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Sheila PARENTAL AUTHORITY

REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES D.LAXAMANA, respondent. G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002 FIRST DIVISION Facts: Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983. Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. They got married and the union blesses with three children. All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable, thus, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, and the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. RTC ordered to remain the custody under the respondent and parties are enjoined to comply with the terms and condition stated in the visitation arrangement. Issue: W/N THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE (3) MINOR CHILDREN. Ruling: Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely stated that: The children were asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent. There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with respondent but subject to petitioners visitation rights in accordance with the December 7, 1999 order of the trial court.

LUNA, Petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTRespondents. G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985 SECOND DIVISION Facts: the herein private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The private respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals. The appealed decision was reversed and set aside and another entered, ordering the petitioners, among other things, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. Issue: Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child, to stay with her grandparents instead of her biological parents and who had signified her intention Up kill herself or run away from home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live with her biological parents Ruling: It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, for any other purpose than execution; nor review it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable; or when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.

Santos, petioner vs Court of Appelas, respondent 40 SCRA 20 January 4, 1995 En Banc, J. Facts: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988,Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CAaffirmed the dismissal. Issue: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for morethan five years constitute psychological incapacity? Ruling : No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more thanfive years does not constitute psychological incapacity.Pyschological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICALANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITYPsychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity thatcauses a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must beassumed and dischargedby the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of theFamily Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelityand render help and support.The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICALINCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of anutter insensitivity or inablity to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his presentsituation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answersto every individual problem PETITION IS DENIED. SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY COMPARE ART 218, FC AND ART 2180 CC Exconde, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Capuno, Defendants-Appellees. G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957 EN BANC Facts: Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak Elementary School. In March 1949, he attended a boy scout parade for Dr. Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took control of the wheels which he later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other. Isidoros mother sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the criminal action, the mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin Capuno. Issue: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for damages. Ruling: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which

imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove. On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.

AMADORA, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents. G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 EN BANC Facts: Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1 Issue: Does Article 2180 apply only to cases of tort which occur in schools of arts and trades?When is a student said to be in the custodyof the school Ruling: Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody." After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices." WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Salvosa, petitioners vs. IAC respondents. G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 SECOND DIVISION

Facts: Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed againstAbon. Salvosa being the (Executive Vice President of BCF). Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He wasalso appointed as armorer of the schools ROTC Unit. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He received orders fromCaptain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges FoundationROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee(officer) of the AFP.On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abonshot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensedfirearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF As aresult, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convictedof the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. Issue: whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon fordamages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious actof Jimmy B. Abon. Held: Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and studentsor apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the studentremains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody thatthe school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they areat attendance in the school , including recess time." In line with the case of Palisoc a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess,"as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance inthe school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. . Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortuous act in the killing ofNapoleon Castro. No costs.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. SPS CARPITANOS, respondents. G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002 FIRST DIVISION Facts: St. Marys conducted an enrollment drive for the incoming school year. This involved visitation of schools. Sherwin Carpitanos, who was part of the campaigning group rode the jeep, along withother HS students. The jeep was owned by Villanuevaand was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year oldstudent. They were on their way to an elementaryschool when the jeep turned turtle due to Jamesreckless driving. Sherwin sustained injuries whichcaused his death. The Carpitanos sued St. Marys,James, the Daniels (parents of James) and Villanueva Issue: Whether or not St. Marys Academy is liable? Ruling: Under 219, FC, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.But, for St. Marys to be held liable, there must be afinding that the act or omission considered a s negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to theaccident.a. The proximate cause of the accident was not the negligence nor the reckless driving of James, but the mechanical defect of the jeep. The steering wheel guide was detached while the jeep was running.b. Theres no evidence that St. Marys allowed the minor James to drive the jeep. It was the grandson of Villanueva, who had control and possession of the jeep who allowed James to drive. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.

EMANCIPATION

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendantsappellees. G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 SECOND DIVISION

Facts : Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Issue: Whether or not the complaint states no cuase of action against the defendant because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage? Ruling: While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

DECLARATION OF NULLITY A.M NO. 02-11-10-SC MAR. 15, 2003 LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner vs. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLIMEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents. G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007 THIRD DIVISION

Facts: On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26, in her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Issue: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. Ruling: Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity

of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

IGNACIO J. SALMINGO, Complainant, versus ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA, Respondent. A.C. No. 6573 July 9, 2007 EN BANC Facts: The following facts spawned the filing of the administrative complaint at bar, for disbarment against Atty. Rodney K. Rubica (respondent), by herein complainant Ignacio J. Salmingo which he transmitted to the Chief Justice by letter of September 27, 2004. Respondent filed on January 9, 2003 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Liza Jane Estao (Liza Jane). Complainant alleged that the respondent failed to comply with the procedural requirements in the declaration of nullity case which subsequently denied by the respondent. The complainant alleges that in prosecuting the annulment case, respondent deliberately concealed Liza Janes address so that she could not be served with summons, that respondent caused the publication of summons only in a newspaper of local circulation; that respondent did not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor; and that he did not cause the registration of the decree of nullity in the Civil Registry. Issue: Whether or not respondent failed to comply with the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on March 15, 2003? Ruling: At the time respondent filed his petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage, what applied was the Rules of Court under which he was not required to file his petition in six copies and to serve copies on the Office of the Solicitor General and that of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. Neither was he required to cause the registration and publication of the decree of nullity. Respondent did comply with the procedure in the Rules of Court on service by publication on a respondent whose whereabouts are unknown, which procedure requires only publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order, as

opposed to a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court may order required by the above-quoted Section 6 (1) of the Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of the complaint by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is upheld. NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents. G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 FIRST DIVISION Facts : Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,[1]in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract. Issue: Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated? Ruling: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage. WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,respondents.

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 THIRD DIVISION FACTS: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo. The petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following: they were married on November 29, 1976;unknown to her (Delia), he had a previous marriage with Emerina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerina sued them for bigamy; since 1979, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in the Philippines when she would avail of the onemonth annual vacation leave granted by her employer; Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of Roberto, who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and consent; while on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage, which is void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired by their union. RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner's motion for lack of merit. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not a petition for judicial delaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.) 2) Whether or not the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively. Ruling: The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation. On the other hand, the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment delaring such marriage void" in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED. VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent. G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000 THIRD DIVISION Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The

assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy. Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. Issue: Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio? Ruling: In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Republic vs. CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 EN BANC

FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Ruling: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case: burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state. CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997 SECOND DIVISION FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time. The

Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage RULING: The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Mabelle Articles 147 and 148 Co-Ownership FRANCISCO L. GONZALES vs ERMINDA F. GONZALES G.R. No. 159521 December 16, 2005 THIRD DIVISION Facts: In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living as husband and wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this union, four (4) children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria Angelica and Marco Manuel. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, docketed as Civil Case No. 3231111. The complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He did not contest that part of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent void ab initio. In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the assailed Decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated July 23, 1997. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally between the parties. Held: Property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code quoted as follows: "ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Petition DENIED. Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Articles 147 and 148 Co-Ownership JOHN ABING vs.JULIET WAEYAN G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006 Second Division Facts: In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the good old days, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they parted ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common properties. Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple bought a 2-storey residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned by a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would send money to John who deposited the same in their joint bank account. In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved in this case. In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc. In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. In a decision dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used in the construction of the structure in question solely came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to surrender possession thereof to John, thus: judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against the defendant (Juliet). Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Held: The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom. Petition DENIED and CA Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Article 151 Members of Family SPOUSES MANUEL and ROSEMARIE WEE vs. ROSARIO D. GALVEZ G.R. No. 147394. August 11, 2004 FIRST DIVISION Facts: Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters.[3] Rosemarie lives with her husband, petitioner Manuel Wee, in Balanga, Bataan, while Rosario resides in New York, U.S.A. The present controversy stemmed from an investment agreement between the two sisters, which had gone sour along the way. On April 20, 1999, Rosario, represented by Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and Rosemarie Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000 at the exchange rate of P38.30 per dollar. The complaint, which was docketed, alleged that Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an agreement whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to be deposited in a savings account while the balance could be invested in the money market. The interest to be earned therefrom would be given to Rosarios son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance. Rosario claimed that pursuant to their agreement, she sent to Rosemarie on various dates in 1993 and 1994, five Chemical Bank checks. However, sometime in 1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000 and for an accounting. Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so. In January 1999, Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, sent Rosemarie a written demand for her US$20,000 and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the demand, thus causing Rosario to file suit. On May 18, 1999, the Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case on the following grounds: (1) the lack of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made in accordance with Article 151[5] of the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the action being premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was defective, having been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the plaintiff, as required by Rule 7, Section 5*6+ of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Wees opposed Rosarios motion to have the Amended Complaint admitted. Issues: 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 2) WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING EXECUTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS DEFECTIVE Held: Petitioners submit that the amended complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 violates Rule 8, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on

which the plaintiff relies for her claim. Specifically, petitioners contend that the allegation of the amended complaint that Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed is clearly insufficient. The sentence is incomplete, thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to petitioners. Under Article 151 of the Family Code, a suit between members of the same family shall not be entertained, unless it is alleged in the complaint or petition that the disputants have made earnest efforts to resolve their differences through compromise, but these efforts have not succeeded. The attempt to compromise as well as its failure or inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family. Petition DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners

Articles 150 and 151 Members of Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994 FIRST DIVISION Facts: Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-inlaw the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect. Issues: (a) Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained; and, (b) Whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides: Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that if it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could not be bound to comply with them. Petition GRANTED.

Articles 150 and 151 Members of Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs SUSAN RAMIREZ G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005 THIRD DIVISION Facts: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification. On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. Issue: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband Held: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil

case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. But, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes. Decision AFFIRMED.

Articles 150 and 151 Members of Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006 FIRST DIVISION Facts: On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.4 On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss. In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed. Issue: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit.

Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article 151 of the Family Code provides that No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Articles 150 and 151 Members of Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ vs RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005 SECOND DIVISION Facts: The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land identified as Lot 18-B-2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54334, as well as the house constructed thereon.[2] On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament[3] directing the subdivision of the property into three lots, namely, Lots 18-B-2-A, 18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. In May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right side of his body. Natividad died on October 26, 1996.[4] Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6, 1997. On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila. He also discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said deed of sale. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice. In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, the matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. They appended the certification to file action executed by the barangay chairman to the complaint. Issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST EFFORTS WERE, IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE, CONSIDERING THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A SUIT IN THIS CASE IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY.

Held: Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the MTC. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent: As regards plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits filed or maintained between members of the same family. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code. The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification to file action by the barangay chairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the Family Code. Petition GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Articles 150 and 151 Members of Family/Earnest Efforts to compromise NICANOR T. SANTOS vs CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005 THIRD DIVISION Facts: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a Basic Agreement of Partition covering properties they inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the Guerreros), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. Subsequently, the Guerreros instituted another complaint against Nicanor with the CFI at Pasig for recovery of sums of money under the May 5, 1959 Deed of Partition. For some reason unclear from the records and which the parties have not explained, the case was also assigned docket number Civil Case No. 5858

Eventually, on December 28, 1979, Judge Migrio rendered judgment (Exh. A) ordering Nicanor, as defendant a quo, to pay Consuelo P31,825.00, representing the amount due her under the May 5, 1959 deed of partition, plus damages and attorneys fees A little over six (6) years later, or on June 3, 1992, to be precise, the Guerreros filed a complaint for revival of the December 28, 1979 decision of Judge Migrio (Exh. A), docketed as Civil Case No. 1784MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon-Navotas. Petitioner Nicanor, as defendant, countered with a motion to dismiss on several grounds, among which were: (a) that the complaint for revival of judgment is barred under the res judicata rule; and (b) that the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards an amicable settlement have been made. Issues: 1. Whether or not In holding that Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no application, and if there is, the subsequent act of herein petitioner already achieved that purpose; 2. Whether or not In disregarding the fact that the decision issued by Judge Eutropio Migrio is null and void for being barred by res judicata and therefore cannot be revived; and 3. Whether or not ruling that the action based on the decision issued by Judge Andres Reyes is already barred by prescription. Held: The petition has no merit. A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code. Petition DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Article 155 Family Home SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. AND DORIS A. KELLEY VS. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. G.R. No. 172263 July 09, 2008 FIRST DIVISION Facts: Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC Makati City). After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.

After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioners' motion was denied for failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement. Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 (RTC Naga City). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0188. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the CA. Issues: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2000-0188 by the RTC Naga City Whether or not the property covered is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from execution. Held: No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. Civil Case No. 2000-0188 REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City.

Article 155 Family Home PERLA G. PATRICIO vs MARCELINO G. DARIO III G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 FIRST DIVISION

Facts: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less. On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003, hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. , the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. Issue: Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home Held: The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Petition GRANTED.

Article 154 Beneficiaries FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC. G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997 THIRD DIVISION

Facts: Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.The property, located in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 174180.

On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23, 1986. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari arguing that the Court of Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He contends that there was no need for him to constitute his house and lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of the same property from the time it was levied upon and up to this moment. Issue: Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code. Held: Judgment affirmed. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence. Article 155 Family Home SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006 FIRST DIVISION Facts: This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former granted a P1,000,000.00 loan to the latter. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the same amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-51142. The execution of the deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to private respondent. Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners for P2,500,000.00. Petitioners paid LedesmaP1,000,000.00 as downpayment, with the remaining balance of P1,500,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments of P75,000.002 starting 15 March 1993. In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma an additional loan of P450,000.00. When private respondent presented Ledesma's check for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was already closed. Subsequently, when private respondent presented for payment the check issued by petitioners, the said check was likewise dishonored because there was a stop payment order. With the dishonor of the checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private respondent came away empty-handed as she did not receive payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan she granted to Ledesma that was assumed by petitioners.

As a result, private respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust before the RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-16003. On 3 April 2000, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court, the latter granted the same in an Order dated 14 April 2000.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution. Held: The trial court criticized petitioner's claim that the subject property was their family home. The court opined that the claim was never substantiated by petitioners aside from the fact that they asserted this defense only after two years since the auction sale has transpired. It added that if not for the private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola filed on 5 August 2002, petitioners would not have raised the issue of family home before the said court. Article 153 of the Family Code provides:The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Petition DENIED. Judgment of the Court of Appeals, for lack of merit, AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Article 155 Family Home JOSE MODEQUILLO vs AUGUSTO V. BREVA G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990 FIRST DIVISION Facts: On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 8700801359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.

Issue: Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code. Held: Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. Article 164 Presumption of Legitimacy SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006 FIRST DIVISION Facts: Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997. Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia AguasMacapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pea. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Pea, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Pea, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990. Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said decision.9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim. This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998. Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98. Issue: Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo. Held:In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present

any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately. Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

Michelle CASES UNDER PROOFS OF FILIATION Herrera vs Alba GR No. 148220 June 15, 2005 First division Carpio, J.: Facts: Respondent filed a petition with the trial court against petitioner for compulsory recognition, support, and damages. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing. The trial court granted the motion to conduct DNA testing. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Issue: Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation? Held: Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows: The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence. The Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence. Mendoza cs. CA GR No. 86302 September 24, 1991 First division Cruz, J.: Facts: Private respondent (Teopista) claimed that she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza (petitioner), but the latter denied the claim. The RTC ruled in favor of Mendoza and dismissed the complaint for compulsory recognition of Teopista. CA reversed the judgment of the RTC. Issue: W/N the private respondent is the illegitimate daughter of Mendoza? Held: Teopista is the illegitimate daughter of Mendoza. An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under Sec. 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the act or declaration of a person deceased or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Tijing vs. CA GR No. 125901 March 8, 2001 Second Division Quisumbing, J.: Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife with six children and the youngest is Edgardo Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Private respondent (Angelita) took Edgardo Jr. without the consent of the petitioners. After four years, the petitioner found Angelita and her son and demanded Angelita to return his son but the latter refused to do so. The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the trial court to recover their son. The RTC granted the petition but the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Issue: W/n Edgardo jr. is the son of the petitioners? Held: first, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. Second, there is a strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a child. Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez (Edgardo Jr.) was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with local civil registrar within 30 days after the birth. Fourth, the trial court observed several times when the child and petitioner were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows, and head shapes. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in petitioners giving birth to Edgardo Jr. at her clinic. Cruz vs. Cristobal GR no. 140422 August 7, 2006 First division Chico-Nazario, J.: Facts: Petitioners are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage. On the other hand, private respondents are the children of Buenaventura from his second marriage. On June 16, 1926, Buenaventura purchased a land in San Juan, Metro Manila. In 1930, Buenaventura died intestate. Six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents executed an extrajudicial partition of the property without them. Petitioners filed a petition in RTC but was dismissed and ruled that petitioners failed to prove their filiation as the baptismal and birth certificates presented are not sufficient proof of filiation. Issue: W/n baptismal certificate is a sufficient proof of filiation? Held: Art. 172 of the Family Code provides: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 10 the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment 20 an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 10 the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

20 any other means allowed by the Rules of Court nad special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, may consist of the childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Colorado vs. CA GR No. L-39948 February 28, 1985 Second division Cuevas, J.: Facts: Petitioners are the natural children of Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del Rosario who were married in articulo mortis before Flaviano died on August 31, 1922. Petitioners claim that they are the legitimiated children of Flaviano by his subsequent marriage to Juliana. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Issue: W/n natural children are legitimated by subsequent marriage of their parents? Held: under the Spanish Civil Code, recognition by the parents to be valid must be expressed or formal not tacit or implied. Under the law prior to the Spanish Civil Code, tacit acknowledgment was sufficient; but since the enactment of the Code, acknowledgment must be effected as prescribed by Art. 131. Acknowledgement by the parentis the conditional compliment of the natural filiation of a child born out of wedlock before such child can be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents under Art. 121 of the Spanish Civil Code. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao GR No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Second division De Leon, Jr., J.: Facts: Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo were legally married and was not legally separated but Corazon cohabited with William Liyao and conceived William Liyao, Jr. William Liyao died hence, Liyao Jr., represented by Corazon filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of the late William Liyao against the respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner but the CA reversed the decision of RTC. Issue: W/n the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy? Held: Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. Article 255 of the NCC provides: Art. 255. Children born after 180 days following the celebration of the marriage, and before 300 days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of the child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his filiation. If the husband, presumed to

be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. ILLEGITIAMTE FILIATION Rivero vs. CA GR No. 141273 May 17, 2005 Second division Callejo, Sr., J.: Facts: Mary Jane (private respondent) executed a compromise agreement for the estate of their deceased father and recognized Benedick Arevalo as the illegitimate child of her father and gave the latter his share on the estate. Petitioners were the buyer of the lotssold at the public auction. However, Henry, the uncle of Mary Jane, questioned the compromise agreement and the recognition of Benedick as the illegitimate son of Benito Sr. Issue: W/n Mary Jane can recognize the illegitimate child in a compromise agreement? Held: Article 2035(1) of the NCC provides that no compromise upon the civil status shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister, or relative. Mossesgeld vs. CA GR No. 111455 December 23, 1998 Third division Pardo, J.: Facts: Petitioner (Mossesgeld), single, gave birth to a baby boy and the presumed father is Eleazar Calasan who is a lawyer and is married. Calasan signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant and indicated the childs surname as Calasan. The person in charge at the hospital rtefused to place the presumed fathers surname in the birth certificate, so Eleazar filed it himself. The officer in charge in the office of the civil register rejected the registration based on Art. 176 of the Family Code. Eleazar filed a petition for mandamus to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of the alleged illegitimate child using his surname. The RTC and CA denied the petition. Issue: W/n an illegitimate child can use the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity? Held: Article 176 of the FC provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. The FC has effectively repealed the provisions of the Art. 366 of the CC giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. Pe Lim vs. CA GR No. 112229 March 18, 1997 Second division

Romero, J.: Facts: Maribel (respondent) filed a complaint for child support on behalf of her daughter against the petitioner who is claimed to be the father, Raymond. Maribel and Raymond (petitioner) never married because of financial issues of the latter. The petitioner then, denied the claim, stating the he and Maribel were only friends and nothing more. RTC rendered a decision favoring Maribel and CA affirmed the decision. Issue: W/n the letters of the petitioner to the respondent establish evidence of filiation? Held: The evidence in the instant case shows that the petitioner considered himself to be the father of Joanna Rose as shown by the handwritten letter he wrote to Maribel. It was only after the petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified as Joanna Roses father as disclosed in the certificate of live birth. Under Article 175 of the FC, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the FC provides: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a fina judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Bernabe vs. Alejo GR No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Third division Panganiban, J.: Facts: Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered the son of Carolina Alejo (respondent). Fiscal Bernabe and his wife died in the same year leaving Ernestina Bernabe (petitioner) the sole heir. Respondent filed a complaint for Adrian, her son, to be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given his share. Petitioner contended that respondent is barred from filing the action for recognition because Article 285 of the CC has been supplanted by the provisions of the FC. Issue: W/n the respondent is barred from filing the action based on Art. 285 because of the enactment of the FC? Held: We hold that Article 285 of the CC is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the FC cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition because that right had already been vested prior to its enactment. To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minor at the time the FC took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Art. 285 of the CC) for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the FC. CHANGE OF NAME Republic vs. Vivencio GR No. 88202 December 14, 1998 First division

Quisumbing, J.: Facts: Fe Esperanza and Pablo Vivencio were married and begot Cynthia Vivencio (private respondent). Pablo Vicencio left and never reappeared and Fe remarried after the dissolution of her former marriage. She was married to Ernesto Yu and the latter served as the father to Cynthia. Private respondent then, filed a petition for change of name because of confusion that arose as to her parentage causing her extreme embarrassment. She wants to change her surname from Vicencio to Yu. Issue: W/n the private respondent be allowed to change her surname? Held: Private respondent is the legitimate child of Fe and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage because of her surname. But even more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN Mariategui vs. CA GR No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 Third division Bidin, J.: Facts: Lupo Mariategui contracted 3 marriages. He was married with his 3rd wife sometime in 1930 and begot 3 children, the private respondents. Petitioners, children from 1st and 2nd marriages, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of Lupos estate. Private respondents filed a complaint to get their shre. Petitioner contended that private respondents are not the legitimate children of their father. Issue: W/n private respondents are the legitimate children of Lupo Mariategui? Held: Article 172 of the CC provides that the filiation of legitimate may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacintos birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said Article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. ADOPTION Tamargo vs. CA GR No. 85044 June 3, 1992 Third division Feliciano, J.:

Facts: Adelberto, a minor of 10 years of age and the son of the private respondents, shot Jennifer Tamargo, petitioners daughter, with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted to death. Petitioners filed a civil complaint for damages but private respondents contended that they are not liable because spouses Rapisur adopted Adelberto. They further contended that spouses Rapisura are the ones liable since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents. Issue: W/n the effects of adoption, parental authority is transferred to the adopting parents even the custody of the child is still with the natural parent? Held: The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the CC upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortuous act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty to closely supervise the child who is in their custody and control. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in responedt Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto, it would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Cang vs Clavano GR No. 105308 September 25, 1998 Third division Romero, J.: Facts: Herbert Cang (petitioner) and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot 3 children. However, the couple obtained legal separation and the custody of the children was awarded to Anna Marie. Petitioner left for U.S. and Anna Marie is likewise always abroad thus, the children were left in the care of the spouses Clavano (respondents). The respondents filed a petition for adoption and Anna Marie gave her consent and the petition was granted. Petitioner questioned the adoption and contended that he did not give his consent. Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner abandoned their children so his consent is not necessary. Issue: W/n parental consent is dispensable in the adoption case if the parent is said to have abandoned the children? Held: In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandon them.

Olga Concepcion vs. CA GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005 FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario. HELD: Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law; the child is not related to him in any way. Tison vs CA Facts: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible. Held:

The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. Mariano ANDAL, assisted by mom Maria Duenas as guardian ad litem, and Maria DUENAS, plaintiffs vs. Eduvigis MACARAIG, defendant [May 30, 1951] Appeal from CFI Camarines Sur judgment Facts: Emiliano Andal & Maria Duenas are sps. Jan. 1941: Emiliano became sick of TB & his bro Felix went to live in their house to help him work in his farm May 1942: Felix & Maria began having sexual intercourse & treated each other as h & w On or about Sept. 10, 1942: Emiliano became so weak he couldnt move or get up fr bed Sept. 10, 1942: Maria eloped w/Felix & they lived w/Marias dad until mid 1943 Jan. 1, 1943: Emiliano died w/o Maria who didnt even attend the funeral June 17, 1943: Maria gave birth to baby boy Mariano. Mariano & Maria: filed suit for recovery of ownership & possession of parcel ofland in Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Complaint alleges that the land inques was acquired by Emiliano fr mom Eduvigis (nice name! Hehe)thru adonation propter nuptias. Emiliano enjoyed possession of land fr 19381942when Eduvigis took advantage of abnormal situation, entered land in ques. CFI: declared Mariano as legitimate son of Emiliano & is entitled to inherit landin ques. likewise declared Mariano as owner of land & ordered Eduvigis to paycost of suit. Eduvigis appealed. If Mariano is legit, hes entitled to inherit, otherwise, land should revert back toEduvigis as next of kin entitled to succeed Emiliano under the law. This wouldbe dependent on relationship bet Emiliano & Maria during period of conceptionof child up to the date of his birth in connection w/death of alleged father. Issues & Ratio: 1. WON Mariano can be considered as a legitimate child of Emiliano. YES. CC Art. 108: Kids born after 180 days after celeb of marriage or w/in 300 daysafter dissolution/separation of sps shall be presumed legitimate. May berebutted only by proof that it was PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for husband tohave access to wife during first 120 day of 300 days preceding birth of child.

Mariano was born on JUNE 17, 1943 & Eimiliano died onJAN. 1, 1943, Marianois presumed to be legit son of Emiliano & Maria since he was born w/in 300days after dissolution of marriage. 2.WON theres evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have access to Maria. NO. Manresa on physical impossibility: absence during initial period of conception,impotence, imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place(even if vs law). No proof that Emilano was absent bet Aug 21, 1942 Sept. 10, 1942 (pre-elopement) w/c is included in 120 days of 30 before birth of child. Theres proofthat they still lived under one roof. Even if Felix was already staying w/them &he had an illicit relationship w/Maria, that still does not preclude cohabitationbet them. Indeed Emiliano had TB & his condition was so serious that he could hardlymove & get up, his feet were swollen & his voice hoarse. But experience showsthat this does not prevent carnal intercourse. Some people even do it in themost crucial stage because theyre more inclined to sexual intercourse. Anauthor on medicine even said that the reputation of TB towards sexual propensity is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than consequences of disease. No evidence either that he was impotent or that he was imprisoned. Presumption of legitimacy must remain since it has not been overcome. In conformity w/ Sec. 68, Par. C, Rule 123, Rules of Court: issue of wifecohabiting w/husband whos not impotent is presumed legitimate if not bornw/in 180 days after marriage or 300 days after dissolution. Emiliano was notimpotent, he had access to Maria & kid was born 300 days after dissolution. Held: CFI affirmed. Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano & Maria. JAO v. CA 152 SCRA 359 (1987) Facts: 1968: Petitioner Janice Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) against Perico Jao. Perico denied paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test duly conducted by the NBI upon the trial courts order. Result: Janice could not have been that possible offspring of Perico and Arlene The trial court found the test result legally conclusive Janice filed MFR, and court ordered trial on merits where Janice was declared Pericos kid and thus entitled to monthly support. Perico appealed to CA, contesting trial courts error to appreciate result of blood test and CA reversed trial court decision, hence this appeal by Janice (for the love story of Arlene and Perico and for the more detailed facts, refer to CA decision) Issue: WON the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity Held: YES. In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA where the court held that the NBI experts report stating that from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is apossible father of the child could not give any assurance that Co Tao was the father,only the possibility. There is now an almost universal agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity (As shown in Co Tao). The fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product o the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents,but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the bloods ofthe mother and the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possiblybe that of the alleged father. In jurisdictions like the U.S., the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non- paternity has already been passed upon in several cases (Gilpin v.

Gilpin, Cuneo v.Cuneo and Clark v. Rysedorph). The important doctrine from such cases is that toreject competent medical testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific factand to deny progress. Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several states. Tolentino affirms this rule on blood tests as a proof of non-paternity. Petitioner attempts to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests by impugning that qualification of the NBI personnel who conducted the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. However, the NBI forensic chemisy who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has extensive practice in this area for several years. The tests were conducted6 times using 2 scientifically recognized blood grouping systems: MN test and ABOsystem, under witness and supervision. Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first bloodtest, she, represented by her mom, declined to undergo the test to prove ordisprove their allegations, even as Perico was willing to undergo the test again. Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals [September 12, 1980] Petition for Review from the decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw.Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang.Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967. April 25, 1972 Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.February 27, 1973 lower court dismissed the complaint Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court.They ruled that minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang.A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. Issues: 1.WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven.The finding of the court of appeals that Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which is self-serving.Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence.Tolentino vs. De Jesus Court held that the findings of facts by the Court of Appeals in conclusive on the Supreme Court, unless: Judgement is based on a misapprehension of facts the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals arecontrary to those of the trial court when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that ofthe physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife withinthe first one hundred and twenty days of three hundred which precededthe birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband. Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between Elizabeth and Crispin. Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the possibility of access to one another. The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven months from the separation of the spouses. Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of the spouses.(note the baby was not premature).This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child.Sexual intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved. Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of the conception was not impossible and there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and legitimate even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception. 2.WON the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. NO /var/www/apps/collegelist/repos/collegelist/trunk/collegelist/tmp/scratch9/4689987.doc \ 3 Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose.