Currents Issues in Public Administration

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
IV. CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies University of Waseda, Tokyo-JAPAN 2008
CONTENTS
1. 2. 2 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 7 8. 9.
INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC CHOICE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BUREAUCRATIC POWER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS DECENTRALIZATION DIGITAL (E) GOVERNANCE
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INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DISCRETIONARY POWERS
LAW
POLITICS
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT PUBLIC POLICY
ECONOMICS
PUBLIC CHOICE
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PUBLIC POLICY
THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICY ANALYSIS IS NOW A WELL ESTABLISHED PART OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. PUBLIC POLICY IS A COURSE OF ACTION ADOPTED AND PURSUED BY GOVERNMENT (HENRY 2004) (HENRY, 2004). PUBLIC POLICY REFERS TO THE DECISIONS MADE BY GOVERNMENT, TO A PURPOSIVE COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN PURSUING SOLUTIONS TO PERCEIVED PROBLEMS (LEMAY, 2002). PUBLIC POLICY CAN BEST BE VIEWED AS A PROCESS, A , SET OR SERIES OF STAGES THROUGH WHICH POLICY IS ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED. THE POLICY PROCESS CONSISTS OF A SUCCESSION OF ANALYTICAL STAGES (LEMAY, 2002)
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PUBLIC POLICY
FOR MANY YEARS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS WERE SEEN AS NEUTRAL IMPLEMENTORS OF PUBLIC POLICIES SHAPED AND DESIGNED ELSEWHERE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SINCE THE 1960s, WITH THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, BOTH THE POLICY PROCESS ITSELF AND THE , ROLE OF PUBLIC A RATION IN IT HAVE BEEN REEVALUATED. PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT POLITICS IS MESSY AND IMPRECISE PROPONENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS IMPRECISE, ARGUE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF RIGOROUS ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES AND DECISION TOOLS WILL DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE BOTH THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THEM.
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PUBLIC POLICY
FURTHER, IT IS ARGUED THAT MORE RATIONAL DECISION PROCESSES WILL NOT ONLY BE MORE EFFICIENT, EFFICIENT BUT ALSO MORE RESPONSIVE TO CITIZEN NEEDS AND PREFERENCES. THIS VERSION OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS VALUES OBJECTIVITY AND NEUTRALITY; IT IS BASED ON AN ABIDING BELIEF IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND ABILITIES.
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PUBLIC POLICY
IT MAKES USE OF TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICS, STATISTICS, OPERATIONS RESEARCH, AND SYSTEMS DYNAMICS, AMONG OTHERS, TO PROVIDE DECISION MAKERS WITH ADVICE IN THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY. IN APPLYING THOSE TECHNIQUES, THE ANALYST MAY ALSO DRAW ON KNOWLEDGE FROM FIELDS SUCH AS SOCIOLOGY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS, LAW, ORGANIZATION - THEORY, THE PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL , SCIENCES, AND ELSEWHERE. POLICY ANALYSIS MUST TAKE THE ANALYST WHEREVER THE POLICY ISSUE LEADS, MAKING ANALYSIS THE MULTI DISIPLINARY ACTIVITY PAR EXCELLENCE.
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PUBLIC POLICY
POLICY ANALYSIS INCLUDES:
1) 2) 3) 4) ) 5) 6)
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED, SPECIFYING THE GOAL(S) TO BE SOUGHT THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY, IDENTIFYING OR INVENTING THE AVAILABLE POLICY ALTERNATIVES, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVES, BOTH , FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE, IMPUTING VALUES IN A SINGLE, COMMENSURABLE MATRIX TO THOSE EFFECTS, AND CHOOSING THE BEST POLICY ALTERNATIVE ACCORDING TO AN EXPLICIT DECISION RULE.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE LAST CENTURY, THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEVELOPED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK SET BY WILSON. THE ENDS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WERE SEEN AS THE "MANAGEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIAL IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PURPOSES OF THE STATE."
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PUBLIC CHOICE
IN HIS BOOK: ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1945), HERBERT SIMON, SUSTAINED A DEVASTATING CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY IMPLICIT IN THE TRADITIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. SIMON ELUCIDATED SOME OF THE ACCEPTED ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES AND DEMONSTRATED THE LACK OF LOGICAL COHERENCE AMONG THEM.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING SIMON S CHALLENGE SIMON'S CHALLENGE, ANOTHER COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS HAS GRAPPLED WITH MANY OF THESE SAME INTELLECTUAL ISSUES. THIS COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS COMPOSED PREDOMINANTLY OF POLITICAL ECONOMISTS HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DECISIONS. ONE FACET OF THIS WORK HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE DEVELOP-MENT OF THE PLANNING PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING (PPB) PLANNING, SYSTEM.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
ONE OF SIMON'S CENTRAL CONCERNS WAS TO SIMON S ESTABLISH THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY AS A NORM FOR EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. SIMON ARGUED THAT THE "CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY DICTATES THAT CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES WHICH PRODUCE THE LARGEST RESULT FOR THE GIVEN APPLICATION OF RESOURCES." IN ORDER TO UTILIZE THE CRITERION OF EFFICIENCY, EFFICIENCY THE RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS MUST BE DEFINED AND MEASURED CLEAR CONCEPTUAL MEASURED. DEFINITIONS OF OUTPUT ARE NECESSARY BEFORE MEASURES CAN BE DEVELOPED.
PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC CHOICE REPRESENTS ANOTHER FACET OF WORK IN POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. MOST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION BEGIN WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS. THE TRADITIONAL "ECONOMIC MAN" IS THEN REPLACED BY "MAN: THE DECISION MAKER." MAN: MAKER
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PUBLIC CHOICE
THE SECOND CONCERN IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE TRADITION IS WITH THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PUBLIC GOODS AS THE TYPE OF EVENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE OUTPUT OF PUBLIC AGENCIES. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY IS ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE EFFECT THAT DIFFERENT DECISION RULES OR DECISION-MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE UPON THE PRODUCTION OF THOSE EVENTS CONCEPTUALIZED AS PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES SERVICES.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
FOUR BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR ARE NORMALLY MADE: FIRST, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE SELF-
INTERESTED (NOT EQUIVALENT TO SELFISH). THE ASSUMPTION OF SELF-INTEREST IMPLIES PRIMARILY THAT INDIVIDUALS EACH HAVE THEIR OWN PREFERENCES WHICH AFFECT THE DECISIONS THEY MAKE, AND THAT THOSE PREFERENCES MAY DIFFER FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INDIVIDUAL.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
SECONDLY, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO BE RATIONAL.
RATIONALITY IS DEFINED AS THE ABILITY TO RANK ALL KNOWN ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL IN A TRANSITIVE MANNER. THIRD, INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSUMED TO ADOPT MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES. STRATEGIES MAXIMIZATION AS A STRATEGY IMPLIES THE CONSISTENT CHOICE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL THINKS WILL PROVIDE THE HIGHEST NET BENEFIT AS WEIGHED BY HIS OWN PREFERENCES. AT TIMES THE PREFERENCES ASSUMPTION OF MAXIMIZATION IS RELATED TO THAT OF SATISFYING, DEPENDING UPON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO AN INDIVIDUAL IN A DECISIONMAKING SITUATION.
PUBLIC CHOICE
FOURTH, AN EXPLICIT ASSUMPTION NEEDS TO BE STATED CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION POSSESSED BY A REPRESENTATIVE INDIVIDUAL. THREE LEVELS HAVE BEEN ANALYTICALLY DEFINED AS INVOLVING CERTAINTY, RISK, AND UNCERTAINTY.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
THE CONDITION OF CERTAINTY IS DEFINED TO EXIST WHEN:
1) AN
INDIVIDUAL KNOWS ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES;
2) EACH 3) THE
STRATEGY IS KNOWN TO LEAD INVARIABLY TO ONLY ONE SPECIFIC OUTCOME, AND; OUTCOME AND INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HIS OWN PREFERENCES FOR EACH OUTCOME. GIVEN THIS LEVEL OF INFORMATION, THE DECISION OF A MAXIMIZING INDIVIDUAL IS COMPLETELY DETERMINED.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK, THE INDIVIDUAL IS STILL ASSUMED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES. ANY PARTICULAR STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL OUTCOMES, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSUMED TO KNOW THE PROBABILITY OF EACH OUTCOME. THUS, DECISION MAKING BECOMES WEIGHTING PROCESS WHEREBY HIS PREFERENCES FOR DIFFERENT OUTCOMES ARE COMBINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR OCURRENCE PRIOR TO A SELECTION OF A STRATEGY.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY IS ASSUMED TO OCCUR EITHER WHERE (1) AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF ALL STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES, BUT LACKS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PROBABILITIES WITH WHICH A STRATEGY MAY LEAD TO AN OUTCOME, OR (2) AN INDIVIDUAL MAY NOT KNOW ALL STRATEGIES OR ALL OUTCOMES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST.
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PUBLIC CHOICE
UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY, THE DETERMINATENESS OF SOLUTIONS IS REPLACED BY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. "SOLUTIONS " ESTIMATIONS ARE MADE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIES.
(VINCENT OSBORNE & ELEANOR OSBORN, 1971) OSBORN
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PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC CHOICE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATION. OTHER MODELS INCLUDE INCLUDE:
RATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE MODEL; BARGAINING MODEL; INCREMENTAL MODEL; PARTICIPATIVE MODEL.
(LEMAY, 2002)
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFERS TO THOSE LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE CREATED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES THAT MAKE RULES AND ADJUDICATE CASES CONCERNING PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND THE LIMITS NEEDED TO CONTROL SUCH AGENCIES. INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF LAWS (OR RULES AND REGULATIONS) OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THAT COLLECTIVELY MAKE UP ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ARE INTERPRETATIVE RULESTHOSE RULES THAT SPECIFY RULES THOSE AN AGENCY'S VIEWS OF THE MEANING OF ITS REGULATIONS OR OF THE STATUTES IT ADMINISTERS.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IS RESTRICTED TO AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COVER THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE PARTIES. IT EXCLUDES THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND DEPARTMENTS OR THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT (MATTERS COVERED IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONCERNS THE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF SUCH AGENCIES ARE POLICY MAKERSBUT WITH A LIMITED RANGE OF AUTHORITY WHEN MAKING RULES.
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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES' FORMAL POWERS ' INCLUDE:

1) 2) 3) ) 4)
INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS; ORDERING THE ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN PRACTICES; SETTING STANDARDS; ; PROSECUTING FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LAWS AND STANDARDS, INCLUDING ISSUING CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDERS AND IMPOSING FINES;
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5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11)
SETTING FORTH RULES AND REGULATIONS; HOLDING HEARINGS BEFORE ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS; HOLDING ADJUDICATION HEARINGS; ISSUING, WITHHOLDING, AND REVOKING LICENSES; PROVIDING FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES; ORDERING TEMPORARY CESSATIONS OF ACTIVITIES; AND SEIZING PROPERTY AND IMPOSING FINES AND PENALTIES.
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LIMITATIONS OVER REGULATORY AGENCY DISCRETION ARE BUILT INTO THE RIGHTS AND PROCEDURAL RULE SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED INTO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY'S ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES, OR PRACTICES AS WELL AS THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW. OTHER CONTROL DEVICES ALSO LIMIT AGENCY DISCRETION. ONE SUCH DEVICE IS MEDIA SCRUTINY. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND THE ABILITY OF MEDIA MEMBERS TO HOLD AGENCIES UP TO PUBLIC RIDICULE DOES SERVE AS SOMETHING OF A CHECK ON AGENCY ABUSE OF POWER.
ANOTHER DEVICE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OMBUDSMAN, OR AN OFFICIAL WHO IS CHARGED WITH PROCESSING AND EXAMINING COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE BUREAUCRACY. OMBUDSMEN TYPICALLY REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURES OR OTHER OFFICE THAT HOLDS AUTORITY. CITIZEN ACTION GROUPS SUCH AS COMMON CAUSE ALSO CAN SERVE AS INFORMAL WATCHDOGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
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TYPICALLY, TYPICALLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WITH REGULATORY POWERS IS ESTABLISHED BY STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE STATUTE CREATES THE AGENCY, DESCRIBES ITS PRIMARY MISSION OR GOALS (OFTEN IN QUITE BROAD AND GENERAL TERMS), AND LAYS OUT ITS JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES-AND, IN SO DOING, SOMETHING OF ITS LIMITATIONS AS WELL. WELL THE LEGISLATURE AT THE SAME TIME MIGHT PASS A GENERAL REGULATORY STATUTE STATING THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE LAW; THE AGENCY THEN DEVELOPS APPROPRIATE RULES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, OR GU GUIDELINES THAT IT INTENDS TO US TO IMPLEMENT OR S S O USE O O MODIFY THE LAW OR TO MEET NEW SITUATIONS.
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ALTHOUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ENJOY WIDE DISCRETION IN DEVELOPING THE MASSIVE BODY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, RULES OR REGULATIONS, THEIR DISCRETION HAS ITS LIMITS. THESE LIMITS MAY BE IMPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE WHEN IT ESTABLISHES AN AGENCY OR WHEN IT ENACTS AMENDING LAWS REGARDING AN AGENCY'S JURISDICTION, AS WELL AS BY AGENCY S THE COURTS THROUGH THEIR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS AND RULINGS.
(LEMAY, (LEMAY 2004)
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BUREAUCRATIC POWER
AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND ORGANIZATIONS GREW LARGER, ORGANIZATIONS (BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR DIVISION OF LABOR INTO MORE AND SMALLER SPECIALIZED UNITS. LARGER INSTITUTIONS BEGAN TO DEFER TO THE JUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT A MAJOR FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS EXPERTISE, OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE.
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AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND SPECIALIZED, DECISION MAKERS RELIED ON EXPERT ADVICE SOME BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES, ADVICE. AGENCIES THEN, DEVELOPED A NEAR MONOPOLY ON THE TECHNICAL DATA OR CRITERIA USED TO DECIDE POLICY. DEPENDING ON THE TYPE OF POLICY THEY IMPLEMENT, BUREAUCRACY HAVE DISCRETIONARY POWER, EITHER MORE OR LESS.
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IN THE MINDS OF MOST OBSERVERS THE ISSUE IS NOT OBSERVERS, WHETHER BUREAUCRACIES HAVE POWER BUT THE MAGNITUDE AND OMINOUS NATURE OF THAT POWER POWER. BUREAUCRACIES ARE SEEN AS TOO INFLUENTIAL, TOO UNCHALLENGED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DANGEROUS. , Q BURCAUCRATS ARC THOUGHT OF AS ASSUMING A PREMINENT, EVEN UNCHECKED ROLE IN THE FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY. POLICY THE DEDUCTIVE CASE FOR WHY BUREAUCRACIES ARE TOO POWERFUL CAN BE MADE ON AT LEAST FOUR GROUNDS.
FIRST, THE WEBERIAN ORGANIZATIONAL FROM SEEMS TO BE AN INHERENTLY POWERFUL INSTRUMENT BECAUSE OF ITS PROPERTIES: ITS UNIFIED HIERARCHY CONCENTRATES CONTROL, CONTROL ITS HIGH DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION PROVIDES GREAT EXPERTISE, ITS PERMANENT RECORDS ACCUMULATE VAST QUANTITIES OF INFRMATION AND OFFICIALLY INTERPRET THE PAST AND ITS TENURED WORKFORCE PAST, CANNOT BE REMOVED AND HENCE IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE. SECOND, SECOND THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND POLICY, PUTS BUREAUCRACY IN THE POSITION OF REPRESENTING THE SOVEREIGN STATE TO CITIZENS IN CONCRETE, EVERYDAY TERMS. TO THEM, THE STATE IS BUREAUCRACY. BUREAUCRACY
THIRD, THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF MODERN ADMINISTRATION MEANS THAT LEGISLATORS AND OTHER ELECTED OFFICIALS MUST DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OR EVEN RULE-MAKING POWER TO THE BUREAUCRATS, WHO THUS ARE "LEGISLATORS" OF SORTS. FOURTH, FOURTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY FAVORING THE AGENTS GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO OUTMANEUVER THEIR PRINCIPALS AND PURSUE THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES.
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TO SUM UP, BUREAUCRACIES ARE CHECKED BUT NOT CHAINED. THEY ARE RESPONSIVE TO EXTERNAL POLITICAL CONTROL BUT NOT POLITICALLY SUPINE. THEY REACT NOT MERELY TO STATIC INSTRUCTIONS BUT TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES THEY NOT ONLY CIRCUMSTANCES. IMPLEMENT POLICY BUT SHAPE AND ADVOCATE IT.
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS

CORRUPTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS BOTH PROFESION AND SCIENTIFIC STUDY FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN VERY MUCH CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION OR ABUSE OF POWER. A CORRUPTED BUREAUCRACY, BY DEFITION, IS ONE THAT, DOES , , , NOT DO WHAT IT IS SUPPPOSED TO, SINCE ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS ARE PRESSUMABLY NOT MADE UNLESS THOSE WHO RECEIVE PAYMENT CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT OF THE LAWS THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY. ALTHOUG FORMALLY SALARIED, BUREAUCRATS IN SUCH QUASI-SALARY SYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE SCALE SELF-ENRICHMENT (RIGGS,1995).
THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IS ENDEMIC TO POLITICS AND TO GOVERNMENT SIMPLY BECAUSE ITS DECISIONS INVOLVE SO MUCH POWER AND WEALTH. WEALTH IT BECOMES COMMON PLACE AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT--IN THE WAYS CONTRACTS ARE AWARDED, JOBS ARE CREATED AND FILLED, PEOPLE ARE HIRED OFFICES FILLED HIRED, ARE SOLD, FAVORED POLITICAL ALLIES ARE REWARDED, POWER IS EXERTED, AND THE NEEDS OR PLIGHT OF OTHERS ARE IGNORED. THE DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT'S REWARDS FREQUENTLY EXCEEDS THE SUPPLY, AND ROUTINE DECISION-MAKING DECISION MAKING PROCESSES ARE LENGTHY, COSTLY, AND UNCERTAIN IN THEIR OUTCOME.
FOR THESE REASONS LEGALLY SANCTIONED DECISION MAKING REASONS, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES CONSTITUTE A "BOTTLENECK" BETWEEN WHAT PEOPLE WANT AND WHAT THEY GET. THE TEMPTATION TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK TO SPEED BOTTLENECKTO THINGS UP AND MAKE FAVORABLE DECISIONS MORE PROBABLEIS BUILT INTO THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY. SOCIETY TO GET AROUND THE BOTTLENECK, ONE MUST USE POLITICAL INFLUENCEAND CORRUPTION, WHICH BY DEFINITION CUTS ACROSS ESTABLISHED AND LEGITIMATE PROCESSES, IS A MOST EFFECTIVE FORM OF INFLUENCE.
( (MICHAEL JOHNSTON, 1982) , )
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CORRUPTION, IS A FORM OF PRIVELEDGE IDULGED IN BY THOSE IN POWER IT CONCENTRATES POWER POWER. IN THE HANDS OF A FEW WHO CAN MAKE DECISIONS BASED NOT ON THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE BUT ON THE INTERESTS OF THE FEW. POWER TENDS TO CORRUPT, AND ABSOLUTE POWER CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY.
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ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PERSON MUST ANSWER TO SOME HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ACTIONS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCY. AGENCY ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO VOTERS. PUBLIC AGENCY MANAGERS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED EXECUTIVES AND LEGISLATURES. AGENCY LEADERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY, WHICH HOLDS GENERAL SOCIETY VALUES AND IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC MORALITY.
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ACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BOTH EXTERNALLY (BY CODES OF ETHICS, LEGAL MANDATES CONTAINED IN A CONSTITUTION AND AUTHORIZATION LAWS, AND PROFESSIONAL CODES OR STANDARDS) AND INTERNALLY (BY AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS OR PERSONALLY INTERNALIZED NORMS OF BEHAVIOR AND MORAL ETHICS). DEMOCRACY REQUIRES A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY: CHECKS AND BALANCES ON GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES, THE SECURITY OF REGULAR AUDITS, AND THE INQUISITIVE EYE OF COMMUNITY AND MEDIA WATCHDOGS.
(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)
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ETHICS
ETHICS CONCERN WITH WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT
IS WRONG.
(FREDERICKSON, (FREDERICKSON 1994)
ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELFSELF
ACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN INNER CHECK ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT.

(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)
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ETHICS ARE IMBEDDED IN THE VALUES AND NORMS OF SOCIETY, AND IN AN ORGANIZATION IN ITS ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE. VALUES ARE ANY OBJECT OR QUALITIES DESIRABLE AS MEANS OR ENDS THEMSELVES, SUCH AS LIFE, JUSTICE, EQUALITY HONESTY EFFICIENCY JUSTICE EQUALITY, HONESTY, EFFICIENCY, FREEDOM. VALUES ARE BLIEFS, POINTS OF VIEW, ATTITUDES. ATTITUDES
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STANDARDS AND NORMS

RIGHT ACTION BINDING UPON THE MEMBERS OF A GROUP AND SERVING TO GUIDE, CONTROL, OR REGULATE PROPER AND ACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR. BEHAVIOR STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE THE CODIFICATION OF GROUP, ORGANIZATIONAL, COMMUNITY GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNITY, OR GOVERNMENTAL VALUES. LAWS, REGULATIONS, CODES OF ETHICS. RULES ARE TYPICAL OF STANDARDS AND NORMS.
(FREDERICKSON, 1994)
STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS
ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS INVOLVES THE APPLICATION OF MORAL PRINCIPLES TO THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZATIONS. ORGANIZATIONS BROADLY SPEAKING, MORAL PRINCIPLES SPECIFY
1)
2)
THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD RESPECT WHEN THEY ACT IN WAYS THAT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE WELLBEING OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY; AND THE CONDITIONS THAT COLLECTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES SHOULD SATISFY WHEN THEY SIMILARLY AFFECT THE WELLBEING OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY.
(DENNIS THOMPSON, 1985)
THE CONVENTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS HOLDS THAT ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD CARRY OUT THE ORDERS OF THEIR SUPERIORS AND THE POLICIES OF THE AGENCY AND THE GOVERNMENT THEY SERVE.
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THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY DOES NOT DENY THAT ADMINISTRATORS OFTEN MUST USE THEIR OWN JUDGMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY. BUT THEIR AIM SHOULD ALWAYS BE TO DISCOVER WHAT POLICY THEIR S SUPERIORS (ELECTED OFFICIALS) INTEND OR O S( C O C S) O WOULD INTEND; OR IN A DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE OF CONFLICTING DIRECTIVES TO INTERPRET LEGALLY OR CONSTITUTIONALLY WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE POLICY.
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ON THIS VIEW, ADMINISTRATORS MAY PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN VIEWS ARGUE WITH THEIR SUPERIORS VIEWS, SUPERIORS, AND CONTEST PROPOSALS IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING POLICY. BUT ONCE THE DECISION OR POLICY IS FINAL, ALL ADMINISTRATORS FALL INTO LINE, AND FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE POLICY. FURTHERMORE, THE DISAGREEMENT MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE AGENCY AND ACCORDING TO THE AGENCY'S RULES OF PROCEDURE. PROCEDURE
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THE ETHIC OF NEUTRALITY PORTRAYS THE IDEAL ADMINISTRATOR AS A COMPLETELY RELIABLE INSTRUMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION, NEVER INJECTING PERSONAL VALUES INTO THE PROCESS OF FURTHERING THESE GOALS. THE ETHIC THUS REINFORCES THE GREAT VIRTUE OF ORGANIZATION-ITS ORGANIZATION ITS CAPACITY TO SERVE ANY SOCIAL END IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ENDS THAT INDIVIDUALS WITHIN IT FAVOR FAVOR.
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FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICS

IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THERE IS A HIERARCHY OF LEVELS OF ETHICS, EACH OF WHICH HAS ITS OWN , SET OF RESPONSIBILITIES.
1)
PERSONAL MORALITYTHE BASIC SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF OUR PAST AND IS DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS PARENTAL INFLUENCES, INFLUENCES RELIGIOUS BELIEFS CULTURAL AND SOCIAL BELIEFS, MORES, AND ONE'S OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES.
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2)
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE A SET OF PROFESSIONAL NORMS AND RULES THAT OBLIGATE THEM TO ACT IN CERTAIN "PROFESSIONAL" WAYS. OCCUPATIONS SUCH AS LAW AND MEDICINE, WHILE OPERATING WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CODES. CODES
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3)
ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS. EVERY ORGANIZATION HAS AN ENVIRONMENT OR CULTURE THAT INCLUDES BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT. PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS TYPICALLY HAVE MANY SUCH RULES. RULES PUBLIC LAWS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND LAWS ORDERS AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS ALL CAN BE TAKEN AS FORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOR.
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CONTROLS PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR BY SHAPING MEMBERS' COGNITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF MEANINGS AND REALITIES, PROVIDING EFECTIVE ENERGY FOR MOBILIZATION AND IDENTIFYING WHO BELONGS AND WHO DOES NOT.
AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE IS COMPOSED OF THE ". . . BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND BELIEFS THAT ARE SHARED BY MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION THAT OPERATE ORGANIZATION, UNCONSCIOUSLY, AND THAT DEFINE IN A BASIC TAKENFOR-GRANTED' FASHION AN ORGANIZATION'S VIEW OF ITSELF AND ITS ENVIRONMENT" ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IS A SOCIAL FORCE THAT
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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IT IS ALSO THE CULTURE, FULCRUM FOR PRODUCING CHANGE. SINCE ETHICS IS THE FULCRUM FOR CHANGING CULTURE, CHANGING CULTURE WITHOUT ETHICS IS AKIN TO CHANGING A TIRE WITHOUT A JACK.
(PASTIN, 1986)
ETHICS IS NOT ONLY THE HEART OF
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4)
SOCIAL ETHICS. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIAL ETHICS OBLIGE MEMBERS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY TO ACT IN WAYS THAT BOTH PROTECT INDIVIDUALS AND FURTHER THE PROGRESS OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. SOCIAL ETHICS ARE FORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN BE FOUND IN THE LAWS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY, INFORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE PART OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL CONSCIENCE.
(SHAFRITZ, RUSSEL, CHRISTOPHER, 2007)
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THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISION MAKING

WHEN MAKING DECISIONS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS INEVITABLY PURSUE CERTAIN GOALS, WHETHER , PERSONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OR SOME MIXTURE OF BOTH. THE PURSUIT OF GOALS INVOLVES STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CHOICES TO ACHIEVE THEM (MEANS AND ENDS). ENDS) SUCH DECISIONS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPRIETY OF THE MEANS USED IN IMPLEMENTING A COURSE OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH A PUBLIC PROBLEM.
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INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS
WHEN AN INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT PURSUES ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND SETS ON A COURSE OF ACTION TOWARD REACHING THOSE GOALS, THE END ITSELF MAY BE GOALS SEEN AS SO COMPELLING AS TO SEEMINGLY JUSTIFY ANY MEANS. ORGANIZATIONS HAVE OFTEN STRIVEN TO CLARIFY SUCH DILEMMAS IN DECISION MAKING BY ARTICULATING CODES OF ETHICS TO GUIDE THE BEHAVIOR OF THEIR MEMBERS. MEMBERS
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PERSONAL ETHICS
OFTEN AT ISSUE IN DECISION MAKING ARE PERSONAL ETHICS. ETHICS THE TEMPTATION TO DIVERT SOME OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR RESOURCES TO PERSONAL USE CAN BE GREAT AND THE RISK OF EXPOSURE OFTEN SMALL. THE MAIN REASON FOR THE WORLDWIDE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IS THAT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS HAVE SOMETHING TO ALLOCATE THAT OTHER PEOPLE WANT. WANT
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ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES OF O O MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE GO S O O CO C DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF BUREANCRACY. BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY TASKS CHARACTERIZED AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL. THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES CONTROL TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC.
BUT AS SUCH, THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SHOW KEEN SUCH ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, O S C OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE. BUREAUCRACY MAY BE S U UC C THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.
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BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING CHALLENGES OF MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE IMPERATIVES OF BUREAUCRACY BUREAUCRACY. BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULAR CONTROL.
THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES TO PRINCIPLES OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE PUBLIC. PUBLIC BUT AS SUCH THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY SUCH, SHOW KEEN ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, EFFECTIVENESS OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE. EXPERTISE BUREAUCRACY MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.
Regime bureaucracy interactions b ea c ac inte actions

Power Distribution in Society Power Distribution in Government
Executive ascendant 1 Executive sublated 2 Bureaucracy dominates democratic political regime
Democracy Democ ac
Democratic political regime controls bureaucracy
3 Bureaucracy subordination to authoritarian political regime
4 Authoritarian political regime shares power with Bureaucracy
Authoritarianism
Sources: modified from Cario, L.V. (1992) Bureaucracy for Democracy (Quezon City: University of Philippines Press).
(TURNER AND HULME 1997) HULME,
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ONE BASIC APPROACH TO THE BUREAUCRACYDEMOCRACY PROBLEM IS TO CONCEIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IMPULSE AS ESSENTIALLY EMANATING FROM "ABOVE." THE "TOP" OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, IN THIS VIEW TOP SYSTEM VIEW, CONSISTS OF THE CENTRAL OR MOST FORMALLY AUTHORITATIVE AUTHORITATIVE' POSITIONS AND ORGANS OF THE GOVERNING SYSTEM: THOSE DIRECTLY CHOSEN BY THE ELECTORATE AND THOSE ENTAILING THE BROADEST AND MOST ENCOMPASSING JURISDICTION.
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BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT LINK TO THE PUBLIC VIA PERIODIC COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS, BODIES LIKE PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVES HAVE A SPECIAL CLAIM TO REPRESENT THE AGENDA OF THE PEOPLE. PEOPLE ONE CHALLENGE FACING THESE POLITICAL LEADERS, THEN, THEN IS TO MONITOR AND CONTROL THE BUREAUCRACY SO THAT THE AGENTS DO NOT REPLACE THE DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN PRINCIPALS AS THE KEY DECISION MAKERS.
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THE OTHER BROAD NOTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IS WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED BOTTOM-UP DEMOCRACY. THE LOGIC IS THAT POPULAR CONTROL IS MOST EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED THROUGH CHANNELS OTHER THAN THE POLITICAL "TOP.
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IN OTHER WORDS, THE BUREAUCRACY AS A POLITICAL WORDS INSTITUTION MIGHT BEST BE CHECKED BY DIRECT POPULAR OVERSIGHT (CITIZENS REVIEW BOARDS MONITORING POLICE DEPARTMENTS, CLIENTS CONTROLLING SOME ASPECTS OF AGENCY DECISIONS) OR BY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT DEVIATE FROM A STANDARD MONOCRATIC AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND INSTEAD INCORPORATE INCENTIVES FOR BUREAUCRATIC ACTORS TO BE DIRECTLY ATTUNED TO POPULAR PREFERENCES. PREFERENCES ONE WAY THAT THESE OPERATE IS VIA OPENNESS OF THE BUREAUCRACY ITSELF TO PRESSURE AND CONTROL BY ORGANIZED INTERESTS THAT MAY CARE GREATLY ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS.
NEITHER LINE OF REASONING ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY OFFERS A FULLY SATISFACTORY PICTURE THE TOP-DOWN ARGUMENTS FRAMED IN THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL CONTROL OFFER AN IMPORTANT PIECE OF THE PUZZLE, BUT AN INCOMPLETE ONE. BOTTOM-UP ANALYSTS ALERT AS TO CRUCIAL MODES AND CHANNELS OF POPULAR INFLUENCE BUT LIKEWISE OMIT ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE INCLUDED. ANY VALID PERSPECTIVE MUST NECESSARILY BE GROUNDED IN THE EMPIRICAL FEATURES OF ACTUAL GOVERNING SYSTEMS.
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A GOVERNANCE APPROACH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCES AT MULTIPLE LEVELS TO INDICATE HOW PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED, DESIGNED ADOPTED, IMPLEMENTED, AND EVALUATED IN TERMS OF BOTH EFFECTIVENESS AND DEMOCRACY. SUCH A POINT OF VIEW CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY WITH EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS CAN SOCIETIES GENERATE THE FAIRNESS AND SLACK RESOURCES THAT PERMIT DEMOCRACIES WITH THEIR LARGE TRANSACTION COSTS TO EXIST AND PROSPER.
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY

CHIEF EXECUTIVE SOCIOCULTURAL NORMS OUTSIDE AUDITORS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY HEAD
EXECUTIVE STAFF AGENCIES
LEGISLATURE
MEDIA
LEGISLATIVE STAFF AGENCIES
INTEREST GROUPS POLITICAL PARTIES
COURTS
OTHER AGENCIES AGENCIES, DIFFERENT LEVELS
OTHER AGENCIES, SAME LEVEL
(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK (ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 71
ABOVE FIGURE PRESENTS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK THAT SEES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TAKING THE CENTRAL ROLE OR STAGE IN A BROADER POLITICAL SYSTEM (THE CONVERSION PROCESS IN THE SYSTEMS MODEL). ) THE MODEL EMPHASIZES THE INTERRELATED NATURE OF THE PARTS AND HOW CHANGE IN AN EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT (CULTURAL, ECONOMIC POLITICAL (CULTURAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, SOCIAL) CAUSES CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURES AND INTERNAL PROCESSES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. THESE CHANGES, IN TURN, INFLUENCE THE OUTPUTS OF THE BUREAUCRACY; THAT IS, WHAT GOODS, SERVICES, POLICY PROGRAMS, RULES PROGRAMS RULES, AND REGULATIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED BY BUREAUCRACY.
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AS IN ANY SYSTEM, A FEEDBACK LOOP DEVELOPS IN , WHICH THE OUTPUTS AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENT, WHICH CAUSES FURTHER CHANGE AND OFTEN NEW DEMANDS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT TO CONTINUE, INCREASE OR DECREASE, MODIFY OR OCCASIONALLY DECREASE MODIFY, EVEN CEASE A PUBLIC POLICY OR PROGRAM.
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CONVERSION PROCESS

ENVIRONMENT CULTURAL CHANGES AND EVENTS ECONOMIC CHANGES AND EVENTS POLITICAL CHANGES AND EVENTS SOCIETAL CHANGES AND EVENTS INPUTS DEMANDS FOR PROGRAMS AND SERVICES MONEY STAF PARTY INTEREST GROUP STAFF AGENCIES ADMINISTRATIVE LINE AGENCIES WITHIN-PUTS RULES PROCEDURES GOALS STRUCTURE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
LEAD TO
OUTPUTS GOODS SERVICE POLICIES PROGRAMME INFORMATION
SUPPORT
ROLES PLAYED BY
(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK (ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 74
DECENTRALIZATION
ALL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVE A COMBINATION OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, FINDING A COMBINATION OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND LOCAL AUTONOMY THAT SATISFIES REGIME NEEDS AND POPULAR DEMANDS IS A PERSISTENT DILEMMA FOR GOVERNMENTS. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION ARE NOT ATTRIBUTES THAT CAN BE DICHOTOMIZED; RATHER THEY REPRESENT HYPOTHETICAL POLES ON A CONTINUUM THAT CAN BE CALIBRATED BY MANY DIFFERENT INDICES INDICES.
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MOST AUTHORS ARE AGREED THAT DECENTRALIZATION WITHIN THE STATE INVOLVES A TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY TO PERFORM SOME SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM AN INDIVIDUAL OR AN AGENCY IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SOME OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY WHICH IS 'CLOSER' TO CLOSER THE PUBLIC TO BE SERVED. THE BASIS FOR SUCH TRANSFERS IS MOST OFTEN TERRITORIAL, THAT IS GROUNDED IN THE DESIRE TO PLACE AUTHORITY AT A LOWER LEVEL IN A TERRITORIAL HIERARCHY AND THUS GEOGRAPHICALLY CLOSER TO SERVICE PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS.
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HOWEVER, TRANSFERS CAN ALSO BE MADE FUNCTIONALLY, THAT IS , , BY TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY TO AN AGENCY THAT IS FUNCTIONALLY SPECIALIZED. SUCH TRANSFERS OF AUTHORITY ARE OF THREE MAIN TYPES. THE FIRST IS WHEN THE DELEGATION IS WITHIN FORMAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DELEGATES ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT). THE SECOND IS TRANSFER WITHIN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE OR PARASTATAL STRUCTURES (FOR EXAMPLE FROM THE HEADQUARTERS OF A MINISTRY TO ITS DISTRICT OFFICES). THE THIRD IS WHEN THE TRANSFER IS FROM AN INSTITUTION OF THE STATE TO A NON-STATE AGENCY (FOR EXAMPLE WHEN A PARASTATAL NATIONAL AIRLINE IS SOLD OFF TO PRIVATE SHAREHOLDERS). SHAREHOLDERS)
SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS

DECENTRALIZATION IS THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SUBORDINATE OR QUASI-INDEPENDENT Q GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
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DECENTRALIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY FROM NATIONAL BODY
(HEYWOOD, 2002)
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE AUTONOMOUS IF THEY ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE, ALTHOUGH AUTONOMY , IN THIS CONNECTION IS SOMETIMES TAKEN TO IMPLY A HIGH MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE
(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD 2002) HEYWOOD,
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WHY DECENTRALIZE?
A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES IN MOST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS THE EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OR DECISION-MAKING AND AUTHORITY WITHIN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS ARE COMMONLY PERCEIVED TO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY AND SOCIALLY REMOTE FROM 'THE PEOPLE' AND TO TAKE DECISIONS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OR CONCERN ABOUT ACTUAL PROBLEMS AND PREFERENCES.
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THE POPULAR REMEDY FOR SUCH CENTRALIZATION IS DECENTRALIZATION, A TERM WHICH IS IMBUED WITH POSITIVE CONNOTATIONS-PROXIMITY, RELEVANCE, AUTONOMY, PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EVEN DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY. SO GREAT IS THE APPEAL OF DECENTRALIZATION THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS NOT CLAIMED TO PURSUE A POLICY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN RECENT YEARS.
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THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS ARGUE THAT DECENTRALIZATION WILL LEAD TO BETTER DECISION MAKING AND HENCE DECISION-MAKING GREATER EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS. GROUNDS
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USING DETAILED AND UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION THAT IS ONLY LOCALLY AVAILABLE. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION, FOSTERED BY DECENTRALIZATION INCREASES THE CHANCES OF MORE EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BEING GENERATED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DIFFUSED. MOTIVATION OF FIELD LEVEL PERSONNEL IS ENHANCED WHEN FIELD-LEVEL THEY HAVE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROGRAMMES THEY MANAGE. WORKLOAD REDUCTION AT AGENCIES AT THE CENTRE OF GOVERNMENT WILL RELIEVE THEM FROM ROUTINE DECISIONMAKING AND GIVE THEM MORE TIME TO CONSIDER STRATEGIC SSU S QU O O C S OU O ISSUES SO THAT THE' QUALITY OF POLICY SHOULD IMPROVE.
LOCALLY SPECIFIC PLANS CAN BE TAILOR-MADE FOR LOCAL AREAS
TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION
1. POLITICAL 2. ADMINISTRATIVE 3. FISCAL 4. MARKET
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POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AIMS TO GIVE CITIZENS OR THEIR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES MORE POWER IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
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FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION INVOLVES SHIFTING SOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EXPENDITURES AND/OR REVENUES TO LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT THE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL ENTITIES ARE GIVEN AUTONOMY TO DETERMINE THE ALLOCATION OF THEIR EXPENDITURE
(WORLD BANK, 2001)4
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LOCAL FINANCE IN INDONESIA

SOURCES
LOCAL REVENUES
EQUITY FUND
OTHERS
LOCAL TAXES RETRIBUTIONS REVENUES FROM LOCAL ASSETS OTHERS
SHARING REVENUES GENERAL ALLOCATED FUND SPECIAL ALLOCATED FUND
GIFT EMERGENCY FUND LOAN
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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET BECOMES, IN BECOMES THE WORDS OF DOUGLAS KELLNER (1999), "MORE DECENTERED AND VARIED IN ITS ORIGINS, SCOPE AND C S O G S, SCO EFFECTS". THE RELATIVE SPEED AND FLUIDITY OF CYBERSPACE SOMETIMES ALLOWS MARGINAL GROUPS TO THRUST THEIR AGENDA INTO THE POLITICAL MAINSTREAM (MITRA, 2001). THE AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF POWERFUL INSTITUTIONAL PLAYERS, BE THEY GOVERNMENTS, CORPORATIONS, OR MAINSTREAM MEDIA, HAS BEEN LOOSENED.
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POLITICAL ACTORS ARE INCREASINGLY ATTEMPTING TO USE THE INTERNET TO ENHANCE THEIR PRESENCE AND LEGITIMIZE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WAYS THAT ARE GENUINELY NEW NEW. STATES ARE INCREASINGLY REQUIRED TO REGULATE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR ONLINE AND ARE MONITORING THE USE OF THE INTERNET for ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR (SUCH AS PORNOGRAPHY), GROUPS AND MOVEMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE A THREAT TO POLITICAL STABILITY AND SECURITY (SUCH AS TERRORISM).
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A WEB PAGE MAY APPEAR AT FIRST GLANCE TO BE A SIMPLE ONE-TO-MANY DEVICE, BUT OFTEN WEB PAGES ARE COMPOSED OF INFORMATION, SUCH AS INFORMATION NEWS FEEDS, FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER BY AUTOMATED SCRIPTS THAT DYNAMICALLY UPDATE CONTENT WITHOUT HUMAN INTERVENTION. WEB PAGES MAY ALSO CONTAIN DISCUSSION FORUMS ALONGSIDE MORE TRADITIONAL FORMS OF CONTENT.
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DIGITAL DIVIDE
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Internet penetration by region, 2002. Sources: Analysis and adaptation of data from ITU, 2004b. The CIA World Factbook 2004 was used to feel a small number of gaps in the 2002 data.
(CHADWICK, (CHADWICK 2006) www.ginandjar.com 126

Currents Issues in Public Administration

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

IV. CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

INTERDICIPLINARY INTERFACE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

MANAGEMENT PUBLIC POLICY

INDIVIDUAL KNOWS ALL AVAILABLE STRATEGIES;

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES' FORMAL POWERS ' INCLUDE:

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ETHICS

ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELFSELF

ACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN INNER CHECK ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT.

STANDARDS AND NORMS

STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS PRINCIPLES OF

FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICS

ETHICS IS NOT ONLY THE HEART OF

THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISION MAKING

BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS

Regime bureaucracy interactions b ea c ac inte actions

Democratic political regime controls bureaucracy

3 Bureaucracy subordination to authoritarian political regime

4 Authoritarian political regime shares power with Bureaucracy

(TURNER AND HULME 1997) HULME,

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY

LEGISLATIVE STAFF AGENCIES

INTEREST GROUPS POLITICAL PARTIES

OTHER AGENCIES AGENCIES, DIFFERENT LEVELS

OTHER AGENCIES, SAME LEVEL

(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK (ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 71

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CONVERSION PROCESS

OUTPUTS GOODS SERVICE POLICIES PROGRAMME INFORMATION

(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK (ROSENBLOOM KRAVCHUCK, 2005) www.ginandjar.com 74

SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS

LOCALLY SPECIFIC PLANS CAN BE TAILOR-MADE FOR LOCAL AREAS

(WORLD BANK, 2001)

LOCAL FINANCE IN INDONESIA

LOCAL TAXES RETRIBUTIONS REVENUES FROM LOCAL ASSETS OTHERS

SHARING REVENUES GENERAL ALLOCATED FUND SPECIAL ALLOCATED FUND

GIFT EMERGENCY FUND LOAN

(CHADWICK, (CHADWICK 2006) www.ginandjar.com 126

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