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The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences
A. Ichijo Online Publication Date: 23 January 2002 To cite this Article: Ichijo, A. (2002) 'The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences', Geopolitics, 7:2, 53 - 74 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/714000939 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714000939

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The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences
1

AT S U K O I C H I J O

Inspired by Walker Connors suggestion to turn our attention to the question When is a nation? in order to understand nationalism, the paper examines the theoretical implications of asking When is a nation? through an examination of the Scottish and Japanese cases. The paper first demonstrates that the question When is a nation? is dependent upon the question What is a nation?, and explores the ways in which the question When can make theoretical contributions in the absence of any agreement as to what the nation is. It concludes that the question When is a helpful first step to conduct a case study in order to comprehend why and for what purpose a certain idea of nation or nationalism is mobilised in a society at a particular time. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical implications of the question When is a nation?. In 1990 Walker Connor concluded his article entitled From tribe to nation? with an observation that more attention should be paid to the question When is a nation? than the question What is a nation?.2 This essay takes up Connors conclusion as a starting point to consider what the discussions of the question When have so far achieved in deepening our understanding of nations and nationalism by examining two cases: Scotland and Japan. These two cases are chosen firstly because both nations are widely seen as old, whose foundations can allegedly be traced back to the Middle Ages or even to ancient times. One could speculate that in the cases of these old nations, whose legitimacy is generally acknowledged, the question When may no longer be relevant. Nonetheless, as this essay demonstrates, it is a highly contested question in

Atsuko Ichijo, European Institute, London School of Economics, University of London. Email: <a.ichijo@lse.ac.uk>. Geopolitics, Vol.7, No.2 (Autumn 2002) pp.5374
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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both cases. Analysing why it is still a significant question for old and established nations will, therefore, clarify what needs to be investigated in the study of nationalism. Secondly, in the contemporary context, there is a tendency to classify the Scottish nation as civic while there seems to be a consensus that the Japanese nation is ethnic. By comparing how the question When is problematised in the two cases, I aim to examine the significance of the question When along the civic and ethnic axis. From a comparative analysis of the cases, the essay argues first that the discussion of the question When is a nation? is still very much dependent on the question What is a nation?. It then explores what role the question When plays in contemporary theories of nationalism. When is the Nation?: The Scottish and Japanese Contexts One of the claims set forth by the Scottish National Party (SNP) in their literature is that the Scottish nation is one of the oldest in Europe, that the Scots were one of the earliest to acquire a clearly defined national identity guarded by stable borders.3 What the pamphlet implicitly refers to is, no doubt, the experience of the Wars of Independence (12961328), and especially to the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) which, according to many Scots, unequivocally demonstrates that a Scottish national identity existed by the late thirteenth century. The SNP is, therefore, advocating that the Scottish nation came into being in the Middle Ages, which, from their viewpoint, provides greater legitimacy for the cause of independence. Despite the considerable degree of democratisation to eradicate militaristic nationalism from the new Japanese society after the Second World War, there still exists an almost blind belief in the oldness of the Japanese nation in contemporary Japan. Not only die-hard nationalists but also many historians, political scientists and sociologists have long accepted the view that the Japanese nation has existed since ancient times as has the Japanese state, thus avoiding a challenge to the validity of the case of Japan being an old nation.4 In both contexts there is a strong inclination to assert the oldness of the nation. According to Walker Connor, however, one should be suspicious of the claim which asserts that a nation existed prior to the nineteenth century because, for him, nationalism is a mass phenomenon.5 He argues that until the majority of people become aware of their membership of a nation, which did not happen even in old nations such as France until the late nineteenth century by way of the introduction of conscription and universal education, a nation cannot exist. From this perspective, the Scottish and Japanese examples represent the efforts on the part of nationalists to persuade fellow members, and other nations, of the authenticity of their

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project. He contends that therefore it makes no sense to investigate nationalism before the nineteenth century. This is a view which is close to the one put forward by a group of theorists called modernists who hold that nations are essentially a modern form of social organisation. However, there are other strands of theories of nationalism which argue for the case of premodern nations such as the primordialists and perennialists; the former argue that nations are natural expressions of human nature while the latter think of nations as a form of social grouping whose origins go back to time immemorial. To put it bluntly, while modernists maintain that nations are a modern construct, the primordialists and perennialists hold that nations are old.6 In what follows, I will examine different views on the question of When is the nation? using the Scottish and Japanese cases to evaluate what analytical insights each position can offer in relation to theories of nations and nationalism. The Scottish Case The Modernists View Some theorists, often referred to as modernists, maintain that the nation is a distinctively modern institution. Although modernists such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson are by no means in complete agreement as to what caused the rise of nationalism, they share at least two basic assumptions: that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and that, in Ernest Gellners celebrated sentence, It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round.7 The modernists thesis is that if nationalism creates nations and if nationalism is a modern phenomenon, then it follows that there can be, by definition, no pre-modern nations.8 What are the modernists views on the Scottish case? Because Scotland is, presumably, often considered to be a relatively minor case i.e., it is a small nation without its own state there is not much about Scotland in these scholars works. It is, nonetheless, still possible to put together observations and comments on Scotland they have made in passing. Ernest Gellner regards a nation as a homogeneous, internally mobile culture/polity which emerged as a response to the processes of industrialisation that had profoundly transformed the structure of society. In this sense, according to Gellner, the nation is a distinctively modern institution. He acknowledges that some nations have navels, that is a tie with a pre-modern cultural and ethnic entity, but asserts that these navels are not essential in understanding the nation phenomenon.9 How does the

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Scottish case fare in his analysis? He concedes that, in the Scottish case, language did not play the major part as allocated in his model and that a shared historical memory a navel was important. In spite of this, he did not feel the Scottish case contradicted his model.10 It is fair to assume that Gellner would argue that the Scottish nation is best understood as an institution formed, like any other nation, in response to the need of industrial society for a culturally homogeneous labour force. Hence, from Gellners point of view, it is nonsensical to argue that there was a Scottish nation in existence around the time of the Wars of Independence. Another modernist, Eric Hobsbawm, also declares that the nation is a product of modernity.11 It is, therefore, pointless to ponder over whether a Scottish nation existed in the Middle Ages. At the same time, he proposes a concept of proto-national bonds to explain why nationalist mobilisation has been so successful across the globe.12 Proto-national bonds are the sense of collective belonging that already existed before the age of nationalism, which can be later mobilised on a national scale. He agrees that protonationalism could have an important role in forming modern nationalism in terms of supplying symbols which, in some cases, evoke powerful emotions, but asserts that proto-nationalism is not nationalism because it has no necessary relation (original emphasis) to a territorial political organisation which he holds to be a key component of modern nationalism.13 He also denies that there is any continuity between protonationalism and modern nationalism, citing the example of Jewish protonationalism and modern Zionism. Reviewing his argument in relation to the Scottish experience, it is reasonable to assume that Hobsbawm would agree that there was a proto-nation in medieval Scotland, which, however, should not be equated with the modern Scottish nation. One could, therefore, contend that Hobsbawm agrees with Gellner on the point that there was no Scottish nation in late thirteenth-century Scotland. The above does not mean that modernists in general deny that there is a Scottish nation because it lacks statehood; most of them are far more sensible than that. Gellner, for instance, casually admits that Scottish nationalism exists.14 However, the Scottish case poses an awkward problem for many modernist schemes such as Gellners with regard to the absence of full-blown nationalism in Scotland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Tom Nairn, who also considers nationalism to be an essentially modern phenomenon, explains this anomaly by pointing out the massive immigration of the Scottish intelligentsia to the South which accelerated after the death of Sir Walter Scott.15 Because Scotland lost the middle-class intelligentsia whose mission is, according to his scheme, to invite the masses into history, he concludes there was a curious absence of Scottish nationalism in the age of nationalism. Benedict Anderson,

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questioning Nairns tendency to treat his native Scotland as an unproblematic, primordial given, goes on to imply that what was happening then was the making of a British nation of which Scotland was becoming a part.16 He points out that by the early seventeenth century, the use of English was widespread in Scotland and that there were no barriers for intellectuals, politicians and businessmen to perform their pilgrimage to the centre under the Union. That is why, according to Anderson, there was neither a typically vernacular-based nationalism nor the American-style civic nationalism in nineteenth-century Scotland. The modernists stance on the question of When was the Scottish nation? is summed up: not in the pre-modern period, but in the modern era. Some Historians View The modernists view is therefore unequivocal. There are, however, dissenting voices raised against their view, especially from historians. They suggest that some nations, including the Scottish nation, existed in the pre-modern era. It is perhaps understandable for Scottish historians to take the view that the Scottish nation existed in the medieval period because of the need to challenge an English-centred view of the history of the British Isles; it is part of the process of re-evaluating the formation of Britain. William Ferguson, an eminent historian, declares that a Scottish nation undoubtedly existed by 1286 as he believes that the episodes of the Wars of Independence demonstrate the existence of a well defined Scottish identity.17 Other historians who are concerned with the problem of nations and nationalism agree with Ferguson. Hugh Seton-Watson classifies the Scots as one of the old nations, that is, nations which came into existence before the emergence of the doctrine of nationalism, along with the English, French, Dutch and so on.18 He argues that a significant number of people of Scotland came to share the belief that they constituted a nation before the French Revolution when the doctrine of nationalism emerged. He states specifically that the Scottish nation was emerging in the late thirteenth century around the time of the Wars of Independence but admits that due to the diversity of peoples and languages, the formation of the Scottish nation was not completed before the sixteenth century.19 In a similar vein, Adrian Hastings argues that the Scottish nation, like many western European nations, was formed well before the eighteenth century, contrary to what most of the modernists suggest.20 These historians arguments are based on the understanding that a nation is a self-aware community which possesses a national identity that is linked to a demand for political autonomy for the people.21 They examine the Scottish experience against this criterion and are satisfied that a Scottish

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nation, a self-aware community with a distinctive identity and desire for political autonomy, did come into existence in the Middle Ages. Another interesting point made by the historians in regard to the Scottish case is that those who lived in medieval Scotland did not constitute an ethnicity, a culturally homogeneous community, due to their multi-racial and multi-lingual nature.22 It is a well-known fact that what is now called Scotland was at that time populated by the Picts in the northeast, the Scots from Ireland in the northwest, the Angles in Lothian, the Britons in Strathclyde, the Normans and the Norse. Many languages were spoken including Gaelic, English, Norman French and Latin. The army which David I, King of Scots, led at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 against Henry I of England was recorded by a contemporary English historian to have been composed of Normans, Germans, English, of Northumbrians and Cumbrians, of men of Teviotdale and Lothian, of Picts (who are commonly called Galwegians) and of Scots.23 These diverse people, however, so the historians argue, shared a national consciousness. They were held together as a nation by geography and kingship. The people of medieval Scotland, according to these historians view, formed, first and foremost, a political community, united in desire to defend the autonomy of the kingdom. These observations about medieval Scotland presented by the historians seem to share certain characteristics that some of the modernists hold as essential to a modern nation. On the criterion that a nation is a political community, it could be argued that the people of medieval Scotland constituted such a one. A Hobsbawmian explanation could perhaps be entertained in this case since the people of medieval Scotland arguably existed as a function of a territorial state called the Kingdom of Scotland. However, Andersons criteria of a nation seem to be more easily met by the Scottish experience. For example, the Declaration of Abroath, which arguably demonstrates an early understanding of the idea of popular sovereignty, could satisfy one of them, i.e., an understanding of and a belief in the sovereignty of the people. Is it, then, legitimate to deny even the possibility of the existence of a nation in the pre-modern era, as the modernists do? In order to answer this question, I would now like to explore further some of the characteristics of a nation in the case of medieval Scotland. These characteristics include self-awareness as being one people, a certain level of mass participation, the idea of comradeship, and a belief in the sovereignty of the people. Medieval Scotland It is, of course, extremely difficult to reveal what people really felt in the past. Thanks to recent research, however, one can obtain at least a rough

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picture of the life of people in medieval Scotland. In this regard, the most important episode in Scottish history is the Wars of Independence (12961328).24 This is a series of wars between the kingdoms of Scotland and England over the kingship of Scotland. When Alexander III (124186) died, leaving as his only heir granddaughter, Margaret, the Maid of Norway (?128390), England had finished its campaigns against Wales and Ireland and was ready to expand its activity to the north. When the Queen Margaret died on her way to Scotland in 1290, the question of succession to the Scottish Crown became paramount. Edward I of England (12721307) intervened at the invitation of some Scottish nobles during the period of interregnum (129092) and chose John Balliol (c. 12501313) as the King of the Scots. King John was enthroned and crowned at Scone on the Stone of Destiny on St Andrews day in 1292. Johns allegiance to England did not last long, probably because of Edward Is intention to requisition all the Scottish wool, the most important export product and a crucial part of livelihood in medieval Scotland, in order to finance his war against France, and to mobilise Scotsmen to fight for England in France.25 King Edward of England regarded King John as his vassal and made many demands which ignored the authority of the community of the realm of Scotland, an authority considered by the Scots to be above the authority of a king. Scotland, having formed an alliance with France in 1295, then started a war with England in 1296. At the battle of Dunbar of 1296, Edward I defeated the Scots and the years of warfare between Scotland and England ensued.26 The Wars of Independence, which these became known, provide interesting episodes in discussing the issue of mass participation in national affairs. Alexander Grant presents two sets of evidence which suggest a considerable degree of participation by ordinary people in the Wars of Independence.27 First, Ragman Roll, which is the list of more than a thousand names of Scots who paid homage to Edward I after the Battle of Dunbar of 1296, contains a considerable number of lesser clergy and townsmen. Grant, comparing these figures to the estimated number of the English gentry in the late thirteenth century (around 3000), concludes that the list contains many more people of a lower status than the English gentry. This, according to him, indicates the wide involvement of ordinary people not only in warfare with England but also in political processes. Secondly, the famous revolt of 1297 which elevated William Wallace (c. 12701305), a son of a minor landowner, to Guardian of the Realm, was depicted by a contemporary Yorkshire chronicler, Walter of Guisborough, as a nationalist revolt. His interpretation of the event that the common folk, led by Wallace, made their stand against the English because they were Scots is still repeated by some historians.28 Modern historians express reservations in interpreting the revolt

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of 1297 as a purely nationalist one, since there were other more compelling reasons to rebel against Edward I, such as a fear of being conscripted for his war in France. There are, however, further episodes from this period which, to some historians minds, point more to the nationalist interpretation of the event.29 When Thomas of Edinburgh, an obscure priest, heard that victorious King Edwards army was approaching the town in 1296, he solemnly excommunicated King Edward in an act of defiance. Another Scotsman called William of Bolhope, who had been resident in England, hurried home to enlist with the Scottish army when war broke out in 1296. Undeterred by Edwards armys victory over his countrymen, he armed himself with two swords and set off for England, where he met his death following his refusal to acknowledge allegiance to King Edward. In another instance, the surviving records of a small estate called Coldingham in southeast Berwickshire, consisting of only two parishes, show that it provided at least 40 men, possibly as many as 80, from its tenants to join the Scottish army of 129798. Needless to say, it is impossible to establish an accurate level of the non-elites involvement in these affairs and admittedly these examples only provide a collection of fragmented episodes which do not necessarily convey a fair picture of what actually happened. Nonetheless, the fact that these episodes were not only recorded in those days but have survived until today deserves serious consideration. There are ample data for the discussion of Scottish self-awareness in the Middle Ages. There is, to begin with, some evidence which suggests the existence of a Scottish self-awareness of their being a united people in medieval Scotland. As already mentioned above, medieval Scotland was composed of many different peoples, a fact which was reflected in the way the Scottish kings referred to their subjects. For example, David I called his subjects Francis et Anglis in 1124; some 40 years later, William the Lion, King of Scots, described his people as tocius terre sue Francis et Anglis Scottis et Galwahensibus. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, however, this racial address had died out and it became customary for the king to refer to his people as subjects of the realm of Scotland. The consequence of this was that they all became, at least in the official addresses, Scots.30 Although this evidence does not reveal anything about the ordinary folk, it suggests that at least among the ruling class there was a desire to present the inhabitants of Scotland as one united people. Another interesting discovery is the place-name Ingliston and its variants. It literally means a settlement of the English and would appear to refer to places where English-speaking Scots lived. However, when all the places called Ingliston are mapped, most of them actually turn out to be Norman settlements from England rather than the settlements of English-

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speaking Scots.31 This demonstrates that the label the English did not simply signify the people who spoke some form of English, as did many of the Scots in the Middle Ages, but rather that it referred to the people from south of the border, from England. This differentiation implies that in medieval Scotland there was a kind of self-awareness among the Scots which was based on geography rather than a language. In other words, the Scots were the people who were not from the South and the language was a less important issue in defining them. Another indication of the existence of Scottish self-awareness is the rise in the writing of medieval history. From the late fourteenth to the midfifteenth centuries, Scottish historians produced successive chronicles of Scotland. The major works included: John Forduns Chronica Gentis Scotorum (Chronicle of the Scottish Race) (c. 136585), written in Latin, which put forward the Gaelic, therefore, ancient origin of the Scottish race. Also Andrew Wyntouns Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland (c. 141020) written in Scots shows a strong sense of Scottishness, vindicated by the Wars of Independence and which advocates, following Fordun, the ancient origin of the Scottish kingdom. Another, Walter Bowers Scotichronicon (Scots Chronicle) (c. 1440), written in Latin, traces Scottish history up to the end of the reign of James I in 1436.32 These were, of course, written by an elite for the elite. But they were, as many historians of medieval Scotland argue, an attempt to consolidate an already existing Scottish self-consciousness with the Scottish claim for independence after the Wars of Independence.33 It was not only historical narratives that began to be compiled as an expression of a separate Scottish identity. Around the same time as Forduns chronicle, a heroic romance of King Robert, The Brus, was written by John Barbour, containing a medieval ballad about Alexander III.34 It was later incorporated in Wyntouns work. In the late fifteenth century, an epic poem, The Wallace, was compiled by Blind Harry, which was effectively a populist version of this official history.35 It is certain that these two poems were read by people outside the ruling circle, and following the introduction of the printing press in 1507, these two works were repeatedly re-printed. On the point of horizontal comradeship, there is also some evidence which implies that there was some form of understanding on common rights and duties for the Scots in medieval Scotland. The very idea of the community of the realm is one such example. The Barons letter to the Pope in 1320 (better known as the Declaration of Arbroath) was written on behalf of the whole community of the realm of Scotland which included not only barons, the ruling circle, but all the freeholders.36 Also, all the adult males in Scotland were required to possess arms appropriate to their wealth so that they could be called upon for policing or military purposes. When they were

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summoned, they went to defend the realm, not the landlord. It was called common army service or Scottish service.37 This is similar to the modern idea of conscription in that it was regarded as a shared duty undertaken by all the adult males in Scotland. In return, the dutiful Scots could expect a fair legal hearing by the King or his representative. As for the belief in the sovereignty of the people, the medieval Scots produced a remarkable document, the Declaration of Arbroath, which was written to plead with the Pope for his acknowledgement and confirmation of Scottish independence from England. Most of the letter is, therefore, dedicated to the description of the history of the Scottish kingdom which, the letter claims, goes back to ancient Egypt, and forcefully argues for the legitimacy of the rule of Robert I. At the end of this account of Scottish history, there is a phrase stating Robert Bruce became the king of Scots by rightful succession and the consent of every one of us.38 What is suggested here is a recognition that popular consent is essential for legitimate rule. There then follows a passage declaring that if Robert Bruce were to surrender Scotland to the English, he would be deposed and another man who could defend the Kingdom would be made King. Two important issues arise from this. The first is a recognition that sovereignty does not lie with the monarch but with the community of the realm. The second is an understanding that the relationship between the king and his people is contractual, and that the king does not have a divine right to rule. The Declaration of Arbroath has, as a consequence, gained a reputation as being the first ever document to clearly demonstrate an understanding of popular sovereignty, which is, incidentally, an important component of the modern ideology of nationalism. When is the Nation? in the Scottish Case The above evidence appears to support the historians claim that there was a Scottish nation in the Middle Ages. This would not, however, convince the modernists, for they consider a nation to be a mass phenomenon, i.e., something in which the majority of the population participates with regards to its formation and maintenance. The evidence cited earlier does not satisfactorily demonstrate the level of mass participation that modernists hold so dear in the case of medieval Scotland. On the other hand, the historians would find no difficulty in claiming that their case is vindicated since popular participation is not the essential issue for them. The modernists and historians arguments fail to engage with each other, and as a result, it cannot be claimed that the question When was/is the Scottish nation? has been thoroughly examined. The main reason why the two positions cannot engage with one another in a constructive manner lies in the familiar old problem: the problem of definition, or in other words, the

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question What is a nation?. Connor suggests that the scholars of nationalism should move on to discuss the question When is a nation? because he believes this has not received sufficient attention. The problem, as has been shown by the above examination of the Scottish case, is that contemporary scholars of nationalism are not quite ready to tackle the question When in a meaningful manner since there is no unequivocal answer to the question What. However, it should be noted that the exploration of the question When in each case will highlight what issues theories of nations and nationalism should strive to explain, and in this indirect way, the question could help the investigation of the phenomena of nations and nationalism. What then has the question When is the nation? illuminated in the Scottish case? In the above examination, the level of mass participation has been clearly marked out as a critical aspect in understanding what a nation is and has brought our attention back to the question of definition. Indeed, this is a theoretical debate which has been going on for a while, and promises to continue for the foreseeable future. Another point the above examination raises is the question of what it is that theories of nations and nationalism can actually achieve in light of the fact that many people believe, in one way or another, that a particular nation is in effect old with its origin based in or before the Middle Ages. From the phenomenological point of view, this belief would then constitute a reality for these people, providing a frame of reference for their thinking and behaviour. The task for analysts then is not just to debunk the myth but to ask why people chose to believe, or wish to believe, in that particular view and what role it plays in a certain setting. The fact that the SNP subscribes to the medieval origin of Scottish nationhood is not surprising since it strengthens their claim of the authenticity of Scottish nationhood. The more authentic a nation is, the more legitimate the cause of independence becomes. However, the SNP also promotes the idea of a modern, civic, inclusive and heterogeneous Scotland, which could clash with their belief in old Scottish nationhood. If a nation is old and authentic, it is very likely that the nation is also pure and homogeneous. Advocating the purity of nationhood in contemporary liberal democracy, however, could be a suicidal act for any political party which aims to become a mainstream force. In the case of Scotland, this potential problem has been solved by portraying Scottish history as one of the continuous intermingling of different peoples as pointed out earlier.39 Therefore, the SNP can advocate the old and authentic nationhood while championing the idea of a civic and multicultural Scotland. Asking the question When is the nation? in the contemporary Scottish context does not reveal when the Scottish nation was irrefutably formed or whether the

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Scottish nation exists; it demonstrates, instead, some of the ways in which the idea of nationhood are moblised in contemporary society. This would lead us to look closely at what role nations and nationalism play in the modern world. In the absence of any agreement as to what essentially nations and nationalism are, what one can expect from theories of nations and nationalism is probably some guidance on how to understand the question Why is the nation? better. Investigating why nations and nationalism are moblised under some circumstances but not under others seems not only to offer more insight into what nations and nationalism mean in a particular setting but also offers another way of approaching what they are. Having identified what the question When is a nation? can and cannot clarify, let me now turn to the Japanese case. In this section, I shall examine the modernist, perennialist, and some alternative views put forward by historians on the question When is the Japanese nation? to see what light these claims can shed on the nature of the Japanese nation and Japanese nationalism in the contemporary setting. The Japanese Case The Modernists View The predominant view among the scholars of nationalism seems to be that the Japanese experience offers yet another case of official or reform nationalism, where the government imposes a version of nationalism in order to legitimate the new political order, to catch up with the West, and to forge the sense of nationhood.40 According to this view, Japanese nationalism came hand in hand with industrialisation and, more generally, westernisation, which is more conducive to the modernist account of the rise of the nation. From the modernists point of view, the Japanese experience serves as a classical case of nationalism inventing the nation, and not the other way round. Kwoncha Yun, for instance, while acknowledging the existence of an entity similar to a nation in medieval Japan, argues that the proper Japanese national consciousness was not formed until the introduction of the capitalist mode of production, which he considers to mark the beginning of modernity in Japan, in the middle of the nineteenth century.41 This was, according to him, because there was no concept of nation in pre-Meiji Japan, a concept which he regards as an essentially western idea. He proposes the idea of nation was imported from abroad through a series of encounters with the west starting with the visit of Commodore Perry in 1853 who demanded the country be opening up to western trade. It was only after

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this that the people of the Japanese archipelago could have formed a nation because they could not have been aware that they constituted a nation as the very concept was absent. Yun confirms that it was only after the idea was taken up by the Meiji government, keen on building a westernised state strong enough to withstand the colonising pressure from the west, that words like minzoku and kokumin, both being translations of the word nation with different nuances, began to be used officially. The Meiji government gradually adopted the view that people of this newly formed state constituted a kokumin, the population under the rule of a government. They then set about introducing universal education, conscription and so on to instil a Japanese consciousness into the population which was, according to Yun, ignorant of the fact that they constituted a Japanese nation. Yun argues that the idea of a Japanese nation, primarily characterised by ethnic and racial features, was developed later between the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, suggesting that the ethnic conception of the Japanese nation was a new invention, which had been arrived at as a consequence of the efforts by the Meiji and successive governments. The thrust of his argument is that the Japanese nation itself is a recent creation by the successive governments since the Meiji Restoration, and that the creation of the Japanese nation was a way for the governments to manipulate the masses, and therefore the Japanese nation is not an embodiment of some Japanese spirit which is supposed to have been always there from time immemorial. It is a clear refutation of the perennialist view. Just as occurred in the Scottish case, one can see that his argument will not engage with that of the perennialist. The two positions attempt to explain two different subjects which are unfortunately called by the same name. As I argued earlier, it is perhaps more fruitful to concentrate on examining who takes up the modernist view and why in order to understand the role played by this view in contemporary Japan. The modernist view has a powerful resonance among left-leaning or progressive intellectuals in contemporary Japanese society, which need to be understood in a historical context. In analysing contemporary Japan, one cannot ignore the impacts of World War II and its aftermath on Japan. After the humiliating, but for some liberating, defeat of 1945, Japanese intellectuals went through a thorough self-re-examination to find out why Japan started the war which had caused so much destruction.42 They focused on an old observation that the Japanese state as well as society had not been fully modernised, and concluded that this backwardness, i.e., the feudal characteristic of Japanese society, was the cause of the disaster. They also concluded that it was urgent for the Japanese to transform their outdated feudal society to a truly modern, democratic one as a means to avoid any

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further wars and associated disasters. For reformist intellectuals, the idea of the Japanese nation as promoted by the pre-war government was something that needed to be discredited in order to create a new, better society. The modernist stance such as that advocated by Yun contradicts the perennialist view in that it allows for a new agenda to reform Japanese society. Examined in this light, the modernist view of the Japanese nation is, therefore, not only an academic stance but also a political statement of the group of people who aspire for a different vision of Japan a modern, democratic, non-racist and modest Japan. Moreover since it is strongly connected to a set of political agendas, whether or not the scholars themselves are aware of this, it is not easy to carry out a discussion of When is the nation? in a manner which will provide a substantial theoretical insight into the nature of nations and nationalism in contemporary Japan. The modernists position has been entrenched even further in recent years due to the rise of the revisionist school of history. A group of historians have been advocating a different version of Japanese history a view on the Japanese nation which lends itself well to the perennialist view. They do not condemn Japanese society for being feudal but try to appreciate it as its unique characteristic. Kanji Nishio, the main advocate of this school, published a book called Kokumin no Rekishi (The history of the nation) in 1999 and has been in the centre of the debate which ensued.43 In addition, a group of historians which he chairs has compiled a new textbook of Japanese history containing many interpretations of historical events which the modernist or Marxist historians would find difficult to stomach.44 As a consequence of these developments, the traditional battleground has been shifted. The question When is the nation? in contemporary Japan is now being fought out in the sphere of ideology. Of course, the modernist view is not the only answer to the question When is the nation? in contemporary Japan. There are two views which could be set against it. The first one is based on the assumption that there has always been Japan, or the idea that the Japanese people and the country have always existed and remained essentially unchanged. This is a typical perennialist view which is, nonetheless, shared by many people, including politicians and academics, perhaps not in a very conscious manner, in contemporary Japan. The second is located between the modernist and perennialist views; it argues that the consciousness of being Japanese as one people were formed in response to changes in the medieval period but it is not an expression of the mythical Japanese spirit. This is a view supported by a number of historians, especially those of medieval history. I would now like to examine both views in more detail.

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The Perennialists View The idea that the Japanese nation has been there since time immemorial was central to pre-war Japanese nationalism which took on an aggressive militarist outlook. After the Japanese unconditional surrender, the Allied Forces, during their occupation of Japan, started to dismantle what was deemed too nationalistic within Japanese society, i.e., undemocratic and feudal institutions, practices and ways of thinking. The ideas that the Emperor was the descendant of God, and that the Japanese nation was a huge extended family organised around the Emperor were also officially denied, and any reference to these notions was eradicated from official documents and textbooks. Despite these concerted efforts by the occupational force and the post-war Japanese government, many people in Japan at the beginning of the twenty-first century, some scholars among them, seem to share the underlying idea that there has always been a Japanese nation and country. This idea has been expressed in a form of a particularly strong assumption about the Japanese; the Japanese are and, more importantly, have been throughout history, homogeneous. As I argued elsewhere, this assumption has become more prevalent in the post-war period than in the pre-war one.45 In the pre-war period, especially at the height of expansionism, the task for the intellectuals was to come to terms with the increasingly multinational and multi-ethnic nature of the Japanese Empire. They then established a view that the Japanese nation was heterogeneous, which lent itself well to the expansionist ideology. In the post-war period, however, a huge number of publications on the question of what the Japanese are (nihonjinron) have appeared. They have contributed toward strengthening the idea that the Japanese are homogenous, and that this has been the case from time immemorial.46 Their homogeneity is also thought to be a unique characteristic of the Japanese nation, which can be utilised to explain Japans economic success since the late 1960s. A close examination of the nihonjinron carried out by scholars such as Kosaku Yoshino points out that perennialists in Japan argue for the case of an old and continuous Japanese nationhood in order to emphasise the perceived homogeneity of the Japanese people. This, in turn, is held to be the most powerful explanatory factor for anything from the Japanese economic success to the relatively low crime rate. The reasons why Japan managed to catch up with the west so quickly in the early twentieth century, why post-war Japan managed to produce such a spectacular economic performance, why Japanese children are achieving higher academic standards, why Japan is relatively safe in terms of both serious and minor crime rates are, according to the perennialists, because Japanese society is highly homogeneous. Homogeneity is supposed to be conducive to

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efficiency and other qualities required to achieve prosperity. Many of the perennialist arguments in contemporary Japan are, therefore, presented not to support legitimacy of the Japanese state as such, since this already exists, but to provide a certain framework within which the Japanese people can make sense of the world. Yoshino concludes this is a form of cultural nationalism, and the fact that this particular cultural nationalism is embraced by a great number of people in Japan shows the ideological power of nationalism in the contemporary world. Despite the alleged expansion of globalisation, people are still making sense of the world in terms of nations and nationalism. This example shows that the question is not whether or not the Japanese nation is old, not even whether there is the Japanese nation, but why people subscribe to the view that there is and what it means to them. Some Historians Views Against this backdrop, some historians have started to question the perennialists view that forms the overall implicit framework of the study of Japanese history. Many of them have been looking through Japans history for evidence to indicate plurality or heterogeneity within Japanese society. Teiji Monwaki, for instance, argues that there were plural regional kingdoms in Japanese islands between the late fourth century to the sixth century. He bases his reasoning on archaeological findings and some conflicting accounts given in ancient texts such as Kojiki (compiled in 712), Nihonshoki (compiled in 720), and Fudoki, a collection of stories from many parts of Japan, of the eighth century.47 He contends that each of these regional kingdoms had its own kingship and name, its own exclusive territory, political and diplomatic systems and its own culture and ideals. Note that these correspond to Anthony Smiths definition of nation quite well; i.e., a nation is a named group of human beings sharing territory, myth and symbols, a public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. What is missing, however, is any mention of the participation of the masses and some degree of economic integration. Judging from the distribution of certain artefacts found in Japan, it would not be too difficult to make a case for a certain degree of economic integration within each kingdom. It should be noted though that since Monwaki is dealing with a very early period, it is perhaps not surprising that he does not touch upon the issue of the popular consciousness. Monwaki stresses that the Yamato kingdom, which eventually unified most of presentday Japan by the seventh century and adopted Nihon as the name of the country in the eighth century, was just one of the regional kingdoms which existed in the ancient times, and therefore questions the assumption of undisrupted homogeneity of the Japanese people. On the other hand, Monwaki recognises that some kind of awareness of being Japanese started

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to develop around the seventh century in the form of aristocratic culture with the invention of two sets of phonetic scripts (kana). Despite the political and, to some extent, cultural unification brought about by the Yamato kingship, some parts of present-day Japan, such as Tohoku (the northeastern part of Japan), were clearly seen as foreign by the central government. Some surviving documents suggest that people in these areas saw themselves as being different from the people of the western part of Japan where the power centre was situated well into the medieval period. Moriwakis view therefore presents a rather untidy picture of ancient Japan revealing the Yamato kingdom was not the only entity in Japanese archipelago, and in fact that many different peoples lived on these islands. In light of these findings, the perennialist view that the Japanese nation and state has been in existence from time immemorial in its present form is called into question and at the same time, the modernist view is also challenged. Another historian, Yoshihiko Amino, a specialist in Japanese medieval history, agrees in part with others that the consciousness of being Japanese began to develop within the ruling class in around the late seventh and early eighth centuries as a consequence of a series of encounters with The other.48 The Yamato kingship, which had, by then, consolidated its power over most of the western part of present-day Japan, lost direct control over the Korean Peninsula by losing the battle of Hakusukinoe to a Korean kingdom. It also confronted the Emishi in the north and the Hayato in the south during its drive to pacify its territory. Amino also points out that the Yamato kingship introduced a taxation system based on rice fields, a new system of trunk roads, a bureaucracy which was built on the spread of the use of Chinese characters, a nationwide registration system, all of which contributed to the cultivation of many features that are now associated with being Japanese. Although the ruling class may have started developing a kind of national awareness, it did not lead to the establishment of a unified identity amongst the Japanese. He argues that as late as the fourteenth century when the Kamakura Shogunate, the first warrior government, was operational, there were at least two significantly different groups in Japan which might have formed a type of awareness akin to national consciousness. The first was found in the eastern part of Japan and the other in the western part. Amino suggests that these two groups could have constituted two different ethnic groups, and lists some evidence to support his argument. First, the two groups had different names: Togoku or Kanto (meaning Eastern country and East of the border, respectively) in the East and Saigoku or Kansai (Western country and West of the border, respectively) in the West. The Shogun, the military

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as well as the de facto ruler of Japan, was based in the east while the Emperor and his court stayed in the west maintaining the ceremonial power so crucial to legitimate the Shoguns government. The east and west, first and foremost, represented different types of power, but which nonetheless complemented each other. Secondly, Amino notes that social stratification within the two groups were different. In the west there were some people including entertainers, warriors, some servants who entered into a contract with a deity in order to serve the shrines, temples and court. Their status in society was accordingly carefully distinguished from other ordinary people such as farmers. This practice was rarely found in the east where the relationship between the ruler and ruled was secular, a relationship which seemed to extend to the entertainers and servants. Indeed, while there is ample evidence to indicate that the social stratification in the west was multi-layered defining many different statuses for every level, a generally more simply structured stratification occurred in the east, based on the mastersubject relationship between the warriors. When then did the awareness of being the same people the Japanese emerge within the divided Japanese archipelago? According to Amino, the process of national awakening, as it were, was triggered by the political instability caused by the split of the Muromachi Shogunate in the fifteenth century and the subsequent civil war in the sixteenth century, which ended in the early seventeenth century when peace was again achieved. Amino believes the wandering monks, merchants, sailors and entertainers played a significant role in spreading the idea of Japan and the awareness of being Japanese. Surviving documents suggest that around the fourteenth century, the ordinary people of Japan were becoming aware of the borders of Japan by ways of folk songs, stories recounting the origin of the sacred places and so on. According to a story complied in the fourteenth century, Japan included the islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, and much of Honshu (excluding the northeastern part), a situation which remained virtually unchanged throughout the medieval period.49 The process was of course facilitated by the language, which had a standard writing system. Because of the introduction of a bureaucratic system in the eighth century, the Japanese writing system was fairly standardised from the early times. The two sets of phonetic scripts, hiragana and katakana, also helped to standardise the written language whilst at the same time preserving differences in dialects in everyday life. It is therefore suggested that despite the deep divide between the east and west and the possibility of having two different major ethnic groups on the mainland, people of Japan gradually began to share an awareness of belonging to the same group during the medieval period.

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It is fair to conclude from the above discussion that these historians are proposing an alternative answer to the question When was the Japanese nation? to both modernist and perennialist approaches. The historians are keen to point out that the awareness of being Japanese first emerged in the eighth century, albeit among the tiny number of the ruling class, and spread to the ordinary people during the Middle Ages. This consciousness was tied to the notion of having the same government. Therefore, they refute the modernists claim that the idea of Japan and being Japanese is just a modern phenomenon. At the same time, they question the perennialists view that the Japanese people as an entity has existed from time immemorial by pointing out the plural nature of ancient and medieval Japan. What the historians suggest is that being Japanese is not as natural and inevitable as the perennialists would argue; awareness of being Japanese has emerged a result of a long process of interaction amongst different peoples who lived in Japan. Conclusion I have so far reviewed different views on the question When is the nation? in the context of Scotland and Japan. My examination has demonstrated that even in these old nations, the question When? is still contested precisely because the answer is tied up with different visions of each nation. It is fair to argue that the question weighs heavier in the Japanese case than in the Scottish one because of the historical baggage the Japanese are carrying. This essay has also shown that there have been some developments in answering the question within the different paradigms, especially in the form of works undertaken by some historians in both cases. However, these developments have not, I would argue, contributed to the deepening of our holistic understanding of nations and nationalism because claims put forward by scholars operating in different paradigms fail to engage with each other. Whatever new insights are brought to light in one paradigm are not addressed by scholars of different viewpoints. In the Scottish case, one view holds that the Scottish nation was formed in the Middle Ages and another that it was not formed until the arrival of industrialization in the eighteenth century. In the Japanese case, there is a view that the Japanese nation emerged long before the Middle Ages while others assert that it was in the last half of the nineteenth century that the Japanese nation came into existence. The reason why scholars are speaking past each other lies with the old, familiar problem: the question What is a nation?. Since there is no agreement on what a nation is, there is little common ground between scholars of different viewpoints to engage with one another. Connor was probably right in 1990 when he said that less attention had been paid to the

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question When than the question What, and was also right to call for more research into the question When. Efforts that have been made since then have revealed that the question When is dependent on the question What, and therefore without further efforts to answer the latter, the quest for the answer to the former will be a frustrating exercise. It has also transpired that discussions of the question When in each case cannot be divorced from political agendas of the participants. The Scottish context is interesting in this respect since the perennialist position that of the SNP for instance has accommodated the civic vision of the Scottish nation. This has become necessary both because of the prevailing idea that civic nationalism is good while ethnic nationalism is bad, and because of the acceptance of the civic idea of nationhood by main actors in Scotland. As a result, a claim for the oldness of the Scottish nation is now sitting with a claim of inclusiveness and plurality, not with a claim of purity of the nation. In the Japanese case, the entanglement of the question with political agendas is even clearer; if one aspires for a truly modern and democratic Japan, it is almost necessary to adopt the modernist position. On the other hand, if one harbours doubts on the post-war settlements, the perennialist position becomes irresistible. Some of the historians, whose works have been discussed here, are also engaged in the effort to present a different vision of Japan, civic and inclusive, by concentrating their efforts on debunking the myth of homogeneity of the Japanese people since a tolerant and pluralistic Japan is a political aspiration for them. So what can one expect from the question When is a nation?? As I have pointed out earlier, unless the question What is a nation? is settled, the question When cannot be fully answered. However, asking the question When can be the first step in formulating our theoretical understanding of nationalism in two ways. Firstly, examining the discussions of the question When will highlight the differences in understanding formed concerning the question What. In this way it will serve as a step forward in the pursuit of the answer to the question What. Secondly, as demonstrated in this essay, exploring the question When in each case can provide interesting insights into what role ideas of nationhood and nationalism play in each setting. It is evident, too, that discussions of nations and nationalism are taking place within certain parameters which are set by what each society is dealing with at that particular moment of history. Even academic debate cannot entirely escape these constraints, so by asking the question When, in this sense, can be the first step in addressing perhaps the most important issue in the study of nations and nationalism: Why is the nation?.

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1. Part of this paper first appeared as When was the Nation?: the Scottish Case, ASEN Bulletin 17 (1999) pp.311. 2. Walker Connor, When is a Nation?, Ethnic Racial Studies 13/1 (Jan. 1990) pp.92103; a similar point was again made in From Tribe to Nation?, History of European Ideas 13/12 (1991) pp.518, reproduced in Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1994), pp.21026 3. Scottish National Party, Scotland: A European Nation (Edinburgh: SNP 1992). 4. For this rarely discussed but prevailing paradigm in history, political science and sociology in Japan, see Takashi Yoshida, Nihon no tanjo (The Birth of Japan), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1997); Yoshihiko Amino, Togoku to Saigoku, Kahoku to Kanan (The East Country and the West Country, The North country and the South Country) in Yasunori Arano et al. (eds), Ajia no nakano nihonnshi IV: Chiiki to minzoku (Japanese History in Asia VI: Regions and Ethnos) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press 1992), pp. 23350; Teiji Monwaki, Nihonjin no keisei (The formation of the Japanese) in Arano et al. (eds), pp.128. 5. Connor, When is a Nation? (note 2). 6. For theoretical discussion of these positions, see John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (London: Fontana 1994) and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge 1998). 7. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1983), p.55. 8. It also follows that there is no post-modern nation since the nation is intrinsic to modernity. 9. Ernest Gellner, Reply: Do nations have navels?, Nations and Nationalism 2/3 (1996) pp.36670. 10. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (note 7) p.44. 11. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1770: Programme, Myth, Reality (revised edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992) p.14. 12. Ibid. pp.4679. 13. Ibid. p.47. 14. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (note 7) p.44. 15. Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (second, expanded edition) (London: New Left Books 1981), pp.1234. 16. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (revised edition) (London: Verso 1991) pp.8090. 17. William Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation: an Historic Quest (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1998) p.19. 18. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London: Routledge 1979), pp.57. 19. Ibid., pp.2142. 20. Adrian Hasting, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997) pp.701. 21. Ibid., p.3, Seton-Watson (note 18) p.5. 22. Hasting (note 20) pp.701, Seton-Watson (note 18) p.26, Ferguson (note 17) p.13. 23. Ferguson (note 17) p.25, Michael Lynch, Scotland: A New History (London: Pimlico 1992) p.53. 24. For an excellent account of the wars of independence, see Geoffrey Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of Realm of Scotland (third edition) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1988). 25. Alexander Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness in Medieval Scotland in C Bjorn et al. (eds), Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past (Copenhagen: Academic Press 1994) pp.8695. 26. The Stone of Scone or Stone of Destiny on which successive Scottish kings were crowned was taken to England by Edward I in the course of this raid. The Stone was, after 700 years, returned to Scotland in November 1996. 27. Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness (note 25) pp.835.

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28. For instance, G.M. Trevelyan in his book described the revolt led by William Wallace as follows: This unknown knight, with little but his great name to identify him in history, had lit a fire which nothing since has ever put out. Here, in Scotland, contemporaneously with the very similar doings in Switzerland, a new ideal and tradition of wonderful potency was brought into the world; it had no name then, but now we should call it democratic patriotism. It was not the outcome of theory. The unconscious qualities of a people had given it reality in a sudden fire of rage. Theories of nation-hood and theories of democracy would follow afterwards to justify or explain it. Meanwhile, it stood up, a fact. G.M. Trevelyan, The History of England (London: Longman 1937) p.218. Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness (note 25) pp.868. Ferguson (note 17) p.27. Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness (note 25) p.78. Ferguson (note 17), pp.4353. Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness (note 25); Lynch (note 23), pp.1334. Ferguson (note 17) p.46; Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness (note 25) pp.7980. Lynch (note 23), p.113. Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 9001300 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984) p.274; Barrow (note 24) pp.30611. Alexander Grant, The Middle Ages: The Defense of Independence, in R, Michison (ed.), Why Scottish History Matters (Edinburgh: Saltire Society 1991), pp.1525; Grant, Aspects of National Consciousness (note 25). Ferguson (note 17) p.42. The idea of a heterogeneous Scotland is widely held in contemporary Scotland. For instance, the exhibits in the Museum of Scotland which opened in 1999 are organised along this idea. Some would even argue because of this historical awareness, Scottish society has been relatively more open to the so-called new immigrants, absorbing them as new Scots (Bashir Maan, The New Scots: The Stories of Asians in Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald 1992)). Anderson (note 16) pp.959; Peter Alter, Nationalism (translated by Stuwart McKinnonEvans) (London: Edward Arnold 1989) pp.347. Kwoncha Yun, Minzoku gensou no satetsu (The failure of the illusion of nationhood), Shiso 832 (December 1993) pp.437. For the concise summary of the intellectual history of postwar Japan with a focus on Japanese culture and society, see Tamotsu Aoki, Nihon bunkaron no henyo (The Transformation of Discussions of Japanese Culture) (Tokyo: Chuo-koron-sha 1990). See, Kanji Nishio, Kokumin no rekishi (The History of the Nation) (Tokyo: Sankei News Service 1999). The Ministry of Education has recently ordered and recommended some revisions to this textbook. In the meantime, a group of historians have published a book aiming to discredit Nishios view of Japanese history for being unscientific and untruthful to the historical facts. See Kyokasho ni shinjitsuto jiyu wo, Renraku-kai (ed.), Tetti hihan: Kokumin no rekishi (Critique of the history of the Nation) (Tokyo: Ootsuki Shoten 2000). Atsuko Ichijo, A Comparison of Pre- and Post-War Japanese Self-Understanding, Working paper series No. 21 (1998), Department of Sociology, London School of Economics. For a detailed analysis of the nihonjinron, see Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Inquiry (London: Routledge 1992). Monwaki (note 4). Yoshihiko Amino, Nihonron no shiza: Rettou no shakai to kokka (The viewpoint of Japanese studies: Society and State in Japanese Archipelago) (Tokyo: Shogakukan 1993). Ibid.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.