Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Index
S. No. Subject Matter/Contents Page Nos.
1. Index 1-7
4. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. S.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. 31
And others, AIR 1990 S.C. 1881” (6.4.1990) (Available)
(M.Imp.)
16. “In Re: Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 SCC 619 : JT 1995 (3) 32
SC 538” (Both Available) (19.4.1995)
21. “J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 32
SC 113” (11.9.1996) (Available) :-
25. “K.S. Villasa Vs. M/S Ladies Corner & Another, AIR 32
1999 SC 2140” (3.2.1999):-
33. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 33
124 (SC)” (25.1.2000) (Available):-
35. “Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 33
308 (SC)” (22.2.2000) (Not Available):-
38. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt. Madhu Trehan 33
& Ors, 92 (2001) DLT 665” (F.B.) (28.5.2001) (Available):-
41. “Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali and Anr, AIR 33
2001 SC 3041 and VII (2001) SLT 153” (9.10.2001) (Both
Available):-
42. “Sudhir Chona vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (62) DRJ 346 33
(DB)” (Delhi) (13.3.2002) (Available)
. 50. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) 34
AD (Delhi) 567” (Delhi) (Not available)
B. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (1) of
CCA
Note : Section 1 of CCA deals with ‘short title and extent’ (Not relevant)
1. Offence of Contempt is one between Court and Contemner –Third party cannot intervene
–Provisions of CPC do not apply vide “1991 Cri L.J. (NOC) 8 (DB)(Cal.)”.
C. Detail of judgments and propositions of law containing the definition of contempt as given
in section (2) of CCA
Note : This Section deals with definitions and this section particularly defines contempt of
court including criminal contempt and this section reads as under :-
(b) “civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction,
order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a
court,
(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of,
any court ; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding ; or
(d) “High Court” means the High Court for a State or a Union territory, and includes
the court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory.
Comments
(i) Attributing improper motive to a Judge or scurrilous abuse of a Judge will amount to
scandalizing the court; Rajesh Kumar Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of M.O.,
(ii) Any action on the part of a litigant- be he a lawyer appearing in person – which has
the tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due course of justice has to be dealt with
sternly and firmly to uphold the majesty of law. No one can be permitted to intimidate or
terrorise Judges by making scandalous unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the
discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant ‘wants’, vide Ajay
Kumar Pandey (in re:), AIR 1998 SC 3299.
(iii) Contempt by speech or writing may be by scandalizing the court itself, or by abusing
parties to actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour of or against a party before the cause is
heard. It is incumbent upon courts of justice to preserve their proceedings from being
misrepresented, for prejudicing the mind of the people against persons concerned as parties in
causes before the cause is finally heard has pernicious consequences. Speech or writings
misrepresenting the proceedings of the court or prejudicing the public for or against a party or
involving reflections on parties to a proceeding amount to contempt. To make a speech tending
to influence the result of a pending trial, whether civil or criminal is a grave contempt.
Comments on pending proceedings, if emanating from the parties or their lawyers, are generally
a more serious contempt than those coming from independent sources; State of Haryana Vs. Ch.
Bhajanlal, AIR 1993 SC 1348.
(iv) Non caring of the warrant issued by the criminal court amounts to criminal contempt; E.
Venkaiah Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1992 (3) ALT 193 (199).
(v) Any willful disobedience to the orders of the court to do or abstain from doing any act or
breach of any undertaking given to the court is prima facie civil contempt; Vidya Sagar Vs. IIIrd
Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1991 All CJ 586 (588).
(vi) The law of contempt must be strictly interpreted and complied with before any person
can be committed for contempt; Roshan S. Boyce Vs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd, AIR 1990 SC 1881.
C-1. Synopsis and judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per AIR Manual :-
3. 2(c )= “Criminal Contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written
or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other
act whatsoever which :-
(i) Scandalises or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any
court ; or
4. A Proceeding under CCA is a quasi –Criminal and as such, the standard of proof required
is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable
doubt vide “AIR 2001 SC 3468 (3469)”
5. In proceeding under CCA, court should take care to ascertain WHETHER THERE
IS SUFFICIENT PROOF before the Court that the respondent is guilty of contempt vide
“1998 (3) Crimes 115 (DB)”
8. Highly placed police officials disregarding order of Court-Even if order obtained by fraud
remains valid unless revised-Violation amounts to contempt vide “1980 Cri LJ 57 : 1979 Pat.
LJR 174.”
9. Contempt is of two kinds : (a) that which interferes with the due course of justice
and pollutes the stream of justice in so far as it concerns parties to a cause, as for instance,
when comments are made on a pending case; (b) that which is calculated to bring a Judge
into contempt or lower his authority or to interfere with the lawful process of the Court
vide “AIR 1953 Orissa 33 (38) : 1953 Cri LJ 349 (DB).”
10. There are three categories of contempt : (i) contempt in respect of orders of Court,
(ii) contempt by letters or pamphlets addressed to the Judge who is to decide the case with
the intention either by threats or flattery or bribery to influence his decisions, and (iii)
constructive contempt depending upon the influence of an intention to obstruct the course
of justice vide AIR 1955 Andhra 156 (159) : 1955 Cri LJ 1028 (DB).”
12. There can be o comprehensive or final definition of what would constitute contempt of
Court; but any conduct which has the effect of diminishing the prestige and authority of the
Court, which is likely to lower the esteem of the Court in the minds of the public and which
gives an impression that, with impunity the orders of the High Court could be disobeyed by mere
stratagem or contrivance, would certainly amount to contempt vide “(1969) Mad. LW (Cri) 25
(27, 28)(DB).”
13. For constituting civil contempt essential ingredient is “willful disobedience” and
“willful” connotes “Purposeful” and “clear intention to flout”. For constituting criminal
contempt essential ingredients are “iterferna” or “tending to interfere with” the due course of any
judicial proceeding or “interference” or “tending to interfere with” or “obstructing” or “tending
to obstruct” the administration of justice in any manner vide “1986 Pat. LJR (HC) 933 (940, 941)
:1987 BLJR 386 (DB) ** 1993 (21) All LR 155 (157) ** 1993 (1) All Rent Cas. 114: 1993 (1)
Civ LJ 394 (398) ** 1993 (I) Pun LR 226 (229) : 1993 (1) Rev LR 202 (DB).”
14. Letter written by contemner to Union Home Minister regarding corruption in judiciary-
Sole object in writing the letter was to invite the attention of the concerned authorities to
increasing corruption – No improper motive or malicious intention attributable- Not a fit case for
taking action against contemner vide “1978 Cri LJ 1440 (1444) : 1978 Raj LW 224 (DB).”
15. Proceedings in contempt-Vague and general allegations not sufficient to make out a case
for proceedings in contempt of Court vide “1972 UJ (SC) 462(2)(463).”
16. The High Court can initiate contempt proceedings suo motu even in a civil contempt. No
particular form of procedure is necessary so long as the proceedings are initiated giving an
opportunity to the contemner to defend himself. Art. 21 of the Constitution is not I any way of
violated thereof vide “AIR 1974 Mad. 313 (316) : (1974) 1 Mad LJ 155.”
17. The question of initiation of contempt proceedings in exercise of suo motu power by a
Judge or Judges will arise only when they are hearing a particular case and conduct of case
comes to notice of Court vide “2004(1)Andh WR 418 (468) : 2003 (12) Ind LD 342 (DB).”
18. Contempt proceedings power to initiate suo motu ca be exercised only by Court of record
such as Supreme Court ad High Court- Status quo order- Alleged violation of –Detention of
defendant by trial Court in civil prison straightway- Trial Court had dealt with contention in
reply affidavit treating it as application U/O 39, R. 2A CPC- Such approach of trial Court runs
counter to principles governing contempt proceedings- Order of trial Court liable to be set aside
vide “AIR 2005 (NOC) 173 : (2004) 6 Andh LD 579.”
19. Where suo motu notice of contempt has been initiated and determined initiation of
inquiry and proceedings under S. 340 Cr. P.C. would not be in interest of justice vide “2007 Cri
LJ 2339 (2347) : 2007 (138) Delhi LT 682.”
20. Criminal contempt- High Court taking suo motu cognizance under Art. 215- Provisions
of Act, not attracted vide “1996 Cri LJ 1090 (1095) : 1996 (1) Mah LJ 491 (DB) (Bom).”
C-2. Synopsis and judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per the book titled
“Iyer’s Law on Contempt of Courts” 4th edition published by Delhi Law House :-
1. Scope
1. “Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of M.P. 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 529 : AIR 1992 SC 904”
“61. To punish an advocate for contempt of court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme
measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the courts from being deflected or interfered with
and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the court,
though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one claim immunity
from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to court or court
proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice.”
2. “R.K. Tiwari Vs. N.K. Pandey, 1999 Cri L.J. 4008 at 4009 (M.P.)”
1. “Pushpendra Pal Singh Vs. Devraj Pandey, 1999 Cri L.J. 3706 (All.)”
2. “Kedar Nath Sinha Vs. Sahadeo Jha, 1977 Cri L.J. 1174(Pat.)”
3. “V.C. Govindaswami Mudali Vs. B. Subba Reddy, 1986 (3) Crimes 170 (AP)”
1. “Daya Shankar Dubey Vs. Subhas Kumar, 1992 Cri L.J. 319 (All.)
1. “Roshan Sam Boyce, Dr. (Mrs.) Vs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd , AIR 1990 SC 1881
1. “Hindustan Level Limited Vs. Cavinkare Limited, 2004 Cri L.J. 349”
1. “R. Narapa Vs. Jagarlamudi Candramouli, AIR 1967 A.P. 219 at page 228”
1. “Dhurandhar Prasad Sinha Vs. Jai Prakas University AIR 2001 SC 2552 “
1. “1913 A.C. 417, Drewry Thacker, (1819) 3 Swan 529 at page 564 and Amar Nath Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1981 Cri L.J. 1880 at page 1884 (Delhi)”
(The remarks of Viscount Haldane, V.C. in Scott Vs. Scott, do support the view that when there
is an irregularity of substance, or lack of jurisdiction to make the order, then there is no duty that
the order be first obeyed before its is quashed by the same or a superior court. Therefore, the
court would forget its duty, if it did not give the respondents the benefit of the fact that the order
might not to have been made.)
2. “Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale Vs. Vidyavardhini Sabha, 1984 Mah. L.J. 520 at pages
532-533” (Most important)
(Where an authority which purports to pass an order is acting without jurisdiction, purported
order is a nullity and it is not necessary for a party, who objects to that order to apply to set it
aside. He can rely on its in validity when it is set up against him, although he has not taken
steps to set it aside. The order of which contempt is alleged to have been committed was
without jurisdiction, and hence, the contemners and the other members of the governing council
who tended and proceeded with the meeting did not commit any contempt when the ignored the
order of injunction passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal)
3. “Kuldip Narain Lal Vs. Mahendra Pal Jain, 1984 Cri L.J. 1243 (All.)
(The proposition that the executing court cannot go into the legality or otherwise of the decree is
not an absolute proposition and certainly the court could go behind the decree if the decree is
said to be without jurisdiction. In the instant case, the order of the Tribunal is said to have been
committed was wholly without jurisdiction and as such, in the particular circumstances of this
case, this could not be the subject matter of punishment under the Act. Once the order is held to
be without jurisdiction then the disobedience of the order would not be a contempt.)
(Administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges
have their accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by the conscience
and oath to their office i.e. to defend and uphold the constitution and lodge without fear and
favour. Thus the Judges must do, in the light given to them to determine what is right. Any
Criticism about the Judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or
which erodes the faith in the objective approach of the judges and brings administration of
justice to ridicule must be prevented the contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt.
Judgments can be criticized. Motives to the judges need not be attributed.)
1. “Anita Sohania Ghai Vs. Snehlata 1996 Cri. L.J. 3641 at page 3643 Bombay
2. “Union of India Vs. Gulsha Bajwa (2003) 7 SCC 545 at page 545”
3. “Court on its own motion Vs. Ajay Bansal, 2004 Cri L.J. 2601 at pages 2614 (P & H)
4.. “B. Ramakrishana Reddy Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149”
1. “Ramesh Chandra Vs. J.R. Chaudhury, 1996 Cri L.J. 1554 (All.)”
1. “Virendra Nath Sorav Vs. Sajjan Kumar, 1996 Cri L.J. 2564 at Page 2567 (Raj.)”
(Law has been well settled by the Apex Court that a party giving undertaking to the court based
on implications or exemptions which are false to its knowledge is guilty of misconduct
amounting to contempt of court within the ambit of section 2).
2. “Bank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin Hasan Haya (2004) 1 SCC 360 at page 371”
(The violation of breach of undertaking which became part of the decree of the court certainly
amounts to contempt of court.)
1. “Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Hari Nath Sharma, 1995 Cri L.J. 1290 (Raj.)”
2. “C. Sadhanandam Vs. Prof. Rama Murthy, 1997 (A) ALD 225 (DB)”
1. “Noor Ali Babul Thanewala Vs. S. K.M.M. Shetty, (1990) 1 CRC 378 (All.) : 1990 (2)
Bom. C.R. 236 at Page 241”
1. “Srinivasa Rao Kumbhari Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 Cri L.J. 353 (AP)”
1. “Rajiv Choudhary Vs. Jagdish Narain Khanna, 1996 J.C.C.L. at pages 6, 7 (SC)”
1. “Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR
1991 SC 2176
2. “Dr. D.C. Saxena Vs. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, AIR 1996 SC 2481”
1. “Nisha Kanto Ray Chowdhury Vs. Smt Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Cal. 294 at page
296”
2. “Bajrang Lal Gangadhar Khemka Vs. Kapur Chand Ltd, AIR Bom. 326 at p. 337”
3. “Sambhu Charan Nundy Vs. Gopi Mohan Bhattacharjee, AIR 1951Cal. 507 at page 509
4. “Bukhtiartur Bihar Light Rly. Co. Ltd Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1951 231 at page 237.”
5. “Raziya Mahboob Patel Vs. Rajesab Hasan, 2001 Cri L.J. 269 at P. 273, 274 (Kant.)”
6. “Smt Lajuklata Vs. Narishingha Prosad, AIR 1952 Cal. 669 at Page. 670”
8. “Suretennaessa Bibi Vs. Chaintaharan Das AIR 1955 Cal. 182 at p. 183”
9. “Bhatanagar and Company Ltd Vs. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 478 at p. 482”
10. “Ram Juwan Vs. Devendra Nath Gupta, AIR 1960 MP 280 at p. 281, 282”
11. “Chhaganbhai Norshinbhi Vs. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai, 1976 (3) SCR 786 at p.
787 : AIR 1976 SC 1909
12. “Babu Ram Gupta Vs. Sudhir Bhasin, (1980) 3 SCC 47”
13. “R.M. Ramaul Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1171 at p. 172”
15. “Virochan Vs. Ram Saran Das, 1982 Cri. LJ 1219 at p. 1222”
17. “Union of India Vs. Mario Cabralae Sa, 1982 Cri LJ 187 (SC )
18. “State Bank of India, New Delhi Vs. D.S. Dalal, 1982 Cri. LJ 395” at p. 399.(Delhi)
19. “K.B. Shiva kumar Vs. Kanak Raj Mehta, AIR 2000 SC 3515 at p. 3515”
20. “Mohd. Idris Vs. Rustam Jahangir, AIR 1984 SC 182”
22. “Shanti Lal Makanji Kalyanji Shah Vs. Ranchoddas Girdhardas,1980 (1) SCC 205”
The averments made by the second respondent in his affidavit before the Sub-Court,
Trivandrum, affirmed as they are by the statements made by him and in the affidavit filed in this
Court clearly show that he has committed criminal contempt as defied in Sec. 2 (c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. These statements scandalize and lower the authority of this
Court and obstruct the administration of justice. Vide “Advocate General, Kerala State,
Ernakulam Vs. Rev. Further. K.T. Mathew, 1986 (1) Crimes 294 at p. 299 (Ker.)”.
“This Court has become a constitutional liability without having control over the
illegal acts of the Government. Thus the people for whom the Constitution is meant
have now turned down their faces against it which is a disillusionment for fear that
justice is a will of the wisp.”
Yet at another place, the petitioner has stated that this Court is sleeping over the issues
like Kumbhakarna. The reading of the writ petition gives the impression that it is clearly
intended to denigrate this Court in the esteem of the people of India. Prima facie view is that the
petition has been drawn up with a designed purpose of bringing the Court into contempt and the
petitioner is, therefore, prima facie guilty of contempt. Vide “Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 107 at pp. 107, 108.”
Moving contempt application against a Judge on flimsy grounds with deliberate intention
of embarrassing and disqualifying him from trying a case, setting up against him unfounded plea
of bias, open expression of lack of confidence in the Judge without any valid reason and then
urging him to release a case, and seeking unnecessary adjournments on non-existent grounds
with oblique motive of arresting or obstructing the progress of a case are the instances of
contumacious conduct tending to interfere with the administration of justice inviting action for
contempt. Vide “Ram Ji Lal Sharma Vs. Civil Judge, A.I.R. 1988 All. 143 at pp. 145, 146.”
The object of writing these offending paragraphs and particularly of filing the
representation petition in the High Court at the time it was actually done was quite clearly to
influence or affect the minds of the Judges and to detract them from the strict performance of
their duties. Vide “Sarat Chandra Biswas Vs. Surendra Mohanty, A.I.R. 1969 Orissa 117 at p.
128.”
Action of the respondents in SWEARING PRIMA FACIE TO THE FALSE FACTS
IN THE AFFIDAVITS AND IN THEIR STATEMENTS amounts to gross contempt of this
Court as the action of the contemner substantially interferes with the due course of justice.
Vide “Sudesh Kumar Vs. Jai Narain, 1974 P.L.R. 23 at p. 26.”
No person is permitted to make allegations scandalizing the Judge of the Court even in an
application for transfer of a case from that Court. The nature of the allegations in such case
assumes importance. It was opined that the allegations in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the transfer
application in the instant case, and to which allegations Shri C.K. Saraf was an active subscriber
leave no manner of doubt that they were made mala fide to disrepute the Judge and to scandalize
him. Vide “State of M.P. Vs. Chandra Kant Saraf, 1985 (2) Crimes 208 at p. 213 (M.P.) see also
Barely Vs. Xavier, m1986 (3) Crimes 544.”
Shri M.L. Sood, Under Secretary (Education), should never have sworn the affidavit
unless he had personally verified the facts from the official record. Of course, he was at liberty
to say in the verification that he was verifying from the copies of the record shown to him by the
particular person. He is warned not to repeat it in future. Vide “Court on its own motion Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh, 1984 Sim. L.C. 51 at pp. 56,59.”
Swearing affidavits personally for the purpose of the same being used in this Court, ought
to be extremely careful as to what language they use and what statements of fact they make.
False affidavit may amount to contempt of Court. Vide “Tarafatullah Mandal Vs. S.N.
Maitra, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 919 at p. 925.”
If some allegations are made in the oral or written representations which turn out to be
true, even then the petitions ridiculing the Courts and lowering their position in the eyes of the
general public are not permitted. It is the prestige of the Court which is at stake, not the
individual who sits as a Judge. Contempt proceedings, therefore, are clearly to safeguard only
the interest and prestige of the public justice. Vide “Court on its own motion Vs. Ajit Singh,
1986 Cr. L.J. 590 at p. 601.”
The submissions made in pursuance of the order of the Court, they cannot be held to be
private communications to the Company Judge in order to decide the case. As these documents
were filed before the Court under the directions of the Court itself, it cannot be said by any
stretch of imagination that these documents prejudiced, interfered or tendered to interfere with
the due course of justice. Vide “Major R.S. Murgai Vs. Major P.N. Kaushik, 1980 (1) S.C.R. 936
at p. 937.”
It depends upon facts and circumstances in a case whether the allegations contained in
transfer application amount or do not amount to contempt of Court. Vide “S. Sher Singh Vs.
Raghu Pati Kapur, A.I.R. 1968 P & H 217 at p. 231.”
The mere statement that Magistrate is friendly with a party who happens to be an
advocate and enjoys his hospitality or has friendly relations with him will not constitute
contempt unless there is an imputation of some improper motives as would amount to
scandalizing the Court itself and as would have a tendency to create distrust in the popular mind
and impair the confidence of the people in the Courts. In the garb of a transfer application, a
person cannot be allowed to commit contempt of Court by making allegations of a serous and
scurrilous nature scandalizing the Court and imputing improper motives to the Judge trying the
case. vide “Govind Ram Vs. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 989 at pp. 993, 995.”
The opposite party committed contempt of Court by attributing mala fides to the
Assistant Registrar in his memorandum of appeal so much so that the Assistant Registrar in his
memorandum of appeal so much so that the Assistant Registrar was made a respondent in the
appeal and cost was sought to be recovered personally against him. Vide “Sitamarhi Central Co-
operative Bank Ltd Vs. Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha, AIR 1965 Pat. 227 at p. 235.
A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the Court from passing
any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, IT SHOULD
ALSO DECIDE THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
TIME. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and
effective till the Court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These
interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction. It is open to the Court to modify these orders while holding that it has no
jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such
orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case where a party has been
dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise in such a case,
the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put
back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has
nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and
their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the
plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the
question of jurisdiction. Vide “Tyabbhai M. Bagasarwalla Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt.
Ltd, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1240 at p. 1250 : (1997) 3 SCC 443.”
(A person is not desirous of complying with the order amounts to contempt of civil court).
3. “Hastings Mill Limited Vs. Hira Singh 1978 Cri L.J. 560 (Cal.)
(An act of misleading the court by deliberate suppression of fact or by the presentation of
falsehood is as much abuse of the courts process as the act of bringing frivolous and
vexatious and oppressive proceedings )
7. “AIR 1942 Bom. 257 (FB) ; AIR 1954 SC 340 & 1985 Cri. L.J. 359”
(It is well settled that an order without jurisdiction is a nullity which can be ignored with
impunity )
97. Deliberately making effort to disobey the orders of the court amounts to contempt
1. “T.R. Dhananjaya Vs. J. Vasudevan, AIR 1996 SC 302 at p. 304 & 305”
98. Attempt to exploit the courts order by illegal means amounts to contempt
1. “A. Dharamarajan Vs. Collector of Kamarajar, 1994 Cri LJ 2960 at p. 2964 (Mad.)
In the instant case, the question was- Whether he committed contempt in the proceedings
of Supreme Court ? Section 2(b) defines, “Contempt of Court” to mean any civil or criminal
contempt. “Criminal contempt” defined in Sec. 2(c ) means interference with the administration
of justice in any other manner. A false or a misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and
willfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would prejudice or
interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings. It is seen that Ahlawat, respondent No. 3,
to the main writ petition and incharge of the criminal administration, with his connivance, caused
two minor boys wrongful detention. He made an averment in the counter-affidavit dated 30t
October, 1993, that they were not in wrongful detention nor are they taken into custody which
was later found to be false. He first used fabricated counter-affidavit, forget by Krishan Kumar in
the proceeding to obtain a favourable order. But when he perceived adverse atmosphere to him,
he fabricated further false evidence and sought to use an affidavit evidence to show that Krishan
Kumar had forget his signature without his knowledge and filed the fabricated document.
Thereby, he further committed contempt of the judicial process. He has no regard for truth from
stage to stage, he committed contempt of the Court by making false statements. Being a
responsible officer, he is required to make truthful statements before the Court, but he made
obviously false statements. Thereby, he committed criminal contempt of judicial proceeding of
Supreme Court. Vide “Afjal Vs. State of Haryana, 1996 (1)Crimes 58 at p. 75 (S.C.) 1996
Cr.L.J. 1679 : A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2326 : (1996) 7 S.C.C. 397.”
The investigating officer by the false statements on oath had clearly tried to misland the
Court with the intention to get the petition dismissed and at no point of time till the disposal of
the petition expressed willingness to withdraw from pursuing with his objection for transfer of
the investigation even after the A.P.P. himself had fairly conceded to the need of transfer of the
investigation to the Economic offences wing. Thus the investigating officer by his conduct and
statements tried to interfere with the administration of justice in as much as that he tried to get
the petition dismissed by making false statements on oath and to the prejudice of the petitioner
when the facts clearly warranted the relief as prayed for by the petitioner. When the act
complained of substantially interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of justice which
is a facet of the broad concept of the administration of justice, then the contemner is not entitled
to evade the peal consequences of such act, by taking shelter of section 13 of the said Act. vide
“The Kapol Co-op. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Cr.L.J. 765 at pp. 769, 774.”
117. Affidavit containing false, mischievous and scurrilous allegation amounts to criminal
contempt
There are no good reasons to infer that the respondent was interested in the purity of
administration of justice and, therefore, he made complaints believing them honestly to be true to
the High Court against the officers. He submitted an advocate copy of his affidavit to the Bar
Association and the bar Association, after discussing the contents of the affidavit, came to the
conclusions that all of them were false and the respondent was requested not to submit the same
to the High Court. In spite of it, the respondent had chosen to submit to the Chief Justice of
Andhra Pradesh High Court, his affidavit containing false, mischievous and scurrilous
allegations against the Subordinate Judge. He thus gave wide publicity to what he intended to do
and this was done, according to Court in the circumstances, only with an oblique motive to bring
the administration of justice into disrespect. He scandalised the authority of the Court and tried
to bring it down by his false accusations. Being a senior Advocate of 32 years standing at the
Bar, e tried to gain an unfair advantage by insisting that the cheque should be given in his name
without filing the affidavit of the decree-holder. He was aware of the clear legal position but he
tried to bamboozle and over-awe the judicial officer in the open court by threatening to show his
power. Not satisfied with that, he made a written complaint against the District Munsif making
a false allegations to what happened in connection with the passing of orders o the cheque
petition. One of the advocates who written statement present in the Court gave an affidavit
describing in verbatim the scurrilous attacks made by the respondent against the officer in the
open court. He has no regard for decency and decorum, his attitude appears to be to terrorise
judicial officers and show his prominence to everybody with a view to gain unfair advantage as a
legal practitioner. His plea in the counter-affidavit that he was interested in the purity of
administration of justice is only a camouflage to gain sympathy of the Court. His attempts to
justify his conduct and his offer to tender unconditional apology do not go together. Court does
not find any bona fides in his expression of regrets. In a deliberate and calculated manner, he
tried to denigrate the two judicial officers- the Subordinate Judge and the District Munsif. A full
Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Advocate General Vs. Rachapudi Subba Rao, vide 1990
(3) A.L.T. 531 after reviewing the case law on contempt of court, observed :
“Any attack on the competence and integrity of a Judge, whether of a superior Court or a
subordinate Court, amounts to scandalizing the Court itself. If an apprehension is created in the
public mind about the integrity, ability or fairness of a judge, it is a Contempt of Court.
Affirmatively it need not be proved that there is an interference with the administration of
justice. An individual occupying a judicial officer cannot be treated apart from his office in
respect of the work he does in the court.”
The conduct of the respondent falls clearly within the ambit of the definition of criminal
contempt under sec. 2(c )(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act. vide “Advocate General, Andhra
Pradesh Vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, 1995 (1) Crimes 86 at pp. 90-91 (A.P.)”
The petitioners obtained favourable orders in the writ petitions by concealing the material
facts and making false representation. Punjab and Haryana High Court was influenced by the
suppressio veri and suggestion falsi. The conduct of the petitioners prima facie amounts to
gross contempt of Court. Let show cause notice to issue to them. The counsel undertook to
produce the petitioners in the Court, as and when desired. The petitioners, through their counsel,
are directed to appear inn Court on 11th February, 1994, so that the show cause notices be served
upon them. Vide “Harbhajan Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 (P&H) 216 at pp. 220, 221; see
also Rita Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 S.C. 2174 at pp. 2177, 2178.”
138. Any conduct intended to interfere with the administration of justice amounts to a
criminal contempt
1. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar, AIR 1994 SC 4994 : (1995) SCC 421” (Available)
1. “Yaqub Ali Vs. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cri L.J. 1376” (Important for Mr. Khanna C/o
Mr. B.L. Mehta Advocate)
154. Reprehensible conduct and indifference to implement the order of Supreme Court
calls for strong condemnation and the contemner is unworthy to hold ay office of
responsibility
1. “Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt; Ltd. Vs. Terai Tea Co. (Petitioner) Ltd, 1996 (1) SCC 589 at p.
592, 593”
1. “State of A.P. Vs. National Council for the Church & Social action, India, 1996 Cri
LJ 2857 at p. 2859, 2860 (A.P.)
157. Filing of forged and fabricated documents with the help of others amounts to gross
contempt of court
1. “Phool Singh Vs. Tulai Ram Gangwar, 1996 Cri LJ 3818 at p. 3821 (All.)”
176. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution Guarantees freedom of speech and expression but
makes an exception in respect of contempt of court
1. “E.M. Sankran Namboodripad Vs. T. Narayanan Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325”
178. Contemner the advocate questioning the conduct of the judges of Supreme Court
demanding apology and compensation from them- 6 months’ imprisonment
1. “In re : - Ajay Kumar Pandey AIR 1997 SC 260 at Page 272” (Important for Mr. Khanna
C/o Mr. B.L. Mehta Advocate )
1. “ Court on its own motion v. K.S. Sethi, AIR 1968 Delhi 248” (FB) (24.11.1967)(referred
by Sh. Vinod Gaur. Irrelevant) (Available)
2 “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and
another, AIR 1980 SC 946” (Available)
3. “In the Matter of Nanak Chand Theog, AIR 1989 Himachal Pradesh 46” (19.8.1988).
(Available)
4. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. S.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. And others, AIR 1990 S.C. 1881”
(6.4.1990) (Available) (M.Imp.)
5. “Delhi judicial service association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and other, AIR
1991 SC 2176” (11.9.1991) (Available)
6. “Court of its own Motion v. B.D. Kaushik 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Referred by Sh. Vinod
Gaur) (Not available)
7. “Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” (19.2.1992)
(Available)
Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC)
8. “Modern Food Industries (I) Ltd & Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass & Another, 1995
Supp. (4) SCC 465 (21.9.1992) :- (Contempt for non-compliance with Court’s orders)
(Available)
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
9. “National Textile Corporation v. Sundram Ors, 1994 (1) Scale 344” (Contempt for non-
compliance with Court’s orders) (Not available)
10. “Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd.) And Another Vs, Russel Estate Corporation and
Another, 1993 (2) SCC 533” (4.2.1993) (Available)
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
11. “National Textile Corporation Vs, V. Sundaram & Ors., 1994 (1) Scale 71” (19.1.1994)
(Available) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
12. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, JT 1994(6) S.C. 584” (4.10.1994)
(Available):-
13. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 : 1995 RLR 1 (SC) : 1994
AIR SCW 4994” (14.11.1994) (M.I.) (Available) :-
14. “Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 130 : 1994 (4) Scale 1088”
(23.11.1994) (Available)
15. “Prof. Shradha Kumari Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad And Others, 1996 Supreme
Court Cases (Cri) 85” (24.1.1995) (Available) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
16. “In Re: Sanjiv Dutta, (1995) 3 SCC 619 : JT 1995 (3) SC 538” (Both Available)
(19.4.1995)
Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC)
17. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 1795”
(2.5.1995) (M.I.) (Available):-
18. “Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” (17.1.1996)
(Available):-
(Contempt of Court and IPC)
19. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”
(10.4.1996) (Available)
20. The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR 1996 SC
1925 (9.5.1996) (Fining false proceeding in the court) (Available)
21. “J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 SC 113” (11.9.1996)
(Available) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
22. “Rita Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 SC 2174 : 1996(2) RCR 472”
(27.9.1996) (M.I.) (Both Available):-
23. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1 AD
(Delhi) 927” : “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997) (Available but not attached herewith) :-
24. “Indian Airports Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chattarjee And Another, AIR 1999 SC
880” (2.2.1999) (Available) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
25. “K.S. Villasa Vs. M/S Ladies Corner & Another, AIR 1999 SC 2140” (3.2.1999):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
26. “Ms. Sophy Kelly and another Vs., Chandrakant Ganpat & Others, AIR 1999 SC 1042 “
(4.2.1999) (Not Available):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
27. “Suo Motu Contempt, in Re : Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300 (26.2.1999)”
(Available):-
28. “T.C. Mathews and anr. V. Distt. and Session Judge, 2000 RLR (N. S.C. ) 19” (Not
Available)
29. “Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction And Another, (1999) 6 SCC
18” (5.4.1999) (Available):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
30. Kapil Deo Prasad Sah And Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3215” (25.8.1999)
(Available):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
31. “Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of Indian and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345”
(15.10.1999) (Available):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
32. “Padmahasini alias Padmapriya Vs. C.R. Srinivas, AIR 2000 SC 68” (16.11.1999)
( Available) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
33. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124 (SC)” (25.1.2000)
(Available):-
34. “P.C. Singhal Vs. R.B.S. Tyagi, 84 (2000) DLT 264 (DB)” (4.2.2000)(Referred by Sh.
Vinod Gaur. Not relevant) (Available)
35. “Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000) (Not
Available):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
36. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal,
Advocate, 2001 RLR 144 :89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB) (Delhi) : (16.1.2001) (Both Available):-
37. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001) (Available) (For filing
false proceedings in court)
38. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt. Madhu Trehan & Ors, 92 (2001) DLT 665”
(F.B.) (28.5.2001) (Available):-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
39. “Rajeev Malhotra Vs. Union of India And Others, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)” (Available)
40. “Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549” (10.8.2001) (Available)
41. “Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali and Anr, AIR 2001 SC 3041 and VII (2001) SLT
153” (9.10.2001) (Both Available):-
42. “Sudhir Chona vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (62) DRJ 346 (DB)” (Delhi) (13.3.2002)
(Available)
43. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri L.J.
493” (30.7.2003) (Available)
44. “S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039” (19.8.2003) (A Three
Judge Bench)
45. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004 SC
3114” (12.4.2004) (Available)
46. “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004)
(Available)
Note: This judgment explain the procedure to be followed for registering a criminal contempt
petition.
47. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367”
(8.3.2006) (Available)
48. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 : 2007 Cri
L.J. 2339” (9.2.2007) (Available)
49. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB)
(17.2.2009) (Available)
50. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Delhi) (Not
available)
Note: Relevant extract of this judgments pertaining to Contempt of Court has been quoted by the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in its following judgment.
51. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”
(Delhi) (21.8.2008) (Paras 2, 8,10,11,20,78,125,127,143,155,169,206 & 207) (Available)
(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were
Public Prosecutor and Defence Counsel respectively)
52. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261”
(20.10.2008) (Available)
53. “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC) (Available)
54. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009) DLT
466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)
55. “Court on its own motion against Ajay Yadav, 165 (2009) DLT 520 (DB)” (6.11.2009)
56. “ST. Ives Laboratories Inc. Vs. Lotus Herbals UK Ltd , 164 (2009) DLT 473 (9.11.2009)
C-7. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Criminal Contempt as
defined in sub clause (iii) of Clause ( C ) of Section 2 of Contempt of Courts Act (Interferes or
tends to interfere with , or obstruct or tends to obstruct, the Administration of justice in any
manner ) decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Delhi High Court and Other High Courts
1. Court on its own motion v. K.S. Sethi, AIR 1968 Delhi 248 (referred by Sh. Vinod Gaur)
(Not relevant)
2. “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries
and another, AIR 1980 SC 946”
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR:-
“Contempt of Courts Act (1971), Section 2 (c ) – ‘Criminal contempt’ – What amounts to –
Proceedings for contempt – Duty of Court. Original Cri. Misc. No. 7 of 1973, D/- 24.4.1974
(Pat), Reversed.
Every abuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of
Court ; ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT CALCULATED TO HAMPER
THE DUE COURSE OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING OR THE ORDERLY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS A CONTEMPT OF COURT. It may be that certain
minor abuses of the process of the Court may be suitably dealt with between the parties, by
striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on
the other hand, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO PUNISH AS CONTEMPT, A COURSE OF
CONDUCT WHICH ABUSES AND MAKES A MOCKERY OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action
and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an
interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly
administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights
and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the
due administration of justice and, so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of
Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Curt against insult or injury as the expression
“Contempt of Court” may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public
that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, or interfered with. “It is a
mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and
outrage”. THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE SEEN TO SIT BY LIMPLY, WHILE THOSE
WHO DEFY IT GO FREE, AND THOSE WHO SEEK ITS PROTECTION LOSE HOPE.
“Contempt of Courts Act (1971), Section 12 – Punishment for contempt of court – Apology –
Contemners expressed unconditional apology to High Court – HELD, THE CONDUCT
OF CONTEMNERS WAS SO REPREHENSIBLE AS TO WARRANT
CONDEMNATION BY IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE – Supreme Court sentenced – each
of the contemners to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-
3. “In the matter of Nanak Chand Theog, AIR 1989 Himachal Pradesh 46 (19.8.1988)”
(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-
“Contempt of Courts Act (1971), S. 10-Contempt of subordinate Courts-POWER TO
PUNISH VESTS IN HIGH COURT ALONE, except in cases covered by S. 228, Penal Code
and O. 39, R. 2-A, Civil P.C. –Disconnection of office telephone of subordinate court for non-
payment of bills-Initiation of suo motu contempt proceedings against Junior Engineer, Telephone
by subordinate Court –Illegal and without jurisdiction-Proper course is to take up matter on
administrative side with higher Telephone authorities with intimation to Registry of High Court.
Penal Code (1860), S. 228
Civil P.C. (1908), O. 39, R. 2-A.”
4. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. SR Cotton Mills Ltd. And other, AIR 1990 SC 1881”
(6.4.1990)
(i) Head Note of the above referred AIR:-
“Contempt of Court Act. (70 of 1971), S. 2- Contempt – Giving undertaking to Court based on
assumptions which undertaker knows are false.
Constitution of India, Art. 142.
The party giving undertaking to Court BASED ON IMPLICATIONS OR ASSUMPTIONS
WHICH ARE FALSE TO ITS KNOWLEDGE IS GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT
AMOUNTING TO CONTEMPT. Thus where the tenant, a Company, who had filed a writ
petition against the eviction decree passed against it, on the petition being dismissed prayed for
grant of time to vacate the premises and the time was granted subject to its filing a written
undertaking that it would not part with the possession of the suit premises or create third
party interests in the suit premises and the tenant Company ALTHOUGH KNOWING
FULLY WELL THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMPANY WAS ALREADY A
LAWFUL SUB-TENANT OF THE SUIT PREMISES, gave the requisite undertaking
which clearly implied that the Company was in possession of the suit premises and in a position
to hand over possession of the suit premises after the time granted to vacate the premises
expired, and thus mislead the Court, the tenant was guilty of misconduct amounting to
contempt.
5. “Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and
other, AIR 1991 SC 2176 (11.9.1991)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (C) of the above referred AIR:-
“Constitution of India, Article 20 (3) – Double jeopardy – Contempt proceeding against police
officials- Criminal proceedings already pending against them- they are not “persons accused of
an offence” - Mere issue of notice of contempt and asking them to file their version before
commissioner appointed by court – Not Violative of Art. 20 (3).
Criminal P.C. ( 2 of 1974), S. 300
Double jeopardy – Contempt proceedings against police officials
Contempt proceeding is sui generis, it has peculiar features which are not found in criminal
proceedings. In this view, the condemners, police officials, involved in arrest, assault, wrongful
detention of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and against whom criminal cases were also registered
do not stand in the position of a “person accused of an offence” Merely on account of issue of
notice of contempt by the Supreme Court…….In this view, there has been no violation of Art. 20
(3) of the constitution and commission’s findings are not vitiated…..”
(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (E) of the above referred AIR:-
“Constitution of India, Art. 129—Scope- Contempt of Subordinate Courts – Powers of
Supreme Court – CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971 DOES NOT IMPINGE
(ENCROACH) UPON POWERS OF SUPREME COURT WITH REGARD TO
CONTEMPT OF SUBORDINATE COURTS UNDER ART. 129. --------.
There is no provision is Contempt of Courts Act. 1979 curtailing the Supreme Court’s Power
with regard to contempt of Subordinate Courts. Section 15, on the other hand, expressly refers
to the Supreme Court’s power for taking action for contempt of Subordinate Courts.
SECTION 15 PRESCRIBES MODES FOR TAKING COGNIZANCE OF CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT BY THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT, --------. Section 15 (2)
does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of the contempt of itself or
of a Subordinate Court on its own motion although apparently, the section does not say so.
(iii) Relevant extract of Head Note (F) of the above referred AIR:-
“Constitution of India Art. 129 – Scope – Contempt of Subordinate Court – expression
“including the power to punish for contempt of itself” in Art. 129 – not restrictive but extensive
in nature.
Interpretation of statutes – Expression “including”.
Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a Court of record and it further provides that the
Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for
contempt of itself. The expression used in Art. 129 is not restrictive, instead it is extensive in
nature.---------- Art. 129 recognized the existing inherent power of a Court of record in its
full plentitude including the power to punish for the contempt of inferior courts.-----------
THE SUBORDINATE COURTS ADMINISTER JUSTICE AT THE GRASS ROOT
LEVEL THEIR PROTECTION IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE
OF PEOPLE IN THE EFFICACY OF COURTS AND TO ENSURE UNSULLIED FLOW
OF JUSTICE AT ITS BASE LEVEL.”
(iv) Relevant extract of Head Note (H) of the above referred AIR:-
“Constitution of India, Articles, 129, 32, 134, 36, 215- Contempt of Subordinate Court –
SUPREME COURT POSSESSES SIMILAR INHERENT POWER AS THAT OF HIGH
COURT UNDER ART. 215 ----------.
Since the Supreme Court has power of judicial superintendence and control over all the
Courts and Tribunals functioning in the entire territory of the country, it has a corresponding
duty to protect and safeguard the interest of inferior courts to ensure the flow of the stream of
justice in the courts without any interference or attack from any quarter. THE SUBORDINATE
AND INFERIOR COURTS DO NOT HAVE ADEQUATE POWER UNDER THE LAW
TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, THEREFORE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD PROTECT THEM. --------- NO DOUBT, HIGH COURTS
HAVE POWER TO PERSIST FOR THE CONTEMPT OF SUBORDINATE COURT
BUT THAT DOES NOT AFFECT OR ABRIDGE THE INHERENT POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 129. -------There may be occasions when attack on
Judges and Magistrates of Subordinate Courts may have vide repercussions throughout
the country, in that situation, it may not be possible for a High Court to contain the same,
as a result of which the administration of justice in the country may be paralaysed, in that
situation, the Apex Court must intervene to ensure smooth functioning of Courts. ---------
Ordinarily, the High Court would protect the Subordinate Court from any onslaught on
their independence, but in exceptional cases, extraordinary situation may prevail affecting
the administration of public justice or where the entire judiciary is affected, the Supreme
Court may directly take cognizance of contempt of subordinate Courts. However, it was
observed that the Supreme Court will sparingly exercise its inherent power in taking cognizance
of the contempt of Subordinate Courts, as ordinarily matters relating to contempt of
Subordinate Court must be dealt with by the High Courts. The instant case is of exceptional
nature, as the incident of arrest, assault and handcuffing of the Chief Judicial Magistrate by
police created a situation where functioning of the Subordinate Courts all over the country was
adversely affected, and the administration of justice was paralysed, therefore, the Supreme Court
took Cognizance of the matter.”
(v) Para 1 of the above referred judgment:-
“K.N. Singh, J.:- On 25th September, 1989, a horrendous incident took place in the town of
Nadiad, District Kheda in the State of Gujarat, which exhibited the berserk behavior of police
undermining the dignity and independence of judiciary. S. R. Sharma, Inspector of Police, with
25 years of service posted at the police Station, Nadiad, arrested, assaulted and handcuffed N.L.
Patel, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad and tied him with a thick rope like an animal and made a
public exhibition of it by sending him in the same condition to the Hospital for medical
examination on an alleged charge of having consumed liquor in breach of the prohibition law
enforced in the State of Gujarat. The Inspector S.R. Sharma got the Chief Judicial Magistrate
photographed in handcuffs with rope tied around his body along with the constables which were
published in the newspapers all over the country. This led to tremors in the Bench and the Bar
throughout the whole country.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of Subordinate Court, the High Court may take
action ON A REFERENCE MADE TO IT BY THE SUBORDINATE COURT or on a
motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union Territory, by Such Officer
as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this
behalf.
(3) x x x x
(i) Relevant extracts of the Head Note of the above referred DLT :-
“Constitution of India- Art. 215- Court of Record-Evolve its own procedure- Respondents
advocates, proceeded for contempt of Court- Aided and abetted by large number of advocates
invaded the High Court and prevented the Judges from discharging their judicial function-Full
Bench initiated proceedings- Contemners expressed regrets –And the apology bonafide-Whether
the act of the contemners tantamounts to an attempt to erode the majesty of the Court ? (Yes).
Held that we must realize that they are members of the noble profession and in their
misguided zeal, ventured upon the defiant course for which they have offered apology. At the
same time we must also keep in mind that simply accepting the apology and discharging
the rule may not appear to be warranted in the circumstances of the gross contempt.
Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, including the outrageous
incident and unqualified apology, we do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it
as we would like to further watch their conduct and behaviour for a period of one year from
today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of Court or
undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But
if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behaviour and do not indulge themselves in
the repetition of such act within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged
on the expiry of the period.
“Gokal Chand Mital, CJ, (for himself and for 11 other Judges)
S.B. Wad, J. (For himself and on behalf of B.N. Kirpal, P.K. Bahri & Arun Kumar
J.)
D.P. Wadhwa, J :
Sunanda Bhandare, J.
Y.K. Sabharwal, J.
Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred RCJ :-
“Constitution of India, Articles 129 and 215- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Contempt
proceedings-Inherent powers of Supreme Court and High Court- The power of the Supreme
Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied in Articles 129 and 215
respectively cannot be restricted and trammeled by any ordinary legislation including the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not
subjected to any limit.----.”
“Finally, the High Court held that the contemner, Mr. Pritam Lal is guilty of criminal contempt
of not only scandalizing the Court and lowering its authority but also substantially interfering
with the due course of justice. Coming to the question of sentence, the High Court taking note of
the defiant attitude of the contemner who even did not think it necessary to apologize but tried to
justify the aspersions, sentenced the contemner to suffer simple imprisonment for two months.
Hence the present appeal.”
“There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon particular instances of conduct which has
been held to constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few.”
“Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J. has laid down the Law of Contempt in 1900 (2) Q.B. 36 at 40
as follows :-
“Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court
into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a Contempt of Court.”
“Lord Justice Donovanin Attorney General Vs. Butterworth, 1963 (1) Q.B. 696 after making
reference to Reg. Vs. Odham’s Press Ltd, ex parte A.G. 1957 (1) Q.B. 73 said, “Whether or not
there was an intention to interfere with the administration of justice is relevant to penalty, not to
guilt.” This makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice
is an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of Court and it is enough if the action
complained of is inherently likely so to interfere.”
“In Morris Vs. The Crown Office, 1970 1 All. E.R. 1079 at page 1081, Lord Denning, M.R.
said :
“The course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it
strike at the very foundations of our society.”
In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke :
The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively
to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not
be obstructed or prevented.”
“In Jennison Vs. Baker, 1972 (1) All. ER 997 at page 1006, it is stated :
“The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek
its protection lose hope.”
(viii) Para 49 of the above referred judgment :-
“Chinnappa Reddy, J speaking for the Bench in Advocate General, Bihar Vs. M.P. Khair
Industries, 1980 (3) SCC 311 citing those two decisions in the cases of offut and Jennison
(supra) stated thus :
“…it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and
makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond
the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The
public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and
orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of
all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in
the due administration of justice and so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of
Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression
“Contempt of Court” may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public
that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered
with.”
“Reference may be made to recent decision of this Court in M.B. Sanghi Vs. High Court of
Punjab and Haryana, 1991(3) SCC 600. In that case, the appellant, a practicing advocate having
failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad-interim injunction pending filing
of a counter by the opposite party, made certain derogatory remarks against the learned Judg3e
who instead of succumbing to such unprofessional conduct made a record of the derogatory
remarks and forwarded the same to the High Court through the District Judge to initiate
proceedings for Contempt of Court against the appellant. The High Court holding that the
remarks made on the learned Sub-Judge are disparaging in character and derogatory to the
dignity of the judiciary found the appellant guilty of Section 2 (c ) (i) of the Contempt of Courts
Act. The appellant therein though denied to have made the remarks however, offered an
unqualified apology. But the High Court without accepting the apology punished the appellant
therein with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.---.”
“After having made the above observation, the learned Judge concurred with the conclusion of
Agarwal, J. dismissing the appeal and while doing so, he expressed his painful thought as
follows :
“When a member of the bar is required to be punished for use of contemptuous language it is
highly painful- it pleases none- but painful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and
dignity of the individual Judge and his office and the prestige of the institution. Courts are
generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against erring members of the profession in
the hope that the concerned Bar Council will chasten its member for failure to maintain proper
ethical norms. If timely action is taken by the Bar Councils, the decline in the ethical values can
be easily arrested.”
“-----It is highly painful to note that the appellant/contemnor who is none other than an Advocate
practicing in the same highest Court of the state after having failed to wrench a decision in his
favour in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person has escalatingly scandalized the
Court by making libelous allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious,
intimidatory, malicious and beyond condonable limit.---.”
“To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme
measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with,
and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court,
though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim
immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct in relation to Court or
Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice.”
“Coming to the question of sentence, it appears from the order of the High Court that the
appellant had adopted a defiant attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by him even
without thinking it necessary to apologize. Before this Court also , the appellant has neither
expressed any contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious allegations made against the
learned Judges of the High Court. But on the other hand, he has exhibited a dogged
determination to pursue the matter, come what may. A reading of his memorandum of grounds
and the written and signed arguments show that he has ventured into another bout of allegations
against the High Court Judges and persisted in his campaign of vilification. His present conduct
has aggravated rather than mitigating his offence.”
“Therefore, having regard to the sentencing policy that punishment should be commensurate
with the gravity of the offence, we hold that the sentence of 2 months imprisonment in no way
calls for interference and accordingly the sentence is confirmed.”
8. “Modern Food Industries (I) Ltd & Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass & Another,
1995 Supp. (4) SCC 465 (21.9.1992) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
9. “National Textile Corporation v. Sundram Ors, 1994 (1) Scale 344” (Contempt for
non-compliance with Court’s orders)
10. “Major Genl. B.M. Bhattacharjee (Retd.) And Another Vs, Russel Estate
Corporation And Another, (1993) 2 SCC 533” (4.2.1993)
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
11. “National Textile Corporation Vs, V. Sundaram & Ors., 1994 (1) Scale 71”
(19.1.1994):-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
12. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, J.T. 1994 (6) SC 584”(4.10.1994) :-
“Section 12 – Conviction of the advocate for raising the pitch of his voice unusually high
and using derogatory language against the Magistrate-Held-When the advocate was warned of
his unruly behaviour, he should have stopped and not retained a defiant and aggressive posture-
‘Lawyers were created for the Course, not Courts for the lawyers’ –Belated apology not
accepted and the appellant was rather admonished for his conduct-However, having admonished
payment of fine was set aside.”
13. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 Supreme Court cases 421”: “1995
Rajdhani Law Reporter Page 1” (Vol. 25) (14.11.1994) :-
(i) Index-A of the Head Note of the above referred SCC at page-422:-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- S. 2(c ) – Criminal Contempt- Fraud on Court--
FORGED AND FABRICATED DOCUMENT FILED IN COURT WITH OBLIQUE
MOTIVE OF DECEIVING OR DEFRAUDING THE COURT-HELD, RESULTS IN
INTERFERENCE WITH ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND AMOUNTS TO
CONTEMPT OF COURT-words and phrases- “Interfere”, meaning of.”
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ----- HELD, APOLOGY NOT OUTCOME OF REAL
REMORSE OR CONTRITION BUT TENDERED AS A WEAPON OF DEFENCE AND
THEREFORE, NOT ACCEPTABLE –“TWO WEEKS” IMPRISONMENT AWARDED
TO CONTEMNOR WITH A VIEW THAT IT SHOULD SERVE AS DETERRENT AND
EYE-OPENER, a mere sentence of fine would not meet the ends of justice in the
circumstances--------.
Held from the facts it is clear that the respondent contemnor had filed a forged and
fabricated document in court TO RESIST THE PRAYER OF HIS WIFE to get the
matrimonial proceedings transferred on the ground of her poverty i.e. it was done with an
oblique motive.
To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, THOSE
WHO INDULGE IN IMMORAL ACTS LIKE PERJURY, PREVARICATION AND
MOTIVATED FALSEHOODS HAVE TO BE APPROPRIATED DEALT WITH, without
which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the
satisfaction of those who approached it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. Any one
who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or if anything is
done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. The word
‘interfere’ means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the
functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Obstruction of justice is to
interpose obstacles or impediments or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the
administration of justice. If recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same
would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the
courts from performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.
Therefore, if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an
intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of
justice-----. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens
rea. In the case and hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court, the
intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt---.
“--------------. People would have faith in courts when they would find that “lR;eso
t;rs” (Truth alone triumphs) is an achievable aim there or (“Yato Dharamstato Jai”) (It is
virtue which ends in victory) is not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the portals of
courts.”
(ii) Propositions of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above referred
case and as mentioned at page 131 of the above referred SCC :-
“Held :
The contempt of Courts Act deals with any acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or
witness “in any manner.” The tendency on the part of the contemner in his action or
conduct to prevent the course of Justice is the relevant fact. ANY INTERFERENCE IN
THE COURSE OF JUSTICE, ANY OBSTRUCTION CAUSED IN THE PATH OF
THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE AN AFFRONT TO THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND,
THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. --------
Due course of justice means not only any particular proceeding but a broad stream of
administration of justice. Therefore, the words “due course of justice” used in Section 2
(c ) or Section 13 of the Act are of wide import and ARE NOT LIMITED TO ANY
PARTICULAR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. ------.
“----It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties EITHER TO PRODUCE
FABRICATED EVIDENCE AS A PART OF THE PLEADINGS
OR RECORD or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of
justice or judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. THIS
TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE OR TENDENCY TO
UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT NEEDS TO BE SEVERELY DEALT
WITH TO DETER THE PERSONS HAVING SIMILAR PROCLIVITY TO RESORT TO
SUCH ACTS OR CONDUCT.---.”
15. “Prof. Shradha Kumari Vs. Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad And Others, 1996
Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 85” (24.1.1995) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
16. “IN RE (1) Sanjiv Datta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, New Delhi (2) Kailash Vasdev, Advocate and (3) Kitty Kumaramangalam
(Smt), Advocate, (1995) 3 SCC 619” referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its above
referred judgment reported as “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009)
DLT 130 (SC)”
Note: The above referred judgment has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
judgment reported as “R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130” (SC)
“Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 142- Criminal contempt-Contemptuous statements made
against Supreme Court by public officer in his affidavit- Advocate who files the affidavit in
Court also commits the contempt-However, having regard to explanation submitted by the
advocate, in response to the contempt notice issued by the Court, that he had no opportunity to
peruse the affidavit before filing the same and the fact that his conduct as practising lawyer in the
Court had been fair, his unconditional apology accepted and contempt notice discharged-
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, S. 12.”
“Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 142- Criminal contempt-Contemptuous statements made
against Supreme Court by public officer in his affidavit- Advocate who drafts or settles the
document also commits contempt- However, accepting the explanation of the advocate that the
draft affidavit which was corrected or settled by him/her was not the same which was filed in the
Court, contempt notice discharged-Contempt of Courts Act 1971, S. 12.------.”
(iv) Relevant extract of the Head Note (D) of the above referred SCC :-
“Constitution of India ---Contempt of Court -----Court has to function freely and fearlessly
undaunted by abuses, attribution of notice, terrorism and defines –Court can also commit errors
but for that law provides internal as well as external cheques –Rule of law must be maintained by
the three organs of the State (Executive, Legislature and Judiciary) by respecting each other’s
functioning ----.”
“Legal Profession- Nature and importance of – Role of lawyers- Casual and indifferent attitude
of some of the lawyers deprecated-Improvement in quality of service stressed.”
“Of late, we have been coming across several instances which can only be described as
unfortunate both for the legal profession and the administration of justice. It becomes, therefore,
our duty to bring it to the notice of the members of the profession that it is in their hands to
improve the quality of the service they render both to the litigant-public and to the courts, and to
brighten their image in the society. Some members of the profession have been adopting
perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from their absence
when the matters are called out, the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings-many times
even illegible and without personal check and verification, the non-payment of court fees and
process fess, the failure to remove office objections, the failure to take step to serve the parties,
etc. They do not realize the seriousness of these acts and omissions. They not only amount to
the contempt of the court but do positive disservice to the litigants and create embarrassing
situation in the court leading to avoidable unpleasantness and delay in the disposal of matters.
This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system.”
(vii) Para 20 of the above referred judgment :-
“The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who
belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had by
acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional has to
be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court. The
legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not only
an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilized society.
Both as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and a responsible citizen, the
lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his professional and in his private
and public life. The society has a right to expect of him such ideal behaviour. It must not be
forgotten that the legal profession has always been held in high esteem and its members have
played an enviable role in public life. The regard for the legal and judicial systems in this
country is in no small measure due to the tireless role played by the stalwarts in the profession to
strengthen them. They took their profession seriously and practiced it with dignity, deference
and devotion. If the profession is to survive, the judicial system has to be vitalized. No service
will be too small in making the system efficient, effective and credible. The casualness and
indifference with which some members practice the profession are certainly not calculated to
achieve that purpose or to enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the institution they
are serving. If people lose confidence in the profession on account of the deviant ways of some
of its members, it is not only the profession which will suffer but also the administration of
justice as a whole. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a stage when the system
will be found wrecked from within before it is wrecked from out side. It is for the members of
the profession to introspect and take the corrective steps in time and also spare the courts the
unpleasant duty. We say no more.”
17. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court
1795” (2.5.1995) :-
“The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court’s
atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are,
therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment; so
also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who
takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if any thing is done
with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. SUCH
PERSONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE PROPERLY DEALT WITH not only to punish them
for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith
of people in the system of administration of justice.”
18. “Afzal And Another Vs. State of Haryana & Others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” :-
19. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”
(10.4.1996)
Note : The above quoted rulling is also most important for appeal to explain the meaning
of the expression ‘pay or tender’ used in section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act.
20. “The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR
1996 SCC 1925 (9.5.1996) (For filing false proceeding in court)
21. “J.S. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, AIR 1997 SC 113” (11.9.1996) :-
Note: The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
22. “Rita Markandey V. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2174”
(27.9.1996) :-
(i) Relevant portion of Head Note (a) of the above referred judgment :-
“(A) Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2(b)- Civil Contempt- No undertaking
given by tenant for vacating premises----.
If any party gives an undertaking to the Court to vacate the premises from which he is
liable to be evicted under the orders of the Court and there is a clear and deliberate breach
thereof, it amounts to Civil Contempt.----.”
23. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1
AD (Delhi) 927” : “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997):-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2 (c), 15 & 18 – Criminal Contempt – Abuse of
process of the court – No interim injunction in earlier suit granted – Same relief sought in
subsequent suits – No copy of earlier plaint and documents filed – Played fraud to gain
advantage – Attempt to over reach the court – Guilty of contempt.
Held: We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over reach
the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as upon the opposite party
and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CAN NOT BE HEARD IN THE
CASE UNLESS IT PURGES IT SELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED and in
our view, it can only be if we non suit the respondents in suit no. 261/97. while, therefore, we
do not purpose to take action against the respondent for contempt except to issue a warning to
respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future, we direct the dismissal of the suit (being suit no.
261/97) suit it self.”
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Secs. 2 (c ), 15 & 18 – Criminal Contempt – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 0 Or. XXXIX rule 1 & 2 – Ad-interim injunction – Ex-parte – Non-disclosure
of dismissal of such application in earlier suit – Amounts to fraud upon the Court – Guilty
of Contempt.
Held: In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by not
disclosing that in the earlier suit, the respondent has not been able to get an injunction, the
respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and such acts
had been done only in order to gain advantage on the other side and to get a stay in the second
suit.
We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over – reach the
court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as on the opposite parte and
is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HEARD IN THE CASE
UNLESS IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED and in our view,
it can only be if we non-suit the respondents in suit no. 261/97. While, therefore, we do not
purpose to take action against the respondent for contempt for except to issue a warning to
respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future we direct the dismissal of the suit (being suit no.
261/97) it self.---------.”
“That the appellant is the owner of the premises being cottage no. 6 situated within the
complex of Shanti Sports Club, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi. ---------- Within the Sports Complex,
there are a few residential cottages. One of such cottages being cottage No. 6 is at the back of the
complex. Between Cottage no. 6 and Cottage no. 7, there is a big lawn. The dispute between
the parities is about the letting out and used and enjoyment of the said lawn by the
occupants of cottage No. 6, namely, the respondent.”
“It appears that the lawn between Cottage Nos. 6 & 7 was being given on higher for marriages
and private parties by the appellant which allegedly caused disturbance to the Managing Director
of the respondent and a suit being suit no,. 3064/96 was thereupon filed by the respondents on or
about 11th December, 1996. It was alleged in the plaint in the said suit that the appellant had
represented to the respondents that the lawn between Cottages 6 and 7 would always remain
vacant and was meant to be used for the families of the occupants of the said Cottages and their
guests. However, due to the said lawn being given on higher for marriages another parties, there
was hardly any moment when respondent no. 2 and is family have been able to have free and
unobstructed access to the premises and enjoy its quite and peaceful possession.”
“The said suit came up for hearing before the Hon’ble Single Judge on 17 th December 1996
------. Ex –parte was not granted in favour of the respondent No. 1 & 2 ----in the said suit no
stay had been granted in favour of the respondents.”
“On or about 4th February, 1997, respondents filed the suit being Suit No. 261/97 for specific
performance of the agreement -----. Alongwith the suit, the said respondents had also filed an
application for the grant of an injunction restraining the appellant, his agents, employees and
servants from in any manner disturbing or interfering with the quit and peaceful possession, use
and occupation of the demised premises being cottage No. 6 and its appurtenant lawn ---.”
“On 6th February, 1997 the Hon’ble Single Judge passed the order of injunction in favour of the
respondent No. 1 and against the appellant ---. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has
filed this appeal and has also filed a Contempt petition for initiating criminal contempt
proceedings against the respondents for their having intentionally and deliberately filed the
proceedings and applications being Suit Nos. 261/97 and I.A. 1124/97 which amounted to abuse
of the process of the Court and an attempt to cercumvant the order of the court passed in Suit No.
364/96.”
“Was it not obligatory on the part of the respondent to disclose to the Court that in an earlier suit
filed by it, the Court had not granted any stay in its favour and if on such a disclosure having
been made, the Court still granted stay in favour the respondent, it could be said that the
respondent had not concealed any material fact from the Court ? But not mentioning anything
about the Court having not granted any stay in similar circumstances in favour of the
respondent in the earlier suit, it appears to us that the respondent had not only concealed
material facts from the Court but had also tried to over-reach the Court. Being
unsuccessful in obtaining stay in Suit No. 3064/96, it was not permissible to the respondent to
file the subsequent suit and seek the same relief which had not been granted to it in earlier suit.”
“In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Others, AIR 1994 SC 853 was held that
the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the
Court, must come with clean hands. “It can be said without hesitation that a person whose
case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. HE CAN BE SUMMARILY
THROWN OUT AT ANY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION. A litigant who approaches the
Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by which are relevant to the litigation. If
he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be
guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.”
“We are informed that in Suit No. 261/97, the plaintiff had not even filed the plaint of the earlier
suit being Suit No. 3604/96 nor the court had an opportunity to go through the allegations made
in the said plaint. We, therefore, of the opinion that by withholding the plaint and the
application in the earlier suit from the Court and by not disclosing to the Court about the
proceedings in the earlier suit and the stay having not been granted to it, the
plaintiff/respondent had tried to get an advantage from the Court and was, therefore,
guilty of playing fraud of the court as well as on the respondent. The following
observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are relevant for purposes of
present case :-
“The High Court in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the
High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath
obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court-----. We do not
aggrieve with the High Court that “THERE IS NO LEGAL DUTY CASTE
UPON THE PLAINTIFF TO COME TO COURT WITH A TRUE CASE
AND PROVE IT BY TRUE EVIDENCE.” The principle of “finality of
litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an
engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. He courts of law are meant for
imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come
with clean hands.----.”
-----. A party must come to the Court with clean hands and must disclose all the relevant
facts which may result in appreciating the rival contentions of the parties. In our view, a litigant,
who approaches the Court, must produce all the documents which are relevant to the litigation
and he must also disclose to the Court about the pendency of any earlier litigation between the
parties and the result thereof.------.In our opinion, it was obligatory upon the respondent to
disclose to the Court that in the application filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief had been
claimed, however, the Court had not granted the said relief. In our view, if these facts were
before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit came up for hearing before it,
MAY BE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE WAS PERSUADED NOT TO GRANT ANY EX-
PARTE STAY IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT. ----. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also
suppressed material facts from the Court with a view to gain advantage in the second suit.
THIS IN OUR VIEW IS CLEARLY OVER –REACHING THE COURT.”
Note : ‘Over-reach’ means to reach or extent beyond, to outwit or get the better of, to
defeat by one’s oversubtlety
“As held by the Supreme Court in Advocate-General, State of Bihar Vs. M/S Madhya Pradesh
Khair Industries and another, (1980) 3 SCC 311, every abuse of the process of the Court may not
necessarily amount to contempt of Court. ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT
CALCULATED TO HAMPER THE DUE COURSE OF A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
OR THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS A CONTEMPT OF COURT.
It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as
between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16 or in some
other manner. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which
abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it pernicious
influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the
administration of justice.
“In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by not
disclosing that in the earlier suit the respondent has not been able to get the injunction,
THE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF PLAYING FRAUD ON THE COURT AS WELL
AS ON THE OPPOSITE PARTY and such acts had been done only in order to gain advantage
on the other side and to get a stay in the second suit.”
(xvi) Relevant extract of para 19 of the above referred judgment:-
“As held by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and another AIR
1977 SC 2421, the pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this county and the
Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious
cases. “It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly
fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And
remembering that AN ADVOCATE IS AN OFFICER OF JUSTICE he owes it to society
NOT TO COLLABORATE IN SHADY ACTIONS. The Bar Council of India, we hope will
activate this obligation.---.”
(xvii) Para 20 of the above referred judgment:-
“We are of the opinion that the above noted passage of the aforesaid judgment in T.
Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal’s case is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. Having not succeeded in getting stay in Suit No. 3064/96, IN OUR VIEW, THE
LAWYER SHOULD HAVE REFUSED TO MOVE AN APPLICATION FOR STAY IN
THE SECOND SUIT.”
“We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over-reach the Court and
the respondents have played fraud upon the Court as well as upon the opposite party and is thus
clearly guilty of contempt. Respondents cannot be heard in the case unless it purges itself of the
contempt so committed and in our view it can only be if we non-suit the respondents in Suit No.
261/97. While, therefore, we do not propose to take action against the respondent for contempt
except to issue a warning to respondent No. 2 to be more careful in future, we direct the
dismissal of the suit (being Suit No. 261/97) Itself. ------.”
24. “Indian Airports Employees Union Vs. Ranjan Chattarjee And Another, AIR 1999
SC 880” (2.2.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
25. “K.S. Villasa Vs. M/S Ladies Corner & Another, AIR 1999 SC 2140” (3.2.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
26. “Ms. Sophy Kelly and another Vs., Chandrakant Ganpat & Others, AIR 1999 SC
1042 “ (4.2.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
27. “Suo Motu contempt in Re: Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300”:-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 14, 12–b Constitution of India, Art. 129-
Criminal Contempt on face of Court-Advocate shouted slogans in open Court. And hurdled his
shoe towards Court- His action intimidates the Court and causes interference with judicial
proceedings-Advocate guilty of gross criminal contempt-Advocate not appearing to be repentant-
Apology tendered, not genuine-Sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for 4 months and fine.
--------. A lawyer does not enjoy any special immunity under the Contempt of
Courts Act where he is found to have committed a gross contempt of Court. ----. It is
unfortunate that a person belonging to the Bar should have behave in this manner. The
action of the contemnor advocate is most reprehensible and has been tendency to interfere with
the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of the Court and the Majesty of Law. ---.
Keeping in view of the seriousness of the offence committed by the contemnor deterrent
punishment imposed on him so that it serves an example to others and no one indulges in
repetition of such acts. Court sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for 4 months and to
pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-.”
28. “T.C. Mathews and anr. V. Distt. and Session Judge, 2000 RLR (N. S.C. ) 19”
“Attorney, Power of. Is not entitled to appear and plead on behalf of an accused or a party with
permission of court. He himself cannot apply. Permission must be sought by the party himself.
Court may grant permission if P.O.A. is honest and intelligent. Lawyers are allowed as they
are accountable to courts.”
29. “Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction And Another, (1999) 6
SCC 18” (5.4.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
30. Kapil Deo Prasad Sah And Others Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 3215”
(25.8.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
31. “Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of Indian and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345”
( 15.10.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
32. “Padmahasini alias Padmapriya Vs. C.R. Srinivas, AIR 2000 SC 68” (16.11.1999) :-
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant for the present case.
33. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124(SC)” (25.1.2000):-
35. “Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000):-
36. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal
Advocate, 89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB)= 2000 RLR 144” :-
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note ------ of the above referred DLT:-
“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 226 – Issuance of Suo Motu Notice to Commissioner,
MCD : Corruption, unauthorized construction and encroachments : Statement made by MCD
Counsel in Court :Explanation sought from him by Chief Law Officer, MCD. Amounts to
interference with action of person having duty to discharge in court and contempt of court Chief
Law Officer, MCD called for explanation of MCD counsel regarding statement attributed to him
by newspaper report whereby he highlighted factum of corruption amongst J.Es of MCD-Writ
petition in first instance was filed in Supreme Court and later transferred to this court and
renumbered- Before transferring matter Supreme Court made various directions to MCD and
other authorities-Instead of complying with directions and checking corruption, unauthorized
constructions, explanation of MCD Counsel was sought by Chief Law Officer MCD-This was
not expected of Chief Law Officer who is instructed in law and lives by law. This amounts to
interference with action of person having duty to discharge in court-IT HAMPERS JUSTICE
AND CLEARLY AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT-Counsel is not mouth piece of his client-
His duty is to uphold truth and honesty-In making statement, MCD counsel has answered call
of duty towards court –explanation of the counsel was called to strike fear in him and to render
him incapable of performing his duty before court-Chief Law Officer and Commissioner MCD
not well advised to adopt this course of action-They have filed affidavits and tendered
unconditional apology and stated they have highest esteem for court-Best measure to judge same
would be through their actions taken for implementing order passed in CWP No. 841/98 and
other similar matter.”
37. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001)
(i) Relevant extract of
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c ) – Constitution of India , Art. 129 – Criminal of
High Court in connivance with Secretary of Physical Education Institution got orders of Court
forged – Used the forged documents to obtain favourable orders from Govt. for holding
examination for students of institution who were otherwise not eligible – Contemnors, held are
guilty of criminal contempt.
The Govt. of Maharashtra did not grant permission to the institution Lokmata Indira Gandhi
College of Sports, Yavatmal for the academic year 1994-95 but the institution admitted several
students and then persuaded the Government for grant of permission. At later stage, the
Government did grant the permission for the academic year 1994-95, so that the students who
have already studied in the institution could appear in the examination. An examination was
conducted in the year 1996 but many of the students could not appear in the said examination,
allegedly because of lack of proper information. Therefore, a writ petition in the court for a
direction that the remaining students who have already studied for the academic session 1994-95,
should be permitted to appear at the examination to be held by the appropriate authority. This
ES/ES/S100245/2001/BNG/CSL writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. Against the said
order of the High Court a special leave petition was filed in Supreme Court and that special leave
petition was also dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the special leave petition, the so-called
students of institution, would not get any chance of appearing at any future examination.
However, the employee of High Court who had filed writ petition in connivance with Secretary
of institution forged the orders of Supreme Court and sent forged order to state Govt. which
indicated that while dismissing Court had directed State Govt. to conduct examination fro those
students list of which had been annexed to writ petition. Question arose whether Secretary and
employee of High Court can be held to be guilty of contempt.
Held, that the order of Supreme Court has been forged and fabricated is proved beyond
reasonable doubt and there cannot be any dispute about the same. It is further established that the
aforesaid forged order of Supreme Court was received by Secretary, which she had indicated in
her latter, to the Director. She was the Secretary of the institution, which institution had not been
granted permission to present the students by the state of Maharashtra and in her letter, she had
requested that examination be conducted, complying with the orders of the Supreme Court for
the remaining students, since according to the Court’s order, examination of students mentioned
in the list had to be conducted. Along with the said letter, the purported true copy of the order of
the Supreme Court has been enclosed. The said secretary had been instructing counsel to file
petitions even at times
by impersonation.
38. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt Madhu Trehan & Ors. 92 (2001) DLT 665”
(F.B.) (28.5.2001) :-
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT :-
“Constitution of India, 1950 –Art. 215 –Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 2(c ) –
Contempt of Court : Article published in scurrilous manner in Journal named “ Wah India” ,
scornfully denigrating judges, causing expressions aspersions on integrity and capability of
Hon’ble Judges of this Court: unqualified apology tendered by respondents –journalists :
bonafides and genuineness of apologies not doubted –anyone who intends to tarnish image of
judiciary should not be allowed to go unpunished ---unconditional apologies tendered by
respondents deserve acceptance- respondents are journalists of standing and repute – respondents
expressed feeling of remorse –apologies accepted ---.”
(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (ii) of the above referred DLT :-
“Constitution of India, 1950 –Art. 215 –Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 2(c ) –
Contempt of Court-publication in question ---casting aspersion on competent of judiciary
---publication in question scandalizes judges –it attempts to rob High Court of its owner and
prestige –CONTEMNORS CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO TAMPER WITH STREAM OF
JUSTICE WHICH MUST FLOW PURE AN UNHINDERED – contemnors cannot be
allowed to commit contempt of court in garb of criticism ----It was not innocent publication –
contempt of court committed by contemnors is of grave nature and tends to substantially
interfere with due course of justice –apologies of contemnors not accepted.”
39. “Rajiv Malhotra Vs. Union of India & Ors, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)
(i) Head Note of the above referred DRJ:-
40. “Pallav Sheth vs. custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC 549 (10.8.2001)
Note: Limitation of one Year from the date of filing of contempt application or one year from the
date of knowledge for filing a contempt application
41. “Pravin C. Shah Vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali & Another, VII (2001) SLT 153” (9.10.2001) :-
“(i) Contempt of Court : Mere statement by contemnor (advocate) before Court that he
apologizes is hardly enough to amount to purging himself of contempt: Court must be satisfied
of genuineness of apology to hold contemnor has purged himself of contempt : Till such order
passed by Court delinquent advocate would continue to be under spell of interdict contained in
rule 11 of the rules- Respondent-Advocate continued to appear in all Courts he was earlier
appearing even after he was convicted by High Court for Criminal Court without being objected
by any Court- This was on account of fact that presiding officers of Court not informed of what
happened-This Court directs in future whenever advocate is convicted by High Court for
contempt of Court, Registrar of that High Court shall intimate that fact to all courts within its
jurisdiction to inform all presiding officer that particular advocate is under spell of interdict
contained in Rule 11 of rules until he purges himself of contempt-Respondent can still purge
himself of contempt in manner indicated under Rule-11-Unless that process is complete
respondent cannot plead in any Court within domain of Kerala High Court including subordinate
Courts-Registrar of High Court of Kerala shall intimate all courts about this interdict as against
respondent-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 12-Kerala High Court Rules-Rules 11-
Advocates Act, 1961 –Section 34 (1).
(ii) Contempt of Court- Person who committed contempt of court cannot have
unreserved right to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in courts without any quaim
or remorse: Bar Council cannot overrule such regulation concerning orderly conduct of court
proceedings.”
42. “Sudhir Chona vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (62) DRJ 346 (DB)” (13.3.2002)
43. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri
L.J. 493” (30.7.2003)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2- Contempt –FALSE VERIFICATION
OF STATEMENT OF FACTS- IS CONTEMPT –But pleading/defence made on basis of
facts which are not false-Howsoever the pleading may be an abuse process of court –Does
not amount to contempt.
Further, when the appellant tried to explain his case in his evidence, the same was shut
out on the basis that it is hearsay. An officer of Bank who had no personal knowledge of the
transactions in question and was deposing on the basis of material on record, his evidence cannot
be from his knowledge and necessarily has to be hearsay. Hence, the lower Court was not
justified in shutting out that part of the evidence.”
45. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004
SC 3114” (12.4.2004)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (B) of the above referred AIR:-
“Criminal P.C. (2 of 1974), S. 311-Evidence Act. (1 of 1872), S. 165 ----------- Presiding judge
must not a spectator and a mere recording Machine- but should play active role in evidence
collecting process – AND ELICIT all relevant materials necessary fro reaching the correct
conclusion to find out truth----------
Section 311 of the Code and S. 165 of the evidence Act. confer vast and vide powers on residing
Officers of Court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence
collecting process--------.”
47. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 : 2007
Cri L.J. 2339” (9.2.2007)
“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 215- Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 340 r/w section
195- Contempt of Court-Cognizance of abuse of legal process- Recovery suits –Loan agreements
not executed on dates recorded thereon- Stamp papers on which they were engrossed, were of
later date- Show cause notice issued to plaintiff and his Advocates for abuse of legal process in
institution and prosecution of suits based on agreements in question- Defendants claimed
plaintiff forged and fabricated loan agreement for institution of suit- Loan agreement was dated
15.5.1997 and 1.7.1997 and notarized on same date- Non-judicial stamp paper on which
agreement engrossed is dated 21.7.1997 – Defendants filed written statement denying execution
of loan agreements- DELIBERATE FALSE STATEMENTS ON OATH, PRACTISING
FRAUD AND FALSE AVERMENTS TO KNOWLEDGE OF COUNSEL IN PLAINT,
witnessing agreement either not executed on dates mentioned or not executed at all APART
FROM BEING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF CODE OF CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS ALSO AMOUNT TO OBSTRUCTING DUE COURSE OF ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL CONTEMPT- Act of instituting suits on
loan agreements knowing that legal notice of demand sent for return of consideration,
claiming it to have been paid in USA, would not be filed by counsel deliberately- It can be
filed by counsel either on account of his total forget-fullness with regard to notice sent or
his being blissfully ignorant of legal provisions and consequences thereof- Dr. Diwan is
Advocate with decades of experience and submits he and plaintiff suffered for their lapses-
Plaintiff lent money, has lost right to recover same on account of manipulation of
documents by defendants-keeping in view age of Counsel and his blemish less tack record,
apology tendered by him accepted- Apology of another Counsel Kiran Singh is bona fide
and accepted-Directions issued accordingly.”
(iv) Relevant extract of Head Note (iv) of the above referred DLT :-
“Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 340 r/w Section 195, 195(1)(b)(ii)- Cognizance of
abuse of legal process-Initiation of proceeding under section 340 Cr. P.C. –Contempt of
Court----As suo motu notice of contempt initiated and determined, initiation of proceedings
under section 340 Cr. P.C. not in interest of justice- Inquiry under section 340 Cr. P.C. would
not serve any useful purpose nor be in interest of justice – Parties requested for quietus in
matter.”
48. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB)
(17.2.2009)
Learned Counsel for respondent in appeal has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1195) 1 SCC 421, to explain that the word ‘interfere’
in the context of the criminal contempt under the Contempt of Court Act 1971 means any action
which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty.
Thus, if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder,
hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the Courts from performing the legal
duties as they are supposed to do. The polluters of judicial firmament are required to be well
taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment. A similar view has been
expressed in Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = AIR
1995 SC 1795 where false affidavits had been filed. In Ram Autar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla,
(1995) Supp (2) SCC 130, it was observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any
acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or witnesses ‘in any manner’. The tendency on
the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice is the
relevant fact. Any interference in the course of justice, ANY OBSTRUCTION CAUSED
IN THE PATH OF THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE AN AFFRONT TO THE
MAJESTY OF LAW AND, THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS PUNISHABLE AS
CONTEMPT OF COURT. Learned Single Judge of this Court in Court on its own motion Vs.
Kanwaljit S. Sareen & Ors., 138 (2007) DLT 682 has observed that a party taking recourse to
fraud deflects course of judicial proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration
of justice.”
49. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367”
(8.3.2006)
50. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Not yet
obtained)
51. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”
(21.8.2008)
(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were
the counsel for the state and defence respectively)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT:-
“Contempt of Court - Interference with judicial proceedings and administration of justice
– Nexus between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – Sting Operation by NDTV –
Role of Defence Lawyer and Special Public Prosecutor in on-going session trial of BMW case
-----Complicity between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – both were More than
mixed up in BMW case – conduct of both had tendency to interfere with or obstruct the
administration of justice as influencing a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify
amounts to interference in administration of justice -------Contempt very much before eyes and
within herein – contempt of courts act, 1972, -section 2 (C ) (Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 20, 78, 125,
127, 143, 155, 156, 169,206 & 207)
52. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261”
(20.10.2008)
“--------. Contempt of Court is a matter which deserves to be dealt with all seriousness.
In Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. V. Sayed Hasibur Rahman & ors., II (2001) SLT 819 =
(2001) 3 SCC 739, this Court held:-
“13. Before however, proceeding with the matter any further, be it noted that
exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious
and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the
contemptuous conduct. The Court must otherwise come to a conclusion that the
contempt complained of TENTAMOUNTS TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
which if allowed, would ever permeate in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok
Ku. Newatia). This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law Courts to punish
an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction the majesty of law.”
53. “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130(SC)” (A Three
Judge Bench Decision)
A. Relevant extracts of the above referred DLT and the judgment pertaining to
prohibition for advocate against appearing in Courts
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (V) of the above referred DLT:-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (c ), 12 – Constitution of India, 1950- Arts. 145, 215
– Advocates Act, 1961- Section 34- Contempt of Court- BMW case- Sting operation-
Negotiation between SK and Special Public Prosecutor and R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate, for
his sellout in favour of defence for a very high price- Prohibition against appearing in Courts-
Observations made in case of Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. UOI followed- No conflict or clash
between section 34 of Advocates Act and Art. 145 of Constitution – Art. 145 and section 34 of
Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an Advocate to appear in Court – An Advocate
appears in Court subject to conditions laid down by Court- Two appellants were debarred from
appearing before High Court and Courts subordinate to it for a period of 4 months.-----
“We were also addressed on the validity of the High Court’s direction prohibiting the two
appellants from appearing before the High Court and the Courts subordinate to it for a period of
four months. Though by the time the appeals were taken up for hearing the period of four
months was over, Mr. Altaf Ahmed contended that the High Court’s direction was beyond its
competence and authority. In a proceeding of contempt punishment could only be awarded as
provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, though in a given case the High Court could debar
the contemnor from appearing in Court till he purged himself of the contempt. He further
submitted that professional misconduct is a subject specifically dealt with under the Advocates
Act and the authority to take action against a lawyer for any professional misconduct vests
exclusively in the State bar Council, where he may be enrolled, and the bar Council of India.
The counsel further submitted that a High Court could frame rules under Section 34 of the
Advocates Act laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate would be permitted to
practice in the High Court and the Courts Subordinate to it and such rules may contain a
provision that an advocate convicted of contempt of Court would be barred from appearing
before it or before the subordinate Courts for a specified period. But so far the Delhi High Court
has not framed any rules under Section 34 of the Act. According to him, therefore, the
punishment awarded to the appellant by the High Court had no legal sanction.”
“Mr. Nageshwar Rao learned Senior Advocate assisting the Court as amicus shared the same
view. Mr. Rao submitted that the direction given by the High Court was beyond its jurisdiction.
In a proceeding of contempt the High Court could only impose a punishment as provided under
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court was bound by the provisions
of the Contempt of Courts Act and it was not open to it to innovate any new kind of punishment
in exercise of its power under Articles 215 of the Constitution or its inherent powers. Mr. Rao
submitted that a person who is a law graduate becomes entitled to practice the profession of law
on the basis of his enrolment with nay of the State Bar Councils established under the Advocates
Act, 1961. Appearance in Court is the dominant, if not the sole content of a lawyer’s practice.
Since the authority to grant licence to a law graduate to practice as an advocate vests exclusively
in a State Bar Council, the power to revoke the licence or to suspend it for a specified term also
vests in the same body. Further, the revocation or suspension of licence of an advocate has not
only civil but also penal consequences, hence the relevant statutory provisions in regard to
imposition of punishment must be strictly followed. Punishment by way of suspension of the
licence of an advocate can only be imposed by the Bar Council, the competent statutory body,
after the charge is established against the advocate concerned in the manner prescribed by the
Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The High Court can, of course, prohibit an advocate
convicted of contempt from appearing before it or any court subordinate to it till the contemnor
purged himself of the contempt. But it cannot assume the authority and the power statutorily
vested in the bar Council.”
“The matter, however, did not stop at Supreme Court Bar Association. In Pravin C Shah Vs.
K.A. Mohd. Ali and Anr. VII (2001) SLT 153 = (2001) 8 SCC 650, this Court considered the
case of a lawyer who was found guilty of contempt of Court and as a consequence was sought to
be debarred from appearing in Courts till he purged himself of contempt. Kerala High Court has
framed Rules under Section 34 of the Advocates Act and Rule 11 reads thus :-
“No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court shall be permitted to
appear act or plead in any court unless he has purged himself of the contempt.”
“An Advocate, notwithstanding his conviction for contempt of Court by the Kerala High Court
continued to freely appear before the Courts. A complaint was made to the Kerala State Bar
Council on which a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the advocate concerned and
finally the State Bar Council imposed a punishment on him debarring him from acting or
pleading in any Court till he got himself purged of the contempt of Court by an order of the
appropriate Court. The concerned advocate challenged the order of the State bar Council in
appeal before the Bar Council of India. The bar Council of India allowed the appeal and set
aside the interdict imposed on the advocate. The matter was brought in appeal before this Court
and a two Judges’ Bench hearing the appeal framed the question arising for consideration as
follows :
“When an advocate was punished for contempt of Court can he appear thereafter as
a counsel in the courts, unless he purges himself of such contempt? If he cannot,
than what is the way he can purge himself of such contempt ?”
The Court answered the question in paragraphs 27,28, & 31 of the judgment as follows :
“27. We cannot, therefore, approve the view that merely undergoing the penalty
imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of
the contempt, particularly in a case where the contemnor is convicted of criminal
contempt. The danger in giving accord to the said view of the Ld Single judge in
the aforesaid decision is that if a contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can
immediately pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same court, and then
again pay the fine and persist with contemptuous conduct. Their must be something
to be done to get oneself perjured of the contempt when it is case of criminal
contempt.”
“28. -----The first thing to be done in get direction when a contemnor is found
guilty of a criminal contempt is to implant or infuse in his on mind real remorse
about his conduct ---. Next step is to seek pardon from the court concerned ------. It
is not enough that he tender and apology. The apology tendered should impress
the court to be genuine and sincere.---.”
“31.------.”
“More importantly, another Constitution Bench of this Court in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs.
Union of India and Another, VII (2002) SLT 229= (2003) 2 SCC 45, examined the question
whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court(s). In paragraph 34
of the decision the Court made highly illuminating observations in regard to lawyers’ right to
appear before the Court and sounded the note of caution for the lawyers. Para 34 of the decision
need to be reproduced below :-
“34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in
Courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of Courts. Section 30 of the
Advocates Act has not been brought in to force and rightly so control of conduct in
Court can only be within domain of course. Thus Art. 145 of the Constitution of
India gives to the Supreme Court and Section 34 of the Advocates Act gives to the
high Court powers to frame rules including rules regarding condition on which a
person (including an advocate) can practice in the Supreme Court and/or in the
High Court and Courts subordinate thereto ----. The right of the Advocate to
practice envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in discharge of his
professional duties. Apart from appearing in the Courts, he can be consulted by his
clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for he can draft instruments,
pleadings, affidavits or any other document, he can participate in any conference
involving legal discussion, he can work in any office or firm as a legal officer, he
can appear for his clients before an Arbitrator.----. Conduct in Court is a matter
concerning the court and hence the bar Council cannot claim that what should
happen inside the Court could also be regulated by them in exercise of their
disciplinary powers.--- But the right to appear and conduct cases in the court is
a matter on which the court must and does have major supervisory and
controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested of control or
supervision of conduct in Court merely because it may involve the right of an
advocate. A RULE CAN STIPULATE THAT A PERSON WHO HAS
COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF COURT OR HAS BEHAVED
UNPROFESSIONALLY AND IN AN UNBECOMING MANNER WILL NOT
HAVETHE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD AND
CONDUCT CASES IN COURTS.---- The very sight of an advocate, who is
guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct,
standing in the Court would erode the dignity of the court ---. Art. 145 of
Constitution of India and section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is
no absolute right to an advocate who appear in a court.----.”
“In both Pravin C. Shah and Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal the earlier Constitution Bench decision was
extensively considered. The decision in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal was later followed in a three
Judge Bench decision in Bar Council of India Vs. The High Court of Kerala, III (2004) SLT 464
=(2004) 6 SCC 311.”
“We respectfully submit that the decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India places
the issue incorrect perspective and must be followed to answer the question at issue before us.”
“Lest we are misunderstood it needs to be made clear that the occasion to take recourse to the
extreme step of debarring an advocate from appearing in Court should arise very rarely and only
as a measure of last resort in cases where the wrong doer advocate does not at all appear to be
genuinely contrite and remorseful for his act/conduct, but on the contrary shows a tendency to
repeat or perpetuate the wrong act(s).”
“In order to avoid any such controversies in future all the High Courts that have so far not
framed rules under Section 34 of the Advocates Act are directed to frame the rules without any
further delay. It is earnestly hoped that all the High Courts shall frame the rules within four
months from today.-----.”
54. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009)
DLT 466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10,11,12,14,15,18,19- Civil
Procedure Code, 1908- Order 39 Rule 2A- Contempt of Court- Criminal Contempt-
CONTRADICTORY STANDS TAKEN IN HIS PLEADINGS/ AFFIDAVITS BY
DEFENDANT/CONTEMNOR REGARDING OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
SUIT PROPERTY- On receipt of REFERENCE from Court of Civil Judge, Division Bench
also found to be case of criminal contempt and charge framed against defendant No. 1
contemnor was also of criminal contempt- FILING OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR
STATEMENTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT AS IT TENDS TO OBSTRUCT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE-
Defendant/Contemnor filed written statement in suit of plaintiff and made statement on
oath before trial court AND ADMITTING HE SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF
AND HANDED OVER POSSESSION TO HIM- But subsequently in his reply to contempt
application filed by plaintiff, contemnor took a somersault AND TOOK PLEA THAT HE
NEITHER SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF NOR HANDED OVER
POSSESSION TO HIM- That fraud was played upon him by plaintiff in collusion with any
other person in making statement- No evidence in this behalf led by defendant/contemnor-Ipse
Dixit of defendant is difficult to be accepted- Apology tendered by contemnor, not at all
apologetic and not accepted- It was tendered by defendant/contemnor for first time while
giving evidence in these proceedings-Defendant/contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt.”
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10, 14, 15, 18, 19- Contempt of Court-
Civil and Criminal- To be decided on basis of facts which are brought to notice of High Court-
As per scheme of 1971 Act, cases of civil contempt can be heard and decided by Single
Judge bench only and criminal contempt petition to be heard and decided only by Bench of
not less than 2 Judges.”
“In the present case, as noticed already, the Division Bench had taken cognizance of “Criminal
Contempt” only against the defendant/contemnor for his having taken contradictory stands in his
pleadings/affidavits regarding the ownership and possession of the suit property. So, we have to
examine whether the defendant/contemnor has committed “Criminal contempt” or not we are of
the view that since no cognizance was taken of “Civil Contempt”, by this Court that aspect
cannot be gone into in the present proceedings even though strongly urged on behalf of the
plaintiff. We say so because of certain provisions of the Act of 1971 as well as some judicial
pronouncements. Under Sections 2 (a), (b) and (c) “contempt of Court”, “civil contempt” and
“criminal contempt”. We reproduce below these definition clauses:
“Section 10. Power of High Court to punish contempt of subordinate Courts-Every High
Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the
same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to it as it has and
exercises in respect of contempt of itself :
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”.
Section 18 also needs to be noticed. It reads as under :-
(2) Sub-section (I) shall not apply to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner.
Section 19 provides as to where would an appeal lie against an order of a Single Judge
bench and that of a Division bench. The relevant part of this section for our purpose is as
follows :
(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-
(a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single judge, to a Bench of not less
than two Judges of the Court;
(b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court :
Provided………………………………………….”
“From these provisions of the Act of 1971, it becomes evident that the question whether
contempt of any subordinate court is committed or not and whether the alleged contempt is civil
or criminal to be decided by the High Court on the basis of facts which are brought to the
notice of the High Court. Those facts can be brought to the notice of the High Court by any
party to the litigation. If the High Court considered on perusal of the facts brought to its
notice that contempt of a Subordinate court is made AND THE SAME IS CIVIL IN
NATURE, then the matter can be entertained STRAIGHTWAY by a Single Judge Bench.
However, if the contempt of any court Subordinate to the High Court is alleged to be
“CRIMINAL CONTEMPT” THEN THE REFERENCE IS MADE TO IT BY THE
SUBORDINATE COURT CONCERNED OR ANY OF THE OTHER AUTHORITIES
MENTIONED IN SECTION 15 OF THE ACT 1971----.”
“In the present case, the defendant/contemnor had filed a written statement in the suit of the
plaintiff and had also made a statement on oath before the trial court on 29.4.2003 admitting that
he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff and had also handed over its position to him. In his
statement on oath also which admittedly was made by him before the Ld Civil judge in the suit
on 29.4.2003 he had admitted that he had already sold the suit property to the plaintiff and so he
will not dispossess him . However, subsequently when the plaintiff filed contempt application,
the contemnor in his reply to that contempt application field before the Reference Court, which
was supported by his affidavit wherein he affirmed the correctness of the assertion made by him
in his reply, he took a somersault and took the plea that neither he had sold the suit property to
the plaintiff nor he had handed over its possession to him. Even before this Court, the
defendant/contemnor filed an affidavit in response to the show cause notice and claimed that
neither he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff not was he given its possession. The
admissions made in the written statement and in the statement made before the trial court,
however, according to the defendant/contemnor, were not made by him voluntarily but were as a
result of fraud played upon him by the plaintiff and one Ved Prakash. Learned counsel for the
plaintiff did not dispute that if any party to a suit has made any admission of fact either in the
pleadings or by way of statement on oath, that party is not precluded from showing that that
admission was got made by the opposite party by indulging in fraud and it is shown that any
fraud was played upon the party making any admission of some important fact in dispute then
that party would not be bound by that admission. However, ld Counsel submitted, in the present
case the defendant/contemnor had failed miserably to show that any kind of fraud was played
upon him by the plaintiff in collusion with any other person.
“-----In our view, the ipsi dixit of the defendant/contemnor that he had made the admissions
regarding sale of property in question to the plaintiff and also handing over of its possession to
him were as a result of fraud having been played upon him is difficult to be accepted. ---.
Consequently, he did commit criminal contempt for which he deserves to be punished. The
stage at which he has tendered an apology shows that he was really not apologetic at all since at
no earlier point of time he tendered apology.---- We are therefore, not inclined to accept the so
called apology tendered by the defendant/contemnor for the first item while giving evidence in
these proceedings.”
“ The matter, however, did not rest at this since the learned Company Judge took a serious view
of the conduct of Mr. Ajay Yadav. This conduct was a consequence of an order passed on
6.10.2006 in an interlocutory application filed in CS (OS) No. 1906/2006 by the company in
terms where of the society, Mr. Ajay Choudhary and other members of their group who were
defendant in the suit had been restrained from representing themselves as share
holders/representatives of the company till further orders.----. The Learned Company Judge
came to the conclusion that in the light of the prohibitions, it was not open to Shri Ajay Yadav to
represent the company and this fact had not been informed to the Court by the counsel
representing Mr. Ajay Yadav. The vakalatnama filed by the counsel on behalf of Shri Ajay
Yadav as if he was representing the company was found to be in the teeth of the order of
injection and the action of Shri Ajay Yadav singing the vakalatnama was observed to be a blatant
attempt to lower the authority of the court in violation of the order dated 6.10.2006 passed in CS
(OS) No. 1906/2006. The conduct of Shri Ajay Yadav was held to be an effort to prejudice due
course of judicial proceedings and would fall into the definition of criminal contempt and the
matter was thereafter directed to be placed before the appropriate Bench after registering the
petition as such.”
“The action of Shri Ajay Yadav in signing the vakalatnamas purportedly on behalf of the
respondent No. 1, is a blatant attempt to lower the authority of the Court in violation of order
dated 6th October, 2006 passed in CS (OS) o. 1906/2006. As a result a dispute was raised by Mr.
Chaudhary, Advocate in the present proceedings as to who is to represent the company. Such
vakaltnama has been signed even as late as on 23rd April, 2009 despite the judgment dated 20th
April, 2009. Despite specific prohibition, Shri Ajay Yadav has made an effort to prejudice due
course of the present judicial proceedings. There can be no manner of doubt that the action is
willful. These acts on the part of Shri Ajay Yadav would clearly fall with the definition of
“criminal contempt “ as defined under Sub-clauses 1 and 2 of Sub section of Section 2 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”
“A perusal of the reply filed by the respondent shows that Sh Ajay Yadav has justified his
conduct of putting an appearance on behalf of the Company through advocates despite the
injunction order. He has sought to raise preliminary objections that no consent of Advocate
General or any State Law Officer has been obtained for initiation of contempt proceedings
against him which plea is without any basis in view of the proceedings having been initiated suo
moto by the Court.---.”
“We find that the respondent has shown no regret. After setting forth 26 grounds of challenge, in
the last paragraph it is stated that the respondent has the highest regard for the Court and does not
want to lower its dignity or authority willfully or otherwise and that the respondent is prepared to
tender unconditional apology in the event of the Court considering the present reply as not being
sufficient to drop or discharge the notice. We find this apology s no apology at all. the
respondent has defended his action.”
“---After having done everything possible to frustrate the orders of the court by acting in
an improper and illegal manner, the respondent has tried to justify his conduct.---.”
(vii) Para 20 of the above referred judgment :-
“We may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma,
(1995) 1 SCC 421 to explain that the word ‘interfere’ in the context of the criminal contempt
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 means any action which checks or hampers the
functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Thus, if recourse to
falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede
even flow of justice and would prevent the Courts from performing the legal duties as they are
supposed to do. The polluters of judicial firmament are required to be well taken care of to
maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment. A similar view has been expressed in Dhannjay
Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = AIR 1995 SC 1795, where
false affidavits had been filed. In Ram Avtar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla, (1995) Supp (2) SCC
130, it was observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any acts or conduct of the
parties to the litigation or witnesses ‘ in any manner’. The tendency on the part of the
contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. any
interference in the cause of justice, any obstruction caused in the path of those seeking justice are
an affront to the majesty of law and therefore, the conduct is punishable as contempt of court.
Learned Single Judge of this court in court on its own motion Vs. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & Ors.
138 (2007) DLT 682 = II (2007) BC 362, has observed that a party taking recourse to fraud
deflects course of judicial proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration of
justice.”
“We deem it appropriate to also refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Sudhir Chona
Vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (97) DLT 642 that while civil contempt is an offence of private nature
depriving a party of the benefit of the Court order, criminal contempt is contumacious or
obstructive conduct or behaviour directed against the court and involves an element of
criminality in it. It is despising, undermining and eroding the authority of the Court and is
punishable to protect and safeguard the public faith in the administration of justice.”
“Despite the conduct of the respondent/contemnor, we restrain from taking an extreme harsh
view and impose fine of Rs. 2,0000/- on the respondent/contemnor and sentence him till the
rising of the Court.”
56. “ST. Ives Laboratories Inc. Vs. Lotus Herbals UK Ltd , 164 (2009) DLT 473 (9.11.2009)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT :-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2(b), 9- Civil Contempt – Constitution of – There
must exist judgment, decree, direction, order, or writ or process of Court or there should be an
undertaking given by defendant to Court---.”
“Section 2 sub section (b) of the Contempt of Court Act defines civil contempt which reads as
under :-
“2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt”
(b) “Civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction,
order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to court.”s
“In the present case, this court did not pass any judgment in favour of plaintiff and against
defendant not decreed the suit of plaintiff nor given any directions to defendant nor passed an
order in favour of plaintiff or against defendant nor issued any writ nor an undertaking of
defendant was recorded.---.”
C-8. Relevant extracts of the above referred judgments pertaining to Contempt of Courts
Act. which are important for the present case and appeal against the order dated 28.3.2008
:-
1. “The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries
and another, AIR 1980 SC 946”
2. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. SR Cotton Mills Ltd. And other, AIR 1990 SC 1881”
(MISLEADING A COURT KNOWINGLY AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT)
(Head Note A)
3. “Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi vs. State of Gujarat and
other, AIR 1991 SC 2176”
(i) “The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person
WHICH WOULD TEND TO INTERFERE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE or which would lower the authority of Court.” (Para 42)
4. “Court of its own Motion Vs. B.D. Kaushik & Ors., 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Full Court)
(19.12.1991) (Available)
(i) Relevant extracts of the Head Note of the above referred DLT :-
“Constitution of India- Art. 215- Court of Record-Evolve its own procedure- Respondents
advocates, proceeded for contempt of Court- Aided and abetted by large number of advocates
invaded the High Court and prevented the Judges from discharging their judicial function-Full
Bench initiated proceedings- Contemners expressed regrets –And the apology bonafide-Whether
the act of the contemners tantamounts to an attempt to erode the majesty of the Court ? (Yes).
S.B. Wad, J. (For himself and on behalf of B.N. Kirpal, P.K. Bahri & Arun Kumar
J.)
Sunanda Bhandare, J.
Y.K. Sabharwal, J.
5. “Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of M.P., Jabalpur, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529” This
judgment has been relied upon by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported as
“R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130 (SC)”
6. “K.A. Mohammed Ali Vs. C.N. Prasannan, J.T. 1994 (6) SC 584”(4.10.1994) :-
‘Lawyers were created for the Courts, not Courts for the lawyers’ –BELATED
APOLOGY NOT ACCEPTED.”
7. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 Supreme Court cases 421”: “1995
Rajdhani Law Reporter Page 1” (Vol. 25) (14.11.1994) :-
(i) Index-A of the Head Note of the above referred SCC at page-422:-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ----- HELD, APOLOGY NOT OUTCOME OF REAL
REMORSE OR CONTRITION BUT TENDERED AS A WEAPON OF DEFENCE AND
THEREFORE, NOT ACCEPTABLE –“TWO WEEKS” IMPRISONMENT AWARDED
TO CONTEMNOR WITH A VIEW THAT IT SHOULD SERVE AS DETERRENT AND
EYE-OPENER, a mere sentence of fine would not meet the ends of justice in the
circumstances--------.
Held from the facts it is clear that the respondent contemnor had filed a forged and
fabricated document in court TO RESIST THE PRAYER OF HIS WIFE to get the
matrimonial proceedings transferred on the ground of her poverty i.e. it was done with an
oblique motive.
As to whether filing of a forged document with intention to defraud amounts to contempt
of court, as this expression has been defined in section 2 of the contempt of courts Act, 1971,
there being no decision of the Supreme Court (or for that matter of any High Court), the same is
required to be examined as a matter of first principle. Contempt jurisdiction has been
conferred on superior courts not only to preserve the majesty of law by taking appropriate
action against one however high he may be, if he violates courts order BUT ALSO TO
KEEP THE STREAM OF JUSTICE CLEAR AND PURE so that purity of court’s
atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the state and the parties who approach the
courts to receive justice do not have to wade through dirty and polluted water before
entering their temples.
To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, THOSE
WHO INDULGE IN IMMORAL ACTS LIKE PERJURY, PREVARICATION AND
MOTIVATED FALSEHOODS HAVE TO BE APPROPRIATED DEALT WITH, without
which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the
satisfaction of those who approached it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. Any one
who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or if anything is
done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. The word
‘interfere’ means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the
functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Obstruction of justice is to
interpose obstacles or impediments or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the
administration of justice. If recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same
would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the
courts from performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.
Therefore, if the publication be with intent to deceive the court or one made with an
intention to defraud, the same would be contempt, as it would interfere with administration of
justice-----. This would definitely be so if a fabricated document is filed with the aforesaid mens
rea. In the case and hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the court, the
intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt---.
“--------------. People would have faith in courts when they would find that “lR;eso
t;rs” (Truth alone triumphs) is an achievable aim there or (“Yato Dharamstato Jai”) (It is
virtue which ends in victory) is not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the portals of
courts.”
8. “Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla (1995) Supp. (2) SCC 130” : 1994 (4) Scale
1088 : 1995 (1) SCJ 310” (23.11.1994)
(ii) “It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties EITHER TO
PRODUCE FABRICATED EVIDENCE AS A PART OF THE PLEADINGS
OR RECORD or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of
justice or judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. THIS
TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE OR TENDENCY TO
UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT NEEDS TO BE SEVERELY DEALT
WITH TO DETER THE PERSONS HAVING SIMILAR PROCLIVITY TO RESORT TO
SUCH ACTS OR CONDUCT.” (para 7)
(i) “The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all
those who belong to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to the profession can be
had by acquiring merely the qualification of technical competence, the honour as a professional
has to be maintained by its members by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the
court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do,
affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the
civilized society. Both as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and a
responsible citizen, the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his
professional and in his private and public life. ------.” (Para 20)
10. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court
1795” (2.5.1995) :-
(i) “ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO INTERFERE WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OR THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.
The swearing of false affidavit in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing
obstructions in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede,
obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. ------. Anyone who makes an attempt
to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by
resorting to the FILING OF FALSE EVIDENCE commits criminal contempt of the court
and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act. Filing of false affidavit
or making a false statement on oath in courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law
and NO COURT CAN IGNORE SUCH CONDUCT which has the tendency to shake
public confidence in the judicial institutions because the very structure of an ordered life is
put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be
poisoned by any one resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and
fabricating false evidence in a court of law.” (Head Note A)
(ii) “THE STREAM OF JUSTICE HAS TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND PURE AND ANY
ONE SPOILING ITS PURITY MUST BE DEALT WITH STERNLY SO THAT THE
MASSAGE PERCOLATES LOUD AND CLEAR THAT NO ONE CAN BE PERMITTED
TO UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT AND INTERFERE WITH THE
DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.” (Para 40)
11. “Afzal And Another Vs. State of Haryana & Others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” :-
12. “State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”
(10.4.1996)
(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred SCC :-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- S. 19- Appeal before Supreme Court from any order or decision
of High Court- Held, appeal will not lie under S. 19 against an interlocutory order of High Court
dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceeding- Words ‘any order’ must be read with
‘decision’ so as to exclude any interlocutory order of High Court from the scope of appeal –
Unless by the order High Court imposes punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt, no appeal will lie against it- However, even against an order dropping/refusing to
initiate contempt proceedings, Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136 can be invoked –
Constitution of India, Art. 136 and 215 – Appeal –Nature of right of –Words and phrases –“Any
order.”
Note : The above quoted rulling is also most important for appeal to explain the meaning
of the expression ‘pay or tender’ used in section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act.
13. “The secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and another, AIR 1996
SCC 1925 (9.5.1996) (For filing false proceeding in court)
14. “Rita Markandey V. Surjit Singh Arora, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2174”
(27.9.1996) :-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Secs. 2 (c ), 15 & 18 – Criminal Contempt – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 0 Or. XXXIX rule 1 & 2 – Ad-interim injunction – Ex-parte – Non-disclosure
of dismissal of such application in earlier suit – Amounts to fraud upon the Court – Guilty
of Contempt.
Held: In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by
not disclosing that in the earlier suit, the respondent has not been able to get an injunction,
the respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and
such acts had been done only in order to gain advantage on the other side and to get a stay
in the second suit.
We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over – reach
the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as on the opposite
parte and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HEARD IN
THE CASE UNLESS IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED and
in our view, it can only be if we non-suit the respondents in suit no. 261/97. While, therefore,
we do not purpose to take action against the respondent for contempt for except to issue a
warning to respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future WE DIRECT THE DISMISSAL OF
THE SUIT (BEING SUIT NO. 261/97) ITSELF. ---------.”
“In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Others, AIR 1994 SC 853 was held that
the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the
Court, must come with clean hands. “It can be said without hesitation that a person whose
case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. HE CAN BE SUMMARILY
THROWN OUT AT ANY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION. A litigant who approaches the
Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by which are relevant to the litigation. If
he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be
guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.”
“We are informed that in Suit No. 261/97, the plaintiff had not even filed the plaint of the earlier
suit being Suit No. 3604/96 nor the court had an opportunity to go through the allegations made
in the said plaint. We are, therefore, of the opinion that by withholding the plaint and the
application in the earlier suit from the Court and by not disclosing to the Court about the
proceedings in the earlier suit and the stay having not been granted to it, the
plaintiff/respondent had tried to get an advantage from the Court and was, therefore,
guilty of playing fraud of the court as well as on the respondent. The following observations
of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are relevant for purposes of present case:-
“The High Court in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the
High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath
obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court-----. We do not
agree with the High Court that “THERE IS NO LEGAL DUTY CASTE
UPON THE PLAINTIFF TO COME TO COURT WITH A TRUE CASE
AND PROVE IT BY TRUE EVIDENCE.” THE PRINCIPLE OF
“FINALITY OF LITIGATION” CANNOT BE PRESSED TO THE EXTENT
OF SUCH AN ABSURDITY THAT IT BECOMES AN ENGINE OF FRAUD
IN THE HANDS OF DISHONEST LITIGANTS. The courts of law are meant
for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come
with clean hands. ------. We have no hasitation to say that a person whose case is
based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown
out at any stage of the litigation. --------.”
-----. A party must come to the Court with clean hands and must disclose all the
relevant facts which may result in appreciating the rival contentions of the parties. In our
view, a litigant, who approaches the Court, must produce all the documents which are relevant to
the litigation and he must also disclose to the Court about the pendency of any earlier litigation
between the parties and the result thereof. ----.In our opinion, it was obligatory upon the
respondent to disclose to the Court that in the application filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief
had been claimed, however, the Court had not granted the said relief. In our view, if these facts
were before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit came up for hearing
before it, MAY BE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE WAS PERSUADED NOT TO GRANT
ANY EX-PARTE STAY IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT. ----. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also
suppressed material facts from the Court with a view to gain advantage in the second suit.
THIS IN OUR VIEW IS CLEARLY OVER –REACHING THE COURT.”
Note : ‘Over-reach’ means to reach or extent beyond, to outwit or get the better of, to
defeat by one’s oversubtlety
“---------. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt
with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16 or
in some other manner. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct
which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it
pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in
the administration of justice.
“As held by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and another AIR
1977 SC 2421, the pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the
Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious
cases. “It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly
fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And
remembering that AN ADVOCATE IS AN OFFICER OF JUSTICE he owes it to society
NOT TO COLLABORATE IN SHADY ACTIONS. The Bar Council of India, we hope will
activate this obligation.--.”
(vi) Para 20 of the above referred judgment:-
“We are of the opinion that the above noted passage of the aforesaid judgment in T.
Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal’s case is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. Having not succeeded in getting stay in Suit No. 3064/96, IN OUR VIEW, THE
LAWYER SHOULD HAVE REFUSED TO MOVE AN APPLICATION FOR STAY IN
THE SECOND SUIT.”
16. “Suo Motu contempt in Re: Nand Lal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300”:-
17. “Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1999 SC 3345”
(i) Head Note of the above referred AIR:-
“Constitution of India, Art. 19 (1) (a) – freedom of speech – Right of criticizing judgment of
court – Cannot be exercised with malice or by attempting to impair administration of justice – no
one can be permitted to distort orders of Court and deliberately give a slant to its proceedings,
which have been tendency to scandalize the court or bring it to ridicule – Court expressed its
displeasure about distorted writings about court’s order permitting increase in height of Dam
made by a literary figure and about actions of one of the party to proceedings – However keeping
in view the importance of the issue of resettlement and Rehabilitation – No contempt
proceedings were initiated.”
18. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124(SC)” (25.1.2000):-
19. “Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal etc., 2000 RLR 308 (SC)” (22.2.2000):-
20. “Court on its own motion Vs. Matter of statement made by Shri Raman Duggal
Advocate, 89 (2001) DLT 572” (DB)= 2000 RLR 144” :-
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note ------ of the above referred DLT:-
“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 226 – Issuance of Suo Motu Notice to Commissioner,
MCD ---------: Counsel is not mouth piece of his client-His duty is to uphold truth and
honesty-----------.”
21. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001)
(i) Relevant extract of the above referred AIR:-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c) – Constitution of India, Art. 129 – ---.”
“----------. Criminal Contempt has been defined in Section 2 (c) to mean interference with
the administration of justice IN ANY MANNER. A FALSE or MISLEADING or a wrong
statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings TO OBTAIN A
FAVOURABLE ORDER would undoubtedly tantamount to interfere with the due course
of judicial proceedings. WHEN A PERSON IS FOUND TO HAVE UTILIZED AN
ORDER OF A COURT WHICH HE OR SHE KNOWS TO BE INCORRECT FOR
CONFERRING BENEFIT ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE SAME,
THE VERY UTILIZATION OF THE FABRICATED ORDER BY THE PERSON
CONCERNED WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HOLD HIM/HER GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of
fabrication. On the aforesaid parameters it would be necessary to examine whether it can be said
that Mrs. Megha Rude can be held to be guilty of contempt. In view of our conclusion on the
basis of materials available in the inquiry proceedings with regard to the role played by Mrs.
Megha Rude, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that Mrs. Rude is guilty of gross
criminal contempt and must be suitably punished for the same. -------.”
“We, therefore hold both Mrs. Megha Rude and Mr. Dilip Wamanrao Gund to be guilty of
contempt having committed criminal contempt as well as under Article 129 of the Constitution
of India and for such gross act on their part, they are sentenced to imprisonment for six months.
22. “Surya Prakash Khatri & Anr. Vs. Smt Madhu Trehan & Ors. 92 (2001) DLT 665”
(F.B.) (28.5.2001) :-
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (ii) of the above referred DLT :-
“Constitution of India, 1950 –Art. 215 –Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 2(c) –
Contempt of Court-publication in question ---casting aspersion on competent of judiciary
---publication in question scandalizes judges –it attempts to rob High Court of its owner and
prestige –CONTEMNORS CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO TAMPER WITH STREAM OF
JUSTICE WHICH MUST FLOW PURE AN UNHINDERED – contemnors cannot be
allowed to commit contempt of court in garb of criticism ----.”
23. “Rajiv Malhotra Vs. Union of India & Ors, 2002 (63) DRJ 243 (DB)
24. “Pravin C. Shah Vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali & Another, AIR 2001 SC 3041 : VII (2001)
SLT 153” (9.10.2001) :-
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR:-
“Contempt of Court Act (70 of 1971), ------ Ss. 2, 12 -------- ADVOCATE FOUND GUILTY
OF CONTEMPT- CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO APPEAR, ACT OR PLEAD IN
COURT UNLESS HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT --------.
The very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of court on the previous
hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness on the same day,
unaffected by the contemptuous behavior he hurled at the court, would erode the dignity of the
court and even erode the majesty of it, besides impairing the confidence of the public in the
efficacy of the institution of the courts. ---------.”
25. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri
L.J. 493” (30.7.2003)
26. “S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039” (19.8.2003) (A
Three Judge Bench)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2- Contempt –FALSE VERIFICATION
OF STATEMENT OF FACTS- IS CONTEMPT –But pleading/defence made on basis of
facts which are not false-Howsoever the pleading may be an abuse process of court –Does
not amount to contempt.
WHERE A VERIFICATION IS SPECIFIC AND DELIBERATELY FALSE,
THERE IS NOTHING IN LAW TO PREVENT A PERSON FROM BEING
PROCEEDED FOR CONTEMPT. But it must be remembered that the very essence of
crimes of this kind is not how such statements may injure this or that party to litigation
BUT HOW THEY MAY DECEIVE AND MISLEAD THE COURTS AND THUS
PRODUCE MISCHIEVOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. A person is under a legal obligation to verify the
allegations of fact made in the pleadings and if he verifies falsely, he comes under the
clutches of law. In order to expose a person to the liability of a prosecution of making false
statement, there must be a false statement of fact and not a mere pleading made on the basis of
facts which are themselves not false. Merely because an action or defence can be an abuse of
process of the Court, those responsible for its formulation can not be regarded as committing
contempt, BUT AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE COURT BY DISGUISING THE
NATURE OF CLAIM IS CONTEMPT. If the facts leading to a claim or defence are set out,
but an inference is drawn thereby stating that the stand of the plaintiff or defendant is one way or
the other, it will not amount to contempt unless it be that the facts as pleaded themselves are
false.
The appellant a Bank Officer was held guilty of contempt of Court on ground of taking
up a false defence as pleaded in the written statement and repeating the same in the evidence-in-
chief. The written statement had been verified by the appellant stating that what is
contained in written statement is based on the information received from the records of the
defendants and he believed the same to be true. THE VERIFICATION OF FACTS
ADVERTED TO IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT IS NOT MADE ON THE BASIS OF
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPELLANT and the defence set up by him is on
the basis of the stand taken by his bank in the companion suit. When in a suit of the
appellant’s Bank, the stand had been accepted, but in the suit against appellant’s Bank, such
stand had been disbelieved, it becomes difficult to say that the appellant had deliberately stated
falsehood to mislead the Court or to simply gain time to the disadvantage of the other party in
this matter.
Further, when the appellant tried to explain his case in his evidence, the same was shut
out on the basis that it is hearsay. An officer of Bank who had no personal knowledge of the
transactions in question and was deposing on the basis of material on record, his evidence cannot
be from his knowledge and necessarily has to be hearsay. Hence, the lower Court was not
justified in shutting out that part of the evidence.”
27. “Zahira Habibullah H. Sheikh and another vs State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2004
SC 3114” (12.4.2004)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (C) of the above referred AIR:-
“Criminal PC (2 of 1974), Ss. 386, 391, 401 – Evidence Act (1 of 1872) S. 165 -------- Object of
391 is to sub serve ends of justice and to get at the truth-Best Bakery case with horror and
terror –oriented History-Star eye-witness had not stated truthfully before trial court- willing to
speck truth before the appellate court on basis of affidavit - power Under S 391 can be exercised
by appellate court ---------- Re-trial observed to be conducted out side state -------
The primary object of S. 391 is the prevention of guilty man’s escape through some
careless or ignorant proceedings before a court or vindication of an innocent person wrongfully
accused. --------.
it is no doubt true that the accused persons have been acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal
has been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and based on tainted evidence, tailored
investigation, unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and evidence of
threatened/terrorized witnesses, IT IS NO ACQUITTAL IN THE EYE OF LAW and no
sanctity or credibility can be attached and given to the so called findings. It seems to be
nothing but a travesty of truth, fraud on legal process AND THE RESULTANT DECISIONS
OF COURTS-CORAM NON JUDIS AND NON-EST, therefore, interference in appeals is
warranted.
28. “Bal Thackrey vs. Harish Pimpalkhute and another, AIR 2005 SC 396” (29.11.2004)
29. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” : 138
(2007) DLT 682 : (9.2.2007)
“Constitution of India, 1950- Art. 215- Criminal Procedure Code, 1973- Section 340 r/w section
195- Contempt of Court-Cognizance of abuse of legal process- Recovery suits –Loan agreements
not executed on dates recorded thereon- Stamp papers on which they were engrossed, were of
later date- Show cause notice issued to plaintiff and his Advocates for abuse of legal process in
institution and prosecution of suits based on agreements in question- Defendants claimed
plaintiff forged and fabricated loan agreement for institution of suit- Loan agreement was dated
15.5.1997 and 1.7.1997 and notarized on same date- Non-judicial stamp paper on which
agreement engrossed is dated 21.7.1997 – Defendants filed written statement denying execution
of loan agreements- DELIBERATE FALSE STATEMENTS ON OATH, PRACTISING
FRAUD AND FALSE AVERMENTS TO KNOWLEDGE OF COUNSEL IN PLAINT,
witnessing agreement either not executed on dates mentioned or not executed at all APART
FROM BEING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF CODE OF CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS ALSO AMOUNT TO OBSTRUCTING DUE COURSE OF ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL CONTEMPT- Act of instituting suits on
loan agreements knowing that legal notice of demand sent for return of consideration,
claiming it to have been paid in USA, would not be filed by counsel deliberately- It can be
filed by counsel either on account of his total forget-fullness with regard to notice sent or
his being blissfully ignorant of legal provisions and consequences thereof- Dr. Diwan is
Advocate with decades of experience and submits he and plaintiff suffered for their lapses-
Plaintiff lent money, has lost right to recover same on account of manipulation of
documents by defendants-keeping in view age of Counsel and his blemishless track record,
apology tendered by him accepted- Apology of another Counsel Kiran Singh is bona fide
and accepted-Directions issued accordingly.”
(iii) Relevant extract of Head Note (iv) of the above referred DLT:-
“Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 340 r/w Section 195, 195(1)(b)(ii)- Cognizance of
abuse of legal process-Initiation of proceeding under section 340 Cr. P.C. –Contempt of
Court----As suo motu notice of contempt initiated and determined, initiation of proceedings
under section 340 Cr. P.C. not in interest of justice- Inquiry under section 340 Cr. P.C. would
not serve any useful purpose nor be in interest of justice – Parties requested for quietus in
matter.”
“It would be seen from the foregoing that apart from the false deposition with regard to the dates
on which the lone agreement were executed, plaintiff’s counsel, Dr. D.C. Vohra, WHO HAD
HIMSELF SERVED A NOTICE DATED 1.4.1998 regarding payment the amount
equivalent to Rs. 16 lakhs in U.S. Dollar in America, filed a suit based on the loan
agreements dated 1.7.1987 and 15.5.1997, wherein it was alleged that the sum of Rs. 16
lakhs was paid on 1.7.1997 and that the amount was paid at New Delhi. The said averments
WERE OBVIOUSLY FALSE TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF the plaintiff and HIS
COUNSEL, as they claimed that the money had been paid in USA. Similar is the position
with regard to the agreement dated 15.5.1997.
“The suits instituted by the plaintiff and signed through counsel, Dr. D.C. Vohra and Ms. Kiran
Singh are on the basis of loan advanced under agreements dated 15.5.1997 and 1.7.1997 not
being repaid. The stamp papers bear the date 21.7.1997, which belie the dates given on the
agreement. The consideration under the agreement, as admitted by the plaintiff, $ 35,000 was
paid in USA to the representative of the defendant. The agreements did not disclose any such
thing, rather money was claimed to be paid under the agreements in Delhi. THE NOTICE
ISSUED BY THE COUNSEL RUNS CONTRARY TO THE AVERMENTS IN THE
PLAINT.
(vi) Para 13 of the above referred judgment:-
“One of the suits (suit no. 1357/1999) has already been permitted to be withdrawn dive order
dated 20.2.2003, while prayer for withdrawal, in the second suit (S, No. 62/1999) has been made
by the plaintiff in the reply to the application under S, 340 Cr. P.C. … which is pending. During
the advanced stage of hearing of contempt proceedings, the plaintiff and the defendants both
desired a quietus to be applied to the matter.
“Coming to the role of Advocates and counsel vis-à-vis the courts and administration of justice.
-----. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. and ors. Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association,
reported in 1994 (2) SCC 204 : (AIR 1994) SC 1654) emphasized upon the role of counsel :
(Para 6)
“The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The
client engages the lawyer for person reasons --------. The lawyer in turn is not an agent of his
client but his dignified, responsible spokesman. ---------. Being a responsible a the court and an
important adjunct of the administration of justice, the lawyer also ows a duty to the court as well
as the opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that justice is done. He demeans himself if he
acts merely as a mouth piece of his client.’
(x) Para 22 of the above referred judgment:-
“Having noticed the legal position regarding deliberately making false statements on oath,
practising fraud and making of averments which were false of the knowledge of counsel in the
plaint, witnessing agreements which were either not executed on the dates mentioned thereon or
were not executed at all apart from being gross violations of the code of conduct or professional
ethics, in the present state of circumstances would also amount to obstructing the due course of
administration of justice and interfering with the same and thus constitutes criminal contempt.
“-------. The notice issued by the counsel runs contrary to the averments in the plaint. Such
conduct on the part of the counsel cannot be condoned or simply excused or washed away. As
noticed by this court, the responsibility of the members of the Bar for keeping the stream of
justice pure and unsullied is far greater. Dr. Vohra initially sought to urge that these were lapses
falling short of contempt which could be corrected by striking out the pleadings, this court is
unable to appreciate this submission and rejects the same
“In these circumstances, considering that this could not have been a deliberate or intentional act,
as discussed therein be fore, but one actuated either by extreme for getfulness or blissful
ignorance of the provisions of law, as also the age of the counsel and his blemishless track record
so far, the apology tendered by him is accepted. However, he is directed to pay a sum of Rs.
15,000/- within two weeks from today, as costs to the Advocates Welfare Fund. He shall also
render pro bono service for a period of six months for at least two hours, twice a week, at any of
the Delhi Legal Service Centers under the supervision and direction of the Member Secretary,
Delhi Legal Services Authority or such other suitable word as may be assigned by the Member
Secretary.
“As regards Kiran Singh, she is a young budding advocate and she has faced this ordeal at the
beginning of her profession itself. She was inexperienced and claims to have signed the
agreements as witness not eh asking of the senior counsel for his clients. She has recognized that
this is a humbling experience and she would exercise extreme care in future and discharge her
functions with responsibility. It appears that the experience for her has indeed been a humbling
one. Her apology, which was tendered at the outset, is a bona fide one and is accepted. She is
directed to do pro bono work and render services under the supervision of the Member Secretary,
Delhi High Court legal Service Authority for a period of six months, for two hours, twice a
week.”
30. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB)
(17.2.2009)
“-----------------. The tendency on the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to
prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. Any interference in the course of justice,
ANY OBSTRUCTION CAUSED IN THE PATH OF THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE
AN AFFRONT TO THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND, THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS
PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. --------.”
31. “Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & ors, AIR 2006 SC 1367”
(8.3.2006)
32. “Court On Its Own Motion vs. Rajiv Dawar, 2007 (1) AD (Delhi) 567” (Not yet
obtained)
Note: Observations made by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the above referred judgment have
been quoted by it in its following judgment reported as COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS.
STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”
33. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”
(21.8.2008)(Delhi High Court)
(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were
the counsel for the state and defence respectively)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT:-
“Contempt of Court - Interference with judicial proceedings and administration of justice
– Nexus between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer –-----Complicity between
Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – both were More than mixed up in BMW case –
conduct of both had tendency to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice as
influencing a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify amounts to interference in
administration of justice -------Contempt very much before eyes and within hearing –
contempt of courts act, 1972, -section 2 (C ) (Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 20, 78, 125, 127, 143, 155,
156, 169,206 & 207)
34. “Three Cheers Entertainment (P) LTD & ors, v. C.E.S.C. LTD, 1 (2009) SLT 261”
(20.10.2008)
35. “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130(SC)” (A Three
Judge Bench Decision)
A. Relevant extracts of the above referred DLT and the judgment pertaining to
prohibition for advocate against appearing in Courts
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (V) of the above referred DLT:-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (c ), 12 – Constitution of India, 1950- Arts. 145, 215
– Advocates Act, 1961- Section 34- Contempt of Court- BMW case- Sting operation-
Negotiation between SK and Special Public Prosecutor and R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate, for
his sellout in favour of defence for a very high price- Prohibition against appearing in Courts-
Observations made in case of Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. UOI followed- No conflict or clash
between section 34 of Advocates Act and Art. 145 of Constitution – ART. 145 AND
SECTION 34 OF ACT CLEARLY SHOW THAT THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT
TO AN ADVOCATE TO APPEAR IN COURT – An Advocate appears in Court subject to
conditions laid down by Court- Two appellants were debarred from appearing before High Court
and Courts subordinate to it for a period of 4 months.-----
“We were also addressed on the validity of the High Court’s direction prohibiting the two
appellants from appearing before the High Court and the Courts subordinate to it for a period of
four months. Though by the time the appeals were taken up for hearing the period of four
months was over, Mr. Altaf Ahmed contended that the High Court’s direction was beyond its
competence and authority. In a proceeding of contempt punishment could only be awarded
as provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, THOUGH IN A GIVEN CASE THE
HIGH COURT COULD DEBAR THE CONTEMNOR FROM APPEARING IN COURT
TILL HE PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT.--------- .”
“More importantly, another Constitution Bench of this Court in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs.
Union of India and Another, VII (2002) SLT 229= (2003) 2 SCC 45, examined the question
whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court(s). In paragraph 34
of the decision the Court made highly illuminating observations in regard to lawyers’ right to
appear before the Court and sounded the note of caution for the lawyers. Para 34 of the decision
need to be reproduced below :-
“34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in
Courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of Courts. ----. Conduct in
Court is a matter concerning the court and hence the bar Council cannot claim
that what should happen inside the Court could also be regulated by them in
exercise of their disciplinary powers.--- But the right to appear and conduct
cases in the court is a matter on which the court must and does have major
supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested
of control or supervision of conduct in Court merely because it may involve the
right of an advocate. A RULE CAN STIPULATE THAT A PERSON WHO
HAS COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF COURT OR HAS BEHAVED
UNPROFESSIONALLY AND IN AN UNBECOMING MANNER WILL NOT
HAVETHE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD AND
CONDUCT CASES IN COURTS.---- The very sight of an advocate, who is
guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct,
standing in the Court would erode the dignity of the court ---. Art. 145 of
Constitution of India and section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is
no absolute right to an advocate who appear in a court.----.”
“----------- . We may respectfully add that in a given case, a direction disallowing an advocate
who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in Court may not only be a measure to
maintain the dignity and though in paragraph 80 of the decision, as seen earlier there is an
observation that in a given case it might be possible for this Court or the High Court to prevent
the contemnor advocate to appear before it till he purge himself of the contempt orderly
functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self protection of the Court and for
preservation of the purity of Court proceedings.---------.
“Lest we are misunderstood it needs to be made clear that the occasion to take recourse to the
extreme step of debarring an advocate from appearing in Court should arise very rarely and only
as a measure of last resort in cases where the wrong doer advocate does not at all appear to be
genuinely contrite and remorseful for his act/conduct, but on the contrary shows a tendency to
repeat or perpetuate the wrong act(s).”
36. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009)
DLT 466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c ), 10,11,12,14,15,18,19- Civil
Procedure Code, 1908- Order 39 Rule 2A- Contempt of Court- Criminal Contempt-
CONTRADICTORY STANDS TAKEN IN HIS PLEADINGS/ AFFIDAVITS BY
DEFENDANT/CONTEMNOR REGARDING OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
SUIT PROPERTY- On receipt of REFERENCE from Court of Civil Judge, Division Bench
also found to be case of criminal contempt and charge framed against defendant No. 1
contemnor was also of criminal contempt- FILING OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR
STATEMENTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT AS IT TENDS TO OBSTRUCT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE-
Defendant/Contemnor filed written statement in suit of plaintiff and made statement on
oath before trial court AND ADMITTING HE SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF
AND HANDED OVER POSSESSION TO HIM- But subsequently in his reply to contempt
application filed by plaintiff, contemnor took a somersault AND TOOK PLEA THAT HE
NEITHER SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF NOR HANDED OVER
POSSESSION TO HIM- That fraud was played upon him by plaintiff in collusion with any
other person in making statement- No evidence in this behalf led by defendant/contemnor-Ipse
Dixit of defendant is difficult to be accepted- Apology tendered by contemnor, not at all
apologetic and not accepted- It was tendered by defendant/contemnor for first time while
giving evidence in these proceedings-Defendant/contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt.”
“In the present case, as noticed already, the Division Bench had taken cognizance of “Criminal
Contempt” only against the defendant/contemnor for his having taken contradictory stands in his
pleadings/affidavits regarding the ownership and possession of the suit property. So, we have to
examine whether the defendant/contemnor has committed “Criminal contempt” or not we are of
the view that since no cognizance was taken of “Civil Contempt”, by this Court that aspect
cannot be gone into in the present proceedings even though strongly urged on behalf of the
plaintiff. We say so because of certain provisions of the Act of 1971 as well as some judicial
pronouncements. Under Sections 2 (a), (b) and (c) “contempt of Court”, “civil contempt” and
“criminal contempt”. We reproduce below these definition clauses:
“Section 10. Power of High Court to punish contempt of subordinate Courts-Every High
Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the
same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to it as it has and
exercises in respect of contempt of itself :
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”.
(2) Sub-section (I) shall not apply to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner.
Section 19 provides as to where would an appeal lie against an order of a Single Judge
bench and that of a Division bench. The relevant part of this section for our purpose is as
follows :
Provided………………………………………….”
“From these provisions of the Act of 1971, it becomes evident that the question whether
contempt of any subordinate court is committed or not and whether the alleged contempt is civil
or criminal to be decided by the High Court on the basis of facts which are brought to the
notice of the High Court. Those facts can be brought to the notice of the High Court by any
party to the litigation. If the High Court considered on perusal of the facts brought to its
notice that contempt of a Subordinate court is made AND THE SAME IS CIVIL IN
NATURE, then the matter can be entertained STRAIGHTWAY by a Single Judge Bench.
However, if the contempt of any court Subordinate to the High Court is alleged to be
“CRIMINAL CONTEMPT” THEN THE REFERENCE IS MADE TO IT BY THE
SUBORDINATE COURT CONCERNED OR ANY OF THE OTHER AUTHORITIES
MENTIONED IN SECTION 15 OF THE ACT 1971----.”
“In the present case, the defendant/contemnor had filed a written statement in the suit of the
plaintiff and had also made a statement on oath before the trial court on 29.4.2003 admitting that
he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff and had also handed over its position to him. In his
statement on oath also which admittedly was made by him before the Ld Civil judge in the suit
on 29.4.2003 he had admitted that he had already sold the suit property to the plaintiff and so he
will not dispossess him . However, subsequently when the plaintiff filed contempt application,
the contemnor in his reply to that contempt application field before the Reference Court, which
was supported by his affidavit wherein he affirmed the correctness of the assertion made by him
in his reply, he took a somersault and took the plea that neither he had sold the suit property to
the plaintiff nor he had handed over its possession to him. Even before this Court, the
defendant/contemnor filed an affidavit in response to the show cause notice and claimed that
neither he had sold the suit property to the plaintiff not was he given its possession. The
admissions made in the written statement and in the statement made before the trial court,
however, according to the defendant/contemnor, were not made by him voluntarily but were as a
result of fraud played upon him by the plaintiff and one Ved Prakash. Learned counsel for the
plaintiff did not dispute that if any party to a suit has made any admission of fact either in the
pleadings or by way of statement on oath, that party is not precluded from showing that that
admission was got made by the opposite party by indulging in fraud and it is shown that any
fraud was played upon the party making any admission of some important fact in dispute then
that party would not be bound by that admission. However, ld Counsel submitted, in the present
case the defendant/contemnor had failed miserably to show that any kind of fraud was played
upon him by the plaintiff in collusion with any other person.
“-----In our view, the ipsi dixit of the defendant/contemnor that he had made the admissions
regarding sale of property in question to the plaintiff and also handing over of its possession to
him were as a result of fraud having been played upon him is difficult to be accepted. ---.
Consequently, he did commit criminal contempt for which he deserves to be punished. The
stage at which he has tendered an apology shows that he was really not apologetic at all since at
no earlier point of time he tendered apology.---- We are therefore, not inclined to accept the so
called apology tendered by the defendant/contemnor for the first itm e while giving evidence in
these proceedings.”
37. “Court on its own motion against Ajay Yadav, 165 (2009) DLT 520 (DB)” (6.11.2009)
“The action of Shri Ajay Yadav in signing the vakalatnamas purportedly on behalf of the
respondent No. 1, is a blatant attempt to lower the authority of the Court in violation of order
dated 6th October, 2006 passed in CS (OS) o. 1906/2006. As a result a dispute was raised by Mr.
Chaudhary, Advocate in the present proceedings as to who is to represent the company. Such
vakaltnama has been signed even as late as on 23rd April, 2009 despite the judgment dated 20th
April, 2009. Despite specific prohibition, Shri Ajay Yadav has made an effort to prejudice due
course of the present judicial proceedings. There can be no manner of doubt that the action is
willful. These acts on the part of Shri Ajay Yadav would clearly fall with the definition of
“criminal contempt “ as defined under Sub-clauses 1 and 2 of Sub section of Section 2 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”
“A perusal of the reply filed by the respondent shows that Sh Ajay Yadav has justified his
conduct of putting an appearance on behalf of the Company through advocates despite the
injunction order. He has sought to raise preliminary objections that no consent of Advocate
General or any State Law Officer has been obtained for initiation of contempt proceedings
against him which plea is without any basis in view of the proceedings having been initiated suo
moto by the Court.---.”
“We find that the respondent has shown no regret. After setting forth 26 grounds of challenge, in
the last paragraph it is stated that the respondent has the highest regard for the Court and does not
want to lower its dignity or authority willfully or otherwise and that the respondent is prepared to
tender unconditional apology in the event of the Court considering the present reply as not being
sufficient to drop or discharge the notice. We find this apology s no apology at all. the
respondent has defended his action.”
“---After having done everything possible to frustrate the orders of the court by acting in
an improper and illegal manner, the respondent has tried to justify his conduct.---.”
“We may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma,
(1995) 1 SCC 421 to explain that the word ‘interfere’ in the context of the criminal contempt
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 means any action which checks or hampers the
functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Thus, if recourse to
falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede
even flow of justice and would prevent the Courts from performing the legal duties as they are
supposed to do. The polluters of judicial firmament are required to be well taken care of to
maintain the sublimity of Court’s environment. A similar view has been expressed in Dhannjay
Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., II (1995) CCR 128 (SC) = AIR 1995 SC 1795, where
false affidavits had been filed. In Ram Avtar Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla, (1995) Supp (2) SCC
130, it was observed that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any acts or conduct of the
parties to the litigation or witnesses ‘ in any manner’. The tendency on the part of the
contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. any
interference in the cause of justice, any obstruction caused in the path of those seeking justice are
an affront to the majesty of law and therefore, the conduct is punishable as contempt of court.
Learned Single Judge of this court in court on its own motion Vs. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & Ors.
138 (2007) DLT 682 = II (2007) BC 362, has observed that a party taking recourse to fraud
deflects course of judicial proceedings and same constitutes interference in administration of
justice.”
“We deem it appropriate to also refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Sudhir Chona
Vs. Shahnaz Husain, 2002 (97) DLT 642 that while civil contempt is an offence of private nature
depriving a party of the benefit of the Court order, criminal contempt is contumacious or
obstructive conduct or behaviour directed against the court and involves an element of
criminality in it. It is despising, undermining and eroding the authority of the Court and is
punishable to protect and safeguard the public faith in the administration of justice.”
“Despite the conduct of the respondent/contemnor, we restrain from taking an extreme harsh
view and impose fine of Rs. 2,0000/- on the respondent/contemnor and sentence him till the
rising of the Court.”
38. “ST. Ives Laboratories Inc. Vs. Lotus Herbals UK Ltd , 164 (2009) DLT 473 (9.11.2009)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT :-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Sections 2(b), 9- Civil Contempt – Constitution of – There
must exist judgment, decree, direction, order, or writ or process of Court or there should be an
undertaking given by defendant to Court---.”
“Section 2 sub section (b) of the Contempt of Court Act defines civil contempt which reads as
under :-
“2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) “Contempt of Court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt”
(b) “Civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction,
order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to court.”s
“In the present case, this court did not pass any judgment in favour of plaintiff and against
defendant not decreed the suit of plaintiff nor given any directions to defendant nor passed an
order in favour of plaintiff or against defendant nor issued any writ nor an undertaking of
defendant was recorded.---.”
D. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (3) of
CCA
Note :This section deals with ‘Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt’
(Irrelevant)
E. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (4) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings not contempt
(Irrelevant)
F. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (5)
of CCA
Note : This section deals with fair criticism of judicial act, not contempt and this section 5
reads as under :-
“5. Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.- A person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally
decided.
Comments
Judgments are open to criticism that must be done without casting
aspersions on the judges and the courts and without adverse comments amounting to
scandalizing the courts; Advocate General Vs. Abraham George, 1976 Cr. L.J. 158 (161).
G. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (6) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Complaint against Presiding Officers of Subordinate Courts
when not contempt’. (Irrelevant)
H. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (7) of
CCA
I. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (8) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘other defenses not affected’. (Not relevant)
J. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (9) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Act not to imply enlargement of scope of contempt’ (Not
relevant)
K. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (10) of
CCA(Most important)
Note : This section deals with ‘Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate
Courts.’
“10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts- Every High Court shall
have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same
procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises
in respect of contempts of itself :
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the India Penal Code.”
(i) Sections 10 & 11 make it manifestly clear that even in respect of contempt of any
subordinate court, it is only the High Court that take action against the contemner vide AIR 1957
Hyd. 17(DB) and AIR 1989 HP 46
(ii) Contempt of subordinate courts –Power to punish vests in High Court alone, except in
cases covered by S. 228, Penal Code and O. 39, R. 2-A CPC vide 1985 MPLJ 730.
(iii) Subordinate Court can make a reference Under S. 15(2) only in respect of ‘Criminal
Contempt”-Cannot entertain application wherein ‘Civil Contempt’ is alleged
(iv) Criminal Contempt of Subordinate Court-Suo Motu action for contempt by High Court-
Permissible vide AIR 2004 SC 2579 (2588)
(v) The High Court may take cognizance even on its own motion of the contempt of a
subordinate court vide 1994 MPLJ 424 (427) (DB)
(vi) Violation of injunction issued by subordinate Court- High Court ca take cognizance o
petition filed by aggrieved party in view of R. 9 of Contempt of Courts (Gauhati High Court)
Rules (1977), which applies in case of civil contempt other than contempt referred to in S. 14 of
the Act. 1992 Cri LJ 1375 (1377) : 1991(1) Gauhati LR 214.
(vii) Order passed by Court having o jurisdiction is nullity and a void order- Its disregard-o
contempt committed-Contempt petition not maintainable. 1981 Cri LJ 1880 (Delhi) ** (1987) 2
Rajasthan LR 864(867) ** 1984 Cri LJ 1243 (1246) : 1984 All Cri Respondent 374 (DB). (1982)
UPLT NOC 79. Reversed.) (Plea of alleged contemner that order of Tribunal was passed
without jurisdiction can be gone into by High Court entertaining contempt petition.)
(viii) The High Court while exercising jurisdiction in contempt proceedings can undo the
wrong which have bee done to petitioner and restore status quo ante. 1992 (1) Rec Cri
Respondent 257 (259) (P&H).
(ix) When single Judge had passed orders on a contempt petition and single Judge was not
conferred with the power of contempt of Court by any order of Chief Justice, the orders passed
by said single Judge on contempt petition were liable to be set aside. 2005 (1) All WC 992 (993)
: 2005 (1) ESC 14 (DB).
(xi) Disobedience of order of High Court –Eviction order passed by authority – Order upheld
by High Court and direction issued to opposite parties – Police Officers to give vacant
possession of premises-Non-compliance of order – Such police officers transferred and other
Police Officers succeeding them- Order of High Court ultimately complied with by the new
officers who took pains to see that premises were vacated- Held, that it was not necessary to
initiate contempt proceedings against opposite parties. 1990 Cri LJ 479 : 1989 All LJ 173.
(xii) In a allegation being of criminal contempt, unless there is clear material at least to
suggest the parties were prima facie involved in the matter as alleged, there would be no
justification to continue contempt proceedings against them. The allegations should not be
circumstantial. ILR (1983) 1 Cut 377 (385) (DB) ** 2002 (2) All Rent Cas 212 (213) ** 1998
Cri LJ 3126 (3127) : 1998 (2) Rec Civ Respondent 195 (Petitioner & H). Interim order alleged
to be violated found to have been subsequently vacated-Contempt petition not therefore tenable).
(xiii) For punishing contemners either under Art. 215 of Constitution or under S. 10 of
Contempt of Courts Act or under O. 39, Respondent 2A of CPC, willful and deliberate
disobedience must be proved beyond all shadow of doubt. 1997 (3)Raj LW 1773 (1775) : (1998
(1) WLC 106.”
(xiv) Where respondent/tenant filed an undertaking in the Court of Rent Controller specifying
particular date to vacate the premises and hand over the possession to the landlord, fact of illness
cannot be a ground for not delivering possession and vacating the premises particularly when
respondent suffering from heart disease from long back as per his own averments. On-vacating
of premises as per undertaking given I Court amounts to contempt of Court and respondent is
liable for imprisonment and fine both. ILR (1986) 2 Delhi 60 (62).
(xv) Case of contempt cannot be made out on the basis of constructive notice through counsel,
contempt proceedings being in the nature of quasi criminal proceedings actual knowledge of the
order is sine qua non before finding a person guilty of disobedience of orders. 1991 All WC 117
(119).
(xvi) Where the Municipal Corporation failed to comply with the orders of the High Court to
return the belongings of the hutment dwellers which were taken from them at the time of
demolition of the hutments, it is fit case in which the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts
Act can be exercised. 1990 Cri LJ 619 : (1989) 3 Bom CR 267.
(xvii) Contempt proceedings initiated by High Court on its own motion against Executive
Magistrate- Charge that he had disobeyed administrative directions of High Court in that he had
failed to send certain monthly returns in time- Explanation for delay found to be just- High
regard for High Court also expressed by concerned Executive Magistrate- Rule discharged. 1990
Cri LJ (NOC) 62 : (1989) 2 Sim LC 201 (HP).
(xviii) The fact that in a case of contempt committed in its face the Court before it calls upon
the Contemner to show cause comes to a decision that a contempt has been committed does not
disqualify the Court from adjudicating upon the matter when cause is shown by the Contemner.
AIR 1932 Lah. 502 (503) : 33 Cri LJ 675 (FB).
(xix) In action by ay of contempt, Court is both the accuser and judge of the accusation.. It
behoves the Court to act with due circumspection – Court must always be jealous in vindicating
its dignity and impartiality while at the same time, it must exercise its power with restraint and
care- Litigant may have a grievance in a matter decided by Courts, but that cannot justify use of
intemperate or improper language by aggrieved party in reference to Courts. AIR 1969 Delhi
169 (170) (FB).
(xx) A Court will not exercise its extraordinary power of committal upon light occasions
and where the ends of justice do not require its use. AIR 1956 Sau 102((104) : 1956 Cri LJ 1355
(DB) ** 2004 (1) Andh LT 1 (11) (DB) ** AIR 1951 Punj 49 (52) : 52 Cri LJ 950 (DB) ** AIR
1950 All 285 (286) : 51 Cri LJ 595 ** AIR 1941 Pat 185 (192) (DB) ** AIR 1969 Delhi 137
(141) : 1969 Cri LJ 599 (DB) ** 1968 Cri LJ 107 (All) ** 1961 (2) Cri LJ 104 (109) (DB) (Ker)
** AIR 1960 All 231 (234) : 1960 Cri LJ 442 (DB) ** AIR 1958 Cal. 474 (482) : 1958 Cri LJ
1162 ** ILR (1955) Mys 524 (DB).
(xxi) Interference with course of justice- Likelihood and not actual interference is essential.
AIR 1969 Delhi 201 (210) (FB).
(xxii) The power to commit for contempt should be used only when contempt is deliberate.
AIR 1939 Mad 257 (260) : 40 Cri LJ 533 (SB) ** AIR 1953 All 266 (270) : 1953 Cri LJ 630
(DB) ** AIR 1969 Delhi 137 (140) : 1969 Cri LJ 599 (DB) ** 1968 Cri LJ 107 (108, 109) (All)
** 1966 All WR (HC) 759 ** 1963 (2) Cri LJ 219 (223) : 1963 MPLJ 1121 (DB) ** AIR 1959
Pat 262 (266) : 1959 Cri LJ 754 (DB).
(xxiii) Interference with due course of justice in pending proceedings- Case in question
referred to in public speech made by P- P explicitly declaring that case was sub judice and he
would refrain from any discussion about it – In view of cautionary trends of speech, jurisdiction
relating to contempt of Court held could not be invoked. AIR 1969 Mad. 378 (380) (DB)
(xxiv) The matter of dealing with the contempt is totally within the jurisdiction of the High
Court and is not the right of ay party in any sense. Further, this jurisdiction must be very
sparingly used only where the interests of justice imperatively require its use, and even then only
to the limit strictly called for by such interests ay impression that the exercise of such jurisdiction
or the power to punish for contempt, has been made in a somewhat hasty or dominating mode
without carefully considering the consequence involved to parties may be even more
unfavourable to the administration of justice, than permitting such acts of contempt to go
unnoticed. (1969) Mad LW 25 (28) (DB) (Cri).
(xxv) The jurisdiction to commit for contempt should not be used to vindicate any personal
interest of the Judge but only the general administration of law which is the public concern. AIR
1956 Andhra 84 (86) : 1956 Cri LJ 475 (DB) ** AIR 1950 All 285 (286) : 51 Cri LJ 595 ** ILR
(1968) 1 Ker. 384 (403) : 1968 Ker LJ 197 (FB) ** 1968 Cri LJ 248(251) : 71 Cal WN 771 (DB)
** 1968 MPLJ 725 (DB) ** AIR 1967 Andh Pra 299 (308) : 1967 Cri LJ 1470 (DB) ** AIR
1961 J & K 76 (81) : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 766 (DB) ** AIR 1959 Orissa 89 (93) : 1959 Cri LJ 626
(DB).
(xxvii) Power of High Court to punish contempts can be invoked only when facts ex facie
support such proceeding and not for enforcement of decreetal rights between parties. AIR 1966
Mad 21 (22) : 1966 Cri LJ 35 : (1965) 2 Mad LJ 162 (DB).
(xxviii) The Court must take into consideration the fact that there is another remedy available
while exercising its discretion to commit or not to commit a person its discretion to commit or
not to commit a person for contempt of Court. AIR1945 PC 147 (150) : 47 Cri LJ 61 ** AIR
1958 Cal 474 (482) : 1958 Cri LJ 1162 ** 1968 Cri LJ 430 (431) (Punj).
(xxix) A party guilty of disobedience of an interim injunction order can be punished under
Order 39, Rule 2-A (Allahabad) of the Civil Procedure Code and also under the contempt of
Courts Act. It is however not necessary to award separate punishment. 1964 All WR 127(128).
(xxx) Where the circumstances require it, Courts should not hesitate to exercise the powers
conferred by the Act. AIR 1954 Pat. 203 (208) : 1954 Cri LJ 533 (DB) ** AIR 1967 Bom.
305(307) : 38 Cri LJ 942 ** (1966) Bom. LR 453.
(xxxi) Contempt of Court by one person another person taking entire responsibility for
offence ad expressing unqualified regrets- Is no ground for absolving former. AIR 1969 Delhi
201 (205) (FB).
(xxxii) Committal for contempt is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with reference
to the interests of the administration of justice. 1970 MLJ (Cri) 139.
(xxxiii) Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts- Commitment for
contempt is discretionary- Power to be exercised to maintain the course of justice pure and
unaffected. ILR (1971) Cut. 237 (SC).
(xxxiv)
L. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (11) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders
found outside jurisdiction. (Not relevant)
M. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (12) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with punishment for contempt of court and it reads as under :-
“12. Punishment for contempt of Court.- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act
or in any other law, a contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with
both :
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted
on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.
Explanation- An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or
conditional if accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court
shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in
respect of itself or of a Court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of
a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a
sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment,
direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may
think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any undertaking
give to a Court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in
charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company,
as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be
enforced, with the leave of the Court, by the detention is civil prison of each such person :
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to
such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he
exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of Court
referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been
committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any
director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company such director, manager, secretary or
other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and punishment may be enforced,
with the leave of the Court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary
or other officer.
COMMENTS
(i) Purpose of imposing punishment is to ensure faith, trust and confidence in administration
of justice ; Rajesh Kumar Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 2725.
(ii) Court dealing with application for contempt of court cannot traverse beyond the order. It
cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any
direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction with an application for initiation of
contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible; Prithavi Nath Ram
Vs. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2004 SC 4277A.
(iii) The various different modes of execution of orders and decrees, as recognized by law,
cannot be resorted to by the Court in a contempt proceeding; Bonbehari Roy Vs. Kolkata
Metropolitan Development Authority, AIR 2004 Cal. 254B.
(iv) The common English phrase “he who asserts must prove” has its due application in the
matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the
standard of proof, be it noted that a proceeding under the Courts Act is quasi judicial, and as
such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to
be established beyond reasonable doubt; Mrityujoy Das Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, AIR 2001
SC 1293.
(v) The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court, though quite wide, is
yet limited and cannot be expanded to include the power to determine whether an advocate is
also guilty of “Professional misconduct” in a summary manner; Supreme Court Bar Association
Vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 1895.
(vi) Committing the contemer to prison is always discretionary with the court; Shakuntala
Sahadevram Tiwari Vs. Hemchand M. Singhania, (1990) 3 Bom CR 82 (Bom).
N. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (13) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with contempts not punishable in certain cases.
O. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (14) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme
Court or the High Court.’ and this section 14 reads as under :-
P. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (15) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases’ and this
section provides the procedure to follow in the High Court and this section 15 reads as
under :-
Q. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (16) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Contempt by Judge, Magistrate or other person acting
judicially.’
R. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (17) of
CCA
S. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (18) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches.’
T. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (19) of
CCA
“19. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in
the exercise of its Jurisdiction to punish for contempt.-
(a) Where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two
Judges of the Court;
(b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court :
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that –
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended ;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and
(c ) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt.
(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed
satisfied the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal the High Court may also exercise all
or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).
(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed –
(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days ;
(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of
the order appealed against.
Note : This section deals with ‘Limitation for actions for contempt.’ (Most Important)
This section, as framed, is not happily worded. The heading of the section, however,
indicates that it was to provide for “Limitation for actions for contempt.” and thus, this section
provides that action for contempt can be taken within a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt was committed. In order to enable the High Court to take action for
contempt within a period of one year, it must legally follow that proceedings for contempt are
initiated when the applications are made and as such an application for contempt of court
should be moved within a period of one year from the date when contempt was committed.
(Paras 34 & 39 of the judgment reported as Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, AIR 2001 SC
2763: 2001 Cri LJ 4175)
U-1. Detail of judgments and propositions of law pertaining to section (20) of CCA as
given in the court of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Note No. 1: This section deals with ‘Limitation for actions for contempt’ and as such, this
section does not directly deal with limitation for filing of contempt application within a
period of one years because as per the said section, the period of one year is for actions for
contempt and not for filing contempt application :-
Note No. 2 : In order to understand and appreciate the point of limitation mentioned in the
above referred section, it is essential to understand the meaning of the phrases ; “terminus
a- quo” and “terminus ad quem”
The above mentioned two phrases are used respectively to designate the starting point and
terminating point of a private way. In the case of a street, road or railway, either end may
be, and commonly is referred to as the ‘”terminus” (As per Black’s Law Dictionary)
2. “Firm Ganpat Ram Raj Kumar Vs. Kalu Ram, AIR 1989 SC 2285 : 1989 Supp. (1)
SCR 223”
Note: As per the above referred judgment, in a case of continuing wrong, S. 20 of CCA is
not applicable.
(iii) Para 19 of the judgment reported as “Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, AIR 2001
SC 2763 (A three Judge Bench Decision ) pertaining to the above referred judgment :-
:-
“In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram, 1989 Supp (1) SCR 223 : (AIR 1989 SC 2285)
where an order of this Court ordering delivering of premises had not been complied with, an
application was filed for initiation of contempt proceedings, “A contempt was raised on behalf
of the alleged Contemner based on Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Dealing with
this contention, this Court observed as follows (Para 7 of AIR ) :
“Another point was taken about limitation of this application under section 20 of the Act,
Section 20 stats that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own
motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt
is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on/or about 3 rd
Nov., 1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt considered,
inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Sr. Sub
Judge, Narnaul dated 12th Feb., 1988. therefore, the application was well within the period of
one year. Failure to give possession if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a
continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of S. 20 of the Act.”
(iv) Para 20 of the above referred judgment reported as “Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and
others, AIR 2001 SC 2763 (A three Judge Bench Decision ) pertaining to the above referred
judgment :-
“The abovementioned observations indicate that the contention based o Section 20 was not
accepted for two reasons firstly that application for initiating action for contempt was filed
within one year of the date when the contempt was alleged to have been committed and secondly
failure to give possession amounted to continuing wrong and, therefore, there was no scope for
application of Section 20 of the Act. This case is important for the reason that the Court
regarded the filing of the application for initiating contempt proceedings as the relevant date
from the point of view of limitation.”
3 “Engg. Projects (I) Ltd Vs. I.D. Ganeriwala, 1990 RLR 180” (Delhi) (22.2.1990)
(Available)
4. “Yogesh P. Sukhanandi Vs. State of Gujrat and Others, 1997 Cri L.J. 497”
(21.11.1995)(Gujrat High Court) (Available)
5. “Sandeep Chandra Vs. Vice-Admiral Subhash C. Chopra (RTD) & Ors., 76 (1998)
DLT 776” (DB) (28.8.1998) (available)
6. “Pathan Nawabkhan Vs. Dr. Liyakatalikhan and others, 2000 Cri L.J.
1237”(23.9.1999) (available)
Note : The above referred judgment is not relevant.
7. “Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal and another, AIR 2000 SC 1136” (22.2.2000)
(Available)
(i) Para 9 of the above referred judgment :-
“Section 20 of the Act reads as under :-
“20. Limitation for actions for contempt- No Court shall INITIATE any
proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, AFTER
THE EXPIRY OF A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON
WHICH THE CONTEMPT IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED.”
(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20 – Limitation for action for Contempt –
Expression ‘initiate any proceedings for Contempt’-Connotation –Proceedings can be said
to be initiated –NOT ON RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR TAKING ACTION- NOT ON
ISSUE OF NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN –
BUT WHEN NOTICE IS ISSUED TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CONTEMNOR SHOULD
NOT BE PUNISHED.--------.”
8. “Devi Kishan Vs. Madan Lal Verma, 2000 Cri. L.J. 3619” (29.5.2000) (available)
Note : This judgment has been overruled.
9 “T. Sudhakar Prasad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) 1 SCC 516 : 2000
AIR SCW 4611” 13.12.2000 ( available) (Three Judge Bench Decision)
(i) Head Note (C ) of the above referred judgment reported in the above referred SCC :-
“Constitution of India- Arts. 129 and 215- Jurisdiction and power of Supreme Court and High
Court under – Nature of –Restated – Power to punish for contempt of themselves, held, is an
inherent and inalienable one and has not been originally conferred by Arts. 129 & 215 but has
been recognized therein –This power cannot be curtailed by law and is governed only by
principles of natural justice –further held, provisions of contempt of courts Act, 1971 are in
addition to, and not in derogation of articles 129 & 215-Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 S. 22.”
(ii) Para 9 of the above referred judgment as reported in the above referred SCC :-
“Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India declare the Supreme Court and every High
Court to be a court of record having all the powers of such a court including the power to punish
for contempt of itself. These articles do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme
Court and the High Court. They merely recognize a preexisting situation that the Supreme Court
and the High Courts are courts of record and by virtue of being courts of record have inherent
jurisdiction to punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power to punish for contempt is
summary. It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles
of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It
cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the
constitution. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and
not in derogation of Articles 129 & 215 of the Constitution. The provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of
jurisdiction contemplated by the said two articles.”
Note : The above quoted observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have been re-iterated by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs.
Sukumar Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60” as is evident from the relevant extract of the following
paras of the said judgment :-
(i) Relevant extract of para 59 of the said judgment reported as Shyamal Krishana
Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60 :-
“Recently in another case the Supreme Court again considered the width of contempt jurisdiction
of the High Court in the context of Art. 215 of the Constitution in the case of T. Sudhakar
Prasad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2001) 1 SCC 516 : (2000) AIR SCW
4611. In this decision, the supreme court considered the constitution bench judgment in
Supreme Court Bar Association (AIR 1998 SC 1895) (Supra). After considering the said
judgment, the Supreme Court has held in para 9 that under article 215 of the Constitution no new
jurisdiction or states is conferred in the High Court. It merely recognized the pre-existing
situation. It also held that such inherent power of punishment for contempt is summary and
further went on to held as follows :-
“ It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles of natural
justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be
taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the constitution.
The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or
regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two articles.”
(ii) Para 83 of the said judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar
Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60”
:-
“It may be noted that subsequently a Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in T. Sudhakar
Prasad (2000 AIR SCW 4611) (Supra) accepted the consistent view of the Supreme Court as
noted above and the Court has take note of its judgment in the case of Supreme Court Bar
Association (AIR 1998 SC 1895) (Supra). But in the previous Two Judge Bench judgment in
Om Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1700) (SC) (Supra) this aspect of the matter was unfortunately not
brought to the notice of the Apex Court, Therefore, the subsequent judgment of the larger
Bench, in T. Sudhakar Prasad (Supra) which is in accord with the consistent views of Supreme
Court right from 1954 may be taken to the binding precedent on this aspect.
(iii) Para 84 of the said judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar
Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60”
:-
“In Om Prakash (supra) the observations to the effect that “Section 20 strikes at the root of the
Court to initiate any proceeding of the contempt” and the further interpretation that where
proceeding has not been initiated within one year the “jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding for
contempt is lost” have been made without consideration of the previous judgments of the
Supreme Court in the context of High Court’s contempt jurisdiction under Article 215 of the
Constitution. Therefore, those observations in Om Prasad (supra) on interpretation of section 20
of CCA 71, with great respect, do not have the binding nature of precedent, especially in view of
its subsequent larger Bench Judgment in the case. T. Sudhakar Prasad (supra). The observations
in Om Prasad (Supra) may be confined to the facts of that case since interpretation on High
Court’s jurisdiction in contempt was made without reference to Article 215 of Constitution or te
law laid down by the Supreme Court on this point.
(iv) Para 88 of the said judgment reported as “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar
Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60”
:-
“It is clear in this case that the decision of Supreme Court in Om Prakash on the jurisdiction of
High Court vis-à-vis section 20 of the CCA was not rendered after considering the effect of
Article 215 on the power of a high Court as a Court of Record in matters of contempt
jurisdiction. In the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court of a larger Bench it has held that the
provisions of CCA cannot limit or regulate the exercise of contempt jurisdiction of a High Court
under Article 215. Therefore, the decision in Om Prakash (2000 Cri LJ 1700) (SC) (Supra)
must yield to the subsequent well considered and larger Bench decision in T. Sudhakar Prasad
(2000 AIR SCW 4611) (Supra).”
10 “Shyamal Krishana Chakraborty Vs. Sukumar Das & Others, 2002 CRI. LJ 60”
(27.7.2001)(Available)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri L.J. :-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 20, 23 – Constitution of India, Art. 215 – Contempt
jurisdiction- Is inherent in High Court and recognized as such under Art. 215 of Constitution-
Not to be truncated and circumscribed by narrow interpretation of S. 20 – S. 20 operates as guide
in exercise of discretion of High Court contempt jurisdiction- It cannot inhibit or prohibit
exercise of jurisdiction of High Court.”
Note : In the case of civil contempt, proceedings normally commence with a person aggrieved
bringing to the notice of the court the willful disobedience of any judgment, decree etc which
could amount to the commission of offence by filing application in this regard within a period of
one year from the date of commission of alleged contempt. But in the case of criminal contempt
of subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the
Subordinate Court or on a motion made by the advocate general or the Law Officer of the
Central Govt. in the case of Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably
commence on an application being filed by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the
advocate-general if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. When the judicial
procedure requires an application being filed either before the Court or consent being sought by a
person from the advocate-general or a Law Officer, it must logically follow that proceedings for
contempt are initiated when the applications are made thus, in the case of civil contempt or
criminal contempt, application must be moved within a period of one year from the date of
commission of alleged contempt as per paras 38 & 39 of the above referred judgment.
Besides that, as per the above referred judgment, OBITER DICTA IS NOT
BINDING UPON A COURT .
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR :-
“Constitution of India, Arts. 215 – 129- Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 20-Supreme
Court and High Court –Constitutional power to punish for contempt- Law prescribing period for
initiation of contempt proceeding- cannot be taken to abrogate constitutional powers-------
Om Prakash Vs. D.K. Mittal, 2000 AIR SCW 722, Overruled.
Observation in AIR 1974 SC 2255, Held obiter. (Para 18)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.
Section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It
applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme
Court but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the Subordinate Court. The
procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different. Section 20 as framed is
not happily worded. The heading of the section, however, indicates what it was to provide for
“Limitation for actions for contempt.” The wording of the sections are negative but it is clear
that terminus ad quem is the initiation of proceedings for contempt. The crucial question that
arises is as to how or when are the proceedings for contempt initiated.
In the case of criminal contempt of subordinate Court, the High Court may take
action on a reference made to it by the subordinate Court or on a motion made by the
Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of Union
Territory. THIS REFERENCE OR MOTION CAN CONCEIVABLY COMMENCE ON
AN APPLICATION BEING FILED BY A PERSON whereupon the subordinate court or
the advocate-general if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the high court. Proceedings
for civil contempt normally commence wit a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court
the willful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount to the
commission of the offence. The attention of the Court is drawn to such a contempt being
committed ONLY BY A PERSON FILING AN APPLICATION IN THAT BEHALF. In
other words, unless a Court was to take a suo motu action, the proceeding under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the
attention of the Court to the contempt having been committed. When the judicial procedure
requires an application being filed either before the Court or consent being sought by a person
from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer it must logically follow that PROCEEDING FOR
CONTEMPT ARE INITIATED WHEN THE APPLICATION ARE MADE.(Paras 33, 34 &
39)
One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act
diligently and not sleep over its rights. -------The proper construction therefore to be placed o
section 20 must be that ACTION MUST BE INITIATED, EITHER BY FILING OF AN
APPLICATION OR BY THE COURT ISSUING NOTICE SUO MOTU, WITHIN A
PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE CONTEMPT IS
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.” (Paras 41, 42 & 44)
“13. Once that is so, one must now proceed to analyse and construe S. 20
independently. A plain reading thereof would indicate that the legislature drew a clear line of
distinction betwixt proceedings for contempt initiated by the Court on its own motion and those
not so done. Suo motu action by the High Court is thus clearly a class by itself. Consequently
the statute in express terms refers to these two classes separately namely, any proceedings
for contempt on COURT’S OWN MOTION, and proceedings for contempt initiated
“OTHERWISE”. The use of the word ‘otherwise’ is significant and indeed provides the
clue to be the true interpretation of Section 20. Therefore, initiation of contempt
proceedings otherwise than on Court’s own motion would include within its sweep
a reference by a subordinate Court to the High Court to take action for contempt
and an application before the Advocate General seeking his consent by any other person
under S. 15
and lastly in cases of civil contempt the motion by a private litigant directly in the Court.
“19. To finally conclude it must be held that the terminus a quo for limitation begins
under Section 20 of the Act on the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed. The terminus ad quem in case of criminal contempt would necessarily vary
and be related to the modes of taking cognizance thereof provided for in S. 15.
In cases where it is initiated on the Court’s own motion, it would necessarily be
from the issuance of the notice for contempt by the Court.
In case of a motion by the Advocate General under Section 15(1)(a), the
proceedings would initiate from the date of the filing of such a motion in the High Court.
Where any other person moves the Advocate General for his consent in writing as
prescribed in S. 15(1)(b), the initiation of proceedings would be with effect from the date of
such application.
Lastly, in cases of criminal contempt of a subordinate Court on a reference made
by it the proceedings must be deemed to be initiated from the date when such reference is
made.”
12. “Ratan Chandra Sharma and Another Vs. Kumari Sheetal Sharma and others,
2003 CRI. L.J. 740” (21.8.2002) (Karnataka High Court) (Available)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri LJ :-
“Constitution of India, Art. 215- Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), Ss. 10, 15- Motion of
criminal contempt of subordinate court- By private party-Consent of Advocate General is
necessary-Consent has to accompany motion-Subsequently obtained consent- Is of no
significance.
The contempt of court alleged in the instant case is that the contemners are in the habit of
filing suit after suit just to frustrate the decrees obtained by the complainant from the Apex Court
and High Court ----. It is undisputed that the party who moved the motion in this contempt
petition is a private party falling under clause (b) of section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act.
It was a motion made by the complainants without obtaining the consent of the advocate
general in writing for contempt of court.---The complainant has prayed High Court to punish
the accused by invoking the powers of the High Court U/S 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act for
committing Contempts of Subordinate Courts. SECTION 10 OF THE ACT PROVIDES FOR
PUNISHING THE ACCUSED FOR COMMITTING CONTEMPT ON SUBORDINATE
COURT. The procedure to initiate contempt action is provided U/S 15 of the Act. For a valid
motion, compliance of the requirement of section 15 of the Contempt Court Act is
mandatory ---. The plea that complainant have obtained the consent of the advocate general as
directed by the Court and hence, complied with the office objections and, therefore, compliance
of section 15 (1)(b) is made by the complainant and the petition is perfectly maintainable is not
tenable. Subsequent obtaining of the consent does not cure the initial defect so as to convert
the incompetent motion into maintainable petition. The contempt petition fails for want of
consent of Advocate General in writing as contemplated U/S 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act.”
13 “Court on its own motion Vs. Kuldip Singh, 2003 Cri L.J. 4483” (D.B.) (Punjab &
Haryana High Court) (30.5.2003) (Available)
15 “P. Damodaran Vs. Cherkalam Abdulla and Ors., AIR 2007 Kerala 153”(7.3.2007)
(F.B.) (Kerala) (Available)
1. Scope – Article 215 no doubt empowers every High Court to punish contempt of Court
subordinate to it, but the Contempt of Courts Act lays down how that power has to be exercised.
Article 215 of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act have to be
read together. The High Court cannot take cognizance even of contempt of itself if the period of
one year has already elapsed. (Harphool Singh Vs. Ranbir Singh, 1980 A. Cr.R. 339 at pp. 339,
340; see also, High Court of Karnataka Vs. Y.K. Subbanna, 1990 (1) Cr.L.C. 281 at pp. 297,
298, 299, 300, 301 ; Ram Dhyan Ram Yadav Vs. State of U.P., 1990 U.P.L.B.E.C. 94 at p. 99;
V.M. Kanade Vs. Madhav Gadkari, 1990 Cr.L.J. 190 at pp. 193, 194 (Bom.) ; Om Prakash
Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal, 1990 All. L.J. 116 at p. 120.)
2. Contempt committed during earlier law, if can be initiated with the force of new law –
3. Recurring cause of action – It is true that action for contempt of Court must be taken
within one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The
payment of maintenance during the pendency of appeal has to be made every month and non-
payment thereof by respondent No. 1 is the recurring cause for the contempt and the appeal is
still pending and Respondent No. 1 is refusing to pay any amount towards the maintenance
though specifically ordered by this Court. Therefore, the present proceedings for contempt, are
not barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. (Sarladevi
Bharatkumar Rungta Vs. Bharathhkumar Shivprasad Rungta, 1988 Cr. L.J. 558 at p. 564 (Bom.).
It is an obligation on the part of the respondent-husband to pay the amounts, one for the
petitioner-wife and the other for the minor daughter, on the stipulated time-frame of every month
till the date of disposal of the petition. This would definitely go to show that the orders are in the
nature of imposing recurring obligation on the part of the respondent-husband till the
proceedings are decided by the trial Court. Any default to make the payment, in terms of the
above said order, can definitely be said to be a continuing wrong. It cannot, therefore, be urged
that the contempt proceedings would be barred under Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. (Lopaben Patel Vs. Hitendra R. Patel, 1999 (2) Guj, L.R. 1616 : at P. 1626 : 2000 Cr. L.J.
2709 at p. 2716 (Guj.).
Starting point of limitation is the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed and not date of knowledge of complaint. As was held in . Venkataramanppa Vs. D.K.
Nikar (AIR 1978 Karnataka 57) and Romesh Kumar Vs. Bhagwan Das Ahuja { (1986) 89 P.L.R.
493 at p. 494 (Petitioner & H) }.
No contempt proceedings ca be initiated by the Court after expiry of the period of one
year from the date of alleged commission of contempt. If an application for taking action under
the Contempt of Courts Act is filed within the period of one year from the date of alleged
commission of the contempt but the Court has not initiated proceeding before the expiry of one
year from such date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the Court is
barred. In the instant case, the application for initiating proceedings for civil contempt has been
filed well within time yet as proceedings for civil contempt have not been initiated within a
period of one year from the date of the commission of the contempt, it is not possible to initiate
proceedings, thereafter. (Kishan Lal Vs. Chhotey Lal, 1987 (13) All. L.R. 44 at p. 46.) Section
20 applies not only to those cases, where the Court takes action suo motu, but also where
contempt application is made after obtaining the permission of the Advocate-General. (Hari
Nandan Agrawal Vs. S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All. 48 at p. 52.)
The date on which the contempt can be alleged to be committed within the contemplation
of Sec. 20 of the Act that has to be reckoned from the time when the Court becomes aware of the
commission of its contempt and not from the date on which the act comprehended to be
contemptuous of the Court was committed by the contemner. (Sudesh Kumar Vs. Jai Narain,
1974 P.L.R. 23 at p. 126).
It is the duty of the person who institutes an action to satisfy the Court that it is within
time. (Dineshbhai A. Parikh Vs. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad,
A.I.R. 1980 Guj. 194 at p. 197.)
It appears that on the unequivocal language of Sec. 20 itself as also on principle, the date
when time begins to run or the terminus a quo here is inflexibly fixed from the point on which
the criminal contempt is alleged to have been committed. This follows from the clear cut ad
plain grammatical construction of Sec. 20 itself. This apart, on principle also the terminus of
limitation has to be a fixed and precisely determinable one. Therefore, the actual awareness of
the Court of an act of criminal contempt would inevitably remain a fortuitous circumstance. For
limitation to run from a point of time so uncertain as the knowledge of the Court itself or when it
is brought to its notice, would introduce a double element of uncertainly for the start of the point
of limitation which would be contrary to sound principles of construction. On such a view, an
action for criminal contempt can be visualized many years after its actual commission because
factually it may be brought to the notice of the Court even after a decade. This, in essence,
would frustrate the very purpose of the Legislature in introducing a period of limitation. (Manjit
Singh Vs. Darshan Singh, 1984 Cr. L.J. 301 at p. 303, 304 (Petitioner & H). It was held in N.
Venkataramanappa Vs. D.K. Naikar. (AIR 1978 Kant. 57 at p. 60), it is not possible to accede to
the by Secalle of Sri Seshagiri Rao, Learned counsel appearing for the complainant, that it is the
date of knowledge of the contempt that is the starting point for the limitation prescribed by Sec.
20, and not the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Having regard to
the clear language employed in Sec. 20 of the Act, namely, “From the date on which the
contempt is alleged to have been committed” it is impossible to take the view that the date of
knowledge of the complaint has any relevance for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation.
4. Date of initiation of proceedings – The proceedings for civil contempt cannot be initiated
after the expiry of the period of one year from that date. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act does not prescribe any limitation. It prohibits initiation of proceedings by High Court.
(Balbhadra Singh Vs. S.K. Viswad, 1987 A.L.J. 326 at p. 327 ; see also High Court of Karnataka
Vs. Y.K. Subbana, 1990 Cr.L.J. 1159 at pp. 1173, 1174 (Kant.) ; Golchha Advertising Agency
Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1990 (2) Bom. C.R. 262 at p. 265. T. Deen Dayal Vs. High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3451 at p. 3455 : (1997) 3 S.C.J. 139 : 1997 Cr. L.J. 4080.)
The Apex Court held that action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely,
that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court’s motion.
The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo
motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases,
initiation can only be by a party fling an application. In their lordships, opinion, therefore, the
proper construction to be placed o Sec. 20 must be that action must be initiated either by filing of
an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date
on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. (Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian, AIR
2001 SC 2763 at p. 2777 : 2001 (4) Mh. L.J. 1 at p. 19 (S.C.) 2001 Cr. L.J. 4175 at 4189 (S.C.)
2001 (7) S.C.C. 549 at p. 572; see also Sabirabai Vs. Brobula Reddy, 2001 Cr. L.J. at p. 1288
(A.P.)
It would be the bounden duty of the Court to examine the question of limitation before
proceeding to take cognizance, much less initiate any action. That obligation clearly flows from
the mandate of Sec. 20 of the Act. moreover, even if the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963
were inapplicable to the contempt proceeding, but the principle underlying Sec. 3 of the
Limitation Act can be telescoped in the provisions of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act so
as to obligate the Court to decide the issue of limitation even if the same has not been
specifically set up by the respondent, having regard to the settled position that fundamentally
contempt is a matter between the Court and the Contemnor. (Earth Designers and Developers
Pvt. Ltd Vs. M.K. Patil, 2003 Cr. L.J. 3785 at p. 3790 (Bom.).
Section 20 of the Act does not intend to “abrogate” the powers under Art. 215, either
wholly or partially. The powers can be exercised in all their amplitude within the period of one
year prescribed in Sec. 20 of the Act. (Advocate General, A.P. Vs. A.V. Koteswara Rao, (1984)
2 Cr. L.J. 1171 at p. 1176 : 1984 (1) A.L.J. 69).
Initiation of the contempt proceedings is the time when the Court applies its mind to the
allegation in the petition and decides to direct, under Sec. 17 the alleged contemner to show
cause why he should not be punished. If the Court had not, within one year of the period limited
by Sec. 20, applied its mind nor decided to issue show cause notice to respondents, the petition
would be barred by time. (Kishan Singh Vs. H’onable Mr. Justice T. Anjaih, Chief Minister,
1985 Cr. L.J. 1428 at p. 1430 (A.P.)
The jurisdiction of the Court is that the court shall not initiate any proceedings for
contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiration of a period of one year from
the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. (Dineshbhai a. Parikh Vs.
Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad, AIR 1980 Guj. 194 at p. 199.)
There is no matter of doubt that the Court did not initiate proceeding for civil contempt
and did not call upon the respondents to show cause why they not be punished for having
committed civil Contempt of Court. It is very clear that the proceeding for contempt have not
been initiated has admittedly expired. (Ratan Singh Vs. Pheree, 1986 (2) Civil L.J. 560 at p. 562
(All.) : 1986 All. C.J. 471 at p. 472.)
The Court wanted respondents Nos. 1 to 5, to make their submissions and for that
purpose, in clearest possible words notices have been directed to be issued why the petition not
be admitted and why action for Contempt of Court be not taken against them. There is no
manner of doubt that on 3rd December, 1985, the Court did not initiate proceeding for civil
contempt and did not call upon the respondents to show cause why they not be punished for
having committed civil contempt of Court. It is very clear that the proceedings for contempt
have not been initiated so far and the period during which the proceedings could be initiated has
admittedly expired on 5th December, 1985. It is not possible to initiate proceedings after the
expiry of such period. (Ratan Singh Vs. Pheree, 1986 (2) Civil L.J. 560 at p. 562 (All.) : 1986
All. C.J. 471 at p. 472).
The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a
proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the
terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Sec. 20 is the date when a proceeding for
contempt is initiated by the Court. In the instant case, the Court has not yet decided to take
action for contempt against the Contemner and the proceedings have not yet been initiated and
the period during which such proceedings could be initiated has expired. It is not possible to
initiate proceedings thereafter. ( Smt Bano Vs. Ram Autar Gautam, 1987 Cr. L,J,. 647 at p. 649
(All.)
It is the Court which initiates the proceedings and the period of limitation under Sec. 20
of the Act is to be reckoned up to the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt by the Court
for the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Even if the applications
are considered to be under Art. 215 of the Constitution, still, for the purpose of limitation, they
will be governed by Sec. 20 of the Act and in this view of the matter also, the application for
taking action of the contempt were barred by limitation. (Manjit Singh Vs. Darshan Singh, 1984
Cr. L.J. 301 at p. 304 (F.B.).
The petitioners filed the present application within five months getting knowledge of the
undertaking given by the respondents in the said case. in such a situation, the proceedings
initiated against the respondents cannot be held to be barred by limitation in view of the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian, ((2001) 7 SCC 549), wherein it has
been held that the period of limitation in a case like the present one has to be counted from the
date of knowledge. (Bank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC 360 at pp. 369-
70.
5. Whether initiation of proceeding start when court gives show cause notice to contemner –
6. Application of the Limitation Act –
7. Limitation – Contemner was asked to produce buses when called to do so –Time taken on
several occasion for the purpose –Limitation starts when for the last time the contemner fails to
produce the buses.
8. Limitation – Plea urging bar of limitation created by Sec. 20 of the Act, is also not
sustainable in the present case, because the obligation to keep the bank guarantees alive was
operative till the Court passed ay further order or the application was disposed of. It is not a case
where there was ay definite terminus for some act to be done by the respondent. (Engineering
Projects (Petitioner) Ltd Vs. Ishwari Prashad Ganeriwala (1990) 40 DLT 567 at p. 573).
12. Enhancement of period of limitation – The mere fact that the petitioner had been filing
representation one after the other will not, in any manner enhanced the period of limitation.
13. Saving of limitation – It is apparent that the show cause notice issued by the Civil Judge
to Sri Chaturvedi will not amount to initiation of contempt proceedings, so as to arrest the
running of limitation. Even if the Court has issued a notice to Sri Chaturvedi to show cause as to
why the petition be not admitted would not have amounted to initiation of proceeding to save
limitation. It follows, limitation could be saved only if Allahabad High Court had, after the
receipt of the reference from the Civil Judge under Sec. 15 (2), considered the matter and issued
notice to Sri Chaturvedi of show cause as to why he should not be punished for having
committed the contempt of the Court of the Civil Judge. (State of U.P. Vs. Civil Judge, Agra,
1991 All. C.J. 1105 at pp. 1106, 1107; see also Advocate General of A.P. Vs. C. Chekrapani,
1997 (3) A.L.D. 588 (D.B.)
14. Date of commencement of the period of limitation for contempt where no time limit was
fixed by the court for compliance of its order-
15. Limitation for initiation of Contempt proceedings is one year from the date of violation
-Violation is the date when court issues show cause notice-
17. Contempt, it will be deemed to have initiated on the day when a court has passed an order
was issuing notice against contemner and thereby applying its mind
18. Barred by time- Admittedly, the period of one year from the date on which the contempt
is alleged has expired and the contempt application has not yet been admitted by the High Court.
Thus, even otherwise the court cannot proceed in the matter to punish the contempt vide (Gopal
Krishna Mishra Vs. Nagar Palika, 1994 JIC 400 (All.)
Period of limitation for initiation of contempt proceedings as provided U/S 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is within one year from the date on which contempt is committed.
Keeping in view of the provisions of section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
there is no occasion to direct for issuance of notices to the opposite parties after a lapse of about
10 years, since the alleged commission of contempt by the opposite parties in January 1994. No
peculiar circumstances have been brought to the notice of the High Court persuading it to direct
for issuance of notices on the contempt petition to the opposite parties as such a late stage.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the contempt petition is liable to be dismissed as
having become infructuous vide (2005 Cri. L.J. 2012 (All.)
19. Contempt proceedings should be initiated within a period of one year from the date of
taking cognizance -
20. Continuing wrong –If under the given circumstances, failure to give possession amounts
to a contempt is no scope for the application of section 20 – Failure to give possession, if it
amounts to a contempt in a given situation is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for
application of section 20 of the Act vide (Firm Ganpat Ram Raj Kumar Vs. Kalu Ram, 1990 SC
F.B.F. B.R. cases 79 at p. 83.
22. There is nothing in the Act that an Act amounting to Contempt of Court should not be
taken cognizance at all merely because sometime has passed after the commission of the said
Act.- The spirit of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, suggests that after the expiry of
considerable period of time, no notice should be taken of the action which are alleged to amount
to Contempt of Court. It is not possible to accept this argument because there is nothing in the
Contempt of Courts Act, either in its letter or in its spirit, which could suggest that a act
mounting to Contempt of Court should not be taken cognizance of, at all merely because
sometime has passed after the commission of the said Act. What is provided in Sec. 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, is that no Court shall initiate ay proceedings for contempt after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed. Vide (V.M. Kanade Vs. Madhao Gadka, (1990) 1 Cr. L.C. 712 at p. 717 (Bom) :
1990 Cr. L.R. 425 at p. 417 (Mah.) : 1990 (1) (Mah.) L.R. 511).
24. No court to initiate proceedings of contempt after expiry of period of one year,
25. The court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance beyond one year of the act or omission
committing or constituting contempt of the court.- In view of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, the Court has no jurisdiction to take a cognizance beyond one year of the act of
omission, committing or constituting contempt of the court, in view of these facts, both these
applications are filed beyond the stipulated time. Hence, the Gujarat High Court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same. Vide (Yogesh P. Sukhanandi Vs. State of Gujarat,
1997 Cr. L.J. 497 at p. 499 (Guj.).
26. Section 5 of the limitation act dos not deal with condonation of the period of limitation
for cognizance by a court vide
(i) “Harphool Singh Vs. Ranvir Singh, 1980 ALJ 1028
(ii). “T.M.A. Abdul Hameed Vs. Radha Krishan 1989 LW (Cr) 257)
27. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply if the wrong done is not of a continuous
nature vide
(i) “Devi Kishan Vs. Madan Lal Verma 2000 Cri LJ 3619at p. 3622”
28. If there is no definite terminus for some act to be done, Bar of limitation created by S. 20
of CCA is not sustainable vide
(i) “Engineering projects--- Vs. Ishwari Prasad, (1990) 40 DLT 567”
29. There are only two points of time that are material. One is the date of commission of
alleged contempt and the other of actual initiation of proceedings of contempt. No intervening
event or order stops the running of time of one year. Vide
(i) “Golcha Advertising Agency Vs. State of Maharashtra 1990 (2) Bom. CR 262”
U-4. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts which contain the proposition of
law that Limitation as provided S. 20 of the Courts of Contempt Act, 1971 does not apply in a
case of continuing wrong.
V. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (21) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Act not to apply to Nyay Panchayats or other Village
Courts’ as is evident from section 21 of CCA which reads as under :-(Not relevant)
“21. Act not to apply to Nyay Panchayats or other Village Courts-Nothing contained in this act
shall apply in relation to Contempt of Nyay Pancayats or other Village Courts, by whatever
name known, for the administration of justice, established under any law.”
W. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (22) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of other laws
relating to contempt’ as becomes evident from section 22 of CCA which reads as under :-
“22. Act to be I addition to, and not in derogation of, other laws relating to contempt- The
provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other
law relating to contempt of courts.
COMMENTS
The provisions incorporated in the Act are supplemental to already existing law of contempt,
Harish Chandra Misra Vs. S. Ali Ahmed, AIR 1986 Pat. 65.”
1. S. 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act postulates that the provisions contained in the act are
supplementary to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of
courts. This is a reiteration of inherent power to punish for contempt of its by court of record
vide (i) 1987 Cri L.J. 2018 (2020) (ii) (1999) 1 Jab. L.J. 217 (220)(MP) (iii) 1993 (1) BLJR 690
(701) (iv) 1990 U.P. Cri. R. 158 (160) (DB) (All.)
2. The court cannot be a mere spectator of its process being abused only to punish the
person so abusing after the abuse but in incompetent to prevent its re-petition. The right to
prevent such acts is inherent in court vide (i) 1978 Cri L.J. 560 (DB) (Cal.)
3. Section 22 does not control S. 20 vide (i) 1981 Cri L.J. (NOC) 141 (1981) 1 Rent L.R.
715 (Delhi) .
4. Contents proceedings for breach of injunction order under the Contempt of Courts Act
cannot be disallowed merely because Order 39, Rule 2 (a) of the Civil Code provides a remedy
for breach of injunction order because S. 22 of the contempt of Court Act provides that the right
to proceed under the Act is an additional right. Vide 2006 (32) PTC 190 (191, 192) (SC)
5. The law of contempt is conceived in the public interest. Where I a case the corporate veil
is being blatantly used as a cloak to willfully disobey the orders of the Court, Public interest
requires that the corporate veil must be lifted to find out the person who disobeyed the order of
the Court. Where A and B willfully disobeyed the order of the Court by which they were
restrained for transferring the property, they are guilty of flagrant disobedience of the order of
the Court. Vide 1987 Cri. LJ 1281 (1286, 1287) : (1987) 32 Delhi LT 198.”
B. Detail of judgments alongwith their relevant extracts as per the book titled Iyer’s Law of
Contempt of Courts, 4th Edition published by Delhi Law House :-
(i) Scope –An act or action which was not contempt of Court before the Act came in force shall
not be punishable as contempt of Court under the Act. The provisions incorporated in the Act
are supplemental to already existing law of contempt as interpreted by the Supreme Court and
different High Courts. (Shri Harish Chandra Mishra Vs. Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ali Ahmed,
A.I.R. 1986 Pat. 65).
(ii) Prevention of Contempt of Court. – The Court cannot be a mere spectator of its process
being abused only to punish the person so abusing after the abuse but incompetent to prevent its
repetition. The right to prevent such acts is inherent in Court. (Hastings Mill Limited Vs. Hira
Singh, 1978 Cr. L.J. 560 at p. 569 (Cal.).
(iii) Principles of order XXI, Rule 32 (5) can be extended to Contempt proceedings –N.C.
Mazdoor Union Vs. Union of India, 1994 (98) C.W.N 474 Cal.
(iv) In case of violation of the order passed by the Court, the court has inherent powers to put
back the aggrieved person in the same position as before.-- It is well settled that the inherent
powers of the High Court under Sec. 151, C.P.C. are wide and are not subject to any limitation.
Where, in violation of any order passed by the High Court something has bee done in
disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the
perpetuation of the wrong doing. The inherent power will not only be available inn such cases
but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interest of justice. Since the respondent has,
in utter violation of any order, conducted as secret enquiry behind the back of the applicant and
the applicant has been affected because of that order, the applicant can approach the High Court
and ask for relief on the ground that the order passed by the respondent would be destructive of
her stand-point and the High Court, on a consideration of the entire circumstances and facts, will
have to put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to the passing of the order.
(Prabhavathi Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, 1994 (1) MLJ 14 at p. 16)
Note : This section deals with ‘Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of other laws
relating to contempt.’
X. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (23) of
CCA
Note : This section deals with ‘Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to make rules’ as
is evident from S. 23 which reads as under :-
“Section 23. Power of Supreme Court and High Court to make rules : The Supreme Court or, as
the case may be, any High Court may make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act, providing for any matter relating to its procedure.”
Y. Detail of judgments and propositions of law contained therein pertaining to section (24) of
CCA
1. “Dr. (Mrs.) Roshan Sam Joyee vs. SR Cotton Mills Ltd. And other, AIR 1990 SC
1881”
(MISLEADING A COURT KNOWINGLY AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT)
(Head Note A)
2. “Court of its own motion Vs. B.D. Kaushik & Ors., 46 (1992) DLT 35” (Full Court)
(19.12.1991) (Available)
(i) Relevant extracts of the Head Note of the above referred DLT :-
“Gokal Chand Mital, CJ, (for himself and for 11 other Judges)
S.B. Wad, J. (For himself and on behalf of B.N. Kirpal, P.K. Bahri & Arun Kumar
J.)
D.P. Wadhwa, J :
Sunanda Bhandare, J.
Y.K. Sabharwal, J.
“To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be regarded as an extreme
measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with,
and to keep the streams of justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court,
though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. NO ONE CAN
CLAIM IMMUNITY FROM THE OPERATION OF THE LAW OF CONTEMPT, if his
act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to
obstruct the due course of justice.”
4. “Chandra Shashi Vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 Supreme Court cases 421”: “1995
Rajdhani Law Reporter Page 1” (Vol. 25) (14.11.1994):-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ----- HELD, APOLOGY NOT OUTCOME OF REAL
REMORSE OR CONTRITION BUT TENDERED AS A WEAPON OF DEFENCE AND
THEREFORE, NOT ACCEPTABLE –“TWO WEEKS” IMPRISONMENT AWARDED
TO CONTEMNOR WITH A VIEW THAT IT SHOULD SERVE AS DETERRENT AND
EYE-OPENER, a mere sentence of fine would not meet the ends of justice in the
circumstances--------.
Held from the facts it is clear that the respondent contemnor had filed a forged and
fabricated document in court TO RESIST THE PRAYER OF HIS WIFE to get the
matrimonial proceedings transferred on the ground of her poverty i.e. it was done with an
oblique motive.
------. Contempt jurisdiction has been conferred on superior courts not only to
preserve the majesty of law by taking appropriate action against one however high he may
be, if he violates courts order BUT ALSO TO KEEP THE STREAM OF JUSTICE
CLEAR AND PURE -------.
To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, THOSE
WHO INDULGE IN IMMORAL ACTS LIKE PERJURY, PREVARICATION AND
MOTIVATED FALSEHOODS HAVE TO BE APPROPRIATED DEALT WITH, --------.
Any one who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or if
anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice.
--------. If recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely
hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from
performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do.
--------. In the case and hand the fabricated document was apparently to deceive the
court, the intention to defraud is writ large. Anil Kumar is, therefore, guilty of contempt--.
“--------------. People would have faith in courts when they would find that “lR;eso
t;rs” (Truth alone triumphs) is an achievable aim there or (“Yato Dharamstato Jai”) (It is
virtue which ends in victory) is not only inscribed in emblem but really happens in the portals of
courts.”
5. “Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla (1995) Supp. (2) SCC 130” : 1994 (4) Scale
1088 : 1995 (1) SCJ 310” (23.11.1994)
(ii) “It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties EITHER TO
PRODUCE FABRICATED EVIDENCE AS A PART OF THE PLEADINGS
OR RECORD or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of
justice or judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. THIS
TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE OR TENDENCY TO
UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT NEEDS TO BE SEVERELY DEALT
WITH TO DETER THE PERSONS HAVING SIMILAR PROCLIVITY TO RESORT TO
SUCH ACTS OR CONDUCT.” (para 7)
6. “Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court
1795” (2.5.1995) :-
(i) “ANY CONDUCT WHICH HAS THE TENDENCY TO INTERFERE WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OR THE DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.
--------. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of
the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the FILING OF FALSE EVIDENCE commits
criminal contempt of the court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with
the Act. Filing of false affidavit or making a false statement on oath in courts aims at
striking a blow at the Rule of Law and NO COURT CAN IGNORE SUCH CONDUCT
which has the tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions because the
very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the
fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by any one resorting to filing of false affidavits
or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law.” (Head Note
A)
(ii) “THE STREAM OF JUSTICE HAS TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND PURE AND ANY
ONE SPOILING ITS PURITY MUST BE DEALT WITH STERNLY SO THAT THE
MASSAGE PERCOLATES LOUD AND CLEAR THAT NO ONE CAN BE PERMITTED
TO UNDERMINE THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT AND INTERFERE WITH THE
DUE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.” (Para 40)
7. “Afzal And Another Vs. State of Haryana & Others, AIR 1996 SC 2326” :-
8. “State of Mahrashtra Vs. Mehboob S. Allibhoy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 411”
9. Satish Khosla v. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and another, 71 (1998) DLT 1: “1998 1
AD (Delhi) 927”: “1998 (44) DRJ 109” (DB) (12.12.1997):-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Secs. 2 (c ), 15 & 18 – Criminal Contempt – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 0 Or. XXXIX rule 1 & 2 – Ad-interim injunction – Ex-parte – Non-disclosure
of dismissal of such application in earlier suit – Amounts to fraud upon the Court – Guilty
of Contempt.
Held: In our view, by withholding the plaint of the earlier suit from the Court and by
not disclosing that in the earlier suit, the respondent has not been able to get an injunction,
the respondent is guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party and
such acts had been done only in order to gain advantage on the other side and to get a stay
in the second suit.
We are of the view that an attempt has been made by the respondent to over – reach
the court and the respondents have played fraud upon the court as well as on the opposite
parte and is thus clearly guilty of contempt. RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE HEARD IN
THE CASE UNLESS IT PURGES ITSELF OF THE CONTEMPT SO COMMITTED
AND IN OUR VIEW, IT CAN ONLY BE IF WE NON-SUIT THE RESPONDENTS IN
SUIT NO. 261/97. While, therefore, we do not purpose to take action against the respondent for
contempt for except to issue a warning to respondent no. 2 to be more careful in future WE
DIRECT THE DISMISSAL OF THE SUIT (BEING SUIT NO. 261/97) ITSELF. ---------.”
“In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath and Others, AIR 1994 SC 853 was held that
the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the
Court, must come with clean hands. “It can be said without hesitation that a person whose
case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court. HE CAN BE SUMMARILY
THROWN OUT AT ANY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION. A litigant who approaches the
Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by which are relevant to the litigation. If
he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be
guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.”
“We are informed that in Suit No. 261/97, the plaintiff had not even filed the plaint of the earlier
suit being Suit No. 3604/96 nor the court had an opportunity to go through the allegations made
in the said plaint. We are, therefore, of the opinion that by withholding the plaint and the
application in the earlier suit from the Court and by not disclosing to the Court about the
proceedings in the earlier suit and the stay having not been granted to it, the
plaintiff/respondent had tried to get an advantage from the Court and was, therefore,
guilty of playing fraud of the court as well as on the respondent. The following observations
of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are relevant for purposes of present case:-
“The High Court in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the
High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath
obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court-----. We do not
agree with the High Court that “THERE IS NO LEGAL DUTY CASTE
UPON THE PLAINTIFF TO COME TO COURT WITH A TRUE CASE
AND PROVE IT BY TRUE EVIDENCE.” THE PRINCIPLE OF
“FINALITY OF LITIGATION” CANNOT BE PRESSED TO THE EXTENT
OF SUCH AN ABSURDITY THAT IT BECOMES AN ENGINE OF FRAUD
IN THE HANDS OF DISHONEST LITIGANTS. The courts of law are meant
for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come
with clean hands. ------. We have no hasitation to say that a person whose case is
based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown
out at any stage of the litigation. --------.”
-----. A party must come to the Court with clean hands and must disclose all the
relevant facts which may result in appreciating the rival contentions of the parties. In our
view, a litigant, who approaches the Court, must produce all the documents which are relevant to
the litigation and he must also disclose to the Court about the pendency of any earlier litigation
between the parties and the result thereof. ----.In our opinion, it was obligatory upon the
respondent to disclose to the Court that in the application filed in the earlier suit, a similar relief
had been claimed, however, the Court had not granted the said relief. In our view, if these facts
were before the Court on February 6, 1997 when the second suit came up for hearing
before it, MAY BE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE WAS PERSUADED NOT TO GRANT
ANY EX-PARTE STAY IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT. ----. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that the respondent has not come to the Court with clean hands and has also
suppressed material facts from the Court with a view to gain advantage in the second suit.
THIS IN OUR VIEW IS CLEARLY OVER –REACHING THE COURT.”
Note : ‘Over-reach’ means to reach or extent beyond, to outwit or get the better of, to
defeat by one’s oversubtlety
“---------. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt
with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of order 6, Rule 16 or
in some other manner. But it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct
which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it
pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in
the administration of justice.
“As held by the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and another AIR
1977 SC 2421, the pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the
Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious
cases. “It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly
fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And
remembering that AN ADVOCATE IS AN OFFICER OF JUSTICE he owes it to society
NOT TO COLLABORATE IN SHADY ACTIONS. The Bar Council of India, we hope will
activate this obligation.--.”
(vi) Para 20 of the above referred judgment:-
“We are of the opinion that the above noted passage of the aforesaid judgment in T.
Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal’s case is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. Having not succeeded in getting stay in Suit No. 3064/96, IN OUR VIEW, THE
LAWYER SHOULD HAVE REFUSED TO MOVE AN APPLICATION FOR STAY IN
THE SECOND SUIT.”
10. “Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar Newatia, 2000 RLR 124(SC)” (25.1.2000):-
11. “In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, AIR 2001 SC 2018” (3.5.2001)
(i) Relevant extract of the above referred AIR:-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c) – Constitution of India, Art. 129 – ---.”
“----------. Criminal Contempt has been defined in Section 2 (c) to mean interference with
the administration of justice IN ANY MANNER. A FALSE or MISLEADING or a wrong
statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings TO OBTAIN A
FAVOURABLE ORDER would undoubtedly tantamount to interfere with the due course
of judicial proceedings. WHEN A PERSON IS FOUND TO HAVE UTILIZED AN
ORDER OF A COURT WHICH HE OR SHE KNOWS TO BE INCORRECT FOR
CONFERRING BENEFIT ON PERSONS WHO ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE SAME,
THE VERY UTILIZATION OF THE FABRICATED ORDER BY THE PERSON
CONCERNED WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO HOLD HIM/HER GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of
fabrication. On the aforesaid parameters it would be necessary to examine whether it can be said
that Mrs. Megha Rude can be held to be guilty of contempt. In view of our conclusion on the
basis of materials available in the inquiry proceedings with regard to the role played by Mrs.
Megha Rude, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that Mrs. Rude is guilty of gross
criminal contempt and must be suitably punished for the same. -------.”
“We, therefore hold both Mrs. Megha Rude and Mr. Dilip Wamanrao Gund to be guilty of
contempt having committed criminal contempt as well as under Article 129 of the Constitution
of India and for such gross act on their part, they are sentenced to imprisonment for six months.
12. “Pravin C. Shah Vs. K. A. Mohd. Ali & Another, AIR 2001 SC 3041 : VII (2001)
SLT 153” (9.10.2001) :-
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (A) of the above referred AIR:-
“Contempt of Court Act (70 of 1971), ------ Ss. 2 , 12 –----- ADVOCATE FOUND GUILTY
OF CONTEMPT- CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO APPEAR, ACT OR PLEAD IN
COURT UNLESS HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT --------.”
13. “Advocate General, High Court of Karnataka v. Chidambara and another, 2004 Cri
L.J. 493” (30.7.2003)
14. “Court on its own Motion v. Kanwaljit S. Sareen & ors., 2007 Cri L.J. 2339” : 138
(2007) DLT 682 : (9.2.2007)
(i) Head Note (A) of the above referred Cri. L. J.:-
“Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), S. 2 (c ) – Criminal Contempt – Interference by Advocate
in due course of administration of justice
The judge and counsel are two wheels of the chariot of justice. While the direction of the
movement is controlled by the judge holding reins, the movement it self is facilitated by the
counsel and litigants, without which the chariots of justice may not move and may even collapse.
--------- AS RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS OF THE COURT, THE COUNSEL HAVE AN
OVERALL OBLIGATION OF ASSISTING THE COURTS IN A JUST AND PROPER
MANNER, IN THE JUST AND PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Deliberately making false statements on oath, PRACTISING FRAUD and making of
averments which were false to the knowledge of the counsel in the plaint, witnessing
agreements which were either not executed on the dates mentioned thereon or were not executed
at all, apart from being gross violations of code of conduct or PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
in the present state of circumstances would also amount to obstructing the due course of
administration of justice and interfering with the same and thus constitute criminal contempt. If
the notice issued by the counsel runs contrary to the averment in the plaint, such conduct
on the part of the counsel cannot be condoned or simply excused or washed away. THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR FOR KEEPING THE STREAM
OF JUSTICE PURE AND UNSULLIED IS FAR GREATER.”
(ii) Relevant extract of Head Note (iv) of the above referred DLT:-
“Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 340 r/w Section 195, 195(1)(b)(ii)- Cognizance of
abuse of legal process-Initiation of proceeding under section 340 Cr. P.C. –Contempt of
Court----As suo motu notice of contempt initiated and determined, initiation of proceedings
under section 340 Cr. P.C. not in interest of justice- Inquiry under section 340 Cr. P.C. would
not serve any useful purpose nor be in interest of justice – Parties requested for quietus in
matter.”
15. “Court on its own Motion v. Swaran Singh Banda, 159 (2009) DLT 362” (DB)
(17.2.2009)
“-----. The tendency on the part of the contemnor in his action or conduct to prevent the
course of justice is the relevant fact. Any interference in the course of justice, ANY
OBSTRUCTION CAUSED IN THE PATH OF THOSE SEEKING JUSTICE ARE AN
AFFRONT TO THE MAJESTY OF LAW AND, THEREFORE, THE CONDUCT IS
PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT. --------.”
16. “COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION VS. STATE & ORS, 151 (2008) DLT 695 (DB)”
(21.8.2008)(Delhi High Court)
(This judgment is in respect of B.M.W. Case wherein Mr. I.U. Khan and Mr. R.K. Anand were
the counsel for the state and defence respectively)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT:-
“Contempt of Court - Interference with judicial proceedings and administration of justice
– Nexus between Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer –-----Complicity between
Special Public Prosecutor and Defence Lawyer – both were More than mixed up in BMW case –
conduct of both had tendency to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice as
influencing a witness to alter his evidence or to decline to testify amounts to interference in
administration of justice -------Contempt very much before eyes and within hearing –
contempt of courts act, 1972, -section 2 (C ) (Paras 2, 8, 10, 11, 20, 78, 125, 127, 143, 155,
156, 169,206 & 207)
17. “R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 161 (2009) DLT 130(SC)” (A Three
Judge Bench Decision)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (V) of the above referred DLT:-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 2 (c ), 12 – Constitution of India, 1950- Arts. 145, 215
– Advocates Act, 1961- Section 34- Contempt of Court- BMW case- Sting operation-
Negotiation between SK and Special Public Prosecutor and R.K. Anand, Senior Advocate, for
his sellout in favour of defence for a very high price- Prohibition against appearing in Courts-
Observations made in case of Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. UOI followed- No conflict or clash
between section 34 of Advocates Act and Art. 145 of Constitution – ART. 145 AND
SECTION 34 OF ACT CLEARLY SHOW THAT THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RIGHT
TO AN ADVOCATE TO APPEAR IN COURT – An Advocate appears in Court subject to
conditions laid down by Court- Two appellants were debarred from appearing before High Court
and Courts subordinate to it for a period of 4 months.-----
“We were also addressed on the validity of the High Court’s direction prohibiting the two
appellants from appearing before the High Court and the Courts subordinate to it for a period of
four months. Though by the time the appeals were taken up for hearing the period of four
months was over, Mr. Altaf Ahmed contended that the High Court’s direction was beyond its
competence and authority. In a proceeding of contempt punishment could only be awarded
as provided under the Contempt of Courts Act, THOUGH IN A GIVEN CASE THE
HIGH COURT COULD DEBAR THE CONTEMNOR FROM APPEARING IN COURT
TILL HE PURGED HIMSELF OF THE CONTEMPT.--------- .”
“More importantly, another Constitution Bench of this Court in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal Vs.
Union of India and Another, VII (2002) SLT 229= (2003) 2 SCC 45, examined the question
whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court(s). In paragraph
34 of the decision the Court made highly illuminating observations in regard to lawyers’
right to appear before the Court and sounded the note of caution for the lawyers. Para 34 of
the decision need to be reproduced below:-
“34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right of appearance in
Courts is still within the control and jurisdiction of Courts. ----. Conduct in
Court is a matter concerning the court and hence the bar Council cannot claim
that what should happen inside the Court could also be regulated by them in
exercise of their disciplinary powers.--- But the right to appear and conduct
cases in the court is a matter on which the court must and does have major
supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divested
of control or supervision of conduct in Court merely because it may involve the
right of an advocate. A RULE CAN STIPULATE THAT A PERSON WHO
HAS COMMITTED CONTEMPT OF COURT OR HAS BEHAVED
UNPROFESSIONALLY AND IN AN UNBECOMING MANNER WILL NOT
HAVETHE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD AND
CONDUCT CASES IN COURTS.---- The very sight of an advocate, who is
guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct,
standing in the Court would erode the dignity of the court ---. Art. 145 of
Constitution of India and section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is
no absolute right to an advocate who appear in a court.----.”
“Lest we are misunderstood it needs to be made clear that the occasion to take recourse to the
extreme step of debarring an advocate from appearing in Court should arise very rarely
and only as a measure of last resort IN CASES WHERE THE WRONG DOER
ADVOCATE DOES NOT AT ALL APPEAR TO BE GENUINELY CONTRITE AND
REMORSEFUL FOR HIS ACT/CONDUCT, BUT ON THE CONTRARY SHOWS A
TENDENCY TO REPEAT OR PERPETUATE THE WRONG ACT(S).”
18. “In the matter of Contempt Proceedings against Kanwar Singh Saini, 161 (2009)
DLT 466” (DB) (20.7.2009) (Available)
(i) Relevant extract of Head Note (i) of the above referred DLT :-
“Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- ---Sections 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c ), ---------- Criminal Contempt-
CONTRADICTORY STANDS TAKEN IN HIS PLEADINGS/ AFFIDAVITS BY
DEFENDANT/CONTEMNOR REGARDING OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
SUIT PROPERTY- ----- FILING OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS OR STATEMENTS IN
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AS IT TENDS
TO OBSTRUCT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE- Defendant/Contemnor filed written
statement in suit of plaintiff and made statement on oath before trial court AND
ADMITTING HE SOLD SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF AND HANDED OVER
POSSESSION TO HIM- But subsequently in his reply to contempt application filed by
plaintiff, contemnor took a somersault AND TOOK PLEA THAT HE NEITHER SOLD
SUIT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF NOR HANDED OVER POSSESSION TO HIM- ---- -
Apology tendered by contemnor, not at all apologetic and not accepted- It was tendered by
defendant/contemnor for first time while giving evidence in these proceedings-
Defendant/contemnor is guilty of criminal contempt.”
Z-2. Important proposition of law pertaining to ‘Contempt of Courts Act’ relevant for
arguments on the petitioner’s application U/o 12, R, 6 CPC:-