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Husserl Studies 8: 17-31, @ 199 1 Kluwer Academic

1991. Publishers.


in the Netherlands.

The transcendental dimension of praxis in Husserls phenomenology*

Chuogakuin University

About twenty years ago, the rehabilitation of practical philosophy was advocatedespecially in German philosophical circles, and since then this trend has continued without decline up to this day.l However, with respect to this movement, the situation seems to remain vague regarding the question:With what meaning did the central conceptof practice come to the fore again?To be more accurate,this vaguenessseemsto result from the situation that the framework of uur relationship to the world, including practice, or with regardto practice, is undergoinggreatchanges. As is well known, by insisting on the clear separationof pure theory, which adoptsthe stanceof cognitive objectivity, and the practical world, which is constituted of various values, modern philosophy has provided natural sciencewith the theoretical basis for its establishment,and the two have developed hand in hand. Practice, as the concept opposed to theory, was excluded from the latter and was relegated to a domain entirely different from the objective and scientific world. At the sametime, for science as a science, which upholds objectivity as its supremeideal, the domain of practice became the object of an analysis which is done externally by way of its objectifying method, while its original naturecame to be ignored as unworthy of scientific attention.On the otherhand, for the modem natural sciences, technology=technique came to be closely connectedwith theory, and the steady scheme of the relation between theory and technology as its application was established. And the objectification and utilisation of the world by means of such theory and technology became a dominant tendency of the modem world-view.
* This paper is a revised and reformed version of Husserl-genshogaku to jissen no mondai (Husserls phenomenology and the problem of praxis) in: The Japanese Society for Ethics ed., Rinrigaku-nenpo (Annals of Ethics) No. 35 (Tokyo: Keiotsushin, 1986), pp. 105-121. It is my duty to express my gratitude to Mrs. Yu Tani for her advices about English and stylization.

18 Meanwhile, the domain of practice, deprived of its original base in this world dominated by scienceus science,retains its life by flowing into the arts, religion, and politics. In theseareas,hoewever,practice as a subterranean stream of modem times has combined with mysticism or irrationalism in a complicated manner and has repeatedly spouted to the surface. However, we find that this oppositional scheme of theory and practice has not always had the same meaning as above, if traced to Aristotle who is often referred to as the originator of this classification. Aristotle used this classification to classify various studies from a certain point of view, and, as is well known, it was theory (tIzeo&) that took as its objects things not capableof being otherwise and things having the principle (wc!I~) of their movement and rest in themselves, while it was practice (praxis) that was capable of being otherwise, having the principle of its movement and rest in another than itself: having its principle in the doer but its end in itself, and it was art=technique (poiksis) that has its principle in a producer and its end in another than itself.* In this classification of theuria, praxis and poikis, the rigid combination of theory and technique=technology- as it prevails in modem times - is not seen;on the contrary, it can be said that Vzeor~uis one of the best forms of praxis.3 Therefore,it may not be too much to say that Aristotle did not have the strict distinction between theory and practice in the modem sense. From this aspect,one may understandthe positive meaning which the key conceptof practice hasfor the movement of the rehabilitation of the practical philosophy mentioned in the opening of this paper.This movement refers neither to the rehabilitation of the practice pushed underground by objectivism under the modem dichotomical scheme - for the reasonthat this objectivism and modem subjectivism are one. For objectivity is none other than that which is guaranteedby a sort of universal subjectivity to be equally valid (gelten) for every subject?- nor to the decision to return to practice in Aristotles meaning. To the contrary, when we graspthe rehabilitation of the practical philosophy as a movement of problematizing this scheme itself, for the first time we come to see the positive meaning of this movement.Therefore, the practice of which the rehabilitation is requiredshould not be opposedto theory, but should rather be an indication of the return of our thinking to that which supports all our life including theoretical activities at its deepeststratum. In other words, we must re-examine the concept of practice itself, and in the courseof this re-examinationopenup a new way of taking part in our world and a new mode of intelligence (Wssen) concerning our life-world

19 I would like to discuss this great changein our way of thinking in the following manner. I will begin by outlining the process by which the problem of practice is presented in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, which beganby inquiring into the basis of mathematicsand logic, then aimed to be a strict science (&enge WSWZSC/UZ$) in this sense, his phenomenologyis a radicalisationof modern scientific thinking. Then I will focus on the contemporary concern with practice by pointing out some problematic dimensions in his phenomenology.In other words, my aim is to make this problematic come to the fore from within the modern way of thinking by following the process of Husserls thinking, which pushesmodem thoughtto its limit. 1. Husserls phenomenology and the problem of living present The method of phenomenologicalreduction, the key idea of Husserls phenomenology,has the aspectof a sort of subjectivism or methodological solipsism, because, the operationof reduction,every existenceis released in from its objectivity made by our positing of it as existence ~,Seinssetzung) and is reducedto pure appearance us. The transcendental to subjectivity is the field in which such pure phenomenaappear, and it appearsas a solipsistic ego due to the operationof putting all existencein parentheses,including the other egos in the world. Of course, as the transcendentalsubjectivity retains (behulten) every existence albeit in parentheses, is not a solipsism in the literal senseof the word. However, it since the evidenceof the transcendental subjectivity itself is regardedas a solid thing, one may say that this transcendentalsubjectivity retains the framework of modem subjectivism. In this way, Husserlcomes to executea radicalisation of modem subjectivism through the method of the phenomenologicalreduction in the manner of interrogating the basis of modem objectivism which implicitly premisesthe universal subjectivity. However, the radicalized reduction put into practice in his late manuscriptson time (the so-calledC-manuscripts)- he defines this reduction clearly as the reduction to the living present (Ms.C 3 I)5 - comes to show a problem areareferredto as the R&se1 der lebendigen Gegenwart (riddle of the living present).This is the problem areawhich cannotbe fully reduced to the phenomenologicalfield opening before the transcendental subjectivity, and which cannot be encompassed entirely by the phenomenologicalreflection. This suggestsa difficult problem concerning the very existenceof transcendental phenomenology,as this latter attempts to reduceevery being to its appearance (Erscheinung) beforethe transcendental subjectivity, And also, from the point of view of this paper, this

problem areaseemsto be a dimension closely connectedto the problem of praxis in Husserls phenomenology.Therefore, I would like to review briefly the so-called riddle of the living present in Husserls considerations of time. First, the living present is a primary flowing (Srr&zen) prior to Zeifigung. It is the basis which makes reflection as Zeifigung possible. The act of reflection disclosesnon-reflecedexperience(MeMs) and its ego-polein the mode just now. (Hua XV, 350). Reflection cannotreflect on the self in the mode of just now until the living presentJ!CWS first and the primary distanceto itself (Urdistanz) takesplace. Only then can the ego become an object of time (Zeitgegenstu&), i.e. be objectified. At the same time, in spite of a self-division in the reflection (reflecting ego and reflected ego), the living presentstands still (sre/zen)or is a standing still (Sfti&gkeir), which remains identical through time, forming the reflection into selfireflection. There is thus the paradoxicalcharacterof the standing still-flowing present (stehend-strtimende Gegenwurt).6 Further, the living present is on the one hand unonymous as an operative now ffungierendes Jefzf) which always flees from the Zeitigung or objectification (Ontzjikation) by reflection - for it is always the reflected ego which appears reflection and neverthe reflecting one; on the otherhand,in spite to of this anonymity, so long as reflection can be carried out as reflection-toifseZf (as self-reflection), the living presentis something hewn to this reflection. Husserl refers to the dimension where the living presentoccurs as the undergroundwhich is prior to the ego (vor-ichkher Untergrund), somethingradically prior to the ego, the standingundergroundof flowing which founds the structure of the ego (Hua XV, 598), or prior-being cVor+ein).7 It is pre-reflectivebecauseit first makes the phenomenological reflection possibleand founds it. Here we have a relationshipof founding in the phenomenologicalsense:it is the dimensionwhich cannotbe reduced to reflection althoughit is only throughreflection that it appears.* 2. Vertical axis of the living present - primal-praxis Next, let us consider the dimension of prior-being and the problems it involves. Here, variousproblems are interwindedin a complex manner,and arenot fully developedin Husserls thought.Therefore,I would like to pick out a number of them and briefly mention the possibility of their development. First of all, the dimension of prior-being and the pre-ego (Vor-fch) point to a dimension preceding the ego-m-its-positing-character,so that theseare not the ego in this sense.However, if the identity of the self or

21 the self-tress of the self were not tieady found in this dimension, we could not understand how reflection is possible, i.e., how we can carry out &$reflection (reflection on myselfi by discermnent after the fact @,ruc/rge+v&~e~).9 example, we say that It is Z who did such a thing. For What, then, is this self-tresswhich has alreadybeenconstitutedin this prior dimension? If what reflection finds is always the ego who is just now, and not the ego who is doing the reflection (fungierendes Zch), then before reflection occurs, a distantiation from the self (distunciution d soi) must occur in such a way that the self continuesto flow away to a not-being-theself and a not-being-the-selfcontinuesto flow into the self. (This situation may be &led that of Urdistunz).And, nevertheless, the reflection is to be if possibleas self-reflection (in fact, it is possible),then the self must already know itself as it is in some way. If this is so, then we must say that it is the movement of self-distantiation(the movement of ek-stase where the self continually overcomesitself by its transcendence a not-being-theto self) that constitutes the selfness of the self. The following text by Husserl should be interpretedin this way: flowing is flowing away and flowing in, and in this flowing away a unity is carried (trugen) within itself (Hua XV, 585). In this movement of distantiation (=flowing) for the first time the self is noticed or known as the self. However, the self in this caseis an unsocial&d self - the self on an isolatedisland (RobinsonCrusoe)- which doesnot yet include the relation to others. That is, Husserls radicalized reduction is centeredon the living presentas the basisof the ego, so that others are excludedunder the epoch& As a result of this methodologicalabstraction,the movement of distantiation which produces the primal distance is picked out as one important moment forming the self-ness. This (aswe shall seelater) is the vertical axis of the living present which develops into the concept of impulse-intentionality (Triebintentionukfit) and of life. On the other hand, to anticipate another discussion, when the problem of intersubjectivity is taken up again at the level of this living presentand opensup the dimension of co-existencewith anonymousothers,then a horizontal axis appears anotherimportant moment. This latter developsinto the problem as of communities and societies, and includes the problem of language. Moreover, at the point where the moments of both series (vertical and horizontal axis) cross,the problem of the historicity of our human existence arisesas anotherquestionto be askedfrom a broaderpoint of view. Reflection, in my view, is nothing but the path which leads us to selfrecognition in the form of a definite self-division (Zch-spultwzg)(Hua VIII, 89) by taking up again the primal-distancewhich has ah-eadyarisen with the movement of distantiation. (I will discussthis point again later.) What we must pay attentionto is that here we have neither a self which is


already there as a being which is identical with itself (seWg), nor a self which always transcendsitself in its self-identity. If such a self does exist, we once again meet the questionof how and where we can realize (know) such a self-identical self, and so fall into a regressad infinitum. On the contrary,we come to realize the self as the self first throughthe movement of distantiation, which has always and alreadyoccuredto us. I am (exist) not first, but sustain(e&&en) myself later, and Being is a self-sustenance @elbs&r/zuZfung) (Hua XV, 367). The next question to be taken up is, what is this that is nor the self which partakesof the movement of distantiation? As discussedabove,we do not have here a self which first exists as something substantial, in opposition to which, that which is not-the-self appearsas the negation.It may rather be said that this not-self is brought forth by an event which may be referredto as a movement of pure negution,and it is precisely this negative movement that yields the self and the not-self ut the sume time, thus giving rise to the selfnessof the self. In this sense,it is negativity which first makes everything exist. Distantiation is nothing but this movement of negation.This negationis invisible to the self because simply this /Ses it: the self is this negativity. This is the dimension of being as origination (Werden) which brings forth every existence(Seie&es) by its movement of negation.It was the works of Heideggerand Merleau-Ponty (in his later period) that openedup the dimension of this unique ontology by developingthe argumentin this direction. I do not intend to discussthis ontology in detail here and will be content to quote the following sentence from Merleau-Ponty:The invisible thing is rhere without being an object. It is pure transcendencewithout wearing a masque antique. Or, a surging-out(swgissement) of negativity into the world.1o In this dimension, however, the self is already aware of itself as an ability (Vermljgen). Husserl formulates this as follows: In my primordiality, I who am a standingconcretepresenthave myself not only in my experiencebut also in my uW@ (Hua XV, 365). And this ability is the ability to be able to show (unweisen) a thing which is there as a selfidentical (se&g) thing by presentingand identifying it (Hua XV, 366). Moreover, he consideredthe primary flowing in the dimension of priorbeing as an ability, as a doing (Hua XV, 584), the ability of identification which is implicated in a flowing (Hua XV, 585). The self is and does while alreadyrealizing itself as the ability in the dimension of priorbeing.I constantlyseizethe absoluteand primary prior-being of flowing in which I urn, doing in my ability (Hua XV, 585). This dimension of the primary movement or effecting (doing) is none but the passivedimension which hasalreadyoccuredfor the effecting ego- moreover,for every doing ego (not only for the reflecting ego), the realization of self-nessis made in

23 this primary movement for the fiist time, and in this sense, this dimension is none but the primal passivity which precedes the ego in every sense - but, in this dimension, the self is already operative as the living present. Husserl refers to what drives us to the effecting or doing in this dimension as an impulse-intentionality and goes on to ask May or must we not presuppose the following universal impulse-intentionality? This is the intentionality which uniformly forms each primary present as a standing temporalization, and moves concretely from present to present in the following way; that is, all content is fullfilled content in satisfying its impulse and is directed to the end. .. (Hua XV, 595).11 This statement shows that the effecting of the self in this dimension already has a certain teleological structure in the form of the satisfying impulse. And, the ability mentioned above has heady been realized in this dimension - as the consciousness I can which is based on a kinesthetic consciousness I do - connected closely with corporeality (Leiblichkeit). Accordingly, the roots of the consciousness of freedom of the self in the ethical sense may be sought in this dimension (although a more detailed examination concerning the relation between freedom and possibility=1 can is necessary). The transcendental I is already within the stable ability of being able to be conscious of I can (Ms. C 5, p. 4). l* In other words, the kinesthesis of sense organs [such as touching an object with moving hands and watching through the eyes] goes on in the form of I do; and it lays the foundation for I can (Hua I, 128). We have here the foundation of the whole system of the kinesthesis familiar to us, which can be managed consciously and freely (Hua VI, 108f.).*s In this way, the self tieady lives this effecting in the dimension of priorbeing. In other words, there is no doubt that the self becomes the self by this effecting and that the primal, pre-egoistic (vorichlich) effecting is the movement of negation (movement of extase) which makes the self the self. In this sense, this movement of negation may be called life=hve (Leben) in the verbal sense. And it seems that the lge-world should be interpreted as indicating the lower stratum of the world where the self lives in this form: . ..my living present where I live in fact (Ms. K III 12, p. 34f.).14 I would like to call the way of being in the dimension of prior-being and the way of being in the living present as shown by Husserl in the above ways, primal-practical (urpraktisch). For it seems that one of the essential aspects of the concept of praxis which is being focused upon again in recent years is to be found in this dimension. This concept indicates the turning of thought to the dimension which supports our life from underneath, and the re-interrogating of the framework of the modem dualistic formula theory-practice. I would like to use the concept primal-practical in order to distinguish this primary dimension from the practical in

24 the ethical sense.As shall be seenlater, there is however a close relation betweenthesetwo concepts. 3. Horizontal axis of the living present - intersubjectivity There is another important problem concerning the dimension of priorbeing.This is the problem of others or of transcendental intersubjectivity; this problem appearsto form the horizontal axis of the living present. In his late manuscriptsHusserl frequently referred to the co-existenceof the transcendental-ego -others. This sort of co-existenceof the self and and others is to be found first in the dimension of prior-being. If this co-existence had merely an empirical meaning, it would be only a fact always experiencedin our ordinary life. Furthermore,it would be an empirical fact which does not particularly call for analysis by phenomenology or philosophy. However, it has an essential meaning in the philosophical sense,as much as the being of others is an indispensableelement in the coming-into-beingof the self. In phenomenology, however, this appears in a paradoxical way. As shown above,the selfnessof the self must aheadyhave beenformed in its anonymity prior to reflection by the movement of distantiation which makes reflection possible, or at the primary effecting of TZM in order that the reflection be organized as self-reflection. That is, when reflection is performed, the reflection (dus Reflektierende) already knows that it is precisely reflection upon itsel& But this knowledge must be an anonymousknowledgewhich takesplace in the pre-egoisticsphereprior to reflection. We can seehere that with this developmentof the argument,the conception of the phenomenologicalreduction to the proper sphereof the ego (Eigensphtire) is transformedin its very depth.For this anonymousself is no longer given to the I as a phenomenon.And it also becomesclear that, in fact, the phenomenologicalreductionto the propersphereof the ego is based,in a sense,upon the suppositionthat othersexist, to the extentthat the others who are bracketedare viewed as those who are not-being-theself but also other selves. If that is so, the reflection alreadyknows that self-reflection can not simultaneouslybe reflection upon others.Otherwise reflection would not be formed asreflection. Therefore,the self has already lived in co-existencewith otherssomehow in pre-egoistic dimension prior to reflection. (In this level, knowing it and living it are the same things.) It is becausethe distinction betweenthe self and others is already made in this dimension that it is possible for reflection to be undoubtedly reflection upon itself. In other words, it is becausethis primary distinction between self and others is already known before reflection, that the

25 phenomenologicalself-reflection as the reduction to the proper sphereof the self becomespossible. In this respect,the distinction betweenself and othersis alreadythe premise of the reflection. Accordingly, this distinction, i.e. others existencedistinguishedfrom the self in this caseis the transcendental primal fact (U$&W) that makesour reflection self-reflection and ourselves our selves. This must be strictly thought in parallel with Husserls argumentthat the existenceof the transcendental subjectivity (or the I) is the primal fact which is prior to its essence.That is, it is a system of the self - the others that is confirmed as the primal fact that establishesthe quality of the self and of others(selfnessand othersnesx) at
the same time.

Here we also fmd the basis for Husserls argument that transcendental subjectivity is already transcendentalintersubjectivity.15The distinction betweenthe self and otherswhich is made in the pre-reflectivedimension is never the samedistinction betweenthe ego and the otherego which is made up by Einjiihlung of the self.M Unlike the latter, the distinction betweenthe self and othersin this dimension is made in their co-existencein the mutual determination(mutual negation)that the self is not othersand othersarenot the (my)-self. Every non-1(Nicht-Zch) itself lies inside the I, but as the intentional unity of Geltung, althoughit is as transcendence the I. In not the sameway, the other transcendental also lies inside the I.. .asthe unity I of Geltung . . . . in fact, as the non-1who himself is the I and holds myself as the non-1 in himself. This interiority of Fiireinandersein as the intentional interpenetration(Ineinundersein) is the metaphysical primal fact and it is the interpenetration the absolute[=I and others] (Hua XV, 366). of The co-existence with the transcendentalothers which is confirmed definitely by Husserl should be regardedas pre-egoistic. It is precisely becauseI and others in the transcendental senseco-exist at the pre-reflective level, that this co-existence is recognized, by reflection, as the intentionul unity or intentional interpenetration the reflectedI. However, in it must be noted that the difference of dimension betweenthe pre-reflective level and the reflective one is vague in Husserl himself, especially when analyzing the problems of intersubjectivity. It might be said that this vagueness showsthe confusionresulting from the methodologicaldifficulty confronting phenomenologywhen tackling the problem of intersubjectivity. A great many of Husserls manuscripts concerning this problem - three volumes of together a 1900 pages in tie Husserliunu - fmely shows the path of his thought and the persistency of his efforts to overcome this difficulty and to gain insight into this complex matter. In this sense,his philosophy is indeedan Arbeitsphilosophie. Concerning the mutual determination of the self and others, Husserl writes: I cannotbe what I am without othersexisting for me, and also these

26 otherscannotbe what they are without me. The intentional mutual includedness (&scMdsse~~e~r) a necessityof transcendental is co-existence.(Hua XV, 370). The self and the others form a unity in conflict (Widerstreitseinheit) (Hua XIV, 413) which arisesfrom a mutual negative determination of each other. The empathy theory omits the othernessof others(the characterthat othersare not (my)-self) because, accordingto this theory, othersultimately result as an imuge of (my-)self. Contraryto this, as discussedabove, the distinction betweenthe self and othersformed in the pre-reflectivedimension makesthe quality of the self and of otherspossible at the sametime. To this extent the distinction also makes the empathy of the I toward others - which takesplace in a higher dimension - possible. The following sentence be cited in this context: It is the I, the primary can ego of the primary life, that has implied in itself the being of the self as the egu us opposed to others, and, in this way, that has implied in itself the being of others as a possible object of empathy (Hua XV, 586).t7Basedon such an equally-primary (gZeichursprikglich) co-existenceof the self and others, it is possible for the first time to constitute the community of persons at a higher level. The interpenetration of constitution, and intentional inexistence in cognition, is tie togetherness(Miteinunder) of being and is the foundation for the new interpenetration, for that of the i.e. establishing of community (Vergemeinschufiung) (Hua XV, 371). The essentialdistinction betweenthe self and others in the prior-being dimension is connectedwith Husserls idea of a transcendental monadology.The monad alreadylives in co-existencewith otherswhen it establishes itself as a monad and the foundation for the mutual intentional interpenetrationof monadsand of their mutual communication is guaranteed this dimension. in (Every monad hasa window.)l* The aboveis a summary of the dimension of prior-being prior to reflection. It is the dimension of primary effecting or doing and of the selftranscending-movement (ex-s&se)as a primaI practice, and also that of the life-world in which we live with others. But also, this dimension is never visible, namely the dimension of the invisible, because and in so far as - we really live this dimension. It is precisely by reflecrion that this dimension is somehowdisclosed,althoughit shows a limit for reflection at the sametime. Thereforeit must be asked,how reflection can relate itself to this dimension and what the relation between reflection and the living presentis. And it seemsto me that in questioningthis relation, the dimension of practice is, for the first time, openedup in its eminent sense.In the following section, by trying to clarify this point, I would like to show where Husserls phenomenologystandsin the presentcontroversyconceming practice and what problemsit retains.

27 4. PraxW19 in Husserls phenomenology As clarified in the preceding sections, reflection is made possible by the primary distancewhich arisesfrom the incessantflow of the self-distantiation prior to reflection. This primary distancecausesthe incessanttransformation of the self to a not-being-the-self (the negativity of the vertical axis), and makes the self recognize(becomeaware of) its selfnessin this negativity. Simultaneously,the argumentfor intersubjectivity clarifies how othersare involved as an indispensableelementin the establishmentof the quality of the self (the negativity of the horizontal axis). Accordingly, the quality of the self cannotbe fixed or stable,but is incessantlyexposedto the dangerof breakingup. The self is a fragile or brittle (hin@Zfig) thing in this respect.2o can recognizehere a sort of original anxiety - i.e. anxiety We in the situation that the selfnessof the self is incessantlyin danger- that necessarily motivates reflection to move to a clear self-recognition by taking again the distanceus distance which deniesthe selfnessof the self. Thus reflection is notbing but the ability to take again,in a defiiite manner, that primary distance us distance. Reflection becomes self-recognition @etzmg des Selbst) for the first time by giving rise to a definite selfdivision. Reflection attempts to achieve a definite self-recognition by concerning itself positively with the distance and in this way positing or objectifying the self as a reflected ego. The life of the I in its activity is nothing but that which incess~tly-divides-itself-in-its-active-conduct (Hua VIII, 9Of.). However, the reflected ego in this reflection is no more tban a reflected ego, and the incessantflowing itself, the living presentitself of effecting has already transformed itseX to the not-being-the-self and moved backward from reflection. (That is, as discussed above, the absolute anonymity of the living present.) However, as mentioned above,the self has heady become aware of the self in this incessantflowing. Thus a performer of reflection bows that the reflected ego is not any longer the ego who performs reflection in its living presentand that, nevertheless, the quality of the self is ensured exuctly und only in the reflection-performance. The identity of the ego is not tbe mere identity of a lasting one, but the identity of a performer (Ms. C 10, p. 28).21But it is done in the way of overcoming itself by continually denying its own precedingreflection (the self-negationof reflection). The identity of the Z (not the self) should be co@med in the performanceof reflection and can be confirmed only in the carrying-on of the reflection. That is, continual self-reflection is the movement which confirms the subject (the I) of the reflection so that here reflection becomes an act (TUT) precisely in the ethical meaning. Here, we seethe establishmentof the person as the executorof this act. Man is a


teleological being and a being which should-be (Sein-sullen), and this teleology acts on every act and intention of the ego (Hua VI, 275f.). This teleology implies a continual attempt to be the being which should be, and also implies a paradoxicalsituation in which the subjectis confiied by the self-negationof reflection - for the ego needsa continual self-renewaldue to its fragility. This attempt is a movement to confirm the self exposedto the dangerof its selfnessby the primal distancewhich arisesincessantlyas long as man lives - the distanceof the self to itself, and of the self to others - as a being which should-bethrough the self-clarifying ability of reflection. And the responsibility is an act of the I who takesit as a subjectfor the self and for others who co-exist with the self. For reflection is none other than to take responsibility for the ego by recognizing clearly that the reflected ego is precisely nzy ego. In recognizing this, I can no longer be entirely unrelated to this ego. In this case,however, the responsibility is passive, something that has already happenedfor this ego and the reflection. As opposedto this, the reflection of continual self-reflection, that is, the reflection in the self-negationof itself, can actively take a responsibility for the ego and othersin the movement to confirm the self as the subject of reflection (the active self-responsibility or tie possibility of active selfresponsibility). Here, we can understand that reflection-performance appearsas praxis which continually confms its subject (the I in its ethical meaning).Reflection is nothing but the constant act by which the self
of the pre-reflective dimension tries to establish itself as a subject while holding itself responsible for the pre-reflective dimension.

We cannot fail to notice that the character of the subject here is somewhatdifferent from that which is defined as res cogitans in modem philosophy. The subject spokenof here is that which must be or shall be confirmed constantly becauseof its original fragility, while an heady confirmed subject does not exist. As the ego objectified and clarified by reflection is the reflected ego, this ego cannot be the subject of the reflection - to be more accurate, of the reflecting. What reflection can recognizeis merely the following: It is only in the course of petiorming the
that the self is definitely established as the self So that the of the reflection does not exist in the reflected ego anywhere. Thus the subject is neither existence (Seiendes) nor substancein the reflection subject

modem philosophical sense. However, we see that the movement to confirm the subject in our new meaning is necessarilypostulated as a movement due to the teleological structure motivated by the original fragility of the self, andis by no meansan irrational thing supportedonly by an arbitrary decision.Eradicatingthe subject as a child of the modem age may have a historical meaning of its own - that is, the significance of overcoming modernity.z2However, we can no longer be content with such


an eradicating.For what is requiredis a basic re-examinationof the concept of the subject itself. Thus, the concept of responsibility also shows a new aspectwith the changeof the concept of subject. For in the modem age, responsibility was a correlative conceptto the subject as the substance which responto sibility should be attributed,but, as we have discussedabove,the subjectin this sensedoes not e~i~f anywhere.Responsibility is required only in the performance(=praxis) as the movement to confirm the self, so it is nothing but the UK@ to assume a certain act as belonging to the self. In this respect,the concept of responsibility must be re-examinedonce more, startingfrom the primary correlationwith the praxis-ability. We must also re-interpret Husserls understandingof those problems from this point of view, especially his understandingin his last work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). The original idea of modem philosophy and its conceptualschemestrongly influencedhis understanding. Here we can seethe peculiar gap in Husserls phenomenologybetweenhis program and the close analysis which he has actually done concerningthe problems of time and intersubjectivity. This is the reason why his understandingmust be re-examined in the light of various important conclusionsresulting from the close analysis of his late manuscripts.However, we must not overlook the important suggestionsof these late manuscriptswhich call for serious examination, under the new praxis-concept,of our situation today. Husserl formulated his own philosophical thinking as follows: The necessity of a deeper and an ultimate self-responsibility of a cognizing person [that is, the subject of the reflection] in the foundation of his cognitional formations was an impulse of the whole movement of transcendental philosophy (Ms. K III 1, p. 23).*s And philosophical reflection is nothing but an universal task to continually execute this reflection in the huge area of transcendentalsubjectivity which involves all of our experience. That is, it is a praxis to be perfomred as a kind of universal vocation (Universalberuf) (Ms. F I 28, p. 334)24 which aims at mans final self-understanding self-responsibility in the name of a reason which and extendsbeyondthe performanceof the ego of one individual. Philosophical reflection is nothing but a praxis which aims at changingthe human beings into an entirely new mankind which is provided with the absoluteability of self-responsibility based on absolute theoretical insight (Hua VI, 329). And this insight is based on the final self-understanding man to take of responsibility for his own being, or his self-understandingto be called (vocation) to havea life in apodicticity (Hua VI, 275). Finally, I would like to reconfirm the problems which lie before the phenomenologyof praxis by pointing out a large question which was not

asked by Husserl. It seems to be summarized in the following formula: the determination to be mankind as rationaI being by vocation. First of ah, the meaning of reason or the teleology of reason stiI1 remains vague. If ultimate self-responsibility is referred to in relation to reason, we must excavate the level of co-existence with others in the pm-reflective dimension and then must discuss it again connected with the problem of the constitution of the intersubjective world. To talk about self-responsibility without relation to others is nothing but dogmatism. Moreover, in taIking about the determination (WiZZensentschZiessung) to be a rationaI being, the anaIysis of the motivationaI nexus (A4otivatimzszusumnenhang) which leads to such a determination is indispensable. This is because such a determination aIways holds a danger back to a mere arbitrary determinism. After ah is said, the phenomenology of praxis must start by confirming the gap remaining between various problem areas which Husserl developed in his late working manuscripts (which we re-examined as the problem of primal-praxis and of the intersubjectivity in the second and third sections of this paper) und the self-understanding which he showed in his last work The Crisis.

1. See. e.g., Manfred Riedel, ed., Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophic (Fteiburg: Rombach), Bd.1 (1972), Bd.II (1974). We can also include the restoration of philosophical henneneutics in this movement. 2. Aristotle, Met. E 1 1025b 2Of., Eth. Nit. 1139b,1140a,1140b. 3. Aristotle, Pol. 1325b 2lf., Eth. Nit. 1177a 20. Cf. Ingemar During, Aristoteles (Heidelberg: Karl Winter, 1966), p. 471, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutik als pralctische Philosophie, in: Vernunft im ZeituZter der Wissenschaji (Frankfurt a.M.: Subrkamp, 1976), pp. 80 and 82. 4. For example, the transcendental subjectivity or transcendental apperception (Zch &nke) of Kant is this kind of universal subject. As we shall discuss later, Husserl radicalizes this modem subjectivism by inquiring into the basis of modem objectivity. 5. Cited in Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 66. 6. See Hua V&171; Hua XV, 670 etc. 7. Hua KV, 585 and Ms. A V 5, p. 5; Ms. C 13 II, p. 9; Ms. C 17 IV, p. 1, cited in K. Held, ibid, p. 116. 8. For a detailed discussion about the living present, see K. Held, ibid. 9. Hua VIII, 89: By reflecting and taking back, I can discern the naive perceiving and I in a state of self-forgetfulness. Therefore, this discernment is originally discernment afier the fact. 10. M. Merleau-Panty, Le visibfe et Zinvisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 282f., p. 303. 11. Dilrfen oder mussen wir nicht eine universale Triebintentionalitit vorausset-

zen, die jede urttimliche Gegenwart als stehende Zeitigung einheitlich ausmacht und konkret von Gegenwart zu Gegenwart forttreibt derart, dass aller Inhalt Inhalt von Trieberftillung ist und vor dem Ziel intendiert ist, . . . Cited in K. Held, ibid., p. 121. Husserl says practical possibilities (EU, p. 89) of kinesthetic consciousness. See E$uhrung und Urteif, L. Landgrebe, ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1972), Section 19. Cited in K. Held, ibid., p. 147f. In fact @zktisch) does not mean the empirical fact counterposed to essence, but the fact in its transcendental meaning. That is, it means the incontestable fact of my existence, something without which I cannot be what I am. Life-world is a world that is lived by me in this sense, and it constitutes the foundation of my existence. See Hua XV, 385. See Hua XV, 367, 370, 373, 587f.; Hua 1,182. Husserls monadology must be situated in this context. We must distinguish the others who are already in the co-existence with the self in the pie-reflective dimension from the other egos (Alter egos) who are constituted as the object of rej7ection at a higher level. Es ist das Ich, das urtiimliche des urmmlichen Lebens, das in sich impliziert hat sein eigenes Sein als ego gegentiber den alteri und so in sich impliziert hat das einftihlungsmassige Sein der Andem. Concerning this monadology, see Hua I, 125, 135f., 149f.,l66, 168, 176, 182; Hua XV, 368,587; Hua VIII, 161 etc. Here we use this concept (praxis) indicating the founding stratum of ethical and political practice. See K. Held, ibid., p. 164f. Cited in K. Held, ibid., p. 85. Structuralism and post-modernism may have this meaning in the history of philosophy. Cited in Gerd Brand, Welt, Zch u& Zeit, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 44. Cited in A. Roth, Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff), p. 152.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.