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game for the Nazis, why would he have had to flee Ber-
m.
This last remark, by the way, is not quite as convincing as it
could have later been a Nazi "plant" in
Bntam, his espionage mission being disguised as headlong flight
from the Gestapo. I am not suggesting that this was the case - on
the I feel, as Mr. O'Donnell does, that the theory of John
havmg been a double agent with a Gestapo role is absurd - but
merely want to point out that pre-arranged "flights" from arrest to
enemy c.amp are standard Intelligence technique.
The .Sovlet-agent version," Mr. O'Donnell goes on to say, "is
at first Sight mor.e plausible, but it, too, breaks down under analysis.
John did go over to the Soviets in 1954, the assumption
IS made that he could have been working for them in 1944 or earlier.
Perhaps he contacts with them in Sweden or in Spain. Or in
Portugal. Stramed attempts have been made to link him with the
Kapelle, a communist radio-espionage group active in Berlin
m the years 1941-42. He did know the fellow-traveling Baron von
Han J h h
th N ;'h'aj among .t !' 20th-of-JulyplottNs caught and executed bv
a e r :ZIS. e oss of hIS beloved brother in this terrible mann!'r furthC'r
I g: Ii. ated Otto S hatred of the Nazis and made it easier for Allied
f
n e to use hIm as an instrument of political and psychological war-
are agamst the Germans.
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, I
283
und zu Putlitz., perhaps as early as 1937, and certainly later. But
here again common sense asks a simple little question. If Otto
John were a Soviet agent from away back, why the elaborate cir-
cus of his melodramatic flight across the sector boundaries of Ber-
lin on July 20, 1954?
"The real difficulty in explaining the last ten years of Otto John's
life, however, does begin right here on the 20th of July, 1944, for
in a certain sense the clock inside him stopped ticking. Although
he has turbulent events still in front of him, he goes through them
like a sleepwalker. And later, when he recounts them, as he very
often did, there is the clearest of evidence of a man who has lost
contact with reality. John, a born raconteur anyway, has several
versions of his dramatic escape. Sometimes he left on the very night
of the twentieth. Sometimes he tells of how he hid out in Berlin
for one, two or three days. Sometimes the flight is direct; some-
times it sets down in several cities. He always keeps in the touch
about how he evaded the Gestapo dragnet at Templehof Airdrome
by signing himself in on the crew manifest. At times John seems
to vary the story to keep from boring himself or old listeners."
Here, Mr. O'Donnell is absolutely right. And his account deftly
touches on the core of the mystery surrounding Otto John's per-
sonality. For, all the evidence points to the fact that John, as a re-
sult of the turmoil of July 20, 1944, lost his mental balance,
which he never regained. Not that he went insane - but ever since,
he has been affected by loss of memory, self-delusion and apparent-
ly spells of outright hallucination. Just as he had varied the story of
his 1944 flight from Berlin from one listener to the next, he subse-
quently varied his account of why he turned up in East Berlin, ten
years later, what happened to him there, and why he eventually
returned to West Germany.
Actually, John left Berlin for Madrid on the 24th of July, 1944,
on a regular daytime flight. In the Spanish capital, he promptly got
in touch with his friends in British Intelligence, who helped him
0Elsewhere in his Saturday Evening Post artic\!', Mr. O'Donnell describes
Baron 'Wolfgang von und zu Putlitz as a "creepy pal" of John'S, who has
in his day worked for (1) the Nazi Foreign Office, until (2) he defected
to the British in 1938; (3) the American OWl and ass during the war;
(4) the British Military Govermhent in North Germany after the war; and
(5) the Communist regime in East Berlin since 1950.
284
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
" .
quickly to get out of a country whose government was a scarcely
concealed aUy of Nazi Germany. Disguised as a Spaniard, his blond
hair dyed dark, John was smuggled into Portugal via the under-
ground "railway." Two German Abwehr officers were also in on
this game: Major G9ttfried Paul, who was attached to the German
Embassy in Madrid, but who secretly worked with British Intelli-
gence: Fritz who operated in a similar dual
capacity ID Lisbon. Paul, It may be added parenthetically, stayed
in Spain after the war. Franco's police picked him up, early in
August 1954, after John's sensational flight to East Berlin, on a
charge of having been a "paid agent of Otto John's."
In Portugal, John ran into trouble again. According to O'Don-
nell, the pseudo-Spaniard got involved in a brawl between some
real Spanish caballeros and some Portuguese peasants over the fa-
vor of a local belle, at a village fiesta. Anyway, fact is that John
was arrested by the Portuguese police and put into prison; that the
Germans, after he had been identified, demanded his extradition' ,
and that he came pretty close to being shipped home. In this dire
predicament, Major Cramer and British Intelligence came to his
rescue. Somehow he got out of jail, was promptly whisked off
to Gibraltar, and from there flew to London. By that time, it was
November 1944.
John later asserted that he had been received with open arms
in Britain and had been taken soon to a country-house hideaway
for a secret conference with Prime Minister Churchill, but O'Don-
nell disputes this version.
"British spokesmen today deny this whole account," he writes.
"They report that when John landed in England, under the name
Oskar Juergens, by a typical wartime foul-up he was mistaken for
a high Nazi deserting the sinking ship. He was interned, first at
Cockfosters in Northeast London; then removed to house arrest in
Knightsbridge. Grilled extensively by the Oxford don, John Wheel-
er-Bennett, the Bishop of Chichester and others who knew, vaguely,
about the ramifications of the 20th of July, John was cleared as a
genuine anti-Nazi."
The next few years probably were the most critical in Otto John's
Unlike many other German refugees in England, he found it
difficult to draw the line between activities that were aimed merely
at the overthrow of the hated Nazi regime and complete subservi-
THE OTfO JOHN STORY, I
285
ence to the Allies' war aims. He accepted the slogans of uncondi-
tional surrender, collective guilt and German partition that were
anathema to many of his fellow exiles. He did research for the
B.B.C.'s propaganda broadcasts to Germany and made his knowl-
, edge and skilIs available for psychological warfare against his na-
tive country.
In London, John made stilI another acquaintance that was to
have a profound effect on his further conduct and his future. He
met, and closely worked with the famous Daily Express reporter
Sefton Delmer, who during the war supervised much of Britain's
psychological warfare propaganda. An enduring friendship devel-
oped between the two men, who continued to see a great deal of
each other even after the war (sec also below).
"This is one of my birds," Delmer, who went by the nom de
guerre of "Mr. Tom," has been reported by the German press to
have said of John, after the latter had joined his staff in November
1944. Other "birds" in his cage included the afore-mentioned Bar-
on von Putlitz, Karl von Schnitzler, Eberhard Koebel and Dr. Ho-
nigmann - all of whom are now in East Germany. It has also been
reported in the German papers that Wilhelm Zaisser, alias Gen-
eral Gomez belonged to this group for a while.
After the end of the war, Ouo John did not, like the majority
. of his fellow exiles in Britain, return to Germany immediately. He
stayed in Britain, interrogating German prisoners of war at the
"London Cage" and preparing legal documents for the Nuremberg
trials. When these got under way in 1946, John went along, in Brit-
ish uniform, with the prosecuting staff. In some cases which he
helped to handle, he let the bitter memories of July 20, 1944, and
his ingrained hatred of the Nazis get the better of his good judg-
ment. A good many Germans who had never sympathized with
the Hitler regime resented the way he helped prosecute the Nur-
emberg defendants. The former Nazis and professional military
men called him a traitor and vowed vengeance. The case of Field
Marshal von Manstein clinched it; John's enemies in and out of
office swore never to forgive or forget what he had done to this
"war hero."
It has been said of OUo John that when he first set foot on Ger-
man soil again, in 1946, he described himself as "the broom that's
going to sweep the Nazi pigsty." Whether or not he ever made
286 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
such a remark, John in the following years became a primary tar-
for the resentment against all those who were help-
109 the occupymg powers in the hard years following the collapse
of the Third Reich.
I have 'already pointed out in a preceding chapter, lies
the prIncipal root of the profound antagonism that was to develop
later between dtto John and his opposite number in Intelligence
- General Gehlen.. .
From 1946 to 1949, Otto John continued to Jive in London
!hough he frequently traveled to Germany. He had made his hom;
In a suburb with a comparatively large percentage of
German res!dents, and therefore locally known as "Little Ger-
many:" While he continued to work for British Intelligence, he also
practiced law, having joined the well-known law office of Holland
and Company, in Lincoln's Inn.
Be.fore he left England for good, in the fall of 1949, Otto John
mamed. To the unconcealed surprise of his friends and acquaint-
ances, the woman he wed at Hampstead Town Hall in November
1949, was not the pretty yOUJ1g fellow refugee he had often dated
working at Sefton Delmer's office (she was a secretary there),
Gisela Mann. Instead, the bride turned out to be - Gisela's moth-
er, Frau Lucy Marleen-Mankiewicz.
It probably was, to some extent, a marriage of convenience. Frau
had connections in high places at Bonn, in-
cluding close fflends of President Theodor Heuss. And Otto John,
at that very moment, was casting about for a job with the new Ger-
man Government that had been formed in September.
Shortly after the wedding, John took his new bride, and step-
to what he still considered his "home town," Wiesbaden.
HIS had died there in 1946, but other relatives (in particu-
lar, hiS father .and married sister) and old friends were still living
there. In was In Wlesbaden, too, that John in 1947 had celebrated
a.happy with his classmate Wolfgang Hofer, who had pre-
Viously emigrated to the United States and now was back in the
uniform of a U: s. Army captain (in the Counter-Intelligence Corp,
or C.LC.). Neither one could suspect, at the time, that their re-
newed acquaintance should bring tragedy for them both a few
years later.
At the time that Otto John made his home in Germany again the
THE OTTO JOHN STORY. I
287
Bonn Government was laying the groundwork for rebuilding its
Auswartiges Amt (Foreign Ministry). John, having applied for a
job with the new agency, was turned down by the man Chancellor
Adenauer had appointed as its chief of personnel, Dr. Wilhelm
Haas. The latter, an old-time career diplomat, felt the newly ar-
rived re-emigrant from Britain could not be considered national zu-
verliissig (a reliable patriot).
Then, in the fall of 1950, the Office for the Defense of the Con-
stitution was being organized. A group of former Resistance men,
with considerable influence in Bonn, in particular Minister Jakob
Kaiser, advanced Dr. John's candidacy for the top post in the new
Office.
On a matter of such importance, the Bonn Government, under
the Occupation Statute then in force, was required to consult with
the Allied High Commissioners. The British representative on the
High Commission, Sir Ivane Kirkpatrick, who had known John in
London during the war, warmly lecommended him for the job.
The American and French representatives did not at first agree,
but later they withdrew their objections.
Towards the end of 1950, John, the new president of the Bund-
esamt fiir Verfassungsschutz (BFY), moved into the unpretentious
office building at Ludwigstrasse 2, in Cologne, where this first all-
German Intelligence agency of the postwar period had set up its
headquarters.
The stage now was set for one of the fiercest contests for power,
as well as one of the most bizarre incidents, in the history of mod-
ern Intelligence.
288
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
I
I
I
i
/
THE ono JOHN STORY, II:
BONN'S SECRET SERVICE TRIANGLE
In the fantastic welter of guesswork, speculation, misinterpreta-
tion and deliberate, officially inspired deception that followed upon
Otto John's disappearance behind the Iron Curtain, on July 20,
1954, the real reason underlying his desperate action was hardly
ever so much as hinted at in the world press.
To be sure, there have been a number of concurrent motives
that combined to bring about this extraordinary situation - but the
principal, determining factor was John's fear of himself falling a
victim to the merciless jungle warfare of secret services.
289
At the bottom of his defection there lay the bitter rivalry that
had developed over the years between the three Intelligence serv-
ices operating under the jurisdiction of the BOlin Government, to
wit:
(1) The Gehlen Apparatus, already described in Chapter 18;
(2) The Office for the Defense of the Constitution (BFV); and
(3) The "Information Division" of the so-called AmI Blank, i.e.,
the embryonic Defense Ministry then being organized.
. The head of this last-named outfit was Lieutenant-Colonel
Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, whose cryptic warning to John, in 1955,
has already been quoted in the preceding chapter.
Who is this F. W. Heinz?
In 1919, when he was 20 years old, the young officer, like so
many of his fellow-soldiers of the lost World War I, enlisted in the
ranks of the so-called Ehrhardt-Brigade, a right-wing terrorist or-
ganization. He took an active part in the 1920 Kapp-Putsch, which
was aimed at the overthrow of the young Weimer Republic. From
1923 on, he belonged to a group of nationalistic authors on or
close to the lunatic fringe, which also included Ernst JUnger, Franz
Schauwecker, Ernst von Salomon, etc. In 1926, Heinz became
editor of the nationalist weekly Stalllhelm, organ of the "Steel Hel-
met" association of war veterans.
He was for several years an active member of the Nazi Party.
Although he claims to have been expelled from it after a 1928-29
attempt to eliminate Hitler from the leadership, Heinz suffered no
untoward consequences after the Nazi seizure of power. At any
rate, he was appointed, in 1936, to a post as department head in
the foreign section of the Abwehr. In this capacity, he was closely
associated for several years with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and Gen-
eral Hans Oster, the two top chiefs of the Abwehr, both of whom
eventually turned against Hitler and paid for it with their lives.
Heinz, too, was arrested after the failure of the 20th of July plot,
but he survived the big purge that followed. He stayed in Berlin
through its siege and capture by the Red Army. In spite of his rec-
ord asa militant rightist and Nazi, he not only remained a free
man, but was even appointed mayor of the small town of Pieskow,
in the Soviet zone of occupation, a: post he held from June 1, 1945,
through March 31, 1946.
From this remarkable accomplishment, which he has never been
290
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
able to explain satisfactorily, it may be inferred that Heinz was al-
ready "persona grata" with the Soviets - in other words, that he
had been a double agent during the war.
With such doubtful qualifications, Heinz, after the establishment
of the Federal Rep,ublic in September 1949, was appointed to the
staff of Chancellor Adenauer's first military adviser, Count Schwer-
in. I
Later, when the BFV was being organized, Heinz (sponsored
by the French High Commissioner) applied for the top post, which
instead went to Otto John. Ever since, there has been a smoulder-
ing feud between the two former Abwehr officers. The two men,
incidentally, saw each other again'in Wiesbaden (where Heinz still
lives) after John's return to that city in 1949.
Rather than take a back bench in John's office of the BFV, Heinz
eagerly seized the opportunity offered him then to become head of
the embryonic Defense Department, which on December 1, 1950,
was put in the charge of Christian trade union leader Theodor
Blank (hence it was called the "Blank Office"). In the following
years, Heinz developed and expanded his "Information Division"
into a full-dress Intelligence service of his own, which could not,
however, compare in size and scope, with those operated by Gehlen
and John.
From the start of the three-cornered fight between Gehlen, John
and Heinz, the Soviet Intelligence Service and its East German
satellite, the SSD, made repeated attempts to draw one or the other
of these rival West German Intelligence chiefs over to their side.
As far as is known, they never tackled Gehlen, who is of course
a poor prospect for conversion to the Communist cause. But they
did contrive to get hold of both John and Heinz, at any rate for a
while, in 1954.
In the case of Heinz, the first known attempt to draw him over
to the Soviet side was made in June 1952. At that time, an agent
of the SSD called on a former secretary of Heinz, who lived in
Berlin at a place not far away from the Soviet sector, and attempt-
ed to persuade the woman to get in touch with her former boss and
ask him to visit her at her apartment. This would presumably
have made abduction possible, if persuasion failed. The woman,
however, informed the West Berlin representative of John, who
took no action in the case but merely gave instructions that any
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, II
291
further such attempt by the Soviets should be again reported to
him. He did not inform either Heinz or Blankof matter.
A second, far more serious attempt to lure Hemz eastward was
made on October 31, 1953. On that date an East German
one Alfred Friedrich, called at Heinz' office, Bahnhofstrasse 6 10
Wiesbaden (it was camouflaged as the Michael-Verlag, a pubhsh-
ing house), and bluntly asked him to to .East Germany. By
way of reward, the visitor promised Hemz a. Job as head of the
German section of the Soviet Intelligence Service and also a.
inent political position "side by side with Marshal Friedrich
Paulus" (who had been taken prisoner at .Stahngrad later head-
ed a German officers' union in league With the R:usslans).
However, Heinz, who somehow had gotten wmd. of the forth-
coming visit, had already alerted the ":iesbade? W?? at the
end of the interview dramatically burst mto the pubhsher s office,
arresting Friedrich. .
The possibility exists - as always in Intelligence - that thiS en-
tire incident was a staged show. For at that time, Heinz had
retired from active service with the Blank Office. had ostensibly
resigned, but had in fact been suspended, effective October 1,
1953. His final discharge took place on March 31, 1?54.. .
His dismissal was directly due to a volumi?ous which hiS
rival John had painstakingly compiled 10 the years
1951-53. Among other charges, Heinz was ?n
main counts: that he had been a terrorist and active .Nazi (v:
hlch
Heinz had never denied); that he had been a
official in 1945-46 (he had his office as Mayor of Pleskow to
spy on the Russians, Heinz declared in rebuttal); and that he had
had traitorous dealings with a Dutchman named J an Eland.
MYSTERY WITHIN A MYSTERY: THE ELAND AFFAIR.
Here we come to one of the most sordid and mysterlous.mterludes
in an affair rich in such episodes. Eland, a double or triple
lived in Berlin at the war's end. For services, real alleged, w.hlch
he had rendered to the Dutch underground NaZI re-
gime, he was made a colonel in the Netherlands
ice, at a salary of $1,250 a month. the g.ay hfe 10 Berhn
and West German cities, without ever domg a stmt of real
Eland had to shop around for an easy and steady source of mter-
292
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
esting information. That's when he went into business with Heinz,
with whom he already had dealings while the latter was still Mayor
of Pieskow (the spy reports Heinz wrote at the time were channeled
through Eland).
So this pair of double-dealing agents set up a private Intelligence
serv,ice of their own, after Heinz, in 1946, had taken up residence
in West Germany and before he became a trusted official in the
Bonn Government four years later.
Otto John was also well acquainted with Eland, having dined
in London with him a number of times in the early postwar years.
When John returned to Wiesbaden late in 1949, he had several
meetings with both Heinz and Eland. At some of these rendezvous
a fourth and no less intriguing person was present, a Dutchwoman
named Else who worked as secretary for Eland. She was the widow
of a Lufthansa captain killed in the war, who had been a close
friend of John's.
John had no qualms about befriending the widow of his old pal,
nor about doing it at a time when, in London, he was squiring
Gisela Mann around and contemplating marriage to the latter's
mother. He saw Else frequently during his trips to Nuremberg in
the years 1946-49 and apparently he did propose to her. And he
continued to see her, after he had come back to Wiesbaden, a mar-
ried man.
After John had become director of the BFV, with resulting dam-
age to his formerly friendly relations with Heinz, a crisis also de-
veloped in the latter's relationship with the Dutchman. Apparently
Heinz, who was also about to become an important official at Bonn,
thought he could no longer afford to patronize a shady character
like Eland.
Stripped of his best source of information, the Dutchman before
long found himself also cut off from homeland subsidies. In this
dire predicament, Eland set about blackmailing Heinz who had
little choice but to pay up, since by that time he had become chief
of the "Information Division." But after a while Heinz got tired of
it, and in October 1951 he had Eland arrested.
On June 19, 1952, Eland went on trial before a Wiesbaden court,
on charges of blackmail and moral depravity. He was convicted,
but got off with a fairly lenient sentence - nine months in prison.
And since he had already spent that much time in the hoosegow,
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, II 293
pending investigation, he was immediately set free. It has been al-
leged (though hardly proven) that John had something to do with
the lenient treatment that was meted out to Eland.
o In any event, fact is that Eland, after his release, met twice
with Otto John personally, once in Cologne and once in Wiesbad-
en. On the second occasion, John, according to Der Spiegel of No-
vember 18, 1953, handed the Dutchman 100 marks and put him
on a train to Switzerland. On November 3, 1953, Eland died in a
Zurich hotel, while writing his memoirs for a Swiss publisher. In
his book, it was reported by Der Spiegel, several prominent Ger-
man Intelligence operators were going to "playa role."
At the time of Eland's sudden death, it was reported in the press
that he had succumbed to an overdose of sleeping tablets. How-
ever, on July 26, 1954 - note the date! - the Frankfurter Rund-
schau, one of West Germany's major newspapers, reported that
the case had been reopened by the Swiss criminal police, on sus-
picion that Eland had been murdered! Nothing more has been heard
of this investigation, though. Chances are that it was quietly buried
again, for a case like that would have been too hot to handle even
for the Swiss authorities ...
In any event, Eland's connections with Heinz figured promi-
nently in the dossier John had compiled about his rival. John also
obtained further incriminating material from Eland's lawyer at
the Wiesbaden trial, Helmut Kelch, who in his turn was sued by
Heinz as an "accessory to blackmail."
When his case against Heinz was complete, John turned the dos-
sier over to Adenauer's State Secretary Hans Globke, one of the
most influential men in the Bonn Government, then as now. Globke
called the material to the personal attention of the Chancellor,
who immediately instructed Blank to discharge Heinz from his of-
fice.
While the downfall of Colonel Heinz had been primarily of Otto
John's making, Gen,eral Gehlen had a hand in it, too. On this score,
the newspaper Neue Pre sse of Frankfurt, on August 11, 1954, gave
the following details:
"The former head of the 'Abwehr' in the Blank Office, Lieuten-
ant-Colonel Heinz (retired), whose conflict with Dr. John is a mat-
ter of public record, declared in Frankfurt yesterday that he had
294 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
long cautioned against John, though he had never suspected him
of being a Soviet agent.
"Heinz corrected a remark made by Mr. Sefton Delmer of the
Daily Express to the effect that he (Heinz) had warned John against
General Gehlen. H;inz, who now lives at Hahn (near Wiesbaden),
stated that he had reproached John, in a letter written in October,
1953, for intrigying with General Gehlen against himself (Heinz)
,,*
"At the time, Heinz added, he had told intimates that John was
not going to benefit from his (Heinz') downfall. For, eventually
John would be dealt with in the same manner by his former ally,
General Gehlen, who, as Mr. Delmer had pointed out correctly,
aspired to sole control of Intelligence affairs . .. (my italics, J.J.) "
Heinz' prediction that John himself was going to be treated by
the third man in the triangle, the way John had treated a weaker
rival, came true to the hilt, though perhaps in much shorter time than
Heinz had anticipated.
Indeed, one week before John crossed over into East Berlin,
General Gehlen saw to it that a fat dossier marked "This Is Otto
John" was placed on the desk of Chancellor Adenauer by the eager-
beaver bureaucrat, Dr. Globke.
"This material was of such a nature," the Rhein-Zeitung of Au-
gust 6, 1954, reported, "that the Chancellor is said to have de-
clared, just before he left for his vacation, 'I never want to see that
fellow (John) again.' John heard about this remark, it is said in
Bonn, and he took Adenauer at his word. He vanished into the
East zone 'and was seen no more."
Exactly what charges against John were contained in the Gehlen
report is not known and perhaps never will be. However, from
various hints that appeared in German papers favorable to Gehlen,
after John's flight, one may infer that the allegations included:
(1) The oft-repeated charge that John had been a Soviet agent
of long standing. For instance, the Ruhr-Nachrichten of July29,
1954, claimed, in an "exclusive" article on the John case that the
The text of this letter was partially published in Der Spiegel on Novem-
ber 18, 1953. In it, Heinz referred to his previous letter to John, dated
March 30, 1953, repeating his warning about the "poisoned cup of coun
ter.intelligence," quoted above.
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, II 295
latter in 1942 had turned over to British diplomat Guy Burgess "a
detailed tactical map of German air defenses"; that he had made
contact, in Stockholm in 1943, with "the Soviet spymaster Sver-
10k"; that he had worked with "General Gomez" (Zaisser) in Lon-
don; that he had maintained contact with the Soviet spy ring Rote
Kopel/e,' and that he had been in touch with the Swiss double agent
Rossler.
In the same vein, Der Spiegel of August 4, 1954, reported on
the basis of information allegedly supplied by the Portuguese In-
telligence service that John had been in touch with a British and
Soviet double agent by name of Eddie Chapman, operating out of
Tangier.... .
That the Soviet secret service tried to contact John, after he had
become head of the BFV, and that on at least one occasion it at-
temped to induce him to switch sides, appears to be well estab-
lished. Minister of Interior Gerhard Schroder, at a Bonn press con-
ference, on July 26, 1954, confirmed officially what had been
rumored before: that Baron von Putlitz in March of that year had
approached John, in Cologne, for the purpose of persuading him
to go over to the East German side. According to Schroder, John
rejected the offer (that was of course before he learned about the
Gehlen report), but failed to inform his superiors of the incident,
as he should have done. John, however, did record the matter in
his files with the entry: "Rejected treason proposal today."
(2) That John was an inveterate drunkard. O'Donnell, in his
Saturday Evening Post article, gives this allegation a heavy play.
John, in his story, is constantly "plastered," "well-oiled," a "lush"
indulging in "drinking bouts," "falling off the wagon," etc., etc.
This is pure Gehlen stuff. Otto John may have been a pretty
heavy drinker, but wasn't as bad as all that.
(3) That John was inclined to homosexuality.
On this score, the Ruhr-Nachrichten reported that John in 1938
was to have been indicted in. Berlin for homosexual offenses but
that the charge was withdrawn at the insistence of Count Helldorf,
Berlin Police Commissioner (who later was disgraced on the same
charge, as well as for "treason"). The paper added: "British Intel-
ligence had learned about this inclination but to this day nobody
knows for sure whether it used this knowledge to press John into
its service."
296 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
Actually, the charges of homosexuality have never been even
remotely proven in John's case. On the contrary, the record shows
that he was quite a ladies' man. Nevertheless, it appean certain
that this allegation did it, as far as Adenauer, a strict moralist, was
concerned. That wais the main reason why the old man vowed never
again to set eyes on Otto John.
i
Thus it was that in the middle of July 1954, John knew the jig
was up. He was a marked man, a man at bay. The best he could
hope for was a dishonorable discharge, leaving him no prospect of
getting another job in West Germany.
The supreme irony of the situation is that while the Gehlen report
was being prepared, indeed while the finishing touches were being
put to it, Otto John (in May-June 1954) was in Washington, being
briefed on how to fight Communism by F.B.I. Chief Edgar Hoo-
ver and C.LA. Chief Allen W. Dulles in person. He was also being
lavishly entertained by his hosts and was sent on a month"'long tour
of the United States, all at the expense of the American taxpayer!
And, at the very moment Messrs. Hoover and Dulles were shak-
ing Otto John's hand with ostentatious cordiality, their best friend
in Germany, General Gehlen, was busy sharpening the knife to cut
John's throat with. Again, this is Intelligence ...
From the happy, carefree days of his American jaunt, then,
Otto John was plunged, almost without transition, into the agony
of learning about the Gehlen report. To make things worse, he was
just then compelled to absent himself from Cologne (leaving the
field to his enemy), for he had accepted an invitation to attend me-
morial services in Berlin for the victims of the blood purge of July
20th, 1944.
John was in a state of evident depression when he left Bonn in
a charter plane that was also carrying several other high Govern-
ment officials to Berlin. One can imagine what memories beset him
as the plane landed at Tempelhof, ten years after the execution of
his brother and his own precipitate flight into exile.
In Berlin, where he arrived several days before the memorial
date, Otto John saw many of his old cronies again. One of the first
to meet him was Wolfgang Hofer. And now another amazing thing
happened: Hofer had been assigned by his outfit, the C.I.C., to spy
on John and report back. But over the dinner table - he dined
THE ono JOHN STORY, II
297
twice with Otto and Lucy John in those days - H(ifer instead con-
fided to his old friend that he, John, was being watched by the
C.I.C. and that the Americans suspected him of having secret con-
tacts with the East. This was all the confirmation John needed.
Now he really knew that they were out to get him.
The following day, July 20th, they all attended the memorial
service. According to O'Donnell: "The somber ceremonies to the
memory of a dead brother added the Wagnerian touch and prob-
ably triggered the crack-up. He sobbed loudly at the religious cere-
monies; he denounced two other mourners as 'Gestapo agents'; he
even was rude to his old friend, Louis Ferdinand."
In the evening, Otto John said to his wife, "I'm. just going down
for a quick beer."
He never came back.
What happened then has long since been reconstructed almost
down to the last detail, largely at John's trial in November 1956.
John, that night, went to the West Berlin office of a friend, a
Dr. Wohlgemuth, who at the time was a practicing physician in
both sectors of the divided city (an ideal "cover" for Intelligence
activities). Evidently it was a date by prearrangement.
There was another man present: Max Wonsich, an agent of the
SSD. The conversation revolved mainly around the question, what
could be done to further the cause of German reunification. Then
Wohlgemuth or Wonsich, or both, suggested it might be a fine
thing if so prominent a figure in West German public life as John
was himself placed at the head of the unity drive sponsored by the
East German Government.
John was stilI wavering and apparently he sought assurances
that he would be free to go back to West Germany any time he
wanted to. This was agreed to, and Wonsich even volunteered to
On the night of July 19, another curious thing happened. John and his
wife were having dinner at the Ritz restaurant in Berlin with Prince Louis
Ferdinand. One of the party drew in the guestbook a crude picture of a
Charlie Chaplin type of man with a tall woman wearing an even hat
and holding a little dog on a leash. A lonely palm tree and a settmg sun
provided the backdrop.
The legend underneath the drawing read: UTIS geht die Sonne nicht
unter sun never sets on us). They all put their Signatures to it (Frau
John signing as "Lieschen").
298 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
stay in West Berlin as a "hostage", in order to guarantee
that John s movements would not be restricted.
As matter of fact, plan was for John and Wohlge-
muth to make a qUIck trip across the line, have another beer
or two m East Berlin, chat with a few officials there, and then re-
turn - the same night!
And,so the/three of them started out, Wonsich (whose offer to
as had been turned down with thanks by John) lead-
the way m his own car; John and Wohlgemuth fo))owing behind
m latter's The calmly crossed the Heidekrug
from West mto East Berltn, without being stopped or ques-
tIOned on either side.
And now we come to an almost ludicrous anti-climax. You'd think
the Eas.t German Communists would have either pounced on John
as a prize catch, or would have welcomed him with open arms as
a defect?r. As a matter of fact, they did neither of these things.
!ust any other group of Berliners crossing the line for a
VISIt to the other side, the party drove to a restaurant in East
Berltn, East German officials (alerted by a telephone caU
from Wonslch) were ready to receive them. There were hand-
shakes, a few more rounds of beer, a lot more talk about German
unity, and a bit of good advice from the East Germans to Otto
go back to ":'est .Germany, resign demonstratively and pro-
claIm your determmatlOn to fight for reunification to the last
breath.
And then the unbelievable happened: John, who was perfectly
free to .go same night, balked. He had had enough of the
palace Illtngues III Bonn, he intimated, and wasn't going back, ever.
He was to .stay right where he was, in East Germany,
and fight for reUll1ficatlOn and against Adenauer's policies.
The East Germans regretfully shrugged their shoulders. It would'
have been more effective the other way, they reasoned, but they
could use John as a defector, too, if he wanted it that way.
Dr. Wohlgemuth was aghast. He realized what it would do to his
flourishing West Berlin practice if it came out that he had "abduct-
ed" Otto Joh?. it woul? mean the end of the life of Riley
he had been Itvlllg III West Berltn bars and nightclubs, and it would
mean good-bye t'J the four or five girl friends he had left behind
on the other side.
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, II
299
That's why the good doctor late that night drove back to West
Berlin alone frantic and distraught, muttering about the capital
blunder he had committed. He quickly gathered up his essential
belongings, left a power of attorney for his lawyer, picked up his
night nurse and favorite mistress, Annemarie Wehres, and headed
back to East Berlin as fast as he could.
For by that time it was almost dawn, and the great scandal was
about to break in West Berlin: Otto John, Head of West Germany's
Secret Police, had'fled, or had been kidnaped, into the enemy camp!
Otto John a traitor!
As a matter of fact, John that night did betray two persons,
though he himself was probably not aware of it at all. One was his
old friend Wohlgemuth, whom he left in a he)) of a fix. The other
was his old friend Hofer.
No sooner had the news of John's disappearance been bruited
about that the e.l.e. picked up Hofer for questioning. A.fter two
days of grilling, the captain, on July 23rd, shot himself at his billet.
With the complete lack of candor that seems to be a "must" in
such cases, the Army, announcing Hofer's suicide a few days later,
blandly declared there was no connection with the John affair. At
first, Army spokesmen even denied that the two had
each other. Later, they admitted that much, but contlllued to dIS-
pute any link between the two cases. .
John himself set the record straight. In a statement Issued from
East Berlin on July 30, he said Hofer had told him he was "fed
up" with Intelligence work and wanted to quit. He had then asked
him (John) to help him (Hofer) get a job in industry or commerce.
"Hofer was destroyed by the e.l.C,'s abuse of him," John adde.d.
Fact is Hofer had showed himself more naive than is permis-
sible in Intelligence.
Few quit this game - alive.
300
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
THE ono JOHN STORY, III:
THE PRODIGAL'S RETURN
In the world press, the story of John's puzzling night ride through
the Iron Curtain was blown up out of all proportion. They made
a great plot out of it - where there was none.
From the start, two theories of his disappearance held each other
in even balance: one was that he had been kidnaped, after
havmg been drugged or mesmerized at Wohlgemuth's apartment;
the other, that he had defected with treasonable intent.
Actually, as I have shown above, there was neither deliberate
premeditated flight, nor abduction by force or any other means:
The whole thing just happened, in a rather haphazard, makeshift
sort of way.
301
Of course John did not exactly stumble into it. He had given
thought to the idea of making a fresh start in East Germany, now
that he knew that his "usefulness had ended," as they would say in
Washington. He had discussed the project with Dr. Wohlgemuth,
perhaps even before that fateful evening get-together.
Yet, when he finally acted on what had been orginally a rather
hazy notion, he did so on an impulse, in a mood, on the spur of the
moment. There was nothing planned or premeditated about it. And
he had no intention whatever of committing treason, not in the
formal sense of the term, anyway.
When high-placed figures from the other side go over to the
West - take Gouzenko, Rastvorov, Petrov, Swiatlo - they in-
variably bring dispatch-cases full of priceless documents along with
them, for these defections just as invariably involve a juicy business
deal on a cash-and-carry basis.
By contrast, Otto John crossed the line empty-handed. This has
been established beyond doubt. Before he set out on his airplane
flight from Cologne to Berlin he haQ, as a routine precaution dic-
tated by his job, carefully removed all compromising papers from
his pockets. He had no documents, no records, no notes or any-
thing else of material value to Intelligence on his person when he
rode across the line in Dr. Wohlgemuth's car.
He did not carry a suitcase, a change of clothes, not even a
toothbrush with him, for he did not mean, and was not meant, to
stay in East Berlin that night. He had not said good-bye to his wife
- and she was more astonished than when he didn't
come back that night.
John was never arrested, or held in custody, in East Germany.
He was never interrogated - certainly not in the technical sense
of the term. He was questioned, of course, but it was all done in
the friendly spirit of people with mutual interests and working to-
wards the same goal: the reunification of Germany and the main-
tenance of peace.
He knew plenty of secrets, to be sure, even though he did not
carry a single one, on paper. They were locked in his brain, and
the SSD had a pretty good notion where to look for the key to that
safe. John was not tortured, nor was he "brainwashed" in the more
technical sense. Nevertheless, in the bland give-and-take of po-
lite, even casual conversation, and in earnest debate on the great
302 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
issues of the day, the SSD sleuths masquerading as political lead-
ers, economists, scholars, etc., did manage to worm quite a few se-
crets out of him. That much seems certain..
. Otto John had elected, of his own free will, to stay in Ber-
lin. He had, to put it bluntly, thrown himself on the hospitality of
the East German Government. The least he could do, to earn his
keep, was to tk to his hosts when they feIt in a conversational
mood. If any additional stimulants were needed, the SSD knew
where to look for them. A bottle of beer, wine or vodka was never
far out of reach when John and his hosts discussed reunification
peace and goodwill among nations. '
. Then, of course, there was John's deep-seated resentment against
unscrupulous rival, General Gehlen. The Communists, by that
tIme, knew more about Gehlen apparatus than Otto John
e.ver dId. All they had to do was to go fishing for a bit of confirma-
tIOn here, a fill-the-gap item there.
John .most certainly did not turn over to the SSD (as has been
alleged III some quarters) a list of Gehlen agents, for the very good
reason that he never possessed one. He did not betray a single one
of his own men, either.
However, . the mere fact .that he was there, in East Germany _
he made qUIte a few publIc appearances in the following weeks
and months, and he was often heard on the East German radio _
enabled the Reds to bring off a very neat trick of psychological
They spread through the grapevine a rumor that John had
wIllfully defected with the intent of exposing West German secrets;
that he had brought along with him a list of undercover agents as
long as your arm; and that he was talking a mile a minute about
where to find them.
. The rumor struck panic into the hearts of many Gehlen agents
hItherto ensconced in safe positions. They surrendered en masse
to the East German authorities, especially after SSD-head Woll-
weber, in the first days of August, had declared in a number of public
statem.ents that full amnesty would be granted to every "V-man"
his identity prior to his arrest. "Once they're caught,
It s too late, Wollweber added ominously.
This mass flight into voluntary surrender was powerfully aided .
br the fact that a goodly number of Gehlen men had already been
pIcked up by the SSD as a result of the Geyer defection, the Trush-
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, III
303
novitch-Glaeske kidnaping affair, and several similar cases. These
arrests naturally became known in the Gehlen network, no matter
how tightly "compartmentalized" the individual cells may have
been, for they were splashed all over the East German press in
such detail that there could be no mistake.
It all added up to almost irresistible compulsion: First, the foun-
dation of the Gehlen setup in the DDR is rocked, through events
unconnected with the John affair; then the spectacular defection
of West Germany's highest-placed Intelligence officer (General
Gehlen held no office at the time and he always remained in the
shadows, while John was out fronO, a man presumed to know every
secret in the land, and known to be hostile to the Gehlen organiza-
tion; next, the cunningly disseminated rumor that John was spill-
ing every secret he knew and handing the boys over en masse to
the SSD; and, lastly, the inducement of forgiveness being dangled
before the repentant offenders' eyes.
It was a psychological catastrophe for the Gehlen apparatus,
and those of its agents who did not give themselves up under the
pressure of such circumstances must be considered brave men in-
deed. There weren't too many of them. Hundreds did surrender,
hundreds more were caught, for every surrender as a rule provided
a fresh lead for the SSD sleuths.
Thus, the Gehlen apparatus was shattered (temporarily) as a
direct result of John's casual ride across the line, even though he
committed no overt act of treason, nor did anything specific be-
yond shooting off his mouth on the radio about the old Nazis "gain-
ing the upper hand" at Bonn and Adenauer's policies leading
straight to a revival of nazism and a new world war.
"I have followed the call of my conscience," he declared on one
of these occasions, trying to explain his move to the East.
What else could he say? Imagine the most notorious "traitor" of
our day sitting down before a microphone in East Berlin and broad-
casting: "Listen, folks. Do you really want to know the true reason
why I came here. I'll tell you: I just wanted to get away from it all."
That would have been the truth, the "startling" truth behind the
Otto John Mystery, but of course it couldn't be told. Truth, hon-
esty, candor - they have no place in the world of Intelligence.
What, then, did John tell his hosts, for the sake of conversation?
Well, one secret he apparently did let out of the bag (it wasn't
304
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
much of a secret, anyway) was that the European Defense Com-
munity Treaty then in the making (it was later torpedoed by the
French Parliament) contained a secret protocol. Schmidt-Wittmack,
who defected to the East a few weeks after John, could tell the
Reds a lot more tabout this matter than John knew about it. The
existence of this protocol had long since been accepted as a fact by
all persons in ~ h e know, though Adenauer kept denying it. But it
never mattered a damn, since EDC was still-born.
John also dropped a few hints about Gehlen men being slipped
into Paris, to spy on the French ally. This, too, wasn't much of a
secret. Gehlen has his eyes and ears everywhere, so why shouldn't
he have a few planted on the terrace of the Cafe de la Paix? The
Communists eagerly seized on these "disclosures," broadcasting
them to the world and of course especially to France. There were a
few more votes cast against EDC, at the final vote on August 30,
1954, than there otherwise would have been.
There you about have it - the full extent of John's "treason":
the EDC "secret" that didn't matter in the long run; a few nasty
cracks about Gehlen and his men snooping in Paris; plus a lot of
high-sounding propaganda blasts against Adenauer's policies,
which would have been perfectly all right if he had delivered them
in the West German press and radio, as the Social-Democrats, for
one, do all the time.
The Bonn Government, naturally, was in a dire mess about the
whole thing. It was getting plenty of dirty looks from its new-found
allies in the West. The British were aghast at the thought of John
blabbing to the Russians about his experience with the British In-
telligence service. The Americans were furious because of the dam-
age done to the Gehlen outfit, then still a U.S.-owned enterprise,
and also because of the ludicrous aspects of the John visit to Wash-
ington a few weeks earlier. French officials (who should have been
delighted) were angry because the Gehlen-in-Paris story upset the
EDC applecart a little more.
Moreover, the Adenauer Government was being severely har-
assed in its own Parliament, and hounded by the world press. There
was plenty of explaining to do. But, how on earth can you explain
the seemingly inexplicable, if there is one thing you cannot possibly
do: tell the truth?
It was a pretty kettle of fish, and the masterminds in Bonn made
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, III 305
the worst of it. They came up with a series of "explanations" so
obviously phony that they drew howls of derision even from the
West German papers of decidedly pro-Adenauer tendencies.
To make matters worse, the official "Bulletin," which is pub-
lished weekly in English by the Press and Information Service of
the Bonn Government, came out, on July 22, 1954, with a hymn
to Otto John and his Office, entitled "Never Again a Gestapo;' that
began with these words:
"Like every democratic State, the German Federal Republic has
the right and the duty to take measures in the defense of its consti-
tution and its democratic institutions. After the war, various re-
gional Offices for the Defense of the Constitution were set up with
the help of the occupation powers. The federal-level office was es-
tablished at Cologne in 1950; its head is Dr. Otto John."
Official publications are not, as a rule, pre-dated like commer-
cial magazines, so one cannot blame this bizarre mishap on tech-
nicalities. Actually, the issue of The Bulletin in which appeared
the first mention of Otto John was printed at about the time he
was on his way to the Communist camp.
The editors of The Bulletin, however, were not at fault. Evident-
ly they had been kept in the dark about the forthcoming disgrace
of the President of BFV. And, in the fantastic confusion and tur-
moil that followed upon this unique vanishing act, nobody had
thought of rushing a "stop-the-press" order to the official printer.
Besides, everybody who was anybody in Bonn was then on vaca-
tion, or about to leave town. The chief of the government himself,
Adenauer, calmly departed for his favorite retreat at BUhler Hone
in the Black Forest the very day the public learned for the first
time of John's defection.
To go back to the "Never Again a Gcstapo" piece in The Bulle-
tin, its second paragraph indulged in a delightful bit of involuntary
humor:
"It is the responsibility of this office to safeguard the Federal Re-
public's free institutions against treasonable and subversive activi-
ties. The geographical and political position of Western Germany
makes such precaution particularly necessary, since it might other-
wise become a seedbed for espionage."
The Bonn Government of course had from the start a pretty
good notion of the real reason behind John's disappearance. But it
306 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
not. so as hint at it without exposing the fantastic secret
service tnangle It had allowed to develop in a country that didn't
want a fot espionage."
all its resources of propaganda and
to disgUIse and distort the simple truth. Official statements
Issued 10 the first few days after John had disappeared all hinted
that he had beqn drugged, kidnaped, lured; that he had fallen for
a hoax or had stepped into a baited trap. The office of the
UDlted High Commissioner, on July 23, also issued a state-
ment saymg John had been "trapped or forced" to go East and
that he was bemg "held" in the Soviet sector.
Early in August, however, the Bonn Government changed its
tune. Adenauer on August 6 called Otto John a "deserter" and on
August 11 he was officially branded a "traitor." In between, Bonn
made the preposterous gesture of offering a reward of 500 000
marks (about $119,000) for information that would clear the
John mystery. Since there was no mystery, and the Government
even then had all the information it needed to "solve" the case, the
of course was never paid. It was just a propaganda stunt
mtended to confuse public opinion even more.
. So was the comedy of the Parliamentary Commission to Inves-
.the John Case that was set up in the fall. With Adenauer's
Chnstlan Democrati.c Union in full control of the Bundestag, it was
a conclUSion that the Commission would not discover
anythmg to the Government. As a matter of fact, it never
anythmg worthwhile, although it was still sitting by the
time the runaway Intelligence chief returned, a year later.
In t.he meantime, John was getting slightly bored in his new sur-
- and who could blame him? After he had delivered
hiS e.xpected quota of propaganda broadcasts, including some pretty
fanciful ones, he had little else to do but sit around and listen to
the endless and tedious cliches and slogans that make up the intel-
lectual fare of people living under Communism
A visit he paid to the aging Field Marshal Paulus at Dres-
den, on 12, did not come off as planned either. John has
never hit. It off well with the military, and Paulus apparently
him off with the scarcely concealed suggestion that he did
not Wish to have dealings with "traitors."
THE OTTO JOHN STORY. III
307
Eventually, John dropped out of sight altogether and became
to an practical purposes The Forgotten Man. And this may very
well have been the determining reason why he came back. For, an
egocentric person like John just can't let the world forget him as
long as he thinks he can do something about it.
There were others, though. For one thing, he didn't get along
too well with his new East German bosses. He never had been,
and never intended to become, a Communist or fellow-traveler. It
did not take him too long to see through the threadbare pretenses
of what they call political life in East Germany.
He also missed the good life in West Germany; and last, not least,
he missed Lucy, for he entertained a genuine affection for his wife.
Soon after his flight, he had written her several tender letters which
of course were intercepted by the police. In one, dated July 23, he
said he had been forced to take this step, but would explain every-
thing to her later. This has been interpreted in some quarters as
meaning to convey that he had been kidnaped while he actually
meant something quite different, to wit: forced to leave by the
Gehlen intrigue.
In a second letter, dated July 24, he told his wife: "I read today
what the Western press has been writing about me. These accounts
leave out everything that's really important. Those people don't
understand me, or they don't want to. I am very sad that I have
caused you so much worry. I always think of you with love and ad-
miration."
A few weeks later, Frau John and her daughter gave up their
home in Cologne, where they had been under constant police sur-
veillance, and returned to London.
About the middle of 1955, if not earlier, John began sounding
out Bonn, through various channels, about what would happen to
him if he returned. He not only wanted assurances that he would
not be put in prison, but also the promise of a new job.
He was encouraged no doubt by the fact that the Federal Prose-
cutor at Karlsruhe, in a provisional report on the results of a crim-
inal investigation of the John case, expressed the view (so entirely
at variance with everything previously put out by official channels)
that his crossing into East Berlin had not been prepared before-
hand and that John had meant to return the same night.
On August 24, 1955, Der Spiegel reported that John, through
308
THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
the intermediary of Communist newspaperman W. K. Gerst in
Bonn, had put out a feeler to the West German Government as
to whether or not he would be allowed to return for the purpose
of acting as middleman between Bonn and the East German regime.
"Although Johrt pointed out that he had not committed any crim-
inal action in East Germany," the magazine added, "Gerst was
told the if he returned, in any case would first be taken
into custody."
Then John's loyal friend, Prince Louis Ferdinand (who had of
course also been questioned by police about the case) pulled a few
strings with a view to bringing his pal back from the East.
The Prince was well acquainted with a Danish newspaperman
stationed in Berlin, Henrik Bonde-Henriksen, correspondent of
Denmark's leading newspaper Berlingske Tidende. As a prominent
representative of the Fourth Estate, from a neutral country, Bonde-
Henriksen was able to operate more freely on both sides of the
demarcation line than any German or other foreign correspondent.
After lunching with Otto John at the East German press club on
Friedrichstrasse, Berlin, Bonde-Henriksen OIll' day in the late fall
of 1955 traveled to Bonn, where he called on State Secretary Dr.
Strauss at the Federal Ministry of Justice. The Danish newsman
later reported:
"I asked him what would happen if Dr. John reappeared in West
Germ,any. Well aware that I often saw John, Dr. Strauss said:
" 'Tell him that he can return without risk. He will probably not
be arrested, but, naturally, we :,hall have questions to ask.'
"I passed the message on to Dr. John."
One of Otto John's fellow-conspirators in the July 20th, 1944
plot against Hitler, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, now a lawyer at
Wiesbaden, also had a hand in the sub rosa negotiations between
John and the West German Government, as did several other per-
sons.
Finally, when John's former boss, Interior Minister Dr. Gerhard
Schroder (chief architect of the legend that John had been drugged
and kidnaped), early in December 1955 repeated to the parlia-
mentary committee still investigating the case his conviction that
the former chief of the BFV had not gone to East Germany with
"treasonable intent," John apparently concluded that this official
pronouncement made it safe enough for him to return.
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, III
309
According to an account published in The New York Times, on
24, 1955, i.e. after John had returned and been ar-
rested: "Several hours before Dr. John's return, Herr Schroeder un-
dertook to defend John's record and character before the Bundes-
tag committee concerned with the case. Herr Schroeder told the
committee he was convinced that Dr. John had not gone to East
Germany with treasonable intent and that he had m.ade. valuable
contributions to West Germany's security before hIs dIsappear-
ance."
After this regular whitewash, in which Schroeder's State Secre-
tary Ritter von Lex also took part, one can only conclude that
who had neve; bet!n lured or trapped into going East, was
indeed tricked into going West, seventeen months later. .
Anyhow, on December 12, John into .automoblle of
Bonde-Henrikson and drove with him, wIthout mCldent, through
the main thoroughfare linking the two sectors, the Brandenburg
Gate. The prodigal son had come back.
Bonde-Henriksen later made a big cloak-and-dagger
out of the way hI( had "spirited John away" East but
it was no such thing. It was of course a first-rate Journahstlc
but it was no great exploit. For the East Germans had known
a long time that their unbidden guest was getting impatient to leave,
and they had decided not to put any in way. In
they seemed to be rather glad to get rid of hIm. (WIlly John, Otto s
70-year-old father, told the Press on December
1955 that his son had obtained a promIse from East German au
thori;ies when he defected that he could return to the .West when-
ever he liked. Strange as it may seem, the CommuOlst rulers of
East Germany simply honored that pledge.) ., .
There was no great surprise at John's return, eIther 10
Germany, or in Washington. A good many people had been 10 on
the secret that he was coming home.
On December 14, New York Times correspondent M. S: Hand-
ler cabled his paper from Bonn as follows: "Many reporters 10 Bonn
believe that some West German officials were 'in the there
is no visible proof of this, unless one faIrly mtld
titude of the Government toward Dr. John smce hIS return as eVI-
dence of previous knowledge.
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THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
"This mild attitude may have no particular significance in view
of the Government's persistent contention in the past that Dr. John
could not have betrayed West Germany because he had no secrets
to betray. This p,rsistently held line would make it difficult for the
Government to reverse itself suddenly and demand Dr. John's pros-
ecution on charges of treason."
That was during the brief interval of freedom John was allowed
to enjoy between his return and his formal arrest on treason charges
on December 23, 1955. Indeed, the Government did reverse itself.
Who gave the order for this flagrant double-cross may never be
known, but the responsibility in any event rests with Adenauer him-
self.
However, one cannot feel too sympathetic towards John, for in
the meantime he himself had done a shabby and despicable thing.
Eagerly picking up the cue handed him by his former boss Schroder,
he now put the whole blame for what he had done on his old pal
Dr. Wohlgemuth.
Bonde-Henrikson, in a detailed account of how he brought John
back (cf. The New York Times, December 15,1955) quoted the
latter as telling him:
"Could any of my friends believe that I had passed the sector
line voluntarily? Around 8 P.M. (on July 20, 1954), I visited Dr.
~ o l f g a n g Wohlgemuth at his Uhlandstrasse clinic. He had prom-
Ised to obtain a pension for a widow of one of the executed men
who had resisted the Nazis. During the war Wohlgemuth had
helped my brother, who was later executed.
"I had tea with 'Wowo,' as we called him. Later we were to go
to another apartment he had in West Berlin. On the way he was
to contact a person who should help this widow.
"What happened after that time I don't know. I woke up two
days later in Karlshorst (Soviet military headquarters in East Ber-
lin - J.J.). There was a woman doctor at my bed. And there were
Soviet Intelligence agents arourid. I was given an injection and later
another one. My head was not clear. I think there is a Mexican
plant poison ... "
John repeated this pack of lies several times later, to anyone who
cared to listen. He stuck to it, too, during his long-delayed trial be-
fore the Federal Supreme Court at Karlsruhe which began in mid-
November 1956 and ended a month later.
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, III
311
He led off his defense by insisting that Wohlgemuth had drugged
and kidnaped him during a visit to the physician's apartment, and
that when he regained consciousness he was forced to "cooperate"
with the Communists. He could have done nothing else, he con-
tended, in the "hopeless" situation he was in; resistance would
have led to torture and something he had managed to avoid - the
revelation of "real secrets."
The Court did not believe one word of this and it was dead right.
Such things do happen, in fact they happen all the time, especially
in Berlin. But they just didn't happen to Otto John, who, quite to
the contrary, had been treated with great consideration in East Ber-
lin, where he had formally requested and received, on August 4,
1954, political asylum.
One curious and unexpected thing did happen in the course of
the month-long, rather dreary, trial at Karlsruhe. On November 28,
1956, John's former rival, Friedrich W. Heinz popped up - as
witness for the defense. Heinz, it must be interpolated here,. had
had a similar adventure in the meantime, or so he said. According
to his testimony at the trial, he, too, had been abducted into the
eastern zone, on December 16, 1954, while riding in the car of a
former associate in Intelligence. He woke up to face a stem Rus-
sian general who first tried to get him to cooperate and, when he
refused, threatened: "Then we shall have to treat you as an enemy."
At this point, he related, he agreed to "cooperate," all the while
thinking of suicide and escape - as John must have done, Heinz
said. In the end he related, in great detail, how he had finally es-
caped through a window and got back to the western sector after
having been held for 27 days.
The five judges listened in stony silence to this cock-and-bull
story. When he had finished his tale, the witness was not cross-
examined by either the prosecution or the counsel for the defense
- a most unusual thing. Heinz' testimony didn't help John one bit.
On December 22, 1956, the court found John guilty of treason-
able conspiracy and willful publication of false information injuri-
ous to the security of West Germany and sentenced him to four
years at hard labor, plus payment of costs expected to exceed 100,-
000 marks ($23,800).
It was a harsh sentence, for the prosecution itself had recom-
mended only two years. And the Court apparently did not take
312 THEY CALL IT INTELLIGENCE
into consideration at all the fact that John had received assurances
of leniency on which he had relied.
It is also of interest to note that the Court dismissed the charges
of treason, substituting instead the lesser one of "acts of a treason-
able nature." f
Specifically, the Court found the defendant gUilty of having dis-
closed "false i9formation that, if true, would have constituted state
secrets" on three counts: (1) that the E.D.C. treaty contained a
secret protocol; (2) that the Gehlen organization was intensifying
its activities in France; (3) that Chancellor Adenauer had ordered
him (John) to investigate one of his own Cabinet Ministers (Jakob
Kaiser). John was also convicted of having revealed the names or
aliases of three members of his staff (people attached to his office
in Cologne, not agents in the field, it should be added).
One may well wonder whether these "offenses" justified so se-
vere a sentence, especially since the question whether the state-
ments made by John were true or false remains very much in
doubt, the verdict of the Court notwithstanding.
On balance, it would seem that Otto John is a man more sinned
against, than having sinned.
After another year and two months had passed, History added
one more footnote to the tang,led John affair: On the evening of
February 11, 1958, Dr. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth was arrested in
West Berlin. Police had found out that his girl friend, Annemarie,
had some time ago quietly moved back from the eastern to the
western sector of the city. They kept the woman's apartment under
constant surveillance, assuming that sooner or later the doctor
w o ~ l d pa! a call. He did and was nabbed. But the charge pending
agamst hIm was not that he had kidnaped Otto John. Rather, he
was accused of having been in the service of Soviet Intelligence.
However, John, from his prison, late in February sent a wire to
the public prosecutor reiterating his charges against Wohlgemuth.
On July 1, 1958, Dr. Wohlgemuth was released on bail of 30,000
marks by order of the Federal Supreme Court at Karlsruhe. And
on July 27, Otto John was released on parole after having served
only 19 months of his 4-year sentence. Was this act of clemency
due .to. new light that had been shed on the case by Wohlgemuth,
or dId It reflect second thoughts, in Bonn, on the justice of the stem
treatment that had been meted out to John?
THE OTTO JOHN STORY, III
313
In mid-December 1958, it was Wohlgemuth's tum to take his
seat in the dock at Karlsruhe. His trial, which like that of Otto
John was held partly in camera, shed little fresh light on this still
tangled affair. On December 19, Wohlgemuth was acquitted.
This, however, was not the end yet of the Otto John story. In
the early spring of 1962 it rebounded once more in. the n e w ~ whe.n
John instituted perjury proceedings against a preVIOusly umde.ntt-
fied "star witness" for the prosecution, a man named Karl RIch-
ard Wittig. Testifying in camera, under the cover name of "In-
formant," Wittig, at Otto John's trial, had alleged that in Weimar
John had candidly admitted that he came to the eastern zone of
his own free will.
John's assertion that Wittig had perjured himself was based on
the latter's denial that he had ever been active in "Intelligence."
But John claimed to have proof of Wittig's previous connections
with secret service agents. At this writing this new case has not
yet been finally decided. It may well represent, as Die Zeit put it
on March 23, 1962, "The Last Chance of Otto John." If Wittig
is convicted of perjury, the road will be open for the eventual re-
habilitation of history's most controversial defector; if not, the Otto
John dossier may be closed for good.
Thus, more than eight years after John's bizarre nightly excur-
sion across the border line into East Berlin, his weird case still
comes under the heading of "Unfinished Business." But then,
many of IntelligenceZs most tantalizing tales never really go, be-
yond that stage ...
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