De Leon vs.

Esguerra
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy. Captain and other petitioners won as Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which commenced on June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1987, while the petitioners still have one year and four months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued a memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the new Brgy. Captain and other respondents as the new Councilmen of the said barrangay. The respondents relied on the Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants the governor to appoint or designate new successors within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987. They also contended that the terms of office of the petitioners were already been abolished and that they continued in office simply because no new successors were appointed yet; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials up to six years must have been deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an original action for prohibition to review the order of the governor. ISSUE: whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during

the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

HELD: No.The Supreme Court held that the memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legal effect. Though the designation was within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25, 1987, however, it was cut short when the 1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the 1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer had the authority to designate successors under the Provisional Constitution which was deemed to have been superseded. There has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials; and the Barangay Election Act is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of prohibition was granted and the petitioners have acquired the security of tenure.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice that the first

impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance. A day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional. Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Held: Yes. The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Gonzales vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of

the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from amaximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue: Held:
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately.

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the

validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. The provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. IMBONG V. COMELEC
MAKASIAR, J.:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzles, both members of the Bar, assail the constitutionality of RA 6132 Sec. 19 because it prejudices their rights asinterested candidates for delegates of theConstitu tional Convention. Sec. 2: apportionment of delegates: constitutional convention should be composed of 320 delegatesapportioned among the existing representativedistricts according to the nu mber of theirrespective inhabitants. Provided that each district is entitled to at least two delegates. Sec. 4: all public officers & employees areconsidered resigned upon filing certificates of candidacy.Sec. 5: disqualifies any elected delegate fromrunning for a public office while Con Con isongoing.Sec. 8: prohibits political parties or otherorganizations from helping Con Con delegates during campaign period. ISSUE: WON RA 6132 is valid? HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1. SEC. 4 is valid in accordance withConstitutional prohibition on publicemployees/offi cials running for election. It doesnot deny them of due process or equal protection.2. Law was enacted in Congress capacity as alegislative body exercising its broad lawmakingauthority. They can grant powers and fix thequalifications and other requirements neededsuch as in the case of the Con Con delegates.3. Congress has right to apportion the number of delegates per district. They can limit it if thereare economic restraints. IN this case, they werecorrect in using the preliminary population censustaken by the Bureau of Census & Statistics. Thismethod is fair. Though only provisional, it is still

Marcos vs. Manglapus G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 FACTS: In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the nonviolent people power revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. ISSUES: Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines HELD: Yes. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is a power borne by the Presidents duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the Presidents duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.

TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
BARREDO, J.:

FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. ISSUE: Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s. HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,

insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections

MARTIN, J,:

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a nati onalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendumplebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National ReferendumPlebiscite.Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Pr ohibition withPreliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of theConstitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M.

Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the a pproval of suchamendment or revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of allits Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shallinitially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace andorder in the country.

SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Mod ernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onpeoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementingle gislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule

thatwhat has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari p otest). Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006(CARPIO, J.) FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to changethe 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite forratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under thepetition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentaryform of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelecruling. ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people RULING: Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full

text. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.2 elements of initiative1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. 2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of suchattachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before not after signing. Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.

In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. Amendment vs. RevisionCourts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of aconstitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in theconstitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of theconstitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On theother hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes withoutaltering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of theconstitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution withoutaffecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered anamendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipinoownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not arevision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for electionto the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of theConstitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not alsoaffect the structure of government or the system of checks-andbalances among or withinthe three branches.However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. Achange in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not anamendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic ortheocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structureof government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specificchange will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions,as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of aconstitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake arevision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the alteredprinciples with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorizedeliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertakerevisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixedand identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendmentsand not revisions. Tests to determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the initiative clause

allows amendments but not revisions to theconstitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: thequantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposedchange is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The courtexamines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of thechange. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in theconstitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reachingchanges in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whetherthere is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, achange in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamentalframework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basicgovernmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of governmentand the system of check and balances.Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revisionand not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changesoverhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposedchanges alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential toparliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.A change in the structure of government is a revisionA change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the threegreat co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of ExecutivePower alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is onlyone of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative bodydrafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisionsbecause members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The samesubstantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments becausethe changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, orvocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framersand the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Wherethe intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005 FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City forthe purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, onMay 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as justcompensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment wasmade on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for thetwo lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressedwillingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republicand AFP officers in possession of the property.On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with theannotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are theowners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P

4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were orderedto execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registeredowners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that theyare not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, assecurity for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lottitle was issued in his name. On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim,

declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lotwith all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In itsDecision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just"...Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932. ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondentspredecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940. HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. " The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years?

Clearly, without fullpayment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete. Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission

G.R. 192935 and 193036 December 7, 2010 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July 30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and thereafter submit its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1 based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create

public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration. ISSUE Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. HELD While the Court was almost unanimous in holding that the president indeed had the authority to create the PTC and that it would not unduly duplicate the powers of the Ombudsman, nine (9) of the justices joined Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza in refusing to uphold the constitutionality of E.O. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was joined by four (4) others in their strong dissent. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. Applying this precept, the majority held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is just being used as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution and that E.O. 1 is only an adventure in partisan hostility. While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that the end does not justify the means. It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds, for ours is still a government of laws and not of men. Govt. of the USA vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceeding HELD: Right to BailExtradition Different from Ordinary Criminal ProceedingsWe agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court.Exceptions to the No Bail RuleThe rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enoughto include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential

extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations. Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by

respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

Feeder International Line vs. CA

G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991 REGALADO, J.:

Facts:
The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. The vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.

The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.

Issue: WON Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: No. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at least an attempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo. Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply. Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11 and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances generally. 12 In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE v QUITLONG [G.R. No. 121562. July 10, 1998] VITUG, J.: FACTS Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time, he wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted his change, he found out that he only received P35 forhis P100. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The 3 men kept arguing. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosiland Calpito. Calpito got stabbed and fell to the ground.- The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion fore investigation alleging that it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed

the victim. The trial court acted favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits. The information, as amended, included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike accusedappellants who were immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed decision. ISSUES WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide HELD YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are only accomplices. 2. NO, the crime was qualified. The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. Whilesuperiority in number would not per se me an superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.- Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules.- object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must beset forth in the complaint with reasonableparticularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.

ROCO v CONTRERAS

[G.R. No. 158275. June 28, 2005]

GARCIA, J.:

FACTS: Domingo Roco, engaged in buying and selling of dressed chicken, purchased his supply from private respondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation (Cals). As payment for his purchase, petitioner drew 5 checks payable to Cals against his account with PCIB. PCIB dishonored the checks for having been drawn from a closed account. Cals then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP22- Before trial could commence, Roco filed with the BIR a denunciation letter against Cals in that it failed to issue commercial invoices. BIR found no prima facie evidence of tax evasion. Trial for Rocos violation of BP 22 commenced. After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on account of petitioners failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, MTCC rendered a judgment of conviction against petitioner. Petitioner went to appeal to the RTC contending that he was deprived of due process. RTC agreed and vacated the MTCC decision. Pending the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999 In a resolution, the MTCC, thru its Judge Edward Contreras, denied petitioners request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases. Judge Contreras similarly denied the MFR. RTC denied due course to petition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, it denied MFR. Petitioner went to CA via certiorari. The petition was still dismissed. MFR was still dismissed. Petitioners claim The denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum is violative of his constitutional rights ISSUE WON THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AS ENSHRINED IN ART. III, SEC. 14 (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION

HELD NO. Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that thefollowing requisites are present: (1) thebooks, documents or other things requeste dmust appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. The first, subpoena ad testificandum, is used to compel a person to testify, while the second, subpoena duces tecum, is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified.- The books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case. However, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal casesthat petitioner miserably failed to discharge hisburden.- Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner had been issued by Cals with temporary receipts in the form of yellowpad slips of paper evidencing his payments, whichpad slips had been validated by the corporationitself. It is clear that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment.

Jackson vs Macalino
[G.R. No. 139255. November 24, 2003]
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Facts:

Several criminal cases were filed against Raymond Michael Jackson, an American citizen. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court against the Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the respondents to make a return of the writ on or before July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (b) ordering the Pasig RTC Judge to whom the case would be raffled to conduct a hearing of the petition, to render judgment and to serve a copy of its decision within two days from its promulgation. In their return filed with the RTC on July 8, 1999, the respondents alleged inter alia that the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID on the basis of the summary deportation order issued by the BOC on December 11, 1997 and of the hold departure order of the Makati RTC in Criminal Case No. 98-1155; the petitioners

petition for habeas corpus was premature as there was a pending petition to lift the summary deportation order before the BOC filed by him. On July 15, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus. Issue: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petition of Jackson and denying his plea for a writ of habeas corpus. Held: No. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized: If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

People v. Gallarde
[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000] DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The trial court convicted him of murder only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of the
FACTS: accused immediately after the incident on the ground that the same were taken when the accused was already under the mercy of the police.

Issue: WON The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Held:

No. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

PSB vs. Bermoy

G.R. No. 151912 September 26, 2005 CARPIO, J.: Facts: Petitioner PSB filed a criminal complaint against the respondent spouses for Estafa thru falsification of public document in RTC Manila. According to the Information, the spouses presented a forged TCT making it appear thereon that they are the registered owners of the subject parcel of land when in fact such land had been mortgaged by them and already sold to spouses ALAMO in the year 1995. The respondents presented such TCT to PSB and used the title as collateral in obtaining a loan of 1M. Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge. RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that the prosec witnesses failed to identify the accused. As to the minutes of the proceedings of June 11, 1997, the RTC said that there is nothing to it which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place. The prosec filed an MR which was likewise denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the petition, affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA further held that even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Petitioner filed an MR which was also denied by the CA. Thus, the petitioner filed this petition for review with the SC. Issue: WON the CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED IN THE CASE. Ruling: Yes.

For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 of Rule 117 requires the following elements in the first criminal case: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form any substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal. In this case, all elements required in Section 7 were all present in the estafa case. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses. Here, petitioner seeks a review of the Order dismissing the estafa case for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. Thus, such appeal cannot be allowed as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

Lejano vs People of the Philippines

GR No. 176389 January 18, 2011 ABAD, J.: Facts: Jessica Alfaro was the state witness of the popular case of Vizconde massacre. She was an asset of the NBI prior to being a witness in the Vizconde massacre. Jessica Alfaro positively identified Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb along with the other accused as among those who participated in the commission of the crime charged against them. The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of Jessica Alfaro and convicted the accused. However, the accused questioned the credibility of the witness as having concocted said testimony using her skill as an NBI informer. According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Jessica Alfaro mentioned a possible witness to the Vizconde massacre. When forced to bring out her witness, Jessica Alfaro could not provide one and said that she can assume to be the witness of the case. This testimony of Atty. Artemio Sacaguing was not rebutted by the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not Jessica Alfaro is a credible witness and that her testimony is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime committed.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled on the contrary. Jessica Alfaro's testimony was uncorroborated. There exist inconsistencies which the Highest tribunal could not ignore. According to the Supreme Court, "Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positiveidentification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold. And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims. Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi." Jessica Alfaro's story was not supplanted with evidence and did not corroborate to testimonies of other prosecution witnesses. In toto, Jessica Alfaro's testimony was made by an experienced NBI asset who has access to official records and made her testimony based on the official records made available to her.