"The Civilizing Process" and "The History of Sexuality": Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault Author(s): Dennis

Smith, Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault Reviewed work(s): Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 79-100 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108506 . Accessed: 22/11/2011 07:55
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The Civilizing Process and The History of Sexuality: Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault
DENNIS SMITH
Aston University, United Kingdom

This article has three tasks.1The first is to demonstratethat a high degree of overlapin argumentand method exists between two major works by thinkers who are usually regardedas being fundamentally opposed in their approachesto understandingsociety.The two works are Norbert Elias's The CivilizingProcess and Michel Foucault'sThe Historyof Sexuality,especiallythe second and thirdvolumes entitled, The Useof Pleasureand The Careof the Self.2The second respectively, task is to identify some key modificationsin Foucault'streatmentof history,power,and knowledgethat occurredbetweenhis earlierwork, for exampleMadnessand Civilization and Disciplineand Punish,3and his later work, especially The Historyof Sexuality.The third objective is to set out a researchagenda that confrontssome of the main issues arising from a considerationof some importantremainingdifferences betweenElias and Foucault.4

ConvergencebetweenFoucaultand Elias The intellectualapproachesto understandingsociety taken by Michel Foucaultand Norbert Elias do not seem at first sight to have much in common.5Adherentsof Elias are likely to have very serious reservations about a work such as Discipline and Punish, which assumes a sharphistoricalbreakbetweentwo regimesof politicaland social conas trol, treats"truth" an expressionof practicesof power,and sees the modern self as the prisonerof a docile body, the artefactof a Panoptic technology operating through the carceralnetwork of a disciplinary society. What could be more at odds than this with Elias'sview that individualization [theprocessof becoming,and learning,who we are as particular
Theory and Society 28: 79-100, 1999. ? 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

80 [the process of becoming, people] and the acquisitionof a "we-image" and learning, who we are as group members]occur within dynamic social networks or figurationssuch as families, occupationalgroups, and nations?Elias argues that these figurationscontain complex and actorssuchas husbands/ shiftingpowerbalancesamonginterdependent and wives, subjects/rulers, so on, and that figurationsof this kind take shape and are transformedin the course of social processes such as state-formation,class-formation,nation-formation,and the civilizing process with a distinctive structure that becomes visible over long periods of time.6 Elias'stheoryof the civilizingprocesswith its emphasison the inculcawas influenced tion of self-restraint, shame,and repugnance profoundly By by Freudianpsychology.7 contrast, in the opening chaptersof The
History of Sexuality. Volume I: an Introduction, Foucault lays into the

Freudian"repressive hypothesis"with gusto, arguingit is misleading to give a centralplace to the exerciseof psychologicalcontrolsover the expressionof libidinousimpulseswhen trying to explainthe workings thereis a In of modern society.8 spite of this unpromisingbackground, of intellectualconvergencebetweenthe second and remarkable degree thirdvolumes of Foucault'sThe Historyof Sexuality,entitled, respectively, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, and Elias's The Civilizing Process, works separated by over four decades. The Civilizing

Process,Elias'sfirstmajorpublishedwork, appearedin 1939.9The Use

of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, which were Foucault's last major

publishedbooks, appearedin 1984,the yearof his death.10 It is helpfulto begin with a very brief summaryof these two works. In The CivilizingProcess, Elias looks at "unintendedand unplanned" changesin "the structureof Westernsociety"and in "the standardof behaviourand the psychicalmakeupof Westernpeoples."1 He argues that over time controlled,peaceful,and refinedforms of interpersonal behaviordeveloped, in the form of courtoisieat the courts of feudal lords and, later,as civilitein the courtsof absolutistrulers.The warrior class was increasinglypacified.Its membershad to adopt increasingly high standards of self-restraintin respect of natural functions and bodily behavior.As Elias puts it, with the "monopolizationof physical violence at the point of intersectionof a multitudeof social interconnections, the whole apparatuswhich shapes the individual,the modes of operationof the social demandsand prohibitionswhich mould his social makeup,and above all the kinds of fear that play a part [were] decisivelychanged."12

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In the first volume of his trilogy on sexuality,Foucault outlines the centralplace of sexualityin the controllingdiscoursesof modern society. He emphasizesthe capacityof these invasivediscoursesto shape, constrict, and distort human impulses and the sense of self. However,
his second and third volumes, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the

Self, contain evidence that within the scope given by their power situation and knowledgemany citizens of ancient Greece and Rome were able to live relativelysatisfyinglives accordingto an ethos based on rationalself-masteryand the pursuitof pleasurewithout ill-health. In this context, Foucaultconcentrateson three areas:care and enjoyment of the body, with special regardto sex, diet, and medical treatment; relations between husbands and wives; and relations between adult males and young boys. As part of his argument, he tries to explain why wives became more powerful and sexual relations more restrainedand austerebetweenthe fourthcenturyB.C. and the second centuryA.D. These two works by Elias and Foucault are both concernedwith how perceptionsof selfhood and society along with standardsof behavior with respectto bodily functionsand the management humanfeelings of have been transformedin the course of Western history. Foucault's account relates mainly to Greek and Roman society between the fourth century B.C. and the second centuryA.D., although he makes occasional referencesback to Homerictimes and has substantialcomments on the medieval and modern periods in European history. Elias'sargumentis mainly focusedon Europebetweenthe twelfthand eighteenthcenturiesA.D. while making many referencesto the centuries precedingand following. In these two works Foucault and Elias, througha kind of unwittingcollaboration,providea criticalanalysisof Western social developmentand mores from the pre-Socraticto the post-Kantianeras. Socratesand Kant are key figuresfor Foucaultand Elias respectively, predecessorsto be both greatly admired and heavily criticized.The two philosophers stand at the ends of a long Western tradition of philosophy and science that sought to discoverthe underlyingprinciples of life and nature and subject them to control with the aid of a coherent intellectual system. According to Nietzsche, this approach was based on "a profoundillusion,"that is, "the imperturbable belief with the clue of logic, thinkingcan reachto the innermostdepths that, of being" (Birthof Tragedy, 53). Foucault is deeply influencedby the Nietzschean and Heideggerianaspirationof sweepingaside the meta-

82 physics of Socrates and Plato so as to achieve a much more direct experienceof the "depthsof being."13 He shares Heidegger'sinterest in pre-Socraticthinkerssuch as Heraclituswhose works, supposedly, expresseda more primalor authenticexperienceof being.14 Elias is also hostile to the metaphysicaltradition from Socrates to Kant but believesHeideggerianexistentialismfails to make a decisive breakwith that traditionin a key respect.It continuesto adhereto the model of homoclausus,the idea that each humanbeingis an "enclosed" consciousness. Eliasproposesan alternative individual,a self-contained model of hominiaperti, the idea that individualsand groups acquire their multipleidentities(with respect to, for example,their individual nation, occupation,religion,ethnicity, persona,theirgender,kin-group, and so on) throughthe experienceof participatingin complex social networksor "figurations" shapedby long-termsocial processes.As has been noted, in Elias's view, identity formation is a shared already social experience,shapedby social and historicallocation. Elias wants to make his own approachto sociology a central feature of modern post-Kantianthinking.'5 In fact, Foucaultand Elias both underminethe model of homoclausus. In works such as Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that the modern self is shaped from "outside"by the penetrating,disciplining force of discursivepractices.However,unlike Elias, Foucaultdoes not believe it is feasible for modern citizens to achieve a high degree of relativeautonomy in exercisingrational choice. In his view, the only proper responses to "disciplinarysociety,"once its nature is understood, are either direct political attack upon its structuresor radical action to subvertthe consciousness of self it imposes upon us. This action includesthe pursuitof limit-experiences throughvariousforms with the bodily senses. Foucault was engaged in of experimentation while workingon The just such a programof personalexperimentation Historyof Sexualityfrom the mid 1970sto the mid 1980s.16 Foucault spent some eight or nine years exploring a Greco-Roman culturethat was also very interestedin the limits boundingthe experience of bodily pleasure.However,the Greco-Romancontext differed from the one experiencedby Foucaultin his daily life in two respects: first, in Greece and Rome the pursuit of bodily pleasure by adult citizens was generallyregardedas a natural and proper activity,not in itself shameful;and, second, the "limits"of interest to Greek and Roman citizens were the boundariesbeyond which you could not go

83 without damagingyour health, showingbad judgment, or losing control to an unacceptable degree. The idea was to maximize pleasure within these limits. In other words, pleasure and control could be combinedwithinthe everyday social worldby exercisinggoodjudgment in the light of relevantknowledgeabout the body, diet, medicine, and so on. This made a fascinating contrast with the modern world, as understood by Foucault, for here, in his view, both pleasure and insight could be gained by transgressinglimits, by deliberatelygoing beyond the frontiersthat led to high physical,psychological,or social
risk.17

In The History of Sexuality and The CivilizingProcess, respectively, Foucault and Elias make use of contemporaryworks giving advice on how to behavein relationto yourselfand others, how to manageyour body and your feelings, and how to do the best for yourself in potentially risky or troublesome situations. For example, in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, Foucault cites writings such as Hippocrates'sRegimen in Health, Xenephon's Oconomicus,Demosthenes's Erotic Essay, Artemidorus'sInterpretation Dreams, and of Plutarch's on Love.In TheHistoryof Manners, firstvolume the Dialogue of The CivilizingProcess, Elias turns to works such as Erasmus'sDe civilitate morumpuerilium, Giovanni della Casa's Galateo, and La Salle'sLes Reglesde la bienseanceet de la civilitechretienne.'8 The advicebooks cited by both Elias and Foucaultgive guidanceabout how one should behaveas human beings within particularsituations. They help one decide what to do or not to do. The "should"is prudential and practical, a guide to getting throughlife in such a way as to ensure survival,maximize success, and avoid physical, psychological, and social penalties. In classical Greece and Rome, the "use of pleasure"and "careof the self" were not just, or even mainly, a matter of sexual practices.Concernwith sexual behaviorwas integralto life but not central,beingcloselyinterwoven with medicine,dietetics,economics (in its originalsense of householdmanagement), politics, and the interof dreams. pretation In Greek and Roman eyes, how competely you managedyour bodily passions and your own householdwas an indication of how skillfully you were likely to behaveas a public figureon the political or military in stage. Similarly, the Frenchcourt as studiedby Elias, it was accepted that good table manners,properconduct towardthe opposite sex and, more generally,skill in conversationand etiquettewere more likely to

84 advance than retard a courtier'spolitical career. Elias and Foucault both deal with areas of human conduct in which the managementof naturalfunctions [for example, sex, eating, drinking,excretion]overlaps with the strategicor tactical pursuitof survivaland advantagein respectof health, marriage,friendship,politics, and so on.19 The practicesinvolvedin care,or watchfulmanagement,of the self had not only political but also ontological implications. In other words, they were closely bound up with not only how people got on in the world but also how they understood themselves.Foucault and Elias are both deeply interestedin the links between how we "manage"or "copewith"our bodily urges and how we conceptualizethe "self,"its substance, capacities, and obligations. Foucault's ultimate goal is a of subject.To illustratehis aphistory or "genealogy" the "desiring" proach, in the early pages of The Use of Pleasure, Foucault quotes Socrates'first speech in Plato's Phaedruswhere the philosophercondemns the love of elder men for "soft boys ... all made up with rouge

Rather then take such a remarkat and decked out in ornaments."20 face value, Foucault explores how this moral attitude was tied to a specific "axis of experience"and "clusterof concrete relationships" that changed in a specific direction over time. He concludes that Socretes'remarkswere one aspect of "athematiccomplex ... of sexual which austerity" present"veryearlyin the moral thoughtof antiquity," in strengthened significantly the courseof six centuries.21 While Foucaultbegins with Socrates,Elias begins with Kant. A major stimulus for The CivilizingProcess was Elias's own critical response carried out in the late to the moral critique of French "civilization" Elias "the middle-classGerman intelligentsia." eighteenthcenturyby to Kant'sopinion:"Cultivated a high degreeby art and science, quotes with all sorts we are civilized to a point where we are overburdened of social proprietyand decency. ... The idea of morality is a part of culture. But the application of the idea, which results only in the similitudeof moralityin the love of honour and its outwarddecency, Like Foucault,ratherthan taking such a amountsonly to civilizing."22 remarkat face value, Elias exploreshow particularexperienceswithin specificfigurationsappearingin the course of the civilizingprocessled to the appearance of civilite among the French court nobility and Kulturamong the Germanbourgeoisieof whom Kant was one of the To "spokesmen."23 be more precise,Elias argues that membersof the Germanbourgeoisiewere largelyexcludedfrom "good society"in the This contributedto "avery special provincialcourts of the aristocracy.

85

kind of bourgeois self-image, a turning away from everythingto do

with the administration of power monopolies, ... a cultivation of in-

wardness,and the elevationof spiritualand culturalachievementsto a special place in the table of values."24Elias believes these attitudes the strengthened hold of the homoclaususimage,especiallyin German thought, making the self problematicin a way that obscuredthe true characterof people and the societies to whichthey belong. Foucault and Elias apply the same methodology at this point. They both dig beneath attitudestoward"proper"social behavior.Elias explores Germanbourgeoisattitudestoward"outward decency"in a way that explainshow a specificnational class acquireda particularontology and a distinctive ethical code. Compare Foucault's analysis of Greco-Romanattitudestoward"proper" behaviorin the specific area of sexual relations. Foucault also shows that beneath the practical question of "how should one behave?"there are deeper questions of and ontology,such as "whatis one's ethical substance?" profoundconcerns about the objectsof ethicalbehavior.25 There are other close parallels between the intellectual strategies of Foucault and Elias. Foucault points out that as the Empire became more centralizedand bureaucraticthis changed the life conditions of Roman citizens and led to alterationsin behavioralstandards.Elias explainsshiftingbehavioralstandardsin medievaland modernEurope in terms of the changingsituationof the secularupperclass in Europe, as feudalsociety was pacifiedand a strongroyal authoritytook shape. It is obviously importantto recognize major differencesbetween the sequencesof historicalchangeanalyzedby the two writers.Forexample, it is evident that in the period studiedby Foucaultthe state apparatus in Rome did not achieve a power monopoly within the Empire that was as stable and centralizedas that achieved,within a smaller territory, by the state in absolutist France.However,there are four major similaritiesbetweenthe analysesprovidedby Elias and Foucault.First, they both arguethat the degreeof centralizationand the complexityof networksof interdependence increasedgreatlyover time in both cases. Second, they each argue that over several generations the group on which they focus - Roman citizens and medievalknights,respectively - underwenta considerablereductionin their relativeautonomyand the simplicityof their life condition. Third, they each show that the social functionsthat had previouslyaccompaniedthe elevatedstatusof the group that concerns them were graduallyremoved. Citizens and knightsretainedtheir status but were no longer free to govern or fight

86 for themselves.Fourth,the analysesof Foucaultand Elias show that in eachcase the responsewas twofold:to elaboratethe externalindications of social status, and to become deeply preoccupiedwith the natureof the self. Accordingto Elias, the court aristocrat,no longer a feudal warrior,is drivenby a "compulsive desirefor social prestige." is also supremely He To self-aware. quote La Bruyere,the courtieris "masterof his gestures, of his eyes and his expression;he is deep, impenetrable."26 Compare La Bruyere'swords with Foucault'sdescriptionof the standardsand preoccupationsof the propertiedRoman establishmentin the firsttwo centuriesA.D.: "On the one hand there is an accentuationof everything that allows the individual to define his identity in accordance with his statusand with the elementsthat manifestit in the most visible way. One seeks to make oneself as adequateas possible to one's own status by means of a set of signs and marks pertaining to physical bearing, clothing and accommodations, gestures of generosity and munificence,spending behaviour and so on.... But at the opposite extremeone finds the attitudethat consists of formingand recognizing
oneself as the subject of one's own actions ... through a relation ...
27 [that]is fulfilledin the sovereigntythat one exercisesover oneself."

chosen In imperialRome, political activitywas a vocation deliberately only by a minority.Those who took part needed the ability to take for responsibility theirown rationaljudgments,navigatea safe passage "the complex and shifting interplayof relationsof command through and subordination,"28 keep a clear distinctionbetweenthe public face and a well-governedinner self, and play the game of avoidingmaking enemies unnecessarilyin the highly unstableconjuncturesof imperial politics. Foucault often quotes Seneca, especially on the need for rationality, sensitivity to others, and realistic goals. The sentiment of Seneca on these mattersare very similarto those of the Due de SaintSimon, whose memoirs give Elias insights into life at the absolutist Frenchcourt.29 Elias and Foucaultboth link changes in standardsof behaviorin the of historicalperiodsthey studyto five othercharacteristics figurational These are:the densityand complexityof interdynamicsor personality. chains; the strengthsof centralizingtendencies;the level dependence of anxiety or fear; the strength of the desire to avoid specific bodily in functionsor activities["thethreshholdof repugnance" Elias's analideas and in the degreeof "austerity" Foucault's]; contemporary ysis,30

87 about the nature of the self. It is that this point that disagreements between the intellectual strategies of Foucault and Elias begin to emerge. Foucault's discussion of changing perceptions of the self in Roman times divergesin a significantrespectfromElias'sanalysisof the development of the civilized personalityin early modern Europe.Each can be taken in turn. Elias arguesthat life in court society encouragedthe personality structureto develop self-control in two respects. One is conscious self-monitoring and self-regulation combined with close observation and careful interpretationof the behavior, feelings, and intentionsof your associates,rivals,and competitors.Strongemotions are subordinatedto rationalcalculation.The other aspect of self-control is "an automatism, a self-compulsionthat [one] cannot resist." This "automatic, of blindlyfunctioningapparatus self-control" develops in life. It builds"awall of deeprootedfears" aroundeach one of us. early The first aspect of self-controltakes the form of foresight,"psychologThe second producesshame,repugnance, ization,"and rationalization. and embarrassment. These feelingsstem fromgrowingsensitivityto the nuances of our own and others' behavior.The pressuresof surviving within highly interdependent social networkslead us to treatourselves and others as a "dangerzone." We feel constant anxiety about being vulnerableto others' behavior.We sufferunrelentingtension between our inner drives and the drive-controlfunctions making us behave
"properly."31

This tension betweendrivesand drive-controlfunctioncauses modern "civilized" humanbeings to see "the individual[as] ... somethingsepa"32 rate'inside'while 'society'and otherpeople are 'external' 'alien.' and This is the origin of the tendencyfor each particularperson to think of himselfor herselfas homoclausus,separatedby an almost impregnable barrierfrom whateveris "outside." One consequence of this habit of of thought is tremendousdoubt about the "reality" our perceptionsof the world outside. Another is the inclinationto see ourselvesas comand pletely free, unique, and sovereign"individuals" to deny the fact, obvious to Elias, that we are profoundlyshaped by the societies or, more precisely,the "figurations" whichwe are born. into CompareFoucault.In his analysis,in classicalGreece,it was taken for granted that rational self-masteryon the part of adult male citizens "implieda close connection betweenthe superioritythat one exercised over oneself, the authorityone exercisedin the context of the house-

88 33 hold, and the powerone exercisedin the fieldof an agonisticsociety." However, six centuries later two major changes had occurred:reciand procityand equalityhad advancedin the household;34 local urban the traditionalsphereof the citizen, had becamepart of a "far politics, 35 more extensiveand complex field of power relations." This had two of effects:first, increasedanxietyabout the vulnerability humanbeings within an increasinglycomplex, ambiguous,and unpredictablesocial pattern of world; and second, disruptionof the old taken-for-granted between the adult male's command of himself, mutual reinforcement his command of his household, and his active participationin the controlof publicbusiness. An importantdifferencebetweenElias and Foucaultis that according to Foucault's analysis, the origin of Roman citizens' anxiety about whetherthey were doing the right thing was cognitive, not affectual. The disruptionof traditionalexpectationsmade the self as an ethical projectproblematic,causing the citizen to stop, think, and worry.Increasedanxietywas not, in Foucault'sanalysis,caused by the appearance within the psyche of a "wall of deep-rooted fears."In fact, he argues during the six-hundredyears between the fourth century B.C. and the second century A.D., sex continued to be experiencedas an enjoyable activity - natural, necessary, and strenuous - which had some unfortunateside effects:specifically,it disruptedthe male's relationshipwith himself and exhaustedhis physicalstrength.Throughout this period dynamitecontinued,so to speak, to be recognizedas dynamite but as life becamemore complex,turbulent,and uncertaingreater attention had to be paid to how this substance was stored, guarded, and used. Rationalcare was the guidingprinciple,not irrationalfear. What changed was the complexity of the figurations within which sexual pleasure and its side effects had to be managed. Increased strategicawarenesswas needed to keep oneself safe but this certainly did not mean that the sexualdrivebecame experiencedas intrinsically What it did mean was that sexualiltyhad to be treated "repugnant." with greatercare and increased awarenessof the prudence of abstinence or moderationwhen circumstancesdictated. As Foucault puts it: "Sexualpleasureas an ethical substancecontinues to be governed by relationsof force - the force against which one must struggleand over which the subjectis expected to establishhis domination.But in this game of violence, excess, rebellion and combat, the accent is placed more and more readily on the weakness of the individual,on 36 on his frailty, his needto flee,to escape,to protectand shelterhimself."

89 continuedto be consciouslyperceivedas a quasi-natural force Sexuality whose capacityto disruptrationalitywas recognizedand treatedwith This attitudedid not change significantly.38 What did great respect.37 change over time was people's perception of the rules it was prudent to follow in their public and private behavior. Specifically,there was increased insistence on the need to take personal responsibilityfor choices, and greaterawarenessof the impermanenceof personal arrangements[jobs, appointments,friendshipsand so on] and the shifting characterof social networks. Foucaultarguesthat the majorshifttowardperceiving sexualCrucially, itselfas repugnant evil coincidedwith the spreadof Christianity, and ity which encourageda furtherand even more radicalredefinitionof the self as an ethical project. A new ontology produced a new way of experiencingthe self, a new relationshipto inner drives. Christians were preoccupiedwith sinfulness.They learnedto fear their own flesh as a source of temptation leading to evil and punishment.39 They subjectedthemselves"to a generallaw that is at the same time the will of a personal god."40 Ethical fulfillmentcould only be achieved by decipheringyour soul, purifyingyour desires, and renouncingearthly satisfactions.A new regimeof confession, penitence,and hatredof the fleshwas inaugurated. This was part of a long-termprocess that could be tracedover severalcenturies.41 The analysisso far has shown that in The Useof Pleasureand The Care of the Self Foucault converged significantlywith Elias's approachin TheCivilizing Processbut that importantdifferences remainedbetween them. The next two tasks, carried out in the following section of this article are: to summarizebriefly the main changes in Foucault'sapproach as comparedwith his position in Disciplineand Punish; and, equally briefly,to identify a researchagenda flowing from the desirabilityof exploringthe implicationsof the similaritiesand differences betweenElias and Foucault.

Foucault'schangingapproach Between the mid 1970s and the early 1980s Foucault moved in three directions, intellectually. First, he explored, and implicitly recommended, a way of inculcatingknowledgethat was very differentfrom the one describedin Disciplineand Powerand the first volume of his Historyof Sexuality.Second, he developeda differentway of treating

90

power. Third, he revised his approach to the analysis of historical to change,althoughhe still referred it as "genealogy."42 On the firstpoint, Foucaultencounteredin classicalGreece and Rome a form of knowledgetransmissionby scholarsand "experts" that was an attractive alternative to the oppressive discursive practices of modernitythat shaped and blinkeredthe self. In The Use of Pleasure and The Careof the Self, he exploredthe content of "textswrittenfor the purposeof offeringrules, opinions and advice on how to behaveas one should."These texts were "designedto be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested out." They were "functionaldevices that would enable individualsto questiontheirown conduct, to watch over and give The key shape to it, and to shape themselvesas ethical subjects."43 Embeddedin the texts was the assumpphrase is "shapethemselves." tion that individualswould incorporatethe opinions and advice they offered within a larger dialogue, not only internal to the individual consciousnessbut also among friends and fellow citizens, a dialogue informedby the lessons of success and failurein confrontingthe challenges of daily life. The dialogue and practicalexperienceof citizens in the ancient world, filled the space later occupied enjoyedunder conditions of equality,44 of by the strait-jacket modern discursiveand non-discursivepractices. In fact, the Greekand Romantexts encounteredin The Useof Pleasure and The Careof the Self allow us to see Foucault'sown earlierwritings in a fresh light. The point is that the quotations from Foucault that havejust been given are equallyapplicableto his own texts.The difference is that while the ancient writerswere operatingin a social order attuned to their practices, Foucault is working against the grain of society, trying to disrupt our habitual assumptions. Books such as and Disciplineand Punishwork by stimulatMadnessand Civilization ing a new and radical awarenessof the way we experienceourselves, about the nature of the self. They encourage us to question and reevaluatethe way we conduct ourselves.45 their existence they chalBy the practicesof the modernscientific-legal complex. lenge Turningto the second point, in Discipline and Punish Foucault had been preoccupiedby the differentstrategiesof dominationand resistance in play during the pre-modernand modern epochs. As is well known, he contrasteda pre-modernstyle of domination, crystallized in the act of public execution, with a modern style, summed up in Bentham'sPanopticon.In Foucault'sview, the modern "carceral city"

91

was held in place by "a multiple networkof diverseelements - walls, These offereda terrainfor acts of spaces, institutions,rules,discourse." localized resistance, a terrain on which Foucault could alreadyhear "the distant roar of battle."46In The Care of the Self, Foucault's approachwas differentin three ways. Comparedto his earlier work, he was more detached,displayedmore sensitivityto the complexityof within human relationships,and paid more attention interdependence to the subtletiesof historicalchangewithincomplexchainsor networks of humaninterdependence. As an exampleof his changedapproach,take Foucault'sargumentthat by the second century B.C. the Roman empire had become vast, "It discontinuous,flexible,and differentiated: was a space in whichthe centresof powerweremultiple;in whichthe activities,the tensions,the conflictswere numerous;in whichthey developedin severaldirections; and in which the equilibriawere obtained througha variety of trans48 actions."47 The "smallsocietyof landowners" who were self-governing citizens and, when necessary,citizen-soldiershad passed away.As a result, "the agonistic game by which one sought to manifest and ensure one's superiorityover others ... had to be integratedinto a far more extensiveand complex field of power relations."49 In describing the situation of Roman citizens in the first and second centuriesA.D. he writes:"Ratherthan imagininga reductionor cessation of political activities throughthe effects of a centralizedimperialism,one should think in terms of the organizationof a complex space. Much vaster, much more discontinuous,much less closed than must have been the case for the small city-states, it was also more flexible, more differthan would be the authoritarianand entiated, less rigidlyhierarchized bureaucraticEmpirethat people would attempt to organize after the Foucault'ssensitivityin such pasgreat crisis of the third century."50 sages to the complexityof powerbalanceswithin complex and dynamically changingfigurationsplaces him very muchcloser to Elias than in his earlierwork. With respect to the third point, in The History of Sexuality Foucault quietlyabandonshis previousmode of historicalanalysis(for example, in The Orderof Things),which imposed sharp and absolute breaks between epochs. Instead, his analysispays more attentionto elements of continuity in long-term historical change. Specifically,he traces a moraliphased transitionin the West societies from "'ethics-oriented' ties" to "'code-oriented'moralities."Four phases can be identifiedin his analysis. In the first phase, ethics-oriented moralities based on

92 rational self-masterypredominatedwhose focus was askesis, in other words,trainingfor self-mastery. Duringa secondphase,ethics-oriented moralitiesbecame more austere.The thirdphase saw the rise of codeoriented moralities under the influence of Christianityduring the medieval era. These moralities have a "quasi-juridical form," which the of definedrulesof behavior.51 emphasized strictobservance precisely Initially, code-oriented moralities took shape in monastic settings. Later, their application was extended to include the whole of the Christianlaity.Confessionand penitencewere the key practices.They provokeda deep and wide-ranging preoccupationwith sexualthought, and behavior. In the fourth phase, modern science and the feeling, secularprofessions,backedby the centralizing bureaucratic state, took over from the Church.They employeddiscourseabout sexualityas the chief mediumof theirwill to knowledgeand will to power,especiallyin the spheresof pedagogy,medicine,and demography. This discussionof code-orientedand ethics-orientedmoralitiesshows that, despite their similarities,importantdifferencesexist betweenthe approachesof Elias and Foucault.A numberof theoreticaland empirical questionsare raisedby these differences. First, thereis the question of the relationshipsbetween the religious and military functions and in theirrelativesignificance shapingmedievalandearlymodernthought, feeling, and practice. As we see here, Elias concentrateson the warriors, Foucault on the priests. To elaboratea little, Elias follows the strandthat leads from the warriorfightingfor his life to the figuration linkingmonarchand courtiers,while Foucaultpoints towardthe intertwining strand that leads from the monk fighting for his soul to the What were the contrifigurationlinking priest and communicants.52 to butions made by each set of transformations the civilizing process, especially the inculcation of self-control, rationalization,psychologization, and the accompanyingfeelings of shame and repugnancein respect of bodily functions?Furtherresearchmight explore in more detail the specific social contexts in which the medieval and early modern manners books studied by Elias were actually used and the intentionsthat were expressedin their use. Take, for example, a key text cited by Elias: Erasmus'sDe civilitate. This work was written in the early sixteenth century for the young Prince Henry of Burgundy.Elias insists that its precepts are general and "not ... intendedfor a particularclass."However,two points are worth making. First, Elias identifies court society as a primary site wherecivilityand civilizedbehaviortook shape and arguesthat "Cler-

93 ical circles, above all, become popularizersof the courtly customs."53 Second, Erasmuswas an Augustinianmonk, a leading figure in clerical circles, and a frequenterof court society.54So the question arises: to what extent does the emphasis on reserved,tactful, and disciplined behavior in early modern Europeexpressthe complex adaptationsof the old feudal aristocracyto the pressuresand opportunitiesof court life, and to what extent does it expressthe moral imperativesof Christianityin the era of the Reformation?55 A second area to explore is the nexus of relationshipsamong affect, discourse,and self-control.Foucaultsees moderndiscursive rationality, as intrusivelypenetratingthe mind and body so as to impose practices disciplines of thought and behavior in the name of rationalityand science, stifling at birth a wide range of spontaneous impulses and imposing a narrow,conformist, and highly constrictedversion of the self. Foucault'sapproachis to search for ways of burstingout of this straitjacket,so as to allow affect to find full expression, to impinge freely upon our consciousness, allowing us to know the world and ourselves in a much richer way. By contrast, Elias assumes it is the exerciseof self-controlover affectsand drivesthat makesclearperception, rationalanalysis,and deliberateaction possible.In his view, language and discursivepractices serve two functions.On the one hand, they provide a means of controlling the self and others through the deployment of symbolic forms, for example in the guise of courtly etiquetteor scientificmethod,both of whichprovideways of subjecting eventsto a regimeof controland predictabilpotentiallyunpredictable On the other hand, discourse provides the observer(for example, ity. the social psychologistor sociologist) with evidenceabout the personality and state of mind of the speaker, and about the habitus and we-imageinculcatedwithin the groupsto whichthe speakerbelongs.56 On this matter,thereare threemajordifferences betweenFoucaultand Elias. First, Foucaulttreatsdiscursivepracticesas an alien imposition upon human beings, shaping consciousness, whereas Elias treats a group'sdiscourseas a productof its sharedexperiences,a reflectionof those experiences ratherthan somethingthat createsthem.57 Second,as we have seen, Foucault has a more positive orientation toward the affectualdimension of human existence than does Elias. Third, Elias has greaterconfidence than Foucault about the feasibilityof modern citizens being able to exercise a relativelyhigh degree of clear-sighted control over theirown lives.

94 This last point leads towardsanothermajorarea of differencebetween the two thinkers. According to Foucault, the French Revolutionary a period inaugurated regimeof centralizedscientific-legaldomination in Elias'sview, duringthe nineteenthand twentiethcenturies whereas, there have been strong tendenciestowardfunctionaldemocratization and the equalization of relations between established and outsider Elias's ambition,stated clearlyin works such as The Society groups.58 Individualsand Whatis Sociology, is to contributeto the task of of makign the insights of science, whetherin the form of "historical... or social psychology" Eliasiansociology,availableto ordinarypeople.59 Elias wants to empowerhis fellow citizensby makingscience available to them, in this way clearingtheir minds of fear and fantasy.Foucault also wants to empowerthem but by subvertingthe claims of science and allowing them to experience sharply and, perhaps, for the first time the promptingsof their innerpassions, the source of the very fear and fantasyabhorredby Elias.60 A researchagenda Empiricaland theoreticalinquiriesare both stimulatedby this debate. To concludethis article,two lines of enquirymay be brieflymentioned. One majorfocus of interestis the mutualinfluenceof the intertwining processes of professionalizationand democratizationwithin modern societies.To what extent, for example, are the interestsand wishes of "ordinarycitizens"articulatedand served in the practices of science, the state, and the professions?How are these issues affected by, for example,the risinglevel of educationwithin the population,the exploand "teamwork"within the ration of strategies of "empowerment" the breakdownof deferencein the post-colonial occupationalsphere, era, the increasing assertiveness of previously subordinate groups (includingwomen and ethnic minorities),the widespreadprivatization of public assets and services, the growing influence of "devolved" regionalpolities "below"the old nation-state,and the developmentof it? structuressuch as the EuropeanCommuity"above" supranational Turningto a second area of enquiry,the complex interplay among affect,rationality,discourse,and forms of control may be exploredby wideningthe implicitdebatebetweenElias and Foucaultto encompass other bodies of literatureincluding,for example,the critical theorists of the FrankfurtSchool.Writerssuch as Fromm and Marcuseshared Elias's interest in Freud but were, like Foucault, more pessimistic

95

about the potentialityfor human emancipationunder modern conditions.61 Another valuableresourcein this wideneddebatewould be the work of Richard Sennett who admiredElias and also workedclosely with Foucault.62It would also be useful to explore the potential contributionof innovativeresearchers such as SilvanTomkinswhose work on affecttheory and script theory suggestspromisinginsightsinto the dynamicsof pride and shame within the personalityand in social life, importantthemes in Elias's work also. Donald Nathanson, a prominent psychiatristwho has continued Tomkins'swork, makes explicit links betweenthe contributionsof Tomkinsand Elias.63 In the work of Elias and Foucault,theoreticalenquiryleads directlyto empiricalresearch.Both Elias and Foucaultwere considerablehistorians who spent long periods of time in the archives. For Foucault, concepts were not an end in themselvesbut, instead, tools with which to conductpracticalexplorationsof the social world, past and present. For his part, Elias used to encouragefollowers to conduct empirical work ratherthan spend much time musing over the details of theory. However,when empiricalwork is being carried out, it is useful to be aware of what is at stake, theoretically,to have a clear idea of the differenceeach empiricalfinding will make when placed on one side or the other of the balance producedby the ongoing theoreticalargument.This articleseeks to make clear what is at stake in a comparison betweenElias and Foucault.64

Notes
1. An earlierversion of the argumentwas presentedat the Norbert Elias Centenary Conference Bielefeld,Germanyin June1997.At this conference at ArpadSzakolcai shows Institute,Florence)informedme thathis own research (European University that in the last few yearsof his life Foucaultbecameacquainted with Elias'swork. See A. Szakolczai, divide:Foucault,Patocka,and beyondthe East-West "Thinking the care of the self,"Social Research,61/2 (1994),and Szakolczai,Max Weber and MichelFoucault.ParallelLife-Works, (London:Routledge,1998). 2. Elias, The CivilizingProcess (Oxford:Blackwell,1994), Foucault,The Historyof Sexuality,VolI: An Introduction (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1979),Foucault,The Use of Pleasure(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984),Foucault,The Careof the Self (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1984). 3. Foucault,Disciplineand Punish(Harmondsworth: Penguin,1977). 4. For some initial evidence of the plausibilityof a comparisonbetween Elias and Las Meninas:in Elias, Involvement Foucault,see their discussionsof Velasquez's and Detachment(Oxford:Blackwell,1987),lii-lxviii, and Foucault,The Orderof Things(London:Tavistock/Routledge, 1974).Both use the paiting to illustratea

96
movementaway from the "subject." Also, both Elias and Foucaultattach significance to the increasingfocus in modernityon the eye as the medium of surveilElias:"Justas naturenow becomes,far morethan lance,control,and appreciation. earlier,a source of pleasuremediatedby the eye, people too become a source of visual pleasureor, conversely, visuallyarouseddispleasure,of differentdegrees of of repugnance. The direct fear inspiredin men by men has diminished,and the innerfearmediatedthroughthe eye and throughthe superegois risingproportionately,"The CivilizingProcess,497; Foucault:"The residenceof truth in the dark to... [the]sovereignpowerof the empirical centreof thingsis linked,paradoxically, gaze that turnstheirdarknessinto light,"TheBirthof the Clinic,xiii. or For some earlierdiscussionsof Elias, see D. Smith,"NorbertElias - established outsider?"SociologicalReview(1984):367-389, and The Rise of HistoricalSociology (Cambridge: Polity,1991),42-54, 157-174. See, for example,Elias, TheSocietyof Individuals (Oxford:Blackwell,1991).For an in Discipline Punish,see P. Spierenburg, and Eliasiancritiqueof Foucault's analysis Executions theEvolution Repression and TheSpectacle Suffering. of (Cambridge: of Press,1984). University Cambridge "how much this study In The CivilizingProcess, Elias notes, with qualifications, owes to the discoveriesof SigmundFreudand the psychoanalytical school,"249. and SigmundFreud'sCivilization its Discontents(New York:Dover Publications, 1994)was firstpublishedin 1930. One,10-13. Foucault,Historyof Sexuality.Volume Elias preparedthe book subsequentlypublishedas The Court Society (Oxford: thesisin 1933. Blackwell,1983),as his Habilitation A furthervolume, Confessions the Flesh, has not been published.See Use of of Pleasure,12. xv. Ibid. Friedrich 1995),53. Nietzsche,TheBirthof Tragedy (NewYork:Dover Publications, of ... "Andis it accidentalthat in one of the fragments Heraclitus the phenomenon Martin ... of truthin the sense of uncoveredness (unhiddenness) shows through?" and Time(Oxford:Blackwell,1963),262. Heidegger,Being See, for example,Elias,Whatis Sociology? (London:Hutchinson,1978),125-133. See, for example,JamesMiller,The Passionof MichelFoucault(London:Harper Collins,1994),chaptereight. are and the impospractice" practically Interestingly, terms"discourse" "discursive sible to find in The Use of Pleasureand The Careof the Self. Foucaultgave these Was he termsa negativeloadingin his previouswork (e.g., Disciplineand Punish). withwhichhe formsof self-control to reluctant use the samelanguagein describing are to References "discourse" plentifulin the firstvolumeof was quitesympathetic? whichdealt with the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies. TheHistoryof Sexuality, See, for example, Use of Pleasure,109, 152, 204, Care of Self, 4, 193, Civilizing Process,43, 61,76. ... Foucaultwrites:"It wouldbe interesting to tracethe long historyof the connections betweenalimentaryethics and sexual ethics...; one would need to discover how, over a long period of time, the play of alimentaryprescriptionsbecame uncoupled from that of sexual morals. ... In any case, in the reflectionof the of Greeks in the classical period, it does seem that the moral problematization food, drinkand sexualactivitywas carriedout in a rathersimilarmanner"(Use of Pleasure,51;see also Careof Self, 141).

5.

6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

97
20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. Ibid., 6,19. Ibid., 21-23. Ibid.,7. Ibid. Ibid., 512. Useof Pleasure,26-27. Process,473,476. Civilizing Careof Self, 85. Ibid., 9. See, for example, Careof Self, 12, 39, 51, 85-86, 103, 148, 167, 178 (Seneca),and See CivilizingProcess,417-418,478-479, 483, 535, 538, 540 (on Saint-Simon). also CourtSociety,passim. see On "shameand repugnance," Civilizing Process,492-498. Ibid., also 445-446. Elias, TheSocietyof Individuals (Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1991). Careof Self, 94. Like Elias, Foucaultrelatesthese changesto shifts within marriageand the strucbecamea concernof tureof the RomanEmpire.He agreeswith Elias thatmarriage law and that most upper-class husbandswereunlikelyto be activein affairs public of state. Like their wives, they were "effectively excludedfrom this sphere,"Elias, "Thechangingbalanceof powerbetweenthe sexes - a process-sociological study: Culture Society(1987):304. and the exampleof the ancientRomanstate,"Theory, Careof Self, 95. Ibid., 67. Elias himselfnotes that humanbeings in the classicalera recognizedthe powerof passion. In a study of the Greekcity states of the fifth centuryB.C. he comments that expressionsof "veryhigh passionateness," examplein the sphereof viofor lence, elicited feelings of wonder combined with "compassion"for those who sufferedas a result.See Elias,"Thegenesis of sport as a sociologicalproblem," in N. Elias and E. Dunning, Quest Excitement.Sportand Leisurein the Civilizing for Process(Oxford:Blackwell,1986),145-147. This aspect of Foucault'sanalysisdiffersfrom the equivalentpart of the argument in The CivilizingProcesswhere Elias suggests that sexual drives were over time as and regarded repugnant shamefulin themselves. increasingly The Christian moral code seems to play a part in Foucault's analysis that is equivalentto the image of homo clausus in Elias's account. Both are treated as burdens See, uponhumanbeingsthatinhibittheirfullerself-realization. forexample, FoucaultHistoryof Sexuality.VolumeOne, 159,Elias, Society of Individuals,56,
Civilizing Process, 445.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

38.

39.

40. Careof Self, 239. There is insufficientspace to explorethe parallelsand overlaps with Weber but for relevantdiscussions see Szkolczai, Max Weberand Michel Foucault Foucault,and David Owen, Maturityand Modernity.Nietzsche,Weber, and theAmbivalence Reason(London:Routledge,1994). of 41. In TheCivilizing inwardness rationalisaand Process,Eliasnotes that the "increased tion"of Protestantism the "change religiousfeelingto whichsociologyhas paid in most attention hitherto is obviously closely connected to certain changes in the situationand structureof the middle classes"while the "corresponding changein Catholicism" (e.g., the foundationof the Jesuits)seems to be "in closer touchwith the absolutistcentralorgans,in a mannerfavoured the hierarchical centralist and by structureof the CatholicChurch"(494). Elias'sreferenceto the attentionpaid by

98
collectedessayson sociologiststo Protestantism may referin part to Max Weber's the sociology of religion, which were publishedin 1920just after Weber'sdeath.
This collection included The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London:

Allen and Unwin, 1976,originallypublishedin 1904-1905).Duringthe 1930s,Elias was operatingwithinan intellectualfield in whichthe memoryof Max Weberwas powerful. At Heidelberg,Elias has attended the soirees conducted by Weber's candidateunderthe sponsorshipof widow and he was, for a while, a Habilitation on Weber's brother,Alfred.See Elias, Reflections a Life (Cambridge: Polity,1994), influenceoverthe petty-bourgeoisie, commentson the Church's 96-99. ForWeber's of the part playedby the Humanistsin "the transformation a feudal and clerical education into a courtly culture based on the largesse of patrons,"the early which "set the Church'srigorousadherenceto a "soberlypracticalrationalism," of tone of a dogmaticand ethicalsystematisation the faith,"and the Church's deep and California:Unisee antipathyto sexuality, Weber,Economy Society(Berkeley, versityof CaliforniaPress, 1968),462-463, 513, 554-555, and 60-66 respectively. to In The CivilizingProcess,Elias makesvery few directreferences Weber.See xv, 526 (a critiqueof Weberon "idealtypes"),529, and 533.Thereare more references to Weberin TheCourtSociety,e.g., 37-38, 41-42, 63, 85, 110,and 121-122. 42. A genealogical approachto historical analysis assumes that events and forces fashion collide with each other throughtime in a haphazardand unpredictable leading sometimes to conflict, sometimes to fusion. The historian adopting this approachhas to give carefulattentionto preciseindividualdetails on the grounds It that this is all thereis to be discovered. wouldbe misleadingto look for heuristic or explanatory guidancein terms of some notion of broaderencompassingsocial from Nietzsche. See, espeprocesses.Foucault adapted the idea of "genealogy" cially, Foucault, "Nietzsche, genealogy, history,"in Paul Rabinow, editor, The FoucaultReader(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986),76-100. In practice,Foucault does seem to be working with some idea of "process"in the second and third volumesof TheHistoryof Sexuality,althoughit is not theorized.For example,he of writesthat "Inthe slow development the art of livingunderthe themeof the care of the self, the firsttwo centuriesof the imperialepochcan be seen as the summitof a curve"(Careof Self, 451) and, elsewhere,that "The setting up of the Christian
model of marriage [was] ... a slow, belated and difficult occurrence ... in the course of the Middle Ages" (Use of Pleasure, 221). 43. Use of Pleasure, 12-13.

44. As Foucaultexplicitlyrecognizes,this was equalityamong adult male citizens,not betweenmales and femalesor betweencitizensand slaves.See, for example,ibid., 47. 45. Elias was engagedon a parallelmission throughhis work for the GroupAnalytic Society.He undertookgroup therapysessions, applyingthe analysisdevelopedin
The Society of Individuals. See Reflections on a Life, 63-64. 46. Discipline and Punish, 308. 47. Care of Self, 82-83. 48. Use of Pleasure, 152. 49. Care of Self, 95.

50. Ibid., 82. 51. Useof Pleasure,29-30. Foucaulttakes the Socraticterm askesis from the work of Platowhereit refersto the rigoroustrainingof the bodyand soul neededto produce Askesis is a form of knowledge that "was not self-masteryand self-awareness. Foucaultfound that moral conreducibleto the mere awarenessof a principle."

99 ceptions in Greek and Greco-Romanantiquitywere much more orientedtoward practicesof the self and the questionof askesisthantowardcodificationof conduct and the strictdefinitionof whatis permittedandwhatis forbidden (Use of Pleasure, 29-30,72). Elias is quiteawarethat in medievalEurope,as in the earlydaysof Rome,"Besides fightingpotentialit was only the possession of magicalpowerthat formeda similarlyimportantsourceof social power - the priestlyfunctionhence stood alongside the warriorfunction"(Elias,"Changing balanceof powerbetweenthe sexes," In Rome, as Elias points out, the leading warriorand clan exercisedthe 294). function of the priest. In medieval Europe, the functions of warriorand priest became more clearlydifferentiated. issue of who would have the upper hand The was in disputefor a long time. See The Civilizing Process,59, 61, 83,451. Elias locates Erasmus's workin "thephasein whichthe old, feudalknightsnobility was still in decline,while the new aristocracy was still in the processof formation." He arguesthat "Thissituationgave, among others, the representatives a small, of intellectualclass, the humanist,and thus Erasmus,not only an secular-bourgeois opportunityto rise in social station, to gain renown and authority,but also a possibilityof candour and detachmentthat was not present to the same degree eitherbefore or afterward. This chance of distancingthemselves,which permitted individualrepresentatives the intellectualclass to identifytotally and uncondiof tionally with none of the social groups of their world - though, of course, they stood closerto one of them,that of the princesand of the courts,than to the others - also finds expressionin De civilitatemorum puerilium"(The CivilizingProcess, influenceof Mannheimseemsevidentin this passage. 58-59). The background One relevantsource of evidenceis the work of Dilwyn Knox who has examined school curricula,timetables,and similardocumentsfromthe period.On this basis, Knox is able to paint a picture of De Civilitatebeing used as a strictlyenforced manualof pedagogicaldiscipline,imposedthroughstrictmonitoringby inspectors, teachers,and prefects.This is a world of pious obedience,mental restraint,and bodily conformitythat remindsus of Foucault'scarceralsociety,with its Christian origins,ratherthan Elias'scourt with its turbulentwarriorpast. Much more work needs to be done in respectto the issue to whichElias devoteda meretwo pagesin the section of The CivilizingProcess entitled "A brief survey of the societies to which the texts were addressed," 81-83. See, for example,Knox, "Disciplina:the monasticand clericaloriginsof European in and civility" J. Monfasani R. G. Musto, editors, RenaissanceSociety and Culture.Essays in Honorof EugeneF Rice, Jr. (New York:ItalicaPress),1991,107-135. Foucaultagreeswith this last pointbut sees "theobserver" the guardin the tower as at the centerof the Panopticon. See, for example,CourtSociety,240-241. CompareKarl Mannheim,Ideologyand Utopia(New York:Harcourt,Braceand World,1936),35-38. vii-x; Whatis Sociology?50-70, Civilizing Societyof Individuals, Process,484. For the viewsof someonesympathetic Elias'sperspective awareof Foucault's to but critique, it is worth considering Pierre Bourdieu, who argues that "The most advancedfields are the site of... an alchemywherebyscientificlibidodominandi is into libidosciendi.This is the rationalebehindmy resistance forciblytransformed to a soft consensuswhich,in my eyes, is the worstpossiblesituation.If nothingelse, let us haveconflicts!" with Bourdieuin P. Bourdieuand L.Wacquant, An (interview

52.

53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

100
Invitationto ReflexiveSociology(Cambridge: Polity,1992),62-215, 178.See Fouof cault, TheBirthof the Clinic,Historyof Sexuality.Volume One,Elias,"Problems involvement detachment," and BritischJournalof Sociology(1956):226-252, What is Sociology?,"The sociology of knowledge:new perspectives," Sociology (1971): 149-168. 355-370, "The sciences:towardsa theory"in R. Whitley,editor, Social Processesof ScientificDevelopment (London: Routledge,1974),"Scientificestablishments"in N. Elias, H. Martins,and R. Whitley,editors, ScientificEstablishand mentsand Hierarchies (London:Reidel, 1982),Involvement Detachment(Oxand ford:Blackwell,1987,introduction Part 1),Societyof Individuals. See, for example,EricFromm,TheFearof Freedom (London:Routledge,1942)and BeaconPress,1955).For Foucault HerbertMarcuse,Erosand Civilization (Boston: on the Frankfurt School,see Foucault,Remarkson Marx(New York:Semiotext[e], 1991),115-129. See, for example,Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1977)and FleshandStone(London:Faberand Faber,1994). of Nathanson'sdevelopment Tomkins's approachis presentedin ShameandPride. Affect,Sex and the Birthof the Self (New York:Norton, 1992).On Elias, see 437448. For a contrastingperspective,see Robert van Krieken,"The organisationof the Archives de soul: Elias and Foucaulton disciplineand the self," Europeennes Sociologie (1990):353-371.

61.

62. 63.

64.