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Should the study of discourse be an important part of Political Science?

This essay argues that the study of discourse is an inevitable part of political science, but

should not be the single focus of the discipline as suggested by many discourse analysts.

The premise that politics and power is made up of ʻhuman individuals participating in forms

of understanding, comprehension or consciousnessʼ (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p.474) creates

the need for a hermeneutical angle to politics through discourse analysis, since we can

use this angle to further understand the ʻhuman individualsʼ that make up and are the

study of political science.

As a start, this essay will offer a clear assessment of what the study of political science is

focussed on and what definitions in that field give us a clearer need for a more prominent

use of discourse analysis. Secondly, this essay will elaborate on what ʻthe study of

discourseʼ entails and what can be seen as weaknesses and strengths in discourse

analysis. This essay will approach the study of discourse from the premise of political

science, instead of vice versa. Studying the core features of political science first to

determine what it lacks, needs or could use that discourse analysis has to offer.

And third, this essay assesses what benefits and additions discourse theory poses for the

study of the political and political science and how these features can be further

incorporated in political science.

Discourse theory is a crucial part of social sciences and political science in specific, for the

focus of these disciplines is largely on the human individual and how their relations and

activities constitute the ʻsocialʼ in ʻsocial sciencesʼ. As a conclusion this essay sees

discourse as a very important study within political science, and therefore significant to a

better understanding of the study of political science as a whole.

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What is ʻpolitical scienceʼ? This is a logical question to start with when determining if

political science itself could benefit from the study of discourse. ʻWhat is the nature and

purpose of political science? Posed in such a direct and stark manner, this may well be a

rather uncomfortable question to ask.ʼ (Hay, 2002, p.64) Not only is this question a rather

uncomfortable question, the posed answers in academia are rather confusing and

numerous as well. Leftwich tries to narrow it down by assessing that most academics are

concerned ʻwith the analysis of the origins, forms, distribution and control over

power.ʼ (Leftwich, 2004, p.2) or the ʻstudy of influence and the influentialʼ (Lasswell in

Leftwich, 2004, p.2). The terms coined in these definitions - such as power and influence -

show a strong trend: they are all extremely subjective and depend almost entirely on

interpretation and perception. This leaves us with the question of how we can or should

construct our perception and interpretation of definitions like that. Whose subjectivity and

interpretation do they depend on? One clear characteristic is the involvement of humans

and social conventions. This seems to be one of the few clear and widely agreed upon

characteristics of politics: the involvement of social conventions by human beings

(Leftwich, 2004, pp.1-2). Or as Bevir and Rhodes put it: ʻpeople act on their beliefs and

preferencesʼ (in Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p.132) Bevir and Rhodes thus acknowledge that

beliefs and preferences - such as concepts of power - are created and acted upon by

people themselves. This essay will elaborate on this angle to politics, power and discourse

using analyses made by Purvis and Hunt later on.

The study of discourse sees ʻlanguage as a form of social practiceʼ (Fairclough, 2001, p.

18) and ʻassumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is

conferred by historically specific systems of rulesʼ (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000,

p.2). But discourse theorists ʻfirmly reject the search for scientific laws of society and

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politics grounded on empirical generalizations, which can form the basis of testable

empirical predictions.ʼ (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.7)

Language in this case is not limited to the system or code we most commonly refer to, but

more general to all signs and symbols that convey meaning. Discourse theorist like to refer

to texts. Fairclough claims it is good to move towards a wider and more cultural concept of

a text, not only having a text refer to written or spoken language but to basically any

cultural artifact. (1995, p.4) Fairclough uses television as a clear example: it is not only the

spoken or written words that convey the information, but also the visual images, music and

sound effects.

Discourse analysts argue from a relativist point of view that our concepts of the world rely

on our interpretation and relative view of it. There is no ʻreal worldʼ - or ʻreal politicsʼ for that

matter - only the relative definitions and interpretations we accept as true or viable. This

discursivity signifies a clear playing field for discourse theory. Laclau elaborates clearly on

this in his classic quote (2001, p.108):

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do
with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism
opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their
specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions
of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is
denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive
condition of emergence.
Popper even goes on to claim that our entire perception is not based in observation: ʻThe

meaning of concepts is not grounded in observation but somehow excogitated from

unstated philosophic premises.ʼ (Meehan on Popper, 1982, p.255)

By seeing that discourse theory does not reject the existence of an ʻexternal worldʼ - as

described by Laclau - and that it thus creates a stable basis for different ontological

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approaches, we can see that it is basically designed as a research or observational tool for

political science. It should not specifically be reduced to hermeneutics, but by

acknowledging the hermeneutic and interpretivist angle to the political it can provide a

useful tool in analysing political science, rather than being the only appropriate view.

So discourse and politics are not two different or separate entities; there is no external, but

an internal relationship. Discourse is part of politics and highly interconnected with both the

practice and the study of politics. (Fairclough, 2001) Shown in the observation that politics

is defined and practiced by humans and therefore dependent on their perception and

interpretation.

The idea that human individuals participate in forms of understanding,

comprehension or consciousness of the relations and activities in which they are
involved; a conception of the social has a hermeneutic dimension, but which is not
reducible to hermeneutics.ʼ (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p.474)
This essay therefore argues that discourse theory is inevitably important to the discipline of

political science, since it is a clear part and foundation of the science itself. This essay will

further determine to what extent discourse analysis proves to be important and what it

lacks to add to the study of the political.

This essay agrees with Purvis and Hunt that the attempt by discourse analysts to reduce

politics entirely to hermeneutics is not feasible, but that hermeneutics and discourse theory

are too crucial and useful to political science to be ignored. Discourse theorists should

aspire offering tools, guidance and new dimensions to political science instead of claiming

a new ʻworld viewʼ.

To put a clear identity or definition on something creates an immediate binary opposition.

By trying to define for example politics, we also define what it is not at the same time. By

claiming politics is concerned with the study of government, we immediately create the

opposite definition of politics not being the study of e.g. gender relations. Discourse

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theorists see this an oppression of certain groups in society. By labeling people as ʻblackʼ

or ʻwhite, or ʻgayʼ or ʻstraightʼ, these actors are put into groups/boxes in society by the

groups that manage to use language to construct power most effectively. Discourse

theorists therefore claim that in society every individual should aspire to step out of these

identities and devise a personal purpose within society. However, this approach clearly

lacks a comprehensive view of society and power relations as a whole.

Because when feminists stop identifying themselves as feminists, but start devising

separate identities, it will be unlikely for these people to identify with one another, in this

case identify with feminism. On an arena level this ʻgroupʼ will thus lose its claims to power

and fall apart in individual agents with all different identities. Not having binary oppositions

at an arena level can have serious consequences in power levels for individuals that have

a significant part of their identity made up by groups or collective identities.

This examples shows how too much emphasis on using the ʻcorrectʼ and open discourse -

or none at all - can affect the outcome negatively. And sticking with the feminist example

this essay sees another clear problem with using the concept of discourse theory too

extensively in this way. Discourse analysts do not leave enough space for the effects and

implications of context.

Social identities are exceedingly complex. They are knit from a plurality of different
descriptions arising from a plurality of different signifying practices. Thus, no one is
simply a woman; one is rather, for example, a white, Jewish, middle-class woman, a
philosopher, a lesbian, a socialist, and a mother. Moreover, since everyone acts in a
plurality of different social contexts, the different descriptions comprising any
individualʼs social identity fade in and out of focus. (Wexler, 1991, p.99)
It is especially this last point that is commonly overlooked by discourse analysts. The way

we are identified or like to identify ourselves relies heavily on the context we are in. And

there is an other aspect: the aspect of time. ʻIt is not the case that peopleʼs social identities

are constructed once and for all and definitively fixed. Rather, they alter over time, shifting

with shifts in agentsʼ practices and affiliations.ʼ (Wexler, 1991, p.99)

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So when discourse theorists are left to construct a political system, this system will lack

fluidity. Funnily enough, discourse theorists see ʻa potentially infinite fluidity of

identityʼ (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.208) as an absolute necessity in decent

political environments. Practically no discourse theorists aim for something in the middle of

ʻno fixed identitiesʼ and ʻcomplete societal fixed identitiesʼ. This shows how discourse

theory is insufficient as a complete foundation of politics and political systems. However,

this essays still hold that discourse analysis is a strong tool in making political science

more comprehensive.

In conclusion, this essay has argued that the study of discourse and political science are

indissoluble and that discourse clearly is a part of political science. Discourse theory can

not offer a foundation comprehensive enough for the entire discipline of political science to

be based on. It does however offer crucial and useful tools to further assess practices and

processes in political science. And since political science consists of ʻhuman individuals

participating in forms of understanding, comprehension or consciousnessʼ (Purvis & Hunt,

1993, p.474) this essay acknowledges a clear need for a hermeneutical stance to politics

through discourse theory. Discourse theory in the end offers us a better understanding of

ʻhuman individualsʼ and how ʻpeople act on their beliefs and preferencesʼ (in Marsh &

Stoker, 2002, p.132).

Word count: 1,938

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Fairclough, Norman, (2001), Language and Power, New York: Addison-Wesley Longman

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