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[A] Terminology
Determinism/Hard Determinism
Indeterminism/Libertarianism
Compatibilism/Soft Determinism
[C] D’Holbach
We are motivated by the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure, but we
can’t help what gives us pain or pleasure. And even if we choose to seek pain or
to avoid pleasure, perhaps so that we can prove to ourselves that we are free to do
so, we can’t help being motivated to prove this to ourselves, so our “choice” to do
so is actually outside of our control. No matter what we do, the chain of causes
and effects that lead to our doing it is inevitable; it is never true that we “could
have done otherwise.” The example of the poisoned water (page 282) shows that
whatever we do, we do for reasons – and these reasons are ultimately
modifications in our brain that make us to choose what we choose. (Since we
can’t control the modifications in our brains, and they cause our actions, then we
can’t control our actions.)
D’Holbach says that “The man who drinks the poisoned water appears a madman,
but the actions of fools are as necessary as those of the most prudent individuals”
(p. 282) We’ll be talking about this kind of issue again when we discuss free will
and ethics.
Deliberation: We feel like we have free will because we deliberate and then
decide. But D’Holbach says that this is just the effects of two opposite motives
acting on us at the same time. “But even in the time of deliberation, during the
comparison [of the two motives], during the comparison, pending these
alternatives of love or hatred the succeed each other, sometimes with the utmost
rapidity, he is not a free agent for a single instant” (p. 283). So, we believe we
have free will because we choose, but even what we will (choose) is determined
by causes other than ourselves.
Memory: Others have said we have free will because we can remember things
that allow us to “check [our] mot unruly desires” (p. 283). For example, we may
really want to go to a movie, but remember that we need to study. This memory
allows us to overcome our current desire (even if it’s really strong). But
D’Holbach points out that we can’t control our memory; it, too, is governed by
forces beyond our control.
“But I can move my hand” (p. 285)… A person can defend the claim that she has
free will by choosing to move – or not to move – her hand. But D’Holbach says
that whatever she decides she wants to do, she wants to do for a reason (in this
case, to prove that she has free will), so the action is not free.
Why D’Holbach is a hard determinist: “When it is said that man is not a free
agent, it is not claimed to compare him to a body moved by a simple impelling
cause. He contains within himself causes inherent to his existence; he is moved
by an interior organ that has its own peculiar laws and is itself necessarily
determined in consequence of ideas formed from perceptions resulting from
sensations that it receives from exterior objects” (p. 285). That is, we do have
will, and we do determine and decide and act on the basis of our decisions. BUT
that does not mean that we are free, it just means that some of the causes of our
actions are internal to us (e.g. motives, desires, beliefs). (“In man, free agency is
nothing more than necessity contained within himself” (p. 286, last line of
reading). A hard determinist believes that free will and determinism are
incompatible, thus our will can’t be free. We’ll compare this later with soft
determinism/compatiblism.
Finally, D’Holbach says that the reason that we think that we’re free (that we feel
like we make our decisions freely) is simply that we’re not aware of the chain of
cause and effect that determines our decisions. The causes and motives that
determine our actions are too complex for us to be able to understand them. “It is
only upon his own ignorance that [man] bases the profound yet deceitful notion of
his free agency…” (p. 286)
[D] Hospers
Hospers argues that all of our actions are determined by our characters, but that
our characters are shaped by forces beyond our control. He also examines the
implications of this claim for our moral judgments.
One possible objection: some people come from bad backgrounds but become
successful; this shows that it’s possible to overcome adversity. So, why should
we excuse people who don’t? Hospers replies that if we look more closely at the
two cases, we will see differences that explain why one person becomes, for
example, a crook, and the other becomes (Hospers’s example) a bank president.
Someone might object that it is deterministic to say that we don’t determine our
characters and our characters determine our actions. This seems to imply that we
ultimately don’t determine our actions.
Hospers replies that: (1) To say that nothing could be otherwise [which a
determinist would certainly want to do] is misleading. It “invites the question,
“No? Not even if you want to?” So, Hospers seems to be saying here that if we
wanted to do otherwise, we could have. (2) To say that we couldn’t have acted
otherwise is “simply not true.” If circumstance had been different, specifically if
our desires had been different, we could have acted differently.
But, since we don’t determine our characters, it seems that Hospers is committed
to the idea that our desires couldn’t have been different. So in what sense could
we really have done otherwise? Hospers really does seem to be a hard
determinist, after all.
The issue seems to be the way he’s defining “could.” “I would not want to say
that I should have done differently even if all the conditions leading up to my
action had been the same (this is generally not what we mean by “could”
anyway); but to assert that I could have is empty, for if I did act differently from
the time before, we would automatically say that one or more of the conditions
were different…” (p. 293)
Study questions
1. What is hard determinism?
2. What is indeterminism?
3. What is compatibilism?
4. What kinds or levels of determinism are there? Briefly explain each.
5. What does D’Holbach say motivates our actions?
6. What does it mean to say we “could have done otherwise”?
7. What does D’Holbach say about deliberation?
8. Why does D’Holbach say that our memory of past events does not make us free from
our current desires?
9. Why does D’Holbach say that we think our will is free?
10. Explain what Hospers says happens when we understand the reasons for someone’s
(immoral) actions.
11. Explain why, according to Hospers, two people can come from disadvantaged
backgrounds and turn out very differently.
12. Why does Hospers say we can’t take credit for our ability to be persuaded by rational
means?
13. What does Hospers say we mean when we say that someone could have done
otherwise? Is this what we normally mean when we talk about free will?
14. Explain the difference between the “level of actions” and the “level of the springs of
actions”