Durkheim's Epistemology: The Neglected Argument Author(s): Anne Warfield Rawls Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol.

102, No. 2 (Sep., 1996), pp. 430-482 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782631 . Accessed: 21/02/2011 09:15
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Durkheim's Epistemology: The Neglected Argument'

Anne Warfield Rawls WayneState University of the for Durkheim'sepistemology, argument thesocial origins the and is categories theunderstanding, his mostimportant mostneof withhis sociolThis argument been confused has glectedargument. and has ogyofknowledge, Durkheim'soverallposition been misunof derstoodas a consequence.The current popularity a "cultural" of or "ideological" interpretation Durkheimis as mucha misunderinterpretation which from of as standing hisposition the"functional" seek articulated thecurrent interpretations to rescuehim.Durkheim in a sophisticated epistemology the classical sense,a pointthathas been entirely missed. of the for Durkheim'sepistemology, argument thesocial origins thecateis and most neglected goriesof the understanding, his most important in The argument, whichis articulated mainly thecentral chapargument. de Le tersofLes Formeselementaires la vie religieuse: Systeme tote'mique en Australie(1912), locates the originof the fundamental categoriesof in empiricaldetails of enacted practices.Unfortuthought the concrete withDurkheim's this has argument beenconfused nately, epistemological as of leadingto itsgeneralmisinterpretation an idesociology knowledge, are alist argument thatbeliefsand collectiverepresentations the origins As of the basic categoriesof thought. a consequence,the epistemology The current popularity a cultural of neglected. properhas been generally
1This article In from numerous comments suggestions. particular, and has benefited comments I wouldliketo thankHarold Garfinkel RandyCollinsforextensive and and discussions. Norb Wiley,Ira Cohen,Anthony Giddens,StephenFuchs, Gary to and also comments whichI have Shepherd, severalAJS reviewers made helpful in I and for tried respond. thankCharlesLemert renewing interest Durkheim to my at encouragement critical points. PeterK. Manning and David Mainesforproviding Carefulreadings Albert Meehan have also been extremely helpful. Lynetta J. by obscure thanksfortireless locating workin the library Mosbydeserves particular in I seminar-ReccoRichardtexts. wouldalso liketo thank students myDurkheim AbdiKusow,EdwardMays, Gibbs, Jerry Charbonneau, son,Wendy Evans,Tyronne in a interest these issues.Finally, specialnote GaryDavid, and CareyFord-for their and to of thanks BernardElevitchwithwhomI read the British Empiricists John on deal to their emphasis the LavelywithwhomI read Kant.My workowes a great of Directcorrespondence AnneWarfield to careful Rawls,Department reading texts. 48202. of Sociology, Detroit, Michigan WayneStateUniversity,

0002-9602/97/10202-0004$01.50 430

? 1996by The University Chicago.All rights reserved. of

AJS Volume 102 Number2 (September1996): 430-482

Durkheim'sEpistemology orsocial constructivist of is interpretation Durkheim as mucha misunderstanding hisposition thefunctional positivist of as or interpretation popularized by Talcott Parsons fromwhich the current seek interpretations to rescuehim. The conflicting of interpretations Durkheim'spositionas and ideologicalboth resultfroma failureto understand functional the relationship betweenhis variousarguments, sociology knowledge, his of and his epistemology. BeforeKant,epistemology witha separation between struggled thought and reality betweenthetwo: thought, occasionedby essentialdifferences and reality, conconsisting conceptsthatare generaland continuous, of Since Kant,epistemology had to deal witha separation sisting flux. of has betweenthought and realitycreatedby human understanding: natural reality always perceivedin termsof humancategories thought is and of neverin itself. either In case, humanwaysofperceiving thinking and add As to thatwas nottherein theoriginal. a consequence, something reality humanknowledge seemsnotto standin an empirically valid relationship withreality. that Duringthecourseofthe20thcentury, to a growing due consensus an argument empirical for cannotbe made, theclassicalform of validity theepistemological whichrequiredempirical has question, validity, been increasingly abandoned in favor of a social constructivist approach to knowledge, whichembracesan element indeterminacy. thisview, of On social consensusand sociallyaccepteddefinitions meaningare treated of as the truemeasuresdefining limitsof validity. the This can be seen in the growing influence postmodern of and pragmatist approacheswithin the social sciencesand humanities. According Durkheim, abandonment classicalcriteria validto this of of ityin favorof a consensustheory truth, of whichhad alreadybeen popularized by WilliamJamesat the turnof the century, onlyappears to be necessary because theepistemological questionhas beencast,bybothempiricists apriorists, individual and in and naturalistic terms, How can individual perceptions naturalreality valid knowledge thatreality? of be of (See Cuvillier[1955] foran extendeddiscussionof the development and influence pragmatism France during in of thisperiod.)Durkheimargued thattheemphasison theindividualand individualperception natural of forcesmade the epistemological problemappear unsolvable.Durkheim to sought replacetheindividualist approachoftraditional philosophy with an approachsolidlyembeddedin enactedsocial practice. Durkheimarticulated epistemological his argument in primarily three works: The ElementaryForms ([1912] 1915),2 PrimitiveClassification
2 A new translationof The ElementaryForms (Durkheim [1912] 1995) by Karen Fields

appeared while this article was already under review at AJS. Citations,therefore, are

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AmericanJournal Sociology of (Durkheim and Mauss [1901] 1963), and Pragmatismand Sociology workedout the ([1913-14] 1955). The essay on primitive classification but parameters the originsof the category classification failedto for of distinguish social logic of the concept(the sociologyof knowledge) the The lectureson fromits genesisin enacted practice(the epistemology). problem somedein pragmatism workedouttheclassicalepistemological solutail and critically evaluatedthepragmatist, social constructivist, or is tionto theproblem. But Durkheim'sown epistemology notelaborated in thatwork.It is onlyin his studyof elementary forms religion of that in Therehe criticizes the Durkheim's epistemology presented itsentirety. is and which epistemological schoolsofempiricism, apriorism, pragmatism, werepopularat theturn thecentury, presents ownsocioempirical of and his in chapters. epistemology theonlyviable alternative thecentral as according The problem withan individualist approachto epistemology, is to to Durkheim, that, is whenknowledge thought beginwithindividual certainproblemsarise: the thingsthat personsexperience experience, Nothingis ever change fromday to day and frommoment moment. to (if exactlythe same twiceand thestreamof experience personshave not of is and changing alreadyacquiredgeneral categories thought) constantly individualexperiundifferentiated a stateof flux).Even if particular (in on to to ences are considered be empirically valid, all attempts generalize the basis of themare invalidif what is added in the processwas not an of What does a generalcateoriginal property theparticular experiences. the from experience particular of thatis different objects goryrepresent in not and events?If generalcategories something present the represent thatis added by the mindto separateparticular experiences, something thecollection particulars, thengeneral validity. of ideas have no empirical to through detailedlogical a Attempts empiricists solve theproblem by betweenobjects and analysisofindividualperception thelogicalrelation in perception concludedthat not onlylogical relationsbut all relations are properties added by themindand notpartof theperceivedobjectin its own right. to Thus, the empiricist attempt establisha directrelation endedin skepticism. between and naturalreality perception an underlying classicalempiricism failing explain for to Durkheim (1915,p. 27) criticized from of even the simplestgeneralideas directly the possibility deriving perhaps it experience:"Classical empiricismresults in irrationalism; it acto would even be fitting designate by thislattername."Apriorism, the from to was no alternative it resulted as accepting cording Durkheim, the the of dilemmaand thentreating impossibility generating empiricist theiraprioristatus. as categories empirically the basis forestablishing
from to the originaltranslationby Joseph Ward Swain. I have also translateddirectly the original French where noted. 432

Durkheim'sEpistemology Durkheimargued in his lectureson pragmatism that even James's of "radicalempiricism" retainsthe problems classical empiricism. reBy placing the dualism of thought and realitywith individualaction as a dynamic connection betweenthetwo in a context utility, of Jameshad to give up thepossibility truth of and logic.The utility pragmatic of action remained individualutility, Jamescould notexplain(without an and fallingback on either realismor idealism)how thebeliefs and practices associated withindividualutility becomegeneralin an empirically valid can bothempiricism apriorism, Durkheimalso disand way. Whilerejecting thatunlesssome commonand valid concepagreedwithJames,arguing the tual basis shared by all personscan be established, problemof explainingboth individualknowledgeand intersubjective communication will remainunsolvableand truth and knowledge will remainindeterminate. Durkheim's socioempiricism focuseson a dynamicrelationbetween in group membersas participants ritualsocial processesand the social processesthattheirparticipation enacts.While naturalforces could only be perceived particulars, as socialforces, Durkheim are argued, inherently and continuous dynamic and, whenperceivedas such by personsassembled to enact practices, provide an empiricalsource forthe categories. This way of addressing gap betweenthought the and reality replacesthe individualist approach,whichcharacterized bothempiricism apriorand ism,withan epistemology is sociallybased. The resulting that epistemolsocial processesas naturalprocesseswhose function ogy treatsconcrete is to make generalcategories thought of humanparticiavailable to their dipants.In thisway Durkheimhoped to overcomethe epistemological lemmasresulting from individualism and to addressthe problemof muIn tual intelligibility. rejecting individualas a starting the point,theway is opened forDurkheimto explainthe originof the necessary basic conof ceptsin terms concrete social processes, something had neverbeen that triedbefore. this of Unfortunately, substitution thesocial fortheindividualhas been as of generally misinterpreted a substitution the ideal forthe empirical. In attempting develop a path betweenempiricism to and apriorism, the was forced place his knower to argument outsidetheemgoes,Durkheim piricalworldbecause he acceptedthe argument thatvalid categories of the understanding cannotbe generated from within empiricism. Thus, it is argued,Durkheimis forced createan ideal worldof symbols, to ideas and as (representations), beliefs an origin theessentialforms human of of thought. This is,however, complete a misinterpretationDurkheim's of epistemologicalargument. did notattempt walk a middlepathbetweenemHe to piricism and apriorism locating origin thecategories an ideal, the by of in 433

American Journal Sociology of timeless, and ahistorical social positionor by locatinga knoweroutside theempirical. quiteexplicitly He emphasizes importance thehistorithe of cal and the empirical.For Durkheimthe middlepath is a concrete and empirical social path composedof practices, a system symbols not of and beliefs.This concretesocial emphasisplaced individualpersonsamong theirfellowsengagedin a mutualenactment social practices, of particularlyreligious ritual, insteadofin an individualist naturalcontext, before posing the epistemological question.This allowed Durkheimto distinguishbetweenindividualsensations naturalforces, of whichposed problemsfor empiricism, theexperience moralforce persons and of by engaged in enacting sharedpractices. arguedthattheperceptions moralforce He of generated sharedenactedpractice wereinternal, by and emotional, immedid diateand therefore notrequire abstraction the from seriesofparticua lar perceptions, whichhad beena majorstumbling blockfor empiricist the of ideas.3For Durkheim, explanation general socialpractices notideal, are and theydo not consistprimarily ideas, representations, beliefs. of and These are merely secondary phenomena. For Durkheim, society consists first and foremost enactedpracticesthatgive riseto real social forces of in that participants the assembledgroup experience jointly.Certainof these social forcesgive rise to essentialideas experienced common, in which Durkheimrefers as the categoriesof the understanding.4 to The in is purposeof religion humanhistory to providethe enactedpractices to theseessentialideas. necessary generate The Elementary Formspresents carefuland thorough a historical and for of comparative argument theempirical origin six basic ideas, or cateidentified the philosophical debate as esgoriesofthe understanding, by sentialto epistemological causalvalidity (time, space,classification, force,
'The emotional character theperception moralforce an important of of is issue.By claiminga distinction betweenemotionalperception and perceptions that come through fivesenses, the Durkheim reinforces argument perception social his that of forces notsubjectto thesame problems perception natural is as of forces. Not only in aresocialforces continuous their ownright, they perceived but are through differa entfaculty mind,an emotional of faculty. This pointDurkheim sharesin essential respects withHume.Elsewhere (Rawls 1996b)I have provided further discussion of thispoint. 4 The article "the" thephrase in "thecategories theunderstanding," a problem of is not ofgrammar causedbyignorance thedifference of between French English. and Locke in in usedthephrase "thecategories theunderstanding" 1690.As he wrote English, of there no translation is The phrase I citeitis Kant's([1781]1965) as problem involved. in andis alwaystranslated English into with article the as attached itappeared Locke. This is becausetheargument beingmade is nota relativistic It does notrefer one. to just anycategories anyunderstanding rather thecategories theunderof but to of as to as of standing a constant. Referring the categories "categories understanding" their the this to suggests indeterminacy. Reading text waycontributes itsmisinterpretation.
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Durkheim'sEpistemology ity,and totality).5 Unfortunately, Durkheim'scommitment empirical to detail resultsin long sectionson totemism that represent essentialparts of his epistemological argument are so long and apparently but focused on totemism se thattheir per epistemological significance beenmissed. has For example,Durkheimtakes up animismin orderto argue againstan he of aprioriexplanationof totems.Similarly, takes up the arguments Frazer and Tylorin orderto argueagainsta classicalempiricist explanation. Durkheim'sconsideration individualand sexual totemsconstiof Because tutesan argument thattotems nothave an individualorigin. do Durkheimbuilt his epistemology details of the actual enactment on of totemic rites, arguments thattreatthosedetailsas havingan individual and origin contradict position, he mustdeal withthem. his Unfortunately, theselong sectionson totems of have been treatedas a consideration totemsin their of own right, as explorations "conceptual or systems," rather thanelaborations theempirical of detailsofenactedpracticeas an essential part of Durkheim'sepistemology. As a consequence,mostscholarswithan interest the epistemology in have concentrated their attention thefirst last chapters, on and wherethe the epistemological argument onlysketched, is while ignoring epistemologicalargument thecentral in chapters, and a curiousmisreading the of texthas resulted. The first chapteris an earlierelucidationof the arguet ment,which appeared in 1909 as "Sociologiereligieuse theoriede la
I ThatDurkheim makesempirical arguments theorigin only categories for of six (time, in space, classification, force, cause, and totality) The Elementary Formshas been missed.Commentators theepistemology on apparently notgrasptheexclusivity do in of the list,and it is represented different ways by different often commentators, withan "etc."This maybe due in partto references Durkheim that himself makes in severalplaces to categories theworkof Aristotle other in and philosophers. The first reference TheElementary in Forms (Durkheim 1915, 21-22),e.g.,is toAristotpp. le's listof categories includes and "personality" "number," and whichdo notappear as categories Durkheim's in argument. "Number" appearsagainon p. 30 and"personall ality" againon pp. 31-32. Theseinstances appearin theintroduction where Durkheimis making reference Aristotle's ofcategories to thegeneral to list and philosophical problem withregard categories. to These are notthesixcategories he argues that fortheempirical validity in thebodyofthetext. of Durkheim also treats categories in loosely theconclusion. result thismisunderstanding One of is thatone ofthemost important thesixcategories, of classification,generally is treated a survey classias of fication practices notas a category itsown right. and in One reviewer thisarticle of commented, "The question thatnagsme most whyDurkheim's is analysis classifiof cationhas promoted muchresearch so whilehis analysisof the categories (space, totality, force, time, so I causality, has promoted little." think question etc.) the answers itself. as Just thisreviewer does notrecognize classification one ofthecategories, as thegeneral sociological Durkheim's of publichas also notrecognized studies classification having as to his anything do with epistemology. Therefore, whiletheepistemolthe ogyhas been almosttotally ignored, partofit thatfocused classification, on becauseithas beenmisinterpreteda survey symbolic as of has a systems, received great deal of attention.

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American Journal Sociology of whichleaves epistemological sociology knowledge connaissance," and of issues relatively, althoughnot entirely, undistinguished (Lukes 1973,p. 408).6 The conclusion presents similar a It difficulty.takesup thesociology ofknowledge after epistemological the argument been completed has and assumes an understanding thatargument. of The epistemological argument itself appearsonlyin thecentral chapters, whichhave beengenerally in ignored thisregard, leadingscholarsto infer epistemology the from the introduction theconclusion and whereit is onlyvaguelysketched. Thus, thecareful relationship drawnbetween specific practices specific and categoriesin the centralchapters missed,and Durkheimis interpreted is instead as havingfocusedon symbolic beliefsystems. Because the epistemological significance the centralchaptershas of been missed,theepistemological has argument neverbeen recognized as such.Even thebesttreatments Durkheim's of of theory knowledge, David Bloor (1982) beingnotablein thisregard,treatit as an argument about the sociology knowledgeand not an argument, the classical sense, of in about thenatureof mindand theorigin humanreason.Yet, it is quite of the clearfrom textthatDurkheim an in articulated epistemology theclassical senseoftheword.The sociology knowledge a distinct of is secondary thatis meantto reston thisfoundation. his introduction In argument to the EnglisheditionofDurkheim'slectures pragmatism, on JohnAllcock (1983,p. xl) wrote that"a rounded of assessment Durkheim's epistemology has yetto be undertaken." Allcockarguesthatdiscussions the nature of ofDurkheim'ssocial factsand his sociology knowledge of have been the focusofDurkheim primary scholarship and have been confused withhis The epistemology.7 resulting failure understand to Durkheim'sdistinction betweenmoral(or social) forceand empirical as perception a sourcefor thecategories theunderstanding led scholarsto dismisstheepisteof has mologyas untenableand focusinstead on his sociologyof knowledge. Even arguments thatpurport addressthe epistemology to often proper, continueto treatthe argument an idealist citingAllcock's remarks, as the of account,entirely overlooking empiricalfoundation the argument in concrete practices(see, e.g., Godlove 1989). As a consequence, Durkheim'sepistemology often has been interpreted as consisting the dictumthatthe categories the understanding, of of for whichhe claims empiricalvalidity, come fromsocial representations or an belief whichhas led to thebelief systems, clearly impossible argument, thatDurkheimwas ignorant basic philosophical of issues (Gehlke 1915;
on section sociology and philosophy 6According to Lukes (1973,p. 582), an earlier

from Elementary The was also omitted Forms. whileAllcock's(1983) essayis one of thebestin manyregards, 7Unfortunately, he offers lectures pragmatism thebestsourcefortheepistemology. the on as 436

Durkheim'sEpistemology Dennes 1924;Parsons[1937]1968;Lukes 1973;Mestrovic 1993;Stoneand Farberman1967; LaCapra 1972). Durkheimhas been accused of failing of to recognize limitations an empirical the of theory general ideas,making him appear to be a positivist, and of arguingthat the categories the of have their understanding sourcein other ideas, makinghimappear to be thatideas come an idealist.The idealistor social constructivist argument from other ideas is partofDurkheim'ssociology knowledge which of (for not he does notclaimempirical validity) his epistemology. Because ofthis it misunderstanding,has been assumedthatDurkheimclaimedan ideal source for the categoriesin collectiverepresentations when in fact he claimed forthema directoriginin the concreteexperienceof enacted practice. enterthe of Durkheimargued that the categories the understanding mindsof individualpersonsduringenactedpracticein such a way as to be empirically the valid. He describes processbywhichpractices generate in of theseideas in detail.It is thesocioempirical origin thesix categories to allows his epistemology to enactedpracticethat,according Durkheim, The categories overcomethe dualityof thought and reality. correspond of as enactedpractice. to thereality social forces generated during Durkin heim'sargument epistemological theclassicalsensein thatitexplains is in the relationship betweenperceptions, ideas, and external reality such a way thatkey thoughts and conceptscan be shown to bear a valid or truerelationship an external to reality, whichin thiscase consists entirely ofsocial forces. Durkheim intended argument replacetheepistemohis to logical arguments Kant, Hume, James,and theirfollowers, of permanently transforming philosophical debate overthevalidity knowledge. of an Providing empirical demonstration theavailability participants of to in sharedenactedritual(religious) practices thecategories theunderof of standingwas a primary objectiveof The Elementary Forms.According to Lukes (1973, pp. 407-8, 459), the titleDurkheimoriginally proposed for The Elementary Forms in a 1908 letterto Leon, "Les Formes elede mentaires la penseeet de la pratiquereligieuse," suggests thattheinterin estin religion serveda long-standing moreimportant and interest epistemologyand morals.8It is only because he believed that religious
8 Durkheim's doctoral thesis (later published TheDivisionofLabor)originally as be-

for gan withan introduction outlining implications moralphilosophy its (included as an appendix theGeorgeSimpson to translation [Durkheim (1893) 1933]).His Latin thesis on of ([1892]1960)focused entirely therelationship between ethics Montesthe quieu and Rousseauand whatDurkheim interpreted their as sociological approach in tomorality. IndeedDurkheim himself a letter Revueneo-scholastique, to November 8, 1907(see Durkheim [1895]1982, 259),claimsto have adopteda focus religion p. on in 1895onlyafter realizing it provided basisfor earlier that the his attempt ground to an empirically validethics theoriginal in version TheDivisionofLaborin Society. of 437

American Journalof Sociology practices necessary order generate are in to valid categories thought of that Durkheim focused religion. on Durkheim adoptedan order argument of in The Elementary Formsthatfollows orderof Hume's TreatiseofHuthe manNature([1739] 1978).It is tailored handlean epistemological to argunot ment, a surveyof religious beliefs.Durkheimwas not interested priin marily religious of in systems belief.His interest was rather themoral forces, and the categories thought of corresponding them,that were to generated religious by practices. Durkheimconsidered religious belief to be an entirely secondary phenomenawithno empiricalvalidity, and he dealt withreligious of beliefin terms thesociology knowledge, the of not epistemology. The argument that the work of the later Durkheimshould be interpretedas takingan idealistturn,popular fromthe beginning, achieved dogmatic statusin theUnitedStatesfollowing in Parsons's assertion The Structure Social Action(1968,pp. 460-65) thatthelaterDurkheim of had moved dangerously close to idealismand in Europe withthe confusion byLevy-Bruhl and others Durkheim'ssociology knowledge of of withhis epistemology. While the argument The Elementary of Formshas consistently been interpreted idealist,Durkheim'sdiscussionof social facts as in The Rules of the Sociological Method ([1895] 1982) and in the earlier Division ofLabor in Society([1893] 1933),interpreted benefit without of his epistemology, givena positivist is interpretation, leadingto the argumentthatthere twoDurkheims: functionalist are a and positivist an idealist (and more recently idealist postmodernist pragmatist) an or (LevyBruhl ([1910] 1966);Levi-Strauss([1958] 1963);Parsons 1968; Stone and Farberman1967; LaCapra 1972;Lukes 1973;Alexander1988;Lehmann 1990;Mestrovic1993). The fundamental lies error in failing distinguish to Durkheim'sepistefrom sociology knowledge. his of Durkheim'sepistemology, best mology represented the centralchaptersof The Elementary by Forms,deals explicitly withthequestionofwhether six categories theunderstandthe of ing can be demonstrated have empiricalvalidity.He arguesthat the to six categories have empiricalvaliditybecause theyare perceiveddido rectly social or moralforces as of duringthe enactment social (religious) practice. Durkheim's sociologyof knowledge,on the other hand, appearing and to mainlyin theintroduction conclusion The Elementary Formsand at theend ofthelectures pragmatism, on consists of roughly theargument thatlanguageand cultureconsistof cosmologies ideas, whicharise as of collective for explanations socialforces, thattheseideas becomeforces and in their own right whoselogicalrelations be studied.The cosmologies can are responsive structural to inertia that so changesbut also have a certain ideas first generated theinterpretation socialprocesses of lose whatever by 438

Durkheim'sEpistemology relation social practices to theymight once have had. Therefore, theydo notbear anynecessary relation an underlying to reality. Durkheim'ssociis withthe logic of ideas withinsuch cosologyof knowledge concerned mologies. There is no contradiction betweenthesetwo positions. They deal with The epistemology how,in thefirst asks different questions. place, persons of valid basic ideas in commonsuch developa framework six empirically to thatanyideas could be sharedto a degreesufficient allow forthedevelThe sociology knowlof of a cosmology opment (Durkheim1915,p. 30). once the betweenconceptswithincosmologies edge studiesthe relations have developed.Durkheim'sepistemology categories positsa directrelationbetweena limitedset of categories and an underlying social reality. With It createsonly a small area of knowledgefreeof indeterminacy. regardto the naturalworld,the worldof science,and the bulk of social leaves intactall the probconcepts, however,Durkheim'sepistemology lems of indeterminacy that Wittgenstein ([1953] 1958), Quine ([1966] Bloor (1976, 1977), Kuhn (1962), Feyerabend(1975), and more recently 1982,1983),Fuller(1989),and Latourand Woolgar(1979)have described. Durkheimargues that "onlythe necessities action,and especiallyof of in formucollectiveaction,can and mustexpressthemselves categorical falls lae" (Durkheim1915,p. 412). Everything beyondthe six categories of withinthe provinceof the sociology knowledge. In layingouthis epistemology, Durkheim focused religious on practices in because he arguedthatreligious practices "simple"societiesprovided a sufficient the degreeofcollectivity support formation generalcateto of to societiescould onlydevelop goriesof thought. According Durkheim, wheresharedenactedpractices producedcategories theunderstanding of in common,thus enablingmembers the same groupto communicate of (Durkheim1915,p. 30). His detailedargument concerning origins the of religion well as thedetaileddescriptions Australian as of totemism, which have been misinterpreted culturalsociology, sociologyof religion, as or a of actuallyconstitute step-by-step analysisof the social generation the of categories the understanding. Durkheimarticulated consistent a epistemology throughout career his thatis much moresophisticated and seriousthan he is givencreditfor. This epistemology evidentin theearlyas well as in thelaterwork:the is coherence hisnotion social factsdepending of of entirely his epistemolon without The resultis an argument it. ogyand appearingto be positivist thatpreserves direct(although a limited) relation betweensociallygenerated categoriesof thought and social realityin general,explainingthe of development the categorieswithoutinvokingthe problemsof either or apriorism empiricism. WhileDurkheim makesrather extensive for arguments thesocioempiri439

American Journal Sociology of cal origins six categories theunderstanding, is notpossibleto conof of it in siderthe arguments all six categories thisarticle.The arguments for are forthesocioempirical origins force, of causality, and classification the part of mostimportant. The argument force, for however,is essentially for in of this theargument causality. Therefore, theinterests brevity, article will confine for itself a sketchof the arguments the socioempirical to of ultimately the origins the two conceptsof causalityand classification, two mostimportant from epistemological an standpoint, considconcepts critieringforceonlyas it relatesto causality.Followingthisdiscussion, cisms and misunderstandings Durkheim'spositionwill be taken up of detail. again in greater THE CATEGORY OF CAUSALITY of Durkheim'sargument the social originof the category causality, for whichoccursin book 3, section3, is the centerpiece The Elementary of mustexplain, Forms.Causalityis thekeyconceptthatany epistemology and theearliersections thebook,particularly extensive of the sections on whichestablish social basis fortheothergeneralcategories the of totems, for and space,time, classification, force, thegroundwork thesocioemlay piricalbasis of the category causality. of In spiteof theimportance theargument causalityto thebook as for of a whole,withotherarguments leadingup to it and buildingon it, most Formsoverlook focusing insteadon the of discussions The Elementary it, of There are threereasonsfor categories time,space, and classification. of of this.First,thegeneral misunderstanding Durkheim'streatment clasof sification, time,and space as social systems ideas insteadof categories in of Durkheimis taken leads to an interest the coherence the "systems" Those categories thatdo notlendthemselves a sociolto tohave described. of are of Second, ogyofknowledge comprised "systems" concepts ignored. in Durkheim'sarguof thisinterest culturalsystems ideas misinterprets accountofknowledge, thus mentas an indeterminant social constructivist his for obscuring epistemological argument the empiricalvalidityof the of among category causality.Third,thereis a generallack of familiarity withtheimportance theconceptof causalityto epistemolof sociologists issues in general. ogyand of epistemological to and causality bothrelations are between According Durkheim, force thatare knownbytheir effects. the Therefore, problem objectsor persons the of establishing conceptof forceis similarto that of establishing the for the conceptof causality.The sectionspreceding argument causality establishthesocioempirical basis fortheconceptof force. However,cauCausalityis a necessary salitycontainsan additionalelement: necessity. relationbetweentwo objects or events.Durkheimdescribesthe percep440

Durkheim'sEpistemology of tion of causalityas the perception a special kind of force,which he refers as necessary to force or efficient force(Durkheim1915, pp. 406, 410-11, 488). Durkheimarguesthat,in orderforcausalityto have a socioempirical basis, it mustbe the case thatthereare social ritualsin whichnecessary force an integral is enactedfeature (Durkheim1915,pp. 408-13). As with available to perforce mustbe immediately theother categories, necessary of ceptionas an enactedfeature the ritualin any singlecase. It mustnot in of be a generalization drawnfrom seriesofperceptions social rituals, a whichcase it would stillbe subjectto theobjectionthatgeneralconcepts of sensations. a cannotbe validlyderivedfrom collection particular his of Durkheim focuses argument thesocioempirical for origin theconritesof sacrifice and oblationbecause,he arcept offorceon thetotemic is gues,theseare the riteswheremoralforce reproduced (1915,pp. 31892). These arguments relating different sortsof totemic ritesto forceand of He causalityare quitespecific. arguesthatthemoralforce thecommunity and ofthetotemic symbol bothreproduced therituals sacriare via of in fice(1915, pp. 381-85). The moral forceof deitiesis also reproduced of and through ritualsof oblationin so faras deitiesare representations on social and not supernatural forces (1915, pp. 385-92). Imitativerites, the otherhand, enact the principleof necessaryforce,or causalityacto theseritesare thefocusofhis argucording Durkheim, and, therefore, and mentsforcausality(1915, pp. 393-414). Whereasritualsof sacrifice oblationachievea deepening as respect and moralsensethatis perceived ritesinvokeand producea directrelation betweenaction imitative force, the and effects, and recreating groupthatenactsthem, actuallycreating thereby achieving conceptofnecessary the force causalityas an inheror ent enactedquality. Lukes (1973,p. 448) arguesthatDurkheim no provides evidencein The Formsforthecausal relation Elementary claimedbetweenparticular social practices and particular The issue is obscured "conceptualsystems." of of into byLukes's introduction thenotion conceptual systems theequaof tion,a sociologyof knowledgeinterpretation Durkheim'sargument. Durkheimneverattempted argue thatparticular to social forms created specificconceptual systemsin his sociologyof knowledge.However, Durkheim's epistemological argument consists themuchstronger of claim thatthere a direct is relation betweenspecific sortsofsocial practices and of Imitativeritesare the origin particular categories the understanding. oftheconceptofcausality. it Properly understood becomesclearthatthe entirediscussionof totemsconsistsof evidence of just the sort Lukes claims Durkheimhas not offered. Durkheimarguesthatparticipants directly perceivenecessary force as part of theirexperienceof certainritualsbecause, as a social relation, 441

Journalof Sociology American of forceis an enactedfeature thoserituals.Durkheim's(1915, necessary ritesservesthe purposeof pp. 393-414) detaileddiscussionof imitative of the establishing occurrence ritualsthat succeed onlyby enactingthe of principle causality. and played a pivotal Causalityis an essentialconceptin philosophy causality, Without and rolein thedebate betweenempiricism apriorism. on philosophers both sides of the debate agreed,sciencewould have no of whichHume arguedconsists initself, foundation. Indeed,knowledge without concept the effects causes,would be impossible to ferences from in If the secureda basis for conceptofcausality diofcausality. Durkheim that importance of of experience thesocial,heachievedsomething great rect debates. and methodological theoretical for implications current has serious THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY Because Durkheimarguesthathe has founda social originforthe catehe goriesof the understanding, is oftentaken to be a Kantian or neodiscussedtheproblem and Kantian.However,bothempiricists apriorists ideas. The difference general in of and/or ofepistemology terms categories of of explanation the origins thecategories, betweenthetwo was in their partin theirepistemological categories playedan important not whether argument. Kant's apriormakesit quiteclearthathe does notconsider Durkheim to of ism to containcriteria validityat all and several timesrefers the at as argument "no explanation" all (1915, p. 27). He writes:"To reply was thatit [theidea of classification] givento us a prioriis not to reply at all" (1915, p. 172). He goes on to say thatthis"lazy man's solutionis ... thedeathof analysis"(1915,p. 172). Eitherone explainstheexistence cannotbe explained as or ofthecategories, concludes, Hume did,thatthey exseeks an empirical Durkheimclearly have no validity. and, therefore, althoughby empiricalorigins planationof the originsof the categories, Durkheim'ssocioempirical in he meansorigins sharedenactedpractices. not of criterion validity, Kant's.9 Hume's empirical approachsatisfies
Whenhiscriticisms as interpreted a Kantianor neo-Kantian. is 9Durkheim generally Locke was to takento be referring Locke. However, he to refer empiricism, is often it as quitehappywithempiricism he had presented and did notmaketheskeptical of are cites.These arguments morecharacteristic Hume that arguments Durkheim withempirinot might have beenfamiliar The argument Durkheim that and James. tooka the overlooks factthatDurkheim withneo-Kantians cismbecausehe studied univerA of Superieure. survey German in from degree philosophy theEcole Normale 1862to 1890(Kohnke1991,p. 249) showsthattherisein neo-Kantianism sities from and of in in interest and availability courses empiricism withit an increased brought to according Kohnke(1991,p. 249)"theshare thisperiod, as rationalism well.During whilethose declined, and of coursesdevotedto Plato,Aristotle Hegel continuously
442

Durkheim'sEpistemology Durkheim While he set himself accomplishHume's task,however, to apand watereddown empiricist did not intendto employa modified to all his proach.On theone hand,he intended argument fulfill ofHume's of the criteria, while,on theotherhand,he feltthatshifting foundations in resulted an enthe argument from individualto enactedpractices, the Durkheimshould not be tirely new solutionto the problem.Therefore, It but considered empiricist rathera socioempiricist. followsthatthe an beforethe problemselaboratedby Hume must be consideredcarefully and itseffectiveness can subtlety Durkheim'sargument be appreciated of evaluated. matheHume arguedthatall knowledge couldbe dividedintotwosorts: knowledge (Hume [1777] 1975,p. maticalknowledge and moral/empirical of knowledge was for Hume a matter purereason 25).Whilemathematical in (because numbers not real but are logicalconstructions the mind), are of or depended theconcepts cause and effect, on empirical moralknowledge (Hume 1975,p. 26). "By meansofthisrelation contiguity resemblance and and alone we can go beyondtheevidenceofourmemory [cause and effect] And fact concerning are ofthesame nature. senses.... All our reasonings between present the is hereis itconstantly supposedthatthere a connection it" from (Hume 1975,pp. 26-2 7). factand thatwhichis inferred Without causal relations betweenperceptions, theywould remainparaccording Hume. It is theconceptofcausality to ticularand unconnected thatintroduces Every inference, every orderintothe fluxof experience. the requires idea factand a prior condition, connection betweena present ofcausality. is causality ideas out thatallows personsto pull particular It of the fluxand connectthemto others. it Therefore, seems obvious that personsmake use of such a concept.The questionforHume was not whether conceptexists, it obviously the as but must, whereit comesfrom and whether not it has empiricalvalidity(Hume 1975,p. 27). Hume or from experiof cannotbe attained arguedthatknowledge cause and effect ence of a singleinstance.That would requirethat objects containand is displaytheir causes,whichHume (1975,p. 27) asserts notpossible:"No object ever discovers, the qualitieswhichappear to the senses,either by the causes whichproducedit,or the effects whichwill arise from In it." event fromits is addition,accordingto Hume, "everyeffect a distinct cause. It could not,therefore, discoveredin the cause" (1975,p. 30). be
devoted Spinoza,Descartes, to Leibniz, Lockeand Hume,as wellas to Kant,showed a continuous increase." Durkheim's neo-Kantian training increases chancesthat the withHume,whosearguments necessary underhe wouldhave beenfamiliar are for standing Kant.Durkheim Hume'sarguments great uses with sophistication.is only It Durkheim's sociology knowledge of thathas neo-Kantian overtones even that and shouldnotbe interpreted Durkheim's within argument separately from epistemology, in thecontext whichit changes essential of respects. 443

American Journal Sociology of Generalizationover a series of particularexperiences, the other on hand, only adds to those particulars the perceiver'sfeelings about the seriesas a series,feelings whichare not an empirical experience cause of and effect. "For as thisidea [causality] arises froma numberof similar instances, notfrom single and any instance, mustarisefrom it thatcircumstance,in whichthenumber instances of differ from everyindividualinstance.But thiscustomary or connexion transition the imagination of is In theonlycircumstance whichtheydiffer. everyotherparticular in they are alike" (Hume 1975,p. 78). Hume arguesthatall thatis added to singleinstances their by collection in a seriesis the feeling personsget about the series.There is nothing empirically different abouttheseriesthatis morethanthesumofitsparts. Therefore, Hume concludedthatcausalityis merely resultof feelings the thatlead to customand habit.Thereare,for Hume (1975,p. 78),no empiricallyvalid experiences corresponding causality. to "Everyidea is copied from some preceding impression sentiment; wherewe cannotfind or and any impression, may be certainthatthereis no idea. In all singleinwe stancesoftheoperation bodiesor minds, of there nothing is thatproduces nor can anyimpression, consequently suggest idea, ofpoweror necesany of saryconnexion."''0 Repetition can neverproduceknowledge causality. It can onlyproducethefeeling beliefthatsimilar or things will keep hapand habitual,and, accordingto pening.This beliefbecomescustomary is Hume, the feeling beliefitself the originof theconceptof causality: or instancesappear, and the same object is al"But, when manyuniform the ways followedby the same event;we thenbeginto entertain notion We or of cause and connexion. thenfeela new sentiment impression ... is and thissentiment the originof thatidea whichwe seek for"(1975,p. in not 78). Thus, causality originates a feeling, in an empirical experience. has It, therefore, no empiricalvalidityand personsare mistaken when, customand habit,theybelieve the transfer this feeling of to following external relations anyvalidity: has "Andas wefeel a customary connexion that feeling the objects; as nothing to is betweenthe ideas, we transfer more usual than to apply to externalbodies every internalsensation, whichtheyoccasion"(1975, p. 78n). Hume demonstrated that causality of cannotbe explainedon the basis of individualexperience naturalob0 thisquote,Hume usesboththe 18th-century In of to meaning "idea"or impression sense denotean exactcopyofa senseimpression sentiment themoremodern or and If of an idea as a thought. an idea is a copyof a senseimpression, has empirical it If as validity. it is a copyofa sentiment, in thefollowing quote,it is notempirically due to Hume's failure use the valid. Whilethe passageis somewhat to ambiguous he word"idea"consistently throughout, does notmeanthatpeopledo nothave and He use theconcept causality. meansthatthere no valididea or senseimpression of is to corresponding theconcept beingused. 444

Durkheim'sEpistemology jectsbecause causality nota sensible is qualityofnaturalobjectsand their relations that can be experienced individualsin a singlecase. If the by to or disposition believe in causalityis an instinct, a conclusiondrawn after perceiving seriesofnaturalobjectsorevents, a matter custom, a or of thenit is something added by the mind to perception, part of the not not originalperception, therefore empirically and valid. The significance Hume's projectis thatit fails, rather, of or thatHume showsthatan individually based empiricism couldnotexplaintheempiriA cal origin theessential of general categories. modern social constructivist accountofthisproblem acceptsHume's conclusion thatknowledge of causalityhas no empiricalvalidity.Social constructivists thenfocuson an accountofthesocial determination customand habitthatprovides of formoreconsistency betweenindividualideas than Hume's conclusion it would seemto allow for. Although could be arguedthatLocke's ([1690] 1959) "commonacceptation" alreadyan earlyversionof a social conis structivist argument (Rawls 1977). DURKHEIM'S SOCIOEMPIRICAL ARGUMENTFOR CAUSALITY While Durkheimaccepts Hume's argument thatindividualperceptions ofnaturaleventscannotgive riseto a valid idea ofcausality, does not he thatcausalitycan have no valid empirical acceptHume's conclusion origin.For Durkheim, social practices empirical, perceived, are are and can an furnish empirically validorigin theconcept causality. for of WhenDurkheimarguesthatthe category causalityis not merely generalization of a of based on a series perceptions thesocialbut,rather, be immediately of can in perceivedas a generalphenomenon the singleinstance, is striking he at the heart of the epistemological problem.When he argues that the empirical(perceivable) effects ritualactionare morethan the sum of of the individualparts (i.e., that shared ritualhas meaningand social or moral force, which the sum of its partstaken alone as particulars does not),he is again makinga significant improvement theempiricist in position." For Durkheimthe categories the understanding the social of and relations thatproducethemare not something added by the mind to a seriesof perceptions naturalobjects and eventsbut, rather, of inherent characteristics enactedritualpractices of and thereby immediately avail" This is whatDurkheim meansby insisting "society" morethanthesumof that is its parts.He is arguing solution theproblem general particular, point a to of vs. a thathas beenmissed. The "parts" usually are as interpreted individual persons, not individual perceptions, theconclusion and generally drawn that a group persons is if of is more thanthesumoftheindividuals thegroup in then Durkheim must articulatbe ing a group-mind theory. is not.It is rather epistemological He an argument about thepossibility perceiving of ideasorcategories theunderstandingenacted of in general whichenactsocialforces, practices, whichare morethanthesumof their parts.

445

of Journal Sociology American who to instance, thoseparticipants in able in perception, each particular enact the ritual. Durkheimpicked up whereHume leftoffbut witha sigEssentially of acceptstheimpossibility an individualWhileDurkheim twist. nificant he which Hume demonstrated, argues that the solution ist empiricism, enBy based empiricism. substituting can be foundin a socioempirically in of generated and and perceptions themoralforces acted social practice themfor enacting by through thosepractices the individualparticipants Durkheimavoids Hume's of individualperceptions naturalphenomena, skepticalconclusion.Enacted practicesdo display theircauses in their still effects. However,as withHume,thecategories have no valid applicationto naturalscience. The generalidea of causalityis revealedby Durkheimas havingbeen all available to perception along on certainsortsof social immediately in of occasions.It is thissubstitution participation enactedsocial practice that not onlyprovidesthe key to Durkheim's forindividualperception the through years,in solutionto Hume's dilemmabut also, consistently about what is distinctive comesto define spiteof themisunderstandings, has unitof analysisforsociology The primary as sociology a discipline. not been the individualbut variouspositedlevels of social organization observablesocial practice. and empirically THE ASSOCIATION OF CAUSALITY WITH IMITATIVE RITES of Durkheimargues that the category causalityhas its originsin those imitativerituals throughwhich the totemicgroup is reproducedand which the forceof the groupis achieved,enacted,and experithrough centralprinciple Durkheimargues,have as their rituals, enced.Imitative the something, thing that"like produceslike,"thatis, that,by imitating rites He can be caused to reproduce. arguesthattheseimitative imitated in enact,and way; the ritesconstitute, are causallyefficacious a singular and therefore give persons thattheyrepresent the reproduce veryforces In force. other of words, in who participate themtheexperience necessary is the the ritesare what theyrepresent: relationship one of equivalence or (Durkheim1915,pp. not and creation, representation correspondence 393-414). is Durkheimfacesin makingthisargument that One of the problems to whichis critical his argument, of rites, his own interpretation imitative in current his day that imitative differs sharplyfromthe interpretation of ritesare based on a crude misapplication the idea of causality.For perspective to (1915,p. 399),theempiricist according Durkheim instance, taken by Frazer (1887, 1889, 1910 and Tylor ([1874] 1973, 1899) treats of the pointof the ritualas the reproduction the actual animal species 446

Durkheim'sEpistemology it thatthetotem Giventhisperspective, appearsthatthememrepresents. because thetotemic bersofthetotem have made a mistake symbol cannot cause the actual reproduction biologicalanimals. If the riteis interof pretedas having successfully reproducedthe totemicspecies only if it causes the biologicalanimal to reproduce, thenthe beliefin the causal of thatit is hard to underefficacy theceremony seemsso grossan error stand.Hume's argument thatcausalityis beyondthecapacityof thehuman mindand thatcustomary and habitualideas are beingcrudelyapplied to natural relationsin the name of causalityseems to have been supported. In orderto establishhis own position, Durkheimundertakes elaboan rateand detailedconsideration theempiricist of interpretation totems. of This discussionhas been mistaken a surveyof totemic for practicesand a social constructivist instead account of the logic of totemicsymbols, of beingrecognized an essentialpartof his epistemological as argument. Durkheimagreeswiththe empiricists people are able to form that crude causal connections based on faulty betweenactionsor eventsand effects generalizations fromexperience.However, more than that would be terms.Taken needed, he argues,to explain these beliefsin empiricist in strictly classicalempiricist terms, theserituals onlylook likea false not of to and applicationof crude principles contiguity resemblance natural events,as Frazer and Tylorargued,theymake primitive peoples appear to be altogether devoid of reason.Durkheimargues thatno one would believe in the literalcausal efficacy imitative of ritualsunlesstherewas moreto theritualthanthecrudeperception custom, of habit,similarity, in and contiguity. Personsmustgetreinforcement thesebeliefs terms for of some real causal efficacy themoralforces of involvedbecause thereis no literal causal efficacy withregardto naturalevents.They thenmisunderstandthe originof thiscausal efficacy and transposeit onto natural or supernatural eventsor agencies,thus,generating beliefs. religious If thetrueefficacy theriteis, as Durkheim of says,notthereproduction of the biologicalspeciesbut rather reproduction the moralenergy the of of the group,then the beliefin the riteis explained.The ritereallyis If the causallyefficacious. the ritereproduces moralunityof the totemic group,thenit does cause the moral reproduction the totemic of species (1915,p. 400). It is theeffect thementhemselves, on their feelings wellof thatgive themthe feeling ritehas succeeded, the beingand moralunity, not any presumed magicalactionof theriteon naturalor animalobjects (1915,p. 402). Durkheim makesan important distinction betweencausalnaturaleventsthatmustbe inferred ityas a relation between from series a of incidents and causalityas a moralforceevidentin any singlecase of enactedpractice. Durkheim the of or arguesthathiddenwithin principle similarity, "like 447

American Journal Sociology of is involving produceslike,"unrecognized the empiricists, a principle by he creationor causality.This hiddenprinciple, argues,has two sortsof and (2) to reproduce the results:(1) to reproducethe moral community rites totemic species(1915,pp. 400-401). Durkheimarguesthatimitative of new (1915,p. 399),which, concern reproduction something the entirely and contiguity therefore, cannot be explainedon the basis of similarity traditional (the empiricist explanation). the the Because, forDurkheim, logicis itself resultof social practices, or must questionof whether not the riteis actuallycausally efficacious be considered empirical an matter fact, a matter logic.Therefore, of not of of is Durkheim arguesthatthepossibility theprinciple causality genthat eratedin and through imitative ritualsneeds to be establishedthrough in careful examination. Instead of considering principle its the empirical he "let us connectit withthe system generaland abstractform, writes, ofideas and sentiments" the"rites intopractice" that (Durkheim1915, put p. 400). In serviceof thisargument, discusDurkheimengagesin an extensive sion of the actual enactment imitative of rites.This discussion, like the of is treated a sociology religion, as of otherdiscussions totems, generally to is and the relationship the epistemology missed.The purposeof this is discussion, however, to establishthe conceptof causalityand demonnot to enacted practices, to explorethe strateits relationship particular detailsof imitative ritualsin theirown right. the imitate animalsorobjects In imitative rituals, members thetotem of of members the totemnot thatthetotemrepresents. Throughthe ritual, but "makeit"and "remake it" and the onlyrepresent reinforce totem, they "Since theyare emusor kangaroos, as a moralcommunity. theycomport like themselves theanimalsofthesame name.By thismeans,theymutuof thattheyare all members thesame moralcomally show one another them.The rite and theybecomeconsciousof the kinshipuniting munity it" this it to does not limititself expressing kinship; makesit or remakes (Durkheim1915,p. 400). idea thatbinds themtogether and thatthey Because it is the totemic all have in theirminds,it is quite naturaland necessarythat therebe of the representations the totemaccompanying ritual.But that should thatthe idea thatthesesymbolscan cause not mislead us intothinking to animalsor comesfrom theirsimpleresemblance totemic reproduction an thatcausal ideas are producedby the symbolism, idealistinterpretaritesare causallyefficacious tion.The idea thattotemic results, according is to Durkheim, from factthatwhat thesymbolrepresents theactual the and themselves factofthemembers thetotem of constituting reproducing and identity as a moralcommunity. through They cause theirown unity of the enactment the ritual. 448

Durkheim'sEpistemology By enacting theirbeliefin the causal efficacy thetotemic of symboldisplaying totemic the symbolto one anotheron theirbodies and acting not likethetotemic animalduring ritual-membersofthetotem only the reaffirm actually "remake"the kinshipgroup in and throughthe but ritual. It alsoexercises profound a influence thesoulsoftheworshipers over who a of whose them feeling well-being takepartin it.Theytakeawaywith is cannot causesthey clearly butwhich wellfounded. see, Theyfeelthat their of theceremony goodfor is them; and,as a matter fact, they reforge fail a in moral nature it. How couldthissortofwell-being to givethem it that that has feeling therite succeeded, ithasbeenwhat setouttobe and end it the it As that hasattained endsat which was aimed? theonly which of this was was consciously sought thereproduction thetotemic species, of is the seems be assured themeans to by employed, efficacy which thus proven. (Durkheim 1915, 402) p. is of that has The feeling participants therite beensuccessful notmerely sharedamongthe personal.Durkheimarguesthatit is a generalfeeling of that sourcein themutualenactment practice. participants has a general of Throughthe ritual,the participants and members the totembecome in in for Their participation stronger theirtotemic feelings one another. in thetotem strengthened. is Therefore totemic the speciesis reproduced them. it Because thecommunity onlyexistsin so faras thetotems represents are enacted,thus creatingand sustaining shared ideas and beliefs,the ritualsthat make and reinforce feeling the causal efficacy the the of of Memmake and remakethemoralcommunity. totemalso quite literally in bers of the totemwho participate the ritualhave been reproduced as of It of members a moralcommunity. is the resulting feeling well-being and moral unitythat makes participants believe the ritehas succeeded (Durkheim1915, p. 402) not the biologicalreproduction the totemic of is available in direct species.The causal relation a social force perception, not an inference concerning relationof the ritualto a naturalevent the of (e.g.,the reproduction the species). If persons enactrituals achievemutuality, is something which to this of aware. The ritualsare theirown effect. is "It theycan be immediately becausethey serveto remake individuals and groups morally thatthey are believedto have a poweroverthings" Durkheim (Durkheim1915,p. 414). "a of writes, fullconception the causal relationis impliedin the power thus attributed the like to producethe like" (1915, p. 406). Thus, the to causal relationin imitative ritesis immediately displayedin its effects, and the problemof inference fromeffects causes that posed such a to block forclassical empiricism avoided. is stumbling The causal relation involvedin imitative ritualis a verydifferent kind 449

American Journal Sociology of causal relation, and Durkheim of causal relation from physical/natural a involvedin the ritual carefully contrasts two; the physicalgestures the is have no naturalefficacy; theirefficacy purelysocial (1915, p. 402). If betweennaturaleventsor beDurkheim'sargument hingedon relations would dependon intweensocial and naturalevents, causal relation the ference Durkheim and thusbe subjectto his own critiqueof empiricism. thatare enactedin theritual irrelevant are arguesthatthespecific gestures They have causal efficacy, because not and could be replacedby others. of magicalor scientific withwhichtheyact on objectsor aniproperties of mals,but rather because,as enactedrepresentations thesharedtotemic thatin turncreatefeelings symbolof the group,theycreatemoralforces of moral unityin its members, strengthening group and hence the the of totem. "The truejustification religious practices does notlie in the apin parentends whichtheypursue,but rather the invisibleactionwhich effect mental our they exercise overthemindand in theway in whichthey status"(Durkheim1915,p. 403). speaksofis a moralone thathe says The causal relation thatDurkheim states.Durkheim'sdiscussion "feelings" of and operateson our "internal" whichhas been disparagedas "internal states"as a basis forknowledge, in an of bad crowd psychology, fact constitutes argument some conseand moralforceare one of the resultsof quence. Feelingsof well-being The causal effiof totemic ritualsthatgive riseto the category causality. Durkas of cacy of the ritualis perceiveddirectly a feeling moralunity. are internally, are they heimarguesthat,because thesefeelings manifest can rather than available and, therefore, be knowndirectly immediately statesis, indirectly withexternal as objects.Knowledgeof theseinternal of statesof afand morevalid than knowledge external better therefore, fairs. an Hume (1975,p. 78) had also calledcausality internal feeling resulting in of a about a collection particulars a series.Howfrom person'sfeeling Durkheim werenecessarily individual. (1915, ever,forHume suchfeelings are thatpurely p. 408) acknowledges personaland individualfeelings inof communicable. However,he arguesthatthe feelings moralforceand ritualsconstitute perception general a of well-being generated totemic by of sharedbymembers thegroup(see Rawls 1996b).They are social forces in rituals: withothers theenactment totemic of theproduct cooperation of in of "Beingtheworkofall, theyare notthepossession anybody particular" (Durkheim1915,p. 408). Causalityis actuallya qualityof the social Hume,theeffect does containand display practice itself, to paraphrase or, will feel(i.e., perceive)it thus,and all will get its cause. All participants As the same idea or category. in Suicide ([1897] 1951),Durkheimargues stateshave a commonsharedsocioempirthattheseinternal "psychic" or ical originin social factsthat explain and cause those internalpsychic 450

Durkheim'sEpistemology states.They are collective forces even though internal and psychical "social forces: life"(Durkheim1915,p. 408). theyare a part of our internal It is important note thatnot all collective to feelings generalin this are to whichDurkspecialsense,onlythosecorresponding thesix categories, heimcalls moralforces. The moralforces generated enactedpractice internalized cateby are as gories.They have an external social sourcein totemic ritualswhose prithesefeelings, as to providea sharedbasis so marypurposeis to generate forreason. The function religion, of accordingto Durkheim(1915, pp. The moral 465-66) is to produce this logical basis for understanding. forcesdo not have theirsource in a "mystical collectiveconscience"or groupmindoperating somesortof constraint, thetheory often via as has the beeninterpreted (Nisbet 1974;Parsons1968),butare,rather, practical resultof concrete The of is social practices."2 feeling moralunity thepurpose of the ritual.It is not in the mindand not added by the mind.The is and feeling the substanceof the ritualand therefore external, general, and individual. shared,not internal Thefeeling a perception theefficacy theritual. is of of Justas particular impressions colorand shape are perceptions external of of statesofaffairs, of of feelings the creationof moral unityare also perceptions external social statesof affairs thatare quite "real" bothin substanceand effect. In thiscase, however, Durkheim treats feelings resulting from social rituals as havinggreater of obempirical validitythan perceptions external of jects because theyare immediately perceptions generalsocial or moral whichact on personsinternally, whereasperceptions external of forces, and stillrequirethe problematic objects remainparticular operationof inference becomegeneral. to This argument of some significance understanding is to Durkheim's claim thatsociallyderivedcategories morevalid than the categories are ofnaturalscienceand logic,whichappears to manycritics be illogical, to and based on a ratherfuzzypsychology collectiveconunfounded, of science. The argumentis reallyquite logicallytight.Whereas natural forces cannotbe perceiveddirectly, social forces can, and the perception ofthem therefore validlysharedwithothers. can be The sharedperception in of moralforces and through enactedpracticeis a better sortof knowlof edge than the individual perception particularinstancesof natural forces thatnaturalscienceand naturalphilosophy mustdepend on."3
See discussion constraint n. 23 below. of in See Vico([1744]1948)for earlier, muchneglected, an also argument knowledge that ofthesocialhas potentially of greater validity thanknowledge natural events. Howon ever,whileDurkheim focuses themoralforce collective of actionas thedeciding factor between two,Vico focuses immediate the on knowledge intentions, obviof an ouslyproblematic notion.
12 13

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American Journalof Sociology Durkheim left is witha degreeofrelativity thecategories as mayvaryto somedegreebetweengroups, and in any case theargument onlyprovides empirical validity six categories-thus,his need to elaboratea sociolfor ogyofknowledge. But,according Durkheim, purposeofthecategoto the riesoftheunderstanding notto secureabsolutetruth transcendenwas or tal validity across groups. The categoriesdid not evolve to fulfill philosophical purposes.14The categories and thesocial practices thatproduce themcame intobeingto fulfill social need forsharedcategories the oftheunderstanding of amongmembers thesame group.He arguedthat without sharedcategories, and intelligibility social cooperation would be "If impossible: mendid notagreeupon theseessential ideas at everymoment. . . all contactbetweentheir mindswould be impossible, and with that,all lifetogether" (1915, p. 30). This is an earlyargument that the needs ofintelligibility place demandson the development forms soof of cial practice. There is no reasonwhythe categories cannotexhibit cera taindegreeofvariation from place to place and stillfulfill socialneed. that have their However,becausethey basis in experience, translation between groupsshouldbe possibleeven wherevariationdoes occur. CLASSIFICATION Classification an even morebasic conceptwithregardto epistemology is thancausality: problem identity difference the of and goingback at least to earlyGreekthought. Durkheim'sargument withregard Unfortunately, to classification, whileit has receivedmoreattention thanthe argument forcausality, been understood has as acprimarily a social constructivist countof the social originsof particular of and systems classification, its importance withregard an argument theempirical to for of validity classias fication a category the understanding been missed.15 of has
14Durkheim's argument thecategories theunderstanding notoriginate that of do for philosophical purposes shouldnotbe takento meanthatDurkheim's own argument is nota critique philosophy e.g.,Hilbert's of (see, [1992,pp. 79-80]misinterpretation of thispoint).Durkheim intended epistemology make traditional his to philosophy of obsolete. However, categories theunderstanding society the that produces maynot a in entirely satisfy conventional philosophical interest epistemology becausethatis nottheir purpose. Theirpurpose to makeintelligibility socialcooperation is and possible. 15 One AJS reviewer said thatmyargument withregard thephilosophical to importanceofDurkheim's idea of"classification" wrong was because,amongother things, in theoriginal French, Durkheim used theword"genre," classification. renot The viewer said thatattention theoriginal to edition French wouldshowthatDurkheim (1912,p. 205) usedtheword"class"onlyonce.It is sufficient pointoutin response to thatin thesection between 200-22 (citedby thereviewer), pp. whichis chap. 3 of book 2 in the original Frenchedition, Durkheim uses the Frenchterms "classification,""classe,""classee,"and "classes"(withor without accent marks)no fewer in than29 times thetext and notes. "class"and "genre" Whiletheterms appearsome-

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Durkheim'sEpistemology The neglectof this argument may be due to the factthat Durkheim on dealt withtheissue ofclassification threelevels,whichhe did notdistinguish clearly.First, he argued that the abilityto perceivesimilarity in and difference crude termsthat do not have empiricalvalidityis a capacitythathumanssharewithanimals(1915,p. 170).This parallelshis discussionof a similarcapacitywith regardto causality(1915, p. 410). of of Second, he exploredthe development social systems classifications on This is a prior "cosmologies" patterned divisionsin social relations. at of and classifications maryfocusof Durkheim'ssociology knowledge, thislevel are not empirically valid. Third,he arguedforthedevelopment of the category classification of the directperception moral of through forcein the enactment thosepractices of thatcreatethe binaryrelations This is his epistemological of sacred and profane, totemand nontotem. of of argument theempirical for validity thecategory classification (1915, pp. 174-75). Thereis a greatdeal ofmisunderstanding regarding Durkheim'streatmentofthecategory classification, ithas generally of and beeninterpreted of of onlyin terms thesecondofthethreelevelsas a sociology knowledge to concernedwith documenting of systems classification corresponding of culturalgroups.This misunderstanding treatsthe category particular as that classification a group of collectiverepresentations develop over thecourseofa seriesofperceptions cultural of Because itis viewed events. in thisway,Durkheimappears to fallintothe old empiricist dilemmaof to valid generalideas from seriesofparticua trying abstract empirically lars. The criticism thatDurkheim'sarguments time,space, and classififor cation are circular,which is cited with such regularity (Dennes 1924; Schaub 1920)is based on thismisunderstanding. Durkheim interpreted is as arguing thatrepeatedperceptions social instantiations space and of of time give rise to the categories space and timethrough processof of a Because a series of particulars abstraction. cannot give rise to a valid generalidea, Durkheimis accused of philosophical naivete.In addition, critics pointout thatpersonswould need alreadyto have ideas of space and timein orderto perceivetheinstantiations space and time,which of are supposedto giveriseto thoseideas as instantiations space and time. of In makingthisargument, critics the confuse first the and secondlevels of Durkheim'sargument withthe argument theempirical for of validity the categories theunderstanding. argument of The thatanimalscan perceivecruderelations space,time, of or and difference similarity (first level) and theargument thattheperiodicity social rituals of and social divisions
timesto be used interchangeably, Durkheim certainly meantto signify idea of the classification a form thought, just as an idea representingkindofthing. as of not a 453

American Journal Sociology of can be turned thecrudecapacityto discerntime,space, and class into by classifications based on social forms (second level) are not the basis for Durkheim'sargument the socioempirical for validityof the category of classification (thirdlevel). While Durkheim(1915) allows that persons have the capacityto forminvalid generalideas beforethe development of the categories, theseinvalid forms not the basis of the categories. are A valid category classification of cannotevolve from ideas thathave no validity. An empirically valid category classification develops,according of only to Durkheim, thatenactmoralrelationships whenpractices producefeelings of moral force.Only afterthe development and enactment the of first moraldivisionproducing moralforceis any complexlevel of social organization possible(1915,pp. 174-75). Durkheim explicitly rejected the thatvalid ideas could be abstracted argument froman accumulation of a thathe identified particular perceptions, position withclassical empiricism.A cosmology withno empiricalvaliditycould theoretically abbe stractedfroman accumulationof perceptions. (1915, pp. 171-72). But, a even then,according Durkheim, society to complexenoughto generate such a cosmology would requirepriordevelopment empirically of valid which Durkheimconsidereda prerequisite any complex for categories, the social development. FromDurkheim'sperspective, critics' own social is constructivist becauseitassumesthatcomplex societargument circular on Durkheim ies are operating thebasis offictive sharedrealities. argued that societiescannotdevelop unless theycan first solve the problemof the of mutualintelligibility through generation valid categories. as of Because he has been interpreted elaborating systems classificaand of for tions,a sociology knowledge argument, notas arguing theempirical validity of the categoryof classification, Durkheim has been of heavilycriticized bothforthe inaccuracy the data on whichhe based his argument, accuracybeingin a sense the whole pointfora sociology and fornot pursuinga consistently social constructivist of knowledge, The thirdlevel of argument been generally has overlooked and position. theepistemological thatwerethe purposeofmakingthearimplications in to gument thefirst place continue be dismissedwithregularity. Thus, it is generally heldthatDurkheim'sargument does notexplaintheorigin of of an empirically valid category onlythe development particular but in uses of conceptslooselylabeled as classifications various societies;a of of or sociology conceptualsystems sociology knowledge. documentsystems classificaof Durkheimdoes elaborately Certainly tion.However,in boththeearlierworkon primitive classification (DurkForms(1915) theempirical heimand Mauss 1963)and in The Elementary detail is not aimed at elucidating various social systems classification of such classification towardevaluatingwhether per se but rather systems 454

Durkheim'sEpistemology for might have providedin and through their enactment thedevelopment of this category. The relationof the discussionof various classification systems the category classification the same as thatbetweenthe to of is of variousdiscussions totemsand the categories forceand causality. of Because an empirically valid category cannotemergeover a seriesof mustdevelopfrom moraldivia the of perceptions, category classification whichis experienced a moralforcein as sion enactedin social practice, a singleinstanceand not as a naturaldivisionperceivedover a seriesof For the moraldivisionto be enactedbecomes particulars. Durkheim first follow.16 thefirst binary social division from whichall other classifications Totemicpractices, according Durkheim, to enactthismoraldivisionin humansocial relations such thatpersonscan immediately perceiveit in enactedpractice. totems a morecomplex are form social diviof Although are sionthanthefirst divisionbetween sacredand profane, they theclosest to theoriginal thosepractices of thatare stillenacted.From one original of divisionof social relations intotwo,totemand nontotem, category the classification subsequentdivisionscould develop. and TOTEMISM AND CLASSIFICATION In orderfortotems, clans,to be able to providea social originforthe or it of classification, mustbe the case thattotemsthemselves are category social and not individualin origin.If totemshad an individualorigin, Durkheim thought thathis argument thegeneration theconceptof for of classification would be circularand subjectonce again to the empiricist dilemma."If [individualtotemism] was the primitive fact,we mustsay thatreligion bornin theconsciousness theindividual, is of thatbefore all else, it answersto individualaspirationsand that its collectiveformis merely secondary" (Durkheim1915,p. 200). Consequently, Durkheim entertains extended an of of discussion theorigins totemism, whichhas two different objectives:first, demonstrate individualexperience not to that is the sourceof totemsand, therefore, an individualistic that approach to and religion generalis invalid;and, second,that in totems understanding the conceptof classification based on totemsas enactedpracticesand is is therefore valid (in Durkheim'sspecial sense) and not circularin the sense.Whenthesetwopurposes notbothunderstood, are empiricist Durkheim's elaborate argument the social originsof totemsseems once for accountof religious instead again to be a social constructivist cosmology
16 This was the point of departure Levi-Strauss for (1963).However, missedthe he of origin thisbinary in opposition sharedenactedpractice and locatedit insteadin sharedbelief. This led himto resthis argument a universe belief on of structures, a position from whichwe are stillstruggling disentangle to ourselves theoretically.

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American Journal Sociology of do have an individual ofa proof thattheenactedpractices notthemselves so that validity thecategories of origin thathe can arguefortheempirical theygenerate. Durkheim developeda sociology knowlof In addressing thefirst point, origin edge ofclassification systems, pointofwhichwas to show their the Durkheimarguedthatas in social as opposed to individualexperience. social groupsdevelopedan internal organization, theydividedthe parts ofnature and society intoclassifications, calledtotems, whichbecamepart of the internal animal,vegetable, organization the group.All things, of and mineral, were assigneda totem: "The unity thesefirst of logicalsystemsmerely the of (1915,p. 170). Religious reproduces unity thesociety" ortotemic order does notreflect individual the perception naturalorder. of diviis Rather, classification naturalphenomena based on familiar the of sionsin organizedsocial life."In the Mount Gambiertribe. . . thereare ten clans; consequently entireworld is divided into ten classes.... the when brought theseten families things of make up a complete together, and systematic of representation the world"(1915, p. 179). and the diviIt is the confusion betweenthe divisionsof social forms sions of naturein the initialtotemicclassifications, accordingto Durkheim,thatfirst to theapplicationof thisidea to nature.For instance, led all thingsbelonging the same totem(animal,vegetable,and mineral) to are classified together virtueof beingrelatedto a commonancestor, by an idea clearlyderivedfrom social relations it could have no possible as of basis in nature."In all probability, would neverhave thought unitwe called classes,if intohomogeneous groups, ing thebeingsof theuniverse we had not had the example of human societiesbeforeour eyes,if we of had notevencommenced making things themselves members men's by and also if human groupsand logical groupshad not been consociety, fusedat first" (Durkheim1915,pp. 172-73). of The equation of naturaland social principles orderis a confusion because the classifications reproducesocial relationsand impose them on naturewhere theydo not belong.But it is also a usefulconfusion. The social construction classifications of providesa way of categorizing thingsin nature that is shared to a degree. As Durkheim (1915, p. 169) writes:"It is because men were organizedthat theywere able to organizethings." Withoutclassifications based on social divisions,personsmightnot to one. have found cruderelation resemblance be a significant "Men the of of theirknowledgein this way if would never have thought arranging the was. But neither what a hierarchy theyhad not knownbeforehand spectacleof physicalnaturenor the mechanismof mentalassociations a the is could furnish themwith this knowledge, hierarchy exclusively and It social affair. is onlyin societythat thereare superiors, inferiors, 456

Durkheim'sEpistemology the equals. . . . It is societythat has furnished outlineswhich logical thought filledin" (Durkheim1915,p. 173). has The abilityto perceiveresemblanceand difference betweennatural is entities basic, and even animals perceivethingsas being of different types.However, totemicclassifications introduce idea of hierarchy, the in whichis a social or moral organization existing nature.Thus, all not classifications the musthave a social origin. involving notionofhierarchy In addressing second point,Durkheimmakes the entirely the distinct thatthecategory classification generated enactedpracof as argument by ticesis empirically valid. The category classification of itself not conis structed the basis of the manyand varied classifications appear on that in any givensociety rather thebasis offeelings moralforce but on of that the enactment thesesocial divisionsin and through of totemic ritesgive to participants. The enactment the totemicritesby membersof the of totemic groupenacts"an internal bond[which] attaches themto thegroup in whichthey placed"(1915,p. 174).This provides original are the experience of a binarydivisionbetweentotemand nontotem, sacred and profane:"A bondofmystic unites each individual those[totemic] to sympathy beings,whetherliving or not, which are associated with him" (1915, p. 174). Durkheimarguesthatthe experience social divisionas moralforce of becomesthe basis forthe empirically valid logicalconstruct classificaof tion providing the mind with a way of thinking that is not tied to the conditions its conception: of "This organization, whichat first may have 7 appearedto us as purely logical,is at thesame timemoral"(1915,p. 175). The basis forthelogicalrelation betweenbeingsin thesame classification is theirmoral relationship: beingsin a totemare "really"the same the because the same moralforcebinds themtogether. According Durkheim, is the focuson individualperception to it and theapplicationofthecategory classification naturalobjects,events, of to and forces, with regardto which it has no validity, that has made the problem empirical of validity appear to be unsolvablebothin philosophy and sociology. This sortof individualist empiricism onlyexplainthe can of development what Durkheimcalls "genericideas" in the individual Generic organism. like imagesand "logicalsymbols" classification not are thesame thing. to According Durkheim (1915,p. 172),animalscan make "An generic representations: animalis able to form generic imagesthough ignorant the art of thinking classes and species."Only beingswho of in enact moralforcedevelop categories.
17 The feeling moral of force with regard classification provides socioempirical to only a basisfor validity theidea ofclassification It doesnotguarantee validity the of itself. the ofanyparticular classifications, whichare often extremely arbitrary.

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American Journal Sociology of INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION VERSUS THE CATEGORIES: DURKHEIM'S ALLEGED DUALISM Durkheim'sdistinction betweenthe basic abilityof individualsto notice similarity difference has no empirical and that validity (first level of the classification argument) empirically and valid categories thought of (third level of theclassification argument) been interpreted his critics has by as a dualist position.The chargeof dualism,however,like the charge of is circularity, based on misunderstanding. Dualism is a name forvarious arguments concerning gap betweenthought the and reality mindand or body. Generallythe argument that the natureof mind and body,or is spiritand matter, so different to be incompatible. instance, are as For in Cartesiandualismtherationalmindcan onlyhave knowledge what is of rationalin the universe, not physicalmatter(unless physicalmatteris conceivedas purelyrational,an idealistposition). sociology term In the dualismis often used to denotethe gap betweenindividualand society. Durkheim'sallegeddualismis largely result misunderstanding a of his to the to attempt distinguish crudeanimalability perceivecontiguity, difference, similarity and from valid category classification the of combined withmisreadings an earlierarticle, of "Individualand CollectiveReprein sentations," which Durkheim([1898] 1953) argued against what he characterized James's psychological as of reductionism. Interpretations thisarticleconsistently confuseDurkheim'sown positionwiththe indito vidualistpositionhe attributed WilliamJames(Rawls 1996a). Durkheimallows fora basic empiricism withinindividualperception in thatis not valid knowledgebut is nevertheless touchwithreality. "It is not our intention denythatthe individualintellect of itself to has the resemblances betweenthedifferent powerof perceiving objectsof which it is conscious.Quite on thecontrary, is clearthateven themostprimiit tive and simpleclassifications presupposethisfaculty" (Durkheim1915, p. 170). While this argument generally is consideredevidenceof Durkheim's Cartesian dualism (Lukes 1973), in fact,Durkheimis arguingthat the biological individual is not capable of the exerciseof reason-not a Cartesianposition all. The Cartesianargument thatthelogicofreaat is son is, first all, a given and, secondly, of with completely incompatible theorganization lack thereof) the"corruptible" of worldofnaturethat (or of of but approximates alwaysfallsshort thepurelight reason.According to Durkheim,the biologicalindividualonlypossessesa basic abilityto sortperceptions to and contiguity, whichgoes no according resemblance does not produce further than Hume's customand habit and certainly valid knowledge. In addition, argument the thatpersons to possesstheinnateability form thosewho have criticized Durkgenericrepresentations oughtto satisfy
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Durkheim'sEpistemology heim's argument circular as sinceDurkheimclearlystateshis beliefthat nonvalidideas of space, time,class, and causalityprecedethe developmentof valid categories thought. of Yet, criticswho chargeDurkheim with dualism and therefore must be familiarwith this argumentalso chargehim withcircularity. In contrast the generalinterpretation his positionas dualistand to of Durkheimin factmakesthehighly neo-Kantian, original argument that, in prior participating ritualpractices, to persons have onlythebasic abilities of animalsto make generic whichare similarto the representations, faculties thatthe empiricists the arguedfor,whereas,afterexperiencing enactment ritualsocial practices, of have empirically valid categories they of the understanding. Durkheim'sargument that categoriesof thought have an empirical is origin completely withboththeKantian incompatible and the Cartesianpositions thathave been attributed it. to While Durkheimarguesthatnaturalrelations cannotbe the originof the categories the understanding, of arguinginsteadthattheyhave their in he thatsocialrelations natural are origin socialrelations, also maintains relations a special sortand therefore of believesthatthereis no deep inbetweenreason and the empiricalworld of natureor becompatibility "If tween individualand society: experience were completely separated fromall that is rational,reason could not operateupon it; in the same way, if the psychicnatureof the individualwere absolutely opposed to thesocial life,society would be impossible" (Durkheim1915,pp. 28-29). Durkheimdoes acknowledgea gap betweenreason and perceptions of naturalforces and arguesthatcategories could notarisefrom perceptions of natural events.However, he also argues that the categoriesare not randomwithregardto naturalorder. There are two reasonsthathe gives forthis.(1) The social order, whichgave riseto thecategories, a natural is orderitself and as such obeysnaturallaws. Therefore, sociallygenerated are categories in somesensenaturalcategories (thiswould notbe truefor whichare ideal). (2) Whilethereare limits thecertainty cosmologies to of knowledgethat sense impressions can give rise to, theydo allow fora sortingof thingsby resemblance, which, while not empirically valid, places limitson the social re-creation nature. of If categories the understanding of that develop fromsocial processes are added to thenaturalability perceiveresemblance, to Durkheim (1915, is p. 486) feelsthatthere thenno reasonthatsorting resemblance could by nothave some limited withregardto naturalphenomempirical validity ena. The validitywould not be equal to thatforsocial phenomenabut not completely of touchwithnaturalreality out either. For instance, Durkheim (1915,p. 170)arguesthatthedivisionofthings into "opposites"appears in so many societiesbecause a high degreeof contrast leads to a highdegreeof naturalvisibility and "intuitions" and 459

American Journal Sociology of of "feelings affinity of repulsion" the contrasts. says there"is a or for He certain intuition theresemblances differences of and presented things" by and thatthishas playedan important "in thegenesisoftheseclassifipart cations [of opposites]"(1915, p. 170). However, the divisionby resemblanceofnatural things notvalid knowledge. is Resemblance and contiguitycan onlygive rise to an opinionor habit of thinking a particular in can way.The categories onlydevelopwhenthesocialbeingjoins in assembly with its fellowsto witnessably enact the moral divisionsof their Critics have generally interpreted Durkheim'sdiscussions individual of and perceptions the distinction betweenthesocial selfand the biological as organism evidencethatDurkheim a positivist, dualist,a realist, is a or a Cartesianrationalist. However,the distinction no moredualistthan is GeorgeHerbert Mead's I versusme distinction whichit bears striking to Both Mead and Durkheimallow rudimentary parallels. abilitiesand an activeprinciple thatprecedes development a socialself.Durkheim's the of valid categories the of pointis thatonlythe social beinghas empirically understanding. The biologicalindividualhas onlyrudimentary abilities for or thatcould neversupplytheframework knowledge mutualintelligi"The feeling resemblances one thingand theidea of class anof is bility: other.The class is the external framework whichobjectsperceivedto of in cannotfurnish Now the contents be similarform, part,the contents. intowhichthey They are made up ofvague and fluctuating fit. theframe images,due to the superimposition partial fusionof a determined and on is numberof individualimages . . . the framework, the contrary, a but definite withfixed form, outlines, whichmaybe appliedto an undeterminednumber things, of or perceived not,actual or possible"(Durkheim 1915,pp. 171-72). A realist of while position wouldpositthenaturalvalidity thecategories are a rationalist wouldhold thatthey perceivable anyindividualratioby Durkheim nal mind.Durkheim deniesbothofthesepositions. arguesthat cannotlead to thedevelopof and feelings affinity repulsion themselves by aboutnatural ment thecategory classification. of of Theyare onlya feeling thatare relations betweenparticulars, theycannotgive riseto categories and realiststreatthesefeelings of by definition general.The positivists valid and affinity repulsionas the only possible originsof empirically an antirealist knowledge.Durkheim'sis, rather, antipositivist, position and thathe positshave no empirical because thenaturalabilities validity
18 refer a quality an object to of or as and "Witnessably" "witnessable,"usedhere, is for an or Moral are not event, whether object event witnessed. divisions, instance, or witnessable nor not generally witnessable, arefeelings concepts. arerendered They in their through enactmentsocial practice.

group.18

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Durkheim'sEpistemology cannotgive riseto categories theunderstanding onlyto feelings of but of resemblance theydo forHume. as On theother hand,whileDurkheim insists a sociallybased rationalon A ism,he is nota Cartesianrationalist Lukes (1973) asserts. Cartesian as rationalist would posita thoroughly rationaluniverseto beginwithand argue that knowledgeof that world must be derivedfroma few basic principles reason.Durkheimarguedthatprinciples reasonall have of of in in whileparticipating certain theirorigin the moralforces experienced and thatknowledge enactedpractices derivedin thisway has onlylimited when applied to the naturalworld. validity An a priori, Kantian,explanation thedevelopment thecategoor of of has riesoftheunderstanding in common withrationalism assumption the In are Durkheim thatthe categories purelylogicalin character. contrast, of (1915, p. 175) arguesthatthe organization the worldintototemsthat "appearedto us as purely logical,is at thesame timemoral."In addition, a Kantian positionassumes that the categoriesare innate and precede all understanding, whereasDurkheimallows thatbothcrudeabilitiesto and and crudesocial behaviorsprecede perceivecontiguity resemblance of are thedevelopment the categories. Thus the categories empirical hisnot mustfollow develthe torical necessities logicalnecessities. Logic itself for opmentof the categories. Therefore, arguments the statusof various ideas as categories should be made empirically and historically loginot cally,accordingto Durkheim.It is as enactedpracticesthattotems lead of of to the development the category classification, as elementary not of of The whichtheenactsystems classifications. category classification, mentof totemicritesgenerates, thenbecomes a basis forlogic,not the other way round, and, whileDurkheim arguesthattheconceptofclassificationprobablyneeded to come before othercategories, is careful the he and not a logicalargument its priority he feels to make a historical for as is thatlogicitself a social product and cannotbe introduced thearguinto mentat thispoint(1915, p. 169).19
19For Durkheim (1912,p. 211),logicis something remains be socioempirically that to which whyhe doesnotmakea logical rather empirical is but established, an argument forthedevelopment logicalcategories thought: of of "C'est la societ6 a fourni qui le la canevassurlequela travaille pens6e I logique." usetheoriginal French herebecause bothavailabletranslations obscure Durkheim's sensethatlogicis a social creation. it Swain translates as "It is society thathas furnished outlines the whichlogical in" has thought filled (Durkheim 1915,p. 173),whileFields translates as "Society it furnished canvason which the logicalthought worked" was (Durkheim 1995,p. 149). I take Durkheim's to meaning be thatlogicis a social creation, or painting, labor, the worked within constraints a socialcanvas.He certainly notmeantoconvey of does a preexisting a entity-logic-thatworkswithin social framework. also DurkSee heim's(1955)criticism James making oflogicin his argument of for use whileat the thatlogicvariesfrom same timearguing to moment moment.

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American Journal Sociology of The argument thatlogicis theresult a social processbeginning of with the simplest totemic ritesis not Cartesianor neo-Kantian. This is an entirely new argument regarding social origins logic.The categories, the of accordingto Durkheim, servea social purposein givingriseto a shared logic,and society dependson this.Societyneedssharedenactedpractices to produce categoriesof the understanding withoutwhich cooperation and communication would not be possible(Durkheim1915,pp. 30, 465, 482, 487). The primary purposeofreligion to providetheenactedpracis ticesnecessary producethe categories to (1915, p. 467). All societieswill have the categories, to according Durkheim, because,iftheycannotproduce the categories, cannot existas societies.Therefore, they wherever societies exist, do willhave generated they thesecategories: could "Society not abandon the categories the freechoice of the individualwithout to If abandoningitself. it is to live thereis notmerely need of a satisfactory moralconformity, also thereis a minimum logical conformity but of beyondwhichit cannotsafelygo" (1915, p. 30). Religiouscosmology a way ofrepresenting is moralforce, religious but practiceis a way of creating This is thecentraldistinction Durkit. that heim makes betweenthe sociologyof knowledgeand the epistemology: thereare practices(social facts),which create categories, and thereare cosmologies (collective them. The catideas),whichexplainand represent egoriesare empirically valid. The cosmologies not. are in Locatingthe basis forscienceand philosophy aboriginalsocial and religiouspracticeleads Durkheimto a respectforwhat he refers as to "primitive whichis rare forthe periodin whichhe wrote. intelligence," Durkheim(1915, pp. 15, 166, 203, 219, 361-62, 476, 487) argues that "primitive" peoplesare notlackingin logic;theyhave their own logic.It is onlyby assuminga universalstandardof reason and logic that they to are found be deficient. This deficiency a social construction Durkis for had difficulty heim,not reality. Levy-Bruhl Durkheimon this following to of point.He refused give up theprimacy logic,whichled himto argue that"primitive" in was deficient essentialrespects. Even the intelligence notionof truth relativist advanced by the pragmatists findsdeficiencies in primitive of religion, an judgingthemby the principle utility without of of appreciation thesocial and epistemological importance what primitive ritualsachieve. NEGLECT AND DISMISSAL OF DURKHEIM'S EPISTEMOLOGY That DurkheimintendedThe Elementary Forms to forever change the faceofphilosophy offering alternative, an by nonphilosophical (socio-logito cal), solution theproblems posed bythedebatebetweentheempiricists 462

Durkheim'sEpistemology and the apriorists clear: "Thus renovated,the theoryof knowledge is seemsdestined unitetheopposingadvantagesofthetwo rivaltheories, to their inconveniences. keepsall theessential It without incurring principles oftheapriorists; at thesame timeit is inspired thatpositivespirit but by which the empiricists have strivento satisfy" (Durkheim1915, p. 32). Durkheimexpectedthe new science of sociologyto become the center of both scientific and philosophical enterprise. Sociologywould replace this philosophy theproper as arenafor epistemological debate.Yet, clearly based on has nothappened.Sociologists continue rely epistemologies to on to individualism, philosophers and continue criticize epistemological the basis of sociology (Winch 1956; Rorty1979; Turner1994). From the beginning, confusion Durkheim'sepistemology the of with as his sociology knowledge led to thedismissaloftheepistemology of has a verybad argument. made claims of empirical with Durkheim validity regardto his epistemology appear absurdwhenapplied to his sociolthat ogy of knowledge.In addition,not recognizing epistemological the significanceof the extendeddiscussionof totemsleaves criticswith the impression thattheepistemological argument scattered is and brief. Gol"While denweiser (1915,p. 733),one oftheearliest American critics, wrote: theauthor'sremarks thatsubjectare notextensive systematic on nor ... the author'sattempt deriveall mentalcategories to from specific phases of social lifewhichhave becomeconceptualized, so obviously is artificial and one-sidedthat one findsit hard to take his view seriously." was It Goldenweiser'sopinionthat Durkheim'sepistemology failedbecause it presupposed complex a socialand conceptual system was notavailable that in all societies. Like manyearlycritics, Goldenweiser's prejudicewithreof cultures combined gardtothesophistication primitive withhismisinterpretation of Durkheim's epistemologicalargument as it concerned conceptual systems kepthimfrom appreciating Durkheim'spoint.20
20 Goldenweiser (1915) arguesthatEskimosand otherprimitive groupsare lacking in eventherudimentary socialclassifications necessary support to Durkheim's argument. partthisis due to a misunderstandingtherolethattotems In of playin Durkheim's argument. it also has clear overtones a generalpresumption the But of of superiority Western of forms thought. of Similarly, Dennes(1924,p. 52) makesthe racist in blatantly argument Negroes Eskimos theUnited that and States proveDurkheim'stheory wrong: is onlymembers closely "It of similar racesthatcan be transferred withsuchresults Durkheim A as describes. group Eskimoor Negroinfants of introduced an English into community wouldnotdevelopthesamequalities mind of and sustain same relations socialcustoms the to and institutions a likenumber that of Germanor Frenchchildren would, as the experience the UnitedStatesof of America shown." has Therewas a general agreement amongtheearlycommentators thatDurkheim gonetoo farin attributingbasic equality all humanbeings. had a to This "fault" verymuchto Durkheim's is credit. Durkheim insisted, contrast in to

463

Journal Sociology of American in A fewyearslater,Dennes publisheda muchcitedcritique whichhe circularand confused: Durkheim'sargument pronounced
of of dependsuponhis ambiguDurkheim'stheory theorigin thecategories of ous conception mind.If he takes mindin the Kantian sense,the sense it of as faculties, is usual in epistemology, the subject's system cognitive of ridiculous say thatthe categories the mindare in any sense transferto wouldhave to exist The of encesfrom social organization. category quantity the and to operatein orderthatan individualmindshouldever recognize one, the many,and the whole,of the divisionsof his social group.... If, of means by minda mereaggregation repreon the otherhand,Durkheim ideas of time or sentations ideas, thereis sense in supposingthatthe first ideas rites, first the religious of may have been of the periodicity primitive is the of quantity, divisionof the tribe,etc. But the supposition then of at so merely historical importance, faras it is of any importance all. It has study or no direct the bearingupon either epistemological thepsychological of of the natureor statusof the categories the mind.(Dennes 1924,p. 39)

was Dennes arguedthatDurkheim'sepistemology onlyvalid as a theory of of not of or of contents, sociology knowledge, as a theory the form the a mind. He pronouncedthe epistemology failure(Dennes 1924, p. 53). It influential. was a major This analysisby Dennes has been extremely citedby on influence Parsons'sreadingofDurkheimand is stillregularly and/orsociologyof knowlon commentators Durkheim'sepistemology edge. thatDurkheimactually argument to the It is difficult reconcile careful it received.One getsthe immade withthe interpretation has generally between1910 an roundofmisinterpretation that, following initial pression was neverreevaluated(1996a). and 1925,the epistemological argument is consensusis thatDurkheim'sepistemology a comThe overwhelming who either is presented ofa Durkheim The view consistently pletefailure. his of contradicted early neverrealizedthathis latersociology knowledge studies(Parsons1968),or ofa man who died too soon to fixthis empirical problem (Stoneand Farberman1967;Hughes[1958] 1977;Parsons1968). of and theearthat Thereis no recognition boththesociology knowledge both.Scholthat studiesreston an epistemology supersedes lierempirical their with whendiscussing critical ars are extremely disappointment what in whichthey contradictions Durkheim'swork, see they as theunresolved to article, attribute philosophical naivete.In book after book,articleafter of the critics complainthatDurkheimhas not fulfilled expectations good scholarship. the thatthey have been letdown,thatthey Criticsoften express feeling
thanotherhumanbeingsbut are that L6vy-Bruhl, "primitives" not less intelligent The religious practices. prevaof of are forms thought a product their rather their that of prevented appreciation Durkheim's an obviously lentbeliefin racial inequality of in insistence a basic humansameness capacity mind. on 464

Durkheim'sEpistemology expectedmore.Dominic LaCapra (1972, p. 287) even goes so far as to suggest thatDurkheim'sargument "liketheconglomerate is bodyofsome incredible Frankenstein Given the broadlyacknowledged immonster." of on portance Durkheim'swork,thefrustrated commentaries his epistestand out in bold relief. mology Parsons,who obviouslyrespectedDurkheim's work,defending him and functionalagainstseveralprevalent misreadings buildingstructural of ism on his interpretation it, nevertheless and expressedexasperation over Durkheim'sepistemology: "His epistemology even embarrassment has brought the basis of human reason itselfinto the same relativistic so sincetherelacircle, as to make the previousrelativism itself relative, a of tivismof social typesis itself productof a system categories which are valid onlyfortheparticular social type.This is a doctrine whichmay be called "social solipsism."It involves all the skepticalconsequences It whichare so well knownin thecase ofindividualsolipsism. is in short, a reductio absurdum" ad (Parsons 1968,p. 447). These criticisms Parby sons of Durkheim'sepistemology circularand solipsistic, as themselves drawnfrom Dennes (1924) and Gehlke(1915),have been extremely influential. the eitherbeLaCapra reflects generaltrendin failingto distinguish tween Durkheim'ssociologyof knowledgeand his epistemology beor and collectiverepresentations, tween categories arguingthat"collective in representations," Durkheim'susage of the term, seemedto cover the gamut fromshared verbal behavior based on deeply rooted beliefs, elaborate"ideologies," more or less sophisticated to through theoretical reflections." (LaCapra 1972, pp. 265-66). LaCapra (1972, p. 281) conin in cludes:"Unfortunately, confiding something palpablyineffective as as social metaphysic, Durkheimdissipatedbothhis massiveintelligence and his genuinespiritual From him one mighthave expected intensity. a moreconvincing to attempt forgea synthesis betweenuncoordinated elements themodern of and of experience theheritage devalued symbolic forms." It is also commonto judge the epistemology the basis of textsin on whichit does not appear. The earlycritics Gehlke(1915),Schaub (1920), and Dennes (1924) based their criticisms on primarily an article published 14 yearspriorto The Elementary Forms,"Individualand CollectiveRepresentations" (Durkheim1953),whichwas a critique James, a preof not sentationof Durkheim'sepistemology (Rawls 1996a). One of the only books devoted to Durkheim'sepistemology, Paul Hirst's (1975) Durkheim, Bernardand Epistemology, an presents analysisofDurkheim epis's temology based on The Rules oftheSociologicalMethod,in whichDurkheim does not make an epistemological argument.Predictably, Hirst (1975, p. 5) pronounces Durkheim'spositionuntenable: "The epistemol465

American Journal Sociology of ogy developedin The Rules of the SociologicalMethod is an impossible one." Allcock(1983),one of the fewto defendDurkheim'sepistemology, argues that the practiceof deducingthe epistemology fromthe earlier empiricalworks instead of fromthe later work is prevalent.Unfortunately, Allcockhimself focuseson thelectures pragmatism thebest on as sourceforDurkheim'sepistemology insteadofon The Elementary Forms. This creates further problems theepistemology notpresented these as is in lectures. Lewis Coser (1971,p. 140)echoesthegeneral theme, arguing thatwhile "in the lightof later criticaldiscussionof the thesisit can be said that Durkheim failed to establish the social origins of the categoriesof it to thought," is important see thathe made an important contribution to thesociology knowledge. of The consistent messageis that, eventhough Durkheimfailedmiserably establishing epistemology, empirical in an his of workand his sociology knowledge can be saved. In his introduction The Rules, Lukes (1982) interprets to Durkheim's a in as interest epistemology a focuson symbolswithout corresponding of their hermeneutic dimension. This equationofthesociology knowledge withthe epistemology particularly is unfortunate because it leads Lukes to arguethatDurkheim of overlooks dimension meaning hermeneuthe or as takes intelligibility its central tics. In fact,Durkheim'sepistemology problematic. His discussionof meaningdoes not become hermeneutic, because he believeshe has avoided theproblems indetermiof however, nacyand interpretation theepistemological at levelbyestablishing empirIf of do icallyvalid categories thought. thecategories notrequire interpreLukes (1982, p. 15) misses this point, tation,thereis no hermeneutic. interpreting Durkheim'sapproach as "dictatedby an obsessionwithan of can onlybe a sterile 'absolute' conception objectivity, [which] prescriptionforthe humansciences." Durkheim's"theory are to Even when critics friendly what is termed his of knowledge," theyhave stillinterpreted positionin idealistsocial of and constructionist terms consistent onlywithhis sociology knowledge is nothisepistemology. Theirpositive assessment onlydue to thefactthat who accept the social constructivists pragmatists or theyare themselves of Stoneand Farberman(1967) are amongthe indeterminacy knowledge. of idealistpragmatist Durkheimin earliestsuch supporters the allegedly from to theUnitedStates.Whileclaiming makea radicaldeparture previous Durkheimscholarship, Stoneand Farberman(1967,pp. 163-64) foland sociologyof low the general trendin confusing the epistemology knowledge, leadingthemto the beliefthat Durkheim"was confounded a and gropedfora new epistemology implicitly, new ontology." and, They Durkheimtowardpragmaargue that his alleged idealismwas turning tism. 466

Durkheim'sEpistemology More recently that Durkheim'salleged idealismis his this argument moreimportant contribution becomequitepopular.It has beenwidely has advocatedby Alexander (1988) and Collins(1988) withregardto cultural Lehmann(1990) studies, Stjepan Mestrovic by (1988, 1993) and Jennifer in connection withpoststructural idealism, Godlove (1989) in religious by in of studies, and by David Bloor (1982) and others thesociology science of who interpret Durkheim'ssociology knowledge a social constructivas ist precursor modernstudiesof scientific to practice. of and Harold Garfinkel Hilbert's(1992) interpretation bothDurkheim as social constructivists this the continues recent trend towardembracing idealistinterpretation Durkheim'sepistemology. of to According Hilbert (1992, p. 78), it is "not at all hard to understand why Durkheimwould draw this final equivalence [betweensocietyand ideas]." For Hilbert, ideas thatconDurkheim'sepistemology involvesa setofsociallydefined strain experience. Practices, Hilbert'sinterpretation, no morethan on are "artful" lines waysofconstructing ofsocial action.Thereis no real pattern in practices, onlyan apparent pattern: see in members' "we artful manageof a of ment indexical expressions collective method sustaining folklore the of relatively fixedunderlying patterns" (Hilbert1992,p. 51; see also pp. 56, 66, 75, 91). The fiction a stable reality, thisview, depends on of on to and is constraint, constraint, according Hilbert, providedbyideal cateThe categories "madeup" bysociety are gories. (Hilbert1992,p. 78).There is no empirical and no reality be experican reality corresponding them, to encedwithout truth entirely is to them.Therefore, relative any particular Hilbertappears to be unconcerned the lack society'sideal categories. by of any independent of thathis interpretation Durkheim of criteria truth implies.21This idealist interpretation stands in direct contradiction to Durkheim'sown epistemological argument, whichwas motivated the by need to specify truth criteria. While Collins has contributedto modern Durkheim scholarship his of of through interactional interpretation Durkheim'stheory practice and supports relevanceofDurkheim'ssociology knowledge conthe of to social theory, shares the idealist interpretation Durkhe of temporary heim'sepistemology. Collins(1988,p. 108)maintains thatTheElementary Formshas been generally overlooked Durkheim by scholars: "Whatis left out?" he writes."Generallyspeaking,what I would considerthe more valuable partsof Durkheim.His mostimportant book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life . . . seems to be regardedas a specialized of matterforsociologists religion, thoughsome references (usuallyvery of critical)are made to its social reductionist theory knowledge."Like
21

He is equally unconcerned theimplicationshisinterpretation with of ofGarfinkel constructionist: as anidealist social aninterpretationisequally from mark. that far the 467

American Journal Sociology of Stone and Farberman,Collins considersthe epistemology be "social to reductionist," finding value of Durkheim'swork mainlyin its relethe vance forculturalstudies. Even Godlove,who directly addressesDurkheim'sargument concerning the originof the categories the understanding The Elementary of in Forms,confusesthe sociologyof knowledgewith the epistemology. He argues that Durkheim's "idealist" epistemology more sophisticated is than the critics have givenhim creditforand thatDurkheimhad good reasonsfor trying "tracethemodalstructure thecategories an ideal to of to object outside the world"(Godlove 1986, p. 385; emphasisin original). According Godlove (1986, p. 390), Durkheim"turned idealismas a to to way of overcoming what he perceivedas the empiricist-apriorist deadlock." Godlove alleges that,in the face of the empiricist critique, Durkheimconcludedthatonlya nonempirical (i.e.,ideal) origin thecategofor rieswas possible. Durkheim'scritiqueof empiricism was muchmoresophisticated than Godlove realizes and his epistemology completely empiricalin that he considered social practices be concrete to witnessable and not phenomena ideal. While emphasizing importance distinguishing the of betweenthe of sociology knowledge and the epistemology, Godlove nevertheless confusesthetwo. He has interpreted epistemology idealistterms, a the in as substitution theideal fortheempirical, of whichare appropriate onlyfor the sociology knowledge. concludesthat"although of He Durkheimwas keenly aware oftheepistemological problem producedby his sociological all theory, his attempted solutionsfailedbadly"(Godlove 1986,p. 400). In a footnote thiscitation says"thedetailsare too well documented to he to bear repeating" (Godlove 1986,p. 400, n.28). THE CONTROVERSY OVER "TWO DURKHEIMS" So muchdisappointment withregardto a scholarwho has led thediscipline to expectso muchand whose workhas sustainedinterest over the courseof a century In requiresan explanation. thiscase theexplanation involvesa complexhistory misinterpretations reactionsto those of and in misinterpretationsboththeUnitedStatesand Europe. The critics from the veryfirst offon the wrongtrack,interpreting got Durkheimas an idealistand confusing epistemology the sociology knowledge. the and of From there, Durkheimscholarship consisted debates betweenthe has of variousmisinterpretations, of whichquestiontheinitialassessment none of his positionas idealist. WhiletheEuropeanand American of interpretations Durkheim'swork have formostof this century appeared to be entirely odds withone at another-the Europeansinterpreting in Durkheim idealistand socialcon468

Durkheim'sEpistemology a funcstructivist terms, while,in theUnitedStatesand Britain, positivist first tionalist interpretation based on hisearlier workdeveloped-the very Durkheimin scholarsin both Europe and the UnitedStates interpreted termsof his laterwork,particularly Elementary The Forms,whichthey consideredto be idealist or social constructivist (Dennes 1924; Schaub between Ameri1920;Gehlke1915;Levy-Bruhl 1922).The divergence the can and Europeanviewsdid notappear until 1930swhenthepositivist the interpretation appeared in the UnitedStates.The original interpretation in of Durkheim'swork as idealistcontinuedunchallenged Europe, and and Durkheim's influence continental on anthropology, linguistics, sociolin of ogywas largely terms his alleged idealism. In the UnitedStates,however, Durkheimscholarship tookan entirely as and different trajectory thepragmatists othersocial thinkers who had as interpreted Durkheimprimarily an idealistin the teensand twenties to felloutoffavor(Rawls 1996a).In the1930s,due particularly theefforts the Parsonsto rescueDurkheim from earlier idealistinterpretaofTalcott tionofhiswork, newinterpretation Durkheim a positivist a of as functionalist became popular. Parsons (1968, p. viii; emphasis in the original) in wrote:"In 1924-25 I spenta year as a researchstudent sociologyat the London School of Economics.... Durkheimwas of course known bothin England and America,but discussions were overwhelmingly derogatory; was regardedas the apostle of the 'unsound groupmind' he theory." Parsonsheavilycriticizes Durkheim'sepistemology sociand Although it the as ologyofknowledge idealist, is notParsonswho introduced interpretation Durkheimas an idealist.Rather,in his attemptto rescue of Durkheimfrom alreadypopular idealistinterpretation, the Parsons created a positivist of interpretation his work. On this view, the work of the"early" in Durkheim was interpreted positivist functionalist terms and fromhis "later"work,which continuedto be insharplydifferentiated as terpreted an idealist sociologyof knowledge.This interpretation of Durkheim'sworkas comprising earlierpositivist an and a lateridealist referred as thetwo-Durkheim to period, commonly hypothesis, effectively banished the later work fromserious consideration scholarsin the by UnitedStatesuntilrecently. From the 1930s until the 1980s, Europeans espoused one "side" of Durkheim's argument whileAmericans championed other. the Europeans interpreted Durkheimas an idealist,while Americans emphasizedwhat theyarguedwas a positivist functionalist of Durkheim'sargument. side Finally,in the 1980s,withthe declineof Parsons's influence, allegiance switchedfromthe "early"Durkheim,which Parsons had preferred, to the "later"Durkheim,which Parsons had ridiculed.This "rediscovery" in the UnitedStates of the"later"Durkheimled to an increasedinterest 469

AmericanJournal Sociology of in Durkheim'ssociology knowledge, cultural of or sociology, in Euroand pean socialtheory, whichhad in important respects beenbuilton an idealist interpretation Durkheim'swork.However,it did not challengeeiof therParsons's two-Durkheim hypothesis theoriginal or interpretation of Durkheimas an idealist. The originalinterpretation The Elementary of Forms as idealistis at theheartof the problem. is onlybecause of thisfirst It misinterpretation in thatParsonsinvented two-Durkheim the hypothesis orderto avoid the of an of consequences accepting idealistinterpretation Durkheim'swork. The contemporary rediscovery a culturalDurkheimmerelyreturns of to of scholarship theoriginal misunderstanding his work.Because ofthis interpretation, Durkheim'swork was initially rendered unacceptableto in sociologists the United States and Britain(exceptto a small groupof of pragmatist sociologists theUniversity Chicago).It was notuntilParat sons distinguished "early"fromthe "later"work,getting of the rid the of and epistemological and sociology knowledge arguments creating posa itivist that functionalist interpretation, Durkheimreallybecame popular in the UnitedStates. In theUnitedStates,references thetwo-Durkheim to argument generally citeParsons's analysisin The Structure Social Action(1968). Parof sons speaks of an Anglo-American prejudiceagainstidealismin thisrebias of the main Anglo-American tradition of gard: "The individualistic has had the effect that any theory which presumed positivistic thought been brandedas 'idealistic' and to questionit has almostautomatically This has happenedin striking hencecondemned 'metaphysical.' as fashwiththeresult ion in thecase ofDurkheim, thathe is stillpredominantly of knownas the theorist the 'unsound' and 'metaphysical'group-mind concept"(Parsons 1968,p. 307). In spite of his insightinto the prejudicialnatureof the rejectionof Durkheim'sallegedly Parsonsdoes not idealisticepistemology, however, challengethe idealist interpretation. Rather,he suggeststhat the last phase ofDurkheim'sworkis onlyidealistbecause it remained incomplete due to Durkheim'spremature death(Parsons 1968,p. 304). The implicationis thatDurkheim would neverhave left workin thisidealistconthe is as dition.The explanation notconvincing, however, fiveyearselapsed of between publication TheElementary the Formsand Durkheim's death, to his idealistepistemologiduringwhichhe continued reiterate allegedly cal position.22 in Unfortunately, orderto save the rest of Durkheim'soeuvre from theprejudiceagainstidealism, Parsonssacrifices Elementary The Forms.
See, e.g., the lectures pragmatism on (Durkheim 1955) and "Dualismof Human Natureand Its Social Conditions" (Durkheim [1913]1960).
22

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Durkheim'sEpistemology Parsons (1968, p. 445) arguedthatDurkheimhad "in escapingfrom the toilsof positivism overshot markand gone clean over intoidealism." the To protect sociology from thisidealistinfluence, Parsonsurgeda focuson of whathe saw as thefunctional Durkheim theearlier positivist empirical studies."At its finalstage,Durkheim'ssociology of stood at thisparting the ways. Both paths represent escapes from positivism, in termsof but the tendency sociologicalthought of analyzedin the present study[Parin sons's study], the especially thefollowing section, idealistic phase must be regarded an aberration, blindalley"(Parsons 1968,p. 447). Thus, as a of The Elementary Formsdid nothave muchimpacton thedevelopment Americansocial theory. Parsons's attempt separateearlierand later to phases of Durkheim'sargument heavilyinfluenced subsequentreadings ofTheElementary Forms.According LaCapra (1972,p. 5), "In hismonto Durkumental TalcottParsonspresented TheStructures Social Action, of heim'sthought caughtin an unresolved as tension betweenearlypositivism and latter day idealism as it tortuously worked its way toward withothervoluntaristic of convergence theories action." At least since Parsons,references "two Durkheims" to have appeared in on with regularity commentary Durkheim(Parsons 1968; Stone and Farberman1967; Hughes 1977; Coser 1971; Lukes 1973; LaCapra 1972; Fenton 1984; Alexander 1988). Alexander(1988, p. 10-11) writesthat "whilesomeinterpreters do notaccede (e.g.,Giddens1977 and Traustill gott1978),thereis an increasing agreement todaythatin thelaterperiod Durkheim'ssociology underwent decisiveshift."23 a
23 Giddensis almostalone in havingcompletely of Parsons'sformulation rejected Durkheim's laterworkas making radicaldeparture from earlywork.Giddens the a (1971,pp. 65-82, 105-6, 114) challenged two-Durkheim the hypothesis earlyas as 1971,carefully documenting continuity the between arguments made by Durkheim in theearlyreview Schaffle arguments appearin thelaterwork. Gidof and that As densnotes, similarity the this between early review theconclusion TheElemento and tary Formsis particularly striking. addition In Giddens (1971,pp. 87-89) argues that thedivision intoan earlier and a laterDurkheim thebasis of a changing on notion of constraint also a misconception. is Othercommentators claimto rejectthe who two-Durkheim hypothesis factmake an equallyproblematic in distinction between twoforms constraint. of Even though Nisbetis referred in theliterature a supto as of porter thetwo-Durkheim hypothesis (e.g.,Fenton[1984,p. 32] refers Nisbet's to he two-Durkheim theory), bestfits intothe groupdistinguishing forms contwo of straint. Nisbet(1974,p. 59) clearly criticizes two-Durkheim the position: "Thereare those whoregard work[TheElementary this Forms] marking passageofDurkas the heim'smindto a moreidealistic, at any rateless positivistic, I or stageofthought. am obliged confess I cannot to in that find this." However, TheSociological Tradition, Nisbet([1966]1993)arguesthatDurkheim underwent transition thewriting in a of TheDivisionofLabor.Thattransition, according Nisbet, todo with realizato had his tionthatsolidarity collective and representations neededto play a rolein modern It society also via constraint. was not a transition idealism. to Nisbet(1993,p. 87) "For too long students Durkheim of again writes: have persisted placingthese in

471

American Journalof Sociology H. StuartHughes assumesthe two-Durkheim thesisin Consciousness and Society.Hughes giveshis versionofthetransition, whichclosely follows Parsons's text:"In Durkheim'scase it [theconfrontation withreligion]markedthebeginning a slow transition a new and deeperunof to of derstanding his subjectmatter. But thistransition was completed too lateforhimto carry in thoroughgoing out fashion revision hisprevithe of ous researches thathe had planned"(Hughes 1977,p. 284). The influence ofParsonson Hughes is clearin thisand in thefollowing passage,which Hughes (1977, p. 285) takes directly from Parsons:"By the same token, Durkheimwas led in effect the assertion to thatsociety existed'only in the mindsof individuals.... In escapingfrom toilsof positivism' the he 'overshotthe mark' and went 'clean over to idealism.... An ironical conclusionfor one who had firsttried to definesocietyin termsof was never resolvedby 'things'."Hughes argues that this contradiction Durkheim: his Butin a more philosophical sense, teaching no clearlead.To the gave very end, central a contradiction remained. theonehand, On there the was in the for of positivist rules" vocabulary, striving a system "imperative

whoseimplications wereobviously and idealist, permissive, pluralistic.

These two aspectsofhis doctrine Durkheim neverbrought intoanyconclusive synthesis. (Hughes 1977,p. 286; emphasisadded)

whichcritics have seenthelast tracesoftheComtianmetaphysic. And with it therewent a hankering aftersimpleand unilateral At explanations. the of same time,therewas the sweepingspiritualdefinition social reality,

Parsons had warned against following path laid out by the later the Durkheimand focusedhis sociology what he saw as the earlierfuncon This createdan emphasisin theUnited tionaland "positivist" Durkheim.
in as works separate intellectual categories, though they marked discontinuous phases In ofhis life'slabors."Coseralso makestheconstraint distinction. his discussion of theearlier and laterDurkheim, Coser(1971,pp. 129,132,136)argues e.g., thatthere to from of wereseveralchanges: external constraint theinternalization constraint as moral; from opinion one abouttheneedfor collective conscience another; from to and externalized to internalized law rules. Parsons himself (1973)cameto accepttheconin straint argument laterlife.However, Durkheim objectedto thisinterpretation of hiswork.He considered interpretationhisposition concerned the of as withexternal constraint be one "from to whichmorethan one misunderstanding resulted" has (Durkheim 1915,p. 239n.). expressed hopethattheanalysis TheElementary He his of Formswould put an end to the problem, "it whichhe statedas follows: has been to is assumedthataccording our opinion, constraint theessential for physical thing of it social life.As a matter fact, have neverconsidered morethanthematerial we of and apparent and fact ideal:this expression an interior profound whichis wholly is moralauthority" (1915,p. 239n).Durkheim goeson to arguethatthesociological problem consists seeking forms external of the of constraint whichcorrespond the to different of is forms moral authority, which precisely whathehas doneinTheElementaryForms. 472

Durkheim'sEpistemology Stateson the functional Durkheimwitha corresponding neglectof both his sociology knowledgeand his epistemology. of This is markedlydifferent fromwhat happened in Europe. There, in of Durkheim'sinfluence was primarily terms what Parsonshad called thelaterwork-the sociology knowledge, of thatis, thelogicof concepts of as laid out in 1912in thelast chapter The Elementary Forms,in 191314 in the nineteenth chapterof the lectureson pragmatism, and in the longdiscussions classification totemism of and thathave been misunderof of stood as "systems" ideas. Levy-Bruhl'sinitialinterpretation Durkof heim's epistemology a philosophy the logic of abstractconceptsinas fluencedLevi-Strauss,who in turn incorporatedthis view into his on influence thedevelopstructuralism, whichthenbecamean important also the ment Frenchstructuralism. of Poststructuralism inherits interpreof as tationof epistemology a system beliefs. in of also influenced somemeasure the Durkheim's sociology knowledge of semiotic arguments Saussure(Jameson1972;Aarsleff 1982;Alexander 1988).Jameson(1972, p. 27) arguesthat Saussure's distinction between langue and parole is drawnfrom Durkheim: "thetheoretical advantages of this new model can be measuredif we compareit to what seems to have been its source in the sociologyof Durkheim." Jamesonalso cites W. Doroszewski(1933,pp. 82-91) and RobertGodel (1957,p. 282) on this on point.He writes:"not onlydoes the latter's[Durkheim's]insistence the representational natureof social factsstrongly resembleSaussure's in notionof signs. . . but the verythrust Durkheim'sthought, its atof to the tempt separateout thepersonaland individualfrom objectiveand social,is quite consistent withthe Saussureandistinction betweenlangue and parole"(Jameson1972,p. 29). It is thisso-calledlaterperiodin Durkheim'swork, whichalwayshad a in of largeimpact Europe,thathas becomethefocus a contemporary revival in in ofinterest theUnited States.Functionalism beingsomewhat disrenow in trend theUnitedStatesis towardtreating apparent pute,thecurrent the idealismin Durkheim'slaterworkas the"real"Durkheim, and thelater workis nowseenas morerelevant contemporary to thanhisearly sociology in work.Scholars prominent thesocialconstructivist approach, particularly in studiesofscienceand culture, have overthelast severaldecades begun to recognize in Durkheim's of as sociology knowledge, articulated TheEleFormsand Primitive mentary Classification, an important as forerunner of their own position. manysociologists thepostpositivist As in periodhave turned cultural to studiesand embracedthedilemmas posed by postmodDurkheim's and ernism, poststructuralism, semiotics, arguments regarding theimportance collective of representations seemedtomakethelater have in Durkheim relevant a verymodern sense. Alexanderand Collins (e.g., 1988, 1990) bothargue thatit is from the 473

American Journalof Sociology laterDurkheimthattheseschoolsof thought have developed.Alexander of (1988, pp. 10-11) writes:"It is, of course,the recognition the crucial of distinctiveness this later work which has allowed the Durkheimian rootsof contemporary culturalstudiesto be traced."Alexander(1988, p. and empirical poststructural6) continues: "Both as theory investigation, ismand semiotic investigations moregenerally be seen as elaborating can one of the pathwaysthat Durkheim'slatersociologyopens up. Indeed, have demonstrated importance his latertheory the of moreforcefully they in than any discipline the social sciencesmorenarrowly conceived." in Similarly, Steve Fenton(1984,p. 1) attributes revivalof interest the in Durkheim the1970sand 1980sto a replacement theearlier of Durkheim "In his by thelaterin American thinking: earlyAmericansociology writand ings were seen as granting undue realismto social phenomena, an werethusbelievedto be antagonistic Americanindividualism the to and tradition." FentoncitesParsons(1968) and Hinkleand Hinvoluntaristic kle(1954).He continues, "The revivalhas beenmarkedbya distinct move of of away from past interpretations Durkheimas the cornerstone social the conservatism, whilst new workhas notshedall socialconceptions and, about Durkheim'sweaknessesas a sociologist, does see these weakit nessesin a new light"(Fenton 1984,p. 1). of idealistside ofDurkheim's Whilethisnew appreciation theallegedly overthemanyyearsofinteris argument in manyways an improvement dualist, rationalist, preting Durkheim a positivist, as functionalist, idealist, of based on the same misunderstanding and realist,it is nevertheless Durkheim's work as composed of later idealist and earlier positivist theorists was a precurphases.Whencontemporary arguethatDurkheim or sor of poststructuralism, theyare merely postmodernism, pragmatism, to following its logical conclusionthe line of reasoningbegun with the Gehlke, idealistinterpretation Durkheimpopularizedby Levy-Bruhl, of in unand Parsonsthathas continued a relatively Dennes,Levi-Strauss, brokenchain to the present.They continueto confusethe sociologyof withthe epistemology. knowledge on fascination withDurkheim's"later"work is centered The current of his arhis sociology knowledge and does notrecognize epistemological overDurkheim recurrent debatesand dilemmas gument. Consequently, Durkheim'ssociology knowledge of volve aroundweaknessesin treating for foundation sociology as an adequate epistemological (Bloor 1982;Alexander 1988; Collins 1988;Mestrovic1993),nothis functionalism, empiriThis view ofDurkheim'swork"rediscal studies, epistemology or proper. in covers"thesideofDurkheim thathas alwaysbeenemphasized Europe. Forms. the of It does notchallenge idealistinterpretation The Elementary of is It merely arguesthatthe lateridealismof his sociology knowledge in thanthe earlierfunctionalism. better Because of this,the new interest 474

Durkheim'sEpistemology Durkheim'ssociology knowledge of has ironically reinforced neglect the of his epistemological argument. The problem withthewholedebateis thatthere werenevertwoDurkheimsin thefirst place.24 BoththeEuropeanand American interpretations of Durkheimare merely from two sides of the same argument resulting of Forms.Both misinterthe idealistmisunderstanding The Elementary pretations result from seeingthedistinction not Durkheim'ssocibetween Durkheim's of oempirical and sociepistemology hissociology knowledge. does ology of knowledge without a foundationin his epistemology of constitute idealisttheory fictive an reality. However,Durkheim clearly intended thesociology knowledge reston his own unique epistefor of to mologicalbasis. is Alexander (1988,p. 6) arguesthatwhilethelaterDurkheim relevant to cultural the also has to acceptthesame limitastudies, laterDurkheim tionson empiricalvalidityas culturalstudies.This is an argument that Durkheim'sown claimsconcerning empirical the vaclearlycontradicts lidity hiswork.Whileit is certainly thatDurkheim had a great of has true and unacknowledged on of influence the development the sociologyof knowledge socialconstructivist and thinking (Bloor 1982;Alexander1988; Fenton 1984),thesearguments quite separatefrom epistemology, are his whichdoes not have to accept the same limitations indeterminacies and as culturalstudies. For social constructivists, of a sociology knowledge thatpositsan indeterminate relationship between thought reality thatis notcapable and and is ofempirical validity thebestsortofepistemology can be hopedfor. that Social consensus, or lead persons to structure, sharedpractices, they argue, believecertain in things think certain or ways.Because personssharethe same beliefs, theyact in ways thatreinforce thosebeliefs.The resulting consensus createstheappearanceofa valid relation betweenthought and reality wherethere can in factbe none.This makesscientific practice and everyday understanding possiblewithincertainlimitsbut rules out the of possibility empiricalvalidity. For Durkheim, of however, genesis thecategories theunderstandthe of ing in enacted practicesolved the problemof indeterminacy. Although Durkheim applauded thepragmatist attempt overcome dualismof to the and a of thought reality relation action,he did notagree through dynamic withthe pragmatist of He theory fictive reality. arguedthatJames'satwas notsuccessful tempt because theargument remained individualistic.
Durkheim himself (1982)suggests whathe calls a "watershed" his thinking. in He givestheyear 1895forthis.But he says thatwhatchangedwas his ability deal to sociologically thequestion religion, a changein epistemology, with of not method, or general theoretical direction has beenasserted as (Lukes 1982,p. 259).
24

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of American Journal Sociology moment, momentof a comes a problematic Into the fluxof experience to personsare brought contension. Jamesarguesthatat thesemoments sciousnessby the need to act. The action,or the need to act, converts There is no longer the fluxof empiricalrealityinto conceptualreality. and reality. They have mergedin action. a separationbetweenthought that in dualismresults theargument of However,thismethod overcoming is because there as whatever actionis takenis thetruth, longas it works, logic,and conceptual reality. Truth, no longera relation an underlying to accordingto Durkheim,to the coherenceall give way in pragmatism, moment.Durkheimargued that action-defined truthof each particular valid knowledge could be explainedand reasonsaved but thatthiscould argument were removed onlybe achievedif thefocusof epistemological from individualactorand placed insteadon sharedenactedpractices the focus He (notsharedbelief). pointedout thatthiswas as mucha dynamic is the on actionas James.The difference that,forDurkheim, actionsare (motions enactedby an assembled collective practices thatare inherently group),whereasforJamestheywere individual. a of While Durkheimdid articulate sociology knowledgealong social lines in the last sectionof The Elementary Forms,he did constructivist in to Rather, theprior notintend thisargument standas hisepistemology. outlinedan epistemology that 400 plus pages of that work,he carefully the demonstrated empiricalvalidityof six key categoriesof the understanding.His sociologyof knowledgewas onlyintendedto explain the valid categories the and of development ideas beyondthesesixempirically He thattheyconstitute. did notintenda of direct knowledge social forces for which basis of validity thecategories themselves, social constructivist how theyhave been understood. is nevertheless betweenthecateDurkheim'sepistemology arguesfora directrelation reality.Knowledge and truthare not fictive. goriesand socioempirical themare ultibut underlying Cosmologiesare fictive, the social patterns of valid knowlmatelydiscoverablebecause the possibility empirically of the Thus, Durkheim'ssociology knowlreality. edge underlies fictive The of edge does notreston an idealistepistemology. "objectivity" social for an factsis just as important argument the Durkheimof The ElementaryFormsas it was forthe Durkheimof The Rules of the Sociological was neverpositivist, even in Method. On the otherhand, the argument the early work, as the two-Durkheim argumentassumes, because the on resting a foundaconstructed phenomena "givens" werealwayssocially valid categories thought of tion of socioempirically (Durkheim1915, p. of with the theory enacted gains in sophistication 465). The argument in Formsbut does not changein espracticearticulated The Elementary to not sence,certainly froma positivist an idealistposition.There only and whentheempirical arguments thesociolappearto be twoDurkheims 476

Durkheim'sEpistemology of ogy of knowledgeare not both seen in the context his socioempirical epistemology. CONCLUSION has A failure appreciateDurkheim'sepistemological to argument imporFor the for and philosophy. sociology imtantimplications bothsociology the leads to plications mostobvious.Misunderstanding epistemology are of serious misunderstandings Durkheim's entirecorpus of work. The sense credit withbeingin someimportant thinker whommostsociologists In a founderof the disciplinehas been fundamentally misunderstood. on his the workwhileneglecting epistemology, discibuilding Durkheim's in position, plinehas generally placed itself an untenable epistemological as philosophers have repeatedly pointedout (Winch 1958; Rorty1979; workthatDurkheim would have Turner1994).What is moreimportant, seen as centralto the discipline, instance,studiesof shared enacted for practice(interaction) variouslevels,has been relegated thesidelines at to in thequest to uncoverallegedDurkheimian or "structures" "social facts" or,the logic of conceptualor narrative systems. The two halves of Durkheim's argument have been practicedsepain conrately different disciplines and subdisciplines on two different and It a coherence. matters great tinents, leavingbothwithout epistemological deal to the disciplineas a whole whether Durkheimsaw social factsas in external entities their own right, his position generas has constraining or ally been interpreted, ratheras enacted practicesthat impose moral from sharedenactment practice. constraints "feelings" via resulting the of In the second case, the details of the enactment shared practiceare of their norms structure, theinvisible not and rulespositedbythetraditional interpretation. Invisiblenorms and rulescan onlybe revealedvia abstract The details conceptualization, quantitative measurement, modeling. and ofenactedpractice, theother on hand,are open onlyto a detailedqualitativeapproach.The implications boththetheoretical for of understanding "structure" forpreferred and methods research vast. In orderto be of are withDurkheim'sargument, consistent sociologywould have to assume an actualorderin theenactment each individual of case rather thantrying to establishtendencies thatmustbe modeled.25 As important theseimplications theimplications philosophy as are, for are potentially but less clear. If it is possibleto establisha valid greater
25 See Garfinkel's (1988)discussion Parsons's of plenum an extended for consideration

ofthepractice modeling hypothetical intraditional of a order sociology theassumpvs. tionmadeby Garfinkel each individual that case displays witnessable a order thatis availableforresearch. 477

American Journal Sociology of epistemological argument thebasis ofstudies enactedsocialpractice, on of in current arguments epistemology, particularly thoseof social construcin tivists, needto be revised, Durkheim will as recognized 1912.Sociology and a sociologicaltheory shared enacted practicewould replace the of current of vogue fortheories practicebased on individualaction,systems of belief,or collectiveparadigm,and sociologywould finditselfat the heartof the epistemological the debate,determining criteria validity, of insteadof at its periphery. Objectionsto Durkheim'sepistemology and should, remain. will, While a good case forhis position can be made,it is ultimately moreimportant to see his workas initiating important ofargument an line that, whilenot explicitly recognized, has always been criticalto the sociologicalenterprise.It would be a mistaketo evaluate the argument the basis of a on thatit was incapable of achievinggiventhe limitations completeness of research methods thetime.Because Durkheim'sepistemology at depends to a largedegreeon the empiricaldetailsof actual sharedenactedpractices-details thatconstitute witnessable the enactment socialfactsbut of also details that the researchpracticesof the time shed relatively little if lighton-it should not be surprising thereis a certainincompleteness in theargument a degreeofinaccuracy and withregard details.Modern to aids to data collection of technological and the sophistication contemporaryfieldworkwhencontrasted to withthelack ofattention such details at the turnof the century guaranteethat this will be the case. It is to modern studiesofsharedenactedpractice thatwe shouldlookforan evaluationofthepotential Durkheim'sview,studies thatare generally seen of as havingno epistemological generaltheoretical or whatsoimplications ever,which,however,turnout to be at the centerof the Durkheimian projectproperly understood. One problem on modelwill have to face any argument a Durkheimian is the fact that the analysisdepends heavilyon the enactment what of Durkheimcalls ritualinteractions, which(at least in formal institutional industrial role terms) play a less prominent in modern society. Contempolike Garfinkel rarytheorists (1988), Goffman (1959), and Collins (1988, local orders have replacedformal rituals 1990)have arguedthatinformal as the sourceof orderand meaningin modernsociety. Goffman can be instiinterpreted arguing an "interaction as for order" quite separatefrom tutional social practices (Rawls 1987). Garfinkelhas focused on the in achievement intelligibility and through of local orders thatare identical withthe practicesthatenact them.Collins arguesforthe importance of whathe calls "ritual interaction chains"in sustaining social solidarity and selfhood time.Durkheim'snotionof enactedpracticemay need through to be interpreted mundaneenactments of along similarlinesas including 478

Durkheim'sEpistemology It "interaction order"in everyday life.26 will certainly need to be clearly from distinguished institutionalized beliefsystems. For Durkheim, experience moralforcewas the mostimportant the of feature enactedpractice providing of for direct experience thesix cateof gories.Mundane enactments local interaction of orderswould seem to fulfill requirement. this There are moralobligations thelevel of"interat actionorder" distinguished from (as institutional levelsoforders) wherein everything dependson themutualcommitment enactedpractice to (Rawls 1987). This gives interaction moral dimensionand implicatesshame, a blame,and trustworthiness (Rawls 1990). The originalsacred character of formal of ritualpracticesmay have played a role in the development the initialcategory classification, of dividingthe world in two morally in orderthat the originaldivisionwould have moral forceand thereby of validity. However,theessential ingredient enactedpracsocioempirical ticewas alwaystheperception moralforce participants, of whichis in by principle separablefrom religious institutional or constraints. experiThe ence of themutualcreation moralforcein and through enactment of the of of sharedpracticeand the experience mutualobligation the enactto mentare bothcharacteristics "interaction of order" practices (Rawls 1987, that professional 1990). Durkheim'sown suggestion associationsmight play a moral role in modernsocietycorresponding totemicritualin to traditional runsalong similarlines. society
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