TENS VE

Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy cuts to the heart of the ph osophy
of Gilles Deleuze and of todays science wars

J th st r of t

o L nd
expl 11
C ENCE
lin

Int n tve SCI nc and VIrtual PhilosOpll'V I wnnen for l

anti-Deleuzi n f phitcso h r for an i-phil () h
It III h n 1r .f YV J hm
f r
I
& V RTUAL
Manuel DeLanda began his career in experimental film . became a
computer artist and programmer, and is now Adjunct Professor of
Philosophy at Columbia University. He is author of the best-selling
books, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines and A Thousand Years
PH LOSOP
of Non-Linear History.

PHILOSOPHY I CULTURAL & MEDIA STUD IES I SC ENCE STUD ES

continuum manuel delanda

 rPV'".Q(7'-- - - ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ......__
Ilt ANS\, I:H SAI.S
NEW I>JH LCTI ONS IN PIII LOSOPIIY INTEN SIVE S (~ II: NeE
ERIE EDITOR
Keith Ansell Pearson, University of Wan i .k AN l) V 11{~r UAL
CO NSULTANT EDIT O R
Eric Alliez , Richard Beardsworth, Howard Caygill, Gary Gcn osko , PHILOSOPHY
Elisabeth Grosz, Michael Hardt, Diane Morgan, John Mullarkey, Paul
Patton, Stanl ey Shostak, Isabell e Steng er s, Jam es Williams, David
Wood.
MANUEL DELANDA
Transver sals explores the mo st exciting co llisions within conte m po rary
thought as philo soph y encounte rs nature, materiality, tim e , techn ology,
science , culture , politics, art and everyday life. Th e ser ies aims to
pr esent work which is both theoreti cally inn ovativ e and challenging,
while retaining a com mitme nt to rigour and clarity, and to the power
and precision of thought.

Intensive Science &.. Virtual Philosophy Manuel DeLand a

Felix Guau ori: an Aberrant Introduction Gary Genosko
Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic John Protevi

FORTHCOMING
Philosophy in the ABe if Science &.. Capital Gr egory Dale Adam son

I
I
 C tit .nt

Continuum lntrodu ct ion: IJl, ll'uze's W orld

The Tow er Building, 11 York Road, Lond on SEI 7 IX
370 Lexington Avenue, New York , NY 10017- 650 3
www.continuumbooks.com The Mathemat ics o f th e Virtual: Manifold s,
Vec to r Fields and Transformation G roups 9
First published in 2002
2 T he Act ualizat io n o f th ' Virtual in pace 45
© Manuel DeLanda 2002 3 The Actualization of th e Virtual in Time 82

All rights reserved . No part of this publication may be repr odu ced 4 Virtuality and th e Laws o f Physics 117
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including phot ocopying, recordin g or any informati on storage or retri eval
system, without permi ssion in writin g from the publishers. Appendix: Deleuze's Words 157

Notes 181
British Lib ra ry Ca ta logu ing-in-Pu b licat ion Data
A catalogue record for this book is available Index 241
from the British Library.

ISBN 0 - 8264 - 5622- 7 (hardback)

0 -8 264 - 5623-5 (paper back)

Typeset by CentraServe, Saffron Wald en , Essex

Print ed and bound in Great Britain by
MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
 '1'" Jltlil"! ;t "" rl ,<I :1 l'illl "LI .
\1'11<) ra uoh
Co
t s" Illl l ('!l a bo u t till' worl. ]
 lntrodu ction : Dclcur c 's World

Th ere arc always dan gers in writing it book with a specific a ud il' lK t' in
mind . The most obvio us o ne is the danger o f mi ssing th e targt'l
audit-nee co m plete ly I eithe r becau se th e subj ect matter fails to gr.lb ih
atte ntion o r because th e sty le o f presentation docs not nu -vt its
standards o r e xpectatio ns. Th en th ere is th e asso ciated d anger o f Iw,ing
read ers wh o , had not that particular target been chose n, would IM H '
formed th e real audien ce o r the book . A book ma y end up this \\ .I~'
with out an~' read ership at all. In th e world o r W estern philosophy . 1,,,'
e xample, history and geog raphy have co nspire d to divide th is world
int o tw o almost mutually exclusive cam ps, the Anglo ~Amcri can .111<1
the Contine n tal camps, each with its o w n st yle , research priorities and
lo ng traditions to defend , A phi losophical book whi ch refus es [ 0 I.,k,·
sides, attem pting, for example , to present th e work of a p hilosopher
of on e cam p in t he terms and sty le of th e other, may end up hein g a
ho ok wit ho u t an aud ience: too Anglo ~American for th e Continentals.
and too Cont inental for th e Anglo ~Amcricans .
Such a da nger is evi de n t in a hoo k like this, w hich attempts to
present t he wor k or t he philosopher Gi lles Dclcu zc to an aud ience or
analytical p hiloso phers of scien ce , and of scie ntis ts interested ill
philosoph ical que stions. W hen co nfro nte d wit h Dcleuze' s original te xts
thi s audience is bo und to be puzzled , and may even be repelled by tIH.',
superficial sim ilarit y or th ese texts with books belon ging to what has
cu me to he known as th e ' post -mode rn' traditio n . Alt hough as I arglH.~
in these pages Dci euzc has ab so lutely nothing in co m mo n with that
tradition, his expe rimenta l sty le is bound to cre ate that impression .
Another so urce of difficulty is th e phil o sophical resources whi ch Dcl cu zc
brings to his project. Despite th e fact that authors like Spin oza and
Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergson. have mu ch to o ffer to phil osophy
tod ay. t hey arc not ge ne ra lly perceived by scientists o r analytical
philosophers of scie nce as a legitimat e resource. Fo r thi s reason wh at I
"11,, IH" h lI"t ,,111 •• , 1111"1",1.11'''11 tIt 11,1,'1/, 10\\ 1'\11 .1
r, '<llI/ llrl/,/I"" 01 III' 1'1111"'''1'1". 11'"1 .1~ ,,,111,1, ,hll",,,t tllI"I"","
re source S ,11111 lines 01 .lrgullwllt. 1111' 1'''.111 lIt 1111 , •• "" IIIHU,," is
1I0t jus t to make his ideas sc,' m Il'gitim.III' 10 III} illll'lIdl'd audience.
bu t also to sho v th at his co n .lusio ns do not depen d 011 his particul : r
cho ice o f resources , o r th e particul ar lin es o f arg ume llt he uses , but
th at th ey arc robust to changes in th eore tical assum p tio ns and st rategi's .
Cl early , if th e same co nclus io ns can be reach ed from enti rely different
points of departure and following ent irely d ifferent paths , th e valid ity
of those conclus ions is th ereby stre ngthe ne d.
I must qualify thi s st ate ment , howev er , becau se what I attem pt
here is far from a co m pre he ns ive recon struction of all of Del cu zc ' s
philosophical ideas. Inst ead, I focu s on a particular ye t fundam ental
asp ect of his w ork: his ontoloBY' A philosopher ' s o nto logy is th e set
o f entit ies he or she assumes to e xist in reality, th e typ es of entit ies
he or she is co m m itted to assert actually e xist. Although in th e history
of philosophy th ere ar e a great vari ety of ontologi cal co m m it me nts,
we can very roughl y classify th ese into three main groups. For so me
phil osophers reality has no ex istence ind ependently from th e human
mind that perceives it, so th eir o ntology co nsists mostl y o f mental
e ntities , wh ether th ese are thought as transcendent obj ect s o r , on th e
co nt rary , as linguisti c representati on s o r soci al co nventio ns. Other
philosophers g rant to th e o bjects of every day expe rience a mind -
ind ependent existe nce, but remain unconvinced that th eoretical ent it -
ies, whether unobservabl e relations such as ph ysical causes, o r
unobservable e nt ities suc h as el ectrons, possess suc h an ontological
autonomy . Finall y, th ere are phil osophers who g rant reality full
auton omy from th e human mind, disr egarding th e diffe ren ce between
th e o bse rvable and th e un ob servabl e , and th e anthropocentri sm this
distinction implies. These phil osophers are said to have a realist ontol -
0BY . Del cuzc is suc h a reali st ph ilosopher , a fact that by itself sho uld
distinguish him fro m most post -m od ern phil osophies wh ich remain
basicall y non-reali st.
Reali st philosophers, on th e other hand , need not agree ab out th e
co nte nts of thi s mind-independent reality . In particular, Deleuze rejects
several of th e e nt it ies tak en for gra nted in o rdinary for ms of realism .
To tak e th e m ost o bv io us exam ple, in so me realist approaches th e
2 3
"II I I III"" ,I., I" I, • "" 'I''' ,.I " I 1,,11 1"1111 01 "It, . I I." ,
•.1111111 '11." 1111".1 I, 11.,,, I'" , ,,," " I ,II I II, . " "II • I "I
1""'"1111 Ih.lld,IIII' \\h,IIII .. , ,,11 '1 II l>e II III' • 11"',1"".1
,h"llI " 'lilt', 01 ,111\ othl'l Ir.JIl (( '11.1"111 ,11111 v , 0 III III plllio "1'1.\
"",..111111' 1'1 " is m'I"It'd t" explain "h.lt I .H ohl " t IIII'll 100.,,,tll
IIId "h.11 1>!"l'SI'n '.,s lhis idcntit , th rouoh tinu- . Hricllv, , th is sll"wthi,,'
" lsI' is d maun cal proll: J '\. , OIl1l' of th ese pr" cl'ssI'S arc ma n-ria l . lId
" ,wr Idie, so me ar e not , but eV1'1I th e latt er remain immane nl 10 tlH'
wor ld of matter and e nl' rgy. Thus, J) 'le uze's proc 'ss o nto log, h n '"k
\ ith th e essent ialism th at cha rac te rizes naive I' .alism and, sim ul
t.1I1 -ously, re moves o n' of th e m ain o bjec tions wh i h non -real ist s IIJ.l k,
against th e post ulat io n of an auto no mous reality. T he ex te nt to w hic h
he indc d depri ves non -r ealist s fro m thi s casy wa y o ut dcp mds, o n lh ,
o the r hand, o n th e d et ails o f his account of how th e mt it ies th .lt
popul at e realit y are produced without th e need for any t hing trans e nd -
cnt, Fo r thi s r eason I will not be co nce rned in thi s recon struction with
th e textual so urce o f Del cuze 's ideas, nor with his sty le o f argumenta-
tion o r his usc o f language . In sho r t , I will not be co nce rned w ith
De lcuze.'s words o n ly with Dcl euzc ' s world.
T he basic plan o f th e book is as foll ows. Cha pte r I introdu cs th e
forma l idea s needed to think about th e abstract (o r rather virtual)
struc t ure o f dynamical processes. I draw on th e same mathemat ical
resources as Del eu ze (different ial ge o met ry , g ro up th eory) but , unlike
him , I do not assume th e reader is already familiar with th ese field s,
Deleuzes grasp of th e technical details inv olv ed is, I hope to show,
co m ple tely ad equate (b y anal yti cal philosophy st andards) , but his
discu ssion of t echnical detail s is so co m pressed, and assumes so much
o n th e part of th e read er , that it is bound to be mi sinterpreted .
Chapter 1 is written as an alt ernative to his o w n presentation of th '
subject, guidi ng th e reader step by ste p th ou gh th e different math -
e mat ical idea s in vol ved (m an ifo lds , transfo rmati on gro ups , vec to r
field s) and giving exam ples o f th e application of th ese abstract ideas to
th e ta sk of modelling co nc re te ph ysical processes. Despite my e fforts
at unpacking as much as possibl e th e contents of Deleuzes highl y
co m pressed description s, however, th e subject matter remains t echni -
cal and so me readers m ay st ill find it hard t o foll ow . I recommend
th at suc h readers skip this first chapte r and, if need be, co me back to
It lIIH I t h" pOlll t fli tilt' 1,,1111 ••1 I I nll n. I.. , 1I11H I 1•. 11
.1 p p lk.HiclIl' III Ic·s, .,h..u-ac t m.1I1t'1 II I tilt IfllIll\\ III lll.lph·1
C hdptl'rs and J deal \\ ith thl prodlll l io n III I h.. c11 11'T"1I1 t'n litit'S
o
that populat e Dcl cu zes world. Tl u- h'l."iic t hem e i, lit" t , \\ it hin .l n·d lis l
pe rspective, o ne d oes not ge t rid o f essences until o ne repl aces them
with so me thing el se, This is a burden whi ch affect s only till' realist
philo sopher given that a non -r eali st ca n sim ply d ecl are esse nces mental
entities or re d uce th em to socia l co nventio ns. One wa)" to think about
esse nt ialism is as a theor-y of the ge nesis of form, that is, as a theory
o f morphogenesis, in which physical ent ities are viewed as more or less
faithful realizatio ns of idea l forms. T he de tails o f th e process of
realizati on arc typica lly ne ver g iven. lisscnccs arc thou ght to act as
models, ete r nally maintaining t heir identity, w hile part icular ent ities are
co nceived as mere copies o f t hese models , resem bling t hem wit h a
higher or lowe r degree of perfect ion . Dcleuze rep laces the False gen C'sis
implied by th ese pre-existing forms w hich remain th e same for all time ,
with a theory o f morphogen esis based o n th e noti on o f th e d!ffe rent. He
co nce ives differen ce not negathoely, as lack of resemblance. but
po sitiv ely or productively, as that which drives a dynamical process .
T he best examples are intensi..e d!ffirences, th e differen ces in tempera-
t ure. pressure , speed, chemical co ncent ratio n , w hic h are key to th e
scie ntific explanatio n of th e genesis of the fo nn o f inorganic cry sta ls,
o r o f the form s of orga nic plants and animals. Chapter 2 is concerne d
w ith th e spatial aspects of thi s inte nsive ge nesis w hile Chap ter 3 deals
with its temporal aspec ts .
After reconstructing D elcu zes onto logy I move o n in Chapte r 4 to
give a bri ef acco unt of his episiemoloqy, Fo r an)' real ist philosopher
th ese t wo areas mu st be , in fact. intimat ely related , This may he most
clearly seen in the case of naiv e realism, w here trut h is co nce ived as a
relati on of correspondence between , on on e hand, a ser ies o f facts about
th e classes o f entities populating reality and , on th e o the r , a ser ies of
sen te nces e x p rl.~ssi ng th ose facts. If one assumes that a class o f entit ies
is defin ed by the esse nce wh ich its members share in co m mon , it
becomes relatively simple to co nclude t hat th ese classes are basically
given, and that the)' exhaust all t here is to know about th e world . The
ontological assumption that t he wo rld is basically closed , t hat entirely
novel classes of e ntities cannot emerge spontaneously, may no w he
4 5
III II ~ IlIllpl• .! \\111111.. "]" IImolo'll II filii • . md till 111111 Pfllld'lHl hll\\llit
IItII IlItllUI ,11 11 1 I' ,lll.llt t,lIl l .. m.lll. It I 111111. ,11 II'
,lh.,11I11
\\ 1a.11 l'It'Il1 .111~ 1, ·,,11 I 1'1.1111 oph"1 .u tu.,!1\ 1111 '11111 ' to till , tr_ lilt h
'Ioll\" \11 ·\\ . hut II IS ~I('ol l th.u " " '~Cllllllhlllin lIt Ik l" II / I" 1' ,111 III
mu ..t n 'l"tl ",Hh on I ' 0 1 Iltl·"" .'''U111ptiolt .u ul 't'pl.H"I' tl)l'lI1 \\Itll
di llt-n'n l om-s.
\Vhilt· in III.., fir..t thn'e ..hapu-rs I J.IIt'm pt 10 ~' li ll1i l1,lh'
lIu· c rrom-ou
.I, ..umpri on o f.1 d o st,c1 \\ o rld . in Chapter 4 I t r)' to repl 'ln · 1I0t Cl llh
tlu- idea of .1 sim ple co rrespo ndence hut . h C)'OIHI that, Il) J,ohlillt' ,"
\'(':Y iJ"ll cj. truth . In ot her words, I wi ll .1 rg Ut· tha t even if otu - ,Kn' pt
th,lt there are true se- n te nces ex prl.'ssing rea l facts it can stil l Ill"
mai ntai ned th at most o f t hese fact ual sentences arc lririal , T Ilt" rolt, 01
till' th inker is no t so m uch to utter truths or establish fact s. hut to
di stin guish among th c large populatio n o f tru e fact s those that ,In·
impo rt ant and rel evant from th ose th at arc not. Importance anJ relevance,
not truth , arc th e key co nce pts in Dcl euzc 's l' pistc mo log)". the ta sk o f
realism be ing to gro und th ese co nce pts preventing th em from hdug
red uced to subjective e valuatio ns or soci al co nve ntions . This po int can
be mad e cleare r if we co ntrast Dcl euzcs po siti on not with th e
lingu ist ic version o f co rre spo nde nce theory but with th e mathcmaucal
o ne. In thi s case a relation o f co rrespo nde nce is post ulated 10 e xist
between the sta tes of a physical o bjec t and th e solut ions to mathematical
models capt uring t he essenc e of t hat ohje ct. By contrast , Dcl cuve
st ress es t hc ro le of co r rectly posed problems, rather than the ir true
so lutio ns, a problem being well po sed if it capt u res an objective
distrib ut io n of the important and t he un im portant , or mo re mathemat-
ically , of the sinq ular and the ordinaly .
Chapte r 4 explo res th is problematic epistemolo8Y and co mpares it with
the more fami liar axi omatic or theorematic versions w hich pred ominate
in th e physical scie nces. To anticipate th e main co nclusion o f the
chapte r , while in an axi omatic episte mo logy one st re sses the roll' o f
qeneral la ws, in a probl ematic on e laws as suc h disappear but without
sac rificing th e obj ectivity o f physical knowled ge , an obj ectivity now
ca ptu re d by distribution s o f th e singular and th e ordinal). If such a
co nclusio n can ind eed be made plausibl e , it fo llows that d espite the
fact that l re construct Dcl cuze to cater to an aud ienc e of scienti sts and
analyti cal phil o soph ers of scie nce , nothing is yielded to the ort hodox
pU'IltiulI lu-ld h., tll('..r- 1\\0 g l o u p " 01 tlllllk cl . (hi til(' ( 01111 ,11\ I'ollt m u ( , 0 1 11 10 , . dl.1 t il 11 1111 . U III' ti lt IH IIII II IIII ' Ill ' III II ,ld II I ' ti ll \ I

p!lf ,de.ll ~d('nn,J .lIH I ,uIoI IJ lil',11 plai lo..oph)' "II11'l'g" 11'.1I 1'ilol"lll( ·;I· from n t'lI \\ 11t II 'Ju olln ' h OIll rlu-u 101llt 1I")d 1 11 1.111 ) . tl Wlt' I th t \ lfl k i ll t

this enc-ounte r with Ik' k ul.t" till' rOnllCr rt'l 'lini ng its o l> j(·l·th·il)' h ut dOli" 10 1)(·I('u/l·'" lIuid , " 10 tilt' \\ ,1\, III' II ,Ilt'> lilt' 111 1'11I.11111"
1\It

losing th e law s it holds so ch-ar, the lat ter maint aining its rigo ur and 'io lid ifi, .u icu (If ,I It'nninolog)' h) ,1Iw,,) !'i kl'(')HlIg it i ll ,I ~t ,I h' 0 1 1111 ,
clarity but losing its ex clusive fo cu s o n fact s and so lutions . And more hxillg hi'i 1t'l'l11illolog)· will 'i( '( '1II 10 'iOllh' .lkin to pin nin g .10\\ II .1 Ii\'(,

importantly, the world itself eme rges transformed : th e vcry idea that buth'rlly, As an .1IItidllt" I otl~'r .111 .ippc ndix whe-re I n ,I.,tt' till' h 'l"IlI "
there can be a set of true sente nces whi ch give us the facts o nce and u'I,d in Ill)' n -ron struction to all th e d iffe- re nt h ·rm iuo!o git·s Ill' U'it'" III
for all, an idea presupposing a d osed and finished wo r ld , gives way to his ow n t('x ts and ill his co llahorativc work, se tt ing his words li",'('
an op en world full of div ergent processes yield ing novel and un ex- linn' ,lgain afte r they have served their pu rpose of givi ng LI S his wurb l.
pected entities, the kind of world that wo uld not sit still lon g eno ugh T he hope is th at this wo rld will ret ain all its o pe nness and din'l'gl'lIn ' ,
for us to ta ke a snapshot of it and present it as th e final truth . so th at th e int en se cx prcss ivity and eve n madn ess so often at tribut.-d
To co nclude this introduction I must say a few words co nce r ning to De lcuzc's wo rds rna)' be see n as int egral prop erties of th e wo rld
that other aud ien ce which my re construction may seem to o verloo k: itse lf.
Deleuzian phil osophers , as well as thinkers and artists of different kinds
who are interested in th e philosophy o f Dcl eu ze . First of all, th ere is
much more to Dcl cu ze 's books than just an ontology of processes and
an epistem o logy of prob lems . He mad e co ntr ibutio ns to suc h diverse
subjec ts as the nature of cinema, painting and literatu re, and he held
very specific views on th e nat ure and genes is of subjectivity and
language. For better or for worse , these are th e subjec ts that have
capture d th e attention of most re aders of Del eu ze , so it will co me as
a surprise th at I will have nothing to say about th em . Ne vertheless , if
I manage to reconst ruct Dcleuze 's world th ese other subjec ts sho uld
be illuminated as well , at least indircctl y: on ce we understand
Dcl euze ' s world we will be in a better position to und erstand wh at
co uld cine ma , lang uage or subjectivity be in that world .
On th e othe r hand, if th is re constructi on is to be faithful to
Dclcu ze 's world it is clear th at I mu st rel y on an ad equat e intcrprc ta -
tion of his wo rds . Therc is a cer tain violen ce whi ch Deleu zes texts
mu st endure in order to be recon struct ed for an aud ience th ey were
no t int ended fo r , so wh en ev er I break with his o w n way of presenting
an idea I ex plain in det ail th e degr ee of rupture and th e reason for it
in a footnot e. A different kind of violence is invol ved in wren chin g his
ideas from his coll aboration with Feli x Guattari. In this reconstructi on
I use Dc! eu ze ' s ontology and episte mo logy as expose d in his ea rly
text s, and use onl y those parts of his co llaborative work w hich ca ll he
directl y traced to those ear ly texts. For thi s reason I always ascribe the

6 7
 CIIAI' I LR I

7 h !!'Iat hemat ic C!I th e Virtu al:

Manifolds, Vector Fields and Traniformation Groups

or all the oncepts which populate th e wo rk of Gilles Deleu ze th ere

is on ' that stands out for its lon gevit y: th e co nce pt of mult iplicity . T his
on cept mak es its appearance in his early book s and remains one of
central im po rta nce, with almost un chan ged meanin g and func tio n, until
his lina l work. I Its formal definition is highl y techni cal , including
·Ieme nts fro m seve ral different branches o f mathematics: differential
ge o me try, gro up th eory and dynami cal syste ms th eory . In thi s chapte r
I will discuss th e techni cal backgr ound need ed to define thi s important
conce pt bu t some preliminary informal remarks will prove help ful in
sett ing th e stage for th e formal discu ssion . In the first place , one may
ask w hat ro le th e co nce pt of a multiplicit y is suppose d to play and th e
answer would be a re place me nt for th e mu ch o lder phil osophical
co ncept of an essence. T he es ence of a thing is th at wh ich ex plains its
identity, that is, th ose funda me ntal traits witho ut whi ch an object
wo uld not be w hat it is. If suc h an esse nce is share d by man y objects ,
then possession o f a co m mo n esse nce would also explain th e fact that
these objec ts resemble each othe r and, ind eed, that they form a distinct
natura l kind of things .
Let 's take one of th e most trad ition al illu strati on s of an esse nce .
When one asks w hat makes o meone a member of the human speci es
the answer may be , fo r example, be ing a 'rational an imal'. The exact
defi nitio n of th e human essence is not what is at issue here (if
rat ion ality and animal it y ar e not co nsidered to be essential hum an
pr op erties so me othe r set will do). T he imp ortant point is that there
be some set of defining char acte rist ics, and that thi s set explain bo th
the identity of the human species and th e fact th at particul ar memb ers
of the species resemble eac h ot her. In a Dcl euzian ontology, o n the
othe r hand , a species (or any other natural kind ) is not defined by its

9
t' .'lItl.1l u.ut hill r.HIu-1 II) til(' tIIl'trh"H It c'I" I"l k c' 111.ll ~." , tI t lo
it . Ib t}h'r th.in rl'l)n·..l·nti llg tinu-h-.... t .1t'·glJnl ·... P" t u- .11r III "'tfJllt .111)
co nsti t uted c lltitit's, tlw rescm hlanc« of the-ir uu-tubc-r: n.p lai,wd hy
having und ergon e co mmo n pron ·sst.·s of natu ral sch-ctlon . .1IId t he
end ur ing identity of th e speck-s itself guar.m lt·t.·d hy the fad th.u it has
become reproductively isolated from other species. In sho rt , whil e an
essentialist account of speci es is basically sta tic, a morphojjenctic
account is inherently dynam ic. And while an essentialist account may
rel y on factors that transcend th e realm of matter and en ergy (et ernal
archetypes, for instance), a morphogen eti c account ge ts rid of all
transcendent fact ors using exclusively form -gen erating reso urces wh ich
arc immanent to th e material world .
Animal and plant species are not, of co urse, th e onl y natural kind s
traditionally defined by essences. Man y other natural kinds, th e
che m ical clements or th e set of elementary particles, for e xample , arc
also typically so defined . In eac h of these cases we wo uld need to
rep lace timel ess cate go rics by historical proccsses . Yet , even if success-
ful thi s replacement would tak e us only half-way towards our goal.
The reason is th at e ven if th e details of a given process account for th e
resemblance am on g its products, th e similarities which mak e us classify
th em as members of th e same kind, th ere may be similarities c!f process
wh ich still demand an explana tion . And when accounting for th ese
co m mon features we may be tempted to reintroduce esse nce s through
th e back door. T hese would not be essences of object s or kind s of
obj ects, hut essences of pro cesses, yet essences nevertheless . It is in
order to break this vicious circle that multipliciti es are introduced .
And it is because of th e ten acity of thi s circle that the concept of
multiplicity mu st be so care fully co nstruc ted , justif)'ing each ste p in
th e co nstruc tion by the wa)' it avoids the pitfalls of esse ntialism . T o
anti cipate th e co ncl usion I will reach after a lon g and techn ical
definitional journey: multiplicities speci fy th e structu re c!f spaces c!f
possibilities, spaces whi ch, in turn , explain th e regularities exhibited by
morphogeneti c processes. I will begin by defining an appropriate
notion of 'space ' , a notion whi ch must not he purely geo metr ical hut
also capable of bein g linked to qu estions of process.
Th e term ' m ult iplicity ' is close ly rel at ed to th at of ' ma nifold' , a
term which design ates a geome tr ical space with cert ain characte rist ic
10
pillpltlil 10 'f.1 P \\Iltl 1 I"tlll ,IIUlllI Ifllllllllial (.11lt1 \ lilt
II ltllltl 1111 (Ollllplt . m o t h l l l ' \ lllcl, 11111.11111I)11\\11111( tllltll
to 'I\ t ., hlll 'f .Hl ttunl 01 Il III tl"h.,1 1111'11I hilt III II 1111' lit' 01
1"(lIl1t.tllt .,1 I_nul o.lnn . . lltl" IIH~ 'HI)U1UlII 01 IIIIII,lt'm IS .HI ,lIHllll1
pr .H tin ' IIlht·rih·tI fr o m tilt' Cn'l·k!l, tht' es tcn ..i\t· u r- of ltll \t. .1Ilt!
tr.'jl.c to rh·... in thl' formulalioll of .1 , .,rid ) of plaf'ik .ll prohl t'l11!l fro m
tht. ...ixh't"llth n' lI l u ry on mad e it TWC(· ssar y 10 d('vel op ru-w pl'ol,h'lIl
snh·illg n· ...ourcc s. \Vith thi s ill mind, Hew," l k sc.,rh·s and Ph·H.· lIl'
l-cr'mat inven te d lIll' now familiar method of t'mht,tlding curves int o .1
rwn .dinu-nsional s ran~ o n wh ich arbitrar y axes co uld lu- fixed . Ont (.
so em bed de d . th e fixcd axes allowed th e assigIlIlH.' nt of .1 pJ.ir of
num bers, or coord inates, to every point of the curve, so that the
gl'OIlll't riC rel ation s between points co uld now he expres sed as n '!at ion
be tween numbers, a task for whi ch th e newl y developed algehra \\ .1"
perfl.ctl y suite d. This translation sche me, in sho rt , allowed th e co m hi
natorial resources of algebra to be brought to hear on the so lution of
gt·ome trical problems.
Th e term ' ma nifold' d oes not l>dong to th e analyt ical ge o ll1l'l ry of
Descartes and Fermat, but to th e d1Jerent ial aeometry of Friedrich Ga uss
and Bernhard Riemann , but th e basic idea was th e same : tapping into
a new reservo ir of probl em -solving resources, th e reservoir in thi s case
bei ng the differential and int egral calculus. In its o riginal application
the calculus was used to solve problems involving relations between
th e changes of two Of more quantities. In particular, if the se rel ations
were expressed as a rare <if change of one quan tity relative to ano ther,
th e calculus allowed findin g the instantaneous valu e for that rat e . For
exam ple , if th e changing quantities were spatial position and tim e , o ne
co uld find instantaneou s values for th e rate of change of o ne relat ive
to th e other , that is, for velocity. Using this idea as a resource in
geome try involved th e realization th at a geom etrical o bject , a curve d
line o r sur face , for instan ce, co uld also be characterized by th e rat e at
which so me of its properties change d , for exam ple , the rate at wh ich
its curvcrure change d between different points. Using th e tools of the
calculus m athematicians could now find ' instantaneo us' values for this
rate of change , that is, the value of th e curvat ure at a given
infinit esimall y sm all point.
In th e ear ly nin eteenth cent ury, wh en Gau ss began to tap int o these
II
 dll it It 1111•• 1 I t IIUI'I ' , I tll l\ld 1 \ \ 11 1111111 11 11111 11 III l.u t \\.1 tudn -d 1I1~ .1Il t 11111 It 100 ltllll.lll/oI llIlIl , III.! III lit I , 1m ,,,,11\,",11. ,I./Iuul
1l"lIlg Ih(' old l '.l rh·'I.lIl 1I1dhod : 1111' "'Il llI.H(· \\,1 t IIIhnld,d 111 .1 Ih n 't' IUIlO , I I I II lilt \\l llt · • ' tl hl l'lIl l " 11111 1 lit II l it l'll .llt •• 1 11111111

dilll t'II,,,iOIl,tl sp.tn' l'o m p lt"lt' \\ itll it" 1) \\ II fl'(t'd "(' 1 0 1 .lX t · " : th en , thillg u.um u ell 11' 1' 1II .1Il \ .lIltl t ilt 0111 , hili , .ttl ll I an 01 ' .11111.1110 11 lu1011 ' II I'

tllO~1' axvx, coo rd inates wou ld he .t~sjg ,wd to (,\(T) ' point of the III ti ll ' IIMIl\ .t lIl h, \\ hh h la.l IIU Ill·"d \\ h,ll"lll'\(" til ullit) ill on lt'l
~lI r1 al'C"; finall)', . the gl'ometric links between points deh>rmining th e 10 I Oflll .1 ",,,It' m ,' " 1' " ,'lH t ' ''l, 0 11 th e- o thvr h.ultl, d o
dd illlllg p ll .. ' t· .....t

form of th e surface wou ld be exp ressed as algebraic n -latlons between u nitv (r.g. tlw uuitv 01 r,llio ll.t lil) ' a nd ,mil1lollily de finin g till' lunu.m
J

th e numbers. Rut Gau ss realized th at the calculus , focu sing as it d o c s t'S'it'; ln') ,lilt!. lIlon ': )\'('[ ' arc takr-n 10 vxi ..l in ,I t ran scx-nd r-nt "1'.1' ~
o ~ infinites~mal points on th e surface itself (that is, op(~rating entirely \\ hi," ".. r vc-s i.1S J container for them or in which lhe) an' (· m b ,· c1d ,·t l.
With local mformatio n), allowed the stud), of th e sur face without anI A multiplicity, o n th e other hand , 'h owever man y dinu -nsion ... il 111.1)
rejerence to a alobal embedding space. Basically , Gauss d eveloped a method Ii.l n ' , . , . ne\'er has a supplementary dimension 10 that whi ch t ran
to implant the co o rd inate axes on th e surface itself (t hat is, a method "pin's upon it. This alon e mak es it natural and immanent. ' S It 111.1)' he'
of ' coordinatizing' th e surface) and, on ce points had been so translated o bj ('Cll'" that these an' pllrl'i )'J ormal dilTl'n'n ces between co ncq >t s• .and

into numbers, to use dilTerential (not algeb raic ) eq uat ions to character-
ize thei r relations. As th e mathematician and historian Morris Kline
o bse rves , by. g<·lting rid of the g lobal embedd ing space and dea ling
With t he surface through its own local properties 'Gauss advanced th e
to ta lly new co ncept that a suiface is a space in itself , 2
The idea of st lld)'ing a surfa ce as a spa ce in itself was further
developed by Riemann . Ga uss had ta ck led th e two -d imensiona l case
so one would have ex pecte d his disci ple to t reat the next case, three-
d im en sional curved surfaces . Instead, Riem an n wen t on to successfully
attack a m uch mo re ge ne ra l problem: that of N -d ime nsional su rfaces
o r spaces . It is these N-d ime ns iona l curved struct ures , defined excl u-
sively th ro ugh the ir int rin sic feat ur es, th at w ere o riginally referred to
by th e term ' ma nifo ld ' , Riemann' s was a vcry bold m ove, one tha t
to ok him into a realm o f abst ract spaces with a varia ble number of
d imen sion s, spaces w hich could be st ud ied w ith ou t th e need to embe d
th em intu a high er-di m en sion al (N't- L) spa ce . As Morris Kline p uts it :
' T he geometry of space o lTe re d by Riemann was no t just an extension
of Gauss 's d ifTerentia l geomet ry . It reconsid ered the whol e approach
to thc st udy of space . " And we co uld add th at thi s new way of posina
spatial problems wou ld, a few decades later in the hands of Einstein and
o the rs, co mpletely alter th e way phy sicists approached th e qu estion o f
spa ce (o r more exactly, of spacetime) .
A Dcl cu zian multiplicity takes as its first d efining feature th ese tw o
traits o f a manifold : its variable number o f dim en sion s and, mo re
importantly . th e absence of a supplementary (higher) dimension impo s-
th at as such , th ey do not ne cessaril y point to a d eeper ontological
din~'[t.·IlC'e . If we~ arc to repl ace esse nces as th e explanat ion of till'
idcntitv o f materi al obj ects and natural kind s we need to specif)' tlu -
wa v in wh ich multiplicities relate to th e ph ysical processes w hich
gL'l;e rate th o se mat erial obj ect s and kinds,
Achi eving this goal implies establishing a m ore int imate relation
between th e geometric properties of manifolds and the pro pcrt h-s
whi ch d efine morphogenetic processes. The resou rces in this case co me
from th e theory of dynamical systems wh ere the di mensions of a
manifold ar c used to represent pr op erties of a particul ar phys ical
process or system, w hile t he ma nifold itsel f beco mes [he space if pOSSible
states w hich t he ph ysical system ca n have. " In other words , in thi s
theo ry mani folds are co n nec te d to materi al reality by th ei r USl : as
models of physica l processes. When o ne atte m pts to m od el th e dynam -
ical be haviou r o f a particular physica l o bject (say , th e dy na mica l
behaviour of a pendul u m or a bicycle , to stick to relatively sim ple
cases) t he first step is to determi ne th e n um ber of relevant wap in
whi ch suc h an ob ject can change (these are known as an object 's deqtees
iffreedom), and then to relate those changes to one another using the
difTcrential calculus . A pendulum , for instance , can change on ly in its
position and moment um, so it has two de gr ees of fre edom . (A
pendulum can, of co urse, be melted at high tem per at u res , or be
explode d bv dvnamite . These ar e , ind eed, other ways in whi ch thi s
object can ~ha~ge, th e)' sim ply are not rel evant ways from th e point
o f view of dynami cs. } A bic ycle , if we consider all its moving parts

12 13
 (11,111111111,11 • 1I.1I1t ,,1111 I. Il ,lIIl t 1i.1I1l '1 .11 \\1111 I ..
1\\01'('11.11,) h,l u-n cI,·gr.t 01 I"'t·dum (C·.1l1a 01 Ihl '1\1 P,lIt ~
I h,Ulgt· in b01h po,i1ioll .1Ite l 1Il0uH'1I1Um) ,
Ncxt , o ne ma ps 1',1('11 d'·gn't· of frn,dolll into one 01 lht, dirrn -usiun s
of a mani fold , A pendulu m ' s span' o f po ssihilit it's will m-cd a twu .
dim en sion al plane , but th e bicycle: ' vill in vol ve a ten -dimen sion al s p,lCt' ,
~fter thi~ mapping o pe ratio n , th e state o f th e object at any gi vl' ll
Instant of tim e becomes a single point in the manif old , whi ch is now
called a state space. In addition, we can capt ure in thi s model an
object's changes ef state if w e allow th e rep resent at ive point to mo ve in
thi s abstract space, o ne tick of the clock at a tim e , describing a cu rve
o r traj ecto ry . A physicist can th en study the changing behaviour of an
o bject by st udyi ng th e behaviour of th ese representativ e trajecto r ies . It
is important to noti ce that eve n th ou gh my exam ple Invo lves tw o
o bjects , what th eir state space capt u res is not th eir sta tic properties
but th e way th ese properties change, th at is, i t captures a process. As
with any mod el, th ere is a trade-off here : we exc hange th e co mplexity
of th e o bject's changes of state for th e co mplexity of the modelling
space . In other w ords, an o bject's instantaneous sta te, no matter how
co mplex, becomes a single po int, a great simplificatio n, but the space
in which th e o bject's state is em bedde d becomes mo re co m plex (e .g .
th e three-dimen sional space o f the bicycle becomes a te n- di mensiona l
sta te space) .
Besid es th e g re at sim plification achieved by mod elling co mplex
dyn amical processes as trajectories in a space of po ssibl e states, there
is the added adv antage that math ematicians ca n bring new resources to
bear to th e study and so lution of the physical problems involved . In
particul ar , topoioqtcal resources rna)" be used to analyse ce rtai n features
of th ese spaces, features wh ich det ermine recurrent or typical behaviour
co mmon to man)" different models, and b), ex te nsion, co mmon to
man)' physical pro cesses. The main pion eer o f thi s approach was
ano the r great nin et eenth-century mathemati cian , Henri Poin care . Poin-
care began his st udy not with a differential equation mod elling a real
phy sical syste m , but with a vcry sim ple eq uation, so sim ple it had no
physical applicat ion, but whi ch nevertheless allo we d him to ex plore
th e recurrent traits of an)' model with two degrees ef freedom. He
disco vered and class ified certain special topological feat ures of t w o -
'4
I mhh .lIlel Ih. dlllll II IOIMI In.Ulll nld (\ " II, d In!JUlllllll I \ llh " 1''' ' 1 I I" It 11111111 III I
( .HI III III. h. 1I.l\ nuu 01 till H"I' t 1111 ItI ,11 11 1 li lt I II I. I.IU.I n pll 1111
oll tu.il t 'lll ' o f (,tlc " lit ,I pll\ h .11 '1111I , .1 1.11 It mlllll 'l h I 111 th ,
s,
, " I , tvrn it (·It.·
ht'h.l\ u urr of tllt' 1111\"lt
Sillgul.lriti t's 11M)' inlhlt'Jl(\ " bt,h,l\'iour h) ,u ting ,\ S aftra(t ~T\ .Ii .,r 1111
Ir,\jc'llorit':-. . \ Vllal this IIW.lIlS is th.n ,I I.ug\· numlx-r of dlllen'nl
tr,Ijt't'lorit's, :-.t,uti ng th ei r cvo lutio u at \'t'r)' d ill't'rent placx-s ill tilt'
uianifoh l, m ol)' end lip in t'xactl)' th e same final sta te (t he at tractor) . .IS
lon g a.s all of t hem hl'g in somewhere within t he 'sphere o f inlhn-no-
o f the auractor (the basin oj aurdcri on). Given th at , in t his SI' T1St',
din.. . rent trajecto ries rna)' be attracted to t he same final state . singu lar .
itivs arc said to rep rl'scnt the inherent or intrinsic long-term tendencies
of a svstcm, t he sta tes which the system w ill spontaneously tt'nd to
adopt "'in the long run as lon g as it is no t co nstrained hy other fon~c..;s,
Some sing ula rities arc topol ogical points , so th e final sta te they d ('(IIlt.'
.1S J d est iny for th e traj ectories is a stead)' state . Beside th ese, Poin care
also found th at ce rta in closed loop s acte d as attractors and called th em
"lim it cvcles' , The fina l state w hic h traject ories att rac te d to a limit
cyc le {or period ic at tractor) arc bo und to adopt is an osci llato ry state .
But wheth er we are dealing w ith steady-state, peri od ic or o ther
attractors what ma tte rs is th at th ey are recurrent topoJo8ical features,
whi ch means th at different sets o f eq uatio ns, re p resenting q uite
different physical systems , ma y possess a sim ilar d istribution of aurae-
tors and hen ce, sim ilar lon g-t erm be hav iour.
Let me give a sim ple exa mple o f how sing ularities (as part o f wh at
defines a multiplicity) lead to an entirely different wa )" of viewing the
genesis of physical forms. There are a large nu mber of difTerent
physical st ructures which form spontaneously as their co mponents try
to meet ce rtain ene rgetic requirem ents. T hese co m ponents rna)' be
co nst rained , for exam ple , to seek a point of m inim al free energy, like
a soa p bubble , wh ich acq uires its spherical form by minim izing surface
tens ion, or a co mmon salt crysta l, w hic h ado pts the for m of a cube by
minim izing honding energy. W e can imagine th e state space of th e
process whi ch lead s to th ese forms as st ruc t ure d by a single point
attractor (re p resenti ng a point of minimal ene rgy). O ne way o f
describing the sit uatio n wou ld be to say th at a capo/anical fo rm (a
singu lar poi nt in a ma nifo ld) guides a process w hich results in ma ny
I ~
 dlllt"t 'l1l ph) 11.11101 111. lIullllh lll ph~' II ' !'i ntl (11)1('. l.hll llllt \\1111 .u II I 0 1 1.1lI ( \ l"Otl ~1l0\\11 ,1 ",I".t'l/ II \' ) \\1111. 1111 11111 .111 t
t1 ifl ~ ' n ' 1I1 .'I( (lm rtru propt"rti~''' '
'I Ill' i.. \\ h.n 1 )..1 " \1/ 1' nu-an s \\ [u-u Ill' lIItt'Pl tl .lll on 01 mill \11 'I
sa)'s th.u singular-i lil's are like ' im plicit for ms th.n df\" Illpolog il.ll
I li t I II III Illd ol .m .HI "pI H' fdl "hl
r.ulu-r "I, t '.It!\ gl\ I 'll III tlw I' I I ( t'f('/~mll(tJ, • ~ It \ \ ct ,,\1 11 1 III li t t 11,1\ III I d t 1.- .11
th an gl·OlTIl· t ric ' ,'* Thi s rna )' hi' co n t ras ted to the ('sSt" lIt i.llis
t dp proadl ,lIu l di..tim I 1l.lhln') llIo 'll billlngl '" IlId ,,) h.I\t.' g l\ (' 11 Ill' plt' lOllIlI"illt
in whi ch th e ex planatio n for th e spheric al 10fl11 of soap bubble
s, fo r ,II lt I .h t t"ph"d IIH' idt.'., th.u dIlItTI'l lli.tlt·d .. 'rll~ um-c l' l1 ll' rg l' P~I~ "I·
instan ce , w ould be framed in terms of the esse nce o f sphe r icity.
tha t ..i\l.h' .IS ti ll' ('g.g <It"\\·lop,... TIH' l"gg is 1I0t, 01 nH lrSl' •.111 untllllt' n 'lI
is, o f ge o me t rica lly charac te rized essence s acting as ideal Fo rms
. li,'h';1 mass : it P()~St'SS I·S au obscur e )l'l t1istillt:l ..rruc-tur c dt"lilu,d
I will di scu ss in a momen t th e mean ing and re levance h)
o f th e zon es of biod ll' l11 il"al comTll lr.llioll and hy po lari t h-s l's lolhlistH
't1 h)' till '
topol ogical nature o f sing u larit ies . What matter s at thi s point
is that .IS\, I11111t.. t r il..l l po siti on of till' yo lk (o r nucleus ), But e-ven though
singula rities, by determ ining long-t erm tendenci es, str ucture the it
possi- de:t's P OSSt'SS th e necessa ry biochem ical mat e rials an ti
ge netic ill f~)r~llJ.
bilities which make up state space , and by ex te nsio n, str uc
t ure th e tion, th ese materials and info rmat ion d o not co nta in a clea r ,mel
po ssibiliti es op en to th e phy sical proce ss modell ed by a state (hstllU't
space. In hiucpri nt o f th e final org an ism . 11
additio n, singu lari ties tend to be recurre nt that is th ey .
, " tend to Alt hough th e egg me ta phor docs provide a vivid illu st ratio n
characte r ize processes indepen dently o f their particu lar physica 01 d.w
l mcch - dis ti nctio n I am trying to draw here, it is neve rthel ess just
anism s. In th e exa m p le above, the mechani sm whi ch lead a wwlul,
s to th e ,m alogy. Fort unate ly, th e re are technical wa)'s o f dcfinin.~ th
producti on of a soap bubble is quite dilTeren t from th e o ne leading e hit',]. 01
to f,oHressil'e J1JCrent ialio n wh ich d o not rely o n metapho rs. I
a salt c rys tal, ye t both ar c minimi zing proce sses. This mechani [u- technic al
sm ~ reso urces in th is case co me from ano t he r crucial ninctl'el1lh
independence is wha t makes singu lar ities (or rather th e multipl ~lTl1ll1r )'
icities inn ova tio n. th e t heory o f groups. a field of ma themat ics w hic
th ey define) perfect cand idates to replace essence s ."? As I said h. tikt'
befnre, th e d ifferen tial ge o me t ry I discussed before, e ven tua lly becam
howev er, we mu st be ca re ful at thi s stage not to make sing ularitic e an
s th e integra l part of th e basic mathem atical technol o~)' ()f.t~\'cn tic~h-c('
equivalent o f t hc esse nce o f a process, T o avoid this e rro r I will nt u~y
discuss physics . T he term 'gro up' refers to a set o f entltl~s . (WI~~
some additio nal formal proper ties o f multipl icities distingui shing special
them pr op erties) and a rul e o f co m binatio n for th~se cntl~lcs . .1he
from es sences and then, as above , I will discus s th e way in whi most,
ch th ese import ant of th e pro pe rties is th e o ne nam ed clo sure , whi ch
purely co nce ptual differen ces con nect with qu estions o f mea ns
ph ysical tha t wh en we usc th c rul e to co m b ine an)' two entities in th
process. e set, th e
res ult is an e ntity also belongin g to th e set. For exam ple . the
The formal differen ce in qu estion has to do with the way essence set of
s posi tive integer s displ ays closure if w e usc addi tio n as a comhin
and multipl icities arc spe cified as e ntities, Whil e essence s ar e ~ti.on
traditio n- r ule : add ing togethe r any two positiv e int egers yield s anot he
ally regarded as po ssessing a clear and distin ct nature (a clarity r posltl\'C
and integer . that is , anothe r cl ement in th e original set. H . .
disti nct iveness also charac te rizing th e ideas whi ch appear in
the mind Althou gh sets o f numbe rs (o r many ot he r m ath emati cal objects
of a phil osophe r wh o g rasps one of th ese esse nces) , multipl icities )
arc , rnav he used as illustra tions o f g ro ups , for th e purpos e of
by d esign. obscure and disrinct: th e sing u larities which defin e ddlnmg
a m ulti- pr~grcssi\'e differen tiati on w e need to co nside r groups ~\'h~se m embers
plicity co me in sets . and th ese sets a re not given all at on ce
but are are not objec ts but tranifo rmations (and th e co m b inatio n
st ruct u re d in such a \\'ay th at th ey pro8r essiYcIy specify th e nature rul e , a
if a co nsecuti ve applica tio n of th ose transfo rmation s) , For e xam ple,
th e, set
mult iplicity as th ey unfold foll owi ng recurre nt seque nces. II
What th is co nsisting o f rot ati ons h)' nin et y degr ees (that is. a set conta
mean s may be illu strat ed first by a metaph or and then gi ven in ing
a pr ecise rotation s hy 0, 90 , 180. 270 degree s) forms a gro up , sinc e
techni cal d efinitio n . Th e metaph or is that of a fertilized egg any .t wo
pri or to co nsecuti ve rotatio ns produc e a rotatio n also in the g ro up.
its unfoldi ng into a fully d evelope d o rga n ism with di fferent iat provided
ed tissues 360 degr ees is taken as ze ro . T he import ance o f gro ups o f transfo
rma-

16
17
 1'011 tI•.• 1 till III 1'1 II I " 101 , I I II '1 11 11 11 '111 ' II till II
OIlI lt
/II I(.lr1</III\ : II \\,' p," 101 Ill!''' Olll 01 till I , Ollp 10111 11'11 O il I IIh, . .in
observer who did Ilol w it m -ss till' Ir.II I, lo rJll,ll io ll \\Iurld not ", ,1" 1,' ( 0
noti ce that allY change had .1·tu ally O("('lI'T,' d (th.u is, tilt' iS lI.11
appca ranc of th e cube wo uld rem ain invarian t rc l.uivr- to this
obse rve r). O n the othe r hand , the cube would not remain invariant
und er ro tatio ns by, say, 45 degrees, but a sph ire wou ld. Inde d, a
sphe re rem ains visually un changed under rotation s by an)' amount of
degrees. Mathematically thi s is ex pressed by aying that the sphe re has
more ~mmet1J' than th e cube relativ e to the rot ati on transformati on,
That is, degree of symme try is measured by th e number of transforma-
tion s in a gro up th at leave a prop erty in variant, and relati on s bet ween
figures may be established if th e gro up of one is included in (o r is a
subgro up of) th e gro up of th e other.
ClaSSifying geometrical o bjects by th eir degrees of sym me try repres-
ents a sharp departure from th e trad itional classificati on of ge o me trical
figur es by th eir esse nces . While in th e latter approach we look for a
set of properties co mm on to all cubes, or to all spheres, gro ups do
not classify th ese figures on th e basis of th eir sta tic prop erties but in
terms of how th ese figures are affect ed (o r not affect ed ) by acti ve
transformati on s, that is, figur es are classified by th eir response to events
that occur to th em. I f Another way of putting thi s is that eve n th ough in
this new approach we ar e still claSSifying entities by a prop erty (their
degree of sym me try), thi s prop erty is never an intr insic prop erty of
th e entity being classified but always a property relati ve to a specific
transformati on (o r group of transformations). Additionally, th e sym-
metry approach allows dynamic relations to ente r into th e classification
in a different way. When two or more entities ar e related as th e cube
and th e sphe re above, that is, when th e group of transformation s of
on e is a subgro up of th e other, it becomes po ssible to envision a process
which converts one ~ th e entities int o th e ocher by losing or gaining
symmetry. For exam ple , a sphe re can 'b ecome a cu be' by loosing
invarianc e to some transformations, or to use the technical term, by
und ergoing a ~mmet1J'-breakin8 transiti on. While in the realm of pure
geometry thi s transmutation may see m some what abstract , and irrelev-
ant to what goes on in th e worlds of physics or biology , there arc
18
111.111\ dlll·.II.III"" II I \1111 111It \ I.. 1~1I 11 ' 1.1111111111 III til 11'"1'
1 1'11 1 I t Ie 1II Ifl1,IIII',
I II ph Il.d III 01 I "III 111111 .1111111 Ih, OIl 'h hi o ~. 11 11l 1l1l 1/\ 11 10.
,,,. III , 1111 " .u np l,-, III till 101111 III rho,,' 1'.," '1/ ,111 I'h.1 I (, .111 1111111
11" ,'\,'111 "hi. h I.lk.· pl.Il" .11 '1Ilil .11 \,1111\' ot OIlW p,II .IIIIt'I. I
II, IlIpl'loIIUI" ', lill'" .nuph-) w it lUll' ,I pll\ ital "It'1Il IIo III tJ/1l 1.11.
\., .m o t lu-r , like the, riti ca] POlllls Ill' tl'mlwr,llllrt' al "llIlh \ .1"'1
, !l .11I , , 'S [rom ice to liquid, or rro m liquid to str-am , '1Ill' "rokl II
'.\ nutu-tr aspect he re can be clcar l S 'I' lI il' WI: cOIllI),\/"l' tilt' g.lS .lIId
""Iid states o r a material, and if' Ior sim pli 'it , W I ' .ISSUn1l' p!'r rl'etl )
Illdlill'lll gases and perfect rys tal arrange ments. In th ese idl',ll COli
,lit ions, th e gas wou ld d i 'play invariant prop ert i , . under all I rans la
t 1< iu s, rotations and reflections, while thc solid wo uld be invarian t [Il
" lIly a subs et of these transfo rmation s. For xa m plc, while tl u- 'il
c ou ld h disp laced by any amo unt and r m ain basi ally the same (that
is, an observer wo uld b un abl e to tell whether a clisp lacc m -nt
lie urrcd at all) th e so lid wo uld rem ain visually unchanged onl und er
displac em ents which moved it one unit crystal at a time (or m ultip les
of that unit). In other words, th e gas has more sym mctry th an till'
so lid , and can become the so lid by undergoing a sym metry -breaking
phase tra nsitio n . I S The metaph ori cal exam ple I gave above, that of a
rel'tilized egg w hich differentiat es int o a fully form ed o rganism, can
now be ma de quite lit eral: th e pro gressive di fferentiat ion of th e
sphe rical egg is achieve d th rough a co m plex cascade of symmctry-
br eaking phase transiti on s. 16
Let me now incorporate th e idea of progressive di fferen tiation into
the co nce pt of multiplicit y by sho wing how it can be translated int o
state-space terms. I said before that for th e purpose of defini ng an
entity to repl ace esse nces the aspect of state space that matter ed was
its singulari ties . O ne sing ular ity (o r set of sing ular ities) may un dergo a
sym met ry-breaking transiti on and be co nve rte d into another o ne.
T hese transiti on s are called bifurcations and may be st ud ied by add ing
to a particular state space one or more 'contr o l knob s' (technically,
co ntrol param et ers) whi ch det erm ine the stre ngth of externa l shoc ks
or perturbation s to w hich the system being mod ell ed may be subject.
These co ntrol param et ers tend to displ ay critical values, threshold ' of
 IIIkll:'4l1, .11 \\Iull. ,I p ,lI III 111,11 hllllll .llIoll LIll' pl." I' I lll".LIll I till III luI 11 .111 111011 111.\\ I II dill I I " I I Lilt d til '" 111 1l~ 1 II \ I lllii t 11 ' III II.. I I ti ll I'
S}llIrndry of lilt' ")""h'I II . J\ "p.ll t' "t1 lh llll n l It)
" Li ll o 0 111' 1)1 Ii lit fll 11 .111 lelllll .111 1l1I 111 11 11 I , llIltll l I
nt tr-ac-tor, 1(11' cxn m p lc, 111.\)' hifi.l n -.l tt' in to ,lIIlltht'r w ith 1\\C1 ~HH h '\ 'Ii 1.111 h.' 1'1 '11 It 0 11I 1111 1' o x.un p h-, .1 1 .1 t,ltl., III halUll ,llilln, 111.'\ lit
at tractors, o r a point an -ac to r may hil'urcat l' int o ,\ IH'ri odi c o tu -, losing 1.lith lu lh n ·,IIi/t·d ill .1 )'11\ !'o il ,II "!'itt' ll l, I hi, n ·.lli/.'1 Ion , ho\\ t" r-r, ht·.I1 !'1
so me of its ori gin al symme try . 17 Mu ch as at t rac to r-s cor m - in recu rrent Ilt l rt·,,· ;nhl.ll1l t' to till' 1I~lol tlh' IlI:\lk,, 1 ('.l ~(,ldl' . III p,lrt h IlI,H' , un like ti ll"
forms, so bifurcations may define recurrent sequen((~.'i o f' such forms. 1,IUI '1" " hkh is mt.· dllll1/HII -lntlqll·nJl·rH, tlal' php ic,t' n '.,lil'"tio lt ill'"ht'
There is a seq uence , for instan ce , that begin s with a point an -ac to r "I'l'd lic nwch ,mi.'ims. T o hl'gin with tln-n- ,11"1 ' causa l inu-r.nuons .uul
which, at a critical value of a co ntro l param et er, becom es unstabl e and tlu-ir t'ITl'ets . To re t u r n to o ur e xam ple, till: How o f 1H'"t into till'
bifurcates into a periodic attractor. Thi s cycl ic singular ity, in turn, can t'tlllt"inl'r causes ,1 grade d dl'l1sit y ditll'n'IKe to form , gin'l1 th'lt wau -r
become unstabl e at another critica l value and und ergo a serlue ncc of t'xlMnds wlu -n heat ed (that is, becom es less den se) . This tklls it)
instabilities (several period-doubling bifurcations) which tran sform it g rad ient , in turn , interacts with o ther forces like th e viscosity till' or
into a chaotic ott-actor. wate r, their balan ce of po wer det ermining wh ether a s)'SIt'Tn swi ld le"
Thi s sym metry- breaking cascade of bifurcations can , in turn, be fro m one flow patt ern to the next. For exa m ple , th e de nsity grad it·nt
related to actual recurring sequences in physical processes . Th ere is, will tcnd to amplify small differen ces in mo vem ent (fluct uat ions) \\ luch
for example , a realization of th e above cascade occurring in a well - cou ld ad d so me detail to th e bland ste ady -sta te How, but whk-h art'
stud ied series of distinct hydrodynamic flow patterns (stead y-sta te , damp ed by th e viscos ity of th e fluid. As th e flow of heat is int vnsifi... l,
cycl ic and turbulent flow) . Each of th ese recurrent flow patterns how e ver , th e syste m reaches a cri tical po int at wh ich th e d l'n sity
appears one aft er th e other at well -defined critical thresholds of grad iellt is stro ng eno ugh to ove rco me viscosity, leadin g to till'
temperature or speed . The seguencc of ph ase transitions may be am plification of fluctuation s and allowing th e formati on of co he re- nt
initiated by heating a water container from below . At low temperatures ro lls. T hus , a very specific seque nce of e vents underlies th e transition
th e flow of heat from top to bottom , referred to as th ermal conduction, to convection. On th e othe r hand, as the biologist Brian Goodwin has
is simple and steady , displaying onl y a hland, featurel ess ov erall po inted o ut , portion s o f this hydrodynamic seque nce may be obse r ved
pattern , having th e degree of symm etry of a ga s. At a cr itical point of in a com plete ly different process, th e co mplex morphogen et ic
temperature , however, thi s ste ady flow sudde nly disappears and Sl'llue llce whi ch turns a fertilized egg into a fully developed o rga nism.
another on e takes its pla ce, th ermal con vection, in whi ch co he rent roll s Afte r describing another instan ce of a seq ue nce of flow paltl'rns in
of wat er form, rotating either clockwise or anti -clo ckwi se . Th e wat er hydrod ynami cs Goodwin says:
co nta ine r now has str uct ure and, for th e same reason , has lost so me
symme try. As th e temperature co ntinues to intensify another threshold Th e point of th e description is not to sugges t that m orphogen et ic
is reached, th e flow loses its orderly periodic form and a new pattern patterns originate from the hydroJynamie properties of living
tak es o ver: turbulence. The cascade that yields the seq ue nce conducti on - orga nisrns . .. What I want to em phasize is sim ply that many
convection-turbulen ce is, ind eed, more complicated and may be patt ern-gen erating processes share with developing organisms th e
stud ied in detail through th e usc of a special machine called th e characteristic that spatial det ail unfolds progressivel y sim ply as a
Co ue tte-Taylo r apparatus , whi ch speeds up (rathe r than heats up) th e result of th e law s of th e process. In th e hydrodynami c exa m ple we
liquid mat erial. At least se ven different flow patterns are rev ealed by see how an initi ally smoo th fluid flow past a barri er goes through a
thi s machin e, eac h appe aring at a specific critical point in speed, and sym me try- brea king eve nt to give a spat ially periodic pattern , fol -
thanks to the sim ple cylindrical shape of th e appa ratus , each ph ase lowed by th e elaboration of local nonlinear detail whi ch devel op s

20 2I
 olll 01 llit' PI ' rlOelh It) Illlh n ollH d ,· \ (·I ClI"I ll'1l1 10110 \ \ .1 111 11 1.11
(llI.l lit.l l in · COur w: illit i.,lly Mllooth p'II1"" .IX'·.. . dIC·IlI' (·h ,·... tlH'
res ult of Sl>.llial bifurcatton from .1 uniform st.llt·, bifun:.llt· to
spa tially periodic patt ern s suc h as sl'gnwl1 ts [iu J.1l Insec-t hodYI.
wi th in wh ich fine r de ta il develops . . . through .1 progn'~si\'c
ex pressio n of non linearities and successive bifurcations . . . The ro ll.'
of ge ne products in such an unfolding is to stabilize a parttcular
morphogenetic pathway by facilitating a sequence of pattern transi-
tions, res ulti ng in a particular morphology, l q
From a Deleuzian point of view, it is this uni versality (o r me chanism-
independen ce) of mul tip licities whi ch is high ly significant. Unlike
essences which are always abstract and general entit ies, multiplicities
arc concreee universals. That is. co nc re te sets of attractors (re alized as
tenden cies io physical processe s) linked together by bifurcations
(r ealized as abrup t transitions in th e tendencie s of physical processes) .
Unli ke the ge nerality of essences, and the resem blance with w hich this
gene ra lity endows instan tiations of an essence , the universality of a
multiplicity is typically diverqem: the different rea lizations of a m ulti -
plicity bear no resemblan ce \..-hatso cvcr to it and there is in prin ciple
no en d to the set of po tential d ivergent forms it may ado pt. Thi s lack
of resemb lance is amplified by the fact that m ulti plicities give fo r m to
processes, no t to the final produ ct, so that th e end res ults of processes
realizing th e same multipl icity may be highl y d issimilar from each
o the r , like th e sphe rica l soa p bubble anel the cu bic salt crys tal which
not only d o not resem ble one anothe r. but hear no sim ilarity to th e
topological point g uid ing th eir prod uction.
The co nce pt of progressive differentia tion whi ch I have ju st defined
was mea nt , as I said , to d istinguish the o bscure yet distinct natu re of
m ult ip licitie s from th e clear and d isti nct identity of essences, as we ll
as from th e clarity afforde d by the light of rea so n to essences grasp ed
hy th e mind . A final di stinct ion m ust now be made : un like essences,
wh ich as abstract genera l en tit ies coe xist side by side sharply distin -
gu ished from one anoth er, concrete unive rsa ls must be thought as
meshed toneth er into a contin uum. This further blurs th e identity of
multipliciti es, creating zones of ind iscernihilitv where they blend into
each o the r , fonning a continuous immanent space very different from
22
•• I I I I \ 1 l tl 0 1 t Il 111011 .lId l' " pi \t1 It11'11\ 1111 , I I). I. 1111 \\ l i lt •
t Ol I t
hilt ti ll') do ~o .,1 po int ' . ti ll tilt' , 'e1 1 t · ~ • • md umh -r g lllllllll' l ill '
w hic h IH'\('r havv llll' u n ilelr ln it) clf .1 n.uu rol light . ()n (·.It h
Ill t .l, io n , o hscuritit·l'i .Hlel 1 111l1' S of ,Jude,,\ co rn" pofl( l 10 tlu-u
c1 i,linl"l ion . IMultiplidt il'''il .H·t' c1islingub.lwd from on e .urorln-r , but
nu t at .111 in th e same manne-r as form s and tlu- terms in "hkh thc''''
.m - incarnated . Thcv ar e ohj l'ctin'h' mad e and unmade according tl l
till' co nd itio ns that : lct e rl1l inl' thl'i; fluent synthes , is. This is IWI". 11'1'
tht;)' co m bine th e gre ate st power o f hdng difTcrenrialt·d with an
inahility to be dttfcrcnciated . J O
Altho ugh I will not stick to thi s subtle typographi cal distin ction ,
I ),ol,'ule distingui shes th e progressive unfo ld ing of a mu ltiplicit j'
Ihrough broken symmetries (diffc renrioltion), from the progn'''isht'
"ilwcificatio n of th e continuous space formed by mu ltip licities as it gin'''i
rise to o ur world of disconti nu o us spa tial str uct ures (differl.·nciatio n) .
Unlik e a transcendent heaven w hich exists as a separate dimensi on from
n 'aHty, Dcleuze asks us to imagi ne a co nti nuum of mul tiplicities whic-h
dlj]crenciaees itself into o ur fam iliar three-d ime nsional space as wel l as
its spatially struct ure d co nte nts ,
Let me explain in wh at sense a co ntin uo us space may he said to
beco m e progressivel y defined giving rise to discontinuous spaces . First
of all, a space is not just a set of points , but a set together with a way
of binding th ese poin ts together into neiohbouThoods th rough well -
defined relati on s o f proximity or continuity . In o ur famili ar Euclidea n
gco met ry th ese rel ation s are specified by fixe d len gths o r distance"
w hich det ermine how close pOinL'i arc to eac h othe r. The co ncept of
' length ' (as we ll as rel at ed o nes, like 'a rea' o r 'v olume' ) is wh at is
called a metric co nce pt , so th e spaces of Eucl ide an geome try ar e kn own
as meeric spaces. 1. Ther e ex ist other spaces, ho wever. w he re fixed
dista nces canno t define proximities sin ce dis tances do no t remain fixed.
A topol ogical space, for exa m ple, may be stre tched with o ut the
neighbourhoods w hich defin e it changing in nature . T o co pe with such
exotic spaces. mathematicians have devised ways of defi ning the
property of 'be ing nearby' in a way tha t does no t presup pose any
 li ll lilt I Ollll 'pl , hili 0111\ 110111111 111 1 t IIllt t pi I.kl ' 1111111111' 1I11••
nl "'~!". li on ,'\ vr nih' I II.II",H. h ', it t'''' It . lilt ' til tu« tmn 111'1 \\ I TII II/n t ll
nonmctric J/,I1US is fuu d.uucuta l in .1 I )"I"llli.Hl olllol,,!:) . rJ ,\1o n'o 't'r .
and this is t he cr ucial point, th ere arc \\TIJ ·d l' fiI Wd u -clmir-al \\.I\'S of
linking m e tric and no nm c t ric span:s in such .1 wa v t hat the fo~m"-'r
become th e product o f the progr essive dmcr('ntiJti(J~ o f th e latte r . To
ex plain how such a svm, mct rv- , b rc aking casca de would wo rk in this
case , I will need to tak e a bri ef d et our throu gh th e history of
nineteen th-century geometry.
Althou gh in th at ce nt ury most physicists and mathematician s th ough t
the struct ure of physical space wa s cap t ure d by Euclidean geo me t ry.
man y ot he r ge o me t r ies , with very different properties, had co me int o
ex iste nce. Some of th em (suc h as th e non -Eucli dean geo me t ry d e-
ve loped b)· Lohatch evsk v] share d with th e geomet ry of Euclid the
p ropert), o f being m etric . There wer-e, howeve r , o the r geo me trics
wh ere metri c co nce pts we re not in fact fund am ental. T he differential
geo met ry o f Gauss and Riemann wh ich gave us t he co nce pt o f a
manifold is one exa m ple, bu t th ere were se veral o the rs (p ro jec tive
ge o met ry, affine geo me t ry , topology). Moreo ver, and despite th e fact
th at Eucli dea n geo met ry reigned sup re me, so me mathem aticians
realized th at its basic co nce pts co uld in fact be derived from th e
non metric co nc epts whi ch formed the foundation o f th e newco mers.
In par ticul ar, ano ther influ ential nin et eenth-centu r y math em ati cian
Felix Klein , realized that all t he ge o me tr ies known J to him could be
categorized by t he ir invari ants und er gro ups o f t ransfor matio ns, and
th at the diff erent g ro ups were em bed ded o ne int o th e o the r . 23 In
mod ern te r m ino logy thi s is eq uivalent to saying that th e different
ge o me t ries we re re late d to each ot her by rel at ion s of b ro ken
sym me t ry.
In Euclidean geo me t ry , fo r ex ample , len gth s, ang les and shapes
remain unalt ered by a gro up co nta ining rotation s, translat ion s and
reflecti on s. This is called th e g ro up o f riBid traniformations. T hese
metric p rop erties, ho we ver, do not remain invariant under the groups
o f tran sforma tions cha racterizing o the r geomct rit·s . T here is o nc
geomet ry , called affine Beomet')', w hich adds to th e g ro up characte riz ing
Eucl idea n geometry new transfonnation s, called linea r traniformations,
under whi ch p ro pe rties like t he parall elism o r th e straight ness o f lines
1 ,Ill t' It 111.111 1 urv .ur.mt , IHIt 11111 till II It Il·d. 111111 till II I 1"11/11 ' " IIlnl/lCff.,
IlIlt ' wlm h ,.dd In II l id .mel )1111'.11 11 .111111111I .111011 tlllI I 01 1'1 0lt ·tlloll ,
tCll"Il "po n ding III , 111I1111,111111011 ,I 111 1'1 1 ot hlru , .11Il1 , (·t I IOIl, I I",
n plh.l)t·nl o f intt 'rn'pti ng liuN' ligh t I .l ) ·"i 011 ,I "it I ( T I1 . (Mort· In hui
("111)', thi s gl'o nw l r) .ldcls t ra n- Io rm.u illllS t-,lllt·d ·p ro jl·t l i\'ilit's' . ) ll n-sc
rr.msforrnat ions d o 1101 nt·n ·ss.lrily h-a ve l .uc-l id r-an or atfi m- pr opt'rti t·
undl.1ng('d. d S CJ Il h.., ('asH)' pictured if we inl.lgilH' .1 film p ro jed o r
(which typi call y inc reases the mJ gnitudl' o f len gth s) and .l proj r-rti on
" . -n-c n at an angle to it (w hich distorts parallel lines) .
If we picture th ese t hree gt.'omet r ies as forming th e leve ls o f a
hierarch)' (p rojcct i\"c-affine -Euclide an) it is easy to sec th at tlu -
tra nsfo rma t ion gro up of eac h level includes th e transformations o f tln -
leve l bel ow it and adds new o nes . In o the r w o rd s, eac h level POSSt'SS('S
more sym metry than the leve l bel ow it . This suggests th at, as we
1110 \ "C down th e hierarch )', a sym me t ry- breaking cascade sho uld pro ·
dun' pr ogressivel y mo re differentiated ge o metric spaces, and, vice
versa, that as we move up we sho uld lose differen tiat io n . For exam ple,
as we asce nd fro m Eucl idea n geomet ry mo re and more figur es become
eq uiva lent to one another, fo rm ing a Jesser number if distinct classes,
T hus , w hile in Euclidea n geo me t ry tw o t ria ngles are eq uivalent on ly if
their sides have th e same len gth, in affine geo metry all tri anglcs an '
the same (regardless of lengths). In other words, as we m ove up th e
class of eq uivalent triangles becomes less differentiated . Or to take a
dillerent ex am ple , whil e in Euclidea n geomet ry tw o co nic sec tio ns
(the fam ily of cur ves co ntaining circl es, ellipses, parabolas and hyp er-
bo las} are eq uivalent if th ey are both of th e same type (both circles or
both parabolas) and have th e same size, in affine geomet ry th ey o nly
need to be o f th e sam e type (rega rd less of size) to be equivalent , whil e
in pr o jective geo metry all co nic sections , w ith out further qu alificati o n.
are the same . H In sho rt, as we mo ve up t he hierarchy figures whi ch
used to be fully differentiat ed fro m one anoth er become pro gressively
less distinct event ually blen di ng into a sing le one , and vice versa, as
we mo ve down, what used to be o ne and t he same shape progressivcl)'
d iffere ntiates into a vari ety o f shapes .
T his hierarchy can be expande d to incl ud e other ge o me t ries, suc h
as differential geometry and topo log}'. T he latter , for exam ple , ma y be
ro ughly said to co nce r n t he prop erties o f ge o met ric figures wh ich
2~
I t 111.1111111 \ .111.\111 !llId ll IUlldlll '. 1111111111 • II I .1 .1 01111111 ' II II Il lI1I1.l
tn ut x, llloll i . tr,m"iIOI"I1l.ltloll \\lu, II do lIul t 1I'.,le IW\\ pOlllt " 0 1 IU "'l'
ill\I,I\( ' tl.III ,lllrnlolliIJn... , I.IIIt,(1
t'xis l ing ones . (fvl(ln' "'(,I<'t l)'. lcll)ll lo g )'
' ho meo mo rp hisms ', which conrcrr n(drb) POints lilt .. nt'utb) ['Oint! .mel
wh ich can be reversed or be continuously 1II1dOlW ,) Llnck-r these
tran sformati on s many figun~s which arc complete ly distil1(,t in Euclid-
can geo me try (a tri angle, a sq uare and a circ le. fo r exa mp le) become
o ne and th e same figure . since the y can be defo rmed into o ne another.
In thi s sense . topol ogy may be said to he th e least d1fe rentiateJ
ge o me try. th e on e with th e least number of distin ct eq uivalence
classes, th e one in which many discontinuous forms have blended into
o ne co nt inuo us one ." Metaphorically, th e hierarchy ' topo logica l-
dilTerential-projecti ve- affine-Euciidean ' may be see n as re prese nti ng
an ab stract sce nario for the birth of real space . As if th e metric space
wh ich we inhabit and that physicists st udy and measure ",as born fro m
a nonmetric, topological co nti nu um as th e latter differentiat ed and
acquired struct ure following a ser ies of sym me try· breaking transitions,
Thi s morphoceneuc view of th e relation between the difTerent geo-
metries is a met aphor in th e sense that to math em at icians these
relation s are purely logi cal , useful becau se th eorems whi ch ar e valid at
on e level are automatically valid at th e lev els bel ow it. ' 6 But thi s
cascade of broken sym me tr ies rna)' be also given an ontoloqtcol dimen-
sion. O ne way in wh ich thi s sce na rio for th e birth of m etric space can
be mad e less m etaphorical and more directl y onto logical, is through a
co m pariso n between m etric and nonmctric ge ome t rical properties, on
o ne hand, and extensive and intensive phy sical properties, o n th e other.
Exte nsive properti es incl ude not only suc h metric prope rt ies as len gth ,
area and volume, but also quantities such as am ount of ene rgy or
entropy , Th ey are defined as prop erties whi ch are intrinsically divisible:
if we d ivide a volume of matter into two eq ual halves we end up with
tw o volumes, eac h half th e exte nt of th e o riginal o ne . Intensive
pr operties, on th e other hand, arc properties suc h as temperatu re o r
pressure, whi ch can no t be so divid ed , If we tak e a volume of water at
90 degrees of te mperature, for instan ce, and break it up into tw o
equal parts, we do not end up with two volumes at 45 degrees each ,
bu t with two volumes at th e original temperature .?"
Dcleu ze arg ues , however , th at an int en sive prop ert}' is not so mu ch
26
flil l Ihlt I 111111\1 1111. 1.II1 IIl U \\ llh lll.UII'., ~ .1I . hl J "hill" ""I .I. lntl ...
d"ml/( III klllJ. 1111 111111" '1 .1111I 1 III .• ' 1\1 11 \ IIIII III I III 11llll id \ \.11_ 1,
III, " .lIll pll, t ,m mdl 'l ,d III ' d l \ II II' d ' 11\ 111 ,11111 t lilt' tlll1l .IIIII " [rr un
Illuk l lll,.Itll l U·.l llfl ' ,I lI 'IIlP, 'I .lllllt· dlll ll l'llt l 11('1\\ t ' . '1I tilt' tllP .uHI
ho llu m portion' of th e w an-r , )'t 'l. \\1.11" pnor to tlu' Iw,ltlll g till
, h' m is .11 cquililu-ium , 011('(' th t' h '111I H'r,lIU l'l' di lll'n'm I' i.. I fl ·.lh ,d
til(' '1)"sk m will [n - aw.1)' from equilibri um , th.u i s , wv con di\ iell' itll
Ic- mpt.' ratlln· hut in so doing we dl.mgt' the sph'm Clll.l!it.lIh c1) .
Indt'('cI, .IS we just saw, if tilt' h'mpe ratu rc- c1ifl~' n'I)(' I' is m.ul t' inll'n"i.·
('lIo ugh th e SYStl' l1\ will und ergo .1 ph ase transition, losing S)' I1I I1h' II")'
.,,111 changillg its d ynami cs, d l'vL·lo ping th e periodi c p.lltL'rn of Iluid
motion wh ich I referred to above as 'co nvec tion ". T hus. in a \'t' r )" n -al
w nsc, phase transit ion s d o divid e the temperature scale hut in so d oin g
Iht,), mark sudde n changes in th e spatial sym ml't ry of a mat erial.
Using these ne w co ncepts we can define th e sense in wh ich tht'
me tri c space we inhabit emerges fro m a no nme tric continuu m through
.1 cascade of bro ken sym me tries. Th e idea wo uld he to view this
g" m'sis not as an abstract m ath emat ical pr ocess but as a co nc- re te
phpical process in w hich an undi fferen tiat ed intensive space (t hat is, a
s paCl~ defined by co nti n uo us inten sive properties) progressivcl )' differ-
cn tiatcs, event ually givin g rise to extensive structures (d iscontinuo us
structures with definite metric prop erties) , W e can take as an illus-
tration of thi s po int som e recent devel opmen ts in qu antu m field
th eories. Although th e co nce pt of spo nta neo us sym me try breaking,
.1I1d its co n nec tio n with phase transitions, devel op ed in rath er humble
branches of physics, like th e fields of hydrodynam ics and conde nsed
matter physics. it was e vent ually incorporat ed int o the main strcam .!"
Today, thi s conce pt is helping unify th e four basic forces o r physics
(gravitatio nal, elect ro magne tic, strong and weak nuclear forces) as
physicists realize th at , at extre m ely high temperatures (the ex tre me
co nd itio ns probably pre vailing at th e birth of th e uni verse) , th ese
fo rces lose th eir individuality and blend int o o ne, highl y sym me tr ic,
force . The hypothesis is th at as th e universe ex pande d and cooled , a
se ries of phase tran sition s broke th e o riginal sym met ry and allo we d the
four forces to differentiate from one ano thcrv '" If we co nside r th at , in
relativity th eory, gravity is \,s hat gives space its m etric prop erties
(mo re exac tly , a gra vitational field co nstit utes th e metric struc t ure of
27
,I 111111 d llll1'l1 11111," 11I,lIl1ll1ld>. 111'( II \\1 ,11 1.1 III 1111 11.,11 'I I II II, It
l' lIl1' rgl' . ,IS .1 (lislillll fi l/'l\' ,11,' P '\1111 II/I" ," pllllll III II 1111, II 1\'
prop 'rty (te m p .rat urc ) , the idl',l 0 1 .1 11 intvusrv « p,lI " ' 1\ 111' 1IIIIh 10
e x te nsive ones through progrcs si vl' din~'rcnl i .1t i on h" l'olll l' · 1110r, ' than
a suggestive m etaphor. I I
Let me pause for a moment to sum m ar ize th e ar gum ent so Iar . I
began by es tablishing some purely formal d ifferen ces bet we en th e
co nce pts of 'esse nce' and of ' m ult iplicity' : whil e th e form er co nce pt
impli es a unifi ed and timel ess identity, th e latter lack s unity and implies
an id entity which is not giv en all at on ce but is defin ed progressivel y ;
and while ess ences bear to th eir instantiations th e same r elation whi ch
a model has to its copies, that is, a relation of greater o r lesser
resemblance, multiplicities imply divergent reali zations which bear no
sim ilar ity to th em. These formal differences, I said, are insuffici ent to
characte r ize th e di stinction between essences and multipli citi es as
immaterial ent ities whose job is to account for th e genesis of form:
replacing etern al archetyp es involves supplying an alternative e x pla-
nation of morphogenesis in th e world. Unlike essences whi ch assume
that matter is a passive receptacle for ex te rnal form s, multiplicities ar e
immanent to material processes, defining th eir spontane o us capacity to
generate pattern without e xte rn al intervention. I used cer tain features
of mathematical model s (state space s) to defin e th e nature of multipli -
cities: a multiplicity is defined by di stributions of sing ular ities , defining
tenden cies in a process; and by a se r ies of c rit ical transitions which can
take several suc h di stributions em be dded within o ne an other and
unfold th em. Finally, I said that a population of suc h co nc re te
universals forms a real dim en sion of th e w orld , a nonmetric co ntin uo us
space whi ch progressi vely specifies itself gi ving ri se to o u r familiar
m etric space as w ell as th e di scontinuous spat ial st ruc t ures that inhabit
it.
No doubt, despite m y effo rts th ese remarks remain highl y m eta-
phorical. First of all , I have defin ed multipli citi es in terms of attractors
and bifurcations but these ar e features of mathematical m odels . G ive n
th at I want th e term ' m ult iplicity' to refer to a conc re te universal (to
replace ab st ra ct ge ne ra l essences) th e qu esti on m ay ar ise as to th e
legitimacy o f taking features of a m odel and r eifying th em into th e
definin g traits of a real e ntity . Second , th e relation between a
28
'"11111111 11 111 " I 1IIII IIIpill Ill. III I II.. ,h 1111 111111 " I 111 1 .11 I .1.1 I'"
II I 11111 • • I ' I " I I, I 1" " . 11 1 11 111 . 1 1. 11 11111 ' 11 1. '1 1111 11
111.,11.'11' ,1111 " ' ' ' II III" 111111 ,11" 1111 1,IId , III "111111 1111 III I dlt 11111 I.
1,,1. li-m. 111111111.11111 ' Ih.. 1I1,'llphlllll ." '"11 1' 11 1 \\ i1 1 \ll\ lIh ,' 11,,111111
,I Ihllrllu ,h <l lllo lo 111 ,,1 \II.lh i 01 I,ll' p,lI" "Ih,'l II ', '/, ,'/ (I.,/, c,'/
1..111 III S('ll.Ir.lll'd 11'0111 its \.1 1"1.11.1 .. 111,111,,'111.1111".11111111<'111 , hilI
IIl1 c"i <1 /)/1
111 addiliol1, J d, 'l.lih,d di scu ssion 0 1 ho\\ 1111'S" tllp" logil.11 111\.11 i.urt
111.1 • Ill' WO\'l'1I to gl'lhl'r to C(I/I.\/[ II I ,I continullus, '('\ Ill'll'ro " '111'0 11 ,
S Il.1 Cl' , In tlu- fo llowi ng chr pll..r I w ill show in te chn ical (k l,lil hem 11 11
ltl l1st r uet io n ca n bl' carried o ut and ho w th e I' sultinv cu nt in uum . 11.1
replace th e top o r least m ct ri ' le vel in th e hierar ch y of gl'ollll"ll'i, ' . I
\\ ill also di s uss ho w th int r m ,<Iiate I rv e ]s m ay he rl' p l.H I'd b\
inl -nsiv pro cesses of ind ividuat ion whi ch yiel d as the ir fina l prtll hll l
tlu- fully differ ntiat ed m tric st r uc t ures th at popUlal l' ~hl' ,bo tlOIl\
lvvc l, At the e nd of chapte r tw o the metaph or of a ge nes Is 0 1 nu -tr«
spa c th rough a cascade of b roken sym m ' t r ies sho uld have been m ost!
e lim inat ed , and a literal acco unt tak en its place.
Mea nw hile, in w hat rem ain s of thi s cha pter I w ould lik 10 mak .. ,I
1I10re detailed analysis of th e nature o f multipliciti es . T he fir st s('\ 0 1
issu es to be d iscussed will in vol ve th e techni cal details of D el C U/." '.
ol1to logical interpretation o f th e co ntents of sta te space. H is approach
is very un orthodox as will be sho w n by a co m pa r iso n with th e stau -
space o ntologies proposed by anal yti cal philosophers, T he n I wi ll 1110\'1'
o n to a sec o nd se t of issu es co ncern ing th e modal srcr us o f multipli citi cs.
Modal logic is th e bran ch o f ph ilosophy w hich d eals w ith th e rdat ior~ s
between th e possible and th e actua l , H ere th e qu esti on to be ans wered IS
if state space is a space of possibl e states what is th e st atus of attra ' to rs
and bifurcatio ns in r elation to th ese po ssibilities? Can multiplicities 1)('
inter p re ted in terms o f th e traditional modal catego ries, th e possibk.
and the necessary , o r do w e ne ed to postulate an origina l form 0 1
physical m odality to char acte r ize th em ? Fina lly, a third se t of issues.
that needs t o be dealt with is related to th e speculat ive dimension o f
Dele uze's proj e ct. Replacin g essences w ith soci al co nve nt io ns or
subject ive beli efs is a relativel y safe m o ve , but putting in th eir place a
new set o f o bject ive ent it ies in evitabl y in vol ves phil osophical sp' u-
lation . What gu ides thi s speculat io n? One wa y o f lo oking at thi s
q ues tion is to see Del euze as e ngaged in a co ns truc t ive proj ect guided
 ,. ( . 11.1111 1" 1' "/'''\ ''''''/' 1/1''. II.. I I . ( " " 1111111 Ill e I. u ll 111111 11 ,,1
\\ h.11 10 do hili \\ h,ll 10 .1\ oltl .10111 ' (lilt I. "" 11.11111 I , 0 1 (1111 c' ,
lit
to avoid the- I'-"f> 01 ('sSI'llli.llislII, hili Ihl rl' .11(' o IIIC' I ,11I.1 till' (' Ill'l'd
to be d iscussed.
Let me begin with Del zuz ·'s o llto logie. 1 .m.lly.sis or state 'pa 'e.
Many philoso phers arc today look ing at these abstract spaces as ob]e ts
of study and reflecti on . A recent shift in th e analyt ical philosophy of
scie nce, for example, mo ving away from logic (and s t theory) and
towards an analysis of th e actual math em atics used by scient ists in the ir
eve ryday pra cti ce , has brou ght th e importance of sta te spaces to the
foreground. 32 Yet non e of th e philosophers invol ved in this new
mo vement has attem pte d such an origina l analysis of state spac e as
Del eu ze has. In particular, analyti cal phil osophers see m unawar e of (o r
at least un con cerned with) Poin care 's top ol ogical studies and of th e
onto logical differen ce that may be posited bet ween the recurrent
features of state space and th e traj ect ori es these features det ermine.
Given that this onto log ical differen ce is key to th e idea of a Deleu zian
multiplicit y, I will need to ex plain how sta te spaces are co nstructed.
First of all , it is important to distingui sh th e differ ent ope rato rs
invo lved in thi s co nstruc tio n. As I aid abo ve , given a relat io n betw een
th e changes in two (o r more) degrees of freedo m ex pressed as a rate
of change, one ope rato r, differentiation , gives us th e instantaneou s
value for such a rate , suc h as an instantan eou s velocity (also kno wn as
a velocity vector). The o the r operator, integrati on , performs the opposite
but co m pleme ntary task: fro m th e instantaneou s values it recon stru cts
a full traject ory or se ries of states .
T hese two operators are used in a par ticul ar order to ge nerate the
str u ture of sta te space. Th e mod elling process begin s with a choice of
manifold to use as a sta te space . The n from ex perime ntal observations
of a system's changes in time, th at is, fro m actual se ries of states as
obse rve d in th e laboratory, we create some traject ori es to begin
populating this m anifold . T hese trajec tories, in turn , serve as the raw
mat erial for th e next step: we rep eatedl y apply th e di ffere ntiation
operato r to the traject ories , eac h application ge nerating o ne veloci ty
vecto r and in thi s way we ge ne rate a velocity vectorfield. Fina lly, using
the integration operato r, we genera te from th e vector field further
trajecto ries which can function as predi ction s ab out future o bserva tio ns
3°
lit Ih. 1'111 1111 I I,. t II I'll' III I I'I 111 ' 11 ' 1" 11111. I (111,,1
I III •1'I1,1 ( 1'''111.111 • II
I IIl' I II. 11 11 • I ), I. 11/1 111.1 ' "'"1
1.///"/1111,,,11 .1, "//(" 1'// " ," // /1" trill 01 ,." till ' 1'1'( ,II III li lt 1 h .1 (
l'0rll.1I1 II I • \ I
11111 . Oil o ll( I10111( , "//1 J /1, « " 1/1" I' 1.1, 11 11 ti ll o lh( I
\\'h ill' .1 p,lll i 111 .11" II"II( 11 01 o r mu - '1.11 curv I' ) IlIodl'l .1 UU ' 11111 (II
,111 11.11 st.lll' S 01.1 \sll' lIl ill Ihl ph~' si .JI \\ odd , Ihl \Idor 1I1·\l1 c ,111Il1I •
1
Ih.. inherent n -ndcn cics or man ' suc h tr: j.·cloril's, and hellll' 01 111.11'
.1 tual svstcm s, to ln-have in C(·rt.l in \\'a~'s , As mcnt ion ..d .11 1lI\( ' , th.. I
tendencies are represented hv singulariti .s in th .. vector field, ,lIld I
1kleuz' not .s, lit-spite the fact tha t the precise narure of cac h sin iul.u
point is w ·1I d ·fin d on ly in th e phase portrai t (b the [orm till
ira] c tories take in its vicinity) rhe e.t islence anJ dimihull on 0\ till ('
singularities is already com plet ly given in the vector (or din'( lio n)
field. In on e mathematician " words:
Th e geometrical interpretation of th e th eory of different ial · ( 11l·11 iUl~
\car ly places in evidence two abso lutely distinct rea lities :. then' I
th e field of d irections and the tcpoloqica! accidents wh ich 11101 )
suddenly crop up in it , as for exam ple the ex iste nce of . .. singlll.lr
points to which no d irecti on has been attached; and then' an', tho
integral curves with the form they take on in the vic~nity 01 Ihl
singular ities of th e field of directi on s . , . T h ~X lst 'I~ e and
distributio n of sing ularities are notions rela tive to th e field 01 vc ' to rs
defined by the differential eq uation . T he for m of th e int gra l curves
is relative to th e solution of thi s equatio n . The two problem ' arc
assuredly complementary, since the nature of th e singu larities of.th...
field is defi ned by the for m of th e curves in their vicinity. But It IS
no less true that th e field of vec to rs on one hand and th e int 'gral
cur ves on th e other are two essentially distinct mathematical realiti es. 14
T he re are seve ra l othe r features o f sing ular ities, or more spccif ally,
of attractors, which are cr ucia l in an on to logica l analysis of state 'pa "
and which furthe r differentiat e its tw o 'distinct mathematical rea liti 's' .
As is we ll known , th e trajectories in thi s space alw ays approach an
attractor asymptotically, th at is, they approach it indif/nitely close bur
nerer reach it. 35 T his means that unlike trajecto ries, w hich re present the
act ual sta tes of objects in th e wo rld, attrac to rs are never actualized,
3I
 II". 1111 p.1I1l1 01 .1 II Jt I 1111 \ I \t I II , ItIII' IIll .u t r.u nu II f II It I 111
l h i , M' II 'iI ' th,lt ' 1Il I u l.lI ll it ', n 'ptt' c u t flllh Iht ' ICII1~ It rill h ,lltkllt II " of
a ,"} Stl' III, neve-r its J.d ll.ll 'il.\h' " , I )t" IHIt' t hl' i, I." k 01 .lllll.lli l\,
at tracto rs are ucvcrth cl css n -al am] h.\,,' dl'fillilt' dlt'lts on .\('tll~i
enti ~i~s . In part icular, th e)' co nfer o n trajc-ctoru-s .1 cc-rtnin dt'grn' of
sta~lh t)', called a~)'mprolic stability. it, Sma ll shol'ks rna)' d i sl ()dg(~ a
traject ory from its att racto r but as lon g as the shock is not too large
to push it o ut o f th e basin of attracti on , t he traject ory will naturally
return to the stable state d efin ed by th e at tr actor (a stca dv sta te in the
case of point attractors, a stable cycle in the case of periodic attract orx,
an~ so o~) , Another important feature invo lves not th e stability of th e
t rajecto ries but that of the distribution of attractors itself (its structural
stability). Mu ch as the stability of trajectories is measured by their
resistance to small shocks , so th e sta bility of a particular distribution
of attractors is che cked by subm itting the vect or field to perturbation s,
an effec t achi ev ed by adding a small vect or field to the main on e and
checking wh ether th e resulting distribution o f attract ors is tapaJoo;caJIy
equi valent to the o riginal one, J7 T yp ically, distributions of attrac to rs arc
str uct ura lly sta ble and thi s, in part , is what accounts for th eir
re curren ce among different physical systems. On th e o the r hand, if th e
perturbation is large eno ugh a distribution of attractors may cease to
be st r uct u rally stable and change o r bifurcate into a different o ne, Such
a bifurcation event is defin ed as a co ntinuo us deformation of o ne
vector field into another topologically inequi valent one through a
st ruct ural instability, 38
Using th e te chnical terms just introduced I can give now a final
definition o f a multiplicity, A multiplicity is a nested set if' vector fields
related to each other by symmetry- breakino bifurcations. [oaether with the
distribut ions of allra clors which define each if' its embedded levels, This
d efiniti on sepa rates o ut th e part o f the model wh ich ca rries informati on
abo ut th e act ua l world (t rajectories as ser ies o f possibl e states) from
that part wh ich is, in principle, never actua lized, This definition
presupposes onl y th e two co nce pts of 'd ifferential relation ' and
'singularity ' , J will return in th e next chapter to a discu ssion o f what
~urther philosophical traniformati on th ese two co nce p ts need to und ergo
In order to be truly detached from th eir mathematical realization. At
thi s point, granting that the definition I just gave co uld spe cify a
32
l oltt II II , 11111 v , \\ t 111 ,1\ .1 ~ \.. h ,lt 111I1111l) ' II .,1 1.11" li t h .111 t 11111 \
.... "lIld h,I'" ( 10 1)1,11...1 I .lIef 01 p.ltlllli 01 ll\dllllhll.lIllll 1111.... lid
III I Mt h 'l'lI IIll'llIhl )lllolh'll t! e"I·lop"lt ·III .1 tll\(1 11111 r('"I" IIl /ll1l Ill .,
llI1i" 'I', .,1 lIIultlpli, il I mi ,lt ,.\tlll1g 'illll l' II ll~l' t th,ll ,llt "I' IM'It -lll
an - re-al, \\ hill' till' Illllitiplid') iht,lI i, 11111. So I h'lt-tl/l' '1)I'"l.. nlll 01
' t!' ,lli/ ,l' io ll' but of dtllllJludlWn, .lIltl inlrotlu,,''i J no"'1 oll lologil ,ll
,"" h-go r)' to refer to t he status of lnu lti plit-itil'S tlll'm"" I,"" : II"u"hr ,
l'hi-, te- rm does not rc-h-r, of co u rsc-, to th e virtual n ,.llity .....hich digl t.,1
..Im ulatio ns han ' made so fnuil iar , hut to a real l" ir'"tJlit)' fo rm ing .1
\ it.ll ('o mp(Hlent of th e ol*'cti\"l' world, As he writes:
TIH~ virtual is not opposed to th e real hut to the actual. The d rtlll Jl
is J ulJ.y real in so Jar as it rs rirw cJI , , . Ind eed , the virtual mu st [u-
defined as st ric t ly a part o f the real obj ect - as th ou gh till' o hjt'l t
had o ne part of itself in th e virtual int o \v·hich it plunged as thou gh
into an objective dimen sion , , , The realit y o f th e virtual co nsists
of the differential el em ents and relatio ns alo ng with th e sing ul.u
points wh ich co rrespo nd to th em , The realit y o f t he virtual is
struct u re, W e mu st avoid g iving th e eleme nts and rel ations that
form a st ruct ure an actuality whi ch th ey do not have, and w ithd raw -
ing from them a reality whi ch they have. ?"
\Vh at is the modal status of th e virtual? If state space traj ectories han'
th e sta tus o f possibilities (p ossibl e ser ies of states) what modality do
virt ual multiplicities represent? This is not an casy qu estion to an swer
givcn that th e ontological status o f even th e familiar modal catego ril's
is a th orny issue. So before d ealing with virtuality let me discu ss th e
ques tion of po ssibility. Traditionally, ontological dis cu ssion of possi-
bilities has been very co nt rovers ial du e to th eir elusive nature , and in
pa rt icular , to th e difficulty o f g iving a clear crite rion for individuatino
th em, that is, for telling whe n we have o ne instead of an other
poss ibility. As a fam ous cr itic o f m od al logic, the philosopher Willard
Van Orman Quine , jok es:
Ta ke , for instan ce, th e possibl e fat man in th e d oorvvay; and again ,
th e po ssibl e bald man in th e doorway . Ar e th ey the same possibl e
man, or tw o pos sibl e men ? How do we decide? How many pos sibl e
33
 "WII lht 1( ' •• r III Ih.lt dIHlr\\.I\ / II till It 1I1t'11 ' l" I 11.1,
th..1II lat OIIt'S ? 110 \\ " Mil) of du-m .Ir,' ,.l lk,· ? (h \\ ould tlwil Ih'lIlg
alik e llIake th em o ne? ,\ n ' not tw o p o s.•dhh, thing s .,Jill"( I ~ Ih b th l'
same as saying that it is impossihl e fc)r tw o thin g,'i to h,· .,Iikl·? Or,
finall y, is th e co nce pt of ide ntity sim p ly inapplicabl e to unactualiz,«]
possibles? But wh at sense can be found in talk ing o f e ntities which
can no t be meaningfully said to he iden tical wi th themsel ves and
distinct from one anothcr-P'"
Most approach es to modal logic co ncent rate on langua ge , or more
specifically, on an anal ysis of se nte nces whi ch exp ress what could hare
been, sentences such as 'If j.F.K . had not been assassinate d th en th e
Vietnam War would have e nde d sooner.' Gi ven that human bein gs
seem capable of routinely using and making sense of these co untc r fac-
tual sentences, the modal logician's task is to explain this ordinary
capability." However, th e fact that linguisticall y specified possible worlds
(like th e po ssibl e world wh ere j .F.K. survived) ar e so de void o f
st r uct u re , and allow so mu ch ambiguity as to what distinguishes one
po ssible world from another, is what has prompted cr iticisms su ch as
Quine's . But as some philosophers have suggested, the problem here
would seem to he ,..'ith linguistic representations and their lack o f
resources to st ruct ure po ssibl e worlds, and not with possibilities as
such . The philosopher o f science Ronald Giere, for instance , thinks th e
extra co nst raints which st ruct ure state space can o vercome the limi-
tatio ns of other moda l approaches:
As Quine d elights in pointing o ut, it is o fte n difficult to individuate
possibilities . . . [But] many models in whi ch th e syst em laws arc
ex pressed as differential equatio ns provide an unambiguous cr ite r io n
to individuate the possible histories of the mod el. They ar c the
trajectories in sta te space co r res pond ing to all possibl e initial
co nd itio ns. Threat ened ambiguities in the set o f possibl e initial
conditions can be elim inated by e xp licitly restri ct ing th e set in th e
definition of th e th eoret ical mod el. 42
G,iere argues that state spaces may be viewed as a way of specifying
possibl e worlds for a g iven ph ysical syste m , or at lea st , possibl e
34
111111 lUll 11I1lJlll b u 11 ,1,111111'1111 IIllhl phil pUllIlIIIl"1 I lit III I 11I11
pu Ibll [u lui H .11 111'11 '11\ I III t ,Ilt 101., .. It '" 01 p,nl I I ht
illdh idtl.llil\ 0 1 tht' d llll'lt'lIl ptl"l"l lhll' IUIOllt' \\1111111 Lilt· P·ltl I
dd ilH'd I I) ' /111\'\, t·xp n ·....,·d h ti ll' dilh-n 'llti ;d l ·clll.lll lln tll ,11 lUlu tio u.dl)
rc-l.ue tilt' sni t(,!H 'S dl'g n 'l ' s o f frlTdom, .Is \\,· 11 .1"1 b)' HlltllJI IIIIIJIlWf!\,
the specific ..ta tv , or po int in till' manif ol d . \\ Iw n ' .I "ph' III Iwgill!l it
evolut ion. G iven a specific iuu ial co nd ition .md a d c n -rm in i tic 1.1\\
(such as those or
classical ph ysics ] OIl(: and o nly tIIW tr.lj ITt or) i
individuated , a fact that ma y he lIsc.'d to Ch.l l1(, l1gc.~ Quilw 's sn ·p til.,1
sta nce. The pha se portrait of any particular stale space will l»- typic,llIy
Fil led with man)' such individual traject ori es, o ne for each po ssihll'
in itial cond itio n. O ne ma y reduce thi s number bJ adding ot her 1.1\\s
wh ich forbid ce rta in co m bi natio ns o f valu es for th e d egr ees o f freedom ,
that is, which make some initial co nd it ions not available for J gin'lI
o4l
svstc rn , but still, o ne enos up with many possibl e histories .
The problem for the phil osopher becomes what omo loq tcal SloW' tn
assign to th ese w ell -d efin ed po ssibilities. One onto logical stance , which
Giere calls 'actualism" , deni es any reality to th e pos sibl e trajcctorics ,
however w ell individuated the y ma y he. A mathematical model , in thi s
view , is simply a too l to help us in the control of particular phy sical
syste ms (that is, th e manipulation in th e laboratory of th e beh aviour:,f
real syste ms) as w ell as in th e predicti on of their future beha\'l(:ur. h:r
this limited purpose o f predi ction and control all we need to Judge IS
t he empirical adequacy of th e model : we generate one trajectory for J
given initial co nd it ion , then try to reprodu ce that particular combi -
nati on of valu es for the degrees o f freedom in the lab oratory, and
observe wh ether th e seq ue nce of actual states mat ches that pr ed ict ed b)'
th e traject ory. G ive n th e o ne trajectory we associ ate with th e act ual
seque nce in an expe ri me nt , th e rest of th e population of traj ect ories is
merely a useful fiction , that is, ontologically unimportan~ . ·4 As Gi ere
argues , how ever, thi s ontological stan ce misses th e lact th~t th e
population o f traj ectories as a whol e displays certain reBularities In tI~t.~
po ssible hist ories o f a syst em, global regularities whi ch pla y a rol e m
shaping any on e particul ar actual history. :" To him , understandin~ a
syste m is not knowing how it actually behaves in thi s or that specific
sit uation , but knowing how it lVould behave in conditions which may in
fact not occu r . And to kn ow that we need to use th e global information
 t"lllboclh d 111 lilt' popUJ..lioll oj pC " 'lhlt III IOlw • 1II101l1l.111011 w huh I
Im.l if we COlln'n tr."t ' on tilt' 0Ilt' t l"' ln to , ) \\hhh I tclIllp,Ht,c1 with
r eal Sl' (IUC IICt'S o f sta tes. 4t>
As sho uld hl' d ea r from till" d iscussion in th is d I.1JlIt"r.. Dt"It'lI/c was
not an "act ualist ' . He held a realist positi on to wa rd s th e mod al
st ruct ure o f sta te space but would have disagrcl'd wilh Git'n .' in his
int erpretati on o f what co nst it utes that mod al st r uct u re . In part icular ,
in a Dcl eu zian ontology one mu st em phasize that lhe regul arities
disp layed . by the different po ssib le traj ectories are a consequence Vf th e
sIngu lantles that shape the vector field . The well -defined nature o f the
poss ible histories is not to be approached by a mere mention of laws
ex pressed as dlffcrcntlal equations, but by an understanding of how
such equations in fact individ uate trajectories , Each pos sible sequence
of states, each possible history, is ge nerate d by following at eac h point
of th e trajectory th e directions specified by th e "ect or field , and any
regularities or propensities exhibite d by th e trajectories sho uld indeed
be ascri be d to th e to po logical accide nts o r singularities o f th e field o f
directions , As D eleu ze puts it, ' the singular ities preside o ver the
ge ncs is' o f th e trajectories. "? In o t he r words, Giere is right in thinking
that state space offers more resources than language to individuate
po ssibilities (thus sides tepping Quine's criticisms) but wrong in his
assessm ent o f how th e process f!f indi viduati on takes place . To leave th e
vector field out o f our ontological analysis (that is, to mak e it int o an
auxilia ry co nst ruct ion or yet another useful fiction) hides the real
source of th e regularities or propen sities in the population o f possible
historics. r"
This point tends to be ob scured in traditional philosophi cal analyses
by the use of exa mples involving th e sim plest typ e of cq uation , a linear
equation . D espite th e fact that o f all th e types of eq uations availab le to
physicists the linear typ e is the least typical, it happen s to be the I)'pe
that becam e d ominant in classical physics. Th e vect or fields of t hese
differential eq uatio ns are ext re me ly simple, "the only po ssible attractor
o f a linear dyn am ical syste m is a fixed point. Furthermore, t his fixed
point is unique - a linear dyn am ical s}"stc m ca nnot have mo re tha n one
basin o f attracti on . '49 In o t her cases (in co nse r vative s}"stl' IllS w hich are
qua si-isolated from their su rro und ings) th ere may be no alt rac to rs at
all , only traj ectorics.Thux, in a linear co nse rvative syste m (suc h as th e
Ia,UllloIlU n t all.\llIl II' d .1 .111 I .11 111'1. iI\ (,I I I. ) 1111 \ n 1111 ht'lti 1 '0
b.u •.1\ l" ,H tll ,ll pur pn,~' s, ht ' ignCln'et
'\ 11 uc tUII·t! tl..11 It 111 ,1\ . 101 lUll t
, . I
. l .1 'CHlit t ' of loll,tr:unt s in the IIldi\ iduation 01 Ir.lit'dorics , On t u-
o t her h.uul, tilt, mort' typi c<11 ~'Cfualio lls (nonlinear equations) have J
mort' t,l.,horah' distr-ibu tio n o f sing uIJri til's. t he sta te space bein g
normal ly par-titioned in a ce llular fashio n b)' many altractors and th eir
ba sin«, and these multiple at t ractors may be o f different types. In th ese
mo rt' co m mo n cases, th e vector field has too mu ch str uctu re to be
igno H'(1.'>0 •
This argument, however.. establishes only that th ere arc In state
.span : othc-r co nst raints for th e individuation of po ssib le histo ries, bl~t
not that th ey should be given a sl'parate modal status , W e could , It
wo uld see m , take sing ulari ties to belong to the realm of the possibl e
and save o urse lves th e trouble o f introducing novel forms of phy sical
mod ality, suc h as virtuality. One w ay o f doing thi s would be to take a
basin o f attrac t ion to be merely a subse t of points o f state space. Given
tha t sta te space is a space o f po ssibl e states , any subse t o f it will also
he just a co llec tio n of po ssib ilities, 5 1 Yet, as I mention ed before,
despite the fact that th e nature o f singularities is well defin ed o nly in
the phase portrait of a system, th eir existence and distr;bution is a~read)'
give n in th e vector field .swh erc they defin e overall flow tendencie s for
t he vect ors, It may see m plausible to think of point attractors, for
exa mple , as just one marc point o f state space , but thi s sing ular point
is not an available pos sibility for th e system since it is never occupied
by a traj ectory, only approached by it asymptotically. Trajectories wi ll
te nd to approach it ever closer but never reach it, and even when on e
speaks of th e end state of a trajectory, in reality th e curve is fluctuating
aro u nd its at t racto r , not occu pying it. St rictly speaking, as I said above,
attrac to rs arc never actualized,
Thus, it see ms, a m ore co mple te analysis o f sta te space does see m
to de ma nd a form of physical m odality that goes beyond mere
poss ibility , Rut could not that o the r tradi tion al modal catcgor)',
necessity, d o th e job? After all, in classical physics' m odels a ge nna l
law rel at es all th e successive points o f a traj ect ory in a necessar y or
det erministi c way, and wh ich spe cific trajectory is ge ne rate d is ncccs -
sarily det ermined given a particular initial sta te . S2 This is, i.ndecd, .t~u.e ,
but th e relative importance o f ge ne ral laws and particular 111111.11
37
 III h ili
,I I'h' II " ' It11111 , till I
\ ' Ill I I I III , III "'ll , , \1 1111 "II
I <Illdll 10III 11..111 'I "'10 I \ , 10101 111 1111.11111' t )11 0111 "'Ild , tI" 11111
III .111\ 1' .11 tHIII.1I 111111., 1 1.111' I 111 .ld\ dlllllli l I" d II". 111.111\ IIl1tl.II \\ riu -:
I OllditiollS (all tho s« tli.u .111' IIHl ud,·d \\ltlllll.1 I),\ IIHII I.II h.1 III) will l«: I ' ,,, llI'd \ \\ ' knm that the cells will
, - Ithl' IltH .lI \ IIII I , ,
eCJ uivall'lIt .I S far as the l'lld st.lle of ti ll" tr ,ljl'l tol ) IS ('ollll'rIIed. 'l he t\s SOO Il as , I . , .t to strict dctermlll ism .
' I ' 111111 I th"n,lor ' su ) I~C •
state s a traj 'c to ry adopts on its way to till' I'lld stall', wha t l'ngilll' C'rs appear: t Ili S P WIlIlIll\ , ' f tl ' cells [clock - or ant i-
I I I rot lion 0 11.: •
call its transient sta tes and whi ch co nst itute the bulk of the trajc tory, In co ntrast, t il" ir e: /l Oll I I ' II blc a ni chance, in th e
10ckw iseJ is ullpredict.lhlc and uncontro a e. y , '1 d at th e
may be of interest so me times, but lcarl y will not be as im po rtant as I ' h t m ay have pr e\ al e
form of till' particul: I' pertur )at~olln ]t ~ 1 hether a given ce ll is
th e stabl e end state , since th e syste m will spend most of its tim ' I ) . rimc nt W I n ecrc e w
(
m om ent 0 t 11' (X I ' _ t remarkable cooperation
fluctuating around that state . On th e other hand , th e role of th e 'l l d W e thus arnve a a
I I
right - o r c t lane ' . . . .d o re formally, several
gen eral law will also be diminished because th e behaviour of th e I de term nllsm . , State m
traj ectory at its end state , a steady-state or a cyclic beha viour, for b .tw ccn c Ilance anc I Chance alon e will
'I I for th same parameter va ue.
solutions arc pOSSI ) e . 51
example , will be determined not by its pr evious states (d efined by th e
decid e which of th ese solutions is realiz ed .
general law), but by th e typ e of the attractor itself.
Thi s argument, again, establishes th e need to consider additional f nt for a different inte r pre ta tion of th e mod~1
factors in th e individuation of possible histories but not th e need for This line 0 argume . _ f t Ocleu ze ' s own , alth ou gh It
f t te space IS III act, no
additional modalities , After all, is not the end state of a traj ectory structure 0 sa ' 'I I ' Oeleu ze own argum nt s
. I f l ' ontologlca ana YSls. .
necessary? In this case too, th e complexity of the distribution of follo ws direct y rom llS . f h _ ible and th e necessar y are o l
d at egones 0 t e POSSI e
singularities mak es a great differen ce in our int erpretation of the modal again st th e ort h 0 ox c 54 d link ed dir ectlv with th e
hil I' I nature an are
a more gene ral p I oso~ n ca d d ' b . di cusse d in th e remaind 'r 01
j ,

str ucture of state spac e . A state spac e with a single attractor , and a f ' I saId nee e to e IS
sing le basin encompassing the entire spac e, has a unique end state for third set 0 Issues . , uid e Oc! euze ' s speculation about
thi s chapte r: the co nstramts ~hat d
g
th e evo lution of th e syst em. Concentrating on thi s at ypical case , h co nstraint to avoid at all
I I lady mentlOn e one sue '
therefore, can mislead us into thinking that det erminism implies a virt uality. lave a re I " I' . . ete rn al esse nces . Meeting
I" ' . t al mu tIp icttrc s as
singl e necessary outcome, On th e other hand, a space with multiple costs concept ua Izmg VII' U . . h f h t modal logiC has to say
, . . ectmg mu c 0 w a ,
attractors breaks the link between necessity and determinism, giving a system thi s co nst ramt reqUIres reJ , th t th e postulation 01
" ., d it The reason IS a
a 'choice ' between different de stinies, and making th e particular end about POSSibIlity an necessl y. I ld as Quine and oth I'
ld . " longside th e act ua wor ,
state a syste m occupies a com bin atio n of determinism and chance . For P ossible wor s eXlstmg a . I ' plies a comm itment to
f ' ked almost a way s im
instance, which attractor a system happen s to be in at anyone tim e is critics have 0 ten Icm ar ' . I' 55 A d it should b em phasized,
h f m of esse ntla Ism. n ,
det ermined, in part, by its contingent history: a traj ectory ma y be one or anot cr or d I hil ophe rs but also to th os
.". I' t only to mo a p I os
dislodged from an attractor by an accident, a str ong-e no ugh exte rn al thi s cn tlCISm app res no . " h . t nee of alt ernate parall I
ph ysicists who ser iously beli eve m t e exts e
shock pushing it out of on e basin and into the sphe re of influ en ce of
another attractor. Furthermore, whi ch specific distribution of attractors univ er ses. II I . es both philosophers and
. ki b t th ese para e urnvers I
a yste m has availabl e at anyone point in its history, may be change d When thin ' mg a "" . e of f ully fo rmed individuals popul atin g th
by a bifurcation . When a bifurcation lead s to two alt ernative distribu - ph ysicists assume t h e eXlste nc.. di t I raises a number of qu cs-
ible 'orl ds ThI S irnm e ia e y I
tions, o nly one of whi ch can be realiz ed, a det erministic syste m faces different POSSI e \ \ . . I' htl alte re d in othe r work s?
'ndividual eXist, s Ig y , I
further 'c ho ices' . Which alt ernative obtains, as nonlinear scie ntists lIya tio ns: Can t h e same I . ny worlds afte r scvc ra
h . tai thi s identIty across rna ,
Prigogine and Gregoire Nicolis have been arguing for decad es, will be Can he or s e main am I d? C Id we identify him or her aft er
slight alteratio ns have accumu ate. o u
decided by chance fluctuation s in th e enviro nme nt . Speaking of the

39
 ..1111'1'1°,1,."", 11,,1,1,
"'t 1.1, 11111 I
. tllll' 111"
,101
•t n ' lIIt1 0dl ll n l to c!"l ll it til' Idllllll ) 01 till I 1I1111\lIlu.ll
g U.U-,lII l t '(· it s pn'M'I"'''lli OI1 .HTO" \\l,dtl" J IWl t' .11"
dilli.'n·nl tec'hnical wa),s or.u ili,·\'jng th is d ltO( I. ( ) II W it'
cla im that t ran sworld identity is insured h} tilt.' p mis..ossion d particular
essence, that is, the propert)' o f bein g thi s pa rticula r indi vid ua l. O n th e
o the r hand . on e can deny that th ere arc, in fact, such transw orld
individuals. and speak sim ply of counterparts, that is, o ther possib le
individuals whi ch closely resemble th eir real co un te rpart, but arc not
identical to it (in particular, th ey do not share the esse nce of bei ng
p recisely th is ind ivid ual). T hese cou nterparts , ho wever I would share a
ge nera l esse nce . (Such as bei ng ' rational animals' , in the case of human
heings. '6)
The alternative o ffere d by Del eu ze is to amid taking as gi ven full)'
formed individuals, o r what am oun ts to the same thing, to al ways
account for the eenesis of individuals via a specific individu ation process ,
such as the developmental process which t urns an embryo into an
organism. Thi s emp hasis o n the obj ective producti on o f th c spatio-
tempo ral structure and boundaries o f individuals stands in stark
co ntrast with the co mple te lack of proces s medi at ing between t he
poss ible an d th e real in orthodox modal th inking. T he cat egory o f th e
possible assum es a set of predefined forms which retain their identity
d espite th eir non-exi sten ce, and whi ch alread y resemble th e forms
th ey w ill adopt once they be come realized. In other words, un like th e
indi vidu ati on p rocess linking virtua l multiplicities and act ua l structures,
realizing a possib ility docs no t add anything to th e pre -exi sting form
but mere reality. As Deleuze writes:
What differen ce can there be between th e existen t and the no n-
exi stent if th e no n-ex istent is alr cady possible, alre ady included in
the co nce pt and having all th e cha racteristics th at th e co nce p t
co nfers up on it as a possibility? . . . Th e po ssibl e and th e virt ual arc
. .. distingui shed by the fact th at on e refers to the form of identity
in the co nce pt , wh ereas th e other designates a p ure multipli city .. .
which radicall y excludes th e iden tical as a prior co nd ition . . . T o
the exte nt th at th e possibl e is open to ' realizatio n ' it is understood
as an image o f th e real, whil e th e real is supposed to resemble the
40
I
p .Utltll.II,I po 'ilhlt I h.u I \\ II 11 I dllh , tllt III U ll til I 1.11111 \\ 11.lt , I 1t "IU I
.u rd to .Itld ttl tlu (1IIll' pt "til II 11 II dill 1 douhh' lilt' "ith lilt ' .. .
! I,I", iL III )' t wo ,\ l'1 l1.lli, .ltio ll III (' .lk \\ It II II·M'mh l.ull ,. ,1 '\ .1 p r o n 'ss no lr-ss th .111 it
1I.lIu l, OIH' C•in doc-s wit h itk nt il) .u .l prim iph- . In this sense, act ua lizatio n o r
or dif1~'n'ndatioll is .1lwa)'s a gt'l1uinc creation . Act ual terms neve r
rcsernhle the sing ulari tit's th ey incarn ate . . . For a potential o r
virtual o bject to he act ua lized is to crea te divergent lines whi ch
co rres po nd to - without resem bli ng - a virtual m ultip licity. n
Besides th e avo idan ce of esse nt ialist thinking, Deleuze ' s speculation
abo ut virtualit y is guid ed hy the closel y related co nst raint of avoiding
lyp oloBical t hinkin g, t hat sty le of t hought in w hich ind ivid uation is
achieve d throu gh th e creati on oj classifications and of formal criteria fo r
membership in those classifJcations. Althou gh so me classificat ion s are
csse ntialist, that is, use transcendent ess ences as th e crite rio n for
membership in a class, t his is not always thc case. For exam ple , unlike
Plat onic esse nces whi ch are t ranscendent entit ies, Aristotle ' s 'natura l
states ' th ose sta tes towards which an individual tends, and whi ch
w ould' be achieved if th ere ",'ere not interfering forces , are not
t ranscendent bu t immanent to those individua ls. But while Aristo telian
philo sophy is indeed no n-essent ialist it is still co mpletely typological ,
th at is, co nce rned with d efining th e cr ite r ia which group individuals
into species , and species into ge ne ra. 58
For th e purpose o f discu ssing th e co nst raints guid ing Deleu zc ' s
co nst r uctive project, on e histori cal exam ple of t ypo logical thinki ng is
particularl y useful. This is th e classificatory pra cti ces which w ere
co m mo n in Euro pe in th e seventeent h and eighteen th ce ntu ries , such
as th ose that led to th e botani cal taxonomies of Linn aeus. Simplifying
so me what , we ma y say t hat th ese classificat ion s to ok as a po int o f
departure percei ved resemblances am on g fully formed indi vid uals, fol-
lowed by precise co mpa risons aimed at an exhaustive listing 01 what
differed and what stayed t he same amo ng th ose indi vidual s. This
amounte d to a tran slation of th eir visible features int o a lingui st ic
re presentation , a tab ulatio n o f d ifferences and identities whi ch allowed
th e assign ment o f ind ivid uals to an exact place in an o rde re d table .
Judgm en ts o f analoBl between th e classes include d in th e tabl e we re
used to ge ne rate higher-order classes , and rel at ions o f opposition were
41
 t 1.11111 hnll lt 1\\ 1'. II 11111. 11.1" . III \11 ,1.1 dilltollllllli 0 1 111111" ,'1.1bor
.llt' hit'r.ln !Iii' 01 t )" ' :0; , I ill' n " ultll1g IHCllllgh .1I 1.1 . ClIIOlllil's wvrc
SlIj>j>IISt'll lo n 'co n, lrucl ,1 nat ur.rl ordor- \\hi,'h \\ .l"' j lUd l1t1d ( On t m lw lH,
rcganll,'ss o f th e I:l et that historical ac'c-k lcn ts m.rv h.Wt' b ro ken that
co ntinuity . In o the r words, given the fixity of tilt.' ':io)og kal typ es, time
itself did not play a co nstr uc tive role in the ge ne ration of typ es, as it
would later o n in Darwin 's theory of th e evolution of species, ~q
Dclcu ze tak es th e four el ements which inform these classificat ory
practices, resemblance, identity, ano lo8)' and oppositio n (o r co ntrad ict io;)
as th e four catego ries to be avoid ed in thinking about th e virtual.
Dclcuze, of co urse, would not den y that th ere arc o bjects in th e world
whi ch resemble o ne another, or th at th ere arc entities wh ich manage
to maintain th eir identity through tim e , It is ju st that resemblan ces and
identities must be treated as mere results of deeper physical processes,
and not as fundamental cat egories on wh ich to base an onto logy ,60
Similarl y, Dcleuze would not den y th e valid ity of making judgments of
analogy o r of establishing relations of o ppos ition, but he demands that
we give an account of that whi ch allows making such judgments or
establishing those relations. And thi s account is not to be a story about
us , about catego ries inh erent in our minds or co nventions inh erent in
our socie ties , but a story about the world, that is, about the objectiv e
individuation processes which yie ld analogous groupings and opposed
properties. Let me illustrate this important po int.
I said before that a plant or animal species may he viewed as defined
not hy an essence hut by the process whi ch prod uced it. I characterize
the process of speciation in more detail in the next chapter where I also
d iscuss in what sen se a species may be said to be on individual, differing
from organisms only in spatia-t emporal scale, The individuation of
speci es co nsists basically of 1\\'0 se parate operations: a so rt ing operation
performed by natural select io n, and a conso lida tio n operation per-
formed by reproductive isolation, th at is, by th e clos ing of the gene
pool of a spe cies to exte rnal ge ne tic influen ces, If selection pressures
happen to be uniform in space and co nsta nt in tim e, we will tend to
find m ore resemblance among th e members of a population than if
th ose select ion forces ar e weak o r changi ng . Similarl y, th e de gree to
whi ch a species possesses a clear-cut identity will depend o n th e degree
to wh ich a part icular reproductiv e co m m unity is effecti vely isolated.
M ,1I1\ 1'1.1111 I II I U , 101 I .l1 l1l'll. II LUll till II I II' ,It 11\ to In,hlld"l
1I1111llgl. out 11\('11 11\ (tllntl. .lIl " tclIdh 1ll.11t1 1.11 \\ltll olllt'l
(,Ill'
p l,lll t ' 1H'('j, ·:"i) .111.1 IWII( t ' It- I h-.u ,Ill 1('lwth Ukll l lt )' th.m
pU 'I 'U" " ,I
1',.rI,'( II)' I"t'protlm th ,') i,ol.lh' d .iniru.•ls. III ~IlCl r.t , 1I,It" d.~g n:, ' 0 1
Tt'\I' mh l.mn' atu l id" ntit)' lh'pt'ml, o n ('(lnti ngt'n t Ill,t orll':,1 dd .lll, Cll
tht' pron'ss o f ind ivid ua t ion, .u HI is tlt,'n -fo n ' not 10 be taken lo r
g r,m h' d . For the same n ·.lSOI\ , rt.'st.· mhlann· and idt.·TlIity sho uld ~10 1 ,1)(
used .1S fund amental co nce pts in an ontology, hut o nly as ( h ' r1\'.l tl\('
not ions,
In add ition to sho wing , case b)' case, how similar it}' and idt.·ntil)' .1ft ',
("(Hl tingcnt on th e det ails of an individuation process, th e rejection 01
static categories and esse nces mu st he e xte nde d to all natu ral kmds , not
just bio log ical o nes . W e mu st sho w, also case b)' case , how terms
wh ich purport to refer to natural catego ries in fact refer to hisIOr;ct11lj
cOnSlilUled individuals. In a way terms like 'h uman' arc th e easiest to
de.essentialize give n th at Darwin long ago gave us th e m ean s to think
abo ut species as historical entities , But what of terms like 'gold' wl\t.'n~
th e esse ntialist account seems more plausible ? After all, an samples 01
go ld must have ce rtain atom ic properties (such as having ~ specific
ato mic number) whi ch , it can be plau sibly argu ed , co nst u utc lIw
esse nce of gold. Part of th e answer is that all atoms, not onl y go ld
atoms, need to be individuated in processes occurring within sta rs
(nucleosy nthesis) , and that we can use th ese processes to specify what
go ld is instead of, say, giving its ato m ic number."! But amon'
co mpelling reason to re ject essentialism here wo uld be to deny that a
given sample 'of gold large eno ugh to be held in on e's hand can be
co nside re d a mere sum of its atoms, hence reducible to Its atorrnc
properties. . .,
In particular, much as between individual ce lls and th e individual
o rganisms which the)' compose th ere are se veral intermediate st ruc-
ture s bridging th e two scales (tissues , organs, organ ~ystems) ~o
between individual atoms of go ld and an individual bulk pIece of so lid
mat erial th ere ar e intermedi ately scaled str uct ures that bridge th e
micro and macro scales : individual at oms form crystals; individual
crystals form small grains; individual small grains form lar ger g rains ,
and so o n. Both crystals and gra ins of d ifferent sizes ar e individuated
follo wing specific cau sal pro cesses, and the properties of an individual
H
 hulk ',11111'1 ( 'l1h" I' lrOIll 1111 ' ("II .r] IIJIl r t llllll
iuu-rnu-di.m - ,,(rllt(lI n · . 'Llu-r r- .ln~ '1If111 proper lit '
h,ning a spt.Tilic melting po int , I()r vx.unpk-, \\ hid . hy dC 'hnition do
not bel on g to individual go ld ato ms sino- single atoms do no t me lt .
Alth ough individual gold crysta ls rna) be said to melt . in rca litv it
takes a population o f crys ta ls with a minimum critica l size (a so .cal led
'rnicroclu ster ") for th e melting point o f the bulk sam ple to eme rge .
Moreover, th e prop erties of a bulk samp le do not emerge all at o nce
at a given cr itical scale but appear on e at a time at different scales.v!
In concl usio n, avoiding essentialist and typo logica l thinking in all
realms of rea lity arc basic requirements in the co nst r uctio n of a
Dc lcuaian ontology. But besides these negative constraints th ere must be
some positiv e resources which w e can use in thi s construction . I will
develop th ese resources in the following chapter from a more detailed
analysis of th e intensive processes of individuation which actualize
virtual multiplicitics. The virtual, in a sense . leaves behind traces of
itself in th e int en sive processes it animates, and th e phil osopher' s task
may be seen as that of a detective wh o foll ows th ese tracks or co n nects
th ese clu es and in th e proccss, cre ates a reservoir o f co nce p t ual
resources to be used in co m pleting th e project whi ch thi s chapte r has
only started . This project ne ed s to include , besides d efining multiplici-
ties as [ did above, a d escription of how a population of multiplicities
can form a virtual continuum. that is, it needs to include a th eory of
virtual space. Similarly, if the term 'virtual multiplicity' is not to be
just a new label for o ld time less ess ences , th is project m ust include a
th eory of virtual time, and specify th e relations which thi s non-actual
temporality has with actual history . Finally, th e relationship between
virtuality and th e laws if' phy sics need s to be discu ssed, ideall y in such a
way th at ge ne ral law s are replaced by univ ersal multiplicities whil e
preserving th e o bjec tive con te nt of physical knowledge . Getting rid o f
law s, as w ell as o f esse nces and reificd ca tegories, can th en justif)' th e
introduction o f th e virtual as a no vel dimen sion o f realit y. In ot he r
words. while introducing virtuality may see m like an intlati cnarv
ontological move, apparently burd~ning a reali st phil o sophy with a
co m plete new set of entities , wh en see n as a replacement for law s and
essences it actually becomes d eflationary, leading to an ultimately
leaner ontology . ' process which yields as its final product indi vidual organi sm s , A more
Itd\\( I 11 till" (
II! '0ld, 'llth.H
C I I,\ I''[' [,I{ 2
The Actualization if the Virtual in Space
T he picture o f a relativel y undifferentiated and co nt inuo us topol ogical
space undergoing di scontinuous transitions and progr essively acquiring
detail until it conde nse s into the m easurable and di visibl e metric space
which we inh abit , is a powerfu l metaphor for th e cos m ic genesis of
spatial structure. I attempted before to remove some of its metaphorical
co nte nt by co mparing the rel ation between topo logi cal and metric
spaces to that between Int ensive and extensive properties: the latt er ar c
d ivisibl e in a simple wa y, like lengths or volumes are, whil e th e former,
exe m plified by properties like temperature or pressure , arc co ntinuo us
and relativel y indivisible . T he cascade o f sym met ry -bre aking even ts
which progressively differentiates a topological space wa s, in tum ,
co m pa re d to pha se transition s occu rr ing at critical values o f inten sit y. I
gave an e xample from co nte m po rary physics wh ere such a sce nario is
becoming literally true but th e fact is th at. as a d escription o f th e
ge nes is of space, thi s picture remains just that, a picture.
It is time now to givc a less metaphorical account of how the
intensive can engender th e extensive , or more exactly, how processes
of individuation characterized by intensive properties can yield as their
final product individuals with spe cific spatial structures . In the first part
of thi s chapte r I will discu ss two different asp ects of th e int en sive ,
eac h illu strated 'w it h a spe cific ind ivid uation process. First I will
describe th e process whi ch individuates biological spe cies and from thi s
d escription I will ext ract tw o of th e main co nce pts whi ch characterize
int en sive thin king: populations and rates if' chanae. I will also show how
these co nce pts can be used to repl ace the two main feat ures o f
esse ntialist thinking: fixed cypes and ideal norms. Then I will move on to
o ur second task, a discu ssion of how th e e xte ns ive o r met ric features
o f individuals em erge from processes whi ch are, at least in an
approximate sense, nonmetric or topological, using as illustrat ion th e
45
 1I1.II I\chlll lllltl "11\\111 1 1" l l t ,lIldll lfJllI III ,
tld .u lt,c1 d" l.lJli 11111 0 1 t' II1 I"\1I11 11I I \\111111 \01\1 II.. til I tlt'p.UIlIlI l 'l l fl r h ,t1 ul t " ,HI

th.t! II 1' 1011111 I .111' dd llH"c1 ntl C tilt' mo ; 0 11\ ion Wh ' 1 1I' 1 1l~ dl lli I t "" t ' III I.Ilc · ' IMlI" II)', .• "'WI. il.'"
from o u r gt'o !Ut' lric Illd.lph o r gl\'"!l
olg ,lII i'm is h." ., muc h I.,rgl·r r' " '11" 0 11 lh,1Il all orgoll1i' l1I sinn' it is t)'picall y
on9 ' h)' e:U cm lC leJ but also b) qualma . In olhl 'l \\ ol d, .. 111 raphi-
t'011lprist.d of SI'\l' I",1 rt' protitH rive l'OmmulIitil-s inh.lhili llg gt.·og
defined both hy its spatial ar('hih Tture , as \\"(·11 , IS b\' tilt' di
ffere nt
("III )" st'paralt.·d t't.'ospl t'llls. Temp orally, a speci es also o
perates at
'('u;n' its spl'cific
materials {hone, muscle ) wh ich gin ' thai archih than the
much largt.·r scales, its a\"cragl' life span heing much greate r
mechanical qu alities. The intensive will then Iw revea led to ht.~
behind
ruc te d
lih-cvc lcs o f organisms. But the fact that specie s arc co nst
both th e e xte nsive and the qualitat ive.
f all, thro~lgh a historical process suggests that they are, in fact , just ano ther
Let 's begin with th e process o f individ uation of species . First o scales
here ? For centuri es individ ual entity, one wh ich o perates at larger spatia- tempo ral
in what sense can w e speak of 'individuation' ph-
kind. th an organis ms , but an individ ua l ent ity neverth eless. One philoso
biologi cal species were o ne of the main exam ples o f a natural sized :
defined by a transec ndent ical co nseque ncc o f this new co nce ption o f species must be empha
Wheth er on e th ought of natural kind s as and
as did w hile an onto logy based on relation s between genera l types
essence , as Plato did, or by an imman ent (natural state' a ~li fTercnt
what an particular instanc es is hierarchical, each level representing
Ari stotle, an imal and plant species provided th e exe mplar o f t erms
onto logical category (o rganism , species , genera ), an approach III
abstract aeneral entity was suppos ed to be . I Charles Darwin o f co urse , o ne
broke with this tradition by sho wing that species , far from
bein~ o f interacting parts and c mergcnt whol es lead s to a fiat ontoloBY
spatio-
and die made exc lusively of unique, singular individuals, diffcrin g in
eternal archetypes, are born at a particular historical time e ot he r hand, the
species tempor al scale but not in ontological stat us ! On th
through extinct ion in an equally historical way, but th e idea that whi ch
rsially) new appro ach d emand s th at w e always spe cify a process through
ar~ individuals, not kinds, has only recentl y (and still co ntro ve ontolog y is charact e r-
the new view on speci es go es a wh ole emergc s , a process which in a Del euzian
gain ed ground . Mu ch o f th e cre d it for intensiv e ,
decad es ized as intensive . The process of speciat ion may he said to he
to th e biologi st Michael Ghi selin who has be en arguing for ideas o f population
n first of all, because its description involv es the hasic
that a species , formed th rough th e double process o f natural selectio a mode
oloqical and heteroBeneity, tw o fundamental co ncepts which charact erize
and reproductive isolation, do es not represent a hiBher om . What makes thi s
th e o f biologi cal ex planatio n known as population thinking
calegory than th e individ ual organism s that co mpose it. 2 Unlike t is
is o ne of for m of thinking differen t fro m esse ntialist and typological though
relation between a natural kind and its membe rs, which s o f the mod ern
to expressed in a famous quot e by one of the creator
~x e,~plifi cation or instantiation, the relation of individual species
as the relation synthesis o f evolution and ge netics , Ernst Mayr:
individual organisms is o ne o f whole and parts, much
More-
between an organism and the individual cells that compose it. -
and a gcneral [For th e typol ogist th ere] are a limited numbe r o f fixed , un change
over , unlike the relation between a particular instance th e
s from able ' ide as' underlying th e obser ved variability lin nature], with
type, the relation of parts to whol e is ca usal: the wh ole emerge th e
A new species , eidos (ide a) bein g th e onl y thing th at is fixed and real , whil e
the ,causal interaction s betwee n the compo nent parts. J
than th e shadow s of an
species observe d variabil ity has no more reality
for Instanc e , may be said to be born wh en a portion o f an o ld stresses
isolatio n is a object on a cave wall . . . [In co ntrast}, the populationist
become s unable to mate with the rest . This reprodu ctive
and th e uniquen ess o f everyth ing in th e orga nic world .. . All org anisms
causal relation between the memb ers of tw o sub-populati ons, be
through time . and organic phenom ena arc co mposed o f unique feature s and can
morc~" er, it is a relation wh ich must be maintained r any
barriers d escribe d co llectivel y onl y in sta tist ical terms. Individuals, o
Anythi ng that breache s th e ge ne tic, mechan ical o r geograp hical deter-
netic identity kind o f organic entities , form population s of which we can
mamtaining this isolation will co mprom ise the endurin g gc
es
o f a species . mine the arithme tic mean and the statistics o f variatio n. Averag

47
 .111 ' 1111 H,I, t •III I ua I .1111
I IltOIl. nllh fhl 111(11\1.111 .t 1 III \\huh till t 1I.1I .1t 11'11 Iii till 1I1l' 1\.. 0 '011111111111111 I I \, II ,!lIlU ,11 lilt" .111 till till

PClP
I U l.l tl ClIII ~ . .m - t OlllpO""t ·«! h. l\ I' r.·,,111 \ .
I
Ulllll.ll(I IU
tll'h IthlCHI'i 0 1'
.mu- 'IH't It' . l-o t t' .lIlI pll. ell l" ndlll' 0 11 tilt I .lll· 01 .1\.111.lhihl) 0 1 .1
t )(' popu anun th in ker .md Iht" t\
Fo I . ' I . " po Iogl\l .m- pnT"t·l,.
. 11..· 0ppo...iu-. IMrtitul.lr n '''Ollllt' (..unh ght . 11I1' r-: .lIu ph' , or .1 lMrtinlbr nutr-ie-nt] tilt.'
'II r , I ll I),",o ogl st the I)'PC (ddos) is n-al J. ut! tht" varia tion .111 rates of grow th of the org,lni..ms in t ht' t wo n )lnl1lllnitit's may in:
I usron
. ', W lilt· for th {e popu Iauon
" rst, th e typt.' (tlw an ' rage ) is an <Ii1lt'n'nt , with o ne co nsis ting of sll1.llll'r o rga nisms than th e o the r. In
a lsst racuon and o nly" th c vanation
. . I. S real . No tw o W J ) 'S o f loo king this case, rln-n - wo uld be no point in saying th at o ne co mm unit)'
at nature co uld be more different. " f('p rcsl'nts th e no rma l, ideal, fixed phen otype, o r th at it ap prox ima tes
it to a gn'ate r d egree of perfect io n . Since the phen ot ypes are flexible
When one views species as natu ral kinds wh ose memb ers share within ce rtain lim its, all realiza tio ns o f the ge noty pe arc normal w it hin
t h o mon l se t o f IIden tica
com ' I properties, th e inevitabl e variatio n ' betweena th ose limits." T he conc ept o f no rm o f reaction repl aces th e idea o f
"" of a decrees of peifection wi th th at of relations between rates of chanae (in ou r
P
o~n7 e7 cdlass canno t be hut an accid ent of history. Fro m th e
d f o fi
VI C'\' 0 f ctc rm ining th c co mm on set o f pr op erties which ex am ple , rat es o f nutrient availability coupled to rat es of grow th) .
Fe nes a I ~ed ar,ch ct ype, thi s vari ation is ind eed quit e unim~ortant Dcleuze cred its Darwinism with thi s d ouble blow to esse ntialism .
o r popu atio n thmkers on th e o th h I ' , ' challenging static classificati on s and th e mod e of th inking th ey im ply
that is C' f b " . er anc , vanauon , genetic variatio n
I Jar rom cmg ummp rta ' h f I w ith a d ynami c form of th ought w hich is at once populational ond
adaptive d 'ffi 1 0 nt IS t e ue o f evo lution: wit ho ut
. bl I cr.c nc~s >et ween organisms nat u ral selectio n ,...ould be d1!e renl ial . As he 'w ri tes:
mcapa e of yielding an)' Improve
' ments in th e population let I
aIIow no vel for r t ' a one First . .. th e form s do not pr eex ist th e populati on, th ey are more
h , ' : s 0 emerge. Put differen tly, for population th inkers
eteroa~nell)' IS t estate w e should expect to exist spontaneousl und er like sta tistical re sults. The more a pop ulation assu mes di vergen t
:~yst :1T~umstahncesb' while bomopeneny is a high I)' unli kely stat: whi ch fo rm s, the more its multi plicit y d ivides int o multipli citi es o f a
e ro ug t a o ut only under ve 'fi I . di fferent nature . . . the mo re efficie ntly it distri butes it sel f in th e
abno rm II . 'C' ry speCl c se ect ron pressures
unuo rrn 111 space an l ti ~ 6 M
'
mi lieu , o r divides up th e m ilieu , ' . Seco nd. sim ult aneo usly and
a }
t hinks o f th " , rr ttm e , o reover, whil e th e typologist'
e genesIs o f form 111 terms o f the e xp ressio n o f sin Ie t under th e same cond itions . . . d egrees are no lon ger measured in
for1 the populationist th e forms' of o rga msm' s aIways evo lve wypes ithi , a terms o f increasing perfecti on . . . but in t erms o f differential
co Iecttviu es (re p ro d uc tive co m m unities. ,.<cor exam p Ie ) as se I
1"I mI relation s and co efficie nt s such as sel ection pressure, catalyt ic act ion,
acIvantageou s traits with differc t ., . ec i vc y speed of propagation, rate of growt h, evo lutio n , mutation . ..
population . n o ngms propagate through th e
Darw inism ' s two fundam ental co n tr ibutions move in th e direction
essPOtp ullatio n thh inking el iminat es one of the t wo und esirable aspects o f o f a scie nce of multiplicities: the substitution of popul at ions J or types,
8
id en' ra Ismf , t c ex iste nce 0 f pre -exlst' mg
, arche types defin ing th e and the substitu tion of rates OT differential relat ionsJOT dCBrees.
I entit ,y 0 speciees, Th e ot her aspect the role which
I , id I ' sue h arc hety'pes
p a) as I ea norms which their instantiatio ns a ' I said before th at between org anism s and the cells that ar e th ei r
:~ss perfect deg ree, is elim ina te d by ano t he r k:;:::~:;::;~:r:7~:;~ wo r king pa rts th ere arc int ermediatel y scaled indiv id ual st ru ct ures,
e norm if reaction . To illu st rat e t his co nce pt let 's " . such as ti ssues or o rgans, Simi larly, be t w een th ese o rganism s and the
diff ducti Imagll1e tv..-o
species th ey co mpose th ere are halfway individ uals called demes:
. h erent
bi , reproli ucuve co m m unit ies be Io ngmg· to th e same spec ies but
III a ltm g ( iflcrcn t ecosystem s T h [ react i n refers to th e fact co nc re te reproductive co m munities inhabiti ng a given eco system ." T he
that there j h . c norm 0 react io
b dil ere ' IS enoh ug " flexibility' in th e. co n nect ion
' between ge ne s an d intensive prop erties of t hese d emes , such as how den sel y th ei r
o I y t ra its t at diff eren ces in the en vironment
. can yield diffe rent com po ne nt o rg anisms are packed in th eir habitat , arc characteri zed hy

49
 I" I' I ' II ,I. • I II ' •
1111 " ,,1," ,,1"1,1 111 111 "
Ill' , \ 1..' ) I. '"
"I • h,lIl
I ,ll. till • I ' I III I.. th, I lit " I " " I Ih 0 1
111111" ,

11\1" 1111111'1\1 ' 111.\1111". ,tll"II·, tll.,1

II' II

11 1....
" I

1 I
I

tIl,' d"IlIl ' , w hu h I I" h., .II 1111 ' U I hi'll 110111 till ' Il n Ih I,ll.' or
ind ivid ual Ol"g,lIliSlllS I just nu-m iom-d. I h., r.II., 01 IIII\\th or .111
ind ividu al , dcmc depend s on thl' hir th, death ,lI1d llligr,lI ion rat's
prevalen t In the co mm unity, as wel l as o n the rate or • vailabi lit\' or
res~urces (so me times referred to as the carry ing apa ity ot
environ ment.) A demc so defined is, ind cd , a dynam ical system, and
as such may exhibit endogeno usly ge nerate d sta ble state (attractors)
a~ well as abrupt transiti on s between stable sta tes (bifurcations), In
s llT~p le m~del s, for instance , th e system co nsist ing of a deme co upled
t~ Its e nviro nme nt ex hibits an unstabl e ste ady state (o ne with popula-
n on at zero numbers, m eaning extinc tion) as well as a sta ble ste ady
state wh ere populati on numbers match th e carry ing capacity .!" More
co mplex attract ors, such as stable cycles , app ear th e moment we add
nonli~ earities to th e mod el. T his may be don e , for exa mple, by makin g
th e birth -rate term more realisti c to reflect th e fact that there ar e
always nonlinear delays between th e moment of birth and th e moment
of sex ual maturity, When th e growth dynamics of a dem e are gove rned
by a periodi c attract or, th e numbers characte rizing its population will
tend not to a fixed stable value but will oscillat e between values , II
This sim ple exam ple is m eant only as an illustration of th e sense in
wh ich a dynamical process occurring in populations and defined by
co upled rates of change ma y be said to be inten sive , How is such an
inte~si ve process rela te d to th e vir tual multipliciti es I discu ssed in the
pr evIOus chapte r? As I said, multiplicities consist of a str ucture defined
by differential rel ati on s and by th e sing ularities whi ch characte rize its
unfolding levels , These two el em ents of the virtual find their co unter-
part in th i~ten,s ~ve , Th e co upled rat es of birth, death , migration and
resource availability co rres po nd with out resemblan ce to th e differential
rcl~ti ons that charac te r ize a multiplicit y. The co llec tive ly sta ble sta tes
aV~'labl e to po~ula~i on s (ste ady-s tate or periodic, in my exam ple)
c.OI resp ~nd , agam WIthout any sim ilar ity, to a distribution of sing ulari-
~I es , ~h,s correspo~dence, in turn , is ex plained by th e fact th at a given
mte~sl,ve ~rocess of individuation em bo dies a multiplicit y , and th e lack
of sl m tl~rtty b tween th e virt ual and th e int en sive is ex plaine d in terms
of th e dl ~ergent characte r of thi s embo d ime nt, that is, by th e fact that
seve ra l different processes may em body th e same multipli city, 12 Finally,
I
, " 1\ , II" IIld. 11 111
I \.,. :' "' I ,I I I., " . I
.11, tll,tl .11 1' tI\I"l l 1111,11 pilltllli I. '" Ill ' ,'Il l I " I
11 ' tilt. II d,'lIl\l'd III
11.11111,11 n'pl.ll '\'IIIl 'lIt ~1\"11 Ih,11 • lit 1'\ . 1., •
u -r ms or .'ss.'nn's,
Thl'S!' wou ld hc , in .1 nutslll'II, till Ih 1"1'1 , nntol o ,jc.11 dillll'lI sion s
its which onstit ute th« I i-lcuzian world: thl' vi rt ual , the intcnsi vv and
Ihl' actual. r to phrase this in te rm ' of thl' m 'tapho r th at 01' .ncd thi s
-haptcr (and n >glecting for a mo ment the t ' mporal dim -n 'io n) the
indivi duals popul at ing th e act ual wo rld would be like th e discontinuou s
spatial or metric structures which condense out of a nonrn tric , virt u. I
co ntinuum. These m etric indi viduals would ex ist at different spatial
scales, since populat ion s at one scale ma y form larger emergent
ind ivid uals at another scale, but alt ogether (fro m th e sm alle r indi vidu al
particles to th e largest cos m ic indi viduals) th ey would co nstitute tho
familiar, measurabl e and divisible space of th e actual world. At thi s
poi nt, how ever , we mu st make o ur first departure from th e geometr ic
met apho r : actual indi viduals differ fr,om eac h othe r not o nly in th eir
extensity (spatial struc t ure and scale) but also in th eir qualities. A
species, for ex am ple, possesses both an exte nsive aspect defining its
distribution in space (its division into seve ral reproductiv e com munities
inhabiting d istinct ecosyste ms) as we ll as a qu alitative aspect defined by
populati on-Ierel qualit ies, distinct from th ose of individual org anisms,
such as playing a particular role in a food chain or having a particular
repro duc tive strat egy , 13 This means that inten sive individuatio n pro-
cesses must be described in such a way th at th e or igin of both
ex te nsities and qualities is accowlte d for .
T o illu strate thi s important point I would like to move to a different
level of scale, do wn from species to organisms, and discu ss two
examples of inten sive pr ocesses in em bryogenesis, one related to th e
pr oduction of ex tensities, th e othe r to th e pr oducti on of qu aliti es. .or
more speci fically, I would like t o discu ss two different em bryolog Ical
processes, one behind th e spatial structu ratio n of org anisms throu gh
cellular migration , folding and in vagin ation , and th e othe r behind th e
qualitatil'e dlj]'erentiation of neu tral ce lls into fully specialized muscle,
bon e, blood , nerve and othe r ce ll t vpes. !" Met aph oricall y, an egg m ay
be co m pa red to a top ological space which und ergoes a progressive

5"0
 IMII 'II .1lul'plollll,III\1 111111'1111... 11011 III lillI/ill! ' ,h. 11111,,, p,U.'
n 'pn '''c-Il11 'c1 h) .1 111 11) IUIIII.·d o lg.lI ll'1 l1 l . 11\11 In \ \ h,11 l ' II'~I' 1,111 "ggs
and org.lllism s hI' ,'i.l id to Ionu ,"p.ln·,..? A'i I s" id ill tilt' pn'\'iOliSI h.ipn-r- ,
dll' d istinction betwee- n me-t r- ic ,lII d uotu m-t rh- sp.ln-s hoi!, d o w n to till'
~V.l)' in whi ch neigh bo urh oo ds (o r the linkagl's bet wee n thl' po ints th ai
form a space) are defincd~ eithe r throu gh exact Il·ngth s o r through
non -ex act topological relations o f proximit y. In thi s sense , the fc rtil izt.d
egg . defined mostly hy chem ical g rad ients and polar ities, as well as th e
early em hryo defined hy neighbo urhoods with fuzzy bo rd ers and ill-
defined qualities, may ind eed be view ed as a topol~gical space wh ich
acquires a rigid I)' m etric anato mical SlTuct ure as tissues, o rgans and organ
s),stems beco me progressively better defined and relatively fixed in
form .
, Let' s begin with the creatio n of distinct spatial structures, sta rti ng
with th e aggrega tio n of individual cells int o d ifTerent neighbourh ood s
o r co llect ives via a vari et ), of adhesion processes, Th ese neighbo urhoods
do not have a well -d efined metric structure . Within an)' on e neigh -
bourhood, th e exact location of a cell is immat erial as long as th ere ar e
sufficiently man y cells with a shared history locat ed nearby. Simil arl y.
th e exact number of neighh ours is not impo rtant and , at any rat e. it is
alway s subje ct to statistic al fluctuations, What is important arc th e
local, adhesive interacti ons between ce lls (o r between cells and th eir
ext ra-cellular matri x during migration ) . int eract ion s which are t),pically
both nonlinear (sma ll change s may lead to large co nseq uences) and
statistical. " As the biolo gist Gerald Edelman has sho wn . the se local
int eracti on s yie ld tw o stable sta tes for co llectives: ce lls may be tightly
linked to each other by adhesion molecul es int o sheets (called epithelia)
or be loosely associ ated via minimal int eract ion s int o migratory groups
(referred to as mesen chym e) . Th ese two stab le states arc r elated to
each other by a tran sformation wh ich closely resembl es a phase
transition . and wh ich lead s to two different types o f cellular m o tion :
migrati on and fold ing . '.
While ce llular migrations mo ve entire co llectives into new places,
where they can inte ract with differen t co llecti,·es. ce llular fo lding and
m\"agmatJOn cre ate a large \"ar iet y of three -d im ensional struc t ures
which co nstit ute th e external and int ernal spatial boundaries of an
organism , Ju st wh ere a co llective migrates and what extensive struc-
,2
IIl1t ,,01 hllltitl \\alll" !tlllJltd I d.ltlfllill 01 1111'11 II Illhlll\1
1l , 1.111t11l ~ : not o llh th l' I ,lit ' 01 \ fill•. I 11111 tit ',.ul,IIIlJll 01 Ih.
ditkl'l' nt .1(111"',;&011 ' 1Il Il II ' l ll l l " (., 111.1111 11'1 111 .111\1 1IIIIIIht ' I III ' lit II
1
11101,'1 uh -s, \\lak h in (urn IIl l ·el i,llI · tllC' pll.l. u au 111011 ht'l\\('I'n th l'
t \\ () st.lhll' sta te-s}, hut .llso th., birth .mtl d",llll 1'.1(( " of n ,lI" \\ it hi n .1
('olln'tin' , I? Tlu-rc is 11 0 de-tailed gl'Tll'tic cnuu-ol of till" l'x ., d n umbe-r
of n·1I d ivision s, o r of the exact number uf n· 1I deat hs. but ra tlu-r .1
non linea r feed bac k rela tion between birth and death rat es and till'
processes of m igratio n and fo lding : these pr ocesses an: affected hy till"
rate at w hich new cel ls are born and die and, vice versa, th e rat es .m-
stro ngl)" place-d ep en den t and hen ce affected hy m ig rato ry and foldi ng
mo tions . III
T he intensive (po pulatio nal and differential) aspl~cts of th is proCl' ss
rna)' be said to be nonmetric in th e following sense. Dcl eu zc ofte n
spea ks of th e cnexccr yec riaorous sty le of tho ught whi ch may I,,·
neccssar )' when ever we need to think abo ut non metric e nt it ics .!" A
go od example would be th e way Edelman approa ches his ce ll co lk-c-
tives, where th e exact number of members or th eir exact position is
immate r ial. Thi s attitude to wards quant itath'e exactitude is not a sign
that biologists. unli ke ph ysicists, are less careful n r disciplined . It
indic ates, on th e co ntrary ~ th e presen ce of a more so phisticat ed
topo logical style of th ought. T o qu ote an other bio logist wh ose work
will be discu ssed in th e foll owing chapte r , Arth ur Wi nfree :
T he scie nce s of life have never been admi red for quantitati ve
exactitude . . _ But it can not be said that living things are at heart
slo ppy , fuzz)', ine xact , and unscientific. Ho w docs an ocean ic salmon
find its way home to spawn o n th e ver)" rivulet it left in O rego n
three years earlier? How is a meter-long seq ue nce of billi ons of
nucl eotide base-pa irs reversibl y co iled without entang lement int o a
nu cleu s no more th an a few tho usand base -pairs in d iam eter ? _ , .
Such miracles bespeak of reproducibl e precision . But that preci sion
is not th e kind we kn ow how to write eq uations about, no t th e
kind we can measure to eig ht deci mal places, It is a more flexibl e
exactit ude whi ch evades qu ant ifying. like the e xact it ude of a ce ll's
plasm a m embrane dividin g the un iverse into an inside and an outside
with not even a viru s-sized hole lost so me where in all th at
 d I IMII I Illpe do 'It .• 1 t
'1111\ I ,lUll .11 Ililldl , 11I1111/(((11I "t I/ Uelll ' II, , "
Jntlt/\ of .. lr.rp fon c , ,mel 11I111' , 'q
Thus, then- is J wcll-rh-Ii ncd St·nSt· in whk -h the SIJ.lli.1 1 rvl.uio us
characte rizing an egg or the still devel oping pJrts o f an em bryo arc,
indeed, anex act yet rigorous, As migration and fo lding hegin lo yield
finished anatom ical structures, however, these non mel ri c relation s
becom e progressively replaced by a less flexib le set of metric on es .
The finished product is a spatial st r uct ure adap ted to specific fun cti ons.
Like a building or a bridge , for example , an animal mu st he able to
act under gravit)· as a load-bearing structu re. On the o ther hand, the
spatial architecture of an organi sm is not th e only factor that deter-
min es its capacity to bear load s, th e qualities o f th e mat erials making
up that archit ecture also matter: th e q ualities of muscle that allow it
to bear loads in te nsion , for instance, or the qualities of bon e that
allow it to bear them in com pression. The intensive processes that
create these materials are anoth er example o f a process of progre ssive
differentiation, one which starts with a population o f relativel y undif-
ferentiated cell s and yields a st ruc t ure chara ct erized by qualitatively
distinct cell types.
When ce lls begin th eir em bryological d evel opment th ey arc pluripo-
tent, that is, th ey are capable of becoming any of th e dilTerent typ es of
ce lls whi ch charact erize th e ad ult individual. This number vari es from
two in bacteria, to twenty or thirty for je llyfish, to about 254 for
21
human beings. Co ntact between different cells (or between dilTerent
cellular co llect ives) leads to th e important ph enomenon of induction.
This term refers to a co mplex process in which co llectives exc hange
che m ical sign als whi ch lead to th e en hance ment or suppressio n o f
cel lular dilTerentiati on . However, as th e biol ogist Stuart KaulTman has
sho wn, these inductive signals act as non-specific sti mula (o r perturba-
tions) whi ch switch a cell am ong a variety of int ernally available stable
states. The basic idea in KaulTman' s model is that th e regulatory gen es
wit hin a cell form a complex network in which ge nes, interacting via
their products, can turn on e anoth er on or ofT. Kauffman has found
that there are ce rtain recurrent patterns of ge ne activit)' within these
networks, patterns w hich exhibit th e kin d o f homeostatic stability
I 4" .1 tlll.ll,d \\111. .1 II r .u l or III1 Itl I.d 111111 tu 1..11,\1 tllll . IIl lllt ,I ,
, '.H II .l tl l.1l III' 11I.1\ 1)( (1 til 111, I (d 'I) It 1'1 I I III .. I t I \II I ( III t 1·11 I " l"
Kauflm.m' 1111111. ·1 dlh'l1Il't III I'l l .Ih I IIllt IIllh lilt IHII II Ill'I 01
dilh'rl'nl n ·1I I)rH' ill ,I gl\l'11 01 ' ,111 1 m , bUI ilion' lIl1porl.lIlt!) Irum
our poinl of \ h-w, II", num la-r of n ·1I t) p" \\ hi, II .1 particular (( ·11 , '.HI
t.!i rec'lj' «1!D~·r(flrl(J'/.· into. (;i n' n .1 n 'lI \\ uh <I Slh·dfi c hbl o r)', ,lilt! .1
certain inductive sig'l<1 1 which can ('It,lUg" its ratt', llw o utcome o f tlH' ir
int eracti on will d epend Oil how man)' o ther att r-actors exist n/.·urh)' in
the state span~ o f the cell (o r more exac l ly, in the stan - sp,ln ' o f til"
netw ork of ge nes within the cel l) , In o ther words, far from din'cd }
determining the qualities o f a differentiated ce ll, inducti ve signals ad
as trioo ers causing cells to swi tch from one attractor to another Iwarh)'
one, guiding a process o f qualitative differenti ation wh ich follow s
attracto rs as so many stepping-sto nes . This prop erty o f st imulus-
independ ence must be added to the mechanism-ind ependence I discu ssed
before as part of what defines ' th e 'signature ' or the virtual, or put
differ ently, as part o f wh at defin es th e traces whi ch th e virtual lea v..s
in the intensive . But relative auto no my from specific stimula can he
ac hie ved o nly if th e internal dynamics o f a cell (o r co llec tivities o f
cells) arc rich eno ugh in endogeno usly ge ne ra te d stable states, This
co ndition is by no means guarantee d and depends o n ce rtain inten sive
properties o f a network , those defining its connectivity: the number o f
ge nes directl y o r indirectl y influ en ced by each single gen e o r th e
number of steps needed for the influ en ce of o ne gen e to be propagat ed
to other genes . At critical values of co nnectivity a phase transition
occurs leading to the crys tallizatio n of large circuits of genes, each
d ispla ying multiple attract ors. : "
Edelm an's and Kauffman's model s illustrate the sense in which the
int en sive may be said to be behind th e ge nes is o f both th e exte nsive
and the qualitative. Yet, neither o ne is a literal rendering o f a simple
cascade o f broken symmetries. While the ce llular neighbourhoods in
Edel man's model do illustrate how non -rigidly metric spaces ma y he
transformed into fixed spatial struct ures, the connection w ith topo logy
is indirect. This is even more tru e in Kauffman's model wher e th e
co nnection with nonm etri c questions is completel y indirect, mediated
by th e topological invariants (such as co nnect ivity) o f abst rac t spaces
01 I'll.. 111I11I 1c" d l 1111111 J till" .I\M!.,"I. 1111It 1.111 , hlllll t ' .un
qll .•IIIII ' , ..
pit'!'> ..!luuld I ll ' '1 '1'11 Il lli .1\ till I ', hUI .. fl"l'Jlll "'.'I p.lI h IIf
t1 ) IIi WOl ra u u I ('1I1It)
t h e simple sy m l1l\' t r}'- brt'.lk ing C.l"' ''ldt · . It is through "Ill II pin.' 11 1\",11
rc placc nu-n ts that lite ral co ntent m .l)' 1)(· unparu-d to, .lII d nu-t.rphoru-al
co ntent re mo ved from, our guiding imagl' fo r th e ac-t ualiza tion of till'
virtual in space . There is on e more aspe('t o f ,'mhryog"lll'sis from
which we can der-ive further resources to co ntinue this process o f
progressive literalization. It involv es looking at a dC\'eloping cm b rvo as
a process c1 assemblj' of organisms, a process which must yield individuals
with the capacity to em/reo As an illustration o f this point I will co ntrast
two different assembly processes , the process behind the creation o f
industrial produ cts , as it takes place in an assembly-line factory , for
exam p le , and th e process taking pla ce wi t hin and amo ng livin g ce lls
whi ch results in th e asse m bly o f tissues and o rga ns .
The parts o f an o bject put together in an assembly line ar e typi cally
fully Eucl idean, hav ing rigid metric properties such as sizes, shapes and
po siti on s, a fact that limits the kind of p rocedures that ma y be fo llowed
for their assembly. T hese procedures must include a rig id ly channe lled
transport system (using conv eyor belts or pipes to transpo rt raw
materials, and wires to transport energy and informatio n) as we ll as
sequences of rigid motions to co rrectly position the parts relative to
one another. By con trast, the co mpo nent parts used in biologica l
assembly arc d efined less by rigid me tric properties than by thei r
topoloqtcal connect ivity : the specific shape of a cell's membrane is less
important than its con tinuity and closure, and the specific length of a
muscle less impo rtant than its attachment points. This allows co mpo -
nent parts to be not inert but adaptiv e, so that muscle lengths can change
to fit lo nge r bones, and skin can grow and fold adaptivcly to cove r
bo th . It also permits the tra nsport processes not to be rigidly
channe lled, using simple diffusion through a fluid medium to hring th e
differe nt parts together. Components ma y float around and randomly
co llide, using a lock-and -ke y mechanism to find matching patterns
with out the need for exact positioning.
All o f thi s has consequences for th e capacit}' to e vo lve through
mutation and selection which each of these tw o assembl y processes
ma y have . If putting together organi sms followed an assembly-line
pattern, random mutations would have to occ ur simultaneo usly in
1I1,lll11l1I' p.lIt . ll. .l1l11ll .lI l1l p l lI t l . 11I11 III IIl d, t III "II,ld .1 \I .lhll
(111 whu h n.u ur.il ..t ,ll·llltlll ttllllt! (11"1 Itt l l« r u r ut t r-tn c- 01
"lIt h .t I,trgt' number or.. irnu lt.uu -uu 1111111111111 I I (II l tl ll l "I' , .l highl}'
hio logic;\1,ls"<t'lIlllh, 011 1111 otht 'l" 1I.IIH I, mu ta tio ns
iml'roll,lhl,' (' \\'1 11 . III
do n ot h.tn· to h(~ so (:oo rdin.H,·tt .11It I till g n',ldJ e nhanc-es tlu-
possi bilities for evolutionary cx pcrinu-nt.uio u. As till' scien tist Eric
l Irvx le r w rites:
Because ce lls and organisms make widespread usc o f diffusive
transport for energy, informati on and mo lecular parts, the e vo lution
of new processing entities (e nzymes , g lands) is facilitated , A ge netic
change that introdu ces an enzyme with a new function can have
immedi at e favorable effec ts becau se diffu sion automati cally links th e
enzyme to all other enzymes , energy sources and signal mol ecules
in the sam e m embrane com part me nt o f th e cell (and o ften beyond) .
No new chan nels need to be built . .. [and ] no spe cial space need
be set aside for the enzyme, because device placement isn't
ge ometric, Changes in the number o f parts . . . become easy. Ther e
are no stro ng geometric o r transport co nstraints; this ofte n allows
the numbe r of mo lecu lar parts in a ce ll to be a variable, statistical
quantit)" Wi th many copies of a part, a mutation that changes the
instruct io ns for so me co p ies is less likely to be fatal . . . At t he
le vel o f m u ltice llu lar organisms, th e striking adaptab ility of tissues
and organs ensures that basic requirem ents for viability, such as
continuity of skin and vascularization of tissues, co ntinue to be met
despite changes in size and structure . If skin and vascular syste ms
wer e inert parts , they wo uld require com pensating adjustments for
such changes . 25
Thi_s example illustrates another indirect way in which the metric
may be said to emerge from th e nonm et ric . Unlike . a deve loping
embryo , a finished organism has more specialized tubes and channels
and some of its co m po nents lose adaptabilit y and rigidify. T his
"metr-iza rion' is, of co urse, never co mplete , e ven wh en an organism
reaches maturity . But what is very significant is that, at least in the
case o f multi -cellu lar animals, if o rganisms were not individuated in an
intensive enviro nment which is not rigidly metric, their capacity to
n
nol\(' \\0111.1 ht ' 11·. l tI) d 1111111 I Iud Ih.lIlk IUlth lodlliu 1\ 111 .111 pllit .
lock .unl kt') lII.thlllng .1 ('lIIbl) . IlIpldogll .11 .II H I .ld.lpll\l · IMlt • 0 11
one h.md, .1S we-ll as stim ulus indt'p"nd"IH e, 011 tht' utiII'I , cvolut u m
has an opl'n space in which to carry out its hlind ~.;t'.Irdl for 11('\\ I~)rllls,
Put differently, hiological e volutio n can lx- din'rgl'nl Jud It'dd to J
prol iferatio n of no vel ties tha nks to the fact that the elements it uses to
try out new co mbinat ions are neit her rigid l)' connected (to specific
stim ula, to specific channels) nor int olerant to hctl' rugen d ty and
variation .
Let m e sum ma rize what thi s discu ssion of em bryoge nesis has taught
us about th e actualization of th e virtual in space . Inten sive processes
po ssess nonmctric properties in subt le and co mplex ways: som etimes
they in volve th e spatial co ntinuity and indi visibility of pr op erties like
temperature, pressure or den sit y; othe r tim es th e ane xact yet rigorous
way in whi ch ce llular spatia l neighb ourhood s are defined ; so metimes
what is invol ved is nothing specifically spatia l, but rath er that wh ich
remains top ologically invariant in a spatial process: an d other tim es
spec ifically spatial capacit ies arc co nce rned, suc h as th e capability of
adaptive com ponents to fold , stre tc h o r ben d . Simila rly, th e final
product of an inten sive process is no t ju st metric geo me trically
spea king: extensive properties include so me geome tric o nes (like
len gth o r volume) but also seve ral o the rs that have nothing geome tric
about th em , like entr o py o r amount of ene rgy; the n there are
properties whi ch ar e metric, suc h as chan nelled tran sport o r rigidity of
parts, but which ex pand th e co nce pt from structure to function; lastl y,
a finished product is characte rized by qualities, whi ch also result from
int en sit ies but whi ch are metrically indi visible like int en sities. T hus ,
the re lation between th e metric and th e non metric in a process of
indi vid uation is not as sim ple and stra ightforwa rd as the metaphor of a
'topo log ical egg' progressivel y differentiating int o a ' Euclide an organ-
ism ' would suggest . But wh at this co m parison has lost in simplicity it
has, I be lieve, gained in lit eral ade quacy.
Ha" ing clarified th e relations bet ween th e int ensive and the non-
metr ic , in th e ne xt part of thi s chapte r I woul d like to probe more
deepl y into th e nature of inten sities. Altho ugh as I said in Chapter I ,
th e term ' inte nsive property' bel o ngs to th ermod ynam ics, it may be
exte nde d to co ver other ar eas. Indeed, my usc o f th e wo rd ' intensive'
III 1111 tI, ( 1 11'11011 0 1 Ihl 11 111 1\ 1ll1l1l lll 11 II I I' II 111.1 or .111 1 III ' .1
.1111'.1(1\ .111 " h' llI lt- d II .11(' . \tl 11'1 III t I , ~ III till ht 10
1(11011 \\111
1)('( il; till' (fl ll lle'( 11011 ht't\\(" ,u lilt l .lUli ml til 11111 111111 ,md it '('\(' 1., 1
c xu-u sron s , Afh'r thi , l OIH t'ptu,ll ( I.'nla, ,111011' l tl l1lp lt'tt'd I ,\ ill 111o,
o n to di" 'u',, 011(' o f I h,lt-u/t ·' .. 11Il....1 imporLutt Iht" t' s n~ganling till"
inu-nstve. The h,)~i(' idl',) is Ih.ll 0110' .1 prol ('SS iudividuauon is or
cornph-u-d, till' iun-nsivc factors whivh dl·fim·d this procl'ss disJppt',lr
or lx-come hidden underneath th e e xtensive and qualitative prOpt'rlit's
of the final produ ct. Or as Dc lc uzc puts it, ' we know intc usitv o n l), .IS
already de vel oped withi n extensity. and as covere d over by qualities' , 110
Thi s the me of the disguising of pr ocess under product is key to
Dc lcuzc's phil osophy since his philosophical method is, at least in p.ut ,
design ed to ove rcome th e objective illusion fostered hy thi s
co ncea lme nt .
Let 's begi n this discu ssion with the textbook definition of til<"
distinction between the inten sive and the extensive : "T he rmod yuarnic
properties can be divided into two ge ne ral classes, na mely intensive
and exte nsive properti es. If a quantity of matt er in a given sta te is
div ided into two equa l parts, each part will have th e same value of
intensive properti es as the original, and half the value of th e exte nsive
prope rt ies . Pr essure , temperature, and den sity are examples of intens-
ive properti es. Mass and total volume are exa mples of ex te nsive
properties. "?" Although this definition d oes point to a basic d ifferen ce
between inte nsities and ex te nsities, its emphasis o n divi sibility allows
it to eq ually appl y to qualities, such as co lo ur or texture . But as we
just saw, a cr ucial part of Dclcu zc' s argument hin ges preci sel y o n th e
distin ct ion between th e int en sive, on one hand , and th e ex te nsive and
q ualitative, on th e othe r. Co lours are, ind eed, not di visible in ex te n-
sion: _a certain pat ch of material of a given co lour does not yield , whe n
hroke n into equal halves, two sma ller patches with half th e value of its
co lour (half th e hu e and half th e brightness). T his lack of di visibility
has misled some philosophe rs int o failing to disting uish q ualities, o r
even su bjectively ex perien ced intensities, such as pleasure , from
ob jective int en sive properties, 2~ Thus, we nee d a characte ristic o ther
than indiv isibili ty in ex te nsion to d istingui sh objective int en sities fro m
qu aliti es.
T he re is, indeed , another way in wh ich physicists sta te th e distinc-
11011 1u- 1\\1 " II dll mu-u 1\" , li lt I till I' tc-u 1\( \\1111. 1\\ 11 ' It 'll'il\t' llll/"' '''IH 1\ li t " dun '0 II 'f It II hili dill . I t I" I I tlMI h\
prolH'l'til" ,Hid lip ill ,I , illl pl(· \\ ,,)' (I\\O,U( ' ,1 "tid lip til , I III 0 1' " 1 t11l11o\1I) whn h tlJ(' '1\' II I 11\111 11,11 , I I II I 1101 pill 111111ll"1I01l II1Il 1111
lol rg t' r arc-a), in u -nsive propt'rti t" d o no t oldcl u p hilt r.ulu-r dlt""Hc. T his nllflllWlloll , Ill 1' ''11 III Ihl pili nOIll. 111111 I \ 1'1 \ Ihm t \\ hit h h.lp
avcrag ing o pe ratio n is an o bjective o peration . in till' !'it'n,',' th.u pladng pen' ,lIul ('\,'1' IIl1n I \\lIh" '1l'IH,I I ltllrt'l.ltt'd wit h ordt 'r~ 01
int o co ntact tw o bodies with ditlcrcm t.'mp,·r atu n ·s will lr igger a d il1 ~ 'rt'l1 cl' s : di lfl'll'lll t" III 1t·\( ,I, 1t'llIp,'r,llUn', pn's~un', n -nvion ,
spo ntaneous diffu sion process which will equalize the tw o tl'mpt'raturcs po u-nt ial, dint'n'Il('t' of ill1t 'Il,il ) , III
at some intermedi at e valu e. "? Thi s capaci t)' to spo nta neo usly reach an
average value explains wh y temperatures o r pressures canno t he The first mod ification wh ich mu st he mad e to th e sta nda rd definit ion
d ivided in exte nsion . A particul ar value of temperatu re o r pressure , of intensive pro perty is, the n. that th e inten sities definin g a parti cu lar
hein g an average, will remain th e same wh en the bod )' possessing th ese physical syste m may indeed he ' d ivided ' but th e differen ces that result
prop erties is broken into tw o o r more part s. But beyond that, it points change the syste m in kind (fro m an eq uilibri um syste m, where
to a dynamical aspect of inten sive properties not shared by qu alities: differe nces are cancelled, to a non-equilibrium o ne) . Moreover if th l"~t'
differen ces in thermodynamic int en sities ar c capable of drh'ing a d iffere nces are made int en se enough a critical thres ho ld rna)' be reached
process o f equilibration in a populati on of molecul es, a process in and th e physical syste m in q uest ion will undergo a phase transition . its
wh ich th ese differences will tend to average th emselves out. The ex te nsive properties suffering ~ rad ical change in nature . Thus, rather
int ensiv e would th en be distingui shed from th e qualitative by the fact than indivi sibility, th e key co nce pt in th e definit ion of th e int en sive is
that d!fferences in inten sity, th ough not in quality, can drive flu xes of productive d1Jerence, as well as th e rel at ed conce pts of endoge no us sta ble
matter o r ene rgy . sta te (such as a th ermod ynamic eq uilibrium state) and of cri tical
Intensive differen ces may be sharp o r grad ual (in whi ch case th ey transition s between states . How does this rel at e to th e tw o co nct'Jlts
arc referred to as 'g radients') bu t in eithe r case th ey are nothing like whi ch I said d efined the int en sive in biology, populations and rat es?
th e exte rn al differences which distinguish on e fully formed individual The answe r is relatively straightforward : intensive grad ients arc rncas-
from another. In static typologies on e confronts the diversity of obj ects urcd by rat es of change , and th e flux es of matter and energy th ese
in the world by a careful ta bu lation of that which stays th e same and differen ces drive ar e eithe r the migratory mov em ents of a molecular
th at which differs among them , Th e exte rn al difTeren ces between population , or mov em ents of ene rgy through suc h a populat ion , H In
d iverse objects ar c viewed simply as a lack of sim ilar ity so th e co nce pt this sense , the thermodyna mic defin ition is di rectly related to the on e
of differen ce plays a purely negativ e rol e . Int en sive o r int ernal differ- I used in biology, bu t I also made several depart ures fro m it.
ence s, suc h as a temperature or pressure g rad ient within o ne and th e W hen I descri bed populati on thi nkin g in evo lutio nary bio logy a key
same body arc, on the co ntrary , positive o r productiv e, forming th e
I
issue was th e ro le of gen etic differen ces. W hile in essentialist or
basis of sim ple processes of individ uati on . The soa p bubbles and salt typological thinking uniformity is the natural state and diffe ren ce wh at
crystals I mention ed in the last chapte r , for instance . arc eq uilibri um need s special explanatio n , for pop ulation thinkers it is differen ce that
struc tures whi ch e me rge from a process dri ven hy intensive g radic nLo;;, is unprobl emati c. Thi s use of th e co nce pt of differen ce alr ead y
o r more exact ly, fro m th e spo ntaneous tend en cy of the molecula r co nstitutes an exten sion of th e o rig inal noti on o f intensive grad ient,
co mpo ne nts of bubbles or crys tals to minimize a pot ential (o r minimize hut it is neverthel ess related: a hiological population wh ere ge netic
an int en sive differen ce) . Given thi s morphogen eti c rol l', it is not dlffercn ces have been el im inate d is as unproductiv e as a th ermodynam ic
surp risi ng that Del eu ze makes int en sive d illl'rl'n n 's J kt} clement in syste m wh ere differen ces in temperature o r pressure have been
his o nto logy , As he writes: cance lled throu gh eq uilibration, " Yet, the biological examples I gave

60 6.
., lt ll \ I' il l\oh, ' . 1 1II 0l t' till' 011 '11 1.1 1 d d ll ll ll oll II I
l .ldh .ll lkp.lItlll l II l1l n
till' inu-nslve . In p.u-tic-ul.u- , unhkr- till ' 111011'1 ul.u- pClplll.lt ioll ' l udil,d in
thermodynamics, the meml u-rs of b iologic.ll popul.uion s [rave .1 I.lrgl'r
repertoire of ways 10 interact with e ac-h oth er. I ike a thermodvuamk-
syste m , a biological population ma)' e xhibit auractors (and tims hl'
defined in part bJ the tenden cies with which these singularities endo w
it) but in addition its members will typi cally display co m ple x capacities
for interact ion which have no co unterpart in the ph ysics of heat.
An individual ma y be characterized by a fixed number o f definite
propert ies (e xtensive and qualitative) and }'et possess an indefinite
number of capacities to c1Jeet and be c1Jeeted by other individuals. The
degree of openness of this set of possible interactions will vary from
individual to individual. In the realm of chemistry. for instance,
different chemica l elements have different capacities to fonn novel
combinations w ith o ther elements. the capacities of carbon, for
instance , vastly outpe rform ing those of the inert gases. In biolog)', as
we jus t saw , the flexib le capabilities of adaptive parts or the capability
to transport and match co mponents without rigid channels or position -
ing procedu res, lead to ev en more ope n combinatorial spaces . This
o pe nness is also re lated to th e virtual as can be g lim psed from t he fact
that it d em and s fro m us th e use of moda l terms (such as 'un limited
po ssibilities ). Deleuze , in fact , always gives a two-fo ld d efiniti on of
t he vir tu al (and th e inten sive), using bo th singularities (u nact ua lized
tendencies) and what he calls c1Jeccs (unactualized capacities to affect
and be affecte d) ,"
Unlike sing ulari ties , w hich arc relativ ely w ell studied th ank s to the
developmen t o f the to pological approach to state space , the for ma l
st udy of affects is relati vely und erdevel o ped . Several scientists who had
previously focused on the study of singularities, ho we ver, have recen tly
sw itched to t he st udy of a d ifferent type of formal system which allows
the exp lo ration or cons tructive capacities. Stuart Kauffman and Walter
Fontana, among others, view the capacity to form novel assemblages
when objects are put into funct ional relations w ith one another as a
problem which is complement ary to that of state space , a problem which
may also lead to the discovery of universal features analogous to those
reveal ed by classifications of attractors. Alth ough th e formal s)'Ste m s
they have designed to stud)' affects ( Kauffman's random grammars,
62
1 0 Ill .IIl ," "l lolltl\l1\lt dW II1 I " \) III I. \ \1 II lind. I 1111 III I!J.IIl lilt
tllnl tlld t o Iiltlth 11 1 III .lIH 1' • tI'l\ hoi, . .,Ir' ,llh \llhltd \ .•IIl,llt',
II I I ,ht ~ tlC 'llI ~ 0 1 11111 1 t ll lll "l lllh 11., 11 0 11, 1111 ludru I tl u ' ell " 0\1 '1")
1I1 t O cl lI"
of .• I't'\\ (("lurrm' t1\\t'nrh~ {'Imam (IIt h .l ,,"tll,.l t .,I) lit 1001''1 ) ,, !lil h
11M \' turn o ut to hI' univ t'r~,,1. '4
\Vhilt' th e re latio n [u-twcc-n inn-n..itit's .Hld ..ingul,Irit it·s does 110t
inv o lve anv dt'p,lrtufl' from th e th ermod ynami c dcfimu on o f ' iuk U'
in" , Jddil;g ca pacities implies ('xtl'nding that definition . Let uu- fi .... t
gin' a more detailed characte rization o f capacities and then sho w ho\\
the original definition may be naturallv e xte nde d to includ e th em . An
individual o rganism will 'typically exhibit a variety o f capabilit ies to
form assemblaaes with oth er individuals, o rganic o r inorganic . A good
e xample is the assemblage which a walking animal form s with a pil·n·
o f so lid g ro und (w hic h supplies it with a surface to walk) and with a
graVitatio nal field (w hich endo ws it with a given weigh t). Although th e
capac ity to form an assemblage depends in part on the emcrg('nt
properties of th e int eracting individuals (an imal, ground, field ) it is
nevertheless not reducib le to them. We may have exhaustive know -
ledge about an individual' s properties and yet, not having observed it
in interaction with ot her individuals, kno w noth ing about its
capacities. 3 5
T he term 'capaci ty' is elosely relate d to th e ter-m 'a fforda nce'
introd uce d by James G ibso n w ithin the co ntext of a th eo ry of
eco log ical inte rac tio nsv'" Gibson distinguishes betw een the intrinsic
properties o f things and th eir atTo rd anc es . A piece of ground docs have
its own intrinsic pro perties determining , for example, how horizon tal
or slanted, how flat, co ncave o r con vex , and how rigid it is. But to be
capable of afford ing support to a w alking anima l is not just ano the r
intrinsic property, it is a capacity wh ich may not be exercised if there
are no animals around. Give n that capacities are relational in this sense,
what an individ ua l affords another m ay d ep end on facto rs like their
relative spat ial scales: the surface of a pond or lake may not afford a
large animal a walking medium, but it docs to a small insect whic h can
walk on it because it is not heavy enough to break th rough the surface
tension of the water. Affordances are also symmetric, that is, the)'
involve both capacities to affect and be affect ed . For exam ple , a ho le
in the ground affords a fleeing animal a place to hide , but such animal
 l o uld .d tI d.· II "" II hllll , Ihu 111. 1 1111 ' " ' I h,lI' ' II I' Ih. ' 1 tlulld
itsl II, ~ illlll .l ri •.111 .1Il II 11oI1 '",1\ III I bl'l ,llI I .1 I'" .1,1111' 11111' d II d.1Il " ' I
but it its..lf aftlmls nut rition 1;1Ih. pn ·d.lllll , ·
W e may ex pand th ' rnl'anillg of th e krill • intr-nsi , I" 10 ill' lud l' th '
properties of assemblages, or mol" e xac t ly, of th e prou'ss,'s wh ich
giv e ris e to th em. An assembly process ma y be said to ln- charac t .r izcd
by intensive properties when it articulates het eropcncous cI .rn c nts as
such. i" In the assemblage formed by a walking animal, a pic e of
ground and a gravitational field, three heterogeneous individuals ar e
joined together as such without the need for any homogenization ,
More generally, the interactions which organisms have with th e organic
and inorgan,ic components of an ecosyst em are typically of th e int ensive
kind (in the enlarged sense), an ecosystem itself being a complex
assemblage of a large number of heterogeneous components: diverse
reproductive communities of animals, plants and micro-organisms, a
geogra phical site characterized by diverse topographical and geologica l
features, and the ever diverse and changing weather patterns. Similarly,
the meaning of 'extensive ' may be enlarged to refer to the properties
of processes, such as the assembly-line process I mentioned before,
where hotnoqeneous components ar e linked together. The enlarged
meaning of 'intensive' is related to the standard definition in the
crucial role played by d!fJerence. Much as a thermodynamic intensive
process is characterized by the productive role which differences play
in the driving of fluxes, so in the enlarged sense a process is intensive
if it re lates diffirence to d!fJerence. 39 Moreover, as the e xam ple of
assembly processes based on adaptive components showed, th e flexible
links which these components afford one another allow not only the
meshing of differences, but also endow the process with th e capacity
of divergent evolution, that is, the capacity to furth er d!fJerentiate
diffirences.
Armed with this more adequate definition of inten sive pr oc ss we
can move on to the second set of issues I said need d to be discu ssed:
the concealment of the intensive under the extensiv e, as \ e ll as the
concealment of the concrete universals (singu larities and afTect s) which
animate intensive processes . To anticipate th con .lusion I will reach
in a moment, in the case of singularities th existe n ce of th e virtual is
manifested in those situations where int ensive diftt'r ' 11(,(" are not
c in. vl! ,I IIll d ll l . III tilt ' I ' II I II h,l l II
I I Illbl.1 '. lilt lit ddt. I I III' U h i l i .111 " , 11111 ' Ih, III
tllI lllI .h hOlllll 'I'III/ .IIIIIII , Ih.II I 1111 .1\ til " I II • I III I'll Ihlllll<'
1,IIIill' 11II .111 I ' 1'1.111.1111111 ill \1'1 111 III \ 11111,111 t ti ll \1 ' 1 ,,1\• ..tlll\\ III '
di l'fl'r('JI('" s ill inll'nsit \ III I . 1.1111. , 111.1 III ..11I1I1ll.llin ' d illi 'n 'lI' I'
Ih rou gb uni fllrmi z,llilll; , I'n~'l"l ivI·l IlId.,s Ih., \ irt u.il ,1I11 1 Illakl's till'
d isappearance of process 1I11lkr product SI'(' III k-ss pr ohl crnat ic .
Alt ho ug h thi s co nce alme nt is partl y tlu- result of human int crvvnt ion ,
o f laborat ory practi ces whi ch focu s on th e final ' 'l uilib riu m stale or
w hich 'yst ' matically homogeni ze materials, for exa m pi . , it is also. n
o bj .ct ive phenomen on . An y ar ea of th e world whi ch is in thermo -
d ynamic eq ui lib riurn , for instance, is an ar ea wh ere intensi c dill er-
c nccs have cancelle d th emselv es out, and hence an ar ea whi ch co nn', I.
th e virt ual without th e need for human intervention. These ar ea s of
th e world, in sho rt , would constitute an objecti ve illusion.
Deleuzc argues, for exam ple , that des pite th e fact that classical
th crmodynamics yielde d valuable insights into the importance of th e
inten sive, thi s branch of physics did not provide th e foundati on need ed
for a th eory of individuation giv en its exclusive focu s on th e final
eq uilibr ium state of a s)"te m . The problem with co ncentrat ing on th e
final state is that only during th e difference-driven process can th e
eq uilib rium state be see n as a virtual attractor, a state which is not
actualized yet but which is neverthel ess real since it is actively
attract ing th e successive states of th e syste m towards itself. But whil e
it is true that classical thermodynamics tends in this sense to under-
est im ate the virtual and th e intensive, 'this t endency wou ld lead
nowhere if intensity, for it s own part, did not present a corresponding
t endency within th e extensity in which it develops and under th e
quality which co vers it. Intensity is difference, but this differen ce tends
to deny or to can cel its elf out in extensity and underneath quality' .-w
In other words , while certain scie nt ific practices tend to systematicall y
down-grade th c intensive and conceal the virtual, th ese practices onl y
amplify an illusion which is obj ective and which is, therefore, much
harder to ov ercome.
One wa y of allowing th e virtual to manifest itself is to design
expe riments or to st ud y phenomena in circumstances wh ere intensive
differen ces are not allowed to canc el th emselv es, This is what is done
 III lIu" 1.'h'l \t ' l Inll 01 Iht " t i t Ilt t 0 1 h.-.u , ti ll
cl/ llI hhn UIII Iht ·nllOd)"ll.llJlICS, \,ht'n' .111 Inlt'n ,,' lIem
t' lIl'rgy cont lnuouslv lr.l\"t'rsl'S lilt' svsn-ru undt'l" st ud v .Kling a..
- -
co nstrain t maintaining int ensive- dil1~'n'nn's JliH·...• I said ill Iht' pn-vi -
o us cha pter that the varictv o f atl ractors which J s)'s ll'rn n1.1)' h.wl'
dep end s on wheth er its dynam ics arc linear or nonlinear. Whi k linear-
systems possess th e sim plest dis tribution of sing ularities, a singll~ glohal
optim um structuring the w ho le of state space, nonlinear ones typically
have multiple attracto rs (o r put more techni cally. nonlinear equations
allow for multiple so lutio ns) . To th e math emat ical d istin ct ion be t ween
th e linear and th e nonli near , th erefore , we mus t now add a thermo-
dynam ic one , th at betw een s)'ste ms near and Jar from equ ilibri um . As
Pri gogin e and Nico lis pu t it "witho ut the maintenance of an appropriate
distan ce from equilibrium, nonlineari ty canno t by itself give rise to
mul tipl e solutio ns. At eq uilibrium detailed balance introd uces a further
co ndi tio n that restricts and even un iqu ely fixes ' th e solutio n." ? In oth er
words, to exhibit th eir full co mplexity nonlinear systems need to be
driven away fro m eq uilibr ium, o r wh at amounts to th e same th ing,
appropr iat ely large differen ces in inte nsity need to be maintained by
e xte rna l co nstra ints and no t allowed to ge t cance lled o r be mad e too
small. In this sense, as these authors say, 'no nequilibrium reveals th e
potentialities hidd en in th e non linea rities, potenti aliti es th at remain
d o rm ant at o r near eq uilib rium' . H
Thi s is important in th e presen t co nte x t becau se it explains th e
physical so urce of th e obj ecti ve illusion Deleu ze ta lks about. Take for
example a linear syste m wi th a sing le attractor . As I just said, wh ile
th e system is on its way to thi s attracto r th e unactualized end state is
ind eed there alr ead y, actively att racting th e process toward s itsel f. At
this point its virt uality is relatively easy to g rasp. But once the process
is over it becomes easy to over loo k th e virtual na ture of the end state,
even th ou gh a system will never actually reach th e attracto r, only
fluctuate in its vicinity. A nonlinear syste m with m ultiple attractors,
on the other hand, continues to display its virtuality even on ce th e
syste m has settled into one of its alterna tive stab le states, because th e
othe r alt ernatives are there all th e tim e, coexisting with th e o ne that
happ en s to be actua lized . All o ne has to do to reveal their virtual
66
held 0 1 IIJr IfI'm I'l l I li t I I 10 IIU ., I II II 1 111111 111 IIl1t l I II Itt. II III 111 pll h II IItl1
of m.u n -r .1Ilt! ol on 1"' ''111 I II ,l lt l,H !lli ll ,ll1 d IlIll l .lIl l ltllll ( 1 11 1 1 \\t tll Uld. "I ttHlI I ,
n -h-r t o lilt.. ,. It , ·l l loIl i \ I ' , I" hl. " I, l tt ' ,I J",nl/"I" ..." IIn1 \ 1I111.• lIlit ·" l llll I
,
J.
1M\(' ,.In·.ul) ,1fglll·t1 for 1hv w,.·d to h·pl.h I ' lilt pO"lhlc \\ ith ,l mUI( '
.l t k 'l U.lI t· form of physical rnod.llit ),. )
A systeTll with multiple au ractors, in shor t, has J gn'ah'r t"' IMdt )·
to l'xpn'ss or revea l t111~ virtual. But this I,' xpn'ssin' cap .wit)' will
depend , in turn, on the thermodynamic "zone of inu-nsity in which
the syS1l'm orl'rJtl~s: at low inten sit ies (ncar equi libriu m) a nonl inea r
system will in effect he linearized, that is, its pot ential complex
behaviou r will no t be revealed . T his procedu re has, in fact, lx-comc
ro utine in physics whe neve r trou blesom e no nlinear effects ru-ed to he
elim inate d: o ne sim ply st ud ies th e syste m in qu esti on at very low
inte nsity values for the trouble-making variable. -4-4 How ever by fo!lo\\, - I
ing pro ced ures like this and systematically neg lecting the high inu- nsit y
values at wh ich no nlin ear effects arc fully ex presse d , physicists pro motl'
an illusion wh ich is originally objective but wh ich now becom es
subjectively amplified . O n th e o the r hand , st udy ing syste ms wh ich are
bo th no nlinea r and no nequ ilibrium , systems wh ere the objective
illusion is at it wea kest , o pe ns up windows into the virtual.
One of th e tasks of a philosopher atte m pting to cre ate a th eo ry of
virt uality is to locat e th ose areas of the world wh ere th e virt ual is still
ex presse d, and use th e unactu alized tenden cies and capacities one
discov ers there as sources of insight into th e nature of virtual
multiplicities. More exac tly, Del eu ze recommends following a very
specific philosophical me thod in wh ich, as he says , it is
necessar y to return to the interior ef scientific states ef ~a j rs or bodies in
the process of belne consti tuted, in o rde r to pen etrate int o co nsiste ncy ,
tha t is to say, into th e sphe re of th e virt ual, a sphe re th at is only
act ualized in th em . It would be necessary to 90 bock up the porh rhor
science descends, and at th e very end of whi ch logic sets its cam p.:"
In o ther wo rds, unli ke the linear and equili briu m ap proach to science
\....hieh conce ntrates o n th e final product, o r at best on th e process of
act ualizatio n but always in th e direct ion of th e final product , philosophy
 I.ollid 1111'" III till 01'1'"11. dlll,lllIlI '111111 '11111111 III
I II ti ll' 1111 ,'11 1\1 1" 0" " " ,dllc i. 1'," d IlC' tl1I'11I , lid 1111111 till It 10 th,
virt u: I.
Let me give a co n, rl'll' cxa m p l« o r w h.n il " wil d III' ,II' to re- turn
to th e int erior of a bod y in the pr ocess or bein g co nstituted . Biological
cate go ries, particularly those abo ve '1' cies, tend to be cr iatcd by
obs erving similarities (or techni cally, homologi es) among th e anatom -
ical parts of fully form ed organism s, To th e exte nt that th e pr ocess
which generates these organisms is ignored th ese static classifications
conceal the virtual. But the development of a nonlinear, non equilib-
rium approach to em bryo logy has reveal ed a different, more dynamic
way of cr eating classifications. A good example is provided by a new
approach to the study of th e tetrapod limb, a structure which can tak e
many divergent forms, ranging from the bird wing, to th e singl e digit
limb in the horse, to the human hand and its opposed thumb, It is
very hard to define this structure in terms of the common properties
of all the adult forms, that is, by concentrating on homologies at the
level of the final product. But focusing instead on the embryological
processes that produce this structure allows th e creation of a more
satisfactory classification. As on e author puts it, this new classificatory
approach 'sees limb homology as emerging from a common process
(asymmetric branching and segmenting), rather than as a pr ecisely
rep eated archetypal pattern '. 46
Returning to th e int erior of th e tetrapod limb as it is being
constituted would mean to reveal how on e and th e sam e ' virtual limb '
is unfolded through different int en sive sequences, some blo cking th e
occurrence of particular bifurcations (those leading to th e branching
out of digits, for example), so me enabling a full ser ies to occur,
resulting in very different final products. This step in th e method,
however, can only con stitute a beginning. The reason is that it still
relie s on the notion of sim ilar ity or homology, even if thi s now
characterizes processes as opposed to products. A seco nd step needs to
be add ed to ex plain th e source of these process homologies. Or to put
this differently, once we have rev ealed th e intensi ve process behind a
product we still need to continue our ascent towards th e virtual
str uct ures that can onl y be glim pse d in that process but whi ch explain
68
11111111 . II I' ," 1.11 11It III 101< I 11'1'111 ' III I 11,11111 ,I dl I II loll III till 1.1111.1
ItI' I 11111.1 Ilk, 10 ,Ic I. II III 1111111111 I, .. 1111 nlll ' 10 till 1111 I. 1'1.111
" III( h 0P,"11 d 1111 ,I.,'pl'" I 1°1'0111 'II ,.I 1',11 I hll II dill, I ' IItl,II. ",.1
di"II !.' il '01111111111,.1 II 1ll" Ollll" 111 0 11<" I'd, mil',' Il'ldl 1111'1'11
J '
[ollowi n J .1 (.be.H I" 01 sv, rruru t rv, hi ".lkin I ,'v, '111 .
I: . u -nsivv struct ures wo uld co nst it uu tl u- co unh 'rl' rt or thl' holl Oll 1
lc 1'1, while inte nsive pr o ·( ' SS 's wo uld he Ihl' co unterpart 01 till'
int rrn ccliat c leve ls, -ach o ne representing a g 'o llll'l ry which is no t
n
fully mctri but whi h can, in fa t , be me:tricized . Th · top Il'v"I , .111
ideally co ntinuo us and relatively undiff erentiated spa " would III till'
co unte rpart of the virtual . I us ' terms like ' to p' and ' botto m' hl'r, '
informall y, with no sugges tion that th ese spac s a tu ally form ,I
hierar hical struct ur . A better image here would b a nest ed se t III
spaces, with th e cascade acting to unfold spaces whi h ar c -mb cddcd
into on e another. Another important qualifi cation is that each on or
th e spaces that co m prises thi s' nest ed set is classified not by its
exte nsit ies or its qualities, but by its affects, that is, by its invariants
under a transformation (o r group of transformations). In othe r word s,
what matters about each space is its wa y of being affect ed (o r not
affect ed ) by specific ope rations, th emselv es characte rized by their
capacity to affe ct (to translat e, rotate, project, bend, fold, st rc t h) .
Without this caveat, we could run th e danger of circularity, since th o
exte nsive properties of th e bottom level would be used to define tlu-
other levels as well.
Thi s metaphor supplies us with a target for a th eory of th e virt ual:
we need to conce ive a cont in uum whi ch yields , through progr essive
differentiation , all th e discontinuous individuals that populate th e a tual
world . Unlike th e metaphor, however, this virtual continuum canno t
be conceived as a single , homogen eous topological space , but rather as
a heterogen eous space made out of a population of multiplicities, each
of which is a topological space on its own . The virtual continuum
would be, as it were, a space if
spaces, with each of its co m pone nt
spaces having the capacity of progressive differ entiation. Beside this
multiplication of spaces , we need a way of me shing th ese together into
a het erogen eous whole. Delcuzc, in fact , refers to th e virtual contin-
uum as a plane if
consistency, using th e term 'consiste ncy ' in a unique
 I' ll v , 111.1 III 1'.11 111 11 1.11 , III ,I I II (. 1..1\ Ill' 1I0t/1I1l' 10 .I" III. 10 111.,1 ,tt.. I •• 11I.1 I ,h. I I I I I' II I,ll I.. • Illhl , '.

IO IlSiS ll' IH), Ih.11 is, " ill. 11.<, .lbs<, III' · 0 1,, "' 111.11111011. H.t/III, 'Oil i 01 .1 h. I 10 "111 011 1,,"111111111"
l:nc)" is defined as the syntlicsts 1 h CI l'r0H '1ll?/I1C\ (,/\ \/II h .' llu III t 1.1 k I • till II , I" •• I tI, ' "11' I" ItII It I" I. 1I11 1l\lJpl

T here ar c tw o se ts o f issu es th at mu st Ill' d iscu ssi«] b,.ro n · \\1' c. n [roru 11I.l tl lI' lIl .l l il (.11111111111 ••1 II I 111'" , 1II I1ILlIII ) .1IId 'll lid ot .111\

move beyond thi s metaph o r . Both arc issues r ·Iat ing to till" CII I it ies th. t trao- or .Kl lI,l li t) 11t.11 till , '0111 pI 11l.1\ 11111....11 di -spite tl w i! .111'1',11"

populate th e virtual. First o f all, Chapter l ' description o f multipli cit - h i ' h ly a bstrac l n.u urv . III Il,Ir or th ese ('o lln' p l 1'.111
II ul.n , 1I01H'

ies left unresolv ed th e qu esti on of th eir nature as co nc re te unive rsal
entities . In other words, I used ce rtain features o f math imatical models
(the vector fields of state spaces) as a source for th e noti ons that defin e
a multiplicity but 1 did not discuss how th e properties of an actual
entity, a mathematical model, can be made into th e properties of a
virtual on e. This is a task which will involve a specific philosoph ical
transiormation of the mathematical concepts involved, a m eans of
detaching th ese concepts from th eir mathematical actualization, so to
speak. In addition to this, th e first part of this discussion need s to add
to the last chapter's characterization a description of what makes
multiplicities capable of being m eshed together. 1 will argue that by
extending eac h singularity into an iriflnite series, and defining th ese
series without the use of m etric or quantitative concepts, multipliciti es
can become capable of forming a heterogeneous continuum .
The se cond set of issu es involves going beyond singularities and into
a discussion of affect s, I said before that th ere ar e two special cases of
intensive proce sses that cry out for explanation in terms of virtuality
(or at an y rate, in terms o f so me kind of physical modality. ) The first
case was exem plified by ph ysical systems with multiple attractors,
syste ms which for ce on us th e problem of accounting for th e m od e o f
ex iste n ce of th e available ye t una ctualized tendencies. The sec o nd case
was flexible assembly processes whi ch lead to an open se t of potential
co mb inatio ns. When a process leads to a clo sed set of assemblages,
thi s set ma y be given by exhaust ive en umeration (that is, it ma y be
defined extensionally) elim inating th e need to bring in a modal
ex planation . But if th e set is div ergent (as in th e case o f biological
e vo lutio n) th en no exhausti ve enum erati on will do since th ere will
always be novel assemblages not included in th e list . The qu esti on now
is, if multiplicities and th eir singular ities co r respond to multiple stable
state s, what corresponds to these unactualized capaciti es in th e virtual
co ntin uum? Is th ere another virtual e ntity e m body ing th e capacity to
I" '5IIPPOSC tndividuation, T hey lH'l'd to he u -an sform ccl t o IW l"OIl H' fllih
pre-individual nonons so th at they 'an for m th logical and pit sical h .ISI
for th e ge nesis o f indi vidu als. When ph ysicists o r mathemati ians spI·.lk
of 'di ffere nt ial relati on s' , for exam ple , th ey have in mind a part icul ar
math ematical object whi ch e m bodies th ose relation s : a J unclion. Such
an objec t ma y be viewed as a de vice whi ch maps one domain or
numbers (o r ot he r entities) into another , or to use a m ore technol o
gical m etaphor, as a de vice whi ch rec eiv es some inputs and maps them
into an o utp ut .?" As suc h, functions defin e mathematical individual i n
processes . For exa mple , when a function is used to model a physical
syste m , its inputs (or ind ep endent variables) become th e dim en sions of
state space , while its output (depend ent variable) individuate s a parti u-
lar state in that space. (A series of suc h states forms a traj ectory.)
Although Deleuze do es defin e virtual ent ities via differential relati on s
(that is, as relations between changes or differences) it is clear that Ill'
cannot co nceive of th ese relations as possessing th e form o f a fun cti on ,
since thi s would presuppose individuality. In ot he r words , th e differ-
ential relations defining multiplicities canno t involve th e asymmetry
between dep endent and ind ependent variables (or input and out put).
If anything, th ese relations must be like ' form less functions' , wh re
inputs and outputs ar e not yet distingui shed, wh ere th e relation is not
a rate of change of on e quantity relative to an other , but th e rate at
whi ch two quantities change relative to each other. As Deleuze puts
, it , virt ual relations must involve a purely recipr ocal determination
between th eir el ements, a reciprocal synthesis between pure changes
or differen ces which sho uld not presuppose any prior individuation .so
A philosophical transformation is also need ed to lift th e virtual co nte n t
from th e mathematical co nce pt of singularity . Mu ch as virtual differ-
ential relations must be distinguished from individuatine Jun cti ons ,
virtual singularities should be di stinguished from indi viduated sta tes .
Attract ors, for exam ple , ma y be defin ed as sp ecial subse ts of state

7° 7I
 'l p .III', tll.11 I ••1 ltmn (Iu't, (01 1111111 t'1 o f ~ 1.1 1t ) But II \ III t
\\ OIlld IIl1ph rh,u tl U'\ .lln' ,llh Pel,,"," ,) dduillt 1I I(I I\ ulll.1I1" .
.1S s l. H I'"
lien ee n el l·tl / e....s ide:' that tht... p n .. iIHli, idu.l1 .lSIW I I (II III l u l.l n th'" c~n
o nly he g raspe d be fore th e) .lC<lu in° a wd l·dl'fillt'd iell·nt it ), in a state
space full o f t raject ori es, that is, when th ey, arc o nlv , ' ".lgu l'h"
, d efined
by th eir existence and distributi on in a vec tor field . Llnlikc t rajecto ries , a
vect or field is not co mposed of Individuat ed sta tes, but o f instantaneous
values for rates of change . Individually, t hese instantaneous rates (o r
infinites ima ls) have , in fact , no reality, b ut co llec tively they do exhibit
to pological inva riants (sing ulari ties) , and it is these in variants that
should be given onto logical significance . O ntologically, how ever , an
in vari an t of a vector field is just a topolog ical accident , a poi nt in th e
field w hic h happens to be stationary (mo re tech nically, a point at w hich
the zero vector is attached). Dcl euze proposes that these topologica l
accidents sho uld be given th e ontological status of an event, but given
th eir universality o r recurren t nature, th ese events sho uld be seen as
ideal, not actual. A sim ilar point applies to th e bifurcations whi ch
unfo ld th e em bed ded levels of a multiplicity: eac h o ne o f th ese
sym metry- breaking transitions sho uld be see n as an id eal event , and
not, of co urse , as an actual pha se transiti on . As Delcuze writes:
W hat is an idea l event ? lt is a singulari ty - or rather a set of
singularities or of singular points charact erizing a mat hematical
cu rve , a physical sta te o f affairs, a psycho logical an d moral perso n.
Singul arit ies arc turning points and poi nts of inflect ion; bo tt lenecks ,
knots, foyers, and centers; points o f fusion, condensation and
boiling; po ints of tears and jo y, sickne ss and health, hope and
anxi cty, ' sen sitiv e points' , , , [Yet , a singularit y] is cssentially pre -
individ ual, non -persona l, and a-con ceptual. It is quite indifferent to
th e individual and th e co llec tive, th e person al and th e imperson al,
th e particular and th e gen eral - and to th eir oppositi on s. Singularity
is neut ral , S l
T o co m plete th e characte rizat ion o f multipliciti es as entities we now
need to discu ss th e capacities for int eraction which th ese co mplex
events may be expected to exhibit. Eacb o f the singularities defin ing a
multipli cit y must be thought as pos sessing the capaCity to be extended or
72
III1'IJI I"."IIIIHI",J th tin '''lUlU " I J I» I. III. 'I" r III rlu \u ll",1
pl Ul l''' ., .1 \ 0 111 1111 111.111111 IIllullllll. II I I IJr hi 11\1 Jl
nwt .lpl.ori l .11 c1" 'llpll llll lit till p'Utl .11 11 1 dU ll ~I \ I' i" " ',hIl H,,1
d l'lill il io ll, TIlt" I1 H't .1ph lll I Ihl Ot c ut rr lilt 0 1 ,I ph .l ( t r a nvi fi o u in .111
a Clll.11n1.lh.'rial SUI h .1' " .1"'''. \\'hl n It '.IIn i' H IO I"d clown 10 .1 lTith .,1
poi nt (abo ut 100°C at !'oe.1 It·H·I) it will spo ntane o usly dlang" nat un-
a nd condense int o a liquid, b ut as we co ntin ue to d l·ITt'.lSe tl U'
tl·mpcratllrc . th e singular e vent wh ich occu rred at th e crit ical poinl
will be foll owed by a series '!f ordm ory el't~·nts (each additional low l'ring
o f tcmp('rature will have only a linear co o ling effect o n the !i<luid
water) , a ser ies which exte nds up to the neighbourhood of anoth er
singulari ty (O°C, w here the nex t critica l e vent, free zing, occ ur s) . A
sim ilar idea wou ld apply to t he virtual: the sing ularities dl'iining .1
multiplicit y would be come th e o rigin o f se ries of ordinary idea l e vc-n tx
extend ing up to th e vicinity o f other sing ularities bel on ging to o thvr
multipliciti es , Unlike th e metaphor, however, t he se series o f ide-al
e ven ts would not form a seq ue nce in time but rather a se ries o f
co existing clements, (I will expand o n thi s in the next chapte r wh en I
d iscu ss th e for m of tem po rality of th e virtual. " )
T o get rid o f th e metaphorical content and to show in what sense
th e ser ies cxtc nding from sing ularit ies arc non metric (thus capable of
forming a virtual co ntinuum) I will need to int ro duce one m ore
techn ical term , that of an irifJnite ordin al series. Unlike an infinite ser ies
of card inal numbers (o ne , tw o , three . . .) an ordinal seri es (firs t ,
second, t hird . .. ) d oes not presuppo se th e ex istence of fully ind i-
vid uate d numerica l q uan t ities , To be defined an o rd inal seri es demands
only ce rtain asymmetrical relations betw een abst ract clements, rcl a-
tions like t hat of beina in between two other cl em ents, In other words,
it is o nly the order in a seq ue nce that matters, and not th e nature
(numer ical o r otherwise) o f th e ele me nts so o rde re d . Bertrand Russell ,
wh ose th ought in th ese matters has influ en ced Del eu ze, arg ues that
mu ch as non metric geo mct ries event ually provided th e foundation for
the o lder metric o nes , so o rd ina l ser ies became th e foundatio n for o ur
vcr)' noti on o f numeri cal quantity. 54 There is, in fact, a direct
relation ship between metric spaces and ca rd inal numbers, on th e one
hand, and non metric spaces and ordinal numbers, o n th e oth er. Two
metric ent it ies , two length s, for example . can be d ivided in a simple
73
 \\ l\ 1/11 0 1>.1" d 111111
1111/111 I " 1111 II " \ II,. /II ,,, I.. \ .11
(Illllll.lred silll I \\ I 1,IIl .. sl..I>h h U/I,\I/lh"IIOU " 11.. III"'" 1/, .,1 ..1<'1111 / ,
of th e t wo Il' ngl hs, Ordi/l.l l SI'IiI's, on till' orlu -r hand , hI h.1\ ' ilion
like topologica l snaccs , whe-re WI' can rigorousl) I'stahlish th: I .1 poinl
is nearby another , but not by cxa .t1 y ho w mu ch (givcn that their
separa tio n ma y b stretche d or co m pr .ssccl) .
Russell introduced th e term distance (or int en sit y) to define relati on s
of proximity betw een th e elements of an o rd inal se r ies . 5'; As a relati on,
an ord inal di st an ce canno t be di vided , and its lack o f div isibi lity int o
identical units im p lies that two o rdinal distances can ne ve r be exactly
compared alt ho ugh we can rigorously esta blish th at o ne is greater or Ie s
than an other. The d!lJerence between two distan ces, in o the r words,
cannot be cancelled through numerical identity, so th e resul ts of th ese
co m pariso ns ar e always an ex act ye t rigo ro us . In sho rt, o rdinal distances
ar e a nonmetric or non -quantitati ve co nce pt. Dcleu ze ad opts th ese
ideas from Ru ssell but break s with him at a crucial point : he do es not
co nce ive of th e priority whi ch th e ordinal has over th e card inal as
bein g purely logical or conceptual, but as bein g o ntolog ical. In othe r
words, Dcleu ze establishes a genetic relati onship betw een se rial o rde r
and its defining nonmetric di st an ces, on one hand, and numerical
quantities, on th e ot he r. An o rd inal se ries w hic h is den se (that is,
where between any t w o clements th ere is alw ays an othe r one) w ould
form a one-dimensional continuum o ut of whi ch cardina l numbers would
emerge through a sym met ry- bre aking discontinuity. 56
L t' s return to th e problem of assembling virtual multipliciti es into
a plan e of co nsiste ncy. As I said , each on e of th e singu lar idea l e ve nts
defining a multiplicity need s to be imagin ed as being extende d into a
series o f ordinary events which are still virt ual o r ideal but that , unl ike
sing ularities, alre ady possess a minimal actualization . 57 Each of th e
series w hich e m anates from a sing ulari ty sho uld be im agined as bei ng
den se and defined exclusive ly by o rd inal distan ces, thus constit uting a
one- d imensional co ntinuum. A heterogen eou s co ntinuum co u ld th en
be woven fro m th e m an y se rial co ntinua spring ing from each m ember
o f th e population o f mu ltipli citi es. To ensure that multipl icit ies ar e
m eshed together by th eir di fferen ces, Del eu ze arg ues th at the relatio ns
amo ng th ese se ries mu st be both convergent and diverqent, In othe r
wo rds, the series m ust be m ad to co me togeth er and communi cate but
74
I"
d ., I, .
" " 1\\ 1 \ 1111
, "'''/' '/1111"'/'/""
/1.1 .11\ 11 " Ill ' dll
II II"
/10 1 1" \ 111'1 '...
1.0 ,I.,.
/I " I
1.11 11" 11
1111 11 '\ '011'
, ,,
'
III \\ 1 111 10 .l\ olel ( lell ll ll l\, 1I11t11111 , .11 ,.11.,.\ .1111 1 \' '' 111 11 111 111 ",).11 11 1
/11,1) Ill' us,·d 10 ' 1 111'1.1"' , .1 1' 1 fllldol l \ 1 " /1 ' 'IU,'/I" , tl1l' lllod ,tI
(" t(' Jo ril'S <pClSsibilil y) Ill' \\ bill'S 10 n -pl.u« . 'j
At Ihis poin t .1Il import.lnt qua lificarion sho uld I" made . Multipli. it
iI'S , ho u k] nol b,' co nce-ived • S possl'ssi ng tlH' '. pae it to activ , I '
interact with o ne • nether th rough t hese s .ries, De-le uze thin ks about
t hem as en dow d \ ith o nly a me re apacity to be affecte d , since t1ll'y
ar c, in his wo rds, 'im pass ive en tit ies - impassiv results , ,(,() T Ill
ne utrality or steri lity of mu ltip licities may be ex p laine d in th e fo llowing
way . Although their divergent unive rsalit y ma kes them inde pe nde nt of
any pa rticular mechanism (t he sam e m ult ip licity may b actua liz ,d b .
several causa l mecha nism s) they do depend on the empirical Jact that orne
causal mechanism or another actua lly exists," T his is m erel y to say th at
th ey arc not transcendent but imman en t entit ies. But beyond thi s,
un like ete rna l and fixed ar chetyp es whi ch have no hist orical o rigin,
Deleu ze views multipliciti es as incorporeal 1Jects c!f corporeal causes, that
is, as hist orical resul ts of act ual causes possessing no ca usal pow e rs of
t heir own . O n th e ot he r hand , as he w rites, ' to th e exte nt th at they
diffe r in na t ure fro m th ese causes, th ey ente r, w ith one ano ther, into
relatio ns of quasi-ca usality . T ogether th ey e nte r into a relation wi t h a
quasi-cause w hic h is itself incorporeal and assures th em a ve ry special
ind ep enden ce . .. ' 6 2
I said before that th e co nst ruction of a vir t ual contin uum invol ves
co nside ring not on ly th e role o f sing ularities but also o f affects . Unlike
actua l capacities, w hich are always capaci ties to affec t and be affected ,
virtual affec ts ar e shar ply divid ed into a pure capaci ty to be affec te d
(d isplayed by impassibl e multipliciti es) and a pure capacity to 4fect. T his
capacity, as I hinted above, is ex hib ite d by ano ther incorporeal e nti ty
w hich Delcu ze refers to as a ' q uasi-ca use' . At thi s po int , int ro duci ng
m ore entities m ay strike us as ar tificial, o r at least as inflati onar y,
enc um be ring an already unfamiliar onto logy wit h furth er un famili ar
features. But thi s int ro d uctio n is far from being artificial . A key
co ncept in th e definition o f a m ult ip licity is th at of 'i nva r iant', but
invari an ces are always relati ve to so me t ra nsfor ma tio n (o r group of
transformatio ns) . In othe r words, w he never we spea k of th e invar iant
 P lllP" lllt ' ol.lII "11111 ) \\t o .110 Iltnllo .II ' l l i l l t .1I1 1l1'l l l or , 01 1'OUp
o f 0 p.' r.ltllr!'\, ,.11),11.11' II I Pt' I IO l"ll1l llg lo t.,lIOIl . 11 .111 I.Itiou s, IHOII'll io n'i.
fc'ldings .1Ild .1 \'.l d,·')' o f o t her t''.ln ,fo rm.lt ioll ' i on It..lt cutitv. So the
o nto log ica l co nten t o f th e virtual mu st also IH' l'Uri, hl'd wi til at le.lsl
one ope ra to r. Th e qu asi-cau se is. indeed, thi s 0p"'rato r and it is dcfjncd
not by its giving rise to multipliciti es but by its capaci ty to affect them .
'T he qua si-cau se do es not create , it ope ra tes", as Dclcu zc says.v'
T his new entity must be as care fully co nstruc te d as multiplicit ies
were : C \ 'CI1' ste p in th e co nst ruct ion mu st meet the co nst ra int o f
avoid ing esse ntialist and typ ological catego ries , and all th e co nce pts
involved in its definition must be shown to be pre- indi vid ual. Roughl y,
the task which th e quasi-causal o pe rato r mu st acco mplish is to cre ate
am ong the infinite seri es springin g from each singularity ' reso nances o r
echoes', that is, th e most ethe real o r least co rpo re al of rclati on s.t" The
techni cal aspects of this task may be specified using co nce pts from
abstract co m municatio n th eor-y, In co m m unication th eo ry , th e actual
occurre nce of an event is said to provide information in proportion to
th e probabilities of the event 's occurrence: a rare event is said to provid e
more info r matio n on being actualized th an a co m mo n one .es These
events, each with its own probability of occ urre nce , may be arranged
in a se ries. \Vh en two separate series of events are placed in
co mm unicatio n, in such a way that a change in probabilities in on e
series affects the probability distribution of th e other, we have an
iriformation channel. A telegraph, with its co upled series of events
(electrical events defining letters in Morse code at both sending and
receiving ends of th e transmission line), is an example of an informa -
tion channe l. But in th e abst ract version of communication th eory
nothing whatsoever is said ab out th e physical realization of a channel ,
such as th e length of the transmission line, o r th e type of code used .
Simil arl y, no mention is mad e of information flowing through a
channel : an em issio n of a 'quantum ' of information is associat ed with
an)' change in probabilities in on e series relati ve to th e o the r series.
(Technicallv, th e tw o series are 'connecte d' o nlv through a co nd itional
" "
probability matrix. )""
T his definition of an infonnation cha nne l appea ls to Del cu zc pre -
cisely becau se of its highly abstract nat ure , presupposing no thing abo ut
det ails of physical impleme nta tion,"? But ma the ma tica l models using
dlllt-lIllll ,llld .lllllll II HIII'lh 1'11111 tid I I \'o l 1\ \ 1111 \ III \llllu
)( ' " lI11pl ) llllil ' 1IC1(IlIIl ~ \,hhl. Il 111 11 pl l 1lIll l\ lcllI.ll, \ ollll IlII"I 'pl
01 .HI .Ih , tr.l( t 111 101111.1111111 (l. ,lIUli I ( I I ,11111' ' Ollll1l 11 lli( .Ilioll" .1111011
~ l' ri ('~
of idt'.ll ('\(' lIt s 1I1t 1"i1 IH huthl I 1I .1Il 1IIIIIwd to hlTOI1l(' tr ill)
pro -individua l. I w ill 11ll'l1li 0 I1 h" I(' (111)' the 1110"t im por-ta n t rrq uin -
nu -nt , ah l10ugh Dl·leu /.l' d i..(u~.,,·~ S(·\t·r,ll more: th e idea l ('\( 'n1'oo
for ming a virt ual se-ries m ust not bl' conn'in'd as having nUn/t'n ca /
pro babilit il's of occ urre nce associated with them ; th l')' mu st b,·
.uranged in se ries using o nly o rd inal distan ces, and he d istingui sht'd
from o nc ano ther exclusively by the di fference between the singular
and the o rd inary , the ra re and th e common, without furt her specific-a
tion . In other words, the co upled changes in distribution s wh kh
co nstitute an informati on tran sfcr sho uld not be co nceived as chang"s
in co nd itional pro babilities, but simpI)' chanaes in the distribution of th e
sina ular and the ordinary within a series .b K
I will return in th e next chapte r to a m ore co m plete characte rization
o f the rela tions between th ese three elements of th e virtual (m ultipli-
cities, qua si-cau sal operat or, plane of co nsiste ncy) . But to co nclude the
present chapter I would like to address a possible obj ecti on to thi s
sche me, What motivat es th e postulation of a qua si-cau sal o pe rato r?
After all, we feel co nfide nt postulating th e existe nce of multipliciti es
to th e exte nt that we can study in th e laboratory certain phen omen a
(such as th e se ries of flow patterns cond uc tion- co nvect io n- t urbulencc)
which embody such a progressively determinable entity , Moreover, we
can also check empirically that a portion of th e same sym me try-
breaking cascade is exhibite d by othe r processes (embryological pro-
ces ses , for ex ample) which dep end on suc h different causal m echanism s
th at th ey alm ost demand we postul ate a mechanism -ind ep endent entity
as part of th eir explanation . Hut what ev ide nce d o we have that th ere
ar c int en sive processes which can spontaneously pciform iriformation
transmission operauonsi I will argu e in a moment that th e answer to thi s
qu esti on is th at th ere arc in fact such processes, and that th ey provide
th e justificati on for thinking that suc h ope rations may ind eed be
performed virtually. But before doin g that let me add th at thi s relian ce
o n 'evide nce ' fro m int en sive processes (mo re exac tly, a rel iance o n
traces left b), th e virtual in th e inten sive) would co nstit ute one of th e
main cha racteristics differentiating a th eory of thc virtual from a th eor-y
77
01 r-tet u ••1 ,111.1 11I1II 11It.ihll 1"'1 III I , lI l1 llk 1111 d 1'''011 11'" I' 01 I ' I 'm I '
in human th ought po ,tlll.lll'd Ii) lho ,~' ,, 1.0 hl,lIn, III ' ''I ii " lI l1li,'s.
the re wou ld lu- <.In rml'",C'hlJl '!J th l' ' /fIU.,I, 'I Ill' lOI I~ 'l· Pb. of " in ' lol l
multiplicit y, quasi-causal opt 'rat ur and pl.lIH· of ul lI:o;ish"lC)' would he .
in thi s sen se, concrete empirtco-ideal notions, not abst ract catl'gor ies. f,9
Is th ere any e vidence motivating th e po stul ation o f a qu asi-cau sal
operat or? There is, in fact, a rel ati vel y new field o f nonlinear scie nce
dedicated to th e st udy o f 'eme rge nt co m putation' , th at is, to th e st ud)'
of physical processes in 'which th e int eracti on s am on g co mpo nl' nts can
exhibit the capaci ty for non-trivial informati on processing ."? Th e
mean ing o f t he term ' com putation ' in th e co nte xt o f natural phenom-
ena is rel ativel y easy to grasp if we th ink about D NA and th e ce llular
machin ery for its transla tion, since thi s invo lves th e rel atively unprob-
lematic idea that bio logica l mechanism s have been evolved for th e
purpo se o f sto ring , transferring and processing information . But I want
to focus my discussion on a more gen era l se t o f physical phenomena
th at do not invo lve any specialized hardware and ye t can be said to
transmi t info rmati on . W e need to keep in mi nd that informatio n
transfer need not involve any co m pute r- like mec hani sm, bu t only th e
estab lishm ent (by whatever means) of a co rrel at ion bet w een t he
pr obabilit ies of occur rence of two seri es of events. As the phil osopher
Ken neth Sayre puts it, we can co nceive 'as an instance of informa tio n
transm ission any process in w hic h th e prob abili ty of o ne or more
mem be rs of an ensemble of eve nt s or sta tes is changed as t he result of
a change in p ro babili ty of an eve nt or state outside the ensem ble . Thus
co nceived , informati on tran smi ssion occurs with every physica l
process , ' 71
The simplest non -biological instance of spontane o us correlation
betw een the probabilities o f events is the behavi o ur o f mat erials near
phase transiti ons. In th is case the tw o se ries of e vents fo rming th e
info rmatio n channel are, in a way , co llapsed into on e, since the
co rrelations arc esta blished between th e probabilities o f occurre nce o f
spatially separate d events in on e and th e same syste m .72 More exactl y,
mat eri al syste ms ca n be characte rized th ermodynamically by certain
variab les wh ose values are not fixed (even at equilib rium) but rath er
fluctuat e (w ith d efinite probabilities) around a given sta te. It is th ese
/IUCtlltlllt 11U1".tIIUIIII1UII th, t .111 '''," hhl.'IIII,I .llllln 11101\1,('
(""...1-11 "1"1.,'I 1'1 1111 11"1111111 ,11 .. t1uo 1",111111 HI It. 11.111\ 1·(ltliIHOI.,thlc' ,
or put dill.... n ·ntl), thn .11' 1110 II 11It( lit II I,.tl .! It intort u.tuon
t r.m sm iscion occur". B il l .1 ., \ I. III "I'IHO.I' II,· .1 ph.IS'· t r .m su io u .
t1Il' S~' lluctuati ons I)(.'gill to di"pl.l) ,orn·l.llion" till' corre latio n len glh
{t he d istan ce across wh ich ,'\','n l" iulhu-ucv ".Iell o t her's pr ob ahilit icv)
incfl'asing th e closer th e s)'Slt:m gl'ts 10 th e crit ical po int. In t he ricinU)
oj the bifu rcation the capacity to transmit iriformation is maximized. Thi:o;
phe no me no n does not de pe nd on th e ph ysical mechani sm s und erl yin g
th e phase t ra nsition: th e same idea applies to a metallic mat eri al
switc hing fro m th e magn et ized to th e unmagnetized state , o r to .1
material sw itc hing from th e gas to th e liquid state . In o ther wo rds , 111l'
phen omen on o f strong co r rela tio ns between fluctuation events in till'
neigh bourhood of a ph ase transit ion displa ys div ergent uni versalit y." !
T o scie ntists w orking in th e field o f eme rge nt co mputa tio n thi s
univ ersality is highl y significan t. So me even think that thi s univ ersal
capacity for information transmi ssion is accompanied by com pleme nt-
ary capacities to store and process info rmatio n associated with other
characteristics of ph eno mena ncar phase transit ions.?" T his has led to
the hypothesis that the specialized hardware whi ch living organisms usc
to p rocess info rm atio n ma y have required that evo lut ionary forces kept
early o rga nisms poised at the ed8e of a phase t ransition , or 'w hat amo unts
to the same thing , away from any stab le altractor. C hr istopher
Langto n, a pio neer in th is field of research, puts it t his w ay:
Living syst ems ar e perhap s best characterized as systems that
dyna mically avoid att ractors . . . O nce su ch syste ms emerged near
a cr itical t ransition, evolution see ms to have discov ered the nat ural -
info rmatio n pro cessing capacit y inh erent in these near-critical
dynamics, and to have taken advantage of it to further the abi lit y o f
such s}"stems to ma intain th emselv es o n essentially open -ended
transients . . . T here is ample evidence in living ce lls to su ppo rt an
intimat e co nnectio n between phase transitions and life . 1\13n)' of the
processes and st r uct u res found in living ce lls are being maintain ed
at o r near phase transit ion s. Exa mples include th e lipid membrane,
whi ch is kept in th e vicinity o f a so l-gel tran sition; th e cytoske leto n,
79
 III \ 111.11 II" . 1101 0 1 11111 I o III I.III. " ' lit 101 11 Ih . 1'"1111 I.. 1\ " n Ih.11 111111111'111 III'" p''''' ''' tlWII 0\\11 111,10111 11\ ,11101 1""\I 'lIll1lg tI" '11I

~IO \\ l h .lIld dl ~~ollli i o ll : .llld

II" 1I.111II.11 101I .11 II I d. n .ll lII lll llIl (III' horn IH'ill~ l'OlIhl,, ·d \\111i (·... 1"11.11 .1I·.Ill'I\I"·" 1111' I ' .1 ''''III'I' ·IIll'1I1.11'\
pin g and unzipping) of' tlu - ('lIl11 p ll·1I11·nl.lr · sl r.lIl1 l. IIf I) , task III Ih~)sl' pl'l'lt)l'IIlI·d ill Ihis Ih.ll'lI'r : dn·..I0I'"lg .1 lIll'ol'y of t iuu:
with .ll'lu.\1 .lIld virtual IMl'l.s , thl' t wo dissinul.u: h.11 v", Iillkl'd I hrough
Kauffman 's networks o f' regulatory ge nes \ hich, as I discu ssed a properl y intensive form of temporalit y. It is to this other task that I
above, may form th e basis of processes of difl cr int iat ion in populations now turn .
of ce lls, arc also poised systems of thi s typ . T hat is, in thi s as ', to o,
the maxim um information transferring capacity is achi e ved wh en the
netwo rk is poised at the brink of a threshold, a threshold beyond
which this capacity melts away . It is much too earl y in th e dev elopment
of this research programme to assess the fu ll sign ificance of t hese
claims . Some of th e early form al results (usi ng cellular automata) have,
in fact, be en challenged .?" But the basic claim that th e vicinity of phas e
tran sitions is a sp ecia l pla ce wh en it com es to th e e merge nc e of
spontaneous information transmi ssion (as opposed to processing or
storage) is still valid. And it is th e ex iste nce of t his emerge nt capacity
in systems which come vel)' close to but do not actualize the phase transition,
which justifies us in pos tu lating such an en tit y as a quasi -causal
op erator.
In conclusion I would like to add that, as un familiar and ap parently
comp licated as De leuze 's scheme for t he prod uction of a virtual
continuum may seem, he must at least be given cre dit for working out
in detail (howev er speculatively) th e req uirements for th e elim inatio n
of an immutable world of transcendent ar ch etyp es. Giv en that essen ces
are ty pica lly po st ulat ed to explain th e existence of individua ls or of
natura l kinds, eliminating them involves giving an alt ernati ve explanation,
not ju st reducing th ese individuals and kinds to social conventions.
First , w e m ust give a detailed description ef th e int ensive processes ef
indi viduation which gen erate aetua lJorms. econd, we must sho w in detail
in what sen se the resources involved in individuation pro cesses ar e
immanent to th e world of matter and ene rgy , that is, we mu st not
sim p ly deny transccndentality in gcn eral but describe concrete mechanisms
ef immanence to explain how th e virtual is produced o ut of th e actual. The
two halves of this chapter ar e merely a ske tc h of how t hese two task s
ar e to be performed . The third and final requirement will invol ve
discu ssing th e temporal dimension of Del eu zc 's ontol ogy. This will
com plete the elim ination of esse nces we hav e bcgun here, ensuring

80 81

CIIAI'IIH ~ if pi 0 lll ,, ·d 111
The Actualization ~f the Virtual in Time
T here is a con flict at the heart of physics, a confli t between two
for ms of scie ntific temporality. O n one hand, the re is t he conception
o f time th at develop ed in th e most prestigiou s branches of phy ics ,
classical mechanics and lat er the special and general theories of
r elat ivit y. On th e o the r, th e co ncept of time born in humble areas of
applied ph ysics, such as eng ineering and physical che mistry, a co nce pt
wh ich eventually becam e th e time o f classical th ermod ynami cs. T he
main differen ce betw een th ese two forms of time , besid e th eir di ffer ent
degrees of int ell ectual prestige , is that whil e in classical and re lativist ic
physics th ere is no arro w o f time, th e time of th e scie nce of heat
co ntains a fundamental as)'mmetry betw een past and future . T his
asymmetry is exe m plified by th e fact that th ermod yn ami c syste ms have
a preferential directi on always tending to approach th ermal equilibrium
as th eir final sta te . As lon g as th ese two co nce ptio ns of time sim ply
coexiste d side by side , as th ey did for most o f th e nin eteenth ce nt ury ,
th eir co ntradic tory relations did not cause any major foundational
co nflicts in th e scientific co m m unity . But wh en th e physicist Ludwig
Boltzm ann attem pte d to unite classical physics and th ermodynami cs
into one un ified th eory (statistical mechanics) , th e co nt radiction
between reversibility at the microscopic level, at th e level of th e interac-
tion s between th e molecul es that make up a gas, for ex am ple, and
irreversibility at the macroscopic level, at th e level of co llective qu antities
like temperature or ent ro py, co uld no lon ger be avo ide d .'
Th e term ' revers ibility of time ' has nothing to do with th e idea of
time flowing backwards, that is, with a flow of time go ing from th e
future towards the past. Rather it refers to th e fact that if we took a
certain process, see n as a ser ies of eve nts, and reversed their seq uential
o rde r, th e relevant properties o f th e process w ould not change. 2 A
sim ple ex am ple fro m classical ph ysics would be th e moti on of an
object in a frictionless medium , such as a ball thrown up w ards in a
82
, 111111111 1011 0 lof It II .Ill II II of Illll 'I II I 11111 III II til II 111111 II
l'" 111011 :\ 111011 011 1" <l U' 1 of 1111 1" IlII ouiol 1,,0 <lh ti lt ,1111'I
II " l' r" , ()II II" 0 11", 1..11,,1, 1110 I p r ll" 't' III
1I11'I'IIHlll)II .II11ics, :-;1 1( h .1 dillusiou 0' lit .i t « OI" hl' 111111 , .11', ' not 1'1" "I
ibk in this svnsc. Diffusion, for «x.uuph-, tl'lId. to homo ', 'niz,' sm.rll
difference s or lIu .t uatio ns, t hat is, u-nd s to damp them. But if w, '
revers,' th e seq ucnce of event ' we gl' t th ' oppo 'it e effect . a clampin I
pron' " t urn ing into a proces ' of amplificatio n of fluctuations, I Math
c m atically, these ideas abo ut processes are expresse d in terms of t lu -
invariance if the laws governing a process: w hile t he laws o f .lassica]
and relat ivisti physics remain invar iant un der a time-reversal t rans
forma tion, the law s of th ermodynamics do not."
I will arg ue in t he foll owing chapte r th at most of th e o bjective
co nte nt of class ical ph ysics can be recov ered in an onto logy without
laws. But in th e traditional ontology of ph ysics, laws ar e clea r ly th ..
single m ost important enti ty . Thus, given th eir ontological ce nt ra lity
and th eir invariance under time -reversal, it is not sur prising th at for
mo st ph ysicists th e resoluti on o f th e conflict has tak en th e form o f
keeping th e sym me t ry o f th e laws whil e explaining irrev rsibility
away. " On th e other hand , th e emerge nce of new co nce pts in th e
nonlinear branches of classical ph ysics, as well as th e ex te nsion of
th ermod yn am ics to situatio ns far fro m eq uilibrium, has added new
mod els and new phen omena displ aying irreversibl e temporal behav-
iour, forcing a re -evaluation of t he co nflict's resolution . lIya Prigogin e ,
a leading pract it ion er in both th ese fields, has been one of th e most
voc al cri tics o f th e atte m pts to elim inate irreversibility. As he argu e ,
if reversing th e seque nce of eve nts which makes up a process has no
effect w hat oever on th e nature of time , then tim e becomes a mere
co ntaine r for eve nts happening in it:
Conse q ue nt ly, as Henri Bergson and othe rs em phasized , every thing
is given in classical physics: change is nothing but a denial of
becoming and time is onl y a parameter un affect ed by th e trans-
formation th at it describes, The image of a stable world , a world
th at esc apes th e process of becoming , has remained until no w th e
very ideal o f th eoreti cal physics . . . T oday we kn ow that ewto-
nian dyn ami cs describes only part of our ph ysical expe rience ...
 [hut It·l.tti,it .lI lt l l jl l.t ll t UIII pIa, 1t "lllI llC'llhcl till 1.1. 1 111
1\\ 111111.111 01 II l l l b t lt lll pul .1111 1 ' I 1111 I I I III ,I 1"" '1 I 111111 IJl Il\ Ul lll '
, .11 , · ..
php .il"s: ., static- uuiv erst', ., univ ('rs,' of bt·"'.'1 \\ Itlll HII I-c l'tI"",t/."
j
111m' \\Itll its nu -tru u u, 1111 1 1111 1.11 1, 1.1 Ih.lt urn,-
IU UI I, .' .... uuu-s
i.. n jl( Iik,' th.tt 01 ll., .. Il.11 ph\ It • Ih.lt I ~. t111ol1l"llt'd h th ,' pro n ·....t ·
T he Dcl cu zian onto lugy I have dc scr lhed in tl w sl' IMgl's is, o
n the .lIld tr.U1s IIJrl1lation... ml.Url lII' \\1111111 I I.
co ntra ry, o ne charac te r izing a uni verse o f bl-'comin s without bdnH.
Or Afu-r rl'vi('wing II H'I"'lI's tl wo r} .1111 1 sho wi ng how it rvlau -s 10
more exact ly a universe wh ere individual beings do e xist hut
o nly as I k lt-UZl" s, I will mo ve o n to discuss some of till' Inten sive l·h.lracl
th e o utcome of bccomi ngs, that is, of irreve rsible pr ocesses t ·r
of istics of rim e, those relating to the individ uation of th e sta ble osci
individ uation . T his is, of co urse, not a co inc ide nce , since Dcl cuz llator..
e was whi ch co lh-ctivc lv
greatl y influen ced by th ose phil osophe rs (suc h as Henri Bergson , create a metric temporali ty, . I will describ e th « wo rk
) wh o o f the nonline ar biologi st Arthur Winfre e wh o pionee red a method
were th e harshest critics of th e reversible and un creativ e tempor to
alit y st ud)' th e birt h and death of oscillati on s, o r more exactly , a method
of classical scien ce. Ne ve rt he less, th e th eory of tim e created to
by locate th e sensitive point in an oscillat ion at which an ex te rnal shoc
Del eu ze, a th eory which I will attemp t to recons truct in thi s chapter k of
, the right int en sity and duratio n can comple tely annihil ate it.
goe s beyond th e co nflict between rev ersibility and ir re ve rsibility 11<, h.lS
. The also inn'stigat cd th e opposite ph en om en on, how a stim ulus of th
problem of time in a Deleuz ian ontolog y needs to he approa e right
ched in int en sity and timing can givc birth to se lf-sustained osci llatio ns.
exactly th e same terms as that of space : we need to co nce ive WIMt
of a Winfre e ' s work sho ws is that th e seq ue nces of osci llations at d
non metric tim e, a tempor al contin uum whi ch through a sym ifferent
mc try- scales making up metric tim e cannot be view ed as co mposed
breakin g proc ess yields th e familiar, divi sible and measur able of
time of identical instants . Rath er, eac h seq ue nce will e xhibit a distribu
e veryday ex per ience. In particu lar, we canno t tak e for granted tion of
th e sinsular and ordinary instants bearing witness to th eir inte nsive
existe nce of a linear flow of tim e alr ead y divid ed into identica l o rigin.
instants W infree 's co nce pts of critical l imina , durat ion and intensit y will
bearing such clos e resemb lance to o ne anothe r that th e flow play a
Illay be cr ucial rol e in defining the int en sive or nonme tric aspects of time
regarded as essentially hom ogen eous. ."
Let' s begin th en with th e qu esti on of exte nsive tim e. A nested
In th e first part of this chapte r I will introdu ce th e ideas need set
ed to of cycles o r differe nt tempor al scales would see m to offer th
think about extensive and int ensive tim e. Th e term ' exten sive' e right
may be form of temporalit y for th e flat o ntology of individ uals I propos
applied to a flow of time already di vided into instants of ed
a s h'en before . In thi s ontolog y, individual organis ms are co mpo ne nt
extension or durati on, instants whi ch may be co unte d using parts of
any device species, mu ch as indiv idual ce lls are parts of the o rganisms themse
capable of perform ing regul ar seque nces of oscillat ions. These lves,
cyclic so th at ce lls, organis ms and species form a ne sted set of individ
sequen ces may be maintai ned m echan ically, as in old clock -w uals at
orks, o r d ifferent spati al scales . But clearl y, each of th ese individ uals
throu gh th e natural osci llatio n of ato ms , as in newer version s, also
but in o pe rates at a differen t tempor al scale so th at somc thing like a
ei the r case sequences if cycles of differen t exte ns ion arc used to nest ed
measure set of cycles would he need ed to com plete th e picture . On th
stretches of time of differen t sca les : second s, minute s, hours, e other
days. hand, to think of species , o rganisms o r ce lls as possessing
Thi s idea , on th e other hand , may be ex trapo lated from th e measur a sing lc
ing characte rist ic spatial scale is too sim plified . As I said, between
process to the very process which gives birth to tim e . I will discu the ce ll
ss a and th e organ ism th ere ar e a vari ety of spatial str uct ures
theory by th e nonline ar physicist Arthur Iberall accordi ng to whi (tissues ,
ch th e organ s, syste ms of organ s) bridgin g th e two scales. A species ,
measurable flow of tim e of our eve ryday expe ri ence is in fact a in turn,
produc t is typicall y co mpo sed of severa l reprod uct ive co m m unities
of a metrirat ion o r a quantiz ation of tim e int o instants . Betwee (de mes)
n th e inhabit ing differen t ecosyst ems, each com m unity co nstit ut ing
fastes t vibra tions of subato mic particle s and th e e xtre mely long an indi -
life- vidual o pe rating at a inte rmedia te spat ial scale betwee n
eyell's o f sta rs and o the r cos m ic bodi es, Iberall imagin es a nested that of
set o rga nism and spe cies.
 11111111 1' "1/11 11'1'1.. 10 10 1111'"1 d 11111 I 1'" ,III It, ,,1 111 d, pi I III III I 1111 II I , hlll It . I

dl\pl.l) 1/1 1 .1 I', l/ WIII oj /111I "II 1.111 IIldl 1, 111 I 0 1 ' 111 1 III , I" 11,,1" II,hll ' ,III OII 0 111 0111 III lilt 11'1. " I ti ll 1>tIIl HI ( 0 1
" . .u n p l. p O SM ' SS iut vrna] 10, b \\ hi, h " 1.,1111 h 1111 " I tI" II 1"lIlpOI •.I dur.iuon ) 01 till' ," I. III Ih 111111 dl II r1'1111011 11I1l h.in ,,·d, ,.II
, ..
S 'ales (t h .ir sln' l> awake cycle), but 111.1" ,llso h. " , 1II01llhh ,md vi-ar l .

cycles and e ven lon ger Dil es, like lilt' 1"IIgih o r tim , 1ll',·d,'d 10 achieve
olh ' I S \\ ill en',ll, ' ,I
ori rina ] one , As I' ri
I

O'llll ,llId
'I"' II ' \ " I ,', Ii Ih ,ll \\ ilh Ih,
IS 0 11I

i, "I.s plll it, ,1 process 'i n tilt' n - 'i nl!

(If I}h(/~l'

sex ual maturity (r product ive ycl .s) . They also pll"sess lllallY short ' r
cycles displa yed in d iffere nt typ es of rh ythm ic be haviour: br eath ing ,
ma sti cati on , locomotion . Thi s mean s that act ual ti m e , rath er t han bein g
a simp le nesting of cycles , ma y include ove rlaps between th multi -
plicity of temporal scales asso ciated w ith each le vel of ind ividuality. In
th e present conte x t , however, it wi ll be more ex pe die nt to assum e a
sim ple e m be dding of time scales. For thi s purpose w e can assign (by
conventi on) a particu larl y prominent time scale to each indi vidu al
le vel, such as th e cycle wh ich m easures th e maint enance if th eir identity:
th e length o f tim e aft er which all (o r most ) o f th e individual ce lls in
an organism hav e been rep laced by new on es without affecting the
organism ' s identity, or the length of time aft er whi ch all th e indi vidual
organism s that form a sp eci es have died and new ones have taken th eir
pla ce, th ereb y preserving th e co ntinuity o f th e species' own identity.
This sim p lified nested set of cycles wi ll constit ute my working model
of ex te ns ive or actual time . The qu estion now is whether thi s m etri c
temporality can be accounted for in th e sam e way as m etric spa ce , that
is, as the product of a sym metry-b re aking event .
N onlinear dynami cs, in fact, allo ws a natural approach to th e
quantization or m etrization o f time in terms of spontaneous broken
sym met ry. In particular, th ere is a w ell -studied bifurcati on , the Hop'!
bifurcation, which con verts a ste ady state attract or into a periodic on e ."
To see in w hat se nse this bifurcation implies a broken time sym met ry
we can use a spatial analogy, I said before that th e pha se transiti on
from a gas to a crys talline state offere d an ex am ple o f a loss o f
invariance under spatial displ acement. While th e pattern of distribution
in space for th e gas remain s basically th e same under all di spl acements
(if we ima gin e th e gas store d in an infinite co ntaine r) a regular
arrangement of crys tals loses so me o f thi s invariance and remains
visually un changed only for a specific number of displa cements (t hose
matching th e len gth of individ ual crys tals, or multiples of th at len gth) .
Sim ilarly , th e time di stribut ion of a pro ces ' ca ught in a steady state
of uniform stcac lv stall' . . , ignores t imc . But once in till' pl'riod i,
re 'ime, it sudd 'n ly "dis overs" time in t h ph ase of the periodic
motion . . . We refer to th is as the breakinB if temporal symmetry. ' 10
Unl ike linear osci llato rs (those most pr valent in c1assi al and
rel ati visti c physics) , a non linear oscillator born from a Hopf bifurcati on
d ispl ays a characteristic period (and amplitude). By co nt rast, th e peri od s
and am plitudes o f linea r osci llators (typ ically modell ed as sinusoi da l
osci llat ions) are not intrinsic but dep end on co ntinge nt det ails abo ut
thei r initi al co nditions. 'I Arthur Iberall uses thi s ide a of an intrinsi c tim
scale not de pe nde nt on ext rins ic co nst raints as a basis for his th eory of
th e quantizat ion of time . As he puts it , suc h a th eory sho uld be bas ' d
on
. . . th e m ath ematics of sequences if pulses urifoldinB in time as
distinpuisbed from sustained sinusoidal oscillatio ns. The basic idea is th at
each pul se of acti on , in a nonlinear syste m em be dde d in a real
univ erse, emerges as a new cre ation out of its past . It is th
sustaine d lin ear instability in th e local env iro nment [which cause d
th e Hopf bifurcati on in th e first place) th at ens ures th e rep etiti ve
quality of th e acti on. On th e other hand , in th e ideali zed lossless
[i.c . co nse rv ative ) linear isochron ou s syste m, with its cha racte ristic
susta ine d sinusoidal oscillation, causality for th e acti on would be
yoke d irrevocabl y to th e e nd less past and to an un ending fut ure . 12
Iberall argu es that , give n that nonlinear osci llato rs hav e a characte r -
isti c tim e scale, ra nging from th e ve ry sho r t cales o f at omic oscillators,
to th e intermediate scales of biol ogical osc illato rs, to th e very long
Iifecycles of stars and othe r cos m ic bodi es, we ma y view th em as
forming a nested set of levels. This em bedde d set would e nsure 'the
unfolding of time , pul se by pulse . . . Time is not a uni versal unity for
all le vels o f org anizatio n . Yet le vel s are nest ed within one an other and ,
w ith in limi ts, are re ferable to each ot he r .' 1 3 In other words, ra ther

86
 I N T E N S I V E SCIENCE AND VIRTUAL PHILOSOPHY
than assuming th at time ex ists as an alre ady qu anti zed flow (d ivide d
into uniform, iden tic al instants ) we should accountJor th is metric structure
using th e em bedde d set of differently scaled osci llatiuns . In a sense ,
eac h oscillation would 'synthesize a pul se of me tric time , many nest ed
sequences of th ese pul ses yield ing th e famili ar for m of time w hich we
hum ans can measure using a variety of chrono me te rs. T his co ncc pt of
tim e is remarkably clo se to that of Del eu zcs for whom each of th ese
pulses of acti on would constitute a synthes is of ' present tirn e ' (the
'lived present ' of at omic, biological and cosmic osci llato rs) , a synthes is
th at wo uld work by contracting an immediate past and futu re into a
living present. He refers to thi s m etric or ex tensive time by th e name
of 'Chro nos ", and writes:
In acco rda nce to Chronos, onl y th e present exis ts in time . Past ,
presc nt and future ar e not three dimen sion s of tim e; onl y th e
presen t fills tim e, wh ereas past and future are two dim en sions
rel ative to th e present in time . In othe r words, whatever is future
o r past in relation to a certain present (a certa in ex te nsion or
durati on ) belongs to a mor e vast present whi ch has a gre ate r
extension o r duration . Ther e is alway s a mo r e vast present whi ch
abso rbs th e past and th e fut ure. Thus, th e rel ativity of past and
future with resp ect to th e present entails a rel ativity of th e pr esents
the msel ves in relation to each oth er . .. Chronos is an encasement , a
coW ng up tif relati ve presents . . . 14
Let mc ex p lain in wh at sense each cycle would co nstitute onl y a
present, and not a past or a future . Given an osci llato r at a particul ar
scale (a biological clock , for instan ce) , w hat is immediate past and
fut ure fo r such an enti ty would still be part of th e ' lived' present of
..Inosci llato r o pe rating at longer tim e scales, at th e level of geo log ical
or ste llar dynam ics, for exa m ple . Co nve rsely, th e minimum living
present for a biological oscillato r already includ es man y past and future
eve nts fo r osci llators operating at ato mic and sub-ato m ic scales. Metric,
ex tens ive tim e would the n be funda me ntally cycl ical and 'composed
only of interlockin g pr esents' .I 'i I mu st em phasize at th is point that,
desp ite th e refe re nce to a 'Hvcd pr esen t ' , this acco unt of tim e has
nothing to d o with psychological tim e . It is tru e that Dclcuz c
TH E A CT UA LIZATI ON O F T H E V I R TU A L IN T IME
some times presen ts his theory of the syn thesis of th e presen t by
co ntraction of immedi at e past and futu re , as a psycholo gical theory,
bu t thi s is sim ply a matter of convenience of presentati on and not
fundamental to his account. 16
T he idea that it is not subject ive ex perience but th e o bjective t ime
scale of osc illato rs th at matt ers m ay be furthe r illustrat ed with a well -
known ex ample fro m rel ativit y th eory 1 an exa m ple w hich has some-
times led to confusion du e to a mistaken psych ological interpretation.
The example co ncerns two twin brothers one of which stays on earth
whil e th e twin travels in a spaceship at a speed clo se to that of light.
The rel ati vistic co nclusion that th e twin o n th e spaceship wo uld age
much less than th e o ne wh o staye d on earth has some times been
challenge d o n the gro unds tha t th e differen ce between th e two
situations is a matter of subjective co nve nti on : w hile th e twin in th e
spaceship may be said to be m oving forwards rel ati ve to th e one on
th e ea rth , it is also possible to say th at, takin g the spaces hip as our
fra me of referen ce, it is th e ear th that is mo ving backwards relative to
th e ship , so that th e sit uation is strictly sym me tric. Giv en this
sym me try, th e shrinkage of ti me wo uld be an illusion, sim ilar to th e
appa re nt shrinkage in size which observ ers ex pe r ience as th ey ge t
further awa y from eac h othe r. 17 This conclusion is, of co urse , false. As
th e phil osopher Han s Rei chenbach argu ed lon g ago, th e sit uation for
th e two twin s is not symmetric. T o see this, ho wever, we must go
beyond the psychol ogical time of th e ob serv er to th e time scale of th e
osci llato rs tif which the observer is composed , not o nly the biological
oscillato rs defining metab olic cycles at th e cellular scale , but also th e
ato mic oscillators of wh ich th e cells th emsel ves are m ad e . It is th ese
osci llators that ar e objectively ~cled in th e case of th e rapidl y moving
twin, slo wing down and hen ce retarding th e aging process, but not in
the case of his eart hbo und co unterpart. I S
A better wa y of explaining in wh at sense we may speak of th e 'liv ed
present ' of a particul ar osci llato r is through th e relati on s between
objective time scales , on one hand , and the resulting capacities to
alTect and be affecte d, on th e othe r. I said in Chapte r 2 th at wh at on e
individ ual m ay afford another may dep en d on their relati ve spat ial
scales: the surface of a lake affor ds a wa lking medium to a small insect
hut not to a large mammal. A sim ilar poin t applies to time scales. Each
 I NTE NSIVE SCI EN CE AN D VI RTUAL PHILOSOPHY
level of tempo ral scale defines wh at oscillators at that level 'perceive .'
as relevant chance: certain cycle s ar e simply too slow for them to appear
as changing or moving relati ve to a faster level , and vice versa , certain
oscillations ar c much too fast for th em to even co unt as existing for
oscillators op e rating at lon ger time scales . Subject ive human tim e, o ur
psycho logically lived present with its ex pe rie nced duration , would
become in this interpretat ion a particu lar case of th ese obj ective
rel at ions of mu tual rel evance between the affordances of osci llators,
Indeed , we may gen eralize this po int to include physi cal phenomena
which cannot be character ized as periodic . W hat matters for this
arg umc nt is th e existence of characteristic time scales, whether on e thinks
of these in terms of the intrinsic period of cyclic attract ors or, more
ge ne rally, in term s of th e relaxati on time associ ated with any kind of
attractor.
An exam ple of what is meant by 'r elaxat ion tim e' is the time taken
by a radio transmitter to settle into a stable pe riodic sta te aft er being
t ur ned on , what engineers refer to as ' tr ansient beh aviou r ' . These
transients occur in man y phenomena and in each case they disp lay a
charac te ristic time scalc .!" In state-space terminology this can be
ex plained as follows . As I said before , all trajectories within a particular
basin of attraction will be deterministica lly drawn to th e att rac to r .
O nce there they may be temporar ily dislodged from th e attractor by
an ex ternal shoc k but as long as th e shock is not int en se enough to
expe l them from th e basin , they will return to the attractor-. In thi s
case , the tim e taken for the trajectory to return to its att ractor is its
re laxa tion tim e . Ho w this relates to the qu estion of affordances may
be illustrat ed with an example ada pted from Arthur Iberall . T here arc
some so lid materials, refer red to generically as 'glasses' , wh ich un like
their crystalline co unte rparts, do no t have a well-defined phase transi-
tion from th e liquid state. In a sense, glasses are 'arres ted liquids' , that
is, th ey retain thc amo rpho us spatia l arrangement of molecul es that a
liquid displays but flow much more sJo wly. Roughly, th e distinction
bet ween th e glass and liquid states can be mad e in terms of relaxation
times: th ese ar c relati vely long for glasses and rel ati vely sho rt for
liquids.
lhcrall argUl~s th at w het he r a particu lar ho dy dppcaTs solid or liquiJ to
d Hil'cn observer w ill depend on the rati o lu-twccn re laxat ion and
THE A CTUALIZATION OF T HE VIRTUAL I N T IM E
obse rv ational tim e scales , in th e sense that for sufficie ntly long
obse rva tional tim es th e glass will appear t o th e obser ver as a flowi ng
liquid. "? Th c inclusion of th e observ er in thi s description may give the
wrong impression that some thing psycho logical is being discu ssed , but
this impression disso lves on ce we realize that ' o bservation' is sim ply
on e particular instance of ' inte ractio n ' , In other words, what co unts
here is th e ratio ef relaxati on tim e to int eraction time, a ratio that can be
defined witho ut inclu ding a human ob server in th e picture. In particu-
lar , we can let the liquid and glass interact with each other and spe ak
of how so lid th e g lass 'a ppears' to th e liqui d , and vice versa. The glass,
given its long relaxation tim e scale relative to the scale of interaction
with the liquid, will be have as a so lid , affording th e liqu id, for instance,
an ob stacl e to its flow, or afford ing it a channel in which to flo w . Th e
flowing liquid , in turn, wi ll afford eros ion to th e glass. In sho rt , what
capacities the g lass has to affect and be affect ed by th e liqu id will
depe nd on their rela tive time scales , the characteristic d urations of
their rel axati on to eq uilih r ium .
T he objectiv e rel ati vity of afTo rdance s with respect to te mp oral
scales mak es them the ideal candidate to defi ne th e ' lived present ' of a
particu lar indi vidual, that is, wh at this individual 'per ceives' within its
o wn tim e scale as th e rel evant capaci ties of th e other individuals
interacting with it. It is in th is sen se th at Deleu zc allirms , q uite
literally , that even ino rgani c things 'have a lived ex perien ce ' . 2 1 T o
sum marize th e ma in concl usio n of this sec tio n: material and ene rge tic
processes give time its metric and measurable for m by th eir po ssession
of a characte ristic time scale , specified either through relaxation times,
or as I will d o in th e rest of thi s secti on, through the intrinsic per iod
of nonlinear oscillati on s. To phrase thi s co ncl usio n in Del eu zc' s words,
at anyone of these em bedded time scales the present is 'cyclical,
me asures th e movement of bod ies and depends on the matter that
lim its it and fills it o ut ' . 22
Having ske tc hed ho w exte nsive time should he co nce ived in a
Dcleuzian onto logy I would like to move on to discu ss th e ideas
neede d to think abo ut the int ensive aspects o f temporality , In th is book
qu esti on s of inten sit y have been mo st ly relat ed to th e problem of the
ge nes is of ind ivid uals. In the case of the non linear osci llato rs wh ich
<Iuanti i",e tim e Arthur Winfn 'c 's uxpc rinu-ntal and theoretical work
 I N T E N S I V E SCIEN C E AND V IFIT UAL PH I L OS OPHY
gives us, as I said, the means to explore the intensive properties
involv ed in th e birth and death o f osc illatio ns. Winfree ' s best -known
wor k deals with populations o f uiological osc illato rs (t he internal clocks
of fruit flies or mosquitoes , for instance) which he isolates from their
surroundings to perform co ntro lled ex perime nts on their reaction to
shocks o f different timing , duration and intensity. Winfree ' s main
result is, basically, that a stnquiat, critical st imulus applied at a smqu lar,
sensitive moment has a destructive effect o n the slee p- awake cycle o f
organisms , giving a popul ation of mosquitoes, for example, pennanent
inso rnnia .:" The stim ulus itself need s to be of th e right duration and
intensity in order to act as an annihilating shock , but it neverthel ess
acts not as a direct cause of the death o f an osci llation but merely as a
trigger. What effect th e shock will have will dep end o n th e internal
in tens ive structure o f the osci llato r itself.
For exam ple, if the osci llation is go verned by a period ic attractor
wh ich co ntains within it a stable steady-state attractor (what Winfree
calls a ' blac k hole ' ) th en th e crit ical stimulus will co mpletely annihilate
th e osc illatio n . H On th e other hand, th e result of the st im ulus may be
not steady-state, atemporal behaviour but arrhythmic, ambiguous
temp oral behaviour, if the periodic attracto r is associated with a set of
sta tes (called a 'phaseless set') bounded uy a phase sing u!arity ." In
addition to these results related to the extinction of oscillations,
Winfree has st ud ied the co mple m entary problem o f wh at gives rise to
th ese osci llati ons in the first plac e. Basically, he has found tbat by
changing the expe r-imental co nditions he can transform an annihilating
stimulus into a conj urina sti mulus, that is, a critical shoc k that can create
osci llations, the phase singularity in this case becoming an organizing
cent re for temp o ral str uc t urcs .?" Winfre e' s results display many o f the
traits that we have found characterize intensive processes, in particular,
mechani sm-independent t endencies. The tenden cy to be annihilated by a
critical shoc k, for example , is no t limit ed to the te mporal behaviour o f
animals with nervou s systems but is also exhibited by thc behaviour of
much simpler oscillators , ranging from )'east cells to inorganic chemical
rca crions .?"
O t her aspects o f W infree ' s wor k on osci llators illustrate a difi'erent
fC.'.ltUfl· of the Intensive: the ability o f non linear osci llators tu synchromre
or entrain o ne anothcrs tem poral be haviour, I said in Chapter 2 that
T HE A CT UALIZAT I ON OF TH E V IFIT UAL I N TI M E
the definition o f 'intensive ' may be e xpanded to include capacit ies, and
in particular, the capacity o f an individual to form assemblages with
individuals very different from itself, Unlike the quantitative o r
qualitative properties of an individual, which as emergent properti es
refer to an individual' s inside (that is, to the interactions among the
lower scale ind ivid ua ls which co mpose it) , an intensive propert y in the
ex panded sense refers to 'an adequate outside with which to assemble in
heterogeneity' , as D eleu ze puts it. 211 The capacity of nonlin ear osci lla-
tors to entrain o ne another's temporal behaviou r is a particularly
striking example o f this o ther aspect o f the intensive, allo wing
biolog ical osci llators, for instance , to synchronize their sleep-awake
cycles w ith cycles outside themselves, suc b as the day-night cycle of th e
planet. Entrainme nt is another phenom enon which Winfree has studied
in d et ail, partly because o f th e need to prevent it from happ ening
whil e st udying th e effects of annihilating stimula. O nly if mosquito o r
fruit fly populations are isolated from th e effects of the Earth 's rotati on
will th eir int ernal clocks di splay th eir intrinsic duration or period . This
period varies for different animals , from twenty-three hours for
mo squitoes to twenty -five for humans, explaining the name 'circadian'
given to these clo cks, a term meaning 'nearly a day' s length' ,
When no t in isolat ion, circadian docks becom e entrained with
the planet's own rotationa l period of tw ent y-four hours, a synchro -
nizing capacity with obvious adaptive value since it allows a fle xible
coo rd ination of internal rh ythms and seaso nally cbanging day lengt hs.
Thanks to entrainme nt, biologi cal oscillators can mesh, or form
a het erogen eous assemblage , with th e d aily and seaso nal rh ythms
o f their ex ternal environme nt. Entrainme nt displays the typical
characte ristics o f an intensive process, st im ulus- ind ependence and
mechanism- independence . Synchroni zation o f temp oral behaviour is
t rigge re d rather than ca used uy rel ati vel y weak co upling signals
wh ich may be o ptical, chemical o r mechanical. The exact nature o f
the signals serving as stimuli is not as important as their intensity:
these signals must be maintained at a critical threshold o f strength
else the synchronization will abruptly stop.?" A similar indifference is
d isplayed to wards the mechanisms implem enting osci llating beh aviour:
e nt rainmen t occurs in po pulatio ns of purdy physical oscillators. such
as the vihrating <.'omporwnts of lase r light. in inorganic chemical
 INTENS IVE SCIENCE AND V IRTUA L PH ILOS OPHY
reacti ons, and in a large varie ty o f hiological osci llators , including the
men strual cyc les of humans. ?"
Th e th eory of metric time in terms of a nested set of cycles wh ich I
sketched above involves a kind of tem porality whi ch is inherent ly
sequential , each individual life being a linear seq ue nce of osci llations.
T he first part of W infr-ee ' s work sho ws th at th ese linear seque nces arc
not , in fact , homogen eous series of identical mom ents o r instants.
T he re are, in eac h series. a distribution of singula r and ordinary moments
and this distribution implies th at th ere exist relati on s of critica l tim ing
be tween th e sensitive points of osci llato rs and exte rnal shoc ks . The
second part of his work displa ys a different aspect of int en sive time.
an aspect which tak es us beyond seq ue ntial and int o parallel temporal
structu res. The phenomen on of ent rainme nt allo ws many ind ep endent
seq ue nces of oscillatio ns to act in unison, to become in e ffect a sing le
pa ra llel process. The most dramatic and well -studied example of thi s
ph en om en on is perhaps th e slime m ould Dicty ostetium. The lifecycle of
this crea ture involves a phase wh ere the organi sm s act as individual
amoebae , th e behaviour of each co nstit uting an ind ep endent seq ue ntial
proCl~ss . At a cr itical low point of availability of nutrients, however,
we witness th e spontaneo us aggregation of an entire population of
these amoeb ae into a single field of parallel osc illato rs , eve ntually
leadin g to th eir fusing together into a single organi sm with differenti-
an-d parts. As on e scientist has remarked, witnessing this ph enomenon
'one may reall y be watching a replay of th e basic kind s of events
responsible for th e appe arance of th e first multicellular organi sm s.' JI
In th e next sect ion of thi s cha pte r I would like to extend th ese ideas
abo ut critica l duration and timing as well as parallelism to more
co mplex processes of individuation than th ose exe m plified b), th e slime
mo uld . But let me first sum mar ize what I have said abo ut th e birth of
metric or ex te nsive tim e . I gave be fore an exam ple of how eac h of th e
embedde d cycles mak ing up thi s form of temporalit y may be said to
I", bo rn th rough a sym metry- brea king event (a Hopf bifur cati on ). Thi s
was , ho we ver, a purely forma l exam ple leaving o ut th e det ails of
prol'l'ss wh ich co nstit ute th e subs ta nce of th e inte nsive. Addi ng to th is
forma l model W infree ' s experime ntal results m itigat c but do no t
l'ompll'tt' ly so lve tilt' problem , \ Vc can compare this simplified mod el
of tilt' birth of me tric tlrnc to th e me ta phor I lISt,1! in the J.lst cha pter
THE ACTUALIZATION OF T H E V IR TUAL IN TIME
to illustrate th e birth of m etric space. T he neat picture of a sym me try-
breakin g cascade transforming a topological space int o a metric o ne
had to be co m pre he nsively reworked to make it physically plau sible :
th e non metric aspects of int ensive pro cesses t urned out to be subtle
and co mplex, as did th e metric aspects of the ex te nsive products;
mo reove r , th e least m et ric level of the embed de d set had to be
replaced with a virt ual co nti nu um wh ose description required ye t
anot he r set of co mplex co ncepts.
A sim ilar co m plcxification is now in o rder to put some Ilesh on the
rath er skeletal form al model of a Hopf bifurcation . I will return to my
two e xamples of individu at ion processes (the ge nes is of o rganis ms and
species) not o nly to add detail to W infree 's ideas abo ut cr it ical timing
and parall elism , but more importantly, to sho w how int en sive tempo-
rality may be crucia l to th e eme rge nce of novelty in biological evo lutio n .
The process of embryogenes is, for instance. involv es th e parallel
dev elopment of many sim ulta neo us seque nce s of events, th e relation s
between th ese seq ue nces det ermined in part by th e relative duration
of these processes with respect to one another, and by th e relative
timing of th e on set or ce ssation of onc proces s relative to ano ther. At
this scale, as I will argue in a moment, th e eme rgence of brand new
design s may come about through relative accelerations in these parallel
processes. A different source of novelty may be illustrated by moving
up in scale to a discussion of ecos ystems, which as individuation
enviro nme nts m ay be said to play rel ativ e to spe cie s the role which an
egg or a womb play for individual organi sm s. In thi s other case too ,
relative accel erations in the tempo of evolution m ay lead to radi cal
inno vations. Unlike the temporality of th e embryo, howev er, wh ere
th e term ' inte nsive' has its o riginal mean ing, ecosyste ms will involv e
th e e xpande d m eaning, th at is, th e so urce of accelerati on and inn ova -
tion in thi s case is th e asse mblage of het erogen eou s species in th e
process known as sym biosis.
Let me begin with th e tempo ral aspects of th e ge nes is of o rga nisms .
In the last chapter I em phasized th e role of rat es of change and co uplings
be twee n sepa rate rates as key to und erstanding embryologica l deve l-
o pml·nt. Altho ugh a rate of chang e d ocs not need to invol ve ti me (we
may he interested in th e rate of change o r pressurt' relat ive to oceanic
dept h or at mos pheric ht'ight . for exam ple}, tinu: d ocs en te r int o the

I NTEN SIV E SC IENCE A ND V IRTUAL P H ILOSO P HY
formulation of many important rates. These rates of cha nge display th e
same int erplay between characte r istic time scale and alTordances whi ch
I mentioned before in connec tio n to rel axation times (the latter ar e , in
fact , nothing but rates of ap pro ach to eq uilibr ium) . A process ma y
change too slo wly or too fast in r elati on to another pr ocess, the
relationship between th eir temporal scales det ermining in part th eir
respectiv e capacities to affect on e another. Even wh en two pr ocesses
ope rate at sim ilar scales, th e result of th eir interaction ma y dep end on
th eir co upled rat es of change. For exam ple , th e graphic patterns whi ch
man y o rganisms displa y in th eir skins (e .g. zebra stripes or leopard
spots) may be explained as th e r esult of th e var iable co nce ntration of
che m ical substances, a conce ntration whi ch dep ends on th e rat es at
whi ch substances react with each other relative to the rates at whi ch
th e products of such reaction diffu se through an em bryo's sur faces.
Different patterns may be achieved by contro lling th ese relative rates,
a task performed by gen es and gen e products (e nzymes).
As th e phy sicist Howard Pattee has co nv inc ingly ar gu ed , in th e
developing organism we find an int erplay between rate-d ependent
phen om ena (like che mical reaction and diffu sion effects) and rat e-
independent ph en om ena . Whil e th e formation of sel f-o rganize d patterns
of che m ical conce ntr ation do es dep end on th e relati ve rates of diffu sion
and reacti on , th e information containe d in genes do es not depend on
th e rat e at whi ch it is decoded . On th e other hand , thi s rat e-
ind ep endent information, once translat ed into enzymes , act s by control-
line rates. t? Enzymes ar e catalysts , and th e latter are defin ed precisely
as chemical el ements capable of accel erating or decel erating a che m ical
r 'actio n . T he fact that em bryo logical development is all about rat es of
change w hich are co upled or un coupled through th e action of ge nes
and gene pr oducts, sugges ts that th e processes underlying embry ologi-
cal de velopm en t ma y be view ed as a kind of 'compute r program ' . But
this met aph or sho uld be used care fully becau se th ere ar e different
kind s of co mpute r programs pr esupposing diffe rent fo rms if time, so me
lIsing se q ue ntial o r se rial tim e , ot he rs departing sharp ly from th ese
linear forms o f temporal ity. As St ua rt Kauffman puts it :
It is a major initial point to realiz e that, in whatever sense the
gen omic regulatory system constitutes something like a develop-
T HE A C TU ALI Z A T ION OF THE V I R TU AL IN T I M E
ment al program , it is almost ce rtainly not like a serial-processing
algo rithm . In a ge nom ic syste m, each ge ne responds to th e vario us
'pr oducts of tho se ge nes whose pr oducts regulate its acti vity. All th e
different ge nes in the network ma y respond at th e same time to th e
o ut put of th ose ge nes w hich regul ate th em . In othe r words , th e
ge nes act in parall el. T he network, in so far as it is like a co m pute r
program at all , is like a parallel-processinp network. In such net works,
it is necessar y to co nside r th e simulta neous activity of all th e ge nes at
eac h moment as well as the temporal proeression if th eir activity
patterns. Suc h progression s constit ute th e integrated beh aviors of th e
parallel -processing ge no mic regulatory syste m . 3 .3
Thinking about th e temporality involv ed in individuation processes
as em bodyi ng th e parallel op eration of many different sequential
processes throws new light on th e qu estion of the emerge nce of
novelty. If em bryo log ical processes followed a st rictly seq uential order,
that is, if a unique linear segue nce of eve nts defined th e production of
an organi sm , th en any nov el struct ure s would be const raine d to be
add ed at the end if th e sequence (in a process called 'terminal addition' ) .
On th e contrary , if em bryo nic development occurs in parallel, if
bundles of relatively inde pe nde nt pr oc esses occ ur simulta neously, th en
nell' desien s may arise ]rom disenBaBinB bundles, o r more pr ecisely, from
alt ering th e duration of one process relative to another, or th e relative
timing of th e star t o r end of a process. Thi s evo lutionary design
strategy is known as heterochrony, of whi ch th e most exte nsive ly studied
case is th e pro cess called 'n eoten y'. 34
In neot en y th e rate of sex ual maturation is disengaged from th e rate
of development of th e rest o f th e body, ind eed, accelerated rel ativ e to
som atic development, resulting in an adult form which is a kind of
'g ro w n- up lar va ' . 3 5 Neoten y illustrat es that nov elty need not be th e
e ffect of terminal additi on of new features , but on th e co ntrary, th at it
can be the r esul t of a loss of certa in o ld features. Humans, for ex am ple ,
ma y be regard ed as ju venalized chim panzees, that is, primates from
wh ich a developmental stage (ad ulthoo d) has been eliminate d . More
ge ne ra lly, the loss of a feature mad e possible by th e un coupling of
rat es o f change may pr o vide an esca pe rout ' from morphologies that
have becom e too rigid and specia lized allo wing organisms to ex plore
 IN T E N S I V E SC IENCE AND V IRTUAL PHIL OS OP HY
new developmenta l pathways. J" T o Del eu ze thi s aspcct of indiv iduation
pro ces, es (an aspect which must be ad de d to populati on thinking to
co mplete the Darwinian revol utio n) is highly significant because it
el im inates the idea that e volutio nary processes possess an inh erent
d r ive towards an increase in co m plexity, an idea wh ich reintroduces
teleology into Darwinism . As he writes, "re lat ive progress . , , can
occ ur by formal and quantitative sim plification rather th an b)' com pli-
cation, by a loss of co mpo ne nts and syn theses rath er than by acq uisition
. . ' It is thro ugh population s that o ne is for me d, assumes forms, and
thro ugh loss that one progresses and picks up speed .' 17
T he flexibi lit y with whi ch parallel processes endo w e mbryo logical
dev elopme nt may be said to co me to an end once the final o rganism
acq uires a more o r less fixed anatomy, T ha t is, at this poi nt th e
int en sive becomes hidden under th e exte nsive and qualitative . Yet ,
anato m ical feat ures arc never fully fixed even in ad ulthood . Many parts
of the body retain their capacity to sel f-re pair , and in some animals
eve n thc capacity for com plete re generation . Additio nally, even if
relative to th e flexibili ty of an embryo the anatomical propert ies of a
finished organism are ind eed rigid , its behavi oural properties may no t
he, parti cul arl y if suc h an orga nism is end o wed with flexibl e skills
beside its hard -wi red reflex es and beh aviou ral ro utines . At any rat e,
even the mos t anato m ically and beh aviou rally rigid individual , eve n th e
1110st extensive of finished product s, is im me d iately caught up in larger -
scale indiv id uat ion processes wh ere it beco mes part of othe r int en sities,
suc h as the inten sive pro perties characte rizing ec osystem s.
O ne of the most importan t facto rs co nside red in stud ies of ecos)'s-
terns is changes in th e population density of each of the interact ing
species. Po pulat ion den sity, like tem per atu re or pressure , is an inten s-
ivc property th at canno t be d ivided in e xte nsion. Hut like othe r
intens ities it ma y be divid ed by pha se transiti on s. In particular, th ere
are critical th resho lds at which th e sta te of a populat ion changes in
kind, suc h as min im al values of den sit y (so me times called 'nucleation
thresholds") below whi ch a populat ion goes exti nct. '· Sim ilarly, mu ch
as a populat ion of m olecul es will spo nta neo usly te nd to relax, afte r a
certain characte r-istic timc , to an eq uilibrium valu e for its temperature,
so populat ion d"'n sity will exhibit a characte ristic re laxat ion tim e afte r
he ing suh jected to an envi ron me ntal shock, sudl as a part icularl y harsh
THE ACTUALIZATION O F T H E V IR TUAL I N TIME
win ter. T he ecologis t St uart Pimm argues tha t this rate of retur n to
eq uilibri um characterizes a population ' s resilience to shocks: sho rt rat es
of return to equilibrium sign al a robust populatio n, that is, o ne capable
of recovering rapidly afte r a shock, wh ile lon g rel axation tim es betray
poor resilien ce and hence , vu lnerability to ex tinc tion . Given th at
extinct ion m ean s the death of a species as an indiv idual , and that the
ex ti nct ion of one species may m ean the rapid birth of othe rs to occupy
the vacant niche , th ese int en sive properties may be said to partly
characte rize processes o f individuat ion at thi s scale .
Ecosys te ms involv e processes o pe ra ting at seve ral sim ultaneous time
sca les. O ne fact or affect ing population den sity is int ernal to a species,
th at is, det ermined by th e birth and death rates of a population . This
fact or disp lays a relatively short tim e scale of re t urn to eq uilibr ium.
When th e den sit ies of se veral populatio ns are co upled in parallel, as
,...·hen a population of plant s, hervibo res and carnivores is co upled into
a food chain . relaxation ti mes become longer: w hen th e densit y of a
preda tor po pul ation affects tha t of its prey, and thi s, in tum, the
dens ity of the plants it co nsumes , re-equ ilibration afte r a shock may be
delayed until the cascad ing effects sto p. T his lon ger t ime scale of
recovery is determined by th e degree of connectivity whi ch o ne species
has to o ther species, th at is, by the length of thefood chain to whi ch th e
species bel ongs. Finall y, th ere are even lon ger-t erm pr ocesses det er-
m ined by non-biological factors such as th e rat e of availability of
mi neral nutrient s in an ecosystem during reco vcry fro m a catas tro phe,
suc h as the effects of th e o nset or cessatio n of an Ice Age . 39 Given th e
importance of resilien ce as protecti on aga inst extinction , an d given th e
key ro le which the degree of connect ivity plays at intermed iate time
sca les, an ecosys te m may also be co nside re d a parallel-processing
net work in which changing relatio nships of fi cness (be tween predators
and prey, o r hosts and parasites) propagate at different rates th roughout
th e network influencing both th e eme rge nce of new , and th e disap -
pearance of o ld, ind ivid ual specics .t"
Relation s betw een population den sities, however, give us a ni)' a
rough ide a o f th e co mple x temporal structu re of an ecosyste m , Co n-
sidered as a network in wh ich the fl esh (o r hiomass) of plant s and
anima ls circulate, an CCOs)'stc m will d ispl ay a vari ct )' of temporal
rhythms d larackrizing eac h of its alime nta ry co uplings, th ese rh yth ms,
 I N T E NS I V E S C IEN CE AN D VIR TU AL PHI L O S OP H Y
in t urn, associated with th e spectrum of osci llato ry be haviour at
d ilTerent scales ex hibited by every o rganism . But co nsider ed as an
individuation en viro nment there is a particu lar rhythm w hich must be
sing led o ut : th e evolutionary rates of each of th e co upled species.
Evolutio nary rates used to be thought as basically uniform, characte r -
ized by a linear and gradual accumulation of ge ne t ically code d beneficial
traits. This rat e of accumulation would vary from spe cies to species,
du e to th eir different generation times, but within each species it was
sup posed to be basically un ifo rm. Today we know that thi s picture is
incomplet e given that for a vari et)' of reasons th ere occu r accelerations
and decel erations in t hese evolutionary rates. (The very large time
scales invo lved in evo lution means, ho wever, that even an accelerated
rat e will still characterize a very lo ng process, o ne between 5000 and
50,000 years, for e xam ple!')
As in the case of em bryo logical devel o pmen t where loss of a
particu lar process or co m ponent ma y lead to th e emergence of novel
features, in an eco system losses may also lead to accel eratio ns in
evo lutio nary rates and rapid sp read of no vel designs. An exti nction
eve nt , for exam ple, ma y eliminate a set of spec ies and vacate t heir
nic hes, leadin g in t urn to an ex plosio n of new design s by ot her spe cies
(an ada ptive radiation) to occupy th e vaca nt po sitions in th e food
chaln .:" A di ffe rent exam ple of events leading to accele rated evolut io n
and rap id eme rgence of new capacities is 9'mbiosis. Altho ugh trad ition-
ally the term 'sy mbiotic relat ion ship ' refers to a partic ular k ind of
alimentary co upling (o ne in w hich both partners ben efit from t he
assoc iatio n) t he difficulty in defining and estahlishing mutually be nefi cial
re lat ions has led to a new view of its nature and function. Today
symbios is is d efined as an assemhlage of heterogeneo us spe cie s which
persistsJor lona periods, relativ e to th e generation times of th e int eracti ng
organis ms, and wh ich typicall y lead s to th e emeraence if norel metabolic
cdpelbilities in at least o ne o f th e partners. r" The em phasis o n lon g
d ura tion is du e to th e need for coel'olulion between th e partners. both
of wh ich need to have e xe rted selection pressures o n eac h o the r biasing
till' lon g -t erm acc u mulat ion o f th e ir ge nes and bodily traits. (G iven
th at so me me mbe rs of an ecosyste m rna)' have arri ved through recent
invasio ns o r co lo nizations. not all interact ing co uples in a food chain
nt·t·e! to han ' ('(u.·voln·d.)
THE A C T UALI Z AT I ON OF T H E V IRTUAL IN T I M E
Symb iosis as a sourc e of evo lutiona ry innovation oc cu rs at m any
level s of scale . At the ce llular leve l, for exam ple, t wo of the key
capacities at the basis o f food chains may have eme rge d t hrough an
assembly of heterogeneities. Ph ot osynthesis , th e ability to 'bite ' int o
so lar rad iation to produce che m ical ene rgy sto re d in sugars , and
respiration, th e abi lity to tap int o a reservoir of o xygen as fuel to burn
th ese sugars, are both thought to have emerge d through cellular level
symbioses with micro -organism s.'" At larger scales, examples include
th e auton omous co m mu nities of m icr o.organi sm s which lin e the guts
o f hcrviborcs allo w ing th em to digest ce llulose , the bact eria that allow
legumes to fix nitrogen , and th e fungi wh ich permit man y plant roots
to ge t access to phosph orous . In all th ese cases, novel capabilities to
e xplo it oth erwise unavailable resources have co me about no t th rough
a slo w and gradual accumulation o f favourable mutations b ut through
an acc elerated process: mes hing the capabilities o f tw o or more
het erogeneo us pop ulations of organ ism s fo llow ed by th e su bseq uent
coe vo lution of the partners.H
W hen d iscu ssing inten sive processes Dclcuze usually di vid es the
subject into singu larities and affects , but so me times he uses an
alte r nativ e and eq uivalent formulati on in terms of spee ds and affects :
speeds if becoming and capacities to become.": T he many parallel processes
w hich define a d eveloping em bryo, fo r example , are defin ed by th eir
rel ativ e speeds , and by t he accelerati ons an d d ecelerat ion s th ese m ay
und ergo resulting in th e p roduct io n of no vel forms . In Delcuzia n
terms, suc h an indiv iduatio n environm ent wou ld be characterized in
part by relation s of 's peed and slowness, rest and m ovemen t , tardiness
and rapidity ' . 4 7 As I said , changes in t hese relative spee d s may be used
as an evolutionary st rategy (he te rochro ny) allowing an o rganism an
escape route from an over-sp ecia lized d esign . Eco s)'stems also d isplay
relations o f relativ e speed between para llel processes but in thi s case
th e eme rge nce o f nove lty dep ends more on the capacity to Join in with
a heterogen eous partner in a co m mon cocvolutio narv line of flight.
o r as Delcuzc puts it . o n ' a co mpos itio n of speeds and affect s involv-
ing en tire ly d ifferent ind ivid ua ls, a sym biosis ' .'HI T o phrase thi s in
Prigogin e ' s term s o f being and h(.~ coming : wh ereas em lJryogenesis is
a process throu gh wh ich a yet unfo rm ed ind ivid ual becomes what it is,
acqu iring a well -defined inside (t he int r insic propt·rti t·s defining its
 I N T E N SI V E S C IEN CE A N D VIRTUAL PHILOSOPHY
being), symbiosis represents a process through which a fully form ed
bein g ma y ce ase to be what it is to become somethinq else, in asso ciation
w it h something heterogen eous on th e outside .
This description of more com ple x forms o f inten sive temporality
was intended as a co m ple me nt to th e sim p ler formulation in terms of
th e ind ividuation of oscillations. Questions of cr itical timing and
duration, as w ell as of parallelism , ar e st ill prominent but have acquired
a subtle r form . Similarly, t he problem of th e m etrization or quantiza-
tion o f time, which also had a sim p le formulation in terms of a nest ed
set of seque nce s of oscillation s, need s now to lose so me of that
sim plicity. In particular, for th e sake of ease of presentation I have
artificially se parate d issues related to time and spa ce, but in reality we
ar c always con fronted with com p lex spatio- tern po ral ph enomena. Even
the sim ple oscillators st udied by Winfree ar e nonlinear spatia-te m poral
osc illators where th e spatial and temporal asp ects interact. For thi s
reaso n, th e qu estion o f th e emerge nce of m etric o r exte nsive prop erties
sho uld be treat ed as a sing le process in which a continuous virt ual
spacetime progressivel y differentiates itself into actual discontinuous
spatio- tc m poral st r uc tures operating at different scales. In other words,
the e merge nce of a m etric space time involves th e entire flat ontology
of ind ividuals, each nest ed lev el o f scal e co nt ri buting to th e m etrization
of space and time simultaneou sly.
I would like to concl ude thi s chapte r with a more detailed discu ssion
o f thi s virt ual space time . In Chapter 2 I described th e el ements whi ch ,
accord ing to Deleuze, constitute th e content of a nonmetric contin-
uum : changing p opulations of virtual multipliciti es (co nce ived as
comp lex ideal eve nts) and a quasi-causal op erator whi ch asse m bles thi s
heterogeneous population into a plane of co nsiste ncy. This particular
breakdow n o f th e co nte nts o f th e virt ual is, of co urse, speculative, and
as su h, it may very well turn o ut to be wron g. There is, as I said , an
.m piricism o f th e virt ual, e ven if it does not (and should not) r esemble
th e e m pirical study o f th e act ual. But whil e th e specific solutio n w hich
Dclc uzc prop ose ma y turn out to be inad equate , he sho uld ge t cre di t
for having aclcq uat ' Iy posed th e problem. In o rder to ge t rid o f essentialist
and t Ipo lug ical thinking it is not e no ug h to den oun e th transcendent
and aflirm th e imm: ncnt , R ' pia ing Plat o ' s transc mdc nt ss inc ' S with
risto l1l" · im ma ne nt natural sta tes, for c am p le. gets us out of
THE ACTUALIZ ATION OF THE VIRTUAL IN TIME
esse n tialism but not o f typ ological th ought. One mu st also give
mechani sms c1 imman ence (ho wever speculat ive) to explain th e ex iste nce,
relat ive auto no my and ge ne tic power o f th e virt ual."? Let m e first
sum ma rize wh at I said before abo ut the qu asi-causal ope rator, th e
mann er in whi ch it meshes multiplicities by th eir diff eren ces, since thi s
co ns tit utes th e first immanen ce m echanism. I will th en describe th e
second task whi ch Deleuze ascribes to thi s virt ual entity : to Benerate th e
multipliciti es by ex tracting th em from actual inten sive processes.
T ogether, th ese two ta sks e nsure that th e resulting virtual space t ime
does not have th e form of a transcendent space filled with tim eless
esse nces .
I described th e first task of th e quasi-causal ope rato r as that of giving
virt ual multipliciti es a minimum of actualization by prolonging th eir
sing ularities into se ries of o rd inary ideal e ve nts , and establishing
relations of co nve rge nce and di vergen ce between th ese se r ies . I said
that to specify how th ese immaterial linkaBes between se ries ar c
establishe d Dcleu ze borrows from th e mo st abst ract vers ion of co m -
munication th eory th e concept of transmission o f information in a
channel (a sign / signal syste m , in his terms,). An information channe l
(signal) exists when ev er two heterogen eous se ries of e ven ts ar e
co upled by chang ing probability distributions. No referen ce need s to
be mad e to eithe r a causal m echanism or to an ything actually flowing
in th e channe l. Quanta of information (signs) ma y be said to pass from
one ser ies to another wh en ev er a change in th e probability di stribution
in on e seri es is correlat d to a change in th e other on e . Such a linkage
o f se ries of events through signs occurs spontane o usly in so me intensive
syste ms , suc h as syste ms poised at th e edBe of a phase transition. Even
w he n suc h poi sed syste ms ar e inorganic, that is, even in th e absen ce of
specialized biol ogical hardware , th ey can cohe re n tly transmit informa-
ti on as long as th ey manage to remain in th e vicinity of th e critical
e ve nt without actually crossing th e threshold.
The em bryo log ical and ecolog ical indi viduation processes I have just
discussed , at least when modelled as par allel -p rocessing networks,
dis p lay th is e mergent abi lity in th e neighbourhood of a critica l pointc1
connectiVity. St ua rt Kau ffman arg ues, for exam p le, th at th e man y food
.hains th at form an ecosyste m mu st not exceed a ce rta in riti al len gth
(ty pica lly o f four sped": a plant , a hcrvibore , a pred ator , and a
 I NTENSIVE SCIENCE A N D VIRTUAL PHILOSO P HY
predator of th e predator) for th e parallel network to display com p lex
behaviour. 50 This sen sitive valu e ma y be achi ev ed via the coevo lution
of th e members of a food chain . Similarl y, th e parallel network form ed
by gen es and gen e products whi ch constit utes th e informational
backbone of a develop ing e m bry o also ne ed s to keep its degree of
co nnectivity near a critical value . Kauffman exp licitly co m pares thi s
critical value (not too low but not too high ) to th e singular zone of
inten sit y ex isting at th e phase transiti on between a gas and a so lid (th at
is between states with too little and to o mu ch orde r , resp ecti vel y) and
arg ues that e m bry os and ec osys te ms ma y need to be poised at th e edge
in orde r to maximize th eir emerge nt co m putational capacities.F'
Unlike actual poi sed syste ms , howev er, where information trans-
m ission takes the form of co rrelations between the numeri cal probabi li-
ties of occurance of two ser ies of eve nts , virtual ser ies m ust exclusively
in volv e changing distributions of th e singular and th e ordinary, given
th at virt ual se ries and th e space th ey form can not presuppose an y
me tric o r quantitative notion without begging th e qu esti on. In particu-
lar , virt ual se r ies mu st be conce ived as den se ordinal ser ies whi ch, as I
arg ue d, ar c logi cally and ge ne tically prior to alr ead y quantized numer-
ical se ries and can be regarded as on e -dimen sional nonmetric co ntinua .
In add ition , th e requirem ent of not presupposing an y notion to whi ch
th e virt ual is suppose d to give rise implies that th e statistical di stribu-
ti on s invo lved in an information channe l canno t be concei ved as fixed
(or 'sede n tary' ) like th e famous Gaussian or bell -shaped distributions
characte rizing th e statistical properties in many actual population s.
Unlike th ese familiar eq uilib rium distribution s whi ch refer to alread y
individ uate d population s occupy ing a m etric space , Del eu ze designs th e
quasi -ca usa l operator to produce mobile and ever-changing (' no ma d ')
dis tributions in th e virtual series, esta blish ing both conve rge nt and
d iv 'rgent relation s between th em. 52
In sho rt, th e first task of th e quasi-cau sal op erator is w hat Deleuze
calls a condensation if sing ularities, a process invo lving th e con tin uo us
creatio n o f co m m unicatio ns between th e se ries em anating from every
singu larity, linking th em togethe r through non-ph ysical resonances,
while simu lta neously rami fying or di ffere ntiating th e se r ies, e nsu ring
they are link ed together o nly by th eir differen ces . 5 I T he m esh o f on ' -
dimens ional co ntinua th at results would co nstit ute th e spatia l aspl' t o f
THE A C T U A LI Z A T I O N O F THE VIRTUAL IN TIME
th e virtual. To thi s, a temporal dim en sion , whi ch Deleu ze call ' Aion",
shou ld now be added . As he wr ites, th e specification of th e virtual
impli es, on th e one hand, a space of nomad di stribution in which
sing ulari ties ar c d istributed (T opos) ; on th e other hand , it impl ies a
tim e if decomposition whereby th is space is subdivi ded into sub-spaces. Each
one of th ese sub-s paces is successively defin ed by th e adjuncti on of
new points e nsuring th e progressive and co m plete d eterminati on o f
th e domain under co ns ide ration (Aion) . There is always a space
which co nde nses and precipitates sing ularities , just as th ere is always
a time whi ch progressivel y co m p letes th e e ve nt throu gh fragments
o f future and past eve nts.v'
Del eu ze borrows th e term ' adjunc tion ' from th e mathematician
Evariste Gal ois, th e cre ato r of gro up th eory. I will return in th e next
chapte r to th e work of thi s pion eer, but at thi s point it is e no ugh to
say that th e o pe ration Gal ois defin ed as ' adjunc tion of field s' is an
abstract ope ration ve ry clos ely related to th e idea of th e progressive
differentiation o f a space through a cascade of sym me try -bre aking
transiti on s. In othe r words, th e successive det ermination of sub-s paces
to whi ch Deleu ze refers is sim ply th e progressive unfold ing of multi -
pliciti es through a se ries of sym met ry- bre aking e vents. T he form of
temporality in vol ved in thi s unfolding, however, sho uld be conceived
in a very different wa y from tha t in whi ch actual bifurcati on eve nts
occur . The latter invol ve a temporal sequence o f e ve nts and stable states ,
th e seque nce o f phase transiti on s whi ch yields th e se ries of stable flow
patterns co nd uc tion-eonvection-tur bule nce, for exam ple . Moreov er ,
as eac h bifurcati on occurs, only one o f th e several alt ernati ves available
to th e syste m is actualized. For exam ple , in th e transiti on to th e
co nvection regime , eit he r clo ck or anti -clockwise rotating convec tion
ce lls ma y e merge , but not both . Ind eed, at eve ry bifurcati on th ere ar e
alt ernatives th at ar c phy sically unstable (unlike th e two options for
co nvection ce lls both o f whi ch ar e stab le) whi ch means that even if
they are act ua lized th ey will not la t very lon g an d wi ll be destroyed
by any de tab ilizing fluctuati on. ss In a virt ua l un fold ing , on th ot he r
hand , th e symm et r y-b rcaking events not o nly Jullj' coexist with one
ano t her (as o pposed to follow eac h ot he r), but in add ition, eac h b rok en
 INTENSIVE SCIENCE AND VIRTUAL PH ILOSOPHY
symmetry p roduces all the alternatives simulta neously, regardless of
whethe r th ey are ph ysically sta ble or not.
T his virt ual form o f time, involving th e idea of absolute simulta neity
(or abso lute coexistence) wou ld see m to vio late th e law s of re lativi ty.
In relati vist ic ph ysics tw o even ts cease to be sim ulta neo us th e mom ent
they become se parated in space, th e dislocati on in tim e becoming all
the more e vident th e larger t he se pa rati ng distan ce . 56 There are tw o
reasons, how ever, w hy thi s sho u ld not be an object ion to De le uzc's
conception of vir tual time . The first and m ost obvio us reason is th at in
vir tua l space th ere are no metric distances, on ly ordinal distances which
join rather than se parate events . Mu ch as th e noti on s of spatial ' length'
or 'a re a' lose th eir meaning wh en we m o ve away from Eucl idean
geometry to othe r ways of specifying th e relati on s of pr oximity
defi ning a space , so sho uld the notions of 's t re tc h' or ' lapse' of time
separating non -simultaneous events be m eaningless in the co ntext of a
no nmctric temporalit y. But th ere is a second and m ore import ant
reason w hy relati visti c co nstraints on absolute sim u ltane ity, suc h as th e
constr aint on th e maximum speed at wh ich causal signals may travel ,
sho uld not apply to th e vir tua l. T he temporality o f th e virtual sho u ld
not be co m pare d to th at of th e processes governed by th e laws o f
relat ivity, but to the temporality if t he laws themselves. Unlike ex pe r imen-
ta l laws (like Boyle ' s law of ideal gases) whi ch simp ly record lab orato ry
reg u larities , fundamental law s (suc h as Newto n's or Einstein's) arc not
m re mathem atical re -descriptions of ex pe r ience . 57 Although physicists
do not usu ally specu late ab ou t t he onto log ical sta t us of fund am ental
laws, to philosophe rs th ese law s ar e su pposed to be eternal, and to be
valid simultaneously throu gh out th e un iverse . In other w ords, in phil o -
sophical discussions funda menta l law s enjoy th e same form of timeless-
ness as immutabl e essences. And it is th is form o f time th at th e virt ual
is supposed to re place.
Nevertheless the q ues tio n re ma ins, what form of temporality would
allow the absol ute coexiste nce of virtual events? Or what amo unts to
th e same thing, ho w sho u ld we co nceive of a non m etric fo rm of time ?
It clearly can no t be any presen t tim e , how e ve r lon g , since t he ve ry
co nce pt of' a present assumes that o f' a stretch or lapse of' ti me of a
particu lar chara tc rist i sca le. But it ca nnot be a timeless d imen sion
either if we an' to avoid the tr ap pings of essen tia lism. The so lutio n
THE A CTUALIZATION OF T HE VIRTUA L IN TIME
which D eleu ze prop oses t o esca pe th ese alterna tives is inge nious .
Unlike a transcende nt heaven inhabite d by pure beings without becoming
(unc ha ngi ng esse nces or law s with a perm an e nt identity) th e vir t ual
needs to b e po pulate d excl usively by pure becomings without being .
Un like act ual becomings wh ich have at m ost an intensive form of
tem porality (b und les of seque ntia l processes occur ring in parall el) a
pure becoming mu st be characte rized by a parallelism without any trace
if sequentiality, or even directionality , Dele uze finds inspi rat ion for thi s
co nception of ti me in phase transit ions, or m ore exactly, in th e cr itical
e vents defi ning unactu alized transi tio ns. W hen see n as a pure becoming ,
the cr itic al point of temperature o f o-c, for exa m p le, m ar ks neither a
m elting nor a freezing of' wa te r, both of which are act ual becomings
(becom ing liq u id or so lid) occurring as t he cr itica l threshold is crossed
in a definit e direction. A pure becoming, on th e other hand , would
invol ve both dir ecti ons at once, a m elting- fr eezing event w hich never
act ually occurs, but is ' al ways fo rthcoming and already past. ' 58
T he events invol ved in th e construc tio n of vir t ual space, th e
progressive un folding of virt ual multipliciti es as well as th e stretc hing
o f th eir sing ularities into series of o rdinary points, need to be th ought
as pure becom ings in thi s sense. In th is co nst ruction, as Del eu ze says,
•Time itself urifolds . . . instead if things urifolding wit hin it . . . [T im e I
ceases to be car dinal and becomes ordinal, a pure order of time . "!"
Unlike actual time, w hic h is m ade excl usive ly out o f presents (what is
past and future relat ive to one tim e scale is still th e living present of a
cycle of greater durati on) , a pure becoming wo u ld imply a temporality
w hic h always sidesteps the present , since to ex ist in the present is to be ,
no longer to b ecome. This tempo rality must be co nceive d as an ordinal
conti nu um urifolding into past and f ut ure, a t im e wh ere nothing ever
occurs but where every t hing is endless ly becom ing in both unlimited
d irectio ns at once, alw ays ' already happ en ed ' (in th e past dir ection )
and always 'a bout to happen ' (in th e fut ure di rect io n). And unlike
act ua l time wh ich is asymmetric relative to th e direction o f relati ve pasts
and fut u res, a pu re becoming would imply a temporality w hich is
perfectly symmetri c in thi s resp ect , the d irectio n of th e ar row of time
e m rgi ng as a brok en symmet ry on ly as t he virtual is act ua lize d. "?
I said in Chapte r 2 t hat m ultipli citi es, being in o r po rca l ffc ts of
mate ria l causes, are impassi ble or ausa llv steri le enti ties. T h· time of
 INTENSIVE S C IEN CE AND V I RT U A L PHIL O S OPH Y
a pure becoming, always already passed and ete rnally ye t to co me ,
forms th e temporal dim en sion of thi s impassibility or ste rility of
multlpli citl es."! But I also said that th e quasi -cau sal ope rato r, far from
be ing impassibl e , is defin ed o n th e co nt rary by a pure capacity to
alTect, acting in parallel w ith physical causality in th e production o f th e
virt ual. In particular, th e quasi-cause mu st be ca pable o f w eaving
m ult iplicities int o a het erogen eous co ntin uum and to d o so co nsta ntly
so as to en do w th e latter with a certain auto no my fro m th eir co rpore al
causes. b1 \Vh at temporal aspect w ould co rrespo nd to th e exe rcise of
t his capacity? Here again , we ca nnot presuppose any metric co nce p ts ,
th at is, we ca nnot assume that thi s performan ce occurs in an)' present
st retch of time , however short . This othe r time must ind eed be
co ncei ved as instanta neous, As Del euze writes :
Corpo re al causes act and suffer throu gh a cos mic mixture and a
uni versal present whi ch produces th e incorporeal event , But th e
qu asi-cau se o perates by doubling thi s physical causality - it em bod ies
th e even t in th e most limited possible present which is th e most
precise and th e most instantaneous, the pure instant grasped at the
point it d ivid es itself into future and past ."!
In wh at sen se wou ld a temporality charac te rized by a instant which
unfo lds itself into past and fut ure he nonmetric? Actual tim e , as I said ,
ma)' he sec n as th e product of a metrization o r qu ant izat ion performed
hy a nested set o f presents wit h characte ristic tim e scales. Whether
o ne views the latt er in terms o f relaxation tim es or in terms o f th e
int rinsic peri od o f nonlin ear osci llatio ns , th e processes occur ring in
ac t ual time always have a time scale of limited J uration and )'et are
potentia lly irifinite, in t he sense that a particular seque nce o f cycles
l11a)' go o n pu lsing for eve r . Virtual timc , o n th e o the r hand, would
he.' nonmct r ic in the sense th at it is unlimited in th e past and future
directions in wh ich it unfolds, bu t alwaysfi nile like th e insta nt w ith out
thick ness tha t pe rforms t he un folding ." T he tim e o f th e virtual would
he.' constituted cn tirelv, bv, wh at , fro m the po int of view of met r ic
tu nc , canno t he hut !Oingular ities : a maximum and a minimu m, events
of unhmllcd Juration (t he unfo ldi ng o f mu ltiplicities) and events o f cero
THE ACTUALIZATI ON O F THE V IRTUAL IN T I M E
duration (t he ope r atio n of th e qu asi-cau se ) . T he quasi-causal operato r
w ould have to
bring about th e co rresponde nce o f th e minimum time wh ich can
occu r in th e instant with th e maximum tim e whi ch ca n be th ought
in accord ance with Aion . T o limi t th e act ualizatio n of th e event in a
present without mixture, to make th e instant all th e more intens e ,
taut , and instantan eou s since it ex p resses an unlimited fu tu re and an
unlimited past. bOO
No d oubt, this description o f th e temporal aspect o f virtualit y lacks
th e precision of its spa tial co unterpa rt. The latter has th e ad vantage o f
o ve r a ce n tu ry o f mathematical work o n th e nature o f nonm ctric
spaces and th eir broken sym me try relations to metric o nes , whereas
sim ilar formal treatments of tim e do not really exist. Moreov er, even
if we disregard tim e and focu s o nly o n space, Del eu zc ' s d escription o f
th e virtual co ntinuum goe s beyond th e resources available from those
formal th eories and ma y th erefore see m mu ch too speculative and
co m plicate d. Why, on e ma y ask, go through so mu ch troub le to
spe ci fy the immanen ce mechanisms through whic h a virt ual continuu m
is co nst ructe d w hen it is simpler and more natural to assu me that the
entities revealed by nonlinear mathematics (att racto rs , bifurcation s) ar e
o f th e same t)'p e as o ur more familiar Plat oni c entities? A leading
figure in th e th eory of dynami cal syste ms , th e mathematician Ralph
Abraham , for example , phrases his evaluatio n o f th e merits of th e field
thi s w ay :
The ben efits of using dynami cal co nce pts at th e present stage o f
devel opment of sclf-orga ni7..atio n th eory fall in t wo classes: perman-
ent o nes - th e acquisiti on o f conce pts to be em bed de d in m orpho-
dynam ics , guidi ng its development ; and temporary o nes - th e
p rac tice o f new patterns of th ou ght. In th e first ca tegory I w ould
place the att rac to rs, th e sta ble bifu rca tions, and their glo ba l bifu rca -
tion d iagrams, as esse ntia l feat ures o f morphod ynami cs. These rna)'
he.' fl'ga rdcd as guidel ines, excl usio n rul es and topo log ical rest riction s
o n the full com plex ity of morphodynamic se.''1uences , .. I Sl'C' [the
 INTENSIVE SCIENC E AND VIRTUAL PHILOSOPHY
importance of dynamicism] for self- organizing syste m th eory as
temporary and preparatory for a m ore co mp lete morphod ynamics
o f th e future . And ye t, dynamicism eve n now promises a permanent
legacy of restrictions, a taxonomy of lega l, universal restraints on
m orphogen etic processes - a Platonic ideali srn .t"
Deleu ze would agree with much of what is ex p ressed in thi s
passage, particularly th e characte r ization o f th e rol e of virtual entities
as to po logical restricti on s or co ns traints, that is, as quasi-causal rela-
tions whi ch com ple ment causal o nes in th e determination o f a give n
sel f-organizing or inten sive process. On th e other hand , to view th e
se t of top ol ogi cal restrictions di scovered so far as forming some kind
o f fixe d , ete rn al taxonomy, would seem to him to defeat th e very
point of po stulating such const rain ts in th e first place . No doubt, it is
m uch sim ple r to assume th e existe nce of Platonic en tit ies than to
define a co m p lex ope ratio n through whi ch th ese e ntities ar e m eshed
into a co ntin uum th ereb y acquiring a ce rtain auton omy from actual
e ve nts. T he preferen ce for simplicity here , howev er , has less to do
with th e elim ination o f redundant features (the legitimate use o f
sim p licit y arguments, as in O ccam's razor) and m ore to do with
f amiliarity . Arguments based on th e latter , as physicist s conce rned with
th e co nce pt ual foundations of their sub ject ar e aware, make an
ilkgi timate use of sim plicity."? In th e present conte xt , it see m s to m e,
to espo use a Platonic ideali sm on th e basis that it is a more familiar
thesis would be mi sguided . Giv en that no philosopher (o r scie ntist) has
e ve r before specified m echanisms of immanen ce, our lack of familiarity
with th e latter sho uld be seen m erel y as a co ntinge nt fact abo ut
int e llect ual hist ory not as a basis to reject a new th eory.
I em phasize thi s point about sim plicity because howev er com p lex
th e description of th e virtual ma y see m so far, it is onl y half th e story.
In parti ular , w e ma y grant that th e above description is a reasonable
specification of how a nonmetric space time continuum ma y be built
NiI-cn a popu lation o f virt ual multipliciti es and st ill demand to kn ow
where th ese multiplicities come fro m. Clearly , th ey can no t be sim p ly
.iss u mcd to exist o n th ei r o wn since this would mak e th em into entit ies
hard ly d ist ingui shabl e fro m immutabl essenc . Ther is, in fact,
ano t lu-r task w hich th e quas i-ca usa l o pe rato r mu st perform , anothe r
THE ACTUALIZAT ION OF THE V IRTUAL IN T IME
immanen ce m ech ani sm whic h accounts for th e ve ry ex iste nce of
multiplicities. As Deleu ze ays, th e quasi-cause ' extracts sinBula ritiesf rom
the present, and from indi viduals and persons w hich occupy thi s
present ' . 6 8 This extractio n operation, recovering a full multipli city fro m
a partial spatia- te m poral actualization, defin es th e second immanen ce
m echanism. Del eu ze so metimes usc a geomet ric characte rizatio n of
thi s operation, describing it as th e ext raction of a section or slice.
O rdinar ily, thi s mathematical ope ration sim ply reduces th e dimens ion-
ality of th e object to whi ch it applies . A slice of a th ree -dimen sional
vo lume , for exa m p le , is a two -dim en sional surface, whil e th e vo lume
itsel f ma y be viewed as a slice or sec t ion of a four-dimen sional
hyp ervolume. The anal ysis o f attractors in state space, particul arl y
strange or chao tic attr actors , makes e xte nsive usc of thi s op eration (a
' Po incare sec tion') to ex t ract information from a co m p lex topological
sha pe and displa y it in a way wh ich is easier to study."? Deleuze,
however , has a m ore ela bo ra te ope ration in mind, one th at docs not
ha ve a co unte rpar t in mathemati cs.
T o see wh at thi s or iginal slicing o pe ration am ounts to let 's re t urn
to th e exam ple of th e seq ue nce of flow patterns co nduc tio n-convec-
tion-turbulen ce. Let ' s imagin e a co nc re te ph ysical syste m in a state of
convec tion , that is, actualizing one of th e available flow patterns (a
periodic attractor) . In thi s case , th e virtua l com pone nt (the attractor)
exists m erely as an effec t of actual causes , such as re lations between
temperature and density differen ces or co mpe titio n between gravita-
tional and visco us forces, causal relati on s whi ch account for th e
e merge nce and maintenance o f co nvectio n ce lls . Dc lcuze 's hypothesis
is that suc h an actual syste m ma y be 's am p led' or 's lice d through ' to
obtain its full qu asi-causal co mpone nt, th e entire set o f attractors
defining each flow pattern and th e bifurcati on s whi ch m ediate between
patterns. In other w ords, a Deleuzian sec tion w ould not consist in a
m ere reduction o f th e original dimensionality, but in an elimination of
every detail o f th e actual e vent except its topoloqi cal im'arian ts: th e
di stribution of its sing ularities, as well as th e full dim en sionality o f its
sta te space .
Let m e spe ll o ut th e details o f th is important idea. I aid in Cha pt r
1 th at Del uze bor ro w s fro m Riemann th co n e pt o f an - (limen-
siona l mani fold w hi h doc ' not n ccd to be mb cdded in a 'pace of
 I NTE NS IV E S C IENC E AND VIRTUAL PH I L O S O P H Y
+ 1 dimen sion s to be st ud ied , but that constit utes a space on its own ,
eac h one of its dimen sion s defining a rel evant degree of freed om of,
or a rel evant wa y of changing for, a given dynamical syst em . Each
multiplicit y ex trac te d or sam pled from actual inten sive processes would
possess a definite dimen sionality (a spe cific value for th e N variable)
since th e process it go verns is capable of changing in only a finit e
num be r of rel evant ways. T his finit e number of dimensions would
co nstitute a key characte ristic defining th e virt ual multiplicit y as a
co nc re te uni versal entity, and thi s finite number would vary for
diffe re nt multipliciti es extracte d from different processes. In othe r
words , th e population of multiplicities would be dimensional ly hetero-
geneo us. Given that th e plane of consiste ncy mu st assemble multiplici-
ties together by th eir differences, thi s 'plane' cann ot be conce ived as a
two-dime nsional surface but as a space of variable dimensionality,
capable of bringing a dimen sionally diverse virtual population into
oex iste nce . As Del eu ze writes:
It is only in app earance that a plan e of thi s kind ' re duces' th e
numbe r of dimen sion s; for it gathers in all th e dimen sion s to th e
ex te nt that fiat multiplicities - which non etheless have an increasina or
decreasinp numb er if dimensions - are inscribed upon it ... Far from
redu cing th e multiplicities' number of dimen sion s to two, th e plan e
I?I consistency cuts across them all, inters ects them in orde r to bring
into coexiste nce any number of multiplicities, with an y number of
di me nsions . Th e plane of co nsiste ncy is th e intersecti on of all
concre te forms . .. The only qu esti on is: Does a given becoming
reach th at point? Can a given multipli city flatten and co nse rve all its
d ime nsio ns in th is way, like a pr essed flower whi ch remains just as
alive dry?70
Dclcu zc so me times phrases his description as if the qua si-cau sal
operat o r was th e agent performing th e extraction or sec tion ope ration,
some othe r times ascribing this age ncy to th e plan e of co nsi ten cy
itse lf, The di ffercn e bet ween th e two formulation s is, I believe,
unimportant . What is im po rtant, on th e othe r hand , are th e det ail of
till' o perat ion and th ei r justificatio n . In particul ar , th e fact that eac h
mu lt iplicity dd llH's a space of its o wn, that is, th e absence cj' a space if
THE ACTUALIZATION O F THE VIRTUAL IN TIME
N+ I dimensions wh ere th ey would be em bedde d, is key to th e task of
co nce iving a virt ual space which does not unify multipli citi es, that is, a
space co mpose d by th e coe xisting multipliciti es th em selv es in th eir
het erogen eity. Sim ilarly , th e qua si-causal op erator is oft en referred to
as a ' line' but not becaus e it would be a on e -dimen sional entity .
Rather, th e qua si-cau se would ope rate at N- ] dimensions, unlike a
transcendent source of unity whi ch mu st op erate from a supp leme ntary
(e .g. N + 1) dimen sion . In Deleu ze 's wo rds:
Unity always o pe rates in an empty dimen sion supplementa ry to that
of th e syste m co nside re d (overco ding) . . . [But a) multiplicity never
allo ws itself to be ovc rc odc d , never has availabl e a supplementary
dimen sion over and abov e its number of lines [or dim en sions) . . .
All multipl iciti es are flat, in th e sense th at th ey fill o r occupy all of
th eir dimen sion s: we will th erefore spe ak of a plan e of co nsiste ncy
of multiplicities, eve n th ou gh th e dimen sion s of thi s ' plane' increase
with th e number of co nnec tio ns that ar e mad e on it. Multiplicities
ar e defined by th e o utside : by th e abstract line , th e line of flight
. . . according to whi ch th ey change in nature and connect with
other multiplicit ies . . . The line of flight marks: th e reality of a
finit e number of dimen sion s that th e multiplicity effective ly fills; th e
impossibility of a supplem entary dimen sion, unl ess th e multiplicity
is transformed by th e line of flight; th e po ssibility and necessit y of
flatt ening all of th e multiplicities on a single plan e of co nsiste ncy or
ex te rior ity, regardless of th eir number of dimen sion s. 7\
Let me summar ize what I have said about th e two immanen ce
mechanisms. Th ope rator's first task , to assembl e multiplicities tog eth er
by cre ating converge nt and divergent relations among th e ordinal seri es
em anat ing from th em, may be conside re d a pre-actualization . It would
endow multiplicities with a minimum of actuality and, in thi s sense, it
would represent th e first broken sym me try in th e cascade that culm i-
nat es in fully formed actual bein gs. The sec o nd task of th e quasi-cau sal
o pe rator, to ex t rac t vir tual events from inte nsive pr ocesses may, in
turn , be see n as a verita ble counte r actua liza tion since it wo uld follow a
direct ion oppos ite to th at whi ch goes from th e vir t ual to till' inte nsive,
and from th ere to th e ex t e nsive and q ualita tive. 71 'o untc r-act ualizat ion
 I N T E N SIV E SCI E NC E AN D VI R TU A. L PH IL OS OPHY
wou ld, in fact, co mpleme nt pre -actualization : while the form er e xtracts
flat (o r folded) m ultiplicities from act ua lly occurring events , the latter
w ou ld take these and 'unflatten ' them, that is, it would allo w them to
p ro gressively unfold and differentiat e without fully actualizing th em .
Each o f these tw o operations w ould po ssess a temporal dimension : the
quasi-causal o perato r would sample o r section all actual events, at all
dilTerent time scales, instantaneously; then, each flat multiplicity would
be immed iately unfo lded in two unlimited directions at on ce, past and
future, distributing th e singularities which d efine each of th e unfo lding
levels on both sides o f the instant at once, 'in the manner of a pod
whi ch releases its spo res' . 7 l
The op eration o f pre -actualizati on would give multiplicities not o nly
a ce rtain autonomy from the intensiv e processes acting as their real
causes , it wo uld also endo w these impassive and stcr ile effec ts with
whatever mo rphogenet ic po wer they enjoy .7 4 In other words , pre -
actualizatio n would not on ly explain how an unactualized singularity
bel on gin g to a physical system with multiple a!tracto rs w ou ld subsist
as a pot ential alternative state , it would also explain how the singularity
that is actualized gets its power to attract in the first place . To the
ex te nt that linking multiplicities to gether and endo w ing th em with
productivity foreshadows the intensive processes w hich follow do wn
the symm etry- breaking cascade , the quasi-causal operator is refe rred
to as a 'dark precursorT " The operation o f co unter-actualizatio n, on
the o ther hand, would operate in the o ppos ite direction, up the cascade
from the inte nsive towards the virtual. I said in Chapter 2 that some
areas o f the world, those defined by processes which are nonlin ear and
which operate far from equ ilibrium, do not co nce al the virtual
underneath extensities and qualities but rather reveal it, or allow it to
ex press itself.?" These areas w oul d represe nt a spo ntaneous movement
toward s th e virtual wh ich is st ill physica l and co rpo rea l but whi ch may
I" , given a boo st making it reach the level o f a pure virtuality. T o th e
e xtent that co unter-actualizatio n accelerates an escape from actuality
whi ch is already present in so me intensiv e processes, the qua si-cau sa]
0 pt'rato r is referred to as a 'line of flight '. 77
In co ncl usio n, I wo uld like to repeat that whatever the merits o f
Dl'lcuzc 's particular proposals for the imp lementation of the quasi-
t',l U~.l l Opt'rato r, we should at least credit him with having e lucida ted
THE A C T UA L IZ A. TI ON OF T HE VI R TUA L IN T IME
the overall co nstraints that any implem entation wou ld have to meet. If
we arc to get rid of essent ialist and typo logi cal thought w e need some
process through which virtual mu ltipliciti es are derived from th e actual
w orld and so me process through which the results o f this derivation
mal' be gh'e n eno ugh co he re nce and auto no my . Deleu ze him self ga ve
seve ral different model s for each one o f these tasks, a fact that shows
that he did not think he had achiev ed a final so lution to th e problem ,
on ly its co rrec t form ulation . On th e other hand , he clea rly t hought
that the problem itself was worth posing, regardless of its particular
so lutions . That this is ind eed th e case may be glimpsed from th e fact
that Dclcuzc ' s d escription o f his co nst ruc tivist m ethod in philosophy
close ly mat ch es th e two tasks whi ch th e ope rato r is supposed to
accomplish : creating virtual events (m ultiplicities) by ex trac ting th em
from actual processes and laying them out in a plane o f co nsistency .711
This methodology, mor eover, is what in his view would distinguish
philosophy from science . As he writes :
It co uld be said that scie nce and philosophy take o ppos ed paths,
because philosophical concepts have events for consistenc y whereas
scie ntific function s have states of affairs or mixtures for ;eferencc :
throug h con cepts, philosophy cont inually extracts a consistent event from
the states if eif!airs . .. whereas through functions, science continually
actualizes the event in a state of affairs, thing, or body that can be
referred ro. ?"
It matters little whether we d escribe thi s method as involving two
separate o peratio ns (to ex tract ideal events and to give them co nsist-
ency) o r as a single on e (to extract a consistent e vent). The importa nt
point is that Dcleuze con ceives of pre -actualization and co unter-
actualization, howe ver imp lemented, a') defining an object il'e movement
wh ich a phil osopher mu st learn to g rasp . As he puts it, we phil oso -
phe rs must invent devices to allo w us to becom e 'the quasi-cause
o f wh at is produ ced w ithin us, th e O pe rato r "."? Spelling out th e
details of Dcleuvcs method ology will invo lve co nnec ting the result s
of his o nto log ical analysis with q ues tio ns of' epistemo logy . In cp istc -
mologic al term s to extract an ideal event from an actually o ecuning
o ne is, hasicall v, to dcfilU' what is problemauc about it , to grasp what
 INTENSIVE SC IE NCE AND VIRTUAl. PH Il.O SOPHV
abo ut the eve nt objectively stands in need oj explanation . This involv es
d iscerning in the act ual event wh at is relevant and irrel evant for its
e xplanation , wh at is important and wh at is no t. T hat is, it involves
co rrectly grasping th e objective distribution oj the singular and the ordinary
defi ning a well-posed probl em . T o give consiste ncy to th ese well -
posed probl ems, in turn , mean s to endow th em with a ce rtain aut on-
omy fro m th eir particul ar solutions , to sho w that probl ems do not
d isappear be hind th eir solutions , just like virt ual multiplicit ies do not
d isapp ear behind act ualized indiv idu als. T he ep iste mo log ical side of a
Dc lcuz ian o ntology is co nstit ute d by such a philosoph y of probl ems
and this will form the subject matter of th e foll owi ng chapter.
C H A PTE R 4
Virtuality and the Laws if Physics
In a flat ontology o f indi vidu als, like the o ne I have tri ed to de velop
here , th ere is no room for rcificd to talit ies . In particular , th ere is no
room for ent ities like ' society ' o r 'culture ' in ge ne ra l. Institution al
o rga ni7..ations, urban centres o r nation states are in th is o ntolog y not
abstract totalities but co nc re te social individuals, :\"ith th e same o~~olo­
gica l sta tus as indiv idu al human bein gs but o pe rating at larger spatio-
temporal scales . Like orga nisms o r species these larger socia l
indiv idu als are products of co ncrete historical processes, having a dat e
of birth and , at least potentially, a d ate of death or ex tinc tion . And
like o rgan isms and species, th e rel ations betw een individuals at each
spatia -te mpo ral scale is on e of parts to wh ole , with each individual
eme rging from th e causal int eractions am on g th e members of popula-
tion s of smaller scale individuals. Althou gh th e det ails of each individu-
ation process need to be described in det ail, we can roughly say that
from th e interactions among individual decision -makers, institutions
eme rge ; from int eractions among institutions, citi es t~merge; and from
urban interacti on s, nation states eme rge _1 The population serving as
substra tum for th e eme rg ence of a larger wh ole may be very hetero-
ge neo us or, o n th e co ntrary , highl y homogen eous. But even in th ose
cases wh ere th e degree of homogen eity at different scales is high
eno ugh to suggest th e existe nce of a single 'cult ure' o r 'society' , th e
temptation to postulat e such to talit ies mu st be resisted, and th e degree
of homogen eity whi ch motivat ed suc h postul ati on must be given a
co ncrete histori cal explanation .
T hus far I have used th e term ' science ' as if its use was unprobl em -
atic, but given th e requirements of a flat o nto log)' it is clear th at this
te rm shou ld no t be used since it refers to an abstract totalit v and
moreo ver, to a to ta lity, defined by , an essence . Instead , we m us; : trh-e
to ide ntitY the specific processes wh ich have gin>n rise to inJiI"idual
SCIentific fi elJs, w hich like an) o ther indivi dual , mus t he co nceived as
 I N T E N S I V E SC IE NCE AND V IRTUAL PHILOSOPHY
co m posed of populations of entit ies at a smaller scale . In th e case of
the field of classical mechani cs, for ex ample. th ese co m po ne nts are ,
ro ughly: populations of mathematical models and techniques for the
indi viduation of predi cti ons and e xplanations ; populations of phenom-
ena produced in laborat ories and population s of machin es and instru-
me nts wh ich ind ivid uate and m easure th ose phen om en a ; populati on s
of ex pe rime nta l skills , th eoretical co nce pts and institution al pract ices.
Like an o rga nic species , th e degree to wh ich an ind ivid ual scie ntific
field has a well -d efined identity will dep end on co ntinge nt historical
fa cts such as its degree of int ernal hom ogen eity and its degree of
isolation from o the r field s. Simil arl y, th e degree to whi ch seve ral field s
rese mb le each o the r sho uld be give n a historical explana tion , such as
o ne field serving as exem plar for the co nst ruction of ano the r. o r the
ex po rt of inst ruments and techniques from o ne field to another, o r th e
shari ng of institutional co m po ne nts among different fields. This way
th e qu estion of wh ether th ere is such a thing as 'scien ce ' in ge ne ral
becomes an em pirical qu estion, o ne w hich, I believe. sho uld receive a
nega ti ve answer . Many co nte m po rary ana lysts do ind eed seem to thin k
th at, as a matter of empirical fact, science d isplays a deep and
2
characte ristic disunity .
In th e first par t of thi s chapter I wo uld like to develo p the ideas
needed to think abo ut ind ividu al scienti fic field s, using classical m ech -
anics as a co nc re te ex am ple, but also to rev iew so me of th e traditional
phil osophical obstacles which have historically prevented a co rrect
assess me nt of th e di sunity, heterogen eit y and divergent development
of 'sc ience". At thi s point it sho uld co me as no surprise that in my
view th e main obstacle has be en th e entre nc hme nt of essentialist and
ty po log ical th ought in philosophical st ud ies of scientific practice . Man y
philoso phe rs in th e past have tak en th e essence of classical mechanics
to be its exceptionless laws. Thi s is particularly tru e wh en fundam ental
laws, suc h as Ne wto n's law s, ar e view ed as ge ne ral truths from wh ich
"\'l'rything else [ollows mechanically , tha t is, by simple logical deducti on.
\VI1l'n species arc view ed no t as indi vid ual entities but as ge ne ral
c.ltego rit."s, th e productive or ge ne t ic pro cesses whi ch yield th ese
indi vidu als te nd to he ign ored . Sim ilarly. th e view of law s as ge neral
tru th s has tended , histo rically, to eli m inate from phil osop hical discu s-
V IRTUALITY A ND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
sia n th e productive or Benetic co nnections invol ved in the physical
processes go verned by th ose law s.
More specifically, th e esse ntialist view of law s has co nce aled the
producti ve po we r of causal connections, that is, th e fact th at events
act ing as causes actually produ ce th eir effects. Co ntrary to a popular
m iscon ception , ph ilosophical approaches to scie ntific practice have
thri ved, from the seve ntee nth century o n , in a world devoid of causes
and rul ed e xc lusive ly by law s sta ting constant regu larities. J Part of what
made possible the re placement of causes by law s was a vie w of
causa lity as an inh erently linear relation, suc h that , give n a particul ar
cause, the same effect was bound to be prod uce d. Clear ly, if causality
always ex hibited thi s simple form , if effects always foll owed mech ani -
cally and necessarily from th eir causes, postulating a separate produc-
tive power of causes distin ct from th e exce ptionless laws go verning
th eir ope ratio n would be redundant. But more co mplex forms of
causality do exist , nonlinear and sta tistical causality, for instance, and
th ese arc involved in all the int en sive production processes which I
have described in previous chapte rs. Hen ce a crucial task for a
Dcleuzian episte mologist invo lves rescuing th ese ge ne tic links between
events from the limbo wh ere general laws have cast them.
Besides concealing prod uctive relations behind sta tic cat egories , the
traditional philosophical approach to laws may be criticized for subor -
dinat ing mathematica l models to Iinaui stic statements . Much of what I
ha ve arg ued in this book depends on treati ng mathematical models in
th ei r specificity, that is, as disp laying a certain beha viour which is crucial
for th ei r successful application to scientific tasks . Th e most obv io us
exa m ple is th e tenden cy of so lutio ns to an eq uatio n to approach an
attrac to r , a tenden cy which is not displayed by linguistic translati on s
o f th e co nte nt of th e eq uatio n but whi ch dep end o n th e speci fic
math ematical form of both th e equation and the ope rato rs that act on
it. Thus, a second task for a Deleu zian episte mo logist is to rescu e
m odels and th eir dynam ic beh aviour from static lingui sti c renderings
of law s. T hese tw o related errors , elimination 1"causes and subordination
to lanau one (and deductiv e logic) arc the basic characte rist ic of essen-
tialist approaches to classica l ph ysics, and th eir criticism will form th e
suhj('ct matt er of the first sec tion of this ch apt e r , Let ow begin with
 I NT E NSI V E S C I EN CE AN D VIRTU A L P HI LOS O P HY
tlu- dismi ssal o f productive causes in favour of constant regularities. As
th l' ph ilosopher of scien ce [an Hacking puts it:
Ilume notoriously taught that cause is only constant conjunc t ion .
To say th at A caused B is not to say that A, from so me power or
characte r within it self, broupht about B. lt is only to say that th ings
u f typ e A are req ularlv followed by things of typ e B ... Hume is in
1:1 t not responsibl e for th e widespread philosophical acceptance of
a co nsta nt -co njunc tio n attitude towards causation. Isaac N ewton did
it, unintentionally. The greatest triumph of th e human sp irit in
l lu rnc ' s day was held to be th e Newtonian theory of gravitation
. .. Immediately before Newton , all progressive scie ntists thought
th at th e world must be understood in terms of m echanical pushes
anti pulls. But gravity did not see m ' mechanical' , for it wa s action
at a dist an ce .. . For em pirically minded peopl e th e post -N ewtonian
altit ude was, th en, this: we sho uld not see k for causes in nature,
hut o nly regularities . .. The natural scie ntist tries to find un iversal
state me nts - th eories and law s - which cover all ph enomena as special
cases. To say that we hav e found th e explanation o f an e ve nt is on ly
to say th at th e event can be dedu ced from a aeneral repul aruy,"
Ii a king argues that this elimi natio n of producti ve causes in favour
of state me nts o f regulariti es (and deducti ve relations between those
si.u c mc nts) is characte rist ic not o f ph ysics in general, but only of
phi loso phies of ph ysics whi ch concent rate excl usive ly on th e th eoretical
t om po nent of a field at th e expe nse of its ex pe rimental com p one nt .
T he day to day practi ce of expe r imental physicists, consisting as it does
in specific causal int erventi ons in reality , is much too rich and co m plex
10 he rcdu cd to logical relations between state men ts. The expe ri ment-
alist is d irectl y invo lved in productive relation s, whether th ese involve
till creat ion o f an ap parat us to individuate ph enomena or th e use of
inst r um -nts to produce individual m ea surements of properties of th o se
ph -no rnc na . It is o nly th eory-obsessed phil osophies, whether held by
physicisls o r professional philosophers, that can afford to forget about
1.. ur sa] co nnec tions and co n e nt rate ex lusivel y o n logical relation s. The
ult imatc ex press ion of thi s esse ntialist stance is a m odel of s icntifi c
c-xp lnnntion de vel op ed in th e twentieth c >nt ury whi ch takes th e
VIRTUAL ITY A N D TH E LAW S OF PH Y SI C S
Humean reduction of cau ses to linguisti c statements of regularities to
an extreme.
In this episte m ological th eory, known as th e deduai ve-nomolopical
approach , scie ntific ex planations ar e treated as logical arguments consist-
ing of sev eral propositions, on e of which must b e an exceptionl ess
law . The term 'proposition ' refers to th e m eaning of declarative
se ntences , that is, to what two sentences in different languages,
expre ssing th e sam e state of affairs, hav e in common. In this model,
to ex plain a particular laboratory ph enomenon is to deduce it from a
set of propositions: from a linguistically stated law (su ch as 'two bodies
are gravitationally attract ed to each other in direct proportion to th e
product of th eir mass es, and in inverse proportion to th e square of
their distance ') and a set of propositions d escribing initial (and other)
co nd itions, w e derive further propositions which may be treated as
predictions to be tested for th eir truth or falsit y in a laboratory. [I' th e
behaviour of th e ph enomenon conforms to th ese predictions w e can
cla im to hav e exp lained it , not, of course, by having given causal
m echanisms for its production, but in th e way one explains things in a
ty po logical approach: subsutninp it as a particular case under a aen eral
catea 0T)'. Although hardly an y w orking ph ysicist would accept that his
or her co m plex exp lanatory practi ces are capt ured by this sim p listic
t he ory , th e d eductive-nomological approach has dominated much of
t w entieth -century philosophy of scien ce and continues to hav e many
d efenders in thi s field. 5
When on e accepts thi s model of exp lanation th e structure of th e
th eoretical component of a scientific field takes th e form of an
axiomat ic: from a few true statements of general regularities (the
ax io ms) we deduce a large number of consequences (theorems) which
are th en compared to th e results of obs ervations in th e laboratory to
check for their truth or falsit y . Giv en that deduction is a purely
m echanical wa y of tran smittina truth or falsity, it follows that whatev er
truth on e ma y find in a th eorem mu st hav e already been contained in th e
ax ioms. It is in thi s sense that axioms ar e like esse nces. To counter
thi s esse ntialist conception , a new gen eration of philosophers has
d eveloped an alt ernative charac te rization of what a th eory is, reintro-
du ing productiv causa l rel ations as an int egral part of explanations,
as w ell as rejecting th e Iingui sti haract erizati on or
ex p lanator
 I N T E N S I VE S C IENC E AND VIRTUAL PHILOSOPHY
practices . In th e view of th ese phil osophers, ex planations , rath er th an
being sim ply logical arguments, invol ve a co m plex use of mathem atical
mo dels of different types: mod els of gene ra l relation s, models of
partic ular ex perimental situations, as well as sta tistical m od els of th e
raw data gathe re d in laborat ori es. O ne of th e de fenders of thi s new
view, Ron ald Giere , puts it thi s wa y:
Even just a brief examination of classical mechanics as pr esented in
modern textbooks provides a basis for some substantial conclusions
about th e overall str uct ure of thi s scientific th eory as it is actually
understood by th e bulk of th e scie ntific co m m unity . What on e finds
in standard textbooks may be described as a cluster (or cluster of
clu sters) of models , or, perhaps better, as a population if models
consisting if related famili es if models. The various famili es ar e
co nstr ucted by co m bining Newton's laws of motion, particularly
th e second law , with various for ce fun ctions - linear functions,
inverse square functi on s, and so on . The models thus defined ar e
th en multiplied by adding other force fun ctions to th e definition .
T hese define still further famili es of models. And so on."
Giere emphasizes th e point that, despite th e fact th at some members
of this populati on of mod els (Newto n's law s of moti on ) se rve to
generate the various branchin g famili es , the relation bet ween a funda -
mental mod el and those deri ved from it is not like th at between axio ms
and theore ms. Far from bein g a m echanical process of deduction , th e
co m plex mod elling practices w hic h have historically gene rate d th ese
fam ilies invol ve man y judiciou s approximations and idealizati on s,
gUided by pri or achievements serv ing as exe m plars ." I will return to
this ques tion in a moment but for now I would like to add that th e
basic idea of th inking of a physical th eory as a population of models
fits we ll with th e onto logical stance I am defending . Such a population
is easi ly co nce ived as th e product of a historical accumulation, subje ct
to all th e co ntinge ncies of such hist ori cal pr ocesses, and hen ce with no
pr ·t n e that it represen ts a co m plete or final set of mod els. At any
rate, the co m pleteness or clos ur of th e set becomes an empirical
matt 1', not .orncthing to b assume d at th e outs t as in axiomatic
trva t rncnts . ~ rtai n popul ations (like th ose o f th e sub -fi lei of classica l
V IR TUAL IT Y AND T H E L A W S OF PHYS I CS
dynamics) may see m to have achieved closure at a ce rtain point in
history only to be reop en ed later giving rise to a new round of
accumulation, as wh en co m pute r- d r iven developmen ts in nonlinear
dynami cs reop en ed wh at was widely co nside re d a closed field . As I1ya
Prigogin e puts it : ' Unfortunate ly, many co llege and uni versit y text-
bo oks pr esent classical dynamics as a closed subject .. . [but] in fact ,
it is a subjec t in rapid evo lutio n . In th e past twenty years , [physicists]
have introduced important new insights , and further developments can
be ex pecte d in th e near future. ' 8
The philosopher of scie nce Nancy Cartwright has pr op osed a set of
distinctions that may be used to describe th e non -axiomatic stru cture
of thi s population of models. Som ewhat parado xicall y, she argues that
th e fundamental law s of physics, those law s which in axiomatic
treatmen ts ar e assume d to be th e high est truths, are indeed false. Th e
law s of physics lie , as she puts it . What she mean s is that a fundam ental
law achieves its generality at the expense if its accuracy. A fundam ental
law , such as Newton 's law of gravity, is strictly speaking true onl y in
th e most artifi cial of circumstances, wh en all other forces (like
electr om agne tic forces) ar e absent, for instance , or whe n th ere is no
fr iction or other nonlinearities. In other words, th e law is true but
on ly if a very large 'a ll othe r things being equal' clause is attached to
it .? W e can co m pe nsate for th e sho rtcom ings of fundam ental laws by
adding to th e basic eq uation other eq uatio ns representing th e action of
othe r forces or th e co m plex causal interacti on s between forces. But
the n we lose th e ge ne rality that mad e th e orig inal law so appealing to
essentialists. Th e mod el becomes more true, describing with increased
acc uracy the struct ure of a given expe rime ntal ph en omenon , but for
th e same reason it becomes less gen eral. In short , for Cartwright th e
objec tive co nte nt of physics do es not lie in a few fundam ental law s,
but in a large number of causal models tailored to speci fic sit uatio ns.
(Giere do es not speak of 'causal models' but of ' hypo t hese s' linking
th e abstract models and th e world , but th e o verall thrust of his
arg ument is very close to that of Cartw right . 10)
T he esse ntialist ma y obj ect that , give n that th e speci alized causal
mod els are d rive d fro m the fundamental law s , th y mu st inherit
w hat ver degree of truth they have fro m th os law s. But Ca rt wri ght
(like G iere) rcpl ic that this o versim plifies th e description of the
 INTENSIVE SCIEN CE AND V IRTUA L PHI LOSOPHY
mod elling practices of real physicists. The causal models are not
logicall y deduced from th e general laws, but construct ed from them
using a complex set of approximation techniques which cannot be
reduced to deductive logic. As Cartwright says, th e content of th e
causal models 'we derive is not contained in th e fundamental laws that
exp lain them. ' II In short, th e population of models whi ch con stitutes
th e th eoretical component of classical mechanics may be roughly
divided into two sub -populations: a larg e number of causal models
clos ely adapted to particular expe r imental situations, and a few
fundame ntal models corresponding to basic laws from which branching
families of other abstract models ar e derived . This breakdown of th e
ontents of th e population leaves out a different class of models,
statistical models if the data, which is also very important. Positivist
philosophers used to think that the predictions deduced from axioms
and auxiliary premises (those describing initial conditions) were con -
fro nte d directly with observations in a laboratory, that is, with raw
data. But for at least two hundred years physicists have used statistical
mo dels to organize th e raw data, and, in particular, to attempt to
capt ure th e distribution if measurement errors in th e data. 12 Besid e ignoring
th is impo rtant kind of model , th e po sitivi st em phasis on 'the obs erver'
is misleading because it reduces to a subjective phenomenon what is in
fact a co mplex practi ce of data gathering, involving not passive
observations but active causal int erventions.
Leaving aside th e expe rimental side for a moment, what ar e we to
think of th e few fundam ental laws ? Is it correct to say that th ey lie, or
is it mo re accurate to say that th ey are not th e kind of mathematical
objects that can be true or false? Cartwright sugg ests that th e function
of these laws is to un!fj and oraanize th e rest of th e population. 13 This
is, I beli eve, a ste p in th e right direction but we cannot simply tak e
this unifying capability for granted; we must at least try to account for
it. Histori cally, th e unification of th e different branches of classical
mechani cs was achieved by a se r ies of physicists and mathematicians,
sta rt ing with th e work of Leonard Euler in th e mid -eighteenth century
• nd culminating a hundred years later with that of William Hamilton.
It may be said that, to geth I' with other important figures (Maupc rtuis,
I ,lgr.1I1gl'), th esc scie ntists transformed classical me han ics from a
VIRT UA L I TY AND TH E LAW S O F PH Y S ICS
science of forces to on e of sinq ularities. In th e words of th e historian
Morris Kline:
Hamilton 's principl e yields th e paths of falling bodies, th e paths of
projectil es, th e elliptical paths of bodies mo ving under th e law of
gravitation, the law s of r eflection and refracti on of light, and the
more elementary ph enomena of electricity and magnetism . How-
ever , th e chief achi evem ent of th e principl e lies in showing that th e
phenomena of all th ese branches of physics satisfy a minimum
principle. Since it relates th ese phenomena by a common mathemat-
ical law, it permits conclusions reach ed in on e branch to be
reinterpreted for another. Hamilton's principle is th e final form of
th e least -action principle introduced by Maupertuis, and because it
em braces so many actions of nature it is the mo st powerful single
principle in all of mathematical physics. 14
Th e history of minimum principles, th e idea that, for exam ple , light
mo ves along th e path that minimizes travelling distance, is ind eed a long
o ne having roots in Greek antiquity and m edi eval philosophy. IS In th e
seve nteenth century , Pierre de Fermat cre ate d th e first application of
this idea in th e co nte xt of ear ly modern physics, th e Principle of Least
T ime govern ing th e behaviour of light in geometrical optics. For much
of its history th e principl e carried strong th eol ogical overtone s as it
was assoc iate d w ith th e beli ef that it reflect ed th e econo my of thought
of a Cre ato r. Maupertuis eve n went as far as to state that his Least
Action principl e was th e first scientific proof of th e existe nce of God.
Event ually th e th eological connection was lost , as scientists realized
th at w hat mattered was not th e ideological interpretation but the
math ematical technology that was cre ate d around th ese ideas: the
calculus if variations. Thi s was th e first technology ever to deal directly
with singular ities and it rivals in importance, as far as its effects on
ninet eenth - and tw entieth -century physics, the othe r mathematical
fields I have discu ssed in thi s book (d iffere ntial geometry, group
thcorvj.!"
One way of looking at the calculus of variations is as a novel way of
I'0sinfl mechanical problems. Instead of looking at a problem in physics as
 I N T E N SIVE S C I E N C E AND VIRTUA L PHI LOSOPHY
a problem of th e causal effccts of forces, one looks at it as a pr obl em
of find ing, am on g th e many possible pr ocesses that ma y change a
physica l systc m from one sta te to ano ther, th e actual process. More
exactly, th e techniques develop ed by Euler and Lagra nge allow th e
constr uction of a set of possibiliti es (fo r exa m ple, a set of possibl e
pat hs w hich a light ray might foll ow) and supply th e resources need ed
to sort th ese possibilities into two gro ups, on e of ordinal)' and one of
sinpulat cases . As it happen s, th e results of expe riments sho w th at th e
singular cases (a m inimum or a maximum) ar e th e ones that are in fact
act ualized ."? Although th e singularities un cov ered by th e calculus of
variations are not, stric tly speaking, attractors, its cre ators did see m to
thi nk that they played a sim ilar role . Attractors ar e described as
defining th e long-t erm tenden cies of a syste m , that is, th e state th e
syste m will adopt if we wait long eno ugh to allow it to settle down.
Thi s emphasis on th e final sta te sugges ts that one way to look at the
difference be tween attractors and causes is through th e old distincti on
mad e by Arist otl e between fi nal and qpcient causes. Euler him sel f,
when introducing his var iatio nal techn ology, used thi s Ari stotelian
distinction:
Since the fabr ic of th e uni verse is m ost perfect , and is th e wo rk of
a mo st wise Cre at or, nothing whatsoever takes pla ce in th e uni verse
in whic h some relat ion of maximum and minimum does not appe ar.
W herefore th ere is abso lutely no doubt th at eve ry effect in th e
univ erse can be explaine d as satisfacto rily fro m final causes, by th e
aid of th e m eth od of maxim a and minim a, as it can from th e
effective causes the ms elves .. . Therefore, two method s of st udying
e ffects in Nature lie ope n to us, one by m eans of effective causes,
w hich is co m mo nly calle d th e direct method, th e other by means of
fina l causes . . . O ne ought to make a speci al e ffort to see that both
wuys if approach to the solution if the problem be laid ope n ; for thus
not only is one solutio n greatly stre ngthe ne d by th e othe r, bu t ,
more than th at , fro m th e agreement between th e tw o so lutions we
sec ure the very highest satisfaction. 18
In a Dc lcuz ian ontology final causes wo uld have to be replaced by
quasi -ca uses in order to avoid ascribing teleological or goal-seeking
VIRTUAL IT Y AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
beh aviour to ph ysical systems . But the im po rtant poin t for my
argument is that it was precisely th e ability to pose a pr obl em not in
te rms of specific efficie nt causes (forces) but in a way w hich by-p assed
causal det ails, that allowed th e variational version of classical mechani cs
to play a unifying and org anizational role in th e population of mod els.
T he sing ulari ties whi ch th e calculus of variatio ns un covered rep res-
en te d, in my terminology, a m echanism -indep en dent r eality. On th e
othe r hand, as Euler himself acknowl ed ged , thi s m ethod was co m ple-
mentary not exclusive to th e causal one . O ne may know that a give n
classical mechanical pr ocess will tend to minimize some quantity, but
the full ex planation of th e process w ill also in vol ve a co rrect descrip-
tion of th e causal m echani sm s th at achieve suc h minimizati on . Thi s
other task, how ever, must be performed by other mod els, less ge neral
and m ore specifically tailored to th e details of an ex perime ntal
sit uatio n .
To sum m ar ize th e arg umc nt of thi s sec tion , far from being mere
math ematical express ions of linguistic truths, law s must be viewed as
models fro m which th e m ath em ati cal form cannot be eliminated . Th e
un ificatio n brought about by th e calculus of variat ions, for ex am ple,
cannot be understood otherwise since its techniques do not appl y to
ling uistica lly state d law s. These irre d uci bly mathematical m odels form
a gro wing and heterogen eou s populati on , some members of w hich
carry causal informatio n about pr oductive relati on s between events,
ot hers embo dy quasi-causal relations between singu lar itics . In other
word s, th e populat ion of m od els making up th e th eoreti cal co m pone nt
of classical mechanics co ntains a large number of speci fic causal models
w hich are th e vehicles for truth (the part of th e population that
inte1aces with the actu al world), and fewer models whi ch do not r efer
to th e act ual worl d (he nce are neither true nor false) but wh ich
nevertheless do inteJjace with the virtua l world by virt ue of bein g well -
posed problems. For Deleu ze a probl em is defined precisely by a
distribut ion of the sing ular and th c ordinary, th e important and th e
un importan t , th e relevant and the irrelevant. A we ll-posed probl em
ge ts the se distribu tion s right, and a so lut ion always has th c truth it
des erves acco rdi ng to how well specified th e co rres po ndi ng pr obl em
is .!" In these t rm s N iw ton' s a hi ve m nt wo uld co n ist not in having
discov ered gene ral tru th s abo ut th e uni v ersc , but in having correct ly

INTENS IVE S C IEN CE AND VIRTUAL P HIL O SOPH Y
posed an objecti ve problem defined by th e simplest distribution of
singular ities (unique minima or maxima). This interpretation preserves
th e obj ectivity of Newton ' s law s but it d eflates his achi ev ement
so mewhat, in th e sense that , if th e insights of nonlinear dynamics
abo ut multiple attractors ar c correct, th e single minimum problem is
not th e most general on e .
T his concl usion assumes, howev er, that the traditional axiomatic
appro ach to physics can be replaced by a problematic approach, that is,
th at problems can r eplace fundamental law statements. But this
replacement needs more justification given that it go es again st th e grain
o f th e traditional ontology of ph ysics . Hamilton 's Least Action prin -
ciple , for ex am ple, is still interpreted by most physicists as an axiom
ex press ing a general truth from which many particular truths in physics
follow m echanically. As Morris Kline puts it:
T o th e scientists of 1850, Hamilton' s principle was th e realization
of a dream ... From th e time of Galileo scientists had been st riving
to deduce as many ph enomena of nature as possibl e from a few
fundam ental ph ysical principles ... Descartes had already expressed
the hope that all th e law s of science would be derivable from a
sing le basic law of th e universe. i?
And, I sho uld add , thi s hope for a single law state men t from which
e ve ry thing else foll ows has displayed a consid erable resilien ce and
lon g vity, still animating th e dream for a final th eory among some
o nte m po ra ry ph ysicists. Therefore th e task for th e next section of this
chapte r will be to describe in more detail the extra-propositional and
sub-represent ative nature of th ese distributions of th e important and th e
unimportant which ar c supposed to replace law statements as well as
esse nces . In Dcleuzc 's words:
It will be said that th e esse nce is by nature th e most 'important'
thing . This, howev er, is precisely what is at issu e: whether notions
o f' importance and non -importance ar c not precisely notions whi ch
co nce r n e ve nts or accidents, and ar c mu ch more 'important' within
accid ents than th e cr ud, oppos ition between esse n e and acc ide nt
itself. Th e probl em o f th ou ght is ti d not to esse n cs but to th
VIR TUALITY AND THE LAW S O F PHY S ICS
e valuation of what is important and what is not, to th e di stribution
of th e singular and regular, distinctive and ordinary points, whi ch
takes pla ce entirely within th e un essential or within th e description
of a multiplicity, in relation to th e ideal events that const it ute th e
cond itions of a probl em. 21
I will focu s first on a particular kind of problem, explanatory problems,
to show th e rol e which th e cau sal and th e quasi-cau sal play in th e
explanation of physical ph enomena. As Ian Hacking has argued, th e
same positivist bias es which promote th e beli ef that causality is not an
obj ective relation also promote th e downplaying of exp lanation as an
ep istem ological activity, that is, promote th e po sitivist thesis that
'explanations may help organize phenomena, but do not provide any
deep er answer to Why questions ... ' 22 To th e non-positivist philo-
sophe rs who ar c reviving th e study of causality, on th e cont rary,
questions as to why a phenomenon occurs ar e crucial since they require as
answers more than a mere description of r egularities. Answering a
Why question typ icall y demands supplying a causal exp lanation , per-
hap s in th e form of a causal model of a m echanism. In addition, I will
arg ue that th ese qu esti ons sometimes require sup plying a quasi-cau sal
fact or to ex plain whatev er regularity th ere is in th e beha viour of th e
m echanism s, that is, to capture th e m echanism -indep endent asp ect of
th e ph enomen on .P Despite th e fact that qu estions and answers ar e,
indeed , linguisti c enti ti es , Why qu estions involv e as part of th e
co ndit ions that make th em answerable, or w ell -posed, a non-linguisti c
or ex t ra- pro positional aspect whi ch is properly problematic: a distri-
buti on of the relevant and th e irrelevant. Let m e begin this new
sec tion with a quote from th e philosopher Alan Garfinkel who has
de veloped an original approach to these matters:
When Willie Sutton was in prison, a pri est who was trying to
reform him asked him why he robbed banks . 'Well , ' Sutton r epli ed,
' t hat's whe re th e money is.' There has been a failure to connect
he re , a failure o f fit. Sutton and th e pri est ar e passing each other by
. . . C lea rly th ere arc different values and purposes shaping th e
qu stion and answer. Th 'y tak e different thing to be problemat ic o r
sta nd in n cd of ex p lanation. For th pri e t , wh at sta nds in need o f'
 IN TEN S I VE SC IENCE AND V I R T U AL P H ILOSOP HY
explanation is the decision to rob at all. He do es not really care
what. But for Sutton, that is th e whole qu estion . What is problem -
at ic is th e choice of what to rob. 24
Garfinkel suggests that requests for explanations may be modeled as
qu estion s having the form ' W hy did event X (as opposed to Y or Z )
occ ur?' with th e clause in parenthesis constituting what he calls a
contrast space. The misunderstanding between the thi ef and the pri est in
his example is du e to the fact that each is using th e same qu estion but
with different contrast spaces . While for th e thief th e qu estion is ' W hy
ro b banks?' (as opposed to gas stations or retail stores) for th e priest
th e qu estion is 'Why rob banks ?' (as opposed to making an honest
living). T he thief's answer is ind eed a true answ er, but as far as th e
pri est is co ncerned, it is an irrelevant answer, a fact that suggests that
the rel evancy and valid ity of an explanation is relative to a particular
co ntrast space . These spac es capture both what is presupposed in a
qu estion (Gi ven that on e must rob , why banks?), and hence considered
to be not in need of explanation , as well as th e rel evant explanatory
alte rnatives . Garfinkel argues that characte rizing contrast spaces invol ves
goi ng beyond th e resources of language , even in cases (like th e thief
and pri est exam ple) wh ere th e situation is mostly lingui stic. As he pu ts
it:
T hese contrast spac es ar e still not well-understood obj ects. Th eir
structure is not readily identifiable with any of th e traditional obj ects
of logic, for example . Th ey have some similarities with ' possible
worlds', for instance, but th ey ar e not simply spaces of possible
wo rlds . Th ey are more like equivalence classes of po ssible worlds
(unde r the relation 'differs inessentially from') with almost all
possible worlds exclude d altogether from th e spac e. (Contrast spaces
are typically quite small.) .. . Basically, these spaces ar e similar to
what physicists call stat e spaces. A state spac e is a geometric
representation of th e possibilities of a syst em; a parametrization of
its states , a display of its rep ertoire . 25
I have alrea dy discu ed why lingui sti cally sp Hied possible worlds
f: iI to br eak with esse ntialism, and how bringing in math matical
V IR TUA L ITY AND THE LAWS OF PH YS I CS
entmes (such as state spaces and th eir attractors) can eliminate th e
need to characte rize rel evant alte rn atives (eq uivalence classes) through
relations like differs inessentially from ' . In a typical nonlinear state
I
space , subdivide d by multiple attractors and th eir basins of attracti on ,
th e structure of th e space of possibilities dep ends not on som e
extrinsically defined relation (specifying what is an inessential change)
but on th e distribution if sinpulariti es itself. Th e traj ectories in state
space , defining po ssible sequen ces of states, are spontaneously broken
into equivalence classes by th e basins of attraction : if th e starti ng point
or initial condition of two different traj ectories falls within a given
basin both traj ectories ar e bound to end up in th e sam e state, and ar e
equivalent in that resp ect. Garfinkel, in fact, acknowledges th e rol e
which attractors may play in structuring th e contrast spac es of physical
and biological explanations. As he says, 'What is necessary for a true
explanation is an account of how th e underlying space is partitioned
int o basins of irrelevant differen ces, separate d by ridg e lines of cr itical
points. '26
How do es a distribution of singularities obj ectively define th e
correctness or truth of a problem? Th e answer is that, as Del euz e says,
'there are problem s whi ch are false through ind et ermination, others
th rough overdet ermination'. 27 In other words, a problem ma y be false
or badly posed if th e alt ernatives whi ch str ucture a contrast space are
roo sharply difined , since in that case th e validity of th e explanation
becomes too dep endent on th e occurrence of precisely those events
(overde te rmi nation). On th e contr ary, th e problem may fail to be true
if it is so vapuely difined that it is impossible to tell wh ether an actually
occ ur ing eve nt belongs to on e or another of th e relevant alt ernatives
(inde te rminat ion). Let me give an exam ple of a problem which is not
w II posed du e to its conditions being overdet ermined. Garfinkel
illustrates this case with a w ell-known ecological ph enomenon, th e
rhythm ic or periodic changes in the overall numbers of coupl ed
populations of pr ey and predators (rabbits and fox es, in his exam ple).
As th e population of rabbits incr eases th e fox es' numbers also increase
du to the ex tra available food. But at so me point, there ar e too man y
fo x 's 0 that th populati on of rabbits is reduc d. Thi s, in turn, brings
down th e number of fa xes, which allows th rabbit population to
reco ver and sta rt th e cycl again. Thi s cycl ic beha viour of th e ouplcd
 INTENS IVE SCI ENCE AND VIRTUAL PHIL OSOPH Y
populations is what is ecologically problematic about th e situation, that is,
what demands an explanation . 28
W e may pos e th e problem in two alternative wa ys, on e at th e level
of intera ctions between individual rabbits and fox es, which gives an
ove rde te rm ine d contrast spac e with too many alternatives, and another
at th e level of the overall density of th e populations yield ing a well-
posed problem. To put thi s in linguistic terms, if w e posed the
pr obl em 'Why was this rabbit eaten?', one answer may be framed at
the population level (because of th e large number of fox es) and another
at th e o rganism level (be caus e it passed through the capture spac e of a
speci fic fox at a specific time) . In other words, on e problem is 'Why
was thi s rabbit eaten (as opposed to not eaten)?' while the other is
IWhy was this rabbit eaten (by this particular fox as opposed by this
o r that other fox)?'. The second contrast space includes much that is
irrelevant to th e qu estion sinc e , given a high enough den sit y of foxes, if
this rabbit had not been eate n by this fox it would have been eaten by
ano the r. In other words, th ere is a ce rtain degree of redundant causality
ope rat ing at the micro-level, so that framing th e qu estion at that level
is bound to yield the wrong distribution of th e important and th e
unimpo rtant. 29 The second way of framing th e qu estion is, as Garfinkel
says, explanatorily unstable:
T he ge ne ra l crite rion in th e cases we are dealing with is that an
objec t of explanation should be chosen whi ch is stable und er sm all
perturbations of its conditions. In th e whole microspace of th e foxes
and rabbits syste m th ere is a point corresponding to th e death of
th at rabbit at th e hands of that fox, at that place and time, and so
forth. Now imagine a kind of mesh laid over the space, which
det ermines what is to count as relevantly th e sam e as that event.
[This is, in effect , th e contrast space of the explanation.] If th e mesh
is very fine, th e resulting cau sal relations will be relatively unstable .
P .rturbing th e initial cond itions slight ly [say, making th e rabbit pass
not so near that fox] will result in a situation which is different,
in '(Iuival -n t . [The rabbit not being eate n by that fox.] If howev er,
w · choose a mesh large eno ugh (and cleverl y nou gh ) we can
·apt urt· a sta ble rel ation , lik th e on b twc m high fo populati on s
VIRTUALI TY AND THE LAWS O F PHYS ICS
and high likelihoods of rabbit deaths. [Where changing the path of
th e rabbit still results in its being eate n but by another fox. 30]
Using th e notion of explanatory stability , Garfinkel develops an
application of contrast spac es to differentiate th e validity of expla-
nations op erating at different scales of reality. In the context of a flat
ontology of individuals this differentiation is crucial sinc e we would
like to have obj ective criteria to tell wh en an explanation is valid at
th e lev el of individual organisms , for exam ple , and when we need an
explanation at the spatio-t cmporal scale of an individual spe cies. In th e
exam ple just mentioned, a population-level intensive property (density)
can furnish a more stable explanation of th e cyclic behaviour of the
pr ey-predator system than an organism-level on e. Similarly for expla-
nations of social ph enomena, some will be adequate at th e scale of
individual subj ects, others will serve to answer Why questions at th e
scale of individual institutions, and yet others will capture th e relevant
causal effects of individual citi es or nation states.
In short, causal problems should be fram ed at th e correct level
given that each emerge nt level has its own causal capacities, th ese
capacities being what differentiates these individuals from each other.
But what about quasi-cau sal factors, how do th ey affect th e success or
failure of ex planations? To return to our exam ple , if th e properties of
th e cyclic dynamics of th e prey-predator syste m , th e duration of th e
cycle , for exam ple , are not stable, that is, if exte rn al sho cks can easily
change this duration, th en th ere is no need for quasi -cau sal factors.
But , on th e other hand, if such shocks only temporarily change th e
d ura tion and th e cycle spontaneously returns to its original period,
then th ere will be an aspect of th e dynamics not ex plained by the
causal model, a mechanism-independent aspect which still demands
e xplanation . Population biologists have in fact observed such stable or
ro bust cycle s both in th e field and in the laboratory, a fact that has
influen ced th e introduction of attractors as part of th eir explanatory
mod cls.!'
I sho uld cm phasiz that, despite my choi ce of exam ple , th ere i
nothing speci fically biological about thi s argument. Th e ex act same
ideas apply to syst im s of causally int ern tin g populations of inorg. nic

I NTE N S I V E SC IEN CE AND V IRT UAL P H I L O S O P H Y
entities. I have menti on ed seve ral tim es th e r egim es of flow of
convection and turbulence . When explaining such phenomena on e has
to frame th e problem at th e co rrect level so as not to introduce
irrelevant differen ces. Given a co nvec t ion cell and its cohere nt cyclic
behav iour, for exam ple , th ere ar e a large number of mi cro-causal
descri pt ions (of indi vidual mol ecul es colliding with on e another) which
ar e irrelevant to its explanation. In other words, th ere is a larg e causal
red un dancy at th e micro-level , with many collision histories being
.o mpatible with th e same macro-level effect: a coherent cyclic flow
pattern. Here th e proper level of explanation will involve macro- causal
factors: temperature and den sity gradients, co m petition between gra v-
itational and viscous forces, and so on. Moreov er, th e existe nce of
ritical thresholds recurring at regular values for th e gradients (struc-
tural instab ilities) and th e robustn ess of the recurring flow patterns to
shocks (asymptotic stability) will call for additional qua si-causal factors:
bifurca tio ns and periodic attracto rs. (O r, in th e case of turbulence ,
chaotic attractors.)
Let me pause for a moment to bring th e different lines of th e
arg ument together, and th en link th e co nclusions to th ose reached in
previous chapte rs . I argued first that th e axiomatic approach to classical
mechan ics, exem plified here by th e deducti ve-nomological model of
ixp lanation , views laws as the m ain car rie rs of objective truth , a truth
which is th en mechanically transmitted to th eorems via de d uction.
Exp laining a given ph enomenon is m od elled as a logical argument ,
subsuming the truth of a th eorem describing th e phenomenon under
the trut h of a law. An alte rnative approach, a probl ematic approach ,
I' jects the idea that fundam ental law s express ge ne ral truths and views
th ern instead as posing co r rec t problem s. Probl ems are defined by
th ir presuppos itions (what is not being ex plaine d) as we ll as by th eir
co ntrast spaces (defining what th e relevant option s for explanation
ar i). In the particul ar case of ex planations in classical physics, wh ere
the laws are expressed by differ ential equati ons, th e presupposition s
arc th physical quantities chose n as relevant degr ees of freed om
(w hich makc up th different dimen sions of a state space) while th e
co nt rast spa is defined by a distribution of singularities in sta te space,
that is, by a part i ular partiti on of possibiliti es into disti nct basins of
attraction. As th e xam pl of hyd rod ynami c reg imes of 1I0w shows,
VIR T UA LI T Y A ND T HE L A WS OF PHYSICS
how ever, a contrast space m ay have a m ore co m plex structure: a
cascade of sym metry-breaking bifur cati on s may link several such spaces
in such a way th at a problem may aradually specify itself as th e different
cont rast spaces it co nta ins reveal th emselves, one bifurcation at a time .
These conclusions are directl y co nnecte d with th e onto log ical ideas
I explo re d before, but to see this connec t ion we must expand th e
conce ption of probl em s beyond th ose involving scientific explanations.
In Deleuze 's approach th e r elation betw een well -po sed ex planato ry
problems and th eir true or false solutions is th e episte mological
co un te rpart of th e onto logical relation between th e virtual and th e
actual. Expl anatory probl ems would be the co unte r part of vir tual
m ultiplicities since, as he says, 'the vir tual possesses the realit y of a
tas k to be performed or a probl em to be so lved' . 32 Indi vidu al solutions,
on th e other han d , would be th e co unte rpart of actual indi vidu al
beings: ' An organism is nothing if not th e solution to a problem , as
are each of its differen ciat ed organs, such as th e eye which solves a
light probl em . P ? Let me illustrate th is idea w ith a sim ple examp le I
used befor e : soap bubbles and salt crystals, viewe d as th e emerge nt
res ult of int eracti ons between th eir co nstitue nt molecul es. Here th e
problem for th e population of molecul es is to fi nd (or compute its way
co) a minimal point of ene rgy, a probl em solved differently by th e
molecules in soap films (which collec tively solve a minimization
problem state d in surface -te nsion terms) and by th e molecules in
crystalline structures (w hich co llectively solve a bonding ene rgy prob-
lem). It is as if an ontologica l problem, wh ose co nditions ar e defined
by a un iqu e singular ity, 'explicate d' itself as it gave rise to a variety of
geom etr ic solutions (spherical bubbles, cubic crys tals). 34
T his intim ate relation betw een episte mo logy and ontology, bet w een
problems po sed by humans and self-posed virtu al problem s, is charac-
teristic of De1eu ze. A true probl em, such as th e one whi ch Newton
posed in re latively obsc ure geometric terms and whi ch Euler , Lagrange
and Hamilto n progressively clarified , would be isomorphic with a real
virtual problem . Similarly, th e practi ces of ex pe rime ntal physicists,
whi h includ e amo ng o ther thin gs th e skilful use of machin es and
instruments to individu ate phenomena in th e laboratory, wo uld b
isomorphic with th e intensiv proc sses of ind ividuation which so lv
or .xpli at' a virtual problem in rea lity. T his co nce ptio n of th task of
 INTENSIVE SCIENCE AND VIRTUAL PH ILOSOPHY
theoretical and experimental physicists runs counter to th e traditional
realist picture which views it as that of producing a corpus of linguistic
propositions expressing true facts which mirror reality. In this old and
tire d view , the relation between th e plan e of reality and that of physics
wo uld be one of similarity . Yet, as Deleuze says, there is 'no analytic
resemblance, correspondence or conformity between th e two plan es.
But th eir ind ep endence do es not preclude isomorphism . . . ' 3S Indeed,
as I said in the conclusion of the previous chapter, there is a further
isomorphism which must be included here: the philosopher must
become isomorphic with the quasi -causal operator, extracting problems
from law -expressing propositions and meshing th e problems together
to endo w them with that minimum of autonomy which ensures their
irreducibility to their solutions.
In th e second part of this chapter I would like to discuss the details
of th ese isomorphisms, one involving th e experimental, the other the
th eoreti cal component of classical physics . This will imply dealing with
both sides of the relation, that is, not only the laboratory and modelling
pra cti ces of physicists, but also the behaviour of the material phenomena
and machin ery which inhabit laboratories as well as the behaviour of the
ma the matical models with which th e theorist makes contact with the
virt ual. I will begin with a discussion of how the capacity of material
and ene rge tic systems to self-organize and self-assemble, a capacity
which reveals a properly problematic aspect of matter and energy , is
co ncea led when physici sts or philosophers focu s on linear causality at
the xpe nse of more com plex forms. Yet, I will also argue that even if
a mat erial system under study has been fully linearized and domest -
icate d, th e causal relations between experimentalist , machines, material
phenomena and causal models are still nonlinear and problematic. Indeed,
the physics laboratory may be viewed as a site where heterogeneous
assemblages form, assemblages which are isomorphic with real intens-
ive individuation processes.
I will th i n move on to qu estions of quasi-causality and compare
Dclcu z ·'s episte mological approach to state spac e, an approach that
e m phasizes th e singularities that define th e conditions of a theoretical
pr obl em, to thos of analytical philosophers who stre ss th e solut io ns
to the problem, that is, who sec not th e singularities but the
traject ori es in state spa c as the co nv 'yors o f theoreti cal knowl ed ge .
VIRTUALITY AND T H E L A W S O F PHYSICS
While trajectories bear a relationship of geometric similarity to
quantities measured in th e laboratory, th e singular ities defining a
problem in physics ar e isomorphic with those defining th e conditions
of a virtual multiplicity. Here too, I will argue that it is the behaviour
of linear equations that conceals th e problematic aspect of mathematical
models. In short, wh ether we ar e dealing with causes or quasi -causes,
with experime nta l or th eoretical physics, th e crucial task is to avoid
the subordination if problems to solutions brought about by th e search for
simple linear behaviour. Let me begin with a quote from the philo-
sopher of science Mario Bunge on th e conception of matter brought
about by excessive concentration on linear causes:
Before atoms, fields and radioactivity became pieces of common
knowledge, even scientists could be found that shared the beli ef that
' brute matter' is a homogeneous, unorganized and quiescent strif! entirely
lackinn spontaneity - th e matter, in short, dreamt by immaterialist
philosophers. From th e fact that e very experiment is an encroach-
ment on matter, th ey jumped to the Aristotelian conclusion that
matter is nothing but th e barren receptacle ifform s - a beli ef still held
in esteem by those quantum th eorists who hold that it is th e
experi mente r who produces all atomic-scale ph enomena. I"
And, I could add, st ill held in esteem by those cr itics of scien ce
who think that all ph enomena are socially constructed. This conception
of matter as basically inert is directly link ed to th e defining charact er-
istics of classical causality, th e most important of which is the simple
additivity of the effects of different causes. This apparently innocent
assumption is ind eed full of consequences, some of which are fatal for
the philosophical project which I have sketched in th ese pages. In
particular, a flat ontology of individuals assumes that, at every spatio-
temporal scale, there ar e properties of a whole which cannot be
ex plained as a mere sum of the properties of its component parts, but
which emerne from their causal int eractions. Without stable em ergent
pr op erties, and th e novel causal capacities th ese, in tum, give rise to,
the co ne pt of a larg er scale individual co llapses .
T he id a of add itive causes becam dominant in physics for th
appare nt Sim plicity \ ith whi ch it endo w a syste m lind r st udy."? In
 IN TEN SIV E SCIENCE AND VIRT UA L PHI LOSOP H Y
from th e Aristotelian concept of efficient cause: externality . In this
view , causes are taken to be exte rn al agents op erating on relatively
passive targets, hence being solel y r esponsible for whatever effects are
produced . The previous four traits of linear causality presuppose
ex te rn ality to the extent that th ey break down pr ecisel y when the
bod y being acted upon ceases to be a mere patient . A failur e of uniqueness
occ urs whenever one caus e can produce several effects depending on
th e tendencies of th e body it acts upon , and similarly for th e case in
which th e same effect can be triggered by a variety of cause s. The
elim ination of necessity in favour of enhanced probability and the
different probabilities of achieving an effect which a causal process may
transmit also depend on th e probabilities to be affected carried by the
target of th e cause . And, of course, the failure of uni -di rectionality
and proportional ity are directly linked to the fact that the bodies acted
upon by causes are not passive but can rea ct back and exe rcise their
o wn causal powers. t "
Th e flat ontology of individuals I have defended in th ese pages
dep ends crucially, as I said, on th e elimination of linear causes , or,
at least , on cutting th em down to size by showing th em to be
speci al limiting cases. In this ontology individuals alwa ys exist as part
of populations in which th e most meaningful and rel evant causal
r elatio ns ar e of the statistical or probabilistic kind. None of the e
indiv id uals is ever a passive rec eptacle for extern al causal influences
sin e th eir int ernal causal structure always plays a part in determining
th final effect . Th e lack of uniquen ess and uni-directionality is further
stre ngthened by the existence of quasi-causal relations. If th e internal
dynamic of an individual is such that several alternative stable states
arc availabl e to it, it is hardly surprising that th e sam e effect (a switch
bctwe n two attractors, for exam ple) may be brought about by a
vari ty of causes , and conversely, on e and the sam e exte rn al cause
may tri gger different effects depending on how close an individual is
to a bifurcation , or to th e border of a basin of attraction.
In sho rt , whil e linear causality makes th e response of a material
syste m to an extern al cause basicall y unproblematic (given the cause ,
the re is nothing lse in th e effect that demands explanatio n), nonlinear
am i statisti al cau alit y re-problemoti z e material syste m, showing th em
capable of s ·If-o rganizatio n and self-assembly, with man y thin gs left
V IR T UALI T Y AND TH E L A W S O F PH YS I CS
un explained in th e effect afte r th e mere citation of an exte rn al cause .
In addition , linear and nonlinear causality impl y two different models
for th e relationship between matter and form. Additi vity and ex te rn al-
ity presuppose, as I said , a matter obe dient to laws and co nstitu ting an
inert receptacle for forms imposed from th e outside. Matter under
nonlinear and non-equilibrium conditions is, on th e other hand ,
intensive and problematic, capable of spontaneously giving rise to form
drawing on its inherent tendencies (de fined by singularitie s) as well as
its co m plex capacities to affect and be affected. As Deleuze says, th e
first model :
assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed homogeneous. It is th e
idea of the law that assure s th e model' s cohe re nce, since laws are
what submits matter to this or tha t form, and conversely, rea lize in
matter a given property deduced from the form . . . [But that]
model leaves many things , activ e and affective, by th e way side. On
the on e hand , to th e form ed or formabl e matter we must add an
entire ene rge tic materiality in mo vement, carry ing sing ularities . . .
that are alr ead y like implicit forms that are topological, rather than
geome trical, and that combine with processes of deformation : for
ex ample, th e variab le undulations and torsion s of th fibers guiding
th e op erations of splitti ng wood. On th e other hand , to th e essential
prop erties of matter deri ving from th e formal esse nce we mu st add
variable int ensive eifJect5, now re sulting from th e op eration , now on
th e co nt rary , making it pos sible : for exam ple , wood that is more or
less porous, more or less elasti c and resistant. At any rate, it is a
qu estion of surrendering to th e wood, th en following where it leads
by co nnec ting op erations to a materiality inst ead of imposing a form
upon a matter . .. 44
Although Del euz e is referring here to artisans (carpenters in this
exa m ple , but also blacksmiths) sim ilar conclusions appl y to expe r i-
mental physicists . As Ian Hacking has forcefu lly argu ed, expe rime ntal
physics, far from being a m ere app endage of th eoretical phy ics
(supplying tests to co nfirm or disconfirm pr edi cti on s from formal
mod ' Is), has in fact a lif,· of it o wn . For ex am ple, th e exp rim entalist
mu st indi vidu ate in a stable and r peat abl way laboratory phenomena .
 INTENSIVE SCIENC E AND V IRTUAL PH ILOSOPHY
Rath er than being a mere by -product of th eoretical knowledge of laws,
th e indi viduation of phenomena involves, as Hacking says, 'a keen
ability to get nature to behave in new ways' . 4-5 In th e traditional
int erpretation, thes e material and ene rgetic phenomena were supposed
to be unintelligible outside a th eoretical framework , but Hacking
sho ws that , on the contrary, laboratory phenomena (such as polariza-
tion of light, the photoelectric effect , Brownian motion) typically
survive th e birth and death of new theories, or what amounts to the
same thing, the switching from on e to another incommensurable
theoreti cal paradigm. Many times th e individuation of a phenomenon
not only precedes the development of a theory that will explain it, but
it remains in this problematic state, crying out for an explanation, for
man y decades. r"
Beside individuating phenomena that mayor may not occur nat-
ur ally , expe rim ental physici sts must develop techniques and procedures
to isolate, identify and manipulate entities which have been individu-
ate d by obj ective processes occurring outside the laboratory. In this
as too, it is a qu estion of connecting op erations to a materiality
inste ad of deducing th e form of the entities in qu estion from a
th eoret ical law . As Hacking argues, physicists individuate entitie s like
elect rons by int ervening causally in the world, int eracting with real
electro ns so as to determine th eir mass (as was done by Thompson in
1897), or th eir charge (as performed by Millikan around 1908 ), as
w II as othe r of th eir properties. t? The individuation of electrons (as
we ll as other form erl y theoretical entities) is even more complet e
when exper ime ntalists move be yond th eir properties to study their
apaci ties. W e learn from electrons, we acquire expertise about them ,
by making th em part of heterogeneous assemblages where they affect
• nd are affecte d by other ent ities , and it is this causal know-how more
than anything related to general laws, which gives us confiden ce that
th ese individuals actually exist . As Hacking writes:
T he re are an enor mous number of ways in whi ch to mak e instru-
ments that rely on th e causal properties of electrons in order to
produ c d ired effects of unsurpassed precision . . . W e do not
mak instrum nts and th n infer th e reality of th e lectron , as
wh en we test a hypothesi , and th ' n b Ii -ve it hccaus ' it pass d th e
V I R TU A LI TY AND THE LAWS O F PHY SI C S
test. That gets th e time-order wrong. By no w we design apparatus
relying on a modest number of home truths about electrons, in
order to produce some other phenomenon that we wish to investi-
gat e . .. W e spe nd a lot of time building prototypes that don 't
work. W e get rid of innumerable bugs . . . Th e instrument must
be able to isolat e, physically, th e properties of entitie s that we wish
to use, and damp down all th e other effects that might get in our
way. We are completely convinced if the reality if electrons when we
reoularly set out to build - and iften eno up ]: succeed in buildino - new
kinds if device that use various well -understood causal properties if electrons
to inteifere in other more hypothetical parts if nature.48
It is in th e context of these complex laboratory practices that the
causal models I mentioned before (th e part of the population of models
that interfaces with the actual world) are deployed. As th e sociologist
of science Andrew Pickering has argued, expe rime ntalists , machines,
causal models and electrons (or other material entities) form, in the
conte xt of a particular expe rime ntal project, a het erogen eous assem -
blage . Each of the se distinct components retains its heterogen eity but
th ey are meshed to on e another in a co mplex process in which causal
mod es ar e fine tuned to better adapt to th e results of an expe rime nt ,
machines and procedures red esigned to change th e way th ey affect and
are affected by ph enomena, and skills sharpen ed to co pe with 'unfor e-
see n difficulties. In this assemblage each of th e component parts plays
a role interactively stabiliz inq th e whole. As Pickering writes, ' Scientific
knowledge should be understood as sustained by, and as part of,
inte ractive stabilizations situate d in a multiple and heterogen eous space
of machines, instruments, con ceptual structures, disciplined practices,
soc ial actors and th eir relations, and so forth. ' 4 9
Following Del euz e we may think about th ese complex assemblages
as th e epistemological counterpart of the intensive in ontology. Mu ch
as virtual multiplicities (view ed as self-posed ontological problems)
dep end on int ensive assemblages like ecosystems to progressively give
rise to ontological solutions, so expe rime ntal problems must first be
embo died in an int ensive assemblage prior to th eir being solved. In
I 'a rn ing by doin g, o r by int eracting with and adjusting to material s ,
machin . and mod els, xpe rime ntalists proorcssivcly discern \ hat is
 IN T E N S I V E SC I E NC E A ND V IRT U A L P HI LOSOP HY
relevant and what is not in a given experime nt. In other words, the
distribution of th e important and th e unimportant defining an expe r i-
mental problem (what degrees of freedom matter, what disturbances
d o no t mak e a d ifferen ce) are not grasped at a glance th e way one is
supposed to gr asp as esse nce (or a clear and di stinct idea), hut slow ly
hrought to light as th e assemhlage stabilizes itself th rough th e mu tu al
accom modation of its heterogeneous components. In this assemb lage
the sing ularities an d affects o f th e ex perimen talist 's body are meshed
with those of machines, mo dels and material processes in order for
learning to occ ur and for em bod ied exp ertise to accumu late. so On the
o ther hand , besides th is expertise (w hich ma y he applied in the design
and perfo rmance of o ther experime nts and which, therefore, remain s
inte nsive) there are also extensive or formal products of laboratory
practices: individual pieces o f data, individual facts, individual solu -
tio ns , whi ch take th eir pla ce in th e co rp us o f accumulated knowled ge.
As Del euze writes, 'Learning is the appropriate name for the subject ive
acts carried out when one is co nfronted with the o bjectivity o f a
probl em . . . whereas knowledge de signates on ly th e gen erality of
co ncepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solution s. ' 5 1
To summarize , there are two different ways of subordinating
problems to so lutio ns in the causal realm . One involves the eli mination
o f the non linear causal capacitie s of the material systems under study
eit he r by ho mogenizing them or hy focusing on low-int ensity cquilib-
rium situations. In either case, one studies a matter so obe dient to
laws that the productive aspect of causal co nnectio ns may be disreg-
arded and he reduced to a constant regu larity. What makes a material
syste m problemati c, what continuo usly demand s new ex planations , is
precisel y th e opcn -endedness of th e assemhlages it may form , o r th e
multiple stable states in which it may exist and the abrupt transitions
it may undergo . But if we assume that there is always a unique stable
state, or that a cause always produces o ne and the same effect , we
ma y forget ab out th e problem and focus on th e sol ut ion: the co nstant
n'gularity itself as d escr-ibed hy a law . O n th e other hand , one
subo rd inates prob lem s to so lutions when the co mplex causal interven -
tio ns in reality which the ex perimentalist mus t perform , as we ll as the
mutual adjustments between machines , skills and 'a large number of
inh'r!ocking low level generalizatio ns', S2 arc relegated to a seco ndary
VI RTU ALITY A ND THE L A W S OF P H Y S I C S
place and th e formal co gn itive products of thi s asse mhlage are tak en as
the o nly worthy objects o f phil o sophical reflecti on . O nc e detached
from their intensive individuation co ntext, wh ere the experime ntal
learning of relevances and irrelevances takes place, these individual
items o f knowled ge become significan t only hy reference to a theoret-
ical framework of laws and abstract concepts.
Let me turn no w to the subordination o f problems to so lutio ns in
the rea lm of the quasi-causal. As I said befo re, th e par t of the
population of models which inte rfaces w ith th e virtual is not t he o ne
composed of detailed models of causal mechanisms but the one
including the mu ch simpler on es expressing fundamental laws. Unli ke
th e case o f co mplex causal models, th e relation of problems to
so lutio ns in th e case of basic law s (and mode ls directly derived from
th em) may he approached using th e results of Del euze' s ontological
analysis of state space . State-spa ce ideas do not appl y to causal models
for two reason s. On e is their sheer co mplexity: the mathematical
techniques need ed to ana lyse sta te space are typi cally valid o nly for
models with a few d egrees o f freed om , defining a state space with a
low dimensionality, and are not at present sufficie ntly developed to
apply to more co m plex cases. T his lim itat ion may be lifted on e day as
these techniques improve but there is a more impo rtant reason why
t hey w ill sti ll he o f limited valu e to the experimen ta list : state spaces do
not capture any iriformati on about causal processes.
Let me exp lain. In som e interpretations of state space the series of
poss ible states whi ch populate it (that is, th e trajectories or sol utio n
curves) are erroneousl y endowed with causal significance, with each
successi ve state viewed as the cause of the following o ne (or in so me
interpretatio ns, the initial state is taken as the cause whil e the final
state is the effect) . This is, indeed. a mathematical expression of the
pos itivist redu ction of the productiv e or genetic aspect of causes to a
processif" uniform succession (another version of Hum c ' s regu lar conjunc-
tion ). But as critics of positivism have pointed ou t. on ly actual events
can perform the genetic role of causes. As Mario Bunge argues . 'states
cannot have a productive virtue of their own . The state of a material
system is a syste m of qualities , not an eve nt o r a string o f events .
Evcry state is the outcome of a set of determiners . . . Conseq ue n tly
then' can he no action of one state upon anot her state of a g iven

I NT E NS IVE SC I E NC E AND VI RT U AL PH I L O S O P H Y
syste mj in particular, there can be no causal links among states, nor among
any other system of qualities . -ss
On th e o the r hand, whil e the anal ysis of th e state spa ce o f a model
may not provid e us with causal information, it can be made to )ield
insight about quasi-causal relations . This epistemo logical result, how-
ever, depends on a particular ontological interpretation o f the contents
o f state space. Deleuze , as I said , does not view the differential
relations defining a model as expressing a law go verning the generation
o f th e serie s o f sta tes that make up a traject ory, but as d efining a
vec to r field whi ch captu r es th e ove rall tenden cies o f th e syste m as a
distribution o f singularities. 'Beneath the general operation o f laws' as
he says 'there always remains thc play o f singu larities.' 'i'' These
sing ular ities d efine th e conditions o f th e problem, ind ep endently of its
so lutions, while each solution curve is the produ ct o f a specific
individuation process guided at every point by th e tendenci es in th e
vect or field :
Already Leibniz had shown that the calculus . . . expre ssed problems
which co uld not hitherto be solv ed or, ind eed, even pos ed . . . One
thinks in particular of the ro le of th e regular and the singular points
which enter into the co mplete determination of th e specie s of a
cur ve . No doubt the specification of t he singular points (for
example, dips, nodes, focal points, centres) is undertaken by means
o f th e form of integral curves, which refers back to the so lutions of
th e differential equations. There is nevertheless a co mplete deter-
rnination with respect to the existence and distribution of these
points whi ch depends upon a completely dilTerent instance, namely,
th e field of vectors d efined by th e equation itself . . . Moreover, if
t he specification of th e points already sho ws th e necessa ry imman-
ence o f the problem in the soluti on, its involv em ent in the solutio n
which covers it, along with the existence and distrihution o f points,
test ifies to the transcendence of the problem and its directive role
in rel ation to the organizatio n o f the solutions them selv es. ss
To bring o ut th e o riginality o f Del euze ' s ana lysis it will help to
co nt rast it with th e anal yses perfo rm ed by ana lytical phil o sophers wh o
focus exclusive ly o n the episte mo logical rol e pla)'{'d hy trajectories. In
V IR T UALITY AND T H E L A W S OF PH Y S I C S
one approach, for exam ple , the role of the trajectori es is to be used as
predictions about the specific sequence of values "vhich the relevant
properties o f the syst em being mod elled will follow. The first ste p in
the procedur e , according to this approach, involv es making measure -
m ents o f the properties of a real system in a laboratory and plotting
the resulting numerical values as a curve. If the laboratory system is
prepared in such a way that it starts its evolution in the same initial
co nditions as the model, thcn this curve and the co rresponding state -
space trajecto ry should be oeome<ricolly similar. A perfect match
be t ween th e two, with th e state-space traject ory exact ly tracking th e
plotted value s, co uld th en be in te rp re ted as meaning that th e model is
true to the modelled system . Given that, du e to empirical limitations,
we cannot prepare a laboratory system to start at preci sely the same
initial conditions as an abstract mod el , the relation between plotted
values and predicted trajectories will not be a perfect match, so that
their relation will be one of approximate truth . Neverthel ess, it is the
geome trical similarity , or approximate simi larity, between the two
curves that matters for epistemo logical purposes. 56
An alternative view would disregard this ex trinsic resemblance
between metri c objec ts, and emphasize instead the common possession of
topological invariants. As one physicist puts it,
For present purposes, a system may be viewed both as a field of
phy sical phenomena in which a class o f elements exhibits its
functions or behaviors in space and time , and as an abstract
d escription which presumably ma y be isomorphic with th e phy sical
field . . . Two system s will be viewed as fun ctionally isomorphic
o ver a dynamic range if they have the same sing ularities of motion, in
the stability sense, over that range .'i7
T his w ould be th e co rrect stance to adop t in a D eleu zian anal ysis. The
episte mo logical valu e o f state space would be to reveal a topoloqicol
isomorphism between singu larities in the model and singularities in the
physica l system bein g mod elled . T his isomorphism , in tum, would be
ex plaine d by sho w ing that th e model and th e physical system are co-
actualizations o f the same virtual multipli city (or o f part o f the same
mult iplicity t given that the iso morphism is valid o nly within a rangl') .

I N T E N SI V E SCIE NCE AN D V I R T UA L P HI LO S O P H Y
Dcleuze's approach d oes not exclude th e po ssibility that th ere can be
sim ilarities between traj ect ories and plotted values, but thi s resemb-
lance must itself be explained as a result of the co mmon topological
properties o f th e systems producing th e curves . The repl y that
possession o f common properties is what makes a mod el and a real
ystem similar is, as th e phil osopher Nel son Goodman arg ued long
ago, redundant. As he put it, 'to say that two things are sim ilar in
having a specified property in com m on is to say nothing more than
that they have that property in com m on'. 58
There is another wa y of stating th e differen ce between th ese tw o
philosophical approaches to th e episte mology of state space . In th e
analytical appro ach , th e main episte mo logical relati on is that between
laws (ex pres sed by differential equations) and the traj ectories obtained
as solutions to tho se equations. This relation is on e of Beneral to
particular. In other words, if we ignore th e rol e whi ch th e vecto r field
plays in th e individuation of traj ect ori es, it see ms natural to view law s
as stat ing a Beneral rule govern ing th e volution of se ries of states , and
to see eac h t rajectory as th e result of appl ying that rul e for a particular
initial condition . In th e Deleu zian approa ch , on th e co ntrary, th e
parti cu lar sta te at w hich a traject ory starts becomes irrelevant, given
that ma ny d ifferent start ing points within th e same basin of attraction
end up in th e same place , th e attracto r. In othe r wo rds, it is th e
distribu tio n of sing ularities itself th at det ermines w hat changes in initial
co nd itio ns are relevant (relative to th e end state) and wh ich are
irrel evant , O n th e other hand, th e ge ne rality of th e law (of which a
g iv'n tra jec tory and plot of real values ar e particular instances) is
r 'p laced by th e uni versality of virt ual multipliciti es of wh ich both model
.1IIt! real syste m are di vergent actualizations. As Del eu ze wr ites,
'S ingularity is beyond particular proposition s no less than uni versality
is h 'yond ge ne ra l prop ositi on s. '59
T he subse rv ience of probl ems to so lutions in th e anal ysis of state
SIl.\CC is but one exam ple of an error with a rather lon g history, a
' long perversion ' wh ich Deleu ze traces back at least to Ari stotl e ."?
O rigin ally, the subo rdinat ion deri ved fro m th e habit of th ou ght of
think ing abo ut problem s as if th ey were proposition s, th at i , from
missin J the non -lingui st ic and ex tra-proposi t ional nat ure of th ir
VI R T UALI T Y A ND TH E L A WS O F PHYSICS
co nditio ns (contrast space). But in more recent times, in th e historical
peri od wh en classical mechani cs developed , the surrende r to solutio ns
took a more specific, more mathematical form . T o Del eu ze , math-
ematical problems are subordinate d to th eir solutions wh en ever th e
we ll- posedness of a problem is approached in terms of its solvability
(the possibility of findin g a solution) . In th e final sec tio n of th is chapter
I would like to discu ss two episode s in th e hist ory o f mathematics
w he re this traditional subord ina tio n was inverted , with so lvability
becoming a consequence of th e w ell -posedness of a problem . As I will
discu ss in a moment, thi s in version has for Deleuze r evolutionary
co nse que nces whose impact has not been gen erally appreciated . One
episode invol ves th e hist ory of algebrai c equations, and th e reversal of
th e subordination had, as on e of its con sequen ces, the birth of group
th eory. The other episode is more familiar, relating to th e hist ory of
differential equations , having as a result th e birth of th e th eory of
dy namical syste ms, whi ch is th e source of th e modern approach to
sta te space.
Let m e begin by describing in very rough form th e techni cal issues
invo lved in qu esti on s of so lvability in th e case of algebraic equatio ns .
T here are two kind s of solutions to equatio ns, particular and Beneral. A
partic ular solution is given by numerical values whi ch, whe n used to
re place an equatio n's unknowns, make th e equation co me out true .
(Fo r ex am ple, an algebraic equation like x 2 + 3x - 4 = °
has as its
nu me rical so lutio n x = I .) A ge ne ral or exact so lution , on th e othe r
hand, does not yield any specific value or set of values but rather the
Blobal patt ern if all particular solutions. Thi s gen eral pattern is typi cally
give n by another equation o r formula. The above exam ple , which
may be written as x 2 + ax - b = 0, has th e gen eral solution
x = V h + b - ~ . When mathematicians speak of the solvability of
d
an equation th ey usuall y mean its exact solvability, and the subordi-
nati on of problems to so lutions ste m s from th e demand that a well -
posed problem have an exact so lution , not ju st numeri cal on es. By th e
sixteenth -ce nt ury mathematician s knew that exact solvability was an
achi vable goa l, at least with eq uations wh ere th e unknown variable
was raised up to th fourth pow er (that is, th os including x 2 , x I and
x"). But th n a crisis ensued. Eq uations raised to th fifth po wer
 INTENSIVE S CIENCE AND VIRTUAL PH ILOSOPHY
sed to yield to th e previously successful method . Was this lack of
:t solvability indicative that there was something wrong with th e
olern as it was posed by the fifth degree equation?
'he answer cam e two centuri es later wh en it was noticed that th ere
a pattern to th e solutions of th e first four cases, a pattern which
ht hold the key to understanding the recalcitrance of the fifth,
wn as th e quintic. First Jos eph -Luis Lagrange and Neils Abel, and
I Evari ste Galois, found a way to approach the study of this pattern
g resources that today we recognize belong to group theory . In a
.hell we can say that Galois ' sho wed that equations that can be
cd by a formula must have groups of a particular typ e, and that
quintic had the wrong sort of group' .6 1 I cannot go here into th e
mical details of Galois's work but what he achieved was to invert
subo rdination of problems to solutions: rather than general solv-
ity defining th e correctness of a problem, th e form if th e problem
me th e explanation if Beneral solvability. In other words, whil e before
exact solvability of th e first four ca e was tak en for granted (as a
Jerty which problems mu st have) it now became something that
ld be explaine d by a uni versal feature of th e problem which these
, cases posed. This is what Del euze means wh en he says that 'it is
th e solutio n which lends its gen erality to th e problem, but th e
rlem which lends its univ ersality to th e solution ' , 6 2 a univ ersality
ur ed in this case by a group of transformations. But how exactly
> a gro up of transformations capture th e universal conditions that
ne a problem as a problem, that is, ind ependently of its solutions?
'0 answe r this question let me first take a different exam ple, th e
of transformation groups to study th e invariants of physical laws.
) of th e mo st typical transformations in this case are displacem ents
pace or time. Given a law -governed physical process that can be
'oducc d in a laboratory, if we simply mov e it in space (for instance ,
-cproducing it in another, far away laboratory) we can expect th e
liar asp ects of its behaviour to remain invariant. Similarly, if we
)Iy hang e th tim e at which we begin an expe rime nt , we can
ct this tim e displa cem ent to be irrelevant as far as th e regularity
he pro ess is on c rn ed . It is onl y th e differen ce in time b tween
first and final states o f th e pr ocess that matt rs, not the ab olute
at which th e fir t tat e 0 ur s. Thus, via transformation appli ed
V IRT UA L I T Y AN D T H E L A W S OF P H Y S I C S
to th e equat io ns express ing laws, w e can discover those types of
change to which th e la w is indifferent, that is, th e types of changes
whi ch do not matter as far as th e law-like process is concerned . Th e
sense in which th e group of an equation captures th e conditions of a
probl em is th en that it reveals distributions of th e rel evant and th e
irrelevant, th e irrelevance of using absolute time or absolute position
as inputs to a law for instance. It may be asserted without exaggeration
that understanding this connection had profound implications in th e
history of physics playing a crucial rol e , for example, in th e develop-
ment of th e gen eral theory of relativity. 63
Similarly, Galois's analysi s of algebrai c eq uations relied on th e use
of certain transformations (substitutions or permutations of th e solutions)
whi ch, as a group, showed what changes were relevant to the validity
of the equation (or more exactly, to th e validity of the relations
between solutions), More specifically, wh en a given permutation of
o ne solution by another leaves the equation valid, th e two solutions
become, in a sens e, indi stinpuishable as far as this validity is concerned.
T he eq uation is indifferent to the switch. As Morris Kline writes, 'The
gro up of an equation is a key to its solvability becau se th e group
expresses th e degree of indistinguishability of th e [solutions]. It tells us
what we do not know about th e [solutions]. '64 Or as Deleuze would
put it , the group r eveals not what we know about th e solutio ns, but
the obj ectivity if what we do not knoll' about th em, that is, th e obj ectivity
of th e probl em itself. 6 5 Moreover Galoi 's method involves the equi -
valent of a symmetry-breaking cascade in that th e solutions to th e
eq uation become increasingly 'mo re accurately defined as the original
group gives rise to sub-gr oups which proBressively limit th e substitu tions
leaving th e relations invariant. In other words, through a cascade which
unfold s th e original group, the problem itself becomes progressively
better spe cified and, as a by-product if this se!f-specification, individual
solutions emerge . As Dcleuze writes:
We cannot suppose that , from a technical point of view, differential
calculus is the onl y mathematical expression of problem s as such
... More r cent ly othe r procedures have fulfilled this rol e better.
Recall the cir I in which th e th ory of probl em s was caught : a
problem is .olvabl o nly to th e ex te nt that is is 'tru ' but we alwa ys
 I N T E N S I V E SCIENCE A ND V IRTUAL PHI LOSOP HY
tend to d efin e th e truth of a problem by its solvability . .. The
mathematician Abel [lat er followed by Ga lois) was perhaps th e first
to b reak thi s circle : he elaborated a whole m ethod according to
w hich so lvability must follow from the form of a problem. Instead
o f see king to find out by trial and error whether a given equation is
so lvable in general w e must determ ine the conditions of the problem
whi ch progressively spe cify the field s of so lvability in suc h a way
that the stateme nt co ntains the seed of the so lution . This is a radical
reversal o f the problem- solution relation, a mor e co nsiderable
re volut io n than the Copernican .w
T he rev ersal of th e problem - solution relation also had revolutionary
co nseq ue nces in the case of d ifferential equat ions . Although very
different from thei r algebraic coun terpart, equations in the calculus
alsn have particu lar and gen eral so lutio ns, both produced by th e
inh.'gration opcrato r. As it happens, mo st differential equations cannot
he so lved by integration in a general or e xact way . Today we get
around this limitation by using co mputers to generate a population of
m,lny num erical so lutions , a popu lation wh ich may be used to discover
lh,' ge nera l pattern . In the eighteent h century, wh en th e physics whi ch
Ne w to n and o thers had created was first given differentia l form, this
way out o f the difficulty was not, of cours e , available . One conse -
qucnce w as the neglect of models who se co nstituent equatio ns co uld
1I0t be so lved exactly, given that without a way o f knowing th e ove rall
pattern of particular so lutions, physicists could not learn very much
from a model. Thus, in a vcry real sense, the solvability of a probl em
was what made it worthy of study . As the mat hematician Ian Stewart
writes :
Th e math emati cian s of the eighteen t h cent u ry ran headlong into a
p ro blem whi ch has plagu ed th eoretical me chanics to this day: to set
up the equations is one thing, to so lve them quite another . . . The
t'ightcl'nth ce ntury's main achiev ements wer e in setting up equations
to model physical phen omen a . It had much less success in so lving
them ... A process o f se lf-selectio n set in, whereby cq uations that
co uld not he solved were automatically of less interest than those
that co uld."?
VIR TUALI TY AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
One can hardly blame these ma th emati cian s and physicists for fallin g
prey to this process of self-s electio n, since they w ere operating within
th e limits impo sed by the mathematical technology of th eir time. On
the ot he r hand , th e long. tern l effccts of su bord inat ing th e cho ice o f
pro blems to th eir so lvability did influen ce th eir (and th eir succ essors")
wor-ld vie w, biasing it towards a clockwork pictu re of realit y. The
reason for this was that the equatio ns that could be ex act ly so lved
happened to be the lin ear equations. The mathematical difference
between linear and nonlin ear equations is ex plained in terms o f the
superposition prin cipl e. which states that g iven tw o d iffere nt so lutions o f
a linear equation, their sum is also a valid so lutio n. In oth er word s.
o nce w e have discov ered a fcw solutions to an cquation many more
can he obtained for free via the superpos ition princip le. In an e ra
characte rized by the ge ne ral scarcity of ex act so lution s, such a principle
mu st have see me d like a gift from th e o ptim izing rationality of God .
Convers ely , failure to o bey thi s prin cipl e promoted th e ne gle ct of
nonlin ear cq uati onst" In the term s I have been using in this chapter
we may say that superpos ition, that is, a property of the behaviour of
so lutions, biased the process if accumulati on that created the population
of mo de ls making up the theoretica l co mpo nent of classical me chanics.
The requireme nt of exact so lvability prom ot ed the accumulation of
linear model s at the ex pense of nonlinear ones , and even the few
no nlinear models allowe d to become part of the popul ation were used
only in a linearized form . ( Linearizatio n is achieved by using non linear
mo dels onl y for very low int ensities of the recalcitrant variables. ) As
Stewa rt puts it :
Classical mathematics co nce nt rated on linear equations for a sound
pragmatic reason: it co uld not so lve anything else . . . So doci le are
linear equatio ns, that classical mathematicians w ere willing to
co mprom ise th eir phy sics to get th em . So th e classical th eory dea ls
w it h shallo w waves, low-amplit ude vibration s, small temperature
gradients [that is, linearizes nonlin earities). So ingrained became the
linear habit that by th e 1940 s and 1950 s m any scien tists and
enginee rs kn ew litt le el se . . . Linearity is a trap. The behaviour o f
linear equa tio ns . . . is far from typi cal. But if yo u decid e that o nly
linear eq uatio ns are worth thinking about, se lf-ce nso rs hip sets in.
 I N T E N S I V E S CIENC E AN D V IRT UA L PHILOS OPHY
Your textbooks fill with triumphs of linear analysis, its failures
buried so de ep that th e graves go unmarked and th e exis te nce of
th e graves goes unremarked . As th e eighteenth century beli eved in
a clockwork world , so did th e mid -twentieth in a linear o ne ."?
T he co unte rpa rt to Abel' s and Galoi s' s reversal of th e problem-.
so lution relation is represented by th e work of Henri Poin care on th e
q ualitative (or topological) st udy of differential equatio ns . His was a
no vel approach crea te d, like th e group- theo re tic approach to algebraic
equa tions, to break through th e barrier of a recal citrant pr obl em: th e
three body problem, th e problem of modelling th e mutual int eractions of
three solar system bodies (such as th e sun , th e earth and the moon).
Altho ugh oth er mathematici ans had alre ady approached th e st udy of
so lutio ns by analysing th eir behaviour in th e neighbourhood of singular
points, Poin care approach ed the wider questi on of th e way in w hich
the existence and distribution of singularities organized th e space of all
so lutions. In other words , like Galois, Poincare by-pa ssed ex act
so lvability as a way to get global information and instead used a novel
method to investigate the space difining the problem itself, that is, he used
the distributions of singular points as a way to gain qualitativ e
information abo ut th e tendenci es in the behaviour of all solutions. "?
Poin car e' s phase-portrait approach to state space has, of course,
been th e basis of mu ch of what I have said in this bo ok abo ut th e
on to logy of th e virt ual and the problematic. But Galois' s approach has
also been crucial since it provided th e idea of a progressive spe cificat ion
of virtual multipliciti es through sym me try -bre aking cascades . In short ,
a th eory of virtuality as has been pursued in th ese pages depends
fundamen tall y on th e results of th e reversal of th e problem- solution
relat ion , and co nversely , subord inating problems to solutio ns may be
see n as a practi ce th at effective ly hid es the virtual , or th at promotes
tln- illusion that th e act ual world is all that must be explained. Thus
co nstrued , this subo rd inatio n joins th e axiomatic treatment of classical
physics as a barrier to a more satisfacto ry probl emati c appr oach." In
.uldi tion , th ere are th e obstacl es posed by th e lin earity of causes in
ex pe rime nta l physics, and th e linearity of models in th eoretical physics,
both of whi ch arc intimately related since th e former' s addit ivity is
t'Cj ui\',lll'nt to the latt er' s supe rpos ition. Additivity and supe rposi tion
VI R T UA LI TY AND THE L A W S O F PHY S I C S
characterize an unprobl emat ic world , o r at best, a world whi ch is only
tem poraril y probl ematic o r in need of ex planation, but whi ch will
eventually yiel d to a supe r-law or a th eo ry o f everything whi ch will
leave nothing un explained . On th e othe r hand, nonlinear m odel s and
the ir multiple attracto rs, as well as nonlinear causes and th eir co mplex
capacities to affect and be affected , define a world capable of sur prising
us through th e emergen ce of un exp ect ed novelty, a world w he re th ere
will always be some thing else to explain and whi ch will th erefo re
re main for ever problematic . As Mario Bunge writes :
If th e joint acti on of se vera l causes is always an exte rnal juxtaposi-
tion, a supe rpos ition , and in no case a synthesis having traits of its
o w n, and if the hypothetical pati ents on which the causal age nts act
arc passive thin gs incapabl e of sponta neity or se lf-activity ~
inca pable, in sho rt, of add ing some thing o f their own to th e causal
bond - th en it foll ows that, in a sense, e}Jects preexist in th eir causes.
According to thi s extre me but consistent doctrine on th e nature of
causation, only old thin gs come out of cbanpe; processes can give rise
to o bjects new in number o r new in some quantitative respe cts, not
however new in kind ; or again , no new qu aliti es can emerge . A
,v-o rld running on a str ictly causal pattern [i.e. a linear pattern] is
such as yog is, Thomists and eighteent h-ce ntury Ne w to nians ima -
gined it, namely, a uni verse without a history . . .71
Unlike this line ar world, th e ontology I have devel op ed in this bo ok
is fully histori cal. Each of th e individuals whi ch populates thi s other
world is a product of a definite historical pro cess of individuation and ,
to the extent that an individual ' s identity is defin ed by its eme rge nt
propert ies and that th ese properties dep end on th e contin uing causal
inte ractions among an individual' s parts, each individual is itself a
histo rical causal process. The realm of th e quasi-causa] is also fully
histori cal but, as I ex plained in th e previous chapte r , it possesses its
o w n o riginal form of temporality and thus bear s no resemblance to
causal history. In ot her wo rds, in a Deleu zian onto logy th ere ex ist tw o
histo ries, o ne act ual and o ne virtual, having co m plex int eraction s with
on e ano the r. O n o ne hand th ere is a historical series of act ual eve nts
gt'lw ticall)' involved in th e producti on of othe r eve nts, and o n th e
 I NTENSI V E SC IE NC E AN D V IRTU AL PHILOSOP H Y
other, an equally historical series of ideal events defining an obj ective
r ealm of virtual pr obl ems of which each actualized ind ivid ual is but a
speci fic solutio n . T o conclude with Del euze 's own words ,
It is co rrect to represent a double series of eve nts whi ch develop in
two planes, echoing without resembling each other: real eve nts on
the level of th e engende re d solutions, and ideal events embedde d in
th e conditio ns of th e problem, like th e acts - or, rather, th e dreams
- of the gods who double our history. 7 ~
Appendix: Deleuze's Words
Gi lles Del eu ze changes his terminolo gy in every one of his books .
Very few of his co nce pts retain th eir names or linguisti c identity. The
poin t of thi s terminological exuberance is not m erely to give the
impression of differ en ce through th e use of syno nyms , but rather to
develo p a se t of different th eories on th e same subject, th eories whi ch
ar e slightly displaced relati ve to on e another but retain eno ugh over-
laps th at th ey can be meshed together as a het erogen eous assemblage.
T hus, th e different nam es wh ich a give n co nce pt ge ts ar e not ex act
synonyms but ncar synonyms, or so metimes, non -synonym ou s terms
defin ing closely relat ed conce pts . In th is book I delib erately homo-
genized th e tenninology for th e sake of clarity but giving a list of
ncar syno nyms will now prove useful to th e read er as he or she
mov es back from my sim plified presentation of Deleu ze' s onto logy to
his original ones . In fact, beyond providing a mere list I will try to
map the connections between th e different terminologies and discuss
the differe nt wa ys in whi ch th e onto logy is co nce pt ualized and artic-
ulated in each of th e books. As I map th ese tenninological co nnec-
tion s I will use th e following abbreviations of Deleu ze ' s bo oks,
followed wh en necessary by a page number (c hapte r numbers refer
to the pr esent book):
Anti-Oedip us AO
A Thou sand Plateaus ATP
Difference and Repetition D&R
l.oOic if
Sense LOS
What is Philosophy ? WIP
The main sou rces used in my recon st ru cti on were D&R, where
the theory of multipli ities and the virt ual co nt in uum they form is
most clearly arti cul ated , and L S w hich pr es .nts the most detailed
 A P P EN D I X : D E L E UZE 'S WORD S
description of the qu asi-causal op erator. I will begin this app endix with
a list of the com pone nts of Deleuzc 's ontology (D&R, 277-8) . [ will
th en expand th e description of each of the seven compone nts of this
'o nto logical list ' , not onl y to relate th em to th e terminology used in
Illy pr esentation, but also to add details wh ich I left out for th e sake
of simplicity but which ar e now ne cessary in order to rel at e th e items
in th c ontological list to thos e in other books. Finally, [ will tak e three
ho oks, ATP, AO and W [P, and map each component of th e list to
their co unte rp arts th ere .
T HE ONTOLOGICAL LIST
( I) th e depth o r spatium in whi ch inten sities ar e organizcd;
(2) the disparate series th ese form , and the fields of individuation that
th 'y o utline (individuation factors) ;
(3) th e ' dark pr ecursor ' w hich causes th em to communicate ;
(4) th c linkages, intern al resonances and forced movements which
result;
(5) the co nstitution of passive sel ves and larval subj ects in the syste m ,
and th e formation of pure spatio-ternporal dynamisms;
(6) the qua lities and exte nsions . .. whi ch form th e double differen -
ciation of th e syste m and cov er over th e preceding factors;
(7) the cent res of envelopment which neverthe less testify to th e
persisten ce of th ese factors in th e developed world of qualities and
ex te nsit ies .
l , Inten si ve Spatium
T his term refers to th e virtual continuum formed by multipliciti es. In
this hook I used th e term 'plane of consistency' to refer to it , a term
used throu ghout ATP. Other near syno nyms include ' plane of imman -
l'll 'c' (W [»), ' bo dy without organ s' (AO , ATP ) , 'rnachini c phylum '
(AT I'), and ' ide al o r met aph ysical surface' (LO S) . A po ssibl e so urc of
co nfusion h .rc is the term ' inte nsi ve ' which in my presentation was
lIsed ill relati on to indi viduation processes, not th e virtual co ntinuum .
I)l,leu:l.l' uses th e term in thr 'e se nses :
AP PEN D I X : DE LEUZE 'S W O RDS
a) Its original , th ermod ynamic sense in whi ch it refers to int en sive
prop erties, like pr essure, temperature or density. Differen ces in
th ese qu antities have a morphogen etic effect (they drive fluxes
of matter or ene rgy, for exam ple) and when not allowed to get
cance lled (as in non -equilibrium physics) displa y th e full potential
of matter-en ergy for sel f-o rganization.
b) A seco nd derived se nse in whi ch it refers to th e assembly of
different com pone nts as such , that is, th e cre at ion of het ero -
gen eous assemblages in whi ch th e co m pone nts ' differences are
not canc ell ed through homogenization.
c) A third derived sen se in whi ch it refers to th e properties of
ordinal se ries , Th ese ser ies ar e con sti tuted by the differences
between their terms, that is, by asymmetrical relations such as
'in between' . When we co nside r more than on e term between
two other s, thi s ser ial relation is called a 'd istance ', although this
term must be qualifi ed (Deleuze speaks of ' non- de com posable
distances' ) to distingui sh it from its non -te chni cal meaning where
it refers to a metric co ncept (such as ' length ' ) . Finally, there ar e
th e un cance llable differences, or constitu tive ine qualities , whi ch
ord inal ser ies present wh en compared to on e another (on ly
judgments of greater or lesser are po ssible, not of exact eq ual-
ity) . lt is mainly in this third se nse that the term is used in the
exp ression 'intensive spatium ' as th e following quote shows:
Differe nce , distance and ineq uality are th e po sitiv e charact eristics of
depth as intensive spatium (D&R, 238),
2. Multiplicities and D ivergent Series
Altho ugh th e term ' m ult iplicity' is not used in the list above, it is clear
that it belongs in this entry since th e 'disparate series' mentioned ar e
no thing but the e ffect of expand ing in a serial form th e sing ularities
d 'fining each unfolding level of a mu ltiplicity. The term has so me near
s Ilon ym s: 'partial obj ects' (AO ); ' philosophical co nce pts' (W [P) ;
' idea l eve nts' (LOS). So me times Dcleuze refer s to multipliciti es
ind irectly via th eir co m po ne nts , suc h as ' no madic sing ularities' and
 APPE NDI X : DELEUZE 'S W O R D S
'noe m atic attr ib utes ' (LOS) , or 'vague essen ces' and 'becomings'
(AT P) .
Th e term 'd isparate ' m eans ' d ifference of difference' (D&R, 241 ) .
To spea k of 'disparate ser ies ' is another w ay of expressing the idea
th at th e ordinal ser ies which form the nonmet ric co ntin uum mu st be
rela te d to one another via '!ffirmative divergence, so that not only are th e
se ries mad e up of differences, their divergent relations further differen-
tiate these d1Jerences:
Di fferen ce mu st become the elemen t , th e ultimate unitv; , it must
th erefo re refer to other differences which nev er identify it but
rath er d ifferentiate it. Each term of th e series , being already a
differen ce, must be put into variable relations with other terms,
th ereb y co nstit uting other se ries d evoid of cen te r and co nvergence.
Divergen ce and decentcring must be affi r me d in th e se ries itself.
(D&R , 56)
3. Dark Precursor
T his term refers to what in my re construction I called th e 'quasi-causal
o perator'. Its near synonyms include: 'quasi-cause ", 'al eatory or para-
do xical point' and ' nonsense ' (LOS); 'line of flight' and ' abstract
machi ne ' (ATP); 'd esiring machines' (AO) ; 'co nce pt ual person ae'
(W IP); 'o bject = x ' (D &R , LOS) .
4. Resonances and Forced Movements
T his ent ry includes th e effects w hich the quasi-cau sal operator has on
the multipliciti es and th eir series . In my reconstruction I used an
info rma tion-t heo re tic model for th ese effect s (in terms of em issio ns of
signs o r informati on qu anta) but Del eu ze also uses an alt ernative phy sical
model in terms o f resonances (D&R, LOS , WIP) . The te rms ' reso nance'
and ' forced mo vem ent.' sho uld not be taken as mere phy sical met ap hors.
Rath er , w e sho uld think about resonance as positi ve fte dback, a ge ne ric
pr on'ss which implies one or o the r form o f mutually stimulati ng couplin8s
k.g. .autocatal ysis} inducing re sonance s amo ng het erogeneous el em ents,
as well .lS th e ampljfica t ion if origina l djfferences (forced mov em ents) .
AP PEND IX : DELE UZE 'S WORDS
The crucial idea is that th e qua si-cau sal op erator m ust couple th e
o rd inal series ema nating from multiplicities so as to weave th ese into a
nonmctric co ntin uum. Resonances are th e means to effect co uplings,
w hile the resulting for ced movem en t produces th e co ntinu um (LO S,
239-40). As I hav e just said, th e couplings between ser ies must en sure
t he ir affir mative di vergen ce , keeping th e continuum op en and in
co nsta nt variation . But also , as a separate operation (w hat I called ' pre-
act ualizatio n' in Chapter 3) , it must induce so me convergences in th e
se ries, since it is in th ese ce nt res of co nverge nce that th e process of
actua lizatio n begins :
To be act ualized . . . mean s to extend ove r a ser ies of ordinary
points; to be selecte d according to a rul e of con verge nc e ; to be
inc ar nated in a bod y; to be come th e state of a body; and to be
ren ewed locall y for th e sake of limited new actualizations and
ex tensions . (LO S, I 10)
5. Passive Selves and Spatio-Temporal Dynamisms
T his en try contains the two components of what in m y reconstruction
I referred to as 'inten sive individuation processes' . The first meaning
of the term 's patia-tem poral dynamism ' is straightforward, r eferring
to t he phenomena of sel f-org anizatio n which occur in many non-
equilib rium system s. Self-organizing dynamics ar e typi cally gov erned
by th e singularities (at t racto rs and bifurcations) which chara ct eri ze
d iffere ntial relations (t hat is, co upled rates of chang e o r relations of
re lative rapidity and slo w ness.) In thi s se nse, th e term relates to th e
first sense of th e word 'intensive', as in a non-equilibrium material
w he re inten sive differen ces have not been cancel led . But th e term also
refers to 'a ffects', or th e seco nd sense of 'inten sive ' , that is, to th e
capaci ties and dynamism s whi ch produce heterogeneous assem blages.
That th e tw o senses are intimately co nnected is clear from th e
''''lo wing:
It is no lon ger a qu estion of imposing a form up on a matt er but of
d ahorating an increasingly rich and co nsistent mat eri al , th e better
to tap incr easingly int en se fo rces . What makes a matt' rial incrcas-
 A PPEND IX: D ELE UZE 'S WORDS
ingly rich is th e same as what holds het erogen eiti es togcther without
t he ir ceasing to be heterogeneous . (ATP, 329)
Unlike spa tio- te m po ra l dynamism s, the terms passive sel f' and
'larval subject' recei ved very little elaboration in my recon struction ,
m ostly because I wanted to keep th e description of Deleu zes ontology
as free from anthropocentrism as possible . The first term is related to
t he 'passive synthes is' whi ch forms th e core of Dclcu zc ' s th eory of
time , the synthesis of 'living presents' which metricize or give measure
to tim e . In his theory, this synthesis is directl y related to the gen esis
of subjectivity (it is a co nte mplative subjec t who co ntracts instants into
a present ) but, as I ex plained in Chapter 3, these 'co ntemplations'
occur everyw here, in the form of prot o -perception s and proto-feelings
wh ich even microscopi c individual entities may be said to have . Hence,
we not only co ntract instants to synthesize our psychol ogi cal sense o f
present , we are made out of micro -contractions and t heir presents:
W c arc mad e o f co nt rac te d water , earth , light , and air - not onl y
prio r to the recognition or representati on o f these, but prior to
their being sen sed . Every organism, in its recept ive and perceptual
el em ent s, but also in its visce ra, is a sum of contractio ns, of
retentio ns and ex pec ta t ions . (D&R, 7 3)
The term 'larval subjec t' is clo sely related to these ideas, referring
to the 'vo luptuous co nsumptio n' of the intensities which drive spa tio -
tem po ral dy nam isms . The best ex am ple here is t he developing emb ryo
as it experiences the inten sive fold ings , migratio ns, and oth er transfor -
mations which will e ventually turn it into a fully formed organism .
Indeed, unlike my recon struction where the term 'indi vidual' refers to
the final produ ct (o rganisms, species, etc.) in Deleu zc 's work it refers
to th e lar val subjec ts t hemselv es. It o fte n has th e m ean ing o f a
Lc ibnizian 'mon ad', and it is said to be born during pre -actu alization ,
that is, from the ce nt res o f co nverge nce whi ch occur in the virtual
series :
A world already envelo ps an infinite syste m of singularities selected
through co nve rgence. Within this world, ho we ver, individuals are
APPEND IX : DELEUZE 'S WORDS
co nstituted which select and envelop a finite numb er o f the singular-
ities of the system . . . An individual is therefore always in a world
as a circle o f co nverge nce, and a world ma y be formed and thought
on ly in th e vicinity of th e individuals whi ch occupy or fill it. (LO S
109-10)
To avo id co nfusion, I will usc the term 'inten sive individual ' to
refe r to these monad s, and 'individual' without qualification to refer
to th e ex tended and qualified actual en tities whi ch form my flat
ontology o f indi viduals .
6. Extensities and Q ualities
These are th e two characte ristics w hich d efin e th e realm of th e ac tual,
the fully co nstit uted world o f ex te nde d and qualified individuals. In
ATP these two characteristics are referred to as 'substances ' and
'forms' respecti vel y . To sec the connec tio n one needs to think , on the
one hand, of a substance without any oth er characte ristic than its
manner of occup ying space (its extension), and, on the other hand, of
the form s o r structures wh ich endo w this substance with specific
qua lities (suc h as its mechanical or optical properties) . Given that no
act ua l substance is e ver purely ex tensional, these two characteristics
arc 'not really distinct. They are the abstract components o f every
articu lation ." (AT P, 50 2)
7. Centres of Envelopment
This co nce pt w as not discussed in my reconstruction. I introduce it
here not o nly bec ause it appears as the last item in the listing of
ontolog ical co mpone nts under discussion , but also because its defin ition
relates to aspects o f th e th eory of t he actual whi ch bear on questions
of te rmi no logy. The different spheres o f the actual (ro ughly, th e
physico-che mical, o rganic and cultural spheres) need to be conce ived
witho ut presupposing a teleo logical devel opment or ' any kind of
rid iculous cos mic e vo lutionism' (AT P, 49) . There are , o n the othe r
hand, very real distinction s bet w een these spheres . In particu lar, unlike
the physico -che m ica l sphere wh e re the 'co de' that underlies form s o r
 A P P E N D I X : DELEUZE 'S W O R DS
q ua lities is distributed throughout th e three-dimen sionali ty of a struc-
ture , in th e organic sphe re thi s co de becom es detached as a se parate
o ne -d ime nsional str uct ure: th e linear seque nce of nu cleic acids consti-
t uting th e ge ne tic code, The ge ne t ic co de, in Deleu ze 's view, repres-
ents an interiorization if the intensive indivi duati nq facto rs whi ch in
physico-chemical st rata remain ex te rn al to indi vidu als. Thi s int eri ori -
zation, w hich characte r izes th e increase in complexit y of living syste ms ,
is w hat is referred to by th e term 'centres of envelopme nt' :
Th e functi on of these ce ntres ma y be defined in se veral ways
we claim that com plex systems incr easingly tend to interiorize th eir
co nstitutive differen ces: th e ce ntre s of envelo pment carry out thi s
int eriorization of th e indi viduating factors. (D&R, 256)
Summary
Let me now summ arize what I have just said about th e co nte nts of th e
onto logical list. Items 1, 2 , and 3 co nstit ute th e eleme nts of th e virt ual:
the co nti nuum , th e multipliciti es and th e quasi-cau sal o pe rato r. Items
4 and 5 may be made to cor res po nd, with a bit of tw eaking , to th e
intensive . T he reason wh y some tweaking is necessary is that it invol ves
s 'parating th e di vergent and th e co nve rgent relati on s between th e
xer ic , the former bel on ging to th e virtual and th e latter (as a kind of
pre-actua lizatio n) to th e int en sive. Ce ntres of co nve rgence would
orrcspond to wh at so me scie ntists call ' mo r phogenetic fields' , o r what
Dc leuzc calls ' fields of indi vidu ati on '. Although Deleu ze includes as
part o f Item 2 'fie lds of indi viduation ' , and th e resonances of Item 4
also produce di vergen ces, it will prove useful to keep th e tw o Items
.lpart and define th e inten sive both by th e field s of individuation and
th . spa tio -tc rnpo ral dynami sm s that perform th e actualization of th ese
field s. Pinally, Items 6 and 7 form th e conte nts of th e actual. Pr eci sely
because th e vir tual, th e int en sive and th e actual are aspects of one and
til(' same pro cess, or th e different mom ents o f a cascade of progressive
d iffer mtiation , so me Items (4 and 7) represent areas of ove rlap
(so l!wt hing of th virt ual, o nv rg nc , within th e inten sive ; so me thing
of th e inte nsive, cnv .lo pmc nt ntrcs, in th actual). Let me now sho w
hm\ tln - virt ual, th e int en sive , and th actual arc trc: ted in other books.
APPEND IX : DELEUZE 'S WORDS
A THOU SA ND PLAT EAU
In ATP the different sphe res whic h make up th e actual world (physico-
che mical, orga nic , cult ural and so on) ar e called 's tr ata' . T he term
's tratification' is near syno nymo us with 'act ualizatio n'. The different
extensities and qualities which characte rize th e actual world are
referred to as 's ubstances' and ' forms' , and also as ' te r ritorialities' and
' codes ' . Thus, Del eu ze writes that str ata ' proceed sim ultane ously by
code and by territoriality' (AT P, 40) . The int en sive processes whi ch
give rise to strata, and which become hidden und er strata, ar e th erefore
called 'territorializat ion ' and 'coding' . Given that so me parts of th e
wo rld ma y be pu shed away from th eir equilibr ium state , th er eby
revealing th e hidd en inten sive factors, th e terms 'de te r ritor ialization'
and 'decoding ' ar e used to refer to th ese departures from th e rigidity
of str ata, or rather, to th e int en sive movem ents wh ich animate strata
fro m within. In D&R, Deleu ze had alre ady introduced th e notion of
'dc- differe nciation' (D&R, 249) but it is onl y later that thi s notion
aC'luires its full importance and that it is divid ed alon g th e tw o
compo nents of actualizati on.
Ind eed , as I argue d in Ch apter 3, th e quasi-cau sal ope rato r may be
said to accelerate th ese dep artures from act uality in an ope ratio n called
'counter-actualizatio n ' . In ATP , Deleu ze spe aks of ' re lative det errit-
o rializations' to refer to moveme nts awa y fro m th e act ual toward s th e
int ensive , and of 'abso lute d et erritorializati on ' to refer to co unte r -
actualization , the acce leration of th ese movemen ts allowing them to
reach all th e way int o th e virt ual. The three co m po ne nts of th e virtual
(the continuum , th e multiplicities th at co m pose it and th e quasi -cau sal
ope rato r w hich effects th e com posit io n) have exact counte rparts in
T P as the foll owing ex tract illustrates:
T here was a first gro up of notions: th e Body without Organs or
dcstrat ified Plan e o f Co nsiste ncy ; th e Matter of th e Plane, that whi ch
oc .urs in the bod y o r plan e (sing ular, non segm ented multipliciti es
co m posed of int en sive co nt inuums , emissions of particl e-sign s, co n-
junctio ns of flow ); and the Abstra ct Machine , o r Abstract Machines, in
Sl) far. s th ey co nst ruc t th at bod y o r draw th e plan e o r 'd iagra m' what
oc urs (line. of flight , or • hsolut det errit o rializati o n) . ( T P, 72)
 APP E NDIX : O E LEUZ E 'S W OR D S
Multiplicities ar e said to ' occ ur ' in th e plan e of consiste ncy becau se,
as I arg ued , th ey are ideal events or becomtnqs. The term ' no nseg mente d '
sho uld be read as near syn onym o us with ' no nmetr ic ", and ' inte nsive
co ntin uum ' as 'ordinal co ntinuum' . The ' emi ssion s of particle-signs '
arc th e resonances that co uple th e multiplicities, and th e 'co njunc tio ns
of flows' co rres pond to mutual amplifi cations o r forc ed movements,
Th e quasi-causal operator, here called the 'abstr act machine', is
charact erized in terms of 'lines of flight' which r efer to th e process of
co unte r -actualization, and is said to 'd raw th e plane ', that is, to extract
ideal eve nt s from what act ually occu rs and to mesh these m ultipliciti es
int o a heterogen eous co nt inu um . As Deleu ze writes 'the plane of
co nsiste ncy does not preexist th e movements of deterritorialization
th at unravel it, th e lin es of flight that draw it or cause it to rise to th e
surface , th e becomings that co m pose it ' (AT P, 270). Finally, the
' centre s of envelopme nt ' are not given a special nam e but th ey are
referred to indirectl y when it is asserted that ' the abstract Machine
exits sim ultaneo usly devel oped on the destratified plane it draws, and
en veloped in each st rat um whose unity of co m posit io n it defines . .. '
(AT !' , 70 ; my em phasis) .
This is, roughly, th e mapping from on e set of terms to another .
But in ATP we witn ess an elaboration of the origin al o nto logical
co mpo nents and thi s introduces new terms and ideas . In particular,
in ATP the actual wo rld is not defined sim ply in terms of extensities
.1nd qu alities, but of vcry spe cific articulations of th e exte ns ive and
the qu alit ati ve . As I discu ssed in my reconst ruc tio n, th e actual co nsists
excl usively of individual entities , eac h individual at a given level of
scale emerging from th e interactions of populations of smaller scale
ind ivid uals. Deleu ze refers to th ese two scales of every stratum as th e
' mo lec ular ' and th e ' mo lar ' . Stratificati on co nsists in producing popu -
lations of ' mo lecules ' and organizing th em into ' mo lar' , or large
scale, aggregates . (Cl earl y, 'molecul es' may be cell s or even organ-
isms, wh en th e molar scale is th at of th e organism or th e species,
rcspcctivelv.} Thus, eve ry strat um needs a double articulation, a
doub] o play of substances and form s, of exte nsities and qu aliti es, o ne
at the level of mol ecu lar populations and ano the r at th e level of molar
.lgg reg.lt es :
AP P EN DI X : DE L EU Z E 'S WO RDS
The first artic ulatio n chooses o r deducts, from un stabl e particle-
flows, m eta stable m ole cular or quasi-m olecular units (substa nces)
up on which it imp oses a statistical o rder of co nnect ions and
successions (forms) . The seco nd articulation esta blishes functi on al,
co mpact , stable structures (/orms) , and constr ucts th e molar com-
pounds in wh ich struc t ures arc simultaneo usly actuali zed (substances) .
(AT P 40 -1 )
T his process is called a 'd ouble articulation ' . Although th e term
' do uble differen ciation ' alr ead y o ccurs in th e ontological list , it refers
only to th e pair substa nce and form , not to thi s more el aborate
inte rpl ay of territorialiti es and co des . A sim ilar elaboration is evident
in Del eu ze 's treatment of th e int en sive . As I arg ued in Chapter 2,
eve n th e most rigidl y metric (or ' m ost stratified ') indi vidual still has
unactualized capacities to affect and be affected, and ma y not be
limi te d to a sing le stable equilibrium but have a vari et y of unactualized
stable states availabl e to it. Th ese two aspect s of the int en sive , 'affects'
.1I1d 's ingularities' , become further developed int o 'parastrata ' and
'cpist rata' in ATP . On on e hand, affects endo w individuals with th e
capacity to establish novel connections with alien mili eus, as with th e
evolutio n of the capacity to tap into a reservoir of ox ygen, or other
non -alimentary ene rgy sources . Organisms may also have the capacity
10 act ively shape th ei r environme nt , as spide r web s or beaver dams
illustrate . These capacities are what Delcuze calls 'parastrata", th e
(·.l pad ty to connect with an 'anne xe d o r associated mili eu' (ATP, 5 1) .
O n the oth er hand, a fully formed individual may be capable of a
\ ,u'kty of stable states whi ch may be act ualized by crossing critical
points and give rise to ' variat ions that ar e tol erated bel ow a certain
threshold of iden tity' (AT P, 50) . Th ese ' inter med iate states or milieus'
.m- what Del euz e calls 'epistrata". As he writes, even ' a sing le chemical
substance (sulfur or carbon , for exam ple) has a number of more or
h'ss dcu -rrit orializcd sta tes' (AT P, 53) . The relations of the different
t('l'ms fo r int en sive factors can th en be summa r ized like this :
Fo rms re late to codes and proccsst.~s of cod ing and decoding in th e
IMf.l-"t rat a; substa nces , l»..· ing formed matt ers, rel ate to tcrr'itorialities
 APPENDIX : DELEUZE 'S W O R D S
and mov em ents of territorialization and deterritorialization on th e
epistrata. (AT P, 53 )
Finally, th ere is a term which refers to th e act ualizatio n (or
e ffectuation) of th e qu asi-cau sal ope rato r its elf. I did no t discuss thi s in
d .tail, but I did give an ex ample in Chapte r 2 of th e neighbo urhoo d of
a pha e transiti on (o r 'e dge of chaos'). Deleu ze 's o wn example is not
critical points in a line of valu es, but critical sUIfaces in objects w ith
volume (LOS , 103) . (In both cases th e quasi-cau se o pe ra tes at an N-I
dim ension, as discu ssed in Chapte r 3) . In ATP, th e organic membrane
as a critical sur face is kept as an instance of th e qua si-cause as it exists
e ffect uated in th e actual , o rga nizing the division of e pist rata and
paras trata (AT P, 49 -50). But now a spec ial term is co ined for this
actua lized qua si-causal ope rator : ' machinic assemblage' . As he writes:
'The most important probl em of all : given a machini c assem blage ,
what is its relation of effect uation with th e abstract machin e ? How
do cs it effectuate it, with what ad equati on ?' (AT P, 71 ) .
Much as th e qu asi-cau se o r abstract machine endows th e virtual
co ntinuum with cons iste ncy , th e machinic assemblage endows actual
ent ities with co nsiste ncy , 'What we term machini c is precisely thi s
synthesis of hetero gen eiti es as such' (AT P, 330) . T he machini c assem -
blage performs th e different o pe ratio ns invo lved in stratification, suc h
as articulating a strat um with w hatever serves as its subs tratum (e.g.
the pr e-biotic so up for o rganic strata), as well as doubly ar ticulating
the different e xtensities and quali ties, substa nces and forms, which
defin e a give n stratu m (AT P, 71 ) . But also , as an actualized qua si-
cause , the machini c assem blage is th e age nt behind co unter-
actua lizatio n:
T he assem blage has two poles or vectors: on e vec to r is o riente d
toward s the strata, upon whi ch it distributes territorialities, relative
dct c rr itori alizati on s and rct erritori alizations: th e othe r is oriente d
to ward s th e plane of consiste ncy o r destratificati on , upon wh ich it
co njugatcs pr ocesses o f det crrit orializati on , carry ing th em to wards
till' abso lute of th e eart h. (AT P , 14 5)
APPENDIX : DELEUZE 'S WORDS
A TI -O EDIPU S
In th is book th e mapping of th e items of the onto logical list is less
straightforward . In particul ar , th e virtual and th e inten sive are gro upe d
togethe r in a pro cess whi ch is referred to as ' mo lecular' (in the sense
just mention ed ), w hile th e actual is re ferred to as ' the m olar '. Unlike
ATP, wh ere all kinds of strata ar e co nside re d, in AO only th e
actualization of human soc ieties is dealt with , so th e molar see ms to
beco me synonymous with ' large social aggregat es', such as stable
persons, govern me ntal o r economic insti tution s, agricult ural or indus-
trial machin es. But it sho uld be kept in mind that thi s narrowing of
the meaning of ' the molar ' is a matter of focu s and not a change in th e
und erl ying th eory.
W ith some care , in fact , th e different el em ents of th e o nto logical
list can be paired with th eir counter parts in AO. The virt ual and th e
intensive processcs of actualizati on ar e referred to as 'des ir ing produc-
tio n' and defined as co nsisting of three separate ' passive syntheses'
(AO , 26). These ar e referred to as ' the co nnective', ' the disjuncti ve '
and ' the co njunc tive' syntheses. (T his three-p art classificati on first
appears in LO S, 174. ) Th e disjunc tive synthesis invol ves th e crea tio n
of divergent relations among se ries , and it is said to occ ur on th e bod y
without organs (AO, 13). It th erefore re fers to th e virtual co nti nuum,
'a pure fluid in a free sta te, flowin g w ithout inte rr uption, stre ami ng
o ver the surface of a full body' (AO , 8) . T he co njunctive synthes is, in
turn, invo lves th e cre ation of conve rgent relat ion s am on g series, an
o pe ration whi ch as I said above , forms ' ind ivid uation field s' whi ch
alre ady prefigure th e inten sive (pre- actualization). Thi s synthes is cap-
tures one of the aspec ts of th e int en sive , th e emergence of a larval or
passive subjec t, 'a strange subject with no fixed identity, wandering
abo ut ove r th e body without organs .. . bein g born of th e [int en sive]
states that it co nsumes , . " (A0, 16) . Finally, th e co nnec t ive synthesis
capture s ano the r aspect of th e int en sive, th e machini c assemblage. It
co nnects o r co uples together het erogcn eous ' partial obj ects or organ s'
thro ugh th e emiss ion of 'e ne rgy flows' (AO, 323) . Here the term
' partial' is not used in its xt in ive se nse but in th e sense of matter
filling spa • to a give n d 'g r of int en sit y. 'T he ye, th e mouth , th e
.lJlII S degrees of ma tter" ( 0, 309) .
 APPENDIX : DELEUZE ' S WORDS
T his int erpretation o f th e three syntheses gives us o ne o f th e
elements of th e virtual (the plan e o f co nsiste ncy o r bod y without
organs), and tw o o f the intensive (larva l subjects, assembl ages), but
leaves several things o ut. In particular, the o ther tw o el em ents of the
virtual, mult iplicities and the quasi-cau sal operator, don 't see m to be
included. Multipliciti es appear in AO as ' partial objects' when th ese
'a tt ach them selves to the body without organs as so man)' point s of
disjunction between which an entire network of new syntheses is now
wov en marking the surface off into coo rdinates , like a grid ' (AO, 12) .
This co rresponds to the idea that multiplicities exist in the sphere of
the intensiv e embodied in self-organizing processes, but may be
e xtracted from these as 'Rat multiplicities' or 'pure events' and
depl oyed as such o n the plane of co nsiste ncy. The quasi-causal o perator
is, in turn, referred to as a 'desiring machine ':
Inso far as it brings together - without unif}'ing or uniting them -
th e body without o rgans and th e partial objects, th e desiring
machine is inseparable both from th e distribution of partial o bjects
o n the body without organs, and o f th e leveling [i.e. flatt ening]
e ffect exerte d on the partial organs by th e body without o rgans ,
wh ich results in appropriation. (AO , 327)
The desiring machine is said to have 'chains' as its apparatus of
transmission (AO, 327). The term 'chain' is used instead of 'series'. It
has the meaning o f a 'Markov chain' (AO, 39), a series o f events in
whic h the probability o f occurren ce o f an y even t depends o nly on th e
previous one in the se ries. In o ther word s , a 'chain ' is a partially
aleatory series. This co rresponds to o ne o f the effects of the quasi-
cause, bri efly discu ssed in Chapte rs 2 and 3, o f injecting chance in th e
distrihutions o f virtual singularities to create 'nomadic' distributions,
,1S opposed to the 'sede ntary' probabilit y distributions which characte r-
ize population s in the actual world. This is also exp res sed by saying
that th e quasi-cause must affirm all of chance with every throw of the
dk-c ( LO S, 59 -60) . The term 'chain ' is also used as in th e exp re ssion
'sig nil),ing chain' hut without any reference to a fixed code , linguistic
or otherwise . Rather these heteroge(wotls chains arc mad e of 'Hying
br-ic-ks , . . co ntaining within [them] not o nly an inscripti on with signs
APPENDIX : DELEUZE'S WORDS
from different alphabets , but also various figures, plus o ne o r seve ral
straws, and perhaps a co rpse' (AO , 40 ).
There is o nc more detail to be discussed which pro vides an
important bridge to th e nex t book to be deciphered (W IP). Mu ch as
multipliciti es are woven into a virtual co ntinuum through their diver-
ge nces, but also form individuation fields when their series converge,
' t he points of disjunction on th e body without organs form circles that
co nve rge on the desiring machine s; then the subject , , . passes through
all the degrees of the circle, and passes from on e circle to another'
(AO , 20 ). The term ' passing' is used here as synonymous with
'becoming', and the 'degre es of the circle' are 'intensive quantities in
the ir pure state ' (AO , 18). The idea here is that thi s larval subj ect
w ith out identit y can mov e about the plane , from one individuation
field to another , becoming now this and now that intensive individual
depending o n the intensities it co nsumes . This is the key idea behind
the process whi ch in AO, ATp and WIp is referred to as 'becoming -
animal' (as well as 'becoming -w oman ", 'becoming-mo lec ule' , etc .).
The co nce pt app ears first in D&R , 25 4:
W e sho uld not say tha t individuals of a given species arc distinguished
by their participation in oth er species: as if, for exampl e , there was
ass or lion, wolf or sheep, in eve ry human being, There is indeed
all th at and metempsychosis retains all its symbolic truth. However,
the ass and the wolf can be co nsidered species only in relation to the
fiel ds o f individuation . . . lit is true that sorncone's so ul) never
change d bodies, but its bod y co uld be re -env elopcd or re -irnplicated
in o rder to ente r, if need be, other fields o f individuation . . .
In o the r words, becomin g -animal is an o peration which canno t be
perfo rmed within the actual , by a transformation from a fully co nsti-
tuted individual o f o ne species to another of a difTercnt speci es. But if
we m o ve to wards the virtual, towards those circles o f convergence or
fields o f individuation wher e there are still communications between
not-yet -actualized specie s, o ne can become 'rc -cnvcloped' in another
field . T his theme is elaborat ed in AO, 86 and in ATP , 238 and
becomes a key co mpo nent of Dcl euzc's theory of artistic practic e as
dis{'uss('d in WIP.
 APPEND IX : DELEUZE 'S WORDS
WH AT IS P H ILOSO P H Y?
Muc h as AO narrows th e focu s of the onto logy and deals o nly with
the act ualizat io n of social struct ures, WIP deals ex clusively with th e
rela tions bet ween th e virtual , th e int ensive and th e act ual, on one
hand, and th e different forms which th ou8h t assumes in certain societies
(p hiloso phical, artisti c and scientific forms of thought). The virtual
ap pears here as ' the plan e of immanen ce' explore d by phil osophical
thought; th e int ens ive as ' the plan e of com pos ition' as it app ears in
artistic tho ught ; and th e act ual as ' the plan e of referen ce ' as it is
investigated by scientific th ou ght. Let me discuss each one of th ese
'planes' sta r ting with th e actual world,
One way of thinking about th e plan e of referen ce is as a flat
ontology of indi vidual s. Th e subject matter of scie nce would be , in
th is inter pretat ion , th e world of fully co nsti t ute d individuals and th e
metric and measurable space time th ey form. In other words, actual
indivi d uals would form th e referen ce of scientific statements, and all
ref rents wo uld form a ' plane' preci sely in th e sen se that, onto logically
at least, they do no t have a hierarchical str uct ure but remain a ' flat'
set , \'arying only in spatio-temporal scale . In Chapters 1 and 2, wh ere
I discussed the philosophical co nce pt of ' m ultiplicity', I em phasized th at
the scientific ideas invol ved (differe nt ial relations, sing ularities) had to
he detached fro m th eir o riginal context wh ere th ey are related to
mathematical J unctions. Th e ju stificati on I gave for thi s transformation
was that func tio ns, as they are ordinaril y used , presuppose indi vidu a-
tion . Indee d, in so me of th eir uses (as in th eir use to cr eate state o r
phase spaces) th ey define procedures for th e individu ation of states
within these spaces . T hese states of affairs co nstitute a re fere nt, and
I he use of functions the re fore foll ows th e line wh ich goes fro m th e
virtua l to its act ualizatio n , retaining o nly the final product.
T his is part of what Deleuze mean s w hen he asserts that the objec t
of science is 'functio ns whic h are presented as propositi on s in discursive
sysu-m s' (W IP, 117 ). I will return bel ow to th e qu esti on of wh ether
one can cha racterize scie nce in th is way. As I said in Chapte r 4, 1 do
no t think the re is such a th ing as 'science ' in genera l, so I reject many
of the det ails of th e characte rizat io n given in WIP . Nevertheless, th e
IMrt of it that I do kee p is th e assertio n that most s icntilic fields tend
APPEND IX : D ELEUZE 'S W OR D S
to study th e world in th e direction of act ualizatio n , sometimes
co nce ntrating on th e final pr oduct and disr egarding th e pr ocess (e .g .
eq uilibrium th ermod ynami cs) , sometimes studying th e process but
always in th e dir ecti on of th e final pr oduct.
Art, on th e other hand , ma y be said to st udy, or engage with, th e
inte nsive itself. The term ' inte nsive' is used in a varie ty of se nses
only so me of whi ch are rel evant to th is characte rizatio n. One of th e
co mpo ne nts of th e inten sive given in th e onto logical list was th e
lar val subject who co nsumes int en siti es as suc h, and is born and
reb orn of th ese vo luptuo us consum ptions . In thi s case , th e int en sive
state co mes first or it is prior to th e individual th at lives it (AO , 20) .
In other words, obj ecti ve int en siti es do not constitute psychological
se nsations bu t th e very ' be ing of th e sensible' (D&R, 140) , a being
w hich is itself imperceptible psychologically given that inte nsities
become hidd en underneath qualities and exte nsities (D&R, 230), In
W IP thi s bein g of th e sensible is di vided into two co m po ne nts ,
'perce pts' and 'affects';
By mean s of th e material [e .g . paint, canvas, brush], th e aim of art
is to wrest th e percept from perceptions of objects and th e states of
a perceiving subject , to wrest th e affect fro m affecti on s [e. g .
feelin gs] as th e transiti on fro m on e state to another: to ex tract a
bloc of se nsatio ns , a pure bein g of sensat ions . (W IP, 167 )
Sim plifying so mewhat , we may say that ' pe rcepts' are related to th e
passive selves involv ed in th e synthesis of living presen ts at all scales of
reality, in th e organi c and inorgani c world. Even though these presents
are constituted by 'conte m platio ns' or 'contracti on s of past and future
instants', th ey do not refer to a psych ological realit y . As Deleu ze
writes :
Th e plant co nte m plates by co nt racting th e ele me nts from whi ch it
originates - light , carbon, and th e salts - and it fills itself with
o lo rs and odo rs th at in eac h case qu alify its var iety, its co m pos iti on :
it is sensatio n in itsel f. It is as if flowers sme ll th emsel ves by
sme lling what co m poses them .. . before being perceived or eve n
sme lled hy an age nt with a ner vou s system and a br ain . (W IP, 2 12)
 APPENDIX : DE LEUZE'S WORDS
On th e othe r hand , affect s re fer to sta te tran sm ons whi ch mu st be
und erstood as ' becomings', in the sense of a becom ing-an imal or
becoming- plant discussed above . Th e artist must reach th at inte nsive
state w he re one can leave one individuation field to enter ano ther,
where one can reach 'a zo ne of indet ermination , of indiscerni bilitv , as
if things, beasts , and persons . . . end lessly reach that point that
immed iately preced es th eir natural differentiation ' (W IP, 173) . Finally,
having reached the very being of th e sensible , th e artist mu st place
th ese percep ts and alTects in their o wn plan e , a plane of co mpos ition,
a bloc o r co m po und of se nsations wh ose 'o nly law of creation is that
the co mpo und mu st stand on its own' (W IP , 164 ) .
T hus, in a very lit eral sense , art is conce rned with making perceptible
the usuall y hidd en realm of th e intensive . Similarly, philosophy mu st
ma ke th e virtual intelligible. Philosophy must go beyond th e centres of
convergence wh ere th e lar val subjects of percepts and affect s und ergo
int en sive becomings, to reach th e virt ual in its full div ergen ce and
difference, its contin uo us or ' inse parable variations' (W IP, 126).
Philo so phy cannot perform this task via a se t of propositi on s whi ch
rifl er to the virtual, but rather, it must const ruct a th ou ght wh ich is
isomorphic with th e virt ual. T he re fore, any phil osophy mu st be co n-
struc te d out of th e three co m po ne nts of th e vir tual: multipli citi es,
qua si-causal ope rato r, and the co ntinuum . In WIP th ese three co mpo-
n .nts are referred to as 'conce pts', 'conce pt ual persona e ' , and ' plane
of immanence', respecti vely.
Th term ' concept ' do es not refer to a se mantic entity , that is, to
cone pts in th e ord inary sense, a se nse in which th ere would also be
s i mtific co nce pts (e .g. entropy) . Rather, it is defined as an entity
whi h wo uld be isomorphic with virtual multipliciti es.
[A concept is] a multiplicit y, an absolute su rface or volume [e .g . a
ma nifold I ... mad e up of a ce rtain number of inse par able inten sive
vari: tion s according to an orde r of neighborhood, and traversed by
a po int in a sta te of survey . (W IP, 32)
T o say that a co nce pt 'orders its co m pone nts by zo nes of neighbor-
hood ' ( W IP, 20) is to say that th e relation s it invo lves ar no nmetric
or o rdi nal. This re fers to the third sense o f 'i nte nsive' as defi ned
APPEND IX : DELEUZE 'S WORDS
above , and to the definition of to po logical spaces in Chap ter I , and is
also ex pressed by saying that a concept 's co mponen ts are 'i nte nsive
ordinates' (WIP, 20) . Concepts, therefore, are not to be th ou ght of
sema ntica lly, bu t literally as sta te or phase spaces, th at is, as spaces of
possibili ties st ructure d by sing ularities and defined by th eir di me nsions
or intensive ord inates. As Deleu ze writes, 'Every co nce pt th erefore
has a phase space, altho ugh not in th e same way as in scie nce' (W IP,
25) . For ex am ple , th e Cartes ian co nce pt of ' the Cogito' wo uld be a
space w ith three d imen sion s (doubting, thi nkin g and being) each
divide d by singularities into phases (e .g. perceptual, scie ntific, ob ses-
sio nal doubting , as different phases of doubt, as oppose d to different
species of th e ge nus doubt) .
T he idea of a ' point in a state of survey' refers to an op eration of
the quasi-cause whi ch I did not describe in my recon structi on. Mu ch
as multipliciti es mu st be meshed together into a continuum whil e
preservi ng th eir dilTeren ces ('exo-consiste ncy'), so the heterogen eou s
components of a multiplicit y must th emsel ves be meshed by a ' po int
of abso lute survey' (W IP, 2 1) whi ch continuo usly traverses th em at
infinite speed ensuring th eir 'endo-consiste ncy' . Exo-consiste ncy is
ex plained in WIP in terms of r esonan ces between di vergent se ries:
Co nce pts whic h have only [endo-]con sisten cy o r inten sive ord inates
outside of any coord inates, fre ely ente r into relation ship s of non -
d iscursive r eson ance . .. Con cep ts ar e ce nte rs of vibratio ns, each in
itself and everyone in relat ion to all the othe rs . This is wh y th ey
all resonate rather than cohe re or corres po nd to each o the r . ..
T hey do form a wall, but it is a dry -ston e wall, and everyth ing
holds together only alon g diverging lines. ( W IP, 23)
T he qua si-cau sal ope rator behind th ese effects of endo- and exo-
co nsistency is referred to as a ' con ceptual persona ' . Thus, Deleuze
w rites: 'T he co nce pt ual persona is need ed to cre ate concepts on th e
plane , ju st as th e plan e need s to be laid out. But th ese two o pe ratio ns
do not merge in th e persona , w hich itsel f app ears as a distinct ope rato r'
(W IP, 76). Co nce pt ual person ae are endo we d with all the characte r-
istics of th e qu asi-cau 011 operato r. Mu ch as th latter mu st inject as
mu h hancc into th e d istribution ' of th singular and till' o rdi nary in
 APPEND IX : DELEUZE 'S WORDS
virt ual se ries, ' the persona esta blishes a corresponde nce between each
throw of th e dice and th e int en sive features of a co nce pt ... ' (W IP,
75 ) . And mu ch as th e ope rato r is said to ex trac t ideal eve nts fro m
what act ually occ urs (that is, to perform co unte r-actualizat ions o r
' counter-effectua tions'), in phil osophy 'i t is precisely th e conce ptual
persona w ho co unte r -effect uates th e event' (W [P, 76).
But w hy the term ' pe rso na'? A clue to the meaning of thi s
expre ssion may be glim pse d fro m some rem ark s in LO S. As [ have
just said , in th e circles of conve'8ence defined by pr e-actualized multi -
plicities an int en sive indi vidual develop s (larval subject) , an indi vidual
whi ch ex pre sses th e world whi ch conve' 8ent ser ies form. Similar ly, in
th e d ivergent series a ' virt ual person ' develop s, a person who ex presses
what is com m on to man y different worlds (LO S, 115 ). A more
eI tailed ex planation , however, emerges from a discu ssion in D&R .
Mu ch as a larval subject is born from percepts and affects whi ch do
no t refe r to psychological phen om ena, but ar e th e very bein g of th e
s msiblc, so personae are intimat ely co nnecte d with w hat co nstitutes
the very being of th e int elligibl e (D&R, 141 ). Differen ce in inten sity
is the being of the sensible (sentiendum') and sim ulta neously th at
whi ch cannot be sense d (by fully act ualized indi viduals) since it is
normally covere d by ex te ns ities and qu aliti es (D&R, 144). im ilarl y,
the being of the int ell igibl e (cogita nd um') is wh at can o nly be tho ught
and at th e same time that whi ch marks th e impossibilit y of th ough t
(again, im poss ibility from th e point of view of a fully actualized
think ' 1') , Hen ce the need to invent a conce ptual person a to capture
these cogitanda or ' thought-events', a persona who ' lives inte nse ly
within th e thinker and forces him to think ' (W IP, 70 ).
Fina lly, th ere is th e third co m pone nt : th e virtual co ntin uum itsel f
or the 'plane of im mane nce ' of a phil osophy. Thi s refers to th e
presu ppositions of a phil osophy, th e main o ne of whi ch is an assumed
' im: ge of th ou ght' (W IP, 37), in other w ords, a pre-con ceptual
int uitio n of w hat it is to think: 'E very phil osophy dep ends up on an
int uitio n that its co nce pts co nstantly develop through slight differen ces
flf intensity .. . ' (W IP, 40). O ne way of und erstanding what thi s
means is to think of the rel ation b tween co nce pts and th e plan e of
imma nc n l' as that be tween so lut ions and probl em s. As I d iscu ssed in
'hapu-r 4, problems ar not reelucibl ' to th ir so lutio ns bu t rath er arc
APPENDIX : DE LEUZE 'S WORDS
defined by th eir co nd itions : a give n distribution of th e singular and th e
ordinary , th e im po rta nt and th e unimportant. As suc h, pr obl em s ar e
inherently 'obsc ure ye t d istinct' and only acquire clarity in th e pr ocess
w hich progr essively specifics eac h of th eir so lutions . T he intuition
referred to above wo uld refer to th e gras ping of a pr oblem as such, as
d istin ct and obscure (as oppo ed to grasping an esse nce, or a clear and
distinc t idea) , an intuition whi ch can only reveal itse lf pro gressively as
co nce pts are create d as cases o f so lutio n :
If th e co nce pt is a solutio n, th e co nditions of th e phil osophi cal
problem ar e found on th e plane of immanen ce presupposed by th e
co nce pts . . . and th e unknowns of th e problem are found in the
conce ptual persona e that it calls up . . . Each of th ese three instances
is found in the others, but th ey ar e not of th e same kind, and th ey
coexist and subsist without one disapp earing int o th e othe r . . .
[T]he three acti viti es making up [th e phil osophical method] co ntinu-
o usly pass fro m one to th e othe r, sup po rt one another, so me times
pr eced e and sometimes foll ow each other, one creating co nce pts as
a case of solutio n , ano the r laying out a plane and a mo vement on
the plane as th e co nd itio ns of a prob lem , and th e othe r in venting a
persona as th e unknown of th e pr obl em . (W [P, 8 1)
In my recon struct ion of Deleu ze ' s onto logy I used as a guid ing
constraint th e avoid ance of th e categories of typological th ou ght:
resemblance, identity, analogy and co ntradictio n. But [ co uld have as
we ll said th at what guides thi s co nstruct ion is th e avo idance of th e
image of th ou ght impli ed by these categor ies: ' a natu ral capacity for
th ou gh t endo we d with a capaci ty for truth o r an affinit y with th e
tr ue ... ' (D&R , 131 ) . This im age whi ch, Dcl euze argues, haunts the
history of philosophy, has th e result of turning the plan e of immanen ce
int o a plane of transcenden ce, Or what amounts to th e same thing, to
trap philosophy within th e plan e of r eferen ce, linking it to linguistic
propositions whi ch are eithe r true of or false of th eir referents. This
manoeu ver, of co urse, closes th e road to th e virtual o r th e problematic.
[f, on th e co ntrary, th e image of th ou ght leads to a plan e of
im mane nce, th n phil osophy ' docs not co nsist in knowing and it is not
inspired by truth. Rath er it is categories like Int I' sting, Rem ark able ,
 APPENDIX : D E LEUZE 'S WORDS
o r Important that deter-min e success o r failure ' (W IP, 82 ). The image
o f t ho ught th at has thi s problematic e ffect is on e in whi ch thought is
horn from the violent shock of an encounter with pure intensiv e
difl ercn ces (being of th e sensible), a sho ck whi ch a philosopher may
th en be capab le of co m m un icating to his or her other faculties, leading
all th e way to pure virtual dilTeren ce s (being of th e int elligible) (D&R,
140).
T his is not th e pla ce to argue for or against thi s view of phil o sophy.
Whether o r not all phil osophical systems ma y ind eed be analysabl e in
te rms o f the three co mpo nents o f the virtual remain s an open question.
O n the o the r hand, I must take issue with the imagc of science which
WI!' d evelops, particularl y because my disagreement with it bears not
just on narro w ly scientific quest ions but on deep ontologica l matters .
Speci fically, my main divergen ce from Deleuzc 's ontology occurs at
th e level o f th e flat ontology of individuals. I m entioned above that I
b roke w ith Dclcuze 's terminol ogy by using the term 'individual' for
extended and qualified actual beings, while he reserves it for intensiv e
bei ngs (larv al subjec ts) . But the break is more than ju st terminologi cal.
Alt ho ug h a flat ontology meshes well with many o f Del cuze' s idea s
(his th eory o f actual tim e as a nest ed set of cycli c presents of different
durations, for example) , it is unclear to what extent he subscribed to
suc h a view . In p articu lar , in a flat ontology as I have developed here
th ere is no room for totaliti es, such as 'society' or 'science' in general.
But Dcl cu ze does not seem to mind such entities . For example , while
I would never speak o f a virtual multiplicity co rrespond ing to all of
society (i.c, a 'social Idea' or 'social multiplicity ' ) he does so without
hesitat ion (D &R , 186).
In the case of 'science ' as defined in WIP, that is, in term s of
functions working as discursive propositions, the problem is that the
image invoked is on e too clos e to that created by Anglo.American
philosophers of science of the first hal f of t he twentieth century. All
the examples o f ' func t ives" (the co mponents of functions) given in
\VIP co me from classical mechanics . No mention is made, for instance,
of the op erators o f quantum physics , which use functions themselves
as inputs ,1I1d o utputs . And, of co urse, the question o f what chemic al
o r biological function s arc is left most I)' unspecified . This amount s to
clt'flning scie nce as if its 'e ssen ce' was classical m echanics . Furthermore,
APPEN DIX ; DELEUZE'S WORDS
mu ch as o ld-scho ol anal yti cal phil osophers disregarded th e actual
mathematical models used by ph ysicists and focused excl usively on se t
theory, so Dcl euz e view s set theory as the too l which constitutes the
plan e of r eference of scien ce (WIP, 121). My analysis in Chapter 4- o f
classical me c hani cs (as an indi vidual field) broke with all this . It
preserved the idea that clas sical physics (as many other scie ntific field s)
is mostl y co ncerned with the plane o f reference (actual beings , metric
spaces) but it uses a very different co nce ption o f how referen ce (o r
the fix ing o f reference) is achi eved, pla cin g more e m phasis on caus al
interventions than on representati on s. Similarly for my treatment of
mathematical models, which are not redu ced to lingui stic entiti es
(func tio ns as propositions) hut tackled in th eir specificity.
On th e other hand , my ana lysis of classical physics meshes we ll with
Dclcuze's views on scien ce as d eveloped else where . The requirem ent
o f avo id ing th e categories of typological thought to prevent th e plane
fro m becoming a plane o f transcenden ce ma y also be e xpressed by
saying that we must avoid the ' classical im age of thought , and th e
st riating of mental spa ce it elTects' (AT P, 379) . Th e term ' striate d
space ' refers to a metri c space , while non metric spaces , 'vectorial,
proj ective, or topological' (AT!', 361 ) are referred to as ' smooth ' .
The transformation of thought itself into a metric space is not,
ho w ever, an internal affair of philosophy , but on the contrary, it's
directly linked to th e relations between individual phi losophers (e .g .
Hegel) and indi vidual State or Royal institution s. It is these intitutions
whi ch first st riate or metricize real space (e .g . agricultural lands, urban
areas), and later perform the same operation o n ment al spaces . The
opposite transform ation, to create a non metric space for thought is
pe rform ed by philosophers (e .g. Spin o za) wh o operate outs ide of th e
State .
A simi lar distin ction is made between scientific fields , or even
among the different practices (theoretical as opposed to expe rime ntal)
w ithin one field, We have. on one hand, 'Royal science ' (the science
of th e great Ro yal Societies o r Academies at th e se rv ice of th e Stat e),
and. o n the other, the 'min or sciences' o perating in less prestigious
surroundings. Roughly, the distinction is between scie ntific practices
which arc axiom atic o r theo remat ic , as o ppose d to problematic; that
0lll'ra l l~ within metr ic and exactly measurabl e spaces, as o ppose d to
 APPENDIX : D E L E U Z E ' S W O RD S
d >aling with anexact yet rigorous nonmetric on es; that focus on th e
simple behaviour of matter, as in ideal solids or gases, as opposed to
confronting th e com plex behaviour of liquid s (e .g. turbulence); and
that st ress constant and homogen eous laws, as opposed to becomings
and het erogeneiti es (AT P, 361 ) . My account of classical physics, whi ch
is clea rly at odds with th e Royal and legalisti c image whi ch that field
has of itself, ma y be see n as an account from th e point if view if min or
science. But for the same reason, it mak es the distincti on whi ch WIP
esta blishes between science and philo soph y pass right through th e
middle of science itself. Thi s, it seems to me, is the 'more Deleuzian '
approach to the subj ect.
Notes
TH E MATHEMATI C S OF TH E VIRTUAL:
MANI FOLDS, VECTOR FIELD S AND
TRANS FORMATION GROUPS
1. The term ' multiplicity' makes its first appearance, as far as 1 can tell , in
1966 in Dcleuze 's book on Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Berpsotiism (Zo ne Books,
New York, 1988), p. 39 . Its final appearance occurs in Deleuze' s last book
in collabo ratio n with Felix Guattari, Gilles Del euze and Felix Guattar i, What
Is Philosophy? (Co lumbia University Press, New York, 1994), p. 15.
2. Morris Kline, Mathematical Thouqh: fro m Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. 3
(O xford University Press, New York, 1972), p. 88 2. (My emphasis)
Making surfaces into spaces, by eliminating the supple mentary dim ension ,
allowe d the differentiation and study of different met ric geo me tries . As
Morri s Kline wri tes:
Thu s if the surface of the sphere is studied as a space in itself, it has
its own geo metry , and even if the familiar latitud e and longitude are
used as the coo rdinates of point s, the geo metr y of that surface is not
Euclidian ... How ever the geome try of the spherical surface is Euclidian
if it is regarded as a sur face in three-dim ensional space. (p. 888)
For the details on Gauss coordinatization pro cedu re, which is what
guarantees th is absence of a suppleme ntary dim ension or embedding space,
see Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time, and Space-Time (University of California
Press, Berk eley, 1977 ), pp. 27-42.
3. Kline, Mathematical Tboupbr, p . 890 .
4 . Gilles Deleuze, D!lJerence and Repetition (Co lumbia University Press, Ne w
York , 1994), p . 182. O n page 183, for example, he says: ' In all cases the
mult iplicity is intrinsically defined, with out externa l reference or recourse
to a uniform space in which it wo uld be subme rged .' See also Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1987 ), pp . 8-9 ,
Unity always operates in an empty dim ension supplem ntary to that of
the syste m co nsidered (ovc rcoding) . .. [But aJ multiplicity never allows
 r
NOT ES
itself to be overcode d, never has available a supp leme ntary dim en sion
over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above th e
multiplicit y of numbers attached to those lines.
.5 . Deleuze and Guattari, II Thousand Plateaus, p . 266 . Th e rem ark qu oted is
made abo ut th e ' plane of co nsiste ncy ' not abo ut multipliciti es. But th e
fo rm er is nothing but th e space formed by th e multipliciti es th emselves , as I
will exp lain in detail in th e next chapte r .
6. Wh en Dcl eu ze defin es his multipliciti es he always see ms to be referring to
manifolds whose dimensions are used to represent degrees of freedom (o r
indep endent variabl es) of some dynamic, and not to manifolds as mere
geo me tric objec ts . Thus, in his first introducti on of th e term he says,
Riem ann defined as 'm ultiplicities ' th ose things that co uld be det ermined
by th eir dimen sion s or their ind ependent variables. He distinguished
between discr ete multiplicities and co ntinuo us multipliciti es. Th e former
co ntain the principle of th eir ow n metrics . . . Th e latter found a m etrical
principle in some th ing else , eve n if onl y in ph en om en a unfolding in th em
o r in th e forces acting in th em. (Bcrasonism , p. 39)
And else w here he says, using th e word ' Ide a' to refer to co nc re te univ ersals
or m ultiplicities as r epla cem ents for esse nces ,
An Idea is an n-dimen sional , co ntin uo us, defin ed multiplicit y. Colour -
o r rath er, th e Idea of colour - is a three dim en sional multiplicit y. By
dim en sion s, we mean th e variables or coo rdinates up on whi ch a phen om-
eno n dep ends; by co ntin uity , we mean th e set of relations between
changes in th ese variables . . . by definition, we mean th e elements
reci procally det ermined by th ese relati on s, ele me nts w hich canno t change
unless the multiplicit y changes its o rder and its metric. ( D!iJerencc and
Repetition , p. 182)
7 . I ta ke th is r ath er Sim plified description fro m Ian Stewart. Does God Play Dice?
The Mat hematics if Chaos (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989), Chapter 6 .
H. Loo king for rel ation ship s between th e d iffere nt solution cur ves [i.e .
tra jectories ] of th e same d ifferential eq uation, Poin car e began with a local
analysis and exami ned th e beha vior of th ese curves in th e neighb orhood
o r a singular point . . . He sho we d that there were four possible different
ty pes o r singular points and classified th em by th e beh avior of th e nearby
so lutio n cu rves: nccuds (no des), throu gh whi ch an infinite number of
sol utio n curves pass; eols (sadd le points), th rough whi ch o nly tw o so lutio n
curves pass ... .foyers (fo i) , w hich th e so lution curves approach in th e
NOTES
manner of a logarithmic spiral; and centres (ce nte rs), aro und whi ch th e
so lutio n curves are closed, envelo ping o ne another. Having used direct
algebraic co m putat ion to sho w th at th ese four ty pes necessaril y e xist, he
studied th eir distribution. He found that in the ge ne ral case o nly three
ty pes pr evailed - nod es, sadd le points and foci - with cen te rs arising in
only exceptio nal circ umstances. (June Barrow-Green , Poin care and th e
Three Body Problem [American Mathematical Societ y, 1997J, p. 32)
Rou ghl y, we can say that Poin car e disco ver ed not only the existence of ce rta in
recurrent ' to po logical for ms' whi ch ar e bound to app ear in a large class of
differ ent ph ysical models, but also that some of th ese forms ar e 'more
gene r ic' th an othe rs, that is, th at if we study the distributio n of sing ularities
in many different m odels some of them (ce nte rs) are less likely to occu r
than oth ers. See also discussion of th e term 'gene ric' , a technical term
whose meaning is still evolving , in Ralph Abraha m and Chr isto phe r Shaw ,
Dynamics: The Geometry if Beha vior, Vol. Three (Aerial Pr ess, Santa Cruz,
198.5), 1'1'. 19-34.
9. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Platea us, p. 40 8.
10. 'To rever se Plat oni sm ' , as Del eu ze says, we need ' firs t and for em ost to
rem ove esse nces and to substi tute events in th eir pla ce, as jet s of singu lari-
ties' (Gilles Del euze , Loqi c c1 Sense [Columbia Uni versity Pr ess, New York,
1990], p. 53) .
11. Speaking of the image of the light of reason (or of rationalit y as a faculty
capable of graspin g the esse ntial truth of thin gs) Deleu ze says,
Th e very co nce ption of a natural light is inseparable from a ce r tain value
supposed ly attache d to th e Idea - namely, 'clarity and distinctness' ...
Th e restitution of the Idea in the doctrine of th e faculties requires th e
explosion of the clear and di stin ct , and th e discovery of a Dion ysian value
according to whi ch th e Idea is necessarily obscure in so fa r as it is distinct, all
th e more obscure th e more it is distinct . ' (Em phasis in th e original;
Gill es Deleu ze , D!iJerence and Repetition , p . 146)
Th e term 'Id ea ' here refers to multipliciti es, and th e fact th at Del euz e uses
th at Platoni c term shows he mean s to r epla ce esse nces with multipliciti es,
Ideas ar e by no means esse nces . In so far as problem s ar e th e obj ect of
Ideas, probl em s belon g on th e side of events, affecti on s, or accidents,
rather than o f theorematic essences . . . Co nseque ntly th e domain of
Ideas is that of th e inessential. (I" 187 )
12 . Self-ass mhl y during [th e ear ly stagcs of) em bryo nic de velopment is not
medi at ed by direct ge ne int erv ention . Wh en all the tran scriptions have
 NOTES
been prevented [thro ugh the use of an inhibitor] th e regular cleavage
patt ern s are re tained. How ever, the polarity of molecular organizatio n of
both th e egg's cyto plasm and its nucle us ... are esse ntial for normal
development. Hence th e main features of [earl y] embryogenesis - ce ll
differ entiation, indu cti on, det ermination o f pattern form ation - all ste m
from th e ooge netica lly originated, spatial distribution of pr eformed
informatio nal macr om olecules. Th e initial conditio n of embryogenesis is
ooge nesis. Th e epigene tic.~ of emb ryo nic development is built on th e
to po logical self-organization and orienta tion of macromolecules of th e
tota l egg. (Vladimir Glisin , ' Molecular BioloBJ in EmbryoloBJ. The Sea Urchin
Embryo", in Se!f-0rsanizins Systems. The Emerpence eif Order, ed . Euge ne
Yates [Plenum , Ne w York 1987], p . 163)
T he term 'oogenesis' refer s to th e pro cess which creates th e egg in th e first
place .
13. Joe Rosen, Symmetl)' in Science (Springe r- Verlag, Ne w York, 1995), Chapter
2.
Besides clos ure, a collec tion of enti ties togeth er with a rul e of comb i-
nation nee ds to display associativity, and possession of identity and inver se
elements. The set of positive integers (including zero, and using addition as
a comb ination rul e) displays associativit y because the res ult of adding two
numbe rs first, and the n addi ng a th ird one is the same as that of adding th e
first to what results from adding the last tw o. It also conta ins an ' ide ntity
cle me nt' , th at is, an eleme nt whi ch added to any othe r leaves th e latt er
unchanged (in this case th e identity elem ent is the number zero) . But it fails
to be a gro up because it lacks inver se eleme nts , th ose which wh en compose d
with certain othe rs yield th e identity eleme nt. For instance , the number
'-3' when co mposed with the number '+ 3' does yield zero (w hich is th e
identity eleme nt) but '-3' is not part of the set of positive integer s. Thus,
for the integers to for m a gro up we mu st also include negati ve numbers in
the set.
14. T his dyna mic aspect of sym me try- based classificati ons is obscure d in standard
presentatio ns of th e subject by th e fact that th e emphasis is not placed on
the t ransfor matio n as an event , but on its input and output. That is, the
t ransformatio n is a pro cess but all that matter s math ematically is the init ial
and final states of th e object transformed. See Ian Ste wart and Martin
Go lubits ky, Fea1ul Symmetry (Blackwe ll, Ox ford , 1992), PI" 32-3.
15. JIM, p. 97.
Besid s assuming ideal solids and gases, th is illustra tion of br oken
s)"lnn1l'try assumes that the gas containe r and the crysta l latti care infinit
ill all direct ion s. T he use of an 'obs rve r' to define invar iancc is just a
NOTES
convenience. The subjective po int of view can , in fact , be avoided. See Joe
Rosen , S)'mmetl)' in Science, PI" 173- 4 .
16 . Ste wart and Go lub itsky, Fea1ul Symmetl)', Chapter 7 .
17 . Ralph Abraham and Christo pher Shaw , ' Dyna mics: A Visual Int rodu ction ' ,
in Se!f-Orsanizing Systems, ed. Yates, p. 576.
18. Stewart and Go lubits ky, Fea1ul Symmeuv, Chapte r 5. See also , Gr egoire
Nicolis and lIya Prigogine , Exp/orins Complexity (W. H . Free man, Ne w York
1989), pp . 12-1 5.
19. Brian C. Goo dwin, 'The Evolutio n of Ge neric Forms', in Orsanizational
Constraints on the Dynamics eif Evolution, ed. J. Maynard Smith and G. Vida
(Mancheste r Un iver sity Press, Manchester 1990), PI" 11 3- 14 .
20 . Dele uze, Difference and Repetition , p. 187 .
Altho ugh Deleuze does not ex plicitly use the term 'symme try- brea king
cascade ', he docs refer to an 'e mbedding of gro ups' (p. 180) pr ecisely in
th e contex t of explaining how a multiplicity may be pr ogr essively det er -
mined . Unfortun ately, his bri ef discussion of gro ups uses a very obscure
aspect of Galo is's meth od , th e originato r of group theory, called th e
'ad junction of fields'. Th e two formulations are, nevertheless, equivalent,
fields of nu mber s and groups being tw o related ninet eenth-cen tury abst ract
objects. An algebraic pr obl em , specified pro gressively as its field is com-
pleted by successive adjunctions, is the eq uivalent of an abstract smooth
space being specifie d by a progr essive series of br oken symme tries, yielding
increasingly mor e differe ntiate d, more striate d spaces . Deleuze 's discussion
of Galois is correct techni cally, but it is not as clea r and intuitive as th e
equivalent formulation in terms of 'embedding of !,TfOUps' . Hen ce in this
reconstructi on I will stick with the clearer alte rnati ve. But wheth er one uses
fields or groups, it is clea r that so me form of prosressil'e differentia tion is a key
compo nent of the concept of a Deleuzian multiplicity.
2I. What distingui shes a pace as opposed to a mere set of poi nts is some
co nce pt that binds th e points togeth er . Th us in Euclidea n space the
distance between points tells how close points are to each othe r . . . As
Frechet [a pion eer in th e development of topol ogy] pointed out, the
bind ing pr op er ty need not be the Euclidea n distance functi on . In
particular he gene ralized the noti on of distan ce by int roducing th e class
of metric spaces. In a metric space, which can be a tw o-dim ensional
Euclidean space, one speaks of the neighborhood of a point and means all
those points whose distance fro m th e point is less than some quantit y
. . . How ever , it is also possi ble to suppose th at the neighb orh oods,
certain subse ts of a gh'en set of poin ts, are speci fied in so me way, even
without the introduction ~f a metric. uch spaccs are said to have a
 NOTE S
neighb orhood topology. (Mo r ris Kline , Math emat ical Thouqh t ; p . 1160;
m y em phasis)
1 will use th e term ' me tric space' and 'no nmetric space' throughout th is
book in the sense in wh ich th ey are defi ne d in th is q uo te but 1 will take
so me liberties. I will spe ak of top ol ogical spaces , for exam ple, as th e ' least
metric ' and of Euclid ean as th e 'most metric' , even th ou gh it would be
more techni call y co rrec t to differentiate fla tures if spaces that do or do not
depend on an)' strictly metric property.
22. Dcl cuze usuall y spe aks (foll ow ing Bergson ) o f tw o d ifferent t)'p es of multi-
pliciti es, metric and nonmetric, whi ch he calls ' striated' and 's mo oth'. For
th e purposes of en suring th e co r re ct int erpretation of Delcu ze 's position
her e it would have been ver y useful if he had e ver discussed Felix Klein ' s
work, thereb y clarifying th e relations between the metric and the nonmetric
as one of group inclusion . Unfortunately, as far as I can tell, Dcl euz e never
discuss es Klein . On th e oth er hand, Del euze is perfectly aware of th e
ex iste nce of several nonmetric geo me t ries and uses a sinnle term (' smooth
space ') to refer to all of th em:
It is the difference between a smooth (vectorial , projecti ve, or topolonical )
space and a striated (metriC) spa ce: in th e first case 's pace is occupied
without co unting' and in th e second case 's pace is counte d in orde r to be
occupied'. (De lcuze and Guattari , A Thousand Plateaus, P: 361 ; my
e m phasis)
T he definitions given in th e extract are his own , but ar e linked to th e
more orthodox definitions. A metric space is co unted in order to be
occupied in th e sense in which sede ntary cultures divide th e land int o
measured (o r counte d) plots in o rde r to inhabit it:
Good sense is . .. agricultural , inseparable from th e agrarian problem,
th e establishme nt of e nclosure s, and the dealings of middle classes th e
part s of whi ch are supposed to balan ce and to regulate on e another. Th e
ste am eng ine and livestock , but also properties and classes, ar e th e living
source s of good sense , not onl y as facts that spring up at a particular
peri od, but as ete rn al ar chetypes. (D eleuze, Loqi c if Sense, p. 76 )
T o the sede ntary way of metricizing space, of dealing with it as esse ntially
e xte nsive, Dcleu z opposes an int ensiv e way of oc up ying space th e way a
liquid do cs, that is, occupying it without Jividing it o r co unting it. Thi s
alternative h· calls a ' no m ad ic d istribution ' . Th e distin cti on bctwc n scdcnt-
.lTV
, .md nomad ic di stribution s is first mad , in DilJ;'rence
. and Repetit ion ,
NOTES
pp . 36 -7, in relation to qu estions of typolog ical thinking, but is taken
furth er in an actual co m pariso n of nomad and sede nta ry cult ures
. . . eve n thou gh th e nomadic traj ect ory may foll ow trails o r customary
ro utes , it do es not fulfill th e function of the sede ntary ro ad, wh ich is to
parcel out a closed spaee to people, assigning each person a share and
regulating th e com m unication between shares . Th e nomadic traj ect ory
does th e opposit e : it distributes people (or anima ls) in an open space .. .
sede ntary space is striate d [i.e. metricized], by walls , enclosures and
roads between enclosures, whil e nomadic space is smo oth [i.c. non-
metric], marked on ly by 'traits' that ar e effaced and displa ced with th e
traj ect ory. (De lcuzc and Guattari , II Thousand Plateaus, p . 380; emphasis
in th e original)
23. Morris Klin e, Math emat ical Tboupht, p. 917 .
24. David A. Brannan, Matthew F. Esplen, Jerem y J. Gra y, Geometry (Cambridge
University Pre ss, Cambridge, 1999 ), p. 364.
25. This way of describing the subject oversimplifies things so me w hat. First of
all , th e actual relati on s between the different geo me tr ies ar e more co mplex
than the Simp lified hierarchy 'topological-differential-projective-affme-
Euclide an geome tries' ma y sugges t. For th e detail s of Klein ' s orig inal
classificati on see ibid., P: 919 .
My friend the math ematician Andreas Dress (pe rso nal co m m unica tion)
sum marizes Klein ' s programme (called th e Erlange r Pro gram) like thi s,
Th e Erlanger Program by Felix Klein is based on the fact that dep ending
o n whi ch (bijective) transformations yo u need to deal with (isome trics
keeping distances invariant , similarities scaling all distan ces by th e same
fact or and, hen ce, keeping rati os of distances in variant, affine maps
keeping rati os of distances of points on parallel lines invariant, proj ectiv-
ities keeping cro ss-ratio s of distan ces invariant , differential transforma-
tion s resp ecting infinitesimal straightness, hom eomorphism s respecting
nothing but infinit esimal clo sen ess) , it always makes sense to ask ( 1)
whi ch features of configurations within th e space of int erest do remain
in variant , and (2) wh ether a basic famil y of such features can be found so
that every othe r suc h feature can be expressed as a function of those basic
ones.
26 . Morris Klin " Math ematical Thouqlu , p . 9 21 . Th er e ar e imp ortant exce ptions
to thi s state me nt. Some mathematicians, like Riemann him self, but also
\ illi: m ' IilTord, did see an o llto logica l co nnec tion between th e metric and
 N OTES
no nme t:ric prop erties of spaces. As one historian of twentieth-century physics
writes,
[Riemann I asserted that space in itse lf was nothing more than a three -
dim ensi onal mani fold devo id of all form: it acquire d a definit e form o nly
through th e mat erial co nte nt filling it and det ermining its m etric relations
. . . Riemann' s anti cipation of such a dep end en ce of th e metric on
physical data later provided a justifi cati on for avoiding th e noti on of
absolute space wh ose metric is ind ep end ent of physical forces . For
example , more than sixty years later, Einstein took Riemann ' s em pirical
co nce ptio n of geome try using it as an important justificati on for his
gene ral theory of relati vity.
(Tia n Yu Cao, Conceptua l Development if Twenti eth -Century Field Th eories
[Camb rid ge Univ ersity Press, Cambridge, 1997], P: 373)
27 . Gordo n Van W ylen, Th ermodynami cs (j ohn Wil ey & ons, New York , 1963) ,
P: 16 .
28 . Wh at is the significance of these ind ivisible distances that are ce aseless ly
transformed and cannot be divid ed or transformed without th eir eleme nts
changing in nature each time? Is it not th e int en sive characte r of this type
of multiplicit y' s elem ents and the relati ons betw een th em ? Exact ly like a
spee d or a temperature, which is not co m pose d of oth er speeds or
te m perat ures , but rath er is envelo ped in o r envelops othe rs , eac h of
which marks a change in nature. T he metrical principl e of these
multipliciti es is not to be found in a homogen eous mili eu but resid es
elsewhere , in forces at work within them , in physical phen om en a
inhabiting th em . . . (De leuze and Guattari , A Thousand Plateaus,
pp . 3 1-3)
T he term 'd istance' is used as if it was a nonmetr ic prop erty, th ou gh in its
usual meanin g it certainly den ot es something metric. Deleu ze takes this
specia l inte nsive mean ing of ' distance' fro m Bertrand Russell as I will discuss
in de tail later in the next chapte r . O n dist an ces as int ensive magnitudes, or
as 'i ndivisible asymme tr ical relations' see Deleu ze, Difference and Repet it ion,
p. 237 . Deleuze does not ex plicitly give phase transitions as exa m ples of
'c hanges in kind ' . But one of the very few illustrati on s he does give is ind eed
a symmet ry-brea king transiti on , 'For exa mple , one can divide mo vem ent
into the gallo p, tro t, and walk , but in such a way that what is di vided
changes in natu re at each moment of th e di vision ... ' (Dc lcuzc and
C uauari, /1 Thausatul Plat eaus, p. 483).
NOTES
O n phase transition s in animal movem ent as broken symme tries see,
Ste wart and Golubitsky, FeOIjul Sy mmetry, Chapte r 8.
29 . Cao, Conceptual Developm ent ,?! Twentiet h-Ce ntu rJ Field Theories, p. 283.
30. Th e essen tial idea of grand unified theo ries . .. [is] the ge ne ral form of
hierarch ical symme try br eakin g : an und erl ying large gauge sym me try of
all int era cti on s is brok en do wn in a success ion of ste ps, giving a hierar chy
of br ok en symme tr ies . (ibid., p. 328 )
31. It is beyond th e sco pe of this chapter to analyse Einste in's use of differential
mani fold s in technical detail. But I sho uld at least mention the way in whi ch
his usage differs from that of Del eu ze. In Einste in's theory a gravitatio nal
field const it utes th e metr ic struc t ure of a fo ur-dimensional mani fold
(spacetime), and to thi s exte nt, th e metric properties of space (rathe r,
space time) are ind eed connected to th e physical pro cesses wh ich occ ur
within it. However, as th e philosoph er of scie nce Lawre nce Sklar reminds
us, despit e the fact that Einste in's field eq uation does rel ate th e metric of a
manifold to the distribution of mass and ene rgy, the relation between th e
two is not ge net ic: the m etric is not caused by the mass-energy distribution ,
it is o nly associat ed with it in a lawlik e way. ee Sklar, Space. Tim e, and
Space-Time, pp . 50- I .
32. Th e mo ve aw ay fro m metamath em ati cs (set th eory) and back to th e actual
mathem atics used by scientists was initiated by th e philosopher Patrick
Suppes . Yet the cre dit for the introducti on of state space into mod ern
analytica l philosoph y, as we ll as the cr ed it for em phasizing physical mod alit y
in th e analysis of that space , goes to ano the r philosoph er, Bas Van Fraasen .
See Bas Van Fraasen , l.aws and Symmetry (C lare ndo n Press, O xford , 1989) ,
Chapte r 9.
33. Ralph Abrah am and Chris to phe r Shaw, Dynam ics: Th e Geometry cd' Beha vior,
Vol. 1 (Aerial Press, Santa Cr uz, 1985 ), pp. 20 - 1. My description is merely
a par aphrase of the foll OWing description :
Th e modeling pro cess begin s with th e cho ice of a particular state space
in which to represent the syste m. Prol on ged o bservations lead to man y
tr ajectories within the state space. At any poin t on any of th ese curves, a
veloci ty "ecto r may be deri ved [using the differentiati on operato r ]. It is
useful in descr ibing an inh er ent tenden cy of the syste m to mo ve with a
habitu al velocity, at part icular po ints in the state space. Th e prescription
of a veloc ity vect or at each point in th e state space is called a velocity
vector .fielJ. T he sta te space , filled with trajectories, is called the phase
p"r/mit of till' d -narn ical syste m. T he velocity vecto r field has been
 NOTES
derived from the phase portrait by d!fTerentiation . . . Th e phrase dyruunical
Sj'stem will specifically denote thi s vector field . (Em phasis in the original)
l4. Albe rt Lautman, qu oted in Gilles Deleuz e, Loqic if Sense (Columbia Univ er-
sity Press, ew York , 1990) p. 345. (My em phasis)
Lautman 's Le Probleme du Temps (fro m which thi s ext ract is tak en ) and
'Essai sur Ie otion de tructure et d ' Existence en Math ematiques', are
Dclcuz c 's main so urce s on th e ontological anal ysis of stat e space. Del eu ze
paraphrases Lautrnan 's description in other books, but given the ce ntrality
of these ideas in his work 1 pr efer to qu ot e Lautrnan ' s own words.
15. Abraham and Shaw, Dynamics: Th e Geomeuy if Beha vior, pp. 35-6.
36. Nicolls and Prigogine, Explorina Complexitv; pp. 65-71 .
n . Abraham and Shaw, Dynamics: The Geomet ry if Behavior, pp . 37-41.
38. Abraham and Shaw, Dynamics: A Visual Introduction, p. 562.
~9 . Deleuze, D!lJerence and Repetition, pp. 208-9. (Emphasis in th e original. )
Deleuz e borrows the ontological distinction of the actual and the virtual
fr om Bergson . See Del euze, Berpsonism, pp . 96 -7.
40. Willard Van Orman Quine , quoted in Nicholas Rescher, 'The Ontology of
th e Possibl e', in The Possible and the Actual, ed . Michael J. Loux (Cornell
Universit y Press, Ith aca , 1979), p . 177.
41 . For a bri ef account of th e recent history of modal logic, see Michael J.
Loux , ' Introd uction: Modality and Metaphysics', in Loux, Th e Possible and th e
Actual, pp . 15-28 .
4 2. Ronald N. Giere, 'Constructi ve Realism ' , in lmap es if Science. Essays an
Real ism and Empiri cism with a Reply by Bas C. Van Fraasen, cds . Paul M.
Churchland and Clifford A. Hook er (University of Chicago Press, 1985),
p. 84 .
4 1. Bas Van Fraasen, Laws and Symmetry', p . 223. Van Fraasen discusses the tw o
standard typ es of laws, law s of succe ssion (which gov ern th e evolution of
trajectories, and are exe m plified by Newton' s laws ) and laws of coe xiste nce
(which restri ct position in state space, and are illu strated by Boyle 's law for
ideal gases) .
44 . Exactly mat ching initial co nditions in the laboratory and th e model is not
possible, so we normally deal with bundles ?f traj ectories in state space. Th e
statistical distribution of a small population of initial state s in the model is
mad e to mat ch that of the erro rs which th e exper imente r may have mad e in
pr ' paring the real syste m in a parti .ular initial condition. In what follow s
thi s point will not mak e mu ch differen ce so I stick to the sim pler case of a
single tr ajectory.
4S . t ;i(,rt, rgues that th e regularities exhibited by the possible histories reveal
'om, thin g about th e w USCl I reqularitles in the real ph)'Sical s 'sl .m :
NO TE S
For th e modal realist, th e causal stru ct ure of the model, and thu s, to
some de gr ee of appro ximation , of the real syste m, is identical with th e
modal structure. For any real syste m , the functional relation ship among
the actu al values of [the degr ees of freed om] are causal not because they
hold am on g th e actua l values in all such real syste ms but becau se th ey
hold for all possible values of thi s particular syste m . (Consrrucrrre Realism ,
p. 84; em phasis in the original)
See also Ronald N . Giere , Explaintnq Science. A Coanitil'e App roach ( Unive r-
sity of Chicago Pr ess, 1988), Chapte r 4. Gier e is, in this case , wrong. Stat e
space, as I will argue in Chapter 4 , provides no causal information about th e
modelled processes.
46 . One's attitude towards modalities has a profound effect on one's whole
theory of scien ce . Actualists . . . must hold that th e aim of scienc e is to
describe the actual history of the world . For [modal realists I . . . th e aim
is to describe the structure of physical possibilit y (o r propensity) and
necessity . Th e actual history is just that one possibilit y that happ en ed to
be realiz ed .. . (Giere , Constructi ve Realism, p. 84)
47. Deleuz e, Loaic if Sense, p . 54.
48. Considering that Deleuz e ' s analysis hinges on the differen ce between the
differ entiation and int egration operators of th e calculus, it will be necessary
to remove on e traditional obj ection to the very idea of giving an ontological
dime nsio n to th ese o perato rs. Thi s o bjectio n is that th e o utput of the
differentiation op erator (instantaneo us rates of change or infinit esimals)
cannot be thought of as anything but mathematical fictions . ot to do so has
led in th e past to man y ste ri le specu lat ions and co ntroversy . However,
alth ough a vector field is ind eed com posed of man y of these instantaneous
rates of change, what matters to us here arc not th e 'instants' themselves,
tak en on e at a tim e, but th e topoloqical in variants which those instants displa y
collect ively , that is, th e singularities of th e field .
49 . Ste phe n G . Eubank and J. Doyne Farmer, ' Intr oduction to Dynamical
ystems ' , in Intr oducti on to Nonlinear Physics, ed . Lui Lam (Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1997), p. 76.
50. Abraham and Shaw , Dynamics: The Geometry if Behavior, pp. 7- 11.
51. Attractors ar e ind eed defined as a 'limit se t ' with an op en inset (its basin).
But th e word 'limit' in the definiti on mak es all the differen ce in the world ,
since it refers pr ecisely to the tendenci es of traj ectories to approach th e
att rac to r in th e limit. See ibid. , p. 44.
S2. 'Intuitively, according 10 Russell, a syste m is det erminist ic e xactly if its
 N O TES
pr eviou s stat es det ermine its later states in the exact sense in whi ch th e
argum ents of a function det ermine its values. (Van Fraasen, Laws and
Symmetl)' , p. 251)
See Van Fraasen 's discussion o f the relation between the modal category
of physical necessity and deterministic laws in Chapters 3 and 4 of Laws and
Symmetry :
53. Nicolis and Prigogine, Explorinq Comple xity, p. 14. (Emphasis in th e original. )
54. For example , the way Del euze approaches the qu estion of necessity is by
splitt ing the causal link : on on e hand , processes of individuation are defined
as seque nces of causes (every effect will be th e cause of yet anoth er effect)
whil e singularitie s become pure incorporeal ifJeas of tho se serie s of causes; on
the oth er hand, these pure effects are view ed as having a quasi-causal capacity
to affect causal processes. By splitting causality this way, Dcl eu ze manag es
to separate the det erminism which links causes to causes, from strict
necessity . See Lopic t?f Sense, p. 169 .
Deleuz e uses the word 'de te rm inism' as synonym ou s with ' necess ity',
and uses the word ' des tiny' instead for the modified link between causes . I
keep the word ' de te r minism' to avoid introdu cing neologisms, but empha-
size the br eak with strict necessity. Anoth er way of expres sing Delcuzc ' s
conce pt ualization of this modality is from D!lJerence and Repetition , p. 83,
Destin y never consists in ste p- by-ste p deterministic relation s between
pr esents which succee d on e another . . . Rath er, it impli es between
successive presents non-localizable connections , actions at a distance, systems
of replay, resonances and echoe s . . . which transcend spatial locations
and temporal succession s.' (My em phasis)
Th e idea of 'non-localizable connec tions' is th e key conce pt her e and can
be und er stood by refer ence to convec tion cells. Whil e th e causal int era ction s
between th e cell's compo nents ar e localizable collisions (billiard- ball style
causality) , th e source of cohere nce in th e flow pattern (the periodic attractor)
is, indeed, nowher e specifically in space or tim e. Th e attractor establishes
co nnec tions (e lse th er e would be no coheren ce in th e flow) but not
localizable one s.
')5. Willard Van Orman Quine , ' Refere nce and Modality', in From a Loqical Point
'!f' Viell' (Harpe r & Row , New York, 1965 ) , p. 155. Even though most
mod al analyses deal with purely lingui stic phenomena, such as counte r factual
sente nces , th e mom ent one approaches such sente nces as referring to th e
real world (tec hnically, th e mom ent we quantify over possible entities) we
arqu ir« an onto logical commitme nt to the existence of ess mces. In othe r
NO T ES
words, we comm it ourselves to affirm that objects possess some of th eir
pr op erties necessaril y whil e other s only contingently .
56. Th e first option (ensuring transworld identity through particular essences or
hacceiti es) is exemp lified by Alvin Plantin ga, 'Transworld Identity or
Worldbound Individu als?', in Loux, The Possible and th e Actual, pp. 154-7 .
Th e seco nd option (co unte rparts linked through gene ral essences) is
illustrated by David Lewi s, ' Counte rpart Th eory and Quantified Modal
Logic', in The Possible and th e Actua l, pp. 117- 21.
57. Delcu ze , D!lJerence and Repetit ion , pp . 211- 12. See also Deleuzc , Berqsonism,
p. 97 . Deleuze does not, in fact , refer to the virtual as a physical modality,
but the fact that he explicitly contrasts virtua lity and possibilit y (following
Bergson ' s lead ) do es indicate that he is thinking in modal terms.
58. I take thi s description of Arist otelian philos oph y from Elliot Sober, The
Natu re t?f Selection (MIT Pr ess, Cambridge , 1987), pp. 156-6 I .
59 . Deleuzc, Difference and Repetiti on, p. 29. To avoid falling pr ey to th e dang ers
of representationalism (or as I call it typol ogical thinking) Deleuze follow s
Michel Foucault 's anal ysis of classical representation, wh ich according to the
latter forms an episte mo logical space with four dim en. ion s or ' degrees of
freedom ' : identity, resemblance, analogy and opposition, P: 262 .
For a discussion of thi s aspect of Fou cault 's thought from th e point of
view of an analytical philosoph er see Gar y Gutting , Michel Foucault 's Archae-
oloBY rif Scientific Reason (Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1993 ), Chapter 4 .
In what follows I Simply tak e the idea that th er e are recurrent features in
th ese classificatory pra ctices (rese mblance, identity, etc .) but not that these
form a global entity called an 'e piste me' . I do not beli eve such global entities
or totalities exist as will becom e clear in th e follo wi ng chapte rs.
60 . 'The first formula po sits resemblance as th e condition of differ en ce . It
ther efore und oubtedl y demands th e possibilit y of an identical conce pt for
the tw o thin gs that differ on condit ion that th ey are alike . . . According
to th e other formula, by contrast, resemblance, identity, analogy and
opposition can no longer be conside re d anyth ing but effects of a primary
differ en ce or a primary system of differ en ces . (Dc lcuzc , D!fJerence and
Repetiti on, p. 1 17)
Dclcuze, in fact , does not speak of 'c onstraints guiding a construct ive
proj ect ' . He rath er affirm s his desire for cre ating a ph ilosophy '!f' difference,
and then denoun ces th e categ ories o f typological or represent ational thinking
as obstacles to reaching that goa l. Th e differences he has in mind are not th e
e u crn al diffe rences between thinq« that are part and parccl of classificatory
pract ices, bUI productive differcnces perhaps best illustra ted by inccmil'e
 NOTES
d!fJerences, dilTe rences in temper ature, pr essure , etc. within one and the
same syste m, which are mark ed by thres holds o f int en sity det ermi ning phase
tra nsitions. See p. 222 .
61 . Ronald F. Fox , Eners)' and the Evolution if Life (W . H. Free ma n, New York,
1988), p. 8.
T he mechanisms by which th e che m ical clem ents come into existe nce is
stella r nucleosynthesis. The pro cesses involved are an example of how ener8Y
./1011' pr odu ces complex states of matt er from sim pler co nstituen ts. A
co mbination of gr avitational ene rgy and nucl ear ene rgy conve rts vast
quant ities of hydr ogen gas, the simplest ele me nt, into the nu clei of other
mo re comp lex cleme nts . Nucleosynthesis invol ves nucl ear reaction cycles
and happ ens in stages that corre late stro ngly with changes in ste llar
structure . (Emphasis in the original)
62 . Philosoph er s tend to imagine that a piece of bulk material is simply a
collect ion of individual crystals arranged so perfectl y th at , for all pra cti cal
pur poses, th e properties of the bulk sample are simply a sum of th e
prop erties of th ese crystals. In oth er words, th ey im agine we can divide the
hulk sample in extension and , given the packing arrange ment of the crysta ls,
we will alwa ys end up with a sim ilar if smaller sample . But in realit y, we
do not have perfectly regular crystal lattices (the irregularities playing a
cru cial ro le in the stability of th e stru ct ure) and w e canno t divid e a bulk
sample beyond a given size with out losing some eme rge nt pr op erties:
Like the biologist , th e met allurgist is conce rned with aggr egat es and
assemblies in wh ich rep eat ed or ex te nded irrepularities in the arranged
atoms becom e th e basis of maj or structural features on a larger scale ,
eventually bridging the gap betw een th e atom and thin gs per ceptibl e to
human senses . (Cy ril Stanley Smith , 'Structure, Substructure, and Super -
structure ', in A Search fo r Structu re [MIT Press, Cambridge, 1982), p. 54 ;
my em phasis)
See also, in th e same volume , Smith , ' Grain Shapes and othe r Metallur-
gical Applicat ions o f To pology'. O n the eme rge nce of bulk pr op erti es at
di ffe rent critical scales, see Michael A. Dun can and Denn is H. Rou vray,
tIIicroclu.ltw (Scien tific Ameri can , Dece mbe r, 1989), p. 113.
2 THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE VIRTUAL IN SPACE
I . Michael T . Ghisclin, Metaphysics and the Oriqin l?I Species (State University of
New York Press, Albany, 1997), p. 78.
NOTES
2. A good history of this de bate, exp laining the ro le which Michael Ghiselin
played in it , can be found in David L. Hull , Science as a Process (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago , 1988) , Chapter 4.
3. Ghiselin , Metap hysics and the Oriq in if Species, pp . 37-4 1.
4. It is unclear to what extent Deleuze subscribes to th is ide a of a flat onto logy
of singu lar ind ividuals. Some parts of his th eor y (for exa mple, his th eor y of
tim e invol ving a nested set of larger and larger tempor al scales) see m to
dem and such an onto logy. Yet , elsewhere , he does see m to talk of tot alities.
Thus, while I view th e rea lm of the socia l as a flat onto logy (made of
individual decision -makers, individual instituti on al organizations, individual
cities, individu al nation states) and thu s would never speak o f 'society as a
who le' or ' culture as a whole ' , Deleuze does talk of 'society as a whole '
and spec ifically, of a virtual multiplicit y of soc iety . See, for example, Gilles
Dele uze, D!lI erence and Repetition (Co lumbia Univer sity Press, Ne w York,
1994), p . 186. T here are also terminological pr obl em s that need to be not ed
give n that Dcl euze uses the term ' indi vidual' in a ver y idiosyncratic way. In
parti cular, he does not use 'actu al entity' and 'i ndividual' as syno nyms as I
do . For Deleuze th e term ' individual' refer s to an entity in th e process '!f
actu alizati on , th at is, before it acquires its final qualiti es and exte nsities . For
exam ple, a fully develop ed hum an being would be an actu al entity , but the
em bryo as it is being unfold ed and dev elo ped wo uld be an individual. On e
would be an ex te nsive being, the othe r an inte nsive one. (See , for example,
pages 247 and 250.) I will use the word ' individual' in the sense in which it
is used by Ghisclin to link it to anti-essenti alist thought, but this should not
cause mu ch distortion to Dcleuze .
O n th e other hand, I do br eak with Deleuze 's use of the term 'species '
whi ch does not see m to impl y that species are also individuals, and hence ,
the pr odu ct of an indi viduati on pro cess disti nct from the one that gives rise
to organic ind ividuals during embryoge nesis . He does no t see m to keep the
tw o levels of scale separate (as I think they should be) and spe aks of 'species'
and ' parts ' as the or ganic ex pression of qualities and exte nsities respectively
(p 25 1). Yet , he does ackno w ledge in passing the role of rep rodu cti ve
isolation in th e individuation of species. He writes,
A kineti cs of population adjoins, without resembling, the kinet ics of the
egg; a geog rap hical pr ocess of isolation may be no less for mative of
species than int ern al genetic variations, and sometimes pr ecedes the
latt er . (p. 2 I7)
5. Ernst Mayr, quoted in Elliot Sober, The Nature of Selection (MIT Press,
Cambridge, 1987), p. 156.
 NOTES
6. Ibid. , p. 159. Sober makes some corrections to Mayr 's way of exp laining th e
reve rsal of Aristot elian esse ntialism . He believe s it is incorrect to compare
averages and essence s, as Mayr do es in the extract , since averages may be
taken to be real properties at th e populationa l level. So th e reversal is
characte rize d in terms of the rol e of variation : whil e for Aristot elian s
hom ogeneity is the nat ura l state and variation is what needs special
exp lanation , for population thinker s it is variation which is nat ural , whil e
homogeneity, when it exists, is what need s to be explained .
7. lbid., p. 160.
8. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (University of
Minn esota Pr ess, Minneapolis, 1987), p. 48. (My emphasis)
9. Niles Eldr edge, Macro-E"olutionary DynamiCS (McGraw- Hill, New York ,
1989 ), pp. 155- 7 .
10.1 . D. Murray, Mathematical BioloBY (Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1989), pp . 1-4.
II. Ibid., pp. 8- 1l.
12. In both organism and cellular populations, for example, we are concerned
with rates of birth (rate s of cell division ), rat es of death , as we ll as mig rati on
rates. Th ese rat es of ch ange , in turn, define in both cases a dynamical
pro cess which disp lays threshold effects as we ll as asymptotic stabl e states.
Divergent uni versa lity also implies that these organic phen omena may share
dynamical feat ur es with inorganic on es. Some processes, like th e formation
o f concentration patterns du e to an interaction between the rat e at which a
chem ical react ion proceeds and the rat e at which the pr odu cts of that
reac tio n diffuse, occur in both em bryological processes and non -biologi cal
chem ical processes (like the famous Belou sov-Zhabotinsky reaction), a fact
which suggests that a virtual multiplicity can be divergently actualized in
both organic and inorganic mo lecu lar populations. Indeed , the mathematical
techniques and analytical methods w hich are used to model intera ction s
between animal and plant populations (such as pr edator-prey syste ms) are
dire ct ly appli cable to reaction kinetics, that is, to th e dynam ical models of
inter acting populations of mol ecules, organic or inorganic. Sec ibid., p . 63 .
13. For a discussion of population -level qualiti es see Sober, Nature ef Selection,
p. 167 .
14. How do es aetuali zation occur in things th ems elves? Ben eath th e
actu al qu alities and exte nsities [of things th em selves] th er e are spatio -
tempor al dynami sms. Th ese ar c th e actualizing, differ enciating agenci es .
Th ey must be surveyed in every domain , eve n th ough they are ordinarily
hidd en by the const itute d qualiti es and exte nsities. Embryology sho ws
that the division of th e egg is secondary in relati on to more significant
Illorph ogen eti c rno vcm mts: th e augm ent ation of free surfaces, stre tc hing
N O TE S
of cellular layers, invagination by foldin g, regional displa cement of
groups . A whole kinematics of the egg app ears whi ch implies a dynamic.
(Deleuze , D!lJerence and Repetition, p. 214 )
IS. Gerald M. Edelman, Topobioloqy, An Introduction CO Molecular Emb'J'oloBY (Basic
Books, New York, 1988) , pp. 22- 4 .
16. As a result of epithe lial-me senchymal transformation , two kinds of motion
can arise that differ to some degr ee in scale . The first invo lves th e
obvious cel l migration that can tak e place after conversion to mesen -
chyme, as w ell as its cessation following cond en sation of mesenchym e
into rounded epithe lial masses. Th e second . . . is th e folding, invagina -
tion or evagination of whole tissue shee ts to form various st ruc tur es ,
including tubes . In both cases, new ce llular environments are created ,
leading to the possibility that different inducti ve Signals will be rel eased .
(Ibid., p. 70)
17. lbid., p. 94 .
18. lbid.; pp. 80 -1.
19. Th e phras e 'an exact yet rigorous ' is used on several occasions by Dele uze to
refer to a style of thought, but also to a characte ristic of topological
manifolds th emselves. O ne occasion is the discussio n of Bertrand Russell's
concept of 'ordinal distan ces ' which I w ill discuss later in the main text.
See, Dele uze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 483. Another use of th e
phrase occurs whil e discussing Husserl's notion of ' vague and material
essences ' , topologieal essences which are assimilated to singularities (events)
and affects (p . 407) .
20. Arthur T . W infr ee, When Time Breaks Down. The Three-Dimensional DynamicS
ef Electrochemical JVa ves and Cardiac Arrhythmias (Princeton Univer sity Pr ess,
Prin ceton, 1987), p. 253 . (My emphasis)
21 . Stuart Kauffman , The Orioins ef Order. Se!f0roanization and Selection in
Evolution (O xford University Pr ess, New York , 1993), p . 461 .
22 . lbid., p. 44 2.
23 . Th e expec te d network connec tivity features exhibit stro ng self-organiza -
tion properties analogous to phase transitions in physics, as the number
of regu lator y connec tions , M, among N gen es incr eases. If M is small
rel ative to N, the scrambled geno mic system consists of man y small
ge netic circ uits , each unconn ect ed to the remainder. As the number of
regulatory connect ions, M, increases past th e number o f gen ' S, N, large
connec te d circ uits form . Th e crystallization of large circuit s as M incr eases
is analogo us 10 a phase transition. ( tuart Kauffman, 'Sc lf-O rganizatlon.
 NOTES
Selecti ve Adaptation and its Limit s', in Evolution at a Crossroads, eds .
David. J. Depew and Bruce H. W eb er [MIT Press, Cam bridge , 1996),
pp . 180)
24. In Deleuze's philosop hy th e connec t ion betwee n multiplicities, on one hand,
and quali ties and exte nsities, on th e othe r, is more intimately defined , with
diffe re ntial relation s correspo nding to qu alities and singularities to
extensities.
[A) multiplicity such as that of co lour is co nstituted by the virt ual
coe xiste nce of relati ons between ge net ic or differ ential eleme nts of
a part icular order . Th ese relations are actualized in qualitatively dis-
tinct colours, while their disti nctiv e poin ts are incarna ted in distinct
extensit ies , which correspond to tho se qualit ies ... W e have see n
that eve ry pro cess of actualizatio n was in thi s sense a double differe ncia-
tio n, qualitative and exte nsive. (De leuze, D!iJerence and Repetition ,
p. 245)
25. K. Eric Dr exler, ' Biological and Nanomechanical Syste ms : Contrasts in
Evolut ionary Capacity', in ArtifiCial L!fe , cd. Christo pher G . Langt on (Addi-
son- Wes ley, Redwood City, 1989) , p . 5 10.
26. Dele uze, D!iJerence and Repetit ion, P: 223.
Intensity cre ates the exte nsities and the qualiti es in wh ich it is ex plicated;
these ex te nsities and qualities are differ enciat ed . .. Crea tion is always
the produ ction of lines and figures of difler en ciation. It is neverth eless
true that int en sity is explicate d on ly in being cance led in this differ en -
ciated syste m that it cre ates. (p. 255)
27. Van Wy len, Thermodynamics, p. 16.
28. Bert rand Russell , Principles if Mathemati cs (W. W. Nort on , New York) ,
p. 104 (for remarks on pleasur e) and p. 171 (for remarks on colour) .
Dc lcuze wo uld not co unt pleasur e as an int en sive quantity part of mental
irulivuluatinq processes . He see ms to view pleasur e as an effect o f th e cance lling
of inte nsive differe nces:
Bioph ysical life imp lies a field of individuati on in wh ich differ ences in
intensity are distributed her e and there in the fo rm of excitations. Th e
q uanti tat ive and qua litative process of th e resolution of such diffe rences
is what we call pleasure . (Deleuze, D!iJerence and Repet ition , p. 96)
29. Marti n II . Krieger , DoinS PhySiCS. How PhySicists Ta ke /-101.1 C!l th e World (Indiana
l.ln ivcrsity Press, Bloom ingt on and Indian apolis, 1992), p. 130.
10. n,·J..uz<', D!I]crmce lind Repa ition , p. 222. (My emp hasis)
NOTES
In this extrac t, 'd ivers ity' refer s to the wo rld of actu al phen omena and
their exte rna lly defined differe nces (that is, to difference as subordinate d to
rese mb lance) while int en sive differe nces define th e in-itself (nuo mena) of
the wo rld, th e positi ve and prod uct ive differences wh ich create or generate
phenom en a.
31. lIya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers , Order out l' Chaos. Man 's Nell' Dialoque
with Na tu re (Bantam Books , Ne w York, 1984) , p. 135.
32. Deleuze ex plains the relation bet ween inte nsive differen ces and gene tic
differences b), saying that 'comp lex syste ms increasingly tend t o int eriorize
thei r constitue nt di ffere nces ' , that is, thei r indi viduating factors (D!iJerence
and Repetit ion , p . 256). See also Deleuz e 's discussion of Darwini an differ-
ences on pp . 248-9.
33. Wh en discussing th e virtual and th e inte nsive, Deleuze usually divides the
subject int o two areas, alth ough the termi nology varies . Someti mes he spea ks
of 'singu larities and affect s' , other times of 's pee ds and affects', yet in other
places he speaks o f 'events and att r ibutes' . All th ese formulat ions are , I
believe , equivalent . See fu rthe r discussion and refer ences in Chapte r 3,
footnot e 46.
34. O n this new class of formal spaces which compleme nts state space, see
W alter Fontana, ' Functional Self-Organization in Co mplex , Syste ms' , in
19 90 Lea ures in Complex Syste ms, eds, L)'nn Nad el and Danie l Ste in (Addison-
W esley, Redwood City, 1991); and, in th e same volume , Stuart Kauffman,
' Rando m Grammars: A New Class o f Mod els for Functional Integr ation and
T ransfor mation in the Biological , Ne ura l and Social Sciences' .
35. W e know nothing abo ut a bod )' until we know what it can do , what its
affects are , how th ey can or cannot ente r int o composition with other
affec ts, with the affects of ano the r bod y, either to des troy that bod y or
to be destroyed by it , eithe r to exc hange action s and passion s with it or
to join with it in composing a mor e pow er ful body. (De leuze and
Guatta ri, A Th ousand Plateaus, P: 257)
36 . James J. Gibson , The Ecoloqical Approach to Visual Percept ion (Houghto n Mifllin
Co mpany, Boston, 1979), pp. 15-1 6.
37 . lbid., p. 132.
38. orne of the rec ur re nt assemb ly patt erns that have bee n discover ed (and
which may tu rn out to be un iversal) are of the type th at articulates
hete roge neous elements. Stuart Kau ffman has coined the term ' meshwo rk'
to refer to th is type of assem hlage.. ee Stua rt Kauffman, Random Gramma rs,
p.428.
I haw mad' -xtc nsivc usc of Kauffm an 's meshw ork s, and of the ir
op posite, hierarchies, as recur ren t assernhly patt ern s for th e analysis of
 NOT ES
human history in Manu el DeLanda, A Thousand Years if Nonlinear History
(Zone Books, New York, 1997 ). A similar distin ction (or a spec ial case , that
of centralized and decentralized decision -making systems) as well as a relat ed
set of recurrent assembl y patterns (clockworks, motors and networks) is
d iscussed and appli ed to history in Manuel Dcl.anda, War in th e Age if
Intelligent Machines (Zon e Books, New York , 1991 ).
~9 . It is no longer .a question of imp osing a form upon a matter but of
elaborating an increasingly rich and consistent mat erial , th e better to tap
increasing ly intense f orces. What makes a mat erial incr easingl y rich is th e
same as what holds heterogeneiti es topether with out their ceasing to be
heterogeneous. (Del euze and Guattarl , A Thousand Plateaus, p . 329; my
emphasis)
40. Delcuze , D!fference and Repetition, P: 22 3.
Th er e is an illusion tied to intensive quantities. This illusion, however, is
not int ensit y itself, but rather th e mov em ent by whi ch difference in
intensity is can celed. Nor is it onl y apparently cancele d . It is really
cancele d , but outside itself, in extensity and underneath quality. (p . 240;
my emphasis)
41 . It is now an easy matter to extend our discussion to nonequiltbrium sta tes
. . . Th ey can be transient . . . But they can also be permanent if we
establish and maintain appropriate conditions, which we refer to as
constraints. Thus , a temperature difference appli ed between two sections
of a slab .. . will result in nonequilibrium situations in which the syste m
is never allow ed to identify itself with its enviro nme nt. W e should not
conclude from th ese exam ples that non equilibrium is an artificially
imp osed condition ... we see non equilibrium states in mu ch of our
natural environme nt - for exam ple , the state of th e biospher e which is
subjecte d to an energy nux that arises from the balan ce of radiation
between th e sun and the earth . (Emphasis in th e original; Gr egoire
Nico lis and lIya Prigogine, Exploring CompleXity [W. H. Freeman, New
York 1989], p . 56)
42. lbul ., p. 59.
4L lbid. , p. 60.
44. David Acheso n , From Calculus to Chaos. An Introduction to Dynamics (O xford
Uni versity Press, Ox ford , 1997) , pp. 54 -6.
45. Delcuze and Guatta ri, Whar ;s Philosophy ?, p. 140. (My emphasis)
4fl. Richard Hin 'hlilTe , T oward a H omol ogy 01' Pro cess: Evolut ionary lmpli ca-
N O T ES
tion s of Expe rime ntal Studi es on the Gen eration of Skeletal Pattern in Avian
Limb Development ', in Organi zational Constraitus on the Dynam ics if Evolution ,
cds. J. Maynard Smith and G. Vida (Mancheste r Univ er sity Press, Man-
cheste r 1990), p . 123 . (Emphasis in th e original)
Th e biologi st Brian Goodwin, who has taken th e br oken sym me try
approach to classification to its extreme, argu es that these insights about
specific organs may be generalized to explain the dynami cal origin of all the
morphological features behind our static classifications:
Th er e are several consequences of this view of morpbogenesis. First , it is
evident that morphology is gen erated in a hierarchical manner, from
simple to complex , as bifurcations result in spatially ordere d asymmetri es
and periodicities, and nonlinearities give rise to fine local detail. Since
th ere is a limited set of simple broken symme tries and patterns that are
po ssible (e. g. , radial, bilat eral, periodic) , and since developing organism s
must start off laying down these elem ents of spatial orde r , it follows that
these basic forms will be most com mon among all species. On th e oth er
hand, the finer details of pattern will be mo st variabl e between spe cies ,
since the pattern-generating process results in a combinatorial richness of
terminal detail , and specific gen e products in different species stabilize
traj ectories leading to one or another of these . . . Th e fact that Virtually
all th e basic organismic bod y plan s wer e discover ed and established
during an early evolutionary period, th e Cambrian, is oft en remarked
with surp rise , but it is just what on e would expe ct on th e basis of the
above argument. (Brian C. Goodwin, 'The Evoluti on of Gen eri c Form s' ,
in Organizational Constrai nts on th e Dynam ics clj' Evolution, eds. Maynard
Smith and Vida , pp . 114-[5 )
See also Brian Go odwin, How th e Leopard Changed its Spots (Simon & Schuster,
Ne w York 1996 ), Chapter 5.
47 . When I introduced dilTer ential geometry in Chapte r 1 I said that on e of
Gauss 's achievements was to get rid of an embedding space by coordinatizing
th e manifold itself. Thi s allow ed him to define the equivalent of metri c
lengths (and oth er properti es) in this differ enti al space. This coordinatization
is an example of what I mean when I say that a nonmetric space is
metricized . DeIeu ze also refer s to this op eration in his discussion of the
relation betw een metric (str iate d) and smooth spaces in Del euze and
Guatta r i, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 486.
48 . Co nsiste ncy necessarily occ urs between heterogen eities, not because it is
the hirth o f a diff erentiation. hut because het erogen eit ies that were
limnerl )' conte nt to coex ist or succcc l one anothe r becom e hound up
 NOTES
wit h one ano the r th rough the 'conso lidatio n' of th eir coexiste nce or
succession . . . W hat we te rm ma chinic is pr ecisely this synthesis of
het erogen eities as such . (ibul.; p . 330)
T erms like "self-consistent aggregate' and ' mac hinic asse m blage' are used
synonymously in this book.
49. Although there are a few math em ati cal functions wh ich produce seve ra l
o utpu ts, th e majority of th em have a sinole outpu t. That is, so me functions
map inputs and outputs (ar!:.'1Iments and values) in a one- to-one fashion,
others in a man y-t o -on e fashion , and a few in a one- to- ma ny form . See
Russe ll, Principles rif Mathematics , pp . 265-6. Deleu ze ' s reciprocal det ermina-
tion , I believe , would imply a many -co-many mapp ino, and a mapping such as
this would be use less as a functi on . On th e o the r hand , thi s ' useless '
mappi ng wou ld capture th e desir ed idea for a multiplicit y, an organization
of th e ' many' as suc h, without th e need for th e 'one ' .
50. Dcleuze , D!lJerence and Repetiti on, pp . 172 - 4 .
In ' W hat is Philo sophy' , th e distincti on between virtual multiplicities
(there referred to as 'c once pts') , and function s is mad e the basis of Dclcu zc' s
critiq ue of scie nce's inability to gra~p th e virtual. Unfortunat ely, th e analysis
there is obscu re d by his introducti on of unfamiliar terms like ' functive'. Sec
Dcleuze and Gu attari , What is Philosophy ?, pp . 117-1 8.
I think its is clearer to see his rejecti on of functions as mod els for th e
virtua l in terms of th e pr e-indi vidual nature of the virtual co upled to th e
fact th at functi on s ma y be tak en to represent ind ividu ation processes. Thi s
way it becomes clear wh y fun cti on s without thi s individuati on aspect
(wi thout a d istincti on between dep endent and inde pe nde nt vari ables) can
indeed be mad e part of th e virtual , Referen ce to ' form less func tions' as a
defi ning ele ment of co ncre te uni versals (o r as th ese are some times referred
to, 'a bst ract machin es' ) can be found in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousan d
Plateaus, p. 141.
51. De leuze, Loqic rif Sense, P: 52. Let me e labo rate thi s point (eve nts as pr e-
indi vidu al e nt ities) by first conside r ing th e typ e of ind ivid uality of actual
crcnts. Co m pare d to th e ind ividuality of an organi sm o r a species (to mentio n
o nly the two entities for whi ch I have given individuation pr ocesses) an
actua l eve nt has a more fleeting and changing individuation . Del iuze arg ues
that eve nts have th e ind ividu alit y of a haecceity , exe m plified by th e ' thisness'
or un ique Sing ulari ty of a m om en t. As he says
T h re is a mod e o f ind ividu ation very d iffere nt fro m that of a person,
subject, thing , o r substa nce. W e reserve the nam e haccceity for it. A
season, a Winter, a summer, an hour , a date have a perfect individua lity
1'lCking no thing, even ulOugh th is indivi dua lity is di ffere nt from that of a
NOTES
th ing o r a su bject. T hey are haecceities in the sense that th ey co nsist
entire ly of relati on s of move ment and rest between m olecules o r
particles , capacities to affect and be affecte d. (Deleuze an d Guattari , A
Thousand Plateaus, p. 26 1)
Some of th e het erogeneou s assemblages I mentioned before, such as th e
assemblage of a wa lking anima l, a piece of ground and a grav itational field,
have this indivi dua lity. Thi s is particul arl y cle ar if we do not picture an
abstract case bu t thi nk instea d abo ut a co ncre te eve nt: thi s anima l walking
o n thi s hot and humi d sum me r day. (' T his sho uld be rea d without a pause :
th e animal-stalks-a t-five-o' cloc k' , p . 263). Thi s event co nsists of affects, not
o nly th e affordances of anima l, gro und and fie ld , but also th e capacities of
th e o the r individuals involv ed, including degr ees o f heat and humidity. (' A
degree of heat is a perfect ly individuated warmth di stin ct from th e substa nce
or subj ect that receives it . A degr ee of heat can ente r int o com position with
a degree of whiten ess, o r with another degr ee of heat , to form a third
unique ind ividuality . . .' , p. 25 3) T he event also co nsists of relations of
rapidity and slow ness : th e gro und affords the anima l a so lid sur face only
becau se relative to the spee d o r temporal scale of change of th e animal, th e
ground changes too slow ly. At ge o logical tim e scales th is piece of so lid
ground would indeed be mu ch more Iluld .
T o apply th is to ideal eve nts . Th e singularities wh ich populat e the virtual
are also haecceities, but the tw o definin g features (spee ds and affects) ar e
distributed d iffere ntly: a singulari ty is nothing bu t an accid ental feature in a
field of speeds (o r vel ocit y vectors) its indi viduality co nsisting enti rely of its
inva riance , th at is, its capac ity of not being affect ed by ce rt ain transforma-
tio ns whi ch affect th e rest of th e field .
52. T he term •co nde nsat io n of singu larities' to refer to the expansio n of
singulari ties into series, and th e establishme nt of co nverge nt and divergent
relati on s betw een series, is used for exa m ple in Del eu ze, D!1Jerence and
Repetition, r- 190 .
53. Multipliciti es (o r Ideas) are referred to as 'com plexes of coe xiste nce' in
ibid ., p. 186.
In othe r wo rds , unlike th e singu larities whi ch defin e an int en sive process
wh ich may be actualized only o ne at a time (e ither becau se th e bifurcati on s
need to be crossed seque ntially, or because only one am on g alt ernati ve
attracto rs may be occupied) virtua l sing ularities all coe xist within their ow n
special temporalit y. Wi thin th e int en sive ' the Ideas, relati on s, variati on s in
these rela tio ns [embed ded le vels] and dist inct ive point s [singul aritiesl arc in
a sense sepa rated: instea d of coexisti ng they enter states of sim ultanei ty or
succession' (p. 252).
 N OT E S
54 . Th e impo rtance of orde r , from a purely mathematical sta ndpo int, has
been immeasurabl y increased by man y modern devel opments. Ded ekind,
Canto r , and Pean o have show n how to base all Arithmeti c and Analysis
upon series of a ce rtain kind . . . Irration als are defined . . . entire ly by
the help of orde r . . . Proj ectiv e Geom etry [has] sho w n how to give
point s, lines and plan es an orde r ind ep end ent of metrical considerat ions
and of quantity ; whil e descriptive Geom etry proves that a very large part
of Geom etry demands only th e possibility of serial arrangem ent. (Russell,
Principles if Mathematics, p. 199)
55. lbid.; pp . 157-9 . Actually, Russell uses th e more gene ral term 'magnitude '
to refer to th ese indi visible int en siti es , and ' distance' as a speci al case of a
mag nitude. A terminologi cal confus ion sho uld be avoid ed here. Russell uses
th e term ' magnitu de' to oppose that of 'quantity' (one involv es onl y serial
orde r, the o the r card inal number) . But wh en Del euz e co m me nts on Russell' s
wo rk (as wcll as Mein ong 's ), he uses ' mag nitude ' as synony m with ' quanti ty'
and opposes both to 'distance' . See D eleuz e and Guattari , A Thousand
Plateaus, p. 483.
T his terminological conflict sho uld not be a probl em here since I will not
be using th e term 'magnitude ', and I will always use th e term 'ordinal
distance' inst ead of just 'dis tance ' to distingui sh th e latter from ' me tric
d istances' o r len gth s. Although Russell introduces distan ces as inte nsive, that
is, as ind ivisible in ex te nsion, he then devises a sche me wh ich allow s him to
spea k of distanc es as divisibl e (by reducing th em , via a co nve ntion, to
exte nsive 's tre tc hes') and thu s abandon s any hope of linking th e int ensiv e
and the ex te nsive m orphogen ctically. (Russe ll, Principles if ,tlathemat ics,
pp . 180 - 2)
')6 . Ordina l co nstr uction do es not imply a sup posed same unit but only .
an ir re duci ble noti on of distan ce - th e distances im plicate d in th e d epth
of an intens ive spatium (orde re d distan ces). Identical unity is not pr esup-
pose d by o rdinatio n ; o n th e co ntrary, th is belongs to card inal number
. . . 'We sho uld not , therefore , believe th at card inal number r esults
unaIyticalIy from ordina l, or from th e fina l terms of finite ord inal series
. . . In fact, ordinal number be com es card ina l only by ex te nsion , to th e
exte nt that the distances [are] de vel op ed and eq ualized in an ex tensity
esta blished by natu ral number. W e sho uld th erefore say th at , from th e
o utset, the concept of number is synthetic. (Deleuze , D!fference and
Repetition, p . 233; m), em phasis)
Russell , o n the othe r hand , esta blishes between magnitudes and numbers
on I)" .1 Iogic'lI re lation, that bet ween th e ge ne ral and the part icular : qu antities
NOTES
are magnitudes which ar e particularized by spatio -te m po ra l positi on (Russe ll,
Principles if Mathematics, p. 167) .
O ne way of bringing up the differen ce between Deleuzc ' s and Russell' s
appro aches to series and numbers, is by co ntrasting th eir analyses of the
th eory of ir ratio nal numbers of Ded ekind . Arguing that th ere were gaps in
th e co mpact series of ratio nal number s, Ded ekind introduced th e noti on of
a 'cut', a way of segmenting a den se co nt inu um int o two , mutually
excl udi ng, parts. His idea was to defin e th e co nce pt of number in terms of
such cuts performed on purely o rd inal co nti nua. Some of these discontinui-
ties yield rational numbers, but others, he po stulated , mu st yield irration als.
Russell , for wh om the den sity of the rati onal s see ms to be eno ugh, objects
t o thi s merely postulated existe nce of irrational cuts, and eq uates irrational s
with one of th e classes of rati on als crea te d by th e cut . Thi s, in effec t ,
ex plains one ex te nsive co nce pt (num ber) in terms of ano the r, equa lly
exte nsive one (class or set). Del euz e, on th e co nt ra ry, sees in th e co nce pt
of a cut a way to ex press the ge nesis of num eri cal qu antity out o f int ensive
non -numeri cal co ntinua: ' In thi s sense , it is th e cut which co nstitutes th e
next genus of number, the ideal cause of conti nuity or the pu re e leme nt of
quantitati vity' (De leuze , D!fference and Repetiti on, p . 172).
57. Dcl eu ze , LoOic cj"Sense, p. 109.
58 . Di vergen ce and disjun ction ar e , o n th e co nt ra ry , affirm ed as such . But
what does it mean to m ake divergen ce and disjun ct ion th e objects of
affirm ation ? As a gene ral rul e two th ings are simultaneou sly affirm ed only
to th e exten t th at their differen ce is deni ed . . . W e spe ak, on the
co ntrary , of an ope rat ion according to w hich tw o thin gs . . . ar e affirm ed
through th eir differen ce . . . to affirm their distan ce as that wh ich relates
o ne to the ot her insofar as th ey ar e different . . . Th c idea of a positiv e
distance as distance (and not as an annulled or o verco me distan ce) appea rs
to us esse ntia l . . . Th e idea of positi ve distance belongs to top olo gy and
th e sur face . (Ibid., p. 172 )
59. Co nverge nt and divergent r elation s defin e th e modal stucus of virtual relation s.
Follo wing Leibniz, D eleu ze calls th ese virtual relati on s compossibility and
incompossibilitv:
T wo eve nts are com poss ihle wh en th e ser ies whi ch ar e organ ized aro und
th eir singularities extend in all directi on s [that is, co ll\'e rge ]; th e)' are
incornpossihle wh en th e ser ies diverge in the vicinity of co nstitutive
singularities . Converge nce and di vergen ce are ent irely origina l relat ion s
wh ich cove r th e rich domain of alogica l co m patibilities and incompatib il-
irics. (Ihid., p. 172 )
 N O TE S
Th e mod al status of the virtua l may be more easily gr asped by contrast ing
it with othe r modal rel ations, such as the relations which modal logicians
postulate to exist between possible worlds. Th e mod ern th eor y of possible
worlds is also based on the ideas of Leibniz, but disregards these alogical
capacities or affect. Briefly, th e key relation between possible worlds is that
of accessibility: one world is accessi ble from anoth er possible one , if eve ry
situation possible in one is also possible in th e othe r. Given this relati on,
possible worlds may be grouped togeth er into families or equ ivalence classes.
Wh enever situations in one class are imposs ible in anoth er one, that is,
when ther e exist logical or physical cont radict ions between th em , worlds
belonging to one arc inaccessible from those bel ongin g to th e oth er (Michae l
J. Loux , ' Intro duction: Modality and Metaphysics', in The Possible and th e
Actu al , pp. 20- 8).
Dclcu ze would accept t hese ideas but argue that contradic tions between
possible worlds are a deriva tive phenomenon . In other words, that distribu-
tion s of possibl e worlds, and th eir fully individuated contents, depend on
deep er relations of compossibility and incompossibility between pr e-indi vid-
ual multiplicities: where th e series emanating from multiplicities converge ,
a family of accessible possible worlds would be defined; wh er e they diverge,
an inaccessible family of worlds would begin . See Gilles Deleuze , The Fold .
Lcibntz and th e Baroque (University of Minn esota Press, Minn eap olis, 1997 ),
p. 60 . ee also Deleu ze , D!fJerence and Repetiti on , p. 48, wh er e he add s 'the
noti on of incompossibility in no way reduces to that of contra dictio n and
docs not even impl y real opposition: it impli es only diver gen ce ... '
60 . Dcleuzc, Loa ic rif Sense, p. 5.
6 I . peaking of the particular case of catastro phe th eory, wher e th e limit ation
to pot enti al-driv en syste ms with four degr ees of freed om makes a full
classification of attractor s and bifurcat ions possible, Alexander W ood cock
and Mon te Davies write
In any syste m go verned by a pot ential and in which th e system 's behavior
is det ermined by no more than four differ ent factors, only seven
qu alitativel y differ ent types of discontinuity [bifurcation] are possible . In
other words, whil e th er e is an infinit e number of ways for such a system
to change continuously (staying at or near equilibrium) , ther e are onl y
seven str uctura lly stable ways for it to change discontinuously (passing
through non -equilibrium rates), Other ways ar e conce ivable, but un -
stable; th 'y are unlikel y to happ en mor e th an once . . . Th e qualitati ve
type of any sta ble discontinuity does not dep end on th e spec ific nature of
the pote ntial involved , merely on its existence. It do 's not dep end on the
specific co nditions reg ulating behavior , merely on their number . It does
NO T ES
not de pend on th e specific quantitati ve cause -and-effect relati onship
between the co nditions and th e resulti ng behavior merely on the empirica l
Jaa th at such a relationship exists. (Alexande r W ood cock and Monte Davies,
Catastrophe Theory (E. P. Dutton , Ne w York , 1978), p . 42; my emphasis)
Th er e are tw o imp ortant ideas expressed her e. Th e first is related to the
qu estion of uni versality: as long as differ ent equation ' or differ ent physical
syste ms share th e same top ological invariants (the same number of singulari-
ties, th e same number of dim ension s) the detail ed nature of th e equations
or of th e syste m (the speci fic type of int en sive differ ence driving th e process,
or th e speci fic qu antities which define th e pr ocess) does not mak e mu ch
differ en ce in the spec ificatio n of their long -term tend encies. Th e second idea
relates to the question of immanence: th e long-term (asympto tic) tend enci es
of a process may he indep end ent of spe cific causes , but they do depend for
their ver y existe nce on ther e being some causal process or anoth er.
62. Del euze, Loa ic rifSense, p. 169. (My em phasis) Deleu ze adopts this approach
from th e Stoics who wer e the first to split the causal link : on on e hand,
pr ocesses of individuation are defined as sequences of causes (every effect
will be th e cause of yet another effect) whil e singularities becom e pure
incorpor eal effects of th ose series of causes ; on the othe r hand, th ese pure
effects are viewed as having a quasi-causal capacity to endo w causal pr ocesses
with cohere nt form. By splitti ng causality thi s way, Delcuze manages to
separate the det erminism (or destin y) which links causes to causes, from
strict necessity.
63 . lbid., p. 147.
64. Th e image of echoes and resonan ces as that which links multipliciti es recurs
throughout Deleuze 's work. See Chapte r 3, footn ot e 53 for an explanatio n
and exam ples.
65 . Kenn eth M. Sayr e, Cybernetics and th e Philosophy rif Mind (Ro ut ledge and
Kegan Paul, Lond on, 1976), p . 23.
66 . lbid., pp. 26- 30.
67. Th er e is a close relation between communication theory and th ermodyn-
amics. Much as in the latter th e equilibrium state (for an isolated system) is
defined as the on e characte rized by maximum disorder (maxim um entro py),
the state achieved once differ en ces in int ensit y have been cance lled, so in
th e former equilibrium corres po nds to a situation wh er e the differ en ces
within series have been cance lled , wh ere all th e events have becom e
equiprobable. In such state no information may flow in th e channel (ibid . ,
pp. 38- 43).
Deleuze uses th is co nnectio n between the inten sive and th e information al
to define the relations between the series of ideal vents. As I have said, he
 NOTES
re fers to an informati on channel as a 's ignal' , and to th e information qu anta
as 's igns' ,
Such systems, constit ute d by placing dis para te elements o r het erogen eou s
series in cc:nmun icat ion, arc in a sense qui te common . T hey are signal-
sign syste ms. T he signal is a struct ure in which d ifferen ces in po tentia l
arc distributed, assuring the co m m unica tion of d isparat e co m po ne nts: th e
sign is what flashes across th e boundary of two levels, between tw o
co m m unicating series. Indeed, it see ms th at all phen omen a respond to
th ese co nditio ns inasmuch as th ey find th eir ground in a co nstitutive
dissymmetry, di fferen ce, ine quality . All physical syste ms are signals, all
qualities ar e signs. (De leuze, Logic c1 Sense, p . 26 1)
Sec also De leuze, Difference and Repetition, pp . 20 and 222 .
68. If we exam ine th e sing ular ities co rres po nd ing to th e tw o im po rtant basic
se ries we see that th ey ar c distin gu ished, in both cases, by their
d istribution . From one to th e othe r, certa in singular po ints disapp ear or
are divi de d, or und ergo a change of nature and funct ion. Th e moment
th e two series resonate or co m m unicate we pass fro m one d istri bution to
ano ther. (Dele uze , Logic c1 Sense, p . 53)
69 . It is in differen ce that . . . ph en om en a Hash th eir meaning like signs. Th e
inte nse world of differen ces . . . is pr ecisely th e object of a supe rio r
em piricism . This em piricis m teaches us a strange ' reason' , th at of
the m ult iple, chaos, and d ifferen ce . (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition,
p . 57)
T here is in add ition a temporal dim en sion of the virt ual, whi ch I will
discuss in the next chapte r, whi ch also defines thi s othe r em piricism.
An Idea, in this sense , is ne ith er o ne no r mu ltipl e , but a mu lt iplicit y
constituted of d ifferen tia l ele ments, differe nt ial re lations betw een th ose
clements , and singula rit ies co rrespo nd ing to th ose relation s .. . All three
are projected in an ideal te m po ral d imen sion whi ch is th at of pr ogressive
determi nation . T he re is, therefore , an empiricism c1
the Idca . . . (p . 278;
my emphasis)
On the concepts of mu ltiplicity and qu asi-causal opera tor (and rela ted
ideas, like 'perplication' , 'complication', etc.) as ernpirico-idcal no tion s, see
r-84 .
70 . Stephanie For rest, 'E merge nt o rn putationr .' e lf-organizing, o llcctive and
Co op e rat ive Phen om en a in Nat ura l and Art ificial om puti ng ctwo rks", in
NOTES
Emerpent Computation, ed . Ste phanie Forrest (M IT Pr ess, Cam bridge, 1991),
p. 2.
71. .lyre, Cybemetics and the Philosophy c1
Mind, p. 30.
7 2 . W he n th e two series of even ts are co llapsed into o ne we get what is called
a 'Markov process'. See ibid., p. 29.
73. David L. Goodstei n, States C!I Matter (Dove r, New York, 1985), pp . 468 -86.
See also Nicolis and Prigogin e, Exploring Complexity , pp . 168- 85.
74 . T hese othe r charac te r istics arc a 'c r it ical slow ing down ' (rel axatio n tim es
beco me lon ger as th e sing ularity is approached) and 'sensitivity to size ' (t he
dy namics o f a syste m can take into accou nt de ta ils abo ut boundary co n-
di tion s). Ho we ver , the link between th ese phen o mena and information
pro cessing and storage has been esta blishe d o nly with in the narrow field of
'cellular auto mata' mod els of co mp uta tion. See Christophe r G. Langto n,
'Computa tio n at th e Edge of Chaos ', in Etnerpent Compu tation , ed. Forres t,
pp . 32-3.
75 . Chris to phe r G . Langt on , 'Li fe at the Edge of Chaos', in Artificial Life II, eds.
Christo phe r G . Langton, Charles Tay lor, Doyne Farmer and Steen Rasmus-
sen (Ad d ison-Wesley, Redwood City, 1992), pp . 85 -6.
76 . Melanie Mitchell , James P. Crutchfield and Pet er T. Hraber , ' Dyna mics,
Co m putat ion , and the "Edge o f Chaos": A Reexam ination ' , in Complexity:
Afetaphors. Models. and Reality, cds . George A. Co wa n, David Pines and David
Meltzer (Addiso n-Wesley, Redwood City , 1994), p . 5 10.
Th e resu lts present ed here do not disprov e th e hypothesis th at co mputa-
tion al capability can be co rrel ated w ith phase tr ansition s in [cellular
automata ] rule space. Ind eed , thi s genera l ph en om ena has alrea dy been
not ed for other dynami cal syste ms . .. More ge nerally , the co m puta tio nal
capacity of evo lving syste ms may very well require dynam ical properties
characte ristic of phase tr ansit ions if th ey are to incr ease their co mp lexity .
3 TH E ACTUALIZATIO N O F THE VIRTUAL IN TIM E
1. O n th e hist ory of these co nflicting co nce ptio ns of tim e and a philosophical
discussion o f the different ways in which th e co nflict has been approached in
bo th physics and phil osoph y of scie nce, see Lawren ce Sklar , Phys ics and
Chance. Philosophical Issues in the Foundations C!f Statistical Mechanics (Cam bridge
University Press, Cam hri dge, 1995), Chapte r 10. And Rob ert B. Lindsay
and Henr )' Margen au , Foundations tif Phys ics (Ox Bow Pr ess, W o od bridge ,
1981 ), Chapte r 5.
2. Joe Rosen , Symmcrry in Scicnce (Springer. Ver lag , Ne w York, 199 5), p. 141.
In add itio n to r('vc rsing the o rde r of th e temporal seque nce, a time
 NOTES
'reflection' transformat ion cha nges the sign of any variable (such as velocit y)
that depends on th e time vari able . This introduces some subtle ideas that
matter in a se rio us analysis of th e sym metry properties of law s.
disc ussio n of thi s point in Sklar, Physics and Chance, pp . 246 -8.
3. Gregoi re Nicolis and lIya Prigogine, Explorinq Complexity (W. H. Freema n,
ew York 1989) , p . 52.
4 . Euge ne P. Wi gn er, ' Invariance in Physical T heory', in Sym metries and
Rifleetions, cds. W alt er Moore and Micha el Scriven (Ox Bow Press, W ood -
bri dge, 1979), p . 4.
As th e ph ysicist Euge ne W ign er rem ark s, if ph ysical regularities had not
d isplayed th is minimal am ount of invariance , we would probably never have
d iscovered th em at all sim ply because they would not app ear to us as
regularities. lnvariance und er transformation s can also reveal subtle assump-
tions behind a law . For instan ce , to say that a law is invariant und er spatial
or temporal displacem ent implies that, as far as th e regul ariti es describ ed by
th e law ar e conce rned, space and tim e are homoq eneous. Similarly, to say that a
law is in variant und er rot ati on in space is to say that th e absolute or ientatio n
of the states of th e pro cess mak es no differen ce in th e pro cess' s beha viour,
but it also mean s that we assume space to have uniform prop erties in all
directions (te chnically, we assum e it to be isotrop ic) .
5. T he re arc several str ategies for ex plaining ir reversibility away . Some
physicists, for example, think th e inh erent directi onalit y o f th e arrow of
time, so evide nt in macr oscop ic pro cesses, is merely a subjective effect (an
effect of o ur ignorance of all th e micr o details) . T o othe rs th e directi on alit y
of time is not reducible to psych ology but it is nevertheless den ied th e status
of a t rue law , bein g merely a co ntinge nt sta tistica l result. As th e physicist
John W heeler pu ts it, th e real m ol ecular int eracti on s arc 'time-symmetric
with on ly th e sta tistics of lar ge numbers giving it th e app earan ce of
asymmetry' (j ohn A. W heel er, 'T ime T oda y ' , in Physical Oriains if Time
A~mmet'J' , eds , Jon athan J . Halliw e ll, Juan Perez-Mercad er and W oj ciech H.
Zure k [Cambridge Uni versity Pr ess, Cambridge , 1996), p . 1) .
In gene ra l, th e authority of th e old reversible tim e has been pr eserv ed
and th e tim e of classical th ermodynamics has disapp eared from th e structu re
of the edifice of ph ysics. As Whee ler puts it ,
T he e xpansion of th e em pire of tim e has el evated the conce pt, human
born as it is, to platform up on platform upon platform of authority.
R 'g ularities of sun and seaso n raised th e first foundation . On top of it
cw to nia n d ynam ics e recte d a second and tight er platform ; special rela-
ti vity a third , terraced furth er in and up; and ge ne ra l re lativ ity sta nds at
till' sum m it, th e final level of autho rity. ot cxc pt o ut of th e m ou th of
NOTES
Einste in 's 19 15 an d still standard theory of spacetime can one hear th e
ge ne ra lly agreed acco un t of all tha t 'time' now means and measures. (p. 6)
ce
6 . lIya Prigogine , From Beina to Becomino ( W. H. Freeman . e w York, 19S0),
p. 19.
7, Arthur S. lberall , Towards a General Science if Viable Systems (McGraw- Hi li,
ew York 1972) .
Iberall' s onto logy is based on individuals which he calls ' atomisrns' (a
category of w hich atoms would be only o ne instance) . He co nce ives of these
in ge ne ral as auto no mo us, nonlinear osci llators. Th an ks to their nonlinearity
th ese at omi sm s are sho w n capable of int e racti ve orde ring (via ent rainme nt,
for exam ple) and capable of forming a co ntin uum at a large r scale . Th ese
co nt inua, in turn , are sho w n to und ergo sym me try- breaking bifurcations
whi ch fragm ent them (o r quantize th em ) to yie ld supe r-a to m isms, that is,
ind ividuals at a larger spatio- te rnporal scale. Ibcrall sho ws in detail how this
alt ernation of ato m ism and continuum can be used recursively to account
for man y features of physics, che m istry, biolo gy and eve n sOciology. He also
shows, o n th e other hand, how mu ch thi s picture breaks with those of
classical and, more importantl y, quantum ph ysics, given tha t the latter docs
not give a m orphogen etic acco un t of quantizati on .
S. W infr ee doe s not use the terms ' inte nsive' or 'no nme tric', Yet, in the previous
chapte r I qu ot ed W infree's ideas abo ut top ological thi nking whe n appli ed to
biology and his ideas are ind eed very close to those of Deleu ze . Using m y
terminology, we can sa)' th at an anexaet yet ria orous approach characterizes
W in free ' s resear ch o n the birth and death of oscillations, a process wh ich
also exhibits divergent un iversalit y or m echani sm -indep en den ce . In his
words,
As a resul t of these co llec tive efTorts, th e reality of phaseless sets, phase
singularities , tim e crystals, and so on became fir m ly established. Th eir
physiological ' me aning' is less clear . . . But that deficien cy is in a way
th e most int eresting asp ect of these findin gs: becau se their pr edi cti on was
in no way dependent on th e mechanistic underpinn inqs of cir cadian physiology,
the same principl es mig ht find appli cati ons in other areas of ph ysiol ogy
and bio chemi stry . Th ese prin cip les m-e not 'mathematical', in the familiar
sense of ' mathe matics ' as 'moving symbols around o n paper' or ' mov ing
numbers aro und in co m pute rs' . Th ey are, rath er, [top ologica l] concepts
about conti nuity that co uld be used in di verse co ntexts with s!ifJicient riBor
to precisely infer biological or che m ical eve nts that had not been
o bserved. (Ar t hur T. Win free , II'hen Time Breaks Down . The Three-
Dimensional Dynamics if Electrochemical lI'al 'cs and Cardiac Arrhyt hmias
[Princet on Un in 'rsit)' Press, Princet o n , 19 71, pp. 64 - 5; m), emp hasis)
 NOTES
9. Ian tewart and Martin Golubitsk y, Feaiful Sy mmetry ( Blackwe ll, O xford,
1992), pp . 66 - 7.
10. Nicolis and Prigogin e, Explorinq Complexity , p . 2 1.
11. Ibid . ,p.103 .
12 . Iberall, Towards a General Science ?f Viable Systems, p . I S3.
J 3. lbid., p. 161.
14 . Gi lles Dcl eu ze, Loa ic rifSense (Colum bia Uni versity Pr ess, Ne w York, 1990),
p. 162. (My em phasis)
1S. lbid., p. 62 .
16 . Gilles Deleuze , D!iJerence and Repeti ti on (Co lum bia Univ ersit y Press, ew
York, 1994), PI'. 70 -1. In th ese pages Deleuze , following Hume, does
indeed pr esent thi s co ntraction whi ch synthesizes pr esent tim e as a faculty
of the mind : a cont ractile power rif conte mplation or imaqination which retains a
past and ant icipates a future. But a few pages later (p . 73 ) he says that ' we
are made of co ntracte d water , earth , light and air - not merel y prior to th e
recognition or representation of th ese, but pri or to th eir being sensed ' .
Clear!y, this remark mak es no sense within a purely psychol ogical int erpre-
tat ion , but it does if we think of thi s contraction as involving a metaboli c
cycle with a characte rist ic tim e scale. He goes on to ascribe to habi ts (or to
the co ntractio n of rep etitive , habitual behaviour) a sim ilar power of synthesis
(I" 74) but again , thi s appli es not o nly to th e habi ts of human beings but to
any re pe titive, cyclic beha viour at all scales.
A so ul sho uld be attributed to th e heart, to th e muscles, nerves and ce lls,
but a co nte mplative soul wh ose entire functi on is to co nt ract a habit.
T his is no mystical or barbarous hyp othesis. On th e co ntr ary, habit here
manifests its full gene rality: it co nce rns not only the senso ry -mo to r habits
that we have (psycho logically), but also, be fore th ese, the primary habits
that we are; the th ou sands of passive syntheses of wh ich we ar e orqanica lly
composed. ( My e m phasis)
17. T he ph ilosopher wh o arg ue d again st th e relativisti c co ncl usions regarding th e
co ntrac tion of tim e in th e twins' case is, of course, Henri Bergson. Bergson
was w rong in assuming that th e case for th e two twins is sym me tric, or as
he put it, a purc 'effect of perspectiv e' sim ilar to that of tw o ob serv ers
looking at eac h othe r at a distance and seei ng each other shrunk in space.
• l'l' lilT .xam plc his repl y to criticisms by Andre Met z in Henri Ber gson ,
'Pici itiou s T imes and Real Time ", in Berqson and th e Evolution ?f Physics,
cd. P. . Y. G unte r (U niversity of Tennessee Press, Knox ville , 1969),
pp. 169 7 1.
T his volume co ntains man y of th e pice s written abo ut till' de bate
incl udi ng the exc h.mge lx-tw ccn III rgson and Einstei n himsel f. If o ne foc uses
NOTES
on Bergson ' s excessive ly psychological int erpret atio n of relati vity th en one
mu st grant th at he lost thi s de bate. O n th e other hand, if instea d o ne sees
him as arg uing for the need of an acco unt of me tric ti me (which mu st
emerge fro m a nonmet ric , virt ual tim e) th en th e o utcome of th e debat e is
less clea r. Th is is Deleuze' s own interpret at ion. He sees Bergson as
cr iticizing Einste in for not having und erstood th e d ifferen ce between th e
actual and th e virt ual, th e d iffere nce between metric and nonm etric
multipliciti es.
Bergson thu s brou ght to light tw o very different kind s of multiplicit y, one
qualitative and fusional , continuo us, th e othe r numeri cal and hom ogen -
eo us, discr et e ... Th e co nfro ntation between Bergson and Einstein on
th e topi c of Relativit y is incompreh en sibl e if o ne fails to place it in the
co ntext of th e basic theory of Riemannian multipliciti es, as m odifi ed by
Bergson. (Gilles Dcl euz e and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateau s [Univer-
sity of Minnesota Pr ess, Minn eapolis , 19871, p . 484)
ee also Gill es Dcleuze , Berpsonism (Zone Books, New York , 1988), Chapter
4.
18 . Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy rif Space and Time (Dover, Ne w York,
1958), p. 194 . An exam ination of the relation s between the th eori es of tim e
in nonlinear and relati vist ic physics is beyond th e sco pe of thi s book, but
neve rt heless tw o co ncl usions foll ow rather directl y. One is th at th ere is no
inco m pat ibility between th e two and ind eed th e nonlinear th eory ma y
co m pleme nt that of relativit y by giving a m orphogen eti c account (via
co nce pts like th e Hopf bifurcati on ) of th e eme rge nce of the osci llato rs
(clocks, elec tromagne tic vibratio ns) used in the expos ition of relativity. On
the o the r hand , o nce we reali ze th at th e metric of tim e is eme rge nt , that is,
that oscillato rs operating at differ ent scales literally quantize time, th e
shri nkage o f time at veloci ties near th e speed of light becom es less co unte r
intu iti ve: an eme rge nt metric, as oppose d to an intrinsic on e, is easier to
visualize as subject to int en sive transformations that do not pr eserv e certain
of its properties in variant.
19. In his care ful exam inatio n of foundational qu esti on s th e philosopher Law -
re nce Sklar sho ws that besides th e need to deriv e the tim e-a symmetric
macro scopi c beha viour of a thermod ynamic syste m from the tim e-symmetric
m icr oscopi c laws, th er e ar e two additional fundam ental qu esti on s in th e
[o und ation s of sta tistical mechanics: to show that th e final equilibrium state
of a syste m is indeed an attraetor for its initi al and all its other int ermedi ate
states, and that th time scales of approach to equilibrium in math em at ical
mo de ls r .Ilcct the tim e scales obse rve d in the lahoratory. klar argu l's th at
tlu s tw o <llIcslions arc 0f'~n problems in equilibri um tlu-rm od 'nam ics:

NOTES
physicists have not yet rigorously demonstrated that equilibrium states
att rac t, nor explaine d wh y the relaxati on tim e exhibits a characte ristic scale
(Sklar, Physics and Chance, pp . 156 - 8, 189 and 2 16) .
klar, how ever, neglects to mention that both of these open probl em s
have ind eed been given a mor e precise formulation , if not solved, in far-
fro m-e quilibrium thermod ynam ics. In this field on e ge ts th e asympto tic
approach to a particular state as an integral part of o ne's mod el, whil e in
co nse rvative system s without attract ors th e asymptotic sta bility of the final
eq uilibrium state need s a speci al explanation. A sim ilar point appli es to
relaxat ion tim es. Unlike th e conservative syste m case , in non -cons ervative
syste ms we have an explanation , in terms of the 'area ' co vere d by the basin
of att raction , which is an integral part of th e mod el. Sklar does discuss
Prigogin e 's work to som e exte nt , but not the speci fic points raised here
(pp. 269 - 76) .
.?O. Ibcrall discu sses this issue in more tec hnical terms (including terms like bulk
viscosity and bulk modu lus needed to define the relaxation tim e of internal
mod es) which are beyond th e scope of this book to explain. Yet I believe
his basic point is captured by my sim plified exam ple . ee his discussion in
Towards a General Science l!f Viable Systems, pp. 122-6.
2 I. . . . th e inte ractio ns between bodi es co nditio n a sensibility , a pr oto-
perceptibility and a proto-affecti vity . . . What is called ' pe rce ption ' is
no lon ger a state of affairs but a state of the bod y as indu ced by another
bod y, and affecti on is th e passage of thi s state to another state as increase
or decr ease of potential -pow er through the acti on of o the r bod ies .. .
Even when they ar e nonliving , o r rath er inorgani c, thina s have a li ved
e.t perience becau se th ey are perception s and affections. (Gilles Deleu ze and
Felix Guatt ari, What is Philosophy ? [Columbia Univ ersity Press, New York,
19941, p. 154 ; my em phasis)
Elsew here he is e ven more explicit about this . W e saw before that
the actualization of the world relies on int ensive processes of self-
o rga nization (such as co nvection ce lls or the mi!,JT"ation and folding of
e mbryo nic ce lls). He refers to th ese phenomena as 's patio- te rnpo ral dyna -
mism s' and says
Actu alizati on tak es place in three series: space , tim e and also conscious-
ness. Every spatio -te m po ral dynamism is accompanied by the e me rge nce
of an e1em ' ntary consci ousness which itself tra ces dir ecti on s, doubl es
mo vem ents and migr ati ons, and it is born on the threshold o f the
co nde nsed sing ular itks of th bod y o r objec t whose co nscio u 'ness it is.
( Dclc uzc, D!Dcrence and Repetiti on , p. 220)
N O TES
22. Deleu ze, Loq ic ifSeme , p. 62.
23. W infree , When Time Breaks D OII'n , p. 22.
24 . Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey, From Clocks to Chaos. The Rhythms if Life
(Prince to n University Pr ess, Princet on , 1988), p. 94 . (This text contains a
discussion of W infree ' s work , and references to black holes.)
25. Winfree , When Time Breaks DOlin , p. 99 .
26. ue., Chapte rs 7 and 8.
27. T hro ugho ut we will discover again and again , in a sur prising diversity of
co ntex ts the same par adox ical entity : a moti onl ess, tim eless organizing
ce nte r called a phase singular ity . Th is is a place where an othe rwise
perva sive rhythm fades int o ambiguity - like the outh Pole , where the
24 hourly tim e zon es converge and the Sun merely circles along the
horizon . (Ibid., p. 5)
Our [to pological] inferenc es seldom involv ed speculation about adaptive
values , molecular mechani sm s, or neural pathways. But they led us to
ever sharpe r focus o n expe rime ntal co ndit io ns in which somethinq stranae
was 8 uaranteed to happen: return of metamorphosin g flies to th e timeless
co ndition of th e newl y fertilized egg, perpetual insomnia in mosquitoes,
abrupt susp en sion of pacemaking in othe rw ise perfectl y healthy and
capable heart mu scle, vorte x ce nte rs of arrhythmia in elec trically rhythmic
tissue, chem ically tim eless rot ors seque ncing reacti on s aro un d their
perimet ers, and che mical clocks made of shifting patt erns of color
topologically locked into three dim en sion al orga nizing ce nte rs. (Ibid.,
p. 254; my em phasis)
28. Del euz e and Guattari , A Thousand Plateaus, p. 24 . (My e mphasis)
29. O ne of th e more ro bust and striking predictions of thc th eory of mutual
syn chroniz ation was that it sho uld fail abruptly bel ow a critical co upling
stre ngth . John Aldridge and E. Kendall Pye tri ed this expe rime nt with
yeast and found exactly that : wh en the ce lls get more than about tw enty
diam et ers apart, the amplitude of their collec tive rhythm falls abruptly.
(Arth ur T. Winfree , Bioloqical Clocks [Scientific Am eri can Library, New
York, 19871, p . 128)
30. Population s of cric ke ts e ntrain each othe r to chirp coh erently. Po pulati on s
of fireflies co me to cohe re nce in flashing . Yeast cells display co he re nce in
glyco lytic oscillati on. Population s of insects show co here nce in their
cycles of c1osion (e me rge nce from th e pupal to the adult form) . . .
Popul ati on s o f wom en living together may show phase e ntrainme nt of
their ovulatio n cvc les. Populations of secreto ry ce lls, such as till' p ituit ar "

NO TES
pancreas , and other organs, r el ease th eir hormones in cohe re nt pul ses.
(Alan Gar finkel , 'T he Slim e Mold Dict yost elium as a Mod el of Self-
Organization in Social Syste ms', in Self- Organizing Systems. The Emerg ence
i!I Order, ed . F. Eugen e Yates [Plenum Press, New York, 19871, P: 200)
\ 1. M. Co he n, qu oted in ibul. , P: 18 3.
P. Il ow ard H. Pattee, ' Instabilities and Information in Biolog ical Self-
O rganizatio n' , in Sell- Org anizing Systems, p . 334.
I \. St uart Kauffman, Th e Origins eif Order. Self- Organi zat ion and Selectio n in
Evolution (Ox ford Univ ersity Press, New York, 199 3), p.442. (My
e m phasis)
\.1. Rud olf A. Raff, The Sh ape eif L!Ie. Genes, Development and the Evolu tio n eif
Animal Form ( Univer sity of Chicago Pr ess, Chicago, 1996), p . 260. Unlike
termin al add itio n, which implies that ear ly stage s of th e devel opment of an
e m bryo resem ble (or recapitulate) early stages of spe cies (or higher tax a)
d .ve lo pment , th e typ e of heterochrony in volv ed in parall el networks destroys
any sim ilari ty between th e tw o.
IS . lbid.; p. 255 .
Ill. IIJid . , P: 337.
Dissociation app ears paradoxical as a cre ator of developmental novelty
because nothing new is add ed. In the case of some het erochronic
dissoc iat ions, such as neoten y in th e axolotl, a novel development al path way
and life history have result ed from th e loss eif a featu re of th e ances tr al
system . (My em phasis)
n. Dc lcuze and Guattari , A Th ousand Plateaus, p . 48 .
IS. W. H . Z ure k and W . C . Schieve, ' N ucle atio n Paradigm : Survival Thresholds
in Population Dynamics' , in Self-Organization and Dissipati ve Stru ctur es: Applica-
li ollS in the Physical and Social Sciences, eds . William C. Schieve and Peter M .
Allen ( University of T exa s Pr ess, Austin, 198 2) , pp . 20 3-22 .
It). . tu art L. Pirnm, Th e Balan ce eif Natu re. Ecological Issues in the Conservation eif
Species an d Communities. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991 ),
C hapte rs 2 and 3.
·10. Kauffma n, The Origins ?f Order, p. 25 6 .
·\ 1. Rud olf A. RafT and Thomas C. Kauffman ; Embryos, Genes, and Evolution
(Ind iana Univ ersit y Pr ess, Bloomington , 1991 ) , p. 40 .
42 . T he fastest evo lutionary rat es fall in th e last, and perhaps m ost int eresting
catego ry, tachytely .. . Ta chytel y resembles th e punctuation of Eld re dge
and Go uld in that both rely o n e xce pt ional high rat es of e volutio n .
Howe ver whil e Eldrl· dge and Gould focused o n a speci ation mod el .. .
N OT E S
[Simpson] suggest ed that the primary co nco m itant of tach ytely is a shift
in a population from on e major adaptive zo ne to another . . . Thus
tachytely is possible during early radiation s of new gr oups expanding into
vacant adaptive zon es. During th e rapid radiation all lineages ar e relatively
poorl y adapted and not mutually co mpe tit ive. Th e result .. . is the
producti on of divers e lines that qui ckl y becom e ex ti nct as other lines
co nso lida te their position s in the adaptive zo ne at th e expe nse of th eir
less-efficient co usins. (lbid., p . 44)
4 L Angela E. Dougl as, Symbiotic Int eracti ons (O xford Uni versity Pr ess, New
Yo rk , 1994) , pp . 7-9 . This author em phasizes th e eme rge nce of novel
met abolic capabilities related directl y to th e flow of biomass in food chains .
As she says, ' N utritional int era ctions ar e fundam ental to most symbioses,
beca use the metabolic capabilit ies most com m only acq uire d through sym bi-
osis relate to nutrition ' (p. 56 , and see Chapte r 7 for an e valuat io n of the
eco logical impact of symbiosis).
44. We rner Schwe m rnlcr, 'Symb iogen esis in Insect s as a Mod el for Cell
Differe ntiation, Morphogen esis, and Speciation', in Sy mbiosis as a Source eif
Evolutionary Inn ovation , cds . Lynn Mar guli s and Ren e Fester (M IT Pre ss,
amb ridge , 1991 ) , p . 195.
4') . Deleuze places great em phasis on sym biosis as a mean s of becoming.
Coevolutio n , as in th e aparallel evolution o f th e wasp and th e orchid it
pollin at es, is a well -known exam ple . See Deleu ze and Guattari, A Th ousand
Platea us, p . 10. But more generally, th e very definition of a het erogen eous
asse mblage as a 'rhizome ' has its origin in symbiosis. Though his introduct ory
exa m p le of rhizome is bulbs and tubers, that is, plants without an arborescent
root syste m , he immediately acknowledges that ' plants with roots or radicles
can be rhizomorphic in other respects alt ogether' (p. 6) . Thi s other resp ect
may be illustrated by the formation of th e so- called rhiz osphere, th e und er-
gro und food web co m posed of th e plant ro ot s of different species together
with the div er se micro-organisms th at form sym biotic cou plings with th em
and inte rface th em to th e flow of und erground nutrients .
46 . Throu ghout this book I have used his first formulati on, singularities and
affec ts , hut he uses several others . Som etimes he says that in th e virtual
co nt in uum (plane of co nsistency) bodi es are charact erized by sp eeds and
affects (ibid .• p. 260).
Elsew here , he says the virtual co nt in uum (Aion) is 'the locus of incor-
poreal e vents and o f attributes which ar e distinct from qualities' (Dc leuzc ,
Log ic eifSense, p . 165) . Here , ' events ' refers to singulariti s, whil e 'attributes'
are capacities to affect and be affect ed (to cut and to be cut, to us ' his
ex am ple).
 N O T ES
47. lbid., p. 255. Rapidit y and slowness, how ever , should not be conceive d
as involving merely quantitative or exte nsive dilTer ences. Spee d is an
int ensive property subject to critical threshold s, as in th e case of fluids
which, below a critical spee d, have on e pattern of flow (laminar) but which ,
beyond th e threshold , display a completel y dilTer ent pattern (turbulence) .
See p. 371.
48 . lbid.; p. 258.
49 . Th e term ' me chanisms of immanen ce ' does not , to my knowl edge, occ ur in
Deleuze , but he expresses himself in similar ways.
Many mo vem ents, with a fraai /e and delicate mechanism, int er sect: that by
means of which bodi es, states of alTairs, and mixtures, conside red in th eir
depth, succeed or fail in the production of ideal surfa ces [plane of
consiste ncy ]; and conversely , that by means of wh ich th e eve nts of the
surfa ce ar e actuali zed in the pr esent of bodi es (in accordance with
com plex rul es) by imprisoning their singularities within th e limit s of
worlds, individuals and persons. (De leuze , Loaic ef Sense, P: 167 ; my
em phasis)
50. Co nnec tance is, in fact , controlled in food webs. Good evide nce suggests
that the number of connections in food web s is adju sted such that each
species maintains roughly a constant number of connections to othe r
species, regardl ess of th e number of species in th e web . . . [as displayed
in J data on more than 100 food webs - terrestrial, freshwater , and
marine. A number of properties - such as length of food chains;
connectance ; ratios of top, int ermediate and bottom spe cies ; and ratios
of pr edators to prey - appear stable and scale in variant , both with respect
to the number s of species in th e web and with respect to th e aggr egation
of ' guild s' of similar species int o single ' tro phic species' or the aggrega-
tion of similar species int o higher tax on om ic units. (KaulTman , The Oriai ns
C!f Order, p. 263)
51. Ibid . , p. 2 19.
52. Alth ough the famous Gaussian, or bell-shaped, distribution does represent
an important eme rgent property of widely dilTerent populations (that is,
ther e is some th ing recurrent or universal about it) it is nevertheless an
equilibrium distribution, and th e populations exhibiting thi s bell shap~ ar e
exa mples of distributio ns in extensity , fixed in th eir form and occ upymg a
metric, divisible space (much as sede ntary cultures do). At th e virt ual level ,
we mu st go beyond th e e distribution s, we mu st make a dilTerent use ef
hancc, Unlik e traditi on al games of chance (ro ulette, di c) in which fixed
rules lor rc th aleatory facto r to be r rained only at ce rtain points (the
NOTES
spin ning o f the ro ulette, the throw of th e dice) leaving th e rest as a
mechanical development of th e conseque nces , at the level of the virtual we
must allow the rul es to change with every throw and inject chance at eve ry
point, to yield trul y nonmetric (or nomadic) distribution s. In Deleu ze' s
words
Each throw em its singular points . . . But th e set of throws is includ ed in
the aleator y point [quasi-causal operato r ], a unique cast wh ich is endlessly
displaced throughout the ser ies . . . Th ese thro ws are succe ssive in
relation to one another , yet simultaneo us in relati on to this point which
always changes th e rul e , or coo rdinates and ram ifies th e co rresponding
series as it insinuates chance ove r th e entire length of the series . . . Each
thro w operates a distribution of singularities, a conste llatio n. But instead
of dividin g a closed space between fixed results which corre spond to
hypotheses [as in traditional treatments of probability], the mobile results
are distributed in th e op en space of th e unique and undi vided cast. Thi s
is a nomadic and non -sedentary distribution . (Dele uze , Loa ic ef Sense,
pp. 59- 60 ; em phasis in the original)
') l. Dcleuze olTers an alternative model for thi s task of th e quasi-causal op er ator
which is based on the ide a of entrainme nt, or more speci fically, th e
phenome no n of frequ en cy entrainme nt. For tw o gr andfather pendulum
clocks to entr ain , weak siq nals must be tran smit ted from one to the othe r to
couple th em (in some cases , these are weak vibrations in the wo od en floor
on whi ch th e clocks are placed) . If the frequ encies of the two clo cks are
close to each oth er they may resonate and th e two clocks will lock into a
single frequ ency. Th e resulting entrainme nt of the two oscillators represents
a much stronaer link aae (force d movem ent) between th e tw o oscillators than
the wea k signals wh ich or iginally coupled th em . In Deleuzc 's words:
A syste m must be constitute d on th e basis of two or mor e series , each
series be ing defined by th e dilTerences between the terms whi ch compose
it. If we suppose that the series co m municate und er the impulse of a
force of some kind [e.g. th e quasi -causal op erator), th en it is apparent
that th is communication relates differences to other differ en ces, constitu t-
ing differ ences betw een differ ences within the syste m . Th ese seco nd
d gre' dilTeren ces play the role of ' dilTere nciato r' . . . Thi s state of alTairs
is adeq uately ex presse d by certa in physical conce pts: coup/ina between
hct erogen eous syste ms, fro m whi h is derived an internal resonance within
the syste m, and fro m which in turn is deri ved a fo rced morcmcnr , the
am plitude of which exceeds that of th e basic scric them selves. (Del uze ,
D!ffercn e and Repcu t ion, p. 11 7)
 N O TES
Del eu ze uses this ' re sonance ' model for th e acti on of th e quasi-causal
ope rator in other places. For exam ple,
Conce pts [multipliciti es], which have onl y co nsiste ncy or int en sive ord i-
nates o utside of any coordinates , freely ente r int o r elati on ships of
nond iscursi ve resonan ce . . . Concepts ar e ce nte rs of vibrations, each in
itself and e veryo ne in relati on to all others . Thi s is wh y th ey all resonate
rather than cohere or cor res po nd to each other. (D ele uze and Guattari ,
What is Philosophyi; p . 23; my emphasis)
Clearly , if we int erpreted th e term 'concept' as ' semant ic conte nt of a
term ' (or in any other lingui sti c way) thi s paragraph would be come
me aning less. Th e term ' inte nsive ordinates' must be int erpreted in terms of
posit ive ordinal distances (which distinguishes it from any cardinal numerical
coo rd inate) and not as referring to on e of th e member s of th e co uple
' ord inates' and ' abscissas' whi ch ar e sim ply th e nam es of two coo rdinates.
54 . De le uze , Loaic if Sense,
p. 121. (My emphasis) Thi s is about th e specification
of th e conditions of a problem , but problem s are , in Deleuzes onto logy ,
no thing but virtual multiplicities. I discu ss thi s r elationship in Ch apt er 4 .
55 . itewar t and Golubitsky, Fea1ul SymmetIJ', pp. 14-16.
56 . Lawre nce Sklar, Space, Tim e, and Spa ce-Time (University of California Pr ess,
B erkcley, 1977) , pp. 25 1- 86.
57. T he reason why it is hard to find a phy sicist who would think of laws as
en ti ties in need of ontological analysis is that mo st of th em have an
instrumentalist or o pe ratio nalist attitude toward th eoreti cal entities. Ever
since Ne wto n refus ed to give me chani sm s to explain th e action of gravity
and settle d on describing how plan ets move, as oppose d to explaining lYhy
th ey do so, man y physicist s have accepted a non-realist approach to laws, as
we ll as unobservable entities in gen eral. Thus, ex pe ri me ntal laws (like
Boylc' s law ) are defined as sym bolic representations of laboratory regularities
or routines '?f experience, whil e fundam ental laws become basic hyp otheses
fro m w hich on e can derive experimental laws, and the validity of which is
not sett led em pirically but through th e validity of th eir co nse <j ue nce s. In
ncither case is th e ontological status of the laws th emselv es an issue . See
Lindsay and Margenau , Foundations if Physics, pp . 14-16 (for expe rime nta l
law s) and pp . 22-6 (for fundam ental principles) .
Wh ile phil osophers can take thi s stance and argue that, if all speci fic
ex pe ri me nta l laws may be deri ved from a set of fundam ental ones, th en th e
latt e r may be see n as a set of axioms and treat ed as ete rn al truths, as in
Euclid's ax iomatic tr eatment of geo me try . But as th e physicist Rich ard
I·c 'nman has arg ued, scie ntists can no t do thi s because th ey are awa re that ,
unlike esse nces, fund am ental laws may have seve ra l diff e r .nt forms. New-
N O TE S
ton ' s law s of motion , for exam ple , may be expressed in three ways wh ich
are, mathe matica lly, co m pletely different : the original force form, the field
form, and the var iational form . Th ese arc taken to express one and the same
law because they have th e same mathematical co nse <jue nces and thu s we
canno t tell them apart ex pe rime ntally. But th e existe nce of a variet y of
forms docs elimi nate th e temptation to adopt a Gr eek axioma tic ap pro ach,
forc ing physicists to adopt, as Feynman puts it, a Babylonian approach. See
Richar d Fe ynman, The Character '?!.
Physical Law (MIT Pr ess, Cambridge,
1995), pp . 50-3 .
Per haps th e o nly clear state me nt o ne can get from physicists as to what
funda me nta l laws ar e suppose d to be co mes from the appli cation of gro up
theory to the law s th em selves , For exam ple , th e well -kn own invariance of
c wto n' s laws under translation s in space and time impli es that
give n the same esse ntial initial co nd itions , th e result will be th e sam e no
matter wh en and wh ere we re alize th ese. Th is principle can be formulat ed
, . . as the state me nt that th e absolute po sition and th e absolute tim e ar e
neve r esse ntial initi al cond itions . . . If th e univ erse turned o ut to be
grossly inhom ogenous, th e laws of nature in th e fringes of th e univ erse
may be quite different from th ose we are studying .. . Th e po stulate of
invariance with resp ect of displa cem ent in space and time disregards this
possi bility, and its appli cati on on the cos mological scale virtually presupposes
" homoqeneo us and sta tionary uni verse. (W igne r , ln varian ce in Phy sical Theory ,
p . 4; my e m phasis)
.lcarly, th is is a more sophisticate d stance than naive esse nt ialism , since
1 his post ulate of ln variance (w hich ma y imply that basic laws ar e simul-
t,' Ilt'ollsly valid e very whe re , and have been so always) can , in turn, be treated
.1' .111 ap proxi rnate hyp oth esis, I r eturn to the <juestion of laws in Chapter 4.
,S "or if it is a qu estion of kn owing, . . ' why water change s its state of
0 0
qu" lity at 0 ce ntigrade', the <juestion is po orl y stated insofar as 0 is
cOllside reel as an ordinary point in th e thermomet er. But if it is
('ollsider xi, Oil the co ntra ry, as a singular point, it is inseparable from
tlu- event occurring at th at point, always being zero in relati on to its
re.r lization on th e line of ord inary points, always Jorthcomina and already
/'" t . (Dc leuzc , Loaic if Sense, P: 80; my em phasis)
li lt" (·.·.K! same formulation recurs thro ugho ut Dcleu zc ' s work :
ion : Ihe inr h-Iin iu- tim e of the eve nt, the floatin g line th at knows onl y
Iw,-ds and co nti n ua lly di vides th.lt wh ich tran spires int o a n alrea dy -t here
11..11 is .11 the sallie time no t - yc-t-h cre , a sim ultaneous too -Ian- and too -

N O TES
early, a something that is both go ing to happen and has just happen ed .
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p . 262)
T he meanwhile, th e eve nt, is always a de ad tim e; it is th er e wh ere
nothing tak es pla ce , an infinite awaiting that is alr ead y infinitely past ,
aw ait ing and reserv e. (Dele uze and Guattari, What is Philosophy ?, p . 158)
"'J, Dclcuzc, D!lJerence and Repetition , p . 88. (My em pha is)
Th e joint . . . is what ensures th e subo rdina tio n of time to th ose pr op erl y
car dina l points through which pass th e peri od ic mo vements wh ich it
measures [e .g . th e nest ed set of cyclic pr esents] . . . By co ntras t, tim e
out of joint means dem ented tim e . . . liberated from its overly sim ple
circular figure, freed from th e e vents that mad e up its co nte nt ... in
sho rt , time presenting itself as an e mpty and pure form . Time itself
unfold s . . . inst ead of things unfolding within it . . . It ceases to be
cardinal and becomes ordinal, a pure order of tim e .
1>0. I have said before that each cyclic present is a contrac tion of past and future
instants at a given temporal scale . Hen ce it is a veritable ' synthes is' of
present time, a syn thesis whi ch Del eu ze calls ' passive ' because it invol ves no
activity .ither by th e world or by th e subject.
Passive synthesis or co ntractio n is esse ntially asymmetrical: it goe s from
th e past to th e future in th e pr esent, thus from th e particular to th e
general, th er eby imparting direction to th e arrow of time . (D eleuz e,
D!fJcrence and Repetit ion, p. 71)
(,1 , T he infinit ely divisibl e event is always both at once. [future and past , acti ve
and passive ] It is ete rn ally that which has just happ en ed and that which is
abou t to happ en, but never that whi ch is happen ing .. . Th e eve nt , being
itself im passive, allo ws th e act ive and the passive to be int erchan ged more
easi ly, since it is neith er the one nor th e other, but rather their co m mon
res ult. (De lcuzc, Loaic if Sense, p. 8)
1> 2. Dclcuzc, Loqic if Sense, PI" 94 -5.
(d . Ihid . , p. 147.
64 . lbid., p. 165.
65 . Ibid . , p. 147.
h h. Ralph II . Abraham, ' Dynam ics and el f-O rganizatio n ', in Se!f-Oraanizina
'stems. Th Emerqence if Order, ed. F. Euge ne Yat es (Plen um Press, Ne w
Yo rk , 1987) , p . 606.
(,7 . 0 11 q uesti on s of sim plicity and famili arity in th e foundat ion s of physics, sec
U nds . and Margellau , Foundations if Phys ics, p . 18.
NOTES
68. Deleuze, Loa ic if Sense, p. 166.
69 . Ian Stewart, Does God Play Dice? The Math ematics if Chaos (Basil Blackw ell ,
Oxford, 1989), pp. 114- 21.
70 . Del euze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 25 1. (Em phasis in th e
o rigina l)
7 1. lbid. , p. 9. Th e term 'line of flight' , refe rring to th e qua si-causal ope rato r,
is defined else w he re (I" 488) as a fractal line. Pr ecisely becaus e th e ope rator
and the plane it co nstr ucts mu st cut and pr eserv e N- d ime nsions for eve ry
multiplicity, Del eu ze co nce ives of it as necessaril y having a fract al number
of di me nsio ns, a number wh ich is not a wh ol e number but a fracti on. For
e xam ple , a flat piece of pap er is a two-dimen sional entity , but one fold ed
into a ball has a dimen sion between tw o and three , that is, it is a fractal
dim ens ion. 0 do es a o ne- dime nsional string so fold ed that it begins to fill a
plane. T he op erator itself would not be a transcendent agen cy ope rating in
N+ I d imens ion s but on the co ntrary , it would work on N-I dimensi ons (a
line for m ing a plan e , or an aleatory poine cir culating through one- d ime nsio nal
se ries) . O n th e fractal dim en sionality of the plan e, see also Del euze and
iua ttari, What is Pbilosophyi; pp. 36 - 8.
7) . I c1cuz e uses th e term 'counte r-act ualization ' for th e ex traction of ideal
events from actua l ones in Del eu ze, Loqic if Sense, pp. 150 - 2. Il l' does not
II S l ' th e term ' pre-actualizat ion' hut thi s term do es capture th e meaning of
till' oth er task th e quasi -cau se mu st perform .
In gene ral, as we have see n, a singularity may be gra sped in tw o ways: in
its existence and distribution [in th e vect or field), but also in its nature,
ill co nform ity with which it exte nds and spre ads itself out in a det ermined
direction ove r a line of ord inary points. This second asp ect alr ead y
represents a certa in stabilizatio n and a bea inn ina if th e actualizati on if
in,qu/ariti cs. ( Ibid., p. 109; m y e m phasis)
71 . . . th insta nt extracts sing ular points twice project ed - once into the
future and o nce int o the past - forming by thi s double equation the
co nst itutive cleme nts of the pure e vent (in the manner of a pod which
r .lcases its spo res). (Ibid. , p . 166 )
/., [W Ill'1I ,1 multiplicit y I is graspe d in its relation to th e qua si-cause which
prod uces it and di stributes it at th e sur face , it inherits, participates in,
,lIId even e nve lops and possesses th e force of thi s ideational cause. W e
h.ivc s e n that th is [qua si-jcau sc is nothing outside its effect, that it haunts
lhi, llll'( t , and that it maint ains with the effect an immanent relati on
whic h tu rn s th, product, the mom ent thai it is produced , int o sonl'thing
prod urtivr-. (De h-uzc , 1.0lI'c of Sense, p. 95)
 NOTES
T his extract is about 'se nse' not 'a multiplicit y' but the two terms are
closely rel ated .
75. Once com munication bet ween het er ogeneou s series is estab lished , all
sorts of consequences follow within the syste m. Some thing passes
betw een th e bor der s, events explode, phenom en a lIash, like thunder and
lightning ... what is this agent, this for ce whi ch ensures co mmunicat ion?
T hunderbo lts explode bet ween differen t int en sities, but th ey are pr eced ed
by an invisible, imp er ceptible , dark precursor, which determines th eir path
in advance but in reverse , as though intagliated. (De leuzc, D!lJerence and
Repetiti on , pp . 118-1 9; emphasis in the or iginal)
76. Dc leuze does not spea k of nonlin ear , no nequilibri um areas of th e world , but
he does distin guish specia l pro cesses (such as th e spo ntaneo us formation of
metas ta ble surfaces) fro m those character izing full equilibr ium structures .
O nly the former have the pow er to give rise to the virt ual.
When we say that bodi es and th eir mixtures pro du ce [th e virtual ], it is
not by virtue of an ind ividuati on whi ch would pr esuppose it. Individua-
tion in bodi es, th e measur e in their mixtures . . . pr esupposes . . . the
pre -indi vidual and imp er sona l neutral field within whi ch it unfold s. It is
therefore in a differ ent way that [the virtual) is pr oduced by bodies. Th e
questio n is now about bodi es taken in their undiffer enti ated depth and in
their measureless pulsation . Thi s depth acts in an origi nal way, by means
1!.f its power to orBanize suifaces and to envelop itsclf with in sUlfaces. (De leuze,
LOBic 1!.f Sense, p. 124; emphasis in th e or iginal)
I have repl aced refer en ces to 'se nse' in thi s ext ract by ' the vir tual'. (The
term 'se nse' is closely related to 'v irtual mul tipli city' , but refer s to th e
re lation between virtuality and language, a relat ion I do not ex plore at all in
this book.) T he capacity of matt er to form sur faces, eve n surfaces at
equilibri um, constitu tes th e m ost primitive for m of self-organizat ion. Th e
surfaces of liqu id or solid bodies are , ind eed , specia l or singu lar zones of
those bodies, very differ ent fro m th e ord inary bulk mat eri al th at th ey
enve lop . T he bul k of a liqu id bod y, a lake or ocean , for instance , consists of
a populatio n o f mo lecules on . wh ich forces of attraction are exer te d in all
directions. At th e surface of this body, on the othe r hand , there ex ists a
changing sub-population on wh ich forces are exe rted inw ard but not
ou twa rd. This gives those surface molecul es special prop ert ies not displayed
b th u bul k. In parti cular , they will possess a certa in amount of free energy
(· ncrgy available for do ing wo rk) wh ich acco unts for the surface's spon-
t,lIWOUS tendency to contract or minim ize its ex te nsion (a 's ur face ten sion '
NOTES
whic h exp lains why dr opl et s of water spon taneo usly acquire a round shape).
See Neil Kensingt on Adam, The Physics and Chemistry '?! Suifaces (Do ver, New
Yor k, 1968), pp . 1-7.
Even at equilibr ium, the surfaces of ind ividu ated bodies are capable of
spo ntaneo usly giving r ise to asymmetr ical distribution s of eve nts, a distribu-
tio n whic h is the signature of the quasi-causal operator. T his is part icularly
dear in the case of electrical ph enomen a occ ur ring at the surface of contact
between differ ent phases of matt er .
When two conducti ng phases are in contact, a differ ence of electrica l
potential is gene rally esta blished between them . Th e establishme nt of thi s
' phase boundary pot ential' is int imately associate d with the formati on of
an 'e lectrical doubl e layer', at the surface, i.e . an unsymmetrical distribution
f!I electrically charBed particles near the phase boundary, with an exces s of
posit ive charges tow ard s the phase which assum es a positive pot enti al and
of negative charges toward s the ph ase assuming negat ive pot enti al.
(p. 300; my emp hasis)
Here is Dele uze 's versio n of th e same ideas,
Everything happ ens at th e surface in a crystal whi ch develop s only on th e
edges. Undoubtedly, an orga nism is not develop ed in th e same mann er
. . . But me mbranes arc no less important, for they carry potent ials and
reBcncrate polarities . Th ey place int ernal and ex te rna l spaces int o contact
without rega rd to distance . Th e intern al and th e exte rna l, depth and
height, have biological significance only through th is topoloqical surface '?!
contact . Thus, even biologically it is necessary to und er stand that ' the
deepest is the skin'. Th e skin has at its disposal a vita l and properl y
superficial potential ene rgy . And just as [virtual) eve nts do not occ upy
the surface hut rather fre quent it, superficia l ener8Y is not local ized at the
.<U~face but rather bound to its formation and riformation . (De leuze, LOBie '?!
Sense, p. J 03; my em phasis)
77. The term 'line of flight' is used in two ways, one to refer to relati ve , th e
other to absol ute movements towards th e virtual. A relative line of flight
refers to act ual assemb lages, like th ose I described above when discussing
emhryogenesis and ecosys tems, defined by affects and relations of speed and
510 \\'n ss.
'omparntive rates of flow in these lines prod uce phe nomena of re lative
slowness or viscosity, or on the co ntrary, of acceleration and ru pture .
t\1I this, lines and measurable spee ds, consti tute an assem blage. (I cleuzc
.uul Guattari , " Thousand Plateaus, p. 4)

NOTE S
I said that in these assemblages relative accelerations (neo teny, symbiosis)
allow an escape from rigid morphologies, th e term 'relative line of flight '
1. T he rejecti on of totalities and th e definition of social ontology as co m posed
refe rring to th ese ph enomena, among others. An absolute line of flight is a
furth er acce ler atio n or boosting of th ese relative escapes whi ch allows th em
to leave th e extensiv e and intensive altogeth er.
Th ese relative movements should not be confused with th e possibility of
. .. an absolute line of flight ... The form er are stratic or int erstratic [that
is, conce r ned with exte nsities or int ensities], wh ereas th e latter conce rn
the plane of consistency .. . There is no doubt that mad particles leave
minimal trace of their passage through th e strata as they accel erate, escaping
spatio-te m po ral and even exi stential coo rdinate s as th ey tend towards ..
th e state of unformed matter of th e plan e of consistency . (pp . 55-66)
And it is th ese absolute lines that cr eat e the heterogeneous virtual
contin uum . 'Moreov er, th e plan e of co nsistenc y does not preexist . . . th e
lines of flight that draw it and cause it rise t o th e surface , th e becomings
th at co m pose it' (p . 270) .
n. Philosophy is a const ructi vism , but constructivism has two qualitatively
different co m plementary aspects : th e cre ation of concepts and th e laying
o ut of a plan e ... Concepts ar e absolute surfaces or volumes, formless
and fragm entary, wh ereas th e plan e is th e formless, unlimited absolute,
neither sur face nor volume but alwa ys fractal ... Concepts ar e events
hut the plane is the horizon of events , the reservoir or reserve of purely
conceptual events .. . (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy ?, p . 36)
Here th e term 'conce pt' do es not refer to ' concepts of the understanding',
th at is, to semantic or representational entitie s, but to virtual multiplicities :
'Every co nce pt . . . is a multiplicity although not every multiplicity is
co nce pt ual' (p. 15). Without this definition referen ce to conc epts as surfaces
or volumes (tha t is, as manifolds) would be meaningless. That virtual
mult ipliciti es cannot be conceived as int elle ctual con cepts is clear from the
follow ing ex tract, wh ere th e term ' Idea ' gives a better rendering of what
'concept' mean s:
If the Idea e lim inates variability, thi s is in favour of what mu st be called
var iety [a syno nym of manifold I or multiplicity . The Idea as co ncre te
univ ersal stands o pposed to co nce pts of the und erstanding. (Deleuze ,
[)!JJcrence and Repetiti on, p. 17 3)
7lJ. Dclcu zc and Guatta ri, What is Philosophy] , p . 126 .
HO . Ikl cu zl·. Lon ic r1 Sense, p . 148.
NOTES
4 VIRTUALITY AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
en tirely of individuals op erating at differ ent scales need s to be defended in
detail. I am aware that th e way I present it here is rough and hardly
co m pelling. Moreover, a co nvincing case for thi s point of view needs of
lic e ssity to have a historical dim ension, that is, it need s to give the details
of .pccific individuation processes , for institutions, cities and nation states. I
have applied this ontology in th e conte xt of a historical anal ysis of W est ern
history in Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years r1
Nonlinear History (Zone
Books, Ne w York 1997) .
lhc rc are man y approaches to th e question of the disunity of scie nce. Some
p.rrticularly useful ar e John Dupree , The Disorder r1
Thinp s. iHetaphysical
l-outulutions r1
c1' th e Disuni ty Science (Harvard University Pr ess , Cambridge,
199 5); Jerry Fod or, 'Spe cial Scien ces, or Th e Disunity of Science as a
\ orking Hypothesis' , in The Philosophy c1' Science, eds. Richard Boyd, Philip
(;. Ispl·r and J. D. Trout (MIT Press, Cam bridge , 199 3); Peter Galison,
' In t ro d ucti on : Th e Context of Disunity ', in The Disunity of Science, eds. Pet er
( ;.llisun and Da vid J . Stump (Stanford Univ ersity Pr ess, Stanford, 1996);
Vndrcw Pickering, The Alanale if Practice. Time, AaenC)', and Science (Univers ity
o t Chicago Pr ess, Chicago , 1995) .
lronically, some co nte m porary socio logists of scien ce who ar e highly critical
01 the ph ilosophers' s approach mak e th e mi stake thinking that a nov el
Pl'ro,ich to the study of scien ce demands th e elim ination of causal relations.
' I' I I. M. Co llins , Chanai na Order (U niversity of Chicago Press, Chicago,
I'}')l), pp . 6-8 .
It is hard to tell wh ether Collins trunks caus es do not exist , thus siding
\ IIh l lu m c, o r wh ether he thinks we should susp end beli ef in them as a
I II ' lhodological man oeu ver to highlight th e 'social ' aspects of scientific fields.
I II latter interpretation would avoid my criticism (that he is siding with the
o ld" ' 1 and most co nse rvative phil osophy of science ) but it would still be
" Jl" 11 to criticism in a differ ent way : bringing 'society' as a totality int o the
nalvsis.
I \II 11.ll'king , Represeminq and Interven inq (Cambridge Univ ersity Pr ess, Cam -
11/1.1 'I ' , 199 2) , P: 46. (My em phasis) In conte m porary philosophy th e re vival
II I 1 ,111. •Ility as a productiv e or ge ne tic relationship, one to be studied
II1Jlll'ic,d ly not mer ely co nce ptually, was foreshad ow ed by the philosopher
1.11 III Hungl' in 1959 , altho ugh the degr ee to whi ch he has influen ced
l UI n -ut aut ho rs is hard to e valuate . His key hook in thi s r 'spe t is Causality
"hi lIoJefTl S k nce (Dover, Ne w York. 1979). Her I adopt man y of Bunge ' s
II \\ 1111 produ ct ivity and depart onl y in the terminology. Il l' uses the term
 NOTES
'd et ermination' for th e gen eral relation (including linear, nonlinear and
statistical causality) reserving th e term ' causality' for lin ear causality, so as
not to depart from tradition. I myself pr efer to spe ak of causal relations in
ge ne ral, taking th e lin ear case as an untypical case , since th e point of my
discussion is to break with tradition in th ese matters.
5. Th e entire group of new phil osophers that have tak en th e ' causal turn ' ar e
unanimous in their rej ection of th e deductive-nomological model of expla-
nation (as w ell as related models which replace deduction by induction, and
exceptionless laws by statistical laws ) for its emphasis on logic o-linguistic
" Ily.1 Prigogin e , From Beino to Becoming (W. H. Freeman . New York, 1980),
form at the expense of causal -productive processes. See Bunge, Causality and
Modern Science, PI" 290 -1; Nan cy Cartwright , How th e Laws rf Physics Lie
" ( ',lTlwright, How th e Laws rf Pby sics Lie, PI" 54-5 .
(C lare ndon Press, Oxford, 1983), PI'. 132- 3; W esley C. Salmon, Scientific
II I 'This fits better with my picture of a nature best described by a vast array
Explanation and the Causal Structure i!f the World (Pri nce to n University Pre ss,
Prin ceton , 1984), PI" 26 -32; Dupree, The Disorder eif Thinas, Pl' 178- 9.
Deleuze som etimes echoe s th e philosophical mis characterization repres-
ented by th e nomological -deductive model wh en he asserts that the object
of science is ' funct ions that are pr esented as propositions in discursive
syste ms' (Del euze and Guattari, What is Philosophyi , p. 118).
Alth ough in his early work Deleuze is very car eful to differentiate
between mathematical functions which are close to lingui sti c statem ents
(such as algebraic functions) from those that ar e not (d iffere ntial functions),
in his last work where the differences between science and philosophy ar e
most dramatically stated, he lapses into a less car eful state me nt of th e
qu estion . Else w here (I" 128) he adds that '[TJhe fact that scien ce is
d iscursive in no way means that it is deductive ', but gives as an exam ple of
non -deductiv e activity th e use of co m pute rs in th e study of nonlinear
functions. I believe th e non -deductive aspe ct needs to be stressed mu ch
mo re and exte nde d to modelling pra ctices much old er than com pute r -based
ex pe rime ntation . 1 have alread y arg ued that Delcuze' s main point, th e
in.H!fficiency '?I J im ctions to captu re th e virtu al , can be mad e without su bo rd inat-
ing m ath ematical models to propositions, that is, by showing that functi on s
define indi vidu ation processes in such a wa y as to st res s th e direction
tow ard s th e actual.
6 . Ron ald N . Giere, Explain ino Science. A Coq nitive Approach (University of
'hicago Pr ess, Chicago , 1988), 1'.82. (My em phasis)
7. ~o m m e n t i ng o n a particul ar case of deri vation, th at of th e mod el of th e
sim ple pendulum in one dim ension from th e two -dim ensional case, Giere
says
Th e mo ve from th e mass-on -a-spring exam ple to the Sim ple pendulum
see ms lo me a clear case of what Kuhn called ' d irect mod elin g '. T he
NOTE S
two ex amples ar e not just special cases of a ge ne ral relationship . One
ma nages to reduce th e pendulum , a two -dimensional system , to th e on e-
dim en sional case o nly by mean s of a judicious approximation that restricts
the pendulum to sm all angl es of swing . In particular, th e ste p from th e
original application of Newton 's laws to the two -dimensi onal pendulum
to th e one- d imensional version is not a matter of purely mathematical,
or logical, deduction . •Approximation' is a valid rul e of deduction only in
physicists ' jokes about mathematicians. (ibid ., 1'.71; sec also PI" 76-80)
p. 19.
,.1 phenomeno log ical [or causal] laws tailored to spe cific situations, than with
"'"' govern ed in an orderl y way from first principles, ' (ibid., p. 66).
On Gie re's view see Giere , Explain ing Science, p . 85, and PI" 90 -1 on
I", d ews on Car twri ght's work.
( ,,'twright, How th e Laws eif Physics Lie, p. 107.
I ),borah G. Mayo, Error and th e Growth eif Experimental Knowledge (University
," Chicago Pr ess, Chicago, 1996), p. 128.
(" twright, How th e Laws eif Physics Lie, PI" 96 -7.
"'JI,i s Kline, Mathematics and th e Physical World (Do ver , New York , 1981),
I' 1-1 0 . (M y emphasis)
\I, ,,ri s Kline, Ala thematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times. Vol. 2
,I I li,rd l.l niversity Pr ess, New York, 1972), p . 580 . More gen erall y, on
II" lrist orv of variational techniques see Chapters 24 and 30.
l ;jvell appro priate variational principles each with an associated multiple
IIlk >ral and scalar int egrand, we can produce all th e important partial
old ('rent ial equations in physics: the wave equation, th e diffu sion
l' I".llio n, Po isson's eq uat ion , Shrodingcr 's equation, and each of Max -
\\'(, 11'S equat ions . . . Such thinking bears fruit. General relativity and
' 1",lI1l UI11 mechan ics both o riginate d from variational principles . (Don . S.
1'1II01lS , Peifecl Form. Variat ional Principles, Meth ods and Applications in
II /IIl'lIIary Php ics [Princeton Uni ver sity Pr ess, Princeton , 1997J, p. 11 I)
I ,I, PI" 17 27. In a passage where Deleuze contrasts the propositional
II" ...HI. 10 the probl em atic o ne (o r what amo unts to the same thin g, an
1'1" ".J( h to th ou gh t in terms of its cond itions as o ppose d to its producti ve
,". ,,) . II(' co m pares l he Kanti an co nce ption of the co n cpt of •shortes t
It 11I1l' ' (.IS a representational sche ma) to the co nce ption made po ssihle hy
III I ,til II Ills of vari.u io us. Th e term 's ho rtes t ', as he S.l)'S,
 NO TES
may be under stood in tw o ways: from the point of view of conditioning,
as a sche ma of the imagination which det ermines space in acco rdance
with the conce pt (the straight line defined as that wh ich in all part s may
be supe rimpose d upo n itsel f) - in this case th e difference rem ains
ex ternal, incarn ated in a rul e of construction . . . Alte rna tively, fro m th e
ge netic point of view, the sho rtest may be under stood as an Idea
[multiplicity] which . . . int eri ori zes the differ en ce between straight and
curved, and expresses this int ernal differ en ce in th e form of a reciprocal
det ermination [differ ential relati on s] and in th e minimal condi ti ons C!f an
inteqral , (De leuze , D!ffer ence and Repet ition , p. 174)
J8. Leo nard Euler, quot ed in Ste phen P. Tim oshenko, Hi story c1 St renqtb
Materials (Dover , New York , 1983), p . 31. (My em phasis)
19 . Far from being conce rne d with so lutions, truth and falseho od primarily
alTect problems. A solution alwa ys has the truth it deserv es according to
the probl em to which it is a response , and a problem always has th e
solution it deserves in pr oportion to its own truth and falsit y - in other
word s, in pr oportion to its sense. (De leuze, D!fference and Repetiti on,
p. 159)
In what follow s I will not speak of ' true pr obl em s' but of 'correct ' or
'well-pose d pr obl em s' but thi s constitutes, 1 believe , only a harml ess
terminological departure from Deleuze.
20. Kline , Mat hematics and th e Physical World , p. 441 . Within this traditi on , the
unifying power of Hamilton 's principle was alm ost inevitabl y inte rpre te d as
consisting in the gene rality of its truth , and axiomatic ver sion s of classical
mechanics were pr odu ced in th e nin et eenth century (by Heinrich Hertz, for
example) to marry th e unifying pow er of variati onal principles with th e
concept of general truth . See Rob ert B. Lindsay and Henry Margenau ,
Foundations tifPhy sics (O x Bow Press, Woodbridge , 198 I), pp. 118- 20.
In a Deleuzian onto logy eliminating essentialism from physics involves
re placing clear and distinct truths (axioms and theorem s) by pr obl em s, that
is, replacing dedu ctively connec te d linguistic propositions in the Euclidea n
geo me try mould by problem s defined by singu larities (events) and affects.
Greek geo me try has a gene ral tend en cy on th e one hand to limit problem s
to the benefit of th eor em s, on the othe r to subor dinate problem s to
theor ems th em selves. Th e reason is that th eorem s see m to ex press and
d rv .lop the pr op rt ies of simple essences whereas probl em s co n ern only
el'ents and Cf./ fections . . . As a result , how ever , th e Beneti c point of view is
ford bly rdegatc d to an inferio r rank : pro of is given that so me thing cannot
NOTES
be rather than that it is and why it is (hence th e fre quency in Eucl id of
negative, indirect and [redu ctio ad absurdum I arguments .. .). No r do
the essen tia l aspects of th e situatio n change with the shift to an algebr aic
and analytic point of view. Probl em s are now traced fro m algebraic
equations . . . How ever just as in geo me try we imagine the probl em
solved, so in algeb ra we ope rat e upon unknown quanti ties as if they wer e
known: th is is how we pursue th e hard work of redu cing pr obl em s to the
form of proposition s capable of sen-ing as cases of solution. W e see thi s
clearly in Descartes. T he Cartesian meth od (the search for th e clear and
distinct) is a meth od for so lving suppose dly given probl em s, not a meth od
of inventi on appropriate to th e const itution of problem s or th e und erstand-
C!f
ing of questions. (De leuze , Difference and Repetuion, p. 160.)
Delcuzc, D!fference and Repetition, p. 189.
' For Probl em s-Ideas are by nature un con sciou s: they arc extra-propositional
aru! sub-representati ve , and do not resembl e the propositions which represent
the affirma tions to which th ey give rise' (I" 267; my emphasis).
I,HI I lacking, Bepresent lnq and ln terveninp , p. 41. (Em phasis in th e original) In
.ldcl ition to igno ring causes and downplaying explanations, positi vist philo -
ophy ho lds a ' verificationist ' th eory of meanin g (if the truth of a state me nt
,.II H1ot he tes te d the state me nt is meaningless) , a belief that verification
111\ olves comparison with raw data (data fro m the senses) and a disbelief in
theore tical (or uno bserva ble) ent ities. Hacking later on also expresses some
do ubts about th e ro le of ex planations (PI" 52- 5) but this is, I believe ,
limited to thei r ro le as argume nts for realism . Hacking is well known for his
, h,lI11pioning of causal inte rve ntio ns in ex pe rime ntal reality as crite ria for
I •• rlism , or for belief in unobser vable entities .
\ II I(H'US on W hv qu estion s is not meant to link th ese matter s to a specific
'.\ ut.ut i c: form, and is Simply a matter of case of ex positio n . Clearly, such
' 1" 1"\1 iOlls may be paraphrased in other ways : the requ est for a causal
I ' 1'1,11 1,11 ion ex presse d by the question ' W hy did event X occ ur?' may be
' 1'I"l"\sed hy ' Ho w was eve nt X produced ?' or some th ing like that. Th ough
1 1,, 1" 11"11' doe s not refer to Why qu estions he does differentiate between
'I" ' ,l illllS with simple propositions as answer s (which subordinate th e
'I" ' ,I jllil to a search for essences) from those mor e prop erly problematic .
IC,tioll,dism want ed to tie th e fate of Ideas [multiplicities] to abst ract and
.1",111 ,'ssen c:es; and to the ex te nt th at the probl em atic form o f Ideas was
1< ·' ·Il~lIi"led. it eve n want ed that form tied to the question of esse nces -
11\ orlu-r words , to th e ' W hat is X?' ... It should be noticed how few
I'flllm0l'lH"rs have placed their tru st in the qu est ion ' \ hat is X?' in or de r
til },.I\"I' 1<i" ,ls. ('..rtainly not risto t lc, O nce till" diah-ct ir Itl ll' .irt of
 NOTES
posi ng pro blem s] brew s up its matter instead of being applied to
propaedeutic ends , th e qu est ion s ' How mu ch ' , 'How' , ' In what cases '
and 'Who ' abo und . . . T hese qu estion s are th ose of th e accid en t , th e
event , the m ult iplicit y. (Dc leuze, D!fference and Repetition , p . 188)
A more important o miss ion in my d iscussio n is th at it does not inclu de
Dclcuz c's d istinction be tween problem s and qu estion s. Problem s are th e
episte mo log ical cou nterpar t to vir tua l multiplicit ies, while qu esti ons (w hich
invo lve an im pe rative, a request or dem and for an ex p lanatio n, for exam ple)
are th e so urces of probl em s or the co unte rpart of th e quasi-causal operator.
Th er e ar e also episte mo logica l co unte r parts to the inte nsive and th e act ual,
W e d ist ingu ished four inst ances; imperati ve o r onto logica l q uestio ns;
dia lectica l pr ob lem s or th e th em es that e me rge fro m them; sym bo lic
fields of so lvability in which th ese problem s are ' scientifically' ex pressed
in acco rdance to th eir co nd itions; th e so lutions gi ven in th ese field s w he n
th e probl em s are inc arna ted in the actuality of cases. (I' . 200)
24. Alan Garfinkel , Forms if Explanation (Yale Uni versity Pr ess, New Haven,
198 1), p . 21. O ther phil osoph ers have develope d sim ilar approaches to Wh y
qu estions and the ir relat ion to th e d istribution s of th e relevant and th e
irrelevan t . See , for ex am ple, Salmon, Scientific Expla nation and the Causal
. tru ctute '!.( the World, PI'. 1-6. See also Salmon's discu ssion of Van Frassen 's
approach to Wh y questions and contrast spaces (PI" 102- 6) which, unli ke
Garfinkel's, is co m p lete ly lingui stic.
) 5. Alan Garfinkel, Forms if Explanation, p . 40.
/6 . lbid.; p. 64 . Garfinke l takes this characterization of state space fro m Ren e
Thorn, cre ato r of catastro phe th eory and of th e conce pt of st ruct ura l
stability . He re th e term ' critical point' may refer to both th e unstable
scparatrix tha t defines (as a r ep ell er) th e border of a basin of attraction, or
to a bifurcation which defines the poin t of str uctural insta bility at which one
distribution of attractors changes into ano ther.
27 . Del euzc, DyJerence and Repetiti on , p . 159.
)H . Alan Garfin kel, Forms if Explanation, PI" 53 -8.
)9. Ihid., Pl" 58-62.
lO. 11M, p. 168.
I I. Robert M. May, ' Chaos and the Dynam ics of Biol ogical Pop ulatio ns' , in
Dynami cal Chaos, ed. M. V. Berry (Lo ndon Royal Society, (987), PI" 3 1-2.
May's focus in this essay is chaotic at tractors, bu t he does m en tion periodic
at tractors , (T he latter are less co ntro ve rsial in populat ion st ud ies than the
Io rmer .) I avoid discuss ion of 'chaos ' in the main t ex t du e to th c excessive
hypc surrounding the subject, bu t more importantly, because on to logically
NO TES
the key notion is th at of 'a ttractor' no t the particular chao tic case . T hat is,
th e key is quasi-causality itself not anyone of its particular forms .
.~ 2 .
De leuze , Differ ence and Repetition , p . 212.
n. lbid. , p. 211.
\4 . Dele uze views the so lving of a virtua l pr oblem by ind ividuation processes as
an 'explanation ' or rather , an 'explication" , Th is term is used to refer to the
cancelling out of int en sive differences d uring a pr ocess of indivi d uation, the
hid ing of int ensit y under the extensities and qua lities it gives rise to .
It is not surprising th at , strictly speaking, difference sho uld be ' inexplic-
able'. Difference is ex plicated, but in syste ms in which it tends to be
canceled ; this means on ly th at d ifferen ce is essentially im plicated, that its
being is impli cation .. . Int ensity is develo pe d and ex plicated by means
of an ex tension whi ch relat es it to th e ex te nsity in which it appears
outside itse lf and hidden ben eath qua lity . (De leuze , D!fJerence and Repe-
tition, p. 228)
Some scien tists to day (C hr is Langto n, for instance) are begi nn ing to view
so me processes of mo rphogen esis as invol ving th e solutio n to computational
problems.
A material near its critical transit ion point bet ween th e liqui d and th e gas
states , mu st, in effec t, come to a global decision abou t whe ther it m ust
settle down to a liqu id or to a gas . T his sounds almost anth ro po mo rphic,
hut th e results r ep orted here sugges t tha t we must th ink abo ut suc h
syste ms as effectively comp uting thei r way to a minimum energy state.
( .hristopher G. Langton , ' Life at th e Edge of Chaos ', in Artificial Life II,
·ds. Christo pher G. Langton, Charles Tay lor, Doyne Farmer and Steen
Rasmussen (Add ison- W esley, Red wo od City, 1992), P: 82 .
lh is, in fact, occurs in a differen t co ntext. Del eu ze never makes this point
n -l.u ivc to theoretical and ex pe ri menta l phYSiCS, but I belie ve his idea can be
I xt cnded in that direction . Th e act ual extract reads,
ot on ly do linguistic varia bles of ex pression enter into relations of
formal opposition or d istinction favorab le for th e extraction of constants;
non .lin guisti c variables of content do also . As Hjelmsle v no tes, an
ex 1'1' .ssion is divided, for example , into ph on ic units in the same way a
co n te n t is divi ded into social, zoologica l, o r phys ical uni ts . .. Th e
nvt work of hinariti cs, or arborescences, is app licable to bot h sides. There
/I . however, no analytic resemblan ce, correspondence or co'!(o rmity betll'ccn th e
I II' '' planes . Rue their independence does not preclude isomorplusm . . . (DelCUZI'
,11 1< 1 Cuauarl, /1 Thousand Plateaus , p. 108; my e m phasis)

NOT E S
\6 . Bunge, Causality and Modern Science, p . 175 . (My emphasis)
17. In a linear system the ultimate effect of the combined action of two
differ ent causes is merely th e superpositio n [e .g . addition] of th e effects
of each cause tak en individually. But in a nonlinear syste m add ing a small
cause to one that is alre ady present can induce dramatic effects that have
no co m mon m easure with th e amplitude of th e cause. (G regoire Nicoli s
and lIya Prigogine, Exploring Complexity [W. H. Freeman, New York
1989J, p. 59)
\8 . Bun ge , Causality and Modern Science, P: 127.
\9. lbid., p. 49 .
40 . Th is is W esley Salm on's character izatio n of statistical causality, m eant to
replace pr evious versions state d in terms of high probabili ty. Th ese old er
vers ions, du e to th c absoluten ess of th e probability value (ne ar = 1), ar e
simply weak enings of nccessity (the case with probability =
I) wh ereas
en hance d probability is not. Th e latt er demands that we know th e prior
probabilities (th e probability of occu rrence of an event without th e pr esen ce
of the caus e) as well as th e posterior probabilities. Wh ether or not th e value
uf th e enhanc ed probability is near = 1 is not an issue in Salmon's version ,
hen ce it really br eaks with necessit y not just weak en s it. See Salmon ,
Scient!fic Explanation and th e Causal Stru cture rif the World, pp. 30 -4 .
41. lbid ., p. 203.
42. Bunge, Causality and Modern Science, Chapter 6 .
4\ . Ibid ., Chapte r 8.
44 . Deleu ze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 408. (Emphasis in the original)
45 . Ian Hackin g , Representing and Interveninq, P: 158. (My em phasis) Hacking
ex plicitl y compares expe r ime ntalists and artisans, both suffering a relativel y
low er soc ial status du e to th eir involvement with an active materiality, on e
th at does not ob ey Sim ple theoretical laws or allow exte rn al forms to be
im posed on it as a co m mand (p. 151). In classical m echanics perhaps th e
bcst exam p les of th ese tw o scie nt ific caste s ar e th e theorists Isaac Newton
o r Rob ert Boyle, on one hand, and th e expe rime ntalist Rob ert Ho ok e, on
th e othe r . As on e scientist puts it, ' unlike Newton, Ho ok e was int en sely
int erested in what went on in kit chens, do ckyards, and buildings - the
mundane mechanical ar enas of life .. . Nor did Hooke despise crafts me n,
and hc pr obabl y got th e inspiration for at least som e of his ide as from his
friend th e g re at Lond on clockmaker Th omas Tompion . .. ' Gam es Ed ward
Go rdo n , The Science rif Structu res and Mat ertals [Scientifi c Am eri can Library.
19881,p ·18) .
46 . 'Phenomena accumulate . For example, Willis Lamb is trying to do optics
without photons. Lamb may kill off the photons [i.c. create a new theory or
NOTE S
a new paradigm for optics] but the ph otoelectric effect will sti ll be th ere '
(Hac king, Represenring and Intervening, P: 56. Also see pp. 155-6 2).
,17. Ibid. , pp. 83-4.
IX. lbid., p . 265. (Em phasis in the original)
I (J. Picke ring , The Mangle rif Practice, p . 70 .
r, O. Dc lcuze, in fact, do es not refer to learning in a laboratory conte xt , but his
idea of lcarning as involving an int ensiv e assemblage or a problematic.field is
d earl y applicable to th e case of ex pe rime ntal physics. Here's how Del euz e
ex presses this idea,
For learning e volves entirely in th e comprehension of problem s as such
. . . Learning to sw im or learning a for eign language means com posing
the singular points of on e's own bod y or of on e's own language with
those of another shap e or cleme nt whi ch tears us apart but also propels
us into a hitherto unknown or unh eard-of world of problems. (Diffe rence
and Repetiti on, p. 192)
And he adds that thi s com position of on e's singularities and affects with
tho se of water (in the case of swimming) or with thos e charact erizing the
o unds and patterns of a language, forms a problematic field (p. 165). A
' problematic field' refers to a het erogeneous assemblagc since , as he says,
' le,lI'lling is th e . . . structure whi ch unites differen ce to differen ce, dissimi-
I.II·ity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them' (p . J 66).
11>,.1., p. 164.
, Il.ll.:king, Representing and Intervening, P: 209.
IIII IIg c , Causality and Modern Science, p. 71. (Em phasis in th e original)
I h leuz e , D!flerence and Repetition, p . 25.
1/.,,1.• p. 177 .
t; " ne ralizing , we can say that a dynamical theory is approximately true
just if th e modelin g geo me tric structure approximates (in suitable
I "spects) to th e structure to be mod eled: a basic case is where trajectories
III th e mo del closely track traj ectories encod ing physi cally rea l behaviors
(or. at least , track them for long eno ugh) . (Pete r mith, Explaining Chaos
1C.llnhri dge Un iversit y Pr ess, Cambr idge, 1998], p. 72)
r rhur " lbe rall , Towards a General Science I?!' Viable Systems (Mc Graw -Hill,
• \\ York, 1972 ), p . 7 . (My e mp hasis)
I I 1111 ( ;ood man, 'Seven tri ctures on Sim ilarity' , in Problem and Projects
dIu),)" Merrill , Indianapolis, 1972 ), p . +45. Goodman ' s att ack on the noti on
" uui l.rritv was as caustic as it was influential. Sim ilarity, he said 'ever
.. I til so l\'\' philosophi cal pr obl em s and oven-orne ob sta les, is .1 pn··
 NOTES
tender, an impostor, a quack . It has, ind eed , its place and its uses, but is
more ofte n found wh er e it do es not belon g, professing powers it do es not
possess' (p,437) . Tod ay' s generat ion of realist philosopher s who have
resuscitated this notion have learned Goodman ' s lesson that any two thi ngs
are similar in some respel.t or another , and that therefore when ever valid
judgments of sim ilarit y ar e made the relevom respects in which things may be
said t o he alike mu st be speci fied (p . 444) . But thi s, of co urse, simply
changes th e task to on e of speci fying distribution s of th e relevant and th e
Irrelevant, and th at is just wha t a problematic approach is su pposed to do .
At this point th e usual reply by defender s of sim ilarity is to fall back on
subjectivism and say that qu estions of rel evan ce and irrele vance are int erest-
relative.
But far from sett ling th e issu e , to re latlvize r ele vance to su bjective
interests is fatal to realism . If there ' s one lesson to be learned from recent
sociology of scie nce it 's th at , as a matter of empirical fact , the inter est s of
scientist s canno t be viewed as bein g purely episte mo logical, born from so me
essent ial rational ity or a driving curiosity . If we are t o relativ ize relevance
to inter ests th en we sho uld bring th e full rep ertoire of interests her e,
including not o nly selfish profession al and institutional interest s but also
those that may be deri ved from a sci entist' s m embership in class o r gende r
hierarchies, for exam ple . Th e rampant relativi sm that thi s manoeu ver has
sometimes given rise to sho uld be a cautio nary lesson for any defender of
realism . Alan Garfinkel somet imes ex pre sses him self as if the choice of
contrast space, that is, th e choice of how to pose a probl em , is relativ e to
human inter est s and values, as in th e differ ent value s held hy th e pr iest and
the thief in his example, But qu esti ons of explanatory stability seem to point
to an object ivity of th e distribution s of the rel evant and th e irrel evant.
Whate ve r relativity th ere may be in explanations it is an objecti ve one ,
depend ing on th e e xist ence of indi vidual s with th eir o wn eme rge nt causa l
capacities at many le vels of scale. Human values would enter th e pict ure in
the choice of on e o r another of th ese level s of scale as th e level of interest,
but a correct ex p lanation, as Garfinkel says , ' will see k its own level'
(Garfi nkel , Formsl!I Explanat ion , P: 59) .
Gilles Dcleuze, D!fftrence and Repetition, p . 16 3.
There is nothing in th e ordinary m eanin g of th e words ' universal' and
' ~ ingu lar ' that marks th e philosophical distin cti on Deleuze is attempt ing to
draw here , In fact, ana lytical phil osoph er s use the wo rds 'gen er al' and
'universal' alm ost inte rc hangeably, and the terms ' part icular' and 's ingular'
JS rloscly relat ed . In D1 ference and Repetition uni versalit y and singularity an'
(loth prop erties of o bje ct ive probl em s, the fo rmer defining th ei r o nto logie.l l
-utus ,1S virt ual entit ies (cap able or di vl.'rgt'n t act ualizat ion) th e latter till'
NOTE S
stat us of th at which defines th eir condition s (d istribut io ns of th e rel evant and
th e irrelevant ). The very first page of thi s book state s ' Ge nerality, as
gt'nl'r ality of the particular, thu s stands o pposed to re peti tio n as un ive rsalit y
of th e singular ' (p. 1). Yet, Deleu ze is not consist ent in his usage , and
else where he says th at th e ' splendid ste rility or neutralit y [of multipliciti es]
. . . is indifferent to th e uni ve rsal and the singular , to th e general and th e
particular, t o th e personal and the co llec t ive' (Gilles Deleu ze , LOBic if Sense
[Col umbia University Press, Ne w Yor k , 19 90], P' 35) .
Ml. Dialect ic is th e art of problems and qu estion s ... Ho wev er , dialectic
loses its peculiar power when it remains conte nt to trace problems from
propo sitions : thus begin s th e hist ory of th e lon g perver sion ' vhich places
it un der th e pO\\'er of th e negative , Ari stotl e writes: Th e differen ce
between a probl em and a proposition is a differen ce in th e turn of phrase .
{Dcle uze , Difference and Repetition, P' 158)
I . 1.1lI Ste wart and Martin Golubitsky, Feaiful Symmetry (Blackwe ll, Oxford ,
1')9 2), P: 4 2. ( Em phasis in the ori ginal )
II } I Jcle uzc , D~fJerence and Repetit ion , P: 162.
h' llu- impact of g ro up th eory o n ph ysics is r evealed not onl y by th e fact that
1111' ('hange fro m classical to relativistic physics can be described in grou p
tlu-un-t lc terms (Einste in replaced th e old Ga lilean group of transformations
Ii )' another one , the Poin car e gro up) but also by th e fact that th e swit ch t o
n-Ia t lvi:..t ic m echani cs involv ed a change of cognit ive st rate gy in which
mva rinnccs und er transformation s becam e more imp ortant th an the ph ysical
I.I\\"\ the m sel ves. As th e ph ysicist Eugen e Wi gner puts it ,
[Einste in's ] papers on speci al relativity .. . mark th e reversal of a trend :
until then t he prin cipl es of invariance were derived from th e law s of
mo tion . . . It is natural for us now to deri ve th e laws of natu re and to
tes t their validi ty hy mean s of th e law s of invarian cc, rath er th an t o
derive t he laws of invarian ce fro m what we belie ve to be th e laws of
o.uun-. T he ge ne ral theory of relativity is th e next mil est on e in th e
!.btury of invariance .. . It is th e first attem pt to derive a law of nature
Ii )' M'lt'di ng the sim plest invari ant equat io n . .. (Euge ne P . Wi gn er,
' Invartancc in Physical T heo ry ', in S/mmetries and Rtfteetiom , eds. W alt er
Moon' and Michael Scr iven [O x Bo w Press, W oodbridge , 19 79], P' 7 )
11111'b Kline, ,lIathemat ical Thouahr from Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. 2
II ) lor d Llnivcrsity Pr ess, Ne w Yo rk , 197 2), P: 7 59 . Thi s idea can he
• I'l.lilll' d hy .1Ilalogy with th e use o f tra nsfo rma t ion grou ps to d assil)'
I t 1I1 1H·lrk.,1 figu n's. W hen un c s,lys th ai a cube remains Invaria nt und e r a
 NOTES
N OTES

gr oup of rotations (e .g. the set containing 0, 90, 180 and 270 degree
logical OpiniOnS, geo me trical th eorem s, algebraic equatio ns , physical
rotations) on e means that, after performing one such transformation the
hypoth eses or transcend ental judgments; and the philosophi cal illusion
cube's app earance remains und1anged: an observer who did not witness the
which involves evaluating problem s according to their 'solvability' - in
transformation would not be able to tell that a change has in fact occ urre d.
other wo rds, according to th e extr insic and variable form of th e possibility
In a similar way, when Galoi s found a group of permutations that left
of th eir finding a solutio n. (Deleuze, D!ffirence and Repetit ion, p. 161)
algebraic relations invariant he found a measure eif our isnorance eif th e solutions,
since we cannot distinguish th em from one another after th ey have been so 7 1 . Bunge, Causality and Modern Science, PI" 203 - 4 . (Emphasis in th e original)
transformed.
The fact that nonlinear th eori es are rare is not so mu ch a peculiarity of
65. Deleuze, D!iference and Repetiti on, PI" 180-1.
natu r e as a sign of th e infancy of our scien ce . No nlinearity involves large
66 . Ibid . , PI" 179-80. That Deleuz e views th e progressive specification of a
mathe matical diffi culti es; beside being math ematically clumsy, it affects
problem as a kind of sym me try- bre aking cascade (a term he never uses,
th e ver y sym bo lic representation of physical entities. T hus forces that add
pr eferring Galois's idea of an ' adjunction of fields ') is clear from this ext ract:
nonlin earl y (as gravitational forces do ) cannot be exactly represented by
On th e contrary, 'solvability ' must depend upon an int ernal chara ct er - vecto rs since the addition of th e latt er conforms to the sup erposition
istic : it must be determined by th e conditions of the problem, engendered ' principle ' . From th e moment it was realized that th e laws of ferromag-
in and by the problem along with th e real solutions. Without thi s netism are nonlinear, it has been more or less clearly suspect ed that all
reversal, the famous Copernican Revolution amounts to nothing . Mor e- physical phenomena may turn out to be at least weakly nonlinear,
over , ther e is no revolution so long as we remain tied to Euclidian linearity being onl y an approximation which is exce llent in som e cases
geo me try : we mu st mov e to . . . a Riemannian -like differential geometry but only rough in othe rs. (I' . 168; em phasis in th e original)
which tends to S hoe rise to discontinuity on th e basis if cont inuity , or to ground
l Iclcuzc, Diff erence and Repetition, p. 189.
solutions on the conditions of th e problem. (I" 162; my emphasis)

67. Ian Ste wart , Does God PIa)' Dice? The Math emat ics if Chaos (Basil Blackw ell,
O xford , 1989), 1'1'.38- 9.
68 . onlinear equations , du e to factors like the occurrence of higher pow er s of
the dependent variabl e, do not obey supe rp osition. On th e differ ences
between the linear and th e nonlinear , and on th e (rare) conditio ns for th e
exact solvability of nonlinear equations (auto no my and separability) , see
David Acheson, From Calculus to Chaos: An Introduct ion to Dynamics (O xford
Univer sity Press, New York 1997), Chapter 3.
O n the superposit ion principle as crite rion to distinguish these tw o types
sec David K. Campbell, ' Nonlinear Scienc e . From Paradi gm s to Practical -
ities' , in From Cardinals to Chaos, ed . Necia Grant Cooper (Cambridge
Univer sity Press, New York, 1989), p. 219.
69 . Ste wart, Does God Pia)' Dice?, p. 83. (Emphasis in th e original)
70 . Jun e Barrow -Green , Poincare and th e Three Body Problem (Am erican Math-
ematica l Society, 1997), PI" 32-8 .
O n th e histor y of this appro ach pri or to th e work by Poin care see Kline ,
Mathematica l Thou,qhtIrom Ancient to Modern Tim es, Pl" 72 1-5.

71 . W e alwa ys find the tw o aspects o f the illusion : th e natural illusion wh ich

invo lves tr acing pr obl em s from suppose dly pr eexistent proposition s,
 Index
.IITects 62-5,69-70,75, 141,167,
199 n.35, 218 n,46
assem blage 56 -8, 62-4, 93, 136,
142-3,236 n.50
.u tractor 15, 20, 31- 2, 36- 7, 50, 55,
79,90,109-1 1, 134, 148,214
n.19
axiom atic 121, 154, 179
I" 'coming 84, 101-2, 107
bifurca tion 19-20,32,50,79,86,
109-10, 134 , 207 n.61
, .Iusality 75 , 119- 20 , 126, 129,
137-40, 142, 144-5, 228 nA
, mtinu urn 22-3,27,69,74 -6, 107,
158, 161
, onvc rgcnce
and communication betwe en virtual
ser ies 76 -7, 104, 160- 1,206
n.59, 208 n.67, 220 n.53
.uu l subjectivity 162- 3, 171
divergence
.1IId ramification of virtual ser ies
74 - 5, 104, 160, 169, 176, 205
n.58
.incl actualization 22 , 28, 64 , 118
,. "'nc<' 3- 4 , 9, 16, 28, 39- 40 , 78,
106, 119, 121, 128, 183 nn. IO &
11 , 23 1 n.20, 2 32 n.23
t ' u-nsiv« 26 -7, 46, 5 1 3, 58, 64, 85,
144, 163
identit y 4, 9, 22, 40, 42, 74, 86, 107,
118, 193 nn.59 & 60
immanence 3,10,13,28,41,75,80,
10 3, 110-11 , 146, 177,2 18 n ,49
individuation 29,40,43,45 -6,51 ,
7 1,84,97-8 , 101, 117, 142,
145,1 6 1,1 64 ,1 71 ,1 95 nA, 202
n.5 1, 234 n. 34
intensive 4, 26 -7,45 -6, 50, 55, 58 ,
64,85,92 -4,98, 135, 143-4,
159 ,1 6 1- 2, 165, 167 , 169,1 71 ,
173- 5, 188 n.28, 199 n.30
invariant 18, 24 , 69, 75, 83, 86- 7 ,
150, 210 nA, 238 n.63
law 83, 106, 118-19, 121, 123- 4 ,
141, 146, 150,180,210 n.4, 221
n.57
metric
space 24 -6,51,56-7,69,73, 172,
179,186 n.22, 187 n.26
time 84,88, 106,108-9,213 n. 17
multiplicities 9, 13, 22, 28, 32,40- 1,
69,72 -5, 105-8, 111- 13, 129,
135,148,1 59,1 66,1 70,1 74 ,
181 n. 1, 182 n.6
natural kind 9, 13, 43, 46
necessity 37-8, 192 n.54, 235 nA O
non -equilibrium 66 -8
nonlinear 37,5 2-3,66 -7,87, 119,
123,131,136,140 1,144,153 ,
155, 235 n. 17, 239 n.6
 IN 0 EX
ordinal series 70,73 -7,104,113 ,
159, 170,204 n.56
phase transition 19- 20, 27, 61, 78 -80,
103- 4 , 107, 197 n.23, 209 n.76
plane of consistency 69, 77, 112-13,
115, 158, 166, 170,226 n.77
population 47-8, 122
possibility 10,13,29,33 -5,37,40,
206 n.59
problems 5, I I, 102, 115, 125, 127,
129- 33, 135- 7 ,1 40 ,1 44 - 5,
146- 7, 149- 52, 154, 168,
176 - 7, 23 1 nn.19 & 20, 239
n. 34, 240 n.72
progressive differ entiation 17, 25, 28,
54,69, 102, 105, 151, 164 , 177,
185 n.20
quasi-causal
opera tor 75- 8, 80, 10 3, 108,
I l l-IS, 136, 160, 165-6, 168,
170, 174 - 6, 219 n 52,220 n.53 ,
223 n.71, 224 nn.74 & 75
re lations 127,129,133 -4,140,
146, 207 n. 62
rates of change I I , 49, 53, 95-6,
99- 100
relevance 5, 13, 90, 130 - 2, 144 - 5,
148, 151
resemblance 4,9, 10,2 1,28,40-2,
60 , 68, 136, 147- 8, 193 nn .59 &
60, 237 n. 58
singularity 5,15 -16,31,36,64-5,
72,77,92,94, 108, 125-7, 131,
134,137,141,146-8,154,167 ,
203 n.53
state space 14-15,30 -2,62, 130,
134, 136, 145-6, 154, 175
symmetry-breaking 18-19, 21, 24-6,
74,86 -7,105,107,135, lSI,
185 n.20, 20 1 n.46, 239 n.66
time scale 87,90- 1, 108, 214 n. 19
topologica l
feature (forms, const raints) 15- 16,
29,31,72, 110-11, 147-8 , 183
n.S, 197 n. 19
space 23, 52-3, 56, 69, 74, 179,
226 n.76
time 105-9,222 nn.58 & 59
transcendence 3, 10, 13, 4 1, 80, 107,
113, 177
truth 5, 121,123, 134, 147, 177
typology 41-2,47-8,68, 177, 193
nn.59 & 60
unity 13, 113
universal
as concrete entity 22, 28, 70, 112
as mechanism-independence 16, 55,
75,79,92 -3,127, 129, 133,207
n.6 1
as opposed to the general 148- 50 ,
237 n.59
Virt uality 33-8,44,65 -8,78, 102,
105- 9 , 127 , 135, 147, 154, 165,
174 - 5, 219 n.52, 225 n. 76