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To cite this Article Chiesa, Lorenzo(2006) '“Le ressort de l'amour”', Angelaki, 11: 3, 61 — 81
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09697250601048515
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09697250601048515
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ANGEL AK I
journal of the theoretical humanities
volume 11 number 3 december 2006
I introduction
The relationship between psychoanalysis and the
classical world’s philosophical and literary pro-
‘‘LE RESSORT DE
duction dates back to Freud who made of the L’AMOUR’’
Oedipus complex one of the conceptual corner-
stones of his revolutionary practice. If, on the one lacan’s theory of love in
hand, Jacques Lacan’s reading of Sophocle’s
Antigone in his Seminar VII (1959–1960) has
his reading of plato’s
been repeatedly investigated by many commen- symposium
tators, on the other, few have ventured to explore
his close and extensive – more than two hundred excellence is the analytic situation.’’5 It is no
pages long – examination of Plato’s Symposium doubt one of the great achievements of psycho-
in Seminar VIII (1960–1961).1 According to analysis to have shown how love could artificially
Lacan, this dialogue depicts an ante-litteram be provoked; according to Lacan, this fact is not
but nevertheless paradigmatic transferential necessarily to the detriment of love itself: love’s
relationship whose protagonists are Socrates artificiality as it emerges in the analytical setting6
(qua proto-analyst) and Alcibiades (qua proto- might suggest that love as such is closely linked
analysand); Seminar VIII is indeed entitled ‘‘Le to some sort of psychical fiction, one which is
transfert.’’2 Lacan also cautiously specifies that however ‘‘essential’’ for the subject.7
his reading of Plato does not primarily focus ‘‘on Given these premises, it is not surprising that,
the question of the nature of love,’’3 on the when approaching Plato, Lacan is mainly inter-
abstract, philosophical notion of love as such ested in articulating a connection between the
which is ‘‘an event, strictly speaking, miraculous Symposium’s philosophical speeches on love – all
in itself’’4 but on the question of love’s relation- revolving around a Socratic ‘‘ti esti?/what is it?’’
ship with the empirical experience of transference – and Alcibiades’ sudden irruption followed by
in psychoanalysis. We could define the latter with his public declaration of love to Socrates: as
Laplanche-Pontalis as ‘‘a process of actualisation Lacan points out, Alcibiades’ vehement and
of unconscious desires [whose] context par profoundly intimate speech in the first person
ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN1469-2899 online/06/030061^21 ß 2006 Taylor & Francis and the Editors of Angelaki
DOI: 10.1080/09697250601048515
61
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
‘‘goes beyond the limit of the banquet.’’8 itself as a reading of Lacan’s reading of
Therefore, in commenting on Plato’s dialogue, Plato’s Symposium.
Lacan’s principal assumption is that its final part
is far from constituting an apocryphal and II lacan as a reader of plato
tangential addendum,9 an unimportant divertisse-
ment or a mere apology of Socrates directed at The first speaker of the Symposium is Phaedrus
those who had accused him of being the cause of (178a–180b). He declares that Eros is one of the
most ancient of all gods. Love has donated
Alcibiades’ notorious hybris:10 these have all
the greatest benefits to men as demonstrated by
been popular readings of the Symposium’s
the fact that when the lover (erastes) is in love, he
conclusion throughout the centuries. On the
wants to distinguish himself before his beloved
contrary, for Lacan, there is no reason why we
(eromenos). Love instils courage and the ability
should not believe that ‘‘this bit has an
to sacrifice oneself for one’s beloved, as the
[important] function.’’11
examples of Alcestis and Achilles clearly show.
It is now my intention to proceed as follows:
Thus, love contributes to the well-being of the
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62
chiesa
decides to die; in her case we can talk of a In Lacan’s opinion, Pausanias’ speech is
substitution and consequently of a metaphor important only insofar as it is ‘‘derisory’’:23
sensu stricto. Achilles’ position is not the Aristophanes has hiccups and is not able to speak
same: as opposed to most commentators,18 when his turn comes since he has been laughing
Lacan takes Phaedrus’s speech at face value throughout its entire duration. Plato is having
and claims that Achilles is an eromenos; and fun as well; he shows it with an interminable
what is more, he sacrifices his life for his series of homophonies which follows Pausanias’
lover in spite of the fact that Patroclus is speech and deals with Aristophanes’ hiccups:
already dead. Strictly speaking, he cannot be ‘‘Having paused Pausanias . . .’’ (‘‘Pausaniou
his substitute. In order to sacrifice himself [. . .] pausamenou . . .’’), etc. (185c).24
for love he needs to become an erastes: According to Lacan, Plato’s message regarding
this becoming erastes of the eromenos, this speech can be said to anticipate the Christian
the fact that the ‘‘beloved behaves like motto according to which the rich person will not
a lover,’’ is defined by Lacan as a ‘‘mir- enter the Kingdom of Heaven (qua Kingdom of
aculous’’ transformation.19 Lacan thus Love, we should emphasize). Why is Pausanias
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underlines Phaedrus’s remark on how this thought to epitomize the position of the rich
change together with the sacrifice it entails man? Why can he not really love? Lacan’s answer
‘‘is what gods deem sublime’’:20 in other is the following: for Pausanias, love is ‘‘all about
words, Achilles’ love is more ‘‘admirable’’ an exchange’’:25 on the one hand, the erastes
than Alcestis’ since, we might add, it ‘‘shows himself able to give a contribution whose
entails a form of disinterestedness that, object is intelligence (phronesis), and the whole
strictly speaking, goes beyond the residual field of merit (areté)’’; on the other hand, the
‘‘pathological’’ utility of sacrifice qua eromenos ‘‘needs to gain something in education
sacrifice-for.21 (paideia) and, generally, in knowledge
The second to speak is Pausanias (180c– (sophia).’’26 The topic of the entire speech is a
185c). According to him, there are two distinct ‘‘quote of values.’’27 The relation of the rich man
kinds of Love: there is a ‘‘celestial’’ Love and a to the other is entirely a matter of value, of the
‘‘vulgar’’ one. Human deeds are never good or ‘‘external signs of value.’’28 Pausanias’ notion of
bad in themselves: actions can be praised only honesty utterly equates to a regulated ‘‘possession
if they are carried out with honest intentions. of the beloved.’’29 Lacan believes that all those
Love is now discredited for the vulgar use that commentators who have overlapped Pausanias’
many people make of it by aiming only at the deceptive ‘‘ethics of pedagogic love’’ – ultimately
body of the beloved. Pausanias then moves on based on an acquisition (ktasthai) – either with
to a description of homosexual relationships and Plato’s own personal beliefs or with so-called
the way in which they are differently considered ‘‘Platonic love,’’ are profoundly mistaken.30
in different parts of Greece. Athenian customs Finally, if Pausanias cannot enter the Kingdom
are ambiguous; the erastes is both encouraged of Love, it is because true love is not measurable
and hindered in his attempts to conquer his and cannot be acquired/possessed. This is some-
eromenos: the latter is blamed if he surrenders thing which Alcestis and, above all, Achilles had
too quickly or for the wrong reasons to the already demonstrated; as a matter of fact, we
erastes. Pausanias thinks that this ambiguity is might add, it is not a mere coincidence if the
due to the necessity of distinguishing between latter’s act was awarded a special compensation
the lover who desires only the body of the by the gods: as Phaedrus reminds us, Achilles
beloved and the lover who, on the contrary, was immediately allowed to enter the Isles of the
aims at improving the knowledge of the Blessed, i.e., the Heaven of the ancient world.
beloved. Homosexuality is permissible only I will omit Eryximachus’s speech, since
when the intention of both the erastes and the Lacan’s comments about it are only indirectly
eromenos is honest.22 related to the question of love.
63
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
64
chiesa
introduced intercourse between two human moved: two half-spheres can copulate through
beings’’ (191b). This passage is fundamental their ‘‘internal’’ middle point but could never
for Lacan: it hints at the fact that in order to fuse and become a sphere again, not even for an
have (object) love ‘‘something which relates instant. There is no sexual relationship if we
to an operation on the genitals must intend it in terms of a transitory ‘‘fusion,’’ of a
occur.’’36 In other words, love is inextricable harmonious, pacifying encounter between the two
from symbolic castration and its assump- sexes; but there is a sexual relationship if we
tion, that is, from the mythical renunciation intend it as an asymmetrical ‘‘superimposition’’40
of the spherical/divine genitals and their or intersection which ‘‘makes one’’ thanks to the
absolute enjoyment – note that the latter illusory veil/sublimation of imaginary love. Love
is only supposed/fantasized: Aristophanes thus proposes itself as a fictional, unifying
clearly indicates how, at this stage, spheres palliative that compensates for the absence of
are already reduced to impotent half-spheres. the sexual relationship. This kind of love clearly
Castration is necessary in order to establish differs from that described by Phaedrus.
both a sexual and a love relationship between The fifth speaker is Agathon (194d–197e):
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65
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
and laws. Diotima also delineates an ascending philosophical conclusion, but philosophy is
trajectory that the lover should pursue: he is not able to go beyond this point: Socratic
asked to move from the love of the beauty of one episteme qua self-consistent, ‘‘completely
body to the love of the beauty which manifests transparent knowledge’’49 cannot attain
itself in all bodies, and then, progressively, to Eros per se. By making Diotima speak on
that for laws and institutions, science, until he his behalf and by reporting her myth, by
reaches the contemplation of beauty itself, which having to switch from episteme to mythos,
is immutable and imperishable. This speech is Socrates would surreptitiously acknowledge
usually attributed to Plato himself given that that Agathon’s speech has got him into
it seems to presuppose his theory of forms; the trouble.50
ultimate kalon, which is reached by the lover (d) Socrates knows that episteme cannot attain
after a gradual process of abstraction, eludes any Eros. Socrates is generally the one who
concrete determination and overlaps with the knows not to know; however, in this
form of forms: goodness-in-itself. dialogue – as well as in the Lysis – he
Lacan is firmly convinced that Agathon’s and more specifically presents himself as the one
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Socrates’ speeches should be read together. They who does not know anything but ‘‘the ways
are perfectly complementary. Why? of love.’’51 Precisely because he knows what
love is, he also knows that his dialectic
(a) Agathon is not just a cheap sophist; he method cannot fully disclose what it is.
‘‘knows very well what he is doing.’’42 By ‘‘Even if Socrates knows, he cannot speak
analysing the language of his intervention himself about what he knows and has to
and strongly disagreeing with usual transla- make speak somebody else who speaks
tions on different points, Lacan shows us without knowing’’:52 a priestess, somebody
how Plato’s main intention here is to through whom the Other (gods) speaks.
deliberately create contradictions (aporia) With an ingenious but nevertheless rather
such as ‘‘when there is love there is no more precipitous comparison, Lacan associates
love.’’43 Agathon, the tragic poet, is pre- Diotima’s ‘‘non-transparent knowledge’’
sented as the real ironist, if by ‘‘irony’’ we with unconscious knowledge. Therefore,
mean deliberately provoked ‘‘dis-orienta- Socrates’ passage from episteme to mythos
tion.’’ Agathon’s message (probably directed entails the implicit admission of the exis-
against Pausanias, his real-life lover) is clear: tence of the unconscious: Diotima’s mythical
‘‘love is unclassifiable [. . .] it never stays in speech is nothing but the speech of Socrates’
its own place’’;44 love is atopos.45 unconscious.53 The direct consequence of
(b) Agathon is far from being convinced by the dioekisthèmen described by
Socrates’ dialectic confutation: he simply Aristophanes’ myth – that is, of the
admits that they are talking about love at ‘‘Spaltung, the division of the perfectly
two different levels, given that he has spoken round primitive being’’54 – is the formation
in riddles (201c).46 Socrates himself of a kind of knowledge – which first and
acknowledges that Agathon delivered a foremost concerns love – that eludes
‘‘kalon logon’’ (198b), i.e., a fine speech: Socratic episteme and can only be expressed
with a laboured pun, he also admits that he by ‘‘dwelling in the zone of the ‘he didn’t
has been ‘‘gorgonized’’ – that is, turned into know.’ ’’55
stone – (198c) by its ‘‘Gorgianic’’ style. (e) According to Lacan, mythos has to be
(c) Socrates’ confutation qua philosophical interpreted in this context according to its
speech on love hurriedly47 replaces love original signification: ‘‘mythos legein,’’56
with desire as the object of its enquiry and which means ‘‘what we generally say,’’
then reveals the interconnection between what we generally say about truth without
desire and lack: ‘‘one desires what one lacks being able to prove why that is true. In such
in essence’’ (200e).48 This is an important a way, one could argue that Lacan implicitly
66
chiesa
makes mythos and doxa overlap insofar as clearly drunk. After a humorous squabble with
they are both forms of non-ignorance that Socrates and Agathon, he declares he does not
partake of the unconscious function of the want to praise Eros but the person of Socrates.
‘‘he didn’t know.’’ On top of his comments When one meets him for the first time,
concerning Diotima’s capacity to talk about Alcibiades says, he may seem to look like a
love in a mythical way, Lacan in fact also Silenus or a satyr:61 however, his words produce a
argues that ‘‘love belongs to a zone [. . .] prodigious, spell-binding effect. When Alcibiades
which is at the same level and has the same was young, he attempted to seduce Socrates but
qualities of doxa; i.e., [. . .] there are failed: Socrates resisted all his advances, even
discourses, behaviours, opinions [. . .] though he admittedly was in love with him.
which are true even though the subject According to Alcibiades, nobody is like Socrates:
does not know it.’’57 Socrates’ and Agathon’s after having been unable to sleep with Socrates,
speeches on love are thus proved to be very he would have obeyed all his orders without
close to one another: Socrates knows but has hesitation, like a slave (219e).62
to talk without knowing, i.e., in mythical Socrates’ answer to Alcibiades’ eulogy
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terms; Agathon’s doxa does not know but, as (epainos) is unexpected: ‘‘The whole point of
Lacan says, ‘‘n’a pas moins fort bien your speech was [. . .] that I ought to love you and
parlé.’’58 nobody else, and Agathon ought to be loved by
(f) Finally, we might suggest that all this leads you and nobody else’’ (222d). Alcibiades accepts
Lacan to draw two fundamental conclusions Socrates’ interpretation.
from Socrates-Diotima’s words: 1) in Why, according to Lacan, is this epilogue so
philosophical terms, love qua real desire important for the overall economy of the
(‘‘érôs-désir’’) corresponds to the continuous dialogue? First, because Plato portrays here love
postponement of what one’s object of desire ‘‘as we live it,’’63 love in action.64 The main
is – a body, bodies in general, laws, etc. – question now is not ‘‘what is love?’’ but ‘‘how
until desire reaches a ‘‘final identification’’ does it work?’’ Second, and more importantly, as
with kalon in itself; 2) in mythical terms, we shall see later in more detail, because Plato is
love qua love (‘‘érôs-amour’’) is the son of implicitly suggesting that Alcibiades’ final posi-
Poros and Penia. Penia is precisely what tion concretely provides us with a notion of love
Poros is not. Penia is literally A-poria, i.e., which is alternative to Diotima’s ascent to beauty/
that which, by being resource-less, constitu- goodness in itself.
tes an impasse, a contradiction.59 Love is So why is Alcibiades’ final position, after his
thus the product of Poros and Aporia. Love true intentions have been unmasked and – above
is a certain, secondary adaequatio which all – acknowledged by him, so important?
follows a structural inadaequatio – Because after Alcibiades’ eulogy of Socrates –
Agathon’s doxatic speech was therefore at i.e., the confession of his transferential love to
least partially correct. This inadaequatio is ‘‘the tribunal of the Other’’65 – and after
a precondition of love, it factually is his Socrates’ own interpretation of the transference
mother; when Aporia lays with Poros-the- – Lacan notes that ‘‘Socrates’ is, properly speak-
resourceful who does not know he is ing, a [psychoanalytic] interpretation’’66 –
conceiving Love since he is drunk and Alcibiades can finally desire for real. Alcibiades
asleep, Aporia does not have anything to becomes what Socrates already was, ‘‘l’homme du
give him but her very own lack.60 désir,’’ which means he stops fearing castration.67
The end of the dialogue coincides with the end
of Alcibiades’ proto-psychoanalysis. It is for the
III in plato more than himself same reason that this epilogue is so significant
Shortly after the end of Socrates’ speech, for Lacan’s own notion of transferential love.
Alcibiades tumultuously enters the house in In Plato’s dialogue, Alcibiades compares
which the symposium is held. He is Socrates to one ‘‘of those Sileni you find sitting
67
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
in sculptors’ shops [. . .] which when opened up Socrates: ‘‘Che vuoi?,’’ ‘‘What do you want
are found to contain a precious object (agalma) from me? Why do you seem to want from
inside’’ (215b).68 The metaphor of the Silenus me something which is not in myself?’’
and the term agalma are central for Lacan’s Alcibiades’ desire is thus initially elicited.
reading of this scene; the analysand behaves However, at this stage, his miraculous
exactly like Alcibiades with Socrates: he attri- transformation into an erastes has not
butes a hidden precious object (agalma), i.e., his occurred yet. Unlike Achilles, he is not
object of desire, to the analyst. How is this desire here a pure desirer. His love remains
initiated? How is it transvalued into ‘‘real’’ desire imaginary. He desires Socrates just to
beyond transference? What is the link between make sure that Socrates desires him in
desire and love in this context? In order to return (only him); his desire is aimed at
provide an introductory answer to these funda- confirming his disputed role of beloved.73 In
mental questions, I shall reconstruct the phenom- other words, like Pausanias, Alcibiades is
enology of the transferential relationship between still proposing an exchange of values which
Socrates and Alcibiades in four different stages: does not contemplate any lack or excess.
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68
chiesa
Alcibiades’ beautiful body] for truth [i.e., For the Lacan of Seminar VIII, real love
Socrates’ agalma]’’; on the one hand, that somehow sublimates real desire for death
would not be fair; on the other: ‘‘Be careful, without erasing it: real love has to come to
examine things with more circumspection terms with real lack. In this sense, love is a
(ameinon skopei) so that you won’t make messenger of the Real, a metaxu between the
any mistake; this self is, properly speaking, order of the Real (qua lack) and reality (in
nothing (ouden ôn). [. . .] There where you which the structural lack is necessarily
see something, I am nothing.’’75 veiled).
(d) Helped by Socrates’ interpretation of the (c) Socrates qua analyst has a priori decided not
facts he is now reliving by recounting them to love; he ‘‘does not enter into the game
publicly, Alcibiades retroactively realizes of love’’78 – even though he could. More
that Socrates is/was not the real object of specifically, he refuses to be loved. This does
his desire; his desire is now contingently not prevent him from desiring: there is a
aimed at Agathon. More importantly, he also specific desire of the analyst. ‘‘If the analyst
grasps that his desire actually aims at what realizes the popular image [. . .] of apathy,
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is in Agathon more than himself, i.e., his this is only insofar as he is possessed by a
agalma. According to Lacan, Socrates desire which is more powerful than [. . .]
ironically anticipates this realization when, getting down to facts with his patient.’’79
at the beginning of the Symposium, he (d) The Symposium has an open ending: we
compares Agathon with a ‘‘full cup’’ ignore what happens next. We do not know
(175e).76 This is obviously an antiphrasis: if Alcibiades and Agathon will start a true
like Socrates, Alcibiades is in fact, by now, love relationship (given Agathon’s coquet-
able to concede that Agathon does not own tish and self-complacent final remarks at
any agalma. Alcibiades knows that Agathon 222e, this seems highly improbable).
is only a contingent object of his desire. He What we know for certain is that
has thus assumed the truth of his desire Alcibiades could now love: he only needs
beyond transference. Alcibiades has become to meet another pure desirer who consents
a pure desirer/erastes; at the same time, ‘‘the to be loved.
miracle of love is realized in him.’’77
At this stage, we can finally ask ourselves:
Moving beyond Lacan’s overt reading of the what is real, true love for Lacan (of which
Symposium, we may also draw the following he directly speaks very little in Seminar VIII
general conclusions: and elsewhere)? How does he distinguish it from
(a) In order to really desire, Alcibiades needs false, imaginary love? A distinction between
to assume lack. One does not merely desire ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘false’’ love is, in different ways,
what one lacks: essentially, one desires the tacitly present throughout Lacan’s œuvre.
lack that desire is; real desire is, in the end, Simply put, ‘‘false’’ love is imaginary, i.e.,
an unconscious desire for death. This is to narcissistic in essence.80 It must occur during
say: by desiring agalma, or, in Lacanese, the psychoanalysis in the guise of transferential
objet petit a, one actually desires the love.81 Above all, imaginary love entirely
(lacking) object which causes desire to determines our everyday life: it shapes and
desire all other objects (at the imaginary gives consistency to our own imaginary identity,
level). This is why, for Lacan, the objet petit our ego. The latter is nothing but the product of
a is defined as the ‘‘object-cause of desire.’’ an alienating redoubling of the subject caused
This is also why the objet petit a is, for by his capacity to identify himself with his
Lacan, an ‘‘object-nothing which creates mirror-image (or with the imaginary other
something.’’ understood as mirror-image). Such an identifica-
(b) Precisely because Alcibiades really desires, tion relies on the fact that the subject is
he is also potentially ready to really love. captivated by the image of the human body
69
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
which functions as a gestalt. The ego thus giving what one does not have.’’86 The first
attempts to realize an impossible coincidence formula refers to the lover, the second to the
with the ideal image reflected in the mirror: beloved. A quotation from Žižek can help us to
given such an impossibility, this relationship explain them:
ends up in a permanent rivalry of the subject
with himself, with the narcissistic image of When in love, I love somebody because of the
objet a in him/her, because of what is ‘‘in him
himself that the lure of the mirror creates. Such
more than himself’’ – in short, the object of
a rivalry is already evident at the level of the
love cannot give me what I demand of him
dialectics between the child’s early perception of since he doesn’t possess it, since it is an excess
his fragmented body and his parallel vision of in its very heart [. . .] the only thing left to the
the completeness of the specular body: it beloved is thus to proceed to a kind of
continues after the constitution of the Ur-Ich exchange of places, to change from the object
and successively consolidates itself in concomi- into the subject of love, in short: to return
tance with the progressive reinforcement of the love. Therein consists, according to Lacan,
ego’s alienating identifications. In other words, love’s most sublime moment: in this inversion
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since the beginning of his psychic life, the when the beloved object endeavours to deliver
subject both eroticizes and vies with his own himself from the impasse of his position [. . .]
by answering the lover’s lack/desire with his
image because this constitutes the ideal perfec-
own lack. Love is based upon the illusion that
tion which the subject does not have. Narcissism this encounter of the two lacks can succeed.87
and aggressivity are thus one and the same
thing; in later years, Lacan indeed creates a In Seminar VIII, Lacan uses a mythical image
neologism in which ‘‘being in love/enamoured’’ to exemplify all this: I want to pluck a ripe fruit.
(enamouré) and ‘‘hate’’ (haine) are fused in a My hand stretches out, it gets closer to the object
single term: he speaks of hainamoration.82 but it still cannot reach it. At that precise
Narcissism can generally be defined as the moment, it is reached by another stretching hand.
(self-loving) relationship between the subject and When the two hands meet, it is as if they were
his own ideal image; aggressivity differs from grabbing the fruit which attracted and still
sheer aggression understood as violent acting attracts them.88 The least we could say is that
(the latter is just one of its possible outcomes): we are here confronted with a notion of love
on the contrary, it is a prerequisite of the which, despite remaining confined to the field
subject’s imaginary dimension and can never be of ‘‘illusion,’’ as Žižek has it, also appears not to
completely eliminated.83 As a consequence, the impede the appearance of (the subject’s) ‘‘pure’’
augmentation of aggressivity will be proportional desire (in the form of the Other’s desire qua
to the narcissistic intensity of the subject’s object a). In other words, in this context, love
relationship with his own ideal image. The bears the sign of a real encounter with lack; it
subject who, when considered qua ego, is bears ‘‘the scar of castration,’’ says Lacan.89
nothing but the consequence of an alienating More specifically, for Lacan, real love is the
identification with the imaginary other, wants to product of a metaphoric substitution in which
be there where the other is: he loves the other ‘‘the function of the erastes, i.e., the lover qua
only insofar as he wants to aggressively be in its subject of lack, comes in the place, substitutes
place. The subject claims the other’s place as the itself for the function of the eromenos, i.e., the
(unattainable) place of his own perfection. It loved [imaginary] object.’’90 The erastes becomes
goes without saying that, for the same reason, eromenos by substituting his narcissistic love
this ambivalent relationship is also self- object with his own lack. The emergence of a
destructive.84 structural inadaequatio91 between real desire and
When it comes to ‘‘real’’ love, Lacan’s its imaginary object together with its assumption
aphoristic definitions are the following: ‘‘What on the side of the subject/lover is a precondition
one loves in a being is beyond what he is, i.e., in of love: this inadaequatio also coincides with the
the end, what he lacks’’85 and, in parallel, ‘‘love is field of tragicomedy.92 Whilst this occurs, the
70
chiesa
eromenos transforms himself into an erastes, that IV in lacan more than himself
is to say, he starts really to desire by offering the
other ‘‘what he does not have’’: this cannot but Does such an account of love actually mark the
be, by definition, the eromenos’ own lack, his own definitive end of its dependence on narcissism?
desire or, which is the same, ‘‘what is in him We should doubt it: for Lacan, the ego will always
more than himself,’’ the agalma/objet petit a that remain a prerequisite of the subject’s own
the lover is looking for. In such a way, an illusory individuation. As he states in one of his early
adaequatio of lacks is achieved. In the end, the essays: The ego is a ‘‘vital dehiscence that is
erastes looks for the desire of the beloved; what constitutive of man’’;97 I take this assumption to
the erastes desires is the Other’s desire. The be valid throughout his entire oeuvre. As a
Other’s desire [le désir de l’Autre] qua agalma is consequence, the neat ‘‘division of two perspec-
the ‘‘spring of love’’ [le ressort de l’amour].93 tives on love’’98 – one which ‘‘derivates, masks,
Returning to the Symposium: the miraculous annuls, sublimates all that is concrete in
character of the eromenos’ transformation is what experience’’ and another which ‘‘revolves
Lacan had emphasised in Phaedrus’s praise of around this privilege, this unique point [. . .]
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Achilles’ sacrifice; the emergence of a structural agalma [. . .] which we only find in a being when
inadaequatio (i.e., an impasse, an aporia) in the we really love’’99 – enacted in certain passages of
erastes from which only an adaequatio can Seminar VIII could rightly be considered as all
successively arise is exactly what the myth of too hurried. Imaginary love and real love cannot
Penia’s conception of Eros with Poros was all easily be separated: if on the one hand, agalma
about. is also constantly operative in narcissistic love
It should be clear by now that both partners despite the fact that we ignore/veil it, on the other
involved in a love relation must be, at the same – as Lacan somehow contradictorily admits in the
time, both erastes and eromenos: this is why the same seminar – every temporary emergence of
relation between Socrates and Alcibiades could agalma in real love must necessarily be ‘‘more or
never be a love relation.94 However, it is less [imaginarily] dissimulated’’; in case this does
important to note how, according to Lacan, not happen, falling in love soon degenerates into
this overlapping of lacks is far from creating any unbearable anxiety.100
sort of symmetry: my hand meets the other’s In a lesson from Seminar IX, Lacan briefly
hand whilst stretching towards a third object; a returns to the interpretation of the conclusion of
real love relationship is a ménage à trois the Symposium he had provided in Seminar VIII
between a couple of lacking subjects and and the reason why the scene between Socrates
agalma/objet petit a.95 On the contrary, two is and Alcibiades should not be understood as an
the number which activates the aggressively example of (the metaphor of) real love. Socrates
narcissistic mirage of completeness. For this qua pure desirer does not accept his being loved
same reason, real love is, as I have already by Alcibiades: therefore, Socrates does not
remarked, less illusory than imaginary love. occupy the place of the beloved, i.e., no
Thanks to the metaphor of love, both partners metaphoric substitution takes place. Lacan main-
somehow realise that what they desire in the tains that he is here specifically focusing on the
other is not a subject but an object which is in ‘‘frontier that separates desire from love’’:101 if
each subject more than the subject himself. there is a substitution, one accesses the realm of
Given that they both take up the position that love; if no substitution occurs, one remains in the
was of the other, what they both desire field of desire. More importantly, in Seminar IX,
through the other is ultimately something Lacan challenges the plausibility of (the metaphor
which is in them more than themselves: an of) real love tout-court: ‘‘It is a matter of
object-nothing which provides the ‘‘extimate’’ establishing whether it is not structurally impos-
kernel of their own being. In this way, they are sible, whether it does not represent an ideal
not apparently desiring in the other their own point.’’102 In other words, all pure desirers – like
ideal image.96 Socrates – would as such, by definition, always
71
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
persist in their refusal to take up the position of association is openly resumed under the motto of
the beloved: being aware of the fact that there is ‘‘noli me amare.’’ At this stage, we should
nothing in them which is lovable, or, better, that naively ask the following basic question: what
they are desired for the ‘‘void,’’ for the ouden, does Diotima’s ascent and ‘‘final identification’’
which is in them more than themselves, pure concretely share with the troubadours and
desirers could not but subscribe to a program- Minnesänger’s love for an inaccessible Lady?
matic ‘‘noli me amare.’’ If according to Seminar Žižek seems to propose that their common
VIII, as we have seen, the signification of real denominator should be identified in tragedy;
love surfaces when ‘‘the function of the erastes, both Platonic and courtly love culminate ‘‘in
i.e., the lover qua subject of lack comes in the Liebestod, in a climactic self-obliteration in which
place of [. . .] the function of the eromenos,’’103 in all distinctions disappear’’:108 both should there-
Seminar IX, Lacan realizes that the lover either fore be condemned as two fundamentally false
fully recognizes himself as a subject of lack (i.e., visions of love. I completely agree with these
as a pure desirer) or accepts his being loved conclusions, but I believe some further elucida-
for something he does not have. tions are necessary.
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What is it then that radically changed in the In Seminar VIII, Lacan explicitly claims that
course of just one year? In Seminar VIII, real/ the notion of tragic (and not tragicomic) love was
non-narcissistic love relied on one main (incon- alien to the classical world,109 and proposes that
sistent) assumption: its compatibility with pure Plato’s fundamental fantasy (in the Symposium
desire. Now, Lacan thinks that such a ‘‘con- and beyond) ‘‘consists in having projected the
junction,’’ as he names it, between pure desire idea of Supreme Good on [. . .] the impenetrable
and the (more or less illusory) ‘‘function of the void.’’110 Platonic love, like courtly love, leads
One’’ which love necessarily supports is simply to the void: in this sense, what they both equally
impossible. Desire and love are structurally share with tragedy is, on one level, an undeniable
incompatible. Desire is the desire of lack, or, Schwärmerei, an ‘‘exaltation.’’ However, not only
more precisely: ‘‘That which desire looks for in do they ‘‘do without satisfactions’’ but, above all,
the Other is less that which is desirable [le unlike tragedy, they point towards ‘‘the institu-
désirable] than that which desires [le désirant], tion of lack.’’111 We could thus affirm that, for
i.e., that which the Other lacks.’’104 Differently Lacan, Platonic (and courtly) love:
put, the pure desirer desires the desire of the
Other, to be understood as that which in (a) Elides the Other. By reducing the beloved to
the Other desires [le désirant dans l’Autre], the void, it mortifies the Other. ‘‘In Platonic
i.e., the Other’s lack. As Lacan notices, for this Eros, the lover, love, only aims at his own
very reason, as a pure desirer, I cannot desire perfection.’’112
the Other desiring me, I cannot desire to be (b) Converts, at last, the quest for the void –
loved: if this happens, I ‘‘abandon desire.’’ To which, meanwhile, has enhanced desire –
express this with Lacan’s own convoluted words: into an absolute, ‘‘final identification with
‘‘It’s me who desires and, given that I desire that which is supremely lovable,’’113 beauty
[the Other’s] desire, this desire could only be in itself, i.e., the Supreme Good qua
desire for myself [désir de moi] if [. . .] I love capitalized Void. In the ‘‘higher mysteries
myself in the other, that is if it is me that I of love’’ described by Diotima, Lack is thus
love.’’105 positively instituted as the ultimate ktema
In Seminar IV, Lacan had already come to the (which Lacan adequately renders as ‘‘but de
conclusion that ‘‘the biggest desire is lack,’’106 possession,’’ ‘‘aim of possession’’114).
and that, consequently, what one loves in a being Psychoanalysis can only define this transva-
is what the beloved lacks. He had also underlined luation – which indeed perfectly corresponds
how this is particularly evident in two specific with the utter obliteration of the Other – as
forms of love: Platonic and courtly love.107 In superlatively narcissistic.115 If, for Lacan,
Seminar IX, the same trans-historical/cultural three is the ‘‘minimum’’ number of love,116
72
chiesa
Diotima remains on the contrary at the level that Alcibiades is literally ‘‘spellbound’’ by
of a ‘‘dual relation.’’117 Socrates’s agalma, beyond good an evil:
(c) Ultimately differs from tragedy insofar as Alcibiades ‘‘is saying ‘I want it because I want
the latter does not operate this final reversal: it, be it my good or my evil.’ ’’125 But, at the same
in tragedy, pure desire embraces the void time, Lacan also puzzlingly affirms that:
without paradoxically elevating it to the ‘‘Without knowing it, Alcibiades provides the
dignity of the Supreme Good. Moreover, true representation of what the Socratic ascent
radical/tragic desire also goes beyond ‘‘the implies.’’126 Are we facing an insurmountable
experience of beauty.’’ As Lacan writes in contradiction in the psychoanalyst’s impromptu
Seminar VII: ‘‘On the scale that separates us statements? A possible way out of this deadlock
from the central field of desire, if the good would consist in referring Alcibiades’ ‘‘true
constitutes the first stopping place, the representation’’ of Diotima’s ascent to a notion
beautiful forms the second and gets of tragic desire which profoundly interests Lacan
closer.’’118 and which, in this period of his production, he
deems compatible with nothing less than the
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We have thus far tacitly associated Platonic ethics of psychoanalysis. If this hypothesis is
love with Diotima’s ascent.119 Does Lacan, in correct, the ‘‘truth’’ of Alcibiades’ desire should
Seminar VIII, actually think that Plato’s own precisely be equated with the fact that its quest
notion of love in the Symposium is unreservedly for agalma (qua void) was never reversed into the
expressed by the priestess? There are at least appropriation of a Supreme Good. Undoubtedly,
three instances in which he overtly denies this.120 Alcibiades is one of the most tragic figures of
If, on the one hand, ‘‘in presenting that which Ancient Greek history: he was rapidly down-
one may call his thought [on love], Plato graded from the status of political leader and
deliberately reserved for himself the place of military hero to that of enemy of the state par
enigma,’’121 on the other, Lacan believes that we excellence (and possibly, as Lacan remarks, of
should definitely be looking for ‘‘the last word of scapegoat); however, even when he was obliged to
what Plato wants to tell us about the nature of flee Athens, he did not cede on his desire (for
love’’122 in the scene between Socrates and instance, to assure a throne to his descendants)
Alcibiades. Lacan’s reading of the Symposium and he ‘‘found nothing better to do [. . .] than
remains as open as Plato’s own ending of the conceiving a child with the queen [of Sparta] in
dialogue: however, a close cross-scrutiny of the open’’;127 he died a violent death. (In order to
lessons X, XI and XII of Seminar VIII enables have an updated idea of the sort of man he was,
us to draw some provisional conclusions. Lacan suggests, one should imagine a ‘‘Kennedy
Concerning Alcibiades, one can infer that who would have been at the same time James
Lacan thinks that, after he has been ‘‘analysed’’ Dean’’!)128 Furthermore, the similarities between
by Socrates, his desire is both irreducible to Alcibiades’ existence and that of the fictional
Diotima’s ascent to beauty in itself/the Supreme character of Oedipus (e.g., profanation of the
Good and strangely contiguous to it. Indeed, Gods; subversion of the laws of the polis;
Lacan states that ‘‘it is not beauty, nor the ascent, imposed exile; conceiving a child with a foreign
nor an identification with God that Alcibiades queen, etc.) are dazzling; Lacan repeatedly
desires, but this unique object, this something he analysed the figure of Oedipus throughout his
has seen in Socrates’’;123 he is able to support this seminars: one may suppose that he did not fail
view by showing how, through the simile of the to notice them.
ugly Silenus and of agalma as something This reference to the real-life Alcibiades leads
precious which is hidden inside, Plato makes us to our second concluding point concerning
Alcibiades ‘‘eradicate us from the dialectic of the the notion of transferential love that, according
beautiful which had thus far been [. . .] the guide to Lacan, Plato would make him impersonate in
[. . .] on the road to what is desirable.’’124 the Symposium. Lacan insinuates that (Plato is
Moreover, Lacan reminds us how Plato writes well aware of the fact that) Socrates does not
73
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
really know what he is doing when he interprets The diffuse ambiguity that permeates the
Alcibiades’ desire.129 He thinks he has displaced finale of the dialogue equally prevents us from
agalma from him to Agathon: as we have just establishing what Socrates’ role is with regard to
seen, what history actually teaches us is that the enunciation of a true notion of love, both for
Socrates has – allow me the expression – Plato and, more importantly, for Lacan. To what
‘‘uncorked’’ Alcibiades’ devastating hybris. On extent is Socrates (and not Plato) a faithful pupil
an initial level – Lacan seems to suggest – Plato of Diotima who, in his turn, converts new adepts
shows us how, by wanting to praise Agathon, to the cause of the Void qua Supreme Good?
Socrates is actually ‘‘indicating to Alcibiades Undoubtedly, the more he is, the less he can
where his desire lies’’130 – given that Alcibiades’ convincingly be presented as a proto-analyst
desire equates with the Other’s/Socrates’ (con- given that Lacan unequivocally distances his
tingent object of) desire. In this sense, it would notion of true love from the ascent to beauty in
appear that Socrates’ interpretation achieves a itself condemning the latter as a radical form
narcissistic ‘‘re-corking’’ of Alcibiades’ desire of narcissism. But even if one unconditionally
through Agathon after having awakened it. But, assumes that there is no connection whatsoever
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on a second level, Alcibiades’ real/tragic desire between Diotima’s theory of love and Socratic
is not ‘‘re-corked’’ by Socrates’ retroactive Eros135 – this is what Lacan seems to imply when
interpretation (‘‘You do not love me, you love he insists on the passage (217e) in which Plato
him!’’). As Lacan himself specifies: ‘‘Alcibiades makes Alcibiades speak of Socrates’ indifference
keeps on desiring the same thing. That which he before beauty and the Good as such136 – many
looks for in Agathon – do not doubt it – is this problems still remain unsolved. First and fore-
same supreme point where the subject abolishes most: Lacan admits that Socrates was driven by a
himself in his fantasy, i.e., his agalmata.’’131 ‘‘desire for death’’; if, on the one hand, reading
This is probably the reason why, in an early the Apology – he says – ‘‘it is difficult to believe,
passage of Seminar VIII, Lacan also notes that hearing [Socrates’] defence, that he didn’t want to
Socrates had been a master of love against die,’’ on the other hand, this desire is itself
everybody’s good and that, consequently, he was contradictory (it is not just a matter of commit-
(rightly) put to death for everybody’s good;132 ting suicide) given that ‘‘it took him seventy
against any superficial apologetic reading of the years’’ to satisfy it.137 This complex proximity
overall economy of the dialogue – such as between the desire of the (proto)analyst and the
‘‘Socrates is not guilty for Alcibiades’ hybris, he desire for death directly introduces us again to
even refused to sleep with him’’ – Plato would the delicate issue of psychoanalysis’ overlapping
instead be the first to admit his teacher’s with tragedy. Justifying or criticizing the reasons
responsibility. and the consistency of Lacan’s temporary super-
I believe that, for Lacan, these two imposition of the aim of psychoanalysis – and
interpretations are equally valid and, what is therefore of the formation of the analyst – with
more – attaching importance to the mythical real desire qua tragic desire lies beyond the scope
stratifications of the Symposium as a whole – of this article. Let us only recall that, some years
should not be held as mutually exclusive. As he later, in Seminar XI, ‘‘the analyst’s desire is not
remarks, the conclusion of the conversation [any longer seen as] a pure desire.’’138 As for
between Alcibiades and Socrates is ‘‘enig- Seminar VIII, what noticeably emerges from one
matic’’:133 Plato purposely disrupts the banquet of its opening lessons – and is later explored by
with the arrival of a new group of drunken Lacan’s dissection of the scene between Socrates
fêtards. I suggest that this second interruption and Alcibiades – is that the psychoanalyst should
should be read together with the abrupt ‘‘Good be somebody who: a) ‘‘is not there for [the
night!’’ with which Socrates answers to analysand’s] good but so that he may love’’; b)
Alcibiades’ advances and which Lacan seems to makes the analysand love ‘‘that which he lacks
associate with his notorious ‘‘interruption de la [i.e., the analysand’s real desire] through the
séance.’’134 medium of the transference.’’139
74
chiesa
one of the most effective definitions of real love substitutes himself for the beloved. He will not
from Seminar VIII – ‘‘last presence.’’140 (And, in take the place of the latter qua pure subject of
case such an answer ever occurred, if he himself lack – as Lacan contradictorily suggests in
consented to answer to it.) Seminar VIII – but as somebody who, despite
As we have seen, for the Lacan who inge- his progress towards the void, finally opts to be
niously re-reads the Symposium through the filter loved regardless of his residual ‘‘impurity.’’ In
of the psychoanalytic setting, pure desire and real other words, the subject of pure desire who has
love are deemed compatible: the emergence of experienced lack finds himself in a position where
pure desire is a conditio sine qua non of real love he can decide either to enact the metaphor of
(contrary to all Lacanian doxa, this is, for love, thus necessarily falling back into narcissism
example, clearly implied by Lacan when he qua structural ‘‘vital dehiscence,’’ or to consume
states that Penia qua erastes – ‘‘original desirer’’ himself in tragedy by refusing to be loved.
– represents ‘‘the logical time that precedes the In Seminar I, Lacan had already pointed out
birth of Love’’)141; conversely, unlike narcissistic how love, by provoking a perturbation of the
love, which, all things considered, also includes symbolic order,143 entails the exposure of one’s
courtly and ‘‘Platonic’’ love, real love does not own narcissism to the influence of the beloved:
hinder pure desire. The problem is that this however, at this level, we are still passive
compatibility remains largely unexplained and, in ‘‘victims’’ of love. The space of discussion
the end, inconsistent with regard to Lacan’s own opened by Seminars VIII and IX invites us to
general theory of desire. Lacan acknowledges think a way in which we could also actively
this in Seminar IX, where the ‘‘subject of desire’’ decide to be loved after having undone our
is neatly distinguished from the ‘‘subject of stagnant narcissistic identifications by tempora-
love.’’142 The latter is now regarded exclusively as rily following our pure/real desire (for the void).
a narcissistic subject. Despite the fact that pure Strange as it may sound, I firmly believe that
desire is apparently the only option one might such a ‘‘decisionism’’ should be thought in
choose that would not amount to narcissism, we accordance with – and not to detriment of – the
should stress one last time that this same logical mode of contingency that undoubtedly
admission is precisely what marks Lacanian permeates Lacan’s later speculation on love.
theory in the early 1960s with the antinomy of Being unable to develop this argument any
tragedy: if on the one hand, the shattering further in this article, I limit myself to pointing
manifestation of ‘‘pure’’ desire is rightly invoked in the direction of the element of ‘‘courage’’ in
to re-engrave on the subject the ‘‘scar of love, as obliquely treated by Lacan in Seminar
castration,’’ on the other hand, Lacan is not yet XX:144 we could suggest that, after subtraction,
able to explain in a convincing way how we in order to love, one must have the courage – and
75
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
thus somehow ‘‘decide’’ – to be faithful to the detailed analysis of the first part of Seminar VIII
event of love, despite obligatory ‘‘re-narcissisisa- has thus far been produced.
tion.’’ As for this imaginary re-inscription, it is 2 Such a relationship is not a ‘‘presentiment of
imperative to make a distinction between new sychanalisse,’’ Lacan admits, but ‘‘an encounter,
imaginary identifications that are the conse- the apparition of certain traits which are, for us,
quence of mere frustration – in everyday life revelatory’’ ( J. Lacan, Le se¤minaire, livre VIII. Le
‘‘there are as many [narcissistic] masks as there transfert, 1960^1961 (Paris: Seuil, 2001) 85^ 86; for
are forms of insatisfaction,’’ Lacan says –145 and an alternative critical edition of Seminar VIII,
those which follow the (reciprocal) experience of see also www.ecole-lacanienne.net/documents/
transfert.doc). (All translations from French
‘‘falling in love,’’ the fleeting moment in which
source materials for which no English translation
the Real qua void pierces the imaginary-symbolic is currently available are mine.)
veil of reality and appears in self-consciousness.
Ultimately, this is precisely the difference 3 Ibid. 37.
between relating to the Other’s demand, demand- 4 Ibid. 71; my emphasis.For a Lacan-inspired treat-
ing something of him, being ment of love qua event and the importance of
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76
chiesa
31 (1977) 22). However, this was not definitely yet Seminar VIII). Simply put, at best, Achilles’ sacrifice
a reputable belief amongst scholars when Lacan is beyond all ‘‘pathological’’ sacrifice but, as it were,
delivered his commentary in the early 1960s. does not sacrifice the non-pathological sacrifice
itself ^ which should therefore be considered as a
12 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 204.
final pathological remainder. On the contrary,
13 Ibid. 59. Sygne sacrifices sacrifice, says ‘‘No!’’ to it.
(However, I fully agree with Zupanc› ic› when she
14 Ibid. 58.
claims that sacrifice is the precondition of Sygne’s
15 Ibid. 95 (see also 40 and 71). What about (the final ‘‘No!’’)
Christian) God’s love for us? We can believe that
22 Why is the idealized erastes/eromenos relation-
God qua supreme Being loves us only insofar as
ship in ancient Greece generally homosexual?
we ultimately doubt about his existence. As is
Putting together different suggestions made by
well known, Lacan was a fervent admirer of
Lacan in Seminar VIII, we might be able to sketch
Spinoza: ‘‘Beneath all belief in a god that would be
an answer: a) The real object of love is always
perfectly and totally generous, there is the idea of
neuter (in general, not only in ancient Greece)
a certain je ne sais quoi that he anyway lacks and
(ibid. 64); b) As the scene between Socrates and
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77
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
34 Ibid.116. exact opposite, i.e., the mythical achievement of
symbolic death through tragic desire, ultimately
35 A general lack of sufficient attention on the
coincide.
side of commentators may be indeed inferred
from the fact that we still call it the ‘‘myth of the 42 Ibid.132.
androgynous,’’ whereas the androgynous is just
43 Ibid. 132. The list of qualities attributed by
one of the three original spherical species.
Agathon to Eros is considered by Lacan to be far
36 Ibid.118. more ambiguous than translators generally con-
sider it to be. Most of the terms used by the poet
37 D. Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian would have a double, pejorative meaning: for
Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996) 181. example, Lacan claims that it is too simplistic to
Briefly put, this lack of symmetry is due to the translate truphe as ‘‘well-being’’ given that it also
fact that the phallus is the only signifier which gov- presupposes a certain hybris qua pretentiousness
erns the relations between the sexes: woman has (ibid. 134). Waterfield also notes that there are
‘‘to take the image of the other sex as the basis some ‘‘obvious absurdities’’ in Agathon’s speech,
of her [symbolic] identification’’ ( J. Lacan, The such as ‘‘love is self-controlled,’’ but he does not
Psychoses 1955^1956 ^ Book III (London: Routledge,
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78
chiesa
56 Ibid.147,153. desires the child for what literally is in him more
than himself: the phallic gestalt (see, for example,
57 Ibid.150.
Le se¤minaire, livre IV 70 ^71).
58 Ibid.163.
72 See M. Nussbaum on this issue (‘‘The speech of
59 Ibid. 149; see Symposium 203b where Penia is Alcibiades: a reading of the Symposium,’’ in The
in fact described as aporia. Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy
and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986)
60 Lacan says he derived this expression
188 ^ 89).
from Symposium 202a (ibid.150).
73 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 187, 213.
61 Indeed, Socrates was snub-nosed and had
protuberant eyes. 74 Ibid.188.
62 Ibid.171. 75 Ibid.189. Elsewhere in Seminar VIII, Lacan reads
Socrates’ ouden in topological term: his being is
63 Ibid.162.
‘‘nulle part,’’ he is atopos. Equally, the analyst should
64 Ibid.168. be atopos. (ibid.103).
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79
‘‘le ressort de l’amour’’
86 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 46. In Seminar IV, Lacan object is worth the other, for a subject things get
similarly states that ‘‘there is no bigger sign of even worse. Indeed, a subject is not actually worth
love than donating what one does not have’’ (Le an other subject: in this case, one subject is the
se¤minaire, livre IV 140). other subject’’ (ibid.178 ^79; my emphasis).
87 S. Z›iz›ek, Enjoy your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in 97 J. Lacan,‘‘Aggressivity in psychoanalysis’’ 21; my
Hollywood and out, revised edition (London: emphasis.
Routledge, 2001) 57^58. One should specify
98 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 181.
though, that, in real love, the beloved returns love
qua erastes, i.e., qua pure desirer. 99 Ibid. 181^ 82; my emphasis. The same dichot-
omy is also expressed in Seminar VIII by the
88 See Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 69; see also 216.
distinction between ‘‘phantasmatic’’ love and
89 Ibid.130. Lacan could have found further corro- the love which aims at ‘‘the being of the Other’’
boration for this expression in the fact that, in his (ibid. 61).
speech, Aristophanes claims that the navel should
be regarded as a ‘‘reminder’’ of the cut inflicted 100 Ibid. 214.
by Zeus (see Symposium 190e ^191a)! 101 Seminar IX (unpublished), lesson of 21
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80
chiesa
symbolically lacks the ‘‘minus’’ (qua imaginary 133 Ibid. 215.
object).
134 Ibid.191.
116 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 168.
135 From a different standpoint, Neumann simi-
117 Ibid.168. larly concludes that: ‘‘It is [. . .] wrong to ascribe
to him [Socrates] the role of Diotima’s educator
118 J. Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959^1960:
intending to father spiritual children in others’’
Book VII (London: Routledge, 1992) 217. The fact (‘‘Diotima’s Concept of Love’’ 57).
that, for Lacan, the aim of psychoanalysis is, in
these years, close to such a tragic notion of desire 136 Lacan comes to this conclusion by strongly
is clearly reinstated in Seminar VIII. Through psy- disagreeing with usual translations of Symposium
choanalysis, we ‘‘find’’ our desire qua lack: the 216e: see Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 170.
latter is incompatible with any good and any pos- 137 Ibid.104.
session of an object (Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 84 ^ 85).
138 J. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of
119 Which is what Lacan implicitly does in Psychoanalysis (London: Vintage, 1998) 276; my
Seminar IV. emphasis.
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120 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 158, 204, 215^16. 139 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 25.
121 Ibid. 204. For a similar sceptical approach to 140
Plato’s own ideas on love, see H. Neumann,
‘‘Diotima’s Concept of Love,’’ American Journal of Love as such is related to the question one
Philology 86 (1965): 33^59 (esp. 34 ^37). Neumann poses to the Other concerning what he can
give us and what he can answer us. It’s not
convincingly disputes the fact that ‘‘Socrates’
that love is identical to all demands with
speech in the Symposium holds the key to the
which we assail the Other; it situates itself
Platonic evaluation of the other speeches’’ (ibid.
in the beyond of this demand, insofar as the
33). However, such a conclusion is drawn after an
Other can answer us or fail to answer us as a
analysis of Diotima’s teachings which differs last presence. (ibid. 207)
profoundly from Lacan’s.
141 Ibid. 160. One should, however, specify that
122 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 204. pure desire is, as such, an ideal asymptotic point.
123 Ibid.194. Pure desire designates here the commencement
of a process of ‘‘purification’’ of desire, the fact
124 Ibid.170. that, as is clear from Lacan’s mythical example,
125 Ibid.191. before meeting the hand of the Other, my hand
has already reduced its distance from the fruit.
126 Ibid.197.
142 Seminar IX (unpublished), lesson of 21
127 Ibid. 33. Lacan mentions again the same February 1962.
anecdote (taken from Plutarch) in Seminar IX
(lesson of 21 February 1962). 143 Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953^1954: Book I
142.
128 Ibid. 35. Interestingly enough, Nussbaum
herself, who never mentions Lacan in her 144 SeeThe Seminar. Book XX 144.
seminal 1979 article on Alcibiades’ speech, 145 Le se¤minaire, livre V 333.
compares Alcibiades to Kennedy (see ‘‘The
Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of Plato’s
Symposium’’ 169)!
Lorenzo Chiesa
129 Le se¤minaire, livre VIII 215. School of European Culture and Languages
130 Ibid. 215. University of Kent
Canterbury CT2 7NF
131 Ibid.194.
UK
132 Ibid.16 ^19. E-mail: l.chiesa@kent.ac.uk