Adam Przeworski

Democratic Socialism in Poland?

The coming months will be decisive in forging the course of history of Poland. The system established in Poland during the late nineteen forties, a system which retained its central features each time as it recovered from workers' revolts in 1956, 1970, and 1976, now appears irreparable. Agricultural production is drastically inefficient; the industry operates in ways which are chaotic, wasteful, and unpredictable; stores are empty and the lines are long. Only a few die-hards believe that the country can survive without fundamental economic reforms. But even if the economic situation is disastrous, the call for reforms would not be sufficient to differentiate the current situation from the many crises that the country experienced during the past thirty years. Economic reforms - whether of agricultural policies, management systems, incentive systems, accounting conventions, local administration, taxation, or central planning - have been as frequent in Poland as projects to combat unemployment in the United States. Their consequences are also the same: nothing ever changes. What is new this time is not the depth of the economic crisis but the political situation. The lingering workers' resistance which exploded in 1970 and 1976 and accelerated during recent years was caused by economic conditions. Perhaps this resistance would have subsided if conditions of work and of daily life had improved in the aftermath of the events of June 1976. But now no economic improvement will suffice. The movement is oriented toward economic demands, but its causes are political. And during two months of this summer the workers' Studies in Political Economy, No.5, Spring 1981
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movement destroyed the relations of political forces under which Poland has lived since 1948. Emerging as an autonomous political force in a country where for thirty years power was concentrated in one center, where politics was reduced to administration, where every conflict was treated as a threat to the system, where the society was atomized, where individuals were reduced to the status of uninformed and unwilling executors of decisions, the Gdansk workers have broken the dam. Their victory gave impetus to a sudden, massive rebirth of civil society.

The Polish Summer The opening was made by workers. On July 1, 1980, the government announced a set of measures concerning the pricing and the distribution of meat. The price of meat sold in ordinary stores was to be increased by 20070 and that of meat in the so-called "commercial" establishments - normally 50 to 100% higher than the general distribution - by 14.2%. Moreover, several varieties of meat, including staple products such as smoked lard and ham hocks, were to be distributed exclusively through the higher price network. Sale of meats through factories was to be abolished and restaurant prices were to be aligned with the commercial network. Meat is politically important in Poland. The increase of the prices of meat in December 1970 led to a series of riots, most notably in the Baltic port of Gdansk, and resulted in the toppling of the then First Secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka. When Edward Gierek became the First Secretary in 1970, he promised that prices of basic staples, including meat, would not be increased for five years. Since in the meantime nominal wages were increasing rapidly (58.6% between 1970 and 1975) and meat production increased only slightly, meat became increasingly scarce and lines longer. Moreover, in order to persuade peasants (80% of land is privately owned in Poland) to produce for the market, the government in 1972 abolished compulsory deliveries of meat and other agricultural products, increased the prices at which the state bought these products from the peasants, lowered the rate of taxation on land, and increased the import of feeds. The result was that meat was being sold to consumers at increasingly subsidized prices. To correct this situation, another attempt to increase meat prices was made in June of 1976, followed by an instantaneous popular explosion. As in 1970, workers in several cities went to the streets. This time the government quickly withdrew, and since 1976 it has been pursuing a more flexible policy of gradual and often hidden price increases, for example, by introducing the two-class system of ordinary and commercial stores. Not until July 1 of this year were meat prices raised again by an administrative decree. This time the increase did not evoke massive outbursts. Although information is incomplete, it seems that local strikes, varying in duration, scope, 30

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and demands, kept erupting all over the country throughout July. The most notable event was a four day strike of municipal transport and railroad workers in Lublin, a city in southeastern Poland. This strike was important because, by its very nature, it was highly visible and because workers there made the first demands concerning unions: they called for a new, secret, and free election to the union local. From what we know, I it seems that the goverment consistently yielded to the demands of strikers, whatever they happened to be. In Lublin, the Vice-Prime Minister, Mr. Jagielski, made his first appearance as a negotiator; all the demands were granted, including the free union election. Elsewhere strikers saw their demands satisfied. In Ursus workers were offered a 100/0 compensatory wage increase and a return to factory distribution of meat; in Swidnik the wage increase was 15%; the garbage collectors in Warsaw received a wage increase of 700 zlotys per month. At the same time, the benefits were limited only to those workers who struck. In a synthetic textiles factory at Bierun Stary, the 170 workers who participated in a strike received wage increases of 20%; the remaining 1,830 workers who did not strike did not obtain the increase. Similarly, in a glass factory at Walbrzych, the strikers got a 10% wage increase; the nonstrikers received nothing. Among the Warsaw transport workers, the strikers received an increase of 1.50 zloty per hour, the non-strikers an increase of 1.10 zloty. Only in Gdansk and Gdynia did some workers discover to their surprise that their wages were increased in their next paycheck. The strikes seem to have intensified by the beginning of August. The demands of strikers continued to be predominantly narrowly economic: wage increases and a return to the prices of July 1. Only one demand which became widespread had political overtones: the alignment of family allowances and pensions to those received by the army and the police, generally thought to be 6 to 10 times higher. On August 14th a strike began in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, a place even more important for political than for economic reasons. It was in Gdansk that workers marched against the local party committee in December 1970; it was there that police opened fire, killing between 42 and 75 persons. Most importantly, it was in Gdansk that the then newly elected First Secretary, Gierek, received from workers the credit of legitimacy when, having presented his program, having promised not to increase prices, and having sworn that he would never order police to shoot at workers, he obtained from thousands of workers a unison pledge of pomozemy, "we will help." It is from this pomozemy and from his personal popularity in his old power base, Silesia, where he was the Regional Party Secretary until 1970, that Gierek drew considerable popular support. 31

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Although rumors about work stoppages in different parts of the immense Lenin shipyard circulated earlier, the immediate impetus for the strike of August 14th was the firing of Mrs. Anna Walentynowicz, a 60 year old crane operator, a member of the strike committees in 1970 and 1976, and a leader of the fledgling independent trade union movement. Supporting this strike were 16,000 shipyard workers. During the next two weeks the attention of the entire country and much of the world focused on Gdansk. The strikers demanded the rehiring of Mrs. Walentynowicz and two other workers fired for union activities, among them a Mr. Lech Walesa; a wage increase of 2,000 zl. per month; and the return of meat prices to those of July 1. They demanded a monument on the site dedicated to the memory of the martyrs of 1970. As one worker put it, "if we have three statues of Lenin, we could have one monument to our fallen brothers". Most importantly, the Gdansk workers were the first to raise what would become the key political issue: dissolution of the official union local to be replaced by a free local union and the publication of all demands by the national media. In the ensuing negotiation, two of the three workers were hired, an increase of 1,200 zl. was offered and the monument was conceded. Yet the director of the shipyard, assisted by the Secretary of the Regional Party Committee, Mr. Fiszbach, declared himself incompetent to negotiate the other demands. As a result, when Mr. Walesa entered the shipyard and urged the workers to continue the strike, they proclaimed him the strike leader and chairman of the newly founded Strike Committee. The workers rejected the offer of 1,200 zl. and demanded the dissolution of the Central Confederation of Trade Unions, the abolition of "commercial" stores, and an interview with the Prime Minister. The strike continued and in the meantime other enterprises, in and around Gdansk, joined in a solidarity strike. On August 15th, the local press for the first time informed the public about "work stoppages." The Prime Minister Mr. Babiuch went on national television promising economic reforms, previously announced in February, and urging workers to return to work. Mr. Gierek cancelled his vacation and returned to Warsaw. The Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee of the Party took place in Warsaw - one suspects to determine the strategy with regard to Gdansk and the strikes in general. On August 17th, the government responded to the strikers, again in a conciliatory manner. The wage offer was increased to 1,500 zl., a new free election to the existing union local was to take place immediately with strike leaders as admissible candidates, and a guarantee of immunity was given to the strikers and their leaders. When the offer was announced, workers received it as a victory, singing the traditional "Hundred Years" to Walesa. The strike seemed to be over. At this moment, however, a repre-

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sentative of one of the factories which joined in a solidarity strike pointed out that the agreement was limited to the Lenin Shipyard and that other enterprises would obtain nothing once the strike ended. Walesa agreed and urged that a new strike be proclaimed, now in solidarity with the other striking workers. Hence, a new strike began on the 17th. That same afternoon an Inter-Enterprise Committee (MKS) was formed. By the next morning 49 enterprises, with 100,000 workers, had joined the MKS, which began to formulate a list of demands. These ranged from the narrowly economic to the broadly political, from the vague to the very specific, from the cautiously moderate to the programmatic. In the ensuing discussion, a member of the KOR (Committee for Social SelfDefense, established after the events of 1976) urged that the demand for free elections be dropped and that the list include more specific economic demands, such as extension of maternity leaves or the advancement of retirement age. Walesa himself took a moderate position, emphasizing that the demands must not preclude a way out for the government. The final list, which bears the imprint of having been produced during a night of spontaneous debates, included the right to strike, the right to form free unions, relaxation of censorship, liberation of all political prisoners (of whom there eventually turned out to be three), broadcast of a Sunday mass by the media, and a number of specific economic demands. When the Central Committee met again in Warsaw, it seems to have arrived at a coherent strategy. Gierek appeared on television, admitted a need for change, recognized that the labor unrest had objective grounds, distinguished between strikers who are "honest workers" (those who raise economic demands) and "anti-socialist elements" (who raise political demands), strongly rejected any possibility of political concessions, and urged a return to work. He did not, however, threaten to use force. A television campaign was organized to convince people that Gierek's speech had the effect of persuading responsible workers that nothing is to be gained by striking and to provoke a middle class backlash against the strikes. The campaign against "anti-socialist elements" was intensified and some 30 dissidents belonging to different groups were detained in Warsaw. The head of the official unions, Mr. Szydlak, came out with a hard, uncompromising speech. At the same time Gdansk was cut off from the rest of the country. Telephone communication was interrupted, road blocks were introduced, selected people travelling by train were stopped and sent back to Warsaw. The strategy with regard to the strikers consisted of sending a Vice-Prime Minister, Mr. Pyka, along with a huge government delegation, to negotiate separately with each of the enterprise strike committees, not recognizing the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS) as a legitimate representative of workers, since such a step would de facto recognize it as an independent union. 33

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Neither the television campaign nor Pyka's mission was successful. Only 17 of the then 280 member committees of the MKS would talk to Mr. Pyka, and whenever an agreement seemed to be within reach, they would return to consult "at the base," thus destroying the results of negotiations. The shipyard workers said that they would not be had twice by Mr. Gierek. At this moment the situation turned into a full-fledged crisis, since the only option of the government was either to recognize the MKS or to use force. What happened cannot be reconstructed exactly, since there are many versions and several appear to be credible. The fact is that Mr. Pyka was recalled from Gdansk, to be replaced by a new delegation, headed by Mr. Jagielski. At the same time, yet another Vice-Prime Minister, Mr. Barcikowski, was sent to Szczecin, where another shipyard had gone on strike on the 19th. Mr. Barcikowski immediately began to negotiate with the Szczecin MKS, and on the evening of the 21st Mr. Jagielski, after tough preliminary negotiations, made the first contact with three delegates of the Gdansk MKS. The Church now appeared as an actor for the first time. The bishop of Gdansk, Msgr. Kaczmarek, met Cardinal Wysznski, and the communique from their meeting contained an appeal to the workers for calm and moderation and at least implicitly for a return to work. On Friday the 22nd, the Central Committee met again in Warsaw, with the participation of Messrs. Jagielski and Barcikowski. This seems to have been the turning point. The introduction of a state of siege, conscription of the striking workers, and the use of force were supposedly discussed, with a narrow majority of those present opposed. The fact is that the meeting opted once again for a policy of compromise. Four members of the Political Bureau, known to be hardliners, were expelled and replaced by two moderates. The Prime Minister, who lost his position in the Political Bureau, also departed from his government post along with several ministers. The head of the official unions was fired. In the aftermath Gierek appeared on television for the second time in six days, but with a much more moderate tone, clearly shaken by the course of events. And immediately after the meeting, Jagielski returned to Gdansk, obviously with instructions to enter into negotiations with the MKS, although apparently holding to a strategy of yielding on all demands save the free unions. On Saturday, August 23rd, Jagielski and his team entered the shipyard for the first time and negotiations began, point by point, broadcast through loudspeakers all over the shipyard. On Sunday, for the first time in the history of People's Poland, the Cardinal appeared on television with a 75-minute speech. He urged workers to terminate the strikes. In the meantime, the television campaign continued. The three prisoners whose liberation was demanded by workers 34

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were portrayed as common criminals. Cooked-up interviews with housewives "inconvenienced" by the strikes were intermixed with statements by old workers calling for responsibility and hard work. Tension continued to mount. By the middle of the next week the Gdansk talks seemed to come to a stalemate. Although agreement apparently was reached on most points the government simply yielding - Jagielski refused even to talk about the unions. Once again, the crisis seemed insoluble. On the 28th a strike began in a coal mine in Silesia, and the day after a similar local Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee grouping first 9 and eventually 11 mines, was formed. Strikes also spread to a steel mill in Nowa Huta and several other places. On the 29th all points were agreed to in Gdansk with the exception of the unions. Finally, on Sunday, August 31st, after a last minute stand-off concerning the liberation of KOR activitists who remained under detention, an agreement was reached in Gdansk. The most important point of the agreement concerned the right to organize. The document signed in Gdansk specifies that workers now have the right to organize unions that are independent of the party and of employers, in conformity with conventions number 87 and 97 of the International Labor Organization, of which Poland is a signatory. At the same time, in creating the new unions the MKS declared that it would respect the principles of the Polish Constitution; that the unions would not play the role of a political party, that they would be based on the principle of social ownership of the means of production, the base of the socialist system in Poland; that they recognized the directing role of the Polish United Workers Party in the state and that they did not oppose the existing system of international alliances. The government in turn promised to create the legal conditions necessary for the existence of the new unions, including the legislation enabling their registration and a new labor code. The unions gained a real opportunity to influence decisions concerning life conditions of workers and the partitioning of the national product into consumption and investment, the distribution of social expenditures, the principles of remuneration (in particular the indexing of salaries on the cost of living), the long-term economic plan, investment and price policy. The unions are to form an independent research institute which will study problems related to material conditions of workers and will publish their results. In addition, the new unions will have their own publications. Finally, the right to strike will be guaranteed in the new labor code. Other points of the agreement included the relaxation of censorship, which is to be limited to state secrets, matters concerning the security of the state and its international interests, and moral offenses. Decisions of the censorship office are to be subject to appeal through the newly created Supreme Administrative Court. Political prisoners, three of whom were

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mentioned by name, were to have their convictions re-examined. The entire communique was to be published by the national media. An economic reform was to be introduced after an extensive public discussion. Finally, the agreement contained as many as 13 specific economic demands, with regard to which the government agreed in general to study the possibility of their satisfaction within some specific time, but without making a specific commitment on most points. The Gdansk agreements constitute the culmination of a process that started in the aftermath of the riots of 1976, a process of gradual organization of civil society. Since at least 1977 the party leadership has reacted in the same way to the growing movements for reform: it has continued to yield under immediate pressures at each time, trying to limit the concessions to those immediately required. The strategy of the leadership was highly flexible and its reactions swift and pragmatic, but they were always designed to arrest the changes, to consolidate the existing state of affairs. Once the pragmatic wing, under Gierek's leadership, had succeeded in repressing the urge for a hard line strategy when in 1977 it released the workers arrested for participation in the 1976 events, no voices for taking the initiative were heard within the party until the party congress which took place in February of this year. The dynamic of the summer events constituted simply an acceleration of this process. Again, the party had taken a conciliatory position toward the July strikers, in fact rewarding those workers who struck. And even in Gdansk, the leadership had first conceded the limited demands, then agreed to consider far-reaching economic demands, while rejecting the right to strike, then accepted all political demands with the exception of the right to organize, and, finally, yielded on the last bastion. Why this posture of enlightened conservatism? Why would the party neither take a hard line, moving toward general repression, nor grasp into its own hands the initiative toward broad reforms? As always under such circumstances, possible explanations abound. What seems clear is that the party, or at least its current leadership, did not, and could not, envision that spontaneous social processes could mount to overwhelm the entire society. Having themselves operated for thirty years in a system in which everything was directed, orchestrated, authorized, reported and approved, they did not believe in the mobilizing potential of the burgeoning movements. They were convinced - against the warnings of hard-liners that the handful of noisy Warsaw intellectuals could be isolated and worn out by mild harrassment and that workers could always be silenced by minor economic concessions. They simply did not believe in the staying power of spontaneity.? Even now they feel at a loss when faced with so many events that were neither planned, nor ordered, nor approved. A party official asked me in a trembling voice, "but who will be responsible for the 36

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new unions?;

who will direct them?"

Secondly, the leaders lived well. The details of abuse of political position, appropriation of public funds, and outright theft are slow to emerge, but it is clear that the people around Gierek and even the lower level party and government apparatus which emulated the example of the top, treated the national product, the allocation of which they controlled, almost as their private property. Their pragmatism went along with their bougeoisification. Defense of private interests required social peace and social peace required concessions. Repression would have disturbed the idyllic life of private pursuits. It would have required an intensification of the ideological climate within the party and increased the power of the security apparatus which might have turned against corruption as well. Political reforms, on the other hand were in no one's interest. Increased democracy, particularly within the party, would have meant accountability, and accountability might have signified the end to privilege. Hence, the pragmatic, conservative yet flexible posture dominated, as intellectuals kept organizing and workers were being driven to the limits of their patience. And there are several indications that the party has still not learned from the summer events. The initiative continues to rest completely with civil society.

The Rebirth of the Civil Society What was not clear about the Gdansk agreement is the geographic scope of the point concerning unionization. Although the document seems to have general validity, at one point it specified explicitly that the new union was to be formed at the coast, which would limit such activity to Gdansk, Gdynia, Elblag, and Szczecin. This ambiguity led workers in other parts of the country to strike for the extension of the agreement. The Silesian strike, which began on the 28th, was quickly settled on September 2nd. The Gdansk agreement was extended and a list of the specific demands of miners added. The same scenario was repeated all over the country. By this time various party officials, Mr. Jagielski among them, declared that the agreement held for the entire country and that workers could form new unions wherever they wish. But in practice, the efforts to unionize were meeting with resistance on the part of managers and were successful only where workers struck. In Warsaw, one of the newspapers published a report that workers in one of the enterprises did not want to join the new union. The enterprise went on strike immediately and the union was formed. At the same time, various professional associations met and declared themselves to be independent and self-governing. The Polish Sociological Association was among the first, along with those of architects, writers,

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artists, doctors, and teachers. A number of professional groups formed an umbrella organization; some joined the Gdansk union, which assumed the name of "Solidarity." University students, who were still on vacation, began to meet and announced the formation of independent and selfgoverning student organization. As if to anticipate the inevitable, the Government announced that it would introduce a law on academic selfgovernment, giving full autonomy, including the right to elect all officers, to the institutions of higher learning. A movement to elect a new Rector of the University of Warsaw was immediately launched in the University Senate. A few days later, still at the beginning of September, some official unions which were members of the Trade Union Confederation, announced that they would leave the Confederation. Some stated their intention to become independent and self-governing and sought to register under the new legislation. The Socialist Union of Students, one of the youth arms of the party, met to emphasize the need for its own autonomy and welcomed the creation of independent student organizations. The resolution called for far-reaching political changes, including free elections. At the same time a movement for reforms erupted within the party itself. Various groups within the party called for internal democracy, for an end to corruption and bureaucracy, for free and secret elections to all party posts, for full information about party activities, and for an increased ideological orientation of the party. Several editorials in party newspapers argued that democracy within the party is a necessary condition for any reforms within the society. The media suddenly became pluralistic. Public discussions erupted in newspapers which began to publish editorial articles explicitly stating their positions with regard to the developing reform movement. Economists were interviewed about the details of the economic crisis and the paths to reform. Television itself became pluralistic: it seems as if each program independently chose its direction. One day, for example, the news began with a long story in which the First Secretary of the Party and the President of Poland awarded medals to peasants for their outstanding achievements, a routine ceremony of the past thirty years. (Perhaps one third of all news material in newspapers used to consist of the numerous titles of officials participating in numerous ceremonies.) The news program was then followed by an hour-long film showing how a factory hastily fabricates its "outstanding achievements" in anticipation of an "unexpected" visit by an official. Several films made between 1976 and 1980 and relegated "to the drawer" were shown at the September Gdansk film festival and reviewed by the press. The Church bared itself as an openly political force. Capitalizing on the

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moderating influence it played during the strikes, the Church sought to cash in on the credits it earned by demanding increased parliamentary participation of Catholic deputies, reintroduction of religious instruction in schools, insertion of moral clauses into the new law on censorship, and a commitment by the state to the morally repressive policies the Polish Church has always advocated. At the same time, the Church continued to try to ingratiate itself with the new unions, denying that the Cardinal betrayed workers in his speech of August 24th (of which six minutes, critical of the government, were in fact cut) and surrounding Wales a with advisers close to the Church hierarchy. On the 5th of September, the Sejm (Parliament) met in Warsaw to approve the governmental changes which had occurred 10 days earlier. The debate was highly critical of the government. The same day in the evening the Central Committee met again, and the wave of changes reached the top: Gierek was replaced as First Secretary by Stanislaw Kania. Other changes of top leadership followed. Kania in his first speech promised that the government would adhere to the Gdansk agreements, suggested wide reaching economic reforms, and emphasized the need for democracy, which, he said, "is not a gesture of the state to the people, but a need of socialist society." Nevertheless, the situation remained unclear and contradictory. Managers of enterprises have been dragging their feet in recognizing new unions. Party press and television news continued to give conflicting signals about the true intentions of the party leadership, censoring, for example, some of the parliamentary speeches. New appointments within the party apparatus were interpreted by many people as indicating the ascendancy of hard liners, the generation of 1968. The press and television continued a very restricted coverage of the new unions and began in turn a campaign against "anti-socialist elements," which lumped together left-wing and nationalistic, right-wing opposition groups. The leader of an openly antiSoviet group, Mr. Moczulski, was arrested and charged with insulting the authority of the state - a strange accusation reminiscent of the worst days - in an interview given to Der Spiegel. (The interview was inflammatory, but he could have been charged with threatening the security of the state an accusation that would have been consistent with the spirit of the Gdansk agreements.) Although Kania and others attempted to calm the situation, their messages were received as ambiguous. Neither the party and government apparatus nor the society at large knew how to interpret such words. After thirty years of double talk nothing could ever be taken at face value. Even those managers who wanted to follow party policy were not certain what this policy truly was. The Council of State had moved swiftly, issuing a decree enabling the Warsaw Regional Court to register new unions, but the procedure takes some time and the unions were impatient. 39

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The new unions were still amorphous creatures of two weeks of organizing. Since at the beginning it was not clear whether unions other than Solidarity would be allowed to register, various groups from all over the country have joined it. As a result, Solidarity combines the Gdansk shipyard workers with, perhaps, teachers from Krakow, machinists from Swidnik, and actors from Wroclaw. Eventually, other union federations appeared, most importantly in Warsaw and Silesia. These unions met and decided not to confederate at the national level at this moment but to remain in communication with each other. The result was rather chaotic. The first internal conflicts also have begun to emerge. There are rumors that within the Lenin Shipyard workers dissatisfied with Walesa's compromise on economic issues have already organized - now wildcat strikes against the new unions. As if to reaffirm their existence and to reassure the membership, the new unions organized a highly disciplined one-hour strike on October 10. Since the situation is in flux, any account of events risks being out of date by the time it is read. When the Central Committee met again on October II it announced, (without specifying the date), the convocation of an extra-ordinary Congress of the Party. This announcement guarantees that the dynamic of the movement for reforms will not be arrested and that it will soon overwhelm the entire party. At least until that Congress the situation will remain volatile and the limits of the possible will be tested repeatedly. The current period is still one of organization of the particular social forces. New unions are still forming and their mutual relations are being forged. The new wave is also sweeping the previously existing organizations. Since the consolidation of the present regime Poland has had innumerable organizations, covering all areas of social life. Two political parties have existed in addition to the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR); the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and a Democratic Party (SO). There are also youth organizations, women organizations, professional associations, cooperatives, sport clubs, cultural groups, hobby circles, and religious groups. Most of them have been given a monopoly of their area of activity, and they have been centralized, bureaucratized, and subjugated to party control. Now they are breaking away from the mold, all declaring themselves independent and self-governing and cleaning their houses by announcing free and secret elections. One should not be surprised if in a few days the Polish Philatelist Association or the Bird Watchers' Union declare themselves to be independent and self-governing. At the same time, they all announced that they will pursue a vigorous defense of self-interests. Once this period is concluded, some kind of an institutional modus since 1948 under a

vivendi will have to develop. Poland has functioned

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system in which patterns of actual interaction among state institutions have had little, if any, relation to the constitutional principles. In particular, the factual role of the party in the state was not a reflection of the law. Even the treatment of the First Secretary as the Head of State was a courtesy granted by other heads of state. This situation has been sufficiently awkward that the party attempted several times to define its legal role vis-avis other state institutions and finally a new constitution was recently adopted which recognizes "the leading role of the party in the state." Yet as long as the relation of political forces remained what it was - the party had an effective monopoly within the state - all the relevant actors could form some stable expectations about the dynamic of the system within which they operated. Now, however, that this monopoly has been broken, neither the established practices nor the existing legal principles will suffice to provide a framework within which the newly independent organizations, the Church, and the Party can coexist and resolve conflicts with some degree of responsibility and predictability. For example, although the existing law specifies that university rectors are to be nominated by the Minister of Higher Education, a new Rector was in fact elected by the University Senate in Warsaw and continues to operate without the nomination: by the mandate of popular will reflecting the relations of political forces, but against the law. The process must enter into an institutionalizing phase as soon as the current wave of organizing ends and most likely before.

Prospects The agreement signed in Gdansk has already been dubbed in Poland a new "social contract." The terms of this contract are that all parties: (I) accept the social ownership of the means of production as the base of the Polish socialist society; (2) recognize the leading role of the Polish United Workers' Party in the state (although this formula is used in somewhat different wording and its scope is far from clear and will be the object of further conflicts); and (3) accept the current structure of Polish alliances, meaning the relation with the Soviet Union. For some groups these points, particularly the second and third, constitute a concession, but thus far any group that rejects any of these three principles would put itself outside the national consensus. These principles define, therefore, the limits of the possible and the criteria by which the legitimacy of any new institutional arrangement and any program for reforms is to be judged. What is the maximal scope of reforms compatible I believe it is broad and includes: with these principles?

(I) A sovereign, superior role for Parliament within the state, including its own investigatory body (which already exists), legislative initiatives, motions of non-confidence, etc. 41

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(2) An electoral system that would guarantee the majority in the Parliament to the Polish United Workers' Party, thus allowing it to form governments, but would leave the remaining 49 per cent of seats (or whatever is the safe margin) to open competition, including campaigning, competitive publications, access to mass media, etc. (3) The right to organize and associate on condition that the organization does not advocate any goals that would be contrary to the three basic terms of the social contract described above, and only on this condition. (4) Widespread institutional autonomy for all voluntary cooperatives, institutions of high learning, etc. associations,

(5) Limitation of censorship to state secrets, matters of national security (including anything dealing with the Soviet Union), and, if the Church has its way, offenses to morality. (6) The right to strike. (7) The right and material capabilities economic decision-making at all levels. for the unions to participate in

(8) High reaching decentralization and autonomy for local governments, increased role of village councils, and their election without any constraints other than those applicable to (3) above. (9) An internal democratization of the party, including fixed terms for all elective offices, free and secret elections, full information for all party members about internal conflicts within the party. (10) Economic reforms that might reduce the role of the state as the organizer of production and increase of its role in mitigating social effects of the market. What could divert the march of Polish society toward democratic socialism? For the Western media, in particular, the threat comes from the Soviet Union. The Soviets, the argument runs, cannot stand and watch idly as Polish workers organize and strike, as Polish society democratizes. Accordingly, American and German newspapers headline troop movements on the Polish-Soviet border, and their accounts of Polish internal events are submerged under alarmist stories of reactions in Moscow. This analysis is based on the traditional premises of anti-communism: "communism" is somehow incompatible with "democracy," hence the Soviets must intervene because democracy is a threat to them. This position 42 seems unfounded. Polish events do not threaten the

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strategic interests of the Soviet Union. The process of democratization, even if it goes as far as I think it might, neither changes the position of Poland in the international structure of alliances nor permits an organization within Poland of forces that might be hostile to the Soviet Union. To the contrary, the success of reforms would consolidate the national consensus that includes the principle of good relations with the Soviet Union. Already, many circles that used to participate in anti-Soviet demonstrations before Gdansk now see such acts as irresponsible and injurious to reform. The Soviets may be concerned about the effects of the Polish events upon their own and other Eastern European societies, but there is no reason why they should attempt to solve internal problems of the Soviet Union or East Germany in Poland. The main danger I see is that Soviet leaders will be persuaded by the New York Times or Der Spiegel that the Polish events are a threat to them, that in the Western view they have good reasons to intervene, and that the West would interpret their noninterventionist posture as an indication of weakness. More credible threats to the path of reforms exist within Poland. One is internal to the party, in so far as it is possible that out of the current crisis will emerge a group of party leaders who will continue to resist or perhaps who will even seek to repress the new movement. There are numerous indications that the party and government bureaucrats entrenched during the Gierek period will defend their positions and privileges by all means. Moreover, any group within the the party that seeks to contest leadership will have to make some compromise with the conservative and corrupt party apparatus, even if only to guarantee immunity for acts of corruption committed earlier. Perhaps more importantly, the party apparatus has no imagination, no initiative and still no understanding that the situation is qualitatively different. They still have not passed the threshold of understanding that democracy means that some conflicts will be resolved against their interests and their views, that they will have to cope with uncertainty, that outcomes of the democratic process may be contrary to what they consider rational in a particular case. Neither do they have any tolerance for the procedural costs and obstacles inherent in a democratic system: they still see conflict as chaos, they are impatient with the fact that democratic organization extends the time necessary for conflicts to be resolved and that it introduces procedural considerations independent of the merit of a particular choice. I think the will to introduce democratic reforms is there. Certainly, there is a strong pressure for democratization within the party. It is the habit that is missing: they accept the need for free elections, but they still expect that such elections must bring desired results; they accept independent unions, but they still think that workers should work rather than discuss. The burden placed on the party by the new conditions is immense. During the years of unchallenged power, the party grew numerically, 43

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became bureaucratized, and lost its ideological combativeness. In the new situation, in which multiple social forces will compete - even if not for power certainly for moral authority and ideological allegiance - the party will have to reassert itself as an ideological authority within the society, as a force hegemonic in Gramsci's sense of moral leader of the nation. If my assessment of the current situation within the party is accurate, there exists a great danger that the party leadership will continue to underestimate the depth of transformations of recent months and the mobilizing power of the new union movement. This movement is young, still angry, still unsure of itself, and this means both powerful and volatile under pressure. It will neither conveniently exhaust itself under internal conflicts nor will it be easily fragmented or co-opted. If the party decides that the changes can be limited to the letter of the Gdansk agreement, it will continue to be forced to yield under pressure, without any initiative or direction of its own. And an urge to repress would be, under current circumstances, fatal for the entire society. Not surprisingly the newly emerging social forces are no better prepared for democratic coexistence. The new unions combine a know-nothing attitude toward existing institutions with an idealized, naive vision of democracy. Much has been written about the responsibility of the Polish workers and all of it is true. But the entire orientation of the new unions is still entirely negative. Their basic conception of their role is one of a narrowly economic, particularistic force that would militantly, through strikes, defend the material interests of their members. Workers believe that the party is responsible for the material deprivations they experience; they point out that the party had 30 years in which it ruled unchecked; they programmatically reject any responsibility for the disastrous economic situation and any participation in the existing institutions which, they believe, would inevitably lead to the co-optation and neutralization of the movement. They repeatedly rejected all offers of democratizing existing unions. They equally emphatically rejected the party's offer to resuscitate the Worker's Councils that appeared after 1956 and were eventually reduced to yet another cog in the bureaucratic machine. As Walesa told Jagielski in Gdansk, workers want to improve nothing: they want an independent union of their own. They will not be had again. Moreover, workers reject all the arguments about the difficulty of the economic situation, about the need for moderating economic demands, and even about general interests of workers, since they know - again from experience - that the acceptance of such exhortations must lead to compromises in which workers will bear the brunt. Workers are not willing to share the cost of getting out of the economic crisis unless and until they will have a political guarantee that their sacrifice will not be again futile and the only guarantee they see is an independent, militant union. The movement is simply too young to afford moderation. Its main task at the 44

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moment is mobilization, and to mobilize the leadership has to be intransigent. Moreover, according to sociological investigations as well as popular perceptions, economic inequalities have greatly increased during the last 10 years and workers in Poland, as elsewhere, see redistribution of income as an immediate solution to their material deprivation. In analyzing the posture of the new unions one is reminded of a speech, made long ago, by Jules Guesde: "The Revolution which is incumbent upon you is possible only to the extent that you will remain yourselves, class contra class, not knowing and not wanting to know the divisions that may exist in the capitalist world."3 The Polish summer should be viewed as a classical struggle for the right to organize. The narrowly economic intransigence combined with pressure for a general democratization, the rejection of the existing institutions, the incipient tendencies toward internal differentiation between leaders and followers are all reminiscent of numerous Western experiences. And I firmly believe that the key to the understanding of the prospects lies in this analogy. Trade unions emerged in Western Europe only after decades of struggle, often more bloody and more protracted than in Poland. They provided an impetus for the democratization of entire societies, they evolved from intransigence to moderation, and both the employers and the state learned to live and cope with them. They continue to struggle for the right to organize against perpetual attempts to divide, co-opt, and repress them. The right to strike, however, has become a carefully and strategically used weapon, restricted by numerous legal technicalities and by economic possibilities that unions learned to calculate and anticipate. The unions themselves have become sufficiently monopolistic, bureaucratized, and entrenched that their appeal is no longer based on militancy. Economic militancy is no longer reactive; it has become strategic. This historical analogy encourages optimism. But nations do not experience their crises as repetitions. Neither the Polish workers nor intellectuals see beyond their own immediate experience. They perceive the situation as unique. At the same time, after so many years during which the promise of improving material conditions remained unfulfilled, Poles have come to see in democratization of political life the panacea for all social ills, including economic ones. Hence, any indications that democracy may be a far from perfect system of political organization are experienced as the proof of the futility of any reforms. The clause requiring a two week warning before a strike, included in the first draft of yet unpublished new labor legislation - was already received by the new unions as unfaithful to the very principle of the right to strike. Indeed, my Polish interlocutors were incredulous when I recited a list of some restrictions on the unions in the United States. Even the notion of a three year long contract seemed unacceptable - Gdansk workers talked about a new list of demands every 45

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two months,

to be followed by strikes each time they are not met.

Yet this lack of experience, this purist position which sees in every limitation and every imperfection a harbinger of the ultimate defeat and which is the source of skepticism widespread in Poland, obviously cannot constitute a sufficient condition for the defeat of the Polish experiment. Otherwise democracy would not have been possible anywhere. Societies learn quickly under crisis conditions. I believe that the party has the will to change itself and to learn to live in a situation where its authority would have to be ideological and moral, not simply bureaucratic. I also believe that the unions will soon learn the realities of power relations and the intellectuals will re-read their Michels. This account would be incomplete if something were not said about the economic crisis." The economy is in a disastrous state. The staggering size of the foreign debt - now about 21.5 billion dollars - would not be in itself a sign of a crisis if it were not for indications that a great part of this money has been squandered or stolen. Market disequilibrium is even more striking and, short of additional borrowing, there is no quick way to moderate it. The entire economy is notoriously inefficient. The inefficiency of agriculture, public and private, is well known, but equally telling is the fact that with steel production and energy consumption per capita equal to that of Italy and Austria, Polish industry manages to supply only one half of final demand goods produced in those countries. The causes of this situation are structural. The central planning system has not worked in Poland in spite of its frequent reforms. In fact the Polish economy is not centrally planned. Plans are made, but individual enterprises, with the support of local party committees and local governments, act as decentralized and particularistic actors and predictably succeed through political pressure in generating an allocation of resources, particularly of investments, that break all the assumptions of the plan. Since construction of new plants is beneficial to the particular enterprises and local communities regardless of the economic efficiency of the new plant, the pressure to over-invest is irresistible and the efficiency of investment meager. Moreover, in the absence of formal market arrangements, the result of these pressures is the absence of any reliable coordination among firms connected through input-output linkages. Central planners are thus condemned to chasing and trying to correct imbalances generated by this spontaneously operating system. Typically, they only succeed in destroying whatever informal arrangements have developed among firms. As someone has quipped, in Poland only mistakes are centrally planned. Both agricultural policy and the management of publicly owned industries must be profoundly altered if the economic situation is ever to improve. But, as recent issues of Polityka - the consistently reformminded party weekly - continue to insist, no economic reform will be 46

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effective without political reforms, since the cause of the chaos is the stalemate between central planning and the pressures exerted by the network of managers and party officials. Whatever the direction of economic reforms, it is certain that the market situation will not improve to any discernible extent for a long time, to be measured in years. Hence, the process of democratization will have to continue under conditions of prolonged economic crisis. Yet the effect of this crisis on the dynamic of political events cannot be assessed unambivalently. Clearly, the party will try to use the crisis to scare the unions into moderating their wage militancy, something the new unions simply cannot afford to do if they are to maintain the support of the rankand-file. One effect of the union pressures will be to push reforms toward the problem of market disequilibrium - something which is long overdue. This is simply not the time for growth. The most urgent need now is to change the proportions between the producer and consumer goods industries and to do this with a minimum of new investment in the producer goods industry. For 30 years Poland has been a society in which producers were politically organized and consumers were not, and the effect of wage militancy would be precisely to correct this situation. The danger is that if the effects of reforms are too slow in coming the unions will have nothing to show their members for their militancy and will face the choice of cooptation or purely expressive, politically provocative strategies. One set of concrete achievements which the new unions might be able to offer their members is a true, effective workers' self-government at the plant level accompanied by participation in decision making at all levels. Let me emphasize again that thus far the unions do not seek plant level selfgovernment and that they perceive their influence over economic decisions as an adversary relation with the government. Yet I do not believe that they can persist in this abstentionist posture. In the situation in which any improvement of conditions of work and life can only follow structural transformations, the unions will be forced to assume some responsibility by actively participating in the national effort to reform the economic system. On the one hand, influence over decisions affecting conditions of work is the only concrete thing the unions can offer in the foreseeable future and I cannot imagine that they would bypass this opportunity, in spite of all their fears of being absorbed into the administrative structure. On the other hand, the national debate about economic reforms is already in full swing and I find it inconceivable that the new unions would be absent from this debate. Obviously, this entire analysis is based on so many hypotheses that the grounds for optimism are indeed shaky. Let me just emphasize that despite the predictive tone, what I have tried to establish are not probabilities, only

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possibilities. Poland.

And I do believe that democratic

socialism

is possible

in

Democratic Socialism in Poland The events of the Polish summer constitute the culmination of a classical struggle for the right to organize, a struggle that has been already fought in many Western countries. Yet, as powerful as this analogy may be in predicting the course of events, the situation in Poland is historically without precedent. The Polish workers have not simply conquered rights already enjoyed by workers elsewhere. They have conquered these rights in a society where the means of production are publicly owned. Workers in Poland reached for political power, the basis for which lies in the public ownership of the means of industrial production, a power which eluded them during thirty years, monopolized by an autonomous, bureaucratic apparatus of the party. The chance which stands ahead of the Polish working class, of the party, and the society is unique, for it is a chance for a democratic socialist society. This is not to say that the Polish society is on its way toward the realization of some pre-existing blueprint. We do not know whether democratic socialism would be a system in which resources would be rationally allocated to satisfy human needs. I will go as far as to say that we do not know whether any form of social organization can rationally allocate resources to satisfy needs. Certainly, we do not have a blueprint for one. We do not even know whether a society in which all institutionsincluding the economic ones - were democratic would be necessarily a society free of inequalities, privileges, and prejudices. Moreover, democracy within the workplace, the community, and the representative institutions can still coexist with a private consumption-oriented, instrumental, and, if the Church has its way, highly repressive value system. What will develop in Poland is some new arrangement of relations among firms, workers' councils, unions, the party, other organizations, the government, the central planning office, and the consumers. The challenge that Poland faces is to develop relations that would combine widespread democracy - and by democracy I do not simply mean participation in decision making but a place for conflicts of interest as well as opinions with economic rationality. The main choices concern the role of the market in the relation among consumers, firms, and the central planners and the structure of relations among the parliament, the government, and the party. Ultimately, the economic question is by what mechanisms (market or not) will people be able to reveal their preferences as consumers and by what mechanisms (market or not) will people be persuaded to orient production toward satisfaction of revealed preferences. The political 48

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question is by what mechanisms will people be able to seek to persuade each other about the desired directions of national development, about superiority of some values over others, and about the legitimacy of their particular interests. These constitutional questions are at stake in Poland and will continue to be for some time to come. I hesitate to make any predictions about the direction of these developments and I would be surprised if they were unequivocal, consistent, or unilinear. Trial and error, and the blunders they involve, are inevitable as are changes and reversals. Yet the fact that the Polish society is on the threshold of this kind of exploration marks the moment as a historical turning point. The ideological and political consequences of the events in Poland are incalculable. No society can ever serve as a blueprint for other societies because historical conditions are never the same. But thus far "actually existing socialism" has served most effectively as the prototype of something to be avoided. Italian Communists have been as eager to avoid any association with the Eastern European example as Nicaraguan revolutionaries have been to shy away from the path of Cuba. The effect of the "actually existing socialism" - the very phrase is an admission of defeat - was to push socialism off the agenda of movements for liberation throughout the world. The success of the Polish experiment would bring it back. October 1980

Postscript: Since these notes were written, Poland has come several times to the brink of an explosion. Yet the process continues. The first days of December constituted the end of the first phase: the period of organization of the civil society. Several independent unions were officially registered. Professional associations asserted their autonomy. Universities became practically, although not legally, self-governing. Even my facetious predictions about the Bird Watchers Union have materialized: the Association of Owners of Workers' Gardens claimed its independence. As one would expect, this general upheaval led to the mobilization of political forces which are best described as the lunatic fringe. On November 11, the day which used to be celebrated in pre-war Poland as the Independence Day, always with strong anti-Soviet overtones, mass demonstrations were held in several cities, including Lublin, Krakow, and Gdansk. Thousands listened to a mixture of anti-Soviet, anti-socialist, and religious invocations, including appeals to "liberate our oppressed brothers in Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania" and statements of outright 49

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hostility to socialism in any form. The ceremonies were enclosed religious format, although the Catholic hierarchy did not participate.

in a

At the same time, the Party underwent a profound internal crisis. Dissatisfied with food dragging of the leadership in instituting reforms and in purging the organization of corrupt officials of the Gierek era, several local party organizations decided to take matters into their own hands. They issued ultimata to the leadership and threatened not to recognize the authority of the Central Committee unless these were met. The leadership itself, divided between a reform tendency and a repressive group, which seems to be headed by Mr. Olszowski, continued to fumble in an indecisive manner, provoking unnecessary confrontations and yielding at the last moment. These developments alarmed the Soviets, who mobilized their troops along the Polish border and initiated a propaganda campaign that looked like a preparation for the invasion. This in turn provided a splendid opportunity for the American right wing forces and eventually for the United States government who could use the Polish situation to push public opinion toward intensified militarization of American society. They succeeded, for the first time since the Berlin Wall episode, if I remember correctly, to put Western European governments in a common line against the Soviet threat. This threat, I believe, was real: as a story in Warsaw had it, the Soviets were about to manifest their friendship by sending 500,000 bottles of champagne, each carried by a waiter. But I think the American media misunderstood or misinterpreted the cause of the Soviet alarm. This alarm was caused by the threat to the Soviet strategic interests that was created by mobilization of the anti-Soviet forces within Poland and the divisions within the Party, not by the existence of independent unions. Clearly, "the Polish disease" is a problem for the Soviet Union and most other Eastern European governments but, as a Mr. Filatov, member of the Soviet Central Committee, said in an important Paris interview, the Soviet Union can live with independent trade unions. For there is another story going around Warsaw: about Ivan who drives a Russian tank across a Warsaw bridge and asks a passer-by where is the Warsaw Regional Court, which registered Solidarity. Stupified, the passer-by asks Ivan why he is looking for the Court. "To register the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics," is the answer. The Soviet threat provided the impetus toward a consolidation. The Party has executed a complicated manoeuvre. First, it pulled itself together by reaffirming its hold over the middle level apparatus, introducing new personnel changes at the top (access of General Moczar, a person with a rather ominous past who now seems to be a leading reformer), expelling the 50

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most vociferous rebels, announcing a firm date for the eagerly awaited Congress (end of March), and proclaiming that it is drawing a line beyond which it will not budge. (It will.) Simultaneously, the Party went to seek help from the Church. In order to understand the role and the importance of the Catholic Church in Poland one would have to review the history of the 150 years of foreign domination during which the organization developed its profoundly conservative conception of the "Church besieged," according to which no innovations in doctrine or in practice can be accepted as long as the Church remains a fortress under attack, and during which religious and patriotic (anti-Russian, anti-German) symbols became melded into a national culture. The chant of anti-Russian religious hymns, sang on November II, appealed to this tradition and, in spite of the weakness of the anti-Soviet forces, constituted a mortal threat to the Party. The Party responded by turning to the Church, asking the hierarchy to dissociate the Church from these forces, to use its powerful influence over the public opinion (over 90070of Poles are formally Catholic and around 70% practice regularly) to restrain Solidarity, and offering in exchange a number of concrete concessions as well as a promise of a long lasting alliance. These concessions include a virtual control of the Church over all matters that relate to the family, and that includes birth control, abortion, and divorce legislation as well as some aspects of welfare and educational policies. They include a number of institutional guarantees, such as permits to build new churches. They also comprise a number of gestures which appear symbolic but which are of fundamental political importance, since they constitute the recognition of the right of the Church to mobilize political forces.

The manoeuvre was effective: the Soviet threat waned, anti-Soviet forces were silenced with minimal repression (to the point that their main organization voluntarily suspended its activities), and Solidarity felt compelled to proclaim a pause in strikes. The unveiling of the monument to the memory of workers killed in 1970, on December 16th in Gdansk, turned into an official celebration of this new alliance. A short speech by Mr. Walesa was followed by a slightly longer speech by Mr. Fiszbach, the local party Secretary and a new member of the Political Bureau, a moment of commemoration of the dead, and a mass that lasted an hour and a half. The homily, delivered by bishop Kaczmarek, was an intolerant, aggressive assertion of the ideological and political power of the Church. It was apparent that the Church played the first fiddle in this orchestra and it was striking that the part of the Union was limited to the drum roll for their fallen brothers. If I were to be forced to summarize in one sentence the final outcome of 1980 in Poland, I would say, obviously with some exaggeration, that political power lost by the Party was gained by the Church. 51

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This picture, however, should not obfuscate other changes which are profound and, I am persuaded, irreversible. The Parliament has become the central focus of the process of democratization. Its sessions are lively and informative: people run home to "watch the Parliament" on television. A new, liberal law on censorship is about to be passed as well as several important pieces of legislation which strengthen the role of the Parliament and provide protection for individual rights. Higher education and research have been freed from daily administrative control. A limited reform of the planning and management systems is about to be instituted, although this reform does not go far enough to resolve any of the notorious problems of the Polish economy. A major shift of resources toward agriculture has been announced and that, coupled with a new and more reasonable fiscal policy, may make some difference. The unions do exist. Still somewhat ephemeral, already divided and already somewhat oligarchical, they will be an essential factor in the life of the Polish society from here on. New confrontations cannot be avoided, since the union has to periodically reaffirm its existence by militant actions and the Party still resists the union as a national organization. At the same time, however, Solidarity has shown a great tactical sense in picking issues which can be resolved and which are important for the daily life of workers, specifically, the five day week. Most importantly, there are already some signs that Solidarity has abandoned its original abstentionist attitude: they now talk about Workers' Councils and they are willing to share power and responsibility at the plant level. The entire description may seem sobering. But one cannot measure the progress of the Polish process by some abstract yardstick, since the path is untravelled and constraints are numerous. What is surprising is that the process continues. As a Nouvel Observateur' commentator observed, no government in the world would like to, see democratic socialism in Poland, for the fear it may happen to them. I am persuaded that in Poland many people do want it, but neither the Party nor the Union have a historical project to realize. Yet in spite of all the twists and turns, Polish society is entering the uncharted territory of democratic socialism. January 1981

NOTES:
These are highly informal and to a large extent personal notes written after a visit to Warsaw in September. They constitute my own attempt to place the Polish events in some framework. Note that the account of events is necessarily impressionistic and that my analysis is not devoid of a point of view. I This account of events is pieced together from Le Monde (excellent coverage by Bernard Guetta), Le Figaro, Le Matin, and Le Nouvel Observateur, Zycie Warszawy, Trybuna Ludu, and Polityka, the New York Times, and a second

52

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2 3 4

hand account of the coverage by Der Spiegel. I have talked to several Polish actors and observers, from different circles but excluding those close to the Church. I have stayed away from analyses of personal struggles within the party, since I could not get a clear picture of the situation and since I believe that under crisis conditions people should be taken for what they say and do at the time, rather than for what they have appeared to represent in the past. Nor did I. See A. Przeworski "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy", Washington, D.C., 1979. Cited in my "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," New Left Review, 122, (July-August 1980) 38, where one can find many analogies. This analysis is incomplete in so far as it ignores the complications due to the presence of the Church. Indeed, one way in which the path to reform can be blocked is by a coalition between some groups within the Party and the Church hierarchy, directed against the new unions. Under the terms of such a coalition, the Church would obtain religious instruction in schools, increased parliamentary representation, and a commitment by the state to repressive policies concerning birth control, abortion, divorce, and moral censorship. In turn, the Church would offer the Party a moderating stance with regard to the unions, thus isolating workers from the public opinion over which it exercises important influence. I do not know enough about the Church, however, to make judgments about the likelihood of this kind of a coalition. Le Nouvel Observateur (December 15-21, 1980).

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