‘Young thinks that she can avoid the pi perspectives are common to groups of people who are otherwise individually Complex and hence have a variety of sometimes divergent interests ané opinions. ‘A similar shift in thinking may be seen in the approaches of Philips and Willams to the problem Philips herseif ralses about how marginalized groups are to be represented without either assuming an unrealistic essentialism or wuntable representatives from these groups speculates thatthe problems of accountability derive nce’ and a ‘politics of ideas’ in opposition to one in legislative another such that either ‘Ideas are treated as totally separate from the people who carry them out’ or ‘people dominate attention, with no though given to 25), Heer solution is to recommend simultaneous s. This suggests = pragmatic approach in which, seat or the party-plat xtegies already described is employed depends on local circumseances. For the key change in thinking about represen- ‘ation iso pay primary a ‘to the inceactions between represented and rsperenatie i wich hey hae he penal hag one another. This, (ces an abstract debate about the nature of representation and {to the practical ground of facilitating ‘communication between repres and consticuenss’ (1998: 231, and Young: 2000: 129). ‘Al the authors cited who support special group representation concur that neither group-blind governmental forums and procedures nor conflic among, ‘traditional interest groups suffices to make for an equitably representative democracy, While they agree with the classic pluralists that democratic theory Should not just concern iself with formal structures of government but should attend to formations and activities of | Chil society, the activities they have in mind are not those of power polities around selfinerest but more akin to the transformative activities favoured by participatory democrats. We turn to these theorists in Chapter 7 after surveying 2 school even further removed from theorists who focus on oppressed groups than classic pluralist. a ee ee ee) wo cats Chapter 6 Catallaxy A survey of curtent democratic-theorercal literature would likely reveal, ax lease in the English-speaking world, a predominance of work by deliber- ative democrats and by social (or ‘public’ or ‘collective’) choice theorists iberative democracy will be the subjece of Chapter 9. Social choice ns techniques supposed to explain any behaviour where ly make decisions and applies them to democratic prac- ~ in paricular those associated wi legislators — by employing an ideal model wo identify problems (such as the cycli Chapter 2) and sometimes to make recommendations about how (© how confident theorist are thar actual tw vote one way oF likely to realize the most highly ranked of his or her preferences possible given the decision-making rules in place, the anticipated behaviour of other individuals, and other such constraints, ‘One guiding methodological postulate of social choice theory is that ratio- basic units of analysis, so when the ‘rationality’ of grou understood that group behaviour can be analyzed into that of members. Applications of social choice theory to democratic politics share with classic pluralism the ‘realist’ assumptions thar politics has to do mainly102 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY CATALLAXY 102 ical actors and democracy with elec- jological individualist’ posculate who adopted the Greek verb, change to describe the essence of political economy. (The approach is ako sometimes attributed to the ‘Virgina presence atthe Thomas Jefferson Cente collaborating there with Buchanan.) The remat ‘ties of any size beyond the tribe for Hayek is ). Subsequently hhas been used to refer to the application of economic theories tation of Downs, who in his An Economic Theory of apply the methods of economic theory to politics t0 these complexities. They also provide points ture, as do the texts by Russell Hardin (1982) ry by Peter Ordeshook (1992) tional behavior in connection with The catallactic theorists rtented toward this end and no other’ (7) Later in this chapter I shall return to the question of whether deployment ‘of some such model and use of rational-choice techniques commits one to theory. There is evidence that it des notin tical parties that compete in elections, to understand the ‘rule of government’ is to understand the behaviour of political parties. These in tum are made up of pol who do not seek office in order to imple- ment favoured policies, ly to attain the income, prest power that comes from being in office,’ for whi profitseeking economy’ in ‘whatever policies they believe will gain the most votes just as entre produce whatever products they Governments must perform ce tain public services, look to national defence, and so on) and governing party must keep enough voters sufficiently satisfied to be re-elected, s0 in the exchange the citizenry gets something in return for its votes, But these useful collection of essays on different aspects of public choice 1997). These ancestral public choice theorists are directly in the smpeter, whose conception of democracy they take asa starting ef among them ate Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, and Gordon social functions (collect taxes, maif-oF Democracy ‘of the motivating goal of getting elected and seaying Since the aim of a party is just to get el the intrinsic worth of ideologies, but pk the largest number of voters. ‘Against chis background Downs adopts a they think will attract, plified model and its graphic ideologically polarized, ewo parties will again so far apart in ideology that once elected @ voters and the large minority that voted against a country where. equal numbers, a mation to the two grocery stores m re he responding to the exercise in. Chapter 1, he would have no hesitation in adducing it as the best example of an electoral democracy. e enh CATALLAXY 105 Stable, US-ype Revolution prone Ineffective matiparty gue 3 Ne: Shaded ares represne the dstrbtion of yours by Ideslogial incinacon. Vara Ines represrt poe! pares, Voter abstention ‘As the US approached its year 2000 presidential election (itself grist for several democratic-theoretical mills), @ Midwest newspaper invited high School students to send it leters about voter apathy. Most ofthe responses cited uninspiring or otherwise off putting qualities of elected leaders. Some curagement due © broken carapaigh promises and suspicion 8 serve powerful, minority interests, and others blamed the rents for bad mouthing elected leaders. One person iden- tified voter attitudes themselves as the cause and admonished citizens to change their ways: ‘Many people don't feel they can make a difference however voting doesn’t cost you anything, but if you don't, i can cost you everything’ (Indianapolis Star May 26, Downs devotes a chapter of his seminal book to this topic and agrees with che view of the quoted s cept in one respect. He notes that ‘what parties are running, to delib- ballot and since ‘time is a scarce erate, to go to the polls, resource, voting is inherer those without cars or w than for others, and this adds 2 pay to vote, these costs are higher incentive to vote. Also, some people are106 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY id they too will be loathe to cost and degree of indiffer the rationality of voter absten- costs and retums, some vote and others mnal agents in general wish to who is indifferent to an elect To this basic accout adds ewo twists (267-72). Citizens have a stake in maintaining electoral democracy, as this is the only peaceful way to change government leaders, and since the perpetuation of this system incurring the costs of voring. Downs this calculation that in a society of ay then each, again, would thit bbe rational to abstain. He then sets conundrum aside ro reiterate his conclusion that voting is a matter of weighing relative costs and benefits Democratic decision-making Buchanan and Tullock begin their book, The Calculus of Consent (1962), by noting a disparity between economics anid traditional polit ‘on a wad iduals rests 10 cooperate and aim to es lace, theorists part isin the (or nondemocratic) ing can discover or promote this interest. Like ‘there is any such thing as the public interest over gained by cooperating, so in catallactic fashion Buchanan and Tullock recommend modelling political theory on economics where no assumption of a social goal is required. Using Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Friday as the human. ‘occupants of an island, Buchanan and Tullock illustrate the parity between general public interest, and seek ways that democs rethods of decision rules for such cooperation. For the ‘this means figuring out what voting rule rational specified circumstances — unanimity, majority rule, or any other proportion ‘of votes required for a binding decision. Being a two-person society the Crusoe/Friday island offers few alternatives (Buchanan and Tullock abstract from the fact that in Defoe'sscory, Friday is ich would, Cr K ‘Number of individuals required to take collective action economics and politics they have in mind. Crusoe is best at fishing and Friday at coconut collection, so the cwo ‘ind it is mutually advantageous to specialize and to enter into exchange’: this is an economic relation, ‘At the same time, each recognizes the advantage of living in a common fortress so they enter intoa ! exchange and coop. nstitutional’ problem of desermining the ipeterian public choice theorist, ividuals would select in is to Friday.) In larger soci Nthe ewo costs. Prescriptive Implications theorists employ an idealised model of rational Ostensively the catall behaviour for explanatory, as opposed to prescriptive, purposes. CB. Macpherson both recognizes this purport and grants that by and lange the views of theorists like Downs and others in the tradition of Schumpeter uncertainty about how best to further their ends ier on the part of voters, governments), Bur at the same time 0 avoid the costs required to acquire infor rot to mention due to to ple hhape policy in reaction to the most vigorous the population. Even knowing that labby- xs, and other such organizations Downs reiterates view in several places in his book. (One summary is: ‘Hence rationalicy under conditions of uncertainty leads CATALLAXY 109 ‘government to construct policies often aimed more at the good of a few voters than at the good of all, or even of a majority’ (1957: 95). Taken lierally, So is the ‘announcement in the quoted passage’s tic government to teat all men as though they were ‘A strained reading might be thac Downs wishes democracy could teat people as political equals and laments the fact that this fies in the face of rationality, but unles he intends to be recommending tics, che prescriptive implications of his view must be £0 resist effort to promote political equality Similar descriptive conclasions with event prescriptive implications run nan and Tullock 1962). Democratic ‘each of building his own in ¢ effort. Since one of the costs tic decision-making depends upon the size of the rele P in Figure 4), this ‘means that an increase in this nu bear on the rational- iy of what democratic collective action at all: ‘eteis uniqueness in the rule ‘The commonly held opi from the fact that most istic, nonposiivistic terms’ (82). Buchanan in purposes of The Calculus of Consent as the -corded to majority vote’ (1986: 243), and ions ofthis theory depart from a stan- in favour of majority rule. In another respect, however, the approach endorses a liberal-democratic emphasis on. representative, rather than participatory democracy. The reason for this is that the ‘decision costs’ of direct democracy are prohibitive in any but stmall groups, and delegating representatives to negotiate among one another later described one of ‘removal of the sacrosanc I-democratic presu110 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY trying to do this among is also sesh while like exchanges or otherwise ly for selfsh motives; however, insofar as like economic exchange they should be members of the commu in pare because they are premised on catallactic theorists have the same ‘premised on this assumption (303-4). the reason that they are also ” Downs approvingly quotes Adam CATALLAXY 111 facilitating the pursuit by individuals of theie various interests, which he vigorously argues is best achieved by allowing the market to function free from state interference. ‘The resulting free marker is described by Hayek as ‘the game of catallaxy’ where, ie games, the outcome for any player is decermined by a ate 10 gain, but a‘wealth-creating game’ where in principle everyone can gain and in any case has a better chance of gaining than under either feudalism or in a democracy with an interventionist state. This is true even if che intervention is supposed to compensate for chance, including the bad luck of being born into disadvantaged circumstances since intervention will and when people who are tallaxy are also attracted to neoliberalism (and in my classroom experiences Thave seen an invariable association on the part of students), but it does ‘establish a necessary, conceptual connection between them. To model tics after economics is not automatically to advocate replacing political ipulates that intervention, ‘must be free-market friendly; for inseance, government should fund universal ‘education by providing vouchers for use at private schools and certify that such things as food products or medi sale of uncertified goods or services (1 2). Government predation 4 tight connection between catallaxy and neoliber- alism is to justify a presumption against more than minimal government intervention in human affairs. This approach is invited by Buchanan and Tullock’s overall argument, which crucially involves per- forming cost/benefit they point out thar coll reduce ‘external’ costs; for instance, to rej chimney that imposes ‘external costs on the is agreed to in order to ce a plant with a smoking dual by soiling his laundry’112. THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY these costs are added ro external tex costs, compen- fe regulatory or other actions will be increasingly fed governmental design’ (1970: 1d Buchanan could be invoked known and revered among ecor they pay ate ‘artificial’ ty cost constitutes lost ination of government keeping with the delib- such terms as ‘theft’ and Tallock’s claim that government intervention in the form of ‘or monopolization of goods or services is bound to be socially wast ight be enough to create a presumption against such inter- vent 1¢ burden of argument would always be on the shoulders of advocates of collective, state action, and one kind of connection berween, catallaxy and neoliberalism would be established. CATALLAXY 113 The rational impossibility of state action A second way to establish the neoliberalism is not one that th would welcome, but their rel reconstructing the calculations of rational individuals, chey dis between decisions to adopt some specific voting rules (‘constitutional deci- sions!) and the exercise of those rules once decided on. While the specific rules may mandate majority vote or more or less than this, a decision about which of these rules to adopt must be unanimous if a specific rule isto be reliably followed. Buchanan and Tullock are not arguing that people submit connection between catallaxy and ‘contract, as theorists like Hobbes I see it as in their long-run interests toa general, originating , bat that rational individuals wi ind themselves to some specific Citing David Hume for supp constitutional rule will be secure ev times be o their advantage to break thar were he free to violate conve will accordingly choose to accept restrictions on his own behaviour to avoid the resulting: chaos (a to Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 314-15, Hume 1978 [1740]: bk 3, theoretical problem of the prisoners’ dilemma: two prisoners changed with ‘committing a crime together are given the option to confes or not to con feasknowing tha if nether confesses they will both gt light sentences, ifone the receive a very heavy sentence, and if both confess each. Jheavy sentence. In this circumstance each prisoner wil is only rational ro confess (to avoid getting a heavy sentence if the ‘confesses or to ger off if the other does not confess). Therefore, both, confess thus receiving harder sentences than they know would be avail- neither did. The point is to show how rationality can knowingly lead {0 suboptimal results, Catallactic theorists cannot appeal to such things as custom or social encouragement of rust to escape the dilemma, since they explicitly set aside such ‘psychological’ considerations (1 1: 7 impossible and should be replaced by the pure vidual actions of the market. This, recall fom Chapter 4, wa argument that Russell Hardin, problems involve several steps, bur their soundness would provide another conceptual link between catallaxy and neoliberalism.114 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY umber makes it necessary for large Thus, not only economic innovation social choice theory gener: Social choice theory and catallaxy CATALLAXY 115 (on whether social choice theory is regarded normatively or descriptively. As an effort to explain or predi behaviour of vocers or legislators, the dilemma and paradoxes function forgone, erratic, or stymied. Social theorists have been strikingly undaunted by demonstrations, as by Donald Green and lan Shapiro (1994), of the many predictive and other failures of thetr approach thus deployed. ication for this stance is to classify predictive failures not as defeats but as provacations distributions of preference rankings) when confronted with the fact slative voting more closely approximates majority preferences chan predicts (Strom 1990). Like most rational decision theorists who address insists that the approach is primarily norma dlilemmas and paradoxes pose laxy, and the answer partly depends upon what the aim of such a theorist is. One commentator, Emily Hauptmann, distinguishes between ‘public choice theory,’ and ‘social choice theory’ by noting that while each is ‘modelled on economics, they follow different approaches to economies and have diferent aims (1996: 2). On her view the aim of public choice theo- tists like Buchanan and Tullock is to analyze democratic insti the model of free market economics with an eye to transforming the in a neoliberal direction. Social choice theorists, ot at least thi ‘ety of his o her highest ranked pref- ing the same succes. They thus seek smed after the Italian economic theo- tions that cannot be changed to satisfy ithout thwarting a preference of some- ion) and model their approach on welfare economics. These social choice theorists ask whether majority vore can aggregate preferences t0 achieve this tlt116 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY caTauaxY 17 the non-instrumental one of encouraging public partic acy functions by public discusion in the expectatic ange as a resule and with the aim of reaching consensus. lites would mix the forum and the market, Such cheorists might interpret political behaviour in 2 catallactic manner and they might even conclude from che putative intractability of const lemmas and voting paradoxes e task of figuring Hauptmann is equally critical of each and considers their simi gt goods is and ins do not require an imagined, respect to democratic theory more striking than theie differences. contract among ison the central role they accord to choice. On either application of by informed ‘choice theory, democracy is centrally a matter of a society making being of the fe choices, and these choices are, again, analyzed and valued in terms of tative governs the choices of individuals. ln her book, Putting Choice Before Democracy, she use of rational choice theory to defend maintains this orientation supposes that ‘democracy is valuable because it ides no motivation ‘to make political evidence of this she notes that ling or vote trading, which, as they selling of votes: 50, the very heart les for a democratic collective decision should be at are ‘competent and just fom a liberal poi that some of broken to ensute ch of view" (1988: 300), ‘Whether some such stance is available to social choice theorists depends gon how they conceive of human sane and upon how ‘totalistic’ they rational choice theory must be. Someone who thinks chat humans are 26-6, Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 122-3, ch. sted by nature or who thinks interested behaviout il and who also thinks that only ‘of appropriate means to adequate base for making 4 86: ch. 5). to arguing that rational choice theorists lack the a ify choices, Hauptmann also maintains that the spec ists, namely, the ability to vote, Regarding the Millian recommen- see the experts and public leaders ‘of rational but not concerned with the public ‘On her altemative view, democracy is to be valued for ular participation and passionate political commitment? anyone sympathetic t digm of rational choi of che participarory-democratic orientation that will be the subject of Chapcer. 7 \carists might avoid ful fal democracy, ‘the market’ and ‘the forum.’ On a market ‘Purpose of democracy and of polities generally is‘cconomic,” iimed at advancing individuals’ interests, and the normal function ro vore on these interests, typically by secret ba Problems of democracy catallactic theorists work wit of people to vote for or aga ‘or against proposed legisla ‘ease of Buchanan and Tullock,118 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY CATALLAXY 119 ing rules. Whatever the loss in distribution, bus in addition to affecting few people, this distribution is supposed to be found in societies lacking deep ideological differences of the sort that inhibit such things as vote-trading coalitions by means of which @ sinority can keep from being completely shut out. Attributing this ‘solu- Tullock, James Hyland identifies it as a version of action to majority tyranny referred to in Chapter 5. approaches, according to Hyland, is that they do not wns when minorities are not in when the problem of the cyranay of the of solution (Hyland 1995: 90-1). f€ good enough at governing to get elected with little interference. Demogoguery ‘As noted in Chapter 4, Ri rational choice theory so popular sovereignty is incoherent. To the extent that such a project suc- ceeded it would certainly avert the problem advised that citizens should be educated in Irrationality and conflict Some responses to these problems were summarized in Chapter 4. Riker meets the charge that democracy is irrational due paradoxes by maintaining that they ro agaregate preferences, but ionality among a population including ief in popular sovereignty. It is less costly for electoral purposes to claima represent ‘the people’ chan to cy figuring out which constellation of arty sys ons for leaders, as it would even in a two-} of party nominations, tic and public choice theory (On such theory preferences and the presence or absence of rational parts ofa given background against which -volution-prone? igure 3 were much higher than the other (in which be of a minority puesch). Majority tyranny problems f those represented at the two tails of the bell curve in the ‘stable? as Teaming through repeated efforts to make a ive decision (called participation is ated strategic games’) can for some changes intemal to processes, but it is not clear how this could accommodate changes in given120. THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY ‘preference rankings or in how rational cation detracts from the descriptive attracts many to the catallactic approach. (A pertinent treatment of endoge- nous preference formation in economic markets with reference to democracy pparsued, I susp hhaving to do with the nature of a person, not uni pate ether a material bee can be ident independency ofits vidual property the ‘most basic threat’ £9 liberty (196. iman and Hayek, they journeyed to Chile after the 1973 coup there to give economic advice to the military gover: tment. Indeed, General Pinochet held a personal meeting wich Hayek, and Buchanan gave a talk at the headquarters of the Admiralty in Vena mately) originated (reported, respectively, ‘or masks oppression as this requires reasons sion in Chapter 4 about whether liberal democracy and socialism are here. In extending the remarks in that chapter to same complexities about how catallaxy and socialism. CATALLAKY 121 re t0 be interpreted apply, as do assumptions about whether ‘Thus, a theorist like Hayek will have no probl endorsing a neoliberal extension of catallaxy on the grounds that this is the least disadvantaging form of human organization and, if free market forces work the way they should, it may not disadvantage anyone at all. Motives of citizens and politicians on the neoliberal scheme may still be to support for the Chilean coup. Acknowledging th democratically elected government and used extrao to suppress opposition, the coup could be justified in the name of democ- racy on the grounds that it was required to prevent socialist planning from blocking the truly democratic functioning of a fee market. This would be 4 sort of procapicalist analogue of defences of socialist authoritarianism as necessary to attain the superior democracy of a cl benign interpretation of the catallactic theorists ‘may stil be faulted for not leaming the lesson of the earlier, Tience that taking one democratic step backwards in anticipat taking two forward falsely assumes that democracy ould have tbe abandoned: In particular Downs implied senetoning of preferential treatment by government offical government action is less appropriate the larger a society should also be dropped122, THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY Chapter 7 Participatory democracy ‘endorsement of democratic rights and discourages participation in favour of tenuously accountable representative democracy. Catallaxy endorses ju iy and voter apathy. nother misgiving percains to Participatory-democra itself as well agains al 167) is just voting, 1 participatory democrats, and competitive voting in formal elections are viewed as necessary best, which they aim to replace wt cof known common goals’ as a vestige of tribalism (19 participar democrats applaud the forging of solidarity asa principal virtue of democracy, Participatory democracy is not only concepeually at odds with catal- laxy and democratic elitism but also its historical opponent. According to Jane Mansbridge the term ‘participatory democracy’ was coined by Arnold ‘Kaufman in 1960 (Mansbridge 1995: 5). This was on the eve of the student ower movements in the US, the alms of which were set down in a docue iment, the ‘Port Huron Statement,’ prepared by radical students at the versity of Michigan (Kaufman was one of their ‘on the part ofthe participatory democrats, to whose views we now tur. -manding participation in university ing the antiparticipacory views of Rousseau ‘Almost without exceprion participatory-democratic theorists have appealed to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in particular his The Social