G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989 NARCISO Y. SANTIAGO, JR., petitioner, VS.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDO A. JOSE, respondents. FACTS: Then Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada extended a permanent promotional appointment, as Customs Collector III, to petitioner Santiago, Jr. The said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), NCR. Prior thereto, Santiago held the position of Customs Collector I. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board referred the protest to Commisioner Tanada for appropriate action. Commmissioner Tanada upheld Santiago's promotional appointment. Respondent Jose then appealed to the Board, which, decided to revoke the petitioner Santiago's appointment and directed that respondent Jose be appointed in his stead. The Board denied Santiago's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Respondent Commission affirmed the Board Resolutions on its own Resolution No. 87-554 saying that although both Santiago and Jose are qualified for the position of Customs Collector III, respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range. Hence, this Certiorari Petition filed by Santiago. ARGUMENTS: Respondent argued that since he is next-in-rank, he should be appointed to the position of Collector of Customs III. On the other hand, Commisioner Tanada, upholding Santiago's promotional appointment, argued that: (1) The next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the position and such fact was not questioned by the protestant; (3) existing alws and jurisprudeence give wide latitude of discretion to the appointing authority provided there is no clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Santiago's promotional appointment should be upheld HELD: YES, the petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs Collector III should be upheld. REASONS: Previous ruling in Taduran vs. Civil Service Commission states that there is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment.

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed as provided for in Section 41 CSC Resolution No. 83-343. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide-latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment. Given this, there is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority. The latter has not been shown to have committed any grave abuse of discretion.

No. L-69137, August 5, 1986 FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees. FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Administrative officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided there (was) no pending administrative acse against the appointee, no pending protest gainst the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment. After protracted hearings, the Cicil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and directed Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked. Hence this petition to question that order and the private respondent's title. ARGUMENTS: The Solicitor-General says the petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case because his appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause. Having acknowledge such an appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran the risk of an abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
1 An employee who holds a next-in-rank position who is deemed the most competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion shall be promoted to the higher position when it becomes vacant. However, the appointing authority may promote an employee who is not next-in-rank but who possesses superior qualifications and competence compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the minimum requirements for the position.

the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of finding, order his replacement by the latter HELD: NO, The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. REASONS: The appointment of the petitioner was permanent. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself. What made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. It has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better quaified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor. Appointment is an essentially dicretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.

No. L-36845, August 21, 1987 CITY MAYOR EULOGIO E. BORRES, CITY OF CEBU, CITY COUNCIL OF CEBU, CEBU CITY TREASURER and CEBU CITY AUDITOR, petitioners, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GERMAN O. LUMAPAC and BARTOLOME ELIZONDO, respondents. FACTS: Private respondents German O. Lumapac and Bartolome Elizondo were appointed by the then Mayor of Cebu City, Carlos J. Quison, as Senior Security and Security Guard, respectively, in the Office of the Vice-Mayor, as recommended by then Vice-Mayor of Cebu, Luis V. Diores. In the 1967 local elections, Sergio Osmena, Jr. and petitioner Eulogio Borres ran and won the Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively, of Cebu City. Osmena Jr., however, did not assume office; hence petitioner Borres became the Acting Mayor of Cebu City. Upon assuming office, petitioner Borres terminated the services of private respondents due to lack of confidence. Private respondents Lumapac and Elizondo, together with Vicente Lao, filed with CFI of Cebu, Branch III, a petition for mandamus with damages against petitioners, and praying among others that

judgement be rendered (a) declaring their removal unlawful and void; (b) ordering their reinstatement to their former positions, with right to receive back salaries from the date of removal up to actual reinstatement; directing payment of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P2500.00; and (d) adjudging costs against City Mayor Eulogio E. Borres. After trial, the court a quo, Hon. Mateo Canonoy presiding, rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of Lumapac and Elizondo illegal and ordered the respondent City Mayor to reinstate them immediately. The petition as to Vicente Lao is dismissed. Lao, as well as the petitioners moved to reconsider the trial court's decision but their respective motions were denied. Lao and petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the trial court's decision stating that an employee or officer in the Civil Service who is holding a primarily confidential position with a permanent status is within the protection of Section 4, Article XII of the old Constitution. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ARGUMENT: One reason given by the respondent Mayor in removing petitioners is that their term of office is coterminus with the term of the public officials they are supposed to serve and therefore he can separate them from the service any time upon the termination of office of the public officials to whom they are rendering their sevices. ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents German O. Lumapac and Bartolome Elizondo may be dismissed, without cause or hearing, on the mere ground of lack of confidence HELD: Yes, private respondents' term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures. REASONS: By virtue of the nature of the duties and functions attached to said positions, the relationship between the Vice-Mayor and his Security is one that depends on the highest degree of trust and confidence, such that trust and confidence are the primary reasons for appointment thereto. As a matter of fact, private respondents were appointed to said positions upon the recommendation of the then Vice-Mayor Luis V. Diores. Petitioner Borres should not be deprived of the right to choose his own men to act as his Security. The tenure of personnel holding primarily confidential positions, such as the respondents, ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures, thus, their cessation involves no removal. In Ingles vs. Mutuc, it should be noted that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office---his 'term' merely expires in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon the expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. Similarly, in the case at bar, it may also be said, with equal vigor, that when petitioner Eulogio Borres, terminated the services of private respondents due to alck of confidence, they were not removed nor dismissed from the service; their term in their respective positions

merely expired. Hence, they were not illegally removed or dismissed from the service.

G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990 RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, VS. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent. FACTS: Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism on April 7, 19862. Persuant thereto, petitioner assumed office on the same date. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains that his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum stating that petitioner's designation is invalid since it was designated not by the President but only by the Secretary of Tourism. Garrucho is then designated as General Manager until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity. Garrucho took over as the General Manager of the PTA and thereafter Pres. Aquino appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of PTA. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner had been removed without just cause in violation of security of tenure HELD: No, the designation is considered only on an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure. REASONS: Section 23-A of the P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority provides that The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by
2 MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BINAMIRA You are hereby designated General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority, effective immediately. By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of office. (Sgd.) Jose Antonio Gonzales, Minister of Tourism and Chairman, P.T.A. Board

the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by alw of additional duties on an incumbent official as in this case where the Secretary of Tourism s designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PTA. Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is thathe shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acing or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure of the person named. The decree also provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the PTA shall be made by the president, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the eexercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, the doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, as also happened in the case at bar. With this ruling, it can be said that petitioner's designation is an unlawful encroachment on a presidential mprerogative, he did not acquire valid title to the position in question.

G.R. No. 87211, March 5, 1991 JOVENCIO L. MAYOR, petitioner, VS. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. RIZALINA CAJUCOM, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. LOURDES A. SALES and RICARDO OLAIREZ, petitioners-intervenors. FACTS: Five special civic actions are jointly decided because they involve one common, fundamental issue, the constitutionality of RA No. 6715 in so fara s it declares vacant all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National labor Relations Commission, and operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. The old positions were declared vacant because of the need to professionalize their higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, salaries or emoluments. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6715 has worked such an abolition of the petitioners' offices, expressly or impliedly HELD: It is immediately apparent that there is NO express abolition in RA 6715 of the petitioners' positions.

Implied abolition means that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old rules and those corresponding thereto under the new law. An examination of the relevant provisions of RA 6715, with a view of discovering the changes thereby effected on the nature, composition, powers, duties and functions of the Commission and the Commissioners, the Executive Director, the deputy Executive Director, and the Labor Arbiters under the prior legislation, fails to disclose such essential inconsistencies. REASONS: Republic Act No. 6715 did not abolish the NLRC, or change its essential character as a supervisory and adjudicatory body. Under said Act, as under the former law, the NLRC continue to act collegially, whether it performs administrative or rule-making functions or exercise appelate jurisdiction to review decisions and final orders of the Labor Arbiters. None of the provisions can be said to work so essential or radical a revision of the nature, powers and duties of the NLRC as to justify a conclusion that the Act in truth did not merely declare vacant but actually abolished the offices of commissioners and others in their place. Similar considerations yield the same conclusion as far as the positions of Labor Arbiters are concerned, there being no essential inconsistency on that score between Republic Act No. 6715 and the old law. The position titles of Executive Clerk and Deputy Executive Clerk(s) provided for in RA 6715 are obviously not those of newly-created offices, but new appellations or designations given to the existing positions of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director. There is no essential change from the prescribed and basically administrative duties of these positions and, at the same time, no menytion in the Act of the former titles, from which the logical conclusion is that what was intended was merely a change in nomenclature, not an express or implied abolition.

No. L-12536, September 24, 1958 CONCEPTION G. BRIONES, accompanied by her husband DEMOCRITO R. BRIONES, and FAUSTINO O. ROSAGARAN, petitioners and appellees, VS. SERGIO OSMENA, JR., Mayor of Cebu City, ETC., ET AL., respondents and appellants. FACTS: Petitioner Conception G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible. She was appointed clerkstenographer, but with permanent status, since then she remained in service continuously, receiving repeated promotions and increases in salary. Petitioner Faustino Rosagaran, on the other hand, is a second grade civil service eligible. He was employed in the Office of the City Mayor and was promoted to Administrative Officer. Upon the passing of Resolution No. 21, series of 1956, 35 positions were created in the City Mayor's Office.

The Municipal Board in its Resolution No. 187, series of 1956, approved Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 15 positions in the City Mayor's Office and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board. Among the positions abolished in the Office of the City Mayor were those occupied by Petitioners. The City Mayor wrote separate letters to petitioners notifying them of the abolition of their positions and advising them of the termination of their services. In reply thereto, petitioners wrote separate letters to Respondent City Mayor (1) acknowledging receipt his letters of separation; (2) protesting the abolition of their positions, and, (3) informing him that they will not relinquish their positions until otherwise determined by higher competent authorities or courts. THE CFI of Cebu decided in favor of the petitioners and declared the abolition of their offices null and void for lack of approval of the Department Head,a s required by the Circular of April 3, 1954 and by Executive Order No. 506, series of 1934. The respondents appealed. ARGUMENT: Appelants contend that the provisions of Executive Order No. 506, Series of 1934, as reiterated in the Provincial Circular of April 3, 1954, requiring previous approval of the Department Head concerned before abolition of positions by local legislative bodies can take effect, is no longer operative. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should be reinstated HELD: Yes, petitioners should be reinstated. REASONS: The reasons given for the abolition of the positions of the appellees (alleged to be economy and efficiency) are untrue, and constitute a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the said appellees, in violation of the security of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution. Considering that the appellees have served in the office of the Mayor of Cebu, since Commonwealth days, before the war; that their efficiency and merit has been attested by repeated and constant promotions and increases in salary; that petitioner Rosagaran was even proclaimed Model Employee as recently as 1955; and that just a short time before the abolition of their positions, the respondents ahd created for the same office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new positions calling for an outlay of P68,100 per annum, almost P6000 a month, the excuse of promoting efficiency and economy is most transparent and unimpressive. A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, like petitioners herein who have rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of political changes. Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution says: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.

G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991 TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, petitioner, VS. CATALINO MACARAIG and RUBEN D. TORRES, in their capacities as Executive Secretary and Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), respectively; and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, respondents. FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines, he filed a courtesy resignation. This was accepted by the President with deep regrets. The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. He protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive. Respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner. Achacoso filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus. ARGUMENTS: Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the officials (provided in the Civil Service Decree), it was beyond the prerogatives of the President to require them to submit courtesy resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if files, should be disregarded for having been submitted under duress, as otherwise the President would have the power to remove career officials at pleasure, even for a capricious reasons. Respondents assert that the petitioner is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official.They contend that as the petitioner was not a career executive service eligible at the time of his appointment, he came under the exception to the rule and so was subject to the provision that he shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination. Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his position. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to security of tenure HELD: No, the mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure to its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. REASONS:

A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority. There is also a long line of cases affirming the rule that One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.

No. L-17287, June 30, 1965 JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, ELEUTERIO CAPAPAS, Commissioner of Customs, JAMES H. KEEFE, Acting Director of Security, and JUAN C. PAJO, Executive Secretary, petitioners, VS. EPIFANIO T. VILLEGAS and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. FACTS: Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs. After a year, he was sent to the US to study enforcement techniques and customs practices. When he returned to the Philippines, he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was designated Acting Director for Security. Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his letter that this involves a change of designation and status from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a classified position. A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director for Security was likewise proposed. This was approved by the President. Villegas served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. Villegas filed action for quo warranto in CFI of Manila. The court gave judgment for Villegas. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not Villegas' removal from office is without cause or illegal HELD: Yes, Villegas' removal from the Office of Director for Security is without cause and is therefore illegal. REASONS:

Even though the position involved in this case is primarily confidential, it is nevertheless subject to the Constitutional provision that No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause . (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec.4). Villegas' removal is, therefore, concededly without cause. Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office. But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures---and it ahs been shown that it has been lost in this case, the incumbent is entitled to continue in office.