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SP006

XII SIMPSIO DE ESPECIALISTAS EM PLANEJAMENTO DA OPERAO E EXPANSO ELTRICA XII SEPOPE


20 a 23 de Maio 2012 May 20th to 23rd 2012
RIO DE JANEIRO (RJ) BRASIL

XII SYMPOSIUM OF SPECIALISTS IN ELECTRIC OPERATIONAL AND EXPANSION PLANNING

FLEXIBILIZATION OF THE REACTIVE POWER COMPENSATION FOR THE BATEIAS IBINA 500 kV TRANSMISSION LINES Ricardo Andr de Andrade Gonalves* Eletrobrs/Furnas Centrais Eltricas S/A Brasil
SUMMARY The 500 kV interconnection between Bateias and Ibina substations is an important link between the Brazilian south and southeast systems. It is composed of two transmission lines in a double circuit configuration, with reactive power compensation in both terminals and with series compensation at Ibina. In accordance with the actual organization of the interconnected Brazilian electrical system, it is an important issue the aggregation of techniques that allow a better utilization of transmission capacity and optimal system voltage control. There is an ongoing concern at the unavailability of transmission lines to cause high financial outlays by the heavy fines imposed by ANEEL. In this context, it was evaluated the possibility to operate the lines of the interconnection with the unavailability of the Ibina line reactors (those of Bateias is vitally important in controlling the terminal voltages of these lines, in such a way that it is not possible to operate without them). It was also investigated the introduction of devices that allow the flexibility of the reactive power compensation of the transmission lines, improving the transmission capacity and voltage control of the terminal substations. The Bateias-Ibina interconnection is composed of two 165 Mvar/550 kV line shunt reactors in Bateias and two 105 Mvar/550 kV in Ibina. These reactors have a nominal neutral voltage enough to make use of neutral reactors and enable the single-phase auto-reclosure. This feature allows the flexibility of the reactive compensation of interconnection thus get a better control terminal voltage substations. The interconnection could have a reactive compensation ranging from 416 Mvar and 540 Mvar at 550 kV. This variation would be done in four switching steps. The highest variation would be switching 38 Mvar/550 kV in Bateias. It will be shown that these steps would bring a very low impact on the interconnection system and on the Itaipu HVDC Link (HVDC), even when done at Ibina ( 24 Mvar/550 kV), which has the HVDC inverter station at 345 kV. For strategy suggested, it will be presented simulation results, not only for steady state conditions, but also for transient at single phase and three phase auto-reclosure after elimination of line faults and load rejection conditions. The evaluation of the operation of the lines without Ibina lines shunt reactors will also be presented. For this study, a comprehensive modeling of south and southeast systems, as well as the HVDC in ATP program were considered. Considering the operation of the HVDC in constant current mode or at minimum alpha and gamma, the simultaneous switching of the four flexible reactors in the Bateias-Ibina interconnection, from full

compensation to reduced compensation would increase the HVDC power injection in Ibina by 50 MW (considering the same system conditions), due to the voltage rise in Ibina 345 kV busbar. KEY-WORDS: Reactive Power Compensation, Long Transmission Lines, Auto-reclosure Switching, Reactors Switching, Arresters.

1. Introduction
Eletrobras/Furnas has given great importance in seeking to reduce the possible unavailability of its transmission lines. The 500 kV Ibina-Bateias double circuit line is one of them. In that sense, it was important to check the possibility of operating such line without its shunt reactors at Ibina substation. The company had already expressed concern about the reduction of outages of that line, taking into account the high value of the disbursement variable portion of the discount associated to it. It was performed a previous study, which came to the conclusion that the line reactors at Bateias terminals are fundamental for overvoltage control. However, to operate the lines without the reactors at Ibina terminals was feasible. That requires the upgrading of the arresters capability at the Ibina line ends which means to replace all those installed arresters at Ibina line ends. There is already an operation instruction that applies a "transfer-trip" to the Ibina-Bateias lines in such a way that the Bateias terminal is opened first in case of line failure. This procedure would prevent the Ibina arresters at the lines terminals in the absence of line reactors to reach its MCOV. There was concern about the time that could the line stay with the terminal opened at Ibina and closed at Bateias substation in case of failure of the breakers of this terminal. This is the situation that would be crucial in defining the number of arresters in parallel columns to be installed at the terminal of the two lines at Ibina end to ensure the protection requirements. In this sense, the first part of this work aims to present the results of the operation of the two lines Bateias-Ibina without its shunt reactors at Ibina terminals. Later it will be also presented a strategy to optimize the compensation of these two lines towards a better utilization of transmission capacity, through better control of terminal voltage substations.

2. Network Configuration
Figure 1 shows the Ibina surrounding busses which includes the Bateias-Ibina interconnection.

It was considered the updated system configuration for the year 2011, using an extensive system equivalent, which considers the modeling of the HVDC [1,2,3]. This system is represented by most of southern and southeastern systems, besides the HVDC. Table 1 below shows the comparison between ATP equivalent system short-circuit with the ONS ("National System Operator") full system data [4]. The validation of the equivalent system, which was used to perform the transients study with the ATP [5], was verified by comparing the short-circuit currents at the most significant substations of the equivalent network with the complete system, according to ONS data [4]. The small differences found between the short-circuit currents are negligible and not enough to invalidate the equivalent system modeled in the ATP program, as described in References [1-3]. The system was considered in heavy load, with the maximum possible operating voltages in Ibina and Bateias substations. In this same context, it was considered that the busses reactors were disconnected from the system (including the Ibina 500 kV busbar reactors).

Figure 1 System Configuration near Ibina

SUBSTATION IBIUNA C. PAULISTA T. PRETO BATEIAS IBIUNA T. PRETO

SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENTS (kA) - YEAR 2 0 1 1 VOLTAGE O N S A T P (kV) Single phase Three phase Single phase Three phase 500 15.5 17.5 15.0 17.0 500 18.9 24.9 14.1 21.0 500 25.4 24.5 24.0 23.0 500 17.7 17.5 16.7 16.8 345 37.4 42.4 35.2 40.1 345 43.2 41.9 41.1 39.1

Table I Short-circuit Currents at the Most relevant Substations for the Transient Studies

3. The Interconnection Operation in the Unavailability of Ibina Lines Reactors:


In the actual structure of the Brazilian interconnected power system, it is an important issue the aggregation techniques which ensure a better utilization of transmission capacity and system voltage control. In addition, there is an ongoing concern at the unavailability of transmission lines for being such a major cause of financial outlays because of the heavy fines imposed by the regulatory agency ANEEL. In this context, it was evaluated the possibility to operate the interconnection in case of unavailability of its line reactors at Ibina substation. Bateias line reactors are larger than Ibina and plays a vital role in controlling the voltages of these lines. Thats why the interconnection can not operate without those reactors. To ensure a safety interconnection operation for such a contingency it is necessary to apply the following procedures: If the flexible reactive compensation scheme (it will be described later) is adopted, the Bateias reactors should operate with full compensation and solid grounded neutral;

The monopolar auto-reclosure should be disabled, and the Ibina terminal should be the leader in applying tripolar auto-reclosure. The line energization should always be initiated by Ibina terminals; The "transfer-trip should be adopted to always open the Bateias terminal before Ibina terminal. If this measure is not adopted, the arresters at Ibina will be exposed to risk due to its low MCOV. In order to evaluate the necessary number of 420 kV ZnO arresters columns, it must be considered the interconnection operating without both line reactors in Ibina. It was performed the worst possible situation in terms of electromagnetic switching transients. To ensure the operation robustness, the "transfer trip" was not considered and, concomitantly, the unavailability of both Ibina line reactors was regarded. It was simulated a double load rejection at Ibina terminal, followed by a single phase fault at one of the two lines at Ibina terminals and also a Bateias breaker failure. This situation leads to eliminate the fault condition only 300 ms after the fault occurrence. It was considered the minimal switching arrester characteristic to maximize the energy absorption. The oscillograms (Osc. 1 to 3) show the dc current behavior of the HVDC, the line voltages on the faulted Bateias Ibina line at Ibina terminals and the line arresters energy in Ibina, during the two 500 kV lines to Bateias load rejection. Since the line shunt reactors are out of operation, it was considered only one arrester column at each line terminal.

Osc. 1 HVDC Current at Ibina

Osc. 2 Voltages at Ibina Faulted Line Considering the results (8 MJ maximum energy consumption by the Ibina arresters), it can be concluded that Bateias - Ibina lines which compose this interconnection, can safely operate without both Ibina line reactors. In order to ensure such an operation, new 420 kV ZnO line arresters, class 5 have to be provided. These arresters will have a special requirement concerning the minimum capacity for absorbing energy of 23 kJ/kVrating (2 columns in parallel), which guarantees a minimum dissipation capacity of 9.7 MJ of energy. The actual 420 kV ZnO arresters are already more than 10 years in operation and therefore must be replaced.

Osc. 3 Ibina Line Arresters Energy

Moreover, the shunt reactors arresters should be also changed by new ones in order to have equality energy shared between the line arrester and reactors arresters, in switching events, when the reactors are in operation.

4. Flexible Reactive Power Compensation for the Interconnection:


The Bateias Ibina 500 kV lines have fixed line shunt reactors in both terminals. In Bateias these reactors are 165 Mvar/550 kV and 105 Mvar/550 kV in Ibina. Considering the introduction of the flexible compensation, it would be possible to have the 165 Mvar shunt reactors operating at 127 Mvar and the 105 Mvar shunt reactors operating at 81 Mvar consumption, for 550 kV operation voltage. Therefore, the Bateias Ibina Interconnection could have a reactive power compensation ranging from 416 Mvar and 540 Mvar at 550 kV or 344 Mvar to 446 Mvar at 500 kV. This variation would be done in four switching reactive steps, in such a way that the biggest change would be for switching in Bateias that would be 38 Mvar/550 kV or 31.4 Mvar/500 kV. These switchings would bring a very low reactive impact on the compensation for the interconnection and for the HVDC, even when done at 500 kV Ibina (24 Mvar/550 kV). The device used to give such flexibility in reactive power compensation has already been described in earlier works [2] and [3]. To use the strategy suggested in these transmission lines, it would be necessary to aggregate the existing line reactors (Rp) at the line end, the following equipments: Three phase reactor (Rs) 38,6 Mvar/145 kV for Bateias and 24,6 Mvar/145 kV for Ibina; 4 independent 145 kV breaker poles, 13 independent 145 kV switching poles; 4 ZnO arresters 108 or 120 kV rated voltage (it may have more than one column, depending on energy capability requirements). Figure 2 shows the three phase diagram of the reactive flexible compensation suggested.

FIGURE 2 Transmission Line Flexible Compensation 4.1. Steady-state Analysis:

The device as previously shown in Figure 1 allows, for steady-state conditions work in two conditions, namely: Circuit phase breakers closed: Full Reactor; Circuit phase breakers opened: Limited Reactor. Considering the Bateias line reactors there would be: Full Reactor: 165 Mvar/550 kV Limited Reactor: 127 Mvar/550 kV. Figure 3 shows the switching of the phase breaker and the changes in the currents reactor. Situation "A" breakers circuit opening phase. Situation "B" breakers circuit closing phase:

FIGURA 3 Steady State Variation of the Reactive Power Compensation In order to have smooth switching transients, it was considered the use of synchronizers to ensure optimized closing instants for the phase breakers. Considering the HVDC operation in constant current mode (actually operates in constant power mode) or even operating at minimum alpha and gamma by systemic conditions, the simultaneous switching of the four interconnection flexible reactors, from the condition of full reactive compensation to reduced reactive compensation would increase 10 MW power injected by this interconnection, concomitantly, would bring a voltage gain for the 345 kV Ibina bus allowing an extra injection of 50 MW by the HVDC in Ibina station (for the same system conditions), as shown in the osc 4 below:

Osc. 4 HVDC Power Injection in Ibina 4.2. Analysis of the Transient Behavior:

4.2.1. Single Phase Auto-reclosure: To verify the effectiveness of this strategy on the use of single phase auto-reclosure, the device was evaluated in one of the two Bateias - Ibina lines. In this context, it was considered in the modeling, all couplings between the two circuits, and the transposition was mechanically implemented. Under heavy load conditions, the power flow of each circuit of this line reaches 1300 MW with average voltage between 1.05 and 1.07 pu and the actual reactive compensation. Under these conditions, single phase auto-reclosure would successfully be applied, considering the neutral grounding scheme of the line reactors, as it was defined in the basic design of this project. Adopting the strategy of flexible compensation for the four line reactors, the flow increases around 10 MW by circuit and the average voltage in 0.01 pu at the terminal substations. With the introduction of variable compensation scheme, when it is operating at 165 Mvar, the neutral has the parallel of the 3 three secondary reactors. On the other hand, the neutral side of these reactors is isolated, which has the same effect of having the main reactor neutral isolated. In this condition, the results were analyzed for fundamental frequency (60Hz), in steady state, the induced voltage at the opened phase and the secondary arc current for different fault locations and the two boundary

conditions of reactive compensation at the interconnection (416 or 540 Mvar at 550 kV). The results of this analysis are shown in Table II below. HEAVY LOAD - 1300 MW 165 e 105 Mvar/550 kV REACTORS
Secondary Arc for Different Fault Locations (Aef)
Fault Location BATEIAS LT IBINA

HEAVY LOAD - 1310 MW 127 e 81 Mvar/550 kV REACTORS


Secondary Arc for Different Fault Locations (Aef)
Fault Location BATEIAS LT IBINA

6.8 4.8 26.9 Phase B 13.3 4.9 21.9 Phase C 16.6 7.2 17.4 Induced Voltage at the Opened Phase
Phase A
Measuring Location BATEIAS LT IBINA

24.7 23.5 31.7 Phase B 30.9 20.4 30.7 Phase C 29.7 23.9 24.3 Induced Voltage at the Opened Phase
Phase A
Measuring Location BATEIAS LT IBINA

Phase A Phase B Phase C

7.0 13.7 16.9

5.2 5.3 7.7

28.0 22.9 18.1

Phase A Phase B Phase C

22.1 27.5 26.4

21.8 19.1 22.2

28.6 27.8 22.0

Table II Secondary Arc Current and Induced Voltage at the Opened Phase Concerning the flexible reactive power compensation (165/105 Mvar and 127/81 Mvar at 550 kV), for both operation limit conditions, the results show that the single phase auto-reclosure is feasible. Because of the isolation of the neutral of the reactor, for both cases, the results are better if compared with the original initial basic project. The worst fault condition occurs at Ibina line end. The HVDC has almost the same behavior, for both compensations as is shown in Osc. 5.

Osc. 5 Transient Analysis of the Single Phase Auto-reclosure Making the reactive power compensation flexible is equivalent to a have a SVC (TSC Thyristor Switched Capacitor) of 0/+124 Mvar in 4 steps (2 x 24 Mvar + 2 x 38 Mvar) at 550 kV. The cost of a 500 kV TSC would be much higher than the proposed solution, manly if it is taken into account that this compensation would need to be splitted in two substations. The single phase auto-reclosure was applied just after the fault clearing, considering a dead time of 500 ms. Based on these results, it can be said that the single phase auto-reclosure would be successfully applied for all the possible reactive power compensation configurations at the terminal substations of the analyzed transmission line. The neutral voltages of the reactor secondary , for both terminals and for both reactive power compensation limits, reached the maximum peak of 1.80 pu (Vnominal=72,5 kV). This peak was enough to make the arresters start conduction but just at the fault application absorbing the maximum 55 kJ energy. The energy capability of this 120 kV ZnO arrester is 840 kJ (class 3 - 7 kJ/kVrating). Eventually other line configurations and reactive power compensations may require more than just one column for the neutral arrester.

Conclusively, it can be said that the single phase auto-reclosure can be applied in any configuration of the flexible reactive compensation suggested in this paper.

4.2.2. Transmission Line Energization:


The phase breakers must be closed in order to have, at both terminals, full line reactors (165 Mvar in Bateias and 105 Mvar in Ibina). The ground breaker 2 must also be closed to prevent any firing of the neutral arresters. In this way there will be on both ends, reactors filled with grounded neutral at the instant of energizing of the line. After the line has been energized and synchronized in the opposite terminal is made the opening of circuit breakers 2 and the operation is released to control the amount of reactive power absorbed by the line through the phase breakers.

4.2.3. Transmission Line Three Phase Auto-reclosure:


Three phase auto-reclosure would only be applied by operational reasons because even in case of unavailability of the both line terminals equipment suggested would not disable the line single phase auto-reclosure since the neutrals of the main reactors would be ungrounded allowing this feature. In adopting the three phase auto-reclosure, the appropriate ground breakers must be closed so that, either at full reactive power compensation or reduced power compensation, the reactors have the neutral solidly grounded. When there is the opening line protection signal, it also sends a signal to the phase circuit breakers on both ends to close them if they are open. At the time of three phase auto-reclosure the line will be compensated by full reactors at both ends, with their neutrals solidly grounded.

4.2.4. Load Rejection:


The load rejection could be the most severe transient which could make the suggested strategy become unfeasible. When the system is in heavy load condition, there would be two lines with both terminals in reduced reactive power compensation for all the reactors. The total Ibina load rejection (the two circuits simultaneously) was investigated and also, the same rejection followed by an application of single phase line fault in one of the two lines at this terminal, at the time and on phase with the highest overvoltage, after the load rejection. In heavy load condition, the flow for each of the two lines is about 1300 MW, from Bateias to Ibina and the substations voltages are, respectively, of 1.07 pu and 1.05 pu. The total load rejection (both lines), for both terminals have no high voltages at the terminals of the lines rejected. The maximum energy in the arresters was 1 MJ. The HVDC is impacted by the load rejection but not enough to create commutation failure of the Ibina valves.

4.2.4.1. Total Load Rejection at Ibina Followed by Single Phase Fault:


It was simulated a total load rejection of Ibina terminal (both lines), followed by a a single phase fault in one of the lines in this terminal, at the instant that the biggest overvoltage occurs after the load rejection. In half cycle after the fault, the series capacitor of the faulted phase is "by-passed" and 50 ms after the fault, the Bateias terminal is opened. The oscillograms from 20 to 26 show the main variables in this simulation.

Osc. 6 HVDC Current

Osc. 7 Faulted Line Voltage in Ibina

Osc. 8 Line Arresters Energy - Ibina

Osc. 9 Secondary Reactors Voltages

Osc. 10 Secondary Reactors Arresters Energy.

Osc. 11 Neutral Voltage Secondary Reactors. Osc. 12 Neutral Arrester Energy Conclusively, as the energy absorbed by secondary reactor arresters reached a value greater than 1.1 MJ, there is a need to double the number of columns of these arresters to ensure that even in the unlikely event of a total rejection at Ibina, followed by a single phase fault at the line end in this terminal, all the equipments would be appropriated sized. The secondary reactors arresters should have a minimum capacity of 13 kJ / kVrating. This would ensure a total capacity of 1.56 MJ by arrester.

4.2.4.2. Total Load Rejection at Bateias Followed by Single Phase Fault:


It was also simulated a total load rejection of Bateias terminal (both lines), followed by a single phase fault in one of the lines in this terminal, at the instant that the biggest overvoltage occurs after the load rejection. In half cycle after the fault, the series capacitor of the faulted phase is "by-passed" and 50 ms after the fault, the Ibina terminal is opened. As it happened for Ibina load rejection, the energy absorbed by secondary reactor arresters almost reached 1.4 MJ, there is a need to double the number of columns of these arresters to ensure that even in the unlikely event of a total rejection at Bateias, followed by a single phase fault at the line end in this terminal, all the equipments would be appropriated sized. The secondary reactors arresters should have the same minimum capacity of 13 kJ / kVrating.

4.2.5. Performance of the Strategy in Case of Equipment Unavailability:


As it can be seen in Figure 2, previously shown, several disconnectors were predicted to allow removal for maintenance or replacement of any equipment of the strategy proposed, without the need to take the transmission line out of operation. It should be mentioned that the breakers are not dimensioned to interrupt short-circuit currents! Therefore, the cost of these breakers is much cheaper than those of conventional breakers.

4.2.5.1. Unavailability of Secondary Three Phase Reactor:


In case applying the suggested strategy, it will require at least one spare three phase reactor in both terminal substations of the interconnection, in order to cover any unavailability of the lines. During this unavailability time, the phase breakers of the damaged reactor are closed which makes the line reactor to operate at full compensation. In this new configuration, the neutral of the line reactors will operate with three 120 kV ZnO arresters to protect it during the dead time of the single phase auto-reclosure. The ground breaker 2 is closed, isolating the three phase secondary reactor. The disconnectors in series with the damaged reactor are opened, allowing the removal of it for substitution. During this time the reactor can only operate in full compensation.

4.2.5.2. Unavailability of a Phase Breaker:


In case of failure or maintenance on a phase breaker (should be kept at least one spare unit in each substation for eventual replacement), its bypass switch should be closed and the other phase breaker should be kept closed. In this condition, the reactor will operate temporarily in full compensation. Therefore the ground breaker 2 closes and the compensation will be operates as described in the previous section. In case of failure of a phase breaker unit during the opening (pole stuck), the reactor will be unbalanced and protection will send command to close the circuit phase breakers. An alarm will indicate the failure and the operation will close the bypass switch to replace the phase breaker failed.

4.2.5.3. Unavailability of the Ground Breakers.


In case of failure or maintenance of the "ground breaker 1", this should be removed from service through appropriate disconnectors. There would be two possibilities: to operate with reduced reactive power compensation, disabling the single phase auto-reclosure, as the neutral of three phase reactor will be solidly grounded until the replacement or repair of circuit breaker or operate with full reactive compensation as described above, keeping enabled single phase auto-reclosure. In case of unavailability ground breaker 2, the appropriated disconnector which by-pass it must be closed. During the maintenance or replacement, the reactor will operate at full reactive power compensation.

5. Conclusions:
The results of transient simulations led to the conclusion that the two lines which compose the IbinaBateias interconnection can operate without the line shunt reactors at Ibina. To guarantee the integrity of the associated equipments, the line arresters have to be replaced by stronger ones. Single phase auto-reclosure has to be replaced by three phase auto-reclosure. The flexible reactive power compensation for the interconnection Bateias - Ibina is technically feasible. If adopted, it would be an innovation in the techniques of control of the electric power system. However, to implement this technique will require solid knowledge of possible problems and solutions for this application. The advantage of such an application is to turn the fixed reactive power compensation, already in operation, into flexible with a relatively low cost if compared with other alternatives. It must be mentioned that apart from cost, it should be considered the space availability in the substations involved.

In addition, several existing transmission lines of the interconnected Brazilian system could make use of this strategy. New transmission interconnection projects could already consider this hypothesis in expansion planning. As an example, for possible future long 800 kV interconnections, this suggested strategy could be used with secondary reactors of 345 kV. In this configuration, a 400 Mvar/800 kV line reactor, would provide a range of 181 Mvar compensation, ie 219 400 Mvar/800 kV (55%, online terminal. In this specific condition, with a reactor 100 Mvar/362 kV, it is possible to obtain a variation of reactive power 181 Mvar/800 kV, with the advantage of keeping the line permanently in operation, even if there is failure of any equipment proposed for the flexibility of compensation.

6. References:
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Itaipu HVDC Link - Conditioning for the Application of Single Phase Auto-reclosure on the 500 kV Ibina Bateias transmission line - R. A. A. Gonalves XII ERIAC 2007; Flexible Line Shunt Reactors Using Switching Control of Neutral Pseudo-Reactors - R. A. A. Gonalves - XIV ERIAC 2011; Flexible Line Shunt Reactors - Optimizing of the Transmission Capacity of the North-South Interconnection - R. A. A. Gonalves XXI SNPTEE 2011 ONS Short-circuit Studies Period 2009 - 2012 - Volume 2; ATP Alternative Transient Program.

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