves Leterme, and the Foreign Minister, most likely Steven Vanackere.
Your visit occurs at a moment when Belgians are poised to take a leading role in
Europe -- their former Prime Minister, Herman Van Rompuy, has just been named as
the first European Council President under the new circumstances of the Lisbon
Treaty, and the Belgian government is preparing itself to hold the rotating
presidency of the EU Council for the six months beginning July 1, 2010. Embassy
Brussels believes that properly motivated, Belgium can be a leader in mobilizing
Europe to assist the United States in meeting two of the key challenges faced by
the Transatlantic community -- Afghanistan and Guantanamo. Hopefully, long-
simmering tensions between the Flemish and francophone regions and linguistic
communities will not distract Belgium from this opportunity. Other opportunities
for cooperation exist on Africa policy, nuclear disarmament in Europe and Iran.
The PM or Foreign Minister may try to promote the candidacy of former Belgian
Foreign Minister Louis Michel for the next President of the UN General Assembly
and may again raise Belgium’s failure to be included as a participant or
observer at the G-20 talks, despite being the 18th largest economy in the world.
End Summary.
TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE
----------------------------------
¶2. (C) For the past few months, Embassy Brussels has been working to set the
stage for a change in Belgium’s self-concept as a small, meek country living in
the shadow of France and Germany, to a country that can show leadership in
Europe in spite of stretched financial and material resources, mainly by
becoming more vocal on the need for Europe to assist in the closing of
Guantanamo and on the need to support the new Afghanistan strategy. Your visit
is a chance to foster and encourage this transformation. In fact, of course, the
transformation began at home in Belgium in 2007 when a new government, made up
of a motley coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Humanists
from both sides of the linguistic border, came to power. The Prime Minister
then, and now again with the departure of Van Rompuy to the EU, was Yves
Leterme, a Flemish Christian Democrat. Formation of the government was delayed
for nearly a year because of difficult issues of power-sharing between the
French and Flemish communities, many of which still remain to be solved.
STEPPING UP IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------------------
¶3. (C) Nevertheless, the new Defense Minister, Pieter De Crem, with sometimes
grudging support from Leterme and others in the cabinet, reoriented Belgium’s
defense policy. Where his predecessor had promoted a mainly humanitarian, EU and
UN support role for the Belgian military, De Crem sought to re-establish Belgium
as a small but reliable NATO ally. As a result, Belgium’s troop commitment to
NATO ISAF operations in Afghanistan has increased from about 250 troops to
nearly 540, with further increases, perhaps to 680, in the offing. Belgians
provide security for Kabul airport, operate and maintain six F-16’s in Kandahar,
run one Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team in Kunduz with a second due to
arrive in January, and participate in a German-run PRT. This increase has been
achieved against a background of declining resources which have required a
thoroughgoing restructuring of the armed forces and recall of peacekeeping
troops in Kosovo and Lebanon. The government has also bucked critics inside and
out of government who prefer a more pacifist, less NATO-oriented approach and
are ever ready to make political hay out of possible casualties. Minister De
Crem moreover has reacted positively to suggestions from the Ambassador that he
become more vocal in his support as a way perhaps to help shore up the support
of other partners. Belgium deserves your appreciation and praise for its
efforts, and although further increases in military contrib SUBJECT: SCENESETTER
FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN LEADERS DURING THESECRETARY’S DECEMBER 3-4
VISIT TO BRUSSELS
¶4. (C) On the other hand, Belgium’s contribuQions to civilian development in
Afghanistan have not kept pace. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was
doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year.
This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official
development assistance. The Ministry of Interior has been considering sending 2-
4 police trainers to Afghanistan but has hesitated over concerns for their
security. Your unambiguous urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan
with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister can help to increase
resources devoted to Afghanistan.
SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) The Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in
Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium
resettled one detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to
Belgian officials. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who
have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the “placement”
of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the
Belgian Ministry of Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier
for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the
possibility of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the
footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG’s -- and Europe’s -- problem
with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe.
There are signs that Belgium’s reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership.
Complaints about Belgium’s exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to
perceived influence of a “directoire” of large countries in the EU are examples.
It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in
a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within
Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is
right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in
coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which
Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.
POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and
a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in
Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van
Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the
confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His most likely
successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that
reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes
the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In
essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should
live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and
social rights. The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007
elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to
be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final
compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme’s coalition in the first
part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid
embarrassment during Belgium’s EU presidency will motivate them to find the
necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.
INTEREST IN ENHANCED AFRICA COOPERATION
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial
power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi. As
such, the GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging
security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC,
promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the
region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing
sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation
between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate
in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. When you met Belgium’s
former
BRUSSELS 00001580 002 OF 003
¶4. (C) On the other hand, Belgium’s contributions to civilian development in
Afghanistan have not kept pace. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was
doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year.
This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official
development assistance. The Ministry of Interior has been considering sending 2-
4 police trainers to Afghanistan but has hesitated over concerns for their
security. Your unambiguous urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan
with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister can help to increase
resources devoted to Afghanistan.
SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) The Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in
Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium
resettled one detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to
Belgian officials. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who
have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the “placement”
of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the
Belgian Ministry of Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier
for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the
possibility of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the
footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG’s -- and Europe’s -- problem
with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe.
There are signs that Belgium’s reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership.
Complaints about Belgium’s exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to
perceived influence of a “directoire” of large countries in the EU are examples.
It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in
a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within
Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is
right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in
coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which
Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.
POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and
a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in
Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van
Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the
confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His most likely
successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that
reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes
the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In
essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should
live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and
social rights. The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007
elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to
be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final
compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme’s coalition in the first
part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid
embarrassment during Belgium’s EU presidency will motivate them to find the
necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.
INTEREST IN ENHANCED AFRICA COOPERATION
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial
power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi. As
such, the GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging
security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC,
promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the
region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing
sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation
between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate
in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. When you met Belgium’s
former
BRUSSELS 00001580 003 OF 003
foreign minister, Karel De Gucht, last February, you discussed naming a
bilateral task force to meet in Washington to discuss security sector reform in
the DRC. This has not yet occurred, because the Belgians opted to wait until the
new USG Africa team was in place. We are now ready to move ahead with this. In
November, Belgium announced an increase in assistance to Burundi, making it the
largest bilateral donor to that country. It plans to do the same for the DRC.
MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT
---------------------------------------------
¶8. (S) Belgium has a special interest in nuclear non-proliferation issues
because it participates in NATO’s nuclear forces at the Kleine Brogel air force
base. It rejected a recent overture from Germany to join with the Netherlands,
Italy and Germany to propose to the rest of NATO that nuclear weapons be removed
from those countries (ref B). However, Belgian MOD and MFA officials apparently
had to rein in then-Foreign Minister Leterme when he initially responded too
positively to the idea. Belgium’s official policy rejects a unilateral approach
to disarmament and insists that the issue must be discussed among all NATO
members at one time, with due regard for U.S.-Russian bilateral discussions and
the NPT. The government is also opposing a proposal from the floor of the
Belgian parliament to ban nuclear weapons from Belgian soil.
IRAN SANCTIONS IF NECESSARY
---------------------------
¶9. (C) Belgium shares our concern about Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear
capability. It supports strengthened sanctions in the EU and UN if necessary. In
that case, at least at first, it prefers to see existing sanctions made more
effective, rather than extending them into entirely new areas, with the possible
exception of a conventional arms embargo.
FORMER FM LOUIS MICHEL’S CANDIDACY FOR UNGA PRESIDENT
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶10. (C) One issue the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister may raise is a request
for support for the candidacy of former Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel
for President of the UN General Assembly (ref C). As you know, we do not discuss
our voting intentions for such posts. They have already discussed this issue
with Assistant Secretary Gordon and with Ambassador Gutman. .
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES1235, C) ARGENTINA: CFK'S FIRST TWO

CABINET CHIEFS SAY KIRCHNERS'
Discussing cables
2009-11-20 2010-11-30 CONFIDENTIAL//NOF Embassy Buenos
09BUENOSAIRES1235
16:04 16:04 ORN Aires
VZCZCXYZ0035
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DE RUEHBU #1235/01 3241653

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 201653Z NOV 09
INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL

NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/11/20

TAGS: PGOV PINR AR
SUBJECT: (C) ARGENTINA: CFK'S FIRST TWO CABINET CHIEFS SAY KIRCHNERS'
SHELF-LIFE WILL EXPIRE IN 2011
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1026; BUENOS AIRES 301
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, DCM, DOS, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Over the past six weeks, we have held several
conversations with President Fernandez de Kirchner's first two
Cabinet Chiefs, Alberto Fernandez and Sergio Massa. Both believe
that the Kirchners, despite their recent political successes,
cannot win re-election in 2011. They disagree on whom is next in
line: Fernandez thinks that the next President will be Vice
President Julio Cobos, while Massa believes that Senator Carlos
Reutemann will prevail. Both ex-Cabinet chiefs are (separately)
plotting their futures in a post-Kirchner political landscape.
Massa expanded on earlier comments to us (ref a) on life with the
Kirchners, describing ex-president Nestor Kirchner as a "monster"
and a "psychopath." End Summary.
¶2. (C) We have had several conversations with the first two
Cabinet Chiefs of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK), Alberto
Fernandez and Sergio Massa. The Ambassador had an introductory
meeting with Alberto Fernandez, who served as Cabinet Chief in both
Nestor and CFK's administrations, on October 28, and DCM lunched
with Fernandez on October 2. The Ambassador and DCM also had
dinner with CFK's second cabinet chief Sergio Massa and his wife,
city councilor-elect Malena Galmarini, at the home of Massa's
former Casa Rosada aide, businessman Jorge O'Reilly, on November
¶12. In each of these conversations, the two prominent Peronists,
who during their tenures in the Casa Rosada worked every day with
the Kirchners to run the Argentine government, were quite frank in
expressing their estrangement from the Kirchners and their
pessimism about the first couple's political prospects.
Alberto and Massa Agree: Kirchners Will Lose in 2011
¶3. (C) Massa said that the Kirchners have no chance to capture the
presidency in 2011. When asked to estimate their chances, Massa
replied, "zero." He also discounted the view that the Kirchners
would extend their rule through Chavez-style governance. Massa
said that, for all of its problems, Argentina is not Venezuela.
Its society remained too literate, too middle class, and too
"temperate," and its economy is far more complex and diverse than
Venezuela's oil monoculture. Argentina, he said, would not abide
the Kirchner's attempts to consolidate power through more
autocratic rule. The result of their hardball tactics after the
midterm elections, he argued, was even more negative ratings in the
polls.
¶4. (C) Fernandez predicted that Nestor would be the Kirchners'
presidential candidate in 2011. He claimed that Nestor has a
better reputation for competence than CFK. Fernandez told the DCM
that his soundings on CFK's potential run for re-election
invariably provoked reactions of alarm and exasperation.
¶5. (C) But Nestor cannot possibly win, continued Fernandez,

comparing the former president to Carlos Menem circa 1999. He said
that, like Menem ten years ago, Kirchner could hope for no more
than 20 percent of the votes in the first round of the presidential
election. These voters, he continued, are Kirchner
"fundamentalists" whose votes reflect ideological affinity or
association with the various political machines (controlled by
piqueteros, labor leaders, etc.) that remain loyal to the Kirchner
project. Fernandez said that, because Kirchner at this point in
his political career has zero attraction to independent voters, he
could expect to win no more votes in the second round of elections
than he would in the first. Fernandez predicted that Nestor would
run and CFK would increasingly govern from the Left, as that "is
the only constituency that remains to them." He added, though,
that such a strategy was doomed to fail -- "the Left on its own
can't elect anyone to the Presidency in this country," he said.
Alberto and Massa Disagree on Next President
¶6. (C) Massa identified Santa Fe Senator Carlos Reutemann as the

likely presidential winner in 2011. He said that Reutemann's
strategy of lying low was prudent, not a blunder or sign of
indecision as often portrayed in the press. With Reutemann quiet,
the Kirchner machine was focused on pummeling Vice President Cobos
and Buenos Aires Mayor Mauricio Macri. The onslaught, he argued,
would damage both of those potential opponents to a Reutemann
candidacy. When the race really begins, Reutemann would be
well-placed to obtain the Peronist nomination and steamroll the
rest of the field. Massa said that the Peronist race would not
begin in earnest until May 1, 2010, when he said five large
Peronist rallies would mark May Day for the first time in years.
¶7. (C) Alberto Fernandez identified Vice President Cobos as the

next president of Argentina. Fernandez noted that Cobos continues
to be the most popular politician in the country, and is conserving
his advantage intelligently. He expected that Coalicion Civica
leader Elisa Carrio, the runner-up in the 2007 election and a
bitter rival of Cobos, would run in the first round and win a
maximum of 12 percent of the vote, deflating the Vice President's
first-round numbers, but Cobos would come out on top. "It's his
election to lose," concluded Fernandez. He took issue with Massa's
view that Peronists would prevail once they united behind a
candidate. Fernandez, a long-time Peronist activist who headed the
party apparatus in Buenos Aires city for many years, said that his
party only controls the loyalty of 38 percent of the electorate.
Given the Kirchners' continuing control over the party apparatus,
the Peronist candidate, even if it ends up being someone with a
last name that is not Kirchner, would not appeal to non-Peronist
voters in 2011. The party's presidential prospects in the coming
election were therefore, in Fernandez's view, poor.
Massa: Nestor is a Monster and Psychopath
¶8. (C) Massa was scathing in his criticism of the first couple,
especially Nestor. Though he made light of press reports that he
and Kirchner came to blows at the campaign bunker in the pre-dawn
hours after their mid-term defeat last June, he called Nestor "a
psychopath," "a monster," and "a coward" whose bullying approach to
politics masks a deep sense of insecurity and inferiority.
(Massa's wife registered such alarm at these uninhibited comments
that he asked her to "stop making faces at me.") He disputed the
argument that Nestor deserved credit as a savvy tactician,
describing the ex-president as blunder-prone and so convinced of
his own brilliance that he was certain to keep making mistakes.
(We've heard similar comments from Fernandez on Nestor's faltering
political judgment -- ref b.) He said that Nestor could not
relate to others outside the narrow gauge of his own political
ambitions: "Kirchner's not a perverse genius," Massa concluded.
"He is just perverse."
¶9. (C) Massa described his twelve-month term as Cabinet Chief as

an ordeal, as he struggled to deal with a controlling presidential
spouse and a "submissive, withdrawn" President "who would be much
better without Nestor than she is with him." He said that, during
his tenure at the Casa Rosada, he decided to do the Oprah-like
daytime TV show hosted by grand dame Mirtha Legrand. On the set
minutes before the show's taping began, he received a call from
Nestor instructing him to walk off the set because the apolitical
Legrand "was an opposition figure." Massa told him he would do the
show unless his official boss CFK, who was travelling abroad,
instructed him otherwise. He then received three successive calls
from Cabinet members pleading with him not to do the show. Massa
did not follow their advice.
Both Focusing on Post-Kirchner Future
¶10. (C) As for his own plans, Massa confirmed that he plans to run
in 2011 for governor of Buenos Aires province, which could pit him
against midterm winner Francisco de Narvaez, incumbent Daniel
Scioli and labor strongman Hugo Moyano. Massa said that he will
announce his candidacy on the third week of January, the week when
(largely vacationing) Argentines buy the most newspapers.
Fernandez also commented on the Buenos Aires race, opining that
Scioli's political moment had passed. Calling the governor "a nice
guy," he observed that Nestor had used him (by grabbing him as his
slate-mate in the province during the midterms) and then cast him
aside. "Scioli is trapped, and he knows it," Fernandez said.
¶11. (C) Fernandez remains politically active as well. He told

the DCM that he is talking to many political figures within and
outside Peronism, including Cobos and the fellow would-be Peronist
kingmaker, ex-President Eduardo Duhalde. Within the party, he
expressed particular interest in the 40-year-old governor of Salta
province Juan Manuel Urtubey. He said that, despite his belief
that Cobos is likely to win the presidency, he is counseling
Urtubey to throw his hat in the ring. He says that the campaign
strategy would be to nudge Nestor out in the first round for second
place, and then emerge as the Peronist candidate in the run-off
against Cobos. (Comment: It appears that Urtubey, once regarded
as a reliable Kirchner ally, is listening. He agreed to host
Fernandez in a much-photographed visit to Salta on November 14,
fueling speculation that the two were plotting a presidential run.)
Comment: Common Views, Divergent Paths
¶12. (C) Massa and Fernandez have much in common, from their
unique experience in CFK's cabinet to their active roles in the
burgeoning anti-Kirchner movement within Peronism. They are both
generally pro-American in orientation. They do not, however, work
together very closely, and their futures seem quite different.
Fernandez, 50, is low-key and content to operate in the background
while others take the spotlight. The most that he seems to aspire
to is success in behind-the-scenes political kingmaking, which
could restore him to his former status as the country's most
influential political consigliore. Massa, 37, the younger man by
more than a decade, has more ambitious plans. He hopes to win the
Buenos Aires governorship and, eventually, the Argentine
presidency.
MARTINEZ
Viewing cable 09MANAMA642, GENERAL PETRAEUS WITH KING

HAMAD: IRAQ,
Discussing cables
09MANAMA642 2009-11-04 06:06 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Manama
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USMISSION USNATO
COMUSNAVCENT
SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T MANAMA 000642
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: PREL MARR ENRG BA AF IZ IR NATO
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS WITH KING HAMAD: IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, NATO AWACS, ENERGY
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an hour-long meeting on November 1 with

CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, Bahrain's King Hamad said
Arab states need to do more to engage Iraq, discussed
Afghanistan and the positive role India could play, urged
action to stop Iran's nuclear program, and reviewed regional
plans for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. END SUMMARY.
2.(C) IRAQ: King Hamad fully endorsed General Petraeus's

point that increased Arab engagement and influence would help
frustrate Iranian designs in Iraq. He added that the Arabs
need Egyptian and Saudi leadership in this matter and that he
had tried to make this point to the Saudi government, but
with little effect.
3.(C) AFGHANISTAN: General Petraeus praised Bahrain's
commitment of a police company for internal security at FOB
Leatherneck. King Hamad confirmed that he would personally
see the force off at the airport on December 16. This date
will be the 10th anniversary of the King's assuming the
throne, and General Petraeus said that U.S. air assets would
be available on the 16th to transport the company to
Afghanistan. King Hamad inquired about the extent of India's
involvement in Afghanistan and noted that Bahrain saw India
as very positive force in the region. "It's a new era," he
said. "They can be of great help."
4.(C) IRAN: King Hamad pointed to Iran as the source of much

of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He argued
forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear
program, by whatever means necessary. "That program must be
stopped," he said. "The danger of letting it go on is greater
than the danger of stopping it." King Hamad added that in
light of these regional developments, Bahrain was working to
strengthen GCC coordination and its relations with allies and
international organizations. He specifically mentioned NATO
and confirmed that Bahrain had agreed to the Alliance's
request to use Isa Airbase for AWACS missions, although the
detail on numbers and timing have yet to be discussed.
5.(S/NF) BAHRAIN AIR SHOW AND NUCLEAR ENERGY: King Hamad

asked General Petraeus for his help in encouraging U.S.
aircraft manufacturers to participate in the inaugural
Bahrain Air Show, scheduled for January 2010. He said that
France was pushing the Rafale and would be there in force,
although he agreed with Petraeus that the French fighter was
yesterday's technology. Warming to the subject of French
commercial diplomacy and referring to President Sarkozy, King
Hamad said, "The UAE will give him a hard time soon," over
France's proposed deal for nuclear reactors. "They're not
happy with the project he's offered them." King Hamad also
mentioned that Bahrain was studying options for using nuclear
power to generate electricity. He said he had asked the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Public Works to
present him recommendations and invited the Ambassador to
discuss with them possible U.S. involvement. Post will do so.
ERELI
Viewing cable 09MUNICH273, GERMAN ELECTIONS: BAVARIA WINS BIG

INFLUENCE IN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0861
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMZ #0273/01 3100821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060821Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CE, DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN ELECTIONS: BAVARIA WINS BIG INFLUENCE IN
THE NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT
REF: BERLIN 1340
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL CONRAD TRIBBLE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) The Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria has

celebrated the outcome of the federal coalition negotiations,
which awarded the party with three ministries and several
state secretary positions. The outcome appears to have
reinvigorated Horst Seehofer, Bavarian Minister President and
head of the CSU, recovering from a bout with the flu and
worse-than-expected results in the September 27 national
elections. Singling out newly sworn-in Defense Minister zu
Guttenberg for praise, Seehofer expects him to compete
successfully for world attention with new Foreign Minister
and FDP chairman Westerwelle. Seehofer has signaled that he
expects to be working with the FDP for a long time. End
Summary.
CSU Thrilled with Coalition Negotiations Results

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶2. (SBU) "We could not be more satisfied with the outcome,"
Michael Hohenberger, a senior State Chancery contact told us
October 28, adding that "even with a better election result
the CSU could hardly have emerged stronger in the new
cabinet." Although some Bavarian observers have deplored the
fact that the CSU lost ministerial posts in financial and
economic affairs at the Federal level, all agree that having
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg as Defense Minister is a very
positive development. A CSU party senior advisor, Christian
Kattner, told us privately on the same day that he could
"understand Chancellor Merkel's point in giving the Finance
Ministry at this difficult time to an experienced man like
(former Interior Minister) Wolfgang Schaeuble (Christian
Democratic Union ) CDU) rather than to a young man at the
beginning of his political career."
¶3. (C) Kattner insisted that the CSU had left its mark with
regard to substance. M-P Seehofer had promised tax cuts,
which are now in the works, and aid measures for farmers, for
which he obtained an agreement on public aid amounting to 700
million Euros. The CDU/CSU stood united in rejecting FDP
demands they considered too business friendly at the expense
of social justice concerns, he said. Bavarian Justice
Minister Merk, who at the beginning of the coalition
negotiations expressed concerns about FDP "weaknesses" on
internal security and counterterrorism, told the CG October
27 that "she was very comfortable with the results."
Strong CSU Bavarian Line-Up in Berlin
-------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) As for the Cabinet, in addition to zu Guttenberg at

Defense, there is Peter Ramsauer heading the Transportation
Ministry, where he will have national influence and a huge
budget. Ilse Aigner (CSU) remains Minister of Agriculture.
Five of the the parliamentarian State Secretaries are
Bavarian, four from the CSU r and one from the FDP. This
gives the CSU and Bavaria generally important influence at
the sub-Cabinet level and sets up influential and direct
Bavarian connections between the Bundestag and Cabinet. In
the Defense Ministry, well-respected Christian Schmidt
retained his position, as did Gerd Mueller in Agriculture.
Hartmut Koschyk moves to the Finance Ministry, providing the
CSU with important direct influence with Minister Schaeuble.
The 35-year old Andreas Scheuer from Passau will assist Peter
Ramsauer at the Transportation Ministry. The fifth Bavarian
is Max Stadler (FDP), who will support Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP) at the Justice Ministry. A
well-respected lawyer from Passau, Stadler is an excellent
choice and a real legal expert with American experience as a
1993 International Visitor Program alumnus.
Seehofer Expects Long-Term Cooperation with FDP
--------------------------------------------- --
¶5. (SBU) At the CSU party convention on October 26, where

the coalition agreement was approved, MP Seehofer made clear
that the CSU,s main rival will now be the FDP, "which no
longer is a small party but clearly intends to become a
people,s party," he said, predicting "they will be targeting
the same voters as the CSU." The CSU, he added, will have to
act as the guardian of the little people "to ensure that
MUNICH 00000273 002 OF 002
social justice prevails." Later, upon signing the coalition

agreement in Berlin, Seehofer indicated that he intends to
remain in the CSU leadership. Noting that this was the
second time he had signed an agreement with the FDP,
following the agreement in Bavaria one year earlier, he said
he might be able to do the same again for the third and
fourth time in 2013. The media jumped on this statement
since it insinuated that Seehofer had given up hope of the
CSU regaining its absolute majority in the 2013 Bavarian
state elections. "This statement might come back to haunt
him," one journalist commented.
Comment
-------
¶6. (C) Bavarian leaders are strong at home and in Berlin.

Contrary to media speculation, Horst Seehofer remains
uncontested as CSU chairman and Bavarian Minister-President.
Our contacts in the party, State Chancery and CSU caucus
unanimously rejected speculation about an imminent revolt
against his leadership, although several acknowledge there
will be discussions of a possible change in 2011 in
preparation for the next Bavarian election in 2013. In the
capital, Defense Minister zu Guttenberg will be a serious
competitor to Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle on the
diplomatic parquet. In foreign and security affairs, zu
Guttenberg is better connected in Washington, fluent in
English, and more experienced in the key issues. Moreover,
his good relations with the USG, which started in Bavaria,
extend beyond the Department of State to the Department of
Defense and Congress, notably through the vehicle of the
annual Munich Security Conference (next iteration February
5-7, 2010), where he is a regular and prominent organizer and
participant.
TRIBBLE
Viewing cable 09PARIS1473, SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO PARIS --

NOVEMBER 8,
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO7742
DE RUEHFR #1473/01 3071139
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031139Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019

TAGS: PREL NATO PARM MOPS SENV KGHG AF FR RU PK
IR, GV, SG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO PARIS -- NOVEMBER 8,
2009
PARIS 00001473 001.3 OF 004
Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Charles H. Rivkin, for reasons

1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Madam Secretary, your Paris Embassy and

the French are eager to welcome you to
France. FM Kouchner quickly invited you to lunch or a
meeting on Sunday, which is not a usual practice.
He looks forward to talking with you about key issues,
including Afghanistan, Iran, and relations with Russia.
Kouchner recently visited Afghanistan, and he will
undoubtedly be interested in hearing your insights
about recent developments there and your views on Pakistan.
France is our strongest ally in pursuing a
dual track policy with Iran, and has been helpful in rallying
Europe to a more clear-eyed assessment of Iran's
nuclear ambitions. Paris welcomed the U.S. "reset" with
Russia and views Moscow as a strategic partner
that cannot be ignored. End Summary.
--------------------
SARKOZY AND KOUCHNER
--------------------
¶2. (S/NF) FM Kouchner, coming from the opposition Socialist

Party, is regularly polled as one of the
most popular French politicians and is a high-profile example
of Sarkozy's successful policy of outreach to
the leaders of other political parties. He has a solid
working relationship with the demanding French President.
Kouchner has also carved out specific areas where he has
largely free rein and which play to his strengths and
previous experience, including in humanitarian affairs, the
Balkans, and democratization efforts. Despite these
positives, we have occasionally witnessed lapses in
communication between the two offices due to Sarkozy's
tendency to seize the initiative and "speak first, consult
later" and his penchant for proposing high-level
summits to cut through bureaucratic red tape.
¶3. (S/NF) Both Sarkozy and Kouchner are committed to a

strong Europe with a strong transatlantic
relationship with the U.S. Both see Europe as our closest,
most natural partner in fighting terrorism
in Afghanistan and piracy on the high seas, or promoting
peace as part of the Middle East Peace process
quartet, fighting Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, and in
stabilizing the Balkans. Likewise, they view France,
and neighboring Germany, as the natural leaders of Europe.
Kouchner and Sarkozy both have a pragmatic approach to
problems, characterized by a high degree of "hands on"
personal involvement in the issues that interest them.
Your visit will give FM Kouchner an opportunity to showcase
his close ties to you and to the Obama
administration, vindicating France's unabashed "pro-American"
stance, which is a significant reversal
from the Chirac years when France defined its power more in
opposition to, rather than collaboration with, the
United States.
-------------------------------------------
AFGHANISTAN: SAME GOALS, LIMITED RESOURCES
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) FM Kouchner was in Afghanistan on October 17-18 on

a "purely political" trip designed to consult
with the main presidential candidates and to move the
electoral process forward. He cooperated closely
with Senator Kerry to send a combined message of support for
the acceptance of a second round of voting.
Afghanistan remains a high foreign policy priority for the
French government, but they have difficulty
translating their interest into additional concrete military
and civilian support. French government
officials, including both President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner,
have long advocated that "there is no
purely military solution" to Afghanistan. When it comes to
putting resources behind the statement,
however, the French government has limited options, due to
political maneuvering and real economic
constraints. As a sop to his own party in exchange for
support for French reintegration into NATO this
April, Sarkozy has publicly and repeatedly promised "not to
send one extra soldier" to fight an
unpopular war in Afghanistan. This is now a political line
French leaders will not cross, although their
military has privately expressed both the will and the
capacity for further contributions. To
compensate, the GOF is currently shifting some of its troops
from a security posture in Kabul
PARIS 00001473 002.2 OF 004
to more active combat roles in the east, where the bulk of

their 3,000 troops are now located. In March,
President Sarkozy created France's first
politically-appointed Special Representative to Afghanistan
and Pakistan,
a post now held by Sarkozy crony UMP deputy Thierry Mariani.
Kouchner fought this appointment
in favor of a career diplomat because political appointments
in the French parliamentary system
are limited to six months in length, limiting the
effectiveness of the position as it currently
functions.
¶5. (C/NF) There is great interest, particularly within the

MFA and from Kouchner personally,
to increase French civilian development assistance to
Afghanistan, with a focus on raising the salaries
of Afghan police and other security forces. However, these
goals are tempered by very limited
resources. After a battle with the Finance Ministry, the MFA
succeeded in restoring French
civilian assistance to Afghanistan to previous modest levels
of 40 million euros (58.4 million U.S. dollars)
after budget cuts threatened to limit French assistance to
only 10 million Euros this year (about 14.6 million U.S.
dollars). One additional area for growth is the deployment
by December 1 of the bulk of the 150 French gendarmes
who make up part of the European Gendarmerie Force for police
training. They will be joined soon by Italian
carabinieri and possibly small contributions from other
countries in the coming year. President Sarkozy is
expected to finally take a long-delayed trip to the region
next spring.
¶6. (C/NF) In September, the French President joined his

German and UK counterparts to propose a conference on
Afghanistan by the end of the year. Kouchner wanted to bring
other Foreign Ministers to Paris to meet you to
pursue this European goal. French officials have since
stated that if the security situation allows, they would
like the conference to take place in Kabul as soon as
possible, with a possible second session taking place
later, after the Afghan government is better able to
prioritize its work plan and strategy.
--------------------------------------
PAKISTAN: COIN AND CIVILIAN LOANS
--------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) On Pakistan, the French are relative newcomers

who have requested close cooperation with the UK and United
States, particularly in areas of counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency assistance. France is providing
military assistance and security cooperation to Pakistan, in
addition to civilian emergency and humanitarian aid.
Paris officials complain that Pakistani cooperation in
combating the Afghan Taliban refuged in their country
is weak, if not non-existent. France has given about five
million euros (7.3 million U.S. dollars) in emergency and
reconstruction assistance to Pakistan this year. France has
also increased its concessionary loan commitments to Pakistan
since the April Tokyo conference from 200 to 382 million
euros (573 million U.S. dollars). The loans cover
nine projects in the areas of hydroelectricity and energy
efficiency. France is still also dispensing funds
made under soft loans worth 11 million euros (16 million U.S.
dollars) for post-earthquake reconstruction; it is not yet
ready to contribute to the World Bank-administered
multi-donor trust fund for Pakistan as it was not clear who
their
partners on the Pakistani side would be and what safeguards
there would be over the funds.
--------------------------------------
IRAN: FEARS THAT WE ARE LOSING GROUND
--------------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) In their October 14 phone call, Presidents

Sarkozy and Obama agreed that if Iran
responds negatively to the uranium enrichment deal on the
table, then we must take more serious measures, including
additional sanctions. Senior French officials believe that
we are losing traction on this issue within the
international community, as countries continue to engage in
normal diplomatic and commercial relations
with Iran (exemplified by Chinese business interests, Turkish
PM Erdogan's recent visit to Iran, and Iranian
President Ahmedinejad's planned trip to Brazil in late
November). Sarkozy's position is bolstered by his staunch
PARIS 00001473 003.2 OF 004
belief in non-proliferation (to maintain France's own

deterrent capability), his real concern about the threat to
Israel, and his personal ire at the way Iran has tried to
manipulate France, including by holding French citizen
Clotilde Reiss and Franco-Iranian dual national Nazak Afshar
for alleged illegal participation in this summer's
street protests. Some senior French officials have suggested
that Sarkozy's tough line can be useful as "the
pointy edge of the sword" in meeting the Iranian challenge.
As we plan next steps on Iran, Kouchner will
likely be interested in your readout of your recent
discussions in Moscow as well as the latest efforts to
bring China on board.
------------------------------------------
PUSHING ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA
------------------------------------------
¶9. (C/NF) French policy toward Russia under President

Sarkozy reflects the belief that engagement with Moscow is
the best way to influence Russian behavior. Paris has
welcomed U.S. efforts to "re-set" relations with Russia and
has consistently emphasized developing a common approach with
Washington toward Moscow. French officials maintain
that dialogue must underpin our efforts to elicit Moscow's
cooperation; this is particularly true on European
security, an area in which Sarkozy -- who last year proposed
an OSCE summit on the issue -- seeks to exert
French leadership. French priorities for strategic dialogue
with Moscow include promoting economic
cooperation; encouraging Russia to work through institutions
with set rules; supporting Russian
actions in public while taking a more honest approach in
private meetings; and cultivating relations with Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev, in the hope that he can become a
leader independent of Vladimir Putin. Putin is due in
Paris later this month, Sarkozy will go to Moscow in
February, and Medvedev will visit France in March 2010.
-----------------------------------------
AN URGENT FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) The French remain divided on how to respond to the

Obama Administration's approaches to climate change.
Most of the interested public and many in the government
believe that interim 2020 reduction targets, and the level
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and concentrations at that
time, will determine success or failure in slowing
global warming. For them, the EU's target of 20 to 30
percent reductions below 1990 is the sole measure of an
acceptable policy. Even sophisticated observers are
skeptical that long-term reduction goals legislated in the
United States can be counted on as more than aspirations,
especially if radical cuts are not imposed up front. We
have reiterated that U.S. laws are reliably enforced by the
Federal government and by U.S. courts, using the Clean
Air Act as our example. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officials agree that legislation moving through Congress
and the Administration's proposals would establish a system
comparable to the EU's measures. These officials
regard Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo's public
criticisms of Waxman-Markey as "insufficient on the medium
term goal" as distracting attention from the need for China
and India to reduce their rates of growth in GHG
emissions.
------------------------------------------
WANTS TO BE A PLAYER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
------------------------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) The GOF is eager to engage with the United

States on the Middle East peace process and worries we are
not moving fast enough. President Sarkozy and FM Kouchner
continue to press for a Middle East peace summit before the
end of the year, to be held under the auspices of the Union
for the Mediterranean, of which Egypt and France are
currently co-chairs. A sense of frustration and ambition
informs the French approach toward the Middle East peace
process: they are frustrated that they must rely on the USG
and on stubborn parties in the region to end a conflict
whose persistence adversely affects their national interests,
and they are ambitious to play a larger role in
the peace process, in order to facilitate a successful
outcome and to enjoy the prestige that such a role would
earn them. As a case in point, last week Kouchner had to
cancel a planned visit to Israel and the Palestinian
territories in part because of the continuing tension there,
and in part because of Israel's refusal to allow him
PARIS 00001473 004.2 OF 004
to visit a French hospital in Gaza. Nonetheless, aside from

their criticism of the pace at which we have proceeded
with negotiations, French officials continue to take concrete
steps to support our efforts to broker peace among
the various states and groups in the region: they have
consistently affirmed our leadership role in their own
bilateral contacts, in multilateral fora, and in public and
private statements.
--------------------------------------------- ------
INCREASING CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. FOCUS ON DISARMAMENT
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶12. (S/NF) French officials are increasingly concerned that

the Obama administration's commitment to an eventual
"world free of nuclear weapons" represents a divergence from
the French position on a strong deterrence policy.
Furthermore, they worry that a focus on disarmament goals by
legitimate nuclear weapons states will pressure them to
cut their own modest arsenal and will serve as a distraction
from serious proliferation concerns by states
like North Korea and Iran. The GOF would like to use every
available forum, including the 2010 NPT Review Conference,
to strongly and specifically rebuke Iran and North Korea (and
were greatly disappointed by our decision not to do so
at the September 24 UNSC summit). Additionally, France is
"psychologically" committed to a deterrent force
as a symbol of its strategic independence and they will
strive to maintain the "legitimacy" of nuclear weapons as a
key element of military strategy. Any suggestion that
bilateral U.S.-Russian arms reduction talks should
eventually include other nuclear powers, or that an FMCT
should address existing stockpiles, are absolute redlines
for the French.
-------------------------------------
A PARTNER IN AFRICA
-------------------------------------
¶13. (C) France is struggling somewhat to implement Sarkozy's

vision of a new approach to Africa, in part
because of recent governance crises in a number of
Francophone countries, including Mauritania, Gabon,
Madagascar, Niger, and Guinea, where the need for expediency
in bringing stability can sometimes trump
loftier principles. We are still waiting to see if France
will, in fact close down one of its military bases on the
Atlantic side, in Senegal or Gabon in an effort to streamline
its presence in Africa. That said, France is a
progressively more open interlocutor on Africa and there are
many areas where we are working closely, including
pushing for a transitional government in Guinea, supporting
efforts to deter sexual violence, and, increasingly,
coordinating on addressing the AQIM threat in Mali and
Mauritania. The MFA's initial response to our new Sudan
strategy is positive. France, as the leader of the EU's anti
piracy effort off the Horn of Africa is an
important partner on counter-piracy and maritime security
issues.
RIVKIN
Viewing cable 09SAOPAULO653, Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to

Brazil: Sao Paulo's Muslims
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09SAOPAULO653.
09SAOPAULO653 2009-11-20 12:12 2010-11-29 09:09 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Sao Paulo
R 201218Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
CONFIDENTIAL SAO PAULO 000653
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SR FARAH PANDITH, KAREN CHANDLER AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO

AMCONSUL RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20

TAGS: PGOV OEXC OIIP PHUM PINR PINS PROP SCUL PTER BR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for SR Farah Pandith's Visit to Brazil: Sao Paulo's Muslims
REF: SAO PAULO 433 SAO PAULO 421 BRASILIA 709 2008 SAO PAULO 542
Classified By: David C. Brooks, State POL; Reason: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (U) Post is delighted to host Special Representative (SR) Farah Pandith’s
first visit to Latin America, November 22-23. Brazil offers a unique context for
engaging the local Muslim communities. The country hosts a significant (400-500
thousand) Muslim minority that lives within a larger society that has
historically taken great pride in both its diversity and tradition of cultural
and religious tolerance. Sao Paulo hosts Brazil’s largest Muslim community, a
combination of both older and more recent Arab immigrants (mostly from Lebanon)
as well as some Africans and Brazilian converts. Engaging this group in the
midst of Brazil’s famous “melting pot” context can generate opportunities for
making connections not available elsewhere and will likely echo favorably with
non-Muslim
Brazilians. Brazil’s Muslims By the Numbers (Such as They Are)
¶2. (U) Statistics on Brazil’s Muslim population vary widely. A year 2000 census
lists only 27,000 Muslims in the country. Spokesmen for the country’s Muslim
community have sometimes put this figure as high as 1-2 million. Most
knowledgeable observers calculate that there are 400-500 thousand Muslims in
Brazil. (Muslim community members universally lament the lack of hard data on
their own numbers, due, in part, they say to flaws in the Brazilian census
methodology.) The majority are Sunnis of Lebanese descent. Many of these
immigrants’ families arrived decades ago and have set strong roots in Brazil. A
more recent group of immigrants has complemented these earlier flows. The new
immigrants are frequently also from Lebanon, but they are poorer and far more
Shiite. Their politics is more radical and they frequently look to Hezbollah for
leadership. The Consulate does not have contact with this latter group, which
tends to keep its distance from us.
Consulate Engagement: A Work in Progress
¶3. (C) For several years, the Consulate has sought greater engagement with Sao
Paulo’s various Muslim groups (Refs A-E). Working closely with the Lebanese
Consul General, Joseph Sayah, we have developed an increasing network of friends
among Sheiks and community leaders in the Sunni community, including an ability
to dialogue with some Sunni Fundamentalists who hold highly critical views of
the United States. We continue to try to make inroads into women and youth
groups, but this is difficult in an essentially conservative, hierarchical
community where even friendly Sheiks tend to guard their flocks closely, youth
often enter family businesses and, as yet, women do not play overt leadership
roles. Your visit offers us an opportunity to increase this engagement by
highlighting both Washington-based programs and giving a Washington push to
ideas we have developed locally.
¶4. (U) What follows is a description of broad trends in Brazil’s Muslim

communities built around data points developed from our own experiences. This
account includes data from only two trips outside Sao Paulo, a gap we intend to
close in the coming year as we promote Muslim engagement as part of our normal
political travel in our district.
The Lebanese Connection
¶5. (C) Heavy Lebanese immigration to Brazil, most of which was Maronite
Christian, has shaped Brazil’s Muslim community in important ways. Most of the
Lebanese who are here are descended from earlier generation immigrants who extol
the virtues of a tolerant Lebanon where Christians, Jews and Muslims mixed with
ease. This is a cornerstone of this community and has only been reinforced by
Brazil’s own broad traditions of cultural tolerance. Many Lebanese Brazilians
would like to see this spirit brought back to the country of their
ancestors/their country of origin. A key figure in this effort is Lebanon’s Sao
Paulo-based Consul General, Joseph Sayah. A Maronite Christian with fluent
Arabic and an intimate understanding of Islam, he actively maintains contacts
with a wide range of actors in the Brazil’s Islamic communities, promoting
moderation. The social events he sponsors put this tolerance on remarkable
display. In his hands, Lebanese National Day becomes a virtual celebration of
religious comity, with Lebanese Jews, Christians and Muslims all hugging and
conversing in fluent Arabic. Sayah is a close friend of the Consulate and a key
interlocutor in reaching out to disaffected Muslims who would rather keep their
distance from us.
America at Arms-Length: the Sunnis of San Bernardo
¶6. (C) The San Bernardo suburb of Sao Paulo is home to a Sunni mosque that is
run by Jihad Hammadeh, a Lebanese Sheik who speaks excellent Portuguese. For
this reason, he frequently appears in local media speaking out on Islamic or
Middle Eastern issues (often criticizing what he sees as unfair stereotyping of
Muslims in global media). Hammadeh also works for two organizations that are
dedicated to the spread of Islam in Latin America: the Center for the
Propagation of Islam in Latin America (CDIAL) and the World Assembly of Muslim
Youth (WAMY). The latter was originally financed by the Saudi Monarchy, but
sources indicate that that funding has dried up in recent years. The San
Bernardo Mosque gives classes in both Islam and Arabic language to those
interested and makes strong efforts to convert Brazilians to Islam.
¶7. (C) Hammadeh meets with us, but never attends our events and keeps us at
arm’s-length. When we have suggested visiting his Arabic language classes, he
has demurred. When during a recent visit SP’s Jared Cohen talked about creating
cyber-linkages between Brazilian Muslims and U.S. Muslims, Hammadeh said that
this should take place through individual Sheiks (Ref B). Hammadeh is generally
moderate in his public pronouncements, but various sources indicate that the
Islamic line he promotes among followers is strongly fundamentalist. Modern
Islam: Sheik Houssam Al-Boustani
¶8. (U) Sheik Al-Boustani teaches a class for young Brazilians interested in
learning Arabic and learning about Islam under the auspices of the Lebanese
Future Movement. Boustani studied Islam in India and has lived in Brazil for
nine years. He is an extremely enthusiastic and energetic teacher who peppers
his lessons on the Koran and on Arabic language with self-deprecating humor. His
students, which he says number seventy-five at any one time, are generally young
Brazilian professionals who are attracted to what Boustani calls his version of
“modern” Islam. Boustani is most welcoming to us and has had Poloff as a guest
in his classes. He has also worked on a number of inter-faith initiatives,
including the Abraham Path Project, consulting for a Brazilian TV movie (a
fictional romance) about a Jewish Holocaust survivor and an Arab woman who marry
in Brazil after World War II, and co-teaching a course on religion with a Rabbi
and a Catholic Priest. Finally, he has recently published a book about Mohammed
in Portuguese and is working on a book on Islam in Brazil.
¶9. (C) Boustani’s openness is sincere, but did not necessarily come naturally
to him. According to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, it is the product of a long
process. Boustani has a tough-hewn past. He is a former amateur boxer, and he
fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. When he arrived here nine years ago,
according to Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah, he was quite extreme in his views. Over
time, he has moderated considerably. His teaching style, as witnessed by Conoff,
is expertly pitched for young Brazilians attracted to Islam but who also dress
stylishly and require/respond to a highly entertaining presentation of religious
ideas. Boustani himself has said that Islamic outreach in Brazil has to engage
other religious traditions. He also admires some aspects of Brazil’s Evangelical
Christian communities, which he says have become experts at reaching humble folk
with a mass message. (Note: Boustani is presently in Lebanon, but we are
attempting to arrange a meeting with his students. End Note.)
Anti-American Attitudes
¶10. (SBU) While Brazil’s Islamic community is peaceful and has many friendly
elements, it also contains reservoirs of strong suspicion of the U.S. In an
August meeting, Sheik Yamani of the Mosque in Londrina (an interior city in
Parana State) told Poloff that Bin Laden’s involvement in the 9-11 attacks on
the Twin Towers had never been proven. (When Poloff pointed out that Bin Laden
had bragged about the same on television, Sheik Yamani replied, “Such things can
be doctored.”) The Sheik, a 31 year old of Portuguese descent, proved otherwise
quite friendly, inviting Poloff to attend Friday services at his Londrina
Mosque. He appeared to represent a conservative strain of Euro-Islam, evidenced
by his and his wife’s highly conservative dress. Poloff has also taken pains to
correct other myths that abound among some Muslim contacts, such as the story
that former President Bush is the grandson of a U.S.-based Pastor Bush, who
wrote a book condemning Islam in the 19th century.
The Radicals
¶11. (C) While the majority of Brazil’s Muslims are moderate in orientation and
the overwhelming majority is moderate in deed and action, genuine radical
elements do exist here, some in the Tri-Border area of Foz de Iguacu and others
among Sao Paulo’s estimated 20,000-strong, Hezbollah-oriented Shia population.
Muslims at the moderate, Sunni-oriented Future Institute charge that Shia
immigrants sometimes come to Brazil with Hezbollah support (allegedly USD 50,000
is a typical sum) to found businesses to support Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Reasons to Engage
¶12. (C) The Brazilian-Lebanese context provides an excellent double background

of tolerance that already promotes a high degree of mixing between Brazil’s
Muslims and the rest of the society. Engaging moderate Muslims puts radicals on
the defensive and opens conduits of communication that could lead to greater
information about more distant elements of the community given over to greater
radicalism. Work with friendly moderates should not be seen as separate from
monitoring more threatening elements. While Brazil’s tiny, Hezbollah-oriented
Shia population is a legitimate concern, Lebanon CG Joseph Sayah also told
Poloff to “not lose sight of the Sunnis.” (Note. Sunnis outnumber Shiites in
Brazil by about ten to one. End Note.) Sayah described how some young
Brazilians, either of Arab background or not, have become attracted to
fundamentalist versions of Islam. While beliefs do not translate directly into
action, such conversions can create a climate for the growth of fanaticism. Al-
Boustani’s version of “modern Islam” is tailored to counter that. "By expressing
a willingness to engage all groups, we make it more difficult for extremists to
try to create the kind of closed atmosphere that enables their recruiting".
¶13. (C) Toward this end, Post has suggested several possible programs,
including a campaign to provide consular information to Muslim contacts, a
series of outreach presentations on President Obama, and, most important, our
desire to bring down a visiting U.S. Sheik who can explain how Islam is now a
vital part of American society and build ties with local religious leaders.
Given its size, diversity and traditions of cultural tolerance, Brazil could be
an excellent testing ground for programs that might be useful to other WHA posts
with similar Muslim minority populations. White
Viewing cable 09STATE119085, WALK-IN GUIDANCE FOR 2009:
HANDLING
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09STATE119085.
VZCZCXRO1706
PP RUEHAG RUEHAO RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHBZ RUEHCD RUEHCHI RUEHCI RUEHCN
RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDT RUEHDU RUEHFK RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGH
RUEHHA RUEHHM RUEHHO RUEHHT RUEHIHL RUEHKN RUEHKSO RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHMC RUEHMJ RUEHMR RUEHMRE RUEHMT RUEHNEH RUEHNG
RUEHNH RUEHNL RUEHNP RUEHPA RUEHPB RUEHPT RUEHPW RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHRS RUEHSL RUEHTM RUEHTRO RUEHVC
DE RUEHC #9085/01 3221739
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181729Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0913
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 2404
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY 6949
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY
SECRET//NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2034

TAGS: ASEC CVIS PINR PREF
SUBJECT: WALK-IN GUIDANCE FOR 2009: HANDLING

FOREIGN NATIONAL WALK-INS, DEFECTORS, AND ASYLUM
SEEKERS
REF: (A) 08 STATE 061194

(B) 7 FAM 180
(C) 09 STATE 030541
(D) 04 STATE 061816
(E) 2 FAM 227
(F) 08 STATE 110175
(G) 09 STATE 110904
(H) 9 FAM 42.1 N4, PN2-5, and PN7
(U) Classified by: David Appleton, Director,

INR/CCS, Reason: 1.4 (c, d).
SUMMARY AND TABLE OF CONTENTS
¶1. (S/NF) This telegram replaces Ref A as the

Department's comprehensive guidance on handling
foreign national walk-ins, defectors, and asylum
seekers - all of whom are generally referred to in
this telegram as "walk-ins." This telegram was
coordinated with interagency partners, including
CIA, DHS, DIA, and the FBI. It explains the
procedures for receiving walk-ins; determining
whether they are of intelligence value and whether
defector, temporary refuge, protection,
resettlement, parole, or other status is
appropriate; and coordinating an appropriate
response. A link to this telegram will be included
in the Chief of Mission (COM) Guide on ClassNet
(http://diplomaps.state.sgov.gov/com). (For
guidance on handling U.S. citizens requesting
emergency protection ("temporary refuge") at posts,
see Ref B.)
¶2. (S/NF) COMs should ensure that all post

personnel are properly prepared to handle walk-ins.
Post management, RSO, and GRPO have the most
responsibility for ensuring proper handling of
walk-ins, but other officers may play critical
roles.
¶3. (S/NF) Correct handling of walk-ins is

important for three principal reasons. Walk-ins
(1) may be sources of invaluable intelligence; (2)
pose numerous security challenges; and (3) may need
protection. Improper handling of walk-ins can put
them and post personnel at risk and result in the
loss of important intelligence. Thus, post's
procedures must be clear, well-understood, and
workable at any hour, day or night.
¶4. (U) Questions or comments regarding the

guidance in this telegram should normally be
directed by telegram to INR/CCS, which will
coordinate a Department response. If additional
guidance is required in an emergency walk-in
situation, however, post should contact the
Department's Operations Center (202-647-1512
highlighting),
which will alert the appropriate Department
personnel.
¶5. (U) This telegram contains the following

sections:
¶A. - Storage and dissemination of this telegram

(paragraph 6)
¶B. - Post preparation for handling walk-ins
(paragraphs 7-23)
¶C. - Procedures for handling walk-in arrivals
(paragraphs 24-33)
¶D. - Requirements for reporting on walk-ins
(paragraphs 34-39)
¶E. - Temporary refuge guidance and cautions
(paragraphs 40-52)
¶F. - Long-term options for walk-ins(paragraphs 53-
63)
¶G. - Travel assistance for walk-ins(paragraphs 64-
65)
END SUMMARY.
Section A. STORAGE AND DISSEMINATION OF THIS

TELEGRAM
¶6. (U) Posts should retain this telegram in the

RSO's files and in a location accessible to duty
officers, replacing and destroying Ref A and any
other prior versions. RSOs should ensure that all
officers have read this telegram and know where it
is retained.
Section B. POST PREPARATION FOR HANDLING WALK-INS
¶7. (S/NF) Each post's Counterintelligence Working

Group (CIWG) should meet upon receipt of this
telegram to review post's procedures for dealing
with walk-ins. The CIWG should ensure that post's
procedures are consistent with the guidance in this
telegram and local security concerns, include
appropriate defensive security measures, and allow
screened walk-ins to meet securely with appropriate
post officials.
¶8. (S/NF) Post's walk-ins procedures should

include (1) special procedures for the reception of
embassy (including consular section) walk-ins of
possible intelligence value; (2) procedures for
constituent posts, if any; and (3) procedures for
approaches at residences, in vehicles, on the
street, via telephone, and through both electronic
and hand-delivered mail. Heightened security at
USG installations increases the possibility of
approaches to USG officials outside USG facilities.
Because of the inherent risks, however, post
procedures should permit arranging substantive
meetings outside post only in exceptional
circumstances and only after approval of the COM
based on the recommendations of the RSO and GRPO.
¶9. (S/NF) Post's procedures must allow for

appropriately balancing the following
considerations which may come into play in walk-in
cases:
(a) post security;

(b) the safety of the individual;
(c) the intelligence value and bona fides of the
individual;
(d) whether the individual requires protection and,
if so, whether appropriate protection is available
from international organizations or host-country
sources;
(e) whether the individual should be resettled
outside the host-country and, if so, whether
resettlement in another country or the United
States is possible;
(f) the time available for resolution of the case;
and
(g) the need to safeguard the confidentiality of
any information that may have a bearing on a future
consular-related activity or possible resettlement
request.
¶10. (S/NF) Post's procedures must be cleared by

the RSO and coordinated with the GRPO and, at posts
with an FBI Legal Attache (LEGATT), with the
LEGATT. (All three should be on post's CIWG.)
Post's RSO should update post's walk-in plan with
the GRPO and LEGATT, if any, on a semi-annual basis
or as needed.
¶11. (S/NF) RSOs should ensure that all relevant

potential participants in handling walk-ins are
appropriately briefed and trained. Non-cleared
personnel can be told that a USG official will
interview walk-ins, because that fact is not
classified. The fact that a walk-in may be
referred to other post officials for a decision on
further actions is classified and may not be shared
with non-cleared personnel. All briefings should
emphasize the importance of ensuring that the walk-
in is fully screened, but should also convey that
legitimate walk-ins may exhibit nervous or anxious
behavior, particularly because access controls and
host nation security forces around many of our
diplomatic posts make it difficult for walk-ins to
approach our facilities discreetly. All briefings
should also stress the importance of not drawing
attention to the walk-in or alerting host nation
security personnel.
¶12. (S/NF) RSO briefings should include (1)

briefing those who may have first contact with a
walk-in - including non-USG local guards and
receptionists - on the procedures to follow at
first contact; (2) providing additional briefings
to MSGs, other USG security personnel, and USG duty
officers on a semi-annual basis or as needed on
more sensitive aspects of the program; (3) briefing
consular officers on handling walk-ins who approach
through a consular service window; and (4) briefing
all arriving cleared USG personnel on the
procedures for approaches that occur off post
premises (as part of the arrival briefing).
¶13. (S/NF) To ensure that walk-ins can communicate

their wishes clearly, post may wish to prepare
language cards that can be shown at first contact
to a walk-in who does not speak English, giving
options from which the walk-in can select. One
option should be "I wish to speak with an American
official." Other options should be plausible
alternatives, such as "I wish to obtain information
about travel requirements." In addition to the
local language, post should consider having such
cards available in priority interest languages such
as Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Farsi, Mandarin, and
Korean, as appropriate in light of the local
environment.
¶14. (S/NF) The RSO should incorporate post's

procedures into the MSG and local guard orders as
necessary.
¶15. (S/NF) Posts should designate a room,

preferably outside the Public Access Control (PAC)
hard-line, for conducting the initial interview of
a walk-in.
¶16. (S/NF) Post should have an interview guide

that can be used during the initial interview, and
should maintain a current roster of cleared USG
personnel who can provide interpretation services
to assist the RSO and others in interviewing walk-
ins as required.
¶17. (S/NF) Post procedures should clearly identify

the officer who will do the initial interview of a
walk-in, and a backup for when that officer is
absent. (These are normally the RSO and Assistant
RSO.) These officials should have a prearranged
signal and appropriate contact numbers for
notifying GRPO of a walk-in of possible
intelligence value.
¶18. (S/NF) MSGs, local guards, and receptionists

should have a codeword or pre-arranged signal to
alert the RSO (or other designated officer) of a
person requesting to speak with a U.S. officer.
¶19. (U) Post should verify that current phone

numbers, addresses, and directions for host
government offices that handle refugee claims and
the local offices of the UNHCR and UNDP are
included in post's walk-in procedures and the duty
officer handbook. This information should also be
readily available as a handout for walk-ins.
¶20. (U) Post procedures should contain current

information on the host government's legal
obligations towards persons claiming to be refugees
or to be in danger of being tortured. These
obligations may arise from the host country's
domestic law and/or treaty obligations. States
party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969
African Union Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa have agreed
not to expel or return refugees, as defined in
those instruments, from their territory under
certain circumstances. States party to the 1987
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment have
agreed not to expel or return an individual from
their territory to another country where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he/she would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.
¶21. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO should coordinate any

operational tests of walk-in procedures.
¶22. (S/NF) RSOs should review walk-in procedures

with constituent posts and ensure that they are
properly prepared to handle walk-ins. This should
include ensuring that constituent post's procedures
are also incorporated into local guard orders as
necessary.
¶23. (S/NF) Posts without an RSO, GRPO, or

UNHCR/UNDP presence in-country should promptly
develop additional post-specific guidance to ensure
that the guidance in this telegram is adjusted to
fit their situation.
Section C. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING WALK-IN

ARRIVALS
¶24. (S/NF) The MSG, local guard, receptionist, or

other employee or official who first makes contact
with the walk-in should ascertain whether the walk-
in wishes to talk with the USG official, using the
language cards as necessary. If so, they should
use the pre-arranged signal to inform the USG
official designated to deal with walk-ins (normally
the RSO or Assistant RSO) as soon as possible.
Posts with MSGs may wish to instruct non-USG local
guards, receptionists, and others likely to be a
walk-in's first point of contact to refer a walk-in
who wishes to speak with a USG official to the MSG,
and then have the MSG involve the RSO.
¶25. (C) Post's first priority must be to determine

whether the individual is carrying a weapon,
device, or hazardous material that endangers post
personnel. Walk-ins must be screened and searched
before being permitted within the security
perimeter. If a walk-in possesses any object or
item that appears suspicious or potentially
hazardous, security personnel should deny access
even if the walk-in presents the item as evidence
of some intelligence he offers, e.g., red mercury
presented as proof of plutonium enrichment.
Security personnel are not required to prove that
an object, item, or material is hazardous to refuse
entry to the walk-in. Only DS-supplied and/or DS-
approved instruments should be used to examine
suspect material. Posts should follow established
DS and Department procedures for screening and
reporting suspect materials, e.g., white powder
incidents. In the event post encounters material
or information relating to alleged radioactive
materials, please refer to Ref C for comprehensive
interagency approved guidance.
¶26. (C) The walk-in's identification and/or travel

documents should be copied as soon as the walk-in
is screened in, if at all possible. Otherwise, the
papers should be copied before the end of the walk-
in's initial interview. Identifying and keeping
records of walk-ins is important for security and
intelligence reasons; copying their identity
documents early is advisable because walk-ins may
get cold feet and leave if kept waiting for an
interview.
¶27. (S/NF) After the walk-in has been searched,

the RSO or designated alternate must interview the
walk-in, using post's interview guide. The RSO
should attempt to establish the individual's bona
fides. (Walk-ins may in fact be mentally disturbed
persons, intelligence vendors, fabricators,
provocateurs from hostile intelligence services, or
persons gathering information on behalf of
terrorist organizations.) Once the subject's bona
fides are established to the RSO's satisfaction,
the RSO should establish what the walk-in wants,
whether the walk-in appears to be of possible
intelligence or counterintelligence interest, how
much time the walk-in has, and methods for future
contact, among other information. The RSO must
also attempt to determine whether the individual is
in imminent danger, including (1) immediate
physical danger, (2) danger of involuntary
repatriation to a country where the individual's
life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, or
(3) danger of involuntary repatriation to a country
where it is more likely than not that the
individual will be subjected to torture. Finally,
the RSO may have reason to interview the individual
for information regarding potential threats to USG
personnel and facilities. (If such information is
obtained, the RSO generally should advise the
LEGATT and should consider flagging the individual
for the Rewards for Justice Program.)
¶28. (S/NF) Monitoring of foreign nationals in

walk-in rooms overseas is permitted only in
accordance with guidelines set forth in Ref D. All
other recording or monitoring conducted by post
employees, including those in cover positions, must
be consistent with the Department Notice of January
24, 1977 ("the Vance Memorandum"), which states
that "No officer or employee of the State
Department . . . shall direct, arrange for, permit,
or undertake the monitoring or mechanical or
electronic recording of any conversation, including
any telephone conversation, without the express
consent of all persons involved in the
conversation," unless advance approval is granted
by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of State.
(Reproduced at Tab U, Special Agent's Legal
Authorities, available at
http://intranet.state.gov.)
¶29. (C) Post personnel should never leave a walk-

in unattended. If possible, two or more post
officials should work together during the interview
phase.
¶30. (S/NF) If the RSO finds the walk-in credible

and to be of possible foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence interest, the RSO should follow
post procedures to ensure transfer of the walk-in
to the GRPO as quickly as possible with minimal
exposure to other post personnel. The GRPO will
determine further actions (interview, contact again
at a later date, etc.).
¶31. (C) Post must strictly limit disclosure of the

fact of any request for temporary refuge, departure
from the host country, asylum in the United States,
third-country visa assistance, issuance or refusal
of visas or permits to enter the United States, and
requests to resettle elsewhere. Only USG personnel
with a need-to-know should be made aware of such
requests.
¶32. (C) Post should provide no comment in response

to press inquiries, unless otherwise instructed by
the Department.
¶33. (C) Post must consult with the Department

prior to responding to congressional inquiries on
specific walk-in cases.
Section D. REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING ON WALK-INS
¶34. (S/NF) If a walk-in is of intelligence

interest, the case will be handled by the
Intelligence Community (IC) once that interest is
established, and reporting on the case will occur
in IC channels. Post must notify the Department of
all/all cases not handled within the IC and
involving the following, using the reporting
channels described in paragraphs 37-39 below except
where otherwise indicated:
(a) A person who may have information on immediate

threats to USG personnel or facilities. See
paragraph 35 below for reporting channel
instructions.
(b) A person who possesses information regarding
plans and intentions of governments and/or
organizations hostile to the United States.
(c) A person who may have information on weapons
proliferation, weapons of mass destruction,
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or any
significant new intelligence or military-related
subjects.
(d) A foreign diplomat, foreign consular officer,
other foreign government official (including
members of the national police and the military),
or political party official, regardless of his/her
country of nationality.
(e) A person who appears threatened by involuntary
repatriation to a country where the person's life
or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, or where it is
more likely than not that the person would be
tortured. See paragraph 36 below for reporting
channel instructions.
(f) Persons seeking resettlement (including
"asylum") in the United States. See Section E
(paragraphs 40-52) below and Ref E for additional
guidance on such cases.
(g) Persons granted temporary refuge. See
paragraphs 50-52 for instructions on reporting such
cases.
¶35. (S/NF) Security threat information reportable

per paragraph 34(a) above should be reported via
TERREP or TERREP exclusive channel telegram (as
appropriate) as soon as possible. Threat
information of an extremely urgent nature should be
provided to the RSO and other appropriate post
officials immediately and relayed to the DS Command
Center (DSCC) at (571) 345-3146
3146 end_of_the_skype_highlighting or via DSCC secure
line at (571) 345-7793 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (571) 345-
7793 end_of_the_skype_highlighting.
¶36. (S/NF) Cases involving threats of involuntary

return as described in paragraph 34(e) above should
be brought to the Department's attention
immediately, by phone, email or cable slugged for
PRM/A, with U.S. Mission Geneva, attention Refugee
and Migration Affairs (RMA), as an info addressee.
¶37. (S/NF) Except as specified above for threat

and involuntary return cases, telegrams should be
sent through normal channels, be slugged for
INR/CCS, P, DS/CI, and the appropriate regional
bureau, and describe the time-sensitivity of the
case. INR/CCS is the action office and will
distribute to other bureaus as appropriate. In
extremely sensitive cases, post should send a Roger
Channel telegram to INR/CCS, which will ensure
appropriate, limited distribution.
¶38. (S/NF) If the case may require consideration

of U.S. resettlement options, posts may also wish
to slug PRM/A, DRL/MLGA, L/HRR, and CA/VO, and to
add DHS/USCIS WASHDC as an info addressee.
¶39. (S/NF) All telegrams should use the PINR and

ASEC tags. CVIS and PREF tags also should be used
in potential resettlement cases. All telegrams
referring to UNHCR should add U.S. Mission Geneva,
attention Refugee and Migration Affairs (RMA), as
an info addressee.
Section E. TEMPORARY REFUGE - CAUTIONS AND

GUIDANCE
¶40. (S/NF) Walk-ins sometimes request that they be

permitted to remain in an embassy or other USG
facility beyond closing hours. The Department
considers this a request for temporary refuge, not
a request for asylum, and post officials should be
particularly careful not to equate the two. In
U.S. immigration law, asylum is a status granted to
qualified refugees, and an application for "asylum"
can only be made in the United States. A walk-in
may request "asylum" in an embassy based on the
erroneous belief that safe passage out of the host
country will be assured if the request is granted.
While a few mostly Latin American countries
recognize such a right of "diplomatic asylum," the
United States and most other countries do not
recognize that concept or accept that the granting
of refuge in an embassy is an authorized use of
diplomatic facilities. A walk-in who requests
"asylum" may also in substance be requesting an
opportunity to resettle in the United States;
guidance on such requests is below under long-term
options.
¶41. (S/NF) Granting a walk-in temporary refuge in

an embassy or other USG facility may actually
increase the danger to an individual, particularly
in hostile countries and if the individual is a
host-country national. The longer the person
remains, the more likely the host government will
become aware of the request for temporary refuge
and possibly take retaliatory action. In hostile
countries, the United States generally is unable
either to assure a walk-in's safe conduct out of
the country or continued safety in the country once
they leave post premises. Thus granting temporary
refuge may lead to a protracted stalemate, with the
walk-in effectively residing in post premises.
"Residence within a post" of persons hostile to the
host government could be a continuing source of
controversy and lead to serious adverse effects on
U.S. interests and unexpected financial
implications for the post.
¶42. (U) In light of these factors, all foreign

national walk-ins seeking refuge in a USG facility
should be informed that post cannot ensure (a)
their safe conduct out of the host country; (b)
their future safety within the host country; or (c)
their entry into the United States. They should
also be informed that they may actually endanger
their own welfare or interests by remaining at
post.
¶43. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may never be granted

to foreign nationals who simply wish to immigrate
to the United States or evade local criminal law;
if granting refuge would put post security in
jeopardy; or if the Department instructs post not
to do so.
¶44. (S/NF) Post should use appropriate measures to

remove a person seeking refuge from the premises
when temporary refuge is not warranted.
¶45. (S/NF) Only the COM or Principal Officer, or a

person designated to act on their behalf in their
absence, may grant a request for temporary refuge.
¶46. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may be granted only if

there is compelling evidence that the walk-in is in
imminent physical danger for any reason, or in
imminent danger of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.
¶47. (S/NF) Within the kinds of cases described in

paragraph 46, post should grant temporary refuge in
those rare situations in which an individual faces
not just imminent physical danger, but immediate
and exceptionally grave physical danger, i.e.,
possible death or serious bodily injury, either in
the host country or in another country to which the
individual will be summarily returned by host-
country authorities.
¶48. (S/NF) Also within the kinds of cases

described in paragraph 46, post may at its
discretion grant temporary refuge if the physical
danger or the danger of involuntary repatriation as
defined above is less serious but appears imminent.
In determining if granting temporary refuge is
appropriate in such instances, post should consider
the following questions:
(a) How serious and immediate is the threat to the

walk-in?
(b) Will the threat to the individual increase or
decrease if the walk-in is allowed to remain at
post?
(c) Can the individual leave or be required to
leave post without being noticed?
(d) If detection by host government authorities is
inevitable and the alleged threat is from the host
government, can the walk-in's presence and
subsequent departure be explained in a manner that
will not further endanger the individual?
(e) What are the likely consequences of allowing
the individual to temporarily remain at the post
with regards to the individual, other persons in
the host country, the security of the post, and the
safety of U.S. Government personnel?
(f) Is the individual of intelligence value to the
United States?
(g) Is the person facing immediate and
exceptionally grave physical danger on account of
peaceful political, religious, or humanitarian
activities consistent with U.S. values and
policies?
¶49. (C/NF) Temporary refuge generally should not

be granted at residential diplomatic or consular
premises. The inviolability of diplomatic
residences (except the COM's) is linked to the
diplomat's residency and may be lost if the host
government declares persona non grata (PNG) the
diplomat whose residence is involved. Consular
residences do not enjoy inviolability (unless it is
provided by special agreement). As a practical
matter all residences, whether diplomatic or
consular, are generally less secure than the
embassy or consulate.
¶50. (C) If temporary refuge is granted, post

should notify the Department in an appropriately
classified "NIACT Immediate" precedence telegram
and should notify other relevant overseas posts by
immediate precedence telegram. Telegrams to the
Department should be slugged for INR/CCS, P, PRM/A,
L/HRR, L/DL, DSCC, DRL/MLGA, CA/VO, and the
appropriate regional bureau. DHS/USCIS WASHDC
should be a direct telegraphic info addressee.
Post also should notify the Department by telegram
if temporary refuge is requested but denied, unless
the case is clearly without merit, e.g., appeals by
a drunken or deranged person.
¶51. (S/NF) If the host government (or the

government of the alien's nationality, if the
individual is a third-country national) requests an
interview with a walk-in who is granted temporary
refuge, post should notify the Department and await
guidance. Post should not/not comply with such
interview requests unless explicitly authorized to
do so by the Department.
¶52. (SBU) If granted, temporary refuge should be

terminated as soon as circumstances permit (e.g.,
when the period of active danger ends), but only
with Department authorization. Post management
should inform the Department (to the same
addressees listed in paragraph 50) when temporary
refuge is terminated. A person who has been
granted temporary refuge may, of course, leave
voluntarily whenever he/she wishes. Post
management should reasonably ensure that the
decision to leave is voluntary.
Section F. LONG-TERM OPTIONS
¶53. (U) Walk-ins often wish to resettle in the

United States, but this may not be appropriate or
possible. The United States encourages local or
regional resettlement of refugees and international
resettlement burden-sharing among many governments.
¶54. (C/NF) In routine cases involving walk-ins

from third countries who may be refugees, the walk-
in should be referred to the host government for
adjudication of his or her status as long as the
host country has satisfactory asylum or refugee-
processing procedures. In most cases, potential
refugees should also be referred to the local
office of the UNHCR, especially if local
refugee/asylum procedures are not available. UNHCR
is mandated to provide protection for refugees and
has primary international responsibility for
seeking durable solutions for refugees, including
possible opportunities for third-country
resettlement. This mandate extends to UNHCR even
in countries that are not party to any of the
treaties just mentioned. Where there is no UNHCR
office, UNHCR's responsibilities are normally
handled by the local UNDP office. Beware, however,
that in some countries UNHCR (or UNDP) may be
placed in an awkward position if it is notified of
a case and there is a need to conceal the case from
the host government. If this possibility exists,
post should approach UNHCR or UNDP discreetly.
¶55. (C/NF) If it appears that entry into the

United States is the appropriate long-term solution
to a walk-in's situation, the walk-in should not be
issued a non-immigrant visa except in unusual
circumstances after consultation with the
Department. Non-immigrant admission will generally
not be appropriate because the circumstances that
lead an individual to become a walk-in normally
lead also to ineligibility under section 214(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an
intending immigrant. Admission to the United
States therefore normally should be as a refugee or
parolee. In some circumstances an immigrant visa
may also be available.
REFUGEE ADMISSION
¶56. (U) A person outside the United States may be

granted refugee admission if he or she qualifies as
a "refugee" as defined in U.S. law and meets other
applicable requirements. DHS has sole
responsibility for adjudicating applications for
refugee admission outside the United States.
DHS/USCIS officers determine whether or not an
individual is a refugee on a case-by-case basis
after a personal interview. To qualify, a person
must normally be outside his country. Given
adequate justification, however, DHS may adjudicate
an "in country" refugee application when requested
by a U.S. Ambassador with the concurrence of PRM/A
and DHS/USCIS in Washington. See Ref F, entitled
"How a post can refer cases to the U.S. refugee
admissions program", and Ref G, entitled "Worldwide
processing priority system for FY 2010", for more
information.
¶57. (U) The U.S. definition of "refugee"

encompasses a person who, under the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, is outside his or her country of
nationality (or, if he or she has no nationality,
the country of last habitual residence) and has
experienced past persecution or has a well-founded
fear of persecution in that country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
U.S. law deems the following persons to have been
persecuted on account of political opinion: a
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has
been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo
such a procedure, or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program; a person who
has a well-founded fear that he or she will be
forced to undergo such a procedure or be persecuted
for such failure, refusal, or resistance.
¶58. (U) Persons admitted to the United States as

refugees are eligible for initial reception and
placement assistance from non-government
organizations (NGOs) funded under cooperative
agreements with PRM and for other publicly funded
benefits.
¶59. (U) If the host government cannot or will not

protect the individual from involuntary
repatriation and UNHCR is unable to intervene, and
post believes that the person may qualify as a
refugee, post should contact PRM/A for guidance on
how to proceed.
PAROLE
¶60. (S/NF) Foreign nationals may also travel to

the United States pursuant to the Secretary of
Homeland Security's parole authority under Section
212(d)(5) of the INA. Parole may be granted based
on humanitarian or significant public benefit
grounds. Authority over humanitarian parole
requests rests with DHS/USCIS/RAIO/HAB. Authority
over Significant Public Benefit Parole (SPBP) rests
with DHS/ICE. DHS/ICE/OIA-LEPB has developed
guidelines in consultation with the Department for
the processing of SPBP cases. Guidelines for both
types of parole are contained in Ref H.
¶61. (S/NF) Use of parole for a walk-in may be

warranted in extraordinary cases, such as when no
other resolution appears feasible and a walk-in is
of special interest to the United States, when a
walk-in is in immediate danger, or when the case is
politically sensitive. If post wishes to pursue
parole for a walk-in, it must submit a request by
telegram, slugged for INR/CCS, CA/VO/F/P, DRL/MLGA,
P, and the appropriate regional bureau. An info
copy should go to the appropriate DHS bureau. The
telegram must provide justification for the
request; include a certification by the COM or the
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) that the information
provided is complete and accurate; and identify all
interested agencies at post that were involved in
reviewing and endorsing the request. A "CLASS"
name check must be completed, and all required
Security Advisory Opinion requests (SAOs) must be
submitted. The results of the "CLASS" name check
should be indicated in the cable.
¶62. (U) All financial arrangements for parolees

must be made in advance. Post should not make any
guarantees of such assistance, but should maintain
a list of possible local sponsors that might be
willing to assist (e.g., church groups or social
service agencies in the United States), to contact
in urgent situations if the parolee first agrees
and signs a statement authorizing disclosure of
his/her identity and situation to persons outside
the U.S. Government. In some cases the Department
may also be able to help by contacting private
organizations in the United States to assist
parolees upon arrival.
DEFECTORS
¶63. (S/NF) For the purpose of this telegram, the
term "defector" refers to a person of any
nationality (usually from a country whose interests
are hostile or inimical to those of the United
States) who has escaped from the control of their
home country and is of special interest to the U.S.
Government. Defector cases generally are handled
under parole procedures. The GRPO will work out
these arrangements with DHS/ICE and/or post's
consular section once Washington's approval is
obtained. The LEGATT should be notified of
defector status as soon as practicable.
Section G. TRAVEL ASSISTANCE
¶64. (S/NF) If the appropriate agencies decide that

a walk-in should be allowed to travel to the United
States (in any of the capacities described above),
transportation out of the host country and to the
United States must be arranged. Transportation out
of friendly countries should not pose a problem.
Post should take appropriate steps, in coordination
with the host government, to ensure that the
individual is permitted to travel and protected
from possible adverse actions (e.g., by their
country of nationality). If the individual lacks
means to pay for transportation, post should
consult with the Department regarding options.
Approved refugees are eligible for a transportation
loan administered by the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) (the recipient will be
responsible for eventual repayment). In
exceptional circumstances, USG-funded
transportation assistance for parolees may also be
possible through IOM. Requests for such assistance
should be sent to the Department (specifically
PRM/A) for consideration.
¶65. (S/NF) In unfriendly countries, transportation

out of the country may prove impossible or
impractical. In such cases, the individual should
be informed that if he/she makes their way to a
more friendly country, the United States will
consider them for admission. To the extent
possible without compromising the confidentiality
of the individual's request, post should monitor
the situation and ensure that, if the individual
leaves the country, he/she is met by USG or UNHCR
officials at the first possible transit point.

CLINTON
Viewing cable 09STATE120288, U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM AND NEXT
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09STATE120288.
09STATE120288 2009-11-21 01:01 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO4858
OO RUEHDBU RUEHMR RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #0288/01 3250135
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210127Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO IAEA MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 120288
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019

TAGS: PREL IR
SUBJECT: U.S. POSTURE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NEXT
STEPS
Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs

3-5.
SUMMARY
-------
¶2. (C) Iran's continued reluctance to cooperate with
international efforts to build confidence and
transparency in its nuclear program will be of
increasing concern to U.S. diplomacy in the weeks ahead.
Of particular note is Iran's apparent refusal to date to
agree to an IAEA proposal for Iran to exchange a
significant portion of its stockpiled low-enriched
uranium (LEU) for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR), and the IAEA report of November 16 indicating
serious unresolved questions about Iran's nuclear
intentions. Department requests posts to draw on the
attached narrative in explaining and securing support
for recent U.S. and P5+1 efforts to engage Iran on its
nuclear program, particularly in the lead-up to the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting on November 26. End Summary.
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶3. (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing,

London and Berlin): Please draw on narrative beginning
in paragraph 7, and hard questions and answers in
paragraph 12 to brief host governments on:
-- Persistent U.S. efforts to engage Iran throughout

2009;
-- Iran's disappointing follow-up to its commitments

with P5+1 in Geneva on October 1;
-- Details of the TRR proposal and the

flexibility the U.S., Russia, France and the IAEA, have
demonstrated to deal with Iranian concerns; and
-- Key findings and implications of the IAEA Director

General's November 16 report on Iran; and
Posts should also begin laying the foundation for

possible future action in response to Iran's non-
cooperation, including at the IAEA (BoG) meeting on 26
November and prudent preparation in the event of a
decision to pursue increased pressure on Iran.
¶4. (C) SPECIAL REQUEST FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING,

LONDON, AND BERLIN: Please inform host government that
we are delivering this message to IAEA members,
consistent with consultations among Political Directors
in the P5+1 process. Posts may share the general tenor
of our message but do not need to deploy the points
themselves with host governments.
¶5. (C) Posts should not leave any part of this message
in writing with host governments.
DEADLINE
--------
¶6. (U) Posts should report the results of their efforts

by November 25. Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO, 202-647-9533
highlighting,
CatalanoE@state.sgov.gov) and Richard Nephew (ISN/RA,
7680 end_of_the_skype_highlighting, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) are the
Department's POCs for this activity.
BACKGROUND
----------
¶7. (SBU) Since the 1 October 2009 meeting of the P5+1

Political Directors and representatives from Iran, the
United States has been working closely with its partners
to fulfill the commitments reached in Geneva and engage
with Iran to build international confidence in the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program. In particular,
we have focused on supporting the IAEA's proposal for
refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR),
facilitating the IAEA's inspection of the previously
clandestine uranium enrichment plant at Qom, and
pressing for a follow-on meeting between P5+1 Political
Directors and Iranian representatives explicitly on
STATE 00120288 002 OF 008
Iran's nuclear program.
¶8. (C) The results since October 1 have been

disappointing. It increasingly appears that Iran will
decline the IAEA's proposal on TRR, though a definitive
answer remains outstanding. In the lead-up to the IAEA
Board of Governors (BOG) meeting on November 26, Iran
may try to blame the apparent failure of the TRR
agreement on intrusive and inflexible demands by western
powers, rather than its own reluctance or inability to
reach agreement on the IAEA proposal which responded to
Iran's request for assistance and was created on the
basis of Iran's own commitments made in Geneva.
Although Iran granted IAEA access to Qom, Iran did not
cooperate with all of the IAEA's requests for access to
information and personnel and there remain serious
questions about Iran's intentions for the facility.
Finally, Iran so far has refused a further meeting with
the P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program. The United
States is now discussing with its P5+1 and other
partners potential next steps, including how to handle
these issues at the next meeting of the IAEA BOG.
¶9. (SBU) IAEA Director General (DG) ElBaradei released

his latest report on Iran on November 16. The report
makes clear Iran's continuing lack of transparency and
cooperation with the IAEA on its nuclear program,
including in assessing a possible military dimension to
its program. As expected, the uranium enrichment
facility at Qom (also known as the Fordow site) was a
central element of the report, and the IAEA states that
Iran's previous failure to declare the facility is
"inconsistent" with its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement. The IAEA's report highlights that revelation
of the Qom facility raises concerns of additional
clandestine nuclear sites in Iran and has asked Iran to
confirm that there are no other undeclared nuclear
facilities; Iran has yet to respond to this IAEA
request. Iran continues to defy UNSC resolutions and
IAEA BOG resolutions calling on it to adopt the
Additional Protocol and to provide the access necessary
for the IAEA to provide assurance as to the absence of
additional undeclared nuclear activities.
¶10. (C) The P5+1 "dual track" policy towards Iran

includes both engagement and pressure if Iran does not
engage constructively. President Obama, Secretary
Clinton, and others have identified the end of the year
as a key period for assessing Iran's responsiveness. If
Iran continues to refuse to take meaningful steps to
meet its international obligations, the international
community must be prepared to take strong collective
action on the pressure track.
KEY DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES AND POLICY NARRATIVE

--------------------------------------------
¶11. (U) Posts should draw on the following key messages

and policy narrative in briefing host governments.
Key Messages
------------
-- We, in coordination with our international partners,

have demonstrated our willingness to engage
constructively and respectfully with Iran to address
long-standing international concerns over its nuclear
program. Our approach has clearly and consistently been
based on the P5+1's dual track strategy.
-- Iran so far has failed to accept a very good and

balanced IAEA proposal to facilitate the refueling of
the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) which would have
fulfilled an Iranian request, addressed a humanitarian
need of the Iranian people, and served as a confidence-
building step to create an opportunity for further
progress.
-- We look forward to close consultations on how best to

persuade Iran to engage constructively as we approach
the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting on November 26 and
beyond.
Policy Narrative
----------------
-- Since President Obama took office, he has made clear

the willingness of the United States to engage with Iran
and to seek a new relationship based on mutual respect.
-- He has authorized the United States' full

participation in diplomatic discussions between the five
permanent members of the Security Council and Germany
STATE 00120288 003 OF 008
and Iran without pre-conditions.
-- The United States has stated its support for Iran's

full right to a civilian nuclear program within IAEA
guidelines, provided Iran meets it international
obligations and carries out its responsibilities within
the NPT framework.
-- As a way to build confidence, the United States, with
Russia and France, has also supported the IAEA's
proposal to positively respond to Iran's request for
nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), in
spite of Iran's continuing violation of UNSC resolutions
and noncompliance with IAEA requirements on its nuclear
program.
-- However, almost one year into the Obama

administration, Iran has not taken practical, concrete
steps that would begin to create confidence in its
nuclear intentions. Iran:
o Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC

requirements that it suspend such operations;
o Revealed it had been building a secret uranium
enrichment facility at a military base near Qom,
in violation of its safeguards agreement ;
o Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA in
addressing the full range of IAEA questions about
the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;
o Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel the
TRR; and
o Since meeting with representatives of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
discuss its nuclear program.
-- Iran's failure to take advantage of these numerous

opportunities raises serious questions about the
intentions of its nuclear program that deserve urgent
international attention. We look to work closely with
your government in the run-up to IAEA Board of Governors
meeting on November 26 and beyond to develop an
appropriate international response.
Tehran Research Reactor

-----------------------
-- The IAEA, Russia, France and the United States

cooperated closely and flexibly to find a way to
positively respond to Iran's request for fuel for the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) so that it could keep
running to meet humanitarian medical needs beyond 2010.
-- The TRR refueling proposal offers Iran the

opportunity to convert its stockpile of low enriched
uranium (LEU) into higher-enriched fuel with the help of
Russia and France. The proposal's elements are simple:
o Iran would transfer a portion of its LEU

necessary for fuel production in one batch to
IAEA custody outside of Iran before the end of
the year;
o Russia would further enrich the LEU to meet fuel
requirements; and
o France would fabricate the fuel assemblies and
return them to Iran before Iran's fuel supplies
are depleted before the end of the year.
-- In addition the United States expressed a commitment

to work with the IAEA to improve safety and control
features at the TRR.
-- The U.S., France and Russia took great risks in
supporting the deal, especially in light of Iran's
continuing violation of successive UNSC resolutions and
IAEA requirements, including its secret construction of
a uranium enrichment facility near Qom, and its
continuing enrichment operations.
-- We did so because the arrangement would begin to

build confidence and would give Iran and the
international community more time to reach a
comprehensive negotiated solution to Iran's nuclear
program, while fulfilling Iran's humanitarian needs.
-- When Iran expressed concern about the reliability of

the proposal, the United States and its partners
expressed to the IAEA a willingness to address Iran's
concerns, including through:
o a U.S. offer to formally join the deal as a

signatory;
STATE 00120288 004 OF 008
o a readiness of the five permanent members of the

Security Council and Germany to guarantee the
deal through a political statement of support;
o a willingness to help secure finance for the
movement of the LEU and fuel;
o an openness to move the LEU to any number of
locations outside of Iran; and
o a willingness to support the IAEA's holding
material equivalent to the fuel in escrow in a
third country as a guarantee for Iran of the
fuel's ultimate delivery.
-- After reaching an agreement in principle in the deal

following talks with the E3+3 in Geneva on October 1,
and following further technical discussions at the IAEA
October 19-21, Iran has so far failed to accept the
deal.
-- This raises a question about Iran's intentions. If

Iran is enriching uranium to meet its civilian reactor
fuel needs, why would it not accept an international
offer (with significant guarantees) to provide its LEU
for fuel to power the TRR to meet its humanitarian
needs, particularly when it does not have the capability
to produce the fuel on its own?
-- This question is troubling in the context of Iran's

continued enrichment activities in defiance of UNSC
resolutions; its secret construction of an enrichment
facility on a military base near Qom; its refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program; and its refusal
to meet with the five permanent members of the Security
Council.
P5+1
----
-- Together with our P5+1 partners, the United States

informed Iranian representatives in Geneva on October 1
of our willingness to discuss any items of concern to
Iran - both bilaterally and multilaterally - in addition
to our concerns about Iran's nuclear program.
-- On October 1, Iran's representatives committed to

meet again before the end of the month based on an
agenda that included Iran's nuclear program. Since that
time, however, the Iranian government has refused all
invitations to meet if its nuclear program would be on
the agenda.
-- Iran's continued refusal to engage on its nuclear

program with the P5+1 deepens our concerns about Iran's
intentions for its nuclear program.
The IAEA Director General's Report on Iran

------------------------------------------
-- The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to

cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA. Key
aspects of the report include:
---- Iran's new centrifuge facility at Qom - built in

violation of Iran's UNSC obligations and not declared to
the IAEA as required - has been inspected, but its
purpose and origin remain unknown. And, Iran has not
yet cooperated with all of the IAEA's requests for
access to information and personnel. Iran's failure to
provide the IAEA with early design information regarding
the Qom facility has been deemed "inconsistent with its
obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
Safeguards Agreement" by the IAEA. Furthermore, the
relatively small size of the facility at Qom is
inconsistent with Iran's assertion that it is to provide
fuel for Iran's civilian reactors, raising questions
about the planned use of the Qom facility.
---- The Agency noted that Iran's failure to declare the

Qom facility also "reduces the level of confidence in
the absence of other nuclear facilities under
construction and gives rise to questions about whether
there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran that had
not been declared to the Agency."
---- These concerns have been compounded by the

continued pace of Iranian enrichment and steadfast
refusal to abide by the UNSC's legal requirement that
Iran suspend all such work. Instead, Iran continues to
produce low enriched uranium and estimated its stockpile
at 1763 kilograms at the end of October.
Notwithstanding a reduction in the number of enriching
centrifuges by approximately 600 since August 2009, this
is roughly a similar rate of production as Iran has
STATE 00120288 005 OF 008
achieved for the past year.
---- Iran continues to install and test additional

centrifuges, with more than 1,000 new centrifuges added
since August 2009.
---- The IAEA has discovered a previously unknown cache
of heavy water in storage at Esfahan, and has requested
Iran to explain its origin. It is important to note
that UN Security Council resolutions include a ban on
supplying Iran with heavy water.
---- It also asked Iran to provide further information

describing an analytical laboratory that Iran says it
plans to install underground at Esfahan.
---- There has been no progress made in addressing

issues associated with Iran's efforts to develop a
nuclear warhead, despite a year having passed since the
last such conversation and many open questions that
surround this work.
-- If Iran wishes to begin to resolve international

concerns, it should comply with its international
obligations, cooperate fully with the IAEA, grant the
access requested (such as to individuals and workshops
associated with past weaponization efforts, and to
individuals responsible for managing Qom), and answer
the questions it has been asked. Iran has created this
confidence deficit and it is up to Iran to restore the
international community's trust.
Next Steps
----------
-- The United States and its partners believe that the

troubling questions surrounding Iran's nuclear program
deserve the full and urgent attention of the
international community.
-- We look forward to working with your government to

promote the active involvement of the IAEA and the
international community in addressing these unresolved
questions.
-- We will be in touch with you in the days ahead to

share ideas on how to approach the issue at the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting that will begin on November
¶26.
-- Beyond the Board of Governors meeting, we would also

like to intensify our consultations on next appropriate
steps in the international community based on the dual
track policy (engagement and pressure) to persuade Iran
to bring its nuclear program into full compliance with
its international obligations.
HARD QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

--------------------------
¶12. (U) We have also compiled the following questions

and answers to draw from should Posts require them:
On The TRR Proposal

-------------------
-- Why must Iran surrender all of its LEU in one batch,

and why must it be before the end of the year?
o The TRR proposal was developed both to supply

Iran with the fuel required for the continued
operation of the reactor, and also as a measure
to build confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions
and its seriousness to negotiate with the E3+3.
o By agreeing to the transfer of 1200 kilograms of
LEU (enough to equal the last fuel supply
agreement Iran signed for the reactor with
Argentina in the early 1990s), we aimed to lessen
international concerns that Iran was attempting
to create a stockpile of uranium to contribute to
an eventual breakout from the NPT. This would
consequently allow more time for negotiations
with the E3+3 on the broader nuclear file.
o The transfer by the end of the year is needed to
ensure that Iran receives the fuel required for
the reactor before December 2010, when the
reactor will run out and be forced to shut down.
-- What risk does the LEU stored in Iran pose to the

international community? Isn't it under full IAEA
monitoring?
o Yes, this LEU is currently under IAEA safeguards.
STATE 00120288 006 OF 008
o However, given Iran's long history of IAEA

safeguards violations and NPT noncompliance, the
international community cannot trust that Iran
will not interfere with IAEA monitoring or
withdraw from IAEA safeguards or the NPT
altogether.
o This project will remove an immediate source of
concern and establish some confidence in Iran's
peaceful intent and willingness to comply with
its obligations.
-- How can Iran be sure it will ever receive the fuel

assemblies for the TRR in the current international
environment, in which many openly seek to diminish
Iran's nuclear capacity?
o We and our E3+3 partners have each made political

commitments at the highest levels to the
fulfillment of this project. Should Iran agree
to it, Iran will receive the fuel required.
o All participants in this project are taking
risks. Iran stands in violation of the NPT, its
IAEA safeguards agreement, and three Chapter VII
UNSC resolutions. This project offers Iran an
opportunity to establish confidence in its
peaceful intentions, a confidence that has eroded
due to Iran's continued non-compliance.
-- Can Iran simply purchase the fuel from an

international supplier, as some have advocated in Iran?
o The UN Security Council resolutions do permit
Iran to Iran can purchase low-enriched fuel from
an international supplier if it wishes.
o However, we are confident Iran would not find a
willing supplier given the concerns surrounding
its nuclear program and its continued defiance of
the international community.
o Outside of the context of the IAEA proposal
before Iran, we would oppose such a deal.
-- How would the E3+3 respond if Iran announced it had

"no choice" but to make its own fuel for the TRR?
o Under three UN Security Council resolutions, Iran
is required to suspend all uranium enrichment-
related activities. We have offered Iran a way
to secure the necessary TRR fuel without further
violating these obligations. Enrichment
activities to produce its own fuel for the TRR
would be a violation of current UNSCRs.
o Further, Iran is not currently able to produce
the fuel. Reconfiguration of Iranian centrifuges
to produce the required enrichment level (19.75%)
would cause serious international concern and
could permit Iran to produce a stockpile of even
greater enriched uranium than it has currently
(Iran's current enrichment level is 3.5%). This
would increase the risk of a near-term Iranian
breakout from the NPT and sprint to producing
nuclear weapons.
On Demands to Suspend Enrichment

--------------------------------
-- Iran suspended enrichment once before in response to

international demands, and received no benefit. Why
should Iran trust the international community now?
o Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and other

activities in the past was intended to support a
diplomatic process. Unfortunately, Iran
terminated that diplomatic process in August 2005
by abandoning suspension.
o However, prior to that point, Iran's temporary
suspension avoided its being reported to the UN
Security Council and the sanctions that would
have likely come along with that report.
o The requirement of suspension imposed by the UNSC
in resolution 1737 is intended to restore that
diplomatic process and to lead to a final
resolution of international concerns with Iran's
nuclear program.
o This was codified in UNSCR 1737 when the UNSC
stated its intention to suspend implementation of
the measures adopted by the UNSC if Iran returned
to negotiations through suspension of its nuclear
and related activities.
o Trust is in short supply on both sides. It is
for that reason that we have offered Iran several
opportunities for reciprocal, confidence-building
steps (e.g., "freeze for freeze" and the TRR
proposal).
-- What about recent reports indicating the Iranian
STATE 00120288 007 OF 008
enrichment program has not grown. What is the

significance of this stagnation?
o Iran has slowed or scaled back the enrichment

program several times since the project became
public in 2002.
o There are many possible explanations for the
stagnation of the Iranian enrichment program,
including technical issues with the centrifuges
and general system maintenance.
o Regardless of Iran's lack of progress in its
enrichment program, it continues to enrich and
stockpile LEU. This activity in violation of
three United Nations Security Council resolutions
calling for full suspension of its nuclear and
enrichment related activities, and increases the
risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT
and sprint to producing nuclear weapons.
Israel's Nuclear Program

------------------------
-- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear

status? Does it not also destabilize the region?
o The United States has long supported universal
adherence to the NPT treaty and continues to
believe that all states that have not done so
should join the Treaty and accept the full-scope
IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear
activities.
o It is extremely difficult, however, to make this
case to a non-NPT state when its neighbors are in
violation of their own NPT obligations, and when
the international community has not demonstrated
the political will necessary to enforce
compliance.
o Iran's failure to comply with its NPT and IAEA
obligations bears out these concerns and
undermines attempts to secure universal adherence
to the NPT. It became a party to the treaty and
proceeded to violate its obligations under it for
over twenty years, presenting a fundamental
threat to the entire nonproliferation regime.
o Returning regional states to full compliance with
their NPT obligations would be an important step
toward NPT adherence by all states in the region.
An Iranian nuclear weapons capability also serves
as a destabilizing factor in the region, possibly
triggering proliferation across the Gulf in
response to a mounting threat posed by Iran. Not
only does this undermine the entire nuclear
nonproliferation regime, but risks further
instability in the region.
Qom Facility
------------
-- How can you say that the Qom facility was secret,
when it was Iran that announced its existence and
invited IAEA inspectors to visit?
o Iran was required to declare the existence of

this facility to the IAEA the moment the decision
was made to construct it, not several years into
its construction. This is a requirement of
Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement (contained in
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's
Safeguards Agreement).
o This code was modified after revelations
surrounding Iraq's nuclear program were made in
the early 1990s.
o Iran was the last state to agree to the revised
code, but it did so in March 2003. Iran
attempted to revert to the early form of the code
(which requires notification only 180 days prior
to the introduction of nuclear to the facility)
in March 2007. The IAEA consistently has
rejected that Iran has the legal ability to make
such a change.
o We also believe that Iran made the decision to
declare the facility not to conform to its legal
obligations, but because it had become aware that
the secrecy of the facility had been compromised.
-- Iran claims it needs such a hardened facility as

Fordu because for years both the US and Israel have
threatened to bomb its nuclear sites. Is it not
surprising Iran would try to keep its location a secret
to have an emergency back-up facility?
O Iran's own failure to meet its obligations for

transparency and IAEA monitoring of sensitive
nuclear installations is the cause for the
STATE 00120288 008 OF 008
international community's concerns that

surrounding its nuclear program.
o Iran's decision to construct yet another
clandestine site only deepens these concerns.
P5+1
----
-- Why should Iran discuss its nuclear program with the

self-appointed P5+1? Isn't the IAEA the proper place
for Iran to engage on its nuclear program with the
international community?
O We welcome Iran's engagement with the IAEA. But

despite its rhetoric, Iran has not engaged with
the IAEA. Iran has refused for several years to
answer the IAEA's questions (even before the IAEA
reported Iran to the UNSC for its myriad
violations of its international obligations).
o The E3+3 mechanism evolved as a means to
negotiate a solution precisely because Iran was
refusing to engage with the IAEA on the concerns
regarding Iran's nuclear program.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2482, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
Discussing cables
09TELAVIV2482 2009-11-16 08:08 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Tel Aviv
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SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of

Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
(MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
Baidatz. The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
defense exercise. Israeli officials explained that they were
going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
surface were a number of significant dangers. They continued
to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its "axis"
with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS. They also expressed
skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas's future, given
his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
restart peace negotiations. Israeli officials were concerned
about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
SUMMARY
-------------------
Bilateral Relations
-------------------
¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow's trip to Israel came as a number of

high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
issues. On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
Lieberman. In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise. The ASD's visit
also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
Israel's QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.
¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel's assessment of

recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
optimism on the steps moving forward. Amos Gilad
acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
Israel's security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
often clash with broader American security interests in the
region. Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as "the
effective process plus the right mitigations." While not
explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
process that incorporates "intimate dialogue." DG Buchris
thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
upon working groups by the end of November. Vershbow stated
that the technical working group discussions would be
launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
Israeli participation on this issue.
------------------------
Iran Remains Top of Mind
------------------------
¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that

Iran's nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
the greatest strategic threats to Israel. They view Iran as
the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
and HAMAS.
¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment

of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is
rapidly closing. General Baidatz argued that it would take

Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran
would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
within six months. (COMMENT: It is unclear if the Israelis
firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
raise greater urgency from the United States). Amos Gilad
explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
supporting "HAMAStan" in Gaza and "Hezbollahstan" in Lebanon.
Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow. He was
less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials

about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
proposal and Iran's recent equivocation on the agreement.
Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
sufficient. They stated that it was only one stop on the way
to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
work on the newly disclosed site at Qom. They warned that
the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
for Iran if it legitimized in the world's eyes Iran's right
to enrich uranium on its own soil. None of the Israeli
officials expressed surprise about Iran's apparent reversal
on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
nuclear weapons capability.
¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
bottom line. We may need time to ascertain whether Iran's
response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1. However,
he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
likely begin pursuing the pressure track.
¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran's

support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that
there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,
Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
all train together and share knowledge. MG Gantz also
emphasized Iran's role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza. On the Russian delay in
delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
Minister Netanyahu's "secret" visit to Moscow and President
Obama's engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
sanctions on Iran. ASD Vershbow said the Russians' signals
on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
Qom facility.
-------------------
West Bank and Gaza
-------------------
¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the

subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was
widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
assessment of Abbas's future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad
stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is
facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take
difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk

away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating
that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues --
specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed
optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
advancing the relationship. Gilad closed, however, on a
sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.
¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political

discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
Force (PASF). Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern
that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,
and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
PASF more visible control of security. Israeli officials
responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
authority (COMMENT: Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
effect of regular Israeli incursions). MG Gantz cited
Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, they
stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
relationship over the long term. The prospect of poor
Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
unacceptable, and would result in the loss of "strategic
depth" for Israel.
¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to

soley focus on the short-term "here and now," but rathr to
envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
Bank could have for Israel's secrity situation in the
future. Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
coud serve as a "magnet" and help solve the Gaza problem.
He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
information operations campaign to better communicate with
the people of Gaza. Israeli officials offered very little in
the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
the territories, but reinforced Israel's core belief that
HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
with HAMAS opposition. General Baidatz articulated Israel's
concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
reach Tel Aviv. These actions, according to Baidatz and
other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
reconciliation both premature and unrealistic. Ambassador
Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel's
biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
peace talks. Specifically, Gilad stated that political
promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation --
concepts that are never realized -- are only resulting in a
climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy. On this matter,
Gilad mentioned that Egypt's role in pushing reconciliation
is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
junctures.
¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris

emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS's
deliberate use of civilians as human shields. He stated that
the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
before bombing legitimate military targets. He also compared
Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was

necessary to protect its population. In response, ASD
Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.
--------------------
Anxiety Over Turkey
--------------------
¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over

the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
of Israel's participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
exercise. They expressed their belief that the strategic
relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan's
views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
Turkey looks East rather than West. Gilad believes this is
understandable as Turkey's EU accession prospects look
increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
with both regions to succeed.
¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to

contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria. In
his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East. Gilad also
noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
recently to support HAMAS. However, he had a less
pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks' agenda
was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
to Turkey. Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
term, but that Israel would continue to foster the
military-to-military relationship because of its strategic
importance.
¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
might do to improve its relationship with Turkey. Vershbow
explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
mediator. He also commented that Erdogan's ideological views
may lead him to focus on Turkey's Islamic neighbors, but he
is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey's
ties to the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and Israel should be
patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
to play a constructive role in the region. He stated that at
the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.
----------------------------
Quiet on the Northern Border
----------------------------
¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the "quiet"

nature of its northern border -- something they attribute to
the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano. However, according to
Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and ezbollah. The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
within the ranks. On the contrary, Israel believes that
LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
zeal. Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.
¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over

developments within Hezbollah -- specifically, its
relationship with Syria and Iran. General Baidatz spoke of
this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
Hezbollah. According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel's
calculus. Under such a scenario, the looming question for

Israeli policymakers then becomes: "to strike or not to
strike."
-----------------
Optimism on Syria
-----------------
¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence

assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
away from Iran's orbit. He explained that President Assad
used his "negative assets," namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
relationship with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
likely be peace with Israel. ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
could be sustained without Syrian support. Baidatz
acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah's and
Iran's flexibility would be significantly reduced.
-------------------------------
Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
-------------------------------
¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a

complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
continued to train its military for war with Israel. Gilad
stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
Israeli officers. He expressed frustration by describing
Egypt and Israel's "frozen peace" and that neither side knows
anything about the other. He noted that the last high-level
military visit for Egypt was in 1991.
¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt's

counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
Operation CAST LEAD in January. However, they stated that
gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai. Gilad said he was
disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
assistance along borders with Egypt.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra - Strengthening the Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General

Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,
stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
technological advancements have made the system much more
viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
or Southern Lebanon. Buchris also emphasized the need for
additional USG support to help fund additional production of
Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
North and the South. Buchris also noted progress on the
upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
(Arrow-3 and David's Sling, respectively). In an earlier
meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
electricity plant. Suffering the loss or damage of places
such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
Israel and, therefore, every effort to
stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
be taken.
¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz's initial
impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise. Gantz stressed
the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
had been a success. ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent
developments with Iran. On the larger issue of missile

defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
cooperation, but stated that Russia's realization that the
new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
ask many questions about the system.
-------
Summary
-------
¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow's interlocutors carried a

consistent message emphasizing that: Iran remains Israel's
greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
relative calm on all Israel's borders does not obscure the
fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria. These threats
suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
calm to end one day.
¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.

CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2500, 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY

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SUBJECT: 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE
SESSION (PART 1 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: During the Executive Session of the 40th

Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and Israeli
counterparts continued discussion on the creation of four new
Qualitative Military Edge (QME) working groups. GOI
interlocutors continued to raise concerns regarding the F-15
sale to Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed that continued
pressure be applied to Iran, especially following the
disclosure of the nuclear facility in Qom. GOI participants
expressed concern regarding Chinese and Russian cooperation
with respect to enhanced Iranian sanctions. The GOI also
raised dual citizenship concerns with respect to access to
sensitive technology, and noted from its perspective Turkey's
disturbing change of course toward Syria and Iran -- and away
from Israel. This is the first in four cables (septels)
reporting on the JPMG. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Israeli Participants:
-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director

General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General
U.S. Participants:
-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of

Political-Military Affairs
-- Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
Qualitative Military Edge

-------------------------
¶3. (S) The Executive Session continued discussion from the

September 30 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) meeting in
Washington. Both sides presented their primary points of
contact for the four newly proposed working groups focusing
on previous agreements, mitigation measures for the F-15 sale
to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and
intelligence/policy. Agreement was reached to begin working
on the details of each working group's meeting schedule and
timeline.
¶4. (S) The GOI continued to express concern over the F-15
sale to Saudi Arabia. U.S. participants noted that the USG
is unable to provide more detailed information about the sale
until Saudi Arabia officially sends a Letter of Request
(LOR). The GOI expressed additional concerns about
stationing these new aircraft at Tabuk airfield in the
northwest corner of Saudi Arabia -- close to the Israeli
border. U.S. participants stated the USG understanding that
this should not be an issue, as the Saudis are considering
stationing new Typhoon aircraft at Tabuk. The GOI also
raised AMRAAM sales to Jordan; U.S. participants explained
that the new C-7 AMRAAM is an export version with
capabilities similar to the C-5 version -- and therefore
provides little to no increase in capabilities.
Iran, China and Russia

----------------------
¶5. (S) Both sides expressed concern over the recent

revelation regarding Iran's nuclear facility at Qom, and
agreed that increased pressure should be applied directly and
internationally against Iran in order to better determine
Tehran's motives and next steps. Both sides agreed that the
facility at Qom should be inspected immediately. One member
of the Israeli delegation expressed the opinion that some
consideration be given to "shutting Qom operations down
completely" to prevent further progress on obtaining a
nuclear weapon. That said, the GOI argued that the
international community not become bogged down on the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and Qom, thereby diverting focus from
TEL AVIV 00002500 002 OF 002
the bigger issue of Iran's nuclear program.
¶6. (S) Several questions were raised about China's position

on Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Both sides
agreed that continued engagement with China and Russia is
needed -- as well as building a consensus in Europe. The USG
speculated, and the GOI concurred, that China will follow
Moscow's lead. USG participants argued that China would seek
to avoid an international confrontation over Iran. The GOI
described 2010 as a critical year -- if the Iranians continue
to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more
difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then
discussed the upcoming delivery of GBU-28 bunker busting
bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled
quietly to avoid any allegations that the USG is helping
Israel prepare for a strike against Iran.
¶7. (S) The GOI made the case for "crippling sanctions";
cooperation between the United States, Europe, Russia and
China will be necessary in order for these sanctions to be
effective. U.S. participants stressed the USG position that
any discussions with Iran on this subject be finite; the USG
will continue to monitor whether negotiations are making
progress. The GOI stated that it is not convinced the
Iranians will negotiate in good faith unless there are
visible and clear threats. U.S. delegation members described
eight lanes of sanctions, and outlined a plan to "pivot to
apply appropriate pressure" on those points and tracks that
have the most impact. U.S. participants concurred that 2010
is a critical year -- but the continued application of
pressure is vital.
¶8. (S) Regarding Russia, the GOI was not confident that
Moscow will be helpful in any Iranian sanctions effort -- GOI
participants opined that Russia is considered a "mystery"
with respect to their views on Iran. The GOI raised the
Russian S-300 sale to Iran, noting that the transfer is still
pending. GOI participants argued that Moscow seeks a return
to superpower status, but there are contradictory trends
regarding Russia's internal condition.
Dual Citizenship Issues

-----------------------
¶9. (S) The GOI raised the issue of dual citizenship within
the context of access to sensitive technology. U.S.
participants acknowledged Israeli concerns, noting that the
issue is being worked at the highest levels of the USG to
reach consensus on how to proceed. The GOI recommended
obtaining a waiver similar to the relationship from which
Canada or Australia benefit.
Turkey
------
¶10. (S) The GOI raised the current direction the Government
of Turkey has taken toward Syria and Iran -- and away from
Israel. Israeli participants argued that Turkey has been
supportive of Hamas in Gaza while pursuing a more "Islamic"
direction with the goal of becoming a regional superpower.
The GOI argued that the Turkish military is losing its
ability to influence government decisions and strategic
direction. After this past year, GOI participants said they
have a "bad feeling" about Turkey. The GOI noted that the
Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander in the past wanted to speak
to the Turkish Air Force Commander, but his Turkish
counterpart declined.
¶11. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.

CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2502, 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION

(PART 3 OF 4)
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1504
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DE RUEHTV #2502/01 3221434
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181434Z NOV 09
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military

Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed
support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an
opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open
ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors
continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S
Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the
Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
learned regarding confronting terrorists in
civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved
counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can
and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S.
delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
JPMG. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:
-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director

General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General
Main U.S. Participants:
-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of

Political-Military Affairs
-- James Hursch, Director, DTSA
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
-- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL
Plenary
-------
¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the

plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to
date." He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the
stability of the world," Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described
this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
the political-military dialogue between the United States and
Israel. He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the
JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into
the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.
Iran
----
¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a

strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President
Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and
Iran's "last chance." He said Iran remains determined to
TEL AVIV 00002502 002 OF 004

reach the "nuclear option," which he described as
"intolerable." He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for
Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
regardless of its leadership.
¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program. He said that the United States is beginning with
engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that
engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to
see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
respond to engagement, then the United States will move
toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl
reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run
out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to
build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy
Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.
¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands

that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing
the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad
said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the
current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the
frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change
the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those
surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.
¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional

hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is
very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to
its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort
to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to
deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl
argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
region and in Europe.
Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
-----------------------
¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and
"Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from
Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's
most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military
capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including
Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved
US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.
¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for

specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to
Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation
TEL AVIV 00002502 003 OF 004
with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness.

He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also
argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that
more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.
Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened
LAF hurts Israel.
QME
---
¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad

suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for
potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys
peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each
of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing
field by reducing the need for training -- and could
ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S
Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while
there may be differences between Israel and the United States
in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
there are no surprises, he said.
Peace Process
-------------
¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a
"pillar" of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and
President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
Palestinian security forces as the "good guys." NEA/IPA
Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.
Goldstone Report
----------------
¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within

the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has
checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded
that the report's accusations are "baseless." Buchris said
the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone
calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the
effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country
has taken such steps," Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro
highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral
to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased
mandate.
¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt
was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to
criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
any further damage from the report.
Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
-----------------------
¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab

neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting
the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether
Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad
TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004
stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on

counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
officers visit Israel.
¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to

strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United
States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted
U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following
the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation. A/S
Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
Israel.
¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the

counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He
cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors --
including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian
weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should
be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and
possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash
flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
since the beginning of 2009.
¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political

sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger
asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as
cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S.
economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He
noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping
companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
said he would take that back to Washington for further
consideration.
Iraq/Yemen
----------
¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of
establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and
DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.
¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He
said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general
lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted
that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is
actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.
¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI1151, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE WARNS

DOE DEPSEC PONEMAN ABOUT IRAN
Discussing cables
09ABUDHABI1151
13:01 18:06 N Dhabi
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DE RUEHAD #1151/01 3511307

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP
ENERGY FOR S1, S2, O???CONNOR AND SANDOLOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/17

TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM ENRG IR YM AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE WARNS DOE DEPSEC PONEMAN ABOUT IRAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador, State, US Embassy Abu

Dhabi, UAE; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a December 9 meeting in Abu Dhabi (other

meetings reported septel), Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel
Poneman told Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) that
the USG shared many energy policy priorities with the UAE,
including renewable energy development and the importance of
critical energy infrastructure protection. Poneman briefed MbZ on
the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal and Vienna talks. MbZ
said he would be surprised if Iran accepted the P5+1/IAEA proposal
and warned that Iran was already acting like a nuclear power.
Further, and more dangerously, Iran is establishing "emirates"
across the Muslim world, including South Lebanon and Gaza, sleeper
"emirates" in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi
Arabia, the mother of all "emirates" in Southern Iraq, and now
Saada in Yemen. MbZ suggested that the U.S. is misreading the
situation in Yemen and failing to recognize strong evidence of
Iranian support. End Summary.
POTENTIAL COOPERATION:
RENEWABLES, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
-------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) The Crown Prince asked DepSec Poneman several questions
about U.S. energy development plans, including the outlook for the
next 25 years. Poneman explained President Obama and Secretary Chu
have a strategic vision of a new energy economy with a low carbon
profile. In the short term, Poneman said DOE is investing Recovery
Act funds to improve efficiency and support new technologies, but
that the USG seeks to facilitate energy development through a
portfolio approach, not dictate what the market should pursue. On
nuclear, MbZ specifically asked what progress could be expected
within the next three years. Poneman said there are a number of
active deals under development, and strong public support for
nuclear power, but that capital costs continue to be a challenge.
(Comment: MbZ pressed hard on US plans for a nuclear renaissance,
suggesting to us that he is worried we may compete with his program
in the hunt for nuclear engineering and technical talent. End
Comment.) Turning to renewable energy and efficiency, the DepSec
noted that USG goals are very much in line with Abu Dhabi's own
Masdar (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company) and that he looked forward
to greater DOE-Masdar cooperation (septel).
¶3. (SBU) Poneman also told MbZ that the USG is interested in
supporting Abu Dhabi's critical energy infrastructure protection
(CEIP) plans and said a DOE team was discussing cooperation
potential with the Critical National Infrastructure Authority
(CNIA, reported septel). Learning from Hurricane Katrina, DOE was
focused on survivability of assets, resiliency and recovery. MbZ
said he was personally very interested in greater cooperation with
the U.S. on CEIP, through DOE, other USG entities and/or the
private sector. He stressed that citizens' confidence in their
government was very important, noting "We're doing our best to make
them feel secure." MbZ added that while UAE is a small country, it
has the resources to protect itself, and is willing to invest in
top-quality infrastructure protection.
IRAN
----
¶4. (S/NF) DepSec Poneman briefed MbZ on the international proposal

for Iran to ship 1,200 kg of Low Enriched Uranium produced at
Natanz to a location outside Iran and where it would be enriched to
20 percent for use to produce medical radioisotopes at the Tehran
Research Reactor. Poneman stressed that the IAEA, the Russians,
and the U.S. had all taken every possible step to address stated
Iranian concerns, including a first-ever official USG statement of
support for the proposal. He stressed that the offer would not
remain open indefinitely; as DG El Baradei had said, this is a
"fleeting" opportunity. He also explained that the extra effort
had strengthened international cooperation, with Russia and China
supportive of the recent IAEA Board of Governors resolution.
Poneman stressed that the deal was not offered out of naivete, but
rather out of the view that if Iran agreed it would remove a
significant amount of LEU from Natanz and if Iran refused it would
help build international support - beginning with Russia and China
- for tougher sanctions.
¶5. (S/NF) The Crown Prince said he would be "very surprised" if a

deal was possible, as Iran's nuclear program is not an issue of
internal conflict but rather one of national pride for the vast
majority of Iranians. He stressed that Iran is not North Korea,
because 1) it is looking to reestablish a Persian empire in the
21st century, 2) Iran has resources and lacks neighbors, including
the UAE, who can pressure it, 3) the leadership has not changed (it
is the same people who seized Embassy Tehran in 1979) , and 4) Iran
believes itself to be a superpower. Poneman said the USG does not
disagree with MbZ's analysis, but believes pride makes the Iranian
leadership more susceptible to the pressure of the world community
uniting against them, whereas North Korea revels in its own
isolation. MbZ agreed, and emphasized the strategic importance of
creating a Palestinian State (i.e., resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict) as the way to create genuine Middle
Eastern unity on the question of Iran's nuclear program and
regional ambitions.
YEMEN
-----
¶6. (S/NF) MbZ said Iran already acts like a superpower and
explained that, while the UAE is a federation of emirates, Iran's
"emirates" have a larger army and budget that the UAE. In addition
to Iran's established emirates in South Lebanon and Gaza, sleeper
emirates in Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,
and the mother of all emirates in Southern Iraq. Now Iran has an
emirate in Saada. MbZ told Poneman, "We believe you don't want us
to believe" the mounting evidence of Iranian involvement in Yemen.
He stressed that he doesn't believe Ali Abdullah Saleh either, but
this is "not like cracking the enigma code" (in World War II),
there are Iranian ships unloading weapons for the Houthis, and "you
have the capability to track this." He warned, "We know your
priority is Al-Qaeda, but don't forget Iran. Al-Qaeda is not going
to get a nuclear bomb; Iran is a matter of time."
¶7. (SBU) DepSec Poneman has cleared this cable.

OLSON
Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD3195, IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

Discussing cables
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Monday, 14 December 2009, 09:57

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.
EO 12958 DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS PGOV, PECON, PREL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf’s social, economic, political
and military circles discussed with Post’s Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs
the scope of Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia clerical
establishment (Marja’iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the
challenges confronting the province’s farmers who are unable to compete with
Iranian-subsidized produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an influential force in
Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi political groups to extend its influence.
Iran remains wary of Sistani’s social and political clout among Shias, notably
in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah’s rejection of the Iranian regime’s adherence
to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf [Sources removed] shared their views on
the state of political and economic development in the province and Iran’s role.
Provincial Council Chairman
---------------------------
¶3. (C) [Name removed] asserted that Iraqis throughout the country were growing
increasingly frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq’s
neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the biggest culprits, but
noted that a “mental revolution” was underway among Iraqi youth against foreign
agendas seeking to undermine the country’s stability, pointing to such trends in
Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and Mosul against the
Turks.
¶4. (C) [Name removed] echoed other interlocutors’ concerns about a premature
U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a political and security vacuum. He noted
that Iran had formed the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists, among
others, in an effort to bolster ISCI’s image as the pan-Shia party of choice in
the elections.
¶5. (C) [Name removed] expressed concerns about rumors circulating in Najaf that
the USG was sponsoring a Baathist conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news
as baseless rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship. (NOTE: A
recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also mentioned a proposed Baathist
conference scheduled to be held in Washington in February. END NOTE).
Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
----------------------------
¶6. (C) [Name removed] described Iran as a threat to Iraqi stability, commenting
that the Iranian government’s (IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in
Iraq in order to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for its
nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq’s potential influence in the
region, and will continue to support local proxies to exert its influence and
undermine Iraq. “Iran does not offer its support for free,” [Name removed]
noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in exchange for Iranian
support.
¶7. (C) [Name removed] is supportive of Maliki’s decision to forego (at least
for now) a political alliance with the INA that is dominated by the pro-Iranian
Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining the INA will only undermine the integrity of
Iraqi security institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill key
security positions with their own supporters, many of whom are unprofessional
and sectarian, [Name removed] cautioned. The Badr Organization, heavily
influenced by Iran, continued to maintain a very effective intelligence arm,
according to [Name removed]. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran’s hit list (NOTE:
According to [Name removed], Iran had already assassinated 180 Iraqi pilots. END
NOTE).
¶8. (C) [Name removed] also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements often
resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of supporters in GOI
detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism unit regularly receives cash offers
to release detainees. He asserted that [Name removed] also alleged that the
Iraqi police were responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
November. “He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is still part of the
militia (Badr),” [Name removed] asserted.
Sistani: “What Do the Americans Want?” ----QDI>RpQd%’MkQQto pulse the cleric on
his views about matters of political consequence. [Name removed] explained that
Sistani’s son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the main conduit of information between
his father whenever a religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
imams in the country.
¶12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll in the howzeh
(religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG infiltration, [Name removed]
asserted. [Name removed] himself is suspicious of Iranian intentions and
asserted that the imams were “in the pocket of the Iranians”, despite their
proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.
The Sadrists
------------
¶13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, [Name removed] recalled fondly his time as a
student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada Al-Sadr’s father),
commenting that, unlike his radical son, the late cleric was admired and
respected by many Iraqis. He Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many
Iraqis. He criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
father’s legacy. [Name removed] also praised the efforts of Sadr’s father and
sought to distinguish between “good” and “bad” Sadrists; the former being
adherents of Sadr’s father. [Name removed] believes the Sadrists are politically
weak and continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own groups.
(NOTE: [Name removed] believes [Name removed] is a closet Sadrist despite his
public alliance with Maliki’s coalition. [Name removed] commented that the
Iranians had told the wayward Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being.
END NOTE).
Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
--------------------------------------------- --
¶14. (C) [Name removed] commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in improving security.
However, he complained that Iran and Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi
farmers by flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce that are
heavily subsidized by their respective governments.
¶15. (C) Iraq’s neighbors were pursuing such measures in order to prevent
economic development, thereby forestalling the continued success of Iraq’s new
democracy, [Name removed] alleged. These problems were further aggravated by
water shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels, outdated
farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted. [Name removed] confirmed that
the Najaf Provincial Council had recently voted to ban the import of foreign
tomatoes into Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60 percent
of Najaf’s labor force works in agriculture. The sector is the province’s most
important revenue generating industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).
¶16. (C) [Name removed] railed against Iran’s pervasive commercial influence in
Najaf, noting that many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians. [Name removed] also
criticized Iraqi politicians “for being ignorant and overly-reliant on clerics”
for their political welfare.
COMMENT
-------
¶17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries significant importance
for Iran and its overall campaign to expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and
the region. The city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
profit spiritually and financially from the city’s religious and commercial
offerings. There is general awareness and acknowledgment among many Iraqis that
Iran’s influence, albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran will continue to
capitalize on its ties to the city in order to foster greater socio-economic
dependencies. The extent of its ability to influence the ways of the Marja’iyyah
are more limited, particularly during Sistani’s tenure, given the clerical
establishment’s unrivaled theocratic and geographic prominence when compared to
its “sister city” Qom. HILL
Viewing cable 09BEIJING3313, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING

WITH CCID DIRECTOR
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO3525
DE RUEHBJ #3313/01 3451022
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111022Z DEC 09
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/11/2034

TAGS PREL, PARM, MNUC, PGOV, KN, IR, CH
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
WANG JIARUI ON IRAN, NORTH KOREA
Classified By: Political Minster Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s
Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Wang Jiarui December 9
to discuss U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Wang said that the
“ideal outcome” of Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen
Bosworth’s current visit to Pyongyang would be a meeting with DPRK leader Kim
Jong-il. The very fact of the visit, Wang emphasized, was important because it
sent a signal to the DPRK that the United States was serious about negotiating a
settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. The DPRK would be unwilling in the
short run to publicly announce denuclearization or an immediate return to the
Six-Party talks, but would not want to lose the opportunity presented by
Ambassador Bosworth’s visit. The important thing was to keep things moving in
the right direction and prevent the situation spinning out of control.
¶2. (C) Wang praised U.S. policy on Iran, calling it a “practical” approach. He
said China was in agreement with the United States “in principle” that Iran
should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that the consequences of
such an event would have a negative impact on Chinese interests. He also said
that China would cooperate in persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it
made at the October meeting in Geneva with the P5-plus-1 to resume discussions
on the nuclear issue and allow third countries to reprocess its nuclear fuel.
However, Wang insisted, continued diplomacy, rather than military action or
stronger sanctions, was the best option at present. U/S Burns stressed the
importance of China’s cooperation and would not close the door on diplomacy but
that U.S. patience was wearing thin and Iran had to soon show it was complying
with international agreements or face real consequences. End Summary.
China Pleased With Bosworth Visit to DPRK

-----------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Asked his views on the North Korea nuclear situation, CCID Director Wang
stated that China was very pleased that Ambassador Bosworth was in Pyongyang,
noting that the visit would be “cost effective” because the North Koreans had
made clear there could be no resuming the Six-Party Talks without first
convening a bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue. Ambassador Bosworth’s visit
effectively “kicked the ball” back to the North Koreans. When asked what the
likely outcome of the talks would be, Wang said the ideal outcome would be a
meeting with Kim Jong-il, which would send a very positive signal, but it was
impossible to predict North Korean behavior through “normal” means of reading
public indicators. Wang said that Ambassador Bosworth would likely meet with
First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was “a hardliner” with “strong
views” and whose opinions were valued by the DPRK’s top leaders. However, Kang
had to follow orders from above, Wang noted, and would not want to lose such an
opportunity to improve relations with the United States. The negotiations with
Ambassador Bosworth would be a bargaining process, with each side trying to
discern the other’s bottom line.
¶4. (C) The North needed a breakthrough in its relations with the United States,
Wang asserted, both because of its domestic situation and the current
international environment, but it would not be easy for North Korea to make a
specific promise regarding a return to the Six-Party Talks or to announce
denuclearization. Ambassador Bosworth’s trip itself was important because it
demonstrated that the United States was serious about preventing a nuclear
Korean peninsula and was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue. Wang
said China was aware that the United States worried that it would be deceived by
the North but in China’s view there was no need to worry because the current
process of promoting dialogue and negotiations was quite transparent and the
international community would know what the outcome would be.
¶5. (C) Wang reiterated China’s long-standing position that the key objective at
this stage was to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from spinning
out of control and to establish a positive direction through dialogue and
negotiation. He said that Ambassador Bosworth should make clear to North Korea
that it was not in U.S. interests to prolong the current state of hostility,
that the United States had no intention of promoting regime change in the North,
and that international sanctions and relations with the DPRK’s neighbors could
be changed and they could help
BEIJING 00003313 002 OF 003

with North Korea’s economic development. This was contingent upon a change in
North Korean behavior and an eventual North Korean pledge to the world that it
would not embark on the road to nuclear weapons. U/S Burns responded that the
United States understood the complexity of the situation and emphasized the
great importance of joint U.S.-China and Five-Party efforts to bring North Korea
back as soon as possible to the Six-Party Talks and its denuclearization
commitments.
Unified U.S.-China Effort Needed on Iran

----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) U/S Burns emphasized that the nuclear weapons challenge in Iran required
a similarly unified U.S.-China and international effort. The United States was
profoundly concerned about Middle East stability, which was crucial to both U.S.
and Chinese security and economic interests. If Iran continued developing a
nuclear capability, Israel would “no doubt” act, and concern among the Arab
states might trigger a regional arms race. President Obama had repeatedly
reached out to Iran’s leaders, but had yet to receive a positive response.
Moreover, Iran had not followed through on the understandings reached in Geneva
in October, including Iran’s commitment to meet with the P5-plus-1 countries for
talks focused on the nuclear issue and its initial acceptance of the IAEA’s TRR
proposal. The United States would continue to take a diplomatic, creative and
flexible approach working with our Russian, Chinese and European partners, but
time was running short. By the end of the year, President Obama would have to
evaluate Iran’s actions thus far. If Iran did not live up to its agreements, the
United States would work with its international partners to make clear to Iran
the consequences of its unwillingness to engage seriously.
Wang Pledges Chinese Support...
-------------------------------
¶7. (C) Wang had high praise for U.S. efforts in the Middle East in general and
the approach to Iran in particular, stating that China viewed U.S. measures in
Iran as very practical and as based on realities on the ground. China had
economic interests in Iran, but, in principle, China had no differences with the
United States on the nuclear weapons issue. China agreed that Iranian nuclear
weapons would bring great instability to the Middle East, including possible
warfare, even on a global scale, with consequences far greater than China’s
economic interests. China agreed with the IAEA proposal and that Iran should
live up to the commitments it made in Geneva, but unfortunately, Iran had not
responded positively to this proposal despite many efforts by the United States,
China, and the international community. China had consistently told Iran that
China strongly opposed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. This message, he
claimed, has been conveyed in party-to-party and government-to-government
meetings and in “all channels.” However, Iran maintained it had no nuclear
weapons and was simply pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
...But Urges Continued Diplomacy

--------------------------------
¶8. (C) Wang pressed U/S Burns for details on when the limits of U.S. patience
might be exhausted and counseled further efforts to find a diplomatic solution.
Burns replied that U.S. patience was nearly exhausted. Wang acknowledged that
there was a potential for an Israeli military strike were the situation not
handled properly, which was of grave concern to China, but insisted that harsh
actions were not yet warranted. Recent U.S. experience with a military option,
he said, should teach some lessons, and the outcome of tougher sanctions was
also unpredictable. The United States needed to understand that Iran was not
Iraq, and the best way forward was to continue to pursue peaceful dialogue and
negotiations and to carefully examine previous diplomatic efforts to see what
changes needed to be made.
North Korea and Iran Similarities

---------------------------------
¶9. (C) Wang also claimed similarities between the North Korea and Iran nuclear
issues. The solution in both cases was to persist over the long haul, continuing
intensive efforts with the objective of ensuring that the situation did not spin
out of control. Wang noted that in his several recent visits to Iran anti-
American sentiment was strong, everywhere, and palpable, which, he said, was not
conducive to resolving the issue.
¶10. (C) Wang asked U/S Burns for his views on who made final decisions in Iran,
President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader
BEIJING 00003313 003 OF 003
Khamenei. He said it would be very helpful to China if the decision-making
process in Iran could be sorted out. Wang appeared to agree with the Under
Secretary that Khamenei was the final arbiter of Iranian policy and concluded by
stating that there might be a way for direct communication with the Supreme
Leader. He said direct engagement would avoid the distortions of message that
occurred when communicating through an intermediary. Wang noted that there was
not one country in the international arena that supported Iran’s quest for
nuclear weapons and emphasized that there was a need for a unified international
view on Iran.
¶11. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States had made very clear its
willingness for direct diplomacy, but that it took both sides to make direct
communication work. He emphasized that this was a core national security issue
for the United States, which could not abide greater Middle East instability,
and said the United States would continue its diplomatic efforts in a creative
and flexible manner. However, he stated, at some point there had to be results
and U.S. patience was fast running out.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
¶12. (C) Wang said China would continue to make its own efforts on the issue but
China was willing to do more to cooperate with the United States to facilitate a
resolution to the Iran nuclear problem. He welcomed further U.S. suggestions on
measures to achieve a breakthrough and asked what the United States would like
China to do or whether there were areas in which China could make a
contribution. U/S Burns emphasized that the United States would like to
cooperate with China and needed to work closely with China to find a way to
persuade Iran to make the right choices. The current focus was on persuading
Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the Geneva meetings on the TRR
proposal and by meeting again soon on the nuclear issue. The two P5-plus-1
tracks -- diplomacy and sanctions -- were not mutually exclusive. The United
States had tried many approaches to Iran in the past 11 weeks, and none had
borne fruit. The United States would not close the door on diplomacy, but as in
the case of putting pressure on North Korea through UN Resolution 1874, we had
to work together to apply pressure to get Iran back to the diplomatic track.
Iran had to understand that it faced a clear choice. Iran could choose to pursue
the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which the United States supported and would
work to implement if Iran demonstrated the exclusively peaceful nature of its
nuclear program. But Iran had to understand there were costs to not following
this path. Wang agreed that both sides should try very hard to resolve the
problem.
HUNTSMAN
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1528, COALITION TESTED AS US-EU

TFTP/SWIFT AGREEMENT
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO6301
DE RUEHRL #1528/01 3371019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031019Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR OFAC SZUBIN, MONBORNE, MAHER

JUSTICE FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
USEU FOR CHASE, DODMAN, SNYDER
STATE FOR S/ES-O, EUR/ERA, EUR/CE, L AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KJUS KHLS GM
SUBJECT: COALITION TESTED AS US-EU TFTP/SWIFT AGREEMENT
PASSES ON GERMAN ABSTENTION
REF: A. BERLIN 1393

¶B. BERLIN 1377
¶C. BERLIN 1167
Classified By: DCM Greg T. Delawie for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: German Federal Interior Minister Thomas de

Maiziere overruled Justice Minister Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and abstained from voting at the
November 30 COREPER vote in Brussels on an interim U.S.-EU
agreement to continue the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.
De Maiziere's decision allowed the agreement to pass and
followed weeks of engagement in Berlin, Brussels and
Washington as well as high-level interventions from Secretary
Clinton, Treasury Secretary Geithner, Attorney General
Holder, National Security Advisor Gen. Jones and Ambassador
Murphy. De Maiziere's decision was difficult for him to make
given that the coalition agreement called for specific
revisions to the SWIFT agreement, none of which Germany
achieved, except a shortening of the interim period from 12
to 9 months. The episode has tested Germany's new coalition
government just weeks after its formation with
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger heavily criticizing the
abstention. This experience suggests that we will need to
pay close attention to Germany during our negotiations on a
long-term TFTP agreement. END SUMMARY
Germany Relents Following Intense Pressure

---------------
¶2. (C) Ambassador Murphy met with Interior Minister de

Maiziere on November 27 and urged him to support U.S.-EU
negotiations on an interim TFTP agreement, to which de
Maiziere indicated that he would abstain from voting on the
agenda item at the November 30 COREPER meeting. De
Maiziere's decision, which followed a German request to
shorten the duration of the interim agreement to nine months
rather than twelve, facilitated the passing of the agreement
as Germany was the strongest holdout. De Maiziere's decision
followed two weeks of intense lobbying in Berlin, Brussels
and Washington by Embassy Berlin, USEU, the Departments of
Treasury, State and Justice and the NSC. The campaign
included calls by Secretaries Clinton, Geithner, the Attorney
General and the National Security Advisor to their German
counterparts. State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator
Benjamin urged support for the agreement during a two-day
visit to Berlin (see septel). Ambassador Murphy twice wrote
to all five relevant ministers (Interior, Justice, Finance,
Chancellery, and MFA) and made repeated calls to senior
decision makers, stressing the importance of the interim
agreement and the need for Germany to not block it. The DCM,
Econ M/C, and staff from multiple embassy sections heavily
engaged on the issue as well.
¶3. (C) De Maiziere (CDU) stressed that his decision was not
an easy one given that the Christian Democrat/Social Union
(CDU/CSU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition had
differing views on the TFTP program. The outcome
particularly irritated Justice Minister
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger because she had expressed
concerns about the TFTP dating back to the initial July
decision to give the negotiating mandate to the Swedish EU
Presidency. Furthermore, in October
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger had inserted language into the
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition agreement specifically addressing the
TFTP negotiations and directing Germany to call upon the EU
to work towards a higher level of data protection (see Ref
B). Following de Maiziere's decision, the Justice Minister
complained that her views were ignored and that the decision
has "upset millions of citizens of Europe." De Maiziere told
the Ambassador that he would be expressing some criticisms of
the agreement publicly in order to reflect MoI concerns and
to deflect public criticism. He was subsequently quoted as
saying that "a not completely satisfactory agreement is
better than none at all."
BERLIN 00001528 002 OF 002
German Vote Comes with Costs for the Coalition

----------
¶4. (C) De Maiziere intimated, and working level contacts have

confirmed, that Germany would like to avoid a repeat of our
all-out lobbying effort during the negotiations for a
long-term TFTP agreement. De Maiziere's strong preference is
to seek consensus with his ministry colleagues. He
particularly wants to avoid another clash with the Justice
Minister on this issue as it has caused no small amount of
discord between the new coalition partners, who are having a
rocky start on a number of fronts. The incident is
particularly difficult for de Maiziere as he entered the
Interior Ministry stressing that he represented a break from
his predecessor Wolfgang Schaeuble, whom he felt overly
focused on security issues (see Ref A). De Maiziere surely
finds this whole experience regrettable as it put him in
exactly the position he did not want to be in: seemingly
siding with the U.S. over German interests, causing
disruption within the coalition, and compromising the data
privacy rights of German citizens.
Engaging the FDP on Data Privacy

---------
¶5. (C) It is not altogether surprising that this disagreement

arose given the FDP's reputation as a staunch defender of
citizens' privacy rights (see Ref C). Nevertheless, the
intensity of this dispute should be a wake up call - we must
avoid repeating this as we look to completing the long-term
U.S.-EU TFTP agreement. The coalition agreement calls for
strict limitations on the use of TFTP data, no automatic
access to the system, data deletion requirements, clear rules
on sharing information with third parties and legal redress.
These positions will guide Germany's views in the follow-on
negotiations, and we need to consider how to take them into
account in a way that does not complicate TFTP
implementation.
¶6. (C) Embassy Berlin is examining how we can reach out to

FDP ministers and parliamentarians to educate them on U.S.
data protection structures as this experience has
demonstrated that they are often misinformed on the nature of
our policies. We will likewise reach out to CDU/CSU decision
makers, in part to enlist their help in reaching the German
public. We also intend to make the point that countering
terrorism in a globalized world, where terrorists and their
supporters use open borders and information technology to
quickly move people and financing, requires robust
international data sharing.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1548, GERMANY RENEWS CONSIDERATION OF
GUANTANAMO
Discussing cables
07:07 21:09 N
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #1548/01 3410728

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070728Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO S/GC MICHAEL WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY RENEWS CONSIDERATION OF GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES FOR RESETTLEMENT
REF: A. STATE 50242

¶B. BERLIN 600
¶C. BERLIN 625
Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In separate December 1 meetings with

Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (S/GC), the Ministry of the
Interior, Foreign Ministry and Chancellery expressed a
willingness to consider seven new cases of Guantanamo
detainees for resettlement as well as three cases that had
already been provided to the former government last spring.
All interlocutors stressed that the MOI is the competent
ministry handling this issue. They also expressed the desire
to be helpful in the spirit of the strong U.S.-German
bilateral relationship. Interior Ministry State Secretary
Beus said that any decision on the cases would likely take up
to two months and agreed with S/E Fried on the following way
forward:
-- the Interior Ministry would be the only ministry

addressing this issue, especially in regard to sharing
information on the detainees;
-- the U.S. and Germany will uphold strict confidentiality
during this review phase and coordinate timing and content of
any public messages;
-- while Germany prefers non-Uighur cases because of expected
tension with China, it will consider the cases of two Uighurs
based on humanitarian grounds;
-- Germany prefers to accept detainees with a connection to
Germany, which S/E Fried explained to be the case with only
one detainee, a Tunisian whose file was previously provided;
-- the German MOI will maintain direct communication with
S/GC at this stage in the process;
-- Germany will decide on the need to interview any
candidates at the end of its review process.
In a later meeting, Chancellery Security Advisor Christoph

Heusgen stressed his confidence in Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere to handle this issue, noting de Maiziere's close
relationship with Chancellor Merkel. End summary.
Interior Ministry is Key

------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Based on a schedule recommended by the

Chancellery, S/E Fried and Ambassador Murphy met first with
Interior Ministry State Secretary Beus and expressed
appreciation for the new government's willingness to consider
resettling detainees. S/E Fried reviewed the numerous
European countries which had accepted or pledged to resettle
detainees at this point, noting that progress has been made
but more is needed. He noted he would only be passing along
detainee dossiers to the MOI and discussing case specifics
with the MOI, and not with other Government ministries, per
earlier requests from the government. S/E Fried handed over
the dossiers of seven detainees: two Egyptians, two Syrians,
a Libyan, and two Palestinians. He explained that if the MOI
has questions or requires additional information, it can do
so through established liaison channels and additionally
offered for a German team to visit Guantanamo to conduct
interviews with detainees under consideration. While
recognizing Germany's preference for non-Uighur detainees,
S/E Fried raised two Uighur cases for consideration based on
humanitarian grounds, one who has psychological problems and
the other, his brother, who serves as a caregiver. He also
acknowledged the German interest in detainees who have some
connection to Germany, noting the one Tunisian case whose
file had been conveyed last spring as the single detainee
with those ties to Germany. In total, S/E Fried requested
that Germany consider 10 detainee cases for resettlement,
three cases already conveyed and seven new cases.
¶3. (C/NF) State Secretary Beus expressed his ministry's

willingness to consider all the cases, including the Uighurs,
and said that his experts would review the files as soon as
possible. Shortly after he began, Interior Minister Thomas
de Maiziere dropped in to stress his desire to be of help.
Continuing, Beus underlined the importance of keeping the
current discussions and review of the detainees confidential,
to which S/E Fried strongly agreed. Beus underlined
Germany's preference for detainees who have some ties to
Germany, noting that this connection would provide the
government with a "plausible" explanation for accepting
certain detainees when faced with the argument that the U.S.
should be resettling them. Beus said that he would be
willing to consider the two Uighur cases on humanitarian
grounds, but noted that they would present special
difficulties because of the diplomatic row which would likely
ensue. Beus also highlighted that even if the federal

government agrees to accept any detainees, it must then find
a German state willing to accept them. He also said that
German services would naturally keep an eye on any resettle
detainees within reasonable resource means.
¶4. (C/NF) Beus also expressed strong interest in

coordinating the timing and content of any public message on
Germany's consideration of and decision on resettling
detainees to prevent political pressure from those who oppose
the move, but regardless the government will advocate in
public in favor of taking detainees if they come to a
positive decision. He added that being able to say to the
public that the U.S. has also accepted detainees or otherwise
explain why the U.S. is not doing so would also be helpful.
S/E Fried expressed his readiness to coordinate and noted
that the U.S. has admitted and plans to admit the more
dangerous detainees for legal proceedings.
Process and Timeframe

---------------------
¶5. (C/NF) Beus said that he and his experts would review the
files and determine if additional information is needed. He
agreed that additional information would go through
intelligence channels and expressed his preference to
communicate directly with S/E Fried on any matters at this
stage of the process. He said that they would decide whether
interviews are necessary when the experts have completed
their review of the information. He estimated that a
decision on taking detainees would take one-to-two months.
MFA Plays Peripheral Role

-------------------------
¶6. (C/NF) It was clear from the later meeting with MFA State
Secretary Wolf Born that the Foreign Office would not be a
major decision-maker as on this issue. S/E Fried reviewed in
general terms the cases of detainees that we are asking the
MOI to consider and also highlighted the humanitarian nature
of the two Uighur cases, which Born noted. Born said that
Foreign Minister Westerwelle wants to be "positive," but
added that it is the MOI which is the "competent" ministry on
this issue. Born mainly asked questions about the numbers of
detainees still at Guantanamo, U.S. plans for addressing the
various groups, and the possible closing date, all of which
S/E Fried discussed with him.
Chancellery Confirms Reticence about Uighurs

--------------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) In the last meeting, Chancellery Security and

Foreign Policy Advisor Christoph Heusgen expressed
appreciation that S/E Fried had proceeded along the lines
that the MOI and Chancellery had requested through Ambassador
Murphy. Heusgen appeared to be already fully briefed on S/E
Fried's earlier meeting that day with Beus. He told S/E
Fried that if Germany were to take any Uighurs, it would be
best to do so in combination with other European countries to
prevent China from focusing its opposition on any one
country. Heusgen was not optimistic that China would
demonstrate any understanding for the two humanitarian cases.
Heusgen inquired as to whether any alternatives for the
Uighurs exists. S/E Fried explained possible options, while
highlighting the difficulty of resettling the two individuals
he is asking Germany to consider.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C/NF) The new government, now in place since October 29,
appears willing to renew consideration of resettling GTMO
detainees and has expressed a clear desire to be of help. In
contrast to former Interior Minister Schaeuble, current MOI
de Maiziere has not (and is unlikely to) flouted security
concerns about cases in the press, nor indicated that Germany
would be hardpressed to accept any detainees put forth for
security reasons. Nor has de Maiziere indicated that the
fact that the U.S. itself has not resettled detainees
presents an insurmountable roadblock, although Beus indicated
that U.S. resettlement would help Germany's PR efforts to
resettle. All interlocutors expressed a strong interest in
keeping the matter confidential and coordinating the timing
and content of any public message. Beus projected sincerity
and realism, noting that even if the federal government
agrees, it must still identify a state that is willing to
resettle the detainees. While all interlocutors did not
outright reject the two Uighur cases, Heusgen made clear that
the prospect of being the only European country to irritate
China by accepting Uighurs would make it difficult, although
it is unclear whether Germany would take part in any broader

European decision to resettle Uighurs.
¶9. (SBU) There has to date been no mention in the press of
S/E Fried's visit.
¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/E Dan Fried.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1577, NOW FOR THE HARD PART: MERKEL,S

TEAM EXAMINES NEXT
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO5162
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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP ETTC EFIN IR GM
SUBJECT: NOW FOR THE HARD PART: MERKEL,S TEAM EXAMINES NEXT
STEPS IN IRAN
Classified By: Ambassador Philip D. Murphy for reasons 1.4 b/d.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellor Merkel set the German agenda on

Iran with her early November statement before the U.S.
Congress on "zero tolerance" for a nuclear armed Iran and the
need for tougher sanctions should engagement not work.
During a private roundtable hosted by Ambassador Murphy,
however, members of Germany's Iran "brain-trust" from the
German Parliament, MFA, Ministry of Economics and top
government funded think tank welcomed the President's
engagement policy, recommended broadening the dialogue to
areas of cooperation (drugs, Afghanistan, diplomatic
relations), betrayed little beyond a superficial knowledge of
the nuclear program, argued that Germany took the largest
economic hit from recent sanctions, and expressed doubts as
to the efficacy of sanctions, giving us a window into the
difficult task Chancellor Merkel will have in keeping her
government on her page. In the end, we assess that Merkel
will have her way. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The November 24 event at the Embassy included members

of Parliament from the four main German political parties:
FDP Elke Hoff, CDU Andreas Schockenhoff, Greens Kerstin
Mueller, and SPD Rolf Muetzenich. From the MFA, Policy
Planner Markus Ederer, DG for Economics Ruediger von Fritsch,
DG for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Amb. Peter Gottwald,
and Iran Task Force Director Andreas Krueger attended.
Ministry of Economics DG for External Economic Policy
Karl-Ernst Brauner and the Director of the German government
funded research institute Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und
Politik (SWP, or Institute for Science and Politics) Volker
Perthes also attended.
-----------------------------------------
MFA: TRR Not Dead Yet; But Not Well Either
-----------------------------------------
¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by thanking the

German government for its excellent cooperation on Iran and
asked his guests to share their thoughts on the Iranian
internal situation, especially given recent reports of the
expanded role of the IRGC in the cultural/educational spheres
of life, and how that might affect Iran's external policy.
MFA DG for Disarmament Gottwald stated that if we were
correct in assessing the Iranian regime's primary goal to be
survival, then we still had a chance with a negotiated
solution. He said that while the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) deal was not "well," Germany wasn't ready to pronounce
it "dead" quite yet. He concluded with a strong statement
saying that a nuclear armed Iran would be a nightmare in and
of itself and a disastrous blow to the NPT regime which was
why Germany would be a strong partner in support of further
sanctions.
¶4. (C) MFA Policy Planer Ederer said he thought Iran was
confused about what it wants and that the West might be even
more confused about how to get what we want. He said we want
Iranian behavior change, but we don't agree yet what will get
us there. He said UN sponsored sanctions would isolate Iran
and limit its capacity, but questioned whether they would
change Tehran's behavior. He said he realized sanctions
remained a good alternative to military action, but
questioned whether they were really capable of anything other
than just buying time.
------------------------------------------
More Carrots before we Reach for the Sticks
------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) SWP's Perthes argued Iranian Supreme Leader

Khamenei's primary interest was to maintain the security of
the system and prevent regime change. Perthes said Khamenei
feared a velvet revolution over all else, though regional
instability was a close second. He noted Iran remained
besieged by problems of drug smuggling, piracy, and
instability in Pakistan. He recommended more emphasis be
placed on trying to find an incentive for the regime to
cooperate on the regional track, which had already shown some
progress. He said the April 2009, 300 million dollar Iranian
pledge at the Pakistan donor's conference was an important
symbol of the value the regime placed on regional security.
He suggested the West "broaden" relations with Iran to areas
where cooperation could be had: drugs, Afghanistan, and
diplomatic (especially Consular) ties. POL M/C noted this
was fine, but ignored the fact that time was not on our side.
Rather, Iran was installing new centrifuges each week. If
Iran wanted to build confidence or "broaden" relations, it
could modulate that pace, but time was not a luxury we had.
Gottwald agreed emphatically.
BERLIN 00001577 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Changing course, Perthes said that if "sticks" had to

be used, he suggested more focus on "export-control" and less
on sanctions. He noted evidence suggested export control
regimes had already worked in slowing down centrifuge
progress. He concluded by saying that if sanctions must be
used, we should avoid all use of the word "crippling" and
instead focus on "targeted" sanctions in order not to turn
the Iranian masses against us and right back into
Ahmadinejad's hands. He also suggested that "unofficial"
sanctions such as Russia's decision not to sell the S300s
were more effective than most formal sanctions. If formal
sanctions had to be pursued he said only global sanctions
would be effective, and therefore advocated UNSC action.
Perthes said he saw readiness in the German business
community to accept financial loss if sanctions were truly
global, but they don't want to see business opportunities
being lost to China or India.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Green Party : Too Late to Prevent, Need To Contain
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶7. (C) From the opposition, Green Party Foreign Policy

Spokesperson Kerstin Mueller said she was glad that the new
U.S. administration no longer talked about a threat of a
military option. But she also said she was skeptical that
Iran can be prevented from obtaining a nuclear capability
without a military option, and that it might even be too late
for a military option to be effective. She said she didn't
see compromise within the interests of the regime and thought
the West should focus more attention on how to "control" a
nuclear-armed Iran.
-------------------------------------------
FDP: Rank and File Grudging Partner on Iran?
--------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) FDP Spokeswoman on Defense Policy, Elke Hoff opened

her remarks with a grudging acknowledgment of the coalition
agreement in which her party agreed that if engagement with
Iran on the nuclear dossier failed, sanctions would be
implemented. She added that she remained personally
skeptical as to their efficacy. She said additional
sanctions would serve the unintended consequence of rallying
the masses around Ahmadinejad.
¶9. (C) Hoff said she often hears from constituents in the
business community that German companies are getting
pressured from their American counterparts not to do business
in Iran, and yet they see plenty of U.S. products for sale in
Iran. Econ M/C intervened and stressed that the U.S. was
ready to prosecute any U.S. businesses in violation of U.S.
sanctions and had already done so. Hoff also suggested
offering German businesses financial compensation should new
sanctions come into play. In response to a criticism from
Hoff on whether the U.S. deadline created for engagement on
Iran reflected Obama's domestic political agenda, the
Ambassador emphasized the deep commitment of the
administration to engagement.
----------------------------
Germany is the Largest Loser
----------------------------
¶10. (C) MFA DG for Economics Von Fritsch agreed with

Perthes' suggestion to focus more on the carrots and not the
sticks. He noted that no single country has (recently)
sacrificed as much financially as Germany has, not just in
existing trade, but also in long term future contracts. Econ
M/C noted that U.S. business had also suffered enormous trade
and investment losses after 1979. Von Fritsch said if
sanctions were inevitable, German business preferred global
and clear sanctions as opposed to vague wording that can be
left open to differing interpretations. On correspondent
banking relations, Von Fritsch said the German government was
still examining the issue but that a complete severance of
correspondent banking relations including with Iran's central
bank would not be possible since it would amount to a total
trade embargo.
¶11. (C) Ministry of Economics DG for External Policy Brauner

referenced the inclusion in German law of the presumptive
right to trade, and said that he was concerned that what the
German Customs and BAFA (export control agency under the
Ministry of Economics) were doing to encourage "Nullbescheid"
(pre-certification that specific trade with Iran is not
illicit) might actually be illegal, as German business had
complained. He said one important consideration for Germany
BERLIN 00001577 003 OF 003
was that a further crackdown on trade with Iran could

endanger repayment of the 4.5 billion Euros in outstanding
credits that Iran owed Germany. Germany had agreed not to
issue any new credit under its Hermes (OPIC-like) program,
but expected to be able to collect on outstanding credits.
Nonetheless, both Brauner and Von Fritsch emphasized that in
the event of no progress in negotiations with Iran, Germany
was ready to enter a new round of stronger sanctions, and
that we should look to Chancellor Merkel's statements in the
U.S. Congress and FM Westerwelle's reiterations of her strong
policy as the final say on which direction Germany would go
on Iran.
¶12. (C) CONCLUSION. The majority of the guests at the table

distinctly deferred to Perthes for guidance on where the Iran
issue might be headed or should be headed. This was striking
amongst such a high ranking group of people operationally
involved with the Iran issue. Also illuminating was the
variety of talking points employed by the participants to
define hurdles for sanction until debunked one at a time by
Embassy officers. The candor with which even some MFA and
Ministry of Economics officials expressed their skepticism on
the efficacy of pursuing tougher sanctions on Iran may mean
that Merkel will have to press hard within her own government
to deliver on her promise of implementing tougher sanctions
should engagement with Iran fail. None of our interlocutors,
however, questioned whether Merkel would, at the end of the
day, be able to "deliver" on her promises. If and when we
decide to go forward on the pressure track on Iran, the USG
may wish to reinforce Merkel's position by showing
appreciation for Germany's strong continuing support. END
CONCLUSION.
MURPHY
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1609, GERMANY'S NEW DEVELOPMENT

MINISTER CONNECTS
Discussing cables
09BERLIN1609
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY'S NEW DEVELOPMENT MINISTER CONNECTS
DEVELOPMENT WITH SECURITY POLICY
BERLIN 00001609 001.3 OF 002
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Dirk Niebel (FDP) was an odd pick as

Germany's new Development Minister -- he had no experience in
international development, and had previously suggested
abolishing the Development Ministry. Now in charge, Niebel
has big shoes to fill, following on the heels of Heidemarie
Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD). Important differences with his
predecessor are already apparent: he would like to integrate
Germany's development policy more closely with its foreign
and security policy, including in Afghanistan. Niebel is
also a firm believer in free markets, and sees a successful
conclusion of the Doha Development Round as critical for
developing countries. For Niebel, nothing is sacrosanct: he
intends to phase out German aid to China, which he regards as
no longer a developing country. With the ministry under new
management, there may be additional opportunities for
collaboration between the United States and Germany on
development policy. END SUMMARY.
DIRK WHO?
---------
¶2. (SBU) Dirk Niebel struck many as an unlikely choice for

Development Minister in the coalition government of
Chancellor Merkel's Christian Democratic Union
(CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) and Guido Westerwelle's
Free Democratic Party (FDP) (the "Black-Yellow" coalition).
A Hamburg native, Niebel's previous work experience includes
eight years as a paratrooper in the German armed forces, and
five years as a placement officer at a job center in
Heidelberg. In 1998, he was elected to the Bundestag (lower
house of Parliament), where he became caucus spokesperson for
labor market policy and a member of the Labor Committee. In
2005, FDP Chairman (and current Foreign Minister) Westerwelle
tapped him as FDP Secretary General -- a position he held
until Chancellor Merkel appointed him Development Minister in
November 2009. As Secretary General, Niebel had called for
the elimination of the ministry he would later head, the
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
(NOTE: This option appears off the table for now. END NOTE)
Niebel succeeds Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), who headed BMZ for a record 11 years.
CONNECTED SECURITY
------------------
¶3. (SBU) In a December 18 meeting with Ambassador Murphy,

Niebel said he intended to "make some changes at BMZ." One
such change is linking development policy more closely with
foreign and security policy -- a concept he referred to as
"connected security." Niebel told the Ambassador he planned
to coordinate very closely with Foreign Minister Guido
Westerwelle, and that he foresaw much greater cooperation
between BMZ and the German military in northern Afghanistan.
(NOTE: Days prior to the meeting with Ambassador Murphy,
Niebel had announced BMZ would increase civilian assistance
to Afghanistan by around 50 million euros, bringing Germany's
2009 total to over 260 million euros. END NOTE)
¶4. (SBU) In a separate meeting several months ago,

Chancellery National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen had
told us that BMZ under a Black-Yellow coalition would be less
wedded to "old" notions of doing development work. This
assessment now appears to be accurate. Wiezcorek-Zeul had
ensured that German development staff worked and lived in
separate compounds, away from provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs) and other bases from which the Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior
operated. She even refused to ride in German military
vehicles when she visited Afghanistan. This kind of
separation seems likely to end under Niebel, both physically
and substantively.
¶5. (SBU) Among other ideas Niebel brings to the table is a
plan to partner with third country donors like Israel on
projects in developing countries. Niebel told the Ambassador
that Israel,s expertise in border protection could be shared
BERLIN 00001609 002.3 OF 002
with African countries, for example. By teaming up with

Germany, Israel could participate in certain capacity
building projects where it might not otherwise have access.
LAISSEZ-FAIRE DEVELOPMENT
-------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Shortly after becoming Minister, Niebel remarked

that his overall development philosophy was helping recipient
countries help themselves. He regards the successful
conclusion of World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Doha
Development Round as especially meaningful for developing
countries. "There is more money being lost by trade barriers
than all the development aid can make up for," he said. This
perspective marks a noteworthy departure from the approach of
Wieczorek-Zeul, dubbed "red Heide" for her affiliation with
the Young Socialists years ago.
¶7. (SBU) Niebel also opposes a proposed tax on international

financial transactions to fund development assistance. Both
Chancellor Merkel and Wieczorek-Zeul had championed the
so-called "Tobin tax." Citing "differences" within the
government on the issue, Niebel has reportedly ended BMZ's
participation in an international working group on the
proposed tax.
¶8. (SBU) Niebel is keen to reorient BMZ's assistance.

Reflecting on comments made publicly in his first days as
Minister, Niebel told Ambassador Murphy that Germany planned
to stop providing development assistance to China, currently
one of the largest recipients of German aid. He added that
China was "only a developing country when it came to climate
change negotiations." BMZ will carry out its existing aid
obligations to China only through next year. The decision
has proved controversial, as BMZ's assistance to China had
reportedly benefitted German companies doing business there.
TRAVEL PLANS
------------
¶9. (SBU) Niebel said he planned to spend the holidays in

Israel. (NOTE: Niebel is a long-standing member of the
German-Israeli Society. END NOTE) His first official travel
to the developing world will be a late January trip to
"Rwanda, eastern Congo, Mozambique, Afghanistan and Asia."
The Ambassador suggested Niebel visit Washington to meet with
new USAID Administrator Shah once confirmed. Niebel said he
would coordinate dates for the visit with the Embassy.
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (SBU) Niebel takes charge of BMZ at a challenging time:

Germany will run its largest post-war deficit in 2010, and
pressure to rein in spending will strain every ministry.
Niebel's close relationship with Westerwelle should be an
asset, however, and could help minimize cuts on key
priorities. The close relationship will also facilitate
Niebel's vision of integrating development policy with
foreign and security policy. Since taking over at BMZ,
Niebel has increased assistance to Afghanistan, where Germany
was already the third largest donor, and appears open to
doing more in support of an integrated strategy in the north.
An early meeting between the new USAID Administrator, who
oversees the world's largest aid budget, and the new German
Development Minister, who oversees the world's second
largest, could be an important step in building stronger
U.S.-German cooperation on our top development priorities.
DELAWIE
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1626, MEDIA REACTION: TERRORISM, IRAN,

CHINA, U.S.;BERLIN
Discussing cables
09BERLIN1626 2009-12-29 07:07 2010-11-28 18:06 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Berlin
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SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/DSAA, DIA FOR DC-4A
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"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE"
SIPDIS
E.0. 12958: N/A

TAGS: OPRC KMDR KGHG US IR CH US
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: TERRORISM, IRAN, CHINA, U.S.;BERLIN
¶1. Lead Stories Summary

¶2. (U.S.) Failed Terrorist Attack
¶3. (Iran) New Protestsn4
¶4. (China) Reaction to Jailing of Liu Xiabo
¶5. (U.S.) Healthcare Reform
¶1. Lead Stories Summary
The majority of dailies opened with reports on the failed terror

attack on a Delta Airlines jet, while Sueddeutsche headlined:
"Protests Intensify - Riots in Iran" and FAZ led with the headline:
"People Killed in Demonstrations in Iran." Editorials focused on

the
failed terror attack in the U.S., with the unrest in Iran and with
the
state of the coalition government in Berlin. ZDF-TV's early evening
newscast heute and ARD-TV's early evening newscast Tagesschau opened
with a report on violent clashes between the Iranian regime and

opponents.
¶2. (U.S.) Failed Terrorist Attack
All papers carry extensive reports the failed terrorist attack on a
Delta Airlines airliners and reported that travelers flying to the

United States must expect heightened security measures and tougher
restrictions on their flights to the United States. Die Welt
headlined: "Terror Attempt Stirring up fear of Terror," while
Financial Times headlined: "Fear of Terror is Back."
In a front-page editorial, Die Welt (12/28) judged: "The fact that

the
would-be attacker was able to board a plane with his dangerous
material reveals gaps in the control system. With metal detectors
alone chemical explosives cannot be discovered."
Under the headline: "Flight 253," Frankfurter Allgemeine (12/28)

opined: "If someone really had believed that we have transnational
terror under control, and that we can give an all-clear signal with
respect to security, then those people have now been taught better.
Irrespective of whether the attacker acted on his own or on the

instructions of al-Qaida, the danger is not over and that is why
travelers, not only to the Untied States, must accept new
inconveniences which are hopefully useful."
"Following the terror attempt in Detroit, the usual security debate
will now begin," Frankfurter Rundschau (12/28) noted, and added:

"controls will be heightened, and agencies are trying to get us to
do
everything possible to prevent another attack. This failed terror
attempt shows how unpredictable people can be who stop at nothing.
For the time being, there is only one lesson we can learn from the
events on Flight 253: It is the courageous effort of Jasper
Schuringa
who prevented even worse events. The unexpected resolve of
individuals can be the right answer to the threat that comes out of
the blue."
In the view of Stuttgarter Zeitung (12/28), "Abdulmutallab was miles
BERLIN 00001626 002 OF 005
away from the organizational level of the 9/11 attackers. But the
Nigerian national succeeded in one thing: he totally unnerved the
western world, and the terror fighting machinery of the United
States
in particular. Even though the U.S. government knew about the
danger
of the young man, he was able to fly around the world without
difficulty. Almost without any problems, he was able to smuggle
dangerous substances aboard an aircraft. But what if he really had
the order from al-Qaida in Yemen to blow up the plane? How does
this
view then fit the U.S. focus on Afghanistan? Is Yemen, too, a front
in the anti-terror war? Many question, but only a few answers."
Regional daily Nrnberger Nachrichten (12/28) and regional daily

Trierischer Volksfreund (12/28) judged: "How was it possible for a
young man to get aboard with a one-way ticket and an Arabic sounding
name, whose contacts with Islamic extremists were known and whose
father even warned the U.S. embassy? The lists of passengers
travelling to the United States are transferred in advance to the
U.S.
Homeland Security Department with all its data bases. But again we
see a big hole in the net that is supposed to capture potential

terrorists. Of course, one hundred percent security will never
exist,
but these gaps are dramatic and should be an alarm call which
politicians should not ignore."
Mannheimer Morgen (12/28) warned against hysteria and judged: "Each
day terror investigators receive hundreds of tips and indications.
How is it then possible to follow a vague suspicion? We should not
exaggerate security measures for flights. The fact that in the

United
States no one is allowed to go to the bathroom one hour before
landing
is ridiculous. The same is true for the ban on liquids in Europe.
Here there is a clear disproportion between cost and benefit."

MQrkische Allgemeine of Potsdam (12/28) opined: "If airlines, as a
reaction to the failed attempt, force their passengers to remain
seated one hour before landing, then this is no more than a gesture
of
helplessness. The second much more important aspect may be
dissatisfying at the moment, but there is no way around it: Muslims
must preach again and again in their own ranks that terror is not
the
culmination of piety but a crime. Any incident like this should
stress to the Muslim world how urgent this message is."
Regional daily Westdeutsche Zeitung of Dsseldorf (12/28) observed:
"Hectic measure such as barring passengers from getting up should

not
prevail in the long run. In the future, there will be no way around
finding the right balance between possible improvements of our

security standards compared to the trouble caused by
them."SchwarzwQlder Bote (12/28) noted: "Everything we have learned
about this attack does not strengthen our confidence in

international
BERLIN 00001626 003 OF 005
security measures. It is certainly right that there cannot be

absolute security from mean terrorist attacks but this does not the
least excuse the gaps in anti-terror measures.
¶3. (Iran) New Protests
All papers carry extensive coverage of the new clashes between the
regime and opposition forces in Iran. Sueddeutsche headlined:
"Protests Intensify - Riots in Iran" and FAZ led with the headline:
"People Killed in Demonstrations in Iran." Frankfurter Rundschau

reported on its front page: "The protests are directed against
Iranian
President Ahmadinejad." The paper also reported that "according to
reports from Tehran, police officers partly disobeyed orders to use
their guns against the protesters. The Internet page "Jaras," which
is critical of the government, reported that 'some [police officers]
tried to fire their guns in the air when their superiors put
pressure
on them.'"
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) said in an editorial under the

headline:
"There is Growing Unrest among the People" that "if the information
fragments from Tehran on the demonstrations during the Ashura

holidays
allow one conclusion, then this one: the rank and file of the
protests
are now overtaking their leaders. Posters of religious leader Ali
Khamenei and the chorus of demonstrators who want to see the
dictator
dead do not correspond with the slogans of the two opposition
leaders
Moussawi and Charrubi. They are now faced with a dilemma: If they
stick to their view that they, in principle, recognize the

institutions of the Islamic republic and want to use the courts to
make their political opposition heard, then it could be that their
followers will leave them because many want something else: regime
change."
Regional daily Suedwest Presse of Ulm (12/28) editorialized: "The

regime is using all its might to extinguish the massive protests.
The
few Internet reports in any case show the brutality of the leading
clique around President Ahmadinejad. In the meantime, the regime
has
its back to the wall. The protests are no longer confined to Tehran
but are spreading to other cities.... The government can no longer
afford the good deeds with which it bought the loyalty of Iranians.
All this is really worrying for the international community of

nations."
Ostsee Zeitung of Rostock (12/28) argued: "Despite jammed cellular

phone networks and despite blocked access to the Internet, the
unrest
in Iran hardly seems to be stoppable. The resistance is still
limited
to a well-educated cosmopolitan, young, urban middle class. Large
sectors of the population, however, seem to keep quiet or seem to
BERLIN 00001626 004 OF 005
support the regime. But the cyber revolt in Tehran has demonstrated
that the mullahs no longer enjoy a monolithic power."

Regional daily Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (12/28) opined: "Since
the
allegedly manipulated re-election of President Ahmadinejad, a state
of
emergency has dominated in Iran. But this is not only the struggle
of
a limited political protest movement against the president and the
ayatollahs behind him. The country is now facing an endurance test.
At issue is whether the country wants to become a fundamental

religious state or an Islamic republic. The pictures from Iran are
shocking. It is the violence on both sides that makes us fear the

worst."
¶4. (China) Reaction to Jailing of Liu Xiabo
Frankfurter Allgemeine (12/28) editorialized under the headline:

"Co-
Responsibility," that foreign countries must also be blamed that a
man
like Liu Xiabo is jailed with such an absurdly high prison term.
The
foreign countries have treated China for economic considerations
with
political kid gloves for years. We can't blame China under these
circumstances because we think that it is unassailable? A positive
reaction to any criticism of the verdict cannot be expected."
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) said in an editorial: "A subtle but

clearly visible trend is getting hold in China. Civil disobedience
among the rank and file is spreading. It is an irony that this tend
has become visible in the tough verdict against Liu Xiabo. In front
of the court in which China's leadership organized the show trial,

we
could not only see international reporters and diplomats, but
Chinese
supporters of Liu shouted slogans and unrolled posters thus
deliberately risking their arrest. Only a few courageous people
went
to the court, but they showed that intimidation no longer works as
successfully as in the past. This new trend is not only confined to
the traditional political protest. Courageous lawyers of the

Weiquan
civil rights movement are defending victims of the arbitrariness of
state agencies and they defend each other, too. And the number of
peaceful and violent civil protests is on the rise. But the Chinese
Communist Party fails miserably when it comes to channeling

communication with its critics into a constructive direction. The
verdict against Liu Xiabo is one more example. It will only
partially
obtain the desired effect but not intimidate the people. At the
same
time, new embitterment, new disobedience is growing. With each show
trial, the party is now doing of what it is accusing Liu: it

undermines the state's authority."
BERLIN 00001626 005 OF 005
¶5. (U.S.) Healthcare Reform
Under the headline: "Reform Blues," Sueddeutsche Zeitung (12/28) had
this to say: "There is no doubt that the healthcare reform bill that
has now been adopted in the Senate is a great work...and

trailblazing.
But enthusiasm about the success is limited. One reason is that the
legislative process is so tiresome; but there is an even more

important reason: disappointment and doubts are spreading. The
advocates of the reform have been brought down to earth again
because
they were able to implement only a few of their demands. Thus far,
the Democrats have lost the fight for public opinion. They will
have
to do quite a lot in the election campaign in 2010 to avoid being
punished for a reasonable reform."
Die Welt (12/28) argued: "The Democrats will now have difficulty
explaining to their irritated voters why it is historic progress
that
31 million compatriots who have no coverage today will get health
insurance, and that health insurance companies can no longer reject
sick Americans or demand astronomically high premiums. This reform

is
supposed to carry itself and not burden the budget. But the
opponents
to the bill do not believe a word, arguing that the nation will go
bankrupt. This is a highly imperfect, weakened bill and, at the
same
time, a giant step forward into an American future in which job loss
no longer means the end of insurance protection for a former

employee
and their whole family."
DELAWIE
Viewing cable 09BERLIN1636, Lame Duck German Governor Kicked Upstairs

as New
Discussing cables
09BERLIN1636
VZCZCXRO9015
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHRL #1636 3651406 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 1636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU
UNCLAS BERLIN 001636
STATE PASS to EEB

STATE PASS TO USTR
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD ELAB GM
SUBJECT: Lame Duck German Governor Kicked Upstairs as New
Energy Commissioner in Brussels
REF: Frankfurt 002808

Sensitive but unclassified; not for Internet Distribution.
¶1. (SBU) Chancellor Angela Merkel nominated Baden-
Wuerttemberg (BW) Minister President Guenther Oettinger as EU
Energy Commissioner primarily to remove an unloved lame duck
from an important CDU bastion. The move was not the promotion
of a valued colleague as Merkel's allies sought to portray it.
Rather, Oettinger's increasing loss of party support in BW
compelled Merkel to push Oettinger out to protect her support
base there. Oettinger is noted for a lackluster public
speaking style, and some commentators have asserted that
Merkel, who has often stood out at EU meetings, wanted to
appoint a German Commissioner who would not outshine her.
¶2. (SBU) Germany has a time-honored tradition of sending

unwanted politicians to the EU Commission, although departing
SPD EU Industry Commissioner Guenter Verheugen proved his
worth during his tenure. Oettinger has criticized Merkel for
her policy stances (on federal support to Opel and on generous
subsidies to the former eastern states, for instance) and her
purported lack of leadership while antagonizing other
influential CDU leaders. In addition to being a poor public
speaker, he has a tendency to put his foot in his mouth. The
best-known example was his ill-advised 2007 defense of a CDU
predecessor as an opponent of the National Socialist regime,
despite his documented pro-Nazi war record. Nonetheless,
Oettinger is said by industry sources in Baden-Wuerttemberg to
be an efficient behind-the-scenes negotiator.
¶3. (U) Merkel was criticized for choosing the energy
portfolio, which many derided as too insignificant for
Germany. Werner Langen, CDU/CSU caucus spokesman in the EU
Parliament, said the portfolio has "lost significance."
Prominent Green Member of the European Parliament, Reinhard
Buetikofer characterized it as "not particularly influential,"
and Der Spiegel called it a "makeshift job." The EU Energy
Commissioner is responsible for issues such as supply
security, energy R&D and efficiency, competition in the gas
and electricity markets, infrastructure and low carbon
technologies. However, key issues such as energy security and
climate change are not in the portfolio; nor will Oettinger
take over the role of EU Commission Vice President from
Verheugen.
¶4. (U) Oettinger has an academic background in law and
economics and professional experience as a tax consultant and
accountant. His political expertise is in media policy. His
background in energy appears limited to public support for
nuclear power and the extension of power plant operating
licenses. His pro-nuclear stance is in stark contrast to many
other German politicians, who support the phase out of nuclear
power. This endears him to the EU, which is focused on
diversification of energy sources and does not exclude nuclear
energy. Nuclear power plants supply most of BW's energy while
renewable energy and fossil fuels do not play a significant
role. Oettinger has not expressed interest to date in energy
issues other than nuclear. His priorities in his list
submitted to the EU Parliament in the run up to the January
hearings of the candidate Commission are reportedly vague.
¶5. (SBU) Parliamentarians, skeptical of several members of

the new Commission, are likely to display particular interest
in Oettinger's views on binding energy efficiency targets and
encouraging more competition in internal energy markets.
Although Germany has embraced a controversial domestic goal of
increasing energy efficiency by 20% by 2020, it has yet to
translate the EU energy efficiency directive into national
law. Germany has also steadfastly opposed liberalization of
its power sector oligopoly (what Brussels calls "unbundling")
although individual German companies are slowly moving in that
direction. Oettinger's stance on the internal energy market
will also be of particular interest to European
parliamentarians, who see France, and particularly French
power giant EdF, as a major barrier to opening up the market.
EdF is a major share-holder in BW regional energy supplier
ENBW, which operates the state's nuclear power plants -- and
with which Oettinger is known to have warm relations.
DELAWIE
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1540, BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON

TERRORISM
Discussing cables
09BRASILIA1540 2009-12-31 13:01 2010-11-29 09:09 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0000
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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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UNCLAS BRASILIA 001540
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
¶1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to cooperate in countering terrorism

and related activities that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in
the region or elsewhere-to include investigating potential terrorism financing,
document forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, elements
of the Brazilian government responsible for combating terrorism, such as the
Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, work effectively
with their U.S. counterparts most of the time and pursue investigative leads
provided by U.S. and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial
agencies regarding terrorist suspects.
¶2. (SBU)There are two separate discourses in the government of Brazil on

counterterrorism; politically, Brazil continues to deny the presence and
potential threat of terrorists and terrorism in Brazil, while law enforcement
and intelligence monitor and cooperate to counter the threat. The head of the
Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) intelligence division in July went on record
during a Brazilian Chamber of Deputies hearing on terrorism and admitted that an
individual arrested in April was in fact linked to al Qaeda (AQ). Despite the
statement, most GOB officials continue to toe the party line and deny any
evidence that terrorists have, or would be, interested in establishing a
presence in Brazil.
¶3. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are concerned that
terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support and facilitate terrorist
attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the
areas of Sao Paulo, the tri-borders areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay;
Brazil, Peru, and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Other
branches of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of External
Relations, do not believe Brazil is vulnerable to terrorism-related activities
and instead focus more heavily on threats from transnational crimes. In October
2009, the MRE did admit, for the first time, that terrorists could become
interested in Brazil because of the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de
Janeiro. Brazilian law enforcement's recognition of the potential threat from
terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that
could raise the profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division
to the department level.
¶4. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work with regional
and international partners. Brazil participates in regional counterterrorism
fora, but is less committed to regional groups in which the Unites States is
involved. Brazil is actively involved Mercosul's working group on terrorism and
the sub-working group on financial issues, the latter of which discusses
terrorism financing and money laundering among the Mercosul countries, but has
proven difficult to engage in 3+1 mechanism on security in the Tri-Border Area
(TBA), where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay share a border.
¶5. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses throughout
Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering, detection of travel
document fraud, container security, and international organized crime. In 2009
the USG again hosted a Major Crimes Conference that successfully brought
together Brazil and neighboring countries' federal and state law enforcement
communities and judges and prosecutors to share best practices and receive
practical training.
¶6. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups and does not
recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has been critical
of the FARC's use of violence and has publicly called on the group to desist in
the armed struggle against the Colombian government.
¶7. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations and

effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the Financial Activities
Oversight Council (COAF), to identify possible funding sources for terrorist
groups. Through COAF, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and
entities on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not
found any assets, accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on
the UN terror-finance lists.
¶8. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its capabilities to
combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen specialized money laundering courts
have been established, including two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a
judge who receives specialized training in national money laundering
legislation. In addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil established a
working group with money laundering judges to share best practices and training
needs.
¶9. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was formed aimed to
build on the success of the specialized courts by creating complementary
specialized federal police financial crimes units in the same jurisdictions. In
2008, the federal police established such units in the Federal District
(Brasilia) and the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In addition, the
Ministry of Justice funded the creation of technology center to combat money
laundering in the federal district and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of which
received two such centers, one embedded with the Public Ministry and one with
the State Civil Police. In 2008, the Ministry signed accords to establish
additional centers in Bahia, Goiais, and Rio Grande do Sul.
¶10. (SBU) The government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy consists of

deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory to facilitate attacks or
raise funds, along with monitoring and suppressing transnational criminal
activities that could support terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through
actions between its law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the
United States and other partners in the region. For example, in 2009 Brazilian
authorities began in earnest to work with other concerned nations (particularly
the U.S.) in combating the significant and largely unchecked document fraud
problem in the country. During the year, multiple regional and international
joint operations with U.S. authorities successfully disrupted a number of
document vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking
infrastructures. This included one of the largest visa fraud cases of its type
in U.S. law enforcement history.
¶11. (SBU) In 2009, the work on the U.S.-Brazil container security initiative in
Santos, Brazil was stalled after U.S. officials traveling to Brazil for the
program had difficulties getting Brazilian visas. The container security
initiative was created to promote secure containerized cargo to the United
States through the establishment of a trade transparency unit to detect money
laundering through trade transactions. The Brazilian Ministry of External
Relations (MRE) was uncomfortable with the counter-terrorism focus of the
program, but has recently agreed to issuing visas in support of the initiative.
¶12. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from recent
investment in border and law enforcement infrastructure that were executed with
a view to gradually control the flow of goods-legal and illegal-through the Tri-
Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, the proceeds of which
could be diverted to support terror groups. The inspection station at the
Friendship Bridge in the TBA that was completed by the Brazilian customs agency
(Receita Federal) in 2007 continued to take effective action to reduce the
smuggling of drugs, weapons, and contraband goods along the border with
Paraguay. According to Receita Federal, from January to July 2009 the agency
seized more than USD 400 million in contraband goods, including drugs, weapons,
and munitions, an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result of the
effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling operations now take
place through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu and some have migrated to other
sections of the border, such as the towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal
Police has special maritime police units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that
patrol the maritime border areas, but because of the scale and complexity of the
endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities through the waterways,
Brazil is considering using an unmanned aerial vehicle to assist law enforcement
in monitoring the border, a development that could further improve border
security.
¶13. (SBU) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and illicit

activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism is undermined by the
GOB's failure to strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework significantly.
Although terrorist financing is an established predicate offense for money
laundering, Brazil lacks legislation criminalizing terrorism or its financing as
autonomous offenses. The 2005 National Strategy against Money Laundering (ENCLA)
created a working group (composed of representatives of ministries involved in
CFT, the judiciary, and the federal prosecutor's office) charged with drafting
legislation to criminalize terrorism and its financing. The draft legislation
was never forwarded from the executive branch to the Brazilian Congress. A long-
delayed anti-money laundering bill is still pending before the Brazilian
Congress. The bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial
and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow
administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of money
laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money laundering and making
it an autonomous offense. KUBISKE 2009-12-31
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES1257, ARGENTINA FACES CHALLENGING

AML/CFT REVIEW
Discussing cables
2009-12-01 2010-11-30 SECRET//NOFOR Embassy Buenos
09BUENOSAIRES1257
16:04 16:04 N Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/01

TAGS: PTER SNAR ECON EFIN PGOV PREL KCOR AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA FACES CHALLENGING AML/CFT REVIEW
REF: BUENOS AIRES 313; BUENOS AIRES 1017; BUENOS AIRES 1212
CLASSIFIED BY: Martinez, Vilma, Ambassador, DOS, EXEC; REASON:

1.4(B), (D)
----------
Summary
----------
¶1. (S/NF) The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

held a two week peer review of the Argentine anti-money laundering
and counter terror finance (AML/CFT) regime. Although hoping to
see some positive moves by Argentina, the FATF operational team
leader is skeptical of the GoA's intentions to combat money
laundering and terror finance. While most money laundering in
Argentina conceals tax evasion and corruption, narcotics-derived
funds are a growing problem. The Argentine statutory framework is
relatively strong, but the bureaucracy working the issues is poorly
led and starved of resources. Consequently, the FATF team leader
views Argentine AML/CFT enforcement as largely ineffectual, with no
meaningful prosecutions in recent memory. Some Embassy contacts
argue that the current GoA leadership, including the President,
stands to lose from honest and vigorous pursuit of money
laundering. While the final FATF report is likely to embarrass the
GoA, potentially provoking a harsh response, it is not likely to
spur meaningful reform. Until now, terror financing and narcotics
money have comprised just a small fraction of the illicit funds
transiting Argentina. The near complete absence of enforcement
coupled with a culture of impunity and corruption make Argentina
ripe for exploitation by narco-traffickers and terrorist cells.
For now, the most promising way to engage the GoA on the issue
seems to be through the new Justice Minister, with whom we have
developed a positive working relationship. We will encourage him
to engage on this set of issues. End Summary.
---------------
FATF Review
---------------
¶2. (C) The FATF peer review of Argentina's AML/CFT laws,

regulations and enforcement, and general compliance with FATF best
practices and recommendations began on November 16 and continued
for two weeks. FATF had originally scheduled the review for last
year but delayed it at Argentina's request. In the interim, the
GoA implemented a tax amnesty law to encourage the repatriation of
funds held overseas and in the process lost most of the AML/CFT
focus and momentum it had built up after the last FATF review in
October 2003. Econoff met with numerous AML/CFT contacts over
several weeks before the review began to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of Argentina's laws and enforcement efforts and to
evaluate perceptions of how it will fare in the review.
---------------------------------
FATF Team Leader is a Skeptic
---------------------------------
¶3. (C) Fabio Contini, the Italian national who heads the
operational review team, has spent over a year in Argentina as the
Economic and Financial AttachC) at the Italian Embassy and is
married to an Argentine. He has a sober view of the GoA's AML/CFT
efforts, which he deems little more than a fig-leaf. The measures
taken, he said, are calculated for minimal compliance with
international standards and evince little real enthusiasm for
cleaning up the financial system. In addition, he said that
Argentina should take control of the informal economy as a first
step toward a serious AML/CFT effort. Contini summarized his views
by noting that a substantial percentage of the Argentine economy is
underground, with pure cash transactions comprising a
disproportionate percentage of economic activity. Such an economic
system, he observed, is inherently vulnerable to money laundering
and other financial crimes. Contini said that Argentina will have
to bring this black economy into the light of day before even the
most robust AML/CFT regulations can be effective.
¶4. (C) While his views will be influential, Contini noted that he
does not have the last word on Argentina's FATF peer assessment.
Once his team makes its report, Argentina will have an opportunity
to respond to the findings. A debate at next year's plenary will
precede the issuance of the final report and any warnings. Contini
said that FATF warned Argentina after the last review that a second
warning could have a negative effect on Argentina's desire to
rejoin the international financial system.
--------------------------------
Money Laundering in Argentina
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) Embassy contacts agree that most money laundering in

Argentina is the product of tax evasion and political corruption.
For the most part, they insist that terror financing is seldom, if
ever, transacted in Argentina. Most maintain, however, that
narcotics trafficking is becoming a real problem and that,
increasingly, the dirty money sloshing through the financial system
originates in the drug trade.
-------------------
AML/CFT System
-------------------
¶6. (C) Embassy contacts, including Contini, have noted numerous

weaknesses in Argentina's AML/CFT regime. Most tellingly, there
have been only two convictions since the criminalization of money
laundering in 1989, and there have been no convictions under the
currently applicable statute enacted in 2000. While the
substantive law is generally considered adequate, there are
numerous loopholes to close and important areas that require
clarification.
¶7. (C) Local AML/CFT experts agree that, with the exceptions noted
below, Argentina has a solid legal and regulatory foundation for
combating money laundering and terror finance. The failures of the
system arise when it comes to applying the law. Inspections are
superficial and do not examine actual accounts and transactions.
According to Pablo San Martin, the head of SMS Latinoamerica, a
local accounting firm, inspectors are often content in their
interviews with banking executives to accept the predictable
anodyne responses to their inquiries without further follow-up.
Several contacts point to the Financial Information Unit (UIF) as
the weakest player on the financial crimes enforcement team, but
the consensus is that a failure of political will cripples the
whole AML/CFT project.
---------------
Self-laundering
---------------
¶8. (C) Several experts have highlighted the money laundering

loophole for criminals who do their own banking as a probable focus
of the FATF review. Argentine law defines money laundering as an
accessory offense so that, for example, a narcotics trafficker
cannot be charged for merely laundering the profits from his drug
deals. Only a third party who aids and abets in hiding the origins
of the money is subject to prosecution.
¶9. (C) According to Raul Plee, the state's attorney who heads the
unit charged with investigating financial crimes, this exemption
for self-laundering explains the lack of convictions. Plee noted
that a bill in draft form would allow him to pursue much of the
currently protected laundering activity, and he believes that FATF
will recommend enactment of the legislation. Plee observed that
some of Argentina's most embarrassing prosecutorial failures, e.g.,
when a judge dismissed charges against Pablo Escobar's widow who
bought two properties under an assumed name, originate in the
self-laundering exemption.
¶10. (C) In contrast, other contacts believe that if the FATF

review fixates on the self-laundering issue it will be a failure.
Marcelo Casanovas, a compliance officer with the Bank of Buenos
Aires Province and a board member of a leading anti-money
laundering association, said that self-laundering is a problem, but
to focus exclusively on that one shortcoming is to miss the whole
forest for one tree. The real problems, he insisted, are systemic.
Contini himself observed that the central failure is an absence of
political will to pursue laundering as a serious crime.
----------------------
Repatriation of Funds
----------------------
¶11. (C) One substantive legal issue that now seems unlikely to
trouble FATF reviewers is the tax amnesty law (Ref A) designed to
encourage repatriation of funds held outside Argentina. According
to commonly cited estimates, Argentines hide about $150 billion in
assets offshore. In an effort to lure back the billions held
outside the formal financial system, the GoA passed legislation in
December 2008 declaring an amnesty on repatriated funds that ran

from March through August of 2009. Local experts and opposition
political figures alleged that because it prohibited Argentine tax
authorities from inquiring into the source of the repatriated
funds, the law facilitated money laundering. FATF also expressed
misgivings but was at least partially placated when then-Justice
Minister Anibal Fernandez defended the law before the plenary in
Paris. In May (after the amnesty had already been in effect for
two months), the UIF issued rules requiring reports of suspicious
transactions (STRs) arising from the capital regularization
program.
¶12. (C) According to figures released by the GoA at the conclusion

of the amnesty, Argentines declared only $4.7 billion. Of that,
only 4.3 percent had been held abroad. The press reported that the
program failed to achieve its goal of capital repatriation.
According to Plee, requiring submission of STRs was a key factor in
this failure and was at least one reason that very little money
returned under this law. Plee and other contacts noted that the
funds declared under the amnesty were not generally the product of
criminal activity other than simple tax evasion. The Regional
Advisor from the International Monetary Fund's Financial Integrity
Group, Mariano Federici, observed that the repatriation was doomed
from the outset because Argentines do not view the local economy as
a stable place to invest, and they mistrust the government because
of its history of economic mismanagement and capricious seizure of
assets.
¶13. (C) Based on the requirement to file STRs and the

insignificant scale of the funds repatriated, many contacts
predicted that the tax amnesty issue will not draw much attention
under the FATF review.
------------------------
Prosecutors and Judges
------------------------
¶14. (C) Another weakness that experts highlighted was the lack of
judicial and prosecutorial understanding of AML/CFT issues.
According to Federici, the prosecutors and judges who should take
the lead in AML/CFT cases lack the financial sophistication
necessary to direct investigations and mount successful
prosecutions. Federici also noted that judges appear uninterested
in acquiring the skills necessary to manage money laundering cases.
When the IMF staged a training seminar, over 70 prosecutors
participated, but of the dozens invited, only one judge chose to
attend. Because judges directly manage investigations under the
Argentine legal system, no money laundering case can proceed
without active judicial engagement. Federici observed that, in the
short term, judicial indifference limits the opportunities for
money laundering convictions.
¶15. (C) Casanovas agreed that the judicial system suffers

deficiencies, but he maintained that prosecutors and investigators
bear more of the blame than judges. Failure to develop solid
evidence is the root of the problem, he said. He observed that
judges want to pursue concrete cases with predictable outcomes, not
squander their limited resources on prosecutions doomed to failure.
----------------------------------
FATF/GAFISUD Representative
----------------------------------
¶16. (C) The FATF Representative's Office, headed by Alejandro

Strega, who has a master's in law from the University of Illinois,
is responsible for coordination of AML/CFT policy and for
developing national strategy and legislation. Under the leadership
of Strega's predecessor, Juan Felix Marteau, the office earned a
reputation for foresight and action. Marteau drafted significant
legislation and developed a national AML/CFT strategy that was
endorsed by then- President Nestor Kirchner. In contrast, Strega's
performance has been lackluster, and, with his weak background in
AML/CFT and lack of resources, he has been largely ineffective.
Strega is a congenial interlocutor, speaks English well, and is
eager to engage with the Embassy, but he has little access to
Minister of Justice Julio Alak, few staff, and almost no money.
¶17. (C) Marteau has insinuated that he lost the job to Strega as a
reprisal for looking too closely into the casino business, where
important Kirchneristas allegedly have interests. Federici
conceded that casinos may be part of the story, but said the real
explanation lies in a personality clash and bureaucratic feud with

Alak's predecessor and current Chief of Cabinet, Anibal Fernandez.
According to Federici, when Marteau drafted his national strategy,
he consulted all high government officials with an interest in
money laundering except for Fernandez, who was Minister of Interior
at that time. As Justice Minister, Fernandez became Marteau's boss
and quickly dismissed him and brought in Strega. Federici also
noted that suspicions of connections to drug trafficking and money
laundering have sometimes wafted around Fernandez (Ref B), and
Marteau may have distrusted him based on those rumors. Strega is
the son of a labor lawyer who is a close Fernandez confederate from
his time as Mayor of Quilmes. His father, Enrique Strega, has been
an attorney for the bank workers' union headed by Juan Jose Zanola,
a Kirchner ally who was also close to former President Menem.
Zanola is now under indictment in a politically radioactive case
involving adulterated medicine, illegal campaign contributions, and
a triple homicide.
-------------------------
UIF: a Broken Institution
-------------------------
¶18. (S/NF) Numerous Embassy contacts and press reports have

fingered the UIF as the main agent of Argentina's AML/CFT failures.
The UIF is an inept and politically compromised institution,
according to Federici. It is led by Rosa Falduto, who won her
position based on the patronage of the judge who oversees the
electoral process, Maria Romilda Servini de Cubria. She has since
quarreled with Servini. Her other benefactor, Anibal Fernandez,
has also reportedly been keeping his distance. Federici said that
according to a highly placed contact in the UIF, Falduto holds on
to her position because she is useful to President Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner and to her husband, the former President,
Nestor Kirchner. Federici told Econoff that Falduto is personally
holding back STRs on the Kirchner inner circle and has refused to
respond to requests for STRs on the Kirchners themselves from
Switzerland, Lichtenstein, and Luxembourg. In July, according to
Federici and consistent with information from other sources,
Falduto also personally leaked information that the UIF had
requested from FinCEN on Francisco de Narvaez, a Kirchner rival.
According to Federici, Falduto did this by design to harm the
reputation of this important opposition figure.
¶19. (C) The defects of the UIF, however, transcend mere

politicization. According to Federici and confirmed by several
other sources, Falduto's organization passes on raw intelligence
that is useless for building criminal cases. Contini said that
information is routinely forwarded to prosecutors so long after the
fact that it is legally and technically impossible to accumulate
evidence on suspicious transactions. In the UIF's defense,
however, San Martin noted that the AML/CFT regulators have
insufficient resources. The UIF and the Argentine Central Bank pay
poorly, he said, and cannot afford to hire sufficient investigative
staff. San Martin agreed, however, that the UIF is likely to come
in for pointed criticism in the FATF review.
--------------
Political Will
--------------
¶20. (C) Several contacts, including Strega himself, have asserted

that the Argentine AML/CFT regime was never designed to catch or
punish money launderers and that the absence of convictions is by
design. According to Federici, Plee's office does not get the
political support that it needs to do its job and the Ministry of
Justice under Fernandez made it plain that it did not want him to
be too aggressive. When the MOJ switched Plee's assistant Federico
di Pasquale from a long-term to a short-term job contract, it was
seen as a message that the office was on a short leash.
¶21. (C) According to Roberto Bulit Goni, an attorney in a private

practice dealing with money laundering issues, too many people
stand to profit from lax enforcement of money laundering statutes.
Casanovas and San Martin agree that the changes that there have
been in the AML/CFT system are mainly cosmetic. The GoA has
enacted the recommended laws and regulations, but the problem, they
noted, is hostility to even token enforcement. Congress, which
will pass to a divided opposition's control in December, has not
played a consistent role in pressing for enforcement or
investigations, but there is some prospect that the Congress and
specific committees will give it increasing attention in 2010.
¶22. (C) The Embassy sources noted above maintain that the MOJ,
under former Minister of Justice Anibal Fernandez (now Chief of
Cabinet), systematically frustrated progress on AML/CFT issues.
The current Minister of Justice, Julio Alak, has brought energy and
a fresh perspective to the job and has shown considerable
enthusiasm for collaborating with the United States on a wide range
of law enforcement issues. While he has not yet focused on money
laundering, the upcoming FATF report and the Argentine response and
debate at next year's plenary give us an opportunity to engage him
to focus more on AML/CFT issues. While a negative report will
likely provoke a hostile response from some quarters of the GoA, it
could well provide an opportunity and political cover for Alak to
push for greater resources and for consequential changes in the law
and enforcement. Alak appears to be serious about tackling
Argentina's law enforcement problems (Ref C) and all Mission
elements will continue to provide him with the information and,
where possible, the resources to move forward with a positive
agenda.
----------------
FATF Outcome
-----------------
¶23. (C) There are two views of the likely conclusions in the final
FATF report. One view is that the FATF review will be so
superficial that Argentina will pass with just a few areas for
improvement noted. Casanovas and San Martin, for example, believe
that the FATF review will be perfunctory. Reviewers will arrive
with a checklist and conclude after talking to regulators that all
the elements are in place. FATF will recommend some changes, but
the review will be generally neutral. The other view is that the
flaws are so glaring, i.e., no convictions and the problems within
the UIF, that even a superficial review will come down hard on the
GoA. Contini, as head of the operational team, seems inclined to
issue a report highlighting a lack of political will to
meaningfully combat money laundering and terror financing.
----------
Comment
----------
¶24. (S/NF) Argentina will likely suffer some sharp criticism in

the FATF review, blackening its eye when it is seeking to reenter
the mainstream of the global financial system. The GOA would
probably lash out publicly at a critical FATF review, with the
government blaming the criticisms on external conspirators
(including perhaps the USG). No matter the criticisms, and despite
the apparent good faith of new players like Justice Minister Alak,
it is probably unrealistic to expect that the GoA will funnel
resources to prosecutors or make a concerted effort to pursue money
launderers. The Kirchners and their circle simply have too much to
gain themselves from continued lax enforcement. Although tax
cheats and compromised politicians may still be the chief source of
dirty money, continued GoA indifference to AML/CFT could offer an
attractive local staging ground to narco-traffickers and
international terrorists. If the GoA does not move to close
loopholes and enhance enforcement, it may soon find its financial
system contaminated by drug money and terror funds.
MARTINEZ
Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES1311, C) ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
TAKES UMBRAGE AT WHA A/S
Discussing cables
2009-12-31 2010-11-29 Embassy Buenos
13:01 21:09 Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBU #1311/01 3651344

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311344Z DEC 09
INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/31

TAGS PREL, OVIP, ECON, KPAO
SUBJECT: (C) ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TAKES UMBRAGE AT WHA A/S
VALENZUELA’S REMARK REGARDING BUSINESS COMMUNITY’S CONCERNS
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D
¶1. (C) Summary: The GOA responded with heavy artillery to a remark WHA A/S
Valenzuela made during a December 16 press roundtable. Immediately after the
press roundtable, Argentine media started focusing almost exclusively on A/S
Valenzuela’s remark that the American business community in Argentina had
conveyed to him concern about rule of law and management of the economy in
Argentina. The press reported that Valenzuela contrasted these concerns “with
the enthusiasm and investment intentions” of the American business community in
1996. GOA officials also expressed their dissatisfaction with the remarks. The
Ambassador and other Country Team members used a December 17 reception for
journalists to stress our desire to work constructively with Argentina, and the
Ambassador has reached out to GOA officials to urge a prompt end to their
criticisms. Government press is beginning to report a softening tone, but we
think that it is too early to tell. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Immediately prior to departure from Buenos Aires on December 16, WHA A/S
Valenzuela met at the Embassy with about a dozen Argentine print journalists. He
followed 20 minutes of remarks by taking questions for another 20 minutes,
explaining his desire to introduce himself to his regional counterparts and
undertake a dialogue with them on regional developments.
Media Zero In on Perceived Criticism

--------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Despite the broad range of issues addressed by A/S Valenzuela, Argentine
media started focusing immediately after the roundtable almost exclusively on
A/S Valenzuela’s remark that the American business community in Argentina had
conveyed to him concern about rule of law and management of the economy in
Argentina. The press also reported that Valenzuela contrasted these concerns
“with the enthusiasm and investment intentions” of the American business
community in 1996. (A/S Valenzuela’s first official meeting in Buenos Aires was
with the Executive Board of the AmCham.) As an example of the sensationalist
nature of much of the reporting, La Nacion’s banner front-page headlines on
December 17 read, “Clash with the U.S. over Rule of Law in Argentina” and on
December 18, “Protest to U.S. over Obama Envoy’s Criticism.”
Kirchner Allies Take Umbrage

------------------------------------
¶4. (C) The GOA response came swiftly. That same night, three GOA ministries
publicly commented (in a clearly coordinated fashion) on the Valenzuela remarks.
Interior Minister Florencio Randazzo said “Argentina is enjoying a phase of
complete institutional and legal guarantees. The country has left behind the
times when a foreign official could come and say what needed to be done. There
is no lack of rule of law. The difference now is that the Government protects
the people, and in the 1990s it protected the companies’ interests that took
millions out.”
¶5. (C) Following the Randazzo statement, the Foreign Ministry issued a four-
point communiquC) saying that: (1) the generalized nature of the Assistant
Secretary’s remarks about supposed concerns in the American business community
made it impossible for the GOA to address the alleged concerns; (2) the MFA had
already written Ambassador Martinez to clarify similar remarks that she had made
the previous week in Cordoba but had received no reply; (3) Argentine
authorities had received no complaints from American companies operating in
Argentina; and (4) the GOA reiterates its disposition to analyze “all aspects
that allow us to promote reciprocal relations, especially economic, between the
two countries. Open and consolidated channels are available to both governments
for this dialogue.”
¶6. (C) The GOA’s third statement on December 16 came from Justice Minister
Julio Alak, who called Valenzuela’s statements “unusual
and unjustified.” Alak claimed that “rule of law is a fundamental asset in the
country that has been protected and rescued from the more adverse conditions
coming from the institutional and economic crisis in 2001 and 2002.”
¶7. (C) After the initial salvos, the GOA officials who met with Valenzuela
chimed in. Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti (who received Valenzuela
December 15 at the MFA and hosted him for lunch) said, “Valenzuela is free to
think as he wishes, but the truth is that 1996 is the prelude of the most
important crisis Argentina faced. It is possible that he felt glad in 1996, but
that ended in the 2001 crisis that impacted many companies, including some
American ones. Argentina doesn’t want to set off sparks (“sacarse chispas”) with
the United States; it is Valenzuela who opines without basing his statements on
reality.”
¶8. (C) Cabinet Chief AnC-bal FernC!ndez said, “We are not talking about a
statement that comes from American businessmen, but of (Valenzuela’s)
prejudices, and that is much more sensitive and what worries me most. I was
concerned to find out that he was critical of many Latin American democracies,
and one of the supporters of the Washington Consensus.”
¶9. (C) Argentine Ambassador to the United States HC)ctor Timerman appeared on
television and in the press to claim that he had urged A/S Valenzuela to meet
with CGT labor leader Hugo Moyano and the opposition Radical Party (UCR), but
that “he met only with the political right: De NarvC!ez, Macri and Cobos. He is
sending a message on who are, in his views, the people with whom he needs to
have dialogue.”
¶10. (C) Argentine press reported that FM Jorge Taiana, who was in Copenhagen
for the COP-15 meetings, used a brief pull-aside with Secretary Clinton to
complain about Valenzuela’s remarks. Taiana told the press that Valenzuela’s
words “were unfortunate and show his ignorance of the Argentine reality. His
reference to the administration of Menem as a time of great growth, when it was
precisely the time when Argentina was hurling headlong toward its worst crisis
in history, like a train with no brakes, was even more unfortunate.”
¶11. (C) Former president Nestor Kirchner said “the statements by someone who
should come with a different policy for Latin America are deplorable. Valenzuela
belongs to the groups that participated in the Washington Consensus; the neo-
liberal model that caused so much damage to the whole region.” Kirchner ally
Deputy AgustC-n Rossi (leader of the FpV bloc in the Chamber) said “Valenzuela’s
visit was not encouraging. We thought the time when foreign officials came to
lecture us was over.” Regarding Valenzuela’s comparison of the current reality
with the one in the 1990s, he said: “it is a fallacy to say we were better with
Menem’s administration; the cracks of the convertibility plan were evident and
led Argentina to bankruptcy.” The leader of the FpV bloc in the Senate, Miguel
Pichetto, said “Valenzuela keeps adding mistakes to the U.S. relation to Latin
America, because a diplomat visiting a country should be much more cautious when
commenting on our domestic politics and the economic recovery our government
achieved.” A couple of days later, at a December 20 political rally, Nestor
Kirchner said “disrespectful viceroys” should first criticize what was happening
in the United States. He blamed Argentina’s loss of rule of law on the U.S.
crisis that “left millions of Americans without their jobs, homes or savings.”
Opposition is Divided
-------------------------
¶12. (C) Reaction among the opposition was divided. Some, such as Santa Fe
governor Hermes Binner, a highly regarded moderate Socialist and possible
presidential candidate, said that Valenzuela’s remarks tracked very closely with
complaints that, they, too had heard from the business community. Others, such
as
Socialist Senator Ruben Giustiniani, who usually coincides with Binner, objected
to any foreign official relaying any criticism of Argentina, while Radical
congressional deputy Ricardo AlfonsC-n took issue with what he interpreted as
Valenzuela’s praise for Menem policies in the 1990s: “We, the Argentines, know
that during those years there was a looting of national assets. For us, it was a
disaster.” However, the head of the Radical Party (UCR), Senator Ernesto Sanz
(who joined Valenzuela’s December 16 lunch with Vice President Cobos) said “it
seems it was necessary that a foreigner come to say this. We have been
denouncing the lack of rule of law from Congress for four or five years. With
each law the Kirchnerists passed, (the country) moved one step towards a lack of
rule of law.” Another prominent opposition leader, Deputy Margarita Stolbizer
(GEN), said, “Unfortunately, Valenzuela is right. This government condemned us
to isolation because of lack of rule of law, and Valenzuela only relayed how the
world sees us.” Leftist congressional deputy and film director Pino Solanas
(Proyecto Sur Bloc Leader) said, “I strongly repudiate Arturo Valenzuela’s
statements. He is the envoy of the empire whose government has legitimized the
coup in Honduras. Mr. Valenzuela represents the government that keeps thinking
the disastrous and tragic 1990s for Argentina are a model to follow.”
Embassy Works to Smooth Feathers

------------------------------------------
¶13. (C) The Ambassador and other Country Team members used a December 17
reception for journalists to stress our desire to work constructively with
Argentina, stressing our common interests and extensive cooperation. The
Ambassador’s conciliatory remarks received broad press play. The Ambassador
called VFM Taccetti, who offered her a long explanation of why the GOA in the
wake of the 2001-02 crisis had been forced to “pesify” contracts that had been
denominated in dollars at a new exchange rate that was disadvantageous to
foreign businesses. (Note: “Pesification” has been a common theme of many of the
complaints that U.S. investors took to the World Bank’s International Court for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes.) Those pesified contracts nonetheless
continued to be profitable, Taccetti claimed. He said Argentina’s current
challenge, however, was to maintain employment levels, which explained the GOA
position regarding Kraft and other labor disputes. Taccetti asked if Washington
could issue a conciliatory statement. The Ambassador also requested a meeting
with Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez to urge a prompt end to GOA public
complaining about A/S Valenzuela’s remarks. Press reported widely A/S
Valenzuela’s clarification (delivered at his next stop, Montevideo) that he was
merely relaying some concerns expressed to him by American businesses operating
in Argentina.
GOA Tones Down Its Commentary

--------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) The GOA’s Telam news service sent December 18 a story that led with
“Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez sought today to lower the tone on the
controversy generated by (Valenzuela’s) remarks.” The wire story quoted
Fernandez saying he had “a very good conversation with Valenzuela on important
topics, and Valenzuela never mentioned concerns about rule of law.” Fernandez
claimed that Valenzuela had several years ago made similar claims about
Argentine rule of law, suggesting a predisposition to judge Argentina. “But this
man is not the United States, no matter how important he is. The United States
is the United States.” Another wire service reported that VFM Taccetti said
“This topic has already passed. Maybe (Valenzuela) knows why he said it. We
think it’s absurd. We are looking straight ahead... I think the points of
agreement between United States and Argentina were aired in the meetings we had.
No one else in the region has been more firm on Iran. We are working in Haiti...
The agreements are notable. In general, U.S. policies and ours on international
matters are in agreement.”
AmCham Pleased with Press Coverage

---------------------------------------------
¶15. (C) AmCham told post’s Commercial Counselor that it was taking a positive
response to press inquiries, talking up the positive contributions their members
make to Argentina’s economy and their desire for dialogue with the GOA on the
business and investment climate. Subsequently, some AmCham members told us
privately that they were pleased a high-ranking U.S. diplomat publicly relayed
their concerns. The AmCham President said he intended to take advantage of the
opening offered by the MFA’s request for specific concerns about the business
climate by sending the MFA letter requesting a meeting to review concerns in
detail.
Comment
----------
¶16. (C) Once again, the Kirchner government has shown itself to be extremely
thin-skinned and intolerant of perceived criticism. Concerns about the weakness
of Argentina’s institutions, and the rule of law in particular, are a dime a
dozen in the Argentine press, voiced by academics, business leaders, judges,
opposition politicians, pundits, and NGOs. Argentines are well aware that
Argentina is not attracting as much investment as are Brazil, Chile, and others
in the region. The business community’s anxiety about arbitrary and capricious
rule changes is well known to the Argentine public and the government. Only die-
hard kirchneristas will agree with Randazzo’s assertion that Argentina enjoys
“full institutional and juridical guarantees,” or the MFA’s contention that it
is unaware of any dissatisfaction on the part of any American company. For most
Argentines, those are laugh lines or cynically disingenuous statements. That
said, we hope that this contretemps will soon peter out, as has happened in
similar such episodes in the past.
¶17. (U) This cable was cleared by WHA A/S Valenquela.

MARTINEZ
Viewing cable 09CARACAS1551, VENEZUELA'S MEDICAL SYSTEM IN

DISARRAY AS GBRV SHIFTS
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO5389
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
RUEHTM
DE RUEHCV #1551/01 3481433
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141432Z DEC 09
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR DRESTREPO
NSC FOR LROSSELLO
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/14

TAGS: ECON ELAB HURI PGOV VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S MEDICAL SYSTEM IN DISARRAY AS GBRV SHIFTS
RESOURCES TO BARRIO ADENTRO
REF: CARACAS 1374; CARACAS 1256
CLASSIFIED BY: DUDDY, AMBASSADOR, DOS, AMB; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Venezuelan doctors have accused the Venezuelan

Government (GBRV) of politicizing health care at the expense of the
health of Venezuelans. In recent months, protests have paralyzed
hospitals across Venezuela as doctors and patients have complained
of shortages of medical supplies, delays in hospital renovations
and unpaid wages and benefits. Observers describe public hospitals
as increasingly dangerous places where underpaid, undersupplied,
and understaffed doctors struggle to provide medical services to
Venezuela's poor. Critics say that the GBRV has created a parallel
medical system-"Barrio Adentro"-that has sucked resources away from
the traditional hospital network and reduced the overall quality of
medical services. The GBRV has suspended doctors for speaking out
about the crisis while giving former military officers and
community councils a greater role in hospital administration. On
November 29, President Chavez announced plans to eliminate a
government health care benefit that pays for public workers to
receive health care at private clinics, a move that would place
even greater strain on already overburdened public hospitals. END
SUMMARY.
HOSPTIAL CRISIS SPREADS ACROSS THE COUNTRY

¶2. (SBU) In recent months, newspapers across Venezuela have
carried daily reports of a growing crisis in the public hospitals.
On November 30, for example, "Notitarde" published reports of a
vigil by patients and doctors to protest shortages of medicines and
supplies at the Enrique Tejera Hospital; on December 1, Ciudad
Guayana's "Correo del Caroni" covered the "technical closure" of
the Negra Hipolita Maternity Ward after the breakdown of the air
conditioning system raised concerns that the heat would increase
bacteria levels in the incubators for newborn babies; and on
December 4, the daily "El Universal" reported that doctors in
Merida had shut down the University Hospital of Los Andes (HULA)
due to medical supply shortages, pronouncing the hospital "dead."
DOCTORS PROTEST DETERIORATION OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS
¶3. (SBU) On November 18, in a development representative of the

breakdown of public hospitals across the country, the Jesus Yerena
de Lidice Hospital shut down after 140 physicians announced their
mass resignation. Lidice is one of the two largest and most
important public hospitals in the impoverished Catia municipality
of Caracas; it serves a poor and marginalized community that
otherwise has little access to health care.
¶4. (SBU) For over three months, Lidice's patients and doctors have
protested shortages of medical supplies, delays in the renovation
of hospital wards, and unpaid wages and benefits. But the conflict
escalated on November 16, when the Health Ministry suspended four
of Lidice's doctors after charging them with inciting protests
among the patients. Lidice's doctors resigned en masse after the
Health Ministry refused to reinstate the four suspended doctors and
resume negotiations over salary payments and benefits owed since
¶2007. The resignations paralyzed Lidice, leaving only two
doctors-an internal specialist and a surgeon-to care for the
remaining patients.
¶5. (SBU) Although Lidice reopened on November 20 after the Health

and Labor Ministry agreed to reinstate the four suspended
physicians and resume negotiations over other demands, the
CARACAS 00001551 002 OF 004
emergency pediatrics unit and maternity ward remain closed for

renovation. The maternity ward of the Lidice hospital-considered
the second most important in Caracas for many years-has now been
closed for two years, while Catia's other major public hospital,
Los Magallanes Jose Gregorio Hernandez, has been partially closed
for over a year while awaiting renovation.
PUBLIC HOSPITALS ARE DANGEROUS, UNDERSUPPLIED, AND UNDERSTAFFED
¶6. (C) During a private meeting on November 10,

XXXXXXXXXXXX, a health reporter for the "El Universal"
newspaper, described the public hospitals as increasingly dangerous
places, where underpaid, undersupplied, and understaffed doctors
work in unsanitary conditions to provide medical services to
Venezuela's poor. Due to shortages of basic medical supplies,
doctors ask patients to purchase their own needles, disinfectants
and gauze. XXXXXXXXXXXX told EmbOffs that doctors sometimes dress wounds
with the same dirty bandages. Other patients are told to bring
their own X-rays from private clinics. As in many areas of
Caracas, public hospitals suffer from water shortages, forcing
doctors to postpone important operations. In some of the older
public hospitals, the plumbing systems cannot pump water above the
first few floors of the building.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that medical residents in public hospitals

make an average of 2,000 bolivars (BsF) per month (USD 930 at the
official rate of 2.15 BsF to the dollar). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, over
fifty percent of the resident doctors move to the capital from
other parts of the country, and their salary is barely enough to
cover rent in Caracas, where an austere apartment in a dangerous
neighbourhood can easily cost 1,800 bolivars per month.
Consequently, many doctors have left the public hospitals in search
of other jobs, while some of the most qualified have left the
country to earn better salaries abroad. In a December 4 press
report, the Venezuelan Medical Federation (FMV) estimated that the
public hospitals are understaffed by 43 percent.
¶8. (C) Crime has further contributed to the flight of doctors from
the public sector. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that criminals go to the public
hospitals to rob, steal, and even kill patients. The emergency
room in Hospital Vargas is only open for twelve hours-between seven
in the morning and seven at night-because of security concerns. In
October, a shootout in the emergency room of the Los Magallanes de
Catia hospital killed two people. Although the Ministry of Health
has promised to send more guards to protect the hospitals, in many
cases the additional security has not arrived.
SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL
¶9. (C) On November 17, XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that the GBRV has
suspended doctors to discourage them from speaking out about the
health care crisis. Last year four doctors were suspended when
they exposed the accidental death of six babies in a maternity
ward. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the GBRV has limited the role of the
resident doctors in hospital management and transferred authority
to local community councils. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that community council
members meet with hospital directors to discuss renovation
proposals. On November 10, the director for the Vargas Hospital of
Caracas, Francisco Hernandez, told the press that he had to present
the hospital's renovation proposals to the community councils
before sending them to the Health Ministry and President Chavez for
approval.
CARACAS 00001551 003 OF 004

BARRIO ADENTRO DRAINS RESOURCES FROM PUBLIC HOSPITALS
¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told EmbOffs that the quality of health care in the
public hospitals has deteriorated as the GBRV has redirected
resources to "Barrio Adentro," a program staffed by the Cuban
Government that provides free medical services in poor areas (Ref
A). Although "Barrio Adentro" has translated into political gains
for President Chavez, its medical impact is questionable, despite
having received massive government investment (Note: The GBRV spent
approximately USD 5.6 billion on Cuban medical assistance,
training, medicines, vaccines, and other services in 2008,
according to one estimate. See Ref A for further analysis of
Barrio Adentro. End Note.). While Chavez has acknowledged a
"crisis" in "Barrio Adentro" and announced a sweeping campaign to
revitalize the program, neither President Chavez nor his ministers
have announced new plans for additional investment in the
traditional public hospital system.
¶11. (C) On October 5, the President of the Venezuelan Medical

Federation (FMV) XXXXXXXXXXXX told EmbOffs that
the health care problem is primarily political.
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the GBRV has focused resources on the
development of a parallel medical system-"Barrio Adentro" -that has
sucked investment away from the hospitals and the traditional
medical infrastructure to the detriment of the health of
Venezuelans. At the same time, the GBRV has appointed military
professionals with no medical background to important positions in
the Ministry of Health. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that there is "anarchy" in the
Ministry of Health, pointing out that the GBRV has released health
statistics just four times in the last 14 months. FMV Vice
XXXXXXXXXXXX added that vaccination rates have
decreased dramatically over the past several years.
¶12. (C) While the GBRV has prioritized "Barrio Adentro" over the
traditional medical system, Venezuelans seem to prefer public
hospitals or private clinics. On October 9, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told EmbOffs that the majority of Venezuelans
continue to receive medical care in public hospitals or private
clinics rather than "Barrio Adentro." XXXXXXXXXXXX cited a 2006 study
by a team of European Union analysts that measured the use of
health services by sector (i.e., public hospitals, private clinics,
or "Barrio Adentro") and confirmed that poorer Venezuelans were
more likely to receive medical care in public hospitals than
"Barrio Adentro."
CHAVEZ THREATENS TO ELIMINATE PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFIT
¶13. (SBU) On November 29, in a move that further illustrated GBRV

efforts to strengthen "Barrio Adentro" as an alternative to the
traditional medical system, Chavez announced his intention to
eliminate the hospitalization, surgery, and maternity (HCM) benefit
that public sector employees use to pay for health care at private
clinics. During a broadcast of the "Hello, President" radio and
television program, Chavez said that the HCM benefit supported the
"bourgeoisie" owners of private clinics and that public employees
should instead use "Barrio Adentro's" network of Integral
Diagnostic Centers. In press reports the following day, public
employees in the petroleum, iron, steel, and aluminum sectors
protested the announcement (Note: According to one press report,
sixty percent of the 12 million Venezuelans with health insurance
work in the public sector. End Note.). Critics pointed out that
the private clinics offer medical services that "Barrio Adentro"
CARACAS 00001551 004 OF 004
does not provide, and that the public hospitals do not have the
capacity to absorb a massive influx of new patients from the
private clinics. On September 23, deputies for the pro-Chavez
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) told EmbOffs that
changes to the medical insurance system would be imposed
progressively given the sensitivity of the issue (Ref B).
COMMENT
¶14. (C) The quality of health care in Venezuela has declined as

the GBRV has shifted resources from the traditional medical system
to "Barrio Adentro." Resource-starved public hospitals are
beginning to show the effects of years of neglect. Mismanagement
has increased as military officers and community council
members-usually with little previous experience in health care-have
assumed a greater role in the administration of public hospitals.
At the same time, the hospitals suffer from the same problems that
plague the rest of Venezuelan society, including the deterioration
of infrastructure, an increase in crime, and the flight of the
professional class. Despite these issues, President Chavez and
other members of his cabinet have not publicly acknowledged the
deterioration of the public hospitals or announced any new plans to
revitalize them. To the extent that President Chavez has
acknowledged Venezuela's health care crisis, the GBRV has looked to
"Barrio Adentro" and Cuba-and not the public hospitals-as the
solution.
¶15. (C) Meanwhile, "Barrio Adentro" has not proven to be a viable

substitute for the public hospitals despite massive GBRV attention
and investment. Indeed, the evidence suggests that all classes of
Venezuelans continue to prefer public hospitals to "Barrio
Adentro," even as the quality of medical services in the former has
deteriorated. The popular preference for public hospitals means
that the traditional medical system must treat a growing number of
patients with dwindling resources, a problem that will only
intensify if the GBRV decides to eliminate the health care benefit
for public employees, forcing them out of the private clinics and
into the public hospitals. Another possible consequence is the
risk that the GBRV will look to expropriate private sector medical
facilities.
DUDDY
Viewing cable 09CARACAS1595, Venezuela: Banco Bicentenario Opens, But is
the Banking
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO4498
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RUEHTM
DE RUEHCV #1595/01 3571944
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R 231944Z DEC 09
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD
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AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23

TAGS: ECON EFIN VE
SUBJECT: Venezuela: Banco Bicentenario Opens, But is the Banking
Episode Over?
REF: 09 CARACAS 1553; 09 CARACAS 1537; 09 CARACAS 1509

09 CARACAS 1491
CLASSIFIED BY: DUDDY, AMBASSADOR, DOS, AMB; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: President Chavez officially inaugurated Banco

Bicentenario on December 21, thus effectively re-opening three of
the eight banks the Venezuelan government (GBRV) has taken over or
shut down since November 20. The National Assembly also passed
changes to the banking law to triple the amount of deposit
insurance, with the new limit applied retroactively to depositors
in the two banks in the process of liquidation. If the episode of
interventions is indeed over, the GBRV will have increased its
share in the banking sector, gained an important foothold in the
insurance industry, and taken over a number of other companies,
particularly in the food processing and distribution sector. While
the exact origin of the episode remains unclear, it appears to have
resulted from a combination of a power struggle among GBRV
officials and insiders and the precarious financial situation of
the banks themselves. A major question mark remains Banco Federal,
a medium-sized bank owned by opposition businessman Nelson
Mezerhane. Chavez and Mezerhane recently traded barbs, with
Mezerhane claiming forces associated with the GBRV were conspiring
to bring down his bank and Chavez characterizing Federal as "having
had grave problems." End summary.
New Steps in an Ongoing Saga
¶2. (U) President Chavez launched a new state-run bank, Banco

Bicentenario, on December 21. Bicentenario is essentially the
union of Banfoandes, a pre-existing public bank, with Central,
Bolivar, and Confederado, three of the eight banks the GBRV has
taken over or shut down since November 20 (refs A-D). Depositors
in these four banks, who have not had access to their money since
November 30 (for Bolivar and Confederado) or December 4 (for
Central), can now transact business normally. Taking figures
provided by the Superintendency of Banks (Sudeban) for commercial
and universal banks, the banks composing Bicentenario represented
5.3 percent of the banking sector by assets and 9.5 percent by
deposits as of November 30 (the latest statistics available). The
extent to which depositors have withdrawn or will withdraw their
money remains to be seen, although there were no reports of long
lines at Bicentenario branches on December 21.
¶3. (U) On December 15 the National Assembly approved modifications

to the banking law that, among other things, will increase the
deposit guarantee offered by the Fund for Guarantee of Deposits and
Banking Protection (Fogade) from 10,000 bolivars (Bs; USD 4,650 at
the official exchange rate) to Bs 30,000, an amount requested by
President Chavez. This increase will apply retroactively for a
limited period of time to depositors in Canarias and and Banpro,
the two banks in the process of liquidation. Banks' contributions
to Fogade will also be raised from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of deposits
as maintained at the close of each semester. (Note: For these
changes to become law, President Chavez must sign the modified law
and it must be published in the Official Gazette. To the best of
our knowledge, it has not yet been published. President Chavez
recently said he might seek further changes to the law. End note.)
Is the Episode of Interventions Over?
¶4. (C) Whether this episode of interventions is over remains a

question mark. There are several other small banks and financial
institutions which fit the pattern of the eight banks intervened in
CARACAS 00001595 002 OF 003
the sense of being weak financially and having been taken over
recently by individuals allegedly close to the government. Two
pending purchases, that of Inverunion by Gonzalo Tiraldo and Banco
Federal by Jose Zambrano, have reportedly been rejected by Sudeban.
Most but not all financial sector analysts and participants Econoff
has contacted continue to believe the episode poses no systemic
risk to the sector given the small sizes and weak reputations of
the banks involved, in comparison with the strong fundamentals of
most of the larger banks. One dissenting voice is that of xxxxxxxxxxxx
reputation) and an outspoken critic of GBRV policies. xxxxxxxxxxxx
called Econoff December 17 to report that, according to information
he had received, several medium-sized or large banks (or their
owners) were putting dollar-denominated assets into collateral
accounts in Florida in return for emergency loans in bolivars.
¶5. (C) Banco Federal remains a major question mark. As reported

previously (ref A), Federal, a medium-sized bank accounting for 3
percent of the sector by assets, is considered weak by several
experts, has been subject to several runs, and reportedly even
received an emergency loan from the GBRV. Adding to the intrigue,
Federal's owner, opposition businessman and minority owner of
opposition TV station Globovision Nelson Mezerhane, recently traded
barbs with President Chavez. In an interview published in local
daily El Mundo December 17, Mezerhane claimed "active laboratories"
that included "people with ties" to the GBRV had disseminated
rumors about Federal's health in an attempt to instigate runs.
Chavez lashed back in a December 19 broadcast, characterizing
Federal as a bank "that has had grave problems," ordering an
investigation into what Mezerhane said, and cautioning that "the
time in which public institutions help private banks like Federal
is over." In an interview published December 20 in local weekly La
Razon, opposition economist Jose Guerra claimed former Vice
President and GBRV insider Jose Vicente Rangel was seeking to bring
down Federal, partly out of bitterness at the fall of his business
associate Pedro Torres (who led the group that owned three of the
intervened banks).
What Initiated the Episode in the First Place?

¶6. (C) With over a month having passed since the initial
interventions, a number of theories have sprung up to explain why
the GBRV chose to act in the way it did and at the time it did.
Many observers believe President Chavez ordered the initial
interventions as the culmination of a power struggle taking place
among GBRV officials and presumed insiders. Theories on the
protagonists in this presumed power struggle abound, however. We
have heard variations such as Diosdado Cabello vs. Ricardo
Fernandez and Jesse Chacon; Ali Rodriguez and representatives of
the traditional left vs. Ricardo Fernandez and members of the
military clique; and President Chavez vs. selected inner circle
members and insiders with their own political projects. An
intriguing tangent is that an alleged report by Cuba's intelligence
service plays a role in several of these explanations. Other
observers believe the GBRV's hand was forced by the terrible
financial situation at the intervened banks, with President Chavez
preferring to take action before the problems worsened and well
before parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2010.
Whatever the origins of the episode, our contacts credit President
Chavez with seeing the interventions as an opportunity to trumpet
anti-corruption credentials by sending the message, as one of our
contacts put it, of "I put bankers in jail."
Changes in the Financial Sector and Business Landscape
CARACAS 00001595 003 OF 003
¶7. (C) The intervention episode has to date led to several changes
in the financial and business landscape that are worth noting.
First, the GBRV has increased its share in the banking sector by at
least five percentage points. With the opening of Banco
Bicentenario, public banks will comprise roughly 20 percent of the
sector by assets and 25 percent by deposits. Second, the GBRV has
acquired an important foothold in the insurance sector with the
associated takeover of Seguros La Previsora and intended formation
of state-owned Bolivariana de Seguros (ref B). (Note: As of June
2009, La Previsora was the fourth largest insurance company in
Venezuela with market share of 8.3 percent. End note.) Many
contacts, including xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxbelieve the GBRV will
consolidate the insurance accounts
position to exert greater control over private medical services

providers. Finally, GBRV takeover of Ricardo Fernandez's companies
in the food and food distribution sectors will further the shift
toward GBRV control in those sectors. (Note: It is still unclear
from GBRV statements if the takeover of Fernandez's companies will
be temporary or permanent. We would not be surprised if it were
the latter. End note.)
Comment
¶8. (C) As we suspected when it began on November 20, much about

this episode remains obscure. We are not surprised that there are
conflicting explanations for how the episode started, though it
seems clear internal power struggles played a key role. What is
still a mystery to us is why the GBRV has not yet used this episode
as an excuse to take over Banco Federal, thus taking an important
asset from Nelson Mezerhane. While we would have expected the GBRV
to have taken it over several weeks ago if it indeed it was going
to, the exchange of barbs between Mezerhane and Chavez certainly
keeps the possibility alive. Perhaps the GBRV has not moved to
take Federal because it fears systemic implications: in a clear
reference to Federal, respected economic consultancy Sintesis
Financiera wrote in a recent report that "concerns will rise and
markets will destabilize if interventions reach larger banks owned
by individuals perceived to be at odds with the government." There
could certainly be other explanations, however. End comment.
DUDDY
Viewing cable 09DOHA728, QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: "THEY

LIE TO US;
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09DOHA728.
09DOHA728 2009-12-20 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Doha
VZCZCXYZ0036
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDO #0728/01 3541214

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201214Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T DOHA 000728
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019

TAGS: ENRG PREL TRGY EPET QA
SUBJECT: QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: "THEY LIE TO US;
WE LIE TO THEM."
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
-- Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman and Ambassador met

December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani
(HBJ) to discuss energy research and development, critical
infrastructure protection, and Iran.
-- HBJ indicated Qatar,s interest in a bilateral critical

infrastructure protection partnership.
-- The PM was skeptical about the plausibility of Iranian

acceptance of a nuclear compromise, saying he would be
shocked if Iran abided by a deal to ship Low-Enriched Uranium
(LEU) out of Iran.
-- The best way to deal with the Iranians, he said, is to get

them to dictate the terms of any such deal. The U.S. and its
partners should strive to get the Iranians to put the details
in writing, including timetables for implementation.
-- HBJ characterized Qatar,s relationship with Iran as one

in which "they lie to us, and we lie to them."
-- According to HBJ, the GOQ tells Iran that it should

"listen to the West,s proposal or there will be military
action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the
middle of next year."
End Key Points.
¶1. (C) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and

Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin
Jassim Al Thani. Also present on the American side was State
Department Coordinator for International Energy Affairs,
David Goldwyn. DepSec Poneman thanked the Prime Minister for
the meeting and expressed his hope that the U.S. and Qatar
could strengthen their bilateral and investment ties.
--------------------------------------
(C) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
--------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary extended USG appreciation to the

Prime Minister for Qatar,s support for the victims of
Hurricane Katrina. The PM observed in response that "We might
have our own Katrina," an apparent reference to security
concerns arising from Qatar,s relationship with Iran. Deputy
Secretary offered U.S. help to Qatar in protecting its
critical infrastructure and in addressing its broader
security concerns. Expressing interest in critical
infrastructure protection, HBJ said he would talk to the
Ministries of Energy and Interior on how best to take
advantage of U.S. assistance.
---------------------------------
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT
---------------------------------
¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised science and technology

investment, noting DoE interest in partnering with the GOQ on
energy-related research and development projects. As an
example of possible cooperation, DepSec Poneman cited
computer simulation, emphasizing that the DOE national
laboratories are international leaders in the field.
¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary reported that DoE had recently
invested in a nanotechnology program and cited this as
another possible area of cooperation, telling the PM there
are additional opportunities for GOQ partnerships with
private labs. Shaykh Hamad immediately expressed strong
interest in nanotechnology, and asked the DepSec to provide
him with a paper on that subject. The DepSec agreed, and
added that he would be pleased to host Shaykh Hamad at the
Sandia nanotechnology facility or another national lab.
¶5. (C) Turning to genomics and solar technology as they

relate to food production and Qatar,s National Food Security
Program, Shaykh Hamad told the Deputy Secretary that he
supported research in those fields, but expressed his opinion
that Qatar,s investment in food and solar technology must be
done on a commercial basis.
--------------------------
(S) IRAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
---------------------------
¶6. (S) DepSec Poneman asked HBJ for his views on Iran,s
nuclear program. The Deputy Secretary noted that the USG had
entered into recent discussions with Iran not out of naivet,
but as an effort to address a humanitarian concern (the need
for medical isotopes) while also attempting to remove a
meaningful amount of special nuclear material. Even though

the effort had not to date resulted in Iranian agreement, it
had borne fruit in the form of Russian and Chinese support
for the most recent resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors
in Vienna. The PM expressed his skepticism that the West
would be able to reach a deal with Iran,s leaders, saying
"I,d be surprised and shocked if the Iranians do a deal. You
always think you have a deal with them and then you don,t."
He continued, "The EU, Chirac, and Solana...they all thought
they had a deal... Solana said two weeks; I advised him it
would take two years."
¶7. (S) Asked for his advice on how best to approach the
Iranians, HBJ said it is imperative that the Iranians commit
to draft any deal, including a timetable. He reiterated that
it is important to "make them tell you (what they will do).
Otherwise they will say 'yes, but...' and the 'but' will be
worse than a 'no.'" The Deputy Secretary countered that,
"They don,t want to make a proposal." To which HBJ
responded, "You don,t understand. Even Mousavi can,t make a
deal!" Poneman pressed the issue, saying the U.S. would not
be offering a better deal than what is currently on the
table. The Prime Minster said, "I know, but this is the way
they are."
¶8. (S) Referring to the current proposal on the Tehran

Research Reactor (TRR), Deputy Secretary Poneman stressed:
"This is a fleeting opportunity. If they don,t take this
deal, what comes next is worse." The PM noted that the
Iranians frequently press the Qataris to have dialogue on
their shared natural gas field and attempt to expand the
dialogue to include other subjects. HBJ said that the
Qataris "are always throwing cold water on their ideas."
¶9. (S) On Qatar,s close ties with Iran, the PM added that he
knows the U.S. becomes upset at times by what it hears about
the Qatar/Iran relationship. However he characterized the
relationship as one in which "They lie to us, and we lie to
them." Poneman replied by underscoring that "It would be
helpful if everywhere they went, they (the Iranians) heard
the same thing." The PM said for Qatar,s part, he had told
Iran that it should "listen to the West, s proposal or there
will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the
Israelis by the middle of next year." Poneman observed that
the Russians had pressed the Iranians hard during the Vienna
negotiations, reinforcing the view that Iranian failure to
accept the Tehran Research Reactor deal would lead back to
the UN Security Council. The PM asked if the U.S. believes
the Russians were in agreement with the U.S. on the
possibility of harsher measures. Poneman replied that, for
now, the Russians appear to be holding a similar line to the
USG on the TRR deal and we remain in close contact with
Moscow.
¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSec Poneman at

Department of Energy.
LeBaron
Viewing cable 09DOHA733, VISIT OF QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER TO

WASHINGTON
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09DOHA733.
09DOHA733 2009-12-21 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Doha
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED NOFORN CAPITION
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NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG EAGR QA
SUBJECT: VISIT OF QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON
JANUARY 4-5
DOHA 00000733 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)
¶1. (S) Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (who serves
concurrently as Foreign Minister) of Qatar will visit
Washington beginning January 4 to continue the strategic
consultations that Qatar and the USG have pursued since June,
when Near Eastern Affairs Assistant Secretary Feltman first
proposed them in Doha. As part of those consultations,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud and
Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohamad Al-Rumaihi
visited Washington last fall.
¶2. (S) The Prime Minister travels to Washington with the aim
of laying the groundwork for visits in the first half of 2010
by Qatar's Heir Apparent and the Amir. We believe he will be
prepared to discuss the gaps between the USG and GOQ on
Middle East peace and counterterrorism cooperation, as well
as to discuss setting the stage for joint cooperation on
Iran, Iraq and other regional issues.
¶3. (S) Suggested talking points for meetings with the PM:
-- We thank you for bringing with you to Washington a

commitment to fund the PA. Your decision to do so is
extremely important to us. We view it as a clear gesture of
friendship to us and of a commitment to partner with us on
Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, just as the United States and
Qatar have partnered on Darfur.
-- As your ally and friend, we hope we can look to you to

increase your cooperation with us on counterterrorism. We
want to work particularly closely with you and enacting
policies and programs that deter financial flows to Hamas and
the Taliban.
-- In this context, we applaud your work with the IMF on

making needed legal and procedural changes to curtail
financing to terrorists. We are ready to help you with
technical support and training once the IMF and Qatar have
worked out an action plan.
-- We especially value consultations with you on Iran. We

recognize your national need for a working relationship with
Iran, given the natural gas reserves you share with Iran.
How best do you think we can persuade Iran to give up its
military nuclear aims without military confrontation?
-- We understand that you are close to announcing a decision

to open an Embassy in Baghdad, but that much depends on
resolving the issue of Iraq's debts to Qatar. Is there
anything we can do to help?
-- We encourage you to recognize an independent Kosovo, as

Saudi Arabia and others have now done. We certainly
appreciate your votes in favor of Kosovo in the IMF and World
Bank. They are important precursors to formal recognition,
but when will you take that final step?
-- On Yemen, we know that President Saleh asked Qatar to stop

its mediation between the central government and Huthi
rebels. Given your past involvement there, what thoughts do
you have on bringing about stability on the Arabian
Peninsula?
-- We applaud Qatar's decision to make food security a

priority, not just for itself but for the entire Arab world.
Food security is a priority for the USG, as well, and we
share Qatar's view that it must be addressed through a
combination of commerce, investment, technical assistance,
technology transfer, and direct aid.
Addressing the Fatah-Hamas Split and Funding the PA

--------------------------------------------- ------
¶4. (S) Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim (HBJ) has told NEA A/S
Feltman that he will come with a financial commitment to fund
the Palestinian Authority. This is an extremely important
gesture by Qatar to the United States. He will also be
prepared to discuss with Secretary Clinton and others Qatar's
view of Hamas, continued contacts with whose leaders it sees
as key to bringing about a stable and enduring Middle East
peace. We expect HBJ to share what other steps Qatar is
prepared to take in support of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
and, in particular, Mahmoud Abbas, whose continued leadership
DOHA 00000733 002.2 OF 003
of the PA Qatar's leaders support. HBJ is likely to bring

with him new ideas to reconcile Hamas and Fatah. Given
Qatar's history of mediation efforts HBJ will no doubt
suggest that Qatar can play a helpful role. Qatar's
restoration of normal operations of the Israeli Trade Office
in Doha would also give testimony to Qatar's willingness to
help achieve U.S. objectives, but we do not expect the
Qataris to take this step absent some significant gesture
from the Israelis, such as much less restricted access to
Gaza for Qatar's humanitarian efforts.
¶5. (S) Qatar almost certainly will not be willing to break

off ties or dialogue with Hamas. If asked to do so, we think
HBJ will explain that the Amir gave his word to both Hamas
and Fatah that he would financially support the winner of
democratic elections in Palestine. Hamas won those
elections, which the Bush Administration pressed the Amir to
support actively. The Amir believes that it would be
dishonorable to isolate Hamas after he convinced its leaders
to participate in elections that were backed by the United
States.
Greater Cooperation on Counterterrorism Needed

--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (S) It is important to make clear to HBJ that cooperation

between the United States and Qatar on counterterrorism
issues in general needs to be greatly improved. Officials
should make known USG concerns about the financial support to
Hamas by Qatari charitable organizations and our concerns
about the moral support Hamas receives from Yousef
Al-Qaradawi. It is also essential to stress that high-level
Qatari political support is needed, if financial flows to
terrorists are to stop.
¶7. (S) An International Monetary Fund (IMF) employee began

advising Qatar's Financial Intelligence Unit in October (in a
relationship expected to last three full years) on making the
necessary legal and procedural changes to address the 49
areas in which international experts have recommended changes
to Qatar's procedures. We assess that the FIU is serious
about making technical changes that will enhance Qatar's
reputation as a global financial center, but we project that,
absent political support from the top, the IMF/Qatari
partnership will fall short in achieving its goals.
Need for Close Consultations on Iran

------------------------------------
¶8. (S) Qatar shares a mammoth natural gas field with Iran.
As a result, Qatar carefully maintains with Iran a high tempo
of top-level contacts , which have increased since the
protests following Iranian presidential elections). Qatar
does this because it is convinced that such a close
relationship with Iran is key to safeguarding trillions of
dollars in potential wealth. We are convinced that Qatar
will not be dissuaded from maintaining those ties.
¶9. (S) That said, Qatar's leaders -- while careful not to say
it publicly -- do not trust Iran; and Qatar does not want
Iran to have nuclear weapons.
¶10. (S) Qatar's relationship with Iran is important to us

for another reason. Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of
CENTCOM and allows us to use Al-Udaid Air Base for
unrestricted air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. We
pay no rent for these facilities, and the Qataris have funded
about 60 percent of the improvements to Al-Udaid since our
partnership on that base began. While few, least of all
Qatar, want a military confrontation with Iran, the USG no
doubt would want to use these Qatari facilities in any
kinetic operations against Iran. Right now, we anticipate
that Qatar would refuse to allow Qatari soil to be used to
attack Iran, short of some sort of permanent USG security
guarantee to Qatar, to include its offshore natural gas field
shared with Iran.
Finding a Way Forward on Iraq

-----------------------------
¶11. (S) For several months, Qatar has expressed frustration

with the current government of Iraq, which it views as too
Shi'a in orientation for its liking, but appears now to be
prepared to consider investment offsets, provided by the
Government of Iraq, but owned by Qatar, as a means for Iraq
DOHA 00000733 003.2 OF 003
to repay the GOI's debt owed Qatar. That would be an avenue

for the resumption of a political relationship, to include an
HBJ visit to Baghdad and the opening of a Qatari Embassy in
Iraq. We should encourage Qatar's outreach to Baghdad and
also encourage Iraq's government to shore up its relations
with Doha.
Recognizing Kosovo
------------------
¶12. (C) MFA Assistant Minister Mohamad Al-Rumaihi told

Ambassador December 20 that Qatar's IMF and World Bank votes
in favor of Kosovo show Qatar's true sympathies on
recognizing Kosovo. The Russian President, however, has
asked Qatar to "go slow" in announcing recognition, he said.
Out of sensitivity to Russian concerns, Al-Rumaihi said,
Qatar has done so. He encouraged Secretary Clinton to ask
HBJ about the timing of Qatar's eventual recognition, noting
that that Qatar had been approached by organizers of a UK
project about using its good offices with the Government of
Kosovo to protect Kosovo's Christian heritage once Qatar
formally recognizes its independence.
Cool to Yemen's Approach on the Huthi

-------------------------------------
¶13. (S) Having attempted to mediate between Huthi rebels in

Yemen and the central government there (before President
Saleh put an end to Qatar's involvement), Qatar believes the
Huthi tribes have legitimate grievances that the central
government must address in dialogue and negotiations. It can
be expected that HBJ will discourage a military approach to
solving the Huthi problem and claim that the role of Huthi
elements in supporting terrorism in the guise of Al-Qaida is
overstated.
Food Security
-------------
¶14. (U) Qatar will host March 3-4, 2010 an international

conference focused on food security in the Arab World. IFAD
(International Fund for Agricultural Development) is a
co-host, as is the Islamic Development Bank. The conference
will have a set of ambitious goals, to include a conference
declaration establishing a permanent secretariat to address
the food security issues of the poorer states of the Arab
League. According to officials of Texas A&M's Borlaug
Institute, this will be the first such conference on regional
food security issues hosted by an Arab government in the 50
years the institute has been active in the Middle East and
North Africa.
¶15. (SBU) In Embassy Doha's judgment, Qatar's food security

policies and strategies reflect the rapidly growing intent by
the Amir and Crown Prince to make food security a key
national priority for Qatar, not just in terms of Qatar's own
food security needs, but in terms of the food security needs
of the Arab region. (HBJ supports having an active food
security policy, as long as it has a strong commercial focus.)
¶16. (SBU) That judgment stems from our conversations with

Qatar government officials:
-- While QNFSP's short-term focus is on the State of Qatar

and building the domestic agricultural sector to diminish
reliance on imports, the strategic goal of QNFSP is to export
the technologies developed in Qatar to countries throughout
the MENA region, and other areas with arid climates.
-- Toward that end, some research results will be part of the

public domain and available to everyone. Some technology
transfer to poorer MENA nations will be donor-based, through
the activities of the offices of the State Minister for
International Cooperation. The third component of Qatar's
strategic goal of exporting QNFSP technology will be more
commercially based, and will employ public/private
partnerships.
LeBaron
Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD3037, BALOCH REQUEST UNHCR

FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF
Discussing cables
09ISLAMABAD3037
VZCZCXRO0120
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #3037/01 3521104
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181104Z DEC 09
INFO RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0113
Friday, 18 December 2009, 11:04

NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/18/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PREF, PK, AF
SUBJECT: BALOCH REQUEST UNHCR FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF
BRAHMDAGH BUGTI TO IRELAND
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Kilian Kleinschmidt, who has been designated by UN High
Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres as UNHCR’s liaison to the Baloch
community in Pakistan, met with the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission on
December 13 to discuss the U.S. Government’s position on the possible movement
of Baloch leader Brahmdagh Bugti from Afghanistan to a country of asylum. He
requested U.S. intervention with Pakistani authorities if UNHCR agrees to
facilitate this movement. XXXXXXXXXXXX Brahmdagh’s uncle, reportedly told
Kleinschmidt that the Government of Ireland has agreed to offer asylum to Bugti,
although UNHCR has not yet confirmed this offer. At the request of UNHCR, the
Ambassador agreed to engage President Zardari and have the Embassy follow up
with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to ensure that the GOP would not act
against such a transfer or negatively respond to UNHCR’s potential involvement.
In a subsequent conversation, however, DGI ISI Pasha registered to COS the
Pakistan military’s opposition to allowing Bugti to obtain refugee status. While
getting Bugti out of Afghanistan is still a good idea, we do not believe UNHCR
should be involved. End Summary.
¶2. (C) At the request of XXXXXXXXXXXX, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Antonio Guterres designated UNHCR Assistant Representative Kilian Kleinschmidt
as UNHCR liaison to Pakistan’s Baloch community. Kleinschmidt met recently with
XXXXXXXXXXXX, who sought UNHCR support in facilitating the movement out of
Afghanistan of Brahmdagh Bugti, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s grandson and head of
the Baloch Republican Party. XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly told Kleinschmidt that the
Government of Ireland was willing to receive Brahmdagh Bugti, who “had to get
out of Afghanistan and would not be safe returning to Pakistan.” XXXXXXXXXXXX
also contended that the USG would be supportive of this transfer. (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX has met with Embassy poloffs several times to float the idea of
moving Bugti, sharing with us that Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister is willing to
help Bugti gain asylum there. End Note.)
¶3. (C) Kleinschmidt sought a meeting on December 13 with the Ambassador to
discuss the USG position on the potential transfer of Bugti, although UNHCR has
yet to verify Ireland’s willingness to receive him or to make a determination as
to whether Bugti is eligible for refugee status. The British Government has
previously refused to consider asylum for Bugti. According to Kleinschmidt,
while UNHCR believes that moving Bugti from Afghanistan and from close proximity
to and influence in Baloch insurgent activity in Pakistan would be in the
Pakistani Government’s interest, High Commissioner Guterres is concerned that
UNHCR’s potential involvement in this transfer could have a negative impact on
UNHCR’s humanitarian access, operations, and security in Pakistan. UNHCR is
seeking assurances that the Pakistani Government will not act against such a
transfer or penalize UNHCR’s potential involvement in it. Kleinschmidt told the
Ambassador that his meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX and all UNHCR’s interaction with
Baloch leaders have been carefully monitored by Pakistani intelligence.
¶4. (C) UNHCR will hold an in-house meeting to be attended by the UNHCR
Afghanistan Country Representative and its Asia Director on December 22 to
discuss more generally what to do with regard to the Baloch in Afghanistan.
Besides Bugti, there are “a few hundred” Baloch in Kandahar (largely from Dera
Bugti), Kleinschmidt explained. He said that recognizing these Baloch as
refugees would be well received by the Pakistani Baloch community - which
believes UNHCR has been insufficiently supportive of them despite Baloch
assistance in facilitating the release of kidnapped UNHCR Quetta Sub-Office Head
John Solecki -- but would not be well-received by the Government of Pakistan.
ISLAMABAD 00003037 002 OF 002
¶5. (C) The Ambassador told Kleinschmidt that the USG would be supportive of
moving Bugti out of the region but said that UNHCR would need to confirm first
Ireland’s willingness to grant him asylum. She and Kleinschmidt both expressed
concern about the possible implications of XXXXXXXXXXXX’s stipulation that Bugti
would need to be able to freely travel outside his country of asylum. The
Ambassador agreed to engage President Zardari and have the Embassy follow up
with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to ensure that the GOP would not act
against a transfer of Bugti out of Afghanistan or negatively respond to UNHCR’s
potential involvement.
¶6. (S/NF) In a subsequent conversation, DG ISI Pasha told COS that he believed
Bugti should return to Pakistan to stand trial for his crimes. While declaring
that the decision belonged ultimately to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he
made clear that the Pakistan military would not favor allowing Bugti to be
accorded refugee status. It was also clear from Pasha’s comments that efforts on
the part of UN agencies to effect Bugti being provided with asylum in Europe
would color the Pakistan military’s perception of those agencies and would
affect their working relationships.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: On the basis of Pasha’s remarks, we are advising
Kleinschmidt that it would be better for UNHCR not to pursue this initiative
with Bugti. End Comment. PATTERSON
Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL440, TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS:

MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
Discussing cables
09ISTANBUL440 2009-12-04 12:12 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXRO7673
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHIT #0440/01 3381236
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041236Z DEC 09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000440

SIPDIS
LONDON FOR MURRAY; BERLIN FOR ROSENSTOCK-STILLER; BAGHDAD

FOR POPAL AND HUBAH; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR
TANGBORN; DUBAI FOR IRPO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2024

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON ETRD KNNP TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND IMPLICATIONS
REF: (A) ANKARA 1516 (EXDIS) (B) ISTANBUL 421 (C)

ISTANBUL 290 (D) 2008 ISTANBUL 85 (E) 2008
ISTANBUL 146 (F) ISTANBUL 425 (G) ANKARA 1704
Classified By: ConGen Istanbul Deputy Principal Officer Win Dayton; Rea
son 1.5 (d).
¶1. (C) Recent discussions with Turkish and Iranian

think-tank, business, and political activist contacts on the
issue of Turkey-Iran relations reveal a broad consensus that:
(1) Turkey pursues closer relations with Iran out of desires
for regional stability and conflict avoidance, recognition of
Turkey as an indispensable East-West bridge; strengthening a
long-term energy and commercial relationship; and hope that
Turkey's approach will moderate Iranian regime behavior. (2)
Iran reciprocates because it sees Turkey as a hedge against
its diplomatic isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a
safety valve for its population. However, (3) Turkey's
influence over Iranian decision-making it limited; Turkey has
never persuaded Iran to change course on an issue of
strategic concern to the regime. To quote one contact:
"Iran knows Turkey is not going to walk away." On the other
hand, our contacts also concluded that Iranian
decision-making responds at least tactically to multilateral
pressure, which argues that Turkey can and should play a key
role to play in supporting tougher approaches on Iran at the
UNSC and IAEA. End Summary.
Views from Contacts on Turkey-Iran Relations

---------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Over the past several weeks, in conversations before
and after President Ahmadinejad's November 8-9 visit to
Istanbul (ref B), ConGen Istanbul's NEA Iran Watcher has
solicited views from a wide range of Turkish and Iranian
contacts on the issue of warming Turkey-Iran relations, what
motivates each side, and whether Turkey's approach has led to
a moderation of Iranian regime behavior. Contacts with whom
we spoke included Turkish academic experts, Turkish
businessmen who deal with Iran, Istanbul-based journalists
who cover Iran, several Iranian political activists now
seeking refugee status in Turkey for fear of persecution in
Iran, and several Tehran-based Iranian contacts who follow
Iran's foreign policy. Our conversations revealed an unusual
confluence of views.
Turkey's Motivations
--------------------
¶3. (C) According to a number of Turkish academic and
think-tank contacts, Turkey is pursuing closer relations with
Iran for several mutually-reinforcing reasons. First, the
underlying principle: According to a Turkish university
professor who informally advises FM Davutoglu on Middle East
issues (ref C), Turkey's pursuit of close relations with Iran
is a direct reflection of Davutoglu's academic philosophy and
influential 2000 book, "Strategic Depth," in which he first
articulated a policy of "zero problems" with Turkey's
neighbors. Another Istanbul-based professor told us that
Turkey's Iran policy represents "a triumph of real-politik,"
with Turkey's national and regional interests trumping any
discomfort that Turkey, as a multi-ethnic, pluralistic
democracy, might feel about the Iranian regime's harsh
domestic authoritarianism. This contact described Davutoglu
as "Turkey's Kissinger."
¶4. (C) Regional Stability and Conflict Avoidance: Turkish

contacts, and indeed even MFA interlocutors, have
acknowledged in the recent past that Turkey sees a military
attack against Iran's nuclear facilities as the worst
possible outcome on the Iran issue. Iran's acquisition of a
nuclear weapons capability would only be the second worst
outcome. This hints at the depth of Turkey's anxiety about
the dangers to regional stability, including Turkey's, of the
unintended consequences of any further military action in the
region, and explains Turkey's commitment at almost any cost
to continued western diplomatic engagement with Iran. As one
contact explained, "After the traumatic violence in Iraq, and
fearful that some countries still think military action is an
option with Iran, Turkey will do anything to prevent armed
conflict." The GoT's approach on this score enjoys some
public support: Turkish public opinion also considers an
attack against Iran as more dangerous to Turkey than Iran
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, almost a
third of Turks polled do not consider a nuclear-armed Iran to
be a threat, believing that Iran would never attack a fellow
Muslim country.
¶5. (C) Recognition of Turkey as Moderate Regional Leader and

Indispensable East-West Bridge: According to an Ankara-based
ISTANBUL 00000440 002 OF 004
international relations professor with ties to PM Erdogan's

office, Turkey is also deepening ties to Iran because the
region otherwise faces a "power vacuum." No other regional
state (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) has the military and
economic power to serve as an effective counterweight to
Iran. Turkey fills this role with the support of regional
states who otherwise fear a dominant Iran, including the Gulf
States and to some degree Iran's own client, Syria.
Moreover, he described Turkey's engagement with Iran as part
of a wider effort to stake out a regional leadership position
that puts Turkey "at the fulcrum" and makes it an
indispensable partner for the west -- whether or not Turkey
eventually joins the EU -- in dealing with the Middle East
and Central Asia. This contact acknowledged that this
sometimes requires Turkey to tactically distance itself from
the USG on several key issues, including Iran's "right" to
enrichment and the regime's dismal human rights record. But
our contact underscored that "this is classic triangulation."
Turkey's intention, he claims, is not a strategic distancing
from the US.
¶6. (C) Strengthening a long-term energy and commercial
relationship: Turkey does not hide the fact that its own
growing energy security needs compel it to look to all
available sources, including Iran, for energy. In response,
we have underscored that the USG supports the diversification
of Turkish gas supplies, while cautioning that Iran has
proven to be an unreliable partner in the past and
reaffirming USG concern over new energy deals with Iran.
Turkey is also actively seeking to expand trade ties with
Iran: Both Turkish and Iranian officials have publicly
called for bilateral trade volume, which was $10 billion in
2008, to reach $20 billion by 2012 -- a goal most trade
experts say is wildly unrealistic. Furthermore, Turkey is
taking steps to protect and expand financial ties with Iran,
for example by continuing to allow Iran's Bank Mellat
(sanctioned by the USG under E.O. 13382) to operate branches
in Istanbul and Ankara, and agreeing to conduct bilateral
trade in Turkish Lira or Iranian Rials rather than dollars
and Euros to avoid having to clear the payments through US or
European banks.
¶7. (C) Tying Iran into regional organizations: As long as
Davutoglu controls Turkish foreign policy, our Turkish
contacts predict that Ankara will seek multiple avenues for
bilateral and multilateral engagement with Iran, deepening
bilateral cultural and economic ties, and working with
regional organizations like the D-8 (ref D), the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ref E) and the OIC to maximize
engagement. Indeed, Davutoglu's MFA sees regional IOs like
these as much more useful tools for engaging Iran, and thus
committing Iran incrementally to pursue regionally
cooperative policies, than previous FMs did, according to
contacts.
Iran's Motivations
------------------
¶8. (C) According to our Turkish and Iranian contacts, Iran
is happy to reciprocate Turkey's interest in closer ties
because it sees Turkey as a hedge against its diplomatic
isolation, a buffer against sanctions, and a safety valve for
its population. Turkey's value to Iran is felt most strongly
in these six areas:
--Economic: Iran recognizes Turkey's emergence as a regional
economic powerhouse, wants to deepen Turkey's dependence on
its natural gas, and sees Turkish markets and bilateral
commerce as a hedge against isolation and sanctions;
-- Diplomatic: Iran knows that Turkey's seats on the UNSC
and IAEA Board give it outsized influence, and Iran benefits
from the occasional inclination of Turkish leaders to give
Iran's nuclear intentions, at least in public, the benefit of
the doubt;
-- Political: Turkey's refusal to publicly criticize the
regime over the conduct of June elections or its crackdown on
peaceful protesters, as well as PM Edogan's quick recognition
of Ahmadinejad's contested election victory, helped bolster
Iranian regime legitimacy at a critical period when the
regime needed it most;
-- Cultural: A quarter of Iran's population is ethnically
Azeri and Turkish-speaking; Turkish TV programs and are among
the most popular in Iran; and one million Iranians flock
annually visa-free to Turkey as a touristic "safety valve";
-- Turkey's strategic importance to the U.S: Iran closely
watched the spring 2009 visits to Turkey by Secretary Clinton
and then President Obama. One direct result of those visits,
according to an Iranian journalist based in Istanbul, was a
decision by the regime to try to use Turkey's enhanced
influence with the USG to "soften" Washington's approach to
Iran.
ISTANBUL 00000440 003 OF 004
The Limits of Turkish Influence On Iran

---------------------------
¶9. (C) Turkey's influence with Iran runs broadly, but does
not appear to run deep. None of our contacts had seen
concrete evidence that Turkey has swayed Iranian leaders to
change course on any issue of strategic interest to the
regime where Iran had not already calculated it was in its
interests to do so.
¶10. (C) An Istanbul-based professor who informally advises

Davutoglu, and joined him in his September and October bilats
(in Tehran and Kuala Lumpur) with Iranian FM Mottaki, claimed
that Davutoglu's interventions helped persuade the regime to
agree to participate in the October 1 Geneva meeting with the
P5 1. However, all other contacts dismissed that claim,
noting that Iranian regime statements and press reports prior
to Davutoglu's bilats already indicated that Iran would go to
Geneva.
¶11. (C) Several weeks of intense, personal diplomacy by FM

Davutoglu, supported by interventions form President Gul and
PM Erdogan, have been unable to persuade Iranian
decision-makers to agree to a compromise deal with Turkey
that would keep alive the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) fuel swap proposal, a key test of the P5 1's efforts to
engage Iran.
¶12. (C) Our contact who advises Davutoglu also asserted that
Turkey played a key role in persuading Iran to release
several detainees including Greek-British journalist Iason
Athanasiadis (jailed in Iran on June 17 and released on July
6). But Athanasiadis (please protect) told us that while
Turkey offered to intervene with Iran on his case, to his
knowledge it never did, and indeed Athanasiadis told us he
believed it was the Ecumenical Patriarch's personal request
to Khamenei (via letter) that probably convinced Iran to
release him.
¶13. (C) Even on issues of lesser strategic importance to

Iran, high-level Turkish intervention does not reveal a
record of successfully moderating Iranian policies.
According to a Turkish businessman who deals with Iran (Ref
F), several interventions from Turkey's Trade and Foreign
Ministers, and even a plea from PM Erdogan in Tehran on
October 27, have been unable to persuade Iran to lower its
customs duties on Turkish imports, currently 45% for finished
products. As our business contact explained, even though Iran
depends on Turkish diplomatic support and benefits from
Turkish gas purchases and other trade, Iran realizes it does
not have to sacrifice any critical policy priorities in
return, including its customs income, because "Iran knows
Turkey is not going to walk away."
Does Turkey Really Understand Iran Better?

---------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Underlying Turkey's pursuit of warmer relations with
Iran is an assumption on the part of Turkish decision-makers
and diplomats that Turkey has correctly judged that the
current Iranian regime will be its long-term interlocutor.
But Turkey's belief that it understands Iranian political
developments better than most western countries is an
assumption strongly challenged by our Iranian contacts.
These contacts suggest that Turkey draws its assessment of
Iran's internal dynamics through a subjective filter, which
values regime stability foremost, and thus Turkey's
assessments artificially inflate evidence suggestive of
regime stability.
¶15. (C) According to two separate "Green Movement" activists

now seeking refugee status in Turkey -- one a Mousavi
campaign official, one the communications director of a
reformist party that supported Mousavi -- Turkey missed an
historic opportunity by quickly recognizing Ahmadinejad's
victory and dismissing the Green Movement's political
significance, either as a meaningful opposition movement or
as the possible vanguard of a more democratic Iranian
government. Most Green Movement activists now see Turkey as
fully committed to the Iranian regime's survival in the name
of regional stability, and predict that Turkey will be "on
the wrong side of history" if and when Iran's fractured
regime faces systemic change at the hands of Iran's
population. "When the system falls and a more democratic,
moderate, outward-looking government comes to power, we will
all remember where Turkey stood on 22 Khordad (June 12) and
after."
¶16. (C) Turkey, like the USG, almost certainly recognizes
that within the Iranian regime there are at least several
factions and key players jockeying intensely for influence.
ISTANBUL 00000440 004 OF 004
The fact that Turkish President Gul agreed to meet former

Iranian presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai, a Rafsanjani
ally, in Ankara in October (despite the INTERPOL Red Notice
issued against Rezai), and the relative frequency with which
Turkish officials including PM Erdogan have met influential
Majles speaker Larijani, an Ahmadinejad rival, in the past
six months, suggest that Turkey -- like others in the west --
wants to hedge its bets on who will emerge as the strongest
of Iran's decision-makers, especially if Supreme Leader
Khamenei faces future leadership challenges. (In a telling
anecdote related to us indirectly, when Erdogan met Khamenei
in Tehran on October 28, Khamenei seemed to be "in a time
capsule", asking uninformed or unrealistic questions about
Turkish foreign policy, and passively uninterested in
discussing the nuclear issue.) Despite its belief that it
knows its neighbor Iran better than most other countries do,
according to our contacts, Turkey is just as uncertain as the
USG and other western countries as to what exactly is
happening behind the regime's closed doors.
Implications
----------
¶17. (C) If the consensus views of our contacts are accurate,
it suggests our efforts to persuade PM Erdogan to adopt a
tougher public stance against Iran will be a tough sell.
Even if Erdogan were to hew closer to P5-plus-one criticism
of Iran, Tehran would likely pay him little heed. On the
other hand, our contacts point out that Iran's regime has a
clear recent history of making tactical concessions in the
face of concerted international pressure, especially pressure
from the UNSC and IAEA. If this holds true, we can and
should encourage Turkey to play a supportive role at the UNSC
and IAEA as the USG and partners consider raising pressure on
Iran in those fora. As noted Ref G, however, any USG effort
to try press Turkey to sign up to tougher international
measures on Iran, especially on issues that might impact the
Turkish economy, will have costly domestic political
consequences for the GoT. The key to securing Turkish
acquiescence at the UNSC and IAEA, a Turkish professor
explained, is to keep the engagement track on the table and
even further sweetened (especially with trade incentives from
which Turkey might also benefit), even as tougher measures
are being pursued.
WIENER
Viewing cable 09LONDON2768, SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX

PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK
Discussing cables
09LONDON2768
16:04 23:11 RN London
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #2768/01 3441648

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101648Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1304
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/09/2019

TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR, AF, UK, PK, IR, IN, CH, RS,
SA, NATO
SUBJECT: SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK
COOPERATION IF TORIES GAIN POWER
Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. During a December 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Shadow
Secretary of State for Defense Liam Fox affirmed his desire to work closely with
the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election.
He highlighted the importance of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation
Treaty insofar as it advances the goal of U.S.-UK interoperability. The Treaty
“means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized, adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to
follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement.” Fox, who accompanied
Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan,
(septel) expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and
optimism about the way forward. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech, Fox
affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission and analyzed challenges
facing NATO.) Fox predicted that negotiations with Iran would fail; he stated
that the U.S. and UK should work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East. He faulted the Labour government for policies which reinforce the
Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign relations on the
subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” End Summary.
U.S.-UK Interoperability
------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Ambassador Susman met December 9 with Liam Fox, Shadow Secretary of
State for Defense. (Mike Threadgold, Head of Fox’s Private Office, and U.S.
Embassy Political Officer Chris Palmer attended the meeting as notetakers.) Fox,
a committed Atlanticist, underscored his desire to work closely with the U.S. if
the Conservative Party wins power in next year’s general election. He affirmed
that when Winston Churchill first raised the notion of the “special
relationship” it was as a wartime leader. The special relationship will remain
strategically central to UK foreign policy regardless of which party is in power
in the UK, Fox underlined. However, the relationship will be especially close in
the defense sphere under Tory leadership, Fox stated. He affirmed his desire to
increase joint defense procurement with the United States. Increasing U.S.-UK
“interoperability is the key” since the U.S. and UK will continue to fight
together in the future.
¶3. (C/NF) Fox stressed that the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty
(Note: SFRL hearings on the Treaty were to be held December 10) is extremely
important insofar as it advances the goal of interoperability. Fox expressed
appreciation for the Ambassador’s update regarding the likelihood of Senate
approval of the Treaty soon. The Treaty “means a lot to us,” Fox emphasized,
adding that “we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American
profile in procurement. The key is interoperability.” Fox asserted that some
within the Conservative Party are less enthusiastic, asserting that “we’re
supposed to be partners with, not supplicants to, the United States.” Fox said
he rebuffed these assertions, and he welcomed the Ambassador’s reassurance that
senior U.S. leaders value the UK as an equal partner.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶4. (C/NF) Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a
December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan (septel), expressed confidence regarding U.S.
leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. He noted that he
hoped to meet with NSA Jones, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus during
the December 11-13 Regional Security Summit in Bahrain. Fox also stated that he
planned to meet DASD Flournoy in Washington December 18; Fox will visit
Washington and New York December 17-20. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House
speech (see paragraph 9), Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission
to the NATO Alliance and the importance of explaining to the British people with
“clarity, conviction, and consistency” “what the national security threats are
that compel us to be in Afghanistan.” End Note.)
Iran
----
¶5. (C/NF) Turning to Iran, Fox observed that there are three possible outcomes
in Iran: regime change, behavioral change for the regime’s leaders, and “a
change of leadership within
the regime.” The first two options “won’t happen” soon, although we could be “in
the beginning of the end game.” When regime change comes it will likely be a
“bloody end,” Fox stated. The regime’s strong hold on power, its implacable
hatred of the U.S. and Israel, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
stranglehold on the economy make it extremely unlikely that the regime will
change from within, he said. He predicted that international negotiations with
Iran would fail. He said that Iran’s Independence Day in February would provide
the next opportunity for the international community to evaluate the strength of
Iran’s internal opposition, based on the size of demonstrations. Fox stated that
he had recently met with a group of wealthy, Iranian expatriates, most of whom
expressed support for Iran’s obtaining a nuclear bomb. “Persian nationalism”
more than Islamic fundamentalism is the basis of Iranian popular support for a
nuclear weapons program.
¶6. (C/NF) The U.S. and UK need to work together to prevent a nuclear arms race
in the Middle East, Fox said. He expressed support for the establishment of a
U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Middle East. Russia would play a more constructive
role in regard to Iran if it began to fear “encirclement” by China and Iran.
China could be more helpful under the right circumstances, Fox said. (Note:
Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the Ambassador in a subsequent
meeting (septel) that in his view China would probably not be more helpful in
regard to Iran in the foreseeable future, although Russia would likely play a
more constructive role. End Note.)
India-Pakistan
--------------
¶7. (C/NF) Turning to India, Fox criticized the Labour government for policies
which reinforce the Indian government’s long-held view that HMG’s foreign
relations on the subcontinent are “skewed to Pakistan.” Fox predicted this would
not be a factor under a Conservative government, since the Conservatives are
“less dependent” than the Labour Party on votes from the British-Pakistani
community.
NATO
----
¶8. (SBU/NF) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Fox touched on the future
of the NATO Alliance, affirming the importance of the ongoing strategic
transformation debate and the future of NATO. Fox focused on NATO in a December
8 Chatham House speech on “The Way Forward for NATO.” In those remarks, Fox
asserted that “NATO’s mission in Afghanistan has created further debate on
NATO’s role and even of NATO’s survival as a defense alliance.” The speech
highlights that “neither the financial burden nor the fighting burden is
properly shared between NATO allies” and that the pending Strategic Concept
should address collective responsibilities. Fox’s speech affirms the importance
of strategic nuclear forces to the Alliance, as stated in the 1999 Strategic
Concept; the speech commits a future Conservative government to “maintaining
Britain’s round-the-clock, independent, submarine-based, and strategic nuclear
deterrent.” The speech concludes that, despite its shortcomings, NATO is a
“necessity” and “in order to successfully face the threats of the 21st century,
NATO is the only way forward.” (Note: The full text of the speech is available
at www.chathamhouse.org.uk End Note.)
ed_Kingdom
Susman
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW3010, MOSCOW'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION

WITH TEHRAN
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO5471
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #3010/01 3481520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141520Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP IAEA RS IR
SUBJECT: MOSCOW'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION WITH TEHRAN
Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Official GOR reports and media have

pronounced the Russian-Iranian relationship healthy and
Minister of Energy's Shmatko's recent visit to Tehran as a
success. Privately, GOR officials and Russian analysts agree
that there are serious tensions in the bilateral relationship
such as the S-300s issue, the Bushehr project and the
possibility of Russia's support of sanctions. They downplay
Moscow's ability to influence Iran, noting competing
interests within Russia that complicate Russian policy
decisions. Iran policy remains a sensitive domestic
question. End Summary
---------------------------
Signaling Iran on Sanctions
---------------------------
¶2. (C) Italian Embassy interlocutors in Moscow reported

that, during his recent visit to Rome, President Medvedev
confided to PM Berlusconi that dealing with Iran lately had
been "frustrating." Medvedev said he was bothered by Iran's
refusal to accept the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal
and that Iran's reaction showed a lack of trust for Russia.
While Russia did not necessarily agree that sanctions would
be effective, he said, the threat of sanctions could signal
Iran that it was time to change course. Medvedev admitted
that he did not know who was making decisions in Tehran now,
but he was nevertheless optimistic that there was still some
room for negotiation on the TRR proposal.
¶3. (C) Ali Mustafabeily, Deputy for Iran and Afghanistan in

the MFA's Second Asia Department who accompanied Shmatko to
Iran, told us that it was time to pressure Iran. The TRR
proposal was a fair offer, but there was also a deadline that
Iran had missed. Commenting that the Iranians were "sly" and
knew how to negotiate, he said that just last week Saeed
Jalili, Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Supreme
National Security Council, had informed the Russian
Ambassador in Tehran of Iran's new thinking on the TRR
proposal. If the West, including Russia, did not agree to a
plan in which the IAEA would take "possession" of the low
enriched uranium (LEU) while it remained on Iranian soil, it
meant the West did not trust the IAEA. Mustafabeily seemed
exasperated by this thinking. He also reported that Iran had
conferred with (unnamed) other countries and determined that
the enrichment proposed in the TRR proposal could be
completed in five months rather than one year. Mustafabeily
said that Russia could not accomplish this process in five
months, but said it was possible that others could.
¶4. (C) Mustafabeily also remarked that he had met many

members of the Iranian diaspora living in France. Most were
involved in business and kept one foot in France and the
other in Iran. While uniformly critical of the current
Iranian regime, they also unanimously opposed sanctions as a
way to influence Iran. They believed sanctions would only
harm average Iranians, not the elites. Mustafabeily reported
his own private conversations with businessmen in Tehran that
confirmed this opinion.
---------------------------------------
S-300s: Still Yellow Light on Transfer
---------------------------------------
¶5. (C) On the issue of the S-300s, Mustafabeily reported

that the Iranians had strongly criticized delays in the sale.
Specifically, the Iranian Ministers of Trade and Economic
Development summoned Shmatko to discuss the S-300s and
threatened legal action against the GOR to resolve the issue.
According to Mustafabeily, the Iranians reminded Shmatko
that they had already paid a considerable amount towards
delivery of the system and they expected fulfillment of the
contract. While Moscow was not considering a refund, GOR
officials recognized the gravity of the issue and that Tehran
was likely waiting for Russia's decision on sanctions before
carrying out its threat of legal action. Baranov said the
decision on the Russian side would be made at the
Presidential level, implying that the MFA was not involved in
the discussions. He did note that some in the GOR believed
transferring the S-300s to Iran would increase stability in
the region because Iran would feel more secure without
developing nuclear weapons.
-----------------------
Anti-Russian Mood Grows
-----------------------
MOSCOW 00003010 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Interestingly, Mustafabeily noticed an anti-Russian

feeling in Iran, even to include unorchestrated
demonstrations in front of their embassy in Tehran. He
commented that Russia was being criticized by the government
and the elites for being too close to the West and for voting
with Western countries in the IAEA. Simultaneously, the
Iranian opposition was also condemning Russia for working
with the Iranian government. Mustafabeily complained that
the propaganda machine was working at full-speed in Iran.
¶7. (C) Maxim Baranov, Director of the MFA's Iran Desk, said
that Minister of Energy Shmatko's visit to Tehran was a
chance to calm Iran's concerns about delays at the Bushehr
facility and reduce rising tensions in the relationship. He
said that Russia planned to open the Bushehr reactor as soon
as technical tests were completed and that confusion over
dates had led to misstatements in the press. Baranov claimed
that Russia was continuing with technical testing and did not
truly have an expected opening date. Baranov acknowledged
that Shmatko's visit came at a difficult time in the
bilateral relationship, given Russia's recent vote at the
IAEA. He noted that, although Iran was upset about Russia's
decision, Iranians would not directly "criticize a guest in
their home." As could be expected, Iranian officials instead
expressed their disappointment through the media. Baranov
explained Russia's IAEA vote as an effort to signal Iran that
Russia would no longer remain its unconditional supporter.
He indicated that Moscow felt deceived by the Qom site.
Baranov also took the opportunity to call for the U.S. to
consult more closely with Russia on Iran and not limit
discussions to like-minded countries.
¶8. (C) Baranov claimed there was no clear signal coming from
Tehran about if or when Iran would negotiate and who was in
charge. According to Baranov, Russia wanted Iran to
understand that, while IAEA Director El Baradei had always
tried to remain objective, there was no guarantee that the
incoming director would follow this path. El Baradei's
proposal was a favorable deal that might not be available
after he leaves his position. Therefore, Russia was urging
Iran to begin cooperation with the IAEA now on the TRR
proposal. When asked about Prime Minister Putin's recent
statement that Russia had no information about a military
dimension to Iran's nuclear program, Baranov seemed caught
off guard. He confided that backing up such a comment would
be "complicated work."
--------------------------------------
Iran's Goal--Capability or Production?
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Yevseyev claimed

that Russia's red line with Iran would be if/when Iran
withdrew from the IAEA because this would demonstrate that
Iran's intention was to build a nuclear weapon. He believed
that, because Iran was hoping to keep the LEU on its
territory and needed an excuse to back away from the IAEA,
its reaction to the vote was calculated and exaggerated.
Nina Mamedova of the Oriental Studies Institute and Zhigun
Yefim of the Middle East Institute agreed that Iran's
reaction was overly emotional. Mamedova claimed that Iran's
reaction and subsequent announcement of plans to build 10
enrichment sites was meant to leave room for bargaining in
the world community. Iran was well known, according to
Mamedova, for adopting harsh positions so there would be room
for retreat. She recalled that six years ago Iran reacted in
the same way to an unfavorable IAEA resolution and threatened
to build 20 nuclear power plants. Then, when Iran realized
that the isolation this decision produced was not helpful, it
renewed cooperation. She predicted that Iran would likely
return to negotiations by early next year but did not know
when exactly.
¶10. (C) Vladimir Sazhin of the Oriental Studies Institute

and commentator for the Voice of Russia claimed that Tehran's
overall goal was completion of the fuel cycle and
infrastructure to produce a nuclear weapon when they needed
it. He did not believe Tehran intended to assemble a weapon.
Merely having the capacity would be enough to satisfy its
need for security and self-aggrandizement. Conversely, both
Mamedova and Yefim believed Iran's goal was to build a
nuclear weapon rather than just develop the capability. They
believed Iran would not feel secure until it had a small
number of nuclear weapons to defend itself against the
"threat" from Israel.
-----------------
Influencing Iran
-----------------
MOSCOW 00003010 003 OF 003
¶11. (C) Although Russia had long considered Iran as a key

element of regional stability, most Russian officials and
analysts agreed that its ability to influence Iran was
minimal and quickly decreasing. Yevseyev pointed out that
Italy and Germany had far greater trade turnover with Iran
than Russia did. Similarly, Mamedova lamented that the
bilateral economic relationship was small, even speculating
that rumors circulating about Iran's readiness to start joint
new exploration efforts with Gazprom of possible gas fields
were more likely empty promises meant to convince Russia to
defend Iran's position in the international community.
¶12. (C) A carrot/stick approach was recommended by some

observers. Vladimir Sazhin said that any use of military
force against Iran would cause catastrophe in the region or
even globally. He advocated balanced measures which included
financial support to the oil and gas sector, a treaty between
the P5 1 and Iran on security guarantees, and recognition of
Iran's prominent role in the region. If these failed to
produce positive results, he believed sanctions against the
banking and oil and gas sectors might be effective. Yevseyev
said the international community should remain flexible and
strive for Iran's integration in to the global economic and
political system when Iran demonstrates behaviors that are
more positive. Mamedova said it was critical that sanctions
avoid inflicting suffering on average Iranians because this
would only increase support for Iran's current behavior.
¶13. (C) Comment: The varying perspectives within the Russian

foreign policy establishment reflect competing interests.
From a purely mercantilist standpoint, sanctions against
Iran, particularly its energy sector, would likely translate
into a bump in world oil prices, which would boost annual
revenues for Russia's state-connected energy companies and
the state budget by billions of dollars annually. If
sanctions harm Iran's burgeoning economic relationship with
China, some in Russia might also regard that as a plus. On
the other hand, sanctions could damage Russia's own trade
with Iran, which is modest (Russia currently has a bilateral
trade surplus of about USD 3 billion) but concentrated in the
politically-influential defense and atomic-energy sectors.
Since many high-ranking officials in these agencies also
favor a more adversarial policy towards the West, an
anti-sanctions posture serves them both economically and
ideologically. The status quo is preferable for Russia and
as the decision point approaches Moscow will probably search
for an outcome that changes as little as possible. Given the
stakes for Russia's economy and its relations with the U.S.,
Israel and the EU, this decision will be made by both
Medvedev and Putin, with implications for the domestic and
foreign influence each exerts. End Comment.
Beyrle
Viewing cable 09MUNICH328, GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN: IS THE CSU

THE WEAKEST LINK
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2941
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMZ #0328/01 3561442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221442Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/SRAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019

TAGS: PGOV EUN GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN: IS THE CSU THE WEAKEST LINK
IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY?
REF: A. BERLIN 1601

¶B. MUNICH 324
Classified By: Consul General Conrad Tribble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Support within Chancellor Merkel,s partner

Christian Social Union (CSU) for sending more German troops
to Afghanistan is not a sure thing. CSU chief and Bavarian
Minister President Seehofer, rattled German policy makers
nationwide when he told Bild on December 7 that he had
"little sympathy" for increasing the number of German
soldiers sent to Afghanistan and that "someone would have to
convince him of a clear alternative" and "any further German
engagement had to be linked to a clear exit strategy." CSU
insiders privately regretted Seehofer's remarks, but the CSU
General Secretary told us that it reflected realistic
thinking. Edmund Stoiber (ex-CSU chairman and ex-Minister
President) acknowledged December 10 that the CSU was not
automatically a firm U.S. ally on this question but said he
expected all federal coalition parties to "live up to their
responsibility" and take the right decision following the
January 28 Afghanistan conference. However, if he is wrong
and there are significant defectors in either the CSU or the
FDP, it will be difficult for even supportive SPD and Green
parliamentarians to vote in favor of the revised mandate.
End Summary.
SEEHOFER MIGHT ECHO POPULAR CONCERNS

------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Echoing concerns expressed privately by some

Consulate contacts, many commentators reacted badly to the
December 7 timing of Seehofer's skeptical Afghanistan
remarks. They accused him of populist posturing while
Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, also CSU, was
under intense political pressure for the Kunduz tanker
bombing, Ambassador Holbrooke was in Germany to receive the
Augsburg University Peace Prize, and President Obama was
heading to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. However,
others acknowledged that Seehofer reflected "proper concerns"
and that Germany "needed to deliberate as carefully as the
U.S. had done before committing new troops." State
Chancellery and Ministry officials, including the State
Secretary for Federal and European Issues, told the Consul
General in a private meeting on December 8 they were
"embarrassed by Seehofer's remarks" and suggested he had
reacted "like a populist" to recent opinion polls that showed
69 percent of Germans opposed sending more German soldiers to
Afghanistan. (NOTE: Another recent poll reported that 69
percent favored immediate withdrawal.) A CSU contact called
us that same morning from party headquarters to express his
frustration over Seehofer who had "once again not consulted
anybody before giving his two cents." In contrast to this,
CSU Secretary General Alexander Dobrindt told CG Tribble on
December 8 that Seehofer's statement was by no means new but
reflected "common CSU thinking." Seehofer had "said this
many times before," he insisted, without producing proof.
AFGHAN ENTANGLEMENTS SPOOK THE CSU

----------------------------------
¶3. (C) The CSU and Bavaria have a well-documented aversion

to sensitive engagements in Afghanistan. The CSU has refused
to accept any of the 17 Uighurs to be released from
Guantanamo, even though Munich is home to an estimated 500
Uighurs, the largest Uigher community in Germany. Bavaria
resisted for over a year all entreaties to send police
trainers to Afghanistan; the first Bavarian police trainers
just left in November after a change of heart by the Interior
Minister. CSU Bundestag deputy Peter Gauweiler, together
with his CDU colleague Willy Wimmer, appealed to the Federal
Constitutional Court in March 2007 to rule against German
Tornado reconnaissance aircraft "assisting the U.S. in a
mission in Afghanistan that was violating international law."
In October 2008, Gauweiler again voted against German ISAF
MUNICH 00000328 002 OF 002
engagement. While Gauweiler is generally seen as an outsider

within the CSU party caucus, he may have some secret
followers. Another CSU Bundestag deputy, Thomas Silberhorn,
said in October that the debate on Afghanistan "should not be
limited to discussing more and more foreign soldiers but
rather appealing on Afghanistan's own responsibility."
CHANCELLOR NEEDS TO WORK HARDER TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC

--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶4. (C) On December 10, Ambassador Murphy called on Edmund

Stoiber, Bavarian Minister President from 1993 to 2007 and
CSU party chairman from 1999 to 2007. Stoiber praised the
new U.S. Administration and President Obama's "courageous and
honest" speeches in West Point and Oslo. He reminded the
Ambassador how German engagement in and responsibility for
two world wars had "left marks of deep trauma on the German
people." The largest demonstrations ever, he recalled,
occurred in the fifties when over one million Germans
protested German rearmament. The decision to support the
NATO two-track decision in the early 1990,s even led to the
resignation of Helmut Schmidt, one of Germany's most popular
chancellors. Stoiber said he did not expect any new insights
from the January 28 London Afghanistan conference, but he
expressed the hope that all parties of the federal government
coalition would live up to their responsibilities. In order
to get broad CSU support, the leadership had to develop a
realistic exit strategy as President Obama had showed the way
with his 2011 target for the United States. Stoiber said he
had much confidence in Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg (CSU) who was politically well-connected, an
expert on foreign policy, and sensitive for what had to be
done. However, he called on Chancellor Merkel to start a
"public relations initiative" aimed at explaining to the
German public why these operations were so vital for German
security interests. At the same time, Stoiber predicted the
SPD and Greens would "return to their anti-war propaganda."
Leaders like Gerhard Schroeder and Joschka Fischer had left
the political scene, and ex-Foreign Minister Steinmeier was
about to get marginalized in the new SPD.
COMMENT
-------
¶5. (C) At the Consulate in Munich, we heard unprompted,

mostly negative, reactions from CSU leadership and working
level operatives around Seehofer to his skeptical remarks
concerning Germany's Afghanistan troop levels. However, it
is clear that the CSU is on the fence and remains to be
convinced about the need or wisdom of sending additional
troops, especially combat troops as opposed to troops sent
to train the Afghan National Army or to provide force
protection for police mentoring teams. He may be accurately
reflecting the opinion of a skeptical German public that
"wants to take its time, just like the United States'
President did." Embassy Berlin observes that unanimous or
near unanimous support from the CSU is critical to Chancellor
Merkel's goal of obtaining a broad majority in the Bundestag
for a revised ISAF mandate after the London Conference. If
there are significant defectors in either the CSU or the FDP,
where there is also significant skepticism about a troop
increase, it will be difficult for even supportive SPD and
Green parliamentarians to vote in favor of the revised
mandate.
¶6. (U) ConGen Munich and Embassy Berlin coordinated this

cable.
TRIBBLE
Viewing cable 09PARIS1638, PRESIDENT SARKOZY: THE KEY DECISION-

MAKER WHO CAN
Discussing cables
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFOR
09PARIS1638 2009-12-04 11:11 2010-11-30 21:09 Embassy Paris
N
VZCZCXRO7625
DE RUEHFR #1638/01 3381149
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041149Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR RIVKIN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/04/2019

TAGS PREL, PGOV, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY: THE KEY DECISION-MAKER WHO CAN
BE A FORCE MULTIPLIER ON GLOBAL ISSUES
REF: A. PARIS 1588 B. PARIS 1589 C. PARIS 1521
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary. At the mid-point of his five-year term, French President
Sarkozy continues to be the dominant, virtually unchallenged, political force in
France. Slowed in domestic reform efforts by entrenched interests and the world-
wide financial crisis, Sarkozy is increasingly focused on successfully
leveraging France’s foreign policy influence on the global stage. Ambitious and
action-oriented, Sarkozy doesn’t hesitate to break traditional French policies
and reach out to new partners, from Saudi Arabia and Syria to India and Brazil.
His impatience for results and desire to seize the initiative -- with or without
the support of international partners and his own advisors -- challenges us to
channel his impulsive proposals into constructive directions with an eye to
long-term results. Sarkozy himself is firmly convinced of the need for a strong
transatlantic partnership and he has long desired to be THE major partner to the
U.S. in Europe, whether on climate change and non-proliferation or Iran and the
Middle East. Our effort to secure increased French contributions in Afghanistan
offers an interesting perspective on the centralization of key decision-making
powers in the French President and how to best work with Sarkozy as a valued,
and valuable, partner. With high-profile events like the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) prep-com next spring, and Sarkozy preparing to lead France’s
chairmanship of the G-8/G-20 in 2011, we believe we can best secure our
interests across a broad front through continued close consultations with our
French partners (including, and perhaps especially, at the highest levels), with
an eye to leveraging Sarkozy’s strong political standing, desire for action, and
willingness to make difficult decisions into force multipliers for our foreign
policy interests. End Summary.
-----------------------------------------
DOMESTIC DRAMA BUT NO DOMESTIC OPPOSITION
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C/NF) Sarkozy’s domestic standing is virtually unchallenged despite lagging
opinion polls which place his personal approval ratings at 39 percent. His
center-right UMP party controls both houses of parliament, and opposition
leaders in France have spent the past two years fighting among themselves rather
than mounting any serious political challenge to the incumbent president.
Sarkozy’s policy of “openness” in appointing opposition politicians to high-
profile positions has contributed to the leadership drain on the left. IMF
President Dominique Strauss-Kahn and FM Kouchner are just two examples of this
successful political ploy. Despite this political security -- or perhaps because
of it -- there is some internal grumbling about Sarkozy’s high-handed style
within his own party, revealed by the recent attempt to name his 23-year old son
Jean Sarkozy, who is still an undergraduate student, to a position at the head
of Paris’s most prestigious business development commission. A brilliant
political tactician, Sarkozy is raising the profile of the March 2010 regional
elections to rally his base and steal voters from the far right as part of a
ramp-up to his re-election bid in 2012. While this makes him more sensitive to
the near-term domestic political impact of certain foreign policy issues (like
Afghanistan), his domestic stature remains fundamentally secure, freeing him to
focus on his goal of leveraging French power in Europe and globally.
------------------------------------------
FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
------------------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) The net result of Sarkozy’s dominance of the domestic political scene
is that he is also one of the most secure leaders in Europe, with no awkward
coalition partner or imminent presidential elections to distract or hinder him.
Sarkozy occasionally recognizes that to be heard on the world stage -- whether
on strategic questions or the global financial crisis -- France’s voice is
amplified when speaking in concert with others. Sarkozy has worked hard to
successfully parlay an initially awkward personal relationship with German
Chancellor Merkel into a smoothly
PARIS 00001638 002 OF 004
coordinated tandem that drives much of European policy. Likewise, he will
frequently pair with Merkel and UK PM Brown to add needed clout to messages in
Brussels and Washington. Sarkozy’s ability to leverage his (and France’s) voice
on the world stage by building on strategic partnerships is one of his greatest
strengths; one of his greatest weaknesses, however, may be his impatience and
penchant to launch proposals with insufficient consultation with other major
players.
¶4. (C/NF) Sarkozy’s most visible successes to date are largely in the foreign
affairs domain, with his greatest achievements within Europe. He championed the
Lisbon treaty in his first months in office, helping to end the stalemate over
reform of EU institutions. This was succeeded by his leadership of the rotating
EU presidency in the second half of 2008, which included the creation of the
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the launch of the EU’s counter-piracy
operation, and his negotiation of a cease-fire after the Russian invasion of
Georgia. Characteristically, he didn’t hesitate to disregard European
sensitivities by attempting to retain the lead on specific portfolios where he
doubted the Czech ability to provide the necessary follow-on EU lead after
Prague took over the rotating presidency in January 2009. On security issues,
Sarkozy is equally bold. He personally authorized additional French troops for
Afghanistan at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit and this year he fought to bring
France back into NATO’s integrated military command, reversing more than 40
years of bipartisan French policy, in spite of strong skepticism within his own
party and intense opposition from others.
-------------------------------------------
NEW PARTNERS, NEW IDEAS
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) In a departure from previous French leaders, Sarkozy has also devoted
a great deal of effort to reaching out bilaterally to countries like Israel,
Saudi Arabia and Syria, recognizing that they are major players in the Middle
East where French ambitions have been frustrated. French officials are convinced
that Sarkozy’s outreach to Syria has made Syrian President al Asad a more
productive partner in resolving Middle East issues (although they are hard-
pressed to provide concrete examples of a change). Sarkozy fully recognizes the
growing role played by emerging powers like Brazil (he has meet with Brazilian
President Lula nine times in the past two years) and India (whose troops he
invited to star in the July 14, 2009 military parade). He lobbied successfully
for the G-20 meeting in Washington to address the global financial crisis, and
he supports an expanded UN Security Council, which earns him additional
popularity among rising powers. The Elysee has also looked to Brazil as a
partner in climate change negotiations and a buyer of French defense equipment
-- including potentially the first overseas sale of the Rafale fighter aircraft.
All of these outreach efforts stem from genuine convictions as well as an eye to
the image of France at the center of a global network of influential leaders.
¶6. (C/NF) Sarkozy is most prone to disappoint when, in his impatience for
action, he effectively “gets ahead” of other key players and his own advisors.
Sarkozy is firmly convinced that the most intractable diplomatic problems can
only be solved by getting leaders together in person to cut through bureaucratic
red tape and make bold decisions -- hence his predilection for proposing
summits. He has little patience for the incremental steps of diplomacy and once
he latches onto an idea he is loath to let it go. Impatient for progress in the
Middle East, he has sought ways to make France a player, first through creation
of the UfM and second by championing a summit, either in the guise of the UfM or
now through other partners (such as the U.S., the Quartet, etc) to achieve his
goals. In another example, his surprise announcement last June in support of a
new treaty on European security architecture took many allies, and his own
staff, by surprise. Although that debate has been channelled into the OSCE Corfu
process for the present, Sarkozy is already chafing at what he considers lack of
progress on this strategic issue and is continuously tasking his staff to come
up with new proposals to address the impasse of CFE, improve the partnership
with Russia, and provide other ideas to overcome blocked initiatives.
PARIS 00001638 003 OF 004
------------------------------------------
NO ONE TO SAY “NO”
------------------------------------------
¶7. (C/NF) Sarkozy has few restraints -- political, personal or ideological --
to act as a brake on his global ambitions. Domestically, he rewards party
leaders prepared to adopt his policies and marginalizes any opponents with a
diverse view. Several “favored” cabinet ministers with high profiles early in
his administration -- including Rama Yade and Rachida Dati -- were subsequently
bumped into secondary jobs after having disagreed with Sarkozy. On the other
hand, State Secretary for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, willingly muzzled
his long-term outspoken support for Turkish Accession to the EU in exchange for
his current post. While Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte
remains a key player, with an extensive background in diplomacy and a calming
personality, other advisors like Secretary General Claude Gueant are playing an
increasingly public role. Despite having Sarkozy’s ear to various degrees, few
appear to exercise any significant degree of influence over the activist
president.
¶8. (C/NF) Sarkozy’s own advisors likewise demonstrate little independence and
appear to have little effect on curbing the hyperactive president, even when he
is at his most mercurial. Elysee contacts have reported to us the great lengths
they will go to avoid disagreeing with him or provoking his displeasure -- even
recently reportedly re-routing the President’s plane to avoid his seeing the
Eiffel Tower lit up in Turkey’s colors on the visit of PM Erdogan (a decision
made by the Paris city hall). After two years in office, many seasoned key
Elysee staff are leaving for prestigious onward assignments as a reward for
their hard work, raising questions as to whether new faces will be any more
willQg to point out when the emperor is less than fully dressed.
-------------------------------------------
WORKING TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE
-------------------------------------------
¶9. (C/NF) When he was elected in 2007, Sarkozy was among the first French
leaders to openly embrace the United States, despite a U.S. administration very
unpopular in Europe at the time. This was due to Sarkozy’s conviction that
France can accomplish more in cooperation with, rather than opposition to, the
United States. When then-Senator and presidential candidate Obama came to France
in July 2008, Sarkozy cleared his schedule to meet with him and further broke
his own protocol rules and held a joint press conference (a privilege normally
reserved exclusively for visiting heads of state). Sarkozy is prepared to be the
U.S.’s key partner in Europe and is hoping for intense regular contact with
President Obama (which enhances Sarkozy’s domestic stature and therefore
directly increases his ability to make hard decisions). French journalists are
pointing out with increasing frequency that Sarkozy has not paid a White House
call on President Obama, and French officials are beginning to express concern
over this perceived lack of high-level visits and other regular consultations.
Journalists and officials alike are expressing the concern that France, and
Europe as a whole, may be of less strategic importance to the United States
today (a view that, all things being equal, does not enhance their incentives to
work closely with us).
¶10. (C/NF) On strategic questions, Paris is frequently willing to back U.S.

positions, even in the face of general European reluctance. Paris has welcomed
U.S. efforts to “re-set” relations with Russia and has consistently emphasized
developing a common approach with Washington toward Moscow. On Iran, Presidents
Sarkozy remains personally engaged and is willing to work intensely within
Europe (both institutionally in the EU and through efforts to persuade
individual countries to adopt national measures). On non-proliferation and
disarmament issues, the GOF has urged regular consultations in the run up to the
2010 NPT Review Conference and launch of discussions on a FMCT treaty. The most
important thing for French officials and Sarkozy himself is to feel like they
are part oQthe decision-making process and not simply called in to ratify
decisions after they have been made in Washington.
---------------------------------------------
AFGHANISTAN: AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
PARIS 00001638 004 OF 004
---------------------------------------------
¶11. (C/NF) Our effort to secure increased French contributions to Afghanistan
underlines how much decision-making power is vested in the French president and
how best we can work with him to achieve desired results. Last year, on our
request, President Sarkozy went against all of his political and military
advisors to deploy a French OMLT to assist the Dutch forces in Uruzgan, a
critical reinforcement of a key ally. It was also Sarkozy alone who made the
decision to deploy an additional 700 troops at last year’s Bucharest summit --
at the time of the announcement, even key staff were still unsure what the final
decision would be. This year, in intense exchanges with all the major French
players including FM Kouchner, NSA-equivalent Levitte and French CHOD Georgelin,
each one expressed support for U.S. policy but were doubtful about additional
French financial or military resources, frequently citing Sarkozy’s earlier
statement of “no additional troops.”
¶12. (C/NF) However, following a direct conversation with President Obama,

President Sarkozy dropped the formerly firm “no” position and moved forward more
quickly and proactively than we envisioned, opening the door to military
reinforcements “in time” and promising increased financial and training
assistance. Although the specifics are not yet provided, the personal outreach
to President Sarkozy made the difference between getting a cautious bureaucratic
response and a genuine commitment from a key ally when we needed it. The French
press led their reports noting Sarkozy was the first foreign leader on Obama’s
call sheet, thereby increasing the pressure on Sarkozy to respond favorably.
---------------------------------------------
COMMENT
---------------------------------------------
¶13. (C/NF) Comment: As one of Europe’s most politically secure leaders at the
head of a country with significant ability to contribute more to global problem-
solving across a broad front, from Afghanistan to climate change, economic
stabilization, Iran, and the Middle East Peace Process, Sarkozy represents a key
actor in the fulfillment of our shared policy goals. We will not always see eye-
to-eye, and differences on key issues (such as non-proliferation and
disarmament, which are seen as critical to French national interests) are
looming. However, though enhanced consultation (including, and perhaps
especially, at the highest levels), I believe we can address these differences,
minimize unhelpful proposals and foster increased collaboration to better
leverage French interests to fulfill ours. France is a like-minded country with
a major economy and the second-largest deployed military and diplomatic forces
in the world. By striking the right note in our bilateral relationship, we can
leverage Sarkozy’s strengths, including his willingness to take a stand on
unpopular issues, to be a major contributor to U.S. goals. We must also
recognize that Sarkozy has an extraordinary degree of decision-making power
which is vested in him alone as the French president. In my opinion it will
necessitQe periodic PreQntial intervention to reassure Sarkozy of our commitment
as an ally and partner and, in many cases, to close the deal. Sarkozy will
remain a power to be reckoned with in France and a significant driver of Europe
for the foreseeable future. It is clearly in our interest to work hard to
channel his energy and initiatives into a constructive form of cooperation that
enhances our ability to solve global issues together. End comment. RIVKIN
Viewing cable 09SAOPAULO663,

Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09SAOPAULO663.
2009-12-08 2010-11-29 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFO Consulate Sao
09SAOPAULO663
18:06 09:09 RN Paulo
VZCZCXYZ0024
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSO #0663/01 3421846

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081846Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAO PAULO 000663
SIPDIS
NOFORN
FOR SRMC FARAH PANDITH, KAREN CHANDLER AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL
RECIFE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/08

TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PREL SCUL KISL KPAO OEXC BR
REF: SAO PAULO 653; SAO PAULO 433; SAO PAULO 421; BRASILIA 709 (08) SAO PAULO
542
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas J. White, Consul General, State Department, Consul

General;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Sao Paulo offers unique possibilities for Muslim engagement,
many of which were evident throughout Special Representative to Muslim
Communities (SRMC) Farah Pandith's November 22-23 visit. The major Sunni and
politically moderate Muslims were delighted to receive SMRC Pandith and eagerly
shared with her several of their flagship institutions, including the elaborate
Santo Amaro Mosque, a Muslim School that serves a 60 percent non-Muslim student
body (Islam is an elective course), and a vigorous interfaith group supporting
the Abraham Path Initiative. Sao Paulo's Muslim moderates worry about the rise
of fundamentalism and Hezbollah influence among more recent waves of largely
Shia Lebanese immigrants, as they promote a broadly tolerant vision of "modern
Islam". Their own community remains quite traditional, with women's and youth
organizations limited. Even so, the traditional leadership's eagerness to
engage, acute awareness of the dangers of radicalism, and their solid
achievements in integrating Muslim and Brazilian identities make them an
excellent example of how a unique MMC (Muslim Minority Community) has, by and
large, carved out a positive space within a diverse Latin American country. Post
will seek Washington support to bring down a U.S. Sheik to help reinforce our
engagement efforts as a concrete follow-up to SMRC Pandith's highly successful
visit. End Summary.
Special Representative Farah Pandith's Visits Sao Paulo
¶2. (U) Special Representative to Muslim Communities (SMRC) Farah Pandith

visited Sao Paulo November 22-23. During the visit, she met with a number of
representatives of the city's Muslim Communities, visited the Santo Amaro Mosque
(the largest mosque in the city) and visited an attached Muslim school, and
attended a reception organized by the Muslim Federation in her honor where
Pandith spoke about the USG's engagement plans and took questions. SMRC Pandith
also gave a press interview to the major Sao Paulo daily "Folha de Sao Paulo" in
which she told her story as an American Muslim. The Sao Paulo Muslims who
received SMRC Pandith, the bulk of them moderate Sunnis, reacted
enthusiastically to her visit and expressed eagerness about future engagement
opportunities.
Working the Lebanon Connection
¶3. (U) SMRC Pandith began her visit by attending the Lebanon National Day
reception, a 1500-person gala organized by the Lebanese Consulate and held at
Sao Paulo's prestigious Lebanese Club on November 22. The majority of Arab and
Muslim immigrants to Brazil are of Lebanese background and this event offered
wide ranging opportunities to interact with various members of the community,
including Sunni, Druze and Shia Sheiks as well as Muslims working in business,
politics and law enforcement.
The Santo Amaro Muslim Community
¶4. (U) SMRC Pandith visited the Santo Amaro Mosque and associated school
November 23. The local Muslim community built the Mosque, usually attracts 300-
350 worshippers on any given Friday, with assistance from Saudi Arabia. The
community also has an Egyptian cleric who helps with the Mosque's ministry. The
mosque is the spiritual centerpiece of a complex of institutions, including a
Muslim high school and a soon-to-be opened nursing school. The high school
houses 600 students, sixty percent of whom are non-Muslim (many on scholarships)
and the study of Islam is an elective. Mohammed el Zoghbi, President of the
Muslim Federation that sponsors the school spoke with particular pride of the
Santo Amaro Muslim Community's efforts to do good works that benefit all
Brazilians. (Note: The Muslim Federation is a moderate Sunni group. It is one of
several such groups that vie to become an umbrella organization for all of
Brazil's Muslims. End Note) El Zoghbi noted that the school provides a strong,
affordable educational alternative for young Brazilians living in a "peripheral"
area of the city. (Note: The Santo Amaro Mosque and Muslim School are located in
a middling to poor neighborhood in a highly socially polarized city. End Note.)
The Federation is now also constructing a brand new nursing school on the same
grounds. It will have a 1200-student capacity and is programmed to open in
January.
A Direct Dialogue with Youth
¶5. (U) SMRC Pandith met with a cross-section of Muslim students, both male and
female, from the high school. The young people reported no real difficulties
with anti-Islamist sentiments in Brazil. Instead, they said that frequently
other Brazilians simply do not understand Islam and are puzzled by the students'
religious affiliation. A number of the young women lamented how stricter Islamic
customs - the prohibition on drinking, for example - made it difficult for them
to socialize with non-Muslim Brazilian teenagers. Overall, the group was
friendly and highly accessible. The kids evinced interest in learning English
and showed obvious knowledge of U.S. pop culture. None had ever been to the
United States.
The Abraham Path
¶6. (U) The Lebanese Consul General, Joseph Sayah, hosted a coffee for SMRC
Pandith where she met Muslim, Christian and Jewish leaders who are all behind
the Abraham Path Initiative in Brazil. Founded by Harvard Professor William Ury,
the Path program promotes a unique kind of Middle Eastern tourism. It encourages
Muslims, Christians and Jews to re-trace Abraham's journey in an effort at
encouraging contemporary reconciliation between the world's three great
Abrahamic faiths. While the Brazilians behind this initiative help facilitate
Middle Eastern travel, they also undertake activities in Sao Paulo. They told
SMRC Pandith about a recent "Friendship Run" they had sponsored that brought
together Muslims, Christians and Jews together into one very positive public
event. Joseph Sayah was incredibly interested in being useful to our mission. He
saw the value of the new position of the Special Representative and provided
SRMC with many ideas about engagement with Brazil's communities but also more
broadly how USG can make an impact using the President's Cairo Speech. He was
enthusiastic about the focus on youth and took SRMC aside to personally present
his dedication to helping the US government take advantage "of this moment in
time" and the "goodwill" out there for the
President and our efforts to engage with Muslims.
¶7. (C) Brazil's Abraham Path sponsors share the overall global goals of the
initiative, but they are also impelled by strongly local concerns. As Salim
Saheen, a Lebanese Brazilian banker and Maronite Christian, told SMRC Pandith,
"Hezbollah is gaining [adherents]," particularly with more recent Shia Lebanese
immigrants. Consequently, the moderates want to "push back against the radicals"
by promoting popular interfaith activities.
Muslim Federation Reception
¶8. (U) The Muslim Federation organized a 40-person reception for SMRC Pandith
at her hotel on November 23. The SMRC spoke to the group about Secretary
Clinton's vision for the US Department of State and the way she has asked us to
engage with Muslims. SRMC talked about the new paradigm of engagement based on
mutual interest and mutual respect. She spoke about the focus on the next
generation (which was met with great enthusiasm) and she mentioned the upcoming
entrepreneurial summit -- to urge guests to suggest names to post of dynamic and
successful young entrepreneurs to be considered. SRMC also highlighted post
plans to educate Brazilian Muslim applicants about our consular procedures and
our desire to bring down an American Sheik. Attendees responded very favorably
to Pandith's remarks and several speakers suggested that both Brazilian Muslim
business persons and students would welcome greater travel opportunities to the
U.S.
Comment: Beginning a Relationship
¶9. (C) Post's Muslim engagement remains a work-in-progress. Sao Paulo's Sunni-
Lebanese Muslim majority is generally a very conservative traditional community
in terms of family structure and both youth and women's groups remain nascent.
At the same time, Sao Paulo's Sunni Muslim leaders are well aware of the dangers
of radicalization, which they have seen grow among the more recent flows of
poorer, Shia Lebanese immigrants. In response, they are actively promoting a
tolerant "modern" Islam that highlights good works to benefit all Brazilians,
regardless of faith. In this, they are reproducing patterns of inter-faith
comity from Lebanese history prior to the 1970s and leveraging Brazil's own
home-grown tendency to broad cultural tolerance. This results in an overall
series of Islamic communities that - while not entirely insulated from
radicalization - have strong interfaith connections and live-and-let-live
traditions.
¶10. (C) Engaging Sao Paulo's Muslims with follow-up programs (like a visit from
a U.S. Sheik) would help bolster mainstream Islam in Brazil, highlight the
importance of freedom of religion in America, the diversity of Islam in America
and debunk the myths that exist about Islam in America. Moreover, such
engagement would reinforce the Sao Paulo Muslim community's efforts to share its
experience in interfaith relations and general good works with other Muslim
communities around the world. For this reason, Brazil merits its own MMC
strategy (a Muslim Minority Country strategy) that builds on the efforts of a
generation of Brazilian Muslims who have become adept at forming a Brazilian
Muslim identity and founding successful institutions that are at once thoroughly
Muslim and genuinely Brazilian. END COMMENT.
White
Viewing cable 09STATE122950, IRAN'S SHIG USING INTERMEDIARIES IN

EFFORT TO
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09STATE122950.
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #2950 3351728

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 011724Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2034

TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA GE IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S SHIG USING INTERMEDIARIES IN EFFORT TO
PROCURE TEST EQUIPMENT FROM GERMAN FIRMS (S)
REF: A. 2008 STATE 029412 AND PREVIOUS

¶B. 2008 BERLIN 000372
¶C. 2008 BERLIN 000637
¶D. STATE 019370 AND PREVIOUS
¶E. BERLIN 000263
¶F. BERLIN 000542
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON 1.4 (C).
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Berlin, please see

paragraph 4.
¶2. (S) Background and Objective: We want to advise German

officials of information indicating that as of June 2009, two
Iranian intermediary firms offered test equipment manufactured
by the German firms Rohde & Schwarz and Hottinger Baldwin
Messtechnik (HBM) to Iran's primary developer of liquid-fueled
ballistic missiles, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG).
While this equipment is not controlled by the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used in
ballistic missile testing applications. Moreover, SHIG made
specific requests for items manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz
and HBM, and goods produced by the two firms were the targets
of previous, long-running procurement efforts by SHIG and the
Iranian procurement network Farazeh Equipment Distributor
Company (FEDCO, which may have been acting on behalf of SHIG)
(Refs). In both cases, German officials investigated the
information we provided and sensitized the firms to their
concerns. (Note: In the HBM case, the company reported that
it did receive a request from Evertop Services (a FEDCO
affiliate), but that the request was rejected. End note.) We
want to share this new information with German officials and
encourage them to continue their efforts to prevent SHIG or
other Iranian entities of proliferation concern from procuring
sensitive items from Rohde & Schwarz and HBM.
¶3. Action Request: Request Embassy Berlin approach

appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL GERMANY)
-- We would like to alert you to information of proliferation

concern and request your assistance in investigating this
activity.
-- Between 2007 and 2009, we discussed with you on numerous
occasions information indicating that Iranian entities of
proliferation concern were seeking equipment manufactured by
the German firms Rohde & Schwarz and Hottinger Baldwin
Messtechnik (HBM).
-- Specifically, we advised you that the Shahid Hemmat

Industrial Group (SHIG, Iran's primary developer of liquid
fueled ballistic missiles) and entities affiliated with the
Farazeh Equipment Distributor Company (FEDCO) were engaged in
efforts to procure Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment.
-- We were pleased to subsequently hear that German officials

had sensitized representatives of both firms to proliferation
concerns related to SHIG and FEDCO, and that HBM had rejected
a request from Evertop Services, an entity affiliated with
FEDCO.
-- We now want to share with you related information

indicating that as of June 2009, SHIG was seeking test
equipment via Iranian intermediaries from both Rohde & Schwarz
and HBM.
-- Specifically, we understand that the Tehran-based Heydari

Ofogh Sanat Anvar Company offered SHIG an ESIB model
electromagnetic interference test receiver and spectrum
analyzer manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz.
-- We also understand that the Iranian company Hamim

Commercial offered SHIG pressure transducers and other
equipment produced by HBM.
-- While this equipment is not controlled by the Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used in
ballistic missile testing applications.
-- We do not know if the Iranian intermediaries are already in

possession of the Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment, but
wanted to make you aware of the fact that Iran's missile
program made specific requests for items manufactured by these
German firms.
-- We also want to reiterate that SHIG often conducts its

business through front companies and middlemen posing as end
users.
-- Given SHIG's interest in this equipment and the previous

Iranian efforts to acquire Rohde & Schwarz and HBM equipment,
we wanted to share this latest information with you, and urge
you to continue your work to prevent these firms from acting,
even unwittingly, as suppliers to SHIG and other Iranian
entities of proliferation concern.
-- We look forward to continuing our excellent cooperation on

nonproliferation matters and to hearing of any updates related
to this case.
¶5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone:

1430 end_of_the_skype_highlighting). Please slug any reporting on this
issue for
ISN/MTR, EUR/CE, and EUR/PRA.
¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 09STATE132349, C/NF) ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER

INTERPERSONAL
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09STATE132349.
VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #2349 3651459

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311455Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0374
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/31/2034

TAGS PINR, PGOV, AR
SUBJECT: (C/NF) ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INTERPERSONAL
DYNAMICS (C-AL9-02612)
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON:
1.4(C).
¶1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE INTERESTED IN ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS,

PARTICULARLY WITH REGARDS TO CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER AND NESTOR KIRCHNER.
DRAWING ON PREVIOUS REPORTING, AND BUILDING UPON OUR OWN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENTS,
WE ARE CURRENTLY PREPARING A WRITTEN PRODUCT EXAMINING THE INTERPERSONAL
DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE GOVERNING TANDEM. WE HAVE A MUCH MORE SOLID UNDERSTANDING
OF NESTOR KIRCHNER’S STYLE AND PERSONALITY THAN WE DO OF CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE
KIRCHNER AND WE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP A MORE WELL-ROUNDED VIEW OF CRISTINA
FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER’S PERSONALITY. AS POST,S TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW AND TO
THE EXTENT POST HAS ACCESS TO THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION, WE WOULD WELCOME ANY
INSIGHT INTO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. MANY THANKS, AND REGARDS FROM WASHINGTON.
¶A. (U) MENTAL STATE AND HEALTH:
1) (S/NF) HOW IS CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER MANAGING HER NERVES AND ANXIETY?
HOW DOES STRESS AFFECT HER BEHAVIOR TOWARD ADVISORS AND/OR HER DECISIONMAKING?
WHAT STEPS DOES CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER OR HER ADVISERS/HANDLERS, TAKE IN
HELPING HER DEAL WITH STRESS? IS SHE TAKING ANY MEDICATIONS? UNDER WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCES IS SHE BEST ABLE TO HANDLE STRESSES? HOW DO CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE
KIRCHNER,S EMOTIONS AFFECT HER DECISIONMAKING AND HOW DOES SHE CALM DOWN WHEN
DISTRESSED?
2) (S/NF) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF NESTOR KIRCHNER’S GASTROINTESTINAL ILLNESS? DOES

IT CONTINUE TO BOTHER HIM? IS HE TAKING ANY MEDICATIONS? LONG KNOWN FOR HIS
TEMPER, HAS NESTOR KIRCHNER DEMONSTRATED A GREATER TENDENCY TO SHIFT BETWEEN
EMOTIONAL EXTREMES? WHAT ARE MOST COMMON TRIGGERS TO NESTOR KIRCHNER’S ANGER?
¶B. (U) POLITICAL VIEWS:
1) (S/NF) WHEN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS, DOES CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER TAKE A
STRATEGIC, BIG PICTURE OUTLOOK, OR DOES SHE PREFER TO TAKE A TACTICAL VIEW? DOES
SHE VIEW CIRCUMSTANCES IN BLACK AND WHITE OR IN NUANCED TERMS? DOES SHE SHARE
NESTOR KIRCHNER’S ADVERSARIAL VIEW OF POLITICS OR DOES SHE ATTEMPT TO MODERATE
HIS HEAVY-HANDED POLITICAL STYLE?
¶C. (U) ON THE JOB:
1) (S/NF) HOW DO CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER AND NESTOR KIRCHNER DIVIDE UP

THEIR DAY? ON WHICH ISSUES DOES CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER TAKE THE LEAD AND
WHICH ISSUES DOES SHE LEAVE TO NESTOR KIRCHNER?
¶2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-02612 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO
THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. CLINTON
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2757, U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT

TO ISRAEL
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #2757/01 3560922

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220922Z DEC 09
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7022
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP EG IR
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Under Secretary for Arms Control and

International Security Ellen Tauscher visited Israel December
1-2. U/S Tauscher focused her visit on setting the stage for
a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference (RevCon) in May 2010. She consulted with GOI
interlocutors on potential strategy in addressing Egyptian
insistence on pushing for the establishment of a nuclear
weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, as a way to
divert attention from Iran to Israel. U/S Tauscher
reiterated that the United States will not take any action to
compromise Israel's security and would consult closely with
Israel -- which GOI officials greatly appreciated.
Nevertheless, U/S Tauscher said the United States is
interested in exploring possible small steps involving Israel
to address some of Egypt's NWFZ concerns regarding the lack
of implementation of the 1995 resolution. GOI officials for
the most part were critical of these tactics, questioning why
Israel should be portrayed as part of the problem. They
recommended a more direct approach to President Mubarak --
thereby circumventing the Egyptian MFA -- in which Egypt is
reminded that Iran is the regional nuclear threat. Other
topics discussed include President Obama's arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, the P5 1 process and Iran's nuclear
program, the FMCT and CTBT, Jordan's plans for a nuclear
reactor, and Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). End
summary.
¶2. (SBU) U/S Tauscher met with National Security Advisor Uzi
Arad on December 1. Arad was accompanied by NSC Senior
Advisor and Nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gil Reich. In a
separate meeting on December 1, U/S Tauscher met with MFA
Director General Yossi Gal, Deputy Director General for North
America Baruch Bina, and Deputy Director General for
Strategic Affairs Alon Bar. U.S. participants for the Arad
and Gal meetings included Political Counselor Marc Sievers, T
Senior Advisor James Timbie, NSC's Adam Scheinman, and
political military officer Jason Grubb. U/S Tauscher met for
dinner with Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and MFA
senior officials on December 1, including IAEC Director
General Saul Chorev, Deputy Director General David Danieli,
and Director for Policy and Arms Control Merav Zefary-Odiz,
as well as MFA DDG Bar and Director for Arms Control Rodica
Radian-Gordon. On December 2, U/S Tauscher met for breakfast
with MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad; U.S. attendees
included Charge D'Affaires Luis Moreno, Timbie, Scheinman,
and Grubb.
Arms Control/Nonproliferation Agenda

------------------------------------
¶3. (S) In various meetings with GOI interlocutors, U/S

Tauscher outlined an ambitious arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, beginning with the President's
Prague speech, and including other priorities such as a
follow-on to START, CTBT ratification, the upcoming NPT
Review Conference, and negotiating the FMCT. She noted that
negotiations with Moscow on START were slow to develop in
part due to delayed confirmations and Russian wariness. But
U/S Tauscher expected a START follow-on -- including a strong
verification regime -- soon.
¶4. (S) National Security Advisor Arad described President

Obama's arms control and nonproliferation agenda as "daunting
and challenging." He reaffirmed that the GOI will
participate in the April 2010 Nuclear Security summit in
Washington, noting that PM Netanyahu planned to attend the
summit as discussed between President Obama and PM Netanyahu
during their recent one-on-one meeting in Washington. GOI
Nuclear Summit Sherpa Gil Reich noted, however, that the
Holocaust memorial day in Israel might be a potential
scheduling conflict with the summit. Arad expressed
appreciation for the summit, noting that if the initiative
had been pursued ten years previously, perhaps proliferation
cases such as AQ Khan might have been prevented or at least
controlled. He wished the United States success negotiating
with the Russians on START.
¶5. (S) Due to the U.S. administration's prioritization of

arms control and nonproliferation, Arad also noted that the
GOI had recently reconvened a high level committee on these
issues comprised of GOI officials and experts from outside
the government. He noted that the committee had been formed
during President George Herbert Walker Bush's administration
to analyze treaties such as the CWC and CTBT, but stopped
meeting in 2007. U/S Tauscher expressed interest in meeting
with the group during her next visit to Israel; Arad took the
request on board.
Egypt and the NPT

-----------------
¶6. (S) On the NPT, U/S Tauscher reiterated the importance of

a successful Review Conference -- including hopefully a
consensus resolution. She raised U.S. concerns over
potential Egyptian actions at the RevCon, based on previous
decades of behavior and "10-15 year-old talking points." U/S
Tauscher said the United States is not "naive" with respect
to Egypt; nevertheless, the United States must make a
sincere, good faith effort to create the conditions for a
positive RevCon -- this might include small steps with Israel
to address some of Egypt's desire to demonstrate progress in
implementation of the 1995 resolution on a region free of
weapons of mass destruction.
¶7. (S) That said, U/S Tauscher reiterated that the United
States would consult and coordinate with Israel, and would
take no action that might compromise Israel's security. She
noted that the United States would like to elevate the NPT
RevCon issue to President Mubarak at an appropriate time, and
expressed interest in developing an alternate communication
track to Mubarak to circumvent the MFA, potentially through
Egyptian Intelligence Minister LTG Suleiman. U/S Tauscher
said her message to Cairo will be "very tough," and that
Egyptian obstructionist behavior linking Israel to Iran's
nuclear program is not helping Egypt.
¶8. (S) Arad said relations with Egypt were "relatively good,"
describing continued dialogue between PM Netanyahu and
President Mubarak, and strong channels of communication at
other levels. In many respects, he said Israel's relations
with Egypt are almost as good as during PM Rabin's time.
Arad said Egypt and Israel do not see "eye-to-eye" on some
issues such as Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, but
otherwise relations are strong.
¶9. (S) Arad described the Egyptian MFA, however, as a

"nagging problem" in the relationship, particularly regarding
the Middle East NWFZ issue, and noted Cairo's refusal to talk
to FM Lieberman. Other GOI officials expressed exasperation
over Egyptian motivations on the NWFZ; Reich raised Egyptian
behavior at the latest IAEA General Conference, as well as
Cairo's negative reaction to the IAEA Board of Governor's
recent statement on Iran. Arad said Israel has supported a
regional NWFZ as far back as 1992, provided Israel enjoyed
peaceful relations with its neighbors. He said the GOI has
spoken frankly with Cairo, noting that such behavior is not
helpful, and is misdirecting focus away from Iran.
¶10. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad said Egypt

understands that Iran is the real threat to the region,
noting that a nuclear weapon-armed Iran is a redline for
Cairo. He averred that Egypt does not accept that Iran will
become a superpower, but remains afraid of its own domestic
political situation post-Mubarak. Gilad expressed succession
concerns, noting that Mubarak is "approaching the past more
quickly than the future." He added that Mubarak does not
have confidence in Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit.
¶11. (S) MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs

Alon Bar outlined repeated attempts by the GOI to engage with
the Egyptian MFA, but to no avail. He described Egyptian
actions linking Israel to Iran's nuclear program in the IAEA
as "not encouraging," and questioned how to convince Egypt to
drop this "obsession" over the NWFZ. Israel Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC) Director General Saul Chorev and Arms
Control Director Merav Zefary-Odiz speculated that Egypt
feels challenged by Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons, and includes Israel in any public attack on Tehran
in order to give Cairo coverage from regional criticism. Bar
argued that the Egyptian MFA raises Israel's nuclear program
as a "wedge issue" in order to prevent better relations
between Israel and others in the region. IAEC Deputy
Director General David Danieli concurred, noting that Egypt
can use the nuclear issue to put Israel "in a corner" while
benefiting from positive relations between the two countries.
¶12. (S) Zefary-Odiz also reviewed her participation in an

International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament conference in September 2009 in Cairo. She
described the conference as "very confrontational," and that
it was clear Israel was targeted by Egyptian interlocutors.
Zefary-Odiz acknowledged that the GOI had anticipated such
behavior, and contemplated skipping the conference. She
noted that Egyptian officials also lambasted Iranian
participants, but were always careful to include Israel and
Iran in the same sentence.
¶13. (S) Arad said the GOI will take their cue from U.S.
"heavy-lifting": if there is a small step -- "not a
concession," he stressed -- that Israel could take to help
facilitate, then the GOI would consider it. He noted that
the GOI wanted to see a "reversal of trends" from Egypt
regarding Iran's nuclear program -- after all, it is in
Egypt's interest to do so. He said Israel continues to have
reservations regarding the NPT -- following nuclear pursuits
by Libya, Syria, and Iran, it is clear to the GOI that the
NPT is not sufficient and must be strengthened. The goal of
the NPT, he stressed, should not be to "prevent the next
Iran, but to stop Iran in order to prevent the next Iran"
from occurring.
¶14. (S) Chorev speculated that Egypt will aim to ruin the
RevCon. Bar said the Egyptians have not been held
accountable for past bad behavior at the NPT RevCon -- "they
have never paid the price." He noted that Cairo knows the
importance the United States attaches to a successful RevCon,
and therefore will try to leverage a "high price" in order
not to ruin it. He noted similar tactics with regard to
Egypt's counter-smuggling efforts along the border with Gaza.
¶15. (S) Timbie outlined several small steps that might
address Egyptian concerns and demonstrate progress in
implementation of the 1995 resolution and the Middle East
NWFZ: an IAEA forum on the experience of other regional
NWFZs; a special coordinator or rappateur on 1995 resolution
implementation; a statement from the United States, United
Kingdom and Russia reiterating the importance of the 1995
resolution; and exploring text with Israel and Egypt on
universality and compliance.
¶16. (S) Gilad questioned these steps from a

"tactical/strategic" context, and suggested this was not a
tactical matter. He argued against creating the impression
that Israel was the problem. Instead, Gilad recommended a
strategic, traditional approach -- concessions will only be
used by Egypt as leverage. He suggested the United States
remind Egypt of its special relationship based on U.S.
support, and reaffirm that Iran is the "bad guy." Gilad said
Egypt should also be reminded that most countries in the
region agree with the NWFZ concept in principle; the Egyptian
MFA's insistence on an immediate NWFZ neither fits the
current political reality nor makes sense as it diverts focus
from Iranian intransigence. He noted that Egypt listens to
the United States; it is therefore important to speak clearly
and directly when taking the issue to Mubarak.
¶17. (S) Chorev and Zefary-Odiz argued these steps had been
tried in the past -- and had failed. Danieli questioned why
Israel should take any steps at all. Based on experience at
the IAEA and the UN First Committee on Disarmament and
International Security, he said "nothing satisfies Egypt" as
Cairo "pockets every concession" and demands more -- "it's a
slippery slope." Danieli said Israel will not "play by
Egypt's rules." Bar concurred, noting that Egypt will "raise
the bar," and begin negotiations with these small steps as
the baseline -- he was skeptical such steps would prove
helpful.
¶18. (S) Arad characterized these steps as "talking endlessly"

-- that is "not progress," he said. He was uncomfortable
discussing Israel NPT compliance, especially as Israel is not
a party to the treaty. He also raised concerns regarding the
definition of the Middle East NWFZ -- did it also include
Pakistan, India and Iran, for example? Arad said such
questions should be posed to Cairo -- if Egypt is willing to
include Pakistan in its definition of a Middle East NWFZ,
then we can take that as a signal that Cairo is ready for a
serious conversation on the matter.
¶19. (S) Zefary-Odiz argued that the NPT as a "global

solution" is not appropriate in the current political
realities of the Middle East. Due to the region's prior
track record of NPT non-compliance, she said a gradual,
step-by-step process employing confidence building measures
be used to improve relations between neighbors. NPT partner
obligations should be enhanced, not reduced, she said.
Zefary-Odiz noted that only after peaceful relations are
established can arms control measures be pursued, starting
with conventional weapons and later focusing on
chemical/biological/nuclear arms. She said that Egypt and
other Arab states de-link comprehensive peace from arms
control measures -- Israel views these elements as
inseparable and sequential.
¶20. (S) On a related note, Chorev asked if Israel should

attend the RevCon as an observer. U/S Tauscher and Timbie
replied that the decision was ultimately the GOI's to make,
but offered to raise the issue in Washington . Chorev noted
that Israel would be careful not to "make any noise," and
could play a positive, consultative role. On the other hand,
Danieli acknowledged the argument that as a non-party,
perhaps it was not appropriate for Israel to attend.
Iran
----
¶21. (S) U/S Tauscher said the United States was very
concerned about the recently announced Iranian plans to build
ten additional uranium enrichment facilities. She reiterated
the two track strategy of persuasion and pressure, and noted
that the time for persuasion is "waning." U/S Tauscher said
the United States has "created the coalition" it had hoped
for, and was happy to see the recent IAEA BOG's resolution
transferred to the UNSC.
¶22. (S) U/S Tauscher noted that the United States was working
hard through the P5 1 process to encourage Russian and
Chinese cooperation to counter continued Iranian
intransigence and inflammatory rhetoric -- Russia and China
are "lynch pins," she said. She noted that Russia had worked
closely with the United States on the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) proposal, which Moscow considered an "elegant
solution," -- but Iran had not agreed. Keeping Russia
engaged, U/S Tauscher explained, also means Chinese
cooperation.
¶23. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad described

recent Russian cooperation on Iran as encouraging, but
expressed reservations that Russia would join in any
sanctions against Iran. He explained that Moscow has raised
the provision of sophisticated Israeli unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) technology in exchange for canceling the S-300
sale to Tehran. Gilad said that Russian interlocutors had
acknowledged development gaps in their UAV platform, and is
prepared to pay USD one billion for Israeli UAV technology.
He reiterated that Israel will not provide its latest UAV
technology, arguing that such technology would likely end up
in the hands of the Chinese.
¶24. (S) Arad said the GOI appreciated the United States'
efforts regarding Iran, noting how hard the United States has
worked to build an alliance. He pointed to the recent IAEA
Board of Governor's resolution as a successful example of
U.S. efforts. Regarding the Qom facility, Arad said the GOI
was not surprised by Tehran's "chutzpah." He described a
high degree of alertness in Israel, and added that the GOI
studies daily Iranian posturing and boastful announcements in
an attempt to discern Iranian intentions. Arad commented
that the trends are bad, as Iran continues to accumulate low
enriched uranium.
¶25. (S) MFA DG Gal said there was not much difference in the
national intelligence estimations (U.S., UK, France, and
Russia) regarding Iran. He said the GOI takes "very
seriously" Iranian plans for ten new enrichment facilities --
"time is of the essence," and "now is the time to implement
crippling sanctions," he added. Gal likened the case for
enhanced sanctions to prescribed antibiotics from a doctor --
one must take the full course of antibiotics for the
prescribed period of time, or they will not work.
¶26. (S) Turning to his crystal ball, Gilad was not sure
Tehran had decided it wants a nuclear weapon -- but is
"determined" to obtain the option to build one. He
acknowledged that the engagement strategy is a good idea --
"as long as you understand that it will not work." Gilad
said it should be clear by February 2010 that engagement as a
option has failed -- the imposition of "crippling sanctions"
for the February/March/April timeframe is crucial. He said
Russian cooperation will be the key, and the current Russian
cooperative mind-set cannot necessarily be counted on in
several weeks time. By June of next year, Gilad said it
should be clear whether sanctions have worked. However,
given Tehran's clandestine nuclear program (e.g., Qom), he
said it will not be clear when Iran has reached the "point of
no return" -- he doubted Iran will choose to let it overtly
known that it has produced a nuclear weapon.
FMCT and CTBT

-------------
¶27. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised the FMCT's future in the

Conference on Disarmament. U/S Tauscher acknowledged
frustration with Pakistan, and noted that while Washington
places a high priority on the FMCT, other efforts like a
START follow-on and the CTBT will come first. Timbie added
that it will take some time to negotiate an FMCT.
¶28. (S) Chorev asked about the current prospects for CTBT
ratification in the Senate. U/S Tauscher noted that the
START follow-on was a higher priority, and said the Senate
will likely focus on the Law of the Sea treaty before turning
its attention to the CTBT. She pointed to mid-term
Congressional elections in 2010, and explained that focusing
on the CTBT in 2011 might be more prudent given the
controversy associated with the treaty. U/S Tauscher
explained the necessity of making the case for the CTBT, and
hoped to build political momentum in favor of the treaty
through the release of the Nuclear Posture Review, a new
national intelligence estimate, and the handover on the
stockpile stewardship program.
¶29. (S) Chorev asked that the United States consult with the
GOI on the CTBT, where he said Israel could be "more flexible
than the FMCT." U/S Tauscher asked if the GOI might be
willing to make affirmative statements in support of the
CTBT; Chorev made no promises, but suspected such a statement
might be possible -- especially if it would help with Senate
ratification.
¶30. (S) Chorev described the FMCT as "very difficult" for

Israel. Scheinman confirmed that negotiations would be based
on the 2006 draft FMCT text, with an added verification
regime that is being worked on -- he described the
verification regime's definitions as "critical" in that
regard. Danieli questioned the FMCT's added value, arguing
that it would have little impact. He asked who was the
FMCT's real target -- India, Pakistan or even Israel?
Jordanian Nuclear Reactor

-------------------------
¶31. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised Jordanian plans to build a

nuclear reactor. He said the GOI has decided not to oppose
the reactor, and have offered the Jordanians Israeli
expertise on where best to build it. Chorev said the IAEC
formed a steering committee with its Jordanian counterpart
comprised of three working groups focusing on safety,
geological surveys, and water issues. Chorev said the
steering committee first met in Amman in June 2009, and is
waiting to convene again. Danieli stressed that the GOI does
not want to hamper the Jordanian nuclear plans, but added
that Israel has concerns about border issues and security
associated with the reactor. Timbie said the United States
is pushing Jordan to sign a 123 Agreement along the same
lines as the recent agreement signed with UAE, only stronger.
Zefary-Odiz noted that Egypt is putting tremendous pressure
on Jordan not to accept a 123 Agreement.
QME
---
¶32. (S) U/S Tauscher reiterated the United States' strong

commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and
expressed appreciation for the GOI's willingness to work with
us through the newly created QME working groups. Both MOD
Pol-Mil Chief Gilad and MFA DDG Bar commended the newly
created QME working groups, and asked they be scheduled to
convene as soon as possible.
¶33. (U) T has cleared this cable.
CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2777, CODEL SKELTON'S MEETING WITH

PRIME MINISTER
Discussing cables
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP MASS SY TU FR KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: CODEL SKELTON'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
NETANYAHU
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. CODEL Skelton met with Prime Minister

Netanyahu November 16 at the Prime Minister's office in
Jerusalem. Their discussion covered Netanyahu's meeting with
President Obama the previous week, Netanyahu's interest in
resuming negotiations with the Palestinians, the Iranian
nuclear program and options for tougher sanctions, possible
negotiations with Syria, U.S.-Israeli cooperation on missile
defense, and Israel's objections to the Goldstone Report.
Netanyahu said his meeting with the President was the best
meeting that they have had. He stressed that he had told the
President that he is ready to negotiate with Abu Mazen now,
and contrasted Israel's position with the PA's setting of
preconditions for negotiations. Netanyahu listed steps the
GOI has taken to support Abu Mazen, noting that the PA is
"doing a good job" on security. A nuclear Iran, however,
would "wash away" all progress as well as undermining
Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu
said that Iran is vulnerable to sanctions and urged the U.S.
to increase the pressure on Iran, with likeminded countries
if Russia and China will not support new sanctions in the
Security Council. Netanyahu commented that there is broader
Arab and European support for tough sanctions than in the
past, although the Arabs may not say so publicly. Netanyahu
praised President Obama's commitment to missile defense, and
commented that U.S.-Israeli cooperation on missile defense
sends a strong signal to Israel's enemies. He thanked the
CODEL for the Congress' support. Netanyahu said Israel faces
three main threats: Iran's nuclear program, the build-up of
rockets and missiles in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and the
Goldstone Report, which condemned Israel for defending its
civilian population from years of rocket attacks. Netanyahu
said Israel will need to ensure that a future Palestinian
state cannot launch rockets at Israel's international airport
or critical facilities. End Summary.
Let's Get on with Negotiations

------------------------------
¶2. (U) CODEL Skelton, consisting of House Armed Services

Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D, MO) and Mrs. Skelton,
Representative Steve Israel (D-NY), Representative Tim Murphy
(R, PA), Congressional Staff members Phil McNaughton, Michael
Casey, and John Wason, Military aides Colonel Jeff Koch and
PolCouns met with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu November
¶16. Netanyahu was joined by Deputy National Security Adviser
Rear Admiral (reserve) Avriel Bar Josef, media adviser Mark
Regev, policy adviser Ari Harrow, and a Congressional liaison
officer from the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
¶3. (C) Netanyahu began the meeting by noting his

appreciation for his meeting with President Obama at the
White House the previous week. Netanyahu described his
conversation with the President as "the best we've had so
far." He said that regarding negotiations with the
Palestinians, he told the President, "let's get on with it."
Netanyahu stated that his government had removed hundreds of
obstacles and roadblocks in the West Bank, helping the West
Bank economy achieve a seven percent growth rate, adding "and
we can kick it up to ten percent growth." Netanyahu said his
Bar Ilan address last June had been difficult for him, but it
had united Israelis in support of accepting a demilitarized
Palestinian state. The current GOI had also restrainted
construction in settlements more than its past several
predecessors.
¶4. (C) Netanyahu then contrasted his efforts with the PA,
which he said is maintaining a "political and economic
boycott" of Israel, setting preconditions for negotiations,
supporting the Goldstone Report in the UN, and is now talking
about a unilateral declaration of independence. Israel wants
to engage, but the Palestinians do not. Netanyahu quoted a
Palestinian official as saying that the PA had "exhausted the
negotiating process," then noted that the Palestinians have
not even started to talk to his government. The real
difference, he pointed out, is that Abu Mazen is facing
elections, while Israel has already conducted its elections.
Netanyahu also commented that the Palestinians had initially
expected the U.S. to "deliver Israel" on all of their
demands, but are now realizing that this will not happen.
President Obama understands, he stated, that Israel is ready
to move forward. The alternatives to negotiations are bad
for everyone. Netanyahu said that if Abu Mazen would engage,
they would confront all the issues. The process would not be
easy, but it has to get started.
¶5. (C) Netanyahu said the West Bank had remained quiet
during Operation Cast Lead because the Palestinians do not
TEL AVIV 00002777 002 OF 003

want to live under Hamas' rule. He asserted that according
to recent polls, Abu Mazen and Fatah would easily win an
election, even in Gaza. Netanyahu stressed that he was not
pushing for the Palestinians to hold elections, but was
instead focused on promoting the expansion of the West Bank
economy by removing both physical and bureaucratic obstacles.
He acknowledged that the PA is "doing a good job" on
security, though he added that PA leaders are not aware of
everything Israel is doing to support the PA's security. If
we could add a political process to the cooperation that
currently exists, we could get security, economic
development, and peace. Netanyahu warned, however, that if
Iran gets a nuclear bomb, the peace process would be "washed
away." Even Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan
would come under enormous pressure.
Iran Sanctions
--------------
¶6. (C) Chairman Skelton noted that his Committee is

following Iran closely. Netanyahu said he had advised the
President to stick to the deadline on the TRR offer, adding
that it is also important to ask Iran to stop its enrichment
activities. Netanyahu commented that there is a new mood in
the major European capitals in support of sanctions. The
U.S. does not need to depend on the Security Council, but can
work with likeminded countries. Sanctions should focus on
Iran's importation of gasoline, while also focusing on
opening up the information networks. The U.S. should lead
the world toward tougher sanctions, or more of the Arab
states will start appeasing Iran, as Qatar is doing.
Netanyahu summed up his advice as: "stick to the deadline,
be firm on the terms, and apply sanctions" if Iran does not
comply. He thought Russia may be more inclined than in the
past, but it would be best not to count on the Security
Council. Having set a deadline, the P5 1 should stick to it.
The Western powers at least will go along. We should close
the gap between understanding the problem and acting on it,
he said. Netanyahu said Israel's problems with Iran are not
limited to its nuclear program. Even without a nuclear
umbrella, Iran is sending hundreds of tons of weapons to
Syria, Hamas and Hizballah. The ship seized November 3 by
the Israeli Navy had on board two thirds of the amount of
rockets fired at Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War.
¶7. (C) Representative Israel asked Netanyahu about the

timetable for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu
responded that Iran has the capability now to make one bomb
or they could wait and make several bombs in a year or two.
It is important to bear in mind that the Iranian regime was
exposed as a fraud during their presidential elections. The
Iranian people detest the regime and have shown great courage
in the streets. The exposure of the Qom facility also helped
convince doubters in the international community that Iran
has a weapons program. Iran has a weak economy and a
fractured political system, so it is vulnerable to sanctions.
The time to act diplomatically is now, Netanyahu said,
adding that we still have a year or two to stop the Iranian
program. Netanyahu said he thought President Obama
understands Iran perfectly. The Arab leaders hope Iran will
be stopped, there is broad Arab and European support for
"vigorous steps." Chairman Skelton asked whether the Arabs
would state their support publicly. Netanyahu replied they
might not, but it would not make a large difference since the
Arab "street" will not rise up in support of the Iranian
regime.
Ready to Talk to Syria

----------------------
¶8. (C) Regarding Syria, Netanyahu urged the U.S. to press

Damascus to stop supplying arms to Hizballah. Noting that he
had stopped in Paris to meet President Sarkozy on his way
back to Israel from Washington, Netanyahu confirmed media
reports that Sarkozy had offered to mediate between Israel
and Syria. Netanyahu said he would prefer direct
negotiations with the Syrians, but added that he would accept
France as a mediator. President Asad, however, still wants
Turkey as the mediator. Noting that Turkish PM Erdogan had
recently stated that he would prefer to meet with Sudanese
President Omar Bashir than with Netanyahu, Netanyahu asked
how the Turks could be fair mediators.
Working Together on Missile Defense

-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Netanyahu said that in addition to peace with the

Palestinians and Iran, he and the President had discussed
joint U.S.-Israeli efforts on missile defense. Netanyahu
TEL AVIV 00002777 003 OF 003
commented that he had personally visited the Juniper Cobra

joint military exercise. The program has reached a phase at
which it is possible to monitor incoming missiles with a good
lead-time, but it is still very expensive to intercept "crude
rockets" such as those fired from Gaza. The information
shield is moving ahead nicely, but the physical shield is
lagging behind. Netanyahu observed that it is very important
for the U.S. and its allies to be able to defend themselves
against missile attack. Chairman Skelton noted that U.S.
personnel who briefed the CODEL were very optimistic about
the program. Netanyahu said only the U.S. and Israel are
currently working on missile defense. This cooperation sends
a powerful message to Israel's enemies he noted, and thanked
the CODEL and the Congress for their support.
Goldstone Report a Key Threat

-----------------------------
¶10. (C) Netanyahu commented that Israel currently faces

three principal threats: Iran's nuclear program, missile
proliferation and the Goldstone Report. Goldstone gave
terrorists immunity to attack Israel if they fire from
populated areas. During Cast Lead the IDF send thousands and
flyers, text messages and phone calls to civilians, warning
them to get out of the way, yet Israel was accused of war
crimes. Hamas and other terrorists fired 12.000 rockets into
Israel from Gaza, Netanyahu said, noting that Israel is the
only country in the world faced with threats to annihilate
it. Netanyahu asked the CODEL to imagine a situation in
which Israeli Air Force pilots must consult with lawyers
before they can travel abroad. Former PM Olmert, former
FonMin Livni and DefMin Barak could be hauled before the
International Criminal Court. Netanyahu said he could not
accept that IDF soldiers could be charged with war crimes for
protecting their country from constant attack. The deaths of
several hundred civilians in Gaza was "tragic," Netanyahu
said, but there was no deliberate targeting of civilians by
Israel. Deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime,
but what should Israel do when terrorists deliberately target
Israeli civilians and then hide within their civilian
population?
¶11. (U) CODEL Skelton did not clear this cable.

CUNNINGHAM
Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA540, STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES

IRAN, SYRIA, AND
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09UNVIEVIENNA540.
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H PLS PASS STAFFDEL AS APPROPRIATE
DOE FOR S2 AND NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, RYU, TALWAR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019

TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC IR SY KN IN
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND
MULTILATERAL VIENNA'S FRUSTRATING NAM DYNAMIC
REF: EMBASSY VIENNA 1450
Classified By: Mark Scheland, Counselor for Nuclear Policy; reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: HFAC staffers Richard Kessler and David Fite
received from IAEA Secretariat November 10 information on the
Iran case that tracked with the tone of the subsequent
Director General's reporting on Iran to the Board of
Governors. The STAFFDEL heard that contact with Iran over
"possible military dimensions" of the nuclear program was at
an "absolute stalemate." According to Safeguards regional
division director Herman Nackaerts, IAEA inspectors' first
visit to the enrichment facility under construction near Qom
had run predictably but without extraordinary responsiveness
on Iran's part; the Secretariat was still trying to
understand the motivation to build the plant as now designed.
Nackaerts described the frustrating limitations of Iran's
cooperation with the Agency, and the STAFFDEL deduced that
Iranian officials held back because they were uncertain about
what lines of inquiry the IAEA was best equipped to exploit.
Questioning then-DG ElBaradei's remark to media that the
Agency had found "nothing to worry about" in Qom, STAFFDEL
asked if the Secretariat would report on how it judged the
plant did or did not fit into Iran's publicly explained
nuclear program. Nackaerts expressed appreciation for the
precision and usefulness of U.S.-supplied information in the
Qom case and generally.
¶2. (C) Summary contd.: On Syria, Nackaerts said the

Secretariat had told Damascus its first explanation for the
presence of anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron
Source Reactor was not credible. Further, the Secretariat
still could not yet present the case for how what was being
built at Dair Alzour fit in as "part of a Syrian program or
part of someone else's program." On DPRK, IAEA/EXPO's Tariq
Rauf said the IAEA, when it could, would ultimately have to
"go back to the early 1990s" to reconstruct accountancy of
plutonium and could not accept a "political" compromise
setting material "off to the side." To get to a finding of
"no diversion" would take several years and extensive
resources and forensics.
¶3. (SBU) Contd.: Treating Technical Cooperation, the

STAFFDEL received the same briefing on the Safeguards
Department's project review process and internal database
that was provided to a GAO review team in 2008. IAEA
External Relations Director Rauf asserted, "We are not a
denial organization." STAFFDEL related how segments of the
GAO report had reduced Congressional confidence in the
efficiency of TC. U.S. national labs were afforded too
little time to review projects for our national
decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk.
Secretariat also described hindrances it faces in having UN
and national development officials recognize and integrate
nuclear applications.
¶4. (SBU) Contd.: The STAFFDEL also engaged P5-plus-1 heads

of mission over lunch on the means to draw or impel Iran to
open up on its nuclear program and on dynamics in Vienna
between blocs of Member States. End Summary.
Fordow/Qom and Iran PMD: Frustration,

but Good Support from the U.S.
-------------------------------------
¶5. (U) House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Staff

Director Richard Kessler and Professional Staff Member David
Fite (STAFFDEL) spent ninety minutes with IAEA staff on
November 10. Principal issues were safeguards verification
in Iran and Syria, the screening of IAEA Technical
Cooperation (TC) projects for proliferation risk, and TC
Department efforts to improve project design and integration
into national and UN development activities. STAFFDEL
affirmed to Secretariat officials that the HFAC under
Chairman Berman: was strongly supportive of the IAEA; put
emphasis on counter-proliferation issues in countries of
concern (indeed, was weighing legislation to impose further
U.S. sanctions on Iran); had advocated an increase in NADR
funding for extrabudgetary contributions to the IAEA,
including for the Safeguards Analytical laboratory; and,
supported "getting the U.S. up to date" on payment of its
assessments to the IAEA's regular budget. Following the
meeting at the IAEA, STAFFDEL consulted Ambassador and
Mission staff and had a working lunch with P5-plus-1 heads of
mission focused on Iran and the dynamics of multilateral
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 002 OF 005
diplomacy in Vienna. STAFFDEL's UNVIE program followed a day

of consultations with Austrian officials (reftel).
¶6. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B (AOR

Mideast, South Asia, parts of Europe, the Americas, and all
nuclear weapons states) Director Herman Nackaerts briefed
STAFFDEL on the inspection he had led a few weeks before to
the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom
in Iran. Nackaerts said Iranian officials had been open to
allowing inspectors access. The Secretariat was still trying
to understand, he said, why Iran would build this facility,
scaled as it was for 3000 centrifuges in contrast to the much
large Natanz facility. It was positive, Nackaerts pointed
out, that Fordow was now under safeguards. He noted that the
IAEA had "at least two" safeguards inspectors at work in Iran
"every day of the year" and would henceforth plan to visit
Fordow regularly. Asked how "complete" the plant was or when
it would be operational, Nackaerts said, "The information we
got from Member States proved to be very precise" on this
point. Asked about permission to take samples at Fordow,
Nackaerts replied that Iranian officials had permitted the
inspectors to perform the same safeguards procedures they
typically undertook at Natanz.
¶7. (S) STAFFDEL asked if the Agency enjoyed full access to

the Arak IR-40 plant. Nackaerts related there had been no
access for a 12-month period but normal access in August and
October 2009. However, the Iranians "claim they cannot go
back on the decision of their parliament, and hence grant the
IAEA a "visit" but do not call it Design Information
Verification. On possible military dimensions (PMD),
Nackaerts said the Secretariat's approach was to follow lines
of inquiry that could involve use of nuclear material, for
example, the documents treating uranium metal or green salt.
The Iranians, he said in a tone conveying his skepticism,
asserted the uranium metal document was "mistakenly" included
in a packet of information they received from the AQ Khan
network but was nothing Iran had asked for or used. The
"green salt" documentation Iran dismissed as a forgery.
Indeed, Nackaerts went on, Iran replied basically on the form
of documents, not on their substance. The Secretariat had
not been "impressed" by the 117-page rejoinder Iran had
provided to the initial presentation of PMD documentation.
It had told Iran the information hung together too much for
it all to have bee fabricated and asked that, if some of the
documentation were "doctored," Iranian officials should show
the Secretariat "where the truth ends." Since August 2008,
(when Ahmadinejad personally shut off Nackaerts's previously
approved visit to workshops indicated in the documentation),
Nackaerts concluded, there remained a high-level decision not
to cooperate. STAFFDEL member Fite took from this that the
Iranians were holding back "because they don't know where any
opening will lead." Nackaerts agreed, saying they knew that
every question they answered would bring another question.
¶8. (S) Fite alluded to then-DG ElBaradei's remarks of a few

days before in U.S. media to the effect that the inspectors
had found "nothing to worry about" in Fordow. Acknowledging
the practical meaning of this remark -- that there were no
centrifuges or nuclear material present -- Fite nevertheless
regretted the headline and asked if the DG's formal report to
Board members (Note: subsequently released as GOV/2009/74,
deresticted by the Board November 27, and available to the
public at www.iaea.org) would deal with how Qom fits or does
not fit into Iran's explained nuclear program. Nackaerts
replied, "We will identify the issues we're working." He
went on that understanding the timeline of Fordow's
development was hindered by Iran's practice never to involve
people who really know the facts or the government's
intentions in discussion with the Agency. The officials with
whom inspectors meet clearly are "steered" by unseen
observers, who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during
meetings. Iran recorded the meetings, he added, but did not
permit the IAEA to do so. Further, the Secretariat never
received original design documents, but ones produced for the
Secretariat that were technically true to the facilities they
found upon inspection. Against this Iranian practice,
Nackaerts added, the Secretariat received very precise
information from Member States that helped inspectors decide
what to ask about. The organization of this information was
good and, while the Agency was satisfied, it had inquired if
more information could be shared with the Agency, "not
necessarily for release to Iran," he said.
Syria Stalemate
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 003 OF 005
---------------
¶9. (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to

look like Iran in that the government provided "good
cooperation" on some areas but presented a "stalemate" on
others. The Secretariat challenged Syria's proposed
explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al
Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be
the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock. Syrian
officials had been told their first explanation for
anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what
nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously
declared. Overall, the IAEA still "did not understand"
(meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how
Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "or
part of someone else's program."
Return to DPRK?
Safeguards in India?
--------------------
¶10. (SBU) Asked how quickly IAEA inspectors could resume

work in North Korea if re-admitted by the government, Tariq
Rauf of IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination
(EXPO) observed that the last resumption had taken a week
(for technical set-up, re-activation of cameras, etc.).
Safeguards Operations A division had a program set out for
what steps to undertake "under circumstances the DPRK may let
us back in." Rauf continued that the Agency would to go back
to the early 1990s' plutonium revelation to reconstruct
material accountancy. When most recently in the DPRK, the
IAEA had been monitoring facility shutdown processes but not
implementing NPT safeguards on DPRK material. The Agency
could "not accept" political compromises that would set some
nuclear material "off to the side". Then-DG ElBaradei had
called for implementation of the Additional Protocol in DPRK,
but even if Pyongyang cooperated fully it would take several
years and much in the way of resources and forensics to be
able to get to a finding of "no diversion."
¶11. (SBU) Asked about progress toward safeguards

implementation in India, Rauf confirmed the GOI had submitted
a "formal list" of facilities that was not a document the
Agency would characterize as a formal declaration under its
safeguards agreement. India was under no mandatory timeline
to make its declaration as it was not an NPT signatory.
(Comment: Rauf's characterization was flat wrong. Mission
had learned from the Safeguards Department three weeks before
this meeting that India had officially "notified" two new
facilities (Raps 5 and 6) under its 2008 safeguards
agreement, that surveillance systems had been installed, and
the facilities were under safeguards. End Comment.)
Scrutinizing and Promoting

IAEA Technical Cooperation
--------------------------
¶12. (U) Renaud Chatelus of the Safeguards Division of

Information Management (SGIM) acquainted STAFFDEL with IAEA
screening of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for their
potential to afford access to sensitive technologies.
Grounded in a 1979 Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/267,
the practice is to focus on projects related to enrichment,
heavy water production, reprocessing of spent fuel, and
plutonium or mixed oxide fuel. Chatelus said SGIM reviewed
projects submitted, project approved, individual procurement
actions, and overall implementation of projects. Reviews are
conducted completely in-house, he said in reply to a
question. Using the same PowerPoint slides that were
presented to a GAO review team in 2008, Chatelus illustrated
with screen shots from the Agency's staff access-only
database the system of flagging projects for: compliance with
INFCIRC 267, compliance with INFCIRC 540 (Additional
Protocol), transfer of "sensitive items" on the Nuclear
Suppliers Group or dual-use lists, general interest, or
possible relation to a safeguarded facility. In subsequent
discussion of the impact of screening and Member States'
sense of entitlement to TC, EXPO's Tariq Rauf affirmed, "We
are not a denial organization."
¶13. (U) STAFFDEL member Fite observed that segments of the

GAO report treating transfers to state sponsors of terrorism
as well as on program management had reduced Congressional
confidence about TC. Fite said he had approached
Appropriations staff about using a supplemental funding bill
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 004 OF 005
to resolve slow U.S. payment of assessments and do more for

the Agency, but was rebuffed because the GAO report on TC had
"poisoned the waters." Apart from political objections to
certain TC recipients benefitting from U.S. funding, he
added, a persisting "Achilles heel" was that U.S. national
labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our
national decision-making on their merit and proliferation
risk. TC Department representative Johannes Seybold replied
that the Agency aimed to provide Member States six weeks time
for review, but was also at the mercy of requesting states
providing the relevant project information. Just the
compendium of project titles and short descriptions became a
very thick document in each biennial cycle, Seybold went on,
and the Agency was "struggling" with some Member States'
national policies to be able to go beyond this level of
transparency.
¶14. (U) STAFFDEL's meeting with Secretariat officials

concluded in an exchange with Seybold, TC's section head for
strategy and partnerships, about the IAEA's awkward position
in development efforts coordinated by the UN or by developing
countries' national institutions. Seybold laid out the
following. The IAEA's cooperation with TC recipient states
occurs through National Liaison Officers, generally in the
atomic energy commission or government ministry responsible
for nuclear power or radiological sources. Generally,
neither the IAEA nor the corresponding national entity is a
participant in UN development team or host government
deliberations about development in the recipient country.
Two-thirds of TC projects address development issues for
which the IAEA is not the responsible lead agency in the UN
system, e.g., water quality and availability, food security,
climate. In many cases, national authorities and the UN team
responsible for these areas in a given country lack awareness
of IAEA capabilities, and/or they maintain a distance from
things "nuclear." Seybold related Agency efforts to
integrate with these authorities through the UNDAF (UN
Development Assistance Framework) process and other
partnering efforts. STAFFDEL expressed encouragement for
bringing nuclear applications to greater impact in the
development field.
P5-plus-1 Ambassadors Regret Iranian Paralysis

on TRR; Depict Grim Dynamic with G-77/NAM
--------------------------------------------- -
¶15. (C) STAFFDEL was the guests of honor at lunch hosted by

the Ambassador with his counterparts from China, Germany,
Russia, and the UK and the French Charge d'Affaires. Kessler
and Fite laid out HFAC's interest and Chairman Berman's
supportive posture toward the Agency, as they had for
Secretariat staff. Opening discussion of Iran, UK Ambassador
Simon Smith said the Iranian answer on the ElBaradei-brokered
deal on refueling the Tehran research reactor (TRR) "had to
be 'yes' or 'no,' not waffling" as it had been. German
Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking posited that the U.S.
Administration had confounded Iranian internal processes and
the latest EU3 proposal had "cornered" Iran. Agreeing that
Iran faced an imperative between "yes" and "no," Luedeking
observed, "they can't answer." HFAC Staff Director Kessler
noted the committee had tried to follow up a Larijani
approach conveyed one year before for a meeting with Chairman
Berman, but found that the Iranians backed off.
¶16. (C) Russian Ambassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy asserted

that confidentiality was a major concern for Iran. He noted
its TRR counter-proposals, either to keep its LEU on its
territory under IAEA safeguards until released in exchange
for fuel rods, or to swap outgoing LEU piecemeal for incoming
fuel assemblies. Moving beyond the TRR issue, UK Ambassador
said he was severely disappointed that Member States had been
unable to "apply consequences for the breaking of rules" of
the organization. We needed to convince some other Member
States, he continued, that tolerating rule breaking as on Qom
and Code 3.1 (of the Subsidiary Arrangement of Iran's
Safeguards Agreement) risked bringing the organization into
discredit. STAFFDEL member Fite asked if Iran's Arab
neighbors were among the problem interlocutors in Vienna; he
asserted that officials of Arabian Peninsula countries told
the Congress they see Iran as an "existential threat." While
they may seek the cover of international signals or sanctions
imposed by others, they say they do want action against Iran.
¶17. (C) Segueing from Iran to DPRK, Chinese Ambassador Hu

Xiaodi said the main difference between the cases was that
progress with DPRK had been achieved when the North Koreans
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 005 OF 005
wanted something specific, whereas he (Hu) had never heard

Iranian officials say that they wanted a settlement, or that
they wanted anything specific. Although we did not at
present know "how" to reach a deal with Iran, Hu concluded,
we were not in the worst situation, in which Iran explicitly
does want something -- nuclear weapons. Asked if he
genuinely thought the DPRK would give up its weapons program
for aid, Hu said "hope" (as opposed to "think.") Ambassador
Davies seriously questioned that Pyongyang would give up a
weapons capability in exchange for a significant material
improvement in our relations, as the government would likely
calculate it had been its possession of weapons that won the
concessions.
¶18. (SBU) Ambassador turned the discussion to the dynamic

between groups of Member States, as illustrated in the
ongoing discussion of a Technical Cooperation project to
advance IAEA use of "results based management." The German
Ambassador observed that NAM positions on many issues were
characterized by "myths" and they were clearly being dictated
by Iran and Egypt. Ambassador Davies asked if the dynamic
was further charged by states beginning to suspect that the
U.S. seriously intends to strengthen the Agency in all its
functions -- with the uncertain shifts in practice and
distribution of resources and clout that could mean.
STAFFDEL lead Kessler said the Congressional perception was
one of a "lightning change" from the last Administration to
the present one in U.S. approaches to the IAEA, to
development assistance globally, and to multilateralism.
German Ambassador agreed and said this was a complication for
NAM states that know they are the immobile ones now. Yet, TC
was a "sacred cow" and the NAM's impulse was to reject
"illegitimate intrusion" into its distribution.
¶19. (SBU) French Charge Philippe Merlin discouraged STAFFDEL

from expecting diplomatic gains, say in the NPT review,
through greater generosity on IAEA peaceful use programs.
"TC is the price we pay," he said, for developing countries'
acquiescence toward the safeguards regime, the thing we
really want. Fite asked if a reasoned discussion with
development officials in capitals about making TC deliver
more impact could translate into different instructions to
the obstreperous missions in Vienna. German Ambassador took
the view that any effort to change TC would be seen in
capitals as "per se bad." It was more advisable to advocate
to NAM states what their own interests in the safeguards
regime were. UK Ambassador agreed there were no points to be
scored by asking NAM capitals about TC effectiveness; he
added that the UK Government "doesn't give two hoots" about
TC, given the small funding level (from the UK Energy
Ministry) in comparison to Britain's official development
assistance. TC was, also in the UK view, the price we pay
for the IAEA we want.
¶20. (U) STAFFDEL did not review this report.
DAVIES
Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA553, AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #09UNVIEVIENNA553.
09UNVIEVIENNA553 2009-12-09 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL UNVIE
VZCZCXRO1474
DE RUEHUNV #0553/01 3431343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091343Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1500
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000553
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2023

TAGS: PREL IR AU AORC KNNP
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS
DRIVING TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT
REF: UNVIE 544
Classified By: DCM Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)
¶1. (C) Summary. On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador

to Tehran Michael Postl (please protect) debriefed MsnOff on
his final calls on Iranian officials as he left post. He
noted that former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani both had
extracted themselves from the normal political scene and were
focused on tangential issues where their weight could still
be felt. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani suggested that it would be
helpful if the West spoke out against the election fraud and
human rights violations that followed.
¶2. (C) Postl said that President Ahmadinejad's chief of

cabinet, Mashaie, made clear to him prior to the Geneva talks
that Iran was planning to approach the talks with a spirit of
compromise and that Postl would be "surprised" by Iran's
attitude. Postl explained the lack of follow-through in the
wake of the talks as a probable decision by Supreme Leader
Khamenei that the West was not trustworthy or that Iran could
get more from the P5 plus 1 than the six offered in Geneva.
Majles Speaker Larijani's outspoken disapproval of the Tehran
Research Reactor deal advocated by Ahmadinejad could have
been an exercise of Larijani's first opportunity to undermine
Ahmadinejad after he was pressured to disavow himself of
knowledge that Iranian prisoners were being raped in jail,
which lost him credibility with the Iranian public. Finally,
Postl argued that the U.S. should focus its outreach to Iran
on formats that Iranians perceive are less biased, such as
BBC Persian's version of Hardtalk or Press TV. End Summary.
¶3. (C) On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador to Tehran

Michael Postl gave MsnOff a readout of the state of domestic
political wranglings in Tehran prior to his departure from
post in October. Now posted in Vienna, Postl noted that he
still advises the Austrian government on Iran issues and that
he was recently asked to see if his contacts in Iran would
meet with him even though he had departed post. Many said
that they would, so he may be asked by the Austrian Foreign
Ministry to return to Iran periodically to make use of the
excellent contacts he was afforded given his Farsi skills and
native Iranian wife.
¶4. (C) Postl recounted his final calls on contacts in Iran

before leaving post, noting that many who had refused
meetings with him after the elections were now willing to
meet him. When he met with former President Khatami, Khatami
noted that because of the post-election environment, it did
not make sense to talk about politics. Postl suggested that
they discuss the possibility of Khatami pursuing a dialogue
of civilizations or religions that might give him an opening
to the West. Khatami noted that he did want to focus more on
that kind of dialogue and engagement and that he might come
to Austria next year in pursuit of such discussions.
-------------------------------------------
Final Calls Reveal Disillusionment with the
Possibilities for Change
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Postl noted that in his final calls, he sought out
a meeting with the new health minister, Marzieh Vahid
Dastjerdi since he was interested in meeting the Islamic
Republic's first female minister. Postl described her as
"sort of a puppet" and very insecure despite her good
credentials for the job. She is a member of the Larijani
family, giving this influential clan placement in the
executive branch, in addition to the leverage they hold
through the key posts of Ali Larijani as Majles Speaker and
Javad Larijani as head of the Judiciary. In their meeting,
Dastjerdi and Postl discussed possible cooperation between
Iran and Austria in hospitals, training, and person-to-person
contacts in the medical field.
¶6. (C) Postl also called on the powerful new chief of

President Ahmadinejad's cabinet, Mashaie. Postl said that
many believed that Mashaie's rejection for a vice
presidential post showed that there were disagreements
between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, but the fact that
he was given the slot as head of the cabinet means that
Khamenei must not be fundamentally opposed to him. Postl was
candid with Mashaie, noting that although the Iranian
elections were an internal matter, the treatment of civilians
in the aftermath of the elections was wrong by any
calculation. Postl assessed that using Farsi instead of
English made a difference in the reaction he received to this
candor, and Mashaie said that he would be pleased to meet
with Postl again if he were in Iran.
UNVIE VIEN 00000553 002 OF 004
¶7. (C) In what Postl believes was the first meeting former
President Rafsanjani had granted to a Westerner -- and
perhaps the first meeting with a foreigner -- since the
elections, the two discussed economic cooperation, which
Rafsanjani said was his primary focus. They avoided the
topics of the election and the nuclear issue, especially
given the presence of 10 to 15 "watchers" from different
veins of the Iranian government. Rafsanjani was very
interested in non-nuclear energy cooperation and asked very
detailed questions about wind energy, which Postl said
Austria would be able to help with. Rafsanjani also
discussed his sense of how the Iranian government could
evolve, arguing that change must come from within Iran and
that interference from foreigners was not welcome in most
circumstances. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani believed that the
best help possible from foreigners would be to say that the
elections were not fair and to note the human rights
violations in the aftermath, though he was not specific about
what he thought the influence of such statements would be.
Postl noted that recent months clearly had been hard on
Rafsanjani; he looked pale and had lost a lot of weight, but
his eyes were still "active," according to Postl.
¶8. (C) Postl described the positions of presidential

candidates Karrubi and Musavi as children of the revolution
and argued that neither of them wants systemic change.
Rather, they hoped to give Iran a "human face." Since the
"population of Iran," according to Postl, opposes the Islamic
system, the people are not very strongly behind either of
these candidates. In closing out his comments on his final
meetings in Tehran, Postl noted that after he departed post,
his contacts were questioned thoroughly and aggressively,
which Postl described as a reality of life in Iran and
contact with a Westerner.
--------------------------------
Infighting and Confusion Driving
the Nuclear Issue
--------------------------------
¶9. (C) In his discussions at the end of September with

Mashaie, Postl encouraged him to ensure that Iran did not
"miss the opportunity" presented by the talks in Geneva.
Mashaie responded that Iran would be "sure to take" advantage
of this opportunity and told Postl that Postl would be
surprised at Iran's approach, that Iran would come with
seriousness and an attitude of compromise. Postl's
assessment is that Iran decided that this was the right time
to show flexibility in order to get an agreement, especially
since Ahmadinejad wants to claim responsibility for an
agreement with the West. Postl believes that Nuclear
Negotiator Jalili came to Geneva with this spirit of
compromise and was following direction, presumably from
Ahmadinejad. Iran's failure to follow through on these
agreements may have been due to a decision by Khamenei either
that the West was not trustworthy despite Iran's supposed
good intentions or that Iran could get more from the West or
P5 plus 1 than was offered in Geneva. Despite the fact that
people close to the President say he wants "more," the system
gets in the way as do Ahmadinejad's bad advisers. Postl's
interlocutors say that if Ahmadinejad alone were to decide
about engagement with the West, "things would move more
quickly." Postl noted that Khamenei is still respected in
Iran and, in his personal opinion, there is no essential
divergence between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad. On
issues where the Supreme Leader's opinions were clear, Postl
argued that other influential Iranians would not "touch on
issues," even to undercut Ahmadinejad. The only way to
challenge these leaders was to focus on "unjust" or
un-Islamic behavior.
¶10. (C) Postl said that Majles Speaker Larijani probably

was not in favor of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal,
but when MsnOff questioned whether he really opposed the deal
or was responding to the fact that Ahmadinejad came out in
favor of the deal, Postl recounted another possibility tied
to the post-election environment. Postl noted that he had
asked someone close to Larijani whether he was aware of the
rapes of election-related prisoners. The interlocutors said
that not only was Larijani aware, but all officials were
aware of what was going on inside the prison. Nevertheless,
when Larijani spoke publicly about the issue, he stated
clearly that the rapes are not occurring and thus lost some
credibility with the Iranian public. To have not given a
more ambiguous response, such as that he would look into the
situation, Larijani must have been under strong pressure from
above, in Postl's estimation. Given the clarity that what
Ahmadinejad had done after the election was wrong and
Larijani's distaste for Ahmadinejad, the TRR proposal may
have been Larijani's first opportunity to strike back at
UNVIE VIEN 00000553 003 OF 004
Ahmadinejad.
¶11. (C) Postl also noted that Iran probably has whiplash
from the international community's response to the Fordow
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which will complicate our
efforts to press Iran into compliance with its obligations.
Although IAEA Director General ElBaradei said after the first
inspection of the FFEP that it was nothing more than "a hole
in a mountain," the IAEA Board of Governors passed a
resolution against Iran, citing the FFEP as one of its main
points (ref A). Postl argued that this probably leads Iran to
believe that the international community is not serious about
the issue, and that, rather, this is "a game."
¶12. (C) One of Postl's contacts close to the Supreme

Leader pointed him to a Kayhan article from December 1,
written by editor Shariatmadari, which espouses the views of
Khamenei on the nuclear issue. The article argues that Iran
has gotten nothing from cooperation and should withdraw from
the NPT immediately. Since Khamenei has said that he is not
opposed to an opening with the U.S., it becomes about
Washington presenting the right arguments at the right time.
However, Postl said that bringing up the issue of the
detained Americans at Geneva probably fell flat with the
Iranians. Iranian officials told Postl that they were
surprised that American officials raised this issue at those
talks. This was the wrong time to bring up this issue, Postl
argued, since these issues are not connected in the minds of
the Iranians. (We will explain to the Austrians why this
issue is so important and resonates so much to the U.S.)
Postl suggested that the UK model was better: when their
sailors were captured, UK officials said that this issue had
nothing to do with the political problems between the two
countries. The dissociation of the issues worked in favor of
getting the sailors released. Pressed on when might be such
a right time to address the U.S. detainees, Postl suggested
that one such way might have been to capitalize on the
October 1 Geneva talks by following up quickly with a call
from Under Secretary Burns to Jalili "in the spirit of
Geneva." During that phone call, Burns could engage Jalili
on the detainee issue as an aside. Postl also noted that
some of his Iranian government contacts had noted with
pleasure the appointment of Ambassador Limbert to deal with
the Iranian file given his understanding of Iran.
----------------------------
Postl's Tehran Retrospective
----------------------------
¶13. (C) Looking back on his tenure as Ambassador to Iran,

Postl noted that the biggest "game changer" had been this
past summer's presidential elections. The events were
causing backlash from much of the population. Parents and
grandparents were saying, according to Postl, that they do
not want their children to be forced to experience the same
Iran that they, themselves, have been living under for the
last 30 years. For the first time, one can see "kill
Khamenei" and "death to Khamenei" scrawled on walls in
Tehran. These direct challenges to Khamenei's authority are
new and significant. Additionally, Postl expects that the
population was disillusioned by the overwhelming fraud in the
elections and many will not vote in the future.
¶14. (C) On engagement, Postl suggested that some ways

forward for the U.S. and Iran might be to look into using a
route from Chah Bahar, on Iran's southern coast, to get U.S.
supplies into Afghanistan and using the assumption of office
by new IAEA Director General Amano to press for "a new start"
on the Additional Protocol and additional transparency
measures discussions.
¶15. (C) Postl reiterated his message that Iranian citizens

see the Voice of America (VOA) as biased and asked that we
not underestimate their frustration. If they see a pervasive
media outlet as biased, this presents the U.S. in a negative
light and works against U.S. messaging. He said that Iranians
currently are faced with two biased choices: VOA and Iranian
Broadcasting (IRIB). In response to a MsnOff question about
how BBC Persian is perceived, he noted that it is seen as
more neutral, but has the stigma of being associated with the
UK. Postl floated the idea of U.S. support to Euro News to
start broadcasting in Farsi. He also suggested that doing
Hardtalk in Persian might be one of the best outlets for U.S.
arguments since the format of pitting opposing viewpoints
against one another would counteract the perception of bias,
but suggested that if our arguments to the Iranian people are
not convincing, this quickly would become clear. Finally,
Postl noted that the U.S. should not shy away from interviews
with Iranian media outlets, suggesting Press TV because it is
in English and it is watched in Tehran. A program built
UNVIE VIEN 00000553 004 OF 004
around broadcasting the differing opinions of the U.S., India

(because its opinion is well-respected given its influence as
a leader in the Nonaligned Movement), and Iran might be a
useful way to get our messages across while counteracting
perceptions of bias.
DAVIES
Viewing cable 10ABUDHABI33, UAE FM DISCUSSES TALIBAN FINANCIAL

FLOWS AND REINTEGRATION
Discussing cables
10ABUDHABI33 2010-01-25 09:09 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu
Dhabi
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 250933Z JAN 10
TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/SRAP, SCA AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/25
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, IR, YM, AE
SUBJECT: UAE FM DISCUSSES TALIBAN FINANCIAL FLOWS AND REINTEGRATION
WITH AMB. HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY A/S COHEN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a January 11 meeting in Abu Dhabi, visiting Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Amb. Richard Holbrooke
discussed Afghan reintegration with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin
Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ). AbZ noted the importance of establishing an effective and
transparent reintegration trust fund that includes Saudi support. Amb. Holbrooke
urged the UAE to do more to disrupt Taliban financial flows. AbZ discussed his
recent visit to Iran, noting Iran is acting more confident even as the country
moves backwards. He added that Pakistani President Zardari had asked the UAE to
take in his family in the event of his death. End Summary.
AFGHANISTAN MEETINGS
--------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke began by thanking AbZ for hosting the well-timed SRAP
meeting in Abu Dhabi on January 12. AbZ said he was looking forward to the Gulf
participation, including that of the Jordanian Foreign Minister, particularly
following the recent attack in Khost. AbZ said Judeh had told him Jordan plans
to send more troops to Afghanistan; Amb. Holbrooke said Judeh had made the same
point during his recent visit to Washington.
¶3. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke said the decisions on the Afghan reintegration program
and the upcoming elections would be the key deliverables for the Abu Dhabi
meeting and would pave the way to success in London. AbZ asked what the role of
reintegration fund contributors would be, noting that the UAE did not want to be
associated with a fund that Afghans would find ineffective, non-transparent or
slow. AbZ said funding must go to programs with clear benchmarks that have
strong financial and policy oversight. He added that it is “very crucial” Saudi
Arabia donate to the fund, for symbolic reasons. Turning to the elections, AbZ
suggested a compromise solution, whereby the Afghan government would ask ISAF
when it would be ready to support the elections, rather than having any party
dictate to President Karzai.
DISRUPTING TALIBAN FINANCE
--------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke stressed to AbZ the importance of UAE efforts to
combat Taliban financial flows through the UAE. Amb. Holbrooke noted the
productive meeting he and Treasury A/S Cohen had with UAE National Security
Advisor Sheikh Hazaa bin Zayed earlier on January 12 and the UAE’s efforts to
crack down on bulk cash smuggling. A/S Cohen added that the USG is most
concerned about Dubai’s central role in regional financial flows.
¶5. (S/NF) AbZ asked several questions about USG concerns and the UAE’s
response, including if Taliban financial flows are regional and/or transiting
Dubai, what is the suspected value of these flows, why the USG does not
intercepting the funds in Afghanistan, if incoming or outgoing cash declarations
would help, and if the USG believed the UAE was not effectively enforcing
existing regulations. Amb. Holbrooke and A/S Cohen explained that the USG is
concerned that Dubai is being used for the facilitation of the flow of Taliban
funds, goods and personnel to and from Afghanistan. The USG is working with
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that the UAE should also take steps to enforce and
investigate inbound cash declarations and amend laws to require outbound
declarations. A/S Cohen noted that the planned DHS/ICE cash courier training in
February would focus on identifing and intercepting likely couriers.
PAKISTAN - ZARDARI CONCERNS
---------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) AbZ said he had met with Pakistani President Asif Zardari in Dubai in
late December and the latter was “in better shape” than AbZ expected. Stressing
the sensitivity of the information, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke that Zardari had
asked AbZ to convey a request to UAE President Sheikh Khalifa (AbZ’s half-
brother) that Zardari’s family be allowed to live in the UAE in the event of his
death. (Note: The Bhutto family has lived in Dubai for years and in effect this
would be a continuation of a commitment late UAE President Sheikh Zayed made to
Ali Zulfikar Bhutto. End Note.)
IRAN - AND YEMEN
----------------
¶7. (S/NF) Turning to his late December trip to Iran, AbZ said it was his first
meeting with Ahmedinejad that did not include a cleric (murshid). He interpreted
this to mean that Ahmedinejad is now trusted and does not need constant
supervision. Noting that Ahmedinejad had cited Western media criticism of
Dubai’s financial situation as a plot against Dubai, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke he
believes Ahmedinejad is “crazy but well-educated.” AbZ said he felt Tehran is
going backwards although he was surprised by the number of women “not covered up
properly.” The Iranians believe that the United States is now preoccupied in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which will prevent any US attack on Iran. AbZ said the
U.S. message on Iran in the region is “not loud and clear.” Many are acting like
Iran is already a nuclear power, and Iran sees the United States is not doing
anything about it. If Middle East peace was achieved, AbZ said the Iranians
would be unable to suggest they are the defenders of the Palestinian cause.
¶8. (SBU) AbZ said that FM Mottaki was polite and courteous, “for a change”
during the December visit. He added that Mottaki called him on January 3 to
convey that the U.S. had promised democracy and development in Afghanistan, but
the result was more smuggling, narcotics and terrorist acts. Mottaki went on to
discuss Yemen, telling AbZ that Saudi and US forces are attacking civilians in
Yemen.
¶9. (SBU) Amb. Holbrooke’s office has cleared this cable. OLSON
Viewing cable 10ANKARA87, WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW

FOREIGN POLICY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO2532
DE RUEHAK #0087/01 0200525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200525Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0250
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0352
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020

TAGS: PREL TU
SUBJECT: WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
REF: A. 09 ANKARA 1717
¶B. 09 ISTANBUL 466
¶C. 09 ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
INTRODUCTION/COMMENT
--------------------
¶1. (C) There is much talk in chanceries and in the

international media these days about Turkey's new, highly
activist foreign policy, which unquestionably represents a
transition not only from prior governments, but also from the
AKP regime before the Gaza/Davos events, and before the
ascent of Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister in April. Some
commentaries are upbeat, but others, including many experts
and editorial writers in the US, have expressed concern. The
ruling AKP foreign policy is driven by both a desire to be
more independently activist, and by a more Islamic
orientation. Frankly, rational national interest,
particularly trade opportunities and stability
considerations, also drives Turkey's new slant. Major
challenges with us in the coming months include the direction
of Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate of the Protocols with
Armenia, and the Turkish posture vis--vis Iran.
¶2. (C) Does all this mean that the country is becoming more
focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its
foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is
"abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western
orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely
not. At the end of the day we will have to live with a Turkey
whose population is propelling much of what we see. This
calls for a more issue-by-issue approach, and recognition
that Turkey will often go its own way. In any case, sooner
or later we will no longer have to deal with the current cast
of political leaders, with their special yen for destructive
drama and - rhetoric. But we see no one better on the
horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world
class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation,
and Middle Eastern culture and religion. END INTRODUCTION.
COMPONENTS OF POLICY
--------------------
"The Traditional Western"
¶3. (C) Turkish policy today is a mix of "traditional Western"

orientation, attitudes and interests, and two new elements,
linked with new operational philosophies: "zero conflicts"
and "neo-Ottomanism." The traditional still represents the
core of Turkish foreign policy, and is centered on
cooperation and integration with the West. Its core is NATO,
the customs union with the EU, and most significantly, the EU
accession effort. This all began with the Ottoman effort to
emulate the European great powers, and was propelled
powerfully forward by Ataturk. Nevertheless the country was
on the sidelines in World War II. It was only the threat of
the USSR, and the dominance (and outstretched hand) of the
US, that led to the "Turkey we know": tough combat partner
in Korea, major NATO ally, US anchor in the Middle East.
Much of this continues.
¶4. (C) Europe is by far Turkey's most important economic
partner in terms of investment and trade. The EU accounts for
42 percent of Turkey,s total trade, while the US accounts
for a bit less than 5 percent. While the US is much less
important in terms of trade statistics, it remains important
in various sectors (e.g.energy, aviation, military), and in
various ways. NATO is essential to and much respected by
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Turkey. (Note: The fact that "only" about one-third of the

Turkish population in one poll see NATO as important to
Turkey's security is actually a plus; on any poll Turks
usually are overwhelmingly negative about any foreign
engagement or relationship. But we should not be too
sanguine here since support for NATO has been halved over the
past decade. End Note) The military is armed by the US, and
Turkey recognizes that many fires in its back yard -- from
Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan -- can only be solved by
close cooperation with and acceptance of US and NATO
leadership. Finally, even AKP leaders know that much of
their allure or "wasta" in the Middle East and elsewhere
stems from their privileged position in key Western clubs.
This traditional orientation may be shaken, or reduced, but
as it has both significant buy-in by elites of all
philosophies, and many concrete advantages, Turkey will not
abandon it.
"Zero Problems with Turkey's Neighbors"
¶5. (C) But this Turkey is trying to "post-modernize" itself.

One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems
with Turkey's immediate "near abroad." This effort stands in
contrast with the "traditional" Turkish policy of letting
these frozen conflicts fester, and is much more compatible
with US and European interests. The list of Turkish
initiatives under the AKP is impressive: accepting the Annan
Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999
rapprochement with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating
in the signing of recognition protocols, warming and
productive relations with both Baghdad and Erbil (the latter
complemented by significant reforms in Turkey's relations
with its own Kurdish population). The signature
accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria. While
this road to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria's
accommodation of prior Turkish governments' demands
(relinquishing claims on Turkey's Hatay province, expelling
Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer. As
noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of
regional problems, from Lebanon to Iran.
¶6. (C) While this new approach is to be applauded, there is a

fly in its ointment. Little of true practical and final
accomplishment has been achieved. Cyprus is still split
(albeit the fault, at least in terms of the Annan plan, lies
more with the Greek Cypriots and the EU); tensions with
Greece in the Aegean continue; the Protocols with Armenia
have not been ratified due to Turkish concerns about
Nagorno-Karabakh; Iraq's instability and the KRG's
unwillingness to do more against the PKK raise questions
about the sustainability of Turkey's constructive Iraq
policy; the rapprochement with Syria has not really produced
any Syrian "flip" away from Iran. Granted, Turkey is dealing
with some of the world's most difficult actors, and facing
stiff opposition at home to making more concessions, but the
proof of this pudding is yet to be seen.
"Neo Ottomanism"
¶7. (C) The idea of Turkey using its cultural and religious
links to the Middle East to the advantage of both Turkish
interests and regional stability is not new with the AKP, but
has been given much more priority by it, in part because of
the Islamic orientation of much of the party, including
leaders Erdogan, Gul, and Davutoglu. Moreover, the AKP's
constant harping on its unique understanding of the region,
and outreach to populations over the heads of conservative,
pro-US governments, have led to accusations of
"neo-Ottomanism." Rather than deny, Davutoglu has embraced
this accusation. Himself the grandson of an Ottoman soldier
ANKARA 00000087 003 OF 006
who fought in Gaza, Davutoglu summed up the Davutoglu/AKP

philosophy in an extraordinary speech in Sarajevo in late
2009 (REF A). His thesis: the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle
East were all better off when under Ottoman control or
influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the region has
been ravaged by division and war ever since. (He was too
clever to explicitly blame all that on the imperialist
western powers, but came close). However, now Turkey is back,
ready to lead -- or even unite. (Davutoglu: "We will
re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan").
¶8. (C) While this speech was given in the Balkans, most of
its impact is in the Middle East. Davutoglu's theory is that
most of the regimes there are both undemocratic and
illegitimate. Turkey, building on the alleged admiration
among Middle Eastern populations for its economic success and
power, and willing to stand up for the interests of the
people, reaches over the regimes to the "Arab street."
Turkey's excoriating the Israelis over Gaza, culminating in
the insulting treatment of President Peres by Erdogan at
Davos in 2009, illustrates this trend. To capitalize on its
rapport with the people, and supposed diplomatic expertise
and Ottoman experience, Turkey has thrown itself into a
half-dozen conflicts as a mediator. This has worked well, as
noted above, with Iraq, and was quite successful in the
Syrian-Israeli talks before Gaza. Turkey has also achieved
some limited success on Lebanon and in bringing Saudi Arabia
and Syria together. As noted below, however, this policy
brings with it great frictions, not just with us and the
Europeans but with many supposed beneficiaries of a return to
Ottoman suzerainty. Furthermore, it has not achieved any
single success of note.
WHY THE CHANGE?

---------------
¶9. (C) Various factors explain the shifts we see in Turkish

foreign policy beyond the personal views of the AKP
leadership:
-- Islamization: As reported REF B, religiosity has been

increasing in Turkey in past years, just as has been seen in
many other Muslim societies. The AKP is both a beneficiary
of, and a stimulus for, this phenomenon. However, bitter
opposition within Turkey against domestic "pro-Islamic"
reforms (e.g., head scarves) has frustrated the AKP, and a
more "Islamic" or "Middle Eastern" foreign policy offers an
alternative sop for the AKP's devout base.
-- Success: Despite its problems, Turkey over the past 50

years has been a success story, rising to the 16th largest
economy and membership in the G-20. This, along with its
extraordinary security situation compared to all other
regional states, and democratic system, encourage a more
active -- and more independent -- leadership role in regional
and even global affairs.
-- Economics: one secret of Turkish success has been its

trade and technology-led economic growth. This growth is in
good part thanks to its customs union with the EU, by far its
biggest export market, and resulting investment from the EU,
as well as decades of technology transfer and educational
assistance from the U.S. Nevertheless, with exports to the
EU down due to the 2008-2009 crisis, Turkey is looking for
new markets, particularly in the hydrocarbon rich Arab world,
Iran, Russia, and Caucasus/Central Asia. They have money,
and strong import demand, and Turkey is dependent on them for
its oil and gas. These countries, however, (along with
China-another Turkish export target) tend much more than the
EU and North America to mix politics and trade. To some
ANKARA 00000087 004 OF 006
degree the West thus is taken for granted and economic

priority is directed towards relations with the Middle East
and "Eurasia."
-- Civilians ascendant: Erdogan's political success -

together with a number of messy scandals resulting in public
investigation - has meant that the Turkish General Staff now
plays a much smaller role in defining Turkey's foreign
policy. Turkey's support to NATO is still strong, but it now
lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war instinct of
General Staff brought to the mix.
-- EU disillusionment: Both popular and elite Turkish

opinion has recently grown much more pessimistic about
eventual EU membership -- or even its value. The reasons for
this are complex, but include the shifting mood in Europe
towards Islam, the replacement of "pro-Turkey" leaders in
France and Germany by Sarkozy and Merkel, both decidedly cool
towards Turkey's EU membership, and a sense in Turkey of
distance from and lack of sympathy for Europe.
-- Relativization of the Western anchor. An op-ed in the

Financial Times by Gideon Rechman on January 4 noted
correctly the tendency of the "young giants" -- South Africa,
Brazil, India, and Turkey -- to pursue Third Worldish
policies and rhetoric even while benefitting enormously from
the globalized trade and international security created and
maintained by the "West." That certainly characterizes
Turkey. With the end of the cold war, relative success in
the struggle with the PKK, and the "taming" of Syria, Iraq,
and (at least from Turkey's point of view) Iran, Turkey's
need for NATO and U.S. security is reduced. Its dependence
on Western trade, investment, technology transfer and
educational exchange remains critical, but is regarded as a
"free good" that Turkey deserves and does not have to expend
effort for. Relations with its various new friends in the
North-East-South or on the other hand require effort which is
facilitated by some downplaying of Turkey's Western anchor.
DAVUTOGLU DISCONTENTS
---------------------
¶10. (C) The AKP's new approach to international affairs

receives mixed reviews inside and outside Turkey. It is not
a major factor in the AKP's relative popularity, but several
elements of it (unfortunately, those we are least happy with)
do appeal to voters. Criticism of Israel post-Gaza is
overwhelmingly popular, and the relatively soft Turkish
position on Iran -- a country about which many Turks are
skeptical -- is presumably helpful with a narrow, but for
Erdogan's electoral fate important, group of Islamic voters
associated with former PM Erbakan.
¶11. (C) Nevertheless, many in Turkey's large westernized

elite see the Islamic Outreach as a complement to the alleged
AKP plan to Islamize Turkish society, and complain bitterly
about their country's losing its western moorings. The
Nationalist segment in Turkey, mobilized most by the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), sees the AKP's compromises on
Armenia, the KRG in northern Iraq, Cyprus, etc, as a betrayal
of diaspora "Turks" (the Iraqi Turkomen, Azeris, Turkish
Cypriots, etc) and charges that the AKP is trying to replace
the Republic's organizing principle of "Turkism" with the
broader Islamic "Umma." The Republican People's Party (CHP),
the lead opposition party, attacks AKP foreign policy
relatively ineffectively with a mix of MHP-like nationalist
rhetoric and "abandoning the west" criticism.
¶12. (C) But it is in the EU that the Erdogan foreign policy

of late has run into the heaviest of sailing. To some degree
ANKARA 00000087 005 OF 006
European angst at Turkey's "new direction" is viewed as an

excuse to pummel Turkey to score domestic points among
anti-foreigner elements. But there is real concern in
Europe, made manifest by the Rasmussen NATO SecGen issue last
April. Europeans were furious with Turkey's presentng itself
as the "Islamic" voice or conscience in NATO, having
consulted with Middle Eastern States before talking to its
NATO allies. Extrapolating that behavior into the even more
diversity-intolerant EU is a nightmare. Erdogan's foreign
(and domestic) policy orientation conjures up not just a
clash of Christianity and Islam, but the spectre of a "meld"
of Europe and the Middle East, and of Europe's secularlism
with oriental religiosity. Davutoglu and others argue that
Turkey's "success" as a coming Middle East power makes it
more attractive to the EU -- giving Europe a new foreign
policy "market" through Turkey. While some in Europe appear
interested in this idea, ironically including Turkey EU
membership skeptic France, this does not seem to carry much
weight in most European capitals, let alone populations.
¶13. (C) Finally, not all of the ex-Ottomans look with

fondness on their past under the Pashas, or yearn for
Turkey's return. Reaction among many in the Balkans to
Davutoglu's Sarejevo speech (REF A) was quite strong. In the
Middle East itself, the Arab street might applaud Turkey's
populistic and essentially cost-free support for more radical
elements, but it's not particularly appreciated by rulers
(although Turkey seems to have made some progress with Syria,
brokered a rapprochement between President Bashir and Saudi
King Abdullah, and has had some role in resolving the Lebanon
cabinet stalemate). Sooner or later, though, Turkey will
have to produce results, take risks, commit real resources,
and take hard decisions to augment a policy now consisting
mainly of popular slogans, ceaseless trips, and innumerable
signatures on MOUs of little importance. The experience with
Iran, which despite significant Turkish verbal support and
wooing, appears uninterested in granting Turkey any
concessions, or agreeing to a Turkish lead in mediation
efforts, is telling.
THE PROBLEM FOR THE US

----------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us.
Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby
relieving us, has long been a desired goal of US policy, but
it comes with a certain loss of control. Nevertheless, on a
whole host of key issues of supreme importance to us --
Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in and on Iraq, NATO
efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile Defense
will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of
Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and
Afghanistan operations is indispensible. Its "zero
conflicts" initiatives, which have moved Turkey forward on
more of the key bilateral spats -- Cyprus, Greece, Kurds,
Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen with any other
Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.
¶15. (C) Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two

problems. At least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of
issues the US , especially the media, interest groups, and
Congress, default to a "blame Turkey" posture regardless of
whatever it does. Second, Turkey has repeatedly run into
trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the
Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued
overflights of Greek islands and domestic opposition to the
Kurdish opening are also relevant. What we fear is that this
inability to bring to conclusion foreign policy initiatives
will affect not just the above, but most Turkish policy,
given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team, and a
ANKARA 00000087 006 OF 006
tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of

diplomatic, military, and assistance capital. (Fortunately,
Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are the two major exceptions to
this tendency.)
¶16. (C) The greatest potential strategic problem for the US,
however, and the one that has some of the commentators
howling, is the Turks neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle
East and Balkans. This "back to the past" attitude so clear
in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech, combined with the Turks'
tendency to execute it through alliances with more Islamic or
more worrisome local actors, constantly creates new problems.
Part of this is structural. Despite their success and
relative power, the Turks really can't compete on equal terms
with either the US or regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans,
Russia in the Caucasus/Black Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even
Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover
resources, to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have
to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays to
Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or
Ahmadinejad, who will be happy to have the Turks take up his
cause. The Turks then attempt to ram through revisions to at
least the reigning "Western" position to the favor of their
guy. Given, again, the questioning of Western policy and
motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP, such an
approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to
demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.
¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high

maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage
to Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious. If the Turks
are genuine in their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and
if they begin achieving real success rather than telephone
books worth of questionable protocols, then that will be of
benefit to us all. But with Iran itself it is a different
story. REF C describes the background to the Turkish
relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their
ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects. Trade/hydrocarbon
interests, Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the
first Gulf War, Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain
domestic political considerations all push Turkey in the
wrong direction. Unlike with many of the other issues,
however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted on Iran, in
the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of UN or
US sanctions. This will have a profound effect on relations
second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the
next year.
Jeffrey

Viewing cable 10ANKARA126, SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL

VISIT:
Discussing cables
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FOR BACKGROUND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020

TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR TU AF PK IR IZ IS AM
SUBJECT: SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT:
SCENESETTER
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d)
¶1. (S) PM Erdogan welcomed President Obama's reiteration of

support to the fight against the PKK during the December 7
meeting in the Oval Office, but the Secretary should expect
questions about how we will operationalize that commitment as
plans to withdraw from Iraq move forward. A key issue will
be how to reduce the gap between the time when the U.S. is no
longer able to provide ISR support and when we will be able
to help Turkey acquire its own capability. On missile
defense, we will look for the Secretary's help in advancing
our work with Turkey to persuade the Turks to allow a key
radar system to be based here. The Turks are struggling to
define what they will need in terms of NATO political cover
to lessen the high cost - both in terms of domestic politics
and in relations with Iran - that Erdogan's government
believes it will have to pay should they agree.
¶2. (S) Although our agenda with Turkey is broad and complex,
the following issues are likely to come up during the
Secretary's trip:
"Need To Raise"
----------------
- Our commitment to continue sharing real-time intelligence

to support Turkey's counter-PKK fight, but caution that the
process for Turkey to acquire an armed UAV system from the
U.S. will be long and complex. (para 3-5, 14)
- The need for a NATO BMD system with Turkey's participation

and the Iranian threat against NATO interests. (para 6-9)
- Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan,

particularly for its new commitments to training security
forces. (para 10-11)
- Appreciation for support to OIF/OEF through Turkey's

territory, including the Incirlik Cargo Hub; easing transit
of non-lethal mil cargo shipments from Iraq to Afghanistan.
(para 12)
- Our advocacy support for Raytheon and Sikorsky on sales of

air defense systems and utility helicopters (para 13).
"Be Ready To Respond On"

------------------------
- Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras 5)
- Turkish requests for 24/7 Predator coverage of the

Turkey-Iraq border to counter PKK operations and activities
(para 5).
- Turkish requests for immediate delivery of AH-1W

helicopters (para 15)
Counter - PKK Operations: Still Turkey's Top Priority

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶3. (C) Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK

have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond
military action alone. Although the government's renamed
National Unity Project (initially called the "Kurdish
Opening") was not fully developed when launched and appears
to be moving slowly, the government has increased social and
economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey,
dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own
language, and increased educational opportunities as well.
It is post's view that the military success against the PKK,
supported by our intelligence-sharing operation, has given
the civilians the political space to explore this opening and
to deal directly with Masoud Barzani and other Iraqi Kurds.
Turkish military operations against the PKK continue,
however, and on October 6, 2009 Parliament extended the
government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations
against the PKK in Iraq for another year. Turkey's leaders
have learned from us and from their own experience that only
a whole-of-government approach will succeed against the PKK

insurgency.
¶4. (C) Our November 2007 decision to share operational

intelligence was a turning point for the bilateral
relationship, and President Obama's declaration before the
Turkish Parliament in April 2009 and during his oval office
meeting with Erdogan in December 2009 of our continuing
commitment to support Turkey's fight against the PKK were
warmly welcomed. Our cooperation has helped to improve the
bilateral relationship across the board, particularly by
making it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq
as a safe haven. We can never reiterate enough our
continuing committment, as President Obama did effectively
with PM Erdogan in December.
¶5. (C) Nevertheless, Turkish causalities are still occurring.

Turkey still looks for more support, and will press us for
more concrete action before the U.S. completes its withdrawal
from Iraq. CHOD Basbug will likely repeat the GOT's request
for laser-designation of targets and/or direct U.S.
operations against the PKK. In December, PM Erdogan also
asked POTUS for 24-hour Predator coverage. At present we
provide approximately 12-hour coverage, with an occasional
surge to 24 hours to support specific Turkish operations,
such as against High Value Targets. A move to 24-hour
coverage is not easy due to resources requirements elsewhere;
however, we may be able to provide a few weeks of 24-hour
coverage during crucial spring months, and are working with
TGS to determine exactly where and when it would be most
useful to do so, and what assets the Turkish military would
employ if additional UAV support is made available.
Missile Defense
----------------
¶6. (S) The Turks asked us to postpone a return visit from

Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, as they are still considering how
best to respond to our request to base an AN/TPY-2 and
(potentially) other MD assets in Turkey. While some of the
Turks' technical questions remain unanswered, the key
questions are now political. During his meeting with
President Obama, PM Erdogan said that such a system must be
implemented in a NATO context to diminish the political cost
that his government will likely bear, both in terms of
domestic politics and in Turkey's relations with Iran. The
ball is now in the court of the civilian leaders here to
determine just "how much NATO" will be enough for them
politically; NATOs inability to fund an "interim capability"
makes it harder for us to show parallel development of a NATO
BMD system with PAA. Erdogan is concerned that Turkey's
participation might later give Israel protection from an
Iranian counter-strike.
¶7. (S) We have made the point to the Turks that a decision to
not base the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey is essentially a
decision to opt out of missile defense coverage for Turkey;
this would not be a political consequence, but just a fact
based on physics and geometry. It is important to make this
point again (gently) with PM Erdogan, but also underscore
that we value Turkey's participation and will try to
"NATOize" the system, if Turkey will tell us how much NATO
would be enough.
¶8. (S) Behind all this, we fear, is a manifestation of both
the Turkish government's, and to some degree the Turkish
public's, growing distancing from the Atlanticist world view
now that most dangers for Turkey are gone. While Turks are
not naive about Iran (see below), MD places them in a pickle,
forcing them to choose between the U.S./West and a Middle
East "vocation" - which, while not necessarily includes
coddling Iran, requires palpable space between Turkey and
"the West."
Iran
----
¶9. (S) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and

international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is
hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part
due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a
trade route to Central Asian markets. It has worked quietly
with us to prevent some proliferation-sensitive shipments to
and from Iran. Turkey's top civilian and military officials
may have come to the conclusion that a military strike
against Iran would be more harmful for Turkey's interests
than Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capability; they believe
international pressure against Iran only helps to strengthen
Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. PM Erdogan himself is a
particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position. However,
Turkey did press Iran (albeit quietly) to accept the P5 plus
1 Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) offer and FM Davutoglu had
been personally engaged in trying to rescue the TRR deal,
which would have removed a significant portion of Iran's
lowly-enriched uranium stockpile. As a current member of the
UNSC, the Turks would be very hesitant to support sanctions
against Iran. We need nevertheless to encourage PM Erdogan
to support UN actions if Iran does not comply with Iran's
international obligations while underscoring that we view
Iran's program as a serious threat to NATO interests in
Europe and would like to see a non-military solution
(including Turkish participation in NATO BMD).
----------------------
¶10. (SBU) Turkey has been a dedicated partner in Afghanistan.

It has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and again
took command of RC-Capital in November. Turkey leads PRT
Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan (also
covering Sar-e-Pol) in mid-2010. Turkey has sponsored the
"Ankara Process" dialogue, one of several efforts to
encourage constructive communications between Kabul and
Islamabad, and is a leading participant in the Friends of
Democratic Pakistan. It hosted a trilateral summit on
January 25 and a Afghanistan Regional Summit (including all
of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors as well as select other
countries including the U.S.) on January 26, just prior to
the January 28 London Conference on Afghanistan.
¶11. (C) Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries:

USD 200 million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to
Pakistan, as well as USD 1.5 million to the ANA. There are
1750 Turkish troops in Afghanistan, and Turkey has four OMLTs
currently in Kabul and, since December, pledged two more
OMLTs and one POMLT. Because of its culture, history and
religious orientation, as well as Foreign Minister
Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to
act as an agent of the international community's goals in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010, Turkey has pledged to
offer 6-8 week trainings for up to a brigade's worth of
Afghan military and police personnel in Turkey and will
establish a training center in Kabul capable of training up
to 600 ANSA personnel at a time.
Retrograde through Turkey

-------------------------
¶12. (S) Turkey's agreement to allow us to use its territory,

facilities and airspace has been essential to our ability to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We now look to
expand current capabilities to transit materiel from Iraq to
join up with the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to
Afghanistan. CENTCOM logisticians, working with us and our
EUCOM Office of Defense Cooperation, seek to take advantage
of improved commercial ties between Turkey and Iraq to move
non-lethal equipment across Turkey to join the NDN. We are
working to expand our current retrograde agreements to
minimize the time and bureaucracy involved, and to expand
permissions to allow non-lethal military equipment, including
armored transport vehicles.
Advocacy for U.S. Defense Industry

----------------------------------
¶13. (C) We much appreciate SecDef's help in advocating for

U.S. firms competing for key projects in Turkey, and hope he
can raise both Sikorsky's and Raytheon's cases in person.
Sikorsky's "International Blackhawk" proposal holds
remarkable benefits. This deal represents a new level of
industrial partnership; Sikorsky guarantees that it would
build in Turkey - for sale outside of Turkey - one Blackhawk
for each one the GOT builds and buys for itself; this is a
boon of hundreds of millions of dollars for the Turkish
economy. On Air Defense, Raytheon's PAC-3 is competing in a
tender for Turkey's air defense. Raytheon also seeks to take
advantage of Turkish industry's ability to co-produce complex
systems with us and would produce systems for sale in the UAE
and elsewhere. The benefit to Turkey's economy from such
co-production would likely exceed USD 1 billion. Technically
and operationally, there is no system which can compete with
the PAC-3, but Turkey's Defense Ministry seeks to broaden
competition to include lower-cost options from Russia and
even from European producers. Raytheon often asks us to
remind the Turks that a decision on requests for support on
Missile Defense should not necessarily affect a decision on
PAC-3.
UAV's, Attack Helicopters, and Intel Surge

------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own

ISR capability to replace the US assets currently being used
in anti-PKK operations. President Obama told PM Erdogan in
December that we support Turkey's request to acquire armed
Reaper UAVs. Nevertheless, approval for armed Reapers is
complicated due to Hill concerns. We have explained this to
the Turks. However, even if those could be overcome, the
delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's
leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our
intelligence support until they can replace it. While we are
working to enhance Turkey's ISR capabilities, we have not
made this commitment to date.
¶15. (C) Bad GOT procurement decisions led Turkey to a severe

shortage of dual engine, high altitude attack helicopters,
which it desperately needs to fight the PKK. PM Erdogan
raised this issue with the President in December 2009; SecDef
should expect this issue to be a top priority in meetings
with Minister Gonul and with GEN Basbug. The Turks took
SecDef's May 2009 letter to provide up to four AH-1W
helicopters each in 2011, 2012 and 2013 as a firm commitment,
and now have asked us to advance that date to 2010. They do
not accept our explanation that these aircraft are simply not
available from our inventory, as they believe they have --
just like the U.S. -- "troops in contact" and need the close
tactical support. While SecDef should make no commitment, we
should also explore whether we can persuade Taiwan to sell or
lease some of its own AH-1W aircraft now that Taiwan is
taking delivery of Apaches.
Support For The US-Turkey-Iraq "Tripartite Security Dialogue"

--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶16. (S) SecDef's visit will take place just as USFI's GEN
Odierno will have left. We expect that GEN Odierno's visit
will give a political boost to the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq
Tripartite Security talks. Turkey's civilian leaders are
taking heat from their domestic political opposition for
pressing the "Kurdish Opening" while casualties from PKK
attacks continue. They hope to use GEN Odierno's visit to
show that their whole-of-government approach against PKK
insurgency is producing results and that it has the support
of senior USG officials in Iraq.
¶17. (S) Trilateral meetings continue regularly and a new

Tripartite operational office in Erbil, established to share
counter-PKK intelligence was established over the summer.
The most recent tri-lat meeting took place in Baghdad in
December, followed by a joint Turkey-Iraq visit in Erbil.
The Turks remain frustrated that, in their view, the KRG is
not doing enough to combat the PKK. The Turks remain shy in
sharing intelligence data; they are not convinced that they
can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information

concerning operations secret. Turkish officials have become
more strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action
against the PKK. The cooperation that does exist is a step in
the right direction; however, it will need to improve
significantly prior to the U.S. pullout of Iraq. CHOD Basbug
and PM Ergodan want the U.S. to put more pressure on the
Iraqis - and particularly Masoud Barzani - to take actions to
cut PKK supply and logistics lines in northern Iraq. We
should stress the need for more trust and collaboration
between Turkey and Iraq, eventually on Turkish CBOs. Absent
greater cooperation, we could see significant bilateral
problems post-2011, to include Iraqi claims of Turkey's
violation of its sovereign territory.
Northern Iraq
--------------
¶18. (C) Turkey will not consider any alternative to the

political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has
become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities
of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's policy remains
focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the
KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the
continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in
the KRG's healthy economy.
Armenia
-------
¶19. (S) The signing of the Protocols to reestablish

Turkish-Armenian relations and open the common border in
Zurich on October 10 was a landmark for the region. However,
neither Turkey nor Armenia have taken steps toward
ratification; the GOT argues that progress toward withdrawal
of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani provinces surrounding
Nagorno-Karabakh is a pre-condition. (Note: This was
not/not part of the agreement, and not a position the U.S.
supports. End note.) Future relations will nevertheless
still be heavily linked to the 1915 "Armenian genocide"
issue. Any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as
"genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and
the effect on our bilateral relationship -- including
political, military, and commercial aspects -- would be
devastating.
Israel
------
¶20. (C) While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General
Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship
is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to
shore up his domestic right flank through continued populist
rhetoric against Israel and its December 2008 Gaza operation.
His outburst at Davos and the last-minute cancellation of
Israel's participation in the Fall 2009 Anatolian Eagle
Exercise (a multilateral Air Force exercise which had US,
Turkey, Italy, and Israel as planned participants) were the
most noticeable examples of this rhetoric, which we and his
staff have sought to contain. The latest incident, a snub in
early January of the Turkish Ambassador by Israeli Deputy
Foreign Minster Danny Ayalon, almost caused the GOT to both
recall its Ambassador and cancel the visit of Israeli Defense
Minister Ehud Barak. However, the very public row was
resolved with an Israeli apology and Barak's visit on January
17 helped to stem the downward spiral for now. Nevertheless,
we assess that Erdogan is likely to continue anti-Israel
remarks and the issues will continue to cast a shadow on the
TU-IS bilateral relationship.
Political Environment
---------------------
¶21. (C) PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development

(AK) Party remains Turkey's strongest political party, but
its poll numbers are slumping, and it continues to fear an
erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist
parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief

of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with
PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's
secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists
(represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds.
Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug
has seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military
involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate
generation of internal chaos remains political theme number
one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their
respective underlings. Public trust in the military is
starting to decline, the result of several very public
on-going investigations into the alleged planning against the
government.
Jeffrey

Viewing cable 10ANKARA150, TURKEY: OF COUPS AND

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO1068
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHAK #0150/01 0290744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290744Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: OF COUPS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
REF: A. ANKARA 120

¶B. ANKARA 130
¶C. ANKARA 107
¶D. 09 ANKARA 1582
¶E. 09 ANKARA 834
¶F. 09 ANKARA 1839
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Reports of coup plots against PM Erdogan's

Islamist-leaning government have been a staple of the Turkish
media since 2007. Despite protests by Turkey's top brass
that there is no substance to the allegations, a growing
percentage of the population believes that at least some
elements within the military have been plotting to undermine
or even overthrow the AKP-led government. The coup
allegations have served as fodder for the Ergenekon
prosecution team and some of the plots have been included in
the formal indictments against senior retired military
officers. The net result of these allegations has been a
gradual erosion of the public trust toward the military. The
latest reports related to the "Sledgehammer" plan (ref a)
come at a time when the government is preparing the process
of amending the constitution to allow military personnel to
be tried in civilian courts (ref b). With the pro-Islamist
media fanning the flames and the Turkish General Staff's
consistently inadequate responses to each allegation, public
opinion is becoming less unquestioning vis a vis the
military; this could help strengthen AKP's position as it
mulls steps to amend the Turkish constitution in order to
affect a shift in the civil-military balance in its favor,
although AKP,s own support has eroded considerably over the
past year. End Summary.
Coup Chronicles: A Review

-------------------------
¶2. (C) Over the course of the last two-and-a-half years, the
Turkish military has faced a number of allegations of coup
plotting having occurred within its ranks, especially in the
2003 to 2004 period. These allegations have increased in
tempo over the last year, with the liberal daily "Taraf"
("Side") -- whose tagline is: "To Think is to Take Sides" --
leading the charge in breaking many of the often-sensational
stories that draw on leaked information from unnamed military
or judicial sources. (Comment: Taraf owner Basar Arslan has
publicly dismissed claims that Taraf is secretly funded by
the Fetullah Gulen movement. End Comment). Paras 8-14
outline the key allegations that have surfaced in the Turkish
media since 2007.
Common Threads
--------------
¶3. (C) One of the common threads in this review is that the
alleged plans are all variations on a theme: they all involve
efforts to sow chaos or foment public opposition to the AKP
and to create the conditions for a military intervention.
None of the alleged plots involve a direct military takeover
(Comment: The military's problem in such a scenario is that
it knows its interventions and coup plots are not popular
among the population. The last "successful" coup -- in 1980
-- occurred in response to a massive breakdown of public
order as armed political, ethnic and criminal gangs engaged
in violent attacks. The core accusation in these current
scenarios is the allegation that the military this time would
foment the violence themselves, blaming radical, Islamic and
other groups, and then step in to "restore order" after the
government fails to do so. End Comment.)
¶4. (C) Another common theme is that all the allegations put
the military in an almost impossible position of having to
prove a negative -- that it did not engage in the planning
actions alleged by the media reports -- to a public, some
parts of whom are increasingly suspicious of the military
with each new claim. While we may never know the extent to
which each of these allegations are true, it is clear from
statements by former Turkish General Staff Chief Gen. Ozkok
that, at the very least, there was serious consideration
given within the military in 2003 to 2004 to overthrow the
ANKARA 00000150 002 OF 004
AKP-led government.
Polling Data and Net Effect Thus Far

------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The series of allegations has been eroding the

public's confidence in the military. While the military
still enjoys strong support among the public -- one poll by
Genar Polling in November 2009 indicated that 80.6 percent of
those surveyed viewed the military as the institution that
inspires most confidence, 15 points above the presidency,
which came in second -- this support has slipped. A poll
conducted by A&G Polling in January indicated that while
public support for the military was around 90 percent before
the Ergenekon investigations began, public support has
dropped to 63.4 percent. Ipsos KMG also published a poll in
early January indicating the trust in the military had
declined from 85 to 90 percent before the Ergenekon
allegations, to 73 percent in late 2009. Another poll
conducted in early January by Turkish polling firm MetroPoll,
before the "Sledgehammer" story broke, found that 30 percent
of respondents in the January poll indicated that their trust
in the military has decreased. 55 percent of respondents
also believed that "there is a group within the military
which is preparing to stage a coup," a rise of 7 percent from
July 2009 figures. Despite the decreasing confidence in the
military indicated by one of three respondents, 62 percent of
respondents did not believe that the military would stage
another coup.
¶6. (C) Secularists who question the motives of the AKP and
the timing of each new coup plot allegation are convinced
that most of the claims are a combination of fabrication and
manipulation of actual military documents and that there is a
systematic campaign to erode the trust of the military. TGS
chief Basbug has led this charge, calling the series of media
stories an "asymmetric attack" targeting the Turkish Armed
Forces. Even as he denounced the media reports, however,
Basbug has also clearly committed the military to supporting
democracy and the rule of law and has stated that the era of
coups in Turkey is over (ref. b).
Comment: Stage is Set for Constitutional Reform

--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (C) With the Constitutional Court's unanimous decision to

overturn a law extending civilian jurisdiction over military
personnel for crimes including coup plotting (ref c), the
government has announced that it plans to seek a referendum
to change Turkey's constitution to affect this change. Many
of the other possible constitutional reforms being considered
by the government -- such as changing the structure of the
Constitutional Court and limiting clauses often used to
justify the prosecution of nationalist Kurds and Islamist
politicians -- would attract the opposition of the military
and its political supporters. The apparent rise in distrust
among the Turkish populace toward the military, particularly
after "Sledgehammer," which allegedly would have targeted
average Turks in an arbitrary manner, could work to the AKP's
advantage as it looks to further shift the balance of power
in civ-mil relations through constitutional reforms, although
AKP,s own standing is greatly diminished from only one year
ago.
COUP DIARIES AND ALLEGED PLOTS

------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Excerpts of diary entries dating back to 2003 and

2004 allegedly belonging to then-Naval Forces Commander
Admiral Ozden Ornek were first published by the weekly
"Nokta" in 2007 (Comment: The magazine was closed shortly
after it published these documents. End Comment). The diary
entries -- popularly known as the "Coup Diaries" -- laid out
in detail discussions among senior military officers of steps
the military needed to take to unseat the Islamist-leaning
Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002.
"Sarikiz" ("Blondie") was the initial coup plan developed by
then-Jandarma Commander General Eruygur, which involved a
coordinated effort among the military and other elements of
Turkey's secular elite, to effect the removal of the AKP from
power. The plot allegedly had the support of all the other
force commanders at the time (Land Forces Commander General
Aytac Yalman, Air Forces Commander General Ibrahim Firtina,
ANKARA 00000150 003 OF 004

and Naval Forces Commander Admiral Ornek). Then-Turkish
General Staff (TGS) Chief General Hilmi Ozkok reportedly
rejected the coup proposal, which led Eruygur and former
First Army Commander General Hursuit Tolon to develop other
plots entitled "Ayisigi" ("Moonlight") and "Yakamoz"
("Phosphorescence"), which provided operational details of a
coup that would involve the removal of General Ozkok and the
restructuring of the military. Other related plans related
to the plot with code names "Eldiven" ("Glove") and
"Demiryumruk" ("Iron Fist") reportedly provided more details
about steps to be taken in the aftermath of a successful coup.
¶9. (SBU) These plots were included in the Ergenekon

prosecutors' second indictment in March 2009, and provided
the legal basis for the detention of retired generals Eruygur
and Tolon (who were initially arrested in July 2008 and were
detained without formal charges until the release of the
indictment). Eruygur has been identified as the alleged head
of Ergenekon while Tolon is considered a leading member.
Retired force commanders Firtina, Ornek, and Yalman were
interviewed by Ergenekon prosecutors in early December 2009,
but have not been charged; Firtina publicly denied
involvement in any coup plots. According to press accounts,
General Ozkok acknowledged during testimony to Ergenekon
prosecutors in April 2009 that most of the contents of the
"coup diaries" were true and that he was aware of plans to
overthrow the government among elements within the military
but did not have hard evidence to move against the plotters.
"KAFES" (OPERATION CAGE)

------------------------
¶10. (SBU) This plot involved senior navy flag officers and
was uncovered during the April 2009 search of the home of
retired Navy Lieutenant Commander Levent Bektas, an Ergenekon
suspect, and was revealed by Taraf in November 2009. CDs
found in Bektas's home reportedly revealed a plot drafted in
March 2009 headed by then-Sea Area North Commander Vice
Admiral Feyyaz Ogutcu (now retired) and current Sea Area
South Commander Kadir Sardic. The plot included plans to
assassinate prominent non-Muslim figures and blame these
attacks on the AKP in order to increase foreign and domestic
pressure for the AKP to step down. Media reports indicated
that the plan included setting off a bomb planted at the
submarine exhibit at the Rahmi Koc Museum in Istanbul and
using women to obtain information from other navy officers
and entrap them into supporting Ergenekon. Bektas has been
under arrest as part of the Ergenekon probe, as well as
several active duty officers, including Lt. Col. Halil
Ozsarac, and colonels Levent Gulmen and Mucahit Erakyol.
Thus far, neither Ogutcu or Sardic has been questioned about
this plot.
¶11. (SBU) Taraf reporter Mehmet Baransu, who broke the news
about "Kafes," received an award from the Turkish Journalists
Association for his "Kafes" reporting, but was also
investigated for violating the confidentiality of an ongoing
criminal investigation. While those charges have been
dropped, there is an ongoing case against Baransu and Taraf
manager Adnan Demir for "openly insulting the military
institution of the state," in violation of Section 301 of the
Turkish Penal Code.
ACTION PLAN AGAINST FUNDAMENTALISM (refs d and e)
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶12. (SBU) Photocopies of the alleged "Action Plan Against

Fundamentalism" were published by Taraf as a front-page story
in June 2009. The plan outlined a psychological operations
campaign to discredit the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) as well as other "sources of fundamentalism,"
including the Fetullah Gulen movement. The action plan was
allegedly drafted by Naval Infantry Colonel Dursun Cicek in
2009 under orders of then-Deputy CHOD Igsiz, with the
knowledge and tacit approval of General Basbug himself. The
TGS denied the existence of such a plan, with General Basbug
dismissing the photocopied documents as "a piece of paper."
The allegation came roaring back to life in November 2009
when Taraf claimed that it had received -- from an anonymous
military officer -- the original copy of the plan with
Cicek's "wet" signature. Cicek was detained in July 2009 for
his role in drafting the plan, but was released due to lack
of evidence. He was again detained and interviewed by
ANKARA 00000150 004 OF 004
prosecutors in November 2009, but was again released without

charges.
ASSASSINATION PLOT AGAINST DEPUTY PM (ref f)

--------------------------------------------
¶13. (SBU) On December 19, two active duty Turkish special

forces officers were arrested by the police near the
residence of Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc. This led to
allegations that the military was planning to assassinate
Arinc. As a result, the civilian judiciary issued a court
order to search the offices of the officers which are located
at the TGS Special Forces Mobilization Command. After
initial refusal by the military to allow a broader search of
the premises, CHOD Basbug, along with Land Forces Commander
(and likely successor to Basbug as CHOD in August 2010)
General Kosaner, met with PM Erdogan on December 26.
Following this meeting, a second search warrant was issued to
allow a judge to review the classified documents stored at
the Mobilization Command headquarters. These searches are
ongoing, but to date, the investigators have not announced
any discovery of evidence that would support the claims of an
assassination plot against Arinc.
"BALYOZ" (SLEDGEHAMMER) (ref a)

-------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) "Sledgehammer," the latest alleged plot, was

allegedly drafted in 2003 by the Turkish First Army, under
its then-commander Gen. Cetin Dogan. The plan, which has
been denied by both the military and retired General Dogan,
involved false-flag bombing of mosques and efforts to provoke
a military crisis with Greece in order to create the
conditions for a military intervention. The plan, as
revealed by "Taraf" on January 20 -- a day before the
Constitutional Court's decision overturning the law allowing
civilian jurisdiction over certain offenses committed by the
military -- allegedly included lists of names of politicians
and journalists to be arrested, as well as names of
politicians who would serve in a new government after the
removal of the AKP.
Jeffrey

Viewing cable 10ASTANA72, KAZAKHSTAN: MONEY AND POWER

Discussing cables
10ASTANA72 2010-01-25 08:08 2010-11-29 23:11 SECRET Embassy Astana
VZCZCXRO6688
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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2396
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1954
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1804

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000072
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030
TAGS PGOV, PINR, EPET, EINV, KCOR, RS, CH, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: MONEY AND POWER
REF: ASTANA 0061
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a private dinner, KazMunaiGaz First Vice President
Maksat Idenov named, in his view, the four most powerful gate-keepers around
President Nursultan Nazarbayev: Chief of Administration and General Services of
the President’s Office Sarybai Kalmurzayev, the President’s Chief of Staff Aslan
Musin, State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, and the tandem of
Prime Minister Karim Masimov and Nazarbayev’s billionaire son-in-law Timur
Kulibayev. According to Idenov, in Kazakhstan, market economy means capitalism,
which means big money, XXXXXXXXXXXX. The following details are a single snapshot
of one version of current reality. The significant point is that Nazarbayev is
standing with Idenov, not Kulibayev, to maintain international standards to
develop the massive Kashagan and Karachaganak hydrocarbon projects. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) On January 21, KazMunaiGaz First Vice President Maksat Idenov and the
Ambassador had a one-on-one dinner in a nearly empty restaurant (times are still
hard!) at the Radisson hotel in Astana. When the Ambassador arrived, Idenov was
barking into his cell phone, “Mark, Mark, stop the excuses! Mark, listen to me!
Mark, shut up right now and do as I say! Bring the letter to my office at 10:00
pm, and we will go together to take it to (Minister of Energy and Mineral
Resources, MEMR) Mynbayev at his house.” On ending the call, Idenov explained he
was talking to British Gas (BG) Country Director for Kazakhstan Mark Rawlings
who had missed the deadline to deliver a letter about arbitration on the
Karachaganak super-giant oil-field project (reftel). Still clearly steamed,
Idenov XXXXXXXXXXXX “I tell him, ‘Mark, stop being an idiot! Stop tempting fate!
XXXXXXXXXXXX Idenov asked, “Do you know how much he (Rawlings) makes? $72,000 a
month! A month!! Plus benefits! Plus bonuses! Lives in Switzerland but
supposedly works in London. Comes here once a month to check in. Nice life,
huh?”
¶3. (S) Idenov calmed down and said, “Let’s look at the menus.” Then he
immediately started typing on his PDA and turned the screen toward the
Ambassador, saying, “Let’s look at the ‘four courses.’” On the screen were four
names: Kalmurzayev, Musin, Saudabayev, and Masimov-Kulibayev.” Idenov said, “The
Big Four around Number One.” (NOTE: Sarybai Kalmurzayev, currently the head of
Administration and General Services in the Presidential Administration, was,
among other jobs, a former head of the Financial Police and, before that, in the
1990s, in charge of privatization. Aslan Musin is the current Chief of Staff for
Nazarbayev. Kanat Saudabayev, a personal friend of Nazarbayev for nearly 40
years, is Minister of State and Foreign Minister. Karim Masimov is Prime
Minister, and Timur Kulibayev is currently the favored presidential son-in-law,
on the Forbes 500 list of billionaires (as is his wife separately), and the
ultimate controller of 90% of the economy of Kazakhstan. END NOTE.) In response
to a question, Idenov said that Masimov has a degree of freedom, but never acts
without permission from “the hyphen” (Kulibayev). Then Idenov stood up abruptly
and carried his PDA to a ledge about 20 feet from the table and asked the
Ambassador to turn off his cell phone.
¶4. (S) Idenov said he wanted to explain why he has been less visible for at
least the last half year. Starting last spring, all the “Big Four” (on the menu)
began blocking him from seeing President Nazarbayev. In October, KMG President
ASTANA 00000072 002 OF 003
Kairgeldy Kabyldin told Idenov, “Kulibayev doesn’t want to work with you any
more.” Idenov said he replied, “Fine,” immediately returned to his office, wrote
his letter of resignation, and packed up his personal files and photos of his
family.” He said Mynbayev immediately called and asked, “My dear friend, what
are you doing?!” Idenov said he was fed up and was going to the Middle East to
work -- “I want out of here!” PM Masimov called and said, “Nazarbayev wants to
know how you’re doing. He’d really like to see you when you have time.” Idenov,
who said he’d been trying to see the President for months but had been blocked
by the “Big Four,” went to see the President and told him, “Kabyldin says
Kulibayev doesn’t want to work with me any more.” Idenov said the President told
him to calm down: “It’s probably just evil gossip. I’ll have Karim (Masimov)
talk to Timur (Kulibayev). Then Idenov went to Masimov and told him, “OK, I’ll
stay, but how do I deal with this?” Masimov said he’d talk to both Kabyldin and
Kulibayev.
¶5. (S) Soon, intermediaries arranged an Idenov-Kulibayev meeting. Idenov said
they both pretended to ignore the core problem -- Kulibayev’s, he alleged,
avarice for large bribes. Idenov averred he told Kulibayev, “Please watch your
image and reputation. You have a real opportunity to improve your own image and
the image of the nation.” Idenov said Kulibayev was “like a Buddha with a Paris
manicure,” and both understood life would continue. Idenov said he believes he
has, so far, the president’s protection. “But the games continue,” he said.
Idenov alleged that both XXXXXXXXXXXX-- and Kulibayev is salivating to profit
from them -- but, so far, Idenov stands in the way. “So long as Nazarbayev says
he wants Kashagan and Karachaganak developed according to international
standards, that’s what I’ll do.”
¶6. (SBU) (NOTE: Fugitive former CEO of BTA bank, Mukhtar Ablyazov, accused of
embezzling over $1 billion, recently leaked “documentary evidence” to the
international media that China’s state companies have bribed Kulibayev over $100
million in recent months for oil deals. END NOTE.)
¶7. (S) The Ambassador asked if the corruption and infighting are worse now than
before. Idenov paused, thought, and then replied, “No, not really. It’s business
as usual.” Idenov brushed off a question if the current maneuverings are part of
a succession struggle. “Of course not. It’s too early for that. As it’s always
been, it’s about big money. Capitalism -- you call it market economy -- means
huge money. Listen, almost everyone at the top is confused. They’re confused by
their Soviet mentality. They’re confused by the corrupt excesses of capitalism.
‘If Goldman Sachs executives can make $50 million a year and then run America’s
economy in Washington, what’s so different about what we do?’ they ask.”
OTHER TIDBITS
¶8. (S) MODEST WEALTH. Idenov alleged that MEMR’s Mynbayev is among the richest
in Kazakhstan but “flies under the radar” because he is a relatively modest and
very hard-working technocrat. His great wealth derives, in part, from his former
ownership of KazKommerzBank -- “But he never flaunts it.”
¶9. (S) VULTURES. Idenov alleged that GazProm and China National Petroleum
Company “continue to circle like vultures,” hoping that the Kashagan and
Karachaganak consortia will implode, and then they can pick up the pieces.
“Won’t happen on my watch!” Idenov vowed.
¶10. (C) HOW TO ORDER LAMB. Idenov insisted the Ambassador order a bottle of
wine for their dinner but then never touched his first glass. Instead, he gulped
three cans of Coca-Cola while inhaling his food. When both he and the Ambassador
ordered lamb chops, Idenov advised, “Well done,
ASTANA 00000072 003 OF 003
never rare -- this is Astana, not London!”
¶11. (S) COMMENT: Idenov is effusive, even theatrical, by nature. When he
trusts, he spills his heart. Of course, there’s no doubt he also spins his own
narrative, as we all do. And so, this dinner is simply a snapshot -- but, we
would judge, a relatively accurate glimpse of one version of current reality.
The significant point is that Nazarbayev is standing with Idenov, not Kulibayev,
to maintain international standards to develop the massive Kashagan and
Karachaganak hydrocarbon projects. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
Viewing cable 10BERLIN128, ACTION REQUEST: OVERCOMING
GERMAN DOUBTS ON U.S.
Discussing cables
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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR, S/CT, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PTER KTFN KCRM KHLS ECPS ECON PREL KPAO KTIA
GM
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: OVERCOMING GERMAN DOUBTS ON U.S.
DATA PRIVACY PRACTICES
REF: A. STATE 8403

¶B. 2009 BERLIN 1528
¶C. 2009 BERLIN 1377
¶D. 2009 BERLIN 1167
Classified By: Robert A. Pollard, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affai

rs, for Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (U) This is an action request.
¶2. (C) Embassy Berlin strongly recommends that the Washington

Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) and data privacy
experts currently scheduled to visit Brussels next week also
visit Berlin to discuss TFTP and U.S. data privacy policy
with German officials. Germany is critical to the debate on
data protection issues within the EU and we need to engage
German government interlocutors, parliamentarians and opinion
makers. The exaggerated data privacy views of the current
minority governing partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP),
have contributed to a domestic discussion that distorts U.S.
policy and is negatively-influencing the European debate.
Embassy believes we will be most successful if we address
German data privacy concerns in a comprehensive way,
including various information sharing programs such as
HSPD-6, TFTP, and Passenger Name Records.
¶3. (C) Germany has become a difficult partner with regards to

security-related information sharing initiatives following
the September 27 national elections, which brought the FDP
into the governing coalition. The FDP sees themselves as
defenders of citizens' privacy rights and these views have
led the FDP to oppose many of Germany's post-9/11
counterterrorism legislative proposals (see reftels). At
times, the FDP's fixation on data privacy and protection
issues looks to have come at the expense of the party forming
responsible views on counterterrorism policy.
¶4. (C) Over the past months, Ambassador Murphy, the DCM, and
other embassy staff have engaged German government
interlocutors, influential parliamentarians and law
enforcement officials to stress the importance of
security-related information sharing initiatives such as
TFTP. However, in these meetings, our German counterparts
consistently raise concerns about U.S. data protection
measures and policy. Furthermore, the German views often
distort and misrepresent U.S. policy. For example, current
Federal Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
(FDP) - who has considerable influence - is particularly
outspoken and does not appear to have (or perhaps want) an
informed view of USG data privacy practices. It is critical
that we aggressively and vocally counter these
misrepresentations of U.S. policy.
¶5. (C) Embassy staff raised the prospect of an inter-agency

experts group visiting Berlin with xxxxx.
xxxxx who is a strong supporter of close U.S.-German
counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing,
welcomed the proposal and believed that skeptics of U.S.
policy in other ministries and Bundestag parliamentarians
would benefit from a comprehensive and factual discussion of
the details of U.S. data protection policy.
¶6. (C) In addition to our request that the Treasury visitors

to Brussels add a Berlin-stop, we strongly recommend that an
inter-agency data privacy experts delegation visit Berlin to
discuss overall U.S. data privacy policy with German
officials. The FDP returned to power after a ten-year foray
in the opposition and key leaders lack experience in the
practical matters of tackling real-world security issues in
the Internet age. In our meetings we have made the point
that countering terrorism in a globalized world, where
terrorists and their supporters use open borders and
information technology to quickly move people and financing,
requires robust international data sharing. We need to also
BERLIN 00000128 002 of 002
demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in

place so that robust data sharing comes with robust data
protections.
Murphy
Viewing cable 10CARACAS107, January 2010 Caracas CIWG

Discussing cables
10CARACAS107 2010-01-28 18:06 2010-11-30 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Caracas
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S E C R E T CARACAS 000107
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NOFORN
DS/ICI/CI, DS/IP/WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28

TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: January 2010 Caracas CIWG
CLASSIFIED BY: Andres Barcenas, ARSO, Dept. of State, RSO Caracas;

REASON: 1.4(G)
(SBU) On January 5, 2010 Caracas held its bi-annual

Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG) meeting to review current
threat levels and countermeasures, to discuss recent CI activity
and establish post policy on use of FOBs and Opennet Blackberries.
In attendance for the meeting were representatives from MSG, POL,
MGT, RSO, DHS, LEGAT, DEA, CONS, ESO, ECON, DAO/Milgroup, ORA and
IMO. The DCM chaired the meeting.
(S/NF) RSO stated the current threat levels for post and stressed
that Caracas is critical and high in 4 of the 6 threat categories.
RSO and other sections confirmed that Venezuelan Intelligence
Services (Directorate of Military Intelligence-DIM and the
Bolivarian Intelligence Service-SEBIN formerly DISIP) are
conducting HUMINT and TECH operations against Embassy staff, as
well as political opposition leaders and are controlled by the
Cuban Intelligence Service operating in Venezuela. While the
collection priority appears to be for political opposition leaders,
RSO reminded everyone that the VIS have the capability, means and
desire to monitor and target Embassy staff.
(SBU) During a review of the current threat levels RSO and SEO
stressed the requirement that locally engaged staff without
security clearances must be escorted at all times in the CAA. This
includes the front entrance of the 5th floor area near the
elevators. LE Staff must not be left unattended in that area.
(SBU) RSO reminded Section heads when having staff meetings with
local employees (non-cleared Americans) inside CAA locations the
Section Head MUST compartmentalize all information and only discuss
unclassified information in their presence. In addition SEO
explained the standards for introducing electronic or new items
into CAA locations and reiterated that no computers or other
electronic items are allowed in CAA unless they have been sent
securely to Post through the classified pouch system and controlled
at all times. Personal items must be screened and tagged by the
SEO before entering the CAA areas. This standard applies to all
agencies and staff, PSC or TDY. SEO is working with MGT to send
out a management notice to all staff reminding them of proper
procurement procedures for CAA locations.
(SBU) RSO reiterated to all Section heads the Department policy and
guidelines for Foreign Contact Reporting and encouraged all Section
Heads to review the contact reporting policy with all Cleared
Americans in their sections. In addition RSO reminded staff that
contact reporting is required for all personal social engagements
with locally engaged staff from the Embassy. RSO will resubmit the
Mission Security Notice on Foreign Contact Reporting next week as a
reminder to all staff.
(SBU) As part of Post Debriefing Program, RSO expects DS TDY

support from Washington in March/April to assist with the Annual
Security Briefings for all Embassy staff. RSO will hold another
debriefing review this month for all cleared-American staff
arriving at post over the last 90 to 120 days.
(S) RSO stressed the need to establish a clear post policy on the
issuance of FOBs and Opennet Blackberries. IMO stated that
currently only cleared American staff have been issued FOBs and
Blackberries, but a few sections have stated the need for a FSN to
carry Blackberries. It was agreed that the CIWG will review all
requests for FOBS and Blackberries and will determine if the need
and stated justification should be approved or denied. The CIWG
discussed the pros and cons of FOB use within Venezuela and on home
computers. The CIWG affirmed that FOBs should remain issued only
to cleared American staff (Further review of the Department
guidelines and requirements states that based on Caracas' threat
level cleared American staff must only use the FOBS on computers
that meet all the Department required security guidelines.) The
CIWG determined that individuals assigned FOBs should evaluate
their need and use discretion of the FOB only when the work cannot
be completed at the Embassy (perhaps only Unclass and not SBU).
Cleared Americans issued FOBs should receive an additional briefing
from the ISSO and the RSO to discourage frivolous use of the FOB,
with a review of what constitutes SBU, especially for non-State
Agencies.
(SBU) Point of contact for this cable is ARSO Andres Barcenas and
RSO Wendy Bashnan, telephone number 58-212-907-8403. Regards.
Viewing cable 10DAMASCUS8, CODEL GREGG'S DECEMBER 30
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
Discussing cables
10DAMASCUS8 2010-01-04 09:09 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Embassy Damascus
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RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0349
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0151
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DAMASCUS 000008
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA

NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR NOBLES
LONDON FOR LORD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2029

TAGS: PREL IR LE IZ SY
SUBJECT: CODEL GREGG'S DECEMBER 30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
ASAD
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (S) Summary: In a frank one-hour meeting with Syrian

President Bashar al-Asad, Senators Gregg, Bayh, Specter,
Enzi, Cornyn, and Klobuchar affirmed Washington's interest in
better U.S.-Syrian relations and pushed Asad to take positive
steps as well. The senators urged Syria to move forward on
security cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq, facilitating the
release of three detained Americans in Iran, and re-opening
the Damascus Community School. Asad welcomed the prospect of
more Congressional visits and candid exchanges, saying
diplomacy had failed to solve the region's problems during
the last two decades.
-- On comprehensive peace, Asad reiterated Syria's strong

desire to return to Turkish-facilitated indirect talks with
Israel as a means to establish agreed terms of reference for
direct negotiations. Syria's relations with Iran should not
be linked to Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. Syria's ties
to Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups could be satisfactorily
resolved only after the achievement of a comprehensive
regional peace, Asad maintained.
-- The U.S. and Syria should use the next several months to
improve bilateral relations so that both sides could overcome
mutual distrust that would hinder U.S. credibility as an
honest broker, Asad told the senators. Later in the
discussion, FM Muallim argued the onus for taking the next
positive step lay with the U.S. Syria could not move on
issues such as the American school or the Cultural Center
unless Washington lifted its ban on the sale of new
commercial aircraft to Syria.
-- Calling Iran the region's most important country, Asad

said the West could improve the prospects for peace by
acknowledging Iran's NPT-protected right to enrich uranium
under IAEA monitoring. Asad argued the West should accept
Iran's "reasonable" counter-offer to ship several batches of
low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for enrichment by other
countries, instead of insisting Iran ship all of its LEU at
once. Asad said he believed Iran was not interested in
pursuing a nuclear weapon, but warned that an Israeli
military strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure would fail
to disable the program and would only increase Iran's
determination. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- --
Doctor Asad: Treat, Don't Condemn, the Illness
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (S) A confident President Asad greeted the six visiting

senators and accompanying staff of CODEL Gregg on December 30
with a call for frank discussion of "the facts" rather than
an exchange of opinions. Only the facts, he said, would
enable both sides to focus on the critical issues of common
interest and lead to a process of identifying solutions to
shared challenges. The international community had failed
for two decades to solve the region's problems. Now, there
were new challenges on top of these that required direct, not
diplomatic, solutions. He welcomed the delegation, saying he
hoped for more meetings with Congressional groups.
¶3. (S) Senator Specter expressed the delegation's

condolences after the death of the President's younger
brother Majd and recalled his numerous meetings with
President Asad since their first meeting in 2000 at the
funeral of former Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. Senator
Specter referred to his earlier discussions with Syrian
officials about Israeli-Syrian peace talks and suggested
DAMASCUS 00000008 002 OF 006
Israel would benefit from peace with Syria. The U.S.

recognized Syria's deep and long-standing ties to Iran, but
it also saw dangers if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
Stipulating that the Israeli government would have to make
its own decisions on how to proceed in peace talks with Syria
without U.S. pressure, Specter suggested the U.S. would
positively view Syrian efforts to use its influence to alter
Iranian policies. Iranian policies currently opposed the
achievement of peace between Syria and Israel, even as Syria
recognized such a development would have a positive impact on
defusing other regional tensions.
¶4. (S) Asad asserted he wanted peace with Israel, but the
issues were complex and required an organized frame of
reference. Both sides might agree on the shared objective of
peace, but they differed on preferred approaches. Calling
for a fact-based approach to identifying the obstacles to
peace, Asad likened the process to how a doctor should treat
cancer. Condemnations and mutual recriminations might be
self-satisfying, but the cancer still grows unless the doctor
is able to treat the root illness. Syria, Asad continued,
had begun indirect peace talks with Israel in May 2008 under
Turkish auspices. In roughly eight months, these talks had
achieved more than several years of direct negotiations with
Israel in the 1990s. The U.S. and Europeans needed to
support the Turkish track, argued Asad. They also should
convince Israel that only peace will protect Israel.
Israel's military superiority would not secure it from attack
against missiles and other technologies. President Obama's
tenure might represent the last opportunity for peace, Asad
told the senators.
-----------------------------------------
Asad on Necessity of Indirect Peace Talks
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Senator Gregg asked why Syria insisted on pursuing

indirect peace talks via the Turks. Why couldn't Syria and
Israel move to direct talks brokered by the U.S., while Syria
helped on issues important to the U.S., such as Hizballah,
Hamas, and relations with Iran? Asad replied Hamas and
Hizballah should be a part of the peace, but not organizing
principles for conducting peace discussions. Syria, as
demonstrated by then-lead negotiator Muallim's efforts in the
1990s, had no problems with direct negotiations. But those
negotiations failed; failing again might foreclose future
opportunities. U.S. ambitions to push the peace process
forward only resulted in spoiling the process because of the
lack of "rules of negotiation." Indirect talks represent the
best way to establish terms of reference similar to those
reached by Secretary Baker during his intense shuttle
diplomacy in 1991. While no one called these talks indirect
negotiations, they functioned comparably to Syria's indirect
talks under Turkish auspices.
¶6. (S) Syria, Asad continued, saw the indirect talks as a

way to institutionalize the process and reach agreed terms of
reference on which to base direct negotiations. This basis
was absent in the 1990s and explained why the direct
negotiations ultimately failed. Referring to the "elephant
in the room," Gregg asked whether it would be possible to
reach peace with Israel without first resolving the Iranian
nuclear issue. Asad cautioned against linking Iran's nuclear
program to an Israeli-Syrian peace deal, arguing such a link
would only complicate both sets of issues. "Too many cooks
spoil the meal," he said. Later in the conversation, however
(in the context of a request for Syrian intervention with
Iran to free detained American hikers), Asad noted every
person and nation was key in bilateral and regional dynamics.
DAMASCUS 00000008 003 OF 006
Syria had cut relations with the U.S. after the 1967
Arab-Israeli conflict, but bilateral relations had improved
markedly after President Nixon visited Syria in 1974 to
discuss peace with Israel. "That's our issue," he stressed,
noting that the Golan track had been active under President
Carter but then dormant through most of the 1980s and the
early part of the current decade.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Iraq: Political Cooperation, Then Security Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶7. (S) Senator Bayh observed that many things in Syria had
changed for the better since his 2002 visit. Now, there were
positive indicators that bilateral relations might be on the
upswing as well. One area, however, in which relations had
not improved was intelligence cooperation. The U.S. and
Syria appeared to have common interests in seeing a stable
Iraq, not dominated by Iran. Yet, foreign extremists
continued to travel through Syria into Iraq. The U.S. had
provided information regarding four named individuals to the
Syrian government, but nothing had happened. Perhaps now was
a propitious moment to consider re-establishing intelligence
ties, Bayh suggested. Asad concurred with the idea of
overlapping U.S.-Syrian interests in Iraq. He noted,
however, that the main obstacle to increased U.S.-Syrian
security cooperation stemmed from the absence of political
cooperation. The U.S. possessed a "huge information
apparatus" but lacked the ability to analyze this information
successfully, maintained Asad. "You're failing in the fight
against extremism. While we lack your intelligence
capabilities, we succeed in fighting extremists because we
have better analysts," he claimed, attributing the superior
analysis to living in and understanding the region.
¶8. (S) Syria, Asad explained, had refused to cooperate with

President Bush because it did not trust him and because the
Bush Administration had wrongfully accused Syria of
supporting foreign fighters. When President Obama assumed
office, Syria tried to be positive. Asad he had proposed to
Special Envoy Mitchell the idea of a border security
cooperation initiative with Iraq as a first step. (Post
Comment: Asad's recollection is both selective and
inaccurate. U.S. officials first proposed a border security
cooperation initiative to a reluctant FM Muallim in May 2009.
President Asad agreed to participate after meeting S/E
Mitchell in late July 2009.) "This was a small step for me,
but big for you," Asad argued. Citing the U.S. inability to
control its long border with Mexico, Asad said the border was
not the major challenge. Syria's close intelligence
cooperation with Turkey enabled both countries to prevent
terrorists from crossing their 860-kilometer border without
relying on a huge border security presence. This
intelligence cooperation enabled Syria to "suffocate"
logistical networks critical to the movement of terrorists.
"In the U.S., you like to shoot (terrorists). Suffocating
their networks is far more effective," said Asad.
¶9. (S) Asad said Syria required a positive first step prior
to resuming intelligence cooperation, a position that Senator
Mitchell had accepted. Syria had succeeded in convincing
Iraqi PM Maliki on August 18 to reverse its opposition to the
trilateral border security initiative and was ready to
participate. After the August 19 bombings and Iraqi
accusations against Syria for facilitating the terrorist
attacks, Syria remained willing to participate in the border
assessments. It was the U.S., Asad insisted, that had backed
away. Syria had no interest in supporting extremists, who
weren't killing Americans but rather Iraqi civilians. "That
DAMASCUS 00000008 004 OF 006
hurts us," Asad claimed. U.S. "mistakes in Iraq" had cost

Syria and the region a great deal. Syria had out of
self-interest sought to deter terrorists who popped up.
Still, despite a shared interest with the U.S. in ensuring
Iraqi stability, Syria would not immediately jump to
intelligence cooperation without ensuring its own interests
would be respected. "I won't give it (intelligence
cooperation) to you for free," he said. Senator Bayh replied
that the U.S. was working to normalize relations and
considering positive steps to take along the way. Syria,
Asad commented, had been clear on how to start rebuilding
relations. "We didn't say no," he said, "but we have to
build from an absence of trust."
----------------------------------------
Asad: Door Open to Iranian Nuclear Deal
----------------------------------------
¶10. (S) Senator Cornyn commented the most dire threat to

regional peace stemmed from Iran's nuclear aspirations.
Syrian interests could well suffer if there were a conflict
between Israel and Iran and possibly others. Asad replied no
one could predict the course of a conflict; therefore, it was
better to avoid one. The Bush Administration took a
political approach to Iran instead of dealing with the
nuclear issue in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Under the NPT, Iran enjoys the right to enrich uranium,
provided there is IAEA monitoring. Instead of trying to stop
Iran's program, the international emphasis should shift to
ensuring proper monitoring. Iran had accepted the principle
of enriching uranium outside of its borders. Now the
challenge was how to meet Iran's concern that shipping all of
its LEU at once would risk not receiving any in return. Asad
claimed Iran sought only to enrich its uranium to 20 percent,
well bellow the 95 percent threshold necessary for
weapons-grade material. If the international community
agreed to divide Iran's shipments into four or five parts,
Iran would be flexible, Asad argued. In the meantime, Israel
had to forget about attacking Iran. Such a move would only
encourage Iran to follow the path of India, Pakistan, and
others in seeking a nuclear weapon. Syria opposed this
outcome, but viewed the only solution was to recognize Iran's
rights and demonstrate flexibility in foreign enrichment,
Asad said.
¶11. (S) Later in the conversation, Senator Specter argued

Iran appeared to be blocking a deal. Asad claimed Iranian
diplomacy was now more flexible because the government was
stronger and more confident after the 2009 elections. Noting
he had shared this assessment with French President Sarkozy,
Asad said he judged Iran to be looking for cooperative signs.
Iran represented the most important country in the region,
Asad assessed, ranking Turkey second and Syria third. The
U.S. had troops in Afghanistan and needed better relations
with Iran. Specter agreed the enrichment issue could be
solved; Russia had offered to enrich Iranian uranium several
years ago, subject to international monitoring. Iran had
answered yes, replied Asad, but the issue was how to proceed.
Iran's desire to divide the uranium shipments represented
the only difference: if the West agreed, the issue would be
solved. There was an open door; if the nuclear issue could
be solved, the peace process would proceed more easily. But
if conflict erupted, the regional context would become
extremely complicated.
------------------------------------
Discussion of Detained Amcits in Iran
-------------------------------------
DAMASCUS 00000008 005 OF 006
¶12. (S) Senator Klobuchar commented that she had supported

Barak Obama because of his promise to advance a new approach
to international relations. While there were no easy
solutions in the region, the U.S. and Syria appeared to have
overlapping interests in avoiding war and in ensuring a
strong and stable Iraq. From the U.S. perspective, Syria
might demonstrate as a goodwill gesture its interest in
better relations by helping obtain the release of three
American citizens -- Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer and Sarah
Shourd -- who apparrently crossed into Iran while hiking in
northeastern Iraq. Swiss officials had visited them, but
they were isolated and the U.S. lacked information on their
whereabouts and any pending charges.
¶13. (S) Asad replied he was unfamiliar with their case and
requested that the Embassy send more information. Senator
Specter interjected later in the conversation that the
Embassy had delivered a letter to the MFA that week from the
Secretary. Specter added he had personally raised the matter
in Washington with Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa. The U.S.
would view positively Syrian efforts to secure the three
Americans' release, Specter said, comparing the case to the
Iranian detention of UK sailors whom Syria helped to free.
"We'll try our best," replied Asad, saying it would be
necessary to ask about the legal aspects of the case.
Specter clarified there had been no charges filed. It had
started as a trespassing case, but U.S.-Iranian relations
were so poor it was impossible to resolve.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Re-Opening DCS: Syria Awaiting U.S. Steps First
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶13. (S) Senator Klobuchar and Senator Enzi argued Syria

might demonstrate good will by re-opening the Damascus
Community School (DCS), whose closure had hurt not just
American students, but also many foreigners and Syrians.
Senator Enzi said his committee's purview on education
created a personal interest in seeing the DCS re-opened; the
school's closure represented a step away from moving towards
positive relations. Asad replied he wanted to open Syria to
the rest of the world. In September 2008, for example, the
French Embassy opened a new international school. Asad
explained he had ordered DCS's closure after a U.S. military
attack on Syrian soil had killed seven innocent civilians in
late October 2008. "We had to respond," he argued, saying
the school's closure "was the only step we could take" in
response to the Bush Administration. President Carter, Asad
continued, had urged the reopening of DCS during his December
2008 visit. "I told Carter that we are ready," said Asad,
who noted the Syrian government wanted to send positive
signals to the Obama administration and had done so by
re-opening the American Cultural Center (ACC).
¶14. (S) FM Muallim noted that only part of the American

Language Center portion of ACC had been allowed to re-open.
He argued that he and other Syrian officials had told State
Department officials that steps by Syria to improve relations
first required U.S. steps. "We can't move without a waiver
for Syrian Airlines," he argued, citing the threat to Syrian
civilians posed a U.S. ban on the sale of civilian aircraft
and spare parts. Asad noted that a good friend who ran a
medical laboratory was similarly unable to import U.S. lab
technology. The bigger issue, Asad said, was about bilateral
relations. Syria's intent was to re-open the DCS. Asad said
he trusted President Carter and supported President Obama.
"We know he has other problems and priorities, but there must
be U.S. steps," Asad insisted.
DAMASCUS 00000008 006 OF 006
¶15. (C) U.S. Participants:

CDA Charles Hunter
Senator Judd Gregg
Senator Evan Bayh
Senator Arlen Specter
Senator Michael Enzi
Senator John Cornyn
Senator Amy Klobuchar
Mr. Paul Grove, Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee
Mr. Christopher Gahan, Staff Member, Senator Gregg's Office
Mr. Michael Pevzner, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
Mr. Tom Sullivan, Staff Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
Mr. Christopher Bradish, Staff Member, Senator Specter's
Office
¶16. (C) Syrian Participants:

Foreign Minister Walid Muallim
Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad
Presidential Advisor for Media and Policy Affairs Bouthaina
Shaaban
MFA America's Desk Director Dr. Muhammad Khafif
¶17. (SBU) Mr. Paul Grove of CODEL Gregg cleared on this

cable.
HUNTER
Viewing cable 10ISLAMABAD175, FATA CLEARING OPERATIONS

CONTINUE, DISPLACED
Discussing cables
10ISLAMABAD175
VZCZCXRO6639
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0175/01 0250903
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250903Z JAN 10
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR MASS PK
SUBJECT: FATA CLEARING OPERATIONS CONTINUE, DISPLACED
RECEIVING ASSISTANCE, AMPLE FOOD
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2591

¶B. ISLAMABAD 2607
¶C. ISLAMABAD 2672
¶D. ISLAMABAD 2708
¶E. ISLAMABAD 2780
¶F. ISLAMABAD 2801
¶G. ISLAMABAD 2837
¶H. ISLAMABAD 2972
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Pakistani military is continuing its

counterinsurgency efforts along the main corridors of South
Waziristan and the northern and central FATA with low level
search and clear operations. Frontier Corps operations in
Bajaur remain on hold, awaiting additional forces.
Meanwhile, humanitarian assistance (food and non-food items)
is reaching both the approximately 12,000 families displaced
from Orakzai and the approximately 38,000 families displaced
from South Waziristan. Of the displaced, only a few, perhaps
one hundred families, are in a camp. End Summary.
SOUTH WAZIRISTAN: CLEARING OPERATIONS CONTINUE

--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (S/NF) In South Waziristan, units assigned to the 11th

Corps continue to conduct small-scale clearing operations on
major and secondary line of communication (LOCs) and in
built-up areas. Units of the 7th Division hold Makin and
Razmak on the northern axis; the 9th Division holds the
southwest axis from Wana while the 14th Division continues to
secure the LOC to Jandola in the south east. All division
continue to conduct search and clear operations. We do not
expect any major new operations in South Waziristan for the
moment. There has been talk of an additional push, but
Pakistani military contacts have indicated to us that troop
rotations and resupply requirements mean any additional
effort would not happen before March.
BAJAUR: WAITING FOR A MAJOR OFFENSIVE

-------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) In Bajaur Agency, Pakistan Army troops remain

deployed along the Charmung and Watalai Valley, with
additional checkpoints in place near Khar to screen vehicles
entering and leaving the Watalai Valley -- an indication of
possible preparations for a future operation. U.S. provided
Intelligence targets of interest in Bajaur Agency's Mamund
Valley and provide coordinates for artillery strikes and
future Pakistan Air Force air strikes. It is likely these
operations will continue through the end of January.
¶4. (S/NF) Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps forces

appear to be delaying the start of a planned three-week
offensive in the Mamund Valley, originally scheduled to start
on January 6, because of a request for two additional Army
battalions for clearing operations. The additional forces
are the 14th Punjab Battalion (from Kwazakhela, Swat, the
12th Northern Light Infantry Battalion (from Sialkot, Punjab)
and the 4th Commando Battalion and Karrar Company of the
Special Services Group battalion (the Pakistan Army's Special
Forces). In addition, the 2nd Wing of the Tocho Scouts
(currently in Bajaur) may be relieved by a wing of the
Chitral Scouts, who just completed FCTC training at Warsak.
INCREASED CHECKPOINTS
---------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Access to Orakzai Agency from the surrounding four

agencies and districts has been blocked by security forces,
and artillery and armor have moved to the Khyber and Kurram
borders with Orakzai. This coupled with the repositioning of
artillery and armor assets in Kurram and Khyber suggests
additional operations are imminent against TTP insurgents in
western Orakzai or Tariq Afridi militants in the Darra Adam
Khel region of NWFP.
INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION
-----------------------------
ISLAMABAD 00000175 002 OF 002
¶6. (U) On December 31, 2009, USAID signed and Implementation

Letter (IL) with the FATA Secretariat for the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of water, road and energy infrastructure
in South Waziristan. USAID will
reimburse the FATA Secretariat for work completed according
to pre-agreed costs and specifications. The GOP is currently
preparing the specifications and cost estimates for the
projects, with an initial emphasis on a major road between
Tank and Makeen. Once the design and cost estimate has been
completed and approved, USAID will advance the FATA
Secretariat 15 percent of the cost to cover mobilization
expenses, with additional funding to be disbursed after the
work is completed. The FATA Secretariat is contracting the
Frontier Works Organization (FWO) to implement the road
projects. In a January 14 meeting with USAID, FWO confirmed
that it had mobilized a team in South Waziristan to complete
the design and cost estimates.
ASSISTANCE TO ORAKZAI AND SWA DISPLACED

---------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Humanitarian assistance - food and non-food items

(NFI) - is reaching both the approximately 12,000 families
displaced from Orakzai and the approximately 38,000 families
displaced from South Waziristan. Of the Orakzai displaced,
the 8,000 families in Kohat have received NFI through UNHCR,
and the rest, who are in Hangu, are supported by ICRC. Only
a very few -- perhaps one hundred families -- are in a camp.
While the Orakzai displaced do not receive cash payments from
the Government of Pakistan, they are supported with food from
the World Food Program (WFP).
¶8. (C) Those registered displaced (members of the Mehsud

tribe) from South Waziristan are primarily in DI Khan and
Tank where they have received ample non-food items from
UNHCR. They receive a one-month food distribution from WFP
upon registration and then are entitled to government
payments of PKR 5,000 (about $60) a month. Those who do not
yet have activated government cash cards continue to receive
WFP food.
¶9. (C) For military and strategic purposes, the GOP does not
recognize members of the neighboring Bhittani tribe as
conflict-displaced IDPs and hence has not designated them as
eligible for government payments. Recently, however, UNHCR
was pleased to be able to win government permission to
register the Bhittani displaced unofficially and to see that
they receive humanitarian assistance. A total of some 2,000
Bhittani families are being registered in DI Khan and Tank,
and when this registration is completed in the next few days,
this group will benefit from NFI and food distributions.
¶10. (SBU) Even prior to the security forces' blocking of

access to Orakzai Agency, humanitarian actors have not been
able to provide assistance within Orakzai or South
Waziristan. Humanitarian organizations have begun planning,
however, for possible assistance upon the eventual return of
IDPs to areas of displacement. They have received some
indications from the military to expect the beginning of this
return in March.
¶11. (S/NF) Comment: As we have previously noted, the Army's

South Waziristan campaign has significantly eroded the TTP's
command and control, but has not destroyed the TTP network,
whose fighters melted away in South Waziristan or fled to
other FATA agencies, rather than put up stiff resistance.
The Army still faces a long road ahead in rooting out the TTP
in South Waziristan and pursuing TTP elements elsewhere in
the FATA.
PATTERSON
Viewing cable 10LONDON86, AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH LIBERAL
DEMOCRAT LEADER
Discussing cables
10LONDON86
14:02 23:11 N London
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #0086/01 0151430

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151430Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EUR/WE FOR MARBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2020

TAGS MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, UK, AF, PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADER
NICK CLEGG
REF: 09 LONDON 2569
Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Ambassador Susman paid an introductory call on Liberal

Democratic Party leader Nick Clegg on January 12. Clegg may find himself cast
into the role of kingmaker if neither of the two main parties wins an outright
parliamentary majority in the upcoming general elections, -- though Clegg
refused to be pinned down as to what his party would do in the event of a hung
parliament. Clegg stressed the tremendous amount of “goodwill” his party has for
the Obama Administration, raising no major objections to current U.S. policy
objectives and expressing his party’s support for the new strategy in
Afghanistan. End Summary.
Overly Optimistic
-----------------
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Susman paid an introductory call on Liberal Democratic

Party leader Nick Clegg on January 12. Clegg may find himself cast into the role
of kingmaker if neither the Labour nor Conservative parties win an outright
parliamentary majority. As he has done recently with the press, Clegg refused to
be pinned down as to which party the Lib Dems would support in the event of a
hung parliament, insisting instead that his strategy was to “focus on the long
term goals.” Despite the fact that current polls indicate that Lib Dems are
unlikely to even hold onto the 63 parliamentary seats they currently have, Clegg
appeared optimistic that his party would make progress towards his goal of
doubling their number of seats.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶3. (SBU) Clegg noted that while the Lib Dems have been very vocal in their
opposition to coalition efforts in Iraq, his party has always supported military
action in Afghanistan. Clegg perceived that “a real page had been turned,” with
Obama’s announcement of our new strategy. Clegg particularly welcomed the Obama
administration’s increased emphasis on civilian engagement. (Note: Clegg has
been extremely critical of HMG’s prosecution of the war effort. Last summer, for
example, he wrote in an op-ed that “recent events have led me to question, for
the first time, whether we’re going about things in the right way...Our young
men and women’s lives are being thrown away because our politicians won’t get
their act together.” Reftel outlines senior Lib Dem statesman Paddy Ashdown’s
views on challenges in Afghanistan and his belief that Lib Dems were “in for the
long haul.”) Ambassador Susman expressed U.S. appreciation for the important
contribution made by UK forces, confirmed our long-term commitment, and stressed
the importance of reconciliation in our future efforts.
Relations with the U.S.

-----------------------
¶4. (SBU) Clegg stressed that one “could not overestimate” the “amount of
goodwill” his party has for the Obama Administration. He quickly accepted
Ambassador Susman’s offer of a briefing on the 2003 extradition treaty. (We
believe the Lib Dems misunderstand the facts.) Clegg further noted that of the
three major political parties in the UK, the Lib Dems are, and have always been,
the biggest supporters of a strong EU. He stressed his belief that the UK had an
important role to play in advocating mutual objectives in Brussels. In response
to Clegg’s question on key priorities the USG would be looking for from any new
British government, Ambassador Susman noted the need for support on the full
range of mutually-shared foreign policy objectives including, among others:
Afghanistan, Pakistan, MEPP, Iran, China and climate change.
Comment
-------
¶5. (C) Clegg came across as very smooth, a bit like Tory Leader David Cameron.
While critical of the previous administration, Clegg expressed considerable
admiration for President Obama. He downplayed his party’s likely leverage in the
event of a hung parliament or minority government, claiming it was “not as much
leverage as people think.” Nevertheless, should the elections bring that result,
Clegg’s choices will be critical. Much will depend, however, on whether he can
keep his often fractious parliamentarians in line.
ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Viewing cable 10LONDON131, SOURCE REMOVED] TARGETED BY

IRANIAN REGIME
Discussing cables
10LONDON131
12:12 18:06 N London
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #0131 0211217

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211217Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
Thursday, 21 January 2010, 12:17

NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS PINR, PTER, PINS, UK, IR
SUBJECT: [SOURCE REMOVED] TARGETED BY IRANIAN REGIME
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: [DETAIL REMOVED] and prominent VOA commentator Ali Reza
Nourizadeh recently told [NAME REMOVED] he had been targeted by Iranian
intelligence, an allegation confirmed by London LEGATT. Nourizadeh was
approached some months ago by Mohammad Reza Sadeqinia, an Iranian national who
introduced himself as a “big fan” of Nourizadeh’s. Nourizadeh met Sadeqinia on
several occasions in London and Washington, DC, but became suspicious when
Sadeqinia took large numbers of photos, including of Nourizadeh’s vehicle.
Sadeqinia was arrested in California on charges of soliciting murder after he
attempted to hire a hitman to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid
Sharmahd. Because his pattern of behavior towards Nourizadeh was similar to his
interactions with Sharmahd, FBI shared the threat information with UK
authorities, who subsequently warned Nourizadeh. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C/NF) Ali Reza Nourizadeh [DETAILS REMOVED] had been visited by British
anti-terrorism police who informed him he had been targeted by the Iranian
regime. The UK authorities (who,[NAME REMOVED] later learned had received the
threat information from the FBI) told Nourizadeh that Reza Sadeqinia, a man who
had visited Nourizadeh several times in London and Washington, DC, was working
for the Iranian intelligence services and gathering information on Nourizadeh’s
habits. They advised Nourizadeh that Sadeqinia had been arrested in California
for soliciting the murder of Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd.
¶3. (C/NF) Nourizadeh, obviously shaken by this news, told [NAME REMOVED]
Sadeqinia had contacted him several months before, claiming to be a “big fan” of
Nourizadeh’s. Nourizadeh became suspicious after Sadeqinia insisted on taking
large numbers of photos, including shots of Nourizadeh’s car and garage. His
suspicions were confirmed after he received a message from a well-placed friend
who told Nourizadeh he had seen dozens of photos of him on the desk of Iranian
Deputy Intelligence Minister Alavi. At that point, Nourizadeh stopped taking
Sadeqinia’s calls and heard nothing more about the matter until he was visited
by UK anti-terror police January 14.
¶4. (C/NF) London LEGATT confirmed the arrest of Sadeqinia in the U.S. after he
attempted to hire a man to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd of
Tondar Radio. Prior to the solicitation of the hitman, videos of Sharmahd had
begun to appear on YouTube with commentary that he was acting against Iran and
an enemy of the state. Sadeqinia apparently admitted his surveillance of both
Sharmahd and Nourizadeh and claimed he was working on behalf of Iranian
intelligence. After similar videos of Nourizadeh were discovered, the FBI
authorized UK authorities to share the threat information with Nourizadeh. UK
authorities are working with Nourizadeh to improve his personal security, and
Nourizadeh is cooperating by providing information about his interactions with
Sadeqinia.
¶5. (C/NF) COMMENT: Nourizadeh is a well-known figure both inside and outside
Iran, and is an outspoken critic of the Iranian regime, so it is unsurprising
that the regime would want to keep a close eye on him. If, however, the regime
has targeted Nourizadeh for assassination, as it appears to have done with
Sharmahd, it marks a clear escalation in the regime’s attempts to intimidate
critics outside its borders, and could have a chilling effect on journalists,
academics and others in the West who until recently felt little physical threat
from the regime. Nourizadeh, while clearly taking the threat seriously, will not
be cowed -- he’s faced this type of threat before (many years ago when he first
left Iran), and he has confidence in the British authorities’ ability to protect
him. In fact, he has encouraged other prominent opposition leaders like Shirin
Ebadi and Mohsen Makhmalbaf to relocate to London for their own safety. END
COMMENT.
ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Viewing cable 10LUXEMBOURG5, TO HELL AND BACK: GITMO EX-

DETAINEE STUMPS IN LUXEMBOURG
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10LUXEMBOURG5.
2010-01-15 2010-11-30 Embassy
10LUXEMBOURG5 CONFIDENTIAL
15:03 17:05 Luxembourg
VZCZCXRO9556
DE RUEHLE #0005/01 0151534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151534Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUXEMBOURG 000005
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE VALERIE BELON, S/GC MICHAEL WILLIAMS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/15

TAGS PGOV, KDRG, PREL, LU
SUBJECT: TO HELL AND BACK: GITMO EX-DETAINEE STUMPS IN LUXEMBOURG
REF: 09 LUXEMBOURG 328; 09 LUXEMBOURG 288; 09 LUXEMBOURG 302
CLASSIFIED BY: Adam Center, Consul; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainee Moazzam Begg met with
Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn 14 January 2010 to press the government of
Luxembourg to accept GTMO detainees for resettlement. Begg, a British citizen of
Pakistani origin, was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 and imprisoned in Kandahar,
Bagram, and Guantanamo Bay, before his release to Britain in 2005. In a
statement to RTL Television, Asselborn said that Luxembourg will do what is
possible and reiterated the government’s position to provide financial
assistance, training and housing costs, and other technical assistance. Consular
officer attended an evening screening of the documentary film “Taxi to the Dark
Side,” followed by a Q&A session with Begg. When asked if he thought Luxembourg
will do more than contribute financially to the resettlement efforts, Begg
replied that he was “pleasantly surprised” with his conversations with MFA
officials and “hopeful.” END SUMMARY
--------------------------------------------
AUDIENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Ex-GTMO detainee Moazzam Begg, released from Guantanamo Bay in 2005, is
barnstorming throughout Europe, pushing governments to accept GTMO detainees for
resettlement. Following his release from GTMO, Begg created an NGO dedicated to
this cause, called Caged Prisoners. Representatives from two additional NGOs,
Reprieve and Center for Constitutional Rights, accompanied Begg on his visit to
Luxembourg. Luxembourg media coverage on the Asselborn-Begg meeting was
ubiquitous, but superficial. With numerous reports that the meeting occurred,
nearly all media outlets were silent on the actual substance of the meeting.
Only Begg provided some limited insight into the outcome of the meeting.
Speaking later in the evening (see para 4), he responded to an inquiry about the
meeting by saying that “without giving anything away,” he was “pleasantly
surprised” and “hopeful.”
--------------------------------------------- -----------
ASSELBORN: “WE’LL HELP”/BEGG: “DO MORE”
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) In an interview following his meeting with Begg, Asselborn avoided
specifics of the discussion. He reiterated Luxembourg’s willingness to provide
financial assistance to the resettlement efforts - the GoL party line for many
months. Asselborn said, however, that he was in regular contact with American
officials, including Special Envoy Dan Fried, as recently as last week. (See
refs a and b on the Asselborn-Fried meeting in September 2009 in Luxembourg and
subsequent exchange of letters.) In comments to the press following the meeting,
Begg only explained what the messages he delivered were - not how those messages
were received. Begg’s primary message is that European governments have to step
up and accept some of the GTMO detainees for resettlement. Begg, an articulate
man, argued that there are dozens of prisoners in GTMO just like him - not
dangerous to society, able to communicate and assimilate, able to be a
contributing and responsible member of society - and they just need governments
to stand up and offer them a place to call home. In an interview prior to his
meeting with Asselborn, Begg was asked if countries like Luxembourg have a
responsibility regarding ex-detainees. Begg reportedly responded that it is a
European tradition to offer asylum to refugees, and that this tradition also
should be extended to former Guantanamo detainees who have not been convicted of
crimes, are not dangerous, and are deemed as releasable.
LUXEMBOURG 00000005 002 OF 003
----------------
TAXI TO HELL
----------------
¶4. (SBU) Begg later attended an Amnesty International-hosted screening of 2007
Oscar Winner for Best Documentary “Taxi to the Dark Side” (French translation of
film title: “Taxi to Hell”). Conoff attended screening and Begg’s Q&A session
following the film. The film, a harrowing depiction of alleged torture inside
Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo, was an undisguised attack on the Bush
Administration, focusing much of its venom on Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
and Former Vice President Cheney. Mr. Begg, on the other hand, presented an
image of “forgive, but never forget,” and has focused his attentions not on the
ill treatment he allegedly received, but on what can be done to resettle the
remaining “releasable” prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. Reporting officer estimates
100-150 people attended the filming and Q&A session and noted the complete
absence of press, other diplomats, or GoL officials.
--------------------------------------------- -
LOOKING FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD
--------------------------------------------- -
¶5. (C) During his presentation, Begg spoke almost exclusively of the future,
with hardly any mention of the past. He did not discuss the question of legality
of torture. Rather than stressing past injustices, he focused on what to do now.
He acknowledged that he lives with the past, but that he now wants to be part of
the solution, and is working to convince Luxembourg and other governments - and
their populaces - to want the same.
---------------------------------------
LUXEMBOURGERS NOT SO SURE
---------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) In a 90-minute Q&A session, Begg was asked, how would ex-detainees fit
in in Luxembourg. How would it work? Where would they live? How would they be
supported? The fear and skepticism was palpable in the audience. Begg and his
NGO cohorts stressed that there were Algerians and Tunisians in GTMO who could
come to Luxembourg and speak French, one of Luxembourg’s official and most-
commonly used languages. He stressed that neighboring countries - France,
Belgium, Portugal, Ireland - provided examples. Begg even argued that if
detainees could fit in in Palau, they could do the same in Luxembourg. Begg
deplored that certain people believe the world is not big enough for the ex-
detainees. He added that if there were colonies on the Moon, “I’m sure they’d
send us there.”
¶7. (SBU) Begg declined to speak about specific physical transgressions against
his person. When told how physically well and mentally sound he appeared, he
joked, “Well, I used to be taller.” Begg spoke articulately, demonstrating
minimal ill will toward his captors - even going so far as to say he speaks on
the
phone occasionally with his former interrogators. Consular officer took note of
the following exchange: Asked if he would ever consider a return to the U.S.,
Begg replied that he had never been to the U.S., but that the U.S. had come to
him. Begg commented that as a British citizen, he could travel to the U.S.
without a visa, but that he thinks he would need “a lot more than a visa to get
out.”
-------------
COMMENT
-------------
¶8. (C) Mr. Begg is doing our work for us, and his articulate, reasoned
presentation makes for a convincing argument. It is ironic that after four years
of imprisonment and alleged torture, Moazzam Begg is delivering the same
demarche to GOL as we are: please consider accepting GTMO detainees for
resettlement. Despite Begg’s optimism, the Prime and Foreign Ministers continue
to publicly state that the GoL supports the closure of the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility and stands ready to assist from a financial and logistical
perspective, but cannot accept detainees for resettlement.
¶9. (U) Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moazzam_Begg and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxi_to_the_Dark _Side for extensive information on
Moazzam Begg and the film “Taxi to the Dark Side.” Stroum
Viewing cable 10LUXEMBOURG5, TO HELL AND BACK: GITMO EX-

DETAINEE STUMPS IN LUXEMBOURG
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10LUXEMBOURG5.
2010-01-15 2010-11-30 Embassy
10LUXEMBOURG5 CONFIDENTIAL
15:03 17:05 Luxembourg
VZCZCXRO9556
DE RUEHLE #0005/01 0151534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151534Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUXEMBOURG 000005
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE VALERIE BELON, S/GC MICHAEL WILLIAMS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/15

TAGS PGOV, KDRG, PREL, LU
SUBJECT: TO HELL AND BACK: GITMO EX-DETAINEE STUMPS IN LUXEMBOURG
REF: 09 LUXEMBOURG 328; 09 LUXEMBOURG 288; 09 LUXEMBOURG 302
CLASSIFIED BY: Adam Center, Consul; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainee Moazzam Begg met with
Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn 14 January 2010 to press the government of
Luxembourg to accept GTMO detainees for resettlement. Begg, a British citizen of
Pakistani origin, was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 and imprisoned in Kandahar,
Bagram, and Guantanamo Bay, before his release to Britain in 2005. In a
statement to RTL Television, Asselborn said that Luxembourg will do what is
possible and reiterated the government’s position to provide financial
assistance, training and housing costs, and other technical assistance. Consular
officer attended an evening screening of the documentary film “Taxi to the Dark
Side,” followed by a Q&A session with Begg. When asked if he thought Luxembourg
will do more than contribute financially to the resettlement efforts, Begg
replied that he was “pleasantly surprised” with his conversations with MFA
officials and “hopeful.” END SUMMARY
--------------------------------------------
AUDIENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Ex-GTMO detainee Moazzam Begg, released from Guantanamo Bay in 2005, is
barnstorming throughout Europe, pushing governments to accept GTMO detainees for
resettlement. Following his release from GTMO, Begg created an NGO dedicated to
this cause, called Caged Prisoners. Representatives from two additional NGOs,
Reprieve and Center for Constitutional Rights, accompanied Begg on his visit to
Luxembourg. Luxembourg media coverage on the Asselborn-Begg meeting was
ubiquitous, but superficial. With numerous reports that the meeting occurred,
nearly all media outlets were silent on the actual substance of the meeting.
Only Begg provided some limited insight into the outcome of the meeting.
Speaking later in the evening (see para 4), he responded to an inquiry about the
meeting by saying that “without giving anything away,” he was “pleasantly
surprised” and “hopeful.”
--------------------------------------------- -----------
ASSELBORN: “WE’LL HELP”/BEGG: “DO MORE”
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) In an interview following his meeting with Begg, Asselborn avoided
specifics of the discussion. He reiterated Luxembourg’s willingness to provide
financial assistance to the resettlement efforts - the GoL party line for many
months. Asselborn said, however, that he was in regular contact with American
officials, including Special Envoy Dan Fried, as recently as last week. (See
refs a and b on the Asselborn-Fried meeting in September 2009 in Luxembourg and
subsequent exchange of letters.) In comments to the press following the meeting,
Begg only explained what the messages he delivered were - not how those messages
were received. Begg’s primary message is that European governments have to step
up and accept some of the GTMO detainees for resettlement. Begg, an articulate
man, argued that there are dozens of prisoners in GTMO just like him - not
dangerous to society, able to communicate and assimilate, able to be a
contributing and responsible member of society - and they just need governments
to stand up and offer them a place to call home. In an interview prior to his
meeting with Asselborn, Begg was asked if countries like Luxembourg have a
responsibility regarding ex-detainees. Begg reportedly responded that it is a
European tradition to offer asylum to refugees, and that this tradition also
should be extended to former Guantanamo detainees who have not been convicted of
crimes, are not dangerous, and are deemed as releasable.
----------------
TAXI TO HELL
----------------
¶4. (SBU) Begg later attended an Amnesty International-hosted screening of 2007
Oscar Winner for Best Documentary “Taxi to the Dark Side” (French translation of
film title: “Taxi to Hell”). Conoff attended screening and Begg’s Q&A session
following the film. The film, a harrowing depiction of alleged torture inside
Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo, was an undisguised attack on the Bush
Administration, focusing much of its venom on Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
and Former Vice President Cheney. Mr. Begg, on the other hand, presented an
image of “forgive, but never forget,” and has focused his attentions not on the
ill treatment he allegedly received, but on what can be done to resettle the
remaining “releasable” prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. Reporting officer estimates
100-150 people attended the filming and Q&A session and noted the complete
absence of press, other diplomats, or GoL officials.
--------------------------------------------- -
LOOKING FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD
--------------------------------------------- -
¶5. (C) During his presentation, Begg spoke almost exclusively of the future,
with hardly any mention of the past. He did not discuss the question of legality
of torture. Rather than stressing past injustices, he focused on what to do now.
He acknowledged that he lives with the past, but that he now wants to be part of
the solution, and is working to convince Luxembourg and other governments - and
their populaces - to want the same.
---------------------------------------
LUXEMBOURGERS NOT SO SURE
---------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) In a 90-minute Q&A session, Begg was asked, how would ex-detainees fit
in in Luxembourg. How would it work? Where would they live? How would they be
supported? The fear and skepticism was palpable in the audience. Begg and his
NGO cohorts stressed that there were Algerians and Tunisians in GTMO who could
come to Luxembourg and speak French, one of Luxembourg’s official and most-
commonly used languages. He stressed that neighboring countries - France,
Belgium, Portugal, Ireland - provided examples. Begg even argued that if
detainees could fit in in Palau, they could do the same in Luxembourg. Begg
deplored that certain people believe the world is not big enough for the ex-
detainees. He added that if there were colonies on the Moon, “I’m sure they’d
send us there.”
¶7. (SBU) Begg declined to speak about specific physical transgressions against
his person. When told how physically well and mentally sound he appeared, he
joked, “Well, I used to be taller.” Begg spoke articulately, demonstrating
minimal ill will toward his captors - even going so far as to say he speaks on
the
phone occasionally with his former interrogators. Consular officer took note of
the following exchange: Asked if he would ever consider a return to the U.S.,
Begg replied that he had never been to the U.S., but that the U.S. had come to
him. Begg commented that as a British citizen, he could travel to the U.S.
without a visa, but that he thinks he would need “a lot more than a visa to get
out.”
-------------
COMMENT
-------------
¶8. (C) Mr. Begg is doing our work for us, and his articulate, reasoned
presentation makes for a convincing argument. It is ironic that after four years
of imprisonment and alleged torture, Moazzam Begg is delivering the same
demarche to GOL as we are: please consider accepting GTMO detainees for
resettlement. Despite Begg’s optimism, the Prime and Foreign Ministers continue
to publicly state that the GoL supports the closure of the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility and stands ready to assist from a financial and logistical
perspective, but cannot accept detainees for resettlement.
¶9. (U) Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moazzam_Begg and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxi_to_the_Dark _Side for extensive information on
Moazzam Begg and the film “Taxi to the Dark Side.” Stroum
Viewing cable 10PARIS71, STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH

ON IRAN,
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10PARIS71.
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #0071/01 0221744

ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY AD133C36 MSI9843-695)
R 221744Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
H PASS TO HOUSE STAFFER KESSLER'S OFFICE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020

TAGS: PGOV PREL IR AF PK FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,
SANCTIONS AND AFGHANISTAN
REF: 09 PARIS 1671
Classified By: Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) Staffdel Kessler, representing the House Committee on

Foreign Affairs, visited Paris January 12-14 to engage French
officials, non-government entities and the private sector
regarding Iran, sanctions, non-proliferation and Afghanistan.
With a main focus of discussing potential U.S. sanctions
legislation related to Iranian efforts to develop weapons of
mass destruction, the staffdel heard from a wide spectrum of
French players. Most of the opinions supported USG efforts
as France has been a strong ally, especially regarding Iran
and Afghanistan. While the usefulness of sanctions continues
to be debated, French officials said their government was
moving forward with haste, and bringing the European Union
(EU) with it, to prepare enhanced sanctions against Iran.
Even the French political opposition appears on board with
this plan. While challenges abound in Afghanistan, the
Government of France (GOF) remains firmly committed to NATO's
mission there. Total company senior representatives
explained to the staffdel members that its activities in Iran
are completely legal, small in scope and that it has not been
able to complete its buy out program there due to
foot-dragging by the Tehran regime. Highlights of Staffdel
Kessler's meetings in Paris are as follows. End summary.
IRAN: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW

------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) In a January 13 meeting with members of Staffdel

Kessler, Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs Advisor to
President Sarkozy, addressed the issue of imposing enhanced
sanctions against Iran. Richier explained that the GOF was
developing a package of measures that largely targeted the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps because of its economic
holdings and its role as a weapons proliferator. This
package would include:
--Finance - The GOF is willing to include the Iranian Central

Bank in targeted sanctions, most likely through some of its
subsidiary bodies. Paris is also trying to target an Iranian
Sovereign Wealth Fund which it recently learned has a branch
in Germany. France would also seek to impose sanctions that
would cut Iran's ability to conduct "correspondent banking."
--Transport - These sanctions would ban Iranian ships from
ports and harbors in Europe. The French envision the
possibility of enhanced sanctions that would trace Iranian
ships that have been re-flagged to obscure their origin. In
addition, Iranian air cargo planes would be banned from EU
airports.
--Insurance and re-insurance - Given the limited number of

actors in the re-insurance industry, France believes
prohibiting re-insurance coverage in Iran would be an
effective sanction.
--Oil and Gas - Paris proposes a ban on technical cooperation

and investment in Iran, a well as prohibiting exports of
refinery equipment and spare parts for oil and gas
industries.
¶3. (S/NF) Richier said he expects the EU will agree to

"complement" any eventual UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) and France hopes for a short timeline to secure a new
UNSCR in early February before securing approval at the
Council of EU Foreign Ministers later that month. Richier
said that we will have to decide whether to accept grudging
Russian concessions in order to get a UNSCR that may be weak
and limited, or whether to "waste time" trying to lobby for a
UNSCR that will be, at best, only marginally better. Richier
noted that it would be helpful if the U.S. Congress did not
act on sanctions legislation at least until the UNSCR debate
is concluded and he said it might be best to have U.S.
sanctions legislation reference the new UN resolution.
Regarding potential Chinese opposition, he hoped for
agreement on a new UNSCR (as the prior ones were unanimous),
but would accept a simple abstention. Richier expects Russia
will support the measure because the Russians were "shocked"
by the discovery of the uranium enrichment site in Qom.
Nevertheless, the Russians still need time to adjust their
thinking to this reality.
¶4. (S/NF) European countries face three main difficulties in

deciding on sanctions against Iran, according to Richier, and
he outlined them as follows:
--Most European countries want a UN framework, including a

new UNSCR. Richier pointed out that a signal from the Obama
administration that we are also prepared to move forward
would be very helpful.
--Determining the nature of sanctions: Some EU countries want

to put the UN decision into EU law, but the French want to go
beyond that and target different sanctions that we are
unlikely to get from the next UNSCR.
--Some countries simply hesitate to support sanctions for a

variety of reasons, whether protecting their own economic
interests, or on ideological grounds. This is manageable,
but complicated by individual circumstances, according to
Richier.
¶5. (S/NF) The GOF remains concerned about enforcing

sanctions with Brazil and Turkey, said Richier, because both
have considerable ties to Iran. He said that Turkey has made
clear it does not want to suffer economically, as it has in
the past. Richier noted France's concern over Turkey's
"regional policy" towards Iran, whereas it views Brazil's
engagement as being more nave and possibly based on
misinterpretation of the Obama decision to try engagement
first (without Brazil knowing what limits on that engagement
should be).
¶6. (S/NF) Richier was skeptical that sanctions aimed at

exporters of refined oil to Iran would be effective, although
the GOF has pushed for this, because such a policy would
require a verification mechanism requiring an investment of
military ships along Iran's long coastline and other
resources. Richier believes such a policy would send a
signal to exporters worldwide, but it would be too hard to
implement, and would likely only dissuade the honest
exporters. When asked about French oil company Total and
pending U.S. congressional legislation, Richier replied Total
has not made new investments in Iran, although it is involved
in a buy-back arrangement and said sales of Total's refined
products in Iran are declining.
IRAN: MFA SHARES ELYSEE'S VIEWS

-------------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) On January 14, Martin Briens, the Foreign

Ministry's DAS-equivalent for Non-Proliferation, largely
confirmed what Richier had said, but he provided additional
information. Briens also highlighted French ambitions to get
a new UNSCR approved and implemented at the February 25
Foreign Ministers meeting. However he said "tough and fast"
in the UNSC was unlikely, so we would probably have to settle
for fast. A total arms embargo, which Russia had previously
opposed but China had not, would be a major victory, assuming
Russia actually supported it.
¶8. (S/NF) Briens asserted that the June election in Iran and
its aftermath had "changed the equation" within the EU with
respect to Iran. He allowed that pending U.S. measures will
"also enter into the equation." Several countries besides
France, including Spain, have come to the conclusion that it
is time to move from sanctions that specifically target
proliferation activities to ones that have a broader impact.
Given the delays in implementing the last UNSCR on Iran,
France and close partners had received EU approval to prepare
modalities of implementation "in parallel" to negotiations in
the UN. The GOF has come to the view that the EU should take
"autonomous" measures that are not merely a magnified
application of UNSCRs, but it is still unclear how far EU
partners would go in this direction. France has noted the
UKs adoption of a process to designate individual foreign
entities for sanctions and it is now considering doing the
same. The GOF also believes that national governments can do
more through Financial Action Task Force decisions made by
the G8.
¶9. (S/NF) In addition to the potential package of sanctions

outlined by Richier (para 2), Briens said the GOF wants the
EU to:
--Impose a "prior authorization" approach on all Iran Central

Bank transactions which would allow truly sovereign
operations by the Central Bank to be approved, but it would
allow greater scrutiny and control, and would slowdown the
processing of transactions.
--Cast a wide net in banning/targeting IRGC persons and
entities.
--Ban trade in equipment for internal repression and identify

people involved.
Briens shared Richier's doubts on the efficacy of trying to

block refined petroleum products ("the bad guys will just get
rich") but the technology and parts for the oil and gas
sectors, especially for refining should also be denied to

Iran. Finally, on the issue of gaining China's
participation, he suggested emphasizing regional stability
and recruiting countries in the region to put pressure on
China as well.
AFGHANISTAN: KARZAI NEEDS TO

FOLLOW UP ON INAUGURATION SPEECH
--------------------------------
¶10. (C) On January 14 Jasmine Zerinini, head of the GOF's

interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, acknowledged that
public opposition in France to the troop presence in
Afghanistan has grown steadily over the past several years,
but that this has not resulted in calls for withdrawal or
even a significant change in strategy. Regarding
coordination between the International Security Assistance
Forces, Zerinini said that there had been a great deal of
improvement, but that the approach was still too fragmented.
She said that France has recognized for the past year that
the forces stationed in the north of the country were unable
to handle the growing insurgency there. General McChrystal
understands this, she added, but this has not translated into
action.
¶11. (C) On civilian assistance, Zerinini said U.S. and French

plans to deploy more civilians are unlikely to bear fruit,
because ultimately only the Afghans themselves can bring
effective development. However, she opined, the Karzai
administration has not shown that it is capable of doing
this. Although Karzai's inauguration speech in November was
a good first step, he has done nothing since then.
Therefore, she said, the London conference is coming far too
early - the goal of London was to renew our partnership with
Karzai, but this is difficult without a real roadmap for
progress from the Afghans.
PAKISTAN: REINFORCING POLITICAL RELATIONS

-----------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Zerinini said France is working to reinforce its

political relations with Pakistan, and was expecting
President Sarkozy to visit Pakistan "early in the second
quarter" of 2010. The GOF does not want to return to a
relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the
1980s, and is instead focusing on counter terrorism in
addition to economic and trade links. France is also trying
to support an EU-Pakistan dialogue, but she said Pakistan
makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting
to focus exclusively on economic issues. Zerinini said the
Pakistani government is eager for trade concessions, but does
not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on
Kashmir.
¶13. (C) On the role of the Pakistani military, Zerinini said
General Kayani has "learned the lesson of Musharraf" and was
staying behind the scenes. However, he is manipulating the
government and parliament, including to prevent change on
Pakistan's policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up
controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties
continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the
military. Zerinini also argued that the west had missed its
opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the
Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan. Citing Jalaladin
Haqqani as an example, Zerinini said in 2004 he had standing
as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the
organization to represent a significant military threat.
However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately
from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network
that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat,
even if it had the will to do so.
¶14. (C) Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to

strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective,
and that more coordination was needed among donors,
especially the United States. She said the Group of Friends
of Democratic Pakistan, while imperfect, was designed to
transform Pakistan's political elite and give them more
leverage over the military. However, Zerinini said it is not
being utilized. She said the U.S. was making significant
efforts to help develop Pakistan's energy sector, but she
added "I have not seen any of this in the energy working
group of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan."
THE FRENCH LEFTIST OPPOSITION

-----------------------------
¶15. (C) Staffdel members met opposition figures from the

French Parliament and Senate including Deputy Pierre
Moscovici (former Minister of European Affairs), Senator
Jean-Pierre Chevenement (former Minister of Defense), Senator

Monique Cerisier ben Guiga (author of "Going Nuclear in the
Middle East"), and Deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron to learn
their views on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. With
respect to Iran, the group generally thought President
Sarkozy's tone had been too harsh and they supported giving
dialogue more time to bear fruit. Moscovici was the most
alarmed at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons
capability and he emphasized that he would not rule out any
means in dealing with it. Boucheron and Cerisier ben Guiga
accepted the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with equanimity
because they felt Iran was only seeking to enhance its power
rather than seeking to use nuclear weapons for hostile
purposes, while Boucheron was more concerned that the West's
focus on this issue was preventing movement on a host of
other issues where Iran might be helpful, including Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza. Chevenement said he was
prepared to support sanctions on Iran, but he argued that
achieving progress towards peace between the Israelis and
Palestinians would be the most effective way of improving
relations with the Iranian regime.
¶16. (C) The group generally agreed that the USG was not
moving fast enough on the Middle East peace process.
Moscovici thought President Obama could both be a friend to
Israel, as well as being firm when necessary. The opposition
members said the USG was not putting enough pressure on
Israel and that the temporary settlement freeze announced by
the Nentanyahu government is inadequate. The group's
expectations for what the Obama Administration could
accomplish in the Middle East were high, and the perceived
absence of concrete results could lead to disappointment on
the French left.
FRENCH ENERGY MAJOR TOTAL IN IRAN

---------------------------------
¶17. (C) Total's Vice President for International Relations

Hubert des Longchamps told staffdel members that the
company's current activities in Iran are legal. Much in line
with recent statements (see reftel), Longchamps said Total's
focus is on recouping funds, in the form of cash payments,
from previous investments in the development of Iran's oil
and gas blocks. He added that Total has no operational
responsibility in the South Pars field, and talks to finalize
buy-back arrangements to reimburse Total a "few hundred
thousand dollars" should have ended in 2008. In addition,
Total provides limited technical services to the Iranians to
safeguard its remaining property interest. Longchamps said
to walk away from these interests would only reward the
Tehran regime. He added that Total from "time to time" sells
excess gasoline supplies to Iran when demand drops in Europe.
Longchamps did not quantify the value of this trade, but he
said if such deals carried a high political risk, Total was
willing to forego the business. He reiterated that there is
no existing regulation prohibiting such sales, and if Total
withdrew entirely from the refined petroleum product markets,
the Indians, Koreans, and Chinese would remain active
players.
18 (C) Like other energy companies, Total plans to return to

Iran in the future when the political situation improves,
Longchamps explained. Therefore, Total offers financial
support to local communities to develop social and medical
projects. These programs help maintain a dialogue with the
Iranian society and is a channel of communication that Total
wants to keep open. He pointed out that Total has not
violated any U.N., EU or French laws. Longchamps cautioned
the U.S. against imposing sanctions in Iran because they
would hurt typical Iranians without impacting the political
leadership. When the Total Vice President asked the staffdel
if pending U.S. legislation could penalize energy companies
for selling refined petroleum to Iran, staffdel members
responded the legislation could possibly impact Total's
recent shale-gas investments in the U.S.
THINK TANK: EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS

--------------------------------------
¶19. (C) French officials are divided over the effectiveness

of sanctions as a response to Iran's continued pursuit of
nuclear enrichment, according to Bruno Tertrais, senior
researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (a think
tank focusing on international security and defense issues
whose main client is the GOF). Tertrais told staffdel
members that he believes sanctions can be efficient, but he
noted the importance of defining the end goal. He stated the
purpose of sanctions on Iran is not to stop the nuclear
program immediately but to exert pressure on the regime and
to elicit a gradual change. He listed the successful use of
sanctions in the past on four different countries -- South
Africa, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea -- the fact that

sanctions on Iran have put a strain on its imports, and the
accelerated debate within Iranian leadership as factors that
back the argument that sanctions can be effective. He
caveated his statements throughout the meeting by saying
sanctions would be ineffective if nothing was done to address
the black market and business circuits to Dubai. Regarding
the GOF's stance on sanctions, Tertrais noted that the Office
of the Presidency (Elysee) was more supportive of further
sanctions and mindful of strategic issues than the MFA, which
tended to take a regional approach and be more dovish.
Tetrais stated that the history of the late 1980s showed that
the more pressure foreign governments placed on the Tehran
regime, the more the Iranians backed down.
¶20. (C) Embassy comment: Staffdel Kessler's engagement with a

broad audience on these issues helped advance our mutual
understanding of the challenges and strategies to advance our
common interests in Iran and Afghanistan, and on the
effectiveness of sanctions.
¶21. (U) Staffdel Kessler did not clear this cable.

RIVKIN
Viewing cable 10RIYADH118, SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSING

CHINA TO STOP
Discussing cables
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NEA FOR ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020

TAGS: PREL MNUC PTER PGOV KGHG SENV ETRD SA IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSING CHINA TO STOP
IRANIAN PROLIFERATION, CONCERNED ABOUT TSA REGULATIONS
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith, reasons 1.4 (b and d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Saudi Foreign Ministry officials told

visiting NEA A/S Feltman that they are convinced Iran intends
to develop a nuclear weapon, and that the Saudi Foreign
Minister pressed his counterpart hard for greater Chinese
engagement on this threat during the Chinese FM's visit
earlier in January. While no explicit deal was discussed,
Saudi Arabia made it clear it was willing to address Chinese
concerns on energy security and trade in exchange for
effective Chinese support to prevent Iranian proliferation.
Saudi Arabia is also concerned about Iran's unhelpful role in
Yemen. While generally very pleased with the state of
bilateral relations, Saudi officials strenuously - and under
instruction - complained about the continued negative effect
of the recent Transportation Safety Administration (TSA)
regulations that call for extra security screening for Saudi
Arabia. The Saudi Foreign Minister will raise these concerns
with the Secretary in London on January 27. They noted that
the Saudi public is increasingly upset by this, and does not
understand why they were put in the same group with Cuba,
which has prompted some Saudis to question how special their
relationship with the United States really is. A/S Feltman
urged Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the Copenhagen
Accord by January 31. The MFA reported that Saudi Arabia
donated $50 million for Haitian relief efforts on January 25.
End Summary.
Iranian Nuclear Ambitions:

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) Visiting NEA A/S Feltman discussed a wide range of
issues with Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki
Al-Saud Al-Kabir on January 26. Prince Torki said Saudi
Arabia is convinced that Iran intends to develop nuclear
weapons, and reported that Saudi Foreign Minister Saud
Al-Faisal pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister on this issue
on his January 17 visit. Saud Al-Faisal told the Chinese
that, for Saudi Arabia, this is a critical security issue.
Iran,s getting nuclear weapons will open the door to the
rest of the Middle East pursuing nuclear weapons. Saudi
Arabia would prefer that the Middle East remain a nuclear
free zone. When the Chinese Foreign Minister replied that
China will not accept Iran's development of nuclear weapons,
Saud Al-Faisal told him that China will have to work more
closely with the rest of the world and the UN Security
Council to prevent this from happening.
¶3. (C) Prince Torki agreed that it was not helpful that the
Chinese sent a low-level delegation to the most recent 5 1
talks. He also agreed it was unfortunate the delegation did
not agree it was time now to increase pressure on Iran.
Al-Kabir also noted that time was not in the UN Security
Council's favor, but in Iran's. Prince Torki said that Saudi
Arabia was convinced the time was ripe to push China on this
issue. It would be important to demonstrate that the
assurances FM Al-Faisal got were not just from the Foreign
Minister, but represented the thinking of the whole
government. He said that Saudi Arabia repeated these points
to the Chinese Middle East special envoy, who visited a week
later. Saudi Arabia has also raised these concerns with
Russia, "which is closer to the U.S. and Saudi positions,"
and with the Deputy French Foreign Minister three weeks ago.
Prince Torki also agreed to work with Lebanon's UN Mission,
now on the Security Council, where it is sure to confront the
issue of Iranian proliferation.
¶4. (C) Prince Torki said that China never directly raised the
issue of its concerns about securing sufficient oil supplies,
particularly in the event of a cutoff of Iranian supplies.
However, Saudi Arabia fully understands China's concerns, and
in that context, is pleased that the Chinese Foreign Minister
had &successful8 talks with Saudi Aramco and trade
officials about specific commercial and energy issues.
Prince Torki noted that Saudi Arabia has become one of
China's largest energy suppliers, and has invested billions
of dollars in refineries in China. Trade has grown from $140
million a decade ago to $75 billion now, with prospects for
further increases. Prince Torki concluded by noting that
Saudi Arabia knows what concerns China, and is willing to
take actions to address those concerns, but must have Chinese
cooperation in stopping Iran,s development of nuclear
weapons as a quid pro quo. Saudi Arabia is encouraging other
Gulf countries to meet with China to explore similar

cooperation, although it expects these countries will seek
the same exchange.
Yemen:
- - - -
¶5. (C) Prince Torki explained that Saudi Arabia also believes
that Iran is playing an unhelpful role in Yemen. Dismissing
the need for specific evidence, he said it was hard to
explain how the Houthis, as a poor tribal group, managed to
get so much money so quickly to obtain the heavy armaments
that they have been using absent the help of some outside
group. It is also hard, he argued, to explain the striking
similarities with techniques that have been used by
pro-Iranian groups in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is convinced that
Iran is providing money for poor tribesmen to fight, as well
as payments to their families, and is facilitating contact
with Somalia and Al Qaeda. Prince Torki said the Saudi
Defense Forces have been impressed how well the Houthis have
fought, displaying advanced training. (Note: in a separate
meeting, Ministry of Interior officials echoed many of these
assessments in greater detail, septel. End Note).
¶6. (C) Prince Torki was unequivocal in stating that Saudi

Arabia has no intention of becoming part of the current
conflict between the central government and the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia felt it had to respond, however, after Houthi
forces crossed its border. He said that it made little sense
for the Houthis to have attacked Saudi Arabia, especially
since the SAG had warned them previously not to. He
concluded that Iran was trying to test Saudi reactions.
Yemen does not need U.S. troops, but does need equipment,
training and information, as well as assistance to meet its
long-term development challenges. He also said that Saudi
Arabia is very concerned about Al Qaeda's continued presence
in Yemen, as it will exploit any opportunity to attack Saudi
Arabia and the United States.
Bilateral Relations:
- - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C). Prince Torki agreed that our bilateral relations are
quite strong in general. He singled out counter-terrorism as
an example of the strength of cooperation, noting that Saudi
Arabia enjoys a unique level of cooperation on security with
the United States. Prince Torki confirmed that Saudi Arabia
had contributed $50 million to the Haiti relief effort on
January 25, which is the largest contribution to date of any
Middle Eastern country. He also welcomed greater U.S.
engagement in multilateral and international organizations.
Climate Change:
- - - - - - - -
8.(SBU) A/S Feltman noted the importance that the President

places on Climate Change, and the Copenhagen Accord. Given
that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi was involved in crafting
the final agreement, A/S Feltman noted the United States is
counting on Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the accord
by January 31. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia was very
pleased the United States was more actively engaged in this
issue, and said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports
trying to address this issue. He noted that the MFA will
have to consult with other involved ministries, such as the
Ministry of Petroleum, and promised to respond before January
¶31.
Concern over TSA Regulations:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (SBU) Prince Torki noted he had been instructed to raise

Saudi Arabia's significant concern about the TSA regulations
which had included Saudi Arabia in a limited group of
countries for additional airport screening. Prince Torki
said that this issue had caused a lot of difficulties and
embarrassment for Saudi Arabia, to the degree that Foreign
Minister Saud Al-Faisal will raise this with the Secretary in
London on January 27. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia
was not upset about the regulation itself, as it recognized
the U.S. right and obligation to protect its citizens. The
issue, rather, was inclusion on the list with the likes of
Cuba, which causes Saudi Arabia's friends and enemies to
question how strong its bilateral relationship with the

United States really is. Prince Torki said it is very hard
to explain to the Saudi public why they are included on this
list, despite not being the origin of the December 25 flight,
while other countries that have had recent terrorist
incidents on planes, like the UK, Egypt and Turkey, are not.
Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia had been shocked to be
included on the list. He noted that Saudi Arabia had been
told these provisions would only be temporary, and said Saudi
Arabia would like to know how and when they will be amended,
implying that the longer they remained in effect without any
public explanation from the USG, the more it was likely to
prompt the Saudi Government to re-evaluate areas of
cooperation, including counter-terrorism cooperation. A/S
Feltman promised to convey the spirit and strength of the
message, and invited any specific Saudi suggestions to
address the security gap regarding nonmetallic explosives
exploited in the December 25 incident.
Middle East Peace:

- - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) In response to a question, A/S Feltman explained that

the United States believes that we need to get the Israelis
and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, which
will be the best way to compel Israel to follow through on
its public statements and to overcome Palestinian skepticism.
A/S Feltman noted that the United States had referred to the
1967 lines with swaps as a way of helping encourage the
Palestinians to return to the table. Prince Torki welcomed
this overview.
(U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Feltman.
SMITH
Viewing cable 10RIYADH123, CHINESE FM YANG VISITS RIYADH

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TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH KWBG IR SA
SUBJECT: CHINESE FM YANG VISITS RIYADH
REF: A. BEIJING 69
¶B. 09 RIYADH 895
¶C. RIYADH 118
RIYADH 00000123 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for

reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY:
----------
¶1. (C) Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with King
Abdullah and FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal on January 13, during
the last stop of a five nation Africa and Middle East tour.
During the visit, FM Yang discussed deepening Saudi-Chinese
ties in a variety of fields, emphasizing trade, in
particular, with his Saudi counterparts. Responding to
statements made by FM Saud, Yang also briefly discussed
Chinese support for Iraq, concern about Iranian nuclear
ambitions, and hopes for the Middle East Peace Process. FM
Yang's foray into regional political commentary appears to
have been a result of FM Saud's prodding, both publicly and
behind closed doors, and is a reflection of the developing
Saudi-Chinese relationship.
END SUMMARY.
TRADE TAKES PRECEDENCE

----------------------
¶2. (U) FM Yang arrived in Riyadh on January 13, the first

high-level visit since Chinese President Hu Jintao's February
2009 "Trip of Friendship and Cooperation." FM Yang's visit
coincided with the 20th anniversary of Saudi-Chinese
diplomatic relations, and followed three days after Chinese
Trade Minister Chen Deming co-chaired the 4th session of the
Saudi-Chinese Joint Commission in Riyadh.
¶3. (U) The Chinese Foreign Minister has traditionally made

his first overseas trip of the new year to Africa, visiting
with African leaders and expressing Chinese goodwill and
improvements in trade relations. This year, FM Yang extended
his visit to include not only major trading partners like
Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco, but also Saudi Arabia. In a
January 13 statement to the press, FM Yang stressed the
importance of strengthening cooperation in "energy,
infrastructure, finance and science and
technology." He said that both sides should carry out
cultural and education exchanges to deepen the bilateral
relationship and pressed the need for closer relations
between China and the GCC.
¶4. (U) These statements echoed similar announcements from

Chinese Trade Minister Chen who, in a January 10 press
conference, called for finalizing the Chinese-GCC free trade
agreement and increasing bilateral trade by 50%, from a total
annual value of $40 billion to $60 billion, over the next
five years (ref A). During the Joint Commission meeting,
Saudi Minister of Finance Ibrahim Al-Assaf reportedly urged
the Chinese to participate in more joint ventures, noting
that while bilateral trade increased 25 times over the past
ten years, the two countries only have 19 joint projects.
Al-Assaf also welcomed China's 44 billion riyal ($11.7
billion) worth of infrastructure projects in the Kingdom.
DUMPING CAUSES A BUMP

---------------------
¶5. (C) This call to increase Sino-Saudi trade comes on the

heels of a December 24 announcement that China would impose
anti-dumping tariffs of up to 13.6 percent on Saudi and
Taiwan-produced butanediol. Beijing began a dumping probe on
methanol and butanediol (BDO) from Saudi Arabia in July,
which caused an unusually public trade spat between the two
countries (ref B). Methanol and butanediol make up 10 to 15
percent of Saudi Arabia's $2 billion in annual non-oil
exports to China. A Ministry of Commerce and Industry
official told Econoffs on January 13 that Saudi Arabia was
able to convince the Chinese not to impose tariffs on
methanol, but said the BDO case was still pending. The
Ministry recently appointed a new Deputy Minister for
Technical Affairs, Dr. Hamad Al-Awfy, who will handle all
anti-dumping issues, he said. Al-Awfy previously complained
to EconCouns that the SAG was increasingly frustrated by the
growing number of Saudi companies complaining about Chinese
dumping in Saudi Arabia. Other senior SAG officials have
caustically complained about the low quality of Chinese
construction and the "short-term, extractive" approach of
Chinese companies to investments in Saudi Arabia.
RIYADH 00000123 002.2 OF 003
A MATURING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP?

---------------------------------
¶6. (C) China recently surpassed the U.S. as the largest

importer of Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia's investments in China
have increased significantly over the last few years,
including a $3.5 billion refinery in Fujian and a $2.86
billion joint-venture petrochemical complex in Tianjin.
Additionaly, President Hu Jintao commemorated the opening of
a cement plant when he visited Saudi Arabia in February 2009.
Saudi Arabia,s more forward-leaning approach, including
large-scale investments in China, indicates a maturing of the
bilateral relations and assumes a more pro-active, rather
than reactive, role towards economic engagement. (Note:
China is now the SAG's number two trade partner after the
U.S. Saudi-Chinese bilateral trade was estimated at $40
billion in 2008, while Saudi-U.S. trade was estimated at $67
billion during the same time period. End note.)
FM SAUD PRODS, FM YANG RESPONDS

-------------------------------
¶7. (U) While trade issues dominated FM Yang's agenda, both he

and FM Prince Saud-Al Faisal commented on the regional
political landscape in a press conference that followed their
bilateral meeting. FM Saud spoke out against Israeli
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and called on
China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to
"deal with world disputes in accordance to international
legitimacy...as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative."
The meetings with FM Yang were "part of a framework of
coordination and consultation," FM Saud continued, that
included not only the Palestinian cause but also Iran's
nuclear file, Iraq and Yemen. In particular, he emphasized
China's role as a member of the P5 plus 1 group and their
responsibility "to solve the (Iranian nuclear) crisis through
dialogue and peaceful means. "Our two nations are keen that
the Middle East and the Gulf should be free of all weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons," he stressed.
¶8. (U) In response to FM Saud's comments, FM Yang said China

called for serious negotiations between Israel and Palestine
that would carry out the peace process and establish the
State of Palestine. "China is ready for cooperation with the
world community to work for stability in the Middle East," he
added. In regard to Iraq, he said that China extended
assistance by reducing Iraqi debt obligations to China and
forging trade agreements between Iraqi and Chinese companies.
With respect to Iran, FM Yang said the Iranian file should
be solved through "political diplomatic channels which help
stabilize the situation in the region."
FM SAUD: CHINA NEEDS TO MORE ACTIVELY COUNTER

IRANIAN NUKES
---------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki told visiting
NEA A/S Feltman on January 26 (ref C) that FM Saud had
pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister hard on the need to be
more active in working with the rest of the international
community and the UN Security Council to counter the threat
of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. FM Saud told FM Yang
that Saudi Arabia was convinced Iran intended to develop a
nuclear weapon, despite its assurances, and that only
concerted international action could stop that. While no
explicit bargain was discussed, Dep FM Torki explained that
Saudi Arabia understood China was concerned about having
access to energy supplies, which could be cut off by Iran,
and wanted to attract more trade and investment. Saudi
Arabia was willing to provide assurances on those scores to
China, but only in exchange for tangible Chinese actions to
restrain Iran,s drive for nuclear weapons.
COMMENT:
--------
¶9. (C) Since King Abdullah's historic visit to Beijing in

January 2006, the Saudi-Chinese relationship has focused
predominantly on energy and trade. However, the relationship
may be showing signs of political evolution. While the
Chinese would likely prefer to stay away from political
controversy, their economic power and permanent seat on the
UN Security Council has made it more and more difficult for
them to avoid politics altogether.
¶10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The incentives for the Saudis to
RIYADH 00000123 003.2 OF 003
try and leverage their economic relationship with China for

political gain with respect to sensitive regional issues,
such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are
significant and growing. After patiently focusing on
building the economic relationsip since 2006, FM Saud,s
public and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the Saudis
are ready to try and cash in some political chips. End
comment.
SMITH
Viewing cable 10ROME87, STAFFDEL KESSLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH
MFA, ENI, PD
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SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH MFA, ENI, PD
REF: ROME 00035
ROME 00000087 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: DCM Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Staff Director of the House Foreign Affairs

Committee (HCFA) Dr. Richard Kessler and HCFA staff members
probed senior MFA and energy and gas parastatal Eni officials
on Italy's intentions concerning Iran sanctions and prospects
for effective multilateral action to curb Iran's nuclear
program. Opposition Democratic Party (PD) officials
discussed Iran, Italy's role in Afghanistan, the MEPP, Iraq,
and nonproliferation with the Staffdel. End Summary.
IRAN DOMINATES MFA TALKS

------------------------
¶2. (C) A January 8 roundtable discussion with Dr. Kessler

and three HCFA staff members at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) included MFA Director General for Multilateral
Political Cooperation Stefano Ronca, Ronca's Deputy Filippo
Formica, and Deputy DG for Economic Cooperation Claudio
Spinedi. Office Directors Massimo Marotti
(Political-Military Security and NATO Affairs); Diego
Brasioli (G8 Issues and Global Challenges); and Giovanni
Pugliese (Arms Control and Nonproliferation) also
participated. After the roundtable the Staffdel had a meeting
with MFA Deputy SecGen and Political Director Sandro De
Bernardin. Post was represented by the Charge, Pol-Mil
Counselor and Poloff (notetaker).
¶3. (C) Ronca believes the deteriorating situation in Iran

will soon come to a head and that the UNSC should convey to
Iran that delay tactics will not work and support this
position by readiness to adopt further pressure. Ronca and
Spinedi told the Staffdel Italy is ready to explore, with its
EU colleagues, the possibility of further sanctions, which,
however, must conform to EU regulations, and not affect the
legal rights of European companies. Ronca suggested that the
Iranian financial, oil and gas, and insurance sectors (but
not the Central Bank) could be targeted and that the list
sensitive products on the export ban list could be expanded.
¶4. (C) Spinedi, who (with Formica) attended the October 7

Washington meeting of "Likeminded States on Iran," started by
briefly alluding to Italy's longstanding complaint of
exclusion from P5 1. Spinedi pointed out we needed to
determine what kind of sanctions would be acceptable to China
and Russia, adding that even at the beginning of January,
China's UN ambassador said that China "needed more time,"
which, Spinedi noted, was not a total rejection of tougher
sanctions. Spinedi advocated strengthening what already
exists and deciding where we are willing to exert additional
pressure (especially in the oil and gas sector). It would be
important to determine which technologies others (e.g., China
and India) are willing to provide and embargo those which
they cannot. Spinedi acknowledged that Italy had not yet
imposed legally binding sanctions, but that the GOI had
successfully used "moral suasion."
¶5. (C) Spinedi noted that sanctions proposed by the U.S. at

the October 7 Likeminded meeting included targeting the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command (IRGC), but did not
include an embargo of refined oil and gas products. Spinedi
echoed Ronca in saying that in the coming months Italy will
need to see how the rest of the Europe will approach new
sanctions.
¶6. (C) MFA Deputy SecGen Sandro De Bernardin told the

Staffdel that Italy was well aware of the danger posed by
Iran and supported a "firm line." De Bernardin noted Eni's
considerable investments in Iran and characterized Italy's
"moral suasion" efforts to wean Iran away from its nuclear
ambitions as a "significant success." On sanctions, De
Bernardin stated that Italy was prepared to assume its "share
of responsibility," but that sanctions are a means of
pressure, not a goal; effective ones must be found. In De
Bernardin's view, U.S.domestic legislation should not
negatively affect other countries and the presidential waiver
has been useful in the past; he hoped it will still figure in
the future.
¶7. (C) Kessler encouraged Italy to continue and reinforce
ROME 00000087 002.2 OF 003
their past efforts. De Bernardin agreed that if Iran gets

the bomb, then others will seek to acquire nuclear weapons
too and that the Iranian regime must realize there is a heavy
price to be paid for persisting in non-compliance. " De
Bernardin reiterated Italy's support for openess to dialogue
in addition to pressure, or the dual-track approach, and that
"putting Iran in a corner" is not the same as "cutting it
off" and characterized Italy as a "crucial player," essential
to catalyzing consensus in Europe. He added that, given
Iran's critical domestic situation, the regime was not in a
position to decide anything.
KEY TO SUCCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

-----------------------------
¶8. (C) With regard to the critical situation in

Afghanistan, Ronca acknowledged that we must strengthen the
military aspect of the campaign, but that institution
building and engaging President Karzai on fighting corruption
must not be neglected. On the security side, Ronca said that
Italy will increase its force by 1000 men during the first
half of 2010 and that its Afghan National Police (ANP)
training program is a first priority. As for civilian
engagement, Italy has committed 465 million euros in various
civilian sectors, including health, education, and justice.
Ronca and Marotti stressed the need for better coordination
of civilian and military activities as an issue that should
be on the agenda of the January 28 London NATO conference.
Ronca noted that reaching out to insurgents was a task that
should also be pursued. The Italians stressed the need for a
long-term development strategy based on Afghan priorities,
but which would also include private sector involvement and
the development of good governance.
CENTER LEFT PD AIRS FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS

--------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Head of the opposition Partito Democratico's (PD)
Foreign Policy Department Piero Fassino told the Staffdel the
PD supports President Obama's initiative to dialogue and
build bridges with the Islamic world, but is very concerned
about the blocked MEPP and the "new wave of terror" in
Afghanistan. As for Iran, the PD supports pursuing a
negotiated solution, but Fassino questioned whether the
current leadership is in a position to negotiate credibly.
He suggested it could be useful to change the order of
priorities in Iran; that is, be more flexible on the nuclear
issue, but harder on human rights. According to Fassino, the
greatest risk with nuclear proliferation is that
irresponsible governments like the one in Iran could gain
access to nuclear arms, adding that the PD assessed that
there was little to fear with nations such as India, Britain,
and France having nuclear weapons. He asked whether a
democratic government in Iran might not have a different
position on the nuclear program.
¶10. (C) Fassino said the PD supports the GOI's increased

(military) support for Afghanistan, but stressed that
strengthening civil and governmental institutions and
economic development are equally important. On the MEPP,
Fassino characterized Netanyahu's proposed 10-month
settlement freeze "a little window of opportunity," but
questioned whether it was enough, given the Israelis' refusal
to discuss (the status of) Jerusalem. As for Iraq, Fassino
said the stabilization process must be supported; there was
no alternative.
ENI JUSTIFIES IRAN ACTIVITIES

-----------------------------
¶11. ( C ) Energy and gas parastatal Eni (Ente Nazionale

Idrocarburi) officials told the Congressional delegation that
it is cooperating to address USG concerns over the company,s
Iran activities, but insisted that it will continue to
fulfill its contractual obligations there. The company
officials said that Eni has understood the USG message to
reduce its presence in Iran, and as a result it has already
decreased its Iran activities to a minimum level. The Eni
officials provided the Staffdel with a copy of the November
16, 2009 CEO Scaroni letter to Ambassador Thorne that states
the company,s position (A copy of Eni's letter was provided
to EEB in November). Referencing this letter, the officials
pointed out that Eni will not undertake new activities in
Iran, including no new activities by its subsidiaries, Saipem
ROME 00000087 003.2 OF 003
and Polimeri Europa. They added that following Scaroni,s

September 16 meetings in Washington the company also gave up
plans for an MOU with Iran for development of the phase III
of the Darquain oil field. The officials stated that while EU
law prevents the Eni from responding to official requests for
information on its Iran operations, it has been transparent
in informing the USG on a voluntary basis.
¶12. ( C ) The Eni officials stated, however, that Eni

intends to carry out exploration and development activities
in Iran that fall under its contractual obligations there.
The officials acknowledged that this is a &gray area8 due
to the differences of opinion between the company and the USG
over what is &new8 activity and what is &old.8 The
company officials said that they hope to clarify this issue
with Washington during separate meetings in January with
senior officials from the State Department and Department of
Treasury. Pressed for details over the company,s existing
obligations, the officials said that it is under contract to
meet certain targets of (oil) production in order to
guarantee defined levels of production within a given time
frame. They added that Eni must keep a certain threshold of
production in order to recover its investments in Iran. They
also explained that Eni receives periodic (possibly
scheduled) payments by Iran in oil equivalent amounts that
correspond to the attained target levels of production.
¶13. ( C ) The Eni officials admitted the frustrating

difficulties of operating in Iran, but stated that Eni's
priority is to recover its investments there while meeting EU
laws. The officials estimated Eni's total Iran investments at
around $3 billion dollars, of which they said Eni has already
recovered already about 60 percent (or about $1.7 billion
according to one Eni representative). The company officials
said Eni still needs to recover about $1.4 billion from its
Iran operations. They added that &if all goes as planned8
Eni will recover this remainder of its investments by the end
of 2013 or early in 2014. They further explained that Eni's
Iran contracts provide the possibility of extensions if the
company is not able to recover its investments within the
stipulated time frame. The Eni officials cautioned that the
company may face EU sanctions if it withdraws from Iran due
to pressure from USG unilateral sanctions.
¶14. (U) Staffdel Kessler has not cleared this cable.

THORNE
Viewing cable 10RPODUBAI13, IRAN'S GREEN PARTY OPPOSITION: ITS

BIRTH AND EVOLUTION (1/3)
Discussing cables
2010-01-12 2010-11-28 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFOR Iran RPO
10RPODUBAI13
14:02 18:06 N Dubai
VZCZCXRO5785
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FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/12

TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN'S GREEN PARTY OPPOSITION: ITS BIRTH AND EVOLUTION (1/3)
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran's Green Path Opposition (GPO) came into being
as a result of the fixed June 12 Presidential election. What
started as a movement to annul the election now gives shelter both
to those seeking the full set of rights guaranteed them by Islamic
Iran's Constitution and others seeking a new system altogether.
Although the numbers of those publicly willing to march under its
banner have decreased in the face of regime brutality, its current
core group, mostly college-age urban youth, have shown no sign of
giving up the fight. But like the regime that seeks to crush it,
the GPO is not monolithic and there is a clear gulf between the
opposition's elite leadership and the popular movement protesting
in the streets. Remaining outside the umbrella of the GPO is an
array of unsatisfied groups whose willingness to join the GPO is
unclear. These groups clearly oppose President Ahmadinejad but do
not yet seek, as do many GPO elements, to overturn the entire
system. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) NOTE: This is the first in a series of three cables

examining the Iranian Opposition since the June 12 Presidential
election, what might happen in the short-term, and what the most
effective levers of US policy have been so far and what combination
may have the most impact in the coming months.
¶I. BIRTH OF THE GPO
---------------------------
¶3. (C) ELECTION BUILD-UP AND ORIGINS OF THE GREEN PATH OPPOSITION:
Iran's current unrest began in June 2009, when Iran's lackluster
Presidential campaign became energized by a (first-time) series of
televised debates among the four Presidential candidates: former
Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (reformist), former Speaker
Mehdi Karrubi (reformist), Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen
Rezai (moderate conservative) and President Ahmadinejad (hard-line
conservative). President Ahmadinejad's accusations that former
Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami were 'plotting' against his
government and, along with Mousavi and other reformists, sought to
undermine the Revolution and to enrich themselves, galvanized
ordinary Iranians. Incivility and accusations at odds with
obligatory Persian politesse left many observers with the
impression (discomforting for some, energizing for others) that the
elections might actually be more of a true contest than past
elections, and that Ahmadinejad might actually be vulnerable to an
upset.
¶4. (C) These Presidential debates sparked popular interest in the

election, and in the last week or so before the June 12 vote
reformist candidate Mousavi, with active and behind-the-scenes
support from Khatami and Rafsanjani, increasingly gained momentum,
with his supporters for the first time beginning to speak publicly
of a 'Green Movement.' Part of his support were young, first-time
voters; part were revitalized older 'Second of Khordad' reformists
who had turned out in record number to support Khatami in 1997 and
2001, but who had subsequently sourced on politics due to Khatami's
inability to effect change. Another large group of first-time
voters were from the ranks of the "Khamoush" ('silent') - ie,
Iranians who had never voted but who were inspired by prospects for
positive change and had hope that this election would be genuine.
Mousavi may have even drawn some support for older and more
conservative voters who remembered his steady stewardship of Iran's
economy during his stint as Prime Minister during the 1980's
Iran-Iraq War.
¶5. (C) ELECTION DAY: IRIG elections have never been 'free and
fair,' but until June 2009 most electoral machinations consisted
primarily of the conservative Guardian Council screening out
ideologically undesirable candidates, plus vote manipulation at
relatively low levels, including using the Basij to 'get out the
vote.' Conventional wisdom going into June 12 was that a high
turnout -- representing energized young and urban voters -- would
favor Mousavi, who would need a few million vote 'cushion' in order
DUBAI 00000013 002 OF 006
to either win outright or to get into a subsequent two-man runoff

with Ahmadinejad. While we don't know nor might not ever know the
real June 12 vote count, it is clear that the turnout was at record
high levels and that there was systematic vote count fraud (if in
fact the votes were even counted) to ensure that Ahmadinejad 'won
big' in the first round.
¶6. (C) Why the fix? In retrospect, many of the reasons seem clear.
Part of the answer could relate to SLK's desire to have unified
control over the three branches of government to strengthen Iran's
hand, and his hand personally, in expected upcoming negotiations
with the West and the US over nuclear issues. More certainly, part
of the answer is that after the 1997-2005 Khatami Presidency,
Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) was determined to prevent any
reformist, especially his former political opponent Mousavi, from
heading the Executive Branch. SLK considers Rafsanjani his most
serious rival, and is also intimidated by Khatami's popularity.
Therefore, that both Rafsanjani and Khatami supported Mousavi may
have led SLK to conclude that a Mousavi victory would consolidate
power in the hands of those bitter rivals and leave him
unacceptably vulnerable to marginalization. And part of the answer
relates to the increasingly powerful IRGC hardline faction that had
supported Ahmadinejad (AN) in 2005, whose support AN strengthened
over the subsequent four years by using government funds and
patronage to increase this faction's power and wealth. As such,
this hardline IRGC faction, composed mostly of high-level officers
with a shared intelligence-security background, wanted 'four more
years,' despite mixed support for AN from within the IRGC ranks.
Anecdotal information indicates that this hardline faction had
convinced SLK that the election could be fixed with minimal
backlash.
¶7. (C) They were wrong, as shown by the unprecedented sight of

millions of ordinary Iranians pouring into the streets chanting
'where is my vote.' On June 19, SLK abandoned his carefully
cultivated pretense of non-partisanship and took the first steps
down the long road of post-election suppression when he lauded the
'epic' June 12 vote and told those disputing the results to stop
protesting and fall in line or face the consequences. In response,
what started as the pre-election 'Green Movement' slowly began
changing into the 'Green Path of Hope' Opposition (GPO), as
reformist leaders Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami signaled that they
would not stand down.
¶8. (C) REGIME RESPONSE: Regime reaction to ongoing post-election

GPO activity was swift, conducted at both the popular and elite
level:
- At the elite level the regime began a widespread intimidation

campaign to include Stalinesque show trials, rounding up not only
'all the usual suspects' (i.e. first-tier reformists, primarily
those associated with Khatami's 'Second of Khordad' movement), but
also their family members, in addition to second-tier reformists,
political and human rights activists, and reporters. Many if not
most of these detained, to include those arrests that garnered the
most publicity in the West, played no significant role in either
promoting Mousavi's candidacy or in engendering post-election
protests. However anecdotal evidence indicates there have been
extensive arrests of younger, lesser-known activists more active in
the GPO. Within the regime, SLK acted quickly to bring into line
as many key power brokers as possible, including traditional
conservatives like Majlis Speaker Larijani, former IRGC commander
(and defeated Presidential candidate) Mohsen Rezai, and Tehran
Mayor Qalibaf - all of whom oppose Ahmadinejad and would have been
happy to see him go, but whose loyalty to the System and to the
Leader trumped concerns they may have had about the extent of the
voting fraud.
- At the popular level the regime increasingly resorted to force on

those public holidays when GPO supporters took to the streets. The
following were the key dates on which the GPO took to the streets:
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-- 20 June 2009: The day after SLK's gauntlet-throwing Friday

Prayer speech saw several hundred thousand Iranians march in Tehran
to protest, and also witnessed the first significant use of regime
force against protestors. The killing of one young marcher, Neda
Agha Soltani, captured on video, focused global attention on the
protests and gave the GPO a tragic but iconic image of martyrdom to
wield against the regime.
-- June 28, 2009 (7th of Tir): The first time the GPO used the
cover of an officially sanctioned ceremony to rally against the
government. GPO supporters, led by a key Mousavi aide, caught
security forces off guard by taking over an annual ceremony to mark
the 1981 bombing that killed several leaders of the Revolution.
-- July 17, 2009: The first and only time since June 12 when
former President Rafsanjani, in many ways the main target of
hardline regime animus, was allowed to give the Tehran Friday
Prayer sermon. Rafsanjani's much anticipated speech, in which he
did not acquiesce to the official election results, energized
opposition supporters and led to street clashes.
-- September 18, 2009 (Ghods Day): The government-orchestrated

event to demonstrate solidarity with Palestinians was co-opted by
hundreds of thousands of GPO supporters flaunting green and
chanting anti-government slogans. Ghods Day was the zenith of the
GPO's ability to bring significant number to the streets, and the
last time when security forces by and large eschewed violence;
-- November 4, 2009 (US Embassy Takeover Anniversary): The GPO

hoped to replicate Ghods Day during the first large-scale protest
since university campuses reopened. Increasingly ominous warnings
from the security forces and revelations of detainee abuse resulted
in smaller GPO turnout, and more violent clashes than previously;
-- December 27, 2009 (Ashura and 7th Mourning Day for Grand
Ayatollah Montazeri): Ashura witnessed the most violent clashes
since June 20, with at least nine killed. Violent clashes also
took place in major cities outside of Tehran.
II. WHERE WE ARE NOW
----------------------------------
¶9. (C) WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION: Up to now the GPO's most significant
tool of resistance is popular turnout in the form of peaceful
marching and civil disobedience on those holidays when the regime
cannot prevent people taking to the streets. However, ongoing
regime violence against protesters has decreased GPO turnout, from
the millions of June 15 to a smaller committed core of (at most)
hundreds of thousands. Much if not most of them are young,
college-age Iranians, and understandably the vast majority of
opposition turnout appears to have been in Tehran, although other
major urban centers have also seen sporadic unrest. Although the
number of GPO'ers willing to take to the streets has decreased from
the days immediately following the June election, those remaining
on the streets seem to have radicalized, with at least some
opposition animus from AN to SLK: the new emblematic chant is no
longer 'where is my vote' but 'death to the dictator (i.e. SLK).'
At the elite level, not only are Mousavi, Karrubi and Khatami the
focus on hardline regime pressure, but former President Rafsanjani
is under ongoing attack by these same forces.
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¶10. (C) The GPO has a strong 'brand' - green, freedom, peace signs,
silent marches, stolen election and martyrs like Neda Agha Soltani.
But like the regime that seeks to crush it, the GPO is not
monolithic. To characterize the GPO's active core as now primarily
(but not exclusively) university students and university-age youth
in a country so demographically young (for example, approximately
one quarter of the population is in its twenties) is not to
belittle its potential. Outside of the active GPO core group there
is a larger, relatively passive group, whose support now mostly
manifests in the anonymous shouts of 'God is Great' from night-time
North Tehran rooftops or who scrawl or stamp anti-regime slogans on
ten thousand Toman currency notes. Presumably many of them have
fled the field due to fear of regime reprisal but might be drawn
back into the fray if the prospects of a GPO victory, however
defined, became more real to them than the prospect of blows from a
Basiji baton.
¶11. (C) OTHER OPPOSITIONS: Stepping back, it is wrong to assume

that the GPO is the logical equivalent of 'the Iranian opposition,'
and indeed it is more accurate to speak of many different Iranian
oppositions, each with different constituents and goals, to include
the following:
- BUREAUCRACY: AN has effected vast bureaucratic top-down Executive

branch personnel changes, ignoring the technocratic cadre that was
the recruitment pool for the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies.
Given his preference for ideology over expertise ('mota'hed' versus
'motakhasses'), he has staffed his government largely from within
the current and former IRGC ranks. Many of these former ministers,
deputy ministers, office heads and other senior bureaucrats have
not been pleased with their professional fates. At lower
government levels, there is anecdotal evidence of widespread
disgruntlement with if not opposition to AN.
-MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE: AN and his hardline IRGC backers have

extensively purged the Intelligence Ministry on the grounds of
partisan loyalty, creating a significant cadre of disgruntled
former Intelligence Ministry officials. Similarly, there is
evidence of at least some IRGC opposition, both within the rank and
file and also the upper ranks, at SLK's handling of the election
and post-election events.
- INDUSTRIALISTS: AN's massive economic mismanagement and the

ongoing economic power grab of 'IRGC Incorporated' has engendered
much ill will among Iran's affluent and influential industrial
leaders.
- RAFSANJANI/CLERGY: Rafsanjani's institutional power is minimal,

but as part of his strategy he seeks to retain/expand his support
within Iran's clerical class, although this class itself is
increasingly impotent and dependent on government favor . As one
element of the regime's efforts to limit the pro-GPO clergy's
influence, it has taken steps in recent weeks to challenge the
religious titles and credentials of at least one top-level
reformist cleric ("Grand Ayatollah"). This move will not likely
endear the regime to many if not most Iranian traditional
seminarians who take matters of religious credentials, learning,
and hierarchy very seriously, especially given SLK's own lack of
qualifications for his religious title.
- 'MODERATE' PRINCIPLISTS: Within the ruling conservative

'Principlist' ('Osulgarayan') grouping there is a significant
faction opposing AN, though still quite loyal to SLK and the
concept of 'Supreme Jurisconsulate.' One of this faction's leaders
is Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, with the Majlis as a whole in an
ongoing battle with AN's increasingly 'imperial' Executive Branch.
Other major Principlist opponents are Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher
Qalibaf and Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai.
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GPO LEADERSHIP- STREET
---------------------------------
¶12. (C) The GPO has promulgated a new mode of oppositionist

organization for Iran. Anecdotal evidence indicates that GPO
leaders, especially Mousavi, have from the start favored a
horizontal, diffuse, decentralized GPO structure as opposed to a
more hierarchical one. Indeed, part of the GPO's resilience stems
from this defuse and decentralized nature, frustrating a regime
that has come to rely on the two-step of identifying and
decapitating leadership as its main tool for extinguishing dissent.
In this regard communication technologies such as the Internet and
SMS technology have been a significant 'force multiplier,' with
virtual space in many ways playing the same 'information-center'
role now that the networks of mosques played in the 1979
Revolution. GPO leaders Karrubi, Mousavi and Khatami play a role
both symbolic and also operational, with anecdotal evidence
indicating that they are playing at least a limited role in
coordinating with if not leading the GPO masses. Additionally,
for the first time since the Revolution elements of the Iranian
Diaspora seem to be playing a role within events in Iran,
coordinating with GPO leadership elements inside the country.
¶13. (C) Distance between the titular GPO leadership and the street
may yield tactical advantages, though it also reflects a gulf
between the leadership and the popular opposition. Mousavi,
Karrubi, and Khatami are longstanding fixtures of the Islamic
Republic, making them ill suited to lead a radicalizing movement
calling for the overthrow of that system. Certainly they retain
support from the broader opposition, but many, and particularly the
more radicalized elements, do not look to Mousavi et al for
leadership. In particular, IRPO contacts in their 20s and 30s
discount the notion that anyone previously associated with 'the
Nezam' ('the System') could accurately represent their interests
and aspirations. The regime, however, has proved particularly
effective at neutralizing emerging leaders from the post-Revolution
generations.
¶14. (C) Within the GPO there is no consensus on its goals. What
started as a movement merely to annul the election results now
gives shelter both to those seeking the full set of rights
guaranteed them by Islamic Iran's Constitution and others seeking a
new system of governance altogether. Much like the ambiguity in
its leadership, the unspecified nature of its goals allow it to
have a 'bigger tent.' Mousavi's recent five point declaration
calling for restoring press freedom, creating a fair and
transparent election law, freeing all political prisoners, and
recognizing the peoples' right to gather and to form political
associations and parties, was however an attempt by the GPO
leaderships to to begin to delimit the scope of their ambitions.
¶15. (C) Heretofore the GPO has yet to adopt any sort of an economic
agenda or set of grievances as part of a core opposition message,
and perhaps the absence of one partially underscores the relative
'bourgeois' leanings of the GPO. Anecdotal information indicates
that unemployment and a potential spike in inflation (expected with
the recent decision to end subsidies) increasingly concern a large
number of Iranians. IRPO contacts and Iranian press reporting also
indicate another spike in labor unrest, due to the parlous state of
Iran's factories and their inability to pay their workers on time.
One would think that a message that capitalizes on these economic
concerns juxtaposed against President Ahmadinejad's (and by
extension the Revolution's) economic mismanagement and continued
corruption would attract a wide spectrum of socio-economic groups
to a more broad-based GPO. However, for whatever reason, in
contemporary Iran it has been political and not economic themes
that have been more effective in mobilizing the Iranian people, and
economic concerns on their own have rarely drawn large protests in
Iran's thirty-year post-revolutionary history.
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¶16. (U) COMMENT: The June 12 election and its subsequent

protests/crackdown was a tectonic shift in Iranian domestic
politics. At the elite level it destroyed Khamenei's non-partisan
veneer, placing him securely in the center of a no holds-barred
political fray. It also redefined the sets of insider ('khodi')
and outsider ('qeyr-e khodi') so that not only were Second of
Khordad Reformists on the outs, but so was former President Hashemi
Rafsanjani and those aligned with him. In this regard, at the
elite level the central dynamic in many ways can be seen as Supreme
Leader Khamenei, AN and the hard-line intelligence-security IRGC
faction on one side and former President Rafsanjani on the other,
with all of Iran's political elite being pressured to openly take
sides (NOTE: there is a substantial economic element to this
dynamic, as in many ways Ahmadinejad's ascension to power coincides
with attempts by a new cohort elite, largely composed of hardline
IRGC 'intelligence-security' elements, to secure positions of
wealth and influence formerly occupied by Rafsanjani loyalists).
Certainly many hardline regime elements see Rafsanjani and his
eldest son Mehdi as the 'head' to the GPO 'body,' and assume that
if Rafsanjani were neutralized then the GPO's threat potential
would be far less.
¶17. (C) COMMENT (CONT): According to IRPO contacts close to the

Rafsanjani circle, Rafsanjani is still unsuccessfully seeking to
persuade Supreme Leader Khamenei that AN and his crowd are a far
greater threat to the Islamic Republic than any threat that
Khamenei might feel from Rafsanjani, and that SLK should withdraw
his support for them. For their part, the regime continues to
pressure Rafsanjani through (inter alia) judicial and other
pressure on his family, such that his eldest son Mehdi has fled
abroad and cannot return. A weakened Rafsanjani has minimal
institutional power, given that the Expediency Council is
subordinate to Khamenei and that the clerics in the Experts Council
are too cowed or beholden to the government to oppose them. As
such, Rafsanjani keeps a low public profile while at the same time
trying to rally elite support, to include moderate conservatives
and influential IRGC commanders. The regime is unlikely to more
directly target Rafsanjani unless and until Rafsanjani were to
become more confrontational.
¶18. (C) COMMENT (CONT): At the popular level, June 12 has revived a
popular reformist movement largely quiescent after the eight
Khatami years while also bringing large parts of Iran's youngest
generation into the fray. This opposition, however, is not
unified. The GPO now is a bifurcated movement, coupling a largely
student-dominated mass following with a titular, elite leadership,
and the two parts are not a cohesive whole. This rather diffuse
organization may be a key to its staying power and simultaneously
an impediment to building an opposition movement that could
challenge the viability of the current government. Beyond the GPO
is an array of unsatisfied groups whose willingness to join the GPO
is unclear. These groups clearly oppose President Ahmadinejad but
do not yet seek, as do many GPO elements, to overturn the entire
system. END COMMENT.
EYRE
Viewing cable 10RPODUBAI15, IRAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: 'FROM

CRISIS TO STALEMATE' (2/3)
Discussing cables
2010-01-13 2010-11-28 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFOR Iran RPO
10RPODUBAI15
13:01 18:06 N Dubai
VZCZCXRO6831
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RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/13

TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: 'FROM CRISIS TO STALEMATE' (2/3)
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At this point the Green Path Opposition (GPO) is
more of a persistent problem for the regime than an existential
threat, and it is unrealistic to assume that the GPO will be able
to effect any 'regime change' in the short-term. Iran's ruling
regime is likely to continue seeing increased violence and
suppression as its most effective tool, including in the build-up
to mid- February anniversary of the Revolution and the opposition's
next planned protests. However it is unlikely be able to
eliminate the GPO, which will continue trying to co-opt public
holidays to stage anti-regime protests and also try to increase
divisions among regime elite. Although subsets of the GPO are
radicalizing, there is no reason to assume that GPO elements
seeking to fundamentally change the system represent most Iranians.
The GPO does not mirror the widespread an varied opposition that
overturned the Shah thirty years ago, and the standoff now is
increasingly becoming a stalemate that (inter alia) imperils the
IRIG's ability to engage with the West. Until a new homeostasis is
reached in Iran's political ruling class, progress on issues of
bilateral importance will be even more difficult than usual. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) NOTE: This is the second in a series of cables examining

the Iranian opposition since the June 12 Presidential election,
what might happen in the short-term, and what the most effective
levers of US policy have been so far and what combination may have
the most impact in the coming months.
ON THIS SIDE: REGIME
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Iran's current leadership sees the GPO with its periodic
street demonstrations more as a persistent problem than as an
existential threat. Ideology and personal experience have taught
regime hard-liners to equate compromise under pressure with
weakness. Supreme Leader Khamenei (SLK) himself is said to believe
that the Shah's fatal mistake, and the reason the Revolution
succeeded, was because the Shah 'retreated,' in addition to
believing that the USSR's fall was due to the same reasons. As
such, the regime can be expected to remain committed to using force
and repression against the GPO as necessary to both incapacitate
its first- and second-tier leadership (primarily through detention)
and its rank and file (through detention and violence, to include
deadly force).
¶4. (C) Opposition activists have told IRPO that at least part of
the regime strategy is a pre-emptive 'rolling round-up' of not just
active GPO elements but also sympathizers. Thus in addition to
those it identifies as participating in GPO activities, the regime
goes after reformist reporters, feminists, human rights advocates,
labor organizers, ageing 'National Front' sympathizers, 'Second of
Khordad' Khatami-era reformists who are not active in the GPO
movement. According to some foreign-based GPO leaders, informed
estimates indicate approximately 2,000 people have been thus far
detained.
¶5. (C) Indications are that the regime is laying the groundwork for
using even more violence, to include the broader use of lethal
force at the popular level if necessary. This could include
executions of those found guilty of 'warring against God,' a term
which the regime is prone to define somewhat expansively. And while
there is certainly a limit to the regime's willingness to use
violence against its own people, there are no indications that it
is anywhere near it. One former IRGC officer told an Iranwatcher
that the IRGC wants to avoid killing more than a 'few dozen'
protestors in any one location on any one day, partially to avoid
associations with 'Black Friday' -September 8, 1978 - when mass
fatalities in a demonstration turned many against the Shah). The
Ashura-day murder of Mousavi's nephew, in addition to the January 7
incident where security officials seemed to have coordinated shots
being fired at a car carrying Karrubi indicate a regime intent to
DUBAI 00000015 002 OF 006
calibrate its level of violence to intimidate the opposition and

its leadership.
¶6. (C) The media press environment is also expected to become far
more restrictive, with one prominent reformist newsman telling IRPO
that he expects all reformist papers to be shut down in the
short-term. The regime continues to block 'subversive' websites,
while also stepping up it jamming of satellite broadcasts from both
VOA and BBC.
¶7. (C) In addition to its familiar tools of force and repression,

the regime also occasionally feints toward reconciliation, issuing
statements counseling moderation and offering up an occasional
scapegoat, such as the recent Majlis report blaming former Tehran
Prosecutor General Mortazavi for the detainee deaths at the
Kahrizak detention center. In the public thrust and parry over
post-June 12 events one regime voice conspicuous by its absence has
been that of President Ahmadinejad, who has largely kept silent.
This strategy has drawn criticism by some fellow hard-liners, who
fault him for his unwillingness to publicly endorse harsh measures
against the GPO.
¶8. (C) According to GPO expatriate leaders and other sources, the
ruling regime can be seen as composed of three groups, with
Khamenei still exercising control:
- relative moderates, such as Ali Larijani and Ahmad Tavakolli in
the Majlis, and Asghar Hejazi, former Foreign Minister Velayati and
former Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nuri all in the Supreme Leader's
office. This group seeks to have SLK cease his active support of
Ahmadinejad so that he can be removed by the Majlis;
-hardliners, such as IRGC Intelligence Head Hossein Taeb,

Khameneni's son Mojtaba, Basij Commander BG Mohammad Reza Naqdi,
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, and Ahmadinejad and his own crowd. This
group seeks increased use of force, to include lethal force, on the
GPO and its leaders;
- a middle way 'swing' group, composed of SLK himself, his two

sons Mostafa and Maysam, and some intelligence officials. This
group seeks a middle course between the two above, favoring
imprisoning, beating but not mass killing of protestors, and house
arrest and intimidation but not arrest and/or execution of GPO
leaders.
ON THIS SIDE: GPO
-------------------------
¶9. (C) Going forward, the GPO seems committed to using public
holidays as a show of strength and support, with the next big GPO
planned demonstration being the anniversary of the Revolution's
victory on February 11 (22 Bahman). According to at least one
prominent GPO activist based abroad, the GPO leadership has a
three-part strategy:
- (1) Maintaining GPO unity while also 'growing' and training its
numbers, expanding both geographically and in its constituent
class/demographic/ethnic elements. Public street gatherings on key
dates are one way of showing solidarity, as are slogans from
rooftops, work slowdowns, and other non-violent 'political
actions.' It will also seek to expand its use of 'blitz'
demonstrations, i.e. rapid assembly and dispersal of protestors, in
DUBAI 00000015 003 OF 006
addition to university demonstrations and other forms of protest.

In this regard it seeks to strengthen links with Iran's labor
force, many of whom have a tradition of striking over non-payment
of wages. (NOTE: The GPO's diffuse structure, and constant regime
pressure, will make implementing better organization and training
difficult in the short-term).
- (2) Creating divisions within the ruling elite, by 'peeling off'

the moderates around Khamenei. Mousavi's recent statement in which
he tacitly accepted the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad government
was a step in this direction. Second of Khordad 'theoretician' Said
Hajjarian used to speak of the tactic of 'pressure from below,
negotiations from above' as the reformist strategy, and at least
some GPO strategists hope that elite pressure from moderate
conservatives dismayed at ongoing popular protests will seek to
convince SLK to cease his active support of Ahmadinejad, at which
point he will be subject to possibly politically fatal attacks from
the Majlis due to (inter alia) his financial mismanagement. These
GPO strategists, who curiously also see regime compromise as a sign
of weakness, see Supreme Leader Khamenei's 'throwing Ahmadinejad
under the bus' as the first step to ultimately bringing down
Supreme Leader Khamenei himself
- (3) Continuing non-violent efforts to 'paralyze' the government,

largely through boycotts of IRGC affiliated companies, through work
slowdowns, and ultimately through strikes. Some within the GPO see
the December 27 Ashura demonstrations as equivalent to the 17
Shahrivar demonstrations during the Revolution, after which the
people slowly 'lost their fear' of the Shah's machinery of
repression. However, even the most optimistic GPO leaders
acknowledge the movement needs significantly more organization and
training before it is able to engage in larger anti-regime
activities (NOTE: Another advantage of a non-violent strategy is
that such non-violent protests are technically authorized by
Article 27 of the Constitution. As such, any move to anti-regime
violence would represent not just an escalation in the likely
overall level of violence, but a move from inter-Constitutional to
extra-Constitutional opposition).
¶10. (C) This 3-part strategy, as articulated by a GPO leader based

abroad, in many respects depends on the willingness of the mass
movement of the GPO for support; whether it has been embraced by
the popular elements of the GPO opposition is unclear.
Furthermore, the increasing radicalization of popular elements
within the GPO potentially undermines this strategy and at the very
least makes near-term predictions less reliable. An opposition
that increasingly responds to regime violence with its own violence
gives the regime greater license to increase repression even
further, creating an unpredictable cycle of violence coupled with
greater disillusionment with the regime.
¶11. (C) MEDIA AND CYBERSPACE: The regime and GPO clash not just in
the streets but also in cyberspace, and the GPO can be expected to
expand its efforts to create a virtual space in which it can
disseminate information to Iranians inside Iran. It continues to
spend significant energies on circumventing Iranian attempts to
monitor, control and block Internet access in Iran, and is
exploring the possibility of providing satellite high-speed
internet access, although funding is the main barrier. In
conventional media, expatriate GPO activists have told IRPO that
while in the short-term GPO is forced to rely on satellite TV such
as VOA and BBC to get oppositionist news into Iran, it is seeking
to create its own news fora, to include its own satellite
television broadcast.
NO 2ND REVOLUTION
-----------------------------
DUBAI 00000015 004 OF 006
¶12. (C) No one knows or can know what will happen next. While
Iran is not North Korea, since June 12 and the subsequent crackdown
it has become harder to follow significant events there, both at
the popular and elite level. Foreign media presence has been
severely curtailed and domestic media is increasingly censored. And
Iran's hardline intelligence-security cabal's 'soft overthrow'
fixation has reduced the number and type of Iranians willing to
talk frankly to the press (and to Iranwatchers) about domestic
events.
¶13. (C) Against that backdrop one must note the 'selective
perception' bias that tends to over-emphasize the GPO's potency.
Some pro-GPO bias stems from their being the (relative) 'good guys'
in this drama, to the extent that their agenda encompasses
principles dear to Western democracies. Additionally, Western
media's Iran contacts tend to be pro-reformist, with Western press
quoting pro-GPO activists and analysts almost exclusively. Also USG
officials' interactions with Iranians tend to be largely limited to
Iranians willing and able to talk with us, with a disproportionate
number of them being those seeking USG assistance in helping fight
the regime. Finally and in many ways most importantly 'if it bleeds
it leads,' so there are no 'Youtube' uploads on demonstration days
of the millions of ordinary Iranians who are going about their
business.
¶14. (C) In this regard, many IRPO interlocutors comment that for
most in Tehran, life is going on as normal, with no sensation of
living in 'a police state' (except on the key dates targeted by the
GPO, and only then for people in specific areas where clashes
occur). In other words, it seems that the vast majority of
Iranians, though more critical of the government to greater or
lesser degrees, are continuing to live their lives as normal.
There is no reason to assume that those 'radical' GPO elements
seeking to fundamentally change the system represent most Iranians.
At most, it appears that many and possibly most Iranians want a
peaceful reform of the system as opposed to another revolution with
an uncertain outcome.
¶15. (C) Having stipulated that no one can assert with confidence
what will happen in Iran's domestic situation over the next year,
it does seem that, as expatriate Iranian oppositionist Ibrahim
Nabavi has written, Iran is moving 'from crisis to stalemate.' The
clash between Iran's government hardliners and the GPO is unlikely
to end decisively to the benefit of either side within the
short-term, and it is quite improbable that in the short-term the
GPO will in some decisive way 'defeat' the Khamenei regime and
change Iran's theocracy into a secular republic.
¶16. (C) In terms of the significant metrics by which can judge the
course of future events, some of the ones significant both in
1977-79 and now include the following:
- Numbers: The numbers of protestors willing to take to the streets

now is an order of magnitude smaller than in 78-79.
- Classes: the GPO as currently constituted doesn't seem to have a

significant ethnic or labor component, and doesn't seem to have
'broken out' of Tehran in a significant way to other major urban
centers, though we recognize that our awareness of developments
outside of Tehran is likely to be more limited.
- Anti-Gov't Activities: Unlike 1979, there have been no paralyzing

strikes, bazaar closings, military defections, or signs of the
government ceasing to function. Whereas the bazaar merchants in
1979 had the inclination and money to fund striking workers
deprived of pay, the there seems to be no such GPO 'deep pockets.'
Indeed both elements of the 'bazaar-mosque' alliance that were in
DUBAI 00000015 005 OF 006
many ways the backbone of the 1979 Revolution are singularly absent
in today's opposition, as each has been largely co-opted by the
government. There have been no indications that Rafsanjani and the
Servants of Construction or Qalibaf's Tehran Municipality are
currently a significant GPO funding source. On a far more limited
scale, expatriate 'Second of Khordad' Reformist elements within the
Iranian Diaspora are leading efforts to create a fund for the
support of detainee families.
- Elite Defection/Emigration: Those hardliners who constitute and

support the regime are very likely to remain committed to the fight
against the GPO, since they know they would have no role in any new
order and would also have nowhere else to go. However for the GPO,
many reformists and oppositionists dissatisfied with Iran's plight
would rather quit then fight, as shown by the ongoing brain drain,
to include increased exodus of political activists. Anecdotal
information shows that many of larger numbers of affluent and
educated Iranians who can be presumed to be oppose the hardliners
are taking their families and fortunes abroad.
¶17. (C) Although much GPO animus has transferred from Ahmadinejad
to SLK, it can be assumed that at least part of the movement's
support would fade were Ahmadinejad to be replaced by someone less
controversial and better equipped to successfully govern. Although
SLK has shown that he prefers suppression to compromise, at some
point pressure at the elite level might persuade him to abandon or
marginalize Ahmadinejad. Granted, the subsequent Presidential
election could provide another spark for future protests, but the
point here is that at both at the popular and elite level, at least
some oppositionist fervor is still fixated on Ahmadinejad, and
would presumably dissipate with his dismissal.
STALEMATE TO CONTINUE
----------------------------------
¶18. (C) The IRIG's decision-making process, multi-polar and messy

even before this turmoil, has been further strained by the battle
between the regime and the GPO as well as by the animosity toward
Ahmadinejad from within the regime. For example, domestic
political opposition torpedoed Khamenei and Ahmadinejad's ability
to sell the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor agreement. Subsidy
reform, the most important piece of domestic legislation in years,
was passed only after a protracted political cage fight between
Ahmadinejad and the Majlis. Amid the IRIG-GPO stalemate and the
accompanying factionalization in the conservative 'Principalist'
camp, Iran will be hard pressed achieve consensus and move forward
on issues relevant to the USG.
¶19. (C) As one US-based IRPO contact noted, only one thing is
certain, namely uncertainty over how the contest will play out. It
is clear neither regime leaders nor opposition figures are
convinced of the path ahead and they are constantly recalibrating
and shifting positions. Moreover, he added, there is hesitancy on
the part of all actors to move decisively. He noted that this was
visible in the regime's unwillingness to use the full force of its
repressive capabilities to crack down on the opposition once and
for all.
¶20. (C) COMMENT: The GPO is not Poland's Solidarity, and Tehran
2010 isn't Tehran 1978. In other words, it is quite unlikely that
the current Iranian system of government will significantly change
in the short-term, and if there were any significant change, it is
more likely to be towards a more authoritarian regime than to be
towards a more democratic one. However, having posited why the
GPO is unlikely to effect fundamental short-term changes in Iran's
ruling system, it is equally true to say that it is unlikely to go
away. What makes the preceding important for the USG is the fact
that Iran's current domestic strife is a political 'black hole'
DUBAI 00000015 006 OF 006
that swallows all other issues, both domestic and foreign, such
that until a new homeostasis is reached in Iran's political ruling
class, progress on issues of bilateral importance will be even more
difficult than usual. END COMMENT.
EYRE
Viewing cable 10SANAA4, GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH
ON SECURITY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10SANAA4.
10SANAA4 2010-01-04 13:01 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Sanaa
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 INL-00 DOTE-00
PERC-00 PDI-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EUR-00 OIGO-00 FAAE-00
FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01
MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00
NIMA-00 MCC-00 PM-00 GIWI-00 SCT-00 ISNE-00 FMPC-00
SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 SCRS-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00
SANA-00 /001W
O 041333Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NCTC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SANAA 000004
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP

NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS MOPS MASS MCAP SA
AE, UK, ER, DJ, QA, YM
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH ON SECURITY
ASSISTANCE, AQAP STRIKES
REF: 2009 SANAA 1430
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Commander of the U.S. Central Command

General David Petraeus congratulated President Saleh on
recent successful operations against AQAP, and informed him
that U.S. security assistance to the ROYG would increase to
USD 150 million in 2010, including USD 45 million to equip
and train a CT-focused aviation regiment under the Yemeni
Special Operations Forces. Saleh requested that the U.S.
provide 12 armed helicopters and train and equip three new
Republican Guard brigades. Saleh rejected the General's
proposal to have USG personnel armed with direct-feed
intelligence present inside the area of CT operations, but
agreed to a have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside
Yemeni territory ready to engage AQAP targets should
actionable intelligence become available. END SUMMARY.
SALEH: HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus,

accompanied by the Ambassador, CENTCOM aides, the Embassy
DATT, and EconOff note taker, congratulated President Saleh
on successful operations against AQAP during a January 2
meeting. The General told Saleh that he had requested USD
150 million in security assistance for 2010, a substantial
increase over the 2009 amount of USD 67 million. Also
present were Minister of Defense MG Muhammed Nasser Ahmad Ali
and Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs
Rashad al-Alimi. Raising a topic that he would manage to
insert into almost every item of discussion during the hour
and half-long meeting, Saleh requested that the U.S. provide
the ROYG with 12 armed helicopters. Possessing such
helicopters would allow the ROYG to take the lead in future
CT operations, "ease" the use of fighter jets and cruise
missiles against terrorist targets, and allow Yemeni Special
Operations Forces to capture terrorist suspects and identify
victims following strikes, according to Saleh. The U.S.
could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six
helicopters each if the American "bureaucracy" prevented
quick approval, Saleh suggested. The General responded that
he had already considered the ROYG's request for helicopters
and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter. "We
won't use the helicopters in Sa'ada, I promise. Only against
al-Qaeda," Saleh told General Petraeus.
¶3. (S/NF) Saleh agreed to General Patraeus' proposal to

dedicate USD 45 million of 2010 security assistance funds to
help establish and train a YSOF aviation regiment, allowing
YSOF to focus on al-Qaeda targets and leaving Sa'ada air
operations to the Yemeni Air Force. Without giving much
detail, Saleh also requested that the U.S. equip and train
three new Republican Guard brigades, totaling 9,000 soldiers.
"Equipping these brigades would reflect upon our true
partnership," Saleh said. The General urged Saleh to focus
first on the YSOF aviation regiment.
AQAP STRIKES: CONCERN FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

---------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes

against AQAP but said that "mistakes were made" in the
killing of civilians in Abyan. The General responded that
the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of
an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into
a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister
Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of
terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike. (Comment:
Saleh's conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he
has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in
Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to
determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage.
End Comment.) AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but
the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives
to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in
affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda. Saleh raised the
issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal
sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported
through other channels.
SHIFTING AIRSTRIKE STRATEGIES

-----------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) President Obama has approved providing U.S.

intelligence in support of ROYG ground operations against
AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh. Saleh reacted
coolly, however, to the General's proposal to place USG
personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time,
direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR platforms overhead.
"You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in
the joint operations center," Saleh responded. Any U.S.
casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts,
Saleh asserted. Saleh did not have any objection, however,
to General Petraeus' proposal to move away from the use of
cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers
circle outside Yemeni territory, "out of sight," and engage
AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available.
Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are "not very
accurate" and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed
precision-guided bombs instead. "We'll continue saying the
bombs are ours, not yours," Saleh said, prompting Deputy
Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just "lied" by
telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa
were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MIL-MIL RELATIONS

-----------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) General Petraeus praised cooperation between the

Embassy and the NSB, YSOF, Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), and
Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), but singled out relations with
the Yemeni Air Force as problematic. Only four out of 50
planned U.S. Special Operations Forces Command training
missions with the Yemeni Air Force had actually been executed
in the past year, he said. Saleh said he would personally
instruct Minister of Defense to improve the situation. The
General also urged Saleh to stop Yemeni Customs' habit of
holding up Embassy cargo at the airport, including shipments
destined for the ROYG itself, such as equipment for the CTU.
Saleh laughed and made a vague pledge to have the customs
issue "taken care of." Saleh complained that the ROYG had
not yet received the necessary training to operate 17 Iraqi
Light Armored Vehicle (ILAVs) provided by the USG in 2008,
saying that YSOF needed the training in order to use the
ILAVs for CT operations. The General said he would look into
having U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel conduct the
training.
¶7. (S/NF) Pointing to the ROYG's problems in combating

rampant drug and arms smuggling, Saleh told General Petraeus
that U.S. maritime security assistance was insufficient to
cover Yemen's nearly 2,000 km of coastline. "Why not have
Italy, Germany, Holland, Japan, Saudi, and the UAE each
provide two patrol boats?" Saleh suggested. The General told
Saleh that two fully-equipped 87-foot patrol boats destined
for the Yemeni Coast Guard were under construction and would
arrive in Yemen within a year. Saleh singled out smuggling
from Djibouti as particularly troublesome, claiming that the
ROYG had recently intercepted four containers of
Djibouti-origin TNT. "Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail
Guelleh that I don't care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen
-- provided it's good whiskey ) but not drugs or weapons,"
Saleh joked. Saleh said that smugglers of all stripes are
bribing both Saudi and Yemeni border officials.
SALEH WELCOMES LONDON CONFERENCE

--------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Saleh told the General that he welcomed PM Gordon

Brown's announcement of the London conference and said that
the cooperation on Yemen between the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE would be benefitial. Qatar should not be
involved, however, because "they work with Iran." In this
regard, Saleh also identified Qatar as one of those nations
working "against Yemen," along with Iran, Libya, and Eritrea.
¶9. (U) General Petraeus did not have an opportunity to clear

on this cable.
SECHE
Viewing cable 10SEOUL62, SPECIAL ENVOY KING’S 1/11 MEETING WITH
FM YU
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10SEOUL62.
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0062/01 0140940

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140940Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2030
TAGS PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ECON, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING’S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy Robert King, FM Yu
downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Yu asserted
that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February; the
North Korean leader needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to
stabilize an “increasingly chaotic” situation at home. An unspecified number of
high-ranking North Korean officials had recently defected to the ROK, according
to Yu. The foreign minister thanked King for his willingness to press the PRC on
the treatment of North Korean refugees. Yu said the ROK would provide
“significant” food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to
monitoring. The ROK also planned to help fund work by NGOs to combat TB and
multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK’s
chronically malnourished population. At a lunch following the meeting, Seoul’s
point man on DPRK issues, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, reiterated the FM’s call for
U.S. help in persuading China to go easier on North Korean refugees. Wi also
thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on
discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding
potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their North Korean kin. End
summary.
FM Yu on: Prospects for North-South Summit...

--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy for North Korean Human
Rights Issues Robert King, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan downplayed press
speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. The ROK was discussing the
issue with the DPRK, Yu said, noting that there were two major Blue House
preconditions: the nuclear issue had to be on the agenda and the ROK would not
pay the North to hold a summit. Yu speculated that it would “take some time” for
the North Koreans to “digest” the preconditions.
...Rumors of a KJI Visit to China...

------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or
early February. The North Korean leader had visited the PRC twice before in that
timeframe, Yu related, adding that KJI needed both Chinese economic aid and
political support to stabilize an “increasingly chaotic” situation at home. In
particular, FM Yu claimed that the North’s botched currency reform had caused
“big problems” for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim
Jong-eun was “not going smoothly.” Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number
of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to
the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasized that the defections have not been made public. End
note.)
...Pressuring Beijing on Refugees...

------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Yu thanked Ambassador King for stating that he intended to work closely
with the ROK on the issue of improving human rights conditions in North Korea.
Yu also expressed appreciation for Ambassador King’s willingness to engage the
Chinese on the issue of North Korean refugees. Yu said he has repeatedly raised
the matter with PRC FM Yang, only to get a boilerplate response emphasizing that
North Koreans in China are economic migrants. Yu claimed that the number of
North Koreans fleeing into China XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to increase; 2,952 North
Koreans made it to the ROK in 2009 and more than that are expected in 2010. Yu
noted that at least 80 percent of the refugees who come to the South are women,
adding that they are often abused by human traffickers. XXXXXXXXXXXX Yu added
that he was skeptical that the DPRK would engage in dialogue with the EU about
human rights.
...and Humanitarian Assistance to the North

-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Responding to a question from Ambassador King, Yu said the North Korean
grain harvest was approximately 4 million metric tons (MMT), which was better
than expected but still short of the 4.5 MMT the regime needs to ensure
stability. (Note: The official ROKG estimate is that the DPRK harvest was
approximately 5 MMT. End note.) Given the North’s chronic transportation and
storage problems, there would be starvation “here and there” during the spring,
Yu lamented. The foreign minister said the ROK would be willing to provide
“significant” food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to
monitoring. The ROK would not, Yu said, simply give the North a huge amount of
grain. Any aid would be given in small amounts, he stressed. The foreign
minister also said the ROK would help fund work by NGOs to combat multi-drug-
resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK’s chronically
malnourished population.
Follow-On Lunch with XXXXXXXXXXXX

--------------------------------
¶6. (C) At a lunch following the meeting with XXXXXXXXXX reiterated the FM’s
call for the United States to XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK
updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart
regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their relatives in
North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea has made only token efforts to
support North-South family reunions and has “reacted badly” to Seoul’s repeated
calls for the release of the approximately 1,000 abductees and POWs believed to
be still held by the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that Seoul appreciated
Ambassador King’s effort to keep the family reunion, abductee, and POW issues on
the proverbial agenda. STEPHENS
Viewing cable 10SHENYANG4, WAITING AND WATCHING: NORTH

KOREA AFTER CURRENCY
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10SHENYANG4.
10SHENYANG4 2010-01-07 00:12 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Consulate Shenyang
VZCZCXRO2163
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHSH #0004/01 0070012
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 070012Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0247
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0194
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0137
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
SE C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 XXXXXXXXXXXX 000004
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION

TAGS: CH ECON EFIN EIND EMIN KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WAITING AND WATCHING: NORTH KOREA AFTER CURRENCY
REFORM
REF: 09 XXXXXXXXXXXX 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. For

Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On December 15, EAP DAS XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX staff
met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a major player
here in Chinese-North Korean economic exchanges. XXXXXXXXXXXX
attributed the DPRK,s recent currency reform to several
factors: controlling rampant inflation, preventing 'hot
money' flows, leveling the wealth gap between workers and
traders, controlling domestic currency, and most importantly,
uncovering potential political opposition. As a result of the
reform, commerce has come to a halt. The leadership, as part
of an ambitious 2012 development strategy, hopes for the
restoration of relations with the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
believes that current plans assume Kim Jong-il will be around
for some time and that Kim Jong-un will be his successor. The
recent recall of DPRK scholars, students and scientists from
China following the defection of a North Korean exchange
student, for example, suggests increasing levels of paranoia.
END SUMMARY.
GIVE ME GOOD REASON

-------------------
¶2. (S/NF) On December 15, EAP DAS David Shear and Consulate
Shenyang staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX visits
Pyongyang frequently. Admitting he is unsure of the exact
value of Chinese investment into North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
the number to be many billions of renminbi. Chinese
companies, like their ROK counterparts, use North Korea as a
processing zone, primarily in the mining and seafood
industries. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK leadership's 2012
target for achieving 'strong-country' status should form the
principal basis for analyzing recent political developments,
including the currency reform measure.
¶3. (S/NF) The most important reason for the recent DPRK currency
reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is to uncover political opposition,
particularly against Kim Jong-il's younger son. Controlling
inflation, leveling the wealth gap, controlling domestic
currency and access to foreign currency, are all part of this
strategy. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the third son, Kim Jong-un,
favored the currency revaluation, and that going forward Kim
Jong-un leans toward a Vietnamese-style of economic reform.
Opposition to the currency exchange, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, might
reveal who opposes the ascension of Kim Jong-un to
leadership. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kim Jong-il's support of the
currency reform points to his favoring the third son; those
opposing the revaluation, also oppose the third son. XXXXXXXXXXXX drew
parallels to the 2009 nuclear tests, which he said were
also influenced by succession plans. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the first
son, Kim Jong-nam, opposes his younger brother's reform
plans and favors a Chinese-style of economic opening.
¶4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the number of factions competing for Kim
Jong-il's attention have made it increasingly difficult for
Kim Jong-il to listen to anyone. As a sign of Kim Jong-il's
paranoia, he recently recalled all students, scholars, and
scientists in China following the defection of an exchange
student in Northeast China. He did this despite the need for
Chinese knowledge, production skills, and technology to
achieve the country's goals for 2012. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
that current instability will settle and the government will
move ahead with reform, fully expecting Kim Jong-il to be
around for sometime to come. The reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, may
not be toward a more open economy. Rather, with currency
reform giving the regime the ability to control domestic
currency, reforms will lead to tighter control over the
economy.
¶5. (S) Prior to revaluation, one dollar equaled 3500 won. To

put that in perspective, the average worker in Pyongyang
earns 3000-4000 won per month. XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that according to
the DPRK Embassy, the official exchange rate following reform
is now one dollar equals 129 won. For the common person,
SHENYANG 00000004 002 OF 002
besides suffering from a significant cut in won-based

savings, supermarkets and department stores that deal in won
have suspended activity as they wait to see what impact
currency reform will have on commodity prices. Thus, it has
become difficult to purchase day-to-day needs. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed
out, if commodity prices rise, the economy will be ruined.
However, if prices settle as a result of reform, and assuming
constant wages, the economy will be okay as workers once
earning one dollar a month will now earn nearly 20 dollars.
¶6. (S) Traders, who earn many times more than the average
wage-earner, have been unaffected by the reform in monetary
terms, as savings are held mostly in euro and dollars. Since
the revaluation, only stores dealing with foreign exchange
have been open and prices in these stores have increased
400-500 percent. For example, a TV that cost RMB 4000 now
costs RMB 20,000. Many of these stores raised prices in
anticipation of the reform, with the expectation that prices
would then fall. However, prices have not fallen. Many of the
stores that raised prices prior to reform have since been
closed by the government, their goods confiscated. Thus, even
traders who have not lost money from revaluation now have
nothing to buy. Chinese traders along the North Korean border
have also been affected by currency reform even though most
trade is done in euros and dollars. As is the case within
North Korea, people are waiting and watching to see what will
happen to prices. In the meantime, nobody wants to sell
anything.
NOT A CRISIS YET BUT CLOSE

--------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX does not believe the DPRK is in crisis mode at this
time. As he said, the people are used to this sort of thing.
He saw the currency reform as being part of a broader
conflict within the government as it moves forward in the
next several years. Since 2002, the DPRK has allowed some
economic reform, without expressing strong support or
opposition. As he put it, the government has been waiting and
watching to see what would happen.
CHINA, the U.S., and EVERYTHING

-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said many in the DPRK believe the Chinese do not
understand their country. While neither the Chinese nor the
DPRK are likely to criticize the other in public, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that in private the DPRK has disparaged the Chinese for not
including North Korea on its list of 147 tourist destinations
or 137 investment destinations. These omissions and the
disparate Chinese actions on regional development projects
clearly indicate that North Korea is not a priority for the
Chinese. For instance, while China recently elevated the
long-beleaguered Changchun-Jilin-Tumen River development plan
to a national level project, the DPRK left the Tumen River
Development Plan, as it sees no benefit (REFTEL). Relations
between the two countries were getting so bad, in fact,
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang two months ahead of
schedule.
¶9. (S/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, North Korea has set an ambitious

target of developing a strong country by 2012. As part of
this project, it is planning to build 100,000 residential
apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. In order to encourage
Chinese investment, the DPRK is offering Chinese investors
mining and ocean rights for their injection of cash into the
project. A former Consul General of the North Korean
consulate in Shenyang, recently spent two weeks in Beijing
attracting about RMB 12 billion for this project and planned
to come to Shenyang following his time in Beijing.
¶10. (S) Restoration of relations with the United States is

another important part of the DPRK's reform plans. He said,
however, that North Korea looks forward to an ongoing cycle
of ups and downs in negotiations and that it counts on the
U.N. to be slow in implementing sanctions. As he said, he
believes that once things settle down, North Korea will show
China and the U.S. "its bottom card."
WICKMAN
Viewing cable 10SHENYANG5, FURTHER INSIGHTS ON PRC-DPRK
TRADE: DECISIONS, DISPUTES, AND
Discussing cables
ID e.g. #10SHENYANG5.
10SHENYANG5 2010-01-11 02:02 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Consulate Shenyang
VZCZCXRO4574
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHSH #0005/01 0110251
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 110251Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0249
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0196
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0139
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000005
SIPDIS
PASS TO EAP/CM, EAP/K, INR
EO 12958 DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS CM, ECON, EFIN, EIND, EMIN, ENRG, PGOV, PINS, PREL
SUBJECT: FURTHER INSIGHTS ON PRC-DPRK TRADE: DECISIONS, DISPUTES, AND
BACK-DOOR DEALS
REF: A. 10SHENYANG 003 B. 09SHENYANG 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman for Reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff XXXXXXXXXXXX that Kim Jong-il has
recently reversed decisions and struggled to implement policies, showing
increasing indecisiveness. XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX also reported that the
children of high-ranking DPRK and Chinese officials hijack deals and aid
projects for their own aggrandizement. Chinese state electric companies are
currently bidding to build the grid for the DPRK’s planned large-scale increase
in power generation and transmission capacity, but apart from the goal to build
100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, few of the DPRK’s other objectives for 2012
will likely be achieved. Construction of the bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju,
seems set to begin in 2010, however, China paying for both the bridge and a road
on the DPRK side. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that North Koreans having connections
and/or money, continue to receive permission to work in Northeast China, despite
reports of a recent general recall. End Summary.
PROMISING THE MOON TO “THE SUN”
-------------------------------
¶2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX PolOff met again with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that
Kim Jong-il has become increasingly indecisive since his stroke and other health
problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed to a recent decision to recall students,
scholars, and scientists working or studying in China as a result of a single
student’s defection in Beijing. XXXXXXXXXXXX said business and trade groups with
interests in Northeast China had pressured Kim Jong-il to reverse the decision,
which he apparently did, and companies in Northeast China are currently
developing “positions needing to be filled” to enable those who left the country
to get new visas.
¶3. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, not only does Kim Jong-il decide to reverse
policies on his own, but officials also chart their own course as different
factions competing for Kim’s attention, making it difficult for Kim to set a
firm, clear direction. Wary of China’s increasing hold on precious minerals and
mining rights in the DPRK, many North Korean officials oppose mineral
concessions as a means to attract Chinese investment. However, the former Consul
General of the DPRK’s Shenyang Consulate, in an effort to fund the construction
of the plan to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, continues to offer
mining and fishing rights to Chinese investors. He attracted more than RMB 12
billion in investment, more than enough to protect himself from the direct
attacks of these opponents. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, over-reporting of actual
value is a common phenomenon on the part of North Koreans charged with securing
foreign investment. For instance, a commitment of RMB 10 million is reported to
Pyongyang as a commitment of USD 10 million or more and the actual sum (the RMB
10 million) is reported as a first tranche. After the initial investment is
realized, the central government is told that the foreign investor demands
further preferences in order to inject more money. The reporting officials count
on the central government either taking additional steps to attract the extra
investment or doing something to upset the Chinese investor. In the latter case,
the official can blame the lack of realizing the investment on political factors
out of his control. XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no examples of the DPRK central
government acquiescing to the demand for additional concessions.
PRC-DPRK INVESTMENT DISPUTES: NOT JUST WITHIN THE DPRK
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Chinese state-owned enterprises have placed
restrictions on investing in North Korea but that a number of privatized Chinese
companies in which the state remains a significant shareholder have invested in
the DPRK. Disputes with North Korean counterparts develop all the time,
XXXXXXXXXXXXnoted. Saying: “It was hard to say” how such disputes are resolved,
XXXXXXXXXXXXgave the impression they are seldom, if ever, resolved. Investment
disputes related to North Korea also
SHENYANG 00000005 002 OF 002
occur between competing investors in China. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, for
example, two Chinese companies - Shandong Guoda Gold Company, Ltd. and Zhejiang-
based Wanxiang Group - are battling for access to Huishan Copper Mine, the
biggest copper mine in the DPRK. Huishan, near the DPRK-China border is rich in
gold, silver, and other valuable metals as well. Though MOFCOM approved both
joint-venture deals, each company wants to be the sole developer. XXXXXXXXXXXX
believes Wanxiang, which has close ties to Premier Wen Jiabao, will likely win
out, Shandong Guoda receiving a payment to quietly go away. Without naming
names, XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested the strong possibility that someone had made
a payment (on the order of USD 10,000) to secure the Premier’s support.
PRINCELINGS BEHAVING BADLY
---------------------------
¶5. (S) According toXXXXXXXXXXXX, the children of high-ranking North Korean and
Chinese officials hijack the most favorable investment and aid deals for their
own enrichment. When the child of a high-ranking official hears of a Chinese aid
proposal to North Korea, he will travel to North Korea to convince the relevant
official to follow his instructions for implementing the aid project. He will
then use his connections to request proposals from Chinese companies to develop
the project, returning to North Korea to convince the relevant official to
select the favored company. At each step, money changes hands, and the well-
connected Chinese go-between pockets a tidy sum. For the offspring of officials
in the DPRK, there are also ample opportunities to work in China. In a typical
situation, a DPRK official will alert another official to an opportunity for the
second official’s child to work in China for a DPRK-Chinese joint venture. After
signing a contract, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX it is a cheap, easy process to
obtain the necessary permit from the Chinese provincial Bureau of Labor and
Social Security. He said the system is similar to the “ting xin, liu zhi” system
in China in the 1980s, in which officials retained their government position
with a suspended salary while going to work for a private company.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has seen a number of similarities between the DPRK and
China since his first visit in 1998. He compared the impact of the famine on
North Koreans to the impact the Great Leap Forward (GLF) had on Chinese in the
countryside. Both incidents forced individuals to lose faith in the government’s
ability to provide a basic standard of living and created a sharp instinct for
self-preservation. He also sees similarities between the GLF and current plans
in the DPRK to become a strong country by 2012. During his previous meeting with
XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke of plans to build 100,000 apartments in Pyongyang by 2012.
North Korea also plans to increase electricity generation capacity by building
coal-fired power plants and hydropower plants, and to increase transmission
capacity by extending grids to all secondary cities. Chinese electric companies
are currently bidding on the grid projects. Despite the need for increased
electricity in North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is almost impossible that North
Korea will reach its goals in the next few years. The focus more likely will be
on the apartment blocks as these are big, physical things that people can see as
a mark of progress. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the long-planned bridge from Dandong
to Sinuiju will begin construction next year and that China will pay for the
entire project, including a highway on the North Korean side of the border (Ref
B).
WICKMAN
Viewing cable 10STATE6451, C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON

TURKISH DEPUTY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #6451 0221349

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R 221344Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1617
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006451
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2035

TAGS: PINR TU
SUBJECT: (C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON TURKISH DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER BULENT ARINC ASSASSINATION PLOT
(C-RE9-02710)
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS
¶1. (SBU) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE CLOSELY MONITORING

CIVIL/MILITARY TENSIONS IN TURKEY THAT HAVE BEEN BUILDING
DURING THE TWO-YEAR ERGENEKON INVESTIGATION. TURKISH GENERAL
STAFF (TGS) CHIEF OF DEFENSE ILKER BASBUG, IN A 17 DECEMBER
SPEECH, WARNED THE GOVERNMENT, JOURNALISTS, AND JUDICIAL
OFFICIALS AGAINST PURSUING INVESTIGATIONS AGAINST SENIOR
OFFICERS. TWO DAYS LATER, POLICE DETAINED TWO MILITARY
OFFICERS OUTSIDE THE HOME OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER BULENT
ARINC, WHERE THEY WERE ENGAGED IN APPARENT SURVEILLANCE
ACTIVITIES, LEADING TO THE FIRST POLICE SEARCHES OF SPECIAL
FORCES OFFICES AND FURTHER DETENTIONS OF MILITARY OFFICERS.
¶2. (SBU) WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON THIS

SURVEILLANCE, SUBSEQUENT POLICE SEARCHES, DETENTIONS OF
MILITARY OFFICERS, THE STATE OF MILITARY/POLICE AND
CIVIL/MILITARY RELATIONS, AND PERCEPTIONS OF THOSE
RELATIONSHIPS THAT POST CAN PROVIDE, AS TIME AND RESOURCES
PERMIT. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE USED FOR UPCOMING ANALYTICAL
PRODUCTION TO KEEP POLICYMAKERS ABREAST OF THE SITUATION.
¶A. (SBU) WHY WAS ARINC BEING SURVEILLED? WHO AUTHORIZED

THIS SURVEILLANCE? WHO ELSE KNEW ABOUT IT? WHAT OR WHO TIPPED
OFF POLICE? DURING THE SEARCH WHAT WERE THEY LOOKING FOR AND
WHAT DID THEY FIND? WERE THE INVESTIGATORS LOOKING FOR
SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OR WAS IT A GENERAL SEARCH FOR INFORMATION?
HOW DO TURKISH LEADERS PERCEIVE THESE EVENTS?
¶B. (SBU) WHAT IS THE STATE OF CIVIL/MILITARY RELATIONS?
¶C. (SBU) WHAT IS THE STATE OF MILITARY/POLICE RELATIONS?

HAVE THESE ARRESTS CAUSED OR INCREASED TENSIONS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE MILITARY?
¶D. (SBU) DOES THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY, OR

ELEMENTS WITHIN IT, SEE THIS INCIDENT AS A MEANS TO FINALLY
"TAME" THE TGS OR DOES PRIME MINISTER TAYYIP ERDOGAN WISH TO
EASE FURTHER CONFRONTATION AND APPEASE THE TGS?
¶3. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-02710 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF

REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 10STATE8675, EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR

COMMODITY
Discussing cables
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #8675 0281433

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281427Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0000
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MUSCAT FOR EXBS ADVISOR TYLER HOFFMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020

TAGS: ENRG ETTC KNNP PARM OTR TC
SUBJECT: EXBS: DOE/INECP REPORTING CABLE FOR COMMODITY
IDENTIFICATION TRAINING, DUBAI, 10-13 JAN 2010
Classified By: Jerry Guilbert for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (U) The Department of Energy,s (DOE) International

Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), through
funding provided by the Department of State,s Export Control
and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program,
conducted Commodity Identification Training (CIT) for Dubai
Customs, Jan 10 ) 13, 2010. CIT teaches customs agents to
recognize WMD-related dual-use items, and this event marked
the first time INECP had delivered any type of training in
the Unite Arab Emirates (UAE).
¶2. (U) The INECP team consisted of Chris Walker (DOE HQ);
Heidi Mahy and Kevin Whattam (Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory); Basil Picologlou (Argonne National Laboratory);
and Kirk Walker (Kansas City Plant). Lisa Meyers (DOS/Office
of Counterproliferation Initiatives) and Tyler Hoffmann (EXBS
Advisor for the Middle East) also attended. The Dubai office
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided
organizational support and attended the course.
¶3. (U) The course began with brief overviews of Weapons and
Mass Destruction and delivery systems (missiles), which
occupied most of the workshop,s first day. The remaining
three days consisted of about three dozen modules covering a
range of controlled goods, including machine tools,
gyroscopes, (precursor) chemicals, and many others. The
course also featured several practical exercises and
&games8 to test the participants, grasp of the material.
Unsurprisingly, the attendees were not particularly lively
during the overview presentations, but they showed strong
interest in the commodity presentations and especially the
exercises. Dubai Customs brought an x-ray van to the course,
allowing both instructors and participants to see how some
controlled goods (that is, the ones INECP brought along as
teaching aids) look when x-rayed, probably the part of the
course that generated the most interest and excitement. This
was the first time any Customs agency had provided an X-ray
van at a CIT seminar.
¶4. (U) Attendance on the part of Dubai Customs varied from

about 15 participants on the first day to around 20 or so for
most of Days 2 through 4, plus a few individuals from the
training division responsible for organizing the event. Most
of the attendees work in Port Rashid, but there were also
attendees from the Jebel Ali, Cargo Village, UAE-Oman border
crossing, and two representatives from Dubai Customs, WMD
division. Mr. Mohammed Foolad, the Dubai Custom,s Manager
for Non-proliferation of WMD, was the senior-most person in
attendance and had a good working knowledge about WMD related
dual-use items from his work. He leads a special unit of
five individuals (one of whom attended the course with him).
He requested extra copies of the printed course materials
and electronic versions of all the Arab-language materials,
which the team provided to him.
¶5. (U) Overall, the level of interest was quite good. The
audience was fairly participatory, and showed a great deal of
energy in particular while x-raying the goods and during a
wrap-up exercise, in which groups of participants identify
pictures of goods from the course. Multiple participants
stated that cooperation should continue in the future; time
will tell if the sentiment was genuine.
¶6. (S) In a side conversation between Mr. Foolad and Ms.

Meyers, he noted that his job is to coordinate WMD- related
cases. He works closely with the Dubai General Directorate
of State Security on sensitive issues. When asked about the
Export Control office, he noted that he works with them, but
that they are new to this issue, while Dubai Customs has been
working on this issue for years. He noted that the UAE was
developing a computer system that will allow Emirate- level
customs offices to communicate with each other.
¶7. (S//NF) CONTD: On targeting, Mr. Foolad noted that Dubai

Customs is stopping WMD related cargo on their own (without
information from foreign governments) using their targeting
methods. They currently use the control lists of the various
regimes to target controlled goods, as well as information
provided by the United States, Germany, and others to target
end users. They have a handbook created by Dubai Customs to
help their officers physically identify WMD related dual-use
goods, but noted they have had difficulty finding pictures of
certain Wassenaar military- related items. He described a
case of glass fiber stopped on its way from the Netherlands
to Iran, as well as some 7075 aluminum. He noted that they
really need more information on who the suspect end users
are, as they could use this information to help them better
target WMD end users. He mentioned that they routinely find
that the same phone numbers are associated with different
companies.
¶8. (S//NF) CONTD: Mr. Foolad explained the serious problems
they are facing at their Cargo Village facility, which is
where they handle air cargo shipments. He noted that they
have to look at over 9,000 shipments a month going to one
country of concern (i.e., Iran). He noted how difficult this
is due to the quick time frame, but how necessary given the
sensitivity. NOTE: Mr. Foolad seemed to take the course,
and moreover his responsibilities leading the WMD unit, very
seriously.
¶9. (U) Point of Contact for DOS/EXBS program activities in
UAE is Vennie Pikoulos-Psaros: ph ) 202-647-4513
highlighting; email:
PikoulosBA8at8state.gov. Point of Contact for DOE/INECP
program activities in UAE is Chris Walker: ph - 202-586-0052
highlighting;
email: chris.walker8at8nnsa.doe.gov.
CLINTON
Viewing cable 10STATE9124, MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE

IRAN'S
Discussing cables
VZCZCXRO0917
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9124/01 0290351
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O P 290343Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO IAEA MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 3003
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 6188
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0260
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2152
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0510
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0095
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 2312
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1808
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1943
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 009124
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2030

TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC
SUBJECT: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S
ENGAGEMENT ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman

for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
REF A: STATE 120288
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see

paragraphs 2-5.
SUMMARY
-------
¶2. (C) The United States, along with its partners, has
made an unprecedented effort to engage Iran in an effort
to diplomatically resolve the international community's
concerns with Iran's nuclear program. Iran's lack of
constructive response so far, and its continued
reluctance to cooperate with international efforts to
build confidence and transparency in its nuclear
program, demand a response. Department requests posts
to draw on the attached narrative to explain our
rationale for why sharpening the choice that Iran
faces, by increasing pressure, is necessary at this
point, and to secure the cooperation of host governments
in these efforts. End Summary.
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶3. (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing,

London and Berlin): Please draw on narrative beginning
in paragraph 11 to:
-- Highlight U.S. efforts to mobilize diplomatic

engagement with Iran in 2009;
-- Underscore the lack of a meaningful Iranian response
to those efforts, especially since the P5+1 political
directors meeting with Iran in Geneva on October 1,
2009;
-- Outline U.S. view of next steps, including increasing

pressure on Iran; and
-- Seek enhanced bilateral cooperation to increase

pressure.
¶4. (C) FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING, LONDON, AND BERLIN:

Posts may share the general tenor of our message but do
not need to deploy the points themselves with host
governments.
¶5. (C) Points should be deployed by Ambassadors to most

appropriate senior counterparts. Posts may not leave
any part of this message in writing with host
governments.
DEADLINE
--------
¶6. (U) Posts should report any substantive response to

their efforts by February 3. Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO,
catalanoe@state.sgov.gov, 647-9533) and Richard Nephew
(ISN/RA, nephewrm@state.sgov.gov, 647-7680) are the
Department's POCs.
BACKGROUND
----------
¶7. (SBU) With its P5+1 partners, the U.S. has been
pursuing a policy towards Iran that includes engagement
STATE 00009124 002 OF 006
and incentives, as well as pressure. Since the 1

October 2009 meeting of the P5+1 Political Directors and
representatives from Iran, the United States has been
working closely with its partners to engage with Iran to
build international confidence in the peaceful nature of
its nuclear program. Based on the agreement in
principle reached with Iran in Geneva, we have focused
on supporting the IAEA's proposal for refueling the
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), facilitating the IAEA's
investigation of the previously clandestine uranium
enrichment plant at Qom, and pressing for a follow-on
meeting between P5+1 Political Directors and Iranian
representatives explicitly on Iran's nuclear program.
¶8. (C) The results since October 1 have been

disappointing. Iran has not accepted the IAEA's TRR
proposal; instead, Iran has rejected a series of updated
and more flexible proposals from the IAEA and our
partners on some terms of the proposal (REF A), and has
offered a substantially different counterproposal which
fails to address the concerns about its nuclear program,
does not fulfill the objective of building confidence in
Iran's nuclear intentions, and, as EU High
Representative Lady Ashton described, in effect rejects
the IAEA's proposal. Iran has also announced its intent
to expand its nuclear program, including its intention
to start enriching uranium to higher levels to make its
own TRR fuel if its terms are not accepted on the fuel
deal. Although Iran granted IAEA access to the facility
at Qom, its cooperation was limited and there remain
serious questions about Iran's intentions for the
facility, which is in open defiance of five UN Security
Council resolutions. Finally, Iran to date has gone
back on its earlier commitment to meet again with the
P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program.
¶9. (SBU) Former IAEA Director General El-Baradei

released his latest report on Iran on November 16, 2009,
and the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) adopted a
resolution on Iran on November 27, 2009. The resolution
notes the Board of Governors' serious concern that Iran
continues to defy the requirements and obligations
contained in UNSC resolutions and IAEA resolutions. The
Board of Governors also expressed its serious concern
that contrary to the request of the Board of Governors
and requirements of the UN Security Council, Iran has
neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor provided
the access necessary for the IAEA to provide assurance
as to the absence of additional undeclared nuclear
activities.
¶10. (U) President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other

P5+1 leaders identified the end of 2009 as a key period
for assessing Iran's responsiveness. While the offer of
engagement remains on the table, we have begun to work
with partners to prepare new measures to increase
pressure on Iran.
DIPLOMATIC POLICY NARRATIVE

---------------------------
¶11. (U) Begin talking points:
Overview: Where We've Been, and Where We Are

--------------------------------------------
-- The President made clear his readiness to open a new

page in our relations with Iran, based on mutual
respect. This new approach featured our offer to engage
Iran directly, as well as our readiness to become a full
and active participant in the P5+1's efforts to resolve
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program
through negotiations.
-- We stated clearly our support for Iran's right to the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided Iran meets its
STATE 00009124 003 OF 006
international obligations and carries out its

responsibilities within the NPT framework.
-- When we met with the Iranian delegation in Geneva on

October 1, along with our P5+1 partners, we sought
Iran's commitment to three concrete actions, which would
demonstrate its intentions for its nuclear program:
-- support the IAEA's proposal for refueling the
Tehran Research Reactor;
-- facilitate the IAEA's full investigation of the

previously clandestine uranium enrichment plant at
Qom;
-- agree to a follow-on meeting between P5+1

Political Directors and Iranian representatives by
the end of October, explicitly focused on nuclear
issues but also open to discussion of any issues
raised by any party.
-- Each of these agreed actions presented Iran with an
important opportunity to begin to assure the
international community about its intentions for its
nuclear program and to pursue together a diplomatic
resolution to our differences.
-- Iran has not followed through on any of these three

commitments.
-- President Obama also stated last year that we would

continually assess Iran's responsiveness to these
offers, and that the end of the year would present a key
period of assessment.
-- It is increasingly clear that Iran has not taken

advantage of the opportunities we have offered.
-- A year into the Obama administration, Iran has not

taken practical, concrete steps that would begin to
create confidence in its nuclear intentions. Iran:
-- Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC

requirements that it suspend such operations;
-- Revealed it had been building a secret uranium

enrichment facility at a military base near Qom, in
violation of its safeguards agreement and UN
Security Council resolutions;
-- Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA

in addressing the full range of IAEA questions
about the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;
-- Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel

the TRR, which was a response to an Iranian
request, despite U.S. and our partners' significant
efforts to be flexible and address Iranian concerns
with the deal; and
-- Since meeting with representatives of the five

permanent members of the Security Council and
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
discuss its nuclear program.
-- Iran has not been able to say "yes" to a balanced

IAEA proposal that would provide fuel for its Tehran
Research Reactor and begin to build mutual trust and
confidence, notably by transferring 1,200kgs of its low
enriched uranium abroad as an indication of Iran's
peaceful nuclear intent.
-- Underscoring the significance of the IAEA's TRR
proposal, in November 2009, former IAEA DG ElBaradei
said that the proposal had "extensive built-in
guarantees...the Russians are guaranteeing implementation.
STATE 00009124 004 OF 006
The Americans are ready for the first time to guarantee

the implementation. The [IAEA] will take custody of
Iran's material so the international community as a
whole will guarantee" implementation.
-- On Iran's desire to retain possession of its nuclear

material under delivery of the fuel (which is the basis
of Iran's counterproposal), Dr. ElBaradei rejected this
approach, saying publicly in November after Iran first
raised this idea that this would "defeat the whole
purpose of the IAEA's agreement...this is not a
solution.";
-- While it allowed IAEA inspectors to visit its newly

revealed enrichment site near Qom, it did not provide
the IAEA with the full access the organization
requested, notably by agreeing to the IAEA's request for
access to specific Iranian nuclear officials and
answering IAEA questions regarding the history and
purpose of the facility. The clandestine construction
of this facility was inconsistent with Iran's IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, and is in open defiance of UN
Security Council resolutions.
-- As the IAEA reported in November 2009, Iran

continues to develop its nuclear program regardless of
international concerns and IAEA, NPT, and UNSC
requirements - most starkly in its construction of a
secret uranium enrichment facility at a military base
near Qom. As former Director General El-Baradei's
report on November 16 outlines, this facility and the
circumstances surrounding it raises the persistent
question of additional such undeclared facilities.
-- The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to

cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA,
answering questions about the use of this facility and
the possibility of other facilities.
-- Iran has failed to take advantage of the creative

TRR proposal, engage with us constructively on other
elements of its nuclear program, and cooperate fully
with the IAEA. It also still defies UNSC requirements
that it suspend its enrichment program, instead
announcing an expansion of its nuclear program. Even
more, it is threatening to begin enriching its LEU to
higher levels of enrichment if the international
community does not accept a TRR deal on its terms, terms
that would not build confidence as they would reduce and
delay transfers of LEU from Iran.
-- Iran's continued nuclear activities and its refusal

to engage meaningfully with the international community
risks a possible arms race in the region and undermines
the global international nonproliferation regime as a
whole.
-- As you know, Israel has stated that an Iran with
nuclear weapons poses a great threat to its security and
that it reserves the right to defend itself. We believe
Iran's continued non-compliance with its international
obligations regarding its nuclear program poses serious
threats to stability in the region. Presenting Iran
with a united global front is the best avenue to resolve
the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means.
-- In addition to its disregard of its nuclear-related

obligations, Iran continues to support terrorist
organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, and militant
groups in Iraq. It also provides some support to the
Taliban to facilitate attacks against ISAF forces in
Afghanistan.
-- Also of deep concern to the international community

is the dramatic uptick in repression inside Iran. As
Secretary Clinton said recently, we are deeply disturbed
STATE 00009124 005 OF 006
by the ruthless repression that Iran is exercising

against its citizens who seek to exercise their
universal right to free expression and assembly.
The Pressure Aspect of the Strategy: Making the Case

--------------------------------------------- -------
-- The two elements of the P5+1 strategy -

engagement/incentives and pressure -- were always
intended to run in parallel, because without a credible
threat of consequences, it is unlikely that Iran will
make a strategic or even tactical change in direction.
-- For that reason, we have always recognized the

possibility that we would need to increase pressure to
sharpen the choice that Iran faces in order to persuade
Iran that the international community is serious.
-- Still, our emphasis over the course of this year has

been on outreach and engagement rather than pressure.
Unfortunately, to date, Iran has failed to respond
constructively.
-- Pressure is not an end in itself; it is a means to

encourage Iran to recalculate costs and benefits, and to
return to a course of constructive engagement at the
negotiating table. But without unmistakable and
meaningful consequences, there seems little prospect for
such a return.
-- The international community has already imposed

strict measures on Iran via various multilateral fora to
demonstrate that Iran cannot ignore its responsibilities
without cost. We believe a more aggressive enforcement
of this existing and robust international framework,
along with the application of significant additional
pressure, will illustrate to Iran the sharp choices it
faces should it continue to rebuff efforts to resolve
our differences diplomatically.
-- Unity among members of the international community
is absolutely essential to demonstrate to Iran that
there are serious consequences for its continued refusal
to engage constructively with the international
community over its nuclear program. Such unity was
clear when the IAEA Board of Governors adopted its Iran
resolution in November. It was also clear in the
European Council's declaration on Iran issued in
December. Both were useful and immediate opportunities
to increase pressure on Iran.
-- We believe Iran's continued non-compliance regarding

its nuclear program deserves the full and urgent
attention of the international community.
Next Steps
----------
-- We stand behind our offer to engage with Iran, but we

are rapidly approaching the moment when we will have to
give full meaning to all elements of our strategy. We,
along with our partners, believe that the time

The Cable Gate

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Viewing cable 66BUENOSAIRES2481, EXTENDED NATIONAL

JURISDICTIONS OVER HIGH SEAS

UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 2481

Original Telegram was Confidential but has since been

E.O. 12958: DECL: DECLASSIFIED BY NARA 09/02/2009

REF: STATE 106206 CIRCULAR; STATE CA-3400 NOV 2, 1966

¶1. PRESS REPORTS AND VARIETY EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM

¶2. NAVATT STATES ARGENTINE NAVY THINKING OF PREFERENTIAL

¶3. FONOFF OFFICIALS REFERRING TO RECENT BRAZILIAN AND US

¶4. FONOFF LEGAL ADVISOR CONCEDES DISTINCTION BETWEEN

¶5. DRAFT LEGISLATION ON SEAS JURISDICTION LAY DORMANT UNTIL

¶6. RE PAR 3 STATE 106206 BELIEVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL MIGHT

¶7. FOR DISCUSSION WITH ARGENTINES WOULD MODIFY TEXT IN STATE

¶8. IF AUTHORIZED, ENVISAGE TWO-STEP APPROACH TO FONOFF.

Viewing cable 72TEHRAN1164, ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006

REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603

COUNTRY TEAM. MESSAGE

¶1. ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON

¶3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION,

¶6. COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 5055

E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006

REF: TEHRAN 4887

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL SAID TAHERI, BOMBING AND OTHER

¶1. IN WAKE OF SMOOTHLY HANDLED ASSASSINATION AUGUST 13 OF HEAD OF PRISONS

¶3. DESPITE INCREASING LEVEL OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, POLICE OFFICIALS REMAIN

THE PROGNOSTICATION THEREFORE IS FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE TERRORISM BUT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 2069

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO

E.O. 11652: GDS

SUMMARY: CREATION OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY ANNOUNCED BY SHAH

¶1. SHAH'S LENGTHY STATEMENT AT HIS MARCH 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, FROM

¶2. SHAH'S STATEMENT BEGAN WITH FAMILIAR RECITATION OF IRAN'S

¶3. COMMENT: ABOVE ALL, SHAH'S ACTION IN RETURNING TO SINGLE PARTY

¶4. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS LITTLE HAS CHANGED, FOR DESPITE FACADE OF

¶5. SHAH'S SPEECH IS VAGUE ON GOALS OF IRANIAN RESURGENCE PARTY AND

¶6. INTERNATIONAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY VARY FROM INDIFFERENCE TO

¶8. IN SUM, GIVEN EXISTING STRICT DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONTROLS,

Declassified/Released US Department of State EO

Viewing cable 79TEHRAN8980, NEGOTIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P

¶1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

¶2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE

¶3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN

¶4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN,

¶5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A

¶6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY

¶6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE

- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF

- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY

- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS

- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE

- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE

- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT

Viewing cable 86MADRID5480, QADHAFI RETALIATES AGAINST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

REF: A) MADRID 5426, B) MADRID 5425, C) MADRID 5418

¶1. (C) LIBYA MAY 12 RESPONDED TO FRIDAY'S EXPULSION OF

¶2. (U) AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED, WE RECEIVED

¶3. (C) COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THIS SERIES