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Top10ProsandCons Doelectronicvotingmachinesimprovethevotingprocess?
VotingMachinesHome FeaturedResources Doelectronicvotingmachines improvethevotingprocess? Top10ProsandCons DidYouKnow? HistoricalTimeline Comments +Pros&ConsbyCategory Projects VotingSystems&Use SlotMachinesvs.Electronic VotingMachines HowtoVoteonanElectronic VotingMachine LearnMore SourceBiographies Glossary NoticesArchive SiteMap +AdditionalResources Getfreeemailupdates: OK

ThePROandCONstatementsbelowgiveafiveminuteintroductiontotheelectronicvotingmachinedebates.
(Readmoreinformationaboutouronestar tofivestar TheoreticalCredibilitySystem.)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

VulnerabilitytoHacking DisabledVoters&ElectronicVotingMachines VoterVerifiedPaperAuditTrails AccuracyinCapturingVoters'Intent PoliticalTiesofManufacturers

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

SecureStorageofVotes MaliciousSoftwareProgramming PhysicalSecurityofMachines SusceptibilitytoFraud FederalLegislation

PROElectronicVotingMachines

CONElectronicVotingMachines

1.VulnerabilityToHacking PRO:"Ifthereisnoexternalcommunicationspathway,thenthere isnoriskofhacking,orgainingunauthorizedentryintothe tabulationsystem.Texasrequirestheuseofclosedsystems. Mostcountiesdonotusemodemtransferoronlydosofrom substations,notdirectlyfromthepollingplace...Itispossibleto detectattemptstoenteramodemline.Also,theCountingStation shouldstillacceptsurrenderanddeliveryofthephysicalmedium andcomparethetallyandnumberofvotescastonthemedium tothemodemedresults." DanaDeBeauvoir ElectionsAdministratorandCountyClerk,TravisCounty,Texas "PreventionofAttack,NotDetectionAftertheFact,"submitted asanappendixtotestimonybeforetheU.S.ElectionAssistance Commission May5,2004 CON:"Vendorsandelectionjurisdictionsgenerallystatethatthey donottransmitelectionresultsfromprecinctsviatheInternet, buttheymaytransmitthemviaadirectmodemconnection. However,eventhisapproachmaybesubjecttoattackviathe Internet,especiallyifencryptionandverificationarenot sufficient.Thatisbecausetelephonetransmissionsystemsare themselvesincreasinglyconnectedtotheInternet...and computerstowhichthereceivingservermaybeconnected,such asthroughalocalareanetwork(LAN),mayhaveInternet connections.Infact,organizationsmaybeunawareoftheextent ofsuchconnections." CongressionalResearchService ElectionReformandElectronicVotingSystems(DREs):Analysis ofSecurityIssues 2003

2.DisabledVotersandElectronicVotingMachines PRO:"Touchscreensaretheonlysystemwhichallowsavoter withadisabilitytocastasecretandindependentvote... CON:"'Veryfewofourmemberswereabletovoteprivately, independently,despiteSantaClaraCounty'ssupposed accessibletouchscreens,'DawnWilcox,presidentoftheSilicon ValleyCounciloftheBlind[said]... Amongthecriticismsprovidedbyvoterswaspoorsoundquality, delayedresponsetimeandBraillethatwaspositionedso awkwardlyitcouldbereadupsidedown." SanJoseMercuryNews "BlindVotersRipEMachines,"byEliseAckerman,SanJose MercuryNews May15,2004

Theaudioballotandadaptiveaids,suchassipandpuffandjelly switches,makeitpossibleforallofthesecitizenstocasta secretandindependentballot...TensofmillionsofAmericans canandwillvotesecretlyandindependentlyif,andonlyif,they useatouchscreenvotingmachine." JimDickson VicePresident,AmericanAssociationofPeoplewithDisabilities TestimonybeforetheU.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission May5,2004

3.VoterVerifiedPaperAuditTrails PRO:"AddinganotherfederalrequirementforDirectRecording Electronic(DRE)votingsystemstoberetrofittedwithavoter verifiedpaperaudittrail(VVPAT)componentinvitesanumberof problemsthatcould,unintentionally,shatterthesystemand significantlyerodepublicconfidenceintheprocess...Thefactis thatexistingDREsystemswithoutVVPAThavetheproventrack recordofdoingthebestjobofallavailablevotingsystemsin achievingthegoalofaccuratecasting,tabulationandreportingof allvotesinaccordancewiththevoters'intentions... Thisdebatealsoneedstorecognizepracticalconsiderations includingsignificantcosts,paperjamsandmalfunctioning printers,voterdelays,difficultyforpollworkers,andmeaningless receipts.IfDREprogrammingcanbemanipulated,thatsame logicdictatesthattheprogrammingcouldbesurreptitiously alteredtochangeelectionresultsafterthepaperballotisprinted." ConnyMcCormack,PhD RegistrarofVotersRecorder/CountyClerk,LosAngelesCounty, CON:"Allfullyelectronic(touchscreen,DRE,Internet)voting systemsaresubjecttothelimitationsandrisksofcomputer technology.Thisincludestheinabilityofexamination,nomatter howthorough,todetectthepresenceofhardwareand/orsoftware thatcouldbeused,deliberatelyorinadvertently,toalterelection outcomes... Democraticelectionsrequireindependentverificationthata)all ballotingchoiceshavebeenrecordedasintendedandb)vote totalshavebeenreliablyandindisputablycreatedfromthesame materialexaminedbythevoters.AVoterVerifiedPaperBallot (VVPB)providesanauditablewaytoassurevotersthattheir ballotswillbeavailabletobecounted... WithoutVVPBthereisnowaytoindependentlyaudittheelection results.Equipmentfailures,configurationsandprogramming errorshaveresultedincostlyelectionrecallsanddisputesthat couldhavebeenpreventedwithVVPB."

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RegistrarofVotersRecorder/CountyClerk,LosAngelesCounty, California TestimonybeforeU.S.SenateCommitteeonRulesand Administration June21,2005

Top 10 Pros and Cons Voting Machines ProCon.org

RebeccaMercuri,PhD President,NotableSofwareandKnowledgeConcepts "FactsAboutVoterVerifiedPaperBallots,"publishedonher website Feb.23,2004

4.AccuracyinCapturingVoters'Intent PRO:"TheadvantagesofDREsystemsinclude:no'chad' eliminatingthepossibilityofan'overvote'(ormakingmore selectionsthanpermissible)andadvisingthevoterofany 'undervote'(whenavotermakesfewerthanthemaximumnumber ofpermissibleselectionsinacontest)...eliminatingmarking deviceswhichcanresultinquestionsofvoterintentand providingareviewscreenbeforeavotercastsaballot." AdHocTouchScreenTaskForce ReporttotheSecretaryofState July1,2003 5.PoliticalTiesofManufacturers PRO:"Eachofourmembershaspoliciesgoverningpoliticaland partisanactivity.Thepolicieseitherprohibit,orsetstrict standardsfor,engagementinpoliticalactivity.Furthermore,the commonlyheldbeliefthatvotingsystemsmanufacturershave beenparticularlyactiveinpartisanactivityissimplynotbasedin fact." HarrisMiller FormerPresident,InformationTechnologyAssociationof America LettertoU.S.RepresentativesJohnConyers,Jr. Apr.15,2005 CON:"Theheadofacompanyvyingtosellvotingmachinesin OhiotoldRepublicansinarecentfundraisingletterthatheis 'committedtohelpingOhiodeliveritselectoralvotestothe presidentnextyear.'TheAug.14[2003]letterfromWalden O'Dell,chiefexecutiveofDiebold,Inc...promptedDemocratsthis weektoquestiontheproprietyofallowingO'Dell'scompanyto calculatevotesinthe2004presidentialelection." ClevelandPlainDealer "VotingMachineControversy,"byJulieCarrSmyth,Cleveland PlainDealer Aug.23,2003 CON:"Thesensorsintouchscreendevicescanbeknockedout ofalignmentbyshockandvibrationthatmayoccurduring transport.Unlessthesesensorsarerealignedatthepollingplace priortothestartofvoting,touchscreenmachinescan misinterpretavoter'sintent.Forexample,avotermighttouchthe partofthescreenidentifiedwithcandidateJones,butcandidate Smith'sboxwouldlightupinstead." EllenTheisen CEOoftheVotePADCompany MythBreakers:FactsAboutElectronicElections 2005

6.SecureStorageOfCastVotes PRO:"Concernsaboutsecurityofthecollectionandcounting processhavealwaysbeenimportant.Computersofferthefirst technologythatcaneasilymakecopiesofinformationindifferent formsforarchivalpreservation.Electronicvotingmachinesof todaykeeprecordsofthevotesondisk,removablephysical mediainmemoriesand,asafinalcount,onapaperscroll.These multiplerecordscanimprovevotingmachines'immunityto problems." TedSelker,PhD Director,Caltech/MITVotingTechnologyProject "SecurityVulnerabilitiesandProblemswithVVPT,"Caltech/MIT VotingTechnologyProjectWorkingPaper13 Apr.2004 CON:"Foroveradecade,alldirectrecordingelectronicmachines havebeenrequiredtocontainredundantstorage,butthis redundantstorageisnotanindependentrecordofthevotes, becauseitiscreatedbythesamesoftwarethatcreatedthe originalrecord.Asaresult,[themultiplefiles]areoflimited use...tocheckthecorrectnessofthesoftware." DougJones,PhD ProfessorofComputerScience,UniversityofIowa "TheEvaluationofVotingTechnology,"achapterinthebook SecureElectronicVoting 2003

7.MaliciousSoftwareProgramming PRO:"Beforethefactvoterigging[is]difficultifnot impossible...Theconcernthatunscrupulousprogrammerswilltry torigelectionsthroughdeceptivesoftwarehasledtospecific processesandpoliciestoavoidsuchanevent.Forexample, softwarecodepassesthroughnumerousinternalandexternal checksbeforeuseinanactualelection,includingrigorous certificationtestingbyindependentcertificationbodies.Voting systemsoftwareisengineeredmonthsinadvanceofactual elections,makingitveryunlikelyforprogrammerstoknowwho candidateswillbeandimpossibletoknowhowtheirnameswill appearonballots.Thesourcecodeisheldinescrowbyvarious stateandfederalofficials,andlocalofficialsdonothaveaccess toit,thuspreventingcodechangesatthelocallevel." ElectionTechnologyCouncil "FrequentlyAskedQuestions"sectionofwebsite Oct.2005 8.PhysicalSecurityofMachines PRO:"Attemptstotamperwithterminals,viaprivacysecurity screenremovalandunlockingofbaydoors,wouldbequickly noticedbythediligent,trainedElectionJudgeandothersinthe pollingplace. SBE[StateBoardofElections]hasinstructedtheLBE[Local BoardofElections]toapplytampertapeoverthelockedbay doorsoftheAccuVoteTS[electronicvotingmachine]terminals CON:"Regardingphysicalhardwarecontrols...manyoftheDRE [directrecordingelectronicvotingmachine]modelsunder examinationcontainedweaknessesincontrolsdesignedto protectthesystem... AllthelocksonaparticularDREmodelwereeasilypicked,and wereallcontrolledbythesamekeys...Anotherparticularmodelof DREwaslinkedtogetherwithotherstoformarudimentary CON:"Testing[electronicvotingsystems]forsecurityproblems, especiallyiftheywereintentionallyintroducedandand concealed,isbasicallyimpossible.Considerthecutesurprises insertedbyprogrammersintocommercialsoftwarethatare triggeredbyobscurecombinationsofcommandsandkeystrokes, called'Eastereggs.'Theseroutinelyslipthroughvendor'squality assurancetesting,includingtheamazingflightsimulatorthatis hiddeninMicrosoftExcel'97.AnEastereggslippedintoavoting programwouldneverbedetected.IftheEastereggalloweda votertomodifythevotesinsidethemachine,itcouldchangethe wholeelection." VerifiedVotingFoundation "FrequentlyAskedQuestions"sectionofwebsite Mar.22,2006

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doorsoftheAccuVoteTS[electronicvotingmachine]terminals andrecordtheserialnumbersduringtheLogicandAccuracy tests...ElectionJudgesverifytheserialnumbersandapplynew tampertapeaftertheunitsareactivatedonElectionDay. Protocolsformonitoringthetampertapeandescalatingtheissue ifevidenceoftamperingisidentifiedhavebeenestablishedand incorporatedintoElectionJudgetraining."

Top 10 Pros and Cons Voting Machines ProCon.org

DREwaslinkedtogetherwithotherstoformarudimentary network.Ifoneofthesemachineswereaccidentallyor intentionallyunpluggedfromtheothers,votingfunctionsonthe othermachinesinthenetworkwouldbedisrupted.Inaddition, reviewersfoundthatswitchesusedtoturnaDREsystemonor off,aswellasthoseusedtoclosethepollsonaparticularDRE terminal,werenotprotected." GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO) Elections:FederalEffortstoImproveSecurityandReliabilityof ElectronicVotingSystemsAreUnderWay,ButKeyActivities NeedToBeCompleted 2005

MarylandStateBoardofElections ProgressReport July22,2004

9.SusceptibilityToFraud PRO:"TheUnitedStateshasbeenusingdirectrecording electronicvotingequipmentforwellover20yearswithoutasingle verifiedincidentofsuccessfultampering... Everyformofpaperballotthathaseverbeendevisedcanand hasbeenmanipulated,ingeneralwithconsiderableease.The reasonisthathumansarefamiliarwithpaperandits characteristics,howtomarkittolookgenuineandhowtoerase it.Bycontrast,alteringredundantencryptedwriteoncecomputer recordsisimpossibleevenforexperts.Soassumingthatthe electronicvotingrecordsarewrittencorrectlyinthefirstplace, thepossibilityofmodifyingthemlaterisremote." MichaelShamos,PhD,JD ProfessorofComputerScience,CarnegieMellonUniversity "Paperv.ElectronicVotingRecordsAnAssessment," Proceedingsofthe14thACMConferenceonComputers, Freedom,andPrivacy 2004 CON:"Votingfraudisnot...eitherpresenteverywhereorabsent everywherefraudcomesindegreesandincrements.Amalicious DRE,createdanddistributedbyonevendortohundredsof thousandsofpollingplaces,systematicallycanfalsifymillionsof votes.Itisfraudonawholesalelevel. Stuffingaballotbox,incontrast,worksataretaillevel.A tamperer,howevermaliciousandskilled,canstuffonlyasmany ballotsasmightplausiblybecastatthepollingplace.Whilean organizedgroupcouldstuffmultipleballotboxes,maliciousDRE softwarecouldaffectfarmorevotes." RonaldCrane,JD Softwareengineer "ADeeperLook:RebuttingShamosoneVoting,"availableonthe VerifiedVotingFoundationwebsite 2005

10.FederalLegislation PRO:"Advocatesforthedisabledstresstheimportanceofvoting systemswhichpermitthehandicappedtoparticipateinthe communalactofvotingatthepollsonElectionDay.HAVA[Help AmericaVoteAct](aswellastheADA[AmericansWith DisabilitiesAct])alsorequiresthatanynewvotingtechnology allowthis...ATMtypetouchscreenvotingsystemspermitthe visuallyimpairedtovotewithoutassistanceatthepollson ElectionDaythroughanaudiointerface.Competingtechnologies (e.g.,opticalscan,punchcard,mechanicallever)donot." AssociationoftheBarofNewYorkCity ReportoftheElectionLawCommittee:SubcommitteeonNew VotingTechnology May,2003 CON:"HAVA[HelpAmericaVoteAct]doesnotrequireDREs. OpticalscanbasedsystemsareHAVAcompliant...Typically,a voterusinganopticalscansystemreceivesapaperballotalong withamarkingpenorpencil...Voterswhoarevisuallyimpairedor requireballotsinaforeignlanguagecanusetactileballotsora computerizedopticalscanballotmarkingmachinewithattached headphones.Suchamachinewouldallowallvoters,including blindvoters,toconfirmorverifytheirballotchoices[HAVAalso requiresthatvotersbeabletoverifytheirselectionsandchange themifnecessary]byslidingtheballotintoacomputerized readerwithattachedheadphones." NationalCommitteeforVotingIntegrity TestimonybeforetheU.S.ElectionAssistanceCommission (EAC) May5,2004

PROElectronicVotingMachines

CONElectronicVotingMachines

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