NathanBrown ntbrown@ucdavis.

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OnAfterFinitude:AResponsetoPeterHallward InhisrecentreviewforRadicalPhilosophy(152)ofQuentinMeillassouxsAfter Finitude,PeterHallwardchargesMeillassouxsworkwithfourmajorflaws: 1.Anequivocationregardingtherelationofthinkingandbeing,or epistemologyandontology. 2.Anequivocationbetweenmetaphysicalandphysicalornaturalnecessity. 3.Aconfusionofpureandappliedmathematics. 4.Anincapacitytothinkconcreteprocessesofsocialandpoliticalchange. AlthoughHallwardexpressesacertainadmirationforMeillassouxsbook,theseare seriousobjections.SincethereisnospaceheretoofferapositivedefenseofAfter Finitudeonthesecountsthroughathoroughreconstructionofitsarguments,norto expressmyownreservationsaboutthelargerprojectofthebook,mygoalissimply toindicate,asbrieflyaspossible,thefalsepremisesuponwhichIbelieveeachof Hallwardsaccusationstorest. 1.HallwardassertsthatMeillassouxholdsthecorrelationistresponsibleforan ontologicalargumentregardingancestralphenomena,despitethefactthat correlationismasMeillassouxdefinesitisinrealityanepistemologicaltheory. Consideredasanepistemologicalproblem,Hallwardargues,theproblemof ancestralityposedbyMeillassouxisnoproblematall,sincetheresnothingto preventacorrelationistfromthinkingancestralobjectsorworldsthatareolder thanthethoughtthatthinksthem,orindeedolderthanthoughtitself. Hallwardsstatementfails,however,toaccountforthelogicofsuccessioninherent insuchathought,whichconstitutesthecruxofMeillassouxsanalysisof correlationismsapproachtotheproblemofancestrality.Whenthecorrelationist thinkstheancestralobjectquacorrelateofthought,sheeffectsatemporal retrojectionofthepastfromthepresent,suchthatitisnecessarytoproceedfrom thepresenttothepast,followingalogicalorder,ratherthanfromthepasttothe present,followingachronologicalorder.Forthecorrelationist,Meillassouxargues, thedeepersenseofancestralityresidesinthelogicalretrojectionimposeduponits superficiallychronologicalsense(AF16). Thus,strictosensu,thecorrelationistcannotthinkancestralobjectsaspriortothe thoughtthatthinksthem.Meillassouxsargumentissimplythatifweacceptthe priorityoflogicaloverchronologicalsuccession(thetransmutationofthedia chronicpastintoaretrojectivecorrelation)wewillbeunabletoassessscientific statementsregardingancestralphenomenawithoutdestroyingtheveritable meaningofthosestatements,whichconcernthechronologicalpriorityofthatwhich camebeforethought,regardlessofanytemporalretrojectionperformedbythinking. Whatisatstakehereaproposofthinkingandbeingisadisagreementregarding thepriorityofthelogicalcorrelationbetweenthinkingandbeingoverthe chronologicaldisjunctionofthinkingandbeing.Meillassouxspointisthatthe 1

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correlationistsinsistenceuponthepriorityoftheformerevisceratestheproper importofthelatter.TheremitofAfterFinitudeisnottosolvethisproblem,but merelytoformulateitasaproblem.Hallwarddoesnotengagetheproblemasitis formulatedinsofarasheignoresMeillassouxscritiqueoflogicalretrojection altogether. 2.HallwardcontendsthatMeillassouxscritiqueofcausalityandnecessityhis critiqueoftheprincipleofsufficientreasonblursthedistinctionbetween metaphysicalandphysicalornaturalnecessity.Itsbeenalongtime,writes Hallward,sincescientistsconfusednaturallawswithlogicalormetaphysical necessities.Myownexposuretotherhetoricofcontemporaryscienceassuresme that,onthecontrary,scientistseitherperformorareafflictedbypreciselythat confusionfairlyregularly.Itmightbemoretothepoint,however,toaskwhy Meillassouxcontinuestorelyupontheconceptoflawatall,asheseemstodo despitehisargumentthatthelawsmaybesubjecttochangewithoutreason.But thisisnotwhatHallwarddoes. TheproblemwithHallwardsownformulationsinthissectionofhisreviewisthat theyarebothquestionbeggingandirrelevanttothepurviewofMeillassouxs arguments.Hallwardpositsthatitisperfectlypossible,ofcourse,toreconstruct thelocallyeffectivereasonsandcausesthathaveshaped,forinstance,theevolution ofaerobicvertebrateorganisms.Regardlessofwhetherornotweagreewiththis contention,ithasstrictlynothingtodowithMeillassouxsbook,sinceitisan assertionabouttheoperationofevolutionasweknowit,whereasMeillassouxs argumentsconcernthepossibilitythatpreciselysuchprocessesmaybecome entirelyotherwisewithoutreason.Hallwardcontinues,therewasnothing necessaryorpredictableaboutthisevolution,butwhyshouldwedoubtthatit conformedtofamiliarlawsofcauseandeffect?HerehesimplybegsHumes question(thequestionatthecoreofMeillassouxsproject)regardingtheputative familiarityofsuchlaws.AndwhenHallwardsuggeststhattheonlyeventthat mightqualifyascontingentandwithoutreasonin[Meillassouxs]absolutesenseof thetermistheemergenceoftheuniverseitselfheagainaddressesaspeculative questionconcerningthepossiblecontingencyofthelawsfromwithinanempirical frameworkpertainingonlytothelawsastheycurrentlyareorhavebeen.Any efforttoundermineargumentsconcerningtheabsolutecontingencyofphysicallaw toutcourtonthebasisofanygivenregimeorlocalcaseofphysicallawwill obviouslybeunsuccessful.ItisnotthecasethatMeillassouxequivocatesbetween metaphysicalandnaturalnecessity,butratherthatHallwardarrivesatthis judgmentthroughhisownconflationofspeculativeandempiricalregisters. 3.PerhapsHallwardsmostseriousaccusationisthatMeillassouxflatlyconfuses pureandappliedmathematics.First,hetakesissuewithMeillassouxsuseof transfinitesettheorytoundermineeveryattempttocloseorlimitadenumerable setofpossibilities.ConcedingthatCantorsdemonstrationthatthereisanopen, unendingseriesofeverlargerinfinitenumbersclearlyhasdecisiveimplicationsfor thefoundationsofmathematics,HallwardarguesthatMeillassouxneedsto 2

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demonstratemoreexactlyhowtheseimplicationsapplytothetimeandspaceofour actuallyexistinguniverse. Again,HallwardcollapsesthespeculativeregisterofMeillassouxsargumentinto theempirical.MeillassouxdeploysCantoriandetotalizationinordertocounter resolutionsofHumesproblemthatrelyuponaprobabalisticlogicdependentupon atotalityofcases.Itistheseprobabalisticargumentsthatapplyamathematical modeltoanactuallyexisting,implicitlyclosedsetofcases.Meillassouxsargument fromtransfinitemathematicsstrikesatthismathematicalmodelitself,thereby attemptingtounderminethevalidityoftheantiHumeanconsequencesthatare drawnfromit.WhenHallwardwritesthatMeillassouxseemstoequivocate,asif theabstractimplicationsofCantoriandetotalisationmightconcerntheconcreteset ofpossibilitiesatissueinaspecificsituation,eg.inanecosystem,orinapolitical conflicthemisunderstandsormisrepresentsthestructureofMeillassouxs argument,whichaimssolelyatthemathematicalgroundsofhisopponentslogic.If Meillassouxseemstohold,asHallwardwrites,thattheCantorian transfinitemightunderwritespeculationregardingtheunreasonwherebyany actuallyexistingthingmightsuddenlybetransformed,destroyedorpreserved,he doesnotdosodirectly.He(1)deploystransfinitemathematicstounderminean argumentagainstthevalidityofsuchspeculation;hethen(2)proceedstospeculate thatthereasonwehavebeenunabletoresolveHumesproblemisthatitindexesa positiveontologicalfact(absenceofanysufficientreasonforthemanifestregularity ofphysicallaw)ratherthananepistemologicallacunae.Thefirstargumentdoes notdirectlyentailtheother;itmerelyopensapathtoitsplausiblearticulationby refutinganobviouscounterargument. Second,HallwardchargesthatMeillassouxelidesthefundamentaldifference betweenpurenumberandanappliedmeasurement.Hallwardwonderswhyan abstract,mathematizeddescriptionofanobjectshouldbeanylessminddependent oranthropocentricthanasensualorexperientialdescription.Hethengoesonto argue,theideathatthemeaningofthestatementtheuniversewasformed13.5 billionyearsagomightbeindependentofthemindthatthinksitonlymakessense ifyoudisregardthequaintlyparochialunitofmeasurementinvolved.Again,this pointhasforceonlyinsofarasitstretchesMeillassouxsargumentsbeyondthe properdomainoftheirapplicationtowhichMeillassouxhimselfiscarefulto restrictthosearguments.Meillassouxdoesnotarguethatunitsofmeasurementor mathematicaldescriptionsofobjectsmightbeindependentofthemind.He arguesthatwhatismathematizablecannotbereducedtoacorrelateofthought. ForMeillassoux(afterDescartes)themathematicaldescriptionsofphysicsor cosmologyindexprimaryqualities.WhatinterestsMeillassouxaboutthescienceof datingisthatitiscapableofestablishingstandardsofmeasurethatspecifyanorder ofchronologicalsuccession.Hedoesnotdefendthethesisthatanysuchmeasureis absoluteormindindependent.Onthecontrary,whatmattersaboutthese measurementsispreciselytheirrelativerelations.However,Meillassouxholdsthat thoserelativerelationsamounttorevisablehypothesesthatconcernanabsolute reality(whichisnotreducibletoacorrelateofthought):simplythat,forexample, 3

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theaccretionoftheearthoccurredpriortomythoughtofthatevent.Thatthe correlationistpurportedlyacknowledgesthisobviousfactwhileinterpretingitina mannerthatunderminesitsstraightforwardsenseiswhatMeillassouxfinds problematic.Thescienceofdatingindexes,throughrelativeunitsofmeasure,an orderofchronologicalsuccessionthatisabsolute(ie.itdoesnotitselfdependupon anyunitorexperienceofmeasurerelativetous).WhileIconcurwithHallwardthat thequestionofmeasure,consideredmoregenerally,maywellconstituteaproblem forMeillassoux,Hallwardwouldhavetoproperlyengagethestructureof Meillassouxsargumentinordertounderminethelatterseffortstoresuscitatethe theoryofprimaryandsecondaryqualities.Moreover,hewouldhavetodosonot simplybyreassertingthedictatesoftranscendentalidealismonthispoint,butwhile accountingforMeillassouxsintrasystemiccritiqueoftranscendentalidealisma critiquethatdoesnotrelyupontheproblemofancestrality,butratherattemptsto underminetranscendentalidealismthroughthelogicalexigenciesofitsown defenseagainstabsoluteidealism. 4.HallwardfeelsthatMeillassouxsspeculativeaffirmationofabsolutecontingency compromiseshiscapacitytothinkconcretepoliticalsituations.Ratherlikehis mentorBadiou,Hallwardwrites,tothedegreethatMeillassouxinsistsonthe absolutedisjunctionofaneventfromexistingsituationshedepriveshimselfofany concretelymediatedmeansofthinking,withandafterMarx,thepossiblewaysof changingsuchsituations.Thatisbecause,forHallward,theabstractlogical possibilityofchange(giventheabsenceofanyultimatelysufficientreason)has strictlynothingtodowithanyconcreteprocessofactualchange. Withthislastpoint,Icouldnotagreemore:Meillassouxsbookhasnothing whatsoevertodowithanempiricalanalysisofpoliticalorsocialsituationsor possiblewaysoftransformingthem.ButtheargumentsputforwardinAfter Finitudeconcerningtheabsolutecontingencyofanyandallsituationsdonot depriveMeillassouxofthemeanstothinkthepossibilityofchangewithinthose situations,or,morebroadly,withintheorderofphysicallawaswepresentlyknow it.(ThelatterispreciselythetaskthatMeillassouxaccordstoscience,whose empiricaloperationshisworkleavesentirelyunscathed).Hallwardspeculatesthat thecurrentfascinationwith[Meillassouxs]work,insomequarters,maybea symptomofimpatiencewithamoretraditionalconceptionofsocialandpolitical changenotthatwemightabruptlybeotherthanweare,butthatwemightengage withtheprocesseswherebywehavebecomewhatweare,andmightnowbeginto becomeotherwise.HereHallwardwritesasthoughthoseofuswhohavetakenan especialinterestinMeillassouxsbookhavedonesobecausewethinkthatahyper chaos,anabsolutetimeabletodestroyandcreateanydeterminedentityevent, thing,orlawmighteventuallyperformjustthosemiraculousalterationsofthe universethatwewoulddeemmostdesirableasthoughthewaywardyouthofthe contemporarycontinentalphilosophyscenehadputtheirfaithinanobscure cosmologicalpowerthatmightterminatethepredationsofneoliberalism,grant rightsofcitizenshiptothesanspapiers,ordeliveranewconstitutiontoBolivia withoutanyoneanywhereliftingafinger. 4

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TheobviousfactthatAfterFinitudedoesnotaddresspossiblewaysofchanging socialandpoliticalsituationsdoesnotimplythatMeillassouxsphilosophyimpedes orcompromisesourcapacitytodoso.Aspeculativedemonstrationthatwhatever situationiscontingentratherthannecessary(despiteitsmanifeststability)doesnot underminethepoliticalurgencyofworkingtowardthecontingentstabilityof anothersituationtowardnewanddifferentwaysofstructuringordistributing relationsamongthegiven.Aninsistenceuponorarationaldemonstrationof thecontingencyofanystablesituationthatwemightimagineorconstruct,and whichwemightcaretopreserve,wouldseemtoencourageratherthandisablethe activetaskofsuchpreservation,howeverfragilethattaskmaybe.Preciselybecause anygivenorconstructedsituationisabsolutelycontingentratherthannecessary,it hastobeupheldbyconvictionandbyforce,evenifwecannotassureitsprotection againsttheperpetualthreatofdisintegration.Contingencymeansthatstability amountstoaperpetualprocessofholdingstable,andthefactthananabsolute timemayabolishallconcretehumanprojectswithoutreasonhardlyvitiatesthe rationaleforengaginginthem. *** ThroughoutHallwardscriticismsofAfterFinitude,thebasicmoveistoextendthe booksargumentsbeyondtheproperdomainoftheirapplicationandthentohold Meillassouxaccountablefortheresultingdifficulties.Ifmanyofushavefound Meillassouxsvolumeinvigorating,thatisbecauseitopensthepromiseofanew relationbetweenrationalismandempiricismbetweenapparentlyopposed traditionsstemmingfromDescartesandHumethataremostpowerfullyand discrepantlyrepresented,today,bytheworkofBadiouandDeleuze.IfAfter Finitudemightthusbetakentoindicateonepossiblewayoutofacertaindeadlock confrontingcontemporaryphilosophy,itonlydoessoinsofaraswegraspthe subtletywithwhichMeillassouxsspeculativeapproachsustainsarigorous disjunctionbetweentherationalandtheempiricalpreciselyinordertoarticulate thepossibilityofanewwayofthinkingtheirrelation.InsofarasHallwards evaluationofMeillassouxsworkfailstorespectthatsubtlety,itmissesthepoint.