Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 162

Nigeria’s Defence Policy in the Fourth Republic: a Critical

Analysis

By

A. M. Katsina
08036168944, amkatsina@hotmail.com,
http://aliyu.wordpress.com
(NDA/PGS/FASS/M/088/06)

BEING
TEXT OF A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
DEFENCE STUDIES, FACULTY OF ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES, AS PART OF THE
NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE AWARD OF Msc. (DEGREE) DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Under the Supervision of:

D. O. Alabi, Ph.D. [1st Reader]


E. B. Mijah, Ph.D. [2nd Reader]

Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna


2008

i
Dedication

To my PARENTS for believing in me against all odds and in spite of my weaknesses;


To my WIFE for tolerating my offensive habit of studies first;
To my SISTERS for, I hope, trying to be better than me;
To those countless souls that perish in trying to PROTECT and PROMOTE NIGERIA’S INTEREST;
To those who nurture the NIGERIAN DREAM and truly desire to SERVE NIGERIA SELFLESSLY;
And to NIGERIA, which truly needs deliverance from the perfidy of her children.

ii
Declaration

I, Aliyu Mukhtar Katsina (NDA/PGS/FASS/M/088/06), do truthfully and knowingly declare that this
thesis is the product of an independent, original and painstaking research carried by me under the
guidance of the assigned supervisors. Efforts are made to acknowledge the sources of the works of other
persons used in compiling this thesis report. Where however inadvertently omission is made to
acknowledge any particular source, the oversight is seriously regretted.

A. M. Katsina,
Katsina, 2008

iii
Certification

This work is an independent research, carefully and independently carried, supervised and approved as part of
the necessary requirements for the award of Msc. Defence and Strategic Studies from the Nigerian Defence
Academy, Kaduna.

_________________________ _____________________

D. O. Alabi, Ph. D. Date


[First Reader]

__________________________ _____________________

E. B. Mijah, Ph. D. Date


[Second Reader]

___________________________ _____________________

H. O. D Date
Political Science and Defence Studies

__________________________ _____________________

External Supervisor Date

__________________________ _____________________

Dean, Date
Postgraduate School

iv
Acknowledgments

Praise and glory belongs to Allah (SWT), Lord of the world and Fountain head of all WISDOM,
KNOWLEDGE and INSPIRATION. Without His guidance, blessings and inspiration, I could not have
done this.

As always, I relied strongly on the knowledge and guidance of my supervisors: D. O. Alabi, Ph. D., and
E. B. Mijah Ph. D. while compiling this report. I must confess that without the encouragement, presence
of mind and tolerance of Prof. Alabi, this work would not have come into existence. I seriously owe him
a lot and I pray that may God reward him abundantly.

The greatest contribution came from my parent. My father for finding about the Academy and
sponsoring the programme; for providing me with unhindered access to his rare, huge and rich library;
for discussing some of the research related topics with me and letting me benefit from his reservoir of
knowledge; for undertaking freely, a thorough editing job on this thesis until it became presentable,
literally, he dissected the facts with his glasses falling short of rewriting another report; for inspiring me
with a zeal of you-can-do-it; and above all for his guidance, understanding and sympathy to my
shortcomings (and they are many). I am eternally grateful. And to my mother, for being the beacon of
hope that lights my path; and for believing in my innate goodness even when all others doubted me.

My wife Amina stands tall and unique in her contribution. Amina’s contribution and encouragement
come in more ways than I care to admit.

During my stay at the academy, I particularly benefited from my lecturers: Ozoemenam Mbachu, Ph. D.,
mni., E. O. Eugene, and M. O. Tedhekhe, Ph. D. Frankly, the inspiration to write on national security
came from Tedhekhe. Among my classmates, Jibrin Jibrin, Mrs Kotty, Muhammad Adamu, Akoje
Kevin and Cdr. K. C. Ezete (NN) were really helpful. Col. C. Atawe (NA) introduced me to Sun Tzu and
Clausewitz and for this I remain indebted. In Kaduna, I was assisted by my cousins Abbas B. Lawal, and
Danjuma Na’inna. However, without Yahaya, R. Haruna (Gona) and Lt. M. A. Bala (NN), I doubt if my
stay in Kaduna would have bore any fruit. I am eternally indebted to this duo. Cousin Labaran was
equally encouraging and helpful.

I must not omit to acknowledge I. S. Ogundiya, Ph. D (H.O.D Political Science, UDUS), for injecting
me with an enthusiasm for undertaking researches. I believe his instructions came in handy while
compiling this thesis. While efforts have been made to acknowledge all works cited in this thesis, where
this is overlooked, I sincerely apologise and considered it an honest omission.

Finally, I alone am responsible for all the mistakes in this thesis.

v
Table of Contents

Title page------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i
Dedication------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ii
Declaration----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
Certification---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iv
Acknowledgements------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v
Table of content------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ vi
Abbreviations-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- viii
Abstract--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ix

Chapter One: Introduction


1.1 Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.3 Research Questions-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
1.4 Research Objectives------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
1.5 Theoretical Framework---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
1.6 Significance----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
1.6.1 Theoretical Significance------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7
1.6.2 Practical Significance---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
1.7 Scope and Limitations----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
1.8 Methodology---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
1.9 Research Structure--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
1.10 Description of Key Terms----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Reference------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13

Chapter Two: Literature Review: Theoretical and Doctrinal Overview of Nigeria’s


Defence Policy
2.1 Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
2.2 Theoretical and Doctrinal Overview of Nigeria’s National Defence Policy-------------------------- 14
2.2.1 Deterrence within the Context of Nigeria’s Defence Policy ----------------------------------------- 18
2.2.2 Dominant Themes in Nigeria’s Defence Thinking----------------------------------------------------- 21
2.3 National Defence Policy: Example of Selected Countries----------------------------------------------- 25
2.3.1 United States of America----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
2.3.1.1 Washington, Monroe Doctrine, World War II, and End of Isolationism------------------------- 26
2.3.1.2 Truman Doctrine, Cold War, and Nuclear Deterrence----------------------------------------------- 27
2.3.1.3 September 9/11 Attacks, Bush Doctrine, and Future of US Policy-------------------------------- 28
2.3.2 China----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31
2.3.2.1 China’s National Defence Policy: Principles and Objectives--------------------------------------- 31
2.3.2.2 Environment of China’s National Defence Policy---------------------------------------------------- 33
2.3.3 India------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 34
2.3.3.1 Principles and Objectives of Indian National Defence Policy-------------------------------------- 35
2.3.3.2 Key Challenges of Indian National Defence Policy-------------------------------------------------- 35
2.3.4 Egypt----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
2.3.4.1 Egyptian Defence Policy: 1948 to Camp David Mutual Peace Agreement of 1979------------ 38
2.3.4.2 Egyptian Defence Policy: Post-Camp David and Beyond------------------------------------------ 40
2.3.4.3 Egyptian Defence Policy and the Challenge(s) of New Century----------------------------------- 41
Reference------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43

Chapter Three: Background Study of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1960-1999


3.1 Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
3.2 Evolution and Formation of Modern Nigerian State------------------------------------------------------ 45
3.3 National Defence Policy in the First Republic------------------------------------------------------------- 46

vi
3.3.1 Policy Objectives and Principles in the First Republic------------------------------------------------- 47
3.3.2 Policy Instruments and the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact-------------------------------------------- 48
3.3.3 Threat(s) Perception in the First Republic---------------------------------------------------------------- 51
3.4 National Defence Policy (1966-1979): Military’s First Coming, Civil War, and National
Security in the Post-War Years------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 51
3.4.1 First Phase: 15th January 1966 Coup, Ironsi Days, and the Outbreak of Civil War---------------- 52
3.4.2 Second Phase: Civil War (1967-1970), Gowon and Reconstruction: 1970-1975----------------- 55
3.4.3 Third Phase: Murtala/Obasanjo Years: 1975-1979----------------------------------------------------- 59
3.4.3.1 Policy Objectives and Operationalisation: 1975-1979----------------------------------------------- 59
3.5 National Defence Policy in the Second Republic: 1979-1983------------------------------------------ 64
3.5.1 Policy Objectives in the Second Republic--------------------------------------------------------------- 64
3.5.2 Policy Instruments in the Second Republic-------------------------------------------------------------- 64
3.5.3 Threat(s) Perception in the Second Republic------------------------------------------------------------ 65
3.6 Second Coming of the Military: 1983-1999--------------------------------------------------------------- 67
3.6.1 National Security and Threat(s) Perception under Buhari: 1983-1985------------------------------ 68
3.6.2 Changing Face of National Defence Policy under IBB: 1985-1993--------------------------------- 71
3.6.2.1 Internal Security Situation: 1985-1993----------------------------------------------------------------- 71
3.6.2.2 External Environment of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1985-1993----------------------------------- 74
3.6.3 National Security under Abacha and the Transition to Fourth Republic: 1993-1999------------- 75
3.6.3.1 Internal Security Situation: 1993-1999----------------------------------------------------------------- 75
3.6.3.2 External Environment of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1993-1999----------------------------------- 78
3.6.3.3 Instruments of Defence Policy: 1993-1999------------------------------------------------------------ 80
Reference------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 83

Chapter Four: Nigeria’s Defence Policy in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007


4.1 Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 86
4.2 Fundamental Principles and Objectives of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1999-2007------------------- 87
4.3 An Assessment of the Environment of National Defence Policy: 1999-2007------------------------ 89
4.3.1 External Environment--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 90
4.3.1 Internal Environment---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 94
4.4 Instruments of Nigeria’s Defence Policy------------------------------------------------------------------- 97
4.4.1 Armed Forces------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 97
4.5 Threat Analysis: Internal and External Threats in the Fourth Republic------------------------------- 106
4.5.1 Internal Threats----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 107
4.5.2 External Threats---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 111
4.6. An Assessment of the Defence Policy Objectives: 1999-2007----------------------------------------- 117
4.6.1 Protection and Promotion of National Sovereignty and Interest: the Bakassi Experience-------- 117
4.6.2 Provision of Humanitarian Services and Support for Civil Authority-------------------------------- 120
4.6.3 Peace Support Operations at Regional and Global Levels--------------------------------------------- 121
4.7 Flaws of Nigeria’s Defence Policy-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 123
4.7.1 Economic and Industrial Constraints---------------------------------------------------------------------- 123
4.7.2 Technological and Scientific Constraints----------------------------------------------------------------- 127
Reference------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 132

Chapter Five: Conclusion


5.1 Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 134
5.2 Summary-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 134
5.3 Conclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 139
5.4 Recommendations---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 142
Reference------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 144
Bibliography--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 145

vii
Abbreviations

AFRICOM: Africa Command


AU: African Union
DIA: Defence Intelligence Agency
DICON: Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria
ECOMOG: Economic Monitoring Group
EU: European Union
FGN: Federal Government of Nigeria
GOC: General Officer Commanding
GWOT: Global War on Terrorism
ICT: Information Communication Technology
MNCs: Multi-National Corporations
NA: Nigerian Army
NAF: Nigerian Air Force
NASS: National Assembly
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDVF: Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NDVS: Niger Delta Volunteer Service
NEEDS: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NIA: National Intelligence Agency
NN: Nigerian Navy
NNDP: Nigerian National Defence Policy
NNSP: Nigerian National Security Policy
NSA: National Security Adviser
NSO: National Security Organisation
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
RWAFF: Royal West African Frontier Force
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
SAR: Search and Rescue
SDI: Strategic Defence Initiative
SMC: Supreme Military Council
SSS: State Security Service
UNO: United Nations Organisation
USA: United States of America
USSR: United Soviet Socialist Republics
WAI: War against Indiscipline
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

8
Abstract

The changing trend of national and international threats to national security is occasioned by the evolution and
development of new factors in the internal and external environment of national security. This creates the need to
critically review Nigerian defence policy in the Fourth Republic. This was the period when most of these new
developments occurred both at national and international levels. This research primarily seeks to analyse and determine
the fundamental flaws of the policy vis-à-vis policy objectives, instruments and resources, as well as the environment in
which the policy operated. The thesis starts with a detailed thematic exposition of the doctrinal and theoretical
foundation of the Nigeria’s defence policy since independence. It argues that the doctrinal basis of the policy is anchored
on strong militaristic doctrine which seriously limits any possibility of examining security threats from non-conventional
perspective. The effect for this, it is shown is a serious and gross threat mis-analysis which breeds severe consequences
for Nigeria’s national security. The thesis argues that although not in immediate danger of conventional security threats
from her neighbours, and seriously limited by economic, industrial and technological resources, Nigeria possess enough
military capacity to protect and promote her interests in the African sub-region. In the final analysis, the thesis reveals
that the daunting challenges to Nigeria’s national security are internal and mainly socio-economic in nature. It concludes
however that technological and industrial development, strengthening the national economy and the institutionalisation
of just economic and political institutions in the country, strengthening democratic culture and values at home and within
the West African sub-region are some of the necessary steps which Nigeria must take in order to guarantee her national
security and promote her national interest.

9
“With the monstrous weapons man already has, humanity is in danger of being trapped in the world by its moral
adolescents. Our knowledge of science has already outstripped our capacity to control it. We have many men of science,
too few men of God”.

Omar N. Bradley,
General of the Army (U.S.A).

10
Chapter One
General Introduction
1.1 Introduction

Generally, the first fundamental responsibility and obligation of any state is to provide security to its

citizens. This involves relative absence of security challenges and harmful threats to their lives and properties.

The importance and relevance of this to the survival, progress and material development of any state cannot

be over emphasised. In a situation where a state possesses the capabilities to defend and promote her national

interests, the question of independence, territorial sovereignty and national development are certainly assured.

Conversely, a state that lacks the basic capabilities – political, economic, industrial and technological – to

establish and project strong national defence and security structure would become vulnerable and exposed to

various threats and challenges that could undermine her independence and development. Therefore, states

designs and evolves policy framework that seeks to harmonise their national interests with available national

resources, strategic environment and real and perceived threats. The importance of this is that defence

structure and policy provides the necessary guiding principles to national security priorities. Since prehistoric

times, human societies have always appreciated the crucial nature of strong defence structure to survival and

even development. Sun Tzu in The Art of War points out that, “War (defence) is a matter of vital importance to

the state…, the road of survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.” (Sun Tzu, 1971:63).

Consequently, defence policies and strategies evolve according to the material development of the states.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Presently, Nigeria could be ranked among countries with lowest national defence capability in the world.

The reasons are simple to establish. The basic ingredients, which make states independent, are absent. States

with well-built defence capability have a well-built economic, industrial and technological base. This supports

the defence infrastructure like the armed forces and arms industries. Since independence, Nigeria operates a

weak and royalty- oriented economy, characterised by the absence of strong and self-supporting industrial and

technological capacity. National productive sector, in essence is virtually empty, making her heavily

dependent on imports, foreign aid, and goodwill (Adeniji, 2001:3). This grossly impedes strong national

11
defence infrastructure. Essentially, national defence policy is an embodiment of a nation’s security priorities,

including an assessment of her strategic environment, threat analysis and resources allocation for maximum

realisation of objectives. Its conception and formulation therefore involves an evaluation of national resources

– economic and industrial capacity, strength and weakness of its political and other vital national institutions,

scientific and technological attainment and the general level of social justice and equality. Against this

background, Lowry (in Goodwin, 1997:7) observes that any serious national defence conception must be

hinged on the fact that the indigenous economic structure offers a foundation for the organisational and

technological progress of the military as the major instrument of national defence in particular and other vital

sectors of national development such as agriculture and social empowerment in general. Nigeria’s strategic

security posture is (NNDP, 2006:24):

Designed to guarantee national security and prosperity by deterring external threats and aggression. While the primary concern is to avoid
war through diplomacy and deterrence, the nation will ensure that the Armed Forces possess the capability to successfully defend
Nigerian territory and her people. When forced upon to do so, Nigeria will ensure that any war is brought to a conclusion favourable to
her. In this regard, the military will be guided by selected strategic options, which include prevention, protection, deterrence, rapid
mobilization, force projection and co-operation with allies.

The weak economic and industrial base and the nature of global distribution of technology disallows for

higher level of optimism on Nigeria’s ability to pursue this posture. One of the constant and puzzling policy

problems in the country is how to harmonize policy formulation with objective reality on ground. Other

countries are mindful of this need for policy harmonisation. According to Deitchman (1982:220), “the realities

have proven to be different… all that has emerged with certainty is that rates of destruction of the machinery

of war, when engagements take place, will be much higher than ever before… and that, the great

sophistication that makes weapons smart is also, in most cases, making them expensive”. Nigeria’s national

defence policy has many fundamental flaws that inhibit its proper operationalisation. For instance, the policy

has not properly articulated how Nigeria will attain the independent capacity for deterrence and its

employment as a principle of national defence. It is unwise to assume that the existing military infrastructure

provides sufficient deterrence against potential aggressors. Without strong and self-propelled indigenous

technological and industrial base, Nigeria cannot hope to develop enough military infrastructures as

instruments of national defence policy. In today’s war, technology significantly determines the outcome. Since
12
independence, Nigeria never exhibits any remarkable commitment towards technological and scientific

revolution (Ugwuoha, 2008). In fact, Nigeria has lost the initiative, when at the end of the civil war she had

the momentum and the opportunity to exploit the indigenous military technologies employed by the Biafrans

to develop and transform her defence infrastructure (Ogbudinkpa, 1985, Lipede, 1996:34). During the war, in

Biafra, “a Petroleum Management Board was established for procurement, management and distribution of

POL (sic). The board designed and built a sizeable and efficient fuel refinery, which produced petrol, diesel,

and engine oil at considerably fast rate…, and Research and Production Board was established. This

organization researched and manufactured rockets, mines, tanks, grenades, launchers, bombs, flame throwers,

vaccines, biological and alcoholic beverages and so forth” (Atofarati,1992). If Nigeria had experimented with

some of those technologies, the military in particular and the country in general would have been less

dependent on foreign technologies.

For a country that cannot generate sufficient technological, industrial or economic output to support

modern military, it is pointless to talk of force projection, rapid mobilization or even co-operation with allies

on an equal basis. “Military technology… has been an important means of changing the world balance of

power. Thanks to the sailing ship and to gunpowder, European states had initially succeeded in gaining an

ascendancy over the rest of the world that lasted for several centuries. The employment of military technology

in wars between major powers was critical in the rise of some (powers) and the decline of others” (Basiuk,

1999:12). Granting that Nigeria can independently sustain her militaristic national defence strategy

economically and technologically, the changing pattern and evolution of new trends and challenges in

international environment such as terrorism, cyber crime, global warming and energy insecurity revolutionises

the approach to national security in the 21st century beyond conventional security doctrines alone. According

to Lock and Wulf (in Kaldor & Asbjorn, 1979:227-228) “so long as third-world countries rely on military

technology designed and mostly produced in industrial countries, and so long as developing countries adopt

military doctrines which have been conceived in the industrialised countries and transferred, imposed via

military aid and training, political independence and military self-reliance cannot be achieved in developing

13
countries”. This is not in anyway an exceptional proposition. Ikoku (1980:45) has warned of this danger in a

different tone. Ikoku argues, “A self-reliant country would have to be conquered part by part, but these parts

will have much higher capacity to organise… non-military forms of defence often after an occupation has

taken place”. Thus, it is a matter of national emergency for policy makers and defence analysts to start

exploring the possibilities of understanding and remedying these evident flaws in the Nigeria’s national

defence policy.

1.3 Research Questions

The following are the fundamental questions, which this research seeks to answer:

I. Is the current national defence policy a product of an objective assessment of the socio-economic,

industrial and technological realities in Nigeria?

II. Is the conventional security doctrine adopted as the guiding principle of the policy, adequate to the

threats of national security and defence in the 21st century?

III. And generally, what are the fundamental flaws of this policy, with emphasis on the Fourth Republic:

1999-2007?

1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of this research are:

I. To historically trace the evolution of the National Defence Policy of Nigeria;

II. To critically examine Nigeria’s defence policy in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007;

III. To examine the constraints faced by the policy;

IV. To suggest possible ways of remedying these constraints.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The concept of conventional defence strategy precedes from the viewpoint that acquisition and building of

strong and sophisticated Armed Forces is a necessary element and guarantor for national security (Ejogba,

2006:307). Conventional theorists including Sun Tzu (1971), Clausewitz (1976) and Morgenthau (in

Freedman, 1994), seeks to justify their postulations on the premise that naked force and military power are the

14
sole ingredients, which human communities fear and respect. According to Alabi (1997:129), “the

conventional… doctrine rests on the assumption that only a (strong) military system can effectively deter

force (attacks) and threats of force (blackmail)…”. This is sometimes described as militarism. The concept

greatly exaggerates the importance of a strong and organized military against security threats. Obasanjo,

Nigeria’s president in the period under study betrayed this propensity to over glorify the relevance of military

to national security calculations thus, “the Armed Forces of any nation are the most visible expression of its

sovereignty and preparedness to secure its place in the comity of nations” (NNDP, 2006:v). Generally, the

conventionalists insist that “all states are driven by an urge to enlarge their territory and enhance their prestige,

and that only military power in the hands of other states restrain them (Palmer and Perkins, 2004:211).

New developments however, coupled with the inadequacy of the conventional security doctrine to explain

serious security breaches in the 21st century obligate the study of national security from a different perspective.

According to Nweke (1988:1), the tendency to equate national defence with militarism bestows undue

superiority on the military as “the custodians of national defence”. It also creates injurious feeling among the

military that peace, security, and progress can only be achieved through them. Conventional doctrine fails to

understand that, the issue of defence transcends military force and encompasses the general well-being and

progress of all members of the society. The state can only remain safe and secured when its citizenry have a

sense of belonging to a common political authority, enjoy equal economic, political and human freedoms.

Thus, this thesis adopts the theoretical postulations of what Imobighe (in Ejogba, 2006:307) describes as

revisionist school of national security. This revisionist paradigm according to Ejogba (2006:308):

Sought security in economic development and help in widening the scope of security from pre-occupation with military arsenals to non-
military issues. According to this view, the utility of military power is declining and this means that states ought to concern themselves
with issues of economic development that would benefit their people. A state will be said to be experiencing a sense of false security if it
still wallows in food shortages, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capita income, a higher rate of illiteracy,
unemployment, etc…security follows from economic development and other essential welfare programmes designed to guarantee the
well being of a people rather than over-indulgence in military power which only gives spurious sense of security.

One needs only to look at international configuration today to accept the relevance and canniness of this

paradigm. Despite super abundance of ultra-modern military, Israel could not for the last forty years subdued

her Palestinian neighbours. Thus to Okwori (1995:20), “national security can not, and infact should not, be

15
reduced to the acquisition of military hardware alone”. According to Tedheke (1998:6), “the term security

goes well beyond military consideration. Security can be understood both as a defence against external (or

internal) threats as well as the overall socio-economic well being of the society”. Fundamentally, the

revisionist school of national defence emphasises shift in studying issues of security and national defence

from the military angle. The new focus advocated by this school is an emphasis on strengthening internal

economic, political and other social institutions and structures, promotion of the general development of the

society and the well-being of its members. The evolution of this school followed trends and developments in

international relations since the mid-80s when the utility of military as an instrument of national security and

foreign policy increasingly began to diminish.

Today, despite the suitability of this paradigm to national security questions in most of African countries, its

weakness in other circumstances is quite glaring. For instance, no matter how hard the proponents of this

theory would try, it is almost impossible to explain away the relevance of military and other physical

instruments of national security and defence such as the police. The assumption that through economic

development and just political system, all need for physical instruments of security would cease because the

true security is human development could at best be described as utopia. Physical instruments of defence,

especially the military for deterrent purposes, will continue to be relevant in national security calculations.

These notwithstanding, there is sufficient understanding and appreciation of the true meaning of security in

this paradigm to use it as the theoretical framework for this thesis.

1.6 Significance

Threats emanating from non-military angle in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era – ill-defined and

ubiquitous Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), erosion of state sovereignty as an effect of globalisation, global

warming, energy crisis, intra-state conflicts and general level of political instability and economic dependence

in Africa – seriously affect national security calculations in the world today. There is the need therefore to

critically examine Nigeria’s defence policy and determine its flaws vis-à-vis these enormous challenges. The

relevance of this thesis is divided into theoretical and practical significance.

16
1.6.1 Theoretical Significance

The idea of national defence among many people implies the capacity to operate modernised and well-

equipped armed forces. This also involves modern system of communications, intelligence, massive

armament build up, systematic means of recruitment and training of armed personnel, or as Alabi & Fage (in

Fage, 2002:165) points that the “ordinary Nigerian has no concept of integrated defence. His idea of defence

policy is that of bullets and guns and the uniformed individuals who live in the barracks”. We neglect to study

and explain other equally crucial elements of national defence, which do not however fall within the core

conventional matrix. These invariably includes a strong national ideology which is always the supreme value

uniting the peoples together, just economic institutions and structures, which always determine the level of

material condition of the people in general, all supported by a credible political system and strong national

leadership. Alabi & Fage (in Fage, 2002:167) argues for this shift thus, “ obviously, security measures must be

directed towards immaterial objects like life-style, culture, freedom, identity and the protection of nature, and

away from the hitherto militaristic conception (emphasis added)”. Theoretically, the study joins the debate in

seeking to explain the concept of defence and security away from the hitherto conventional and militaristic

angle. It aims to arrive at a definite scientific conclusion while taking into consideration Nigeria’s peculiar

historical experience. In the end, the research seeks to offer a scientific explanation on the true meaning and

nature of the present national defence policy as well as its incompatibility in the 21 st century. It is believed that

the findings of this thesis can be applicable to most African states even though the scope of the study covers

Nigeria alone. This is because of similarities in their socio-economic and political process of formation and

prevailing material conditions.

1.6.2 Practical Significance

Frankly, there is a manifest lack of understanding among Nigeria’s policy makers on how the national

defence policy should be formulated. Nigeria’s policy makers have come to view this issue in a strictly

conventional sense, thereby reducing its significance to the logic of militarism. Consequently, policy

conception and formulation reflects this distortion. Practically, this research seeks to correct this distortion and

17
confusion. It offers a comprehensive explanation of the general issues and specific requirements of national

defence. This will equip the policy makers with a conceptual paradigm in line with the national

economic/industrial/technological realities. At the end of the research, there is a firm conviction that the

findings will go along way in stimulating further national debates on which direction Nigeria’s defence policy

ought to follow.

1.7 Scope and Limitations

The aim of this research is to undertake a critical review of Nigeria’s National Defence Policy. Emphasis

will be on trying to disclose the inherent contradictions within the policy such as obvious lack of objective

assessment of the national resources, changing pattern of national and international security trends in

formulating the fundamental principles of the policy. The scope of the study is the Fourth Republic, 1999-

2007. The research has its limitations. Insufficient funds limit the research from undertaking exhaustive

inquiries. Some form of information may be considered sensitive, restricted or classified. Naturally, this poses

another serious problem, hence the application of secondary data in most cases.

1.8 Methodology

Content Analysis is used as the method of data analysis in this thesis. The nature of the research

necessitates resort to secondary source of data. To this end, aside relevant textbooks for the purpose of

literature review, other published sources such as academic journals, research and seminar papers, government

publications and bulletins are to be used. Electronic sources will equally be used, especially the Internet,

which has become in contemporary time an indispensable companion to researchers. In addition to this, print

and electronic media where useful and available will be consulted.

1.9 Research Structure

This thesis is divided into five parts. Chapter One includes the general theme of the research, research

problem, research questions, research objectives, theoretical framework and the justification for the research,

which is sub-divided into theoretical and practical significance. In addition, the chapter also includes the scope

of the research, research limitations, methodology as well as research structure and clarification of key terms.

18
Literature review is Chapter Two. There is an extensive examination of the theoretical and doctrinal

overview of the Nigerian Defence Policy, the principle of deterrence as element of defence strategy within

Nigerian context, the dominant theme of the Nigerian defence thinking and, an overview of the conventional

defence strategy. Also undertaken in this chapter is a comparative survey of the national defence policies of

U.S.A, China, India and Egypt.

The Chapter Three is a background study of the Nigerian defence policy since independence. It traces the

evolution of Nigeria’s defence policy since independence. Its transformation is examined under the various

political transitions Nigeria experienced since independence. It therefore covers the civilian and military

administrations respectively.

Chapter Four explores the fundamental principles and objectives of the Nigerian defence policy in the

Fourth Republic. The internal and external environment of the defence policy is critically appraised. There is

also a thorough assessment of the objectives of the policy as well as the existing and emerging threats to

Nigeria’s national security. The limitations on the proper operationalisation of the defence policy imposed by

science and technology, as well as by weak economic and industrial base are also critically analysed in this

chapter.

Chapter Five is the last chapter. It includes summary of the research, conclusion as well as

recommendations. In addition, at the end of every chapter references are attached. Similarly, the research

includes a well-organised bibliography to facilitate further studies.

1.10 Clarification of Key Terms

The following are some of the key terms used in this thesis. For the purpose of clarity, they are defined

hereunder according to the context in which they appeared in this thesis.

I. Conventional Defence Strategy: Wikipedia, (2005) points that strategy is a Greek word; ‘strategos’

denoting the collective way of planning the conduct of war. Che Guevara (1961) defines strategy “as the

analysis of the objectives to be achieved in the light of the total military situation and the overall ways of

reaching these objectives”. According to Lipede (1996:30), “strategy involves the linkage, coordination,

19
utilisation and planning of a country’s resources in the most economical way to achieve a desired objective”.

Griess (in Elaigwu, 1994:2), argues that strategy “is the planning for, coordination of the concerted use of the

multiple means and resources to an alliance, a nation, a political group, or commander, for the purpose of

gaining an advantage over a rival”. Strategy can be formulated only after the objectives to be accomplished

have been determined. After national objectives have been determined, all aspects of the problems confronting

the state must be thoroughly examined and accurate evaluation made of the character, size and capabilities of

the various available elements of national power. Then possible course of action, utilising the national power

in varying combinations, are analysed to develop the national strategy possible. Conventional defence strategy

has been defined by Galtung (in Okwori, 1995:22) as resting on the “assumption that only a (strong) military

system can effectively deter force (attacks) and threats of force (blackmail) aiming at changing the society and

also provides a means of fighting if the attack is not deterred”. According to Peret (in Elaigwu, 1994:2-3),

conventional defence strategy is “the use of armed force to achieve the military objectives and by extension,

the purpose of war. It involves the mobilisation of a state’s overall capabilities for the purpose of

implementing its policy of war”. A purely military strategy for a state in modern time is no longer possible. A

clear-cut line of demarcation between military, economic and political matters no longer exists. Consequently,

the development of military strategy takes into consideration political and economic factors and conversely,

political strategy must be firmly based on military and economic realities (Burke, 2006).

II. National Defence policy: In simple language, defence is the general ability, power or strength of

protection against anything-harmful (Defence, 2006). Where a state is faced with imminent threats – internal

or external – to its interests, the expectation is that such a state will demonstrate enough capabilities to fend-off

those threats. In other words, defence is the method and means a state chooses or adopts in the physical

protection of its national interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Policy on the other hand connotes a

plan of action; statement of ideals proposed or adopted by a government (Hornby, 1998:893). Policymaking is

the exercise of considering all options available to the state and its corresponding resources for the realisation

of her specific objectives. Mbachu (1998:1) sees policy “as a way of dealing with public problems that

20
involves some form of concrete social action”. Chandler and Plano (in Olaniye, 1998:15) defines public

policy as “the strategic use of resources to alleviate national problems or governmental concerns”. In a similar

vein, Dimock, et al., (in Olaniye, 1998:15) sees public policy as “deciding at anytime or place what objectives

and substantive measures should be chosen in order to deal with a particular problem, issue or innovation. It

also includes the reasons they should be chosen”. Policy formulation must always be accompanied with the

instruments of achieving its goals and detailing how that could be achieved. A policy always seeks to address

a particular social problem such as health, education, foreign relations, or security. Ogomudia (in Ezete,

2007:9) explains national defence policy as “the broad course of action by government to protect the country

from any act of aggression in pursuit of its national objectives”. Ezete (2007:9) sees national defence policy

“as the programme of actions, events and activities formulated and executed by government towards ensuring

national defence and security in all ramifications”. In the context of this thesis, national defence policy is taken

to mean an elaborate course of action designed by the government in order to deal with all forms of security

threats, actual and potential, internal and external to Nigeria’s national interest.

III. National interest: According to Ezete (2007:5-6), “national interest is an elusive concept” that defies

universal definition. Ezete however argues that national interest is the sum total of all values which a state

hold sacred. Mbachu (1998:22) offers a more elaborate explanation thus, “National interest expresses core

socio-economic and political ideals, values and aspirations which are well defended at home, and pursued or

promoted or defended beyond national boundaries”. Implicitly, any value, ideal or goal, which a state

considered germane to its development and progress, is part of the national interest. Ejiofor (1981:5) points

that the “basic interests of nations are identical, and they consist of persistence, autonomy, sovereignty,

internal and external territorial integrity and, of course, stability”. These are the core interests. Nations do not

willingly negotiate them away. Other interests are categorised: intermediate and peripheral/instrumental

(Ejiofor, 1981:5). Intermediate interests, sometimes described as secondary, include economic relations with

other nations, which in turn facilitates the promotion of core interests. Peripheral or general instruments on the

other hand include alignments, external relations and aids (Ejiofor, 1981, Mbachu, 1998:23-24). Ukpabi

21
(1986:153) argues, “National security would appear to be the most vital of national interests since it is the pre-

requisite for any nation’s well-being”.

IV. National security: This is a concept that lacks universality (Ejogba, 2006:305). National security is the

ability of a nation to protect its values and interests from all forms of threats (Okwori, 1995:20). It should be

noted that the focus is on the capability for protection through available resources and this does not assigned

an exclusive right of national defence to the military alone. Therefore, a state may choose to design an

alternative means of protecting and promoting its national security without recourse to the military. National

security is concerned with national sovereignty, territorial security and self-determination without external

interference. National security is also concerned with the ability of a state to protect and promote the

individual and collective security and welfare of its members (Umar, 2000:44). Primarily, national security is

the most vital of all national interests.

V. Threat: Babangida (in Ukpabi, 1986:146) defined threat as “an intention to hurt or punish; an indication or

expression by word or deed that portends hostility or evil intention”. In this sense therefore, any act designed

and deliberately calculated to hurt, harm or injure the collective interest of a nation has become a threat. This

calculated act may however emerge from different sources and may assume different forms defending always

on the objective of the threat. Thus, a nation can face economic, political, cultural or military threats. Again,

threats may be internal or external. General observations and deductions can be made on threats. The most

important being that today there is hardly any state, which does not have, at least one form of threat or the

other facing it. According to Ukpabi (1986:147), “correct perception of threat, therefore, enables a state to

adopt the correct posture in international affairs and to make contingency plans should any threat materialise.

It is also the basis for the formulation of a realistic defence policy”.

22
Reference:

Alabi, D. O. (1997). Issues and Problems in the Nigerian Defence Policy in the 1990s: a Critical Review. Nigerian
Army Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 128-143.
Atofarati, A. A. (1992). The Nigerian Civil War, Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt. Retrieved on 6th June,
2008 from http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html
Basiuk, V. (1999). Technology, World Politics & American Policy. New York: Colombia University Press.
Burke, A. (2006). Strategy. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD] Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Clausewitz, C.V. (eds. Howard, M. & Peter, P). (1976). On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Ejogba, O. A. (2006). African Security in the Twenty-First Century. Nigerian Forum: A Journal of Opinion on
World Affairs. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 27, Nos. 9-10. pp. 303-319.
Defence. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD] Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Deitchman, S. J. (n.d.). Military Power and the Advance of Technology. Colorado: West View Press.
Ejiofor, L. U. (1981). Africa in World Politics. Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers.
Elaigwu, V. A. (1994). The Basis and Limitations of Iraq’s Strategy in the Gulf War. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.4, pp. 1-17.
Ezete, K. C. (2007). National Defence Policy and Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal. A Seminar Paper Presented at
PSDS 623 PG Seminar Series. July 2007.
Guevara, C. E. (1961). Guerrilla Warfare. Retrieved 10th September 2007, pdf.
Fage, K. S. (ed.). (2002). Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Myths, Realities, Challenges and Prospects. Kano:
Triumph Publishing Company.
Federal Government of Nigeria (2006). National Defence Policy. Federal Ministry of Defence, Abuja, Nigeria.
Hornby, A. S. (1998).Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (5th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ikoku, E. U. (1980). Self Reliance: Africa’s Survival. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing.
Lipede, A.A (1996). Strategy and Military Technology During the Nigerian Civil War. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 30-51.
Lock, P. & H. Wulf. (1979). The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-oriented Technology. (in) Kaldor,
M & Asbjorn, E. (eds.). (1979). The World Military Order: the Impact of Military Technology on the Third
World. London: Macmillan.
Lowry, S. T.(1991). Pre-classical Perceptions of Economy and Security. (in) Goodwin, C. D. (ed.). (1991). Economics
and National Security. Duke University Press, Durham and London.
Military Strategy. (2005). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved 27th, march 2007 from
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/military_srategy
Morgenthau, H. J. (1994). Six Principles of Political Realism. (in) Freedman, L. (ed.). (1994). The Ethics of War. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mbachu, O. (1998). Foreign Policy Analysis: the Nigerian Perspective. Owerri: Kosoko Press.
Nweke, G. A. (1992). Some Critical Remarks on the National Security Question. Nigerian Journal of International
Studies. pp.1-7.
Ogbudinkpa, R. (1985). The Economics of the Nigerian Civil War and its Prospects for National Development. Ibadan:
Fourth Dimension Publishers.
Olaniye, J. O. (1998). Foundation of Public Policy Analysis. Ibadan: Sunad Publishers Limited.
Okwori, A.S. (1995). Security and Deterrence: Towards Alternative Deterrence Strategy for Nigeria In the 21st Century
and Beyond. Defence Studies; Journal of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.5, pp. 19-28.
Palmer, N. D. & Howard, C. P. (2004). International Relations (3rd ed.).Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers and Distributors.
Sun Tzu. (1971). (Trans. By S. B. Griffith). The Art of War. London: Penguin Books.
Tedheke, M.E.U. (1998). Defence and Security in Nigeria: Beyond the Rhetorics. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.8, pp. 1-22.
Ugwuoha, C. (2008). Science and Technology: Whither Nigeria? Retrieved on 6th March, 2008 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/www/article/detail/?id=568
Umar, M. K. (2000). Nigeria’s Internal Security: Trends, Problems and Prospects. Defence Studies: Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.10, pp. 42-57.
Ukpabi, S. C. (1986). Strands in Nigerian Military History. Zaria, Gaskiya Corporation.

23
Chapter Two
Literature Review:
Doctrinal and Theoretical Overview of Nigeria’s Defence Policy

2.1 Introduction
Generally, national defence policy determines how well a nation endures national and international

challenges to her national interest. A strong and integrated national defence policy – one in which all elements

of state power are co-ordinated and harmonised to support national objectives after an analysis of the threats

and environment of the policy – is therefore pertinent to the security and development of any nation that

desires progress and stability in the world. However, this type of policy is always attended by doctrinal and

theoretical framework, which informed the view, prejudice and even the attitude of the policymakers. In this

chapter, attempt is made to study the major theoretical postulations and doctrinal underpinnings of the

Nigerian defence policy. The importance of this is that it offers a window view into the main strategic and

defence thinking and attitude of Nigeria since independence. Consequently, with this understanding it begins

to emerge that the defence and security structure, which exist in Nigeria today, is not actually intended for

national security or for promoting national interest. This situation reveals the profound defect inherent in the

defence thinking in the country: Nigeria’s conception of national security is profoundly different from the

widely acknowledged and obviously better definition of the post-Cold War period. The chapter proceeds from

this view to examine the fundamental principles upon which the entire Nigerian defence and security structure

subsist. Ultimately, the chapter concludes with an attempt to study the general trend of defence policy in some

pre-selected countries. These countries, it is believed offers an interesting, and unique in their respective ways,

lessons on policy formulation through taking into consideration national interest, objectives and power.

2. 2 Theoretical and Doctrinal Overview of Nigeria’s National Defence Policy

The 2006 edition of the Nigerian National Defence Policy provides the theoretical basis of the national

defence policy as “designed to guarantee national security and threats by deterring external threats and

aggression. While the primary concern is to avoid war through diplomacy and deterrence, the nation will

ensure that the Armed Forces posses the capability to successfully defend the Nigerian territory and her

24
people” (NNDP, 2006:24). It is important however to point that Nigeria’s defence policy since independence

is anchored on six interrelated principles of prevention, protection, deterrence, rapid force mobilization, force

projection and co-operation with allies (NNDP, 2006:25-26). From the above, it is possible to infer that

Nigeria’s defence policy is grounded in the conventional defence strategy.

According to Palmer & Howard (2004: xxix), national security would continue to dominate the agenda of

the state as long as it remains the prevailing form of political organisation in the world. Short of utopia, there

is no convincing evidence that states will cease to dominate all forms of political interactions at national and

international level. The reasons are obvious. Most liberal theoreticians since Hobbes (1588-1679), such as

Harrigan (1998), and Schlesinger (2004), continues to view state as the single most important social system

outside of which life is completely meaningless and impossible. Currently, the mounting assault on the

concept of statehood by proponents of globalism, and their new gospel of ‘borderless world’ has done little to

make the state seems irrelevant. For instance, Ohamae (in O’Meara, 2000:93), one of the ‘state-must-perish

champions’ stresses, “The nation-state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing

human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world”. This notwithstanding, opinions

among scholars continue to support the relevance of the state. Mayall (in Levine, 1992:28) notes that, “nation-

state remains the basic political unit. It continues to define the primary space in which political argument takes

place”. Laski (2004:25) says the importance of state is because it “becomes an organisation for enabling the

mass of men to realise social good on the largest possible scale”. This gives the state ultimate legitimacy,

authority and political sanctity to plan, and organise the best ways through which its citizens enjoy good life

including security and defence. However, this process of providing good life to its citizens brings states into

conflicts with each other. It is natural that other states would equally want what is best for their people.

Moreover, the resources being inadequate to share around, states resort to various methods and subterfuges for

dominance. This generates tension and conflicts in international relations. Sometimes, states resort to war as

an extreme measure for achieving their goals. Umar (2000:42) argues that:

25
“One of the responsibilities of modern states, indeed, even during the times of old empires, is to protect and promote their sovereign
interests; defence in terms of national security and territorial integrity. These interests are constantly under threats. These threats to
national sovereignty manifest themselves in variety of forms”.

In contemporary time, the essence of the state rests on its ability to protect and promote the security and

well-being of its members. Mbachu (1998:23), argues, “The first task of any state is to ensure the safety of life

and property of its citizens”. This provides the basis for outlining principles of national security. It is

imperative for states to design ways and conceive of means through which their interests can effectively be

secured. This explains why “the issue of national security cannot be taken for granted by any state” (Mbachu,

23). National security is central to the formulation and implementation of any fundamental policy principle

aimed at enhancing or protecting a state’s interest at internal and external levels. Umar (2004:44) observes:

National security is concerned with the maintenance of national sovereignty, territorial security of the state, the defence of national self-
determination with respect to the right to choose an independent socio-economic system without interference by external forces or
interests. National security also includes the ability of the sovereign state to protect, and promote the individual and, collective security
and, welfare of its citizens. An analysis of national security is therefore, concerned with the way and manner nations plan, make and
evaluate the decisions and policies designed to maximise their relative ability to ensure the survival and continuity of (its) vital interests.

This view on national security is further supported by the arguments of Tedheke. Tedheke (1998:6), argues,

“Security is beyond militarism. The term security goes well beyond military consideration. Security can be

understood both as a defence against external (or internal) threats as well as overall socio-economic well being

of the society”. In analysing security from this perspective, there is the dilemma of categorisation: either there

is absolute security, or there is absolute insecurity. To Tedheke, there is nothing like relative security.

McNamara (in Tedheke, 1998:6) shares this opinion:

In a modernizing society, security means development. Security is not military force though it may involve it: security is not traditional
military ability though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware though it may include it. Security is development and
without development, there can be no security.

McNamara (in Tedheke, 1998:7) further elucidates:

Any country that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosion, low
level of productivity, fragile infrastructural base for technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic
problem of unemployment has false sense of security.

National security “is more than territorial defence, it focuses on the physical, social and psychological

quality of life…both in the domestic setting and within the larger regional and global system” (italics added)

(Braithwaite, 1992:9). National security cannot be reduced to physical military strength alone. Okwori,

26
(1995:21) argues that national security based on “capability in military terms alone is not enough and should

be located within the unconventional security matrix”. Capability is defined “as the capacity of a state to effect

changes in the global environment in its own interest. By such capability, a state does what it can and suffers

what it must” in order to achieve her objectives (Okwori, 1995:21). This however is not always easy, or even

possible. The present nature of global distribution of power is such that it does not favour states that are

technologically underdeveloped. Therefore, talking of capability must always involve understanding the central

role of non-military agents in national security and defence. The highlight of this effort in fact ought to start

with the recognition that comprehensive economic development and enthronement of social justice and

equality is the cornerstone of national security and defence.

To hold that “security is the prevention of property damage, injury and loss of lives caused by military

means as well as the limitation of such damage, casualty and death in the event of war”(Okwori, 1995:20), is

quite simplistic if not overly misleading. Security entails a larger picture. One that seeks to incorporates within

its matrix the recognition of the pre-eminence of justice, egalitarianism, development and ultimately, societal

well-being as the pillars guaranteeing (or undermining, by their absence) security of the state. In essence,

security is the presence of sufficient deterrence against all forms of threats caused by in-equality, exploitation

and underdevelopment in the society. Okwori (1995:20) holds that “National security can not, and in fact

should not, be reduced to the acquisition of military hardware alone”. It is difficult not to link this attitude to

national security with countries like Nigeria. Since independence, successive administration have sought to

increase the volume of military purchases – thereby, ironically, further compromising Nigeria’s security –

without the corresponding transformation in the material condition of the people or even technological and

industrial development of the country.

There is the need to point that states always need to recognise the enormous dangers which international

environment poses to their survival. Therefore, the conception of national security ought to come between

these two extreme views. On one hand, those who maintain that security can only be achieved within the

unconventional matrix, needs to recognise the importance of military as a strong and veritable agent of

27
deterrence. On the other hand, it is important to recall the example of former USSR on how excessive

militarism can in the end become eventually tragic and catastrophic. Notwithstanding her military might,

USSR could not survive in the face of colossal economic, social and even political challenges (Powell,

2003:401-402). Palmer & Howard (2004: xxix) sees national security as the maximum reliance on a state’s

own resources. This came close to any accurate description of the concept of national security. Ikoku

(1980:45) adopts this approach to the question of national defence. He views the issue from self-sustaining

economic foundations angle. When a country is self-reliant, its capability for national defence is greatly

enhanced.

In Nigeria, the choice of conventional defence strategy no doubt is informed by the nation’s historical

experience and less by any conscious effort from the policymakers to develop a strong defence strategy for

national security. Nigeria’s geo-strategic location and her own view of national interest are equally

responsible. Located in a region of comparatively weaker countries, in terms of human and financial

resources, Nigeria could not define her national interests beyond these considerations. According to Fage

(1995:1), “since independence, successive Nigerian leaders have emphasised two principles as the

fundamental tenets of the country’s …policy. One is Afrocentricism. The other is good neighbourliness”. In

line with this thinking, Nigeria, theoretically and practically, limits her defence policy to military preparedness

as the tangible vital element of national security and defence. Nigeria’s strategy for national defence is “to

avoid war through diplomacy and deterrence; the nation will ensure that the Armed Forces possess the

capability to successfully defend Nigerian territory and people” (National Defence Policy, 2006:24). This

forms the bulk of Nigeria’s ultimate strategy of defence and security in general. Obviously, Nigeria tailors her

strategy on the employment of military firepower to discourage or deter potential enemies. It is important

therefore to look at this idea of deterrence within the context of 21st century challenges. Subsequently, there

follow an analysis of Nigeria’s general thinking on national defence and security. The analysis ends with an

intensive reflection on the doctrine of conventional defence strategy.

2.2.1 Deterrence within the Context of Nigeria’s Defence Policy

28
According to the Nigeria’s National Defence Policy (2006:25):

The nation shall maintain a credible defence capability and communicate her intentions in consonance with the prevailing circumstances
in order to ensure that potential aggressors are kept in no doubt of the willingness to use the Armed Forces and all weapons at their
disposal. Force modernization and development for the next few years shall, therefore, give priority to acquisition of relevant deterrence
capabilities.

Deterrence and force projection are the vital elements and principles upon which the national defence

policy in Nigeria rests. Deterrence has today become a cache phrase to most states unmindful of its cost

defined primarily in terms of technological, economic and industrial development. According to Synder (in

Okwori, 1995:21), deterrence:

Means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risks which outweigh his prospective
gains… Deterrence works on the enemy’s intentions, the deterrent value of military forces is their effect in reducing the likelihood of
enemy moves.

Hypothetically, Nigeria’s sub-Saharan neighbours do not have the necessary human, economic and

technological resources to compete with her. In fact, for sometimes, the belief is popular within the

policymaking circles, that because of her policy of good neighbourliness, Nigeria would not face substantial

threats to her national interests from sub-Saharan Africa. This may be far fetched. Although by any standard,

Cameroon is not to Nigeria what Pakistan is to India; still the existing relation between these two neighbours

is anything but cordial. The same cannot be said of those who by any index of analysis are not neighbours.

The idea of deterrence is an idea of economic development and integration, excellent infrastructure,

industrialisation and superior technology in relation to the immediate source of threats. Nigeria of the 21 st

century possesses none of the above. Okwori (1995:19) elaborates further on deterrence:

The understanding has been that massive acquisition of lethal weapons form the basis for effective manipulation…aimed at removing the
war option from the strategic calculations of potential adversaries, although such acquired weapons of mass destruction could be used but
only as a last resort. Global changes however call for a change or shift in the interpretation of the concepts of security and deterrence by
African states.

The challenge to Nigeria is to re-examine this principle of deterrence with a view to design and adopts less

costly, yet effective approach to national defence. It is out of question for Nigeria, to develop the technological

and economic capacity to sustain deterrence at a par with non-African states. It is pointless to waive with a

hand, the probability of one of the world powers today, especially USA, invading Nigeria. In a world where

US supremacism runs berserk, it is prudent to look at the possibilities and the options attached to each. Nigeria

29
is a considerable supplier of crude oil to US markets. NNDP (2006:13) recognises this possibility thus,

“Nigeria’s natural endowments… imposes on her, heavy responsibilities and challenges”. The nation can

equally become a target. With the growing activities of the Niger-delta militants, continued destruction of oil

facilities and disruption of oil flow to the West, it cannot be farfetched, if the US decides to go the whole nine-

yards and secure the oil flow. Already talks of establishing AFRICOM in Africa are in the pipeline.

Economic and technological development is not the only thing, which hampers proper operationalisation

of deterrence from the standpoint of conventional theories of defence. There is another power, subtle, yet

formidable, one that Okwori and all proponents of principle of deterrence failed to see. With the rather abrupt

way the Cold War was brought to an end, a new force emerges in international arena. That is terrorism. Today,

the power and impact of terrorism defies the sheer force of military. The September 9/11 attacks on USA

confirm this suspicion and bring to light the embarrassing limitations of the conventional security theories in

national defence. Not withstanding her refutation as the greatest economic, industrial, technological and

military power, agents of terrorism invaded US and wrought dangerous havoc in her own turf. With the

passage of Cold War, terrorism becomes a strong force in international politics. According Laqueur (in

O’Meara, 2000:152):

Terrorism’s prospects… are improving as its destructive potential increases. This has to do both with the rise of groups and individuals
that practice or might take up terrorism and with the weapons available to them. The past few decades have witnessed the birth of dozens
of aggressive movements espousing varieties of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, fascism, and apocalyptic millenarianism.

Terrorism is cheap, dangerous, deadly, and with fair amount of luck, quite effective. The lessons of

Afghanistan Mujahiddeen in the 1980s, Lebanon, September 9/11, resurging Taliban in Afghanistan, Iraq, and

Israel have all shown that there are forces, which cannot be fought conventionally. To Laqueur (149-150):

Terrorism has been defined as the sub-state application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or
even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change. It shades on occasion into guerrilla warfare (although unlike
guerrillas, terrorists are unable or unwilling to hold territory) and even a substitute for war between states. In its long history, terrorism has
appeared in many guises; today society faces not one terrorism but many terrorisms.

Laqueur should have added that political considerations, though mainly the dominant motive, are not the

only considerations among terrorists. In the 21st century, economic and religious considerations figure so

prominently in terrorists’ activities (Bishara, 2001). It is easy to determine that Nigeria is frankly vulnerable to

30
terrorist attacks for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, it is not easy to determine yet, if the country has even

acknowledge the enormous threats this poses to her national security. The 2006 NNDP is silent about this

threat. This points to how Nigeria (mis)perceives her security threats in the 21st century.

Yet, another dangerous enemy to deterrence is globalisation and its by-products, including information and

communication technology ICT. In this century, there are growing debates on the role of state. Many of these

centres on what they perceive to be its increasing irrelevance in an increasingly ‘globalised’ world. Internet

ensures the dissemination of all form of information, including subversive, on a global scale. This brings states

and governments under the close watch of international community. This situation seriously limits national

sovereignty. Suffice it here to posit that, states now review their national defence strategies in order to find

ways of addressing these challenges.

2.2.2 Dominant Theme(s) in the Nigerian Defence Thinking

Conventional defence doctrine is the dominant theme, which guides defence thinking in Nigeria. The

formulation and operationalisation of national defence policy along conventional lines has as long a history as

the political independence of Nigeria itself. To begin with, the conception and or formation of the tangible and

intangible aspects of state interests reflect the ideological character of the state itself. This includes historical

experience, as well as the factors (both internal and external) that shape her economic and political values. In

Nigeria, the answer to internal and external threats is seen from the angle of strong, effective, efficient, and

modern military organisation (NNDP, 2006:24). According to Alabi (1997:130), in Nigeria today, “two crucial

issues have helped to explain the militaristic perception of the country’s defence policy”. The nature of the

historical evolution of the country in general and the military in particular counts as one. Obasanjo (NNDP,

2006: v), says, “The Armed Forces of any nation are the most visible expression of its sovereignty and

preparedness to secure its place in the comity of nations”. This view betrayed the fundamental thinking among

defence planners and policymakers in Nigeria. By regarding the military as the custodians of national

sovereignty, the policymakers glorify them to the detriment of other equally vital instruments of national defence.

In its simplest and purest form, military is an institution of the state created to serve the purpose of physical

31
self-protection against harmful threats to its sovereignty and territorial interests. In this context, it is important

to point that this instrument reflects the level of development, which a society has attained, in its historical

process of development. It embodies in its purest form, the basic values and character of the society. As a tool,

it never rises above the general level of industrial and technological development, which the society has

attained. As a social institution, it embodies the dominant class character of the society (Dudley, 1978:88). To

Marxists, military is pre-eminently an apparatus of the ruling elites to aid in subjecting, dominating, repressing

and exploiting the freedom of the peoples (Engels, 1977). There are those who argue that the approach to

defence from militaristic perspective has fundamental flaws. Tedheke (1998:8) points that, the relegation of

the economy in issues of defence and security, betrays our profound lack of perspective. There is a merit to

this argument. Always, the military seems willing in being an effective accomplice in emasculating the weak

and deprived. This institution proved veritable and zealous in waging the wars of imperialism and the

subsequent enthronement of colonialism in Africa. Ever since, the role of military is not so edifying in

African economy and politics. Resources that could be used for projects of national development are divested

for their up-keep and enjoyment. In order to understand this point in its proper perspective, it is imperative to

first turn to the circumstances that led to the formation of military and indeed, entire defence structure in

Nigeria.

Historically, Nigerian Armed Forces, and by extension, the entire defence structure, is an offshoot of the

British defence structure. This indeed, is one of the remaining living legacies, and stark remainder of the

process of the emergence of Nigeria from colonial debris. According to Wikipedia (RWAFF, 2006), an online

encyclopaedia, the military in Nigeria emerged from the ashes of the Royal West African Frontier Force

(RWAFF). This was formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison her West African colonies

against purported French intrusion in to West African coast of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia.

Dudley (1978:88) adds an enlightening perspective to the understanding on the origins of Nigerian military.

The personnel were indigenous mercenary in the services of the foreign trading companies, used to harass the

indigenous population. The collection of these forces later became RWAFF. In reality, RWAFF was conceived

32
by the colonial overlords as an answer to the resistance of the indigenous communities, and in fact, any

potential resistance that may choose to recur. It was never designed, nor formed to protect the people or even

the nation. Its goal never passed beyond protecting the interest of the colonial overlords. Consequently, the

entire structure is not meant to provide national security to post-independence African states. Later, during

independence, this role of custodians of national security is conceived, without actually taking any step to alter

its values.

The second crucial issue, which explains Nigeria’s militaristic perception on defence according to Alabi

(1997:130), is the absence of national security community “through which the rich resources available in the

academic community can be mobilised to continuously contribute to national security policy formulation and

awareness”. This in Alabi’s opinion contributes immensely to a narrow, faulty, and misleading perception of

national security in Nigeria. With a comparatively large, out-ward looking culture thriving in the academic

community, it is not clear, how this can contribute towards a broad and integratist perception of national

security. Within the defence community, this is evident in the manner academicians and indeed the policy

makers continue to swallow and ape anything Western without discrimination. This prevents proper

understanding of national security in Nigeria; rather, it seeks to equate national security with modernisation

and westernisation. In fact, without trying to sound uncharitable, this act in itself is a threat to national security

and development. Therefore, as Asobie (1988:18) argues, any meaningful analysis of the militaristic nature of

the Nigerian defence policy must look at the arrangement made for security and defence of the country since

independence. This arrangement “was meant to protect the Nigerian ruling class against both external

aggression or subversion and internal rebellion”.

There were two elements to this arrangement. Internally, it is felt that the existing security apparatus is

strong enough to protect the ruling class from all forms of threats to its interests. The army effectively

demonstrates this in domestic uprisings such as Tiv riots early at independence, and the Western Region crisis.

Even after the fall of the First Republic, the ruling elites continue to rely on the military to secure their grip on

power. On external front, communism (Nigeria got her independence at the peak of the Cold War) was

33
regarded as the major threat to national security (Asobie, 1988:18). On this ground, Nigeria concluded a

mutual defence pact with Britain. The pact was to ensure that Nigeria remained within the western capitalist

orbit with Britain, a NATO member, assuming the responsibility of protecting her. This is not surprising;

Nigeria is then ruled by a party (Northern Peoples Congress) the President General (Sir Ahmadu Bello) of

which believed there is “neither need nor justification for breaking the close bonds of friendship forged with

the people of Britain” (Amune, 1986:190).

Since then, subsequent efforts in planning and designing new policies continue to reflect this conventional

security doctrine and sentiment. Among the three basic principles of Nigerian’s foreign policy identified by

Alkali (2003:183), “maintenance of national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity” forms the most

cardinal. Apparently, this is a clear testimony and demonstration of how deep and pervasive, the influence of

conventional perception of defence is in Nigeria. According to Nweke (1988: 1-2), this form of thinking

amounts to equating national security with the survival of the state, since it is pointless to talk of security of

the state until “the aggregate of people organised under it has a consciousness of belonging to a common

sovereign political community, enjoy equal political freedom, human rights, economic opportunities, and …

the state itself is able to ensure independence in its development and foreign policy”. Further, Nweke (1988:2)

admits that, although national security includes inviolable boundaries and the right to individual and collective

defence against external and internal threats, it must also involve:

Strengthening of the foundations of the political economy, abolition of all forms of internal injustices and ethno-social inequality,
persistent struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, all round development based on freedom and self-reliance, and establishment
of real equality, friendship and fraternal co-operation in international politics.

No one can argue against the need to eradicate social in-equality in the society, or establish justice. Yet,

admittedly, the strength of this argument lies in its idealistic and utopian garb. In the immediate future, it is

apparent that traces of political and socio-economic in-equality will persist in Nigeria. This constitutes a

formidable threat to African security in general and Nigeria’s in particular. The idea of national defence policy

in Nigeria according to Alabi (1997:130), “…is that of bullets and guns and the uniformed individual who live

in the barracks”. This aptly captures the dominant and most popular theme currently prevailing in Nigeria. In

34
summary, Nigeria since independence has never experimented with any other form of defence strategy beside

the conventional/militaristic one. Therefore, to talk of defence policy in Nigeria actually is to talk about the

conventional defence strategy. However, unless policymakers accept that defence policy is in a complex

relationship with other variables of national development, the country cannot hope to enunciate any

meaningful and efficacious policy for national defence. According to Vogt (in Tedheke, 1998:8):

The Nigerian defence policy must be designed around a proper understanding of national interests and objectives of the state because if
we do not have a proper perspective of the mission or goal which state policies are designed to achieve, the chances are that we may
advocate and adopt inadequate policies.

Alabi (1997:131) faults Vogt on the ground that the relevant national interests, which the national defence

policy should strive to protect, are not clearly articulated. In Nigeria frankly, policy problems are mostly

addressed on ad-hoc basis. What Nigeria has, as national interests are no more than mere respect of tradition

in international politics: sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, good neighbourliness, and world

peace and security. In most of the industrial societies today, there is a visible harmony and interdependence

between military as a social institution mandated with the responsibility of translating the defence objectives

of the state with other equally vital social institutions. The issue of defence entails changed conditions of

living in the society. There cannot be successful strategy when social roadblocks such as inequality, poverty,

and ignorance which ought to support the entire defence structure, are left unattended.

2.3 National Defence Policy: The Example of Some Countries

In this section, attempt is made to examine national defence policies in some selected countries. These

countries are USA, China, India and Egypt. Each of these countries has some peculiar traits, which makes her

an interesting and revealing lesson in defence policy analysis.

2.3.1 United States of America

United States of America is today the most formidable military power in the world (Shah, 2007). To

Albright (Punch Newspaper, Tuesday, 4 February, 1997:18), “the United States is strong because we have the

world’s most productive economy; the world’s most versatile and powerful military and the world’s finest

diplomacy”. Many factors contribute to this. The most significant comes from the belief among her top

35
policymakers and even the public that US “is a nation… at war. We face a diverse set of security challenges”

(National Defence Strategy of the U.S.A, 2005), hence a strong military. A meaningful analysis of this

development involves a study into at least three distinctive, yet defining stages of U.S defence policy.

The first relates to the exhortations of President George Washington (1732-1799) which for the next eight

decades, provides the principles of U.S defence and foreign policies. This is later entrenched in Monroe

Doctrine. The second defining stage involves America’s transformation in the period succeeding World War

II. Truman Doctrine was designed to respond to this change. Practically, this remained the guiding spirit of the

U. S’s defence and foreign policies, until early 1990s when USSR collapsed. The third important stage

involves the self-appointed crusader role U.S assumed in the wake of September 9/11. Bush Doctrine

embodies, in its most primeval element, the ascription of this role in this century.

2.3.1.1 Washington, Monroe Doctrine, World War II, and End of Isolationism

Towards the end of his tenure in 1796 as US president, George Washington warns America “it is our true

policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world… In my opinion it is

unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them” (Washington’s Farewell Address, 2006). In effect,

Washington provides U.S foreign policy with its theoretical and practical inspiration. Since it is decided that

America would not be an international player, the place of military in national security was secondary. The

country operated a militia not exceeding 2000 troops (Powell, 2003: 449). In 1823, President James Monroe

reiterates this resolve to pursue isolationist path in foreign affairs (McCormick, 2006). The combined forces of

geography and distance successfully help U.S adhered to this course for another century. Even during the civil

war (1861-1865), U.S fairly avoided what Washington described as “foreign entanglements” (Washington’s

Farewell Address, 2006). This posture, breeds little need, if any at all, for a militaristic national defence

strategy. Her isolationist policy ensures that she is safe and completely unaffected by outside intrigues.

Evidently, the American-Spanish war of April 25-August 12, 1898 over Cuba was the beginning-of-the-

end for isolationism as a foreign policy principle. President McKinley (McKinley Asks Congress for War,

2006), justifies this war thus, “first in the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed,

36
starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or

unwilling to stop… it is no answer to say this is in another country… and therefore none of our business”. The

impacts of this war on American foreign policy were tremendous. The war coincides with the ‘Manifest

Destiny’ campaign in top policy cycles. It generates the feeling that it is U. S’s destiny not to be bogged down

in one place, but to expand and establish her dominance at the global stage (Spanish-American War, 2006).

2.3.1.2 Truman Doctrine, Cold War, and Nuclear Deterrence

The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 robbed the world of an opportunity of seeing if

international relations could have been different. U.S emerged from the war comparatively stronger than all

the rest of the allies put together. With her A-bomb technology, at the end of the war there was the tempting

prospect of America becoming single greatest power on earth. Mutual suspicion among the allies: USSR and

USA killed any prospect of continued co-operation in all matters of national and international security and co-

operation. Any chance for peace and stability in international environment evaporated. The world was

polarised and camps emerged, Communist and Capitalist blocs, with the USSR and USA heading each

respectively. As a result, these changing patterns necessitated the creation of new strategies for defence and

security. “In 1947 Truman inaugurated the containment of Soviet expansionism…” and ended the isolationism

of the 19th century as a policy principle (Dockrill, 1993:39). From then onwards U.S pursued a vigorous,

proactive and increasingly aggressive foreign policy. First, she needed to sharpen her edge on military

superiority. A-bomb technology had already given her an edge (Dockrill, 1993:26). This was not to last long.

By early 1950s, USSR had filled this gap. This started arms race and for the next four and half decade, it raged

with spectre of nuclear holocaust lurking in the background. In this period, the principles of American foreign

policy “are to defend the nation’s physical territory, to protect citizens from enemy attacks, to further the

nation’s economic interests and prestige, and to promote ideals of liberty and democracy abroad”

(Baker,2006). The strategies for the realisation of these objectives varied. In some places, it was overly

provocative and confrontational as in Vietnam and Korea, subtly subversive as in Salvador Allende’s Chile,

37
supremely militaristic as in Panama or completely and hypocritically double standard as in her relations with

Israel and the Arab oil kingdoms. Dockrill (1993:1) points:

The Cold War has been defined as a state of extreme tension between the superpowers, stopping short of all out war but characterised by
mutual hostility and involvement in covert warfare and war by proxy as a means of uphol-ding the interests of one against the other. The
Cold War remained ‘cold’ because the development of nuclear weapons had made resort to war a suicidal enterprise: both sides will be
devastated by such an eventuality. The struggle between the two sides has accordingly been carried out by indirect means, very often at
considerable risk, and the resulting tensions have ensured that both sides have maintained a high and continuous state of readiness for
war. The massive expenditures by both sides on research and development of nuclear arsenals and delivery vehicles has led to a spiralling
arms race which could, in turn, as a result of miscalculation by one side or the other, have led to a holocaust.

During the Cold War, it is clear US operated what could rightly be described as instant militaristic defence

policy. This was characterised by the application of the most advanced and sophisticated technology, large and

professionalized Armed Forces, to deter and to serve as offensive tool as the case may be. Powell points

(2003:170) “American budgets, politics, weapons, foreign policy, science, research, and domestic priorities…

were influenced almost as much by what happened in Moscow as by what happened in Washington”.

2.3.1.3 Sept 9/11 Attacks, Bush Doctrine and the Future of U.S Policy

The post-Cold War environment in which U.S national defence policy operates is one whereby for all

conceivable reasons, she is the only superpower. Practically the collapse of USSR in the 1990s consolidated

her dominance and signalled the dawn of new order in international politics. The 9/11 terror attacks decidedly

changed American perception of national security and defence strategy, and her international obligations.

Consequently, there is a need to design new policy measures to meet new and emerging challenges.

Previously, the goal of U.S national defence policy was to contain the spread of communism by applying the

principle of ‘Containment and Proactive Deterrence’ (Schlesinger, 2004:21). Presently, the most serious

challenges to US are terrorism, the possibility of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of ‘rogue’ nations

or groups, the resurging Russia and emerging Asian economies, notably China. Following the 9/11 attacks, a

rude awakening more or less to US vulnerabilities, President Bush outlined a radical approach to U.S foreign

policy in September 2002. It seeks to destroy terrorism and all nations supporting it, as well as to prevent other

nations from acquiring WMD (McCormick, 2006). U.S intend to achieve this through ‘Pre-emptive and

Preventive War’ as is presently happening in Afghanistan and Iraq (Schlesinger, 2004:22-23). Officially, Bush

38
Doctrine divides the world into two camps: the decent and friendly nations (those who support U.S), enemies,

and rogue states (those who oppose U.S).

According to the National Defence Strategy (2005:7-8):

During the Cold War, our deterrent was based necessarily on the threat of a major response after we suffered an attack. In the current era,
there are many scenarios where we will not want to accept the huge consequences of an attack before responding. Therefore, our
deterrence policy in this new era places increasing emphasis on denying enemy objectives by seeking to prevent attacks”.

During the Cold War, both powers had enough capacity to inflict maximum damage on one another in case

of first strike, hence caution, and application of deterrence. The 2006 edition of the National Security Strategy

provides some explanations on this policy change. The policy (National Security Strategy of the U.S.A,

2006:49) recognises that “there was a time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems in

other lands, leaving America to lead by example”. Developments in globalisation and communication

technology make it impossible for U.S to revert to isolationism. Nevertheless, this is not enough to explain

why terrorists hit U.S. Other countries are not attacked by terrorists. China is relatively safe, so are

Switzerland and Vatican and indeed many other nations. The reality must be divorced from myth and fiction.

America is attacked because of a criminally lopsided foreign policy. Almost everyone accepts this except the

Americans. Rockwell Jr. (2004) examines this trend:

Everyone agrees that the nation needs defending. If you believe that it can’t be done privately, that government should just do it, you run
the risk of unleashing Hell. Thus has the US government presumed that right to shell out half a trillion of other peoples money every year,
build and threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction, place troops in nearly 130 countries, and generally build the most well-funded,
destructive, expensive, meddlesome empire in all of human history. The result has been ever more threats, ever less actual defence, ever-
high costs.

The government however disagrees with this unpalatable view. It sees its actions as following (National

Defence Strategy, 2005:1), “a strategy that aim to preserve and extend peace, freedom; and prosperity

throughout the world”. Paradoxically, many analysts however see a raging imperialism unfettered by any

moral or ethical consideration, but fuelled by pure greed and economic imperialism. Shah (2007) argues that:

Whether this global hegemony and stability actually means positive stability, peace and prosperity for the entire world (or most of it) is
subjective. That is, certainly the hegemony at the time, and its allies would benefit from the stability, relative peace and prosperity for
themselves but often ignored in this whether the policies pursued for their advantages breeds contempt elsewhere, in the modern era that
may equate to ‘anti-Americanism’, resorting to terrorism…

“It is the policy of the US to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and

culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”. This is one principle, which always pitches her
39
against other states and cultures. This is a vivid demonstration of the self-delusion which U.S inextricably

immersed herself and which ultimately would prove her greatest undoing against the exhortations of

Washington. The National Security Strategy of the U.S.A, (2006: ii) observes:

America now faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear, isolationism and protectionism, retreat
and retrenchment. This administration has chosen the path of confidence. We choose leadership over isolationism… the path we have
chosen is consistent with the great tradition of America foreign policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, our approach is idealistic
about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.

This is not encouraging recalling that Truman officially ended isolationism, and launched the Cold War. In

addition, among the legacies to his eternal credit, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and later Korea, still lingers. On the

other hand, Reagan represents the archetype of modern militarism. He designed the Strategic Defence

Initiative (SDI) or the so-called ‘Star Wars’, to tilt the ante to the advantage of U.S in the arms race with

USSR (Powell, 2003:295). He topped this with the invasion of Grenada in 1983, sped up the demise of ‘the

evil empire’. With inspiration from presidents like these, it is little wonder America is always involved, often

against common sense, in conflicts, crisis, and issues outside her own borders. From Somalia, Haiti, to

Grenada, and Afghanistan the imprint is the same: U.S meddlesomeness and imperialism.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: a Strategy for Today; a Vision for

Tomorrow (2004:2) highlights the role of the Armed Forces in national defence. It says:

The National Security Strategy establishes homeland security as the first priority of the nation. The Armed Forces’ role in homeland
security is complex, combining actions overseas and at home to protect the United States. Our first line of defense(sic) is abroad and
includes mutually supporting activities with… allies to counter threats close to their sources. Closer to home, the Armed Forces use their
capabilities to secure strategic air, land, sea and space approaches to the United States and its territory. When directed, the Armed Forces
employ military capabilities at home to protect the nation, the domestic population and critical infrastructure from direct attack.

There is no need to question these principles simply because, America has the most advanced and well

trained army, ever ready to discharge whatever is assigned to it. This in fact is what made the observation of

‘Defence and National Interest’, an online journal, that “history has shown that a large army was as likely to

be used to oppress its own people as against foreign invaders” completely untenable within the American

context. Economic resources and technological superiority afford the US an opportunity to operate a large and

sophisticated military. For instance, she is projected to spend about $ 643.9b in 2008 on military alone. This

excludes other vital sectors of national security and defence such as intelligence, R & D, the cost of foreign

40
bases and operations. For instance, fiscal year 2008’s budget includes a supplemental request of $ 141.7b to

cover Iraq and Afghan operations (Shah, 2007). Despite this sharp edge, United States is:

vulnerable to challenges ranging from external attacks to indirect threats posed by aggression and dangerous instability. Some enemies
may seek to terrorise our population and destroy our way of life, while others will try to 1) limit our global freedom to act, 2) dominate
key regions, or 3) attempt to make prohibitive the cost of meeting various international commitments.
Traditional military threats to the U.S are manifestly impossible. The resurgence of Russia is an eyesore to

the U.S; it is not in doubt that for considerable time to come, neither Russia nor any other country would be

strong enough to pose a threat to her interests at global level. China, which spends second largest budget on

military, pales in comparison to the U.S. Terrorism, is likely to remain the most formidable threat to U.S in the

future. According to the National Security Strategy (2006:8):

Defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and a break with old patterns. We are fighting a new enemy with global reach. The US
can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight
must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run.

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that conventional defence strategy, which embodies the concept of

militarism, is the critical component, indeed building block of the American defence policy. This does not

imply that this strategy is perfect. In recent history, it repeatedly failed and even humiliated them. For instance,

despite her heavy fighting power all she could achieve in Korea was an armistice. Vietnam is perhaps the most

glaring limitation of U.S militarism to date. Memories of Operation Black Hawk Dawn in Somalia are still

fresh. It is crucial not to be in a hurry to pass judgement about militarism as effective instrument of U.S

defence policy until the dust of Afghanistan and Iraq finally settles down.

2.3.2 China

China is today the largest military spender after U.S (Shah, 2007). Many analysts suspects China of

imperialist designs. This charge of imperialism or what General Guangkai (2008) called “China threat”, can

be explained within economic expansionism and not necessarily, political expansionism. Fears of territorial

imperialism, no matter how hard she tries, cannot easily be dispelled especially among her comparatively poor

South East Asian neighbours. China defence policy includes deterrence and defence. In order to understand

the nature of the Chinese defence policy, it is important to understand two interrelated factors. These are the

41
need to examine the fundamental principles of her defence policy as well as the historic and geo-strategic

considerations, which informs Chinese thinking on national security and defence in this century.

2.3.2.1 China’s National Defence Policy; Principles and Objectives

The 2002 edition of China’s National Defence Policy amply captures and demonstrates the level of

awareness in Beijing of the changing trends in international politics, and the need to meet these challenges.

Primarily, the policy provides for the realisation of five cardinal objectives.

The goals and tasks of china’s national defence policy are:

I. To consolidate national defence, prevent and resist aggression,

II. To stop separation and realise complete re-unification of the motherland,

III. To stop armed subversion and safeguard social stability,

IV. To accelerate national defence development and achieve national defence and military

modernisation and,

V. To safeguard world peace and oppose aggression and expansion (China’s National Defence

Policy, 2002).

China, unlike US has no visible imperialist or expansionist agenda in political terms. For instance, China

has no troop contingents of any kind on overseas assignment. She equally operates no military base outside of

the country. The same applies to military blocs. China, unlike many other countries, subscribes to no one. Her

only concern seems to be on how to contain the Taiwan and Tibet ‘bugs’ around her. This explains why anti-

separation and unity of the motherland counts as the number two principle. Guangkai (2008) points, “we

(China) have worked hard to achieve national reunification through peaceful means, but we will never

commit to not using force” against Taiwanese separatists forces and Tibetan troublemakers opposed to

national unity. To score the first two goals requires a strong deterrent capability. Historically, China has

suffered innumerable humiliations, plunders, wars and conquests from foreign powers: Opium Wars of 1839-

1842 & 1856-1860 with Britain, Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Boxer Rebellion in 1901, and the Japanese

42
invasion of Manchuria (Clunas, 2006). To avoid recurrence, China resolved to build a modern and strong

military. The China’s National Defence Policy (2002) echoes this feeling thus:

The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in implementing the strategy of building a strong military through science and technology, has
accelerated the R & D of defense (sic) weaponry and equipment, trained higher-quality military personnel of new type, established a
scientific organisational structure, develop theories of military operations with Chinese characteristics, and strengthen its capability for
joint, mobile and multi-purpose operations.
This is not militarism. Although in just about any other issue related to defence and security, militarism

features prominently in Chinese thinking. In conventional sense, China is not a big nuclear power. She

however recognises the importance of nuclear as a tool of deterrence. Her attitude to WMD is to “consistently

upholds the policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons, and adopts an extremely restrained attitude towards the

development of nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear counter-attack ability is entirely for deterrence against

possible nuclear attacks by other countries” (China’s National Defence Policy, 2002). China poses enormous

economic threats virtually to all nations in the world today.

2.3.2.2 Environment of the China’s National Defence Policy

The Chinese ‘Monster’, at least, from economic angle is real. China is conscious of these feelings

especially from the West, which has until the resurgence of China in the later part of last century, monopolised

international trade. Equally, she is aware that threats to her national security and defence are not necessarily

military or even political. Taiwan and Tibet are not the only regions in South East Asia that will be happy to

see China go. Her neighbour to the south, India, would only be as glad. Because of her historical experiences,

Chinese national defence strategy is fundamentally anchored on the concept of ‘peoples’ war’. China’s

National Defence Policy (2002):

“highlights and carries forward the concept of people’s war. In the face of the new changes of modern warfare, China persists in relying
on the people in national defence building, enhancing the popular awareness of national defence, and instituting an armed force system of
combining a small but capable standing army with a powerful reserve force; upholds the principle of combining peacetime footing with
wartime footing, uniting the army with the people, and having a reserve among the people, improving the mobilisation mechanism with
expanded mobilisation scope, and establishing a national defence mobilisation system in line with the requirements of modern warfare;
and adheres to flexible applications of strategies and tactics, creating new ways of fighting so as to give fuller play to the strength of a
people’s war.

The theoretical basis of this concept is derived from the experiences of the communist revolution in the

period before and after the Second World War. Chinese army, unlike most national armies, has its antecedents

in the struggles against Japan and the overthrow of the nationalist government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-

43
Shek spearheaded by Mao Tse-tung and his communists’ band. This band later transformed and modernised

into any equivalent of sophisticated fighting machine in modern age. The strength of this notion of people’s

war proceeds from the understanding that, a state ought to be a social institution of dispensing justice and

progress. Where it succeeds in achieving this, the people as a whole would be predisposed to its defence. In

this sense, security is defined as justice, equality, and sustainable development. In China today, the question to

ask is not if the citizens are disposed to national security and defence, or even how far they are willing to go,

but essentially, on determining the mechanisms put in place to ensure expanded mobilisation. Chinese strategy

of national defence is not military-centred. The strategy is people-centred, which in case of invasion the entire

populace would easily be mobilised to resist the invaders. If the lessons of guerrilla armies elsewhere,

especially in Vietnam, Cuba, and even in China itself during the Second World War are revealing, then its

efficacy cannot be doubted. They succeed in this simply by ensuring national economic development, justice

and rule of law, and social equality. In essence, “China’s national defence policy provides the guarantee of

maintaining China’s security and unity, and realising the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in

an all-round way”.

2.3.3 India

India belongs to two exclusive clubs whose membership in international arena is ruthlessly restricted. One,

she is a card carrying member of the nuclear club. Two, she is in a state of perpetual war with Pakistan, a

neighbour that would not shirk from launching a surprise attack so long as she is sure of the outcome. In

addition to these, India is in a state of perpetual tension with her neighbour: the Red China. Naturally, these

breed a proactive national defence policy, which must recognise the nature of the threat(s) to national security,

its extent, as well as the resources, and adequate mechanism or strategy of handling it. The issue of India vs.

Pakistan is central to the Indian defence calculations. These countries have maintained, over the last five

decades, a relation of ‘war’ rather than ‘peace’, at times engaging in an all out military confrontation over the

Jammu and Kashmir disputed territories. In the intervening decades, this hostile relation precipitates a

44
dangerous arms race between India and Pakistan. The highlight of which culminated in the acquisition of

WMD by both countries. Relations seem to improve however between them recently.

An analysis of Indian defence policy is therefore a study into the prevailing level of (dis)trust between

India and her ‘archenemy’ Pakistan, and to a certain degree, China. To understand the national defence strategy

in India however, first it is imperative to focus attention on the principles of Indian national defence policy.

The thesis then proceeds with an analysis of the threats posed by her neighbours in the sub-region with a view

of finding whether the policy provides a sufficient response to these threats. We hope to highlight the level of

economic and technological development in India especially, in metallurgical sciences, in order to show that,

although militarism is the national strategy, India has the resources to sustain it.

2.3.3.1 Principles and Objectives of Indian National Defence Policy

Indian goals and principles of national defence policy fall within what Tellis (2004:2) sees as ‘traditional

platitudes matrix’. These are internal security and territorial integrity, good neighbourliness, regional and

world peace, as well as a just world order. Many states, including India, do however recognise the need for the

re-evaluation of their principles of national defence policies after the Cold War. The Indian Defence

Information (IDI, 2007), stated that Indian defence policy “aims at promoting and sustaining durable peace in

the sub-continent and equipping the defence forces adequately to safeguard against aggression”. Practically,

the national defence strategy is anchored on the doctrine of conventional defence strategy. This explains the

current position of India as eighth (8th) largest military spender in the world with an annual budget of about

22$bn USD, (Shah, 2007). Substantial parts of her defence and security needs are presently homemade

including some of the advanced heavy military technologies such as missiles. India in 1974 became the sixth

world nuclear power (Los Angeles Times, May, 1974) a situation that spurs nuclear race with neighbouring

China and Pakistan. India however recognised the need for an integratist approach to the question of national

defence. This informs the creation of a civilian reserve force known as the Territorial Army, which plays

useful role in the defence of the country.

2.3.3.2 Key Challenges to Indian National Defence Policy

45
As this century unwinds, India increasingly demonstrates potentials of emerging as one of the largest

economies in the world. However as Tellis (2004:1) points “for a country like India the rise to great power

status will require it to be able to integrate the creation, deployment and use … of military instruments in

support of national objectives”. She has partly succeeded from the political, economic, technological, and to

an extent human angle. The neighbouring angle however is not certain. At different times, India had resorted

to war with her northern and western neighbours, China and Pakistan respectively. It is not clear to date how

much political solution and rapprochement India achieves with these two neighbours. Her quarrel with China

is because of a territory along her northeastern border in Arunal Pradesh. The tension degenerated into war in

1962. The after effects of this are largely responsible for the modernisation, new arms procurement policies

and in fact an entirely new approach to national defence in India (Oldenburg, 2006). The war with China is in

effect a revelation to the inadequacies of Indian defence forces. Her Armed Forces were mauled and large

territory overrun by China. Although relations have since become less antagonistic, it is not clear how much of

it is concrete and lasting. For some times now, there are talks of ‘China threats’ in India.

The Pakistani angle however is the most persisting and pestering. Since its partition into two separate states

of India and Pakistan by the departing colonial masters, relations remains heated. At the centre of this conflict

is the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan fought three (3) wars. Two of these wars: the

first in 1947-1949, and in 1965 are directly related to the question of the status of Kashmir. The third is,

equally if, remotely related to the Kashmir issue. In December 1971, India invaded Pakistan in support of the

Pakistani eastern province in their attempt to secede. Later, Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state (Sumit,

2006). In mid-2002, the sub-continent came close to witnessing another war between these two antagonistic

neighbours. Over one million troops were amassed by the two asides on their shared borders in anticipation of

hostilities. Fortunately, the situation was arrested through timely intervention by the international community.

It could have resulted into a nuclear confrontation. Pakistani threat has since 2003 considerably reduced. “In

May 2003, relations between the two countries begun to normalise as diplomatic ties were restored”. Both

sides have sufficient military and nuclear capability to destroy each other. Again, there is an increasing

46
recognition among top generals and policy makers, that co-operation with Pakistan and not confrontation is

the catalyst to lasting peace, development and security against terrorism in the region. According to Gen.

Kapoor, Indian Army Chief of Staff, (Gilani, 2008) “India has wide ranging interests in international defence

and military co-operation. It has been used as an effective tool of foreign policy, and now needs to be

integrated as a tool of defence policy” especially in relations to Pakistan.

Minimising threats from Pakistani angle does not however mean India is relatively free from threats. New

and formidable threats come from within. Even the Kashmir issue has since around 1989, taken a new

dimension. This is the evolution of militants’ separatists groups advocating, largely by violence, the creation

of an independent state of Kashmir. Since the outbreak of this insurgency, over 40,000 lives were lost, a

number far greater than is lost in all the wars between the two countries combined (Sumit, 2006). The

existence of another separatist movement in the Indian state of Manipur creates serious security dilemma to

India. The devastation being cause by these separatist movements is simply breath taking. For instance, “in a

terrorist attack on the rail road system in Mumbai in July 2006, more than 180 people were killed. The co-

ordinated bombings occurred aboard seven commuter trains within fifteen (15) minutes of each other”

(Oldenburg, 2006).

Approach to defence in India ought to recognise these emerging forces. Instead of trying to muffle them, it

is important if considerable attention should be devoted towards understanding the root cause(s) of these

separatist movements with a view to solving them. Experiences (Vietnam, China, Pakistan, and Tibet) have

shown that, these kinds of adversaries are not easily defeated with conventional forces. The idea is almost

obsolete that in the considerable future, India or any of her two neighbours, China and Pakistan, could risk an

open military confrontation. The reason for this is not far to discern. All of them have accumulated enough

military capacity including WMD to make the prospects of launching all out war quite unappealing.

Nevertheless, for now, they seem to be more interested in grappling with economic drive than territorial

consideration. The challenge remains that of tackling insurgency, separatism, terrorism, and to a considerable

degree, Hindu nationalism. Hence, the defence policy needs to come out of its Cold War mentality, which the

47
East-West divide has plunged it. It needs to embody and recognise these emerging trends in Indian national

security, and take appropriate approach to address them without escalating the violence.

2.3.4 Egypt

Egypt is one of the countries with the largest military force in Africa, which points to her resolve to build,

operate and maintain modern military capabilities as instrument of defence and deterrence. A simple, yet

instructive study into the Egyptian national defence policy revolves around two monumental shifts in her

foreign policy principles and objectives. The first shift relates to the combative posture of the Egyptian foreign

policy, which covered approximately the period since the creation of the state of Israel in 1947 to the Camp

David Mutual Peace Agreement of 1979 between Egypt and Israel. The second shift is the consequence of the

conciliatory tone that followed Camp David (Egypt Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2008).

The intention here is to look at this transformation, which the Egyptian defence policy has experienced

with a view to analysing how it affected the Egyptian national security. It is worth noting that Egypt’s defence

policy was influenced more by Israeli factor than any other considerations. The success of the policy was

measured by the extent to which Egypt was able to confront, appease or agree with Israel at any particular

period, and by success in achieving the traditional objectives such as preservation of sovereignty, territorial

integrity, and other national interests. For instance, from 1947 to 1978, Egypt had fought five (5) wars with

Israel alone. In 1977, Egypt fought another war with Libya (Babatope, 1981:89). No other African nation

equals this experience. Egypt’s geographical location equips her with strategic importance, strength and

indispensability in both African affairs as well as the Middle East. According to Boutros-Ghali (in Aluko,

1977:41):

Egypt’s geographical position and historical background give to the country four characteristics: Egypt is an African country and a
Mediterranean country… She is also an Islamic country and an Arab country. This unique geographical situation at the crossroads of the
three continents means that Egypt has four foreign policies (and defence policies as well). Being an African country Egypt can play a
positive role of leadership in this emergent continent. Being a Mediterranean country Egypt has often been considered as part of Europe
and could potentially become part of it. Although Egypt is not the largest of the Islamic states, she is the foremost Islamic country. Being
the most important Arab country, Egypt has not only ascendancy over the Arab league but also over all the Arab world. A fifth policy
emerged after the Bandung conference, the policy of neutralism and non-alignment. (Italics added).

Resulting from this unique position, Egypt has been an active player in African and Middle East affairs in

the last century, and would likely remain in this century. This could be true, especially, with the bulk of Global
48
War on Terror (GWOT) largely centred in the Middle East. Today, both Israel and the USA considered Egypt

a strategic partner in this war on terror. The post-Nasserist’s Egypt has come along way from Pan Arabism and

‘Arab Socialism’ as the guiding principle of all state policies, to the Mubarak’s pragmatism in his dealings

with the West.

2.3.4.1 Egyptian Defence Policy: 1948 to Camp David Mutual Peace Agreement of 1979

Egyptian national defence policy until the 1979 peace accords was a response to Israeli threat to Egyptian

national security. Geographically, Egypt was an African country, but her socio-cultural, religious and political

affinities were to her Arab brothers in the Middle East. This explains the strong anti-Israeli nature and

undertone of the Egyptian national defence policy. Egypt, more than anything, considers herself as Arab, and

with some element of validity, the socio-economic and political nerve centre of the entire Arab world. Because

of this, the entire Egyptian foreign and national defence policy before 1979 was coloured with intense pan-

Arab nationalism, anti Semitism, non-alignment and what for the absence of better term would be described

as ‘Nasser’s Hegemonism’ in the Arab world. During this period, the fundamental objectives of the defence

policy hardly differed with the fundamental objectives of her foreign policy. These were:

I) The preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Egypt;

II) The promotion of Arab unity and development in the Middle East;

III) Adherence to the principle of Non-alignment in international politics;

IV) Maintaining peaceful relations with all nations, and working together with other nations at the

United Nations to promote world peace and development (Boutros-Ghali in Aluko, 1977:43).

Instances and incidences abound that demonstrates the level of success and failure, which Egypt

encountered in realising these objectives. Egypt did take hard and practical posture towards realising her

stated policy objectives. Instructively, from 1948 when the state of Israel was declared to 1979 when the

Camp David peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel, Egypt had fought five (5) wars, either alone,

or with other sister Arab states, against the state of Israel (Egypt Foreign Affairs and Defence,2008). These

were the Arab –Israeli War of 1948 between Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq against Israel

49
(Cohen, 2006), the Suez-Sinai War of 1956 between Egypt against Israel, France and Britain (Bess, 2006), the

Six Day War of 1967 fought by Egypt, Jordan and Syria against Israel (Cohen, 2006), the 1969-1970 War of

Attrition between Egypt and Israel which did not degenerated into full scale war before it was resolved (Stein,

2006), and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 fought by Egypt and Syria against Israel. According to Amin

(1978:69), because Israel “hope to become the little ‘major power’ of the area, to substitute itself for the old

colonial powers, to reduce the Arab states to perpetual powerlessness… to become the main bastion of

imperialism” she became totally unacceptable to the Arabs including Egypt, who was the largest industrial and

military power in the Arab world (Defense Industry; 2008).

Another cardinal objective, which Egypt considered important to her national security, was the question of

Arab unity. Egypt was a foundation member of the Arab League with six other states. Part of the purpose of

the League was to liberate the Arab world from colonialism, ensure co-operation in all matters of socio-

cultural and economic interests and to promote unity among the Arabs (Aluko, 1977:43). This last objective

was actually to prove almost impossible and impractical. Even though Egypt did take practical steps in this

direction when together with Syria and Jordan, they formed a federation from 1958-1968 known as United

Arab Republic (UAR). This was an experimental step towards greater Arab unity. The experiment failed,

according to Amin (1978:104), for reasons of uneven economic development and industrialisation “the Arab

world would then remain divided into independent states”. Thus, the federation came to an abrupt end in

1968.

The last important aspect of Egyptian foreign policy, and by implication, national defence policy from

1948-1978 was her stated neutralism and non-aligned posture in international relations. President Nasser of

Egypt was among the pioneer founding leaders of the Non-aligned Movement. Since then Egypt continued to

championed neutralism as the guiding principle of her relationship with all nations. (Mohammed, 1982:126).

Boutros-Ghali disagreed with this non-aligned posture of Egypt as mere rhetoric. For instance, Egypt had a

15-year treaty with the USSR notwithstanding neutralism and non-alignment (Boutros-Ghali in Aluko,

1977:44).

50
2.3.4.2 Egyptian National Defence Policy: Post-Camp David and Beyond

The peace of 1979 between Egypt and Israel was a new shift, in the Egyptian national defence policy. For

the first time Egypt not only recognised the state of Israel but also took the bold step of signing a peace treaty

with her (Camp David Accords, 2008). This no doubt came with its consequences, which Egypt readily paid.

The highest cost to this attempt was probably the assassination of President Anwar Sadat himself. This was in

addition to severe condemnation, humiliation, and in fact, ostracisation that Egypt was subjected to in the

Arab world. She was seen as a traitor, and therefore even expelled from the Arab League from 1979-1989

(Foreign Relations of Egypt, 2008). This seriously affected the new direction the Egyptian national defence

policy was determined to follow in the future. Gradually, Egypt continued to edge away from her militant

foreign policy to one based on the principles of dialogue, understanding, diplomacy and peace (Foreign

Relations of Egypt, 2008). President Mubarak underscores the futility of war by pointing, “War resolves

nothing, it only brings misery and death” (Eshel, 2005).

Ideally, this shift ought to have made Egypt reduced its military spending. Unlike U.S and other countries

with large defence budgets that experienced budget cuts and reduced defence spending after the demise of the

Cold War, Egypt increased her defence budget. For instance, from 1972-1975 when Egyptian antagonism to

Israel and her Western backers was at its peak, Egyptian military spending was in the range of 1.230-1.340

Billion USD (Mohammed, 1982:130). In the 1990s, there was an upward increase in military spending in

Egypt to about 3.2 Billion USD annually. In this decade, the figure could be around 7-8 Billion USD annually

(Eshel, 2005). Wikipedia, online free encyclopedia, however put the figure at 2.5 Billion USD as of 2006

(Military of Egypt, 2008). This is in addition to enormous military aid, which Egypt annually received from

the U.S. From 1979-2003, U.S provided Egypt with about 30 Billion USD in military aid, making her the

second largest recipient of U.S military aid in the world after Israel. Because of this, Egypt not only become a

strategic partner of the U.S in the middle east peace process, but also in her own right a strategic ally of the

U.S and Western Europe (Foreign Relations of Egypt,2008, Egypt Foreign Affairs and Defence,2008).

2.3.4.3 Egyptian Defence Policy and the Challenge(s) of the New Century

51
The assassination of Anwar Sadat pointed to some of the stiff challeng es the Egyptian defence policy was

likely to face in the future from diverse interests. The challenges are less likely to come from outside as they

are more likely to come from within. With the recognition of Israel and the peace treaty between them, it is

unlikely for war to break out in the near future between Israel and Egypt. With a military force, which is

ranked as the 11th in the world, 1st in Africa, and 2nd after Israel in the Middle East (Military of Egypt,2008),

the possibility of invasion by another country either in Africa, Middle East or even across the Mediterranean is

even more distant (Eshel,2005). Barring any unforeseen Islamic revolution, military take-over, or democratic

changeover of the ruling party by a more fundamentalist or radical party in Egypt, the greatest challenges,

which the Egyptian defence policy has to contend with are resurging Arab-nationalism and terrorism.

Egypt is still considered in the Middle East as a sell-out among the Arab nations after the peace of 1979.

Many felt that she has abandoned the struggle for the liberation of Palestine from Jewish domination and

instead, has allied herself with the U.S, the principal backer of Israel. Because of this, feelings of angst, disgust

and disappointment are gradually turning into dangerous resentment against Egypt in the Arab world. These

feelings exposed her to acts of terrorism especially by the militant Islamist groups. The Sharm-el-Sheik

terrorist’s bombings of 2006 were a vivid remainder to these feelings of resentment. Although no one will

advocate for the reversion to the old, militant and anti-Israeli foreign policy by Egypt, yet still, there is a need

to explore ways of speeding up the peace process in the Middle East. Her position, economic and political,

saddles her with enormous responsibilities in the region. True peace in the Middle East is the only guarantee

to Egyptian national security. Would Egypt follow this popular sentiment and work towards genuine peace in

the region? Only time would tell.

52
Reference:

Alabi, D. O. (1997). Issues and Problems in the Nigerian Defence Policy in the 1990s: a Critical Review. Nigerian Army
Journal, Vol.9, No.3, pp.128-143.
Alkali, R. A. (2003). Issues in International Relations & Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (2nd ed.). Kaduna: Northpoint
Publishers.
Aluko, O. (ed.). (1977). The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Amin, S. (1978). The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggle. London: Zed Press.
Amune, S. A. (1986). Work and Worship: Selected Speeches of Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto. Zaria: Gaskiya
Corporation Limited.
Asobie, H. A. (1988). The Theoretical and Doctrinal Foundation of Nigeria’s Defence Policy. Nigerian Journal of
International Studies. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Nsukka, pp.17-34.
Babatope, E. (1981). Coups, Africa and the Barracks Revolt. Ibadan: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
Baker, J. H. (2006). United States Government. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Bess, M. D. (2006). Suez Crisis. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Bishara, M. (2001). Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid, Prospects for Resolving the Conflict. Halifax, Nova Scotia:
Fernwood Publishing Ltd.
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1977). The Foreign Policy of Egypt. (in) Aluko, O. (ed.). (1977). The Foreign Policies of African
States. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Braithwaite, T.(1988). Foundations and Dynamics of National Security. Nigerian Journal of International Studies.
Nsukka: University of Nigeria Nsukka, pp. 8-9.
Camp David Accords. (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords
Cohen, S. (2006). Arab-Israeli Conflict. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
. (2006). Six Day War. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
China Issues White Paper on National Defence. (2008) Retrieved on 18th February, 2008 from
http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/china issues white paper.mht
China National Defence Policy. (2002). Retrieved on 12th February, 2008 from
http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd2.html
Clunas, C., et al. (2006). China. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Defence Industry. (2008). Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://wwwglobalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/industry.htm
Dockrill, M. (1993). The Cold War 1945-1963. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.
Dudley, B.J. (1973). Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
Egypt Foreign Affairs and Defence.(2008). Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://www.uam.es/otrescentros/medina/Egypt/egypoltfor.htm
Engels, F. (1977). The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Eshel, D. (2005). Egyptian Military Build-up; a Threat to Israel? Defense Update. Retrieved on 7th June,
2008 from http://www.defense-update.com/2005/01/Egyptian-military-buildup-threat-to.html
Fage, S.K. (1995). Nigeria’s Regional Policy: Ideals and Aspirations. Defence Studies; Journal of the Nigerian Defence
Academy, Kaduna, Vol.5, pp. 1-18.

53
Federal Government of Nigeria. (2006). National Defence Policy. Federal Ministry of Defence, Abuja, Nigeria.
Foreign Relations of Egypt. (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 7th June, 2008
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Relations_of_Egypt
Ganguly, S. (2006). Indo-Pakistan Wars. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
George Washington’s Farewell Address. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Gilani, I. (2008). Indian Strategists Favours Increasing Defence Ties with Pakistan. Retrieved on 13th march,
2008 from http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp/page=main_13-3-2008_pg7.
Guangkai, X. (2008). China’s Defence Policy Equals Peace. Retrieved on 3rd March, 2008
from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/editorial/china’s defence equals. mht
Harrigan, J. J. (1998). Politics and Policy in States and Communities (6th ed.). New York: Longman.
Ikoku, E.U. (1980). Self Reliance: Africa’s Survival. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co.
India Detonates 1st Nuclear Shot for Technology. (1974, May 19). Los Angeles Times.

Indian Defence Policy in the 21st Century and Beyond. (2007). Retrieved on 3rd March, 2008 from Indian
Defence Information (IDI); http://www.indiamilitaryconsortium.org/Indian_defence_policy_21st_century
Laqueur, W. (2000). Post Modern Terrorism. (In) O’Meara, P., Mehlinger, H.D., & Matthew, K. (eds.). (2000).
Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: a Reader. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Laski, J. (2004). Grammar of Politics (2nd Indian reprint). Delhi: Surjeet Publications.
Mayall, J. (1992). Nationalism and International Society, (in) Levine, H. M. (ed.).(1992). World Politics Debated: a
Reader in Contemporary Issues (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.
Military of Egypt. (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Egypt
Mohammed, B. (1982). Africa and Non-Alignment: a Study in the Foreign Relations of New Nations. Kano: Triumph
Publishing Co. Ltd.
Mbachu, O. (1998). Foreign Policy Analysis: the Nigerian Perspective. Owerri: Kosoko Press.
McCormick, J. M. (2006). Foreign Policy. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
McKinley Asks Congress for War. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Nweke, G A. (ed.). (1988). Some Critical Remarks on the National Security Question. Nigerian Journal of International
Studies. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Nsukka, pp. 1-7.
Office of the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2004). National Military Strategy of The United States of America: a
Strategy for Today; a Vision for Tomorrow. Washington: Department of Defence, Pentagon. Retrieved on 6th
February, 2008 from
Office of the US Secretary of Defence. (2005). National Defence Strategy of the USA. Washington: Department of
Defence, Pentagon. Retrieved on 6th February, 2008 from
http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm
Office of the US President. (2006).The National Security strategy of the United States of America. Washington: White
House. Retrieved on 6th February, 2008 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/html
Ohmae, K. (2000). The Rise of the Region State, (in) O’Meara, P., Mehlinger, H.D., & Matthew, K. (eds.). (2000).
Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: a Reader. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Okwori, A.S. (1995). Security and Deterrence: Towards Alternative Deterrence Strategy for Nigeria In the 21st Century
and Beyond. Defence Studies; Journal of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, vol.5, pp. 19-28.
Oldenburg, P. (2006). India. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Palmer, N. D. & Howard, C. P. (2004). International Relations (3rd ed.).Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers and Distributors.
Powell, C. & Joseph, E.P. (2003). My American Journey. New York: Ballantine Books.
Punch Newspaper, Tuesday, 4 February, 1997
Rockwell, Jr., L.H. (2004). The National Defence Myth. Retrieved on 11th march, 2008 from
http://www.mises.org/articles/national_defence_myth
Royal West African Frontier Force. (2006). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 13th February
2007 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/royal_west_african_frontier_force
Schlesinger, A. M. Jr. (2004). War and the American Presidency. New York: W.W. Norton
Shah, A. (2008). World Military Spending. Retrieved on 11th march, 2008 from
http://www.globalissues.org/geopolitics/ArmsTrade/worldmilitaryspending.asp
Spanish-American War. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Stein, K.W. (2006). Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Corporation.

54
Tedheke, M.E.U. (1998). Defence and Security in Nigeria: Beyond the Rhetorics. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.8, pp. 1-22.
Tellis, A. J. (2004). Future Fire: Challenges Facing Indian Defence Policy in the New Century. Retrieved on 20th
February, 2008 from
Umar, M. K. (2000). Nigeria’s Internal Security: Trends, Problems and Prospects. Defence Studies: Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.10, pp. 42-57.

Chapter Three
Background Study of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1960-1999

3.1 Introduction

Some of the exciting and delicate challenges often associated with the idea of statehood and sovereignty in

modern times centred on designing practical policy framework, principles and instruments with which to

address multifarious socio-political, economic, foreign, as well as national security problems inherent in all

social systems. The independence of Nigeria from colonial rule and her emergence as a sovereign state means

conception and implementation of policies to address these huge challenges. Generally, policy is a response to

any given set of public problem(s) in the society (Mbachu, 1998:1). Nations make policies on almost any

conceivable topic or problem - health, education, sports, foreign, security and defence issues. Speaking about

the challenges to sovereignty and nationhood among the new states of Africa, Ali Mazrui (in Paden & Soja,

1970:534) pointed, “Independence is a time when a newly created state has to seek direction for its diplomacy

(national security and other related affairs). The experience of conducting international relations as a sovereign

state is entirely new”. This chapter is a background study of Nigeria’s national defence policy – its evolution

and transformation – since independence. The chapter is concerned with the major events, which directly or

indirectly shaped the direction of the policy, as well as the main factors that gave insight into policy

formulation process and its operationalisation in the country.

3.2 Evolution and Transformation of Modern Nigerian State

55
The modern history of Nigeria as a sovereign state encompassing different ethnic groups, cultures and

political organizations dates from the completion of the British conquest in 1903 and the subsequent

amalgamation of 1914 (Tamuno in Ikime, 1999:393, Nigeria History,2006). In 1960, Nigeria was granted

independence (Fage & Alabi, 2003) in circumstances, which were generally considered peaceful unlike other

ex-colonial states (Garba, 1991:182) such as Algeria, Vietnam, Kenya, Ghana and India (Mortimer, 1969

Arnold, 1977: x). Opinions are sharply divided on whether Nigeria could have emerged as a state without this

colonial influence. Dudley (1973:23-24) opined that an accurate description of the British role in the

formation and emergence of the Nigerian state “would be that far from ‘creating’ Nigeria, the boundaries of

that community were delimited by the colonial administration only after the gross patterns of the indigenous

cultural geography had already been established”. Fage & Alabi (2003:4) subscribed to this argument thus:

“due to trade, inter-tribal marriages, the spread of Islam etc., many of the component ethnic groups in the

country were already in close contact with one another and a measure of unity and integration was already

crystallizing among them”.

Oyovbaire (1984:136-137) rejected the argument of Dudley, because:

Dudley did not provide evidence for the argument, for example, we are not told which culture was assimilating the others and of the
structures and diffusion or exercise of power (if any) covering the Nigerian area. In any case, even if the growth of a latent community
could be discerned at the beginning of this century, it is extremely difficult to argue for it or locate the structures of that community for the
period before the 1880s… The point should be emphasised that until Britain had established and consolidated its structures of governance
over the contemporary boundaries of the country from 1914, no ruler or set of rulers, social class or regime had any claims… over all the
pre-colonial state-systems.

Olusanya (in Ikime, 1999:545) balanced this argument thus: “the Sokoto jihad had led to the establishment

of a caliphate made up of fifteen emirates about half the present day Nigeria. By bringing together such a large

area under one political unit, the jihad paved the way for the emergence of a greater Nigeria”. There were co-

operation, harmony as well as peaceful interaction between them (Usman, 1979:32). Because colonial Nigeria

was created to serve Britain (Maier, 2000: xxiii), the political and security structures instituted by the

departing colonialists were concordant with the British interest and not necessarily Nigeria’s interest (Ake,

1978:83). The military, which is the primary instrument of national defence, “owe its origins to the indigenous

mercenary forces recruited by the trading companies (chiefly, Royal Niger Company) to serve as constabulary

56
agents… With this force, British colonial agents unleashed a reign of terror on the territories inhabiting the

present Nigeria” (italics added) (Sulaiman & Abdulkarim, 1988:90).

3.3 National Defence Policy in the First Republic

The independence and sovereignty of Nigeria in 1960 paradoxically posed some serious national security

dilemma to the new political leadership. Previously, Britain was responsible for Nigeria’s national security

chiefly defined in terms of threats to the British interests not Nigeria or its people. Britain also designed the

measures to respond to them including physical instruments of national defence such as Armed Forces and

Police. Naturally, after independence Nigeria had to redefine the objectives of her national defence policy to

reflect her interests as a sovereign state. The instruments of the policy – Armed Forces and Police - largely

remained intact and unchanged even after independence. Asobie (1988:18) argues that for “a discussion of the

Nigeria’s defence policy to be meaningful should start with the analysis of the arrangement made for the

defence and security of Nigeria on independence”. At independence, there was an absence of well-articulated

national defence policy encapsulating the fundamental objectives of national security in Nigeria. Adeniran

(1985:188) points, “it is logical to argue that the foundation of Nigeria’s foreign policy was laid before 1960

when the country became independent. The organisation and administration of the country’s foreign policy

machinery were conceived and planned prior to independence”. The 2006 National Defence Policy (2006:1)

admits this monumental oversight thus: “the publication of this document (National Defence Policy) marks

the realisation of efforts started in the late 1970s to formally lay down a policy framework governing the

conduct of defence in Nigeria”.

3.3.1 Policy Objectives and Principles in the First Republic

According to Tafawa Balewa (Ojigbo, 1979:309), “Nigeria would endeavour to remain on friendly terms

with every nation, which recognizes and respects our sovereignty; that the country would not blindly follow

the lead of any one, but that her pursuit of any action would be selected with proper independent objectivity in

Nigeria’s national interests”. This provided the elementary principles Nigeria’s foreign policy at the time of

independence. The cardinal objectives of the foreign policy, and by implication defence policy, during the

57
First Republic were stated by Adeniran (1984:189-190) as: “safeguarding…the interests of the federation and

its citizens, membership of the commonwealth and the United Nations, not identifying with any of the power

blocs as a matter of routine, devotion to Africa-oriented policies in the interests of continental unity, total

decolonisation, sovereign equality and non-intervention in each state’s internal affairs, and, lastly,

cooperation.”. Aluko (1977:172-173), provides the following as Nigeria’s objectives under Balewa:

A) Defence of national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,

B) Commitment to promoting world peace,

C) Commitment to the independence and development of Africa, and

D) Non-alignment in world affairs.

3.3.2 Policy Instrument(s) and the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact

“In seeking to achieve objectives, realize values, or defend interests, government must communicate with

those whose actions and behaviour they wish to defer, alter or reinforce…there are many occasions and means

of communications that may be employed for conveying hopes, wishes, or threats to others”

(Mbachu,1998:25-26). Governments worldwide employ several of these channels of communication and

instruments to either protect or promote their national interests. These include economic instruments such as

aids, grants, trade, sanctions and embargoes. They may be political such as diplomacy, alliances, agreements,

or military force and war. Nations employ these instruments selectively defending mostly on the seriousness

of the interest(s) involved. Generally, war is the last resort. However, military capabilities are considered as

integral part of the defence and security structure.

Adeshina (1999:84) identifies three cardinal roles, which national defence policy ascribed to the military in

Nigeria since independence. These are:

1. The defence of the nation’s borders and territory;

2. Providing internal security in aid of the government;

3. Participation in international peace-support missions.

58
At the time of independence, Nigeria inherited a military organisation designed to serve three purposes: to

help the Civil Authorities maintain law and order in the country when called; to serve as a symbolic

expression of power and sovereignty; and as a ceremonial outfit (Dudley,1973:89-90). Analysts strongly argue

on the lack of technological, operational and even tactical readiness of the military in Nigeria to perform its

traditional role of defence (Larmack, Pooz & Tordoff, 1993:141, Tolofari, 2004:23). In size, “Nigeria

maintained one of the smallest Armed Forces to be found in the new states of Africa… At the time the

federation became independent state, total capital spending on defence amounted to no more than 1.28

Million Pounds representing just about 2.6 percent of total federal capital spending” (Dudley, 1973:89). Part

of the explanation for this small military was that “the political leadership judged that Nigeria had little to fear

from the aggression, or threat of aggression, either of her neighbours or of foreign European states” (Dudley,

1973:90). Another explanation, and perhaps most important, Britain had reduced Nigeria’s national interests

and security virtually identical to hers. As such, there was no reason allow for the development of a strong

military capable of serving as an instrument of defence policy after independence. The Anglo-Nigerian

Defence Pact, which committed the two countries to mutual defence in case of aggression by a third country,

was a strong testimony to this argument (Asobie, 1988:18). In effect, national security in Nigeria was defined

in terms of British national interests, and by implication, the whole of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) alliance. This was true to Asobie (1988:19) because “from the start it was clear that the principal

objective of the pact was the containment of communism, thus giving it the same raison d’etre with the

NATO”. Joe Garba however rejects this argument. According to Garba (1991:182) “to be fair to Nigerian

political leaders, they were unhappy about this pact in 1958 but they agreed to initial it on the understanding

that they would reconsider the question as soon as Nigeria became independent…the Prime Minister… feared

that Her Majesty’s Government would delay their independence if they did not accept it”. It might be said that

the pact was a tactical manoeuvre by Nigeria’s political class to secure Nigeria’s independence. Clark

(1991:377) shares this opinion with Garba, for he observes that Nigeria was not the only country to have

signed a defence agreement with Britain on the eve of her independence. There was a growing concern in the

59
West that former colonial territories could be swayed by the communist USSR. The pact should therefore be

seen within this context as a coup by Britain against USSR. This Pact was eventually killed via intense and

massive protests especially, by students (Garba, 1991:182).

This notwithstanding, Nigerian political leaders recognised the futility of independence without a strong

military, and the only way to achieve that was to train them (Clark, 1999:424). According to Gen. Babangida

(in Lame & Dabin, 2000:200), with the subsequent adoption of the Republican status in 1963, there was an

increased need for “a bigger and permanent military organisation for the purposes of protecting Nigeria’s

territorial integrity, supporting her international commitments and for exercising direct and continuous control

over the people”. Significantly, federal capital spending doubled in two years rising to 3.82 million pounds or

9.4% in 1962/63 and 6.75 million pounds or 12.1% in 1965/66. There was also an increase in the total

strength of personnel of about 45 percent in the period 1960/1961 and 1965/1966. (Dudley, 1973:89-90). In

addition, the federal government established a Military academy – Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) – to

train the officer corps of the Nigerian military (Clark, 1991:424). All these efforts were however seen as no

more than cosmetic attempts to establish a military in line with the sovereign status of Nigeria, and in reality,

not much to do with the quest to establish a strong instrument of national defence. For instance, Dudley

(1973:90) argued:

The increase in the manpower strength of the army in itself may be regarded as no more than a gesture towards maintaining the image of
sovereignty as Nigeria became an independent state. The same thing could be said of the establishment of a ‘Navy’ and ‘Air force’ and a
munitions factory all of which were seen as accoutrements of statehood rather than conscious policy of creating a defence force.

In seeking to achieve the objectives of the defence policy – maintaining internal security, territorial

integrity, and meeting Nigeria’s international obligations – Nigerian Army had between 1960-1966 performed

or at least participated in five national and international operations (Babangida in Lame & Dabin, 2000:200).

Three of those operations were domestic to help restore law and order and to prevent breakdown of national

security. In 1962, the Military was called to reinforce the Police in restoring ‘law and order’ during the state of

emergency in the Western Region. The Military was again called in 1964 to restore law and order in the Tiv

division of the Northern Region of Nigeria. While the Tiv operations were going on, the Military was yet

60
again invited to maintain security in the Western Region (Dudley, 1973:98). The Military in all those instances

performed creditably, and at least proved capable of achieving the objective of internal security.

At the international level, Nigerian Army participated in two operations. Those were the United Nations

Emergency Force in the Congo and in Tanzania. Gen. Babangida (in Lame & Dabin, 2000:200) explains,

“The two operations outside the country’s boundaries were in support of the United Nations and a sister

African country on a bilateral agreement between Nigeria and Tanzania”. Nigeria’s participation in Congo

was at the behest of the United Nations, and was regarded as part of the Nigeria’s international obligation to

Africa’s security, peace and development. Nigeria’s intervention in Tanzania was in order to quell a rebellion,

which had already spilled to the neighbouring countries of Uganda and Kenya. After order was restored in

Tanzania, Nigerian Army spent time in that country in place of the indigenous army, which was disbanded by

the government, and trained a new national army (Clark, 1991:644).

3.3.3 Threat(s) Perception in the First Republic

At the time of independence, and even long afterwards, policymakers felt that Nigeria had little to fear in

terms of foreign aggression (Dudley, 1973:90). There was little need therefore towards building a strong

military and intelligence organisation as deterrent instrument. The only fear of foreign aggression entertained

at this period was suspicions of communists’ subversions, either from USSR, China or any of their numerous

agents (Asobie, 1988:23).

The sources of threats to national security in the First Republic were chiefly internal. From the crises of

1962, when a state of emergency was imposed in the Western Region, it was quite evident that by far, greater

threats to national security were internal. The political class and its fiercely primordial and chauvinistic

politics was probably the most formidable threat to national security. The Tiv and Western Region crises of

1964 further testified to this argument. For instance, Dudley, (1973:98) indicts the ruling class for aggravating

and later imposing a state of emergency in the West in 1962, as a façade to get a hold on the West since there

was “scarcely any evidence of a breakdown of law and order and little justification therefore for the

declaration of the state of emergency”. The management of these crises supported the argument of Asobie

61
(1988:18) that the arrangement made for the security and defence of Nigeria at the time of independence was

actually meant to serve the ruling class. In January 1966, the military staged a violent coup d’etat and

overthrew the First Republic. This coup was the greatest demonstration of how grave and dangerous the

internal threats to national security became in the First Republic.

3.4 National Defence Policy (1966-1979): the Military’s First Coming, Civil War, and the National

Security in the Post-War Years

The changes and transformations, which accompanied Nigeria’s defence policy from 1966 to 1979, when

the military relinquished power, were largely directed at the instruments of the policy, such as Armed Forces,

Police, and Intelligence services. For instance, the National Security Organisation (NSO) was a military

creation meant to centrally co-ordinate and harmonise intelligence gathering and analysis in and outside

Nigeria. The national defence policy in the Military years is here studied under three phases. The first phase is

the period from January 1966, to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1967. The second phase is the Civil War

period from 1967-1970 and the era of reconstruction (1970-1975) which accompanied the War. The third

phase examined the changes that attended the post-War Nigeria in the administrations of Murtala and

Obasanjo from 1975-1979. The focus is on the changing pattern and development of the policy and its

instruments in this period.

3.4.1 First Phase: 15th January 1966 Military Coup, Ironsi Days and the Outbreak of the Civil War

On 15th January 1966, in addition to its statutory function of national defence, Nigerian Armed Forces

assumed political leadership of the country. This followed a bloody coup attempt by a group of army officers

mostly of Igbo origins. The Prime Minister, the Premiers of the Western and Northern Regions, and a score of

senior military officers were killed by the plotters (Muffett, 1982). The first coup d’etat to have occurred in

modern Africa took place in Egypt in 1952, and since then, the culture of coups had taken firm root in Africa

(Babatope, 1981). January 1966 was however, the first time military intervened in Nigerian politics. With the

benefit of hindsight, it could be said that January 15th, 1966 opened the floodgate of military incursions into

national politics. It was not difficult to predict changes – political, administrative, security and defence – that

62
would accompany this dramatic occurrence (Muffett, 1982:72-74). General Ironsi, the GOC of the Nigerian

Army took control of the nation. The defence and foreign policy structure, doctrine, and indeed policy

orientation of the First Republic were considerably left intact (Adeniran, 1985:192). Perhaps, this was because

Ironsi did not stay long in power to effect any policy changes in the country.

Nigerian Military was among the institutions to experience early changes and respond to them. Hitherto, its

role was limited to implementing the objectives of the national defence policy as provided by the constitution.

The events of January 1966 however changed this. The military now constituted the ruling class with the

responsibility for policymaking and implementation. Regional governments were abolished and in their places,

regional military governors were appointed – responsible to the military Head of State. Administratively, the

country was united under the military culture of unity of command and control (Balogun, 1973:25).

In the immediate days preceding and succeeding the January 15th putsch, the greatest national security

questions in Nigeria were mainly internal. The January 1966 coup would pass as one of the greatest security

failures of the First Republic. Notwithstanding Asobie’s argument that the entire security and intelligence

services, including the Armed Forces, were fashioned and solely designed to protect the ruling class and its

interests. In fact, the January coup was in itself a strong rebuttal of this argument. It did not make sense that

the entire security and intelligence organisation – which was meant to protect its masters – was willing to let

its masters be killed. In fact, there was considerable evidence to suggest that the intelligence arm of the

Nigerian Police Force had discovered the coup at its planning stages, yet the Police and the Military did

nothing to stop it from happening (Gbulie, 1981:124 Paden, 1986:656-657). There were at least two important

lessons in this coup. Number one, the coup demonstrated how grossly ill prepared or ill disposed the

intelligence and other national security agencies were towards the question of national security in Nigeria.

Coup making is an enterprise that cannot be excused under whatever justification. Secondly, and probably the

most instructive is that a government that evidently lacked legitimacy, in the final analysis would loose the

support of the people. Where this happened, ultimately the government would collapse through either coup d-

etat or mass uprising.

63
Isaac Adaka Boro provided the military government with its first national security crisis. In the immediate

days following the January coup, a group of Ijaw tribesmen from the Niger-Delta Region under Isaac Boro

declared the secession of the Niger-Delta from the Nigerian Federation. Boro cited a number of reasons for

the secession. Prominent among those reasons were the years of neglect by the federal government and

calculated attempts by the Igbo dominated administration of Ironsi to keep them in continued subjugation and

exploitation. Eventually the powerful hand of the Federal Government caught up with Boro and his Niger-

Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) (Boro, 1982). Because the questions raised by that rebellion were not

properly addressed, they were to haunt Nigeria’s national security into contemporary period. This secession

attempt of the Niger-Delta Republic lasted for twelve days.

The way Ironsi government handled the crisis was at the time commendable. In retrospect however, there

was a glaring weakness in the conventional defence approach adopted by the federal government. The

deterrent power of the military as an instrument of national defence has its own limitations. If the government

had used a different approach, say political, to the Niger-Delta issue, the region certainly would not have

turned into the most volatile region in Nigeria today. Instead of deploying the military to contain the situation,

the government could have looked into their grievances and addressed them accordingly. As far back as the

1940s, both Azikiwe and Awolowo for instance, had advocated for the creation of states in Nigeria to address

the question of minorities in the country. In 1957, British established a commission (Willink Commission) to

look into the grievances of the minorities (Balogun, 1973:25-26, Awa, 1976:40).

The precarious security situation in Nigeria in early 1966 further deteriorated in the months ahead. The

failure or procrastination of the Ironsi administration to try the January coup plotters added to the worsened

situation. His Unification Decree No 34 and his top appointments were variously interpreted as calculated

attempts to provoke the already aggrieved North (Garba, 1982:62). The boiling frustration and disappointment

in the North against Ironsi erupted into violent riots in most of the major Northern cities (Muffett, 1982:82-

84). From 29th - 31st July 1966, a group of Army officers of Northern origin staged a violent counter-coup to

avenge the January losses. The Head of state and a score of Igbo army officers were killed. The military, a

64
supposedly national institution, had dramatically transformed itself into a tool of ethnic bigotry and

vengeance. In the period from January 1966 to the outbreak of the Civil War, if a foreign power had invaded

Nigeria, there was no question that a demoralised and divided military and other instrument of national

security could have successfully defended her sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Lt Col Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner, became the new Head of State. This was a development which a

number of army officers, especially senior officers like Col Ojukwu, refused to accept (Garba, 1982:77).

Gowon’s initial failure to halt the riots in the North made any form of rapprochement between the regions

impossible (Balogun, 1973:55-56, Obasanjo, 1981:7). Despite several attempts to broker peace between the

Eastern Region and the federal government, including the Aburi peace talks (de St Jorre, 1975: 91-92, Ojigbo,

1979:126-127), determined to secede, the Eastern Region under Col Ojukwu, declared the sovereign state of

Biafra on the 30th May 1967.

3.4.2 Second Phase: the Civil War; 1967-1970, Gowon and Reconstruction; 1970-1975

The period of Nigerian Civil War was one in which Nigerian Military experienced their greatest expansion

since independence. Conventionally, the decision to go to war was one involving huge economic cost to the

nation, serious expansion in the Armed Forces in terms of personnel, logistics and weaponry. In all climes and

societies, war is a serious business, which requires in-depth planning, risk assessment and abundant financial

and technological resources to wage it. Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese general and military thinker, had warned,

“War is a matter of vital importance to the state…the road of survival or ruin.” (Sun Tzu, 1971:63). The point

is that war as a policy instrument is only resorted to as a desperate and final measure by states. As the arbiter

of final resort, states and political leaders do not regard war lightly especially in modern times when

technology has equipped man with some of the most effective and devastating weapons of waging it.

On 30th May 1967, Col Ojukwu, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, “solemnly proclaimed that

the territory and region known as Eastern Nigeria, together with her continental shelves and territorial waters,

shall henceforth be an independent sovereign state of the name and title the Republic of Biafra” (de St.Jorre,

1975:122). To keep Nigeria united, war had thus become inevitable (Fage & Alabi, 2003:199). Writers like

65
Forsyth (1982:91) argued that the Eastern Region was forcefully driven out of the Nigerian federation. The

point, Forsyth contended, remained valid that the Federal Government was unwilling and unready to

implement fully the terms and conditions of the Aburi Accord of January 1967.

About six weeks of inactivity from both sides followed the May declaration of independence by Biafra.

Gen. Oluleye, (1985:51) explained that in Lagos, the overwhelming perception was that the Easterners were

not serious about secession. The federal government launched operation ‘UNICORD’ that indicated solving

internal problem. It was a ‘Police Action’ against some misguided Nigerians. The operation was backed by a

lengthy Code of Conduct, which introduced an element of caution in the way and manner the federal troops

should wage the ‘Action’. The expectations at this early period were that the rebellion would be crushed in

days if not hours. The realisation in Lagos that Nigeria was truly on the brink of disintegration and collapse

ended what de St.Jorre described as the ‘Phoney War’. On the 6th of July, Nigerian Civil War begun. It turned

out to be neither Gowon’s ‘Police Action’ nor Ojukwu’s implied walkover” (de St Jorre, 1975:125).

At the beginning of the war, some of the serious challenges, which the military in Nigeria faced, included its

size, combat readiness, morale, weapons systems and technological capacity to domestically produce its own

weapons, logistics, level of training and leadership. Opinions varied among scholars and analysts alike as to

the exact level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces on both sides at the beginning of hostilities. Forsyth

in his book Emeka (1982:92) had painted a picture of a Federal Military Force that was “fully armed and

equipped”. Forsyth argued that Nigerian military was already prepared in anticipation of this war. This was in

vivid contrast to the Biafran Military, which was ill equipped, under manned, and generally un-trained.

According to Forsyth (1982:94), there was a complete “absence of experienced infantry officers” in the

Biafran army. Dudley (1973:203) rejected this opinion because as a matter of fact, “recruitment and by

implication, mobilisation and training into the Biafran Armed Forces actually began some five months before

the Federal Government’s. The latter began mobilisation in August, the former in March 1967” (italics added).

Oluleye (1985:64-66) equally shared this opinion. This observation underlined the state of ill preparedness of

66
the Nigerian military, its helplessness, and indeed its complete dependence on foreign source for arms supply

(for a detail analysis of international intervention in the war see: Cronje, 1972, and Obasanjo, 1981:146-158).

At the break of the war, the entire Federal Army, officer corps as well as rank and file, was no more than

10,000 (Eluwa et al., 2005:268). Nigeria had a late start in recruitment and mobilisation but at the end of the

war “had a standing army of about 250,000 men” (Mbachu, 1998:49). The Nigerian Civil War marked a

milestone in the military history of modern Africa. “For the first time, 20th Century technology reached a

battlefield where Black African met Black African in conventional combat. The expansion of capabilities,

from the chaotic spears-and-knives of the Congo to the set piece, automatic-rifles-and-jet-airplanes of Nigeria,

introduced new dimensions in devastation to Africa south of the Sahara” (Stafford,1984). During the war, the

army was organised into three divisions:

A). First Division: Organized around what remained of the pre-war Nigerian Army. This division

represented the best-trained and disciplined elements of the Nigerian army. The Division had about 40,000

soldiers in six infantry Brigades (Oluleye, 1985:73-74).

B). Second Division: Included three infantry Brigades and around 20,000 troops. The Division was hastily

formed during the Biafran invasion of Midwest in August 1967. Its lack of experienced officers and trained

men resulted in numerous failures on the battlefield (Stafford, 1984).

C). Third Marine Commando: With a total strength of about 35,000 soldiers, this Division was divided

into eight Commando Brigades who executed numerous amphibious operations in the Delta areas throughout

the war (Stafford, 1984).

The Nigerian Navy – comparatively smaller in size and equipment to the Army – was also active in the

war. It was effective in blockades and patrols along the coastal areas. There were few ships available. A

frigate, the NAS Nigeria, and a submarine chaser had been obtained from the Netherlands in 1966. The

British had provided two minesweepers, a landing craft and a patrol craft. The Russians also sold Nigeria

three torpedo boats and several radar-equipped seaward-defense vessels after the war started. These last

vessels were effective in canalizing relief flights for Biafra into uncovered air avenues (Stafford, 1984).

67
The Nigerian Air Force did not exist until 1962 and was in its formative stage when the war started. Britain

had started the Air Force training, but terminated it when Nigeria unilaterally voided a military landing rights

agreement. West Germany then continued the programme in 1963. Training was conducted in both West

Germany and Nigeria, but stopped in July 1967 with the first air raids on Kaduna Airfield when a West

German trainer was reportedly killed (Garba, 1982:102, Stafford, 1984). Regardless, the Nigerians had no

combat aircraft. In early 1967, her fleet consisted of 5 Dakota (C-47) transports, 20 Dornier DO-27 light

liaison planes, and 12 P149D Piaggios. The Dorniers and Piaggios had come from the Luftwaffe Training

Mission. However, help soon arrived, in mid-August 1967 when the Soviets sent MIG 15's and 17's, as well

as Czech Delfin L-29 light attack trainers (adapted for strafing and bombing). In all, Nigeria received about

15 MIG's and 12 Delfins during the war and hosted hundreds of Soviet and Czech technical assistants.

Egyptian, European and South African mercenaries piloted for Nigeria through the first part of the war

(Stafford, 1984). In early 1968, three IL-28 Ilyushin bombers were received at Makurdi. Additionally, the

Force had two BAC Jet Provosts (gifts from Sudan), eight Westland Whirlwind Helicopters (purchased from

Australia) and 5 DC-3's (borrowed from Nigerian Airways). In fact, the Nigerian Air Force represented a

flexible and intimidating factor, which had significant strategic impact on the war effort. Yet even with its

tremendous superiority over the Biafran opposition, Nigeria never fully exerted her advantage. In fact, the Air

Force was more notorious for bombing and strafing civilian population and in its failure to stop airlifts into

Biafra after it was cut off from every other means of support (Stafford, 1984).

On January 12, 1970, ‘General’ Philip Effiong, the emergency Head of State of Biafra surrendered to the

federal forces after Ojukwu had fled Biafra in ‘search of peace’. “Thirty bloody months had gone before the

rebels were forced to surrender” (Oluleye, 1985:141). No doubt, keeping Nigeria united was the greatest

achievement of the military government in this time (Gbanite, 2001). At the end of the war, Nigerian Armed

Forces acquired considerable experience definitely second only to Egypt and South Africa in terms of

operational capability to engage in a conventional combat (Babatope, 1981:26). According to Arnold

(1977:37) “the Civil War meant that a small-scale colonial style army was turned into one of the largest in

68
Africa (indeed, in the world). Its officers and men emerged from the Civil War with a sense of battle

competence that gave them assurance in the post-War years”.

On 29th of July 1975, the third military coup in Nigeria’s political history occurred. The coup came nine

years after the second coup, and barely five years after the Civil War had ended (Adeshina, 1999:85).

Opinions varied among scholars and some of the dramatis personae at the time regarding the ability or

otherwise of the intelligence and security organisations to uncover the plot at its planning stages. Gen. Gowon

admitted to a foreknowledge of the plot. In his (Gowon) words “I did not act because I didn’t want heads to

roll” (Arnold, 1977:21). Oluleye (1985:160) countered that although Gowon may be privy to the plot, he

could not act because he was helpless and incapable of addressing the situation. This was because “there was

certainly a great deal of speculation at the time that he (Gowon) did know about the coup in advance and that

the manner of his going had been worked out with his successor” (Arnold, 1977:21).

3.4.3 Third Phase: Murtala/Obasanjo Years; 1975-1979

At least, from the perspective of the July 1975 coup plotters, the July coup was a national security

imperative. Major reasons given for the putsch were the drift, corruption, and aimlessness of the previous

administration, which could plunge the country into chaos and serious national security crisis (Yar’Adua

Foundation, 2004:86-87). In his maiden address to the nation, the new Head of State, Gen Murtala

Muhammad (FGN, 1980:1) pointed, “Nigeria was left to drift. This situation, if not arrested, would inevitably

have resulted in chaos and even bloodshed”. In essence, “the nation was thus being plunged inexorably into

chaos”. In his interpretation of the events, which justified the coup, Gen. Murtala had brought an entirely

different explanation to the question of national security in Nigeria. For the first time in the history of Nigeria,

a member of the ruling class, no less a person than the Head of State himself, openly acknowledged the level

of national security threat which the ruling class posed to the nation because of poor leadership and insensitive

policies and programmes. In simple language, national security was defined in terms of independence,

freedom, development and progress of Nigeria and Nigerians. The Armed Forces, as the traditional instrument

of national defence, were considered as an integral and a supporting pillar of the entire national security

69
structure. The security and well-being of Nigeria and her people was tied down to the security and well-being

of Africa and Africans. According to Ojigbo (1979:137), “the main challenge for the new leadership was the

provision of the basis for political stability, peace and national security. The Administration of General

Muhammad not only realized and accepted that challenge, it also established concrete programmes that can

and should provide for internal political stability and international respect” (italics added).

3.4.3.1 Policy Objectives and Operationalisation: 1975-1979

Upon assuming office, Murtala appointed a review panel that came up with the following as objectives of

Nigeria’s foreign policy:

a) Defence of national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity;

b) The creation of necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world, which

will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries, while at

the same time fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development;

c) The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world;

d) The promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of the

Blackman;

e) The defence and promotion of world peace (Mbachu, 1997:83-84).

As pointed earlier, the administration had a profoundly different perspective to internal stability and

national security in the country. Therefore, “the attempts to establish a solid basis for political stability …

centred around three key issues: a new constitution, an acceptable population census, and the question of the

sizes of the respective units of the Federation and hence the question of the creation of more states” (Ojigbo,

1979:137). In discussing Ironsi days, this research has pointed that the question of minorities in the country

was one of the most constant and ever-recurrent problem that posed formidable threat to national security.

This no doubt explained the promptness with which Murtala/Obasanjo regime tried to diffuse the problem.

Barely a month after it had come to power, the Administration established the Irikefe Panel to look into the

question of creating more states in Nigeria. Generally, Nigerians believed the creation of more states “would

70
safeguard their interests, their security and resolve the issue of power sharing and hence the basis for national

political stability” (Ojigbo, 1979:189).

One area in which the Administration laid a strong foundation for national stability was in the nullification

of 1973 census results. The 1973 census exercise was so flawed that it had already awaken the monsters of

ethnic and religious bigotry once again in the country. It had already become obvious that accepting the results

by the Federal Government was enough to threaten any peace in-roads and national reconciliation that might

have been achieved since the end of the Civil War. This was because “the fear of domination in Nigeria has

been centred on the question of population of the different ethnic groups, and more importantly, the sizes of

the regions. Political decisions were immensely influenced by the population strength of each region” (Ojigbo,

1979:208). The cancellation of the census results were among the first measures taken by the administration

upon coming to power. In the words of General Murtala (FGN,1980:5) “With regard to 1973 population

census, it is now clear that whatever results are announced will not command general acceptance throughout

the country. It has therefore been decided to cancel the 1973 population count.”

Early in 1976, the Federal Government announced its decision to reduce the size of the Armed Forces.

The intention was to ensure that it become the best equipped and effective in the continent (Arnold, 1977:40).

According to General Yar’Adua (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:126-127), “the present size of the army

(Military) is…such that it is almost impossible to equip properly and give it any meaningful training”.

Paradoxically, while the leadership pursued the modernising and re-positioning course of the instruments of

Nigeria’s national security and defence with vigour, the leadership paid negligible attention to its personal

security. General Oluleye argued that because of the ‘Low-profile’ policy of the regime, technically, the

“Special Branch (the intelligence arm of the Nigeria Police Force mandated with the responsibility among

others, of detecting plots against the Government) of the Police went on holidays”. The Head of State himself

was not security conscious. For instance, “the Head of State demonstrated his popularity by driving himself to

places and even functions, armed escorts were of no necessity” (Oluleye,1985:178). These factors made the

71
possibility of a violent coup attempt against the government near successful in February 1976. The result was

tragic enough – the Head of State was killed in the process.

Predictably, this incident significantly altered security perception in the remaining days of the

Administration. New national security measures were introduced to protect the national leadership and the

nation itself from destructive elements (internal and external) (Oluleye, 1985:191-192). One such measure

was the creation of the National Security Organisation (NSO), which was patterned along the USA’s Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Oluleye, 1985:191). The responsibilities of NSO included intelligence gathering

(spying and counter-spying), and central co-ordination and harmonisation of all Intelligence Services in the

country.

There is a consensus among scholars that Murtala/Obasanjo military regime epitomised the golden period

of Nigeria’s proactive, dynamic and progressive foreign policy. The objectives of the policy were pursued

with vigour and zeal unmatched before or ever since in Nigeria’s history. It might be interesting to know that

as a measure of its commitment to the well-being of Nigerians, the first international problem the regime had

to tackle was on what Joe Garba, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, described as “cows and a broken bridge”

(Garba, 1991:2). As laughable as it might sound, this was a serious national security concern for the country,

which if left unattended was capable of undermining the security of Nigeria. The issue as Garba pointed

included an embargo on cattle trade by Niger Republic, which created meat shortage in Nigeria. The embargo

was interpreted by Lagos as an anti-Nigerian measure. This no doubt was what Garba (in Ojigbo, 1979:311)

meant by protecting Nigeria’s “interests without equivocation”. Another instance worth mentioning was the

way Nigeria handled Equatorial Guinea. For a long time, the tiny island of Equatorial Guinea was a large

consumer of Nigerian labour, albeit in degrading conditions. This ill-treatment reached its peak in January

1976 when the country’s Armed Forces killed about six Nigerians and her nationals “went on a rampage,

beating up Nigerians in market places, looting and committing other acts of vandalism” (Ojigbo, 1979:344-

347). The evident complicity of their government in these acts, and the indignations, which these hostilities

72
drew in Nigeria, made the Federal Government respond by sending evacuation team and “a naval armada to

move towards their shores” (Mbachu, 1997:94, Gbanite, 2001).

Garba (1991:40) once observed, “Countries choose their friends but never their neighbours. Nigeria’s

neighbours are a matter of colonial heritage and making friends out of her neighbours has been and will

continue to be a major pre-occupation of Nigeria’s foreign policy”. Being friendly with them, and seeing that

they remained considerably peaceful and stable is a necessary pre-condition to securing her borders, peace,

security and development. This explained the decision of the regime to intervene in the Chadian Civil War,

which broke out in 1978 between factions loyal to the president, Felix Malloum, and the prime minister,

Hissene Habre. Although, the crisis would outlive Obasanjo regime, his government did what it could to help

reduce the tension. The Nigerian intervention and the subsequent efforts to mediate in the war were informed

largely by pragmatic considerations. It was an open secret in Lagos that Libya and France were openly

involved in support of client factions (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:140-142). It was not in Nigeria’s strategic

interest to have a world power – France, which at best their relations were no more than cordial – installed a

puppet regime close by her borders. The alternative was no less appealing. For some time, Nigeria had been

viewing Libyan intentions in West Africa with suspicion. Then, there were also the spectre of cross-border

migration of criminals and other undesirable elements, a situation that was capable of undermining Nigeria’s

internal security.

Murtala/Obasanjo Administration tied Nigeria’s national security, political and economic development to

the liberation and development of Africa and its people. Angola in Southern Africa was the “first area where

Nigeria most evidently demonstrated this meaning…and most importantly, of her commitment to the total

liberation of Africa” (Ojigbo, 1979:312). General Murtala had observed at a speech to Organisation of African

Unity (OAU) Extra-Ordinary Summit in Addis Ababa on January 1976, “as long as Africa remains dependent,

it is within the orbit of NATO countries and is available for exploitation to sustain Western prosperity while

the Africans sink deeper into poverty”. Murtala further observed (FGN, 1980:63):

Africa has come of age. It is no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country,
however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or mar. For too long have we been kicked around; for too long have

73
we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the African
needs an outside ‘experts’ to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it clear that
we can decide for ourselves; that we know our own interests and how to protect those interests; that we are capable of resolving African
problems without presumptuous lessons in ideological dangers, which more often than not have no relevance for us, nor for the problem
at hand.

In the same vein, Obasanjo though not with the same intensity, reiterated this position on October 13, 1977

while addressing the Thirty-second Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Mohammed, 1982:80-

82). By far and large, the administration “acted courageously, decisively and with a commendable degree of

independence and self-confidence” (Eluwa et al., 2005:275). This notwithstanding, there were scholars who

viewed the achievements of Murtala/Obasanjo as mere happenstance. For instance, Wilmot, (1979:15) said,

“The…regime of late General Murtala Muhammed was characterised more by the occasional brilliant stroke,

executed with masterful decision, than by consistent programme of political reform. A case in point is the

masterfully executed, but isolated, decision to spearhead the recognition of the MPLA government of

Angola”. In essence, Wilmot was saying there was no co-ordinated policy framework to guide the conduct of

decision-making and implementation under this administration. Nweke (1985:221) was equally blunt:

In terms of leadership…nor General Murtala, nor General Obasanjo was an ideological or revolutionary-charismatic leader, but mere
revolutionary opportunist belonging to the same social class that was in itself a product of colonialism. They frequently referred in their
public pronouncements to Nigerian commitment to the policy of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-neo-colonialism, Pan-
Africanism, and non-alignment, but they neither give serious thoughts to these categories nor understood their philosophical
underpinnings in defence and foreign policy (italics added).

3.5 National Defence Policy in the Second Republic

In 1979 when Second Republic was inaugurated, Nigeria had been a sovereign state for exactly nineteen

(19) years. In that period, her national defence and security priorities have experienced enormous

transformation and development. There were changes, which were caused by the Nigerian Civil War. And just

about four years (4) to the date of inauguration of the Second Republic, a panel was established by Murtala

administration to review Nigeria’s foreign policy. The results were new principles and objectives highlighting

the changing shift of Nigeria’s status as a potential continental power (Mbachu, 1998:83-84). Essentially, this

provided a completely new definition to the issue of national security in the country.

3.5.1 Policy Objectives in the Second Republic

74
Shagari administration did not depart from the basic objectives of the policy pursued by all previous

regimes since independence – territorial defence, sovereignty, non-alignment, friendly relations with all

nations, Afrocentricism and co-operation to bring about African unity and development (Shagari, 2001:343).

Policymakers in the Second Republic devoted enormous resources to secure Nigerian borders from external

threats and acts of aggression. In addition, the country also actively participated together with other nations in

various international peace-support operations as a measure of her commitment to peace and development.

3.5.2 Policy Instruments in the Second Republic

Policy instruments in the Second Republic did record considerable expansion and development. For the

Nigerian Army, this development included “the procurement of sophisticated military equipment and

weapons. A drastic re-organisation of the Army was conducted with a view to making it fully mechanized and

mobile in order to enhance its state of preparedness” (Shagari, 2001:320). The Defence Industries Corporation

(DICON) in Kaduna was reorganised to enable it produce sufficient quantity of military hardware and

munitions to meet the needs of the Nigerian Military. In addition, an armoured vehicle plant was established in

partnership with a Swiss company in order to make Nigeria self-sufficient in her defence needs. The Navy, Air

Force, and other security agencies recorded similar developments. According to Shagari (2001:321), all these

services were “equipped with modern weapons and sophisticated equipments of all types and shapes…

Training institutions for each arm was either established or expanded to meet the growing needs for trained

personnel in these services”. Williams (1982:207) felt sufficiently confident to point that Nigeria’s military

were the “Black Africa’s biggest (numerically), and their equipment is constantly being improved”.

Other parts of the national security structure – Police Force for maintaining internal law and order,

Customs and Immigration Services for border patrol, Intelligence services for intelligence gathering (spying

and counter spying) – were accorded due attention. For instance, a Ministry of Police Affairs was created,

with responsibility for all police matters in the country. According to Shagari (2001:322), “the object (of the

ministry) was to re-activate the Police Force and equip it properly to enable it cope, effectively and efficiently,

with the task of maintaining law and order throughout the federation”. Accordingly, the administration

75
embarked on a nation-wide re-organisation and expansion of the Police Force, so that its impact could be felt,

especially in its role of crime control, maintaining and enforcing law, and general security of the public.

Again, “the Police Force was equipped with modern weapons and other equipments that would make it more

effective” in its duties (Shagari, 2001:322). The intelligence services were also affected in these changes.

Previously, the Police Special Branch (E Branch), the Military Intelligence, and the Security Department of

the Cabinet Office, acted independently in matters of intelligence gathering and sharing without a central co-

ordinating unit to the detriment of Nigeria. Under Shagari, NSO became the central co-ordinating agency for

all intelligence matters with responsibility to brief the president and kept him – daily and fully – informed on

the security situation in the country (Shagari, 2001:325-327).

3.5.3 Threat(s) Perception in the Second Republic

Some of the national security threats were internal and so ferocious that almost the whole instruments of

national defence – Army, Police Force and the intelligence services – had to be called in to contain them. The

Maitatsine disturbances that started in Kano city in 1982, and in other places within the federation was

probably the most serious in the second republic. This disturbance was caused by Muhammad Marwa, an

Islamic religious scholar with fanatical streak in his teachings. What started as a local problem soon

degenerated into a national security crisis. Initially, government response was to consider this disturbance as a

routine law and order affair. The Police was deployed to contain the situation. Nevertheless, police

performance was an abysmal failure, and to Shagari (2001:323), “fell below… expectation”. The military was

called-in to quell the disturbances (Mbachu, 1998:49, Shagari, 2001:324). However, because of the way the

government generally handled this problem, the followers of Maitatsine regrouped again in other places,

including Maiduguri, Borno state in 1983, and nearly repeated Kano experience of the previous year (Shagari,

2001:323-324). The Army was again used to complement the Police in restoring law and order in Bakalori

peasants’ riot of 1982 in Sokoto state (Mbachu, 1998:49, Shagari, 2001:323). This riot was allegedly caused

by the non-payment of compensation to the people of the Bakalori area by the Sokoto State Government after

it appropriated their land for an Irrigation project in the area.

76
By far however, the greatest test to the national defence policy under Shagari came from the external

sources. The near break down of peaceful relations between Nigeria and her eastern neighbour, Cameroon in

March 1981 was the most intense. Actually, “the circumstances (for this strain) were never fully established;

but Cameroon forces in the coastal area killed five Nigerian soldiers who were according to Nigerian sources,

inside Nigeria” (Williams, 1982:210). In any case, the killings, complemented by a lingering border dispute

between Nigeria and Cameroon provided the catalyst for a near-implosion. In Nigeria, there were calls for

retaliatory action against Cameroon (Williams, 1982:210). In the policymaking cycles, decision was taken to

mobilise and amass large troops along the Nigeria/Cameroon border for possible military action (Shagari,

2001:362-363). Although the crisis was eventually settled diplomatically without recourse to war, this

incidence was the first time Nigeria came close to war with another country. It also provided the first serious

and graphic demonstration of the readiness of Nigeria to resort to war in order to protect and defend her

territorial integrity. Relations with Cameroon would continue to feature in Nigeria’s national security.

Another potential national security nightmare for Nigeria in the Second Republic was the civil war going

on in Chad. According to Williams (1982:208), “Nigeria’s most immediate … policy problem, however, is on

her own borders”. Nigeria’s economic resources, military strength and geographical contiguity made it a

strategic partner in the peace and development of her immediate neighbours including Chad. The failure of

Nigeria to intervene in Chad would seem that Nigeria was abdicating her responsibility to her neighbour, and

that would look like an open invitation to the Libyans to intervene in support of one of the factions. The

outcome of this would not be palatable to Nigeria’s national security. Again, non- intervention would look like

an open invitation to the Chadian refugees to pour into her borders through Borno state. Criminals and bandits

would certainly exploit this opportunity for their nefarious ends. In essence, the instability in Chad could turn

contagious. National security, more than any other consideration, dictated that she should do all in her power

to bring peace. Nigeria’s intervention in the Chadian civil war was therefore a strategic necessity. In the

process, Nigeria provided peacekeeping troops and other forms of assistance in order to end the conflict

(Williams, 1982:208-209, Shagari, 2001:321-322). Generally, in the Second Republic though the threats were

77
formidable, the instruments of national defence played their part, especially, the military, which “secured

Nigerian borders against incursions by foreign troops operating from Chad, the Cameroons and on a few

occasions from the Republic of Benin” (Shagari, 2001:321). During the Second Republic, Nigerian Army

participated in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations in Lebanon until 1982 when they withdrew

(Shagari, 2001:321).

3.6 Military’s Second Coming: 1983-1999

As it was, Shagari administration was merely a momentary break from a long chain of military

administration in the country. In a series of trends, which started with the January coup of 1966, the military

were to rule Nigeria for a total of twenty-nine (29) years out of her forty-eight (48) years of independence.

The period 1983-1999 constituted the second time, barring the Shonekan’s days in 1993, the military

exclusively dominated politics in Nigeria. In what follows, an attempt is made to continue with a background

study into the development and transformation of national defence policy under the military.

3.6.1 National Security and Threat(s) Perception under Buhari: 1983-1985

On December 31st 1983, the Nigerian Army toppled the recently re-elected Shagari Administration. The

coup launched the military’s second coming into politics. It was not in dispute that by late 1983, Shagari’s

survival looked increasingly tenuous. The economy was faltering because of dwindling oil prices and a

rapidly increasing foreign debt. The mounting debt was becoming hard to service and even harder to justify.

There were allegations of corruption against the politicians. The September presidential elections, which

returned the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to office was characterised by allegations of fraud,

irregularities, thuggery, and violence (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:170). Nzeribe (1985:5) argued that the four

years of civilian administration were merely characterised by drift, hence “all patriots in and outside Nigeria

quickly rallied to support the military. It is a measure of both the scale of mismanagement by the civilian

government” and the dissatisfaction among the public that the military wasted no time in establishing

legitimacy. In a sense, the military’s intervention was altruistic: informed by patriotic sentiment and in keeping

with their role and responsibility of protecting Nigeria’s national integrity. Buhari described his administration

78
as a continuation of Murtala/Obasanjo regime (Barrett, 1985:78). Thus, “Buhari had ostensibly set out to

reclaim Murtala’s agenda, cleanse the political system, and re-lay the foundations for a stable democracy”

(Yar’Adua Foundation, 2005:172).

From what analysts such as Eluwa et al., (2005:282) argued, the military “came to power when the nation

was yearning for someone to deliver her from her economic, social and political troubles; and…was

determined to deal with those who threatened the nation’s survival”. It was evident that, when Buhari came to

power national security was to be defined fundamentally in terms of economic policies and programmes.

Barrett (1985) cited the permissiveness of Shagari Administration in socio-political matters and economic

mismanagement as equally being another source of threat to national security. According to Barrett (1985:34):

One of the major factors that threatens the maintenance of stability in Nigeria in 1984 is the fact that democratic government allows for
the expression of dissent without restraint. The lack of self-discipline that has become a hallmark of national attitudes militates against
objectivity and, in political criticism, a balanced assessment of the political circumstances. In a nation as volatile, and frustrated with
failed programmes and squandered wealth, as Nigeria, unrestrained and unsubstantiated rumours are often ‘Pass’ for political criticism. In
such an atmosphere, a worsening economy in 1984 could lead to an even more volatile situation.

To address this situation, Buhari instituted stiff and draconian measures. The treatment of armed robbers,

drug traffickers, and even the politicians was effective just as it was ruthless (Eluwa et al., 2005:282-283).

Some of the judgements on the ousted politicians passed by the Military Tribunals were out rightly seen as

travesty of justice (Africa Events, October, 1985:6). It is quite difficult even today to justify those harsh

measures, yet not difficult however to understand the motive for such steps. Nigeria at that time was tottering

in the grip of politicians who were fleecing her dry. Life to an average Nigerian was unbearable. This could

turn into a serious national security nightmare. Already there were strong indications to that effect. Some of

the urban centres had already swelled with an increasing number of slum dwellers - one of the side effects of

the poor economy occasioned by unemployment and mass retrenchments. “Certainly life has never been

harder in the towns, where the amount of gangsterism and armed robbery has recently reached new peaks”

(Africa Confidential, January 1985, Vol. 26 No 3:3). In order to combat these ugly trends, the War Against

Indiscipline (WAI) was launched (Nzeribe, 1985:86-87). Remarkably, in the short period of Buhari regime,

there was a noticeable absence of any serious internal security problem. Probably this was because of the

draconian disposition of the regime and, less to do with any substantive and comprehensive socio-political and
79
economic policies. Barrett (1985:80) argues “Buhari Government is the first true military dictatorship, albeit

benevolent, that Nigeria has experienced”. This provided little avenue for any real serious trouble in the

country (Africa Confidential, January 1985, Vol. 26 No 3: p3).

Another possible explanation on the relative peace in the country could be traced to a rejuvenated NSO and

series of decrees enacted by Buhari, especially, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 and

Decree No. 4 (Public Officers Protection against False Accusations) respectively. Decree No. 2 was enacted in

1984 as a modified version of Decree No. 3 of 1966. The Decree empowered the regime to arrest any

person(s) and to detain him without trial if there were sufficient reasons to consider him a threat to national

security. Decree No. 4 of 1984 was a modified version of Decree No. 11 of 1976 enacted by Obasanjo after

the death of Murtala. The Decree specifically empowered the regime to withhold any information that might

be considered embarrassing to the government. Other sections of the Decree provide that journalists should

only publish what was not inimical to public peace and would not bring disrepute to the government (Barrett,

1985:77). Eluwa et al., (2005:282) summed the situation thus: “By decrees he [Buhari] conferred absolute

power on his government. Its supremacy could not be questioned even in courts of law”.

To enforce his WAI and other national security measures, the regime relied heavily on NSO and the

military personnel. The NSO, which had acquired a reputation for incompetence, and was widely seen as

being more interested in gratification and corrupt enrichment of its personnel under Shagari, than intelligence

gathering (Africa Events, October, 1985:25) was re-organised. Its Director General was elevated to the

membership of the SMC, the highest ruling body in the country (Africa Confidential, January 1985, Vol. 26,

No. 3:4). Personnel of the Armed Forces, on the other hand, were employed mainly to enforce – often with

gun butt – discipline, observance of law and order among the citizenry in such matters as sanitation and Bus

queues (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:172).

On the external front, the Chadian conflict was regarded in Nigeria as one of the greatest security threat to

Nigeria. There were misgivings, especially, among the top Military and other security personnel regarding the

way Shagari handled the Chadian conflict. In fact, the decision of the military to topple Shagari was connected

80
to this. In the course of those operations, Shagari had withdrawn Nigerian troops from Chad. This allowed for

cross-border banditry in which some Chadian soldiers crossed the border and killed a number of Nigerian

soldiers. Although the military had accepted the withdrawal order loyally, according to Buhari (Yar’Adua

Foundation, 2004:170) “we didn’t like it and we [the Military] told the authority we didn’t like it”. A simple

explanation for this turn of events was that “for several years, the Nigerian security apparatus has regarded

Libyan finance, agents provocateurs and military involvement as the single biggest external security threat to

Nigeria” (Africa Confidential, January 1985, Vol. 26, No. 3:3). The misgivings of the military were thus

founded upon the fear of compromising Nigeria’s national security by an ‘inept leadership’. In fact, Buhari’s

1983 skirmishes – while he was the GOC Third Mechanised Division in Jos – over Lake Chad was the first

major encounter with Libyan-connected intrigues in Chad. According to Africa Confidential (January 1985,

Vol. 26, No. 3:3), the “abstract but real fear of the Nigerian [Military] High Command is that Libyan ‘MIGs’

could one day have facilities at both N’djamena in Chad and Cotonou in Benin. Given the lack of ground-to-

air defence capabilities in Nigeria, Libyan aircraft operating from these bases could attack targets anywhere in

Nigeria”.

In summing up the challenges of national security from 1983-1985, it is safe to posit that internally, the

challenges were limited to poor economy and weak industrial base and the attendant socio-political

consequences. Because of this, the regime directed much of its energy and resources towards “revamping the

country’s economy” (Mbachu, 1997:114). On the external front, the only serious security threat to Nigeria’s

national defence security was Chad.

3.6.2 Changing Face of National Defence Policy under IBB Regime: 1985-1993

“On August 27, 1985, Buhari’s regime was overthrown by another right-wing military coup led by Major

General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, accusing his regime of being insensitive, draconian, unresponsive and

hypocritic [sic]” (Mbachu, 1997:116). With the exception of Gowon, no military ruler ever lasted as long as

IBB. Enormous developments in the areas of national defence and security occurred in this period. Internally,

probably excepting the Civil War, no period in Nigerian history ever came close to some of the most serious

81
challenges and threats to Nigeria’s national security. Externally, the regime presided on Nigeria’s affairs when

the global political and security equation was undergoing monumental changes.

3.6.2.1 Internal Security Situation

Among the first internal security measures introduced by Babangida was the restructuring of the security

organisations in 1986. The National Security Organization was dissolved, prompting the formation of three,

smaller, more specialized agencies. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) became Nigeria's main civilian

intelligence agency with responsibilities for counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection operations.

The NIA focused on external threats to Nigerian national interests. The State Security Service (SSS) managed

domestic intelligence, and worked closely with the Federal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB), the

liaison agency between law enforcement and intelligence services (Encyclopedia of Espionage, 2004).

Nigeria's military intelligence was coordinated through the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA). The

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was responsible for foreign and domestic military intelligence. The DIA

was more secretive in its operations and maintained a larger special action force than the civilian intelligence

agencies (Encyclopedia of Espionage, 2004).

The weak economic base, which Buhari grappled with compelled Babangida to implement Structural

Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 to address the worsening economic recession in the country. Despite

US$4.2 billion of support from the World Bank and the rescheduling of foreign debt, the recession led to a

series of currency devaluations, a decline in real income, and rising unemployment during the second half of

the 1980s (Anyanwu, 1992:1). The cumulative impact of these on the citizens led to protests, demonstrations

and violent riots. The SAP riots of 1989 were the most virulent (Maier, 2000:65).This fall-out of SAP policies

posed a serious threat to internal security of the country. Late Bala Usman,(1990:1) says this about SAP:

“The fundamental issue of Nigerian sovereignty and its basis in the right of the people of Nigeria for self-determination is closely tied up
with their right to ensure their survival. For this Structural Adjustment Programme formally enacted in July 1986, and rigorously imposed
for the last three and a-half years has clearly failed to bring about even the beginnings of economic recovery in this country. The prospect
of continuing with it for another twenty years raises the question not just of self-determination, but of survival of the country and its
people as a whole” (italics added).

Another security problem that cropped up was the spate of violent religious crises that became a recurring

feature under Babangida. This was actively nurtured and encouraged by the Federal Government’s blatant
82
violation of the secular character of the Nigerian state. The backdoor attempt to smuggle Nigeria into the

Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), an international body of Islamic states, was interpreted to mean a

departure from the country’s secular status. Actually, Buhari initiated the decision, Babangida only allowed it

to stand. The strong reaction of the Christian community – often violent – was an embarrassment to the

government. This was the first time since 1978 Shari’a debates at the Constituent Assembly – not with equal

intensity – that religion assumed a centre stage as a serious force capable of dismembering Nigeria.

A botched coup attempt in December 1985 had already signalled that even within the military there were

opposing sides. On April 22nd of 1990, another violent and bloody attempt at toppling the government and

dismembering the country was made (United States’ Department of State: Nigeria, 2007). The coup exposed

the operationally weak and vulnerable state of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Most observers agreed that the

coup was a near success (Maier, 2000:67, Tolofari, 2004). Tolofari (2004:24), explicates on the condition of

the armed forces thus: “our military was rotting to the ground…our Armed Forces were not fit to fight”.

Perhaps, to forestall a recurrence of such tragedy, IBB established a militia known as the National Guard, and

operationally, administratively and financially responsible to him (Nigeria Police Force, 1991, Noble, 1992).

Nevertheless, the most intense national crisis remained entirely political. The decision of the military to

annul the June 12th presidential polls of 1993 nearly caused the total disintegration of Nigeria. The crisis in its

early phase consumed the IBB’s regime. June 12 was to assume a serious form and proportion that would

eventually remained alive for years to come and would ultimately consume many of the country’s political

elite –the short-lived Shonekan’s ING, Abacha’s regime and the remaining days of the military before the

inception of the Fourth Republic. The military, in cohort with its civilian counterpart, has become the single

greatest and formidable threat to national security. Ahonsi-Yakubu (2001:8) asserted that Nigeria since the

beginning of the Babangida transition in 1987 was in a state of perpetual violence inflicted by the military. An

act which itself undermined national security. To Usman (1990:4), “the whole system [was] sustained by

violent repression, not by colonial troops, but by mercenarised Nigerian armed forces, special and ordinary,

83
posing as the ‘saviours’ of the nation, but actually serving much more nakedly as brutal, debt-collecting

goons…thereby further escalating the national security crisis in the country” (italics added).

An interim national government headed by Shonekan replaced Babangida in August 1993. This step was

necessary in view of the political tumult which IBB’s annulment of June 12 plunged the country (Maier,

2000:71). Demonstrations, riots and even calls of secession by sections of the country trailed the annulment

and well beyond IBB’s departure from power. The following summarised the security situation under

Babangida (National Security, 1991):

A political formula for stability continued to elude successive Nigerian governments, economic and social conditions worsened
during the 1980s, and the military became entrenched as the ultimate arbiter of power. Indeed, the future role of the military
and the fear of coups, resulting especially from radicalization of frustrated junior officers and soldiers, haunted Babangida's
regime as it attempted to create a durable constitutional government in a highly uncertain political environment. Ethnic,
sectional, and religious cleavages marked the underlying political fault lines, from which the military itself was not immune,
and organized labour and students continued to be the agents of public discontent. These internal sources of instability could be
incited or intensified by an array of external forces, such as foreign subversion, oil prices, and foreign debt. To make matters
worse, the national police and criminal justice system were strained beyond capacity. Crime was increasing, prisons were
grossly overpopulated, and military rule by decree bred human rights abuses that were the object of public and international
reproach.

3.6.2.2 The external Environment of Nigeria’s National Defence Policy under IBB Regime

Prior to 1990, Nigeria’s defence policy operated in a bi-polar world where two powers dominated

international relations. The regime came on the scene when the world Balance of Power was steadily tilting in

favour of USA. In simple language, this was the sunset of the Cold War. No doubt, this influenced Nigeria’s

strategic thinking, alignment and its entire security and defence structure. Within the African continent, for

long Egypt – the only country with resources to challenge Nigeria’s claim to leadership in Africa – has

identified more with her Arab brothers than Africa. This technically made Nigeria the ‘de facto Continental

Power’ in Africa. Collapse of Apartheid in South Africa, enthronement of democracy and emergence of

Mandela as an ‘African Statesman’ contested this position which Nigeria had enjoyed for long. She was no

longer to be seen as the only ‘Power’ in Africa. Closer to home in West Africa, most of the internal

contradictions in those states were gaining expression through violent social uprisings, conflicts and civil

wars.

84
Nigeria’s security was closely linked to her relations with her neighbours as well as the internal political

cohesion and economic development among those neighbours. Though none of the West African countries

possessed enough resources to threaten Nigeria’s territorial integrity, they could however serve as a base to

other powers interested in Nigeria’s resources; say for example, France or USA. Strategic considerations

therefore dictated that Nigeria should always maintain friendly relations with her neighbours. Since Gowon,

Nigeria had maintained keen interest in the West African regional affairs. Babangida regime took steps

towards re-strengthening the relationship between Nigeria and her neighbours. Financial and technical

assistance were used to cement these relationships. Even Libya, which hitherto was considered an ‘enemy’,

was courted by IBB regime (Mbachu, 1997:118). The suspicions and ‘cat-and-mouse’ relationship that

hitherto characterised those relations were significantly altered, and threats from these sources considerably

reduced. In order to achieve internal cohesion among her neighbours as a catalyst to her security and

development, Nigeria took measures, which were widely acclaimed. One of such measures was the

establishment of the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was established at a

time when Liberia was passing through one of the most devastating civil wars in Africa; the body was meant

to stop the war and contain its spread to other West African countries (Khobe, 2000). ECOMOG had justified

its creation especially as it related to the West African regional security (ECOMOG, 2007).

Nigeria's armed forces, estimated to be at least 94,500 in 1990, and among the largest in Africa, were

modest in relation to the country's territory, population, and economic resources. The diversity of foreign-

origin armaments reduced dependence on any single supplier but imposed significant logistical constraints; a

fledgling domestic arms industry had been established and abandoned. Nigeria acquired naval, amphibious,

and airlift forces and created a rapid deployment force for African contingencies, thus confirming its intention

and capacity for power projection abroad. Externally, Nigeria remained secure and its defences adequate. Its

Armed Forces’ size was a pointer to her lack of imperial designs within the West African sub-region (National

Security, 1991). It might be said that when on the 27th of August 1993, IBB ‘stepped aside’; the external

security situation was relatively healthy. There were reduced external pressures and potential threats to

85
Nigeria’s survivability and independence. With the decisive way, Nigeria had resolved the Liberian conflict,

her status as the regional power was consequently asserted.

3.6.3 National Security under Abacha and the Transition to the Fourth Republic: 1993-1999

Shonekan’s ING was generally regarded as an ‘illegal contraption’ concocted by the military to save face

and placate the Yorubas. On 17th November 1993, General Abacha, staged a palace coup and sacked

Shonekan (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:239). The human rights and pro-democracy groups acclaimed the

coup as timely (Maier, 2000:103, Hallmark, 7th July 1999:15). There was some justification in these friendly

receptions. Though years of political interventions and intrigues had somewhat eroded its professionalism and

ethics, yet, the military was seen as the only institution capable of saving Nigeria from the anarchy, which she

was progressively descending into since June 12. The internal security was such that an ‘illegal contraption’

like ING was not capable of addressing (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:233, Oloyode, 2007:13).

3.6.3.1 Internal Security Situation: 1993-1999

It is important to point that for the entire duration of Abacha presidency and, in fact, until the inauguration

of the Fourth Republic in May 1999, the un-resolved question of June 12 remained one of the serious items on

the agenda of national security in Nigeria. Abacha assumed power when Nigeria was increasingly grappling

with deteriorating internal security condition (Egwaikhide & Isumonah, 2001:2). The descent into

lawlessness, violence, civil unrest and near-anarchy was progressing alarmingly (United States’ Department of

States; Nigeria, 2007). In his maiden address to the nation, Abacha observed, “the survival of our beloved

country, is far above any consideration. Nigeria is the only country we have. (New Nigerian, Tuesday 28,

January 1997:11). Another internal security challenge that came to the forefront again and assumed a greater

force was the Niger-Delta issue. These two issues defined the entire span of Abacha presidency and even

beyond.

Many factors were responsible for the worsened security situation in the country. The deteriorating

economic condition – a fall out of SAP policies of the 1980s – was perhaps the major cause. The grinding

poverty, which SAP policies institutionalised in the society created a complex cycle of social insecurity

86
(Ahonsi-Yakubu, 2001:9). Youth violence, drug trafficking and abuse, human trafficking, prostitution and

armed robbery all undermined Nigeria’s security. Abdullahi (2005:4) painted a rather gloomy, yet correct

picture of the consequences of this: “security of life involves food security and health-care delivery. You do

not get anything, far less self-reliance, from people who are hungry or sick. If people are too concerned with

their securities, there would be no time to be patriotic or to think of production of goods and services. The

young and able-bodied would be too busy seeking other means of survival, begging or stealing. .. Where self-

survival is at stake, talk of self-reliance is useless”. Ujomu (2001:2) summed up the internal security situation

in the following words: “the evidence of the dismal state [of] national security is seen as the diminishing

standard of living and the deteriorating social infrastructure and educational system”.

Not all of the problems associated with national security during the period under review were economic

however. Large portion were political or have political connotations. On Shonekan’s resignation, Abacha

pledged not to overstay in power more than necessary to save the country from collapse. Later it however

became evident that Abacha was neither willing nor ready to relinquish power. On the contrary, he was

scheming on how to transmute into a life president (Egwaikhide & Isumonah, 2001:20, United States’

Department of State; Nigeria, 2007). Naturally, this bred antagonism with the political class, especially, the

pro-democracy activists and other human rights groups (Abimbola, 2002, Oloyode, 2007:3). The groups

accused Abacha of gross human rights violations. In turn, the government accused them of complicity with

foreign agencies, organisations and interests groups to sabotage and destabilise Nigeria. There were bomb

explosions in some major cities in the South West, which (Egwaikhide & Isumonah, 2001:12) the Police and

other intelligence agencies directly linked to the pro-democracy groups, especially the National Democratic

Coalition (NADECO) (Tempo, 6th February 1997:16). This was in addition to assassinations of notable

politicians and pro-democrats. This equally was seen as the handwork of the government to silence her most

vociferous critics (Egwaikhide & Isumonah, 2001: 10-11, Ahonsi-Yakubu, 2001:20-21).

Another serious internal security problem with political connotation that came to national and international

attention was the Niger-Delta question (Ahonsi-Yakubu, 2001:19). This was not the first time the issue would

87
take the centre-stage, nor was it the first time it would constitute a formidable threat to national unity, stability,

development and progress. The thesis has already noted how, while in Nigeria’s formative stage – 1966 to be

precise – the Ironsi administration deployed the army to contain the secession of Boro’s Niger Delta Volunteer

Force (NDVF). This measure by Ironsi largely succeeded in subduing the Deltans but not conquering their

resolve and determination. The issues involved in Niger Delta, were far more complex: demands for

reviewing the national revenue allocation formula, local autonomy for the control of all mineral resources

(resource control), a stop to ecological devastation by oil companies, and compensation for the past misdeeds

to the oil-producing communities. As sensitive as these issues were, successive governments did not accord

them the attention they deserved. No doubt, this was responsible in alienating the people, driving them on the

edge of frustration, and ultimately forcing them to resort to extreme and violent measures to get the

government listen to them (Adejumobi, 2002).

One of those organisations committed to the development of the Niger Delta was the Movement for the

Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The activities of this organisation led by its president, Ken Saro-

Wiwa, and other leaders eventually led to a confrontation with the government. On 21 May 1994 following

the murder of some prominent Ogoni chiefs, Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders was accused of

committing the crime, tried, and hanged by Abacha regime. Analysts, including Saro-Wiwa himself strongly

suspected the government of the murders (Saro-Wiwa, 2000:1). Consequently, the trial was condemned by

national and international human rights organisations, punitive measures including suspension of Nigeria from

Commonwealth and sanctions by Europe and U.S were imposed (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:276-277). The

government used force and bullying tactics to subdue the Deltans. The eruption of violence and militancy that

characterised Fourth Republic was in large measure an indication of the flawed nature of Abacha’s militaristic

approach. It is not far fetched to say that an honest economic and political gesture from the government would

have considerably addressed the problem. Meanwhile, the government, including Abdussalami’s choose to

continue with the militarization of the region started by Abacha. This greatly encouraged the emergence of

militant youth groups in the region (Egwaikhide & Isumonah 2001:20), professionally trained in the arts of

88
violence, and perpetrating some worst forms of violence in the region including kidnappings, oil bunkering,

pipeline vandalisation, and flow station sabotage against oil companies (Adejumobi, 2002).

Another measure of internal instability of Nigeria was the two alleged coup attempts against Abacha

administration (United States’ Department of State; Nigeria, 2007). If those coup attempts did achieve

anything, it was only to reveal how grossly unstable and insecure the ruling class itself was. The coups were

regarded as set-ups by Abacha (Ahonsi-Yakubu, 2001:21). Generally, considering the internal security

situation when Abacha took over the control of the government in late 1993, it could be said that he succeeded

in restoring some degree of law and order in the country. The deteriorating security condition was vigorously

combated – armed robbery, drug trafficking and money laundering – and drastically reduced. Nevertheless,

some of the problems persisted and spilled-over to the Abdussalami’s ten-month stay, and eventually, passed

on to the Fourth Republic.

3.6.3.2 External Environment of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1993-1999

From 1990 onwards, Nigeria increasingly showed interests in the affairs of her West African neighbours.

Nigeria under Abacha was interested in the people who occupied leadership position in those countries. In

countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, violent socio-political conflicts and civil wars have reduced them to

no more than lawless jungles. Nigeria, using the instrument of ECOMOG intervened and restored law and

order in a peacekeeping, or more appropriately peace-enforcement operations in those two countries (Vann,

1998, Khobe, 2000). Tejan Kabbah of the post-Civil War Sierra Leone and Charles Taylor of Liberia became

presidents in their respective countries at the behest of Nigeria (ECOMOG, 2007). Equally, when some army

officers staged a coup against Kabbah in Sierra Leone, Abacha promptly sent troops and chased them out

(Vann, 1998, Absioye, 2000). Nigeria’s growing imperialism was not limited to the war-torn countries.

Relatively peaceful countries like Niger Republic, Benin Republic, and Gambia were known to have been

under Nigeria’s heavy influence. In fact, it could be said that Nigeria was ‘tele-guiding’ many of their actions

and policies. Nigeria employed all elements of her national power to assert her power and interest in the West

African sub-region. According to Gbanite (2001) “Under Gen. Abacha, our spheres of influence within the

89
region was felt and reverberated to the point that Mr. Charles Taylor was made to understand that he was not

an equal to our Head of State, and he was made to toe the line. Mr. Foday Sanko had a permanent residence in

Nigeria without complaint. We influenced the leadership in Gambia, Benin, and Niger Republic without

apologies”. The perennial conflict over Bakassi between Nigeria and Cameroon once again cropped up.

Nigeria again deployed troops to the area. Besides minor skirmishes however, the conflict did not degenerate

into a full-scale war (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:251).

Under Abacha, Nigeria projected a measure of independence in her foreign policy. Nigeria fully projected

preparedness and commitment to pursue her national defence objectives regardless of the interests or costs

involved. Within the wider African society, and even the world, Nigeria related with countries and leaders that

were not in the good books of the West. For instance, in Africa, Abacha was particularly close to Mu’amar

Ghaddafi of Libya. Libya under Ghaddafi was for long living in isolation, and was regarded by the West as a

sponsor of state-terrorism. His friendship with China was also part of this calculated anti-Western stance of

Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria's influence beyond West Africa remained potential than actual. Whether

Nigeria would become more activist, interventionist, or assert overweening regional hegemony remained

contingent on many external factors, such as its threat perceptions, the degree of regional stability, and the

regional distribution of military capabilities. Much also depended on how well Nigeria coped with its social

and economic crises, on the process and outcome of restoration of civilian rule, and ultimately, on the political

disposition and competence of the military (National Security, 1991).

3.6.3.3 Instruments of Defence Policy: 1993-1999

It is important to point that, generally, in history – ancient and contemporary – the development and

expansion of instruments of national defence is directly correlated with the nature, form and enormity of

threats – internal and external – to the survival, internal cohesion, and development of any particular nation or

state. Conceivably, if there were reduced threats to national security, the instruments would not experience

major expansions and development. Accordingly, threats to national security make instruments of defence to

expand and develop. The period 1993-1999 was noted to have been when Nigeria was most seriously beset

90
with a complexity of internal security problems. There were also the potential of external threats through

direct foreign attack from the West, most likely, USA. In addition to all these, the 1990s was comparatively a

period when West Africa was either witnessing violent civil wars, or military take-overs. Expediency of

survival dictated that Nigeria should intervene, if not to restore order and peace, then at least to contain the

spread of the conflict to other countries. The danger of inaction could turn those crises contagious and

infectious, spreading to other West African countries, including Nigeria herself.

Thus, the security sector had the largest budgetary allocation in all those years. “Security guzzled 35% of

the total PTF’s disbursement of 59.839 Billion Naira in 1997” (Scrutiny, June 1998, Vol. 1, No. 8). In addition,

large (undisclosed) sums of money were known to have been released as ‘Security Vote’ by the government.

The services, especially the intelligence services, civilians and military, expanded tremendously. Steady and

progressive decline in law and order had already become an enduring hallmark of the Nigerian society since

the dawn of the 1990s. Abacha himself had recognised this need and called for a “surgical operation” of the

police, to among other things purge the force of corrupt and ineffective elements and traits, reposition it to

meet the challenges of a new century, and to be able to perform adequately, its statutory role of preventing and

combating crime, and enforcing law and order in the society. Patrol cars, boats, and helicopters were acquired.

Protective vests and armour-plaited cars were also provided to the police. Training facilities were upgraded

and modernised, and new laboratory technology and forensic equipments were equally provided. In short, the

police was equipped with some of the latest technology to combat crime in the society. Other security and

intelligence agencies were also given due consideration. Suffering from arms embargo imposed by the West,

Nigeria found an alternative supply source in China and Libya. The remarkable performance of the Nigerian

troops in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and even in Guinea-Bissau under the auspices of ECOMOG was a testimony

to the lesser impact of those sanctions on Nigeria’s military.

Under Abacha, national security was at a different level. The operatives knew and understood their

objectives, and operated with candour. They were able to penetrate and compromise subversive groups in the

country. It was an effective intelligence work and collaboration of all the security agencies (Gbanite, 2001).

91
Shortcomings of the instruments of national defence in Nigeria from 1993-1999, more rightly were not on

their state of preparedness. Those shortcomings would come on the extra-judicial activities, which became a

pastime with most of them. The inglorious roles of the armed forces, police, and other security agencies have

been widely documented to bear any repetition here. Under Abacha, special security units such as the Strike

Force (SF), and the dreaded Special Body Guards (SBG) acted more as tools of political victimisation and

hunting political enemies of the regime, than as instruments of national defence. State Security Service (SSS)

became an ugly caricature of its predecessor, NSO, imbibing the very traits for which the NSO was criticised

and disbanded. Even the Police and the Armed Forces were not insulated from this extra-judicial pastime.

With the death of Abacha on 8 June 1998, and the emergence of General Abdussalam as the new Head of

State, there was renewed optimism in the political stability of the country (Civil Liberties Organisation, 1998).

Part of the measures undertaken by Abdussalam in the remaining days of the military included the

commencement of fresh political transition programme, release of political prisoners and return of the exiles.

On the international front, Abdussalam continued Nigeria’s commitment in ECOMOG, and sought to

normalise the strained relations between Nigeria and the West. On 29th May 1999, a new democratically

elected civilian administration was sworn-in. This brought to an end a long stretch of military rule, and

heralded the dawn of a new era. All these measures were conceived and implemented to give Nigeria a new

lease of life, cool the over-heated political atmosphere, and lay the basis of sustainable socio-economic and

political stability. Nevertheless, poor economy, and the ever-widening gap of in-equality between the rich and

the poor, for long the bane of stable society, would continue to undermine any efforts towards genuine

democratisation if not properly articulated and addressed.

In the final analysis, the main challenges and focus of national defence policy in the coming years should

be in trying to contain a considerable portion of the population, which decades of economic mismanagement

has literally, turned into beggars, social misfits and enemies of the country. Because “as long as the majority

of Nigeria’s citizens do not benefit from the prosperity of the nation, they will feel little responsibility towards

its government or its institutions” (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2004:301). Therefore, promotion of social justice,

92
radical programme on poverty reduction, and a blueprint for a comprehensive national development are

crucial to any quest to establish a relatively strong internal security situation. On the international scene, since

the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the demise of Cold War, rules of international relations have

considerably changed. New interests and alliances have replaced traditional ideological blocs and sentiments,

which characterised the Cold War era. New threats to national and international security have emerged to defy

accepted doctrines and theories. Previously, nuclear holocaust and a threat of World War III were the two most

significant threats. Defence doctrines and theories were developed on how to explain and contain those threats

in case of eventual outbreak. In the post-Cold War world, United States’ unilateralism and budding

imperialism, pandemic energy crisis, Global Warming and, the spectre of Terrorism tops the list of the most

serious national security threats and, probably in this order. Ultimately, the challenge to nations, including

Nigeria, which is so determined to realise her potential as a continental and even world power, is how to

develop new doctrines and policy framework that will comprehensively reflect these changing realities in the

world. This policy framework must be capable of providing all the necessary impetus to building a strong

economic, political and technological base at domestic level. This will enable Nigeria to become substantially

independent, while at the same time serving as a strong basis for national defence and security.

Reference:

Abdullahi, M. D. (2005). Resource Management for Self-Reliance in Nigeria. Speech at the 2nd National Conference on
Resource Management for Self-Reliance in Nigeria, Organised by the College of Administration and
Management Studies, Hassan Usman Katsina Polytechnic, Katsina, 28-30 June, 2005.
Abimbola, A. (2002). Pressure Groups and the Democratic Process in Nigeria (1979-1993). Nordic Journal of African
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1. Pp. 38-47.
Absioye, L. (2000). Imperialist Interests Behind Barbarism in Sierra Leone. Downloaded on 15th June 2008,
from:http://www.newyouth.com/archives/Africa/sierraleone/imperialist_interess_sierra_leone_20000523.asp
Adamu, Y. (1999). The Essence of Excellence: Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, an Appraisal.
Kaduna: Sarumedia Printing and Publishing Co.
Adejumobi, S. (2002). Ethnic Militia Groups and the National Question in Nigeria. A Paper Presented to the Conference
on Urban Violence, Ethnic Militia, and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. April 23-26,
2006, Lagos.
Adeniran, T. (1985). The Terrain and Tenor of the Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, (in) Atanda, J. A. & Aliyu, A. Y. (eds.).
(1985). Political Development, Volume 1. Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria since
Independence. March 1983. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Limited.
Adeshina, R. A. (1999). Military in Politics: A Comprehensive Strategies for Ending Military Rule in Africa. Ibadan:
Wezereth Press Ltd.
Africa Events, Vol. 1, No. 10, October 1985.
Africa Confidential, Vol. 26, No. 3, January 30, 1985.

93
Ahonsi-Yakubu, A. (2001). Political Transition, Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria. Africa Development, Vol. XXVI, Nos.
1&2.
Ake, C. (1978). Revolutionary Pressures in Africa. London: Zed Press.
Alabi, D. O. (1997). Issues and Problems in the Nigerian Defence Policy in the 1990s: a Critical Review. Nigerian Army
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, Pp. 128-143.
Alkali, R. A. (2003). Issues in International Relations & Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. Kaduna: North-Point Publishers.
Aluko, O. (ed.). (1977). The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Anyanwu, J. C. (1992). President Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria. Journal of
Social Development in Africa, Vol. 7, No. 1, Pp. 5-24.
Arnold, G. (1977). Modern Nigeria. London: Longman.
Asobie, H. A. (1988). The Theoretical and Doctrinal Foundation of Nigeria’s Defence Policy. Nigerian Journal of
International Studies. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Nsukka, Pp. 17-34.
Awa, E. O. (1976). Issues in Federalism. Benin-City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.
Babangida, I. B. (2000). Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria. (in) Lame, I. Y & Dabin, H. (eds.). (2000). Democracy,
Good Governance and National Development in Nigeria: Actualizing The people’s Mandate. Proceedings of a
National Seminar Organised by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Abuja.
Babatope, E. (1981). Coups, Africa and Barrack Revolts. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Company.
Balogun, O. (1980). The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis 1966-1970. Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.
Barrett, L. (1985). Agbada to Khaki: Reporting a Change of Government in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension
Publishers.
Boro, I. J. A. (1982). The Twelve-Day Revolution. Benin City: Idodo Umeh Publishers Ltd.
Civil liberties organisation. (1998). Nigeria after Abacha: Background on Pro-democracy Position.
Downloaded on 13th July 2008 from: http://acas.prairienet.org/alerts/Nigeria/afteraba.html
Clark, T. (1999). A Right Honourable Gentleman: The Life and Times of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Zaria:
Hudahuda Publishing.
Cronje, S. (1972). The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-1970. London: Sidgwick &
Jackson.
de St. Jorre, J. (1972). The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Dudley, B. J. (1973). Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press.
ECOMOG: Condensing Successes and Failures. (2007). Downloaded on 6th July 2008, from:
http://politicsinmotion.blogspot.com/2007/05/ecomog-condensing-successes-and.html
Egwaikhide, F. O. & Isumonah, V. A. (2001). Nigeria Paralysed: Socio-political Life under General Sani Abacha. Africa
Development Vol. XXVI, Nos. 3&4, Pp.5-24.
Eluwa, Et. al. (2005). A History of Nigeria for Schools and Colleges. Onitsha: Africana-First Publishers Ltd.
Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security. (2004). Nigeria: Intelligence and Security. Downloaded on 12th
June 2008 from: http://fas.org/irp/world/Nigeria/nso.htm
Fage, K.S & Alabi, D.O. (2003). Political and Constitutional Development in Nigeria: from Pre-Colonial to Post
-Colonial Era. Kano: Northern Printers Ltd.
Federal Government of Nigeria. (1980). A Time for Action: Collected Speeches of General Murtala Muhammed.
Department of Information, Office of the President, Lagos, Nigeria.
_____. (2006). National Defence Policy. Federal Ministry of Defence, Abuja, Nigeria.
Forsyth, F. (1982). Emeka. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Garba, J. (1991). Diplomatic Soldiering: The Conduct of Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1975-1979. Ibadan: Spectrum Books
Ltd.
______. (1982). Revolution in Nigeria: Another View. London: Africa Journal Limited.
Gbanite, M. (2001). National Security and Intelligence in Nigeria under Democracy: the Way Forward. Downloaded on
23rd June 2008, from: http://kwenu.com/publications/max/national_security.htm
Gbulie, B. (1981). Nigeria’s Five Majors: Coup d’Etat of 15th January 1966 First Inside account. Onitsha: Africana
Educational Publishers.
Hallmark Weekly News Magazine, July 7, 1999.
Khobe, M. (2000). The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG operations in West Africa. Downloaded on 31st June 2008
from: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html
Lammack, P., Pooz, D., & Tordoff, W. (1993). Third World Politics: A Comprehensive Introduction. London:
Macmillan.

94
Maier, K. (2000). This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
Mazrui, A. (1970). African International Relations. (in) Paden, J.N & Soja, E. W. (eds.). (1970).The African Experience
Volume 1: Essays. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Mbachu, O. (1998). Foreign Policy Analysis: the Nigerian Perspective. Owerri: Kosoko Press Ltd.
Mohammed, B. (1982). Africa and Non-Alignment: A Study in the Foreign Relations of New Nations. Kano: Triumph
Publishing Company.
Mortimer, E. (1969). France and the Africans 1944-1960: a Political History. London: Faber & Faber Limited.
Muffett, D. J. M. (1982). Let Truth Be Told: The Coups d’Etat of 1966. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company.
National Security, (1991). Downloaded on 13th June 2008 from: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9452.html
New Nigerian, Tuesday, January 28, 1997.
Nigeria: History. (2006). Downloaded on 3rd May 2007 from: http://www.world66.com/Africa/nigeria
Nigeria: Nigeria Police Force. (1991). Downloaded on 31st June 2008, from:
http://www.photius.com/countries/Nigeria/national_security/Nigeria_national_security_nigeria_police_force.ht
ml
Noble, K. (1992). Nigeria Plans New Force to Deal with Unrest. Downloaded on 18th June 2008, from:
http://www.query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EoCEoDD1630F935A15756C0A964958260
Nweke, G. A. (1985). The Transformation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Since Independence. (in) Atanda, J. A. & Aliyu,
A. Y. (eds.). (1985). Political Development, Volume 1. Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria Since
Independence. March 1983. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Limited.
Nzeribe, F. A. (1985). Nigeria: Another Hope Betrayed, The Second Coming of the Nigerian Military. Suffolk:
Kilimanjaro.
Obasanjo, O. (1981). My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970. Ibadan: Heinemann.
Ojigbo, A. O. (1979). 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana:
Mladinska Knjiga.
Olayode, K. ( 2007). Pro-democracy Movements, Democratisation and Conflicts in Africa: Nigeria, 1990-1999. African
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 10, Nos. 1&2. Pp. 127-146.
Oluleye, J. J. (1985). Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979. Ibadan: University Press Limited.
Olusanya, G. O. (1999). Nationalist Movements. (in) Ikime, O. (ed.). (1999). Groundwork of Nigerian History (PTF
Edition). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
Oyovbaire, S. E. (1984). The Nigerian State as Conceptual Variable. Studies in Politics and Society: Journal of the
Nigerian Political Science Association. Issue No. 2, Pp.129-149.
Saro-Wiwa, K. (2000). A Month and a Day: a Detention Diary. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Scrutiny, Vol. 1, No. 8, June 1998.
Shagari, S. (2001). Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve, an Autobiography. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.
Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation. (2004). Shehu Musa Yar’Adua: A Life of Service. Shehu Musa Yar’Adua
Foundation, Abuja
Stafford, M. (1984). Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War.
Sulaiman, I & Abdulkarim, S. (eds.). (1998). On the Political Future of Nigeria. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing.
Sun Tzu. (1971). The Art of War. (Translated by S. B. Griffith). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tamuno, T. M. (1999). British Colonial Administration in Nigeria. (in) Ikime, O. (1999). Groundwork of Nigerian
History (PTF Edition). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
Tempo February 6, 1997.
Tolofari, S. (2004). Exploitation and Instability in Nigeria: The Orkar Coup in Perspective. Lagos: Press Alliance
Network Limited.
Ujomu, P. O. (2001). National Security, Social Order and the Quest for Human Dignity in Nigeria: Some Ethical
Considerations. Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Pp. 245-264.
United States Department of State Background Note. (2008). Nigeria: The Abortive Third Republic. Downloaded on
15th June 2008, from: http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/Nigeria.html
Usman, Y. B. (1990). The 1990 Budget and Our Future. Zaria.
______. (1979). For the Liberation of Nigeria: Essays and Lectures 1969-1978. London: New Beacon Books.
Vann, B. (1998). Nigerian Military Topples Sierra Leone Junta. Downloaded on 13th June 2008 from:
http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/feb1998/searaf20.shtml
Williams, D. (1982). President and Power in Nigeria: The Life of Shehu Shagari. London: Frank Cass and Company.
Wilmot, P. F. (1979). In Search of Nationhood: The Theory and Practice of Nationalism in Africa. Ibadan: Lantern

95
Books.

Chapter Four
Nigeria’s Defence Policy in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007

4.1 Introduction

In the Cold War era, the global landscape was evenly dominated between two powers – USA, USSR, and

their allies (Ebo, 1996:70). In Africa, the idea of national defence to most countries involved mutual defence

pact, military alliance with either of the power blocs (USA and NATO alliance, and USSR and Warsaw Pact

alliance) and a small and dependent military organisation supported by either of the power blocs (Ejogba,

2006:311-312). Today, this division along politico-ideological lines has given way to a new global order that

features new centres of power with USA as the dominant superpower, a resurgent Russia in world politics,

emergent powers notably, China, India and Brazil and the evolution of non-military threats to national security

96
especially global warming, energy security, terrorism and globalisation (Ki-Moon, 2008:13). These

developments introduced new trends and dimension to the nature and interpretation of national security threats

among the developing nations. Today, the possibility of war in conventional sense between nations is distant

and unlikely, just as it was close and likely in the Cold-War era. The prevailing norms and culture trend in the

21st century do not simply encourage this venture. Gray (2005:33) dissented and dismissed the view that

major war among nations for whatever reasons “is obsolete, or at least obsolescent, rests on nothing more

solid than superficial trend spotting”. Equally, Mao (in Chang & Halliday, 2005:14) had written, “wars will

last as long as heaven and earth and will never become extinct”. These notwithstanding, it is not a subject of

debate that as the 21st century slowly unravels, non-military threats would come to be more potent in national

security equation (Ejogba, 2006:318).

Alabi (1997:136) argues that: “much of the realities, dynamics and trajectory of international politics,

military alliances and opertions [sic] in the 1990s were largely shaped and nurtured by the developments in

the 1980s”. There is no argument that these new developments and changes cause shifts in public policy

formulation by moulding public opinions and policy environment. For instance, energy crisis in any nation

would result in economic crisis, massive closure of businesses and industries, unemployment and ultimately,

social crisis with all the attendant consequences. What is subject to debate however, include selecting

appropriate mechanism or policy framework by the developing nations to respond to these enormous

challenges. Generally, defence pattern designed to safeguard the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and basic

interests of a nation, considerably determines the level of national stability and progress. If defence structure

were weak or fluid, the pace of national development would be stagnant. The fundamental objective of any

national defence policy is protection of a nation’s internal and external interests. If those interests were left

unprotected, disintegration, insecurity, chaos, anarchy, and economic crisis would ensue (Ezete, 2007:4).

This chapter examines the adequacy of Nigeria’s defence policy in the Fourth Republic (1999-2007) vis-à-

vis the challenges of the 21st century. It is believed that the policy is grossly constrained by many flaws. The

aim of this chapter is to determine how realistic the policy objectives are in relation to the policy environment,

97
policy instruments as well as threat(s) analysis of the policy. The chapter concludes with a survey of the

fundamental constraints of the policy: economic and technological.

4.2 Fundamental Principles and Policy Objectives of Nigeria’s Defence Policy: 1999-2007

Section 18 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides the following as the

basic objectives and fundamental principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy:

I. Promotion and protection of the national interest;

II. Promotion of African integration and support for African unity;

III. Promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual

respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its ramifications;

IV. Promotion of a just world economic order.

In this context, national interest and its preservation are the supreme value and objective of the

government and all its institutions, apparatus and resources. According to Ukpabi (1986:150):

National interests have to do with those values which are best for the nation and which are conducive to its continued survival
and security, the prosperity of its people and the unimpeded development of its institutions. Some of these interests would be
so vital that Nigeria would have to go to war if necessary to maintain them. Others may be peripheral, long-term or short-term
and may be emphasised or diminished depending upon the priorities of the government.
In order to achieve the objectives of promoting and protecting national interest, federal government

develops national policy frameworks especially, foreign and defence. Some analysts however seek to

limit the purview of defence policy to the use of force alone. For instance, to Ezete (2007:11) “defence

policy is based on employing the military in [the] protection of national interest both within and outside

the country”. An assertion like this no doubt is anchored on a narrow and militaristic conception of

national security. Of course, national security is the most vital of all national interests since without

security it is pointless to speak of survival and development. Nevertheless, from the lessons of history,

it has repeatedly been revealed that the military is not the only guarantor of national interests. The 2006

Nigerian National Defence Policy (NNDP) is largely an outgrowth of Nigeria’s National Security

Policy (NNSP). The NNSP “focuses on the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad

98
and the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its assets” (NNDP, 2006:2).

Ukpabi (1986:154) lists the following as the core objectives of the NNSP:

I. Self-preservation or survival of the entity known as Nigeria;

II. Security which implied the continued existence of Nigeria without serious external threats to

those values and interests on which the country put so much premium;

III. Prosperity and economic well-being;

IV. Good international image or prestige;

V. Protection of the nation’s strategic resources as well as its investments at home and abroad;

VI. Protection and promotion of national ideology;

VII. Peace, implying the absence of the use of armed forces in conflict over interests or a state of

affairs from which armed conflict is absent;

VIII. Power, which in international politics may be defined as the ability to affects the actions,

thoughts and feelings of others;

IX. Bringing about favourable political and economic situations in contagious countries, which

can best serve our national interests.

The policy provides general guidelines and necessary framework for the application of all elements

of national power in order to achieve stated objectives. The policy is however replete with militaristic

bias that gives it a narrow purview of national security threats. The NNDP (2006:22-23) in the Fourth

Republic specifically has the following as its objectives:

I. Protection of Nigeria’s sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory

against external threats;

II. Promotion of defence as well as strategic advice and information to government;

III. Promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians;

IV. Response to requests for aid to civil authority;

99
V. Participation in disaster management and humanitarian relief operations both at home and

abroad;

VI. Assistance to government agencies and levels of government in achieving national goals;

VII. Protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside;

VIII. Ensuring security and stability in the West African sub-region through collective security;

IX. Participation in bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations;

X. Contributing to international peace and security.

In order to determine the practicality of these objectives, there is the need to study the environment

that provides the arena under which the policy will contend with the challenges it is designed to

address. Ultimately, the goal is to provide a succinct analysis vis-à-vis the set of objectives provided by

the national defence policy.

4.3 The Environment of National Defence Policy: 1999-2007

An in-depth and realistic evaluation and assessment of the internal and external environment

produces a strong defence policy. Thus, where there is a comprehensive assessment of the environment,

the objectives of the policy will be realistic. “A nation’s NNDP must be grounded upon a realistic

assessment of the strategic environment in which it will operate. This assessment is necessary since the

environment is both the source of opportunities a state may pursue as well as the threats to its security”

(NNDP, 2006:5).

4.3.1 External Environment

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: 1999-2007, coincided with a period when world politics “is entering a

new phase” (Huntington, in O’Meara, 2000:1). Although realities of the international environment had

somewhat changed with the demise of the Soviet Union – arms race halted, arms production dropped

since World War II and the Balance of Power tilted in favour of the US – the rules of the game hardly

changed. Interests and national survival are still the fundamental objectives of defence relations

between nations. In an attempt to examine the course of international politics in the 21 st century,

100
Huntington (in O’Meara, 2000:1), observes that: “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world

will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the

dominating source of conflict will be cultural”. Culture and religion, no doubt are strong factors in

international relations, but it is quite wrong to assume that relations among nations in post-Cold War

period are primarily motivated by either. Economic and political interests defined in terms of national

security will continue to determine the shape of international politics in the future. Nonetheless, in a

strategic review of the external environment of national defence policy, the following features

prominently (NNDP, 2006:5-9):

A) Changed Nature of Global Politics and Pre-eminence of Culture: The end of Cold War

precipitated the emergence of new centres of power and conflicts among nations. Ban Ki-Moon

(2008:13), UN Secretary General, observes, “There are new outbreaks of war and violence”. To try to

locate the causes of conflicts among nations from cultural perspective alone is quite illogical.

Subscribing to the view that international politics is sharply divided along cultural, historical, religious

and anthropological affinities has no basis in practical realities of modern times. Politics among nations

to-date tends to follow economic and strategic interests. For instance, it is hard to explain why the

Caucasus continues to be mired in conflicts despite sharing common socio-cultural heritage.

B) Nature of Conflict: “The preponderance of post-Cold War conflicts are now between groups within

a state. These arise from internal ethnic, religious and other contradictions in the unsettled nature and

foundations of the countries concerned” (NNDP, 2006:6). Although scattered instances – US’s invasion

of Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia’s war with Georgia – exist that makes generalisation quite impossible

at this period, yet majority of conflicts in Africa does follow the intra-state pattern. Ebo (1996:79)

observes, “One basic assumption implicit in the post-World War II security arrangement is that most

conflicts in international system would be inter-state. However, an emerging feature of the post Cold

War era is that the most devastating and persistent conflicts are either intra-state or begin as such. The

wars in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia are examples”. One explanation for this situation

101
seems to be that countries are now developing mechanisms with which to confront threats of crises

with others before they degenerate into full-scale wars.

C) International Terrorism: Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is in fact, the only project wholly

occupying the military, financial, political, and diplomatic resources of the West. Terrorism, as already

revealed, has become a potent threat to the national securities of many Western nations. This however

provides no plausible justification for seeking to expand the frontiers of fighting terrorism to every

corner of the globe, as the U.S is aiming to do. Countries like Nigeria that do not directly stand on the

beltway of international terrorism (at least, its Islamist variant) are in no immediate danger of its

threats.

D) Globalisation: This is closely linked to factor number five: Erosion of State Sovereignty.

Globalisation allows for international financial oligarchies with trans-continental influence – MNCs,

IMF, World Bank, WTO, international trade organisations. These in turn severely limit and by the

nature of their operations undermine states’ sovereignties. Globalisation allows for a “greater

interdependence, regionalism and internationalism. New regional blocs have been formed, with

particular emphasis on defence and security and the facilitation of inter-state trade” (NNDP, 2006:7).

The case of European Union (EU) is cited as the incontrovertible proof of this development. In the 21st

century however, notwithstanding the influence of such global institutions, regional organisations and

multi-national corporations, nation-states “will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs

(Huntington, in O’Meara, 2000:1)”.

E) Changed Concept of Security: The Nigerian National Defence Policy (2006:8) recognises the

growing consensus on the changing nature in national security conception and threats. New emphasis is

being directed towards evolving an integrated concept of defence and security that gives prominence to

the culture of human development as against the existing concept, which accords prominence to the

culture of military power.

102
F) Reinvigorated UN Security Council: Founded after World War II to avert recurrence of similar

tragedy in human history, the relevance of UN cannot be faulted even when the reasons that gave birth to

the organisation seem to have significantly receded. The undemocratic composition of the Security

Council and its dictatorial powers and the need to revisit the charter of the organisation so as to

accommodate new global challenges such as climate change, make the idea of a strengthened Security

Council without expansion and inclusion of other emerging nations simply laughable, untenable,

undemocratic and the greatest source of weakness to the organisation (Aziakou, 2008:6).

G) Arms Dumping in Africa: With the end of Cold War, the threats of major wars, a least among the

superpowers and their allies, significantly diminished. Defence industries faced fall in demand of their

products. Thus, surpluses were created with no markets in Europe or America. This situation led to the

unfortunate practice of arms dumping at cheap rates in Africa. This further heightens the level of

insecurity in the continent. Because of small arms and light weapons proliferation, crime and armed

banditry are now rampant. According to a Department of International Development Policy Briefing

(DFID, 2001:2): “there are an estimated 550 million small arms and light weapons in circulation: one

for every 10 people on the planet. The easy access to these weapons exacerbates conflicts, facilitates

violent crime and terrorism, thwarts post-conflict reconstruction and undermines long-term sustainable

development”. The Policy Briefing (DFID, 2001:3) further observes, “illegal small arms…most

commonly used in the perpetration of crime, contribute to the high levels of instability, conflict,

violence and social dislocation evident in…the African continent as a whole”. Coordinated and

painstaking efforts by security agencies and border patrols including Custom and Immigration Services

can significantly halt this dangerous practice in Africa.

H) Other Security Challenges identified as part of the international environment include migration

and human trafficking, trans-national organised crime, drug trafficking/smuggling and money

laundering (NNDP, 2006:8). Certainly, the combination of these forces in a unified environment tasks

103
any national defence policy on inventing comprehensive approach of tackling these challenges. This

involves designing appropriate instruments and resources for successful realisation of policy objectives.

Regional Environment: It has already been argued that, the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and

ostracisation of Egypt by her Arab sister nations following her diplomatic recognition of the state of

Israel unsettled the balance of power in Africa. From the early 1990s, South Africa and Egypt became

contenders to this influence. This created an atmosphere of uneasy rivalry between these three regional

powers. The present fierce competition between the three African powers to secure a permanent seat in

an expanded UN Security Council should be seen from within this context.

Another important development in the last century with clear influence on defence policy is the

receding culture of military coups in most parts of Africa. The wind of democratisation blew across

Africa and in the process swept many military dictatorships. This does not imply that Africa is now free

of ‘military politicians’. The recent case of Mauritania negates this form of optimism. Unfortunately, in

Nigeria and other states, military dictatorships are being replaced by civilian dictatorships and “violent

intra-state wars and conflicts of varying intensity” (NNDP, 2006:9). One explanation for this is the

dialectics of economic relations and development in these states. This creates room for in-equality,

social injustice and corruption between the mass of the people and the political elite. This feeling of

frustration and antagonism creates division and finds expression through violent group conflicts. Other

indices that point to the nature of the terrain of Nigeria’s defence policy include consistent political

instability, economic and technological underdevelopment. Poverty and diseases, especially, HIV/AIDS

that seems to be on rampage are also serious challenges to national security in the Fourth Republic.

Besides violent civil wars that raged in Liberia and Sierra Leone, destructive intra and inter-group

conflicts in most West African states including Nigeria, the security challenges of the Gulf of Guinea

are increasing in view of its growing importance in the strategic considerations of the world as a source

of secure and stable petroleum and gas for world economic progress (NNDP, 2006:9).

4.3.2 Internal Environment

104
A study into the internal environment of the Nigerian defence policy in the Fourth Republic reveals

a number of remarkable factors. It is possible that this environment could be viewed from political,

economic and socio-cultural angles.

A) Political Dimension: The return to democratic rule in May 1999 broke a long stretch of military

rule in Nigeria. There is an echoing need for strengthening impaired political institutions, enthroning

culture of responsible leadership as well as healing divisive tendencies that had crept-up in the waning

days of the military, such that Nigeria’s unity is seriously threatened. The political situation is such that

leadership in the country lacks the legitimacy as well as respect necessary for its proper functioning.

Corruption, cutthroat power competition among the political elites and other forms of political intrigues

and induced violence militates against any measure of political stability in Nigeria.

B) Economic Dimension: Since IBB led federal government introduced SAP in 1986, the economic

fortunes of the country deteriorated (Alabi, 1997:139). While there is a visible increase in the revenue

base of the nation, living condition for an average Nigerian is worsened by what many perceived as

anti-people policies of the successive regimes since Babangida (Analysis, Vol.1 No.3 September,

2002:10-11). Nigeria’s near-absolute dependence on crude oil earnings as principal source of revenue

further confounds the state of economic underdevelopment. The poor economic condition in the country

manifests itself in serious social crises. Poverty and disease, which are the bye-products of poor

economy, appropriates the top of national security agenda. In Nigeria, this social insecurity ultimately

breeds crimes such as armed robbery, drug abuse, prostitution, and rising rural-urban migration in the

society. The poor level of economic development is not helped by absence of technological and

industrial development in the national economy. These worsen the problems, and condemn Nigeria to

the life of dependence on foreign technology, economic aid and industrial expertise.

C) Socio-Cultural Dimensions: Nigeria was and is still lucky, violent socio-political and ethno-

religious conflicts in the country have not deteriorated into a Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Yugoslavia

where violent intra-state conflicts degenerated into bloody and destructive civil wars. Still, there are

105
causes for concern on how years of lopsided and distorted federalism, poor leadership, and corruption

contributes collectively to a state of perpetual suspicion among the constituent ethnic groups in the

country. The election of Obasanjo as president in May 1999 is widely seen as an attempt to help

assuage the feelings of other ethnic groups in the country (Falae, 2008:49-51). It is difficult to posit that

this move is successful as the events that unfolded later in the country revealed.

Beside socio-cultural conflicts, religious crises – mainly inter-religious – were an enduring feature

of the 80s and 90s. In fact, with the dawn of democracy in 1999, religion has become a force that is

capable of dismembering Nigeria. There could be a correlation between socio-religious crises and the

poor economy, which has been the landmark of Nigeria since the second half of the 1980s. One thing

that cannot be dismissed easily is that the internal environment of the Nigerian defence policy is beset

with a great number of challenges (Ukpabi, 1986:154). They are enormous, daunting and breathtaking.

Interestingly however, there seems to be little appreciation of these facts. The policy only succeeds in

narrowing down the dimensions of the domestic environment to cross-border problems, “infiltration of

arms, contrabands, criminals, illegal immigrants and harmful ideas and ideologies into the country”

(NNDP, 2006:11). It is easy to see lack of proper appreciation of the challenges at domestic level. The

revolution in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) dramatically alters information flow

among human societies. It is simply indefensible for the policy to seek to limit the domestic challenges

of the defence policy to cross-border infiltration of harmful ideas. Whatever ideas are harmful could

now be accessed by individuals with Internet facilities from the comfort of their homes.

A proper assessment of the domestic environment ought to have started with an appreciation of the

fact that economic in-equality and social in-justice in Nigeria are the greatest challenge of any defence

policy. Nigeria’s neighbours simply lack the resources, the initiative or even the will to launch a full-

scale shooting war against Nigeria. It should be added here that it is not, nor shall it ever be in their

strategic interests to see or participate in the dismemberment of Nigeria. Therefore, none of her West

African neighbours would ever participate in any conspiracy capable of deeply hurting Nigeria’s

106
national interests (Nigeria: National Security, 2008). In reality, the issue of illegal immigrants,

contrabands, arms and criminal infiltration is a function of associated and complex factors. Nigeria has

extensive, porous and un-demarcated borders with her neighbours. Border patrol is largely unavailable,

and where it exists has been compromised by corrupt elements among the border officials. Based on

the above overview, it is possible to arrive at some broad deductions.

I). Internationally, the future of world security and stability is uncertain. The combined effect of U.S’s

aggressive foreign policy, organised international crime and coalition of international terrorism poses

challenges to continuing international stability. This is fraught with dangers to emerging nations like

Nigeria that relies heavily on the patronage of the Western industrial powers for their survival.

II). At the regional level, sizeable pockets of potential danger zones that could affect Nigeria’s internal

security exists. In fact, the spectre of civil wars and intra-state conflicts within the West African sub-

region is still very much alive. Again, Nigeria’s borders will continue to be a source of national security

threats. Contrabands, illegal immigrants, and criminals would continue to have unrestricted access to

Nigerian territory. The activities of oil smugglers and pirates – a source of concern to Nigeria’s

economic interest – on the Nigeria’s coastal areas would increase unless checked. The implication of

this to national security is obvious.

III). Internally, the security environment is “still very fragile and delicate” (NNDP, 2006:12), owing

mainly to the unsettled socio-political and economic issues in the country. The unpredictable trait of the

political institutions and leadership is still a source of security concern to the country. Risk of youth

violence and other social abnormalities occasioned by economic underdevelopment and in-equality

would be more pronounced in the coming days.

4.4 Instruments of Nigerian Defence Policy

In order to meet the challenges of national security, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria assigned the strategic role of national defence to the armed forces and other instruments of

national defence. More specifically, “the NNDP enunciates general guidelines for the employment of

107
the Armed Forces in particular and resources in general to maintain the country’s territorial integrity,

and protect her from external aggression” (NNDP, 2006:2-3).

4.4.1 Armed Forces

Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution provides for “an armed forces for the federation which shall

consist of an Army, Navy, an Air Force and such other branches of the armed forces of the federation as

may be established by an Act of the National Assembly”. Section 217, (Sub-section 2) of the same

constitution provides the objectives and responsibilities of the armed forces as follows:

I. Defending Nigeria from external aggression;

II. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea and

air;

III. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called

upon to do so by the president, but subject to such condition as may be prescribed by an Act

of the National Assembly;

IV. Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

The national defence policy envisages “a compact, flexible, cost effective and above all, battle

winning armed forces. It provides direction for the development of the defence organisation together

with other elements of national power for the security of Nigeria” (NNDP, 2006:3). Further, the Policy

(NNDP, 2006:23-24), provides the following specific tasks for the armed forces:

I. Providing advice and information to government on development in defence worldwide;

II. Protecting the sovereignty of Nigeria through surveillance and control of Nigeria’s land and

maritime territory as well as airspace;

III. Protecting Nigeria’s onshore and offshore strategic assets;

IV. Co-ordinating national search and rescue (SAR) programmes;

V. Providing military aid to civil power (MACP) and military aid to civil authority (MACA);

108
VI. Embarking on non-combatant evacuation of Nigerians in crisis-ridden countries in

collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA);

VII. Initiating bi-lateral and multi-lateral contacts and exchange with selected countries;

VIII. Participating in multi-national operations to stabilize any state or group of states in the West

African sub-region;

IX. Participating in peace support missions sponsored by the AU and UN;

X. Attaining the capabilities to carryout other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the

National Assembly.

From the “foregoing, the armed forces of Nigeria should be able to engage in conventional warfare

and low intensity conflicts, be capable of rapid deployment to counter a wide spectrum of threats at

home and abroad and be able to operate jointly to meet the security needs of Nigeria” (NNDP, 2006:3-

4). There is the need to determine the capabilities and combat readiness of all the three component

services of the armed forces. Adeshina (1999:89) points: “in measuring the capabilities of a nation’s

armed forces to determine its readiness and professionalism, the following factors are necessary:

I. Force size in line with defence policy objectives,

II. Weapons system (the quantity and state),

III. Mobility/capability of the force,

IV. Logistics (supply),

V. Its strategic and tactical doctrine,

VI. Level of training,

VII. Military leadership (are the officers estranged from the men?),

VIII. Morale (this is the most crucial, a demoralised military can do nothing – as demonstrated by

the Nigerian forces in Sierra Leone and Liberia after Samuel Doe),

IX. Industrial capacity of the nation,

X. Technology of the nation to support military operations.

109
In 2004, Nigeria’s military budget rose to about US$737.6 million, representing 0.8 percent of the

GDP. The age requirement for voluntary military service is 18 years. Nigeria has participated in United

Nations operations and missions in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ivory

Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Western Sahara (Nigeria: National Security, 2008). In what

follows therefore an attempt is made to study the historical background, objectives,

structure/organisation (Combat and Non-combat Supporting Arms and Services), strength, logistics,

equipments and combat readiness of the three armed services.

A) The Nigerian Army (NA):

The Nigerian Army had its origins in the punitive expeditions of 1863 led by the Lagos Imperial

Governor, Lt Glover of the British Royal Navy. The purpose of the expeditions was to protect British

interests and trade routes around Lagos area. This small force of 18 Northern Nigerians metamorphosed

into Hausa Constabulary and later integrated into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Between

1956 when Queen Elizabeth II visited colonial Nigeria and 1963 when Nigeria became a republic, the

force had different designations. Initially, it was Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment (QONR), before it

was changed to Nigerian Military Force (NMF) and at independence was called Royal Nigerian Army

(RNA). In 1963 when Nigeria became a republic, the name was changed to Nigerian Army (NA). The

1999 Constitution provides that NA together with sister services, shall be responsible for the protection

of Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from

violation either on land, sea or air. The NNDP (2006:34-35) points:

The NA shall function as a combined armed force. In this regard, it shall operate either on its own in special operations or…
with the NN and the NAF. The essence is to ensure rapid deployment and response capability in order to protect the nation’s
borders and assist the NPF in overcoming problems of internal security. The NA shall maintain a highly mobile force with
capability for conventional, NBCW and counter-revolutionary operations. The force shall also have the capability to operate in
desert, jungle, mountainous and riverine environments within and outside Nigeria; it shall be structured to take advantage of
relevant technology.

NA has two combat arms: infantry and armour organised into three infantry-heavy divisions, one

composite division and an armour-heavy division. According to the official website of the NA:

110
The organisation of NA divisions took cognizance of the threat analysis and each division has been tasked to meet specifically
identified/perceived threat areas. The…organisation of the divisions is such that they can react to threats not exceeding an
identified minimum unit expected of the divisions. Each of the five fighting divisions of the NA less 81 Div has two brigades
with affiliated brigade and equipped in accordance with the terrain in which they are expected to operate. Their equipment
ranges from medium and light armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery guns and ground to air missile delivery systems. The
organisational structure therefore, ensures that the NA can react promptly either in an offensive or defensive situation without
losing its efficiency level.

These divisions are distributed brigade-wise across all the socio-political regions in the country. The

1st Div. is located in the North West with headquarters in Kaduna, the 2 nd Div. in the South West with

headquarters in Ibadan, the 3rd Div. in the North East with headquarters in Jos and the 82nd Div. in the

South East with headquarters in Enugu. The 81st Div. is the youngest division of the NA as it was

initially a garrison before being upgraded to a division status in 2002. Like all modern armies, NA has

artillery, engineers and signals corps as its Combat Support Arms. The artillery consists of field and air

defence artillery each with its specific tasks. The artillery obtains targets, coordinates and delivers all

firepower resources available to the enemy during operations. The combat engineers are practically the

livewire of the NA. Engineering arm is supposed to enable the body of troops to move and fight as a

unit while at the same time doing everything practical to cripple enemy’s operational capability. The

signals arm of the NA provides an indispensable support of secure communications services. This is

essential for effective command and control in combat. The relevance of signals is even more

significant with the need for spectrum dominance in modern battlefield. The Combat Support Services

on the other hand includes the Nigerian Army Corps of Supply and Transport (NACST), Nigerian

Army Medical Corps (NAMC), Nigerian Army Ordnance Corps (NAOC), and Nigerian Army

Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (NAEME).

Currently, Wikipedia (Military of Nigeria; 2008), puts the number of active military personnel in

Nigeria at 85,000 for the three services. According to Wikipedia (2008), NA “has demonstrated its

capability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain brigade-sized forces in support of peacekeeping operations in

Liberia. Smaller forces have been previously sent to the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and

Sierra Leone”. In addition to its excellent performance in all peacekeeping operations, NA had fought a civil

war to keep Nigeria united as well as several skirmishes with armies from neighbouring countries. In all these,
111
the performance of the NA has been commendable. Presently, NA has contingents in several African countries

including Liberia and Sudan. The equipment of the NA include: M16 Rifle, FN FAL Rifle, Heckler & Koch

G3 Rifle, Daewoo K2 Rifle, SIG SG 540 Rifle, FN FNC Rifle, FN MAG Machine Gun, Baretta M 1951

Pistol, Walther P5 Pistol, Blowpipe Missile (MANPADS)- 48 Launchers, ZSU-23-4 (SPAAG), ZU-23-2 (Air

Defence Gun) – 20, BM-21 (Rocket Artillery) – 11, L16 81mm Mortar, M-46 (Field Gun) – 7, OTO Melara,

Mod 56 (Howitzer) - 18, T-55 (Medium Tank) – 50, BTR-60 (APC) – 6, BTR-3 (APC) - 10. (Wikipedia;

Military of Nigeria, 2008)

B) The Nigerian Navy (NN):

Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution provides for a Nigerian naval force. The navy’s role shall include

the defence of Nigeria’s territorial waters, singly or jointly with other services to protect Nigeria from

aggression and act in aid to civil authorities to restore order and general enforcement of internal

stability. In the Nigerian National Defence Policy (2006: 35), NN provides:

The maritime element of the nation’s defence forces with the general responsibility of meeting the nation’s maritime defence
objectives. This entails the defence and protection of the nation’s territorial waters and vital economic interests. Additionally,
the NN shall develop the capability for strategic sealift and hydrographic survey. This operational requirement necessitates a
strengthened force structure to effectively execute the military, constabulary and diplomatic roles, including internal security
tasks. The NN shall therefore be modernized and equipped with surface, subsurface and air defence capabilities.

Historically, NN traces its origins to the establishment of the “Lagos Marine as a quasi-military

organisation combining the duties of present day Nigeria Ports Authority, the Inland Waterways and the

maritime policing duties of modern day navy” by the colonial government. After the unification of 1914, it

became known as Nigeria Marine. On 1st June 1956, this force was officially converted to a full-fledged and

functional naval force (Wikipedia, 2008). During the Nigerian Civil War, the NN actively participated in the

prosecution of the war especially in patrolling/blockading of the Biafran enclave. Today NN command

structure consists of the Naval Headquarters based in Abuja, two operational commands with headquarters in

Lagos and Calabar, two training commands with headquarters in Lagos and training facilities in many parts of

Nigeria, two operational bases, five forward operational bases, two dockyards located in Lagos and Port

Harcourt and two fleets based in Lagos and Calabar. The Navy has 8,000 personnel, including those of the

Coast Guard. By 1990, the navy has two geographical fleet commands and the Naval Training Command.
112
The latter, established in November 1986, includes training facilities, which are collocated with fleet

commands. The senior Western Naval Command, under a rear admiral, has operational responsibility for the

area from the Brass River, in the Niger Delta, to the border with Benin. NN’s main shore establishments are

Nigerian Naval Station (NNS) Olokun; NNS Quorra in Apapa; and the Navy Helicopter Squadron, the Naval

Hospital, the Navy Secondary School, and the Navy Diving School, all at Ojo near Lagos. In the Niger Delta

area are NNS Umalokum, an operational base in Warri, which is to be expanded with a shipbuilders'

workshop and jetties to accommodate ships of up to 2,000 deadweight tons; and NNS Uriapele,

commissioned in 1986 as a logistics base, and the Navy Technical Training Centre, both at Sapele. The

Eastern Naval Command, usually headed by a commodore, has operational responsibility from the Brass

River to the Cameroon border. Its principal shore establishments are the operational base NNS Anansa, and

the Navy Supply School in Calabar. In the Port Harcourt area are NNS Akaso at Borokiri, a training base; the

Nigerian Naval College near Bonny; NNS Okemiri, a naval base commissioned in late 1986 in the Port

Harcourt area; the Navy Hydrographic School at Borokiri; and the Basic Seamanship Training School in Port

Harcourt. Other naval bases are located at James Town, Bonny, and a Special Forces base on the Escravos

River.

The naval fleet consists of two frigates, six missile craft, two corvettes, eight large patrol craft, forty-one

coastal patrol craft, two minesweepers, two amphibious vessels, and various support ships. However, most

ships are in disrepair and have not been decked since the early 1980s. The IISS Military Balance (2007) lists

the NN as having one MEKO 360 class frigate (NNS Aradu), one Vosper Mk 9 corvette (Enymiri-F 83), two

modified Italian Lerici class coastal minesweepers (Ohue and Marabai, commissioned in 1987 and 1988

respectively) 3 French Combattante fast missile craft (Siri, Ayam, and Ekun), and four Balsam ocean patrol

craft (ex buoy tenders). All these vessels are listed as having their serviceability in doubt. Vessels which may

be operational are a German Lurssen 57m coastal patrol craft, 12 Defender patrol boats, the landing ship tank

NNS Ambe (LST 1312), and the five logistics and support ships: one survey vessel, three tugs, and the

training ship Ruwan Yaro (A 497). There are two Agusta Westland Lynx Mk.89 ASW helicopters and three

113
Agusta A-109 Hirundo/Power helicopters, all except the Lynxs are operational (Wikipedia; Military of

Nigeria, 2008). However in late 2006/early 2007, a naval exercise was held which saw several previously

thought unservicable ships involved (NNDOCID:1991). Recently, it was revealed that NN is gearing to obtain

a submarine warship for its fleet (Daily Sun Newspaper, Monday, July 21, 2008:10).

NN operates within three defence perimeters. Level One: the highest priority is coastal defence and inshore

operations involving surveillance, early warning, anti-smuggling and piracy operations; protecting offshore oil

installations; search and rescue; and policing out to 100 nautical miles. Level two: encompasses the

maintenance of a naval presence in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for monitoring, policing, and sea

control; and for coordinating efforts, such as prevention of poaching, dumping of hazardous materials or toxic

waste, and marine research. Level three: the outer ring, involves surveillance, intelligence-gathering, training

and flag-showing cruises; independent and joint exercises; and allied operations. The Navy's maritime defence

roles, officially known as the Trident Strategy, comprised three elements contributing toward national military

strategy. The first element was sub-regional sea control to defend Nigeria's national and maritime interests and

to execute the national shipping policy by protecting sea-lanes. The second element, coastal defence, includes

protection of the coastal zone's approaches, territorial waters, and the EEZ. In the third element, the navy is to

provide adequate sealift and gunfire support to the army in amphibious operations (NNDOCID, 1991).

C) The Nigerian Air Force (NAF)

The Nigerian Air Force is constitutionally responsible for the defence of Nigerian airspace as well as

providing support services to the two other services during combat. According to the NAF official

website (2008), the creation of NAF is because of difficulties encountered when the country was called to

participate in two foreign military operations in war-torn Republic of Congo in the early 1960s and to quell

military insurrections in Tanganyika (Tanzania) in 1959. In all these operations, Nigeria relied on civil aircraft

for conveying her men and logistics to the theatre of war or being airlifted by other foreign air forces. Thus,

the first batch of cadets for training as Air Force officers were recruited and sent on training with the Ethiopian

Air Force in July 1962. A second batch followed in February 1963 to train with the Royal Canadian Air Force

114
and Indian Air Force. The third batch of cadets left for Germany in August 1963. NAF was created by Act No.

11 of 1964 of the Nigerian Parliament, which partly stated the objectives of the Air Force thus:

I. To achieve a full complement of the military system of the Federal Republic of Nigeria both in the

air and on the ground;

II. To ensure fast versatile mobility of the Armed Forces;

III. To provide close air support for ground forces in all phases of operation and to ensure the territorial

integrity of a United Nigeria;

IV. To give the Country the deserved prestige which is invaluable in international matters.

NAF’s operational doctrine rests on the following fundamental assumptions:

I. NAF can best be developed and employed in accordance with the principles of unity of command,

centralized control and decentralized execution;

II. The best employment of NAF shall be on the offensive; and

III. Air superiority is essential to the successful conduct of combat operations.

The operational dictum of NAF is ‘ACTIVE DEFENCE, FORWARD ENGAGEMENT’. This forms part

of the framework for a strategically defensive but tactically offensive military stance. This primarily draws

from what the Nigerian National Defence Policy (2006, 35-36) envisages as the responsibility of NAF:

Defence of the nation and the protection of vital economic interests by air. NAF shall be employed either singly or jointly with other
services in regional and sub-regional operations. Such response capability shall be enhanced for force projection within the region. As a
critical element of the interdependent land, naval and air force synergy, air power is a decisive force in warfare. Therefore, in the event of
hostilities, NAF shall deny control of the air to the enemy air force and provide the land and naval forces the assistance necessary for
them to control their environment. The primary mission of NAF is the attainment of air superiority. Therefore, NAF shall be modernised
and equipped for this mission. In addition, it shall be equipped to provide effective support for surface forces.

According to Wikipedia (Nigerian Air Force; 2008), NAF is the largest in West Africa, consisting of

100+ fighter aircraft including SEPECAT Jaguars, Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21s, and Dassault-Dornier Alpha

Jets, and a handful of Russian made bombers and military transport aircraft. However, in recent years many of

these are no longer airworthy. In 2005, it was reported that Nigeria has approved $251 million USD to

purchase 15 Chengdu F-7 fighters from China. The deal includes 12 F-7NI single seat fighters, and 3 FT-7NI

dual-seat trainers. The $251 million package includes $220 million for 15 aircraft, plus $32 million for

115
armaments, including 20 live PL-9C AAM, 10 training PL-9 rounds, unguided rockets, and 250 kg bombs. In

early 2008, however, the deal was scrapped. Nigeria had previously considered a $160 million deal to

refurbish its fleet of MiG-21's by Aerostar/Elbit Systems, IAI, and RSK MiG. However, with the new F-7

purchase, the government of Nigeria has decided to scrap the refurbish option and grounded its fleet of MiG

21's (Wikipedia; Nigerian Air Force, 2008).

Today, NAF (Wikipedia; Nigerian Air Force, 2008) is believed to have the following Combat Aircraft: 15

Chengdu F-7 Airguard (12 F-7NI, 3 FT-7NI), 32 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 Fishbed (grounded, to be

retired), 18 SEPECAT Jaguar (grounded, to be retired). Trainers: 60 Van's Aircraft RV-6, 12 Aermacchi MB-

339, 24 Aero L-39 Albatros, 37 Scottish Aviation Bulldog T1, 24 Dassault-Breguet/Dornier Alpha Jet, 20

Dornier Do 27, 36 Dornier Do 28. Transport Aircraft: 5 Alenia G.222 (being refurbished by Alenia), 1

Boeing 707, 1 Boeing 727, 1 Boeing 737, 1 BAe 125, 2 Dassault Falcon 900, 9 Dornier Do 228, 6 Fokker

F27 Friendship, 1 Fokker F28 Fellowship, 1 Gulfstream II, 1 Gulfstream IV, 9 Lockheed C-130 Hercules.

Helicopters: 7 Agusta A 109, 14 Hughes 300, 24 MBB Bo 105, 6 Mil Mi-24 Hind, 9 Mil Mi-34 Hermit.

Transport Helicopters: 11 Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma, 12 Eurocopter AS 332 Super Puma, 4 Mil Mi-8 Hip.

A recent Senate Committee report however painted a picture of an ill-equipped, ill-prepared, grossly under-

funded and collapsing NAF. The report, while asserting the readiness of the officers and men of the Air Force

to defend the nation, nevertheless described the aircraft and other equipment of the service as obsolete. Some

have been grounded far too long to be serviceable (Vanguard, Thursday, August 7, 2008:6). In comparison to

her neighbours, Nigeria possesses overwhelming military powers. Her comparatively sizeable and well-

equipped military is capable of defending the country against any potential external threats. As the experience

of the civil war confirmed, the military is capable of meeting internal challenges to national security. In fact,

Nigeria is the only country in West-Central Africa to mount and sustain military operations abroad. The

military significantly allows Nigeria projects her influence within the sub-Saharan Africa. Although the army

had not had any massive recruitment since the end of the Civil War in 1970, its firepower and mobility have

increased considerably. The other services have grown little, but their combat systems increased in number

116
and sophistication. The navy expanded its mission from coastal defense to sea-lane protection and acquired

modest amphibious and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Likewise, NAF developed and improved its

capacity for ground attack, air support, interdiction, air defense, airlift, and air mobility operations. Generally,

discipline and morale among the personnel is at par with the necessary pre-requisite for a successful military

organisation. By African standards, the officer corps is well informed and fully trained to the challenges of

leadership (Nigeria: Military Capability, 2008).

4.5 Threats Analysis: Internal and External Threats in the Fourth Republic 1999-2007

Imobighe (in Alabi, 1997:140) defines threats as “anything that can undermine the security of the

nation, or anything that constitutes danger to its survival as a corporate entity, as well as undermine the

prospects of the harmonious relationship of the various communities that make up the nation, or the

peaceful co-existence of its people”. Generally, not all threats require military solution. Some threats

are intense and other peripheral. According to Ukpabi (1986:147):

Certain observations can be made concerning threats. For instance, there is hardly any country which does not have one threat
or another hanging over it and there is hardly any state which can provide completely against all the threats to which it may be
exposed to…Given this situation, it becomes necessary for each nation to analyse and perceive correctly what constitutes a
threat. Failure to do so will result either in utilising all its resources in order to counter imaginary dangers, to the detriment of
the various aspects of national development, or in adopting a complacent attitude leading to inadequate provisions…for the
nation which may lead to disaster in the event of a major threat. The correct perception of threat…enables a state to adopt the
correct posture…and to make contingency plans should any threat materialise. It is also the basis for the formulation of a
realistic defence policy.

Generally, threat perception and analysis in the Fourth Republic comes under two headings: internal

and external. Parallel to an analysis of these threats, is an effort to discuss some of the major causes of

some of the threats.

4.5.1 Internal Threats

Internal threats in the Fourth Republic have many dimensions. Some of these threats are politically

motivated, socially and or economically induced. They could also have military connotations.

However, political causes constituted the most significant percentage of all threats to national security

in the Fourth Republic. There is no question that the political elite in general and the political

leadership in particular are the greatest threat to national security. This is because, repeatedly, through

117
their actions and inactions – corruption, nepotism, poor leadership, ethnic and religious chauvinism and

anti-democratic tendencies – have constituted themselves as the single greatest threat to national

development, unity and integration (Fagbadebo, 2007, Obi, 2004). Writing about security and the

political class in the Second Republic (1979-1983), Imobighe (1984:41) points:

Any detailed study of law, order and security during the first four years of Presidential rule in Nigeria will present a number of
striking paradoxes. The first paradox is that those who are saddled with the responsibility of managing the affairs of the
country turned out to constitute the greatest danger to the security of the country. This observation is based on the fact that a
people’s security must start from the level of meeting what is basic to human life before moving into the area of providing
security against physical violation. In this sense, by robbing the nation of the means of meeting, the basic necessity of human
life, either by mis-management or outright looting of the treasury, the political elite of the Second Republic and their
bureaucratic collaborators have created a climate of insecurity in the country the indisputable mark of which is general
frustration and miscontent. The second paradox is that of faithlessness on the part of the political elite in the survivability of
the system they are given the responsibility to manage. By implication, it is also a manifestation of a lack of confidence in their
own ability to ensure the survival of the system.

This observation is apt and relevant and in fact, reflects vividly the similarity of pattern between the

politics of the Second and Fourth Republics. In fact, the political elite have become even more

dangerous and impervious to Nigeria’s development and unity and by implication national security.

Mohammed (2006) relates the lust for power by the political elites and grave consequence to national

security. It is easy to understand what Mohammed is arguing. Imobighe attributes the failure of

leadership to deliver on its responsibilities as the greatest threat to national security in the Second

Republic. In the Fourth Republic, it is the elite’s anti-democratic tendencies, their blatant disregard for

rule of law, their enthusiastic proclivity to violate the law, their penchant for corruption and their

intellectual and moral bankruptcy. Mohammed (2006:58) cites the ill-fated ‘Third Term Agenda’ of

President Obasanjo, as a vivid and clear historical proof of the perfidy and dangerous nature of the

Nigerian political class. “Leaders who are bent on enthroning authoritarianism are known to be both as

ruthless as well as reckless in the pursuit of their inordinate ambitions. Unfortunately, our President is

increasingly shaping into that frame. While he flaunts his credentials as a patriot who has fought to

keep Nigeria one, his recent actions cut him in the mould of those who work tirelessly to destroy

Nigeria” (italics added) (Mohammed, 2006:58). Central to good leadership in the society is the

promotion of good life and protection of citizens from all forms of physical, psychological and material

harm. In Nigeria, the political class entrusted by constitution with this onerous responsibility, has
118
turned to be the greatest hurdle to the realisation of these goals. Fundamentally, the cycle of leadership

in the country has failed to impact positively on the lives of the citizens. By jettisoning their

fundamental responsibilities, the political class is responsible for creating a vacuum, and today this

vacuum is being filled by lawlessness and anarchy.

In the Nigerian National Defence Policy (2006:15-16), the most potent threats includes “frequent

military coups d’etat, endemic corruption, extreme poverty, mass unemployment, political jingoism,

greed, poor economic growth, criminality, religious fanaticism/intolerance, drug trafficking and arms

smuggling. These have led to a weak, volatile and unpredictable situation”. Nevertheless, owing to an

absence of analytic tools for threats evaluation, some of the measures are quite deficient. There is no

way “appropriate training programmes aimed at entrenching military professionalism, democratic ethos

and civil-military relations shall be embarked upon for the armed forces that will enhance internal

security where years of economic mis-management has left a significant portion of the society hungry

and un-employed. Regarding the increased demand for MACA, the armed forces shall continue to be

adequately funded, trained and equipped to discharge its responsibility (italics added)”(NDP,2006:16).

Visibly, the measures are designed to enforce peace in the society, which in the final analysis would

prove defective. The policy is silent on the most critical threats: political leadership and economic

inequality. The policy is also silent on how to address some of the threats identified such as endemic

corruption, extreme poverty, unemployment and political jingoism. It is understood that all these threats

are to a certain degree linked with poor leadership. Even military takeovers are generally regarded as a

fall-out of bad leadership or its failure altogether. By making faulty threat assessment, the policy

prescribes and seeks to implement defective measures.

Beside the above, social and religious variables assumed a proportion which seriously hinders

internal security. Ejogba (2006:317) notes: “the threat posed by social and religious crises to African

security is worrisome. In most cases, both religion and ethnicity have been politicized, so much so that

minor religious and communal disagreements, which could be resolved amicably, end up violently.

119
This has caused untold hardship for innocent people”. One can argue that there is never, in Nigerian

history, a period when the country came close to disintegration because of socio-religious and ethnic

crises like in the first four years of the Fourth Republic: 1999-2003. Violent religious crises, inter-

ethnic conflicts with thousands dead, and properties worth millions destroyed characterised this period.

Again, in almost all the socio-religious and ethnic incidences that occurred in the period in question,

the subtle hand of the political elite – greedy, ambitious, and disgruntled and out of favour with the

government – was visible. For instance, most of the violent inter-religious crises that erupted in many

parts of Nigeria between 1999-2003 are believed to be a direct reaction to the controversial decision of

Zamfara State to introduce Shari’ah legal system for the state (for detailed legal arguments and

opinions on the constitutionality or otherwise of Shari’ah, see: The Sharia Issue: Working Papers for

Dialogue). As a result, severe national crisis nearly doomed the nascent democracy.

Manipulation and politicisation of ethnicity and religion as a serious threat to national security in

Africa is not a recent phenomena (Alabi, 1997:139-142). In the Fourth Republic, available evidence

indicates resort to this subterfuge by the elites for various reasons. The outbreak of social and ethnic

crises and violent inter-ethnic massacres nearly brought the country to its knees. Some of the worst

fears harboured by many that Nigeria is not a nation and integration has a long way to go were

tragically confirmed. It is not possible to catalogue the woes that had befallen the country during those

days. Suffice it to mention that thousands of innocent lives were lost, properties destroyed and most of

the culprits left unpunished. Mohammed (1999) has warned of the danger inherent in the actions and

utterances of most of Nigeria’s political elite who thrive and sustain their political relevance by fanning

the embers of social and ethnic hatred.

The Fourth Republic is also the time when youth militancy re-emerged fiercely in the Niger Delta

region. In an historical context, Niger-Delta agitations are regarded as liberation struggles for

improving the living conditions of the people of the region. Isaac Boro and Saro-Wiwa provides

incontrovertible proof for this historic struggle for better life in the Delta. In the present context, these

120
agitations looks more like exhortations and blackmail spearheaded by criminal gangs in the guise of

freedom fighting. New dimensions introduced to these agitations such as political thuggery, oil

bunkering, kidnappings and incessant violent intra-group conflicts between the various militant groups

helps justify the scepticism of many observers. Nigeria relies on crude oil revenue – extracted from the

Niger Delta area – for its survival. It is therefore easy to see how with the sabotage of oil pipelines,

kidnappings, oil bunkering and general lawlessness in the Delta, Nigeria’s security is gravely

threatened. From the middle of the last decade when the Niger Delta struggles took a new dimension,

successive administrations reduced the entire context of the agitations to one that could be addressed by

greater violence. Without bothering to discriminate between genuine cases of struggles for life

improvement from brigandage, the government aids and escalates the crisis. Instead of taking a holistic

approach to a problem that could easily be solved through integrated measures, the government decided

to dance with military force. Fanon (1978) warned that violence is reciprocal. Iyayi (2003) reflecting on

the general condition of Nigerian society echoes the same view. Violence in Fanon and Iyayi is

counterproductive, as it leads to counter-violence. Despite heavy military presence in the region,

lawlessness continues unabated. The militant organisations are now more bold and daring in their

demands and operations. According to Sylva (2008:27), “the delay to respond positively to the crisis of

underdevelopment of the Niger Delta, and its youth, has its manifestations in the rising sabotage of oil

installations and hostage takings, various acts of insurgency and counter-insurgency which have taken a

huge toll on national revenue, the environment, and livelihoods”.

African economy is also central to any meaningful understanding of national security. According to

Ejogba (2006:317), economic underdevelopment in Africa “has contributed immensely to the

deepening socio-economic crisis that has plagued most African countries and has greatly constituted a

serious threat to the security of the African continent… In most African states, the basic needs of life

such as food, housing, water supply and transportation which are taken for granted in other societies are

still lacking”. According to NEEDS document (2004:95) in Nigeria:

121
Successive governments have tried to ensure security, especially since 1999. Despite their efforts, however, the level of
security in parts of the country has fallen, driven by growing poverty, wide income disparities, high unemployment, social
dislocation caused by massive rural-urban migration, and the breakdown of societal values, leading to fraud and community
and unrest. The institutions established to guarantee security are incapacitated by limited personnel and skills, inadequate
funding, poor equipment, and lack of proper orientation and commitment. A weak economy can only exacerbate the situation.

Alabi (2007:139) shares this view: “another contributory factor to instability and violent conflicts in

Africa…has been poverty – absolute poverty – manifested in food insecurity, mass unemployment,

declining health and educational infrastructure, housing problems, urban slum, over-population, high

disposition to violence, short temperament etc.”. Ebo (1996:71) stresses, “This socio-economic

environment is crucial to an understanding of the protracted nature of conflict in much of Africa. The

Liberian civil war, the conflict in Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola are all largely exacerbated and

perpetuated by severe economic conditions”. This poor state of African economies is further

confounded by a very weak industrial and technological base, excruciating foreign debt, domination of

the real sectors of the economies by multinational corporations as well as dependence on foreign aid.

The net result of these is “the increasing vulnerability of the economies of African nations as they have

become pawns in the hands of predator-nations and the survival of their economies has been further

threatened. This now constitutes a very dynamic source of insecurity in Africa and a threat to African

security” (Ejogba, 2006:318).

4.5.2 External Threats

Ukpabi (1986:156) warns, “External threats to a nation should be seen in relation to its geo-political

environment and to the intensity of competing national interests”. Frankly, in discussing external threats

to Nigeria, one has to approach the subject from at least two dimensions: military threats such as direct

attack on Nigeria’s territory, declaration of war by another country or acts of hostilities such as

blockades and non-military threats such as cross border banditry/crime/drugs, migration and energy

security. In a more generic sense, Straw (2006) identifies ten key challenges to an understanding of

Nigeria’s national security in the 21st century. Three out of these: development, good governance and

conflict are traditional challenges that have been with Nigeria since independence. New challenges

include terrorism, migration, crime/drugs, energy security, environment/climate change, Islam and
122
China. According to Straw, these are the post-Cold War challenges that shape the destiny of Nigeria and

to a considerable degree the rest of Africa. Okeke (2007) identifies five key security threats in Africa

that explicitly affects Nigeria. These are economic and military dependence, conflicts and wars within

states, inter-states antagonisms and conflicts, South Africa’s belligerency and great-power intervention

in African affairs.

Nigeria is one of the countries with huge land mass in Africa, with extensive borders of about 4900

km. Nigeria shares about 773 km with Benin Republic on the west, about 1497 km with Niger Republic

on the north, 87 km with Chad Republic on the northeast, 1690 km with Republic of Cameroon on the

east and 853 km of coastline. Naturally, these extensive and largely porous borders poses serious

security dilemma to Nigeria (Akpuru-Aja, 2003:3). It is not possible, owing to the large resources

necessary, to patrol these borders. For relatively guarded borders, Nigeria has to develop and cultivate

goodwill with her neighbours. Otherwise, these borders will continue to remain a source of concern for

her national security. There are also instances of unresolved geo-political issues with some of her

neighbours. The most widely known was the territorial dispute with the Republic of Cameroon over

Bakassi and other territories. This issue was one of the most serious sources of security threat to

Nigeria since the Second Republic. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague ruled on the

matter in 2007 in favour of Cameroon. Otherwise, the dispute might have been resolved in the

battlefield. There were antecedents. In the past, several times Nigeria and Cameroon had come close to

an all out war before diplomacy could eventually prevail (Akinterinwa, 2008:18).

The National Defence Policy (2006:17) points: “other sources of threat are local conflicts, civil strife

and unrests in neighbouring countries that could have spill over effects. Rebels and bandits from these

countries have demonstrated this through incessant violations of Nigeria’s north-eastern border”. There

are boundless instances where local conflicts and civil war in one West African country spilled to

others. For instance, Liberian Civil War spilled to Sierra Leone. Another aspect that causes concern is

the violation of Nigeria’s borders by bandits for smuggling activities, armed robbery and drug crimes.

123
To date, the entire northeastern part of Nigeria is practically under siege from the activities of these

bandits especially from Chad Republic. There is however, visible reduction on the overall picture as

Nigeria steps up intensive border patrol singly and jointly with her neighbours. Most important is the

fact that most of the West African countries have democratised or are in the transitory stages. The

impact of this will be increased accountability and decreased violence, conflicts and civil strife.

“Subversive penetration is also a major threat that Nigeria must guard against. This relates to the use

of subtle means such as economic sabotage and pressure, sometimes with the aid of trans-national and

multinational co-operations, financial institutions or their local collaborators to destabilise the country”

(NNDP, 2006:17). Generally, multinational or trans-national corporations are among the most serious

impediments to national independence and development of Africa. History and experience show that

they are agents of destabilisation and as such part of the greatest threats to national securities of Africa.

According to Wilmot (1979:130), “the multinational corporation is the chief instrument of western

imperialism which now manifests itself in the form of neo-colonialism…Because they command

economic and political resources that dwarf the budgets and political capacities of most African

countries, multinational corporations which represent the interests of their home nations represent a

threat to the national independence of the Third World”. Arguably, without sovereignty, or where it

comes under intense threat, all other questions of national security and interests are secondary.

Usman (1979:56-57) cites the example of Chile, Kenya and Middle East to demonstrate how multi-

national corporations actively undermine national securities of the developing nations. According to

Wilmot (1979:133), the threat to national security by the multi-national corporations relates to allowing

them constructs, operates or even manages sensitive facilities and services in their host countries

(Shchetinin: 1981, carries a detailed study on the activities of MNCs and how they undermine national

securities of the developing nations). How far these kinds of threats are present in the Fourth Republic

is only a matter of conjecture. Essentially, most of the activities of these companies and institutions in

Nigeria are shrouded in secrecy. It cannot be determined with certainty how deep or severe their

124
penetration is into the economic life of Nigeria. The only indication on the kind of penetration they

have achieved emerged from the measure of influence they wield in the commanding heights of the

economy. If anything is achieved by the government, it is definitely not on guarding against this deep

penetration into the economy to avoid sabotage. Paradoxically, the government, through its

privatisation programme of the strategic sectors of the economy –

communications/telecommunications, aviation – actively engages in undermining the security of the

nation.

Perhaps, one of the most worrisome threats to Nigeria’s security relates to the establishment of

military bases in Africa. Some of the major world powers notably USA and France have shown

increasing keenness to establish substantial military presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Lubeck et al.,

(2007:1) explains that: “over the past 15 years, amidst a deepening crisis in the Middle East and

tightening petroleum markets, the U.S. has quietly institutionalised a West Africa-based oil supply

strategy. Nigeria, currently providing 10-12 percent of U.S. imports, serves as the cornerstone of this

Gulf of Guinea strategy”. Thus, the motive is practically economic and simply intended to secure the

strategic advantage over oil supplies from Africa. According to Berschinski (2007: iii): “Africa is a

continent of growing economic, social, political, and geo-strategic importance to the U.S. It is also a

continent of overwhelming poverty, rampant disease, chronic instability, and terrorist activity. The

establishment of a new Combatant Command for Africa—AFRICOM—marks an important milestone

in the evolution of relations between the United States and the governments of Africa”. Rightly, it

marks a new phase in the un-equal relations that have characterized all interactions between African

countries and the West. The national policy realised the possibility of using these military bases by the

foreign powers “as staging post for hostile activities against Nigeria” (NNDP, 2006:17). During the

Nigerian Civil War, France with substantial military presence in West Africa, effectively undermine

federal government’s war efforts.

125
Terrorism, as a threat cannot be dismissed. Nevertheless, in West Africa at least, the war on

terrorism in the near future would continue to act as a smokescreen shielding the real motives and

intents of the U.S and other foreign powers in the Gulf of Guinea. According to Lubeck et al. (2007:2-

3), a combination of many trends compelled the U.S to revise its Africa strategy. These include a

rapidly growing demand for oil especially by India and China; declining productivity in the Persian

Gulf owing to under-investment; and increased socio-political instability in the Middle East, site of the

world’s largest oil reserves. These and other threatening trends such as “assertive petro-nationalism in

Iran and Venezuela and political conflict in the Andean and Caspian oil zones” and Russian

hegemonism in the Caucasus, poses serious risks to the energy security of the U.S. These possibilities,

not terrorism, are the crucial determinants of U.S.’s policy in Africa. The challenge to Nigeria, a major

supplier of petroleum to American and European markets, is in deed daunting.

While, “Nigeria might not face an imminent threat of direct military invasion in the foreseeable

future, the challenges to her security that have been identified are potent enough to warrant a state of

constant preparedness” (NNDP, 2006:17). One of these challenges actually revolves around fending the

overzealousness of some of the foreign powers’ military personnel in trying to secure oil supply to

violate Nigeria’s territorial integrity. U.S navy is known to have a presence in Nigeria’s territorial

waters to protect Shell’s Bonga oil field (Lubeck et al., 2007:19). In fact, as early as August 2000,

Nigeria under Obasanjo was believed to have signed a military cooperation with USA to:

I. Train/retrain the Nigerian military force;

II. Protect the nascent democracy against military incursions;

III. Provide patrol vessels for the Nigerian military (Navy) to police the oil producing areas;

IV. Protect oil installations in the Niger Delta;

V. Train/retrain the Nigerian military for peacekeeping operations (Akpuru-Aja, 2003:3).

From the foregoing survey, there are in fact many instances where the use of military force is

envisaged. Because Nigeria is not in the immediate future vulnerable to a direct territorial invasion, does

126
not imply that the threat or the possibility for such an eventually does not exists. Most likely, attacks on

Nigerian territory would be from or through any of her neighbouring territories by land, sea or air.

Neighbouring countries could be used as a staging post for military raids against Nigeria. It is

incumbent therefore for the armed forces to develop the capability and technical expertise to monitor

and counter these eventualities. This should include the use of intelligence, counter-intelligence, latest

surveillance techniques and early warning systems. Other instances – domestic and international – that

would warrant the employment of the armed forces for the protection of Nigeria’s security includes:

blockades and raids, internal security and other low intensity conflicts, peace support operations,

attacks on embassies, ships, aircrafts and other strategic facilities, disaster relief services, search and

rescue (NNDP, 2006:18-19). Blockades and raids on Nigeria would generally take the form of

interference with sea-lines of communications, disruption of shipping activities in Nigeria’s maritime

zone, land blockades of trade routes or imposition of no-fly zones in her airspace by a hostile foreign

power. As these forms of hostile activities are usually carried without advance warning, it is important

for the armed forces to be in constant alert. The imperativeness of an ‘Early Warning System’ is crucial

here. Other scenarios for the use of armed forces include peace support operations in international

theatres of conflict. One of the abiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy is her commitment to

international peace. Nigeria commits enormous resources including its military and police force for

peace support operations in different parts of the world. The most notable instances in recent times are

in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast where Nigerian troops performed commendable operations.

Presently, Nigeria has a large peace support mission in Sudan. Akpuru-Aja (2003:4) posits that:

Inspired by the perceived size, wealth, population and strategic location, Nigeria has consistently assumed a supportive, and
indeed, leadership role in the areas of conflict resolution in Africa. It must be stated clearly that Nigeria’s external military
ambition and commitments usually outweigh the realities of its domestic capabilities. In each of its external military
engagements, Nigeria participated so at a high cost, and from a position of weakness. In spite of the odds, Nigeria has been
very consistent in its efforts to support conflict resolution in Africa where the big powers dread to accept a role.

Nigerian armed forces, especially the army and the navy in the Niger-Delta areas, are conversant with

internal security operations and low intensity conflicts. In the Fourth Republic, the armed forces have

127
been employed in enforcing law and order in different parts of the country. The most notable examples

are Kaduna, Yelwa-Shendam in Plateau, Zaki-Biam in Benue, Odi in Bayelsa States.

4.6 An Assessment of the Nigeria’s Defence Policy Objectives: 1999-2007

It is not possible to proceed with an analysis of the flaws of Nigeria’s defence policy in the Fourth

Republic without an assessment of the policy objectives. In this sense, it is crucial to start with a

thorough review of these objectives – how successful was the country in achieving them in light of the

changed nature of national and international environment, changed nature of internal and external

threats, resources and instruments available, and even technological development of the country.

Generally, Nigerian defence policy seeks to achieve three broad goals viz: 1) Commitment to the

protection of national sovereignty and the promotion of national interest at home and abroad; 2)

Provision of humanitarian services such as disaster management and aids in support of civil authority;

and 3) Commitment to the promotion of peace and security at regional and global levels. Attempt is

made to study these objectives from a practical viewpoint. In essence, the thesis seeks to draw from the

available practical incidences that had occurred from 1999-2007 when the policy was in full swing to

assess whether the federal government had taken deliberate and conscious steps to advance and achieve

the objectives of the defence policy.

4.6.1 Protection and Promotion of National Sovereignty and Interest: the Bakassi Example

On Thursday, 14th August 2008, Nigeria handed over the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon based on

the ICJ ruling and Green Tree Agreement, which Obasanjo administration consented to (Akinterinwa,

2008:18). This action is seen as direct negation of Nigeria’s national interest. Section 19(a) and (d),

Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for “the protection and

promotion of national interest”. Scholars including Ejiofor (1981) and Mbachu (1998) consider

territorial integrity as being the fundamental component of national interest. In this vein therefore, the

decision of the federal government to hand over Bakassi territory based on the ICJ and Green Tree

Agreement is seen and regarded as a direct contravention of Nigeria’s constitution and her national

128
defence policy objectives which includes “protection of Nigeria’s sovereignty, interests and territory”.

In fact, it is difficult to justify the decision from the angle of serving or promoting Nigeria’s national

interest. This is more valid after it became known that Obasanjo acted unilaterally and arbitrarily

without the knowledge of the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria – the body statutorily

empowered with the power of ratification for all international agreements and treaties (Akinterinwa,

2008:18). During a three-day public hearing conducted by the Senate on the ICJ/ Green Tree

Agreement, it was revealed, “Obasanjo administration signed the agreement without consulting the

military on the security implications of ceding that territory” (Daily Sun, August 12, 2008:20).

Against this backdrop, it can be argued that Nigeria in the Fourth Republic failed significantly to

achieve the greatest objective of her national defence policy, which is the protection and promotion of

national interest. According to Akinterinwa (2008:18), “the ceding of Bakassi peninsula is not in

Nigeria’s national interest”. It is instructive to note that even the then Chief of Defence Staff, Gen.

Azazi issued a public statement describing this act as going against national interest (Daily Sun, August

12, 2008:20). Instructively, there are those who felt that ceding Bakassi was the right thing and was a

strong demonstration of the respect Nigeria has for peace and international law. Ambassador Chadi

Abubakar, Nigeria’s former ambassador to Morocco, asserts that it is better to cede the territory than to

start fighting over it (Daily Sun, August 13, 2008:4). To Gadzama SAN, (Thisday, August 12, 2008:47),

“the hand over should take place in view of Nigeria’s desire for mutual respect among the comity of

nations particularly bearing in mind her rightful and genuine desire to be a member of the Security

Council of the United Nations. Also, it must be specifically noted that the consequences of not handing

over are unimaginable and go beyond the issue of denting our reputation and standing in the

international community”. Some of the points raised by Gadzama have merit. Nonetheless, “it is

difficult to understand why any country, particularly Nigeria, should make the respect of international

law and treaty obligation an objective of foreign policy. In the context of the cessation of the Bakassi

peninsula, it is apparent from constitutional provisions that the federal government has only respected

129
them without reservation and without any other ultimate objective for the respect” (Akinterinwa,

2008:18). It is therefore pertinent to point that if Bakassi is to be taken as the yardstick for measuring

the success or other wise of the NNDP in the Fourth Republic especially as it concerns protection of

Nigeria’s sovereignty, her national interest, territorial integrity and her citizens; it is not difficult to

reach one of these conclusions. Either the authorities responsible for the policy implementation lacks

the broad and finer understanding of what exactly constitutes national interests, are not keen on its

complete success or the policy itself did not anticipate such kind of challenges. From whatever angle

one chooses to view the Bakassi debacle, it is indeed hard to justify ceding a whole territory and

portion of citizens to another country. This action without doubt is not in the Nigeria’s interest.

Significantly, the policy has seriously failed in its most fundamental objectives, which are protection of

sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and her citizens.

In handing over portions of her territory and citizens to any country, Nigeria failed to achieve the

most cardinal objectives of her national defence policy. Objective number one is to protect Nigeria

sovereignty, citizens, interests, resources and territory. Giving out Bakassi on all standards cannot be

regarded as a calculated attempt towards achieving this objective. Objectives number two and three

provides for the promotion of defence as well as strategic advice and information to government, and

promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians. It is not difficult either to see that security

organisations including intelligence agencies have not performed this function of advising the

government or alternatively the government had chosen to disregard their advice. Protection of

Nigerians wherever they may reside is objective number seven. Nonetheless, Bakassi hand over

tragically exposed a case of Nigeria dramatically abandoning her citizens to another country. (For

additional information on Bakassi, see: Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Nigeria, July

2008).

4.6.2 Provision of Humanitarian Services and Support for Civil Authority

130
Humanitarian services, which the military can provide, include disaster management and relief

efforts during famine, fire, epidemics, earthquakes, floods, war and other national emergencies (NNDP,

2006:19). On the other hand, support for civil authority ranges from commons support services such as

joint military/police patrols, border patrols, quelling riots and civil disturbances to law enforcement

duties as a complement to the police services (NNDP, 2006:18). In Nigeria, national defence policy

anticipates these responsibilities and has accordingly made it part of the objectives of national defence

for all the instruments of the policy to be involved in the provision of humanitarian services and

support for civil authority where necessary or requested. Therefore, the question to ask is simple: have

these instruments, especially the military, been active, forthcoming and successful to this objective. The

answer to this would not necessarily involve an exhaustive survey of the national emergencies that had

occurred in the Fourth Republic and had thus warranted the services of the military and national

defence instruments. There are two components to this objective, disaster management and aid in

support of the civil authority, which conceivably have a far wider range.

Concerning disaster management and humanitarian relief efforts at home and abroad, there is hardly

any shred of evidence to suggest that in the Fourth Republic, Nigeria participated in providing

humanitarian services and relief efforts to various disaster managements in the country and even

beyond. Discounting the relief efforts provided by Nigeria in 2006 to the Republic of Niger, spear-

headed by the Office of the Speaker, Federal House of Representative, NASS, Nigerian military’s

participation in international humanitarian services was virtually non-existent. At domestic level,

however, the picture was different. Instances abound where the military was known to have directly

participated in SAR as a component of relief efforts. It is instructive to note that though met little

success, the Nigerian military was deeply involved in all the search and rescue missions, which

accompanied the scores of airplane crashes that occurred in the Fourth Republic. Although, it is not

possible to argue that the military has achieved significant success in this direction, yet it is not possible

to conclude that they had recorded dismal failure. Perhaps, the performance of the Nigerian military in

131
January 2002, when the Ikeja munitions depot bomb explosions occurred in Lagos. It was on record

that the military together with relevant agencies were involved in providing relief services to the

affected persons (UNDAC, 2002).

Perhaps, one area in which the military and other instruments of defence acquitted themselves well

was in providing aid in support of the civil authorities in the Fourth Republic. It is on record that

Nigeria from 1999-2008 experienced some of the worst incidences of the total-breakdown of law and

order in many parts of the country. In most circumstances, these incidences followed religious or ethnic

conflicts. The governments, both federal and state, relied heavily on the military, police and other law

enforcement agencies to quell these crises. Kaduna, Yelwa-Shendam in Plateu State, Odi in Bayelsa

State, and Zaki-Biam in Benue State were some of the most prominent cases where the military had to

be redeployed to restore law and order. There were other cases and instances either whereby the

military were deployed to complement police efforts. These instances included the so-called Taliban

uprising of Barno State in 2004, and the incessant Niger-Delta youth militancy. If enforcing peace

instead of taking measures to prevent in the first place, disruption of the peace is anything to go by,

then NNDP met with considerable success in these areas. Frankly, most of the crises in which the

military were used were avoidable crises.

4.6.3 Peace Support Operations at Regional and Global Levels

Commitment to international peace, security and stability has been one of the cardinal objectives of

Nigerian defence policy since independence. Section 18 of the 1999 Constitution provides as one of the

cardinal objectives of the Nigerian foreign policy, the promotion of international co-operation for the

consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of

discrimination in all its ramifications. According to NNDP (2006:27), “Nigeria’s participation in

international peace support missions is an expression of its will and ability to be a provider of security

resources and a show of solidarity for collective international security. Such participation provides the

necessary exposure to the Nigerian armed forces working in co-operation w ith forces of other countries. It

132
also enhances the nation’s profile in the comity of nations”. This participation can be examined from at

least three levels: regional level that restrict the operations to the West African sub-region, continental

level that covered the whole of Africa, and the global level that involved peace support missions in

other parts of the world. It is instructive to note that NNDP, (2006:27) understands the need for

streamlining the objectives which these operations – requiring huge financial and human investment –

are expected to achieve for the benefit of the nation. Accordingly, “participation in international

military operations shall be based on clearly defined objectives that reflect our national interest and

further both regional and international peace and security. Participation shall also be based on the

nation’s ability to sustain the forces without jeopardizing the nation’s economic well being” (NNDP,

2006:27).

Nigeria’s participation in regional peace support missions has been a subject of various analysis and

documentations. What is not in contention is that Nigeria has, more than any other West African

country, contributes the most towards regional peace and stability. Nigeria was the greatest contributor

to the establishment of ECOMOG, a regional peacekeeping organisation (Khobe, 2000). From 1999-

2007, Nigeria had participated in virtually all peace support missions within the West African sun-

region. These included, though not restricted to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Sao Tome, Guinea Bissau

and Cote D’Ivoire (Bako, 2007, Background: Nigeria, 2008). Nigeria’s participation in peace support

missions goes beyond regional level and includes the whole of Africa. Presently, Nigeria has one of the

largest troop contingents in Darfur, Sudan (Bako, 2007). Nigeria’s security and interests is best

protected in a peaceful environment devoid of rancour and civil strife. In addition, Nigeria’s economic

and political status in Africa makes it necessary for her to be a stakeholder in Africa’s development and

progress. At the global level, Nigeria’s participation is equally commendable. At several times, Nigeria

had together with other countries, participated in different peace support missions including Lebanon

and former Yugoslavia. Bako (2007) observed, “Nigeria has been and will remain a major player in

global peace and security missions internationally, regionally and in the sub-region”. Thus, within

133
reasonable bounds, it can be argued that Nigeria has characteristically maintained a higher level of

participation in international, continental and sub-continental peace-support missions. Essentially, this

posture is in keeping with her express objective of supporting and co-operating with other countries to

promote and protect international peace.

Bako (2007) however disagrees with the view that Nigeria’s national interest benefits from her

participation in peace-support missions. To Bako (2007) “Despite its achievements,

however, any assessment of Nigeria’s participation in PKO (peacekeeping

operation) will reveal that she has, and is yet to reap the benefit of her

contributions due to some problems. These include lack of an institution for the

training of troops, thereby affecting peacekeepers training, and absence of an

effective organization that can coordinate peacekeeping operations, prevent

improper accounting and make effective use of reimbursements. The question of

national interest in Nigeria’s participation in PKO is, therefore, problematic”. (For

detailed survey of Nigeria’s participation in peace-support operations in the first half of the Fourth

Republic, see: Berman, 2002. For new trends in international peace-support operations, see: The Future

of Peace-support Operations, 2008).

4.7 Flaws of Nigeria’s Defence Policy

One of the objectives of this thesis is to determine the flaws of Nigeria’s defence policy with a view

to offer some relevant suggestions on how to strengthen the policy. Based on the preceding analysis,

two critical impediments that became evident are absence of economic/industrial and scientific/

technological development.

4.7.1 Economic and Industrial Constraints

“The ability of a nation to grow and defend itself is controlled in large part by the availability of

natural resources. Nations that do not possess sufficient mineral, energy, agricultural, and water

resources within their boundaries must obtain them on the international market…In times of war, all or

134
part of the international market may be inaccessible and critical resources unavailable for import”

(Haneberg, 2004). Nigeria’s economy is oil driven. Crude oil accounts for about 80% of all government

revenues, 90-95% of export revenues and over 90% of foreign exchange earnings (Analysis, Vol.1.

No.3. September 2002:23). It is generally agreed that Nigeria (1999-2007) had recorded massive

upward increase in her revenue base. “Federal Government recorded geometric increases in the year

2000 as compared to 1999. In this year, the total gross revenue of the government was more than 300%

above the total earnings in the last seven months of 1999. The year 2001 was the greatest. In this year,

the revenue increases from the previous year were very dramatic” (Analysis, September 2002:11-12).

Despite these huge increases in national wealth, economic and industrial development continues to

suffer. Strategic support centres of the economy such as electricity, transportation/aviation,

communications/telecommunications and manufacturing industries have not fared better in the Fourth

Republic. In fact, they deteriorated with an alarming speed. This poor economic status creates serious

condition of dependence on foreign economies for sustenance, giving birth in the process to unequal

relations between Nigeria and the countries that supply her with the necessary tools for her survival and

progress. The effect of this to Nigeria includes deepening crisis in her national economy sustained by

perpetual state of industrial underdevelopment. The dependence on foreign supply shops occasioned by

absence of industrial development complimented with ill-conceived economic policies enables foreign

companies an absolute control over strategic centres of the economy and jeopardises Nigeria’s national

security. “At independence, Nigeria had an economy organised primarily for the export of primary

commodities and the import of finished manufactured goods. This economy was dominated by a

corporate private sector, made up of a handful of Multi National Corporations led by UAC, John Holt,

CFAO, PZ and SCOA, for whom the government and all its public sector enterprises like the ports and

the railways, were established to provide protection and support for, and to create an enabling

environment for their profitable operations (italics added)” (Analysis, Vol.1. No.5. November 2002:30).

The only changes recorded since independence, chiefly relates to the scope of operations, the discovery

135
of new interesting avenues to exploit, and even the emergence of new and competing interests into the

Nigerian market. For instance, in the 1960s, the interest was chiefly on agricultural products. This

shifted to petroleum products with the commencement of oil exploitation in commercial quantity in

Nigeria.

Because of this orientation, one prominent trend that remains an enduring feature of the Nigerian

economy is the absence of an industrial base. Nigeria has tragically managed to remain a raw material

producing nation for well over forty years. This is in effect caused by the way and manner the public

sector is organised and operates in the country. The public sector is fundamentally designed in such a

way as to support the grip of the powerful MNCs on the economy through the exports of raw materials

and the import of finished merchandise (Analysis, November 2002:30). The questions to ask therefore

are simple and straightforward: how does this economic condition advances or hinders its national

security; and how does it become a constraint to national defence policy in the Fourth Republic?

According to Sen (1995:76), “the involvement of the State in the economy can be conceptualised on

two levels: at the onset of industrialisation, where the state is attempting to create an industrial

capability, and subsequently, in assuring the viability of the economy… It is held that the intervention

of the state in the economy to establish the group of strategic industries and ensure their viability when

threatened is primarily motivated by the concern for national defence”. This also involves the desire to

achieve substantial national economic autonomy. It has already been suggested that in Nigeria this

intervention is lacking. On the contrary, public policy since independence, favours private corporate

business interests including privatization of these strategic industries to foreign companies and private

interests. In this context, “the industries which will be described as strategic are those which not only

contribute directly and successively to the growth of an economy overtime, but also those whose

growth guarantees and stimulates further growth for themselves and the remaining non-strategic

industries” (Sen, 1995:48). These groups of industries include steel and communications in

contemporary period. For instance, “the impact of the military demand for iron was responsible for the
136
establishment of coal industry; the latter in turn initiated modern rail transport, which in turn stimulated

both coal and iron production hastening economic growth in general. Of course, both coal and rail

transport were themselves of extreme military importance” (Sen, 1995:106).

In any case, the stimulating effect of industrialisation to national defence is tremendous. Apart from

ensuring the regenerative capacity for the national economy, it ensures a sufficient level of autonomy in

matters of national defence. The interdependence of the process of production is an acknowledged fact.

The need to meet the demands of national defence in one area stimulates successive national economic

expansion in several areas. Since industries, as the backbone of any national economy are a necessary

prerequisite for national defence and development, it thus appears counter-productive and highly

unreasonable for a country to put little stock in the process of industrialisation. In Nigeria, industries,

whether large or small, with regenerative capacity are non-existent. This no definitely constitutes a

serious flaw to the successful take-off of the defence policy. Lacking in national capacity to meet its

military needs imposes on Nigeria a sense of helplessness. This compels her to rely on foreign sources.

As shown already, the country has been robbed of the twin advantages of further national economic

growth and development as well as substantial autonomy in her military needs. Much as Nigeria wants

to project an independent military capability in the sub-Saharan Africa in line with the objectives of her

defence policy, this aspiration would severely be curtailed by an obvious lack of strong economic and

industrial base. The little she achieves depends on the goodwill of her suppliers, including their moods

and realities of international politics at any given time. It is safe therefore to assume that a sanction or

an arms embargo on Nigeria any time in the future would have a crippling and debilitating impact

especially on her ability to maintain internal security, law and order as well as to maintain a military

force strong enough to serve as a deterrent in Africa.

4.7.2 Technological and Scientific Constraints

137
Technology in general terms is the process by which human beings fashion tools and machines to control

their physical environment. Technology is a Greek word ‘tekhme’, which refers to an art or craft. ‘Logia’

means an area of study. Literally, technology means study or art of constructing a tool, an implement, or just

about anything physical and material (Merritt, 2007). Human inventions in history are regarded as

technological breakthroughs. Providing a narrow perspective on the concept, Basiuk (1999:8), argues that

technology is the totality of physical man made tools intended to modify man’s environment. It has already

been pointed that, the effort made by man in the direction of science and technology is a product of the desire

to understand, modify, adapt and dominate his environment. A comprehensive definition of technology shall

include not only the tools, but also material application of those tools for the progress and development of

human community. Suffice it here to posit that science and technology are sine qua non to any quest for

national development. In addition, the rate of technological changes because of scientific discoveries provides

an insight into how the two interdependently transform human societies. Technological innovations appear at

a rate that increases geometrically without respect to geographical limits, cultural barriers or political systems.

These inventions transform traditional defence and security system, frequently with unexpected social

consequences (Merritt, 2007). For instance, gunpowder changed the nature of war among human societies.

According to Ajakaiye & Akinbinu (2000:79):

Technological capabilities are those critical assets – human and organisational capital that are employed by productive enterprises for the
efficient use of machinery, equipment and technologies… These capabilities are…firm-specific and for these reasons, a whole range of
capabilities exist across sectors applicable to a broad spectrum of industrial activities. The building of these numerous capabilities has
been defined as technological development.

The notion that science provides ideas for technological innovation and that research is an essential part of

any significant advancement in technological development is, in the context of modern societies, valid,

notwithstanding that some of the greatest technological inventions since ancient times were not achieved in

laboratories. In modern times, technological progress is chiefly a function of scientific advancement. These

two fields of human endeavour developed out of the need to adapt and dominate the environment for

maximum utility. How does science and technology helps man in this regard? Technology provides the tools –

138
necessary implements for dealing appropriately with the environment – while science develops, explains and

provides man with the understanding of those natural laws necessary for his survival (Burnie, 2006).

In broad sense, defence implies protection against harmful attack by an enemy from within or without. In

its narrow sense, defence implies the ability and capability by a sovereign nation to protect itself from harmful

internal and external threats and attacks as well as institutionalize mechanisms as deterrents. During the Cold

War, the two superpowers (USA & USSR) used nuclear technology as deterrent against each other. Essentially

the success of a particular security strategy centres on the level and degree of advancement a state has attained

in scientific and technological development. In contemporary period, industrial nations with sophisticated

defence systems offered by science and technology, dominates and wields all forms of influence over the

poorly developed and technologically disadvantaged third world states. Developments in science and

technology have today become the yardstick of measuring prosperity and national development among

nations.

Nigeria’s place vis-à-vis developments in science and technology are indeed very dismal (Vanguard,

Thursday, August 7, 2008:8). Although, it cannot be dismissed as highly lacking, the little development

that exists is grossly inadequate to give the country a place among the technologically developed

nations of the world. In fact, it is not even close enough to allow Nigeria meets most of her military and

non-military commitments. According to Ugwuoha (2008), “today, there is nowhere in Africa where

breakthrough in Science and Technology is canvassed, espoused or significantly encouraged… This is

despite superabundance of technological geniuses in Africa, who are tactically repressed in the hostile

policies of their various countries, or, if lucky, spirited away by the knowledgeable civilisations”. This

is however different from what was initially envisaged as the role of science and technology in national

development. In 1986, a national policy on technology was formulated which seeks to give Nigeria the

much needed direction for technological development. Although the policy did seek to integrate

indigenous technology to foreign one, its greatest failure was on the premium it placed for foreign

technology transfer as a vehicle for achieving national development (Ajakaiye & Akinbinu, 2000:83).

139
From the preceding preview, it is quite clear that science and technology are two essential elements

to national security. Yusuf (2004:45) points: “a strong national economy, which is essential to national

security and strength, is in turn greatly dependent upon science and technology and the industrial

products they bring to the marketplace at home and abroad”. Thus, the constraint poses by

underdevelopment in science and technology to defence policy are clear and relates to Nigeria’s need

and ability to sustain modern armed forces. Modern militaries are very different from the mass

organisations of the previous centuries that passed as military forces. In the 21 st century, military as an

institution is an organisationally and structurally centralised and sophisticated system under a unified

command and control mastering the latest discoveries and inventions in science and technology. Yusuf

(2004:45) observes:

The development of the first atomic bomb introduced a novel and highly significant element into the complex relations
between science and society. This was in part due to the revolutionary military potential of the weapon. At the end of the First
World War, the principal scientific devices that had been tested in action, included the aircraft, tanks, automatic guns,
submarines, radio communications and poison gas. The Second World War forms a watershed in the progress and organisation
of science. Six important development or devices arose or grew to stature because of the war. They were the atomic energy,
radar, rocket propulsion, jet propulsion, automation and operational research.

Further, Yusuf (2004:45) points:

It has been principally through scientific discoveries and the technological applications of these discoveries that man has been
able to achieve his material and economic objectives. Advances in technology that affect the readiness and ability of the armed
forces to perform their missions pose a challenge in terms of policy formulations and choices of alternatives. The structure of
the armed forces in meeting that challenge results in complex relationships among them and between other government
functionaries, agencies and institutions. Of principal interest to the security forces are the concepts behind systems of research
and development planning, programming, budgeting, control, communication and assessment, and the related issues and
trends. When all these are properly meshed in a system project science and technology are truly serving national security.

In Nigeria, there is an absence of an independent capacity augmented with a harmonious policy

framework to encourage development in science and technology. This defeats any efforts to achieve the

objectives of national defence policy. Nigeria’s quest to project independent military capability within

her sphere of influence is grossly weakened by absence of strong scientific and technological base. As

of the present, Nigeria relies on imported technology for all her military needs. It is worth pondering:

what if Western countries, the largest suppliers of all Nigeria’s military equipments decide to cut her

supplies; would Nigeria still be able to project military power in West Africa; would Nigeria still be

able to run and operate modern armed forces? Nigeria would not be able to project military power nor

140
would she be able to operate modern armed forces. This is because the military personnel – officer corps

as well as the ranks – are about the only thing Nigeria produces indigenously. To buttress this point, it

is worth quoting Ukpabi (1986:165-166):

The threats to Nigeria may arise from the acts of the leaders of this country and the citizens as well as what they fail to do.
Nigeria’s level of self-reliance in technology, armaments, industrial output to satisfy basic needs and food production is very
low and therefore constitutes a threat. For instance, we still depend on spare parts from abroad to service our ships and other
vital machines. Our combat aircraft also have had to be serviced abroad all because of technological inadequacies at home. We
thus have a situation in which they [sic] very instruments for warding off military threats and for the maintenance of our
security depend for their efficient functioning on the technical know-how of those countries some of which are threats to
Nigeria. It is accepted that every nation has threats to which it is prone. But nations are not simply helpless in such a situation.
It is my view that Nigeria can reduce considerably such threats through good internal policy and security arrangements, the
nurturing of a committed and disciplined citizenry, an appropriate foreign policy and effective exploitation of world order.

In the second chapter, it has been revealed that even the national defence strategy and doctrine lacks

originality because they formed part of an enduring legacy of British imperialism. Lack of independent

and indigenous technological capability is part of the serious flaws that inhibits proper

operationalisation of the policy in the Fourth Republic. Ideally, the policy ought to have recognised this

serious flaw, and should have advanced comprehensive alternatives on how to address the problem.

Otherwise, Nigeria would continue to formulate policies and pursue national defence objectives with

little noticeable impact. Nigeria’s past dependence on its armed forces, police and other physical

instruments of national security, will in the future be strained as the burden of enforcing law and order,

in a country ravaged by its political elites and her dependence on imported technology taxes the

nation’s capacity to maintain it. In deed, Akpuru-Aja (2003:4) notes, “records abound that, if only

Nigeria should stabilise its economy and polity, it has the potential to ensure independent capacity-

building in retraining itself, and project power beyond national frontiers from a position of strength”.

All available indices however show otherwise. Political and economic developments in Nigeria

continue to face innumerable problems along the way. Owing to this lackadaisical pace and the severe

strain, which the economy is undergoing, diplomatic options according to Alabi would seem to be more

prudent and pragmatic as effective strategy for national defence. To countries in Nigeria’s category, this

suggestion is plausible. In order to buttress his point, Alabi (1997:133) quotes Beaufre who stresses

that: “when the ends are critical and the means are limited, piecemeal actions that combine direct and
141
indirect pressures with controlled military force may be effective”. Fundamentally, the greatest source of

threats to Nigeria’s national interests is internal (Ukpabi, 1986:133). In the Fourth Republic, these

threats – armed robbery, youth violence, corruption, socio-religious crises, and crime – are mainly

economical in nature or have economic undertone in their manifestations. It therefore defies reason to

see Nigeria, even when these threats find expression in violent internal crises, stubbornly adheres to

conventional military doctrines that stresses the relevance and primacy of militarism. In the window of

these doctrines, threats to national security are mostly regarded as variables that can effectively be

combated through the application of sheer force. Not surprisingly, the profound failure of the policy to

address most of the security threats in the Fourth Republic is directly traceable to faulty threat

assessment and policy recommendations. The changed nature of global politics in this century

increasingly dwarfs the idea of conventional military defence among nation-states. In this century,

capacity building for national defence must necessarily be ingrained in industrial, technological,

economic, political, social and educational development of a country. Although, as discussed earlier,

wars among human communities would last as long as human civilisations lasts, there is still a valid

agreement that the most effective deterrent to internal and external threats to national security in Africa

would be strong and just economic institutions. Ebo (1996:80) using the Sierra Leonean civil war as a

case study, argues that the conflict “portrays the increasing irrelevance of the conventional military

oriented definition of national security and the associated assumptions that threats to nations are

external. The war remains largely fuelled by poverty and deprivation. In Africa therefore, it would

appear that poverty is at the heart of insecurity…threatening the social, political and economic fabric of

the societies”.

142
Reference:

Adeshina, R. A. (1999). Military in Politics: a Comprehensive Strategies for Ending Military Rule in Africa.
Ibadan: Wezereth Press.
Ajakaiye, O. & Akinbinu, B. (eds.). (2000). Strategic Issues in Nigerian Development in a Globalising and
Liberating World. Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER).
Akinterinwa, B. (2008). Beyond Handing Over of Bakassi Peninsula. Thisday Newspaper, August 17, 2008.
Akpuru-Aja, A. (2003). The State and the Military: Perspectives on Nigeria-USA Military Cooperation. Strategic
Analysis: a Monthly Journal of the IDSA, London, April-June 2003, Vol. XXVII, No.2.
Alabi, D. O. (1997). Issues and Problems in the Nigerian Defence Policy in the 1990s: a Critical Review. Nigerian Army
Journal, vol. 9, No.3, pp. 128-143.
Analysis, Vol.1 No.3 November, 2002.
Analysis, Vol.1 No.3 September, 2002.
Aziakou, G. (2008). Calls to Reform United Nations. Saudi Gazette, Monday 22, September 2008.
Bako, D. A. (2007). National Interest and Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: an Assessment.
Ban Ki-Moon. (2008). World Must Unite in Partnership. Arab News, Wednesday, September 24, 2008, Vol. XXXIII, No.
298.
Basiuk, V. (1999). Technology, World Politics & American Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Berchinski, R. G. (2007). AFRICOM’s Dilemma: the Global War on Terrorism, Capacity Building,
Humanitarianism and the Future of US Security Policy in Africa. Retrieved on 3rd May, 2008 from:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
Berman, E. G. (2002). Regional Organisation’s Peace Operations: Developments and Challenges. Retrieved on
1st December 2008 from: http://www.issafrica.org/Pubi/ASR/11No4/Berman.html
Brief History of the Nigerian Army (2008). Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://www.nigerian-army.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id-2Itemid=4
Bureau of African affairs. (2008). Background Note: Nigeria. Retrieved on 1st December 2008 from:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm
Burnie, D. (2006). Science. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Chang, J. & Halliday, J. (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story. London: Ted Smart.
Daily Sun Newspaper, Wednesday, August 13, 2008. p.4
Daily Sun Newspaper, Tuesday, August 12, 2008. p.20.
Daily Sun Newspaper, Monday, July 21, 2008.
Department of International Development (2001). Small Arms and Light Weapons: a U.K. Policy Briefing.
DFID,
London.
Ebo, F. A (1996). The Sierra Leonean Civil War: Implications for Regional Security. Defence Studies: Journal
of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 68-83.
Ejogba, O. A. (2006). African Security in the Twenty-First Century. Nigerian Forum: A Journal of Opinion on
World Affairs. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 27, Nos. 9-10. pp. 303-319.
Ezete, K. C. (2007). National Defence Policy and Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal. A Seminar Paper Presented at
PSDS 623 PG Seminar Series. July 2007.
Fagbadebo, O. (2007). Corruption, Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria. African Journal of Political Science
and International Relations, Vol.1, No. 2, pp. 28-37.
Falae, O. (2008). Interview. The Guardian Newspaper, Vol. 26, No. 10,874. Saturday, October 4, 2008.
Fanon, F. (1978). The Wretched of the Earth. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006). National Defence Policy. Federal Ministry of Defence, Abuja, Nigeria.
_______. (2004). National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy NEEDS. National Planning
Commission,
Abuja, Nigeria.
_______. (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
Gadzama, J. K. (2008). Why Bakassi is a Done Deal. Thisday Newspaper, Vol. 13, N0.4861, Tueday, August 12, 2008.
Gray, C. S. (2005).Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Haneberg, W. (2004). Natural Resources and National Security. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, Security.
Retrieved on 3rd May, 2007 from: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1g2-3403300520.html

143
History of the Nigerian Air Force (2008). Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://www.nigerianairforce.net/naf_history.htm
Huntington, S. (2001). The Clash of Civilizations. (in) O’Meara, P., et al., (2001). Globalization and the
Challenges of a New Century: a Reader. Bloomington & Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Imobighe, T. A. (1984). Chasing the Shadow: the Illusory Battle for Law, Order and Security in Nigeria. (in)
Mohammed, S. & Tony, E. (eds.). (1984). Nigeria: a Republic in Ruins. Zaria: ABU Press.
Iyayi, F. (2003). Violence. Lagos: Longman.
Khobe, M. (2000). The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG operations in West Africa. Downloaded on 31st June 2008
from: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html
Lubeck, M., et.al., (2007). Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the Securing of Nigerian Democracy.
Centre for International Policy.
Merritt, R. H. (2006).Technology. Microsoft Student2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Military of Nigeria (2008). Wikipedia Online Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_military
Mohammed, A. S. (2006). Obasanjo: the Lust for Power and its Tragic Implications for Nigeria. Kaduna:
Vanguard Printers and Publishers.
______. (1999). Chief Bola Ige and the Destabilisation of Nigeria. Zaria: CEDDERT.
Nigerian Air Force (2008). Wikipedia Online Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Air_Force
Nigerian Military Capabilities (2008). Retrieved on 3rd September, 2008 from
http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/national_security/nigeria_national_security_military
Nigeria: national security (2008). Retrieved on 18th September, 2008 from
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/new_profiles/344.html
Obi, C. I. (2004). Nigeria: Democracy on Trial. Text of a Lecture Organised by the Swedish Development Forum,
Stockholm, Tuesday, September 14, 2004.
Okeke, v. o. s (2007). Path to African Security Under the 21st Century Nuclear Regime. African Journal of Political
Science and International Relations, Vol.2, No. 1, pp. 1-12.
Sen, G. (1995). The Military Origins of Industrialization and International Trade Rivalry. London: Pinter.
Shchetinin, V. (1981). Transnational Companies: a Threat to National Sovereignty. Moscow: Novosti Press.
Straw, J. (2006). Lecture Presented at the 30th Commemoration of the Late Gen Murtala Muhammad. February 13th
2006,
ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.
Sylva, T. (2008). The Root of Niger Delta Crisis. Leadership Newspaper, Monday, August 11, 2008.
The Future of Peace-support Operations. (2008). Retrieved on 1st December 2008 from:
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/peace-paix/balden2003/section5.aspx
The Sharia Issue: Working Papers for Dialogue (2000). A Committee of Concerned Citizens, Abuja.
Ugwuoha, C. (2008). Science and Technology: Whither Nigeria? Retrieved on 3rd April, 2008 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/www/article/detail/?id=568
Ukpabi, S. C. (1986). Strands in Nigerian Military History. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation.
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination Team (UNDAC, 2002). UNDAC Mission to Lagos: Munitions
Depot Explosion Environmental and Humanitarian Assessment Report. February 2002.
Usman, Y. B. (1979). For the Liberation of Nigeria: Essays and Lectures 1969-1978. London: New Beacon.
Vanguard, Thursday, August 7, 2008.
Wilmot, p. f. (1979). In Search of Nationhood: the Theory and Practice of Nationalism in Africa. Ibadan: Lantern Books.
Yusuf, R.O. (n.d). Science and Technology; Issues in International Security Management. Nigerian Army
Journal.Vol.8. pp.42-47.

144
Chapter Five
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This thesis critically studies Nigeria’s National Defence Policy in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007, its

formulation vis-à-vis internal and external environments, threat analysis and the resources available to achieve

the objectives of the policy. Generally, national defence capability forms the first vital requirement and crucial

element of any sovereign community in human history. Without this capability, there would not be progress

and development. In fact, the very idea of independence and sovereignty are rooted in a strong national

defence structure. It is inconceivable to talk of independence and territorial integrity in any nation today

without the corresponding support of a strong national defence strategy and framework to sustain it. National

defence policy framework enables nation-states to anticipate various threats – internal and external – to their

national interest and respond to these threats. It is therefore quite appropriate to argue that an integrated and

effective policy framework would be a function of a holistic and in-depth threat(s) analysis of the policy

environment in which it operates. Resources and capabilities – economic, scientific and technological – must

accordingly correspond with the overall defence strategy to allow the policy instrument(s) attain the objectives

of national defence. In chapter one, the objectives of this thesis are given as follows:

I. To historically trace the evolution of the national defence policy of Nigeria;

II. To critically examine Nigeria’s defence policy in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007;

III. To examine the constraints faced by the policy;

IV. To suggest possible ways of remedying these constraints.

In order to understand how far this thesis succeeds in achieving these objectives, it is important to

undertake a summary of all the major points raised beginning from the first chapter.

5.2 Summary

145
Chapter one highlights the research problem as obvious incompatibility of Nigeria’s defence policy in the

Fourth Republic to the changing nature of national and international politics and by implication the whole

trajectory of national security conception. Cold War era security threats have been supplanted with new,

elastic yet deadly compendium of threats largely with non-military outlook. This chapter also presents the

research questions and objectives. The theoretical framework chosen for this research is the non-conventional

security doctrine. This theory discloses the contradictions and monumental flaws inherent in the current

defence strategy and planning in Nigeria. Although this theory is constrained by excessive emphasis on non-

military aspects of national security, it still offers an illustrating insight into the nature of threats to Nigeria’s

national security in the Fourth Republic. The justification for this research is under two headings: theoretical

and practical. Theoretically, the research offers an understanding of the theoretical flaws inherent in the

NNDP. Practically, the research offers a comprehensive analysis of nature of threats to Nigeria in the 21 st

century as well as the requirements of national defence. The scope covers Nigeria’s national defence policy in

the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007. Some of the limitations encountered in carrying this research include paucity

of funds, research materials and data. Content Analysis is used as the method of data analysis. The chapter

also includes research structure and description of key concepts.

In Chapter Two, attempt is made to review all related literature on the concepts of national defence,

security and deterrence in the context of Nigeria’s defence policy. In this attempt, care is taken to emphasize

on the theoretical and doctrinal foundation of the policy. Nigeria’s national defence policy rests squarely on

the doctrine that threats to national security are physical in the shape of modern conventional armies. This

doctrine over-glorifies the military to the detriment of other important variables of national security and

defence. In Nigeria, variables such as economic development, social justice and equality, which are

indispensable to any strong and effective defence strategy, are downplayed. This situation creates two

dangerous trends that are dangerous to Nigeria’s security. One, by emphasizing on the importance of military

to national defence, policy framework addresses wrong set of threats. In the 21 st century, threats to national

security of Nigeria, comes in economic form, yet Nigeria makes defective analysis of the environment and

146
thus eventually ends with flawed policy framework. Second, with virtually non-existing industrial, economic,

technological and scientific base, this kind of defence planning ties Nigeria to other countries in a client-

master relationship for her military needs. This is counter-productive and quite dangerous to her security. In

simple language, Nigeria lacks the basic infrastructure to sustain conventional military on which her entire

defence thinking and strategy squarely rests.

The chapter continues with a comparative study of national defence policies of USA, China, India and

Egypt. From a geo-strategic and economic standpoint, each of these four countries represents an interesting

lesson in national defence conception, threat analysis and policy formulation. Believed to be the greatest

military power in the world, USA’s defence conception and planning is an example of the limitation of

conventional security doctrine in national security strategy. As the most powerful country in the world, U.S

record disasters and humiliation in military terms than any power since World War II. Virtually, in all her

military forays abroad – Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia – US is beaten by a combination of

factors including hostile terrain, un-conventional military tactics and strategy. China is today the fastest

growing economy in the world with almost a quarter of the total world population. These two assets make

China an important global player and a considerable threat to many countries. Explicitly, China does not seem

to have any imperialist agenda in military and political terms. Implicitly however there is a shred of budding

economic imperialism in most of her actions. This situation offers a window into Chinese defence thinking

which is anchored on economic determinism and supremacism. The efficacy of this strategy emerges after the

Cold War and the evident triumph of capitalism. Today, the strength of her population, industrial, economic,

technological development and nuclear capacity ensures a balanced and coordinated national defence

capacity. At least three important considerations informed the choice of India as the third country in this

review. One, India belongs to an exclusive international club of nuclear powers since 1974, which

dramatically changed its national security status. Two, India shares extensive borders with two other nuclear

but hostile powers: China and Pakistan. At best, relations between these protagonists are less than cordial with

Pakistan and cautious with China. Three, India offers an illustration of the resilience and determination of a

147
third world country to bridge the gap of underdevelopment and transit to the first world status. These three

considerations call for strong national defence strategy to ensure protection and promotion of her national

interests. Presently, Indian defence policy is anchored on three interrelated principles: professional military,

nuclear capability and strong economy. Egypt provides a unique and intriguing lesson. Geo-strategically,

Egypt is located at the vital cross-roads of three continents of Europe, Africa and Asia. In Africa, her strong

economy and military might make her a powerful player in regional politics just as her Arabian heritage and

contiguity to Middle East makes her a strategic partner in Middle East politics. In addition, her geographical

location close to the Mediterranean and her control of the Suez Canal qualifies her as an indispensable ally to

Europe. These considerations impose on Egyptian defence policy a heavy strain. This policy is founded on the

doctrine of conventional security strategy. Egypt has a strong and well-trained military mainly acquired

through years of war with Israel and in fighting unconventional forces especially terrorists and political

dissidents. The limitation to her defence policy has however been revealed several times in her conflicts with

Israel. This, more than any other consideration ought to have forced a rethink in the Egyptian national defence

policy.

Chapter three entitled background study of Nigeria’s defence policy undertakes systematic and

comprehensive survey of the evolution, transformation and general development of the national defence

policy since independence. The chapter starts with the evolution and development of modern Nigerian state.

From 1960, when Nigeria became independent, through the civil war, the Second Republic, second coming of

the military until the eve of Fourth Republic’s inauguration in 1999, the thesis picked one important strand

that straddles defence policy evolution. This is the nature of actual threat(s) to national security, their level of

intensity as well as the level of distortion among the policymaking cycles. Even though it is impossible to

dismiss other threats – internal and external – in this period, Nigeria’s political class constituted the single

greatest threat to national security, unity, progress and development of the country. From political instability

that characterized First Republic, to the ensuing military coups, civil war and other forms of socio-economic

crises in the country, the political class carries the highest culpability. This has been made possible by dubious

148
policies, programmes such as SAP and privatization and even outright corruption and looting of the national

treasury. This chapter also studies the regional and global environment of national policy. It is revealed that

Nigeria is in no immediate danger of invasion and war from another country. Parallel to this historical

analysis, the chapter examines the development of the instruments of national defence policy – armed forces,

police and intelligence agencies. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the likely challenges of national

security in the 21st century.

Chapter four is data presentation and analysis in the form of content analysis. The chapter is entitled

Nigeria’s defence policy in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2007 and it systematically and analytically studies

Nigeria’s defence policy in the Fourth Republic. The objectives are to determine the compatibility of the

policy in a changed national and international environment as well as to determine the major constraints of the

policy in this period. The chapter studies the fundamental principles and objectives of the policy and proceeds

to assess the internal and external environment of the policy. Externally, a number of new developments –

changed nature of global politics and conflict, emergence of international terrorism, globalization with its

concomitant effects that includes erosion of state sovereignty, changed concept of security and a weakened

UN – with implications on Nigeria’s security had emerged. At regional level, Nigeria faces growing rivalry

with Egypt and South Africa – the only countries with considerable resources to challenge her influence and

hegemony in Africa. Other developments include emerging civilian dictatorships, intra-state conflicts, civil

wars, poverty, diseases and general economic underdevelopment. Within Nigeria itself, the environment is far

from being stable owing to un-settled nature of socio-political and economic issues. Distortion of federalism

and the unpredictable nature of political institutions and political class are sources of national security

concern. Chapter four also examines the military as the major policy instrument. With the probable exception

of South Africa and Egypt, no African country has the kind of well-trained and equipped military Nigeria has.

The chapter considerably dwells on a practical analysis of the major objectives of the NNDP. In this regard,

specific cases that include Bakassi handover, military relief and other humanitarian services and international

peace-support operations in the Fourth Republic are examined. The chapter also identify some of the threats to

149
Nigeria that are likely to persist. At internal level, some of these threats include political jingoism, endemic

corruption, extreme poverty and mass unemployment, poor economic growth, crime, religious fanaticism,

drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Manipulation and politicization of religion and ethnicity, youth violence

and Niger Delta militancy tops the list of internal threats to national security. At regional and global level, the

most serious threats include economic dependence, cross-border banditry, terrorism, migration, piracy,

smuggling, inter-state rivalries, intra-state conflicts, civil wars, foreign companies, great power intervention in

African affairs and foreign military bases in Africa such as AFRICOM. Not all these challenges require the

use of force however. Either for strategic considerations, or for technological and industrial reasons, some of

these challenges call for diplomatic solutions. In addition, chapter four critically examines the major flaws of

Nigeria’s defence policy. The two most critical impediments are technological/scientific and

economic/industrial. Poor economy creates a state of dependence and un-equal relations between Nigeria and

her trade partners. Science and technology on the other hand provides the necessary expertise and skills to

build and operate modern and efficient defence instruments. This chapter reveals a minuscule of development

by Nigeria in the areas of science and technology that constrained her from building and equipping an

advanced military institution.

5.3 Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, sufficient evidence exists to strongly argue that the objectives of this

thesis have been adequately achieved. On the strength of this, the thesis proceeds to offer answers to the

research questions raised in chapter one. These questions are:

I. Is the current National Defence Policy a product of an objective assessment of the socio-economic and

technological realities in Nigeria?

II. Is the conventional security doctrine adopted as the guiding principle of the policy, adequate to the threats

of National security in the 21st century?

III. And if not, then generally, what are the fundamental flaws of this policy, with emphasis on the Fourth

Republic?

150
Research Findings and Discussions:

I. It is clear that Nigeria’s defence policy does not exhibits the necessary understanding of the

important corollaries of policy formulation process in general. Policy making process is a science

that involves a careful setting of goals, evaluation of the existing and potential problems,

resources, and the general environment of the policy (Olaniyan, 1998:26). In Nigeria it is obvious

that the policy does not take cognizance of its environment, true nature of threats, or even

resources of the state. Otherwise, it is quite implausible to explain how such a policy could evolve

objectives and seek to operate in an economy that is practically weakened by the absence of

industrial, technological and scientific infrastructure.

II. In simple language, conventional security doctrine can not satisfactorily explain nor hope to

address all forms of national security threats in the 21st century. Otherwise it would have deterred

September 9/11 terror attacks on USA – the greatest military power in the world. Until the

collapse of the Berlin Wall, demise of USSR, and the ending of the Cold War in the 1990s without

firing a shot, most policymakers and scholars believed that militarism is the antidote to national

security threats. The emergence of non-military threats that are even more dangerous such as

terrorism, energy crises, global warming and globalism finally put to rests the prominence of

militarism in international security calculations. In the 21st century, Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine

are some of the gross amplification of the limitation of militarism. Even at the regional and

internal levels, this doctrine could not address the myriad of problems bedeviling Africa in general

and Nigeria in particular. Problems such as civil wars, intra-state conflicts, endemic corruption,

political instability, youth violence, armed robbery, mass un-employment, and general economic

underdevelopment can not be explained in the light of conventional security doctrine in this

century.

III. In so far as a verdict is to be passed, or the extent to which the NNDP achieved its objectives is to

be determined, it can be argued that the policy has fallen far short of its fundamental

151
responsibility. Nigeria’s constitution and even the cardinal objective of the policy have envisaged

defence of Nigeria’s territorial integrity and the promotion of its national interest as the defining

motive of the policy itself. The cessation of Bakassi Peninsula, under whatever excuse can not be

justified. National sovereignty and national interest can not under any circumstances become

subordinated to respect and adherence to international laws. Although international laws and

conventions are necessary, if the international system is to remain stable, yet for policymakers,

there is the urgent need to understand that in most cases, international laws and conventions are

adhered to only if they do not conflict with national interest. Bakassi handover conflicted with

national interest, and abandonment of Bakassi indigenes was an absolute and complete negation

of not only the constitution and NNDP, but the whole essence of the Nigerian state. Protection of

citizens and the promotion of their welfare is the only essence that justifies the existence and

continued relevance of any sovereign state in the world.

IV. Another interesting point worth noting is that Nigeria has managed to maintain active

international profile in this period. The number of international peace-support missions which

Nigeria either singly or jointly participated was many. This is a testimony to her resolve to live up

to her objective of promoting international peace and stability as provided by both constitution

and NNDP. What is however difficult to determine is that: did Nigeria participated in these

missions in order to promote or protect her national interest; or is it a continuation of ‘father

Christmas’ mentality which her foreign policy suffers since Gowon? It is not easy to answer this

question without venturing outside the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to point however that no

visible benefit accrued to Nigeria in most of her peace intervention. In fact, in most cases these

countries, no sooner had they became stable than they turn into rabid anti-Nigerians.

V. Fundamentally, the flaws of Nigeria’s defence policy include the absence of national capacity to

sustain the national defence strategy as well as the enormous level of threat mis-analysis inherent

in the policy. It is illogical to dismiss the centrality of industrial and technological development to

152
any serious defence planning. The absence of strong scientific, technological and industrial

capacity strongly undermines Nigeria’s ability to project independent defence capabilities and

uncompromisingly articulate and protect her national interests.

VI. Another visible weakness of the national defence policy is its defective threat analysis. It produces

wrong set of security priorities for the country. In Nigeria, the political class has always been the

single most dangerous threat to national security. However, because of this defect, the policy

overlooks this serious threat to national security.

5.4 Recommendations

One of the objectives of this study is to make theoretical and practical suggestions on the possible ways to

address the identified flaws of the Nigeria’s national defence policy.

I. The fundamental responsibility and obligation of any organised human community is the

provision of security and promotion of good life among its members. In this regards, there is the

abiding need for policymakers to reposition the national defence policy so that it will reflect the

true environment in which it operates, the resources available and the true nature of internal and

external threats. Part of the responsibility of the policymakers is to ensure the formulation of well-

coordinated and integrated policy that is anchored on objective assessment of the socio-economic,

technological and industrial realities of Nigeria. This policy necessarily has to reflect the true

nature of the Nigerian state, the strength and weakness of its institutions and its national interests.

II. There is equally the need for the policy makers and scholars to devote attention towards

understanding the pattern and trend of the evolving challenges to national security in the 21 st

century. This must necessarily involve discarding the dogmatically held doctrine of conventional

security. Without this, Nigeria will continue to grope with a policy that is not by any means

capable of either protecting or promoting her national interests.

III. Again, there is the need for policymakers to realise that the best form of defence is the one that

invest in human resources and their development. Economic development in which all segments

153
of the society are catered for, equality and social justice are an indispensable pre-requisite for any

meaningful and strong security and defence strategy. A state, no matter how endowed, without

social justice and equality would eventually crumble and disintegrate. More than any other factor,

economic development bolster or undermine national security. “Through self-reliance the military

capability of the country increases. In a country where the economy is organised according to the

principles of self-reliance there is little or no domino-effect by knocking out a centre, e.g., the

capital…A self-reliant country would have to be conquered part by part, but these parts will have

much higher capacity to organise paramilitary, guerrilla-type resistance as well as non-military

forms of defence often after an occupation has taken place” observes Ikoku (1980:45).

IV. The academic community has the onerous responsibility to evolve a new paradigm with which

new thinking in national defence will be done. For as long as Nigeria, and indeed Africa,

continues to view their problems from within the prism of Western industrial societies, the

question of national security and development will remain a mirage.

V. There is also the need for the academic community to articulate the relevance and in fact, the

aptness of other vital variables in national defence thinking. These include a strong national

ideology that unites the people under a common goal, just economic institutions and credible

political leadership.

VI. In the final analysis, there is the need to carry further research especially on the relation between

national defence capabilities and such other variables of national development like agriculture,

education and social empowerment. No doubt, a scientific research will reveal that the

underdeveloped status of this country arises out of confusion, misdirection, contradiction and

evasion that characterised policymaking and implementation in this country since independence in

all sectors of her national economy and planning (Mabogunje in Otite & Okali, 1990:457). Two

other areas worth studying are: international peace-support missions and the protection and or

promotion of the Nigeria’s national interests; and the determination of the tangible and intangible

154
benefits that accrued to Nigeria from her rigid adherence to international law and conventions as

exemplified by the Bakassi case.

Reference:

Ikoku, E. U. (1980). Self-Reliance: Africa’s Survival. Ibadan: Fourth Dimension Publishers.


Mabogunje, A. L. (1990). On Developing and Development. (in) Otite, C. & Okali, C. (1990).
Readings in Nigerian Rural Society and Rural Economy. Ibadan: Heinemann.
Olaniye, J. O. (1998). Foundation of Public Policy Analysis. Ibadan: Sunad Publishers.

155
Bibliography

Text Books:

Adamu, Y. (1999). The Essence of Excellence: Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, an Appraisal.
Kaduna: Sarumedia Printing and Publishing Co.
Adeniran, T. (1985). The Terrain and Tenor of the Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, (in) Atanda, J. A. & Aliyu, A. Y. (eds.).
(1985). Political Development, Volume 1. Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria since
Independence. March 1983. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Limited.
Adeshina, R. A. (1999). Military in Politics: a Comprehensive Strategies for Ending Military Rule in Africa.
Ibadan: Wezereth Press.
Ajakaiye, O. & Akinbinu, B. (eds.). (2000). Strategic Issues in Nigerian Development in a Globalising and
Liberating World. Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER).
Ake, C. (1978). Revolutionary Pressures in Africa. London: Zed Press.
Alkali, R. A. (2003). Issues in International Relations & Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (2nd ed.). Kaduna: Northpoint
Publishers.
Aluko, O. (ed.). (1977). The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Amin, S. (1978). The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggle. London: Zed Press.
Amune, S. A. (1986). Work and Worship: Selected Speeches of Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto. Zaria: Gaskiya
Corporation Limited.
Arnold, G. (1977). Modern Nigeria. London: Longman.
Awa, E. O. (1976). Issues in Federalism. Benin-City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.
Babangida, I. B. (2000). Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria. (in) Lame, I. Y & Dabin, H. (eds.). (2000). Democracy,
Good Governance and National Development in Nigeria: Actualizing the People’s Mandate. Proceedings of a
National Seminar Organised by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Abuja.
Babatope, E. (1981). Coups, Africa and the Barracks Revolt. Ibadan: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
Balogun, O. (1980). The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis 1966-1970. Benin-City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.
Barrett, L. (1985). Agbada to Khaki: Reporting a Change of Government in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension
Publishers.
Basiuk, V. (1999). Technology, World Politics & American Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bishara, M. (2001). Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid, Prospects for Resolving the Conflict. Halifax, Nova Scotia:
Fernwood Publishing Ltd.
Boro, I. J. A. (1982). The Twelve-Day Revolution. Benin City: Idodo Umeh Publishers Ltd.
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1977). The Foreign Policy of Egypt. (in) Aluko, O. (ed.). (1977). The Foreign Policies of African
States. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Chang, J. & Halliday, J. (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story. London: Ted Smart.
Clark, T. (1999). A Right Honourable Gentleman: The Life and Times of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Zaria:
Hudahuda Publishing.
Clausewitz, C.V. (eds. Howard, M. & Peter, P). (1976). On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Cronje, S. (1972). The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-1970. London:
Sidgwick & Jackson.
Deitchman, S. J. (n.d.). Military Power and the Advance of Technology. Colorado: West View Press.
de St. Jorre, J. (1972). The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Dockrill, M. (1993). The Cold War 1945-1963. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.
Dudley, B. J. (1973). Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
156
Eluwa, et. al., (2005). A History of Nigeria for Schools and Colleges. Onitsha: Africana-First Publishers Ltd.
Ejiofor, L. U. (1981). Africa in World Politics. Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers.
Engels, F. (1977). The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Fage, K. S. (ed.). (2002). Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Myths, Realities, Challenges and Prospects. Kano:
Triumph Publishing Company.
Fage, K. S & Alabi, D. O. (2003). Political and Constitutional Development in Nigeria: from Pre-Colonial to Post
-Colonial Era. Kano: Northern Printers Ltd.
Fanon, F. (1978). The Wretched of the Earth. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Forsyth, F. (1982). Emeka. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Garba, J. (1991). Diplomatic Soldiering: The Conduct of Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1975-1979. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
______. (1982). Revolution in Nigeria: Another View. London: Africa Journal Limited.
Gbulie, B. (1981). Nigeria’s Five Majors: Coup d’Etat of 15th January 1966 First Inside Account. Onitsha: Africana
Educational Publishers.
Gray, C. S. (2005).Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Harrigan, J. J. (1998). Politics and Policy in States and Communities (6th ed.). New York: Longman.
Hornby, A. S. (1998).Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary(5th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huntington, S. (2000). The Clash of Civilizations. (in) O’Meara, P., et. al., (eds.). (2000). Globalization and the
Challenges of a New Century: a Reader. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Ikoku, E. U. (1980). Self-Reliance: Africa’s Survival. Ibadan: Fourth Dimension Publishers.
Imobighe, T. A. (1984). Chasing the Shadow: the Illusory Battle for Law, Order and Security in Nigeria. (in)
Mohammed, S. & Tony, E. (eds.). (1984). Nigeria: a Republic in Ruins. Zaria: ABU Press.
Iyayi, F. (2003). Violence. Lagos: Longman.
Lammack, P., Pooz, D., & Tordoff, W. (1993). Third World Politics: A Comprehensive Introduction. London:
Macmillan.
Laski, J. (2004). Grammar of Politics (2nd Indian Reprint). Delhi: Surjeet Publications.
Laqueur, W. (2000). Post Modern Terrorism. (in) O’Meara, P., et. al., (eds.). (2000). Globalization and the Challenges of
a New Century: a Reader. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Lock, P. & H. Wulf. (1979). The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-oriented Technology. (in) M.
Kaldor & Asbjorn, E. (1979). The World Military Order: the Impact of Military Technology on the Third
London: Macmillan.
Lowry, S. T.(1991). Pre-classical Perceptions of Economy and Security. (in) Goodwin, C. D. (ed.). (1991). Economics
and National Security, Duke University Press, Durham and London.
Mabogunje, A. L. (1990). On Developing and Development. (in) Otite, C. & Okali, C. (1990).
Readings in Nigerian Rural Society and Rural Economy. Ibadan: Heinemann.
Maier, K. (2000). This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
Mayall, J. (1992). Nationalism and International Society, (in) Levine, H. M. (ed.). (1992). World Politics Debated: a
Reader in Contemporary Issues (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Inc.
Mazrui, A. (1970). African International Relations. (in) Paden, J.N & Soja, E. W. (eds.). (1970). The African Experience
Volume 1: Essays. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Mohammed, A. S. (2006). Obasanjo: the Lust for Power and its Tragic Implications for Nigeria. Kaduna:
Vanguard Printers and Publishers.
______. (1999). Chief Bola Ige and the Destabilisation of Nigeria. Zaria: CEDDERT.
Mohammed, B. (1982). Africa and Non-Alignment: a Study in the Foreign Relations of New Nations. Kano: Triumph
Publishing Co. Ltd.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1994). Six Principles of Political Realism. (in) Freedman, L. (ed.). (1994). The Ethics of War. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mortimer, E. (1969). France and the Africans 1944-1960: a Political History. London: Faber & Faber Limited.
Muffett, D. J. M. (1982). Let Truth Be Told: The Coups d’Etat of 1966. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company.
Mbachu, O. (1998). Foreign Policy Analysis: the Nigerian Perspective. Owerri: Kosoko Press.
Nweke, G. A. (1985). The Transformation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Since Independence. (in) Atanda, J. A. & Aliyu,
A. Y. (eds.). (1985). Political Development, Volume 1. Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria Since
Independence. March 1983. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Limited.
Nzeribe, F. A. (1985). Nigeria: Another Hope Betrayed, The Second Coming of the Nigerian Military. Suffolk:
Kilimanjaro.

157
Obasanjo, O. (1981). My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970. Ibadan: Heinemann.
Ogbudinkpa, R. (1985). The Economics of the Nigerian Civil War and its Prospects for National Development. Ibadan:
Fourth Dimension Publishers.
Ohmae, K. (2000). The Rise of the Region State, (in) O’Meara, P., et. al., (eds.). (2000). Globalization and the
Challenges of a New Century: a Reader. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Ojigbo, A. O. (1979). 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Ljubljana:
Mladinska Knjiga.
Olaniye, J. O. (1998). Foundation of Public Policy Analysis. Ibadan: Sunad Publishers Limited.
Oluleye, J. J. (1985). Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966-1979. Ibadan: University Press Limited.
Olusanya, G. O. (1999). Nationalist Movements. (in) Ikime, O. (ed.). (1999). Groundwork of Nigerian History (PTF
Edition). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
Palmer, N. D. & Howard, C. P. (2004). International Relations (3rd ed.).Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers and Distributors.
Powell, C. & Joseph, E. P. (2003). My American Journey. New York: Ballantine Books.
Saro-Wiwa, K. (2000). A Month and a Day: a Detention Diary. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Sen, G. (1995). The Military Origins of Industrialization and International Trade Rivalry. London: Pinter.
Sulaiman, I & Abdulkarim, S. (eds.). (1998). On the Political Future of Nigeria. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing.
Sun Tzu. (1971). The Art of War (Trans. by S. B. Griffith). London: Penguin Books.
Shagari, S. (2001). Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve, an Autobiography. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.
Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation. (2004). Shehu Musa Yar’Adua: A Life of Service. Shehu Musa Yar’Adua
Foundation, Abuja
Shchetinin, V. (1981). Transnational Companies: a Threat to National Sovereignty. Moscow: Novosti Press.
Schlesinger, A. M. Jr. (2004). War and the American Presidency. New York: W.W. Norton
Tamuno, T. M. (1999). British Colonial Administration in Nigeria. (in) Ikime, O. (1999). Groundwork of Nigerian
History (PTF Edition). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Publishers.
Tolofari, S. (2004). Exploitation and Instability in Nigeria: The Orkar Coup in Perspective. Lagos: Press Alliance
Network Limited.
Ukpabi, S. C. (1986). Strands in Nigerian Military History. Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation.
Usman, Y. B. (1990). The 1990 Budget and Our Future. Zaria.
__________. (1979). For the Liberation of Nigeria: Essays and Lectures 1969-1978. London: New Beacon.
Williams, D. (1982). President and Power in Nigeria: The Life of Shehu Shagari. London: Frank Cass and Company.
Wilmot, P. F. (1979). In Search of Nationhood: the Theory and Practice of Nationalism in Africa. Ibadan: LanternBooks.

Journals:

Abimbola, A. (2002). Pressure Groups and the Democratic Process in Nigeria (1979-1993). Nordic Journal of African
Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 38-47.
Ahonsi-Yakubu, A. (2001). Political Transition, Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria. Africa Development,
Vol. XXVI, Nos. 1 & 2.
Akpuru-Aja, A. (2003). The State and the Military: Perspectives on Nigeria-USA Military Cooperation. Strategic
Analysis: a Monthly Journal of the IDSA, London, April-June 2003, Vol. XXVII, No.2.
Alabi, D. O. (1997). Issues and Problems in the Nigerian Defence Policy in the 1990s: a Critical Review. Nigerian Army
Journal, Vol. 9, No.3, pp. 128-143.
Anyanwu, J. C. (1992). President Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria. Journal of
Social Development in Africa, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 5-24.
Asobie, H. A. (1988). The Theoretical and Doctrinal Foundation of Nigeria’s Defence Policy. Nigerian Journal of
International Studies. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Nsukka, pp.17-34.
Braithwaite, T. (1988). Foundations and Dynamics of National Security. Nigerian Journal of International Studies.
Nsukka: University of Nigeria Nsukka, pp. 8-9.
Ebo, F. A (1996). The Sierra Leonean Civil War: Implications for Regional Security. Defence Studies: Journal
of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 68-83.
Egwaikhide, F. O. & Isumonah, V. A. (2001). Nigeria Paralysed: Socio-political Life under General Sani Abacha. Africa
Development, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 3&4, pp.5-24.
Ejogba, O. A. (2006). African Security in the Twenty-First Century. Nigerian Forum: A Journal of Opinion on
World Affairs. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 27, Nos. 9-10. pp. 303-319.
158
Elaigwu, V. A. (1994). The Basis and Limitations of Iraq’s Strategy in the Gulf War. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.4, pp. 1-17.
Fage, S. K. (1995). Nigeria’s Regional Policy: Ideals and Aspirations. Defence Studies; Journal of the Nigerian Defence
Academy, Kaduna, Vol.5, pp. 1-18.
Fagbadebo, O. (2007). Corruption, Governance and Political Instability in Nigeria. African Journal of Political Science
and International Relations, Vol.1, No. 2, pp. 28-37.

Lipede, A. A. (1996). Strategy and Military Technology During the Nigerian Civil War. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 30-51.
Nweke, G. A. (1992). Some Critical Remarks on the National Security Question. Nigerian Journal of International
Studies. pp.1-7.
Okeke, V. O. S (2007). Path to African Security Under the 21st Century Nuclear Regime. African Journal of Political
Science and International Relations, Vol.2, No. 1, pp. 1-12.
Okwori, A. S. (1995). Security and Deterrence: Towards Alternative Deterrence Strategy for Nigeria in the 21st Century
and Beyond. Defence Studies; Journal of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.5, pp. 19-28.
Olayode, K. ( 2007). Pro-democracy Movements, Democratisation and Conflicts in Africa: Nigeria, 1990-1999. African
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 10, Nos. 1&2. pp. 127-146.
Oyovbaire, S. E. (1984). The Nigerian State as Conceptual Variable. Studies in Politics and Society: Journal of the
Nigerian Political Science Association. Issue No. 2, pp.129-149.
Tedheke, M.E.U. (1998). Defence and Security in Nigeria: Beyond the Rhetorics. Defence Studies; Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.8, pp. 1-22.
Ujomu, P. O. (2001). National Security, Social Order and the Quest for Human Dignity in Nigeria: Some Ethical
Considerations. Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 245-264.
Umar, M. K. (2000). Nigeria’s Internal Security: Trends, Problems and Prospects. Defence Studies: Journal of the
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Vol.10, pp. 42-57.
Yusuf, R.O. (n.d). Science and Technology; Issues in International Security Management. Nigerian Army
Journal.Vol.8. pp.42-47.

Newspapers and Magazines:

Africa Events, Vol. 1, No. 10, October 1985.


Africa Confidential, Vol. 26, No. 3, January 30, 1985.
Akinterinwa, B. (2008). Beyond Handing Over of Bakassi Peninsula. Thisday Newspaper, August 17, 2008.
Analysis Magazine, Vol.1 No.3 November, 2002.
Analysis Magazine, Vol.1 No.3 September, 2002.
Aziakou, G. (2008). Calls to Reform United Nations. Saudi Gazette, Monday 22, September 2008.
Ban Ki-Moon. (2008). World Must Unite in Partnership. Arab News, Wednesday, September 24, 2008,
Vol. XXXIII, No. 298.
Daily Sun Newspaper, Wednesday, August 13, 2008. p.4.
Daily Sun Newspaper, Tuesday, August 12, 2008. p.20.
Daily Sun Newspaper, Monday, July 21, 2008.
Daily Sun Newspaper, Monday, July 21, 2008.
Falae, O. (2008). Interview. The Guardian Newspaper, Vol. 26, No. 10,874. Saturday, October 4, 2008.
Gadzama, J. K. (2008). Why Bakassi is a Done Deal. Thisday Newspaper, Vol. 13, N0.4861, Tueday, August 12, 2008.
Hallmark Weekly News Magazine, July 7, 1999.
India Detonates 1st Nuclear Shot for Technology. (1974, May 19). Los Angeles Times.
New Nigerian Newspaper, Tuesday, January 28, 1997.
Punch Newspaper, Tuesday, 4 February, 1997
Scrutiny, Vol. 1, No. 8, June 1998.
Sylva, T. (2008). The Root of Niger Delta Crisis. Leadership Newspaper, Monday, August 11, 2008.
Tempo Newspaper, February 6, 1997.
Vanguard Newspaper, Thursday, August 7, 2008.

Government Publications:
159
Department of International Development, (2001). Small Arms and Light Weapons: a U.K. Policy Briefing.
DFID, London.
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006). National Defence Policy. Federal Ministry of Defence, Abuja, Nigeria.
_______. (2004). National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy NEEDS. National Planning
Commission,
Abuja, Nigeria.
_______. (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
_______. (1980). A Time for Action: Collected Speeches of General Murtala Muhammed. Department of Information,
Office of the President, Lagos, Nigeria.
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination Team (UNDAC, 2002). UNDAC Mission to Lagos: Munitions
Depot Explosion Environmental and Humanitarian Assessment Report. February 2002.

Electric/Internet Sources:

Absioye, L. (2000). Imperialist Interests Behind Barbarism in Sierra Leone. Downloaded on 15th June 2008,
from:http://www.newyouth.com/archives/Africa/sierraleone/imperialist_interess_sierra_leone_20000523.asp
Atofarati, A. A. (1992). The Nigerian Civil War, Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt. Retrieved on 6th June,
2008 from http://www.africamasterweb.com/BiafranWarCauses.html
Berchinski, R. G. (2007). AFRICOM’s Dilemma: the Global War on Terrorism, Capacity Building,
Humanitarianism and the Future of US Security Policy in Africa. Retrieved on 3rd May, 2008 from:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
Brief History of the Nigerian Army (2008). Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://www.nigerian-army.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id-2Itemid=4
Baker, J. H. (2006). United States Government. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Bako, D. A. (2007). National Interest and Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations: an Assessment.
Berman, E. G. (2002). Regional Organisation’s Peace Operations: Developments and Challenges. Retrieved on
1st December 2008 from: http://www.issafrica.org/Pubi/ASR/11No4/Berman.html
Bess, M. D. (2006). Suez Crisis. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Burke, A. (2006). Strategy. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD] Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Bureau of African affairs. (2008). Background Note: Nigeria. Retrieved on 1st December 2008 from:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm
Burnie, D. (2006). Science. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Camp David Accords. (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords
Civil Liberties Organisation. (1998). Nigeria after Abacha: Background on Pro-democracy Position.
Downloaded on 13th July 2008 from: http://acas.prairienet.org/alerts/Nigeria/afteraba.html
Cohen, S. (2006). Arab-Israeli Conflict. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
. (2006). Six Day War. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
China Issues White Paper on National Defence. (2008) Retrieved on 18th February, 2008 from
http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/china issues white paper.mht
China National Defence Policy. (2002). Retrieved on 12th February, 2008 from
http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd2.html
Clunas, C., et al., (2006). China. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Defence Industry. (2008). Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://wwwglobalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/industry.htm
Defence. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD] Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
ECOMOG: Condensing Successes and Failures. (2007). Downloaded on 6th July 2008, from:
http://politicsinmotion.blogspot.com/2007/05/ecomog-condensing-successes-and.html
Egypt Foreign Affairs and Defence. (2008). Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://www.uam.es/otrescentros/medina/Egypt/egypoltfor.htm
Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security. (2004). Nigeria: Intelligence and Security. Downloaded on 12th
June 2008 from: http://fas.org/irp/world/Nigeria/nso.htm
Eshel, D. (2005). Egyptian Military Build-up; a Threat to Israel? Defense Update. Retrieved on 7th June,

160
2008 from http://www.defense-update.com/2005/01/Egyptian-military-buildup-threat-to.html
Foreign Relations of Egypt. (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 7th June, 2008
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Relations_of_Egypt
Ganguly, S. (2006). Indo-Pakistan Wars. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
George Washington’s Farewell Address. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Gilani, I. (2008). Indian Strategists Favours Increasing Defence Ties with Pakistan. Retrieved on 13th march,
2008 from http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp/page=main_13-3-2008_pg7.
Guangkai, X. (2008). China’s Defence Policy Equals Peace. Retrieved on 3rd March, 2008
from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/editorial/china’s defence equals. mht
Guevara, C. E. (1961). Guerrilla Warfare. Retrieved 10th September 2007, pdf.
Gbanite, M. (2001). National Security and Intelligence in Nigeria under Democracy: the Way Forward. Retrieved on
23rd June 2008, from: http://kwenu.com/publications/max/national_security.htm
Haneberg, W. (2004). Natural Resources and National Security. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security.
Retrieved on 3rd May, 2007 from: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1g2-3403300520.html
History of the Nigerian Air Force (2008). Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://www.nigerianairforce.net/naf_history.htm
Indian Defence Policy in the 21st Century and Beyond. (2007). Retrieved on 3rd March, 2008 from Indian
Defence Information (IDI); http://www.indiamilitaryconsortium.org/Indian_defence_policy_21st_century
Khobe, M. (2000). The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG operations in West Africa. Downloaded on 31st June 2008
from: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html
Lubeck, M., et.al., (2007). Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the Securing of Nigerian Democracy.
Centre for International Policy. Retrieved on 11th September 2008 from: http://www.ciponline.org
Merritt, R. H. (2006).Technology. Microsoft Student2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Military of Egypt. (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 7th June, 2008 from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Egypt
Military of Nigeria (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 16th August, 2008 from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_military
Military Strategy. (2005). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved 27th, March 2007 from
http://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/military_srategy
McCormick, J. M. (2006). Foreign Policy. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
McKinley Asks Congress for War. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
National Security, (1991). Downloaded on 13th June 2008 from: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9452.html
Nigerian Air Force (2008). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 16th August 2008 from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Air_Force
Nigeria: History. (2006). Downloaded on 3rd May 2007 from: http://www.world66.com/Africa/nigeria
Nigeria: Nigeria Police Force. (1991). Downloaded on 31st June 2008, from:
http://www.photius.com/countries/Nigeria/national_security/Nigeria_national_security_nigeria_police_force.ht
ml
Nigerian Military Capabilities (2008). Retrieved on 3rd September, 2008 from
http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/national_security/nigeria_national_security_military
Nigeria: National Security (2008). Retrieved on 18th September, 2008 from
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/new_profiles/344.html
Noble, K. (1992). Nigeria Plans New Force to Deal with Unrest. Downloaded on 18th June 2008, from:
http://www.query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EoCEoDD1630F935A15756C0A964958260
Office of the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2004). National Military Strategy of The United States of America: a
Strategy for Today; a Vision for Tomorrow. Washington: Department of Defence, Pentagon. Retrieved on 6th
February, 2008 from
Office of the US Secretary of Defence. (2005). National Defence Strategy of the USA. Washington: Department of
Defence, Pentagon. Retrieved on 6th February, 2008 from:
http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm
Office of the US President. (2006). The National Security strategy of the United States of America. Washington: White
House. Retrieved on 6th February, 2008 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/html
Oldenburg, P. (2006). India. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Rockwell, Jr., L.H. (2004). The National Defence Myth. Retrieved on 11th March 2008 from:

161
http://www.mises.org/articles/national_defence_myth
Royal West African Frontier Force. (2006). Wikipedia Free Online Encyclopedia. Retrieved on 13th February
2007 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/royal_west_african_frontier_force
Shah, A. (2008). World Military Spending. Retrieved on 11th march, 2008 from:
http://www.globalissues.org/geopolitics/ArmsTrade/worldmilitaryspending.asp
Spanish-American War. (2006). Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation.
Stafford, M. (1984). Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War.
Stein, K.W. (2006). Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Microsoft Student 2007 [DVD], Redmond, WA: Corporation.

Tellis, A. J. (2004). Future Fire: Challenges Facing Indian Defence Policy in the New Century. Retrieved on 20th
February, 2008 from:
The Future of Peace-support Operations. (2008). Retrieved on 1st December 2008 from:
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/peace-paix/balden2003/section5.aspx
Ugwuoha, C. (2008). Science and Technology: Whither Nigeria? Retrieved on 3rd April 2008 from:
http://www.saharareporters.com/www/article/detail/?id=568
United States Department of State Background Note. (2008). Nigeria: The Abortive Third Republic. Downloaded on
15th June 2008, from: http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/Nigeria.html
Vann, B. (1998). Nigerian Military Topples Sierra Leone Junta. Downloaded on 13th June 2008 from:
http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/feb1998/searaf20.shtml

Seminars and Public Lectures:

Abdullahi, M. D. (2005). Resource Management for Self-Reliance in Nigeria. Paper at the 2nd National Conference on
Resource Management for Self-Reliance in Nigeria, Organised by the College of Administration and
Management Studies, Hassan Usman Katsina Polytechnic, Katsina, 28-30 June, 2005.
Adejumobi, S. (2002). Ethnic Militia Groups and the National Question in Nigeria. Paper Presented to the Conference
on Urban Violence, Ethnic Militia, and the Challenge of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. April 23-26,
2006, Lagos.
Ezete, K. C. (2007). National Defence Policy and Foreign Policy: a Critical Appraisal. Seminar Paper Presented at
PSDS 623 PG Seminar Series. July 2007. NDA, Kaduna.
Obi, C. I. (2004). Nigeria: Democracy on Trial. Text of a Lecture Organised by the Swedish Development Forum,
Stockholm, Tuesday, September 14, 2004.
Straw, J. (2006). Lecture Presented at the 30th Commemoration of the Late Gen Murtala Muhammad. February 13th
2006,
ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.
The Sharia Issue: Working Papers for Dialogue (2000). A Committee of Concerned Citizens, Abuja.

162