Gov't Opp 12-1236

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Date Filed: 07/18/2012
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NO. 12-1236
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

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IN RE: REQUEST FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM PURSUANT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN THE MATTER OF DOLOURS PRICE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE
V.
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON COLLEGE, MOVANT-APPELLANT
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ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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BRIEF OF THE UNITED STATES
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CARMEN M. ORTIZ UNITED STATES ATTORNEY RANDALL E. KROMM ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY FEDERAL COURTHOUSE 1 COURTHOUSE WAY SUITE 9200 BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02210 (617) 748-3381
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TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The subpoenas and motions to quash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The December 16, 2011 Memorandum and Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Subsequent proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The January 20, 2012 Findings and Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 This Courts July 6, 2012 decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSIONERS SUBPOENA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A. B. Standard of review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 In Re: Request forecloses Boston Colleges argument that the district court was required to order the production only of material directly relevant to the UKs request.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Boston College identifies no other error in the district courts determination of the documents to be disclosed.. . . . . . . . . . 21 i
C.
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CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 19-21 Cusumano v. Microsoft, 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 14, 16, 19 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442 (1st Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 In re Premises Located at 840 140th Avenue NE, Bellevue, Washington, 634 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 In re: Request from the United Kingdom Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in the Mater of Dolours Price, Nos. 11-2511, 12-1159 (1st Cir. July 6, 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 17, 19 United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453 (1st Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 United States v. Farrell, 672 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 University of Pennsylvania v. Equality Employment Opportunity Commission, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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STATUTES 28 U.S.C. 1291.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 18 U.S.C. 3512.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 6
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The district court had subject matter jurisdiction because the subpoenas were requested and issued pursuant to federal law. See 18 U.S.C. 3512. The district courts final order denying the motion to quash of the movant, the Trustees of Boston College (Boston College), and ordering the production of documents was docketed on January 20, 2012. [D.47].1 Boston College filed a timely notice of appeal on February 21, 2012. [D.57]. This Court has jurisdiction over Boston Colleges appeal from this final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining, after in
camera review, that Boston College was required to provide to the United States certain confidential interview materials responsive to a subpoena issued pursuant to the US-UK MLAT.
The citation [D._] refers to a docket entry. Other citations are as follows. The citations [Br._] and [Add._] refer, respectively, to Boston Colleges brief and addendum. The citation [JA:_] refers to Boston Colleges joint appendix. The citation [S.App._] refers to the governments ex parte supplemental sealed appendix. 1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE On August 4, 2011, the United States, acting through a Commissioner2 duly appointed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3512 and pursuant to a legal assistance treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) (the US-UK MLAT),3 served on Boston College subpoenas requesting recordings, documents, and other materials in its possession relating to the 1972 abduction and death of Jean McConville. [Add.4; D.12]. Boston College moved to quash the subpoenas. [D.12]. After an in camera review of over 1,000 pages of transcripts and other documents, the district court (Young, J.) denied the motion to quash and ordered When the subpoenas were served, the Commissioner was Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Todd F. Braunstein. In September 2011, AUSA John T. McNeil succeeded AUSA Braunstein as Commissioner. [D.20]. In June 2012, First Assistant United States Attorney Jack W. Pirozzolo succeeded AUSA McNeil as Commissioner. [D.68]. The US-UK MLAT, which is in full force and effect, is formally known as the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed at Washington, D.C., on January 6, 1994 (the 1994 Treaty), S. Treaty Doc. 104-2, as amended by the Instrument as contemplated by Article 3(2) of the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the United States of America and the European Union signed 25 June 2003, as to the application of the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters signed 6 January 2004, signed at London on December 16, 2004 (the 2004 Instrument), S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-13. The Annex to the 2004 Instrument reflects the integrated text of the provisions of the 1994 Treaty and the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the United States of America and the European Union, signed June 25, 2003. 2
3 2
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the production of certain documents and recordings. [Add.51-55; JA:201]. On April 24, 2012, this Court stayed the district courts order pending appeal with the governments assent. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. The subpoenas and motions to quash.
In May 2011, a Commissioner appointed pursuant to the US-UK MLAT issued subpoenas to: (i) the John J. Burns Library at Boston College; (ii) Robert K. ONeill, the Director of the Burns Library; and (iii) Thomas E. Hachey, Professor of History and Executive Director of the Center for Irish Studies at Boston College, seeking documents and records relating to interviews with Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price, former members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). [Add.4]. The interviews of Hughes and Price were part of a group of interviews conducted between 2001 and 20064 with participants in the Troubles in Northern Ireland as part of an oral history project known as the Belfast Project. [Add.4-5; JA:55]. Under the directorship of Ed Moloney, the Belfast Project recorded approximately 200 interviews with about 40 different individuals who were members of groups involved in the Troubles, including the IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force
The materials held by Boston College also included additional interviews conducted with Dolours Price in 2010. 3
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(UVF). [Add.5,7; JA:143]. The resulting interviews were stored in a limitedaccess portion of the Burns Library. [Add.6]. Boston College provided the United States with information relating to Hughes, who had passed away, but declined to provide the documents relating to Price. [Add.3]. Boston College subsequently moved on behalf of the subpoena recipients to quash the United Statess request for the Price materials. [Id.; D.5]. In its motion, Boston College contended that the interviews were granted in exchange for promises of confidentiality and should be protected from disclosure as confidential academic research materials. [Add.8, 34]. Boston College also argued that disclosure of the interviews would have adverse consequences, including a chilling effect on future oral history projects and possible retaliation against interviewees and against one of the Belfast Project interviewers, Anthony McIntyre, who was himself a former IRA member. [Add.8; JA:54-57]. Boston College additionally argued that the district court should undertake an in camera review of the materials to determine which, if any, should be disclosed. [D.5, p.17]. The United States opposed the motion to quash. [D.7]. The United States argued that the US-UK MLAT strictly circumscribed the district courts authority to review the subpoena, requiring the court to enforce the subpoena unless it
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violated a constitutional guarantee or a federally recognized testimonial privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege). [D.7, p.8]. The United States further argued that, to the extent the district court found it necessary to consider whether the materials were protected from disclosure by the First Amendment, it should be guided by Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), which held that a reporter has no First Amendment right to refuse to answer relevant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation. [D.7, p.14 (quoting 408 U.S. at 708)]. Based on these principles, the government argued that Boston College had not identified any basis justifying its refusal to produce the requested documents. [D.7, pp.16-21]. In August 2011, while the motion to quash was pending, the Commissioner served a second set of subpoenas. [Add.4]. These subpoenas requested the
production of all materials relating to any and all interviews containing information about the abduction and death of Mrs. Jean McConville. [Id.].
McConville was a widowed mother of 10 who disappeared in 1972 and is believed to have been murdered shortly after her abduction by members of the IRA. [JA:74, 76]. Boston College moved to quash these subpoenas on the same grounds as it had the earlier subpoenas. [D.12]. A short time later, Moloney and McIntyre moved to intervene in the motions to quash. [D.18]. The United States opposed
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both the supplemental motion to quash and Moloney and McIntyres motion to intervene. [D.13, 24]. 2. The December 16, 2011 Memorandum and Order.
On December 16, 2011, the district court issued a memorandum and order that resolved a number of issues relating to the motions to quash and also addressed the motion to intervene. The court first considered whether it had
discretion to review a subpoena issued by a commissioner pursuant to an MLAT. [Add.22]. Construing the language of the US-UK MLAT and 18 U.S.C. 3512, the court concluded that it retained discretion to conduct such review. [Add.26]. The district court next turned to the standard to be applied in reviewing the subpoenas. [Add.27]. After considering relevant precedents, the court found that the appropriate standard of review is analogous to that used in reviewing grand jury subpoena[s]. [Add.33]. Under this standard, the court held that a properly authorized subpoena is entitled to deference and granted a presumption of regularity. [Add.32; see also id. (noting that context of MLAT makes it
appropriate for courts to be extremely deferential to government requests)]. The court further found that the strong factors in favor of the government concerning a subpoena requested pursuant to an MLAT could be overcome only upon a showing of a constitutional violation or applicable privilege. [Add.34].
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Turning to Boston Colleges claim that the materials were protected by the First Amendment, the court rejected the proposition that there was a recognized privilege protecting confidential academic information from disclosure. [Add.37]. Nonetheless, the court went on to evaluate Boston Colleges First Amendment rights under a hybrid test it derived from this Courts precedent, in particular Cusumano v. Microsoft, 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998), and In re: Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). [Add.34-41]. Under this test, the court first considered three threshold questions: whether the disclosure was directly relevant to a nonfrivolous claim or inquiry undertaken in good faith; whether the materials were readily available from a less sensitive source; and whether the information could be considered confidential. [Add.41-42]. The court concluded that these standards were met, finding that the subpoenas were in good faith and relevant to a nonfrivolous criminal inquiry, that the materials were not readily available from a less sensitive source, and that the materials were meant to be confidential. [Id.]. The district court then balanc[ed] the governments need for the requested information against the potential harm to the free flow of information. [Add.42]. Here, the court found that the UKs request concerned serious allegations of crimes including murder, conspiracy to murder, incitement to murder, . . .
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kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm and that this weigh[ed] strongly in favor of disclosing the confidential information. [Add.45]. The court
acknowledged that, [i]n general, the compelled disclosure of confidential research does have a chilling effect, and that the disclosure could have a negative impact on other oral history projects (although not this one, since the Belfast Project was complete), but ultimately ruled that this did not justify quashing the subpoenas. [Add.45-48]. The district court then ordered that the material be turned over to the court for in camera review pursuant to the standards it had announced. [Add.48]. The court denied Moloney and McIntyres motion to intervene. [Id.]. Neither the United States nor Boston College appealed from the December 16, 2011 memorandum and order.5 Moloney and McIntyre, however, appealed from the denial of their motion to intervene and from the dismissal of a separate civil action challenging the MLAT request. [D.39].6 On July 6, 2012, while this appeal was pending, this Court issued its decision in Moloney and McIntyres appeals. See In re: Request from the United Kingdom Pursuant to the Treaty
The United States, having prevailed in the district court, did not need to appeal. Nonetheless, the United States continued to note its objection to the courts determination that it should undertake any weighing of First Amendments interests in reviewing the documents and that any standard other than that of Branzburg should apply. [See JA:188-89; see also D.36 (S.App.6); D.48].
6
The two appeals were consolidated, expedited, and argued on April 4, 2012. 8
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Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price (In re: Request), Nos. 11-2511, 12-1159, slip op. (1st Cir. July 6, 2012).7 As relevant here, the substance of that decision is discussed below. 3. Subsequent proceedings.
On December 20 and 22, 2011, the district court held conferences to discuss the process of conducting its in camera review. At the conferences, Boston
College revealed that the Price materials included 13 interviews and that there were 192 additional interviews (a number subsequently revised downward to 176), involving 24 other IRA-affiliated individuals, that potentially contained information responsive to the second set of subpoenas. [Add.51; JA:158-59].8 The court informed the parties that it would be performing the in camera review itself, beginning with the Price materials. [JA:147]. At the December 20 conference, the United States urged the district court to take an inclusive view of what documents were responsive to the subpoenas, noting that the court was taking on the role that ordinarily the UK government or
7
A copy of this slip opinion is contained in the United Statess addendum.
Boston College also stated that there were additional interviews involving nonIRA related individuals. The parties agreed that these materials were unlikely to contain relevant information and that Boston College would take responsibility for reviewing these materials. [JA:158]. 9
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the United States government would take, . . . looking with[] the eye of an investigator at investigative materials. [JA:155]. The court stated that it
understood and invited the United States to submit, ex parte and under seal, any additional information it believed would assist the court regarding the context of the criminal conduct to which the subpoena requests related. [JA:156]. The
government subsequently did so, supplementing earlier ex parte filings discussing the nature of the investigation. [See S.App.6-14; see also S.App.1-5; D.8]. At the second conference, the district court provided additional information about its review process. The court stated that, on the one hand, it would be looking at the materials to see whether, fairly read, they fall within the scope of the subpoena. [JA:173]. In doing so, the court explained, it would not be
reviewing for any issue of relevance as [] attorneys would think of it meaning an evaluation of the evidence for materiality [and] logical relevance to particular charges because it did not have sufficient information about the UK investigation or the crimes charged to do that. [JA:172-73]. It would, however, be checking to see whether the data produced conforms to the subpoena, and if material relate[d] entirely to other events, other times than called for in the subpoena, it would not order the material produced. [JA:173].
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On the other hand, the court stated, it was balancing [disclosure] against the free flow of information, meaning that it would maintain a sensitivity to the importance of the free flow of information in our society and the essential role that our institutions of higher education here play in that. [JA:173-74]. On this point, the court noted that, having begun its review, it believed the materials were of valid academic interest[] and that Ms. Price, at least, would not have said what she did if she thought the information would be revealed.9 [JA:174]. The court also explained that it was still thinking about how to weigh the impact of disclosure on the free flow of ideas and was continuing to review information on this subject. [JA:174-79]. At the conclusion of the conference, Boston College asked that the district court, when reviewing the Price materials, consider the purposes of the underlying investigation and exclude material that was not relevant to that purpose. [JA:192]. The district court responded that it d[id not] think it [was] the role of [the] court to perform a relevancy inquiry. [Id.].
The court later qualified the latter statement, in light of information showing that Price, in published interviews, had revealed details of her IRA involvement. [JA:189]. 11
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4.
The January 20, 2012 Findings and Order.
On December 27, 2011, the district court issued an order requiring Boston College to turn over the Price materials in their entirety, which Boston College did not appeal. [JA:195-97]. On January 20, 2012, the court issued a separate
Findings and Order addressing the second set of subpoenas. [Add.51-55]. The court explained that it had personally conducted a review of the transcripts of interviews relating to 24 interviewees over 1,000 pages of material pursuant to the standards described in its prior rulings, sensitive that the requesting state desires the subpoena to be read expansively. [Add.52; JA:201]. Having done so, the court found that six interviewees mention[ed] the disappearance of Jean McConville. [Id.]. Of these, one interviewee provide[d] information responsive to the subpoena and a second had proffer[ed] information that, if broadly read, is responsive to the subpoena. [Id.]. Three others ma[d]e passing mention of the incident, although the court could not discern whether these three [were] commenting from personal knowledge, from hearsay, or are merely repeating local folklore. [Id.]. The sixth provided information that the court determined, in context, did nothing more than express [a] personal opinion on public disclosures made years after the incident. [Id.]. The court ruled that Boston College should
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produce the full series of interviews for the first five individuals, but need not produce materials relating to the sixth individual. [Id.]. The court also stated that two other interviewees had mention[ed] a shadowy suborganization within the Irish Republican Army that may or may not be involved in the incident (the time period and geographical location within Northern Ireland are generally congruent with the incident). [Id.]. The court noted that the references were made at such a vague level of generality that it was virtually inconceivable that UK authorities did not already have the information. [Add.52-53]. Nonetheless, the court determined that Boston College should produce the two specific transcripts in which this organization was discussed together with sufficient identifiers to ascertain the identity of the interviewees. [Add.53]. The court did not require any other materials to be produced. The district court stayed its order and this Court subsequently extended that stay pending appeal, with the governments assent. [D.67]. Thus, no materials have been turned over pursuant to the January 20 order. 5. This Courts July 6, 2012 decision.
Moloneys and McIntyres appeals from the district courts denial of their motion to intervene and dismissal of their separate civil action raised a number of
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arguments going to the merits of the district courts December 16, 2012 ruling. Of particular relevance here, Moloney and McIntyre argued that the district courts order declining to quash the Commissioners subpoenas infringed First Amendment protections accorded to confidential academic materials under this Courts precedents, including Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708. See In re: Request, slip op. at 32. In its July 6, 2012 decision, this Court addressed and rejected Moloneys and McIntyres argument. Id. at 32-41. In doing so, the Court bypassed the question whether the district court had discretion to quash the subpoena in the first place and decided the merits of the First Amendment claim. Id. at 28-30. On the merits, the Court held that the scope of any applicable academic privilege protecting the Boston College materials was controlled by Branzburg, which established that neither the First Amendment nor any common law privilege was violated by requiring the production of confidential materials in response to a criminal subpoena. Id. at 33. The Court also found relevant the Supreme Courts decision in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), which rejected a universitys claim of academic privilege for peer review materials and also rejected a requirement that there be a judicial finding of particularized relevance before such materials should be disclosed in response to a subpoena in a tenure
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discrimination case. Slip op. at 35 (citing University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 188, 194). The Court concluded, based on these precedents, that Moloney and McIntyre simply ha[d] no constitutional claim against production of the materials; thus, their assertions of such rights were properly rejected and the district courts denial of the motion to quash not an abuse of discretion. Slip op. 29-30, 40 & n.27. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In this appeal addressing the same collection of academic materials at issue in In re: Request, Boston College contends that the district court abused its discretion in its January 20, 2012 Findings and Order by requiring the production of documents that were not directly relevant to the subpoena. This claim is foreclosed by this Courts recent decision in In re: Request, which rejected the contention that this Courts precedents warrant the application of any heightened scrutiny or relevance requirement to the Belfast Project materials. Absent such a requirement, Boston College identifies no basis for concluding that the district courts review of the materials constituted an abuse of discretion, and the district courts order should therefore be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSIONERS SUBPOENA. Boston Colleges public brief makes, at bottom, a single legal argument that this Courts precedents required the district court to order the disclosure only of information directly relevant to the UKs request and that the courts January 20, 2012 order violated this requirement. This argument is foreclosed by this Courts recent decision in In re: Request, which establishes that no First Amendment or common law privilege protects the Belfast Project materials from being produced in response to the Commissioners subpoenas. A. Standard of review.
This Court reviews a district courts denial of a motion to quash a subpoena for abuse of discretion. United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 462 (1st Cir. 2009). Where a party claims that the court applied an erroneous legal standard in denying its motion to quash, that claim is reviewed de novo, if preserved. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442, 444 (1st Cir. 1998); accord Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 713. If not preserved, a claim of legal error is reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Farrell, 672 F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, review arguably should be only for plain error. While Boston College questioned the
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district courts statement that it would not review for relevance, it did not specifically argue, as it does now, that In re Special Proceedings required the court to disclose only materials directly relevant to the subpoena. The standard of review does not matter, however, because Boston Colleges claim is foreclosed in any event. B. In Re: Request forecloses Boston Colleges argument that the district court was required to order the production only of material directly relevant to the UKs request.
Relying on language in In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, Boston College argues that, due to the First Amendment concerns present in this case, the district court could order the disclosure only of information from the Belfast Project that it determined to be directly relevant to the purposes for which the information was sought. [Br.31-32]. Because the court did not limit the disclosure to directly relevant materials, Boston College argues, it abused its discretion. [Br.34-37]. This argument fails at its first step, as this Courts decision in In re: Request establishes that the First Amendment does not provide a basis for Boston College to withhold these materials. At the outset, the United States notes that this case, like In re: Request, implicates the threshold question of whether the district court had discretion under 3512 and the US-UK MLAT to consider First Amendment claims like those
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raised here. It remains the United Statess position that the court did not have such discretion. As the United States argued below, the US-UK MLAT imposes a mandatory obligation on the parties to provide assistance in criminal investigations when asked. [D.7, pp.6-7]. While the treaty allows the United States to decline to execute a request or to delay or narrow such execution under particular circumstances, it reserves the authority to take these actions to the Attorney General, not the courts. [D.7, pp.7-8]. To the extent courts retain discretion, it is limited to circumstances where enforcement would offend constitutional guarantees, see In re Premises Located at 840 140th Avenue NE, Bellevue, Washington, 634 F.3d 557, 572 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing request under the USRussia MLAT), or violate a federally-recognized privilege, such as the attorneyclient or spousal privileges. [See D.7, pp.8-9 & n.4 (citing legislative materials and precedent supporting narrow scope of district court discretion)]. Resolution of this appeal, however, does not require this Court to address that question for the same reason that it did not need to be addressed in In re: Request: Boston College articulates no valid basis for concluding that whatever discretion the court possessed was abused. Slip op. at 29-30.10 As noted above, the United States did not appeal because, although it objected to the standard employed by the district court and its in camera review, the government was satisfied with the result reached by the district court. The government urges the Court not to endorse the standard or process employed by the 18
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Boston Colleges argument on appeal starts from the premise that this Court, in cases like Cusumano and In re Special Proceedings, has afforded special protection to confidential academic research materials of the kind at issue here that requires heightened sensitivity and a finding of direct relevance before they could be disclosed to the United States pursuant to the US-UK MLAT. [Br.21-22, 28-32]. This protection, Boston College contends [Br.21], is greater than that suggested by the Supreme Courts decision in Branzburg, which declined to find that newspaper reporters had any privilege grounded in the First Amendment or the common law to refuse to disclose confidential information in response to a properly issued grand jury subpoena. 408 U.S. at 690-91 ([W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.). In Boston Colleges view, the district courts abuse of discretion occurred because the court failed to implement these special protections in conducting its review of the
district court. If the Court reaches the issue, it is the United Statess position that the district court's discretion is limited to evaluating whether the issuance of a subpoena would offend some constitutional guarantee or violate a recognized federal privilege. 19
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Belfast Project documents. [See Br.34 (district court abused its discretion because it used the wrong test in its in camera review)]. Boston Colleges argument is untenable after In re: Request., which squarely rejected the claim that First Circuit precedent addressing confidential academic information provides a basis for objecting to the disclosure of Belfast Project materials pursuant to the UKs MLAT request. In re: Request acknowledged the prior cases Boston College cites as affording greater protections than Branzburg, but concluded that those cases arose in distinguishable circumstances, while this case is closer to Branzburg itself. Slip op. at 36-37. Indeed, the Court noted that [t]he law enforcement interest here a criminal investigation by a foreign sovereign advanced through treaty obligations is arguably even stronger than the governments interest in Branzburg. Id. at 36-37. As a result, Branzburg
controls. Id. at 33. Applying the Branzburg analysis, the Court concluded that the interests that Moloney and McIntyre asserted in favor of protecting the Belfast Project material, including concerns of a chilling effect on academic research, potential threat[s] [to] job security or personal safety, and dishonor or embarrassment, had been considered and found insufficient in Branzburg and, as a result, necessarily [were] insufficient here. Id. at 38-39.
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In re: Requests holding applies with equal force to Boston Colleges claim here, which asserts the same rights in connection with the same academic materials. Given In re: Requests conclusion that the protections afforded the Belfast Project materials in this context are measured by Branzburg, and that those protections are not infringed by the disclosure of those materials pursuant to the US-UK MLAT, Boston Colleges claim cannot succeed. The district court had no obligation to go beyond Branzburg by reviewing the Belfast Project materials with heightened sensitivity and authorizing the disclosure of only directly relevant documents; as a result, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to do so. C. Boston College identifies no other error in the district courts determination of the documents to be disclosed.
While the foregoing provides sufficient basis to reject Boston Colleges appeal, a further brief response is warranted to address Boston Colleges suggestion, in addition to its legal argument, that the district court improperly ordered the disclosure of documents that simply bore no relationship to the Commissioners subpoenas and/or the MLAT request. suggestion also lacks support. First, the United States notes that it did not propose or agree with the in camera review process that procedure was urged by Boston College. [D.5, p.17]. Having persuaded the district court to undertake the task of reviewing more than a 21 [Br.38-40]. This
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thousand pages of documents to determine what should be turned over, Boston College faces a high hurdle in arguing that this Court should revisit the courts judgment. This point was made by this Court in United States v. LaRouche
Campaign, which emphasized the near-final effect of a district courts decision regarding the documents to be disclosed after in camera review, which is justified by the deference accorded the district courts in making this type of determination as well as the fact that a party resisting disclosure would not normally have detailed knowledge regarding the needs that animated the request in the first place. 841 F.2d 1176, 1183 (1st Cir. 1988). These considerations have particular import here, where the district court received and considered non-public, ex parte information regarding the scope of the investigation. [Discussion Filed Separately Under Seal]. In light of this information, the district court reasonably chose to read the subpoena expansively. [Add.52]. Boston College also misstates the record in suggesting that the district court abandoned any attempt to assess the relevance of the documents selected. [Br.3435]. The courts statements at the December 22, 2011 conference make plain that it was declining only to review[] for any issue of relevance as [] attorneys would think of it in terms of an in-court proceeding, meaning the materiality [and]
22
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logical relevance of the information to particular criminal charges. [JA:172-73]. The court affirmed that it would be reviewing the materials for relevance in a less formal sense, that is to see whether, fairly read, they fall within the scope of the subpoena. [JA:173]. This distinction was reasonable. Because the information was sought in the context of a broad criminal investigation, rather than in a charged case, the court was not well-positioned to judge materiality or logical relevance. Rather, the more plausible standard for relevance was whether the information was responsive to the subpoena. Nor is any error demonstrated by the district courts statement in its January 20, 2012 order that only one interviewee provided information fully responsive to the subpoena, while another was said to have done so only if the information was broadly read and three others merely made passing mention of the incident involving McConville. [Br.38]. Read in the context of the record as a whole, and in light of the information sought by the UK, these statements do not establish that the court was ordering the production of documents that were outside the proper scope of the subpoena. Rather, the courts statements are reasonably read as reflecting its effort to be transparent about the differing degrees to which the interviewees had discussed the McConville abduction while respecting the fact
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that much of what it knew regarding the contents of the interviews (and the nature of the UKs request) was not a matter of public record. In light of the foregoing, the government is aware of no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion in determining the Belfast Project documents that should be turned over in response to the Commissioners subpoena. The district courts order should be affirmed. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district courts order.
Respectfully submitted, CARMEN M. ORTIZ United States Attorney By: /s/ Randall E. Kromm RANDALL E. KROMM Assistant U.S. Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH Rule 32(a) Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 5,334 words (an opening or answering brief may not exceed 14,000 words, a reply brief may not exceed 7,000 words), excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) (i.e., the corporate disclosure statement, table of contents, table of citations, addendum, and certificates of counsel). This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Times New Roman 14 point, in Word Perfect 14.
2.
/s/ Randall E. Kromm Assistant U.S. Attorney Randall E. Kromm Dated: July 18, 2012
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Randall E. Kromm, Assistant U.S. Attorney, hereby certify that on July 18, 2012, I electronically served a copy of the foregoing document on the following registered participant of the CM/ECF system: Jeffrey Swope, Esq. Nicholas A. Soivilien, Esq. Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP 111 Huntington Ave. Boston, MA 02199 /s/ Randall E. Kromm RANDALL E. KROMM
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Appeal No. 12-1236 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ___________________ IN RE: REQUEST FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM PURSUANT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN THE MATTER OF DOLOURS PRICE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner-Appellee v. TRUSTEES OF BOSTON COLLEGE, ET AL., Movants-Appellants ___________________ Addendum Table of Contents 1. In re: Request from the United Kingdom Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price, Nos. 11-2511, 12-1159 slip op. (1st Cir. July 6, 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G.Add.1
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United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit
No. 11-2511 IN RE: REQUEST FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM PURSUANT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN THE MATTER OF DOLOURS PRICE
UNITED STATES, Petitioner, Appellee, v. ED MOLONEY; ANTHONY McINTYRE, Movants, Appellants.
No. 12-1159 ED MOLONEY; ANTHONY McINTYRE, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General; JACK W. PIROZZOLO, Commissioner, Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before Lynch, Chief Judge, Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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Eamonn Dornan, with whom Dornan & Associates PLLC and James J. Cotter III were on brief, for appellants. Barbara Healy Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, and John T. McNeil, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
July 6, 2012
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LYNCH, Chief Judge. the denial, in two cases,
These consolidated appeals are from of the efforts of two academic
researchers to prevent the execution of two sets of subpoenas issued in May and August of 2011. The subpoenas were issued to
Boston College ("BC") by a commissioner appointed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3512 and the "US-UK MLAT," the mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. subpoenas are part of an investigation by United The
Kingdom
authorities into the 1972 abduction and death of Jean McConville, who was thought to have acted as an informer for the British authorities on the activities of republicans in Northern Ireland. This appears to be the first court of appeals decision to deal with an MLAT and 3512. The May 2011 subpoenas sought oral history recordings and associated documentation from interviews BC researchers had
conducted with two former members of the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"): Dolours Price and Brendan Hughes. Hughes materials because he had died BC turned over the and so he had no
confidentiality interests at stake. the Price subpoenas.
BC moved to quash or modify
The second set of subpoenas issued in August
2011 sought any information related to the death or abduction of McConville contained in any of the other interview materials held by BC. BC moved to quash these subpoenas as well.
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The district court denied both motions to quash.
In re: And
Request from the U.K., 831 F. Supp. 2d 435 (D. Mass. 2011).
after undertaking in camera review of the subpoenaed materials it ordered production. Order, In re: Request from the U.K., No. 11-
91078 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2011), ECF No. 38 (ordering production of Price interviews pursuant to May subpoenas); Findings and Order, In re: Request from the U.K., No. 11-91078, 2012 WL 194432 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2012) (ordering production of other interviews pursuant to August subpoenas). BC has appealed the order regarding the August BC chose not
subpoenas, but that appeal is not before this panel.
to appeal the order regarding the Price materials sought by the May subpoenas. The appellants here, Ed Moloney and Anthony McIntyre, who unsuccessfully sought to intervene in BC's case on both sets of subpoenas, pursue in the first appeal a challenge to the district court's denial of their motions to intervene as of right and for permissive intervention. Their intervention complaint largely
repeated the claims made by BC and sought declarations that the Attorney General's compliance with the United Kingdom's request violates the US-UK MLAT and injunctive relief or mandamus
compelling him to comply with the terms of that treaty. The effect of the relief sought would be to impede the execution of the subpoenas.
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Having lost on intervention, Moloney and McIntyre then filed their own original complaint, essentially making the same claims as made in this intervenor complaint. The district court
dismissed the complaint, stating that even assuming the two had standing, the reasons it gave in its reported decision for denial of BC's arguments and denial of intervention applied to dismissal of the complaint. See Order of Dismissal, Moloney v. Holder, No.
11-12331 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 2012), ECF No. 15; Tr. of Mot. Hr'g, Moloney v. Holder, No. 11-12331 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2012), ECF No. 18. Appellants freely admit that their complaint "essentially set In the
forth the same claim" as their complaint in intervention.
second appeal they challenge the dismissal of their separate civil complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. I. The factual background for these suits is not disputed. A. The Belfast Project at Boston College The Belfast Project ("the Project") began in 2001 under the sponsorship of BC. An oral history project, its goal was to
document in taped interviews the recollections of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Provisional Sinn Fein, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and other paramilitary and political
organizations involved in the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland from 1969 forward. The purpose was to gather and preserve the stories
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of individual participants and provide insight into those who become personally engaged in violent conflict. The Project is
housed at the John J. Burns Library of Rare Books and Special Collections at BC. The Project was first proposed by appellant Ed Moloney, a journalist and writer. He later contracted with BC to become the Project's director. Before the Project started, Robert K. O'Neill, the Director of the Burns Library, informed Moloney that, although he had not yet conferred with counsel on the point, he could not guarantee that BC "would be in a position to refuse to turn over documents [from the Project] on a court order without being held in contempt." Against this background, the Project attempted to guard against unauthorized disclosure. The agreement between Moloney and BC directed him as Project Director to require interviewers and interviewees to sign a confidentiality agreement forbidding them from disclosing the existence or scope of the Project without the permission of BC. The agreement also required the use of a coding
system to maintain the anonymity of interviewees and provided that only the Burns Librarian and Moloney would have access to the key identifying the interviewees. Although the interviews were
originally going to be stored in Belfast, Northern Ireland, as well as Boston, the Project leadership ultimately decided that the interviews could only be safely stored in the United States. They
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were eventually stored in the "Treasure Room" of the Burns Library, with extremely limited access. The agreement between Moloney and BC requires that
"[e]ach interviewee is to be given a contract guaranteeing to the extent American law allows the conditions of the interview and the conditions of its deposit at the Burns Library, including terms of an embargo period if it becomes necessary" (emphasis added). agreement, in this clause, expressly acknowledged that The its
protections could be limited by American law.
The agreement also
directs that the Project adopt an "appropriate user model, such as Columbia University's Oral History Research Office Guidelines statement."1 The Project employed researchers to interview former members of the Irish Republican Army and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Appellant Anthony McIntyre, himself a former IRA member, McIntyre worked for the Project
was one of those researchers.
under a contract governed by the terms of the agreement between Moloney and BC. McIntyre's contract required him to transcribe and index the interviews he conducted and to abide by the
confidentiality requirements of the Moloney agreement.
McIntyre
conducted a total of twenty-six interviews of persons associated
As the district court noted in its opinion, researchers for Columbia University's oral history projects apparently advise interviewees that whatever they say is subject to release under court orders and subpoenas. See In re: Request from the U.K., 831 F. Supp. 2d 435, 441 n.4 (D. Mass. 2011). -7-
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with the republican side of the conflict for the Project by the time it ended in 2006. In addition, the Project contains
interviews with fourteen members of Protestant paramilitary groups and one member of law enforcement. There are a total of forty-one
interview series (each series may contain multiple interviews with a single person). Interviewees entered into donation agreements with BC, which were signed by the interviewees and by O'Neill, the Burns Librarian. The donation agreements transfer possession of the
interview recordings and transcripts to BC and assign to the school "absolute title" to the materials, "including whatever copyright" the interviewee may own in their contents. The donation agreements have the following clause regarding access to the interview
materials: Access to the tapes and transcripts shall be restricted until after my death except in those cases where I have provided prior written approval for their use following consultation with the Burns Librarian, Boston College. Due to the sensitivity of content, the ultimate power of release shall rest with me. After my death the Burns Librarian of Boston College may exercise such power exclusively. This clause does not contain the term "confidentiality" and
provides only that access will be restricted.
But it does recite
that the ultimate power of release belongs to the donor during the donor's lifetime. The donation agreements do not contain the "to
the extent American law allows" language that is contained in the -8-
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agreement between Moloney and BC. A copy of the donation agreement for Brendan Hughes, but not one for Dolours Price, is in the record, but we assume both signed one.2 In 2010 Moloney published a book and released a
documentary, both entitled "Voices from the Grave, Two Men's War in Ireland," based on Belfast Project interviews with Hughes and with David Ervine, a former member of the Ulster Volunteer Force.3 In
addition, news reports in Northern Ireland revealed that Price had been interviewed by academics at a Boston-area university and that she had admitted to being involved in the murder and
"disappearances" of four persons targeted by the IRA, including Jean McConville. B. The US-UK MLAT Subpoenas On March 30, 2011, the United States submitted an
application to the district court ex parte and under seal pursuant to the US-UK MLAT and 18 U.S.C. 3512, seeking the appointment of an Assistant United States Attorney as commissioner to collect
An affidavit from McIntyre, who interviewed Price, states that Price did sign a donation agreement, which McIntyre states that he witnessed and also signed, and that he sent the donation form to BC. The affidavit from O'Neill, the Burns Librarian, states that a search of the Project's archives for Price's executed donation agreement failed to locate it, but that there is no reason to doubt that Price did in fact execute a donation agreement just like the one executed by Hughes. At the time the book was published, both Hughes and Ervine had died, so under the terms of their donation agreements their interviews could be released to the public. -93
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evidence from witnesses and to take such other action as necessary to effectuate a request from law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom. That application remains under seal. The
application resulted from a formal request made by the United Kingdom, pursuant to the US-UK MLAT, for legal assistance in a pending criminal investigation in that country involving the 1972 murder and kidnapping of Jean McConville. The district court
granted the government's application on March 31, 2011, and entered a sealed order granting the requested appointment. The commissioner issued two sets of subpoenas for Belfast Project materials. The first set of subpoenas were received by BC
on May 5, 2011, and were directed to the Trustees of Boston College; Robert K. O'Neill, Director of the Burns Library; and Thomas E. Hachey, Professor of History and Executive Director of the Center for Irish Studies at BC. The subpoenas were issued for
the purpose of assisting the United Kingdom "regarding an alleged violation of the laws of the United Kingdom," namely, murder, conspiracy to murder, incitement to murder, aggravated burglary, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm. The subpoenas did not state the
identity of the victim or victims of these crimes, and sought recordings, written documents, written notes, and computer records of interviews made with Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price, to be produced on May 26, 2011.
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BC produced responsive materials related to Hughes; the conditions of his donation agreement pertaining to the release of his interviews had terminated with his death. The time to produce
the Price materials was extended by agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office until June 2, 2011. The second set of subpoenas were received by counsel for BC on August 4, 2011. The August subpoenas sought recordings of
"any and all interviews containing information about the abduction and death of Mrs. Jean McConville," along with related transcripts, records, and other materials. The August subpoenas were directed
at the 176 interviews with the remaining 24 republican-associated interviewees who were part of the Project. These subpoenas
directed production no later than August 17, 2011. C. The Litigation Initiated by BC On June 7, 2011, BC moved to quash the May subpoenas. In the alternative, BC requested that the court allow representatives from BC access to the documents that describe the purposes of the investigation to enable BC to specify with more particularity in what ways the subpoenas were overbroad or that the court conduct such a review in camera. The government opposed the motion. After receiving the August subpoenas, BC filed a new motion to quash addressed to both sets of subpoenas, which the government also opposed.
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On August 31, 2011, appellants Moloney and McIntyre filed a motion to intervene as of right and for permissive intervention, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, along with their intervention complaint. That pleading tracked the arguments made in BC's motion to quash and also alleged that the Attorney General's compliance with the United Kingdom's request violated the US-UK MLAT and that
enforcement of the subpoenas would violate Moloney and McIntyre's First and Fifth Amendment rights. Moloney and McIntyre sought
declarations that the Attorney General was in violation of the US-UK MLAT and injunctive relief or mandamus compelling him to comply with the terms of that treaty, the effect of which would be to impede the execution of the subpoenas. the motions to intervene. On December 16, 2011, the district court issued an opinion denying BC's motions to quash the May and August subpoenas for the reasons stated in its opinion. U.K., 831 F. Supp. 2d at 459. In re: Request from the The government opposed
As to BC's alternative request, the
court ordered BC to produce materials responsive to the two sets of subpoenas for the court to review in camera.4 Id.
During a hearing held on December 22, 2011, the court explained that it would engage in a two-part analysis, first determining whether the produced materials fell within the scope of the subpoenas, and second engaging in a balancing test. See Tr. of Conf., In re: Request from the U.K., No. 11-91078 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2011), ECF No. 35. -12-
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The district court also denied Moloney and McIntyre's motion to intervene as of right and their motion for permissive intervention. Id. The court stated that no federal statute gave
Moloney and McIntyre an unconditional right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1), "and the US-UK MLAT prohibits them from challenging the Attorney General's decisions to pursue the MLAT request."5 458. The district represents court any "conclude[d] potential that Boston claimed Id. at College by the
adequately
interests
Intervenors.
Boston College has already argued ably in favor of
protecting Moloney, McIntyre and the interviewees." Id. The court did not separately analyze permissive intervention. Moloney and
McIntyre timely appealed the denial of their motion to intervene on December 29, 2011. Having reviewed in camera the interviews of Dolours Price sought by the May subpoenas, the district court on December 27, 2011 ordered that the May subpoenas be enforced according to their terms. See Order, In re: Request from the U.K., No. 11-91078 (D. BC and the other recipients of
Mass. Dec. 27, 2011), ECF No. 38.
the May subpoenas did not appeal this order.6
The district court also mentioned but did not analyze the rule that "[a]n interest that is too contingent or speculative . . . cannot furnish a basis for intervention as of right." In re: Request from the U.K., 831 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (quoting Ungar v. Arafat, 634 F.3d 46, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On December 30, 2011, this court granted Moloney and McIntyre's motion to stay the portion of the district court's order -136
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Having been denied intervention, Moloney and McIntyre filed a separate civil complaint in the district court on December 29, 2011. The same legal theories were stated in this complaint as had been in the intervention complaint. The government moved to
dismiss plaintiffs' separate complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on January 24, 2012, and dismissed the case from the bench. See Tr. of Mot. Hr'g at 11, Moloney v. Holder, No. 11-12331 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2012), ECF No. 18. The district court "rule[d] that neither Mr. McIntyre nor Mr. Moloney under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and its adoption by the [S]enate and the treaty materials has standing to bring this particular claim." district court also stated: Beyond that, on the merits, I am satisfied that the Attorney General as [a] matter of law has acted appropriately with respect to the steps he has taken under this treaty, and I can conceive of no different result applying the heightened scrutiny that I think is appropriate for these materials were this case to go forward on the merits.7 Id. The
of December 27, 2011 permitting the government to turn over the Price interview materials to the United Kingdom, pending the resolution of this appeal. It is evident from the transcript of the hearing that the district court considered Moloney and McIntyre's constitutional claims as being the same as those raised by BC's motions to quash and that the court dismissed Moloney and McIntyre's claims for the -147
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Id.
Moloney and McIntyre timely appealed the dismissal of their
complaint on January 29, 2012. As to BC's motion to quash the August subpoenas, on January 20, 2012, the district court ordered BC to produce to the government the full series of interviews and transcripts of five interviewees and two specific interviews (but not the full
interview series) with two additional interviewees, along with transcripts and related records.8 See Findings and Order, In re:
Request from the U.K., No. 11-91078, 2012 WL 194432 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2012). The court determined that the remaining interviews were not within the subpoenas' scope.9 BC has appealed this order, and See Appeal No. 12-1236.
that appeal is not before this panel.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts (ACLUM) has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants Moloney and McIntyre.10
same reasons that it denied BC's motions. Tr. of Mot. Hr'g at 811, Moloney v. Holder, No. 11-12331 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2012), ECF No. 18. The court made production contingent on the lifting of the stay entered by this court on December 30, 2011. No party raises on appeal any question whether the district court had discretion to review the materials to determine whether they fell within the scope of the subpoenas or acted within any discretion it had. The brief states three interests: support of the First Amendment claim, expression of concern about disclosure of confidential information held by others, and an expression of concern about the government's interpretation of the US-UK MLAT. -1510 9 8
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II. Dismissal of the Civil Complaint's Claims Under the US-UK MLAT and 18 U.S.C. 3512 We review de novo the dismissal of the appellants' complaint. See Abdel-Aleem v. OPK Biotech LLC, 665 F.3d 38, 41
(1st Cir. 2012) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction reviewed de novo); Feliciano-Hernndez v. Pereira-Castillo, 663 F.3d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissal for failure to state a claim reviewed de novo), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 11, 2012). We "accept[] as true all well-pleaded facts, analyz[e]
those facts in the light most hospitable to the plaintiff's theory, and draw[] all reasonable inferences for the plaintiff." New York
v. Amgen Inc., 652 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 2011)), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 993. We are not
bound by the district court's reasoning but "may affirm an order of dismissal on any basis made apparent from the record." Cook v.
Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 266 (1st Cir. 2006)). Moloney and McIntyre essentially make several arguments of statutory error and one constitutional claim. They argue that
(1) they state a claim under the US-UK MLAT and 18 U.S.C. 3512; in any event, (2) they have a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, and 28 U.S.C. 1331; and that,
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regardless, (3) the district court had residual discretion which it abused in not quashing the subpoenas. They also argue that their
claim under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, brought under federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1331, was
improperly dismissed, an argument we address in part III. Moloney and McIntyre contend they may bring suit on the claims that the Attorney General failed to fulfill his obligations under the US-UK MLAT and that they have a private right of action to seek a writ of mandamus compelling him to comply with the treaty or to seek a declaration from a federal court that he has not complied with the treaty.11 The appellants' claims under the US-UK MLAT fail because appellants are not able to state a claim that they have private rights that arise under the treaty, and because a federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim for judicial review of the Attorney General's actions pursuant to the treaty.
Appellants assert that the Attorney General's actions violate the US-UK MLAT because it was not reasonable to believe that a prosecution would take place in the underlying case; he failed to take into account certain "essential interests" and "public policy" in deciding whether to comply with a request under the treaty; the crimes under investigation by the United Kingdom were "of a political character;" and he did not consider the implications for the peace process in Northern Ireland of complying with the United Kingdom's request. The federal courts may not review this decision by the Attorney General. -17-
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A.
Explanation of the Treaty and Statutory Scheme The United States has entered into a number of mutual
legal assistance treaties ("MLATs") which typically provide for bilateral, mutual assistance in the gathering of legal evidence for use by the requesting state in criminal investigations and
proceedings.
A description of the history and evolution of such
MLATs may be found in the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re 840 140th Ave. NE, 634 F.3d 557, 563-64 (9th Cir. 2011). The MLAT between the United States and the United Kingdom was signed on January 6, 1994, and entered into force on December 2, 1996. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-2. In 2003, the
United States signed a mutual legal assistance treaty with the European Union ("US-EU MLAT") that made additions and amendments to the US-UK MLAT; the latter is in turn included as an annex to the US-EU MLAT. See Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the
United States of America and the European Union, U.S.-E.U., June 25, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-13. Both MLATs are self-executing treaties. S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-13, at vii ("The U.S.-EU Mutual
Legal Assistance Agreement and bilateral instruments [including the annexed US-UK MLAT] are regarded as self-executing treaties under U.S. law . . . .").
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Article 1 of the US-UK MLAT provides that the parties to the agreement shall assist one another in taking testimony of persons; providing documents, records, and evidence; serving
documents; locating or identifying persons; transferring persons in custody for testimony or other purposes; executing requests for searches and seizures; identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing, and forfeiting the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; and
providing other assistance the parties' representatives may agree upon. See US-UK MLAT, art. 1, 2. Importantly, article 1 further states: "This treaty is intended solely for mutual legal assistance between the Parties. The provisions of this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request." art. 1, 3. US-UK MLAT,
This treaty expressly prohibits the creation of
private rights of action. Article 2 concerns Central Authorities: each party's representative responsible for making and receiving requests under the US-UK MLAT. US-UK MLAT, art. 2, 3. The treaty states that
the Central Authority for the United States is "the Attorney General or a person or agency designated by him." art. 2, 2. US-UK MLAT,
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Article 3 sets forth certain conditions under which the Central Authority of the Requested Party may refuse assistance.12 Before the Central Authority of a Requested Party denies assistance for any of the listed reasons, the treaty states that he or she "shall consult with the Central Authority of the Requesting Party to consider whether assistance can be given subject to such conditions as it deems necessary." US-UK MLAT, art. 3, 2.
12
Article 3, paragraph one states that [t]he Central Authority of the Requested Party may refuse assistance if: (a) the Requested Party is of the opinion that the request, if granted, would impair its sovereignty, security, or other essential interests or would be contrary to important public policy; (b) the request relates to an offender who, if proceeded against in the Requested Party for the offense for which assistance is requested, would be entitled to be discharged on the grounds of previous acquittal or conviction; or (c) the request relates to an offense that is regarded by the Requested Party as: (i) an offense of a political character; or (ii) an offense under military law of the Requested Party which is not also an offense under the ordinary civilian law of the Requested Party.
US-UK MLAT, art. 3, 1. -20-
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In article 18, entitled "Consultation," the treaty states that [t]he Parties, or Central Authorities, shall consult promptly, at the request of either, concerning the implementation of this Treaty either generally or in relation to a particular case. Such consultation may in particular take place if . . . either Party has rights or obligations under another bilateral or multilateral agreement relating to the subject matter of this Treaty. US-UK MLAT, art. 18, 1. The requests from the United Kingdom in this case were executed under 18 U.S.C. 3512, which was enacted as part of the Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-79, 123 Stat. 2086. When the US-UK MLAT was entered into,
requests for assistance were to be executed under a different statute, 28 U.S.C. 1782. (1996) (report of the See S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-23, at 13 Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate
accompanying the US-UK MLAT).
Among other differences, 3512
provides for a more streamlined process than under 1782 for executing requests from foreign governments related to the
prosecution of criminal offenses.13
Enforcement of similar MLATs
Section 1782 effectively requires the Attorney General as Central Authority to respond to requests for evidence from foreign governments by filing requests with the district court in every district in which evidence or a witness may be found. See 155 Cong. Rec. S6810 (daily ed. June 18, 2009) (letter from Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. Burton to Sen. Whitehouse). In practice this requires involving multiple U.S. Attorneys' Offices and district courts in a single case. Id. Section 3512, on the other hand, permits a single Assistant United States Attorney to pursue -21-
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under the provisions of 1782 was the subject of consideration in In re 840 140th Ave. NE, 634 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2011); In re Commissioner's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part by Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004); and In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993). B. Appellants Have No Enforceable Rights Derived from the US-UK MLAT Interpretation of the treaty takes place against "the background presumption . . . that '[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefitting private persons, generally do not create rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.'" Medelln v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.3 (2008)
(alteration in original) (quoting 2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 907 cmt. a, at 395 (1986)). The First Circuit and other courts of appeals have held that "treaties do not generally create rights that are privately
enforceable in the federal courts."
United States v. Li, 206 F.3d
56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 201 & n.25 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases from ten circuits holding that there is a presumption that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of express
requests in multiple judicial districts, see 18 U.S.C. 3512(a)(1); 155 Cong. Rec. S6809 (daily ed. June 18, 2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse), and allows individual district court judges to oversee and approve subpoenas and other orders (but not search warrants) in districts other than their own, see 18 U.S.C. 3512(f). -22-
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language to the contrary).
Express language in a treaty creating See Mora, 524 F.3d
private rights can overcome this presumption. at 188.
The US-UK MLAT contains no express language creating private rights. To the contrary, the treaty expressly states that Article 1, paragraph
it does not give rise to any private rights.
3 of the treaty states, in full: "This treaty is intended solely for mutual legal assistance between the Parties. The provisions of this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request." US-UK MLAT, art. 1, 3. The
language of the treaty is clear: a "private person," such as Moloney or McIntyre here, does not have any right under the treaty to "suppress . . . any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request." If there were any doubt, and there is none, the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that accompanied the US-UK MLAT confirms this reading of the treaty's text: [T]he Treaty is not intended to create any rights to impede execution of requests or to suppress or exclude evidence obtained thereunder. Thus, a person from whom records are sought may not oppose the execution of the request by claiming that it does not comply with the Treaty's formal requirements set out in article 3. S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-23, at 14.
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Other courts considering MLATs containing terms similar to the US-UK MLAT here have uniformly ruled that no such private right exists. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 646 F.3d 159, 165
(4th Cir. 2011) (subject of a subpoena issued pursuant to an MLAT with a clause identical to the US-UK MLAT's article 1, paragraph 3 "failed to show that the MLAT gives rise to a private right of action that can be used to restrict the government's conduct"); United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 129 (2d Cir. 2007) (defendant who argued that evidence against him was improperly admitted because it was gathered in violation of US-Netherlands MLAT could not "demonstrate that the treaty creates any judicially enforceable right that could be implicated by the government's conduct" in the case); United States v. $734,578.82 in U.S. Currency, 286 F.3d 641, 659 (3d Cir. 2002) (article 1, paragraph 3 of US-UK MLAT barred claimants' argument that seizure and subsequent forfeiture of money violated the treaty); United States v. Chitron Elecs. Co. Ltd., 668 F. Supp. 2d 298, 306-07 (D. Mass. 2009) (defendant's argument that service of criminal summons was defective under US-China MLAT, which contained a clause identical to article 1, paragraph 3 of US-UK MLAT, failed because "the MLAT does not create a private right of enforcement of the treaty"). Moloney and McIntyre attempt to get around the
prohibition on the creation of private causes of action with three arguments based on the treaty language. Appellants appear to argue
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that the text of the US-UK MLAT only covers requests for documents in the possession of the Requested Party but not for documents held by third persons who are merely under the jurisdiction of the government which is the Requested Party. This is clearly wrong.
Article 1, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that a form of assistance provided for under the treaty includes "providing
documents, records, and evidence." US-UK MLAT, art. 1, 2(b). As the Senate report explains, the treaty "permits a State to compel a person in the Requested State to testify and produce documents there." S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-23, at 7. Appellants' second argument is that article 1, paragraph 3 applies only to criminal defendants who try to block enforcement. This argument has no support in the text of the treaty. The US-UK
MLAT plainly states that the treaty does not "give rise to a right on the part of any private person . . . to impede the execution of a request." US-UK MLAT, art. 1, 3 (emphasis added). This
prohibition by its terms encompasses all private persons, not just criminal defendants. Appellants finally contend that they do not seek to "obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request," but instead merely to enforce the treaty requirements before there can be compliance with a subpoena. Their own requests for relief make it clear they are attempting to do exactly what they say they are not.
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Because the US-UK MLAT expressly disclaims the existence of any private rights under the treaty, appellants cannot state a claim under the treaty upon which relief can be granted.14 C. The APA Does Not Provide a Claim for Judicial Review Appellants attempt to circumvent the US-UK MLAT's
prohibition on private rights of action by framing their suit as one of judicial review under the APA.15 See 5 U.S.C. 702.
It is true that 702 of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Id.
However, 701(a)(1) withdraws the right to judicial review to the
We reject their broader contention that the US-EU MLAT provides a basis for applying U.S. domestic law. That treaty has a provision that reads: "The provisions of this Agreement shall not . . . expand or limit rights otherwise available under domestic law." US-EU MLAT, art. 3, 5. Not only is appellants' reliance on this provision question begging, it is also misplaced. By its terms the provision applies only to the US-EU MLAT and not to any of the related bilateral agreements, such as the US-UK MLAT at issue in this case. The government argues that Moloney and McIntyre lack prudential standing to bring their claims under the APA because their asserted interests fall outside the zone of interests meant to be protected or regulated by the US-UK MLAT. See Match-E-BeNash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, Nos. 11-246, 11-247, 2012 WL 2202936, at *9 (U.S. June 18, 2012) (describing the prudential standing test). The zone-of-interests standing question "is an issue of statutory standing," not Article III standing. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). We may and do bypass the question of appellants' statutory standing and resolve the issue of whether the APA provides them with a cause of action on the merits. See id. at 97 & n.2 (merits questions may be decided before statutory standing questions). -2615
14
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extent that "statutes preclude judicial review."
Id.
The treaty Further, its
here by its express language precludes judicial review. "the structure of the statutory scheme, its
objectives,
legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved" all dictate that no judicial review is available under the APA. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). Section 701(a)(1) thus bars federal court jurisdiction here.16 Accord Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[T]he APA does not grant judicial review of agencies' compliance with a legal norm that is not otherwise an operative part of domestic law." (citing 5 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 28.1, at 256 (2d ed. 1984))).
Appellants admit they cannot invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, as an independent basis for jurisdiction over their claims. See Alberto San, Inc. v. Consejo de Titulares del Condominio San Alberto, 522 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008) (Declaratory Judgment Act "merely 'makes available an added anodyne for disputes that come within the federal courts' jurisdiction on some other basis.'" (quoting Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 1995)) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950))). Nor are appellants entitled to a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. 1361. "Mandamus is regarded as an extraordinary writ reserved for special situations. Among its ordinary preconditions are that the agency or official have acted (or failed to act) in disregard of a clear legal duty and that there be no adequate conventional means for review." In re City of Fall River, Mass., 470 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2006). Such clear legal duty must be "nondiscretionary." Eveland v. Dir. of Cent. Intelligence Agency, 843 F.2d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)). Here, the plain text of article 1, paragraph 3 of the US-UK MLAT precludes any legal duty -discretionary or nondiscretionary -- under the treaty on the part of the Attorney General to any private party. -27-
16
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D.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion, in Any Event, in Denying Relief The district court reasoned that it had discretion, under
the laws of the United States, particularly 18 U.S.C. 3512, to quash the subpoenas, and concluded that it would exercise its discretion not to do so. The appellants, accordingly, argue that
they may take advantage of that discretion and that the district court abused its discretion in not granting relief.17 The
government in this case has chosen not to address the question of whether there is any such discretion, or, if so, the scope of it or who may invoke it. By contrast, in a case under the US-Russia MLAT
and 28 U.S.C. 1782, the government argued that the district court
Appellants' reliance on Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), fails. Moloney and McIntyre argue that the district court should have evaluated the subpoenas by applying the discretionary factors set forth in Intel. In that case the Supreme Court set out "factors that bear consideration in ruling on a 1782(a) request" for the production of evidence for use in a foreign tribunal. Id. at 264. The Intel factors are not applicable in this case for two reasons, whether or not 3512 provides any residual discretion. The request here was brought under 18 U.S.C. 3512, not 28 U.S.C. 1782(a). In addition, the United Kingdom's request was made pursuant to an MLAT. The Court developed the Intel factors to apply to a situation where 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) provided the only substantive standards for evaluating a request, but here such substantive standards are provided by the US-UK MLAT. See In re 840 140th Ave. NE, 634 F.3d 557, 571 (9th Cir. 2011) (MLAT requests brought pursuant to 1782 use that statute's procedural mechanisms "without importing [its] substantive limitations"); Nanda & Pansius, Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts 17:53 ("The [MLAT] provides at least three advantages: reciprocity; the reduction (if not elimination) of the court's discretion under 1782; and the streamlining of evidence processes."). -28-
17
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lacked discretion to quash the subpoena. 634 F.3d at 565, 568. The Ninth
In re 840 140th Ave. NE, Circuit agreed with the
government's position, and noted that at most the statute provides "a procedure for executing requests, but not . . . a means for deciding whether or not to grant or deny a request so made." Id.
at 570 (quoting In re Commissioner's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1297) (internal quotation mark omitted). In doing so, it agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in In re Commissioner's Subpoenas. By contrast, here, for purposes of this appeal, the government discretion has to assumed quash arguendo that the district of court had the
(going
beyond
the
issue
whether
documents were responsive to the terms of the subpoenas) and has argued that the court acted properly within any discretion it may have had. So we have no occasion to pass on these assumptions and The issues
caution that we are not deciding any of these issues. before us are more limited. Even assuming arguendo the district court
had
such
discretion, a question we do not address, we see no basis to upset the decision not to quash. The district court concluded that the See Order, In re:
balance of interests favored the government.
Request from the U.K., No. 11-91078 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2011), ECF No. 38; Findings and Order, In re: Request from the U.K., No. 1191078, 2012 WL 194432 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2012). The court's
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finding that any balancing favored the government was not an abuse of discretion, assuming such discretion existed. III. The Constitutional Claims Were Properly Dismissed Moloney and McIntyre's civil complaint alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the First Amendment.18 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. It is undisputed that treaty obligations are subject to some constitutional limits. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396, 417 & n.9 (2003) (treaty obligations are "subject . . . to the Constitution's guarantees of individual rights"). Like the
Ninth Circuit in In re 840 140th Ave. NE, we think it clear that the Constitution does not compel the consideration under the treaty of discretionary factors such as those contained in 1782, although Congress may choose to enact some in statutes. at 573. We affirm the dismissal for failure to state a claim, after disposing of some of the government's initial arguments. 634 F.3d
Although the complaint alludes to a Fifth Amendment claim, based on alleged risk to appellants, no such claim is pled or briefed, and it fails. See Marrero-Rodrguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 2012) (dismissing as not properly pled a Fourth Amendment claim which was only mentioned on the first page of the complaint, and was not even pled as a claim). -30-
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A.
The Government's Standing Objections The government attempts to short stop any analysis of
whether a claim is stated by arguing that neither appellant has standing under Article III to raise a constitutional claim. Standing has both an Article III component and a prudential component. 2012). Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 71-72 (1st Cir.
If the government's objections went only to prudential
standing, they could easily be bypassed in favor of a decision on the merits. Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir.
2006) (challenges to plaintiff's standing to sue "must be addressed first only if they call into question a federal court's Article III power to hear the case"). "Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010). At this stage, under Iqbal we credit
plaintiffs' allegations of threatened harm.19
See Katz, 672 F.3d On their face,
at 70; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
the pleadings appear to allege the requisite Article III injury that is fairly traceable to the issuance of the subpoenas and redressable by a favorable ruling. To the extent the government
We add that the government disputes these allegations of threatened harm to appellants, which also makes any final resolution of the standing issue at this stage inadvisable. -31-
19
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asserts that the appellants lack prudential standing, we bypass the arguments. B. Failure to State a First Amendment Claim We affirm the dismissal, as we are required to do by Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). As framed, the claim is
one of violation of appellants' individual "constitutional right to freedom of speech, and in particular their freedom to impart historically important information for the benefit of the American public, without the threat of adverse government reaction." They
support this with an assertion that production of the subpoenaed interviews is contrary to the "confidentiality" they say they promised to the interviewees. They assert an academic research
privilege,20 to be evaluated under the same terms as claims of a reporter's privilege. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d
708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Academicians engaged in pre-publication research should be accorded protection commensurate to that which the law provides for journalists.").
The Supreme Court, for First Amendment purposes, has distinguished between "academic freedom" cases, on the one hand, involving government attempts to influence the content of academic speech and direct efforts by government to determine who teaches, from, on the other hand, the question of privilege in the academic setting to protect confidential peer review materials. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1990). We view appellants' claim as falling into the second category. As such, it is far attenuated from the academic freedom issue, and the claimed injury as to academic freedom is speculative. Id. at 200. -32-
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Our analysis is controlled by Branzburg, which held that the fact that disclosure of the materials sought by a subpoena in criminal proceedings would result in the breaking of a promise of confidentiality by reporters is not by itself a legally cognizable First Amendment or common law injury. See 408 U.S. at 682, 690-91, 701. Since Branzburg, the Court has three times affirmed its basic principles in that opinion. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501
U.S. 663 (1991) (First Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, if the defendant newspaper breaches its promise of confidentiality); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (First Amendment does not give a university any privilege to avoid disclosure of its confidential peer review materials pursuant to an EEOC subpoena in a
discrimination case); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (First Amendment does not provide any special protections for newspapers whose offices might be searched pursuant to a search warrant based on probable cause to look for evidence of a crime). In Branzburg, the Court rejected reporters' claims that the freedoms of the press21 and speech under the First Amendment, or the common law, gave them the right to refuse to testify before grand juries under subpoena with respect to information they learned from their confidential sources. The Court held that the
strong interests in law enforcement precluded the creation of a
21
No claim of freedom of the press is involved here. -33-
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special rule granting reporters a privilege which other citizens do not enjoy: Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process. On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 408 U.S. at 690-91; accord Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. The Branzburg
Court "flatly rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter's privilege for confidential sources, whether by virtue of the First Amendment or of a newly hewn common law privilege."22 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004). said in Zurcher, Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in Branzburg, that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well as And as the Court
The Branzburg Court "left open . . . the prospect that in certain situations -- e.g., a showing of bad faith purpose to harass -- First Amendment protections might be invoked by the reporter." In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972)). This suit does not fall within that premise. There is no plausible claim here of a bad faith purpose to harass. -34-
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subpoenas, are permissible in proper circumstances, it does not make a constitutional difference in our judgment. 436 U.S. at 566 (citation omitted). As in Branzburg, there is no
reason to create such a privilege here. The Court rejected a similar claim of First Amendment privilege in University of Pennsylvania. The claim rejected there
was that peer review materials produced in a university setting should not be disclosed in response to an EEOC subpoena in an investigation of possible tenure discrimination. The Court
rejected the University's claims of First Amendment and of common law privilege. It also rejected a requirement that there be a
judicial finding of particularized relevance beyond a showing of relevance. 493 U.S. at 188, 194. The issue of defending against court proceedings
requiring disclosure of information given under a promise of confidentiality has come up in a variety of circumstances in this circuit. Some cases involved underlying criminal proceedings as in Branzburg. See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.
2004) (upholding order finding reporter in civil contempt for refusing to reveal to a special prosecutor the identity of the person who leaked a videotape in violation of a protective order entered in a criminal proceeding). One case did not invoke grand
jury or government criminal investigations, but rather a request from criminal defendants. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841
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F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988) (upholding order finding television network in civil contempt for refusing to comply with criminal defendants' subpoena seeking "outtakes" of an interview with a key government witness).23 Two of our precedents dealt with claims of a nondisclosure privilege in civil cases, in which private parties both sought and opposed disclosure; as a result, the government and public's strong interest in investigation of crime was not an issue. See Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708;24 Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980). This case is closer to Branzburg itself, buttressed by University of Pennsylvania, than any of our circuit precedent. The Branzburg analysis, and especially as to in the not strength impeding of the
governmental
public
interest
criminal
investigations, guides our outcome. The fact that a U.S. grand jury did not issue the subpoenas here is not a ground on which to avoid the conclusion that Branzburg controls. The law enforcement interest here -- a
As the Seventh Circuit recognized in McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003), there is a circuit split on whether under Branzburg there can ever be a reporter's privilege of constitutional or common law dimensions. This circuit has recognized such a possibility in United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (1st Cir. 1988). Even if Branzburg left us free, as we think it does not, to engage in an independent balancing utilizing the test articulated in our decision in Cusumano, we would still affirm, for the same reasons. -3624
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criminal investigation by a foreign sovereign advanced through treaty obligations -is arguably even stronger than the
government's interest in Branzburg itself.
Two branches of the
federal government, the Executive and the Senate, have expressly decided to assume these treaty obligations. In exchange, this "The federal
country is provided with valuable reciprocal rights.
interest in cooperating in the criminal proceedings of friendly foreign nations is obvious." 532 (7th Cir. 2003). States government and McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530,
The strong interests of both the United the requesting foreign government is
emphasized by language in the treaty itself, which prohibits private parties from attempting to block enforcement of subpoenas. See US-UK MLAT, art. 1, 3. The Supreme Court in Branzburg stressed that "[f]air and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government." 408 U.S. at 690. "The preference for anonymity of
those confidential informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to escape criminal
prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is hardly deserving of constitutional protection." Id. at 691. The court
also commented that "it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy." Id. at 696.
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In doing so, it relied on legal history, including both English and United States history outlawing concealment of a felony. 696-97. Branzburg weighed the interests against disclosure Id. at
pursuant to subpoenas and concluded they were so wanting as not to state a claim.25 of reporters who The opinion discussed the situation, not merely promised confidentiality, but also of both
informants who had committed crimes and those innocent informants who had information pertinent to the investigation of crimes. The
interests in confidentiality of both kinds of informants did not give rise to a First Amendment interest in the reporters to whom they had given the information under a promise of confidentiality. These insufficient interests included the fear, as here, that disclosure might "threaten their job security or personal safety or that it will simply result in dishonor or embarrassment." 693. Id. at
If the reporters' interests were insufficient in Branzburg,
the academic researchers' interests necessarily are insufficient here. It may be that compliance with the subpoenas in the face of the misleading assurances in the donation agreements could have some chilling effect, as plaintiffs assert. This amounts to an
Branzburg also rejected arguments of First Amendment protection based on a notion that the press was being used as an investigative arm of the government, imposing burdens on it. 408 U.S. at 706-07. -38-
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argument that unless confidentiality could be promised and that promise upheld by the courts in defense to criminal subpoenas, the research project will be less effective.26 account precisely this risk. Branzburg took into
So did the Court in rejecting the
claim in the academic peer review situation in University of Pennsylvania. See 493 U.S. at 188, 194. The choice to investigate criminal activity belongs to the government and is not subject to veto by academic researchers. We add that this situation was clearly avoidable. It is
unfortunate that BC was inconsistent in its application of its recognition of the limits of its ability to promise
confidentiality. Burns Librarian
But that hardly assists the appellants' case. O'Neill informed Moloney before the project
commenced that he could not guarantee that BC "would be in a position to refuse to turn over documents [from the Project] on a court order without being held in contempt." warning, Moloney's agreement with BC In keeping with this that "[e]ach
directed
interviewee is to be given a contract guaranteeing to the extent
McIntyre, but not Moloney, in his affidavit states that neither he nor the people he interviewed would have participated in the Belfast Project had they thought that the interviews would be subject to disclosure before their deaths and without their permission. Burns Librarian O'Neill states in his affidavit that "[h]ad the assurances of confidentiality not been made, it is doubtful that any paramilitary would have participated in this oral history project. Their stories would have died with them, and an opportunity to document and preserve a critical part of the historical record would have been lost forever." -39-
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American law allows
the conditions of the interview and the
conditions of its deposit at the Burns Library, including terms of an embargo period if this becomes necessary" (emphasis added). Despite Moloney's knowledge of these limitations, the donation agreements signed by the interviewees did not contain the
limitation required to be in them by Moloney's agreement with BC. That failure in the donation agreement does not change the fact that any promises of confidentiality were necessarily limited by the principle that "the mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence . . . does not create a
privilege. . . . No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice." 408 U.S. at 682 n.21 (quoting 8 Wigmore, Branzburg, 2286
Evidence
(McNaughton rev. 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be clear, even if participants had been made aware of the limits of any representation about non-disclosure, Moloney and McIntyre had no First Amendment basis to challenge the subpoenas. Appellants simply have no constitutional claim and so that portion of the complaint was also properly dismissed.27
Appellants' intervention complaint raised the same claims as their separate civil complaint. We have affirmed that there is no cause of action under the treaty and under the Constitution, so there is no need for us to consider whether the district court acted within its discretion in denying appellants' motion to intervene. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the district court's denial of a petition to intervene was harmless error because the merits of the appellant's claim were eventually considered on -40-
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IV. We uphold the denial of the requested relief for the reasons stated and affirm. No costs are awarded.
-- Opinion Concurring in the Judgment Follows --
appeal). -41-
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring in the judgment only). I reluctantly concur in the judgment in this case, doing so
only because I am compelled to agree that the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), and subsequent cases has most likely foreclosed the relief that the Appellants in these consolidated appeals seek. I write separately to emphasize my view that, while the effect of Branzburg and its progeny is to forestall the result that the Appellants wish to see occur, none of those cases supports the very different proposition, apparently espoused by the majority, that the First Amendment does not provide some degree of protection to the fruits of the Appellants' investigative labors. that the Cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. high court has considered It is one thing to say interests and
competing
determined that information gatherers (here, academic researchers) may not refuse to turn over material they acquired upon a premise of confidentiality when these are requested via government subpoena in criminal proceedings. It is entirely another to eagerly fail to recognize that the First Amendment affords the Appellants "a measure of protection . . . in order not to undermine their ability to gather and disseminate information." Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998). "It is firmly established that the First Amendment's aegis extends further than the text's proscription on laws Cusumano v. Microsoft
'abridging the freedom of speech, or the press,' and encompasses a
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range of conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of information." Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
Confidentiality or anonymity, where prudent, naturally protects those who seek to collect or provide information. Accordingly, it
is similarly well-settled that the First Amendment's protections will at times shield "information gatherers and disseminators," from others' attempts to reveal their identities, unveil their sources, or disclose the fruits of their work. See Cusumano,
162 F.3d at 714; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (noting "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment"); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (noting City's ordinance banning
distribution of handbills lacking names and addresses of authors and distributors "would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression"); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988) ("We discern a lurking and subtle threat to journalists . . . if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if
nonconfidential, becomes routine and casually, if not cavalierly compelled."). The Appellants in these consolidated cases are academic researchers and, as such, axiomatically come within the scope of
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these protections, as recognized by this Circuit's settled law. See Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714 ("The same concerns [that advise extending First Amendment protections to journalists] suggest that courts ought to offer similar protection to academicians engaged in scholarly research."). It is also beyond question that the content of the materials that the government wishes to obtain may properly be characterized as confidential: the Appellants and the Belfast Project's custodians have gone to great lengths to prevent their unsanctioned disclosure. See Maj. Op. at 6-7. The question then
becomes one concerning the degree of protection to which they are entitled. depends on The manner in which this inquiry unfolds necessarily context, not on "semantics" -the "unthinking
allowance" of discovery requests in these circumstances, we have warned, will inevitably "impinge upon First Amendment rights." Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 716 (quoting Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1980)).
Consequently, balancing the interests on either side of such a request is both proper and essential. See id. ("[C]ourts must
balance the potential harm to the free flow of information that might result against the asserted need for the requested
information." (quoting Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d at 59596)). Fortunately for this Court's panel -- but unfortunately for the Appellants -- the Supreme Court has already done the lion's
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share of the work for us. Under the mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, the federal government has assumed an obligation to assist the United Kingdom in its prosecution of domestic criminal matters -- here, a homicide -- to the extent permitted by U.S. law. See UK-MLAT Technical
Analysis, S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-23, at 11 (noting "MLATs oblige each country to assist the other to the extent permitted by their laws, and provide a framework for that assistance").28 In my view, the Appellants cannot carry the day, not because they lack a cognizable interest under the First Amendment,
Appellants also claim that the Attorney General's actions are not in compliance with the US-UK-MLAT, among other reasons, because "the crimes under investigation by the United Kingdom were of 'a political nature.'" Pursuant to Article 3, 1(c)(i) of the treaty the United States may refuse assistance to the United Kingdom's request if it relates to "an offense of a political nature." Ignoring the underlying and pervasive political nature of the "Troubles," as the Irish-British controversy has come to be known in Northern Ireland, is simply ignoring one hundred years of a well-documented history of political turmoil. These came into focus when Ireland was partitioned, and six of its Ulster counties were constituted into Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom by virtue of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. See generally Northern Ireland Politics (Arthur Aughley & Duncan Morrow eds.) (1996). That the academic investigations carried out by Appellants in this case, and the evidence sought by the United Kingdom involve "offenses of a political nature" irrespective of how heinous we may consider them, is borne out by the terms of the Belfast Agreement (also known as the "Good Friday Agreement") entered into by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republican Army, whereby almost all prisoners were released by the British government, including many who had been convicted of murder. See Karl S. Bottigheirmer & Arthur H. Aughley, Northern Ireland, Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007). Unfortunately for Appellants, they are foreclosed from pursuing their claim by virtue of Article 1, 3 of the treaty, which prohibits private parties from enforcing any rights thereunder. -45-
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but because any such interest has been weighed and measured by the Supreme Court and found insufficient to overcome the government's paramount concerns in the present context. Finally, with regards to the district court's denial of the Appellants' motion to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), I harbor doubts as to whether Boston College could ever "adequately represent" the interests of academic researchers who have placed their personal reputations on the line, exposing both their
livelihoods and well-being to substantial risk in the process. Because, for the reasons explained above, I am constrained to agree that the Appellants are unable to assert a legally-significant protectable interest, as Rule 24(a) commands, see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971), any concerns I may have in that regard are regrettably moot. See Ungar v. Arafat, 634 F.3d
46, 51 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Each of [Rule 24(a)(2)'s] requirements must be fulfilled; failure to satisfy any of them defeats
intervention as of right.").
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Case: 12-1236

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

TRUSTEES OF BOSTON COLLEGE, MOVANT-APPELLANT

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STATUTES 28 U.S.C. 1291.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 18 U.S.C. 3512.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 6

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A copy of this slip opinion is contained in the United Statess addendum.

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The January 20, 2012 Findings and Order.

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Gov't Opp 12-1236

Gov't Opp 12-1236