Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 28

BRILL

Phr.onesis 53 (2008)

243-270

www.brill.nl/phro

Aristotle on Natural Slavery*

Malcolm Heath
Department of Classics, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JZ m.fkeath@leeds.ac. UK uk

Abstract Aristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality {Pol. 1.5, 1 2 5 4 b 2 0 23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristode knew about non-Greek societies. Aristodes argument requires only a lack of autono mous practical rationality. A n impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (PoL 7 7 , 1 3 2 7 b l 8 31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtru sively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristode seems to have believed that the existence o f people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable o f eudaimonia are to achieve it, the exis tence o f natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotles natural teleology

Keywords Aristotle, slavery, deliberation, thumos^ teleology

A r i s t o t l e b e l i e v e d t h a t the

majority of h u m a n beings may

be

enslaved not finds

w i t h o u t i n j u s t i c e , b e c a u s e t h e y are slaves b y n a t u r e . T h a t b e l i e f has e n d e a r e d h i m to m o d e r n i n t e r p r e t e r s : J o h n M c D o w e l l , for e x a m p l e , it embarrassing.


1

J u s t as w e

t e n d to avert o u r

gaze from embarrassing

* This paper's completion was made possible by an award under the Arts and Humanities Research C o u n c i l s Research Leave scheme (grant reference A H / D 5 0 1 2 1 0 / 1 ) , with addi tional support from the University of Leeds. Successively less deficient versions were given to the Classical Association annual conference (April 2 0 0 6 ) , the Leeds Classics Research Semi nar (January 2 0 0 7 ) , and the Northern Association for Ancient Philosophy (March 2 0 0 7 ) ; I a m grateful to the audiences on each occasion for comments and encouragement.
0

McDowell 1 9 9 5 , 2 0 1 : 'this embarrassing feature of Aristotles thinking. Cf. Schofield

1999, 115: Aristotles views on slavery are an embarrassment to those who otherwise hold
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156852808X307070

244

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

sights w e p a s s in the street, s o A r i s t o t e l i a n specialists s e e m reluctant to invest in the t h e o r y o f natural slavery the b o u n d l e s s energy that has b e e n d e v o t e d to m a k i n g sense of, for e x a m p l e , Metaphysics
2

Z. T h e t h e o r y is,

i n d e e d , easy to d i s m i s s : w e k n o w that it is false; w e c a n easily explain it a w a y as a p r o d u c t o f ideological b i a s ; a n d A r i s t o t l e gives a very i n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t o f it. T h e q u e s t i o n o f slavery arises in Politics 1, w h e r e it is i n c i d e n tal to his m a i n c o n c e r n , the diversity o f political a u t h o r i t y (Pol.
3

LI,

1 2 5 2 a 7 - l 6 ) ; h e therefore offers n o m o r e t h a n a sketch o f the theory, full o f g a p s a n d a p p a r e n t inconsistencies. T h a t is n o t u n u s u a l in Aristotle, a n d in other p a r t s o f the c o r p u s s c h o l a r s w o r k h a r d t o fill g a p s a n d resolve inconsistencies. H e r e , ideological r e p u g n a n c e has p r o v e d a deterrent. B u t A r i s t o t l e has a g o o d t r a c k - r e c o r d for intelligent r e a s o n i n g . I f in this case he reasons intelligently f r o m beliefs that I d o n o t s h a r e to c o n c l u s i o n s that I reject a n d d e p l o r e , I see n o c a u s e for e m b a r r a s s m e n t . In this p a p e r I shall l o o k for a n interpretation o f the t h e o r y o f n a t u r a l slavery that is credible, in the sense o f b e i n g b r o a d l y c o h e r e n t a n d p l a u s i b l e , relative t o t h i n g s that A r i s t o t l e is likely to h a v e believed, a n d shall e x a m i n e s o m e o f the theory's wider implications.
4

1. Diagnosis
(a) A Misdiagnosis: Comprehensive Failure of Autonomous Reason

I start f r o m an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that fails to m e e t that c o n d i t i o n . Aristotle regards reason as distinctive to h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d h e s e e m s to state clearly

his philosophy in high regard'; Kraut 2 0 0 2 , 277: a deeply disturbing feature of his political thought.' Too easily for this to have much point. Schofield 1 9 9 9 largely resists the temptation (216 n.43: 'I am not here concerned with praise or blame, but with understanding the theoreti cal framework within which the idea o f natural slavery might come to seem inevitable'), but not entirely (133: 'Aristotle accepted that most slaves in his own society were natural slaves. N o doubt his assumption is to be explained in ideological terms'). More illuminating expla nations o f the kind of error in question are suggested by empirically based cognitive and social psychology (see n.22 below). Deslauriers 2 0 0 6 . Since the theory entails that I (as a Northern European) a m a natural slave and may be enslaved without injustice, it should be needless to labour the point that I am not remotely tempted to accept the theory or to defend it in any larger sense. But, for the record, I do not believe that any human beings fit Aristotles account of natural slaves as reconstructed here; nor do I believe that, if they did, it would be just to enslave them.
2) 3) 4)

M. HeathJ Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270 (Pol.

245 1.13,

that n a t u r a l slaves are h u m a n a n d h a v e a s h a r e in r e a s o n

1 2 5 9 b 2 7 - 8 ) . B u t elsewhere h e qualifies that s t a t e m e n t : a n a t u r a l slave S h a r e s in reason to the extent o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g it, b u t d o e s n o t h a v e it h i m s e l f (Pol. 1.5, 1 2 5 4 b 2 0 - 2 3 ) . W e k n o w f r o m t h e ethical treatises t h a t

in h u m a n s the n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t o f the s o u l , the p a r t w h i c h perceives a n d desires, is also in a s e n s e rational: a l t h o u g h it is n o t c a p a b l e o f r e a s o n i n g , it can b e r e s p o n s i v e to r e a s o n (NE 1.13, 1 1 0 - 2 b 3 0 - 3 a 3 ; EE 2.1, 1219b26-

3 2 ) . I f this p r o v i d e s his m o d e l for n a t u r a l slaves, t h e n A r i s t o t l e s s u g g e s t i o n is that, t h o u g h slaves can b e r e s p o n s i v e to the r e a s o n e d i n s t r u c t i o n s o f a master, they h a v e n o c a p a c i t y for r e a s o n i n g a u t o n o m o u s l y .
5

B u t t h a t is n o t

a credible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m is n o t that it conflicts w i t h the facts: that c a n b e s a i d o f m a n y t h i n g s that A r i s t o t l e believed. W h a t is crucial is that it conflicts w i t h w h a t A r i s t o t l e m u s t h a v e t a k e n to b e the facts. C o n sistency w i t h things that w o u l d h a v e b e e n p e r f e c t l y o b v i o u s to A r i s t o t l e m u s t p r o v i d e a crucial c o n s t r a i n t o n the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f a n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f his theory. A r i s t o t l e believed that n o n - G r e e k s (pocpoi) are n a t u r a l slaves 1.2, 1 2 5 2 b 5 - 9 ; 1.6, 1 2 5 5 a 2 8 - b 2 ; 3 . 1 4 , 1 2 8 5 a l 9 - 2 1 ) .
6

(Pol.

Many purported

facts a b o u t n o n - G r e e k p e o p l e s were r e c o r d e d in t h e literature available to e n q u i r e r s in Aristotle's day, a n d the s u b j e c t is o n e w h i c h h e researched: h e w r o t e a w o r k o n n o n - G r e e k c u s t o m s (vjaijia a p a p n c ) , a s u b j e c t w h i c h he r e g a r d e d as useful for legislative s c i e n c e (Rhet. 1.4, 1360a30-8).
7

A l t h o u g h t h a t w o r k is lost, h i s ethical a n d political w r i t i n g s c o n t a i n n u m e r o u s c o m m e n t s o n n o n - G r e e k p e o p l e s . W h e n h e notes t h a t s o m e d i s t a n t n o n - G r e e k p e o p l e s are b y n a t u r e l a c k i n g in r a t i o n a l i t y (.7iaioi) a n d live b y p e r c e p t i o n a l o n e , like n o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s (NE implicitly a c k n o w l e d g e s 7.5, I l 4 9 a 9 - l l ) , he especially

the r a t i o n a l i t y o f m o s t n o n - G r e e k s ,

t h o s e nearest a n d m o s t familiar. T h a t is n o s u r p r i s e . A r i s t o t l e c a n n o t h a v e failed to b e a w a r e that, left to t h e m s e l v e s , n o n - G r e e k s were able to o r g a n i s e

Fortenbaugh 1977; Kraut 2 0 0 2 , 2 8 3 . Despite the disagreements recorded below, I regard Kraut's discussion (277-305) as extremely helpful; it is also unusually generous in its acknowledgement that 'Aristotle s framework for thinking about this subject was internally consistent and even contained a limited amount o f explanatory power' (278). It does not follow that this is true o f every individual non-Greek, without exception. For Aristotle, natural processes are relatively robust tendencies, not exceptionless rules (e.g. Pol. 1.5, 1254b2734; 1.6, 1255b3-4). See Kraut 2 0 0 2 , 2 9 4 n . 3 1 . Periegetic literature, recommended here, is cited at Pol. 2 . 3 , 1262a 1 8 - 2 1 .
G) 7)

5)

246

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

societies t h a t were v i a b l e , t h o u g h d e f e c t i v e .

S o m e of them could plan and

e x e c u t e l o g i s t i c a l l y c o m p l e x p r o j e c t s ( s u c h as X e r x e s ' i n v a s i o n o f G r e e c e ) . Some of them had technologically a d v a n c e d cultures. T h e


9

Egyptians

i n v e n t e d m a t h e m a t i c s (Met. w e r e g o o d a s t r o n o m e r s (DC

1.1, 9 8 1 M 3 - 2 5 ) ;

they a n d the Babylonians

2 . 1 2 , 2 9 2 a 7 - 9 ) . H o w could they m a n a g e any

o f these t h i n g s , i f t h e y w e r e w h o l l y i n c a p a b l e o f a u t o n o m o u s r e a s o n i n g ?

(b)

An Impairment

of ~ Practical Reason

S o A r i s t o t l e c o u l d n o t h a v e b e l i e v e d t h a t n a t u r a l slaves suffer f r o m a c o m p r e h e n s i v e failure o f a u t o n o m o u s rationality. B u t t h a t leaves o p e n t h e p o s sibility o f a m o r e l i m i t e d failure. A r i s t o t l e r e c o g n i s e s different k i n d s of

rationality. T h e evidence m e n t i o n e d a b o v e s h o w s that n o n - G r e e k s m u s t be capable o f technical a n d theoretical r e a s o n i n g .


1 0

W h a t about practical

8)

Viability might seem inconsistent with PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 2 a 3 0 - 3 4 , which grounds the dis

tinction between natural ruler and natural subject in the slave s lack of foresight with regard to survival. B u t the context refers to the earliest stages o f social development, and we should be cautious about extrapolating these c o m m e n t s to larger social organisations. It is the establishment o f self-sustaining communities that allows the horizon o f h u m a n concern to extend beyond the mere preservation o f life to living & good life {PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 2 b 2 7 - 3 0 ) , i.e. a life o f fine actions (PoL 3 . 9 , 1 2 8 0 b 4 0 - l a 4 ) . W h a t is at stake for the isolated household with which Aristotles account begins is survival, for which instrumental competence suffices. Practical wisdom can only c o m e into question as a legitimating quality for the master-slave relationship when the household becomes a locus for the pursuit o f the g o o d life, i.e. when it is part o f apolis.
9 )

This invention was not, in Aristotles view, driven by instrumental applications: it is

because mathematics neither meets essential needs nor provides pleasurable luxuries that an advanced society able to sustain a leisured class (such as the Egyptian priests) was its pre condition. Contrast Herodotus' conjecture (2.109) that geometry was invented in Egypt for application in land allocation a n d tax assessment.
M))

Since xxvn in its strict definition involves rationality (NE6A,

1 1 4 0 a l 0 ; cf. Met. 1.1,

9 8 1 a 5 - 3 0 ) , the claim that Asiatics are intelligent a n d 'technical' (PoL 7 . 7 , 1 3 2 7 b 2 7 - 8 ) seems to provide explicit evidence that (some) non-Greeks are capable o f technical rational ity. Admittedly, T^vn can be emulated by habitual skills acquired a n d exercised without understanding (what Aristotle calls euTteipa: Met. 1.1, 9 8 1 a l 2 - 1 5 ) , or even by instinctive animal behaviour {HA 7 . 1 , 5 8 8 a 2 8 - 3 1 ; cf. 8 . 1 1 , 6 1 5 a l 8 - 9 ; 8 . 1 3 , 6 l 6 a 4 - 6 ; 8.37, 6 2 0 b l 0 11; 8 . 3 8 , 6 2 2 b 2 2 - 2 4 ) . However, building pyramids a n d invading Greece are not like nest ing or spinning a web: they are not a mere matter o f finding instrumental means to simple ends', following 'fixed rules' that eliminate the need for adaptability and ingenuity' (Kraut 2 0 0 2 , 2 8 9 ) . The complexity o f such projects d e m a n d s more than an instinct or tacit knack.

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008) reason?


11

243-270

247

T h e d i s t i n c t i o n between practical a n d technical rationality is 6.4-5). Practical w i s d o m is c o n c e r n e d w i t h a c t i o n (rcpaiji),

clarified b y the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n practical w i s d o m (<ppvr|Gi<;) a n d a r t (i%vr|) (NE art w i t h p r o d u c t i o n (Tcovncu). T h e r e are two differences. First, p r o d u c t i o n is n o t intrinsically v a l u a b l e , b u t derives w h a t e v e r value it has f r o m the p r o d u c t ; by contrast, g o o d a c t i o n is intrinsically v a l u a b l e (that is, c h o s e n o n a c c o u n t o f itself: NE 2 . 4 , 1 1 0 5 a 3 1 - 2 ; 6 . 3 , l l 4 4 a l 8 - 2 0 ; 1 0 . 6 , 1 1 7 6 b 6 10). Secondly, art d o e s n o t tell y o u w h a t y o u should d o ; it o n l y tells y o u c o n d i t i o n a l l y w h a t y o u s h o u l d d o if you w a n t to m a k e the p r o d u c t . Y o u m u s t l o o k elsewhere to d e t e r m i n e whether the p r o d u c t is w o r t h m a k i n g . I n fact, y o u m u s t l o o k to practical w i s d o m , w h i c h is (in A r i s t o t l e s t e r m ) a r c h i t e c t o n i c (NE 1.2, 1 0 9 4 a 2 6 - 8 ;
1 2

6.7, H 4 l b 2 1 - 4 ; c

1.6, 1 2 1 7 a 6 the best

7 ) : it provides overall g u i d a n c e for life. Aristotle says that n a t u r a l slaves c a n n o t achieve eudaimonia, that eudaimonia consists in v i r t u o u s activity (NE k i n d o f h u m a n life (Pol. 3 . 9 , 1 2 8 0 a 3 1 - 4 ) . T h e r e a s o n t h e y c a n n o t d o s o is 10.6, 1 1 7 7 a 6 - l l ) . That places it b e y o n d the s c o p e o f technical rationality. T o explain a n inability to live a v i r t u o u s h u m a n life, it is necessary to i n v o k e a failure o f architectonic' practical r e a s o n . S o it is p l a u s i b l e to s u p p o s e that this is the k i n d o f rationality that A r i s t o t l e denies to n a t u r a l slaves. H i s a p p a r e n t l y u n r e stricted f o r m u l a t i o n s are s h o r t h a n d expressions; there w a s n o p o i n t in spelling o u t qualifications w h i c h are entailed b y o b v i o u s facts a b o u t n o n G r e e k s , a n d w h i c h are i m p l i e d b y a c o n t e x t in w h i c h o n l y rationality in ethics is relevant. W h e n A r i s t o t l e says that a n a t u r a l slave shares in reason to the extent o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g it, b u t d o e s n o t h a v e it h i m s e l f , therefore, he is t h i n k i n g specifically o practical (c) An Impairment 0/Deliberation reason.
13

I n w h a t w a y is a n a t u r a l slave's c a p a c i t y for p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i m p a i r e d ? O n e possibility w o u l d b e that h e c a n n o t f o r m u l a t e the right k i n d o f c o n c e p t : For this tripartition: Met. 6 . 1 , 1025b25; cf. NE 6.2, 1 1 3 9 a 2 6 - 3 1 ; EE IX 1 2 l 4 a 8 - 1 2 ; Top. 6.6, I 4 5 a l 5 - 1 8 . Referring to politics, which is the same cjt as practical wisdom, though different in being (NEl.%, l l 4 l b 2 3 - 4 ) . This restriction is recognised by Brunt 1993, 3 6 2 ; 'it is the power o f deliberation that precedes moral c h o i c e . . . which a natural slave lacks'; Garver 1994, 178: Slaves have the reasoning ability necessary for techn and so obviously deliberate well in a narrow sense o f performing instrumental reasoning. A clever slave is no contradiction in terms.'
12) 13) y l l }

248

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

that c o n c e p t i o n s o f right a n d w r o n g h a v e no m e a n i n g for h i m . B u t this, t o o , is s o m e t h i n g that A r i s t o t l e c o u l d n o t h a v e believed. F o r Aristotle, a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n h u m a n s a n d o t h e r a n i m a l s is that, whereas other a n i m a l s c a n c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h e a c h o t h e r a b o u t s o u r c e s o f p l e a s u r e a n d distress, o n l y h u m a n s h a v e an awareness of, a n d a c a p a c i t y to c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t , w h a t is a d v a n t a g e o u s a n d h a r m f u l , r i g h t a n d w r o n g (PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 3 a 7 - 1 8 ) . It w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t t h e e t h n o g r a p h i c d a t a to d e n y that natural slaves can c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t w h a t is right a n d w r o n g . E v e n the b a r b a r o u s T r i b a l l i a n s have a c o n c e p t o f w h a t is kalon intrinsically w o r t h w h i l e ) .
14

(fine, n o b l e , flawed:

A d m i t t e d l y , their c o n c e p t i o n is terribly

they t h i n k it is kalon to sacrifice their fathers (Top. 2 . 1 1 , 1 1 5 b 2 2 - 6 ) . B u t they d o h a v e the c o n c e p t , a n d are m o t i v a t e d b y it. T h e T r i b a l l i a n s c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t is kalon is d e e p l y m i s g u i d e d . Perh a p s , then, the r o o t o f the s l a v e s i m p a i r m e n t lies in a p r o f o u n d d y s f u n c tion in the c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i s e ends: a n i n c a p a c i t y to m a k e p r o p e r l y r e a s o n e d j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t right a n d w r o n g . H o w else c o u l d the Triballians have failed to identify their b a r b a r o u s m i s c o n c e p t i o n a b o u t w h a t is kalon . B u t A r i s t o t l e says s o m e t h i n g different. N a t u r a l slaves are i n c a p a b l e o f p r o h a i r e s i s a n d eudaimonia (Pol. 3 . 9 , 1 2 8 0 a 3 1 - 4 ) . T h e s e t w o incapacities w i t h o u t v i r t u o u s a c t i o n ; a n d there is n o (for e x a m p l e , NE2.6, 1106b36; 6.2, (for is d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e are linked: there is n o eudaimonia v i r t u o u s a c t i o n w i t h o u t prohairesis 1 1 3 9 a 2 2 - 3 ; EE e x a m p l e , NE33, 37,
7

1 2 3 4 a 2 3 - 6 ) . Prohairesis

1113a9-12; 6.2, 1139a23; 2 . 1 0 , 1226b 13-23); and is therefore u l t i m a t e l y r o o t e d in this a n d d e l i b e r a t i o n are b o t h c o n c e r n e d 1 1 1 2 b l l - 1 5 , 33-4;

natural slaves lack the c a p a c i t y for d e l i b e r a t i o n (PoL 1.13, 1 2 6 0 a 1 2 ) . T h e slave s inability to achieve eudaimonia deliberative incapacity. B u t prohairesis

w i t h 'the t h i n g s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s the e n d s ' (NE33,

2 . 1 0 , 1 2 2 6 a 7 - 1 3 , b 9 - 1 3 , 2 7 a 7 - 2 4 ) . S o t h e n a t u r a l s l a v e s deliberative i n c a p a c i t y is not a failure o f r e a s o n e d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t e n d s ; e n d s are p r o p o s e d by character, n o t b y inferential r e a s o n i n g (avXKoyioyLq: 1 2 2 7 b 2 2 - 5 , b 3 4 - 8 a 2 ; cf. NE7.8, 1151al5-19).
1 5

EE 2 . 1 1 ,

Deliberative incapacity

i m p a i r s r e a s o n i n g f r o m e n d s to their i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s .

Rhet. 1.9, 1366a33-4: whatever, being worthy o f choice for itself, is praiseworthy, or whatever, being good, is pleasant because it is good' (o a v 5i' a u t o oupeiv v Ttaivetv fi, ii o a v y a 6 v v i\dv x\ T I y a v ) . Cf. EE 8.3, 1 2 4 8 b 18-20. This is not, o f course, the whole story. The relevant kinds of end are inaccessible to animals without reason (they are motivated solely by pleasure and distress). Moreover, the existence o f the ethical treatises shows that inferential reasoning about ends is not pointless.
y 15)

U)

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

249

D e l i b e r a t i o n is r e a s o n i n g b a c k f r o m a g o a l t o t h e a c t i o n r e q u i r e d to implement that g o a l (EE 2 . 1 0 , 1 2 2 6 b 1 2 - 1 3 ) . R e a s o n i n g o f the f o r m ' b e c a u s e o f that, this is to b e done* is a f o r m o f c a u s a l r e a s o n i n g , in t h e sense that t h e g o a l explains t h e a c t i o n ; it is the final cause: it explains why that is t h e t h i n g to d o (EE2,10,1226b25-9). The behaviour of n o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s c a n also b e e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s o f final c a u s e s . T h e p e a c o c k displays in order to m a t e w i t h a p e a h e n ; t h e z e b r a r u n s in o r d e r t o e s c a p e the lion. B u t t h e a n i m a l s b e h a v i o u r is driven directly b y the p l e a s u r e o r distress w h i c h a t t e n d s its p e r c e p t i o n s (or e x p e c t a t i o n s ) ; it is n o t m e d i a t e d b y a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the behaviour's (final) c a u s e . N o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d c a u s e s , a n d therefore c a n n o t e n g a g e i n causal r e a s o n i n g ; t h e s a m e is true o f h u m a n c h i l d r e n . prohairesis (EE2.10,
16

S o neither is c a p a b l e o f d e l i b e r a t i o n o r

1226b21-5).

C h i l d r e n , u n l i k e n o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s , g r o w o u t o f this incapacity. T h e y b e c o m e c a p a b l e o f d e l i b e r a t i o n . O r s o m e o f t h e m d o : w h e n Aristotle c o n trasts children, w h o have a p o t e n t i a l for d e l i b e r a t i o n w h i c h h a s n o t yet m a t u r e d , w i t h slaves, w h o s e deliberative c a p a c i t y is p e r m a n e n t l y i m p a i r e d (Pol. 1 . 1 3 , 1 2 6 0 a l 2 - l 4 ) , it g o e s w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t n a t u r a l l y servile chil dren g r o w u p t o b e c o m e a d u l t s w i t h the servile d e l i b e r a t i v e incapacity. B u t this d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t they r e m a i n in a c h i l d l i k e s t a t e .
17

The adult slaves

i n c a p a c i t y differs f r o m the child's i n t w o w a y s . First, t h e a d u l t 'shares in reason t o t h e extent o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g it', w h i l e s m a l l children are n o t yet able even to u n d e r s t a n d reason. A r i s t o t l e is q u i t e clear a b o u t this difference: 'those w h o d e n y reason to slaves a n d s a y that o n e s h o u l d o n l y give orders are w r o n g : slaves s h o u l d b e a d m o n i s h e d [vo^OexriTov] m o r e than chil dren (Pol. 1.5, 1 2 6 0 b 5 - 7 ) ; b y c o n t r a s t , children's b e h a v i o u r m u s t b e steered b y p l e a s u r e a n d distress (NE 1 0 . 1 , 1 1 7 2 a 2 0 - l ) . T h o u g h t h e slave n e e d s a m a s t e r s a d m o n i t i o n to m a k e u p for his deliberative incapacity,

However, Aristotle holds that argument is not necessary to discover the starting-points o f action if one has a properly formed character (NE 1.4, 1 0 9 5 b 3 - 8 ) , and is useless if one does not (NE2A, 1105b 12-18; 10.9, 1179b4-31); and there is a risk o f being misled by bad arguments (EE 1.6, 1 2 1 6 b 4 0 - 1 7 a l 7 ) . Relevant discussions include Tuozzo 1991; Smith 1996; Vasiliou 1996. Children resemble non-human animals: NE3.2, l l l l b 6 - 1 0 ; 6 . 1 3 , 1 1 4 4 b 8 - 9 ; 7 . 1 2 , 1 1 5 3 a 3 0 - 3 5 ; EE 2.8, 1 2 2 4 a 2 5 - 3 0 ; 2 . 1 0 , 1 2 2 6 b 2 1 - 5 ; Phys. 2 . 6 , 197b5-8; HA 8 . 1 , 588a31-b3. 'Childlike is used too freely in Schofield 1999, 124-8 (cf. 132: 'it was reasonable to try to identify a specific form o f rule appropriate to the childlike').
16) 17) 5

250

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

that a d m o n i t i o n is only o f use to h i m because h e is responsive to deliberative reasoning that he w o u l d b e incapable o f p r o d u c i n g himself. T h e child is not yet able to deliberate; the a d u l t slave is n o t a b l e to deliberate form of deliberation.
18

independently.

Secondly, natural slaves are c a p a b l e o f technical reason, w h i c h involves a C r a f t s m e n m a y have to w o r k o u t solutions to novel p r o b l e m s ; Xerxes' generals h a d t o solve the logistical p r o b l e m s involved in i n v a d i n g Greece. T h e child is i n c a p a b l e o f any kind of deliberation; the adult slave is incapable o f i n d e p e n d e n t practical (d) An Impairment of G l o b a l deliberation.

Deliberation

T h a t m a y s e e m a p u z z l i n g incapacity. A clever Triballian c r a f t s m a n s p e n d s all d a y in his w o r k s h o p w o r k i n g o u t h o w to m a k e a novelty p o t t o sell to G r e e k tourists; o n his w a y h o m e it o c c u r s to h i m that h e s h o u l d d o s o m e t h i n g fine a n d n o b l e ; h e k n o w s that sacrificing one's father is fine a n d n o b l e ; w h y s h o u l d he n o t b e a b l e to w o r k o u t h o w to d o that? W h y s h o u l d causal r e a s o n i n g o f the f o r m ' b e c a u s e o f that, this is to be d o n e ' fail in o n e d o m a i n , b u t not another? C o n s i d e r a s i m p l e e x a m p l e o f practical r e a s o n i n g . I see a destitute per s o n w h o is h u n g r y a n d has n o t h i n g to eat. I r e c o g n i s e that it w o u l d b e kalon to h e l p h i m , a n d w a n t t o d o so. H o w c a n I help? I c o u l d help by g i v i n g h i m f o o d ; a n d here is s o m e f o o d . S o I shall give h i m this f o o d . B u t p e r h a p s that w o u l d b e w r o n g . H e r e is s o m e f o o d , but the f o o d b e l o n g s to s o m e o n e else - a n d it w o u l d b e disgraceful t o steal. In that case I o u g h t not give the f o o d . I s h o u l d p u r s u e m y g o a l b y o t h e r m e a n s ( p e r h a p s by pers u a d i n g the o w n e r to d o n a t e the f o o d , or finding o t h e r f o o d w h i c h I have a right to d i s p o s e o f ) . A practical r e a s o n e r m u s t consider, n o t j u s t w h a t can b e d o n e to i m p l e m e n t a goal, b u t w h a t c a n b e d o n e consistently w i t h the a c t i o n still b e i n g fine, since v i r t u o u s a c t i o n is p e r f o r m e d b e c a u s e o f (or for the s a k e o f ) to kalon.
19

Practical r e a s o n i n g m u s t integrate a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f

m o r a l l y relevant c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

Kraut, though denying that natural slaves are 'helpless mental invalids' (2002, 283-4), thinks that they are incapable o f technical as well as practical deliberation (285-90, 292; cf. 3 0 4 n.48 for theoretical reason). Contra n.10 above. 1 1 1 5 b l 2 - 1 3 , 20-4; 3.8, H l 6 b 2 - 3 , 1 1 1 7 a 8 - 9 , 17; 3.9, 1117b9, 13-15; 3 . 1 2 , 1 1 1 9 b l 6 ; 4 . 1 , 1120a23-9, 1121b3-5; 4.2, 1122b6-7; 4.3, 1123a24-5; 9.8, 1168a33-4; 10.8, 1 1 7 8 b l 2 - 1 3 ; EE3A 1 2 2 9 a l - 9 , 3 0 a 2 6 - 3 2 ; 8.3, 1 2 4 8 M 8 - 2 2 , 34-7, 4 9 a 5 - 6 , 13-14.
19) t

18)

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

251

Aristotle m a k e s the f o l l o w i n g d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h regard to deliberation: g o o d d e l i b e r a t i o n in the u n q u a l i f i e d s e n s e . . . is w h a t s u c c e e d s in relation to the e n d in the u n q u a l i f i e d sense, g o o d d e l i b e r a t i o n in the p a r t i c u l a r sense in relation to s o m e p a r t i c u l a r e n d ' (NE6.9, I l 4 2 b 2 9 - 3 1 ) . Practical w i s d o m involves u n q u a l i f i e d d e l i b e r a t i o n , the ability 'to deliberate well a b o u t w h a t is g o o d a n d beneficial for [one]self, n o t in p a r t i c u l a r r e s p e c t s . . . b u t a b o u t w h a t sorts o f t h i n g c o n d u c e t o living a g o o d life in general' (NE6.5, 1 l 4 0 a 2 5 - 8 ) . Perhaps, then, w h a t n a t u r a l slaves lack is the c a p a c ity for that k i n d o f g l o b a l d e l i b e r a t i o n . T h e y c a n p l a n s t e p s to i m p l e m e n t a p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l g o a l , b u t they c a n n o t b u i l d i n t o that p l a n n i n g the s e n sitivity to a w i d e r a n g e o f m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that is necessary if o n e is to achieve the c o h e r e n c e o f a life that is lived well in general. I f that is right, t h e n it is p o s s i b l e to see h o w there can b e a deliberative i n c a p a c i t y that leaves the n a t u r a l slave s technical ability u n i m p a i r e d . T e c h n i c a l a n d p r a c tical d e l i b e r a t i o n differ in this respect: a l t h o u g h technical r e a s o n i n g m a y involve the i n t e g r a t i o n o f c o m p e t i n g d e m a n d s ( t r a d i n g off a structure's s t r e n g t h a n d w e i g h t , for e x a m p l e ) , it is n o t a r c h i t e c t o n i c , a n d is therefore n o t s u b j e c t to the s a m e c o n s t r a i n t o f g l o b a l i n t e g r a t i o n . (e) The Failure of Executive Control
i

I f n a t u r a l slaves are u n a b l e to e n g a g e in g l o b a l d e l i b e r a t i o n , their actions will n o t b e g u i d e d b y a stable a r c h i t e c t o n i c c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d life. T h e y will inevitably p u r s u e a series o f u n c o o r d i n a t e d p a r t i c u l a r g o a l s . B u t living w i t h o u t the g u i d a n c e o f a stable c o n c e p t i o n o f the overall g o o d is n o t u n i q u e to n a t u r a l slaves: there are G r e e k s w h o live like that t h r o u g h their o w n fecklessness (NE 1.4, 1 0 9 5 a 2 3 - 5 ; EE 1.2, 1 2 l 4 b 6 - l l ) . T h e s e p e o p l e d o n o t p r o v i d e a satisfactory m o d e l for t h e n a t u r a l slave's i m p a i r m e n t . A l t h o u g h their a r c h i t e c t o n i c c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d life c h a n g e s erratically, there is n o reason to d o u b t that these feckless G r e e k s are able to deliberate in relation to whatever c o n c e p t i o n t h e y h a p p e n to h o l d at a given time; n a t u r a l slaves are not. S o w e m u s t l o o k deeper. C o n s i d e r a m o r e radical folly: the failure t o h a v e a n y u l t i m a t e g o a l at all. I f there is n o t h i n g that is c h o s e n for itself, desire is r e n d e r e d futile b y an infinite regress: each t h i n g is c h o s e n for the s a k e o f s o m e t h i n g else, w h i c h is in t u r n c h o s e n for the s a k e o f s o m e t h i n g else, a n d s o on (NE 1 0 9 4 a l 8 - 2 1 ) . In the Protrepticus ( F 4 3 D u r i n g = I a m b l i c h u s Protr. 1.2, 52.16-

5 3 . 1 4 ) , Aristotle h i g h l i g h t s the l a u g h a b l e i g n o r a n c e o f those w h o always a s k w h a t use is this?' W e m u s t c o m e t o rest in s o m e t h i n g that w e c h o o s e ,

252

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

n o t b e c a u s e it leads to s o m e t h i n g else, b u t b e c a u s e it is intrinsically w o r t h c h o o s i n g . B u t s u p p o s e y o u a r e the k i n d o f p e r s o n w h o d o e s always a s k w h a t use is this?


3

N o t h i n g y o u d o has i n t r i n s i c validity; e v e r y t h i n g

is

r e q u i r e d to l e a d to an o u t c o m e that will s u p p l y it w i t h extrinsic v a l i d a t i o n . T h i s m e a n s that a c t i o n (Ttpai) c o l l a p s e s i n t o p r o d u c t i o n ; all y o u r d e l i b e r a t i o n b e c o m e s technical d e l i b e r a t i o n - w h i c h is w i t h i n the p o w e r s o f natural slaves. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , b e c a u s e o f t h e regress, the extrinsic v a l i d a tion y o u seek is never a c h i e v e d , s o y o u r d e l i b e r a t i o n is r e n d e r e d futile. I f y o u r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r e s o u r c e s are l i m i t e d t o technical d e l i b e r a t i o n that is n o t a n c h o r e d b y an a r c h i t e c t o n i c c o n c e p t i o n o f i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , y o u c a n n o t live a m e a n i n g f u l l i f e .
20

Yet this t o o d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a s a t i s f a c t o r y m o d e l . W e h a v e already seen that the n a t u r a l slave n e e d n o t l a c k a c o n c e p t i o n o f intrinsic value: the well b r o u g h t u p T r i b a l l i a n sees sacrificing his father as kalon, a n d therefore

w o r t h c h o o s i n g for itself. T h e p r o b l e m , t h e n , is n o t that h e lacks this c o n c e p t i o n ; it m u s t b e t h a t it fails t o a n c h o r his d e l i b e r a t i o n . W h e n A r i s t o t l e d i s c u s s e s w e a k n e s s o f will h e s h o w s t h a t t h e r e are v a r i o u s ways in w h i c h j u d g e m e n t s which a person holds, a n d can articulate, m a y b e c o m e detached f r o m executive c o n t r o l o f b e h a v i o u r (NE 7.3, 1 1 4 6 b 3 1 - 4 7 a 2 4 ) . I f that

d e t a c h m e n t recurs persistently, w e m a y d o u b t w h e t h e r the p e r s o n really u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t h e is saying; p e r h a p s h e is j u s t p a r r o t i n g the w o r d s . B u t that n e e d n o t b e the case. I persistently p e r f o r m b a d l y a t t h e k i n d o f test o f spatial r e a s o n i n g that involves i d e n t i f y i n g w h i c h o f several d r a w i n g s o f t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l o b j e c t s is a r o t a t i o n (or o t h e r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ) o f the o b j e c t in a s a m p l e i m a g e . It is n o t that I d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d the relevant spatial c o n c e p t s ; I j u s t c a n n o t a p p l y t h e m in p r a c t i c e .
21

But when I am

s h o w n t h e right answer, I h a v e n o p r o b l e m in u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h y it is right. I a m deficient in a u t o n o m o u s spatial r e a s o n i n g , b u t a m a b l e to fol-

20)

Aristotle does not claim that the addressees of the Protrepticus are actually in this pre dicament: if they were, his strategy for discrediting the objection that philosophy is useless would fail. Having pointed out that the objection cannot be generalised without absurdity, he goes on to show that the objectors are in fact motivated by intrinsic value in the absence o f further instrumental advantage ( F 4 4 = Iamblichus 53.15-54.5). The final move is to suggest that the addressees' existing commitments to intrinsic value (as spectators of athlet ics and theatrical performances) actually point the way to the greater intrinsic value of philosophy. This incapacity is connected with m y very weak visual imagination: I cannot manipulate the objects in thought and 'see' how they look.
21)

M. Heath /Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

253

low the g u i d a n c e o f a c o m p e t e n t s p a t i a l reasoner. I f s o l v i n g s u c h puzzles were the k e y to a w o r t h w h i l e h u m a n life, I w o u l d b e a n a t u r a l slave. (f) Conclusion

N a t u r a l slaves, then, suffer f r o m a n i m p a i r m e n t t h a t is l i m i t e d in several ways: it is a n i m p a i r m e n t o f the c a p a c i t y for practical ( n o t technical or deliberation theoretical) r e a s o n i n g ; it is a n i m p a i r m e n t o f the c a p a c i t y for

( n o t a c o n c e p t u a l or m o t i v a t i o n a l failure); it is an i m p a i r m e n t o f the c a p a c ity for global d e l i b e r a t i o n ; a n d it is an i m p a i r m e n t t h a t d i s r u p t s d e l i b e r a tion by d e t a c h i n g a n individual's c o n c e p t i o n o f intrinsic v a l u e from executive control o f his behaviour. Yet, t h o u g h the i m p a i r m e n t is l i m i t e d in these ways, its c o n s e q u e n c e s are p r o f o u n d . I n every other respect a n a t ural slave m a y b e extremely intelligent; b u t h e lacks the c a p a c i t y to m a k e r e a s o n e d j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t w h a t he s h o u l d d o c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h his c o n c e p t i o n o f living well in general. A n d this renders h i m i n c a p a b l e o f living a worthwhile h u m a n life.
22

2. Aetiology
(a) The Influence of Climate

H o w d i d the natural slave get that way? B y living in t h e w r o n g place. A r i s t o tle observes that G r e e k s are m i d - w a y geographically between E u r o p e a n s , w h o live in a c o l d climate, a n d Asiatics; a n d they are m i d - w a y between t h e m in terms o f character a n d intelligence as well (Pol. 7 . 7 , 1 3 2 7 b l 8 - 3 1 ) . T h e clear implication is that the differences are c a u s e d by t h e climatic variations. E n v i r o n m e n t a l explanations were certainly current in Aristotle's d a y .
22) 23

An impairment that is limited in scope, but profound in its effects, is just what is needed if we are to understand how it retained its credibility in Aristotle's eyes. The rest can be left to confirmation bias (e.g. Nickerson 1998) and attribution error (e.g. Ross and Anderson 1982; Gilbert and Malone 1995; cf. Brunt 1993. 3 7 9 - 8 0 ) , The power o f roles in a hierar chical relationship to bias the perception o f traits has been demonstrated even under exper imental conditions, when participants knew that roles had been assigned randomly (Humphrey 1985). Hippocrates Airs, Waters, Places 12-24. Hippocrates account recognises a greater variety of factors, and is not based on a Greek/non-Greek polarity: see Jouanna 1999, 211-32; Thomas 2 0 0 0 , 86-98; Sassi 2 0 0 1 , 105-20; Isaac 2004, 5 6 - 8 2 (and on Aristotle's theory o f slavery also 1 7 5 - 8 1 , 2 1 1 - 3 ) .
23)

254

M, Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

G r e e k s are s p i r i t e d (evBtiuo) a n d intelligent (iccvorj-ciK); E u r o p e a n s are full o f spirit, b u t l a c k i n g in intelligence a n d art; A s i a t i c s are intelligent a n d t e c h n i c a l l y - m i n d e d , b u t l a c k i n g in s p i r i t (OCGDUO). T h u s the E u r o p e a n c l i m a t e p r o d u c e s o v e r - s t i m u l a t e d spirit (thumos) w h i l e i m p a i r i n g intelli

g e n c e ; the A s i a t i c c l i m a t e leaves i n t e l l i g e n c e u n i m p a i r e d w h i l e p r o d u c i n g under-stimulated spirit.


24

T h e u n i m p a i r e d i n t e l l i g e n c e a t t r i b u t e d to A s i a t

ics m u s t refer to technical a n d theoretical intelligence, since w e h a v e already r e c o g n i s e d t h a t practical alike. T h e r e is n o r e a s o n w h y c l i m a t e s h o u l d n o t exercise a direct influence o n r e a s o n i n g capacity. Intellect ( v o ) as s u c h is n o t e m b o d i e d (DA 2.1, intelligence is i m p a i r e d in A s i a t i c s a n d E u r o p e a n s

4 l 3 a 3 - 7 ; 3 . 4 , 4 2 9 a l 0 - 2 9 ) , b u t t h i n k i n g is. F o r t h o u g h t is n o t w i t h o u t ' phantasia (DA 1 . 1 , 4 0 3 a 8 - 1 0 ; 3 . 7 , 4 3 1 a l 4 - 1 7 ; 3 . 8 , 4 3 2 a 7 - l 4 ) ; delibera 'deliberative' (as d i s t i n c t f r o m p e r c e p t u a l )

tion, in particular, involves phantasia

(DA 3 . 1 1 , 4 3 4 a 5 - 1 0 ; cf. 3 . 1 0 , 4 3 3 b 2 9 ) ; a n d the faculty o f phan 1, 4 5 9 a l 4 - 2 2 ) .


2 5

tasia is t h e s a m e as t h e p e r c e p t u a l faculty (Insomn.

The

exercise o f h u m a n rationality therefore d e p e n d s o n the e m b o d i e d c a p a c i ties for p e r c e p t i o n a n d desire, a n d s o is p o t e n t i a l l y sensitive to e n v i r o n m e n t a l effects o n h u m a n p h y s i o l o g y .


26

H o w e v e r , if the influence o f c l i m a t e

o n intelligence w e r e direct, w e m i g h t e x p e c t it to affect all f o r m s o f r e a s o n ing; yet in A s i a t i c s , technical a n d theoretical r e a s o n i n g are n o t i m p a i r e d . W e s h o u l d therefore c o n s i d e r the p o s s i b i l i t y that the effect o n intelligence is, in w h o l e or p a r t , a n indirect c o n s e q u e n c e o f the diverse effects o f c l i m a t e o n thumos. If so, t h e n the d o m a i n - s p e c i f i c i t y o f the n a t u r a l slave s c o g n i t i v e i m p a i r m e n t is e x p l a i n e d b y its t w o - s t a g e a e t i o l o g y : c l i m a t e affects a n d thumos affects practical d e l i b e r a t i o n . tbumos,

The implication is that environmental conditions that deviate from the norm produce compensatory internal deviations: an excessively cold climate must be offset by excessive internal heat (requiring a hot, and therefore spirited, nature); an excessively hot climate suppresses internal heat (producing a cold, a n d therefore fearful, nature). Thus Probl. 4 . 1 5 , 9 1 0 a 2 8 - b 8 (cf. 14.8, 9 0 9 b 9 - 1 5 ; 10.60, 8 9 8 a 4 - 8 ) . Cf. PA 2.4, 6 5 0 b 3 5 for thumos as pro ductive of heat; the whole chapter discusses the physiological basis of the association between heat a n d thumos on the one hand, a n d intelligence, fearfulness and cold on the other. C o m p a r e the contrast between young and old in Rhet. 2.12-13 ( 1 3 8 9 a l 7 - 1 9 , 1389b29-32).
25)

24J

2G)

It is a dysfunction of the faculty of phantasia that underlies my impaired spatial reason ing (n.21). O n the embodiment o f thought, and the physiological and environmental factors that affect it, see van der Eijk 1 9 9 7 .

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008) (b) The Role 0 / T h u m o s

243-270

255

Thumos, like a p p e t i t i v e desire (niQv[i), l l l l b l l f . ; EE 2 . 1 0 , 1 2 2 5 b 2 5 - 7 ; DA

is a f u n c t i o n o f the n o n - r a t i o n a l a n i m a l s (NE 3.2, thumos 3 . 9 , 4 3 2 b 6 ) . H o w e v e r , the n o n -

p a r t o f the s o u l w h i c h w e share w i t h n o n - h u m a n

r e a s o n i n g p a r t o f the human soul is responsive t o reason, a n d b o t h

a n d a p p e t i t e m a y arise in r e s p o n s e to r e a s o n e d j u d g e m e n t . In n o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s , appetitive desires are p r o m p t e d b y the p e r c e p t i o n that s o m e t h i n g is pleasant; in h u m a n s , desire m a y also b e p r o m p t e d b y a r e a s o n e d j u d g e m e n t to the s a m e effect. B u t w h a t is it that evokes a s p i r i t e d response? Aristotle's c o m m e n t s o n thumos are sparse. It is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h fear a n d a n g e r (Top. 4 . 5 , 1 2 6 a 8 - 1 0 ) ; w i t h reactions to insult a n d i n j u s t i c e (Pol. 7 . 7 , 1 3 2 8 a l - l 6 ; NE7.6, 1 1 4 9 a 3 2 f ) ; it reacts w i t h p a r t i c u l a r intensity to insult 1 3 2 7 b 3 6 - 8 a l ) ; a n d it e q u i p s us to a n d injustice f r o m friends b u t , conversely, it also m a k e s us affectionate t o w a r d s t h o s e familiar to us (Pol. 7.7, rule over others, a n d to exercise o u r o w n i n d e p e n d e n c e (Pol. 7 . 7 , 1 3 2 8 a 6 f . ) . T h i s is, at first sight, a d i s p a r a t e set o f f u n c t i o n s . Their u n d e r l y i n g cohere n c e m a y b e m o r e readily a p p a r e n t in the c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i m p l e s t r u c t u r e o f a n o n - h u m a n p r i m a t e society. A c h i m p a n z e e c o m m u n i t y is a n e t w o r k o f vertical a n d horizontal relationships ( d o m i n a n c e a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n , alliance a n d rivalry) that are m a i n t a i n e d b y fear, w h i c h inhibits violations o f t h o s e relationships, a n d anger, w h i c h p u n i s h e s t h e m , a n d b y afEliative b e h a v i o u r s s u c h as reciprocal g r o o m i n g , w h i c h m a i n t a i n positive relationships a n d avert - or a i d recovery f r o m - hostile i n t e r a c t i o n s .
27

Fear, a n g e r
28

a n d affiliation are the i m p u l s e s w h i c h regulate t h e social structure; a n d these are precisely the d o m a i n o f thumos in Aristotle's a c c o u n t . Thumos

A brief and vivid account in B o e h m 1 9 9 9 , 16-29 (which, however, says little about affiliative interactions). For more detail see (e.g.) Goodall 1986; Boesch a n d BoeschAchermann 1999; de Waal 1 9 8 2 , 1989. A community's internal cohesion may be reinforced by hostility towards outsiders. Isocrates reports that the Triballians are unique in their degree o f internal solidarity, but exceptionally aggressive towards all outsiders (Panath. 2 2 7 ) . Plato, concerned that his Guardians' spiritedness might make them aggressive towards fellow-citizens as well as strangers, commends the philosophical discrimination o f dogs as a model (Rep. 2, 3 7 5 b 6c). Aristode, however, denies that fierceness towards strangers is a proper counterpart to affection towards familiars (Pol. 7.7, 1328a8-10). Hostile intergroup relations are characteristic o f chimpanzees, though less so of the closely related bonobos (Wilson and Wrangham 2 0 0 3 ) .
2)

27)

256

M. Heath / Phronesis 53

(2008)243-270

u n d e r p i n s a set o f d i s p o s i t i o n s w h i c h are f u n d a m e n t a l to m a i n t a i n i n g the d y n a m i c stability o f a social network. A m o n g h u m a n s , obviously, reason can generate a m o r e complex w h a t A r i s t o t l e m e a n s w h e n h e s p e a k s o f thumos a w a y that appetitive desire d o e s not (NE 7.6, as it were set o f i n p u t s i n t o this set o f d i s p o s i t i o n s . T h i s m a y h e l p u s to u n d e r s t a n d reasoning (cuA-OYiauevo)' before reacting, so that in a sense it listens to reason in I l 4 9 a 2 4 - b 3 ) . Appetitive desire m a y r e s p o n d to r e a s o n e d j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t p l e a s u r e , b u t that is a value that also exists for n o n - r e a s o n i n g a n i m a l s ; thumos, b y contrast, c a n r e s p o n d to j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t values that are d e p e n d e n t o n r e a s o n , i n c l u d i n g ethical v a l u e s .
29

O n the other h a n d , thumos is n o t always correct in its finished giving your 1 l49a25-8). reasoned

r e s p o n s e to r e a s o n e d i n p u t . Aristotle c o m p a r e s it t o a n over-eager servant w h o rushes t o d o y o u r b i d d i n g before y o u have A spirited r e s p o n s e m a y b e i m p u l s i v e , instructions, a n d so e n d s u p d o i n g the w r o n g t h i n g (NE7.6,

a n d thus pre-empt

reflection. Yet thumos is i n d i s p e n s a b l e . If p e o p l e are to b e easily g u i d e d towards virtue, they m u s t be b o t h naturally intelligent and spirited {Pol. 7 . 7 , 1 3 2 7 b 3 6 - 8 ) . In fact, t h e y n e e d to be like G r e e k s , n o t like E u r o p e a n s or Asiatics. P r o b l e m s arise w h e n thumos deviates f r o m the m e a n in o n e d i r e c tion or another; for if thumos a d a p t s p e o p l e t o virtue, deviations will b e m a l a d a p t i v e . O n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I have o u t l i n e d , they will be m a l a d a p tive b y d i s r u p t i n g the capacity for practical d e l i b e r a t i o n . (c) The Example of Courage one

If thumos is c o n d u c i v e to v i r t u e in general (PoL 7 . 7 , 1 3 2 7 b 3 6 - 8 ) ,

w o u l d expect it to b e i m p l i c a t e d in all virtues. B u t A r i s t o t l e d o e s n o t spell o u t this i n v o l v e m e n t in m o s t o f his analyses o f particular virtues. O n e case in w h i c h it is o b v i o u s is m i l d n e s s (7tpaTT|): the deviant d i s p o s i t i o n s react t o o little or t o o m u c h to things that o u g h t to evoke tbumos-rehted distress,

I am cautious about the stronger correlation of thumos with to kalon proposed by C o o per 1996. There is thumos-movitc action which is not concerned with to kalon (see the discussion of courage below); NElA suggests that we should think o f the non-reasoning part of the human soul as distinguished by an openness to, not a special focus on, reasoned values. C o o p e r s position is rescued by a crucial qualification: 'in the specific case of the morally virtuous person (266; cf. 2 7 6 only for the morally virtuous person). But this means that Cooper fails to provide a general account o f Aristotelian thumos. Attempts to modify C o o p e r s position so as to extend its scope can be found in Sihvola 1996; Lorenz 2 0 0 6 , 189-94.

29)

M. Heath /Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

257

s u c h as d i s p l a y s o f c o n t e m p t or insult (EE 3 . 3 , 1 2 3 1 b 6 - 1 5 ) . T h e m o r e c o m p l e x e x a m p l e o f c o u r a g e m a y help to clarify the effect. Y o u act w i t h g e n u i n e c o u r a g e i f by d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e y o u face things that are p r o p e r l y s o u r c e s o f fear ( p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y , d e a t h in battle) b e c a u s e it is kalon t o d o so.
3 0

C o u r a g e requires m o r e t h a n a r a t i o n a l a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t that a cer-

tain act s h o u l d b e p e r f o r m e d b e c a u s e o f to kalon; the n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t o f the s o u l m u s t m a k e a c o n t r i b u t i o n : 'brave m e n a c t b e c a u s e o f to kalon, b u t thumos c o l l a b o r a t e s w i t h them' (NE 1 1 1 6 b 3 0 - 2 ) . B u t the e l e m e n t o f 3 . 8 , 1 1 1 6 b 2 3 - 7 a 9 ; EE 3 . 1 , and B u t since there 1117a8f). generally deliberated choice is essential. If s o m e o n e is m o t i v a t e d to face d a n g e r s purely b y thumos, that is n o t g e n u i n e c o u r a g e (NE 1 2 2 9 b 2 7 - 3 0 ) . It w o u l d b e c o u r a g e w i t h the a d d i t i o n o f prohairesis 'that for the s a k e o f which' (TO OV v e r a : NE 3.8,1117a4f.). is n o d e l i b e r a t i o n , there is n o prohairesis?
1

a n d if the a c t i o n is n o t c h o s e n ,

then o f c o u r s e it is n o t c h o s e n for the s a k e o f to kalon (NE.8, c o u r a g e . T h e i r excessively s t i m u l a t e d thumos will m a k e t h e m

O n e w o u l d e x p e c t E u r o p e a n s to b e p r o n e t o this k i n d o f p s e u d o i m p u l s i v e : s t o p p i n g to t h i n k is n o t their (I s h o u l d , o f c o u r s e , say our') s t r o n g p o i n t . T h a t explains their failure to d i s p l a y technical a n d theoretical rationality; it also m a k e s it difficult for t h e m to e n g a g e in practical r e a s o n ing. T h e y will often n o t s t o p to d e l i b e r a t e at all, b u t they will find it p a r ticularly difficult to e n g a g e in the c o m p l e x r e a s o n i n g r e q u i r e d for g l o b a l deliberation, in w h i c h an i n t e r i m c o n c l u s i o n (I s h o u l d give the h u n g r y p e r s o n this f o o d ) m u s t b e sensitive t o p o s s i b l y c o n f l i c t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in a m o r e g l o b a l perspective (this f o o d is n o t m i n e ) . B y c o n t r a s t , A s i a t i c s have n o t r o u b l e s t o p p i n g t o think: they have n o t g o t e n o u g h thumos to get in the way. T h a t is w h y t h e y are g o o d at technical a n d theoretical t h i n k i n g . S o o n e m i g h t p r e d i c t that they w o u l d n o t b e p r o n e to thumos-movztt p s e u d o - c o u r a g e . B u t A r i s t o t l e says that 'in gen(EE 3 . 1 , 1 2 2 9 b 2 9 f ) . T h i s m a y eral n o n - G r e e k c o u r a g e is w i t h thumos

m e a n s i m p l y that, since Asiatics are rarely w i l l i n g t o c o n f r o n t d a n g e r s , they c o n t r i b u t e o n l y a s m a l l m i n o r i t y o f n o n - G r e e k acts o f c o u r a g e ' . A l t e r n a tively, it m a y b e that they are rarely willing to d o so unless their generally feeble thumos is sufficiently p r o v o k e d . Fear is o n e o f the t h i n g s that reside in the s p i r i t e d part o f the s o u l , a n d fear c a n s u s t a i n aggressive a c t i o n (as in

NE 3.7, 1 1 1 5 b l 2 - 1 3 , 20-4; 3.8, 1116b2-3; 3.9, 1 1 1 7 b 9 , 13-15; 10.8, 1 1 7 8 b l 2 - 1 3 ; 3 . 1 , 1 2 2 9 a l - 9 . O n the role o f to kalon in motivating courage see Rogers 1994. Acts motivated by thumos have least to do with prohairesis {NE52, 1111 b l 8 - l 9).
31}

30)

258

M. Heath /Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

the case o f a cornered a n i m a l ) .

3 2

In a n y c a s e , A r i s t o t l e r e c o g n i s e s e x c e p discussing

t i o n s to his g e n e r a l i s a t i o n a b o u t n o n - G r e e k c o u r a g e . W h e n

a n o t h e r inferior a n a l o g u e to c o u r a g e , in w h i c h d a n g e r is e n d u r e d t o a v o i d legal p e n a l t y o r p u b l i c d i s a p p r o v a l , o r to g a i n h o n o u r s , h e refers t o H o m e r i c h e r o e s , i n c l u d i n g the n o n - G r e e k H e c t o r (NE 1229al2, 1230al6-21).


3 3

3 . 8 , H l 6 a l 7 - 2 9 ; EE

3.1,

T h e r e is a s u b t l e b u t c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n here. I f

y o u d o w h a t is fine, a n d will t h e r e f o r e r i g h t l y b e h o n o u r e d , b e c a u s e it is fine, y o u are a c t i n g v i r t u o u s l y . I f y o u d o w h a t is fine, a n d will therefore

rightly b e h o n o u r e d , b e c a u s e it will b e h o n o u r e d , y o u r a c t i o n is i n s t r u m e n t a l - t h a t is, it is m o t i v a t e d b y s o m e t h i n g t h a t it l e a d s t o , r a t h e r t h a n b y its i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . T h e c o l l a p s e o f p r a c t i c a l i n t o technical deliberation

will b e a p a r t i c u l a r l y e a s y error for t e c h n i c a l l y a d e p t A s i a t i c s to fall i n t o .

3. Some Implications
(a) Are Natural Slaves Sub-Human?
3 4

A r i s t o t l e s t h e o r y is t a k e n b y s o m e t o i m p l y t h a t slaves are ' s u b h u m a n . A r i s t o d e d o e s n o t agree: h e is in n o d o u b t that t h e y are h u m a n (Pol. 1 2 5 4 a l 4 - 1 7 ; NE 8.11,

1.4,

H 6 l b 5 f ) ; m o r e specifically, t h e y are h u m a n a n d 1 . 1 3 , 1 2 5 9 b 2 7 f . ) . I t is t r u e that their r a t i o n a l i t y is

p o s s e s s r a t i o n a l i t y (Pol.

3 2 )

N o t e that natural courage is not the same as thumos-bzs&

courage. Animals such as

lions have a stable natural disposition to act courageously; Aristotle distinguishes them from spirited animals that sporadically erupt in aggressive behaviour, such as wild boars. See esp. HA 1.1, 4 8 8 b 16-17- (eXe-uOpia K a i v p e t a ical zvytvr\ contrasted with GuubSn. K a i vGTctTiKc). According to Pol. 8.4, 1 3 3 8 b 1 7 - 1 9 , animal courage is associated with gentle, lion-like characters, not with extreme ferocity.
3 3 )

D i o m e d e s is also mentioned: so this pseudo-courage is not uniquely non-Greek, but is

perhaps the best that can b e expected o f non-Greeks. Aristotle attributes //. 2 2 . 1 0 0 to Hector ( I l l 6 a 2 3 , 1 2 3 0 a 2 1 ) , b u t also 2 . 3 9 1 - 3 (actually spoken by A g a m e m n o n ) : presumably he had in m i n d H e c t o r s threat to Poiydamas at 1 2 . 2 5 0 (cf. sch. b T 77. 13.95). For the assimilation o f H o m e r s Trojans to contemporary non-Greeks cf. Ar. F 1 3 0 Rose = 3 8 6 G i g o n (sch. T 11 16.283); F 1 5 1 Rose = 3 7 5 G i g o n (Porphyry on II. 4 . 8 8 , sch. D //. 4.88); Heraclides o f Pontus F 1 7 2 Wehrli = 100 S c h t r u m p f (Porphyry on II. 3 . 2 3 6 , 1.59. 11-29).
3 4 )

Schofield 1 9 9 9 , 139: natural slaves are effectively conceived as subhuman'; Lear 1988,

199: 'natural slaves are not fully human'; Garnsey 1 9 9 6 , 113: 'It seems that natural slavery is some kind o f s u b h u m a n c o n d i t i o n /

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

259

i m p a i r e d , b u t it is n o t A r i s t o t l e w h o d r a w s the ( s u r p r i s i n g ) inference f r o m c o g n i t i v e d i s a b i l i t y to s u b h u m a n i t y . It is also t r u e that h e correlates slaves w i t h n o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s (ripa) in a series o f a n a l o g i e s illustrating the existence o f n a t u r a l hierarchies (Pol. L 5 , 1 2 5 4 a 2 6 , b l 6 - 2 0 ) . B u t there is

n o i m p l i c a t i o n that the diverse r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h s u p p l y these illustrat i o n s are identical in a n y other respect t h a n b e i n g n a t u r a l a n d hierarchical, n o r t h a t the s u b o r d i n a t e t e r m s are identical in a n y other respect t h a n b e i n g n a t u r a l l y s u b o r d i n a t e . A r i s t o t l e d o e s say t h a t slaves a n d d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s are s i m i l a r ( t h o u g h n o t i d e n t i c a l ) , b u t o n l y in the w a y t h e y are used (Pol. 1.5, 1 2 5 4 b 2 4 - 6 ) ; a n d that is i m m e d i a t e l y after h e has clearly d i s t i n g u i s h e d slaves, w h o are r e s p o n s i v e to r e a s o n , f r o m n o n - h u m a n a n i m a l s , w h i c h are n o t ( 1 2 5 4 b 2 3 f i ) . Slaves are, i n d e e d , a n i m a l s (ca). S o are m a s t e r s , for m a n k i n d is a n a n i m a l species. Specifically, h u m a n s are political animals': that is (in A r i s totle's official d e f i n i t i o n o f the t e r m ) , g r o u p - l i v i n g a n i m a l s w i t h a 'shared' activity (HA 1.1, 4 8 8 a 7 - 1 0 ) . N o t all political species have functionally 9.10,

differentiated s u b g r o u p s : flocks o f cranes h a v e leaders a n d sentinels (HA

6 1 4 b 1 8 - 3 0 ) , a n d there is n o reason to t h i n k t h a t these are different k i n d s o f c r a n e . B u t s u c h differentiation d o e s occur, f o r e x a m p l e , in bees. It is therefore p u z z l i n g to read the c o m p l a i n t t h a t A r i s t o t l e , w h i l e raising the natural slave s o m e w h a t a b o v e the a n i m a l k i n g d o m , h a s n o t yet f o u n d a c a t e g o r y o f h u m a n to w h o m h e c a n be a p p r o p r i a t e l y c o m p a r e d ' .
3 5

For

A r i s t o t l e , n a t u r a l slave is a c a t e g o r y o f h u m a n . It w o u l d be h a r d to take seriously a c o m p l a i n t that n o o n e h a s f o u n d a c a t e g o r y o f b e e to w h i c h w o r k e r bees c a n b e a p p r o p r i a t e l y c o m p a r e d ; a n d n o o n e i m a g i n e s that w o r k e r s are s u b - a p i a n .


3 6

36)

G a m s e y 1996, 115. It might be objected that, since rationality is an essential human characteristic, its absence or impairment must compromise an individuals humanity. B u t on the interpretation proposed here, natural slaves are rational. They share the reason-dependent capacity to grasp, be motivated by, a n d communicate about values other than pleasure and distress which makes humans more political than other animals (Politics 1,2, 1 2 5 3 a 7 T 8 ) . They are able to reason autonomously outside the domain of global practical deliberation. The defect which disrupts the exercise o f rationality within that d o m a i n does not imply that intellect (vou) itself is impaired: compare Aristotle's comments on the effects of senescence a n d disease on mental and perceptual capacities (DA 1.4, 4 0 8 b 18-29).

35)

260 (b) Are Natural

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008) Slaves Unnatural?

243-270

N o n - G r e e k s are n a t u r a l slaves b e c a u s e o f a c o g n i t i v e i m p a i r m e n t c a u s e d b y their e n v i r o n m e n t . O n e m i g h t w o n d e r , therefore, w h e t h e r they are really natural: is the a d v e r s e e n v i r o n m e n t a l influence n o t a n i m p e d i m e n t p r e v e n t i n g the realisation o f the e n d to w h i c h h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t naturally t e n d s (Phys. 2 . 9 , 1 9 9 b I 5 - 1 8 ; cf. 2 . 2 , 1 9 4 a 2 8 - 3 0 ) > I f s o , is natural servility n o t contrary to nature? T h e c o m p l e x i t y o f A r i s t o t l e s use o f n a t u r e ' b l o c k s that inference. H e is w i l l i n g to talk a b o u t s o m e o n e c o n g e n i t a l l y b l i n d as
c

b l i n d b y nature^ (NE',

1 1 1 4 a 2 6 ) . T h o u g h c o n g e n i t a l b l i n d n e s s is c o n -

trary t o n a t u r e in o n e sense (it is a n i m p a i r e d realisation o f the h u m a n f o r m ) , it results f r o m the o p e r a t i o n o f n a t u r a l c a u s e s ( a n d not, for e x a m p l e , f r o m t r a u m a or d i s e a s e ) . n


37

A r i s t o t l e m a k e s this d i s t i n c t i o n w h e n he d i s -

cusses d e f o r m e d births, terata. A teras is c o n t r a r y to n a t u r e as generality (cb

to

KOXV),

b u t n o t to n a t u r e as i n v a r i a n t a n d necessary (ei Kai

vaYKrjJ; s o w h a t is c o n t r a r y to n a t u r e in o n e sense ( f o r m a l ) is b y n a t u r e in a n o t h e r ( m a t e r i a l ) . H e n c e p e o p l e are less likely to s p e a k o f a teras if the d e f o r m i t y is f r e q u e n t l y recurrent (GA 4.4, d e f o r m i t i e s (terata), qwoncq: GA4.6, (c) 7 7 0 b 9 ~ 2 7 ) . W o m e n are a case in p o i n t . A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s that females are i m p e r f e c t l y f o r m e d . T h e y are not b u t b e i n g f e m a l e is a n a t u r a l i m p a i r m e n t ' (vocTUipoc
3 8

775al5f.).

The Teleological

Dimension

A r i s t o t l e can explain the m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h necessitate the g e n e r a tion o f a f e m a l e rather t h a n a m a l e a n i m a l . H e c a n also explain the existence o f females i d e o l o g i c a l l y : w h y it is g o o d that there exist inferior females as well as s u p e r i o r m a l e s {GA 2 . 1 , 7 3 1 b l 8 - 2 4 ) . O n e m i g h t think that the answer is o b v i o u s : b o t h are n e e d e d for r e p r o d u c t i o n . B u t that is superficial: since there are species that r e p r o d u c e asexually, it is sexual r e p r o d u c t i o n itself that needs to b e e x p l a i n e d .
37) 39

A modern explanation

C o m p a r e NE75, 1 l 4 9 a 9 T 1, contrasting the distant non-Greeks whose irrationality is congenital and natural (ic (p'o'e) with people whose irrationality is due to disease. McDowell (n, 1) is embarrassed by Aristotle's views on women, too. Mayhew 2 0 0 4 provides a more sympathetic discussion of Aristotles misconceptions; but note the justified reservations in Henry 2 0 0 7 . In GA 4.3, 7 6 7 b 8 - 1 0 Aristotle is addressing the problem of why offspring do not invariably take after their fathers. H i s solution is that there must be mechanisms to ensure that this happens, since the birth of females is (hypothetically) necessary for the continued existence of sexually reproducing species. Sexual reproduction is presupposed in this argument, and one must look elsewhere for the explanation.
38) 39)

M. Heath ! Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

261

w o u l d b e e v o l u t i o n a r y : it w o u l d try to s h o w t h a t s e x u a l r e p r o d u c t i o n is advantageous under natural selection. B u t w h e n A r i s t o t l e says that the

d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n m a l e s a n d f e m a l e s in s e x u a l l y r e p r o d u c i n g s p e c i e s exists b e c a u s e it is better that way, there is n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a n a s e x u a l l y r e p r o d u c i n g s p e c i e s w o u l d b e less g o o d at s u r v i v i n g . In A r i s t o t l e s t h e o r y of

reproduction, the male parent supplies form, the female parent supplies m a t t e r ; f o r m is s u p e r i o r to m a t t e r ; a n d 'it is b e t t e r that t h e s u p e r i o r p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m the inferior
5

(GA

2.1, 732a3-9).

4 0

W o m e n a n d slaves are b o t h inferior; b u t t h e y are n o t inferior in

the

s a m e w a y T h e fact t h a t n o n - G r e e k s treat their w i v e s as they treat their slaves is s y m p t o m a t i c o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u s t a i n i n g p r o p e r p a t t e r n s o f social relationships in c o m m u n i t i e s (PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 2 b 5 - 9 ) .
4 1

c o n s i s t i n g entirely o f n a t u r a l slaves

T h e n o r m a t i v e h u s b a n d - w i f e relationship is n o t d e s 1.12, EE

p o t i c , like the relationship o f m a s t e r to slave, b u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l (Pol. 1 2 5 9 a 3 9 - b 3 ) , o r m o r e precisely a r i s t o c r a t i c (NE8AQ, 7.9, 1 2 4 l b 2 7 - 3 2 ) .


4 2

H60b32-6lal;

T h e difference b e t w e e n w o m e n a n d slaves reflects the

fact that n a t u r e is n o t stingy: it d o e s n o t p r o v i d e o n e a l l - p u r p o s e t o o l , b u t a

1 0 )

O n this argument see H e n i y 2 0 0 7 , 2 7 3 - 8 . Despotic treatment o f wives is attributed to non-Greeks in general; despotic (rather

4 0

than monarchical) treatment of sons is specifically Persian ( M i 8.10, 1 I 6 0 b 2 4 - 3 0 ) . Perhaps spirited European sons would not submit to despotic rule.
4 2 )

The constitutional model is not perfect: crucially, there is no exchange of roles in the

husband-wife relationship, since the wife is perpetually subordinate. In this respect the aristocratic model is more satisfactory (cf. Schofield 1 9 9 9 , 1 4 0 ) . It remains true that there is a sphere in which it is appropriate that the wife should exercise control a n d in which it would b e wrong for the husband to seize control ( V E 8 . 1 0 , 1 1 6 0 b 3 4 - l a ) . Hence husbandwife relationships raise questions o f justice (NE8A2, I l 6 2 a 2 9 - 3 1 ) , which d o not arise in the master-slave relationship OWE 8 . 1 1 , I l 6 l a 3 2 - b 5 ; cf. NE 5.6, 1 1 3 4 b 8 - 1 8 ) . Aristotle adds the qualification that, although there is no justice towards the slave qua slave, there is qua human (NE 8 . 1 1 , 1 l 6 1 b 5 - 8 ) . There is no contradiction here (as claimed by Schofield 1999, 124). A wife has entitlements qua wife that she does n o t have qua human; the slave has no such status-dependent entitlements, b u t does not lose the entitlements he has qua human. Aristotle, o f course, does not believe that enslavement infringes the human rights o f a natural slave: freedom is an entitlement that individuals possess qua naturally free, not qua h u m a n . B u t it is wrong to hunt h u m a n s for food or sacrifice qua humans {PoL 7.2, 1 3 2 4 b 3 9 - 4 l , noted by Kraut 1996, 7 5 9 ) . Less dramatically, failing to honour a conditional promise m a d e to a slave (e.g. o f freedom in return for meritorious service) would be unjust, since in meeting the condition the slave would have acted as a party to a contract (OI)V6T|KT|: NES.ll, 1 1 0 6 b 6 - 7 ) . Admittedly, Schofield denies that natural slaves can enter into con tracts ( 1 9 9 9 , 139); b u t he is assuming a more radical incapacity for deliberation than (on my interpretation) Aristotle claims.

262

M. Heath /Phronesis

53 (2008)

243-270

r a n g e o f s p e c i a l i s e d t o o l s (PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 2 a 3 4 - b 5 ) . T h e existence o f f u n c tionally differentiated h u m a n s u b g r o u p s is therefore f a v o u r e d b y n a t u r e . B u t this i m p l i e s that the existence o f n a t u r a l slaves is j u s t as m u c h d u e to n a t u r e s g e n e r o s i t y as the existence o f w o m e n , a n d e q u a l l y o p e n to i d e o logical e x p l a n a t i o n . Is that inference o n e that c a n b e a t t r i b u t e d to Aristotle? It is, o n the face o f it, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h his c l a i m that b o t h the h u n t i n g o f a n i m a l s a n d the s u b d u i n g o f natural slaves are n a t u r a l f o r m s o f a c q u i s i t i o n . T h i s claim is m a d e at the e n d o f a p a s s a g e {PoL 1.9, 1 2 5 6 b 7 - 2 6 ) w h o s e i d e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s h a v e p r o v e d controversial, even w h e n the a p p l i c a t i o n to slavery is left o u t o f a c c o u n t .
43

B u t the prima facie case for i n c l u d i n g slaves in n a t u r e s

bounty seems strong. Aristotles argument begins with natures provision o f sources o f n u t r i t i o n (for e x a m p l e , m i l k ) for n e o n a t e s as yet u n a b l e to fend for themselves. T h e s e c o n d stage d r a w s a n a n a l o g y (coerce uoco bl5)

b e t w e e n this a n d n a t u r e s p r o v i s i o n o f p l a n t s as sources o f f o o d for a n i m a l s , a n d o f a n i m a l s as s o u r c e s o f f o o d , c l o t h i n g a n d tools for h u m a n s . T h e final s t a g e infers f r o m this (5i b 2 3 ) that h u n t i n g a n i m a l s a n d s u b d u i n g natural slaves are natural f o r m s o f a c q u i s i t i o n . A r i s t o t l e s h o w s n o sign o f r e g a r d i n g the a n a l o g y b e t w e e n the first a n d s e c o n d stages as a n y t h i n g less t h a n r o b u s t ; a n d if it were n o t r o b u s t , the c o n c l u d i n g inference t o the naturalness o f e n s l a v e m e n t w o u l d b e c o m p r o m i s e d . Yet the n a t u r a l n e s s o f e n s l a v e m e n t is crucial to his defence o f slavery. I a m therefore n o t c o n v i n c e d that it is p o s sible to reconcile t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f this p a s s a g e w i t h a restrictive a c c o u n t o f the s c o p e o f A r i s t o t l e s n a t u r a l t e l e o l o g y .
44

T o the extent t h a t restrictive r e a d i n g s a r e m o t i v a t e d b y a sense o f w h a t we find q u i t e b i z a r r e . . . h a r d to find p l a u s i b l e ' ,


4y

they f o u n d e r o n A r i s t o t -

le s m a n i f e s t willingness to a d o p t p o s i t i o n s that are, f r o m o u r perspective, u n d e n i a b l y bizarre a n d i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f sexual r e p r o d u c t i o n in GA 2 . 1 , 7 3 2 a 3 - 9 is a case in p o i n t . T h a t is b y n o m e a n s the o n l y o c c a s i o n o n w h i c h A r i s t o t l e a p p e a l s t o 'the better as a n e x p l a n a t o r y

resource. A s t r i k i n g e x a m p l e is his thesis t h a t n a t u r e a s s i g n s p r o t e c t i v e cove r i n g to the better a n d m o r e h o n o u r a b l e s i d e o f a n a n i m a l , unless the less


>

43)

Sedley 1 9 9 1 , 180 tactfully curtails the passage before the mention of slaves; so too C o o p e r 1 9 8 2 , 2 1 8 . Owens 1 9 6 8 , 168-70 does take account of it. E.g. Judson 2 0 0 5 , 3 4 8 ( o n l y to the generation, functioning, and parts of natural substances*). Judson 2 0 0 5 , 3 4 1 (exempligratia).
44) A5)

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

263

h o n o u r a b l e side n e e d s m o r e p r o t e c t i o n (PA 2.14,

6 5 8 a 1 9 - 2 4 ) . I n other

w o r d s , hair is f o u n d o n the b a c k o f q u a d r u p e d s b e c a u s e this confers a s u r vival a d v a n t a g e ; b u t hair o n the f r o n t o f h u m a n s is 'better', for reasons u n r e l a t e d to survival. T h e h u m a n n o r m n e e d s n o f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n ; it is the fact that q u a d r u p e d s d e p a r t f r o m the a r r a n g e m e n t w h i c h is in p r i n c i p l e 'better' t h a t n e e d s special e x p l a n a t i o n in t e r m s o f the imposed by survival.
46

constraints

C o o p e r , h a v i n g a r g u e d t h a t 'the p r i n c i p l e o f the n a t u r a l teleology,

p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the species' is the key to A r i s t o t l e s

a c k n o w l e d g e s that h e is left w i t h a residue o f p a s s a g e s s u c h as these in w h i c h 'the g o o d a i m e d a t . . . is n o t a n y living t h i n g s g o o d , in the sense o f its survival or well-functioning'; h e c o n c l u d e s that w e h a v e to d o here w i t h two separate aspects o f Aristotles p h i l o s o p h y o f nature, and no a c c o u n t o f t h e m is p r e s u m a b l y to be l o o k e d f o r ' .
47

unified

It is certainly i m p o s s i b l e exclusively the

to integrate the residual p a s s a g e s i n t o a t e l e o l o g y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d s survival, b u t if a p p r o a c h e d f r o m the opposite

direction

unification p r e s e n t s n o p r o b l e m . A t e l e o l o g y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d s 'the better' a u t o m a t i c a l l y s u b s u m e s survival. M e r e survival is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f the e n d , b u t is n o t itself the e n d . W e live in o r d e r t o live w e l l .
48

In t h e case o f the d i v i s i o n o f sexes, A r i s t o t l e is a b l e to e x p l a i n the m a t e rial c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h necessitate the g e n e r a t i o n o f a f e m a l e rather t h a n a m a l e ; b u t h e also a r g u e s t h a t the existence o f h u m a n s w h o are n a t u r a l l y i m p a i r e d in the w a y that w o m e n are is better. I n t h e s a m e way, h e is a b l e to

Similarly, the fact that up, front a n d right (cf. Lloyd 1 9 6 2 ) are 'better' and 'more hon ourable' is used to explain the position of internal organs at PA 3 . 3 , 665a22-6; 3.4, 6 6 5 b 1 8 23; 3 . 1 0 , 6 7 2 b l 9 - 2 4 (applied to the movement o f the heavens at DC 2.5, 2 8 8 a 2 - 1 2 ) . At PA 4.10, 6 8 7 a 8 - 1 9 the principle o f the better is used to establish the explanatory priority o f intelligence over hands, against Anaxagoras. Cooper 1 9 8 2 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 0 - 1 . Contrast the profoundly un-Aristotelian assumption that only survival is in question in Johnson 2 0 0 5 , 2 3 5 : Acquisition is natural insofar as it is necessary to provide for things needed in order to live. B u t it is not natural if it is not necessary for survival.' Earlier on the same page, he had spoken more correctly of'survival and flourishing'. Strangely, the trun cated formula appears immediately after Johnson has quoted Aristotle's statement that natural acquisition provides what is necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household' (PoL 1.8, 1 2 5 6 b 2 6 - 3 0 ) ; but the city exists for the sake o f living well (not just living): PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 2 b 2 9 - 3 0 ; 1.4, 1253b24-5; 3 . 9 , 1 2 8 0 a 3 1 - 2 . Cf. PA 2 . 1 0 , 6 5 6 a 6 ; Protr. F 5 3 . 5 D u r i n g = Iambi. 4 0 . 6 - 7 . As Johnson notes a little later (239), the goal o f living well is what differentiates the political existence of free h u m a n s from that o f natural slaves and of nonhuman animals.
47) 48)

46)

264

M. Heath /Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

e x p l a i n the m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h n e c e s s i t a t e the g e n e r a t i o n o f a n a t u ral slave rather t h a n a n a t u r a l master. G i v e n that h u m a n b e i n g s are d i s t r i b u t e d a c r o s s the earth, a n d that different r e g i o n s o f the e a r t h h a v e different c l i m a t e s (as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the m o v e m e n t s o f the heavenly b o d i e s ) , then it is inevitable that s o m e h u m a n s will t u r n o u t as n a t u r a l slaves. S o it is n o t p o s s i b l e for all h u m a n b e i n g s to b e n a t u r a l m a s t e r s . B u t even if it were p o s sible, it w o u l d n o t b e d e s i r a b l e . I f servile l a b o u r c o u l d b e a u t o m a t e d there w o u l d b e n o n e e d for slaves (PoL 1.4, 1 2 5 3 b 3 3 - 4 a l ) ; b u t in the a b s e n c e o f s a t i s f a c t o r y n o n - u t o p i a n s u b s t i t u t e s for servile l a b o u r ,
49

a w o r l d in w h i c h

all h u m a n s were n a t u r a l l y m a s t e r s w o u l d m a k e it i m p o s s i b l e for a n y o n e to live a g o o d h u m a n life. I f n o o n e w a s e n s l a v e d , t h e n everyone w o u l d h a v e to d o their o w n l a b o u r , a n d n o o n e w o u l d h a v e the leisure n e e d e d to c u l tivate v i r t u e (PoL 7 . 9 , 1 3 2 9 a l ) . B u t e n s l a v i n g p e o p l e w h o were n o t n a t u r a l slaves w o u l d b e u n j u s t , c r e a t i n g a n i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n even m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y subversive o f the g o o d life. S o it w o u l d b e r e a s o n a b l e for A r i s totle to c o n c l u d e t h a t the existence o f h u m a n s w h o are n a t u r a l l y i m p a i r e d in the w a y that n a t u r a l slaves are is better. S o m e h u m a n s h a v e a c a p a c i t y for living well that c a n n o t b e fully realised w i t h o u t the s u p p o r t o f servile labour. I f h u m a n excellence is to b e achieved in its highest f o r m , therefore, it is hypothetically necessary (Phys. 2 . 9 , 1 9 9 b 3 4 - 2 0 0 b 8 ) that n a t u r a l slaves exist. W i t h o u t n a t u r a l slaves, the masters' n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y for eudaimonia b e frustrated; a n d n a t u r e d o e s n o t h i n g in v a i n (PoL 1.9, would
5 0

1256b20-l).

4 W

The implication (Pol. 1.2, 1 2 5 2 a 2 6 - 3 1 ) that the master cannot exist without the slave is overstated: it is possible to rely on animal or family labour (Pol. 1.2, 1252b 12; 6.8, 1 3 2 3 a 5 - 6 ) . B u t these are makeshifts available to the poor (jtvniE, cntopoi), not satisfac tory substitutes. This teleology is anthropocentric in one sense: 'man is the ultimate beneficiary (Sedley 1 9 9 1 , 180) - more precisely, in the light o f the present discussion, some human beings. But there is no implication that the natural order is wholly, primarily or exclusively for human benefit, as some o f Sedley s critics have alleged (e.g. Judson 2 0 0 5 , 3 5 7 , 3 6 1 n.66; Johnson 2 0 0 5 , 2 3 2 - 7 ) . A 'cosmic' teleology (Kahn 1985) would be contestable if it required taking the cosmos as a single substance or beneficiary (Sedley 2 0 0 0 ; cf. Matthen 2 0 0 1 ) . But for present purposes we need only suppose that different entities, each independently pursuing its own good, may through their interactions give rise to a higher-order good - namely, a natural order in which it is possible for those entities to achieve their respective goods; and it is reasonably clear that Aristotle believes that the cosmos does exemplify such an order, by virtue of the joint relationship of all its constituent entities to a single ultimate good (Met. 12.10, 1 0 7 5 a l l - 2 2 ) . See further Bodnr 2 0 0 5 . It is worth noting that axiological explanation, though generally out o f favour, does not entirely lack modern defenders: Rescher 2000, 149-79.
50) 5

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008) (d) How Does the Slave Benefit from Slavery?

243-270

265

T h e existence o f n a t u r a l slaves, then, is for the better. T h a t is to say, it is better for m a s t e r s that n a t u r a l slaves exist, b e c a u s e it m a k e s it p o s s i b l e for t h e m to live better lives. Is the existence o f n a t u r a l slaves also g o o d for the slaves? Aristotle certainly thinks t h a t being enslaved is g o o d for n a t u r a l slaves. H e is n o t u n d e r the illusion that slavery exists in order to benefit natural slaves: the benefit w h i c h the slave g a i n s f r o m b e i n g enslaved is incidental (PoL 3.6,1278b32-37; cf. 1.5, 1 2 5 4 b 3 9 - 5 a 2 ) ; b u t it is beneficial, even so. However, b e i n g enslaved is n o t the s a m e as b e i n g a n a t u r a l slave. M o s t n a t u r a l slaves live in their o w n c o m m u n i t i e s , in w h i c h e v e r y o n e is a natural slave (PoL 1.2, 1 2 5 2 b 5 - 9 ) ; s o they never g a i n the benefit o f b e i n g enslaved to a n a t u r a l master. T h e m a j o r i t y o f n a t u r a l slaves therefore suffer f r o m a n u n c o m p e n s a t e d i m p a i r m e n t . S o the a n s w e r to m y q u e s t i o n m a y s e e m self-evident: the existence o f natural slaves is n o t g o o d for the slaves. O n the other h a n d , the a d v a n t a g e s o f b e i n g n a t u r a l l y free c o u l d n o t b e realised if there were n o n a t u r a l slaves. S o w h i l e a n y i n d i v i d u a l natural slave w o u l d have been better off if h e h a d been b o r n naturally free, he w o u l d n o t h a v e been better o f f i f e v e r y o n e h a d b e e n b o r n naturally free. T h e e x i s t e n c e o f n a t u r a l slaves is n o t g o o d for the slaves; b u t t h e n o n existence o f n a t u r a l slaves w o u l d n o t have b e e n g o o d for a n y o n e . H o w exactly d o e s the n a t u r a l slave benefit f r o m e n s l a v e m e n t ? O n the face o f it, the a d v a n t a g e is all o n the o t h e r s i d e o f the relationship. T h e slave is u s e d to fulfil b a s i c f u n c t i o n s for the m a s r e r (PoL 1.5, 1 2 5 4 b 2 8 ; 1.13, 1 2 6 0 a 3 3 f ) ; this frees the m a s t e r f r o m the b u r d e n o f l o w - g r a d e l a b o u r to s u p p l y w h a t is m e r e l y necessary, a n d gives h i m t i m e to d e v o t e h i m s e l f to w h a t is kalon - a c t i o n that is intrinsically w o r t h w h i l e . T h i s m i g h t b e a life centred o n theoretical c o n t e m p l a t i o n , w h i c h is t h e p a r a d i g m o f h u m a n w e l l - b e i n g (NE 1 0 . 8 , 1 1 7 8 b 3 3 ) ; o r it m i g h t be a life c e n t r e d o n political 10.8, 1 1 7 8 a 9 f ) .
5 1

activity, w h i c h A r i s t o t l e a c k n o w l e d g e s as a s e c o n d a r y ( t h o u g h still g e n u ine) k i n d o f h u m a n w e l l - b e i n g (NE F r o m the m a s t e r s

5I)

Pol. 1.7, 1255b36-7: those who are able to d o so devote themselves to philosophy or politics, devolving the management o f the household to a steward. The steward is, of course, himself a slave. O n the interpretation presented here, though he is dependent on his mas ters practical wisdom for overall guidance about household policy, he is capable of the technical reasoning needed to determine how the rest o f the slaves should be directed so as to implement that policy. Like Xerxes' generals, he has to be able to solve logistical obstacles to the fulfilment o f his masters project; unlike them, he is fortunate enough to have a master who is not himself a natural slave.

266

M. Heath /Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

p o i n t o f view, therefore, the slave is i n s t r u m e n t a l in his living a n intrinsically w o r t h w h i l e life. T h e natural slave is n o t c a p a b l e o f l i v i n g s u c h a life. B e c a u s e h e c a n n o t deliberate g l o b a l l y in the d o m a i n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , he c a n n o t live a life o f intrinsically w o r t h w h i l e activity c h o s e n b e c a u s e o f its intrinsic w o r t h . A t least, h e c a n n o t d o this o n his o w n : b u t t h o u g h deficient in autonomous

p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , the slave m a y b e r e s p o n s i v e to another's p r a c t i c a l w i s d o m . S o if h e is enslaved to a n a t u r a l master, h e is c a p a b l e o f p a r r i c i p a t i n g in a n d c o n t r i b u t i n g to a n intrinsically w o r t h w h i l e life. H e c a n c o n t r i b u t e to the m a s t e r s living o f a g o o d life; his o w n life t h u s b e c o m e s m o r e w o r t h w h i l e . A r i s t o t l e s p e a k s o f the slave as a p a r t o f the m a s t e r - even as a s e p a r a t e d p a r t o f the m a s t e r s b o d y (PoL 1.6, 1 2 5 5 b l l ) . T h a t s o u n d s strange. B u t the slave is i n s t r u m e n t a l in t h e m a s t e r s life, a n d it d o e s n o t s o u n d s o s t r a n g e to s p e a k o f a tool as a n e x t e n s i o n o f the b o d y - if, for e x a m p l e , I u s e a stick as a p r o b e to e x p l o r e an o t h e r w i s e i n a c c e s s i b l e s p a c e .
5 2

Pros-

thetic devices m a y b e external or internal: m y deficient eyesight is assisted b y the lenses in m y glasses, a n d by lenses i m p l a n t e d in m y eyes. T h e i m p l a n t s h a v e b e c o m e p a r t o f m y b o d y ; t h e f u n c t i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t external lenses a r e s e p a r a t e d p a r t s o f m y b o d y . F r o m the m a s t e r s p o i n t o f view, t h e n , the slave is as it were a p a r t a n d d e t a c h a b l e tool o f t h e m a s t e r (EE 7 . 9 , 1 2 4 1 b 2 2 ) ; (Tcpi/W 1.4,
5 3

specifically, h e is a d e t a c h e d i n s t r u m e n t for a c t i o n

1254al-17).

I n a sense, that cuts b o t h ways. F r o m t h e slave s p o i n t o f view, the m a s ter is like m y glasses. T h e m a s t e r s g u i d a n c e c o m p e n s a t e s for the slaves i m p a i r e d p r a c t i c a l rationality; h e is a k i n d o f c o g n i t i v e p r o s t h e s i s .
54

But

there is a n a s y m m e t r y . U s i n g t h e slave allows the m a s t e r to exercise his o w n , u n i m p a i r e d c a p a c i t i e s for a c t i o n ; thereby, the m a s t e r partially c o m -

MA 8, 7 0 2 b 4 - 6 : 'It makes no difference whether the part is a continuous part of the body or not; the stick m a y be looked at as a detached part o f the w h o l e . Cf. Polanyi 1958, 55-63 ( 5 9 : ' O u r subsidiary awareness o f tools a n d probes can be regarded now as the act of making them form part o f our own b o d y ) . Aristotle can apply the term 'tool' to non-slave subordinates (PoL 1.4, 1253b28-30). This way of speaking just marks the (obvious) fact that one human being can play an instrumental role in another h u m a n beings action. Contrast Garnsey 1996, 123: 'his living tool seems to have very little that is h u m a n about it.' See also NE 5.6, 1134b 10, where both property and children are part' of the father. C o m p a r e the active externalist' approach to cognition in Clark and Chalmers 1998. Background: Rowlands 2 0 0 3 .
54) 53)

52)

M. Heath / Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

267

p e n s a t e s for the slave s i m p a i r m e n t . B u t it is the m a s t e r w h o m a s t e r m i n d s it all: the m a s t e r uses the slave, t h e slave d o e s n o t u s e the master. S o it is correct to see the slave as p a r t o f the m a s t e r , rather t h a n the other w a y r o u n d (cf. Pol. 1.4, 1 2 5 4 a 8 - 1 3 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , if w e t a k e the n o t i o n o f the slave as part o f the m a s t e r seriously (as A r i s t o t l e evidently d i d ) , the m a s t e r slave d y a d is a single s y s t e m . T h e slave b e c o m e s a n e n a b l i n g part o f a sys t e m that lives a w o r t h w h i l e h u m a n life. It is the m a s t e r , n o t the slave, w h o is the p r o p e r s u b j e c t o f that life, b u t the slave b y his i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y p a r ticipates in it. H i s o w n life therefore b e c o m e s m o r e w o r t h w h i l e : h e has benefited f r o m e n s l a v e m e n t .

(e) How Does the Slave Benefit from Being Freed? T h e s l a v e s benefit is incidental: slavery d o e s n o t exist for the s a k e o f the slave. T h e m a s t e r therefore h a s n o o b l i g a t i o n to i m p r o v e a natural slave's lot b y e n s l a v i n g h i m . I f servile l a b o u r were a u t o m a t e d , there w o u l d b e n o n e e d for slaves (Pol. 1.4, 1 2 5 3 b 3 3 - 4 a l ) , a n d there w o u l d b e no reason to take n a t u r a l slaves i n t o captivity. M o r e o v e r , a l t h o u g h it m a y s e e m o b v i o u s that, if e n s l a v e m e n t is t o the s l a v e s benefit, f r e e d o m will be d e t r i m e n t a l , the incidental n a t u r e o f the benefit m e a n s that there is n o o b l i g a t i o n to k e e p a slave in slavery i f it is in the master's interest to set h i m free. It m a y well b e in the master's interest to d o so. T h e slave p r o b a b l y d o e s not realise that h e is benefiting f r o m b e i n g a slave, a n d the p r o s p e c t o f f r e e d o m will p r o v i d e a n incentive to serve his m a s t e r w e l l . be, if f r e e d o m is a g a i n s t the slave's interests? F r e e d o m in the a n c i e n t w o r l d d i d n o t necessarily i m p l y c o m p l e t e a u t o n o m y : freed slaves typically retained a s u b o r d i n a t e relationship to their m a n umittors.
57 55

Yet in his will, A r i s t o t l e


56

s e e m s to regard f r e e d o m as a reward for m e r i t o r i o u s s l a v e s .

H o w c a n that

S o it is p o s s i b l e that a f r e e d m a n will still g a i n the incidental

Schofield 1999, 2 1 7 n.47: natural slaves would usually prefer to be free. That being so, they are more likely to cooperate a n d to work hard if promised their freedom: that is why it is better to hold out the prospect - better for masters.' D . L . 5-15: ' D o not sell any o f the slaves who took care o f me, but employ them; and when they reach the appropriate age, set them free as they deserve.' Zelnick-Abramovitz 2 0 0 5 , 3 3 9 : 'Although legally free, in social terms the manumitted slaves' actual position w a s . . . half way between slavery and f r e e d o m . . . (T)he manumitted slave is not a wholly free person. H i s or her function was to keep working for others; it was his or her natural [sic] social position to be dependent on others.'
56} 57)

55)

268

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

benefit o f b e i n g a s u b o r d i n a t e p a r t o f a hierarchical relationship. B u t a d e e p e r s o l u t i o n e m e r g e s if w e c o n s i d e r t h e s l a v e s w h o l e life. A limited

p e r i o d o f h i g h l y m o t i v a t e d a n d therefore s u p e r i o r e n g a g e m e n t in a g o o d life is m o r e w o r t h w h i l e t h a n a longer, b u t less m o t i v a t e d a n d inferior, c o n t r i b u t i o n . T h e fact t h a t t h e slave's e n h a n c e d service is in the m a s t e r s inter est m e a n s t h a t it is also (incidentally) in t h e slave s interest, since it m a k e s the s l a v e s life (taken as a w h o l e ) objectively m o r e w o r t h w h i l e . S o the A r i s totelian s l a v e - o w n e r a n d his slave b o t h believe t h a t the slave s life will be better if he is offered the p r o s p e c t o f f r e e d o m , t h o u g h for different r e a s o n s . T h e slave's j u d g e m e n t is likely t o b e s w a y e d b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f his o w n s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t m e n t . H i s m a s t e r s j u d g e m e n t is i n f o r m e d b y a r e c o g n i tion o f the increased o b j e c t i v e v a l u e c o n f e r r e d on t h e slave's life b y e n h a n c e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the master's d e l i b e r a t e d ethical praxis.

Conclusion
I h a v e a r g u e d that Aristode's cryptic c o m m e n t s o n the natural slave s c o g n i tive i m p a i r m e n t can b e interpreted in a w a y that is c o n s i s t e n t a n d p l a u s i b l e , relative to things that A r i s t o d e is likely to h a v e believed. O n the interpreta tion p r o p o s e d , the i m p a i r m e n t is l i m i t e d in s c o p e b u t p r o f o u n d in its effects - precisely the c o m b i n a t i o n n e e d e d if it is to h a v e the m o r a l a n d political c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h Aristotle infers, w h i l e r e m a i n i n g ( f r o m his perspective) empirically p l a u s i b l e . T h e different f o r m s w h i c h this i m p a i r m e n t t a k e in different p o p u l a t i o n s c a n be e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s o f the m e d i a t i o n o f climatic effects o n deliberative r e a s o n b y thumos. Finally, a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f s o m e o f the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Aristotle's theory, t h u s r e c o n s t r u c t e d , s u g g e s t s that it is m o r e internally c o h e r e n t than is usually a c k n o w l e d g e d ; it is also, n o t least in its i d e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , m u c h stranger.

Bibliography
Bodnr, I. (2005) Teleology across natures', Rhizai 2, 9 - 2 9 . Boehm, C . ( 1 9 9 9 ) Hierarchy in the Forest: the Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior (Cambridge MA). Boesch, C . and Boesch-Achermann, H . (1999) The Chimpanzees of the Tat Forest: Behav ioural Ecology and Evolution (Oxford). Brunt, P.A. ( 1 9 9 3 ) 'Aristotle and slavery', in Studies in Greek History and Thought (Oxford), 343-88.

M. Heath /Phronesis

53 (2008)

243-270

269

Clark, A. and Chalmers, D . (1998) 'The extended mind', Analysis 58, 7-19. Cooper, J . M . ( 1 9 8 2 ) 'Aristode on natural teleology', in M . Schofield and M . N u s s b a u m (ed.), Language and Logos (Cambridge), 1 9 7 - 2 2 2 . (1996) 'Reason, moral virtue, and moral value', in M . Frede and G . Striker (ed.), Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford), 8 1 - 1 1 4 , reprinted in Reason and Emotion (Princ eton 1999), 2 5 3 - 8 0 . Deslauriers, M . ( 2 0 0 6 ) 'The argument o f Aristotles Politics 1 \ Phoenix 6 0 , 4 8 - 6 9 . de Waal, F . B . M . (1982) Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (London). (1989) Peacemaking among Primates ( C a m b r i d g e M A ) . Fortenbaugh, W.W. (1977) Aristotle on slaves and women', in J . Barnes, M . Schofield and R. Sorabji (ed.), Articles on Aristotle, 2: Ethics and Politics ( L o n d o n ) , 135-9. Garnsey, P. (1996) Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine ( C a m b r i d g e ) . Garver, E . (1994) 'Aristotle's natural slaves: incomplete praxeis and incomplete h u m a n beings', Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 2 , 175-96. Gilbert, D . T . and M a l o n e , P.S. (1995) 'The correspondence bias', Psychological 117, 2 1 - 3 8 . Goodall, J . ( 1 9 8 6 ) The Chimpanzees ofGombe: Patterns of Behavior (Cambridge MA). Henry, D . ( 2 0 0 7 ) 'How sexist is Aristode's developmental biology?', Phronesis 52, 2 5 1 - 6 9 . Humphrey, R. (1985) ' H o w work roles influence perception: structural-cognitive processes and organizational behavior', American Sociological Review 50. 2 4 2 - 5 2 . Isaac, B . H . (2004) The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton). Johnson, M . R . ( 2 0 0 5 ) Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford). J o u a n n a , J . (1999) Hippocrates (Baltimore). J u d s o n , L. (2005) Aristotelian teleology', OSAP 2 9 , 3 4 1 - 6 6 . Kahn, C . H . ( 1 9 8 5 ) "The place o f the Prime Mover in Aristotle's teleology', in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle on Nature and Living Things: Philosophical and Historical Studies Presented to David M. Balme on his Seventieth Birthday (Pittsburgh), 1 8 3 - 2 0 6 . Kraut, R. ( 1 9 9 6 ) , Are there natural rights in Aristotle?', Review of Metaphysics 4 9 , 7 5 5 - 7 4 . ( 2 0 0 2 ) Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford). Lear, J . (1988) Aristotle: the Desire to Understand (Cambridge). Lloyd, G . E . R . ( 1 9 6 2 ) 'Right and left in Greek philosophy', JHS 8 2 , 56-66, reprinted in Methods and Problems in Greek Science: Selected Papers ( C a m b r i d g e 1991), 2 7 - 4 8 . Lorenz, H . (2006) The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford). McDowell, J . (1995) ' E u d a i m o n i s m and realism in Aristotle's ethics', in R. H e i n a m a n (ed.)> Aristotle and Moral Realism ( L o n d o n ) , 201 - 1 8 . M a t t h e n , M . ( 2 0 0 1 ) 'The holistic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f Aristotle's cosmology', OSAP 2 0 , 171-99. Mayhew, R. (2004) The Female in Aristotles Biology: Reason or Rationalization? Review of General Psychology 2, 1 7 5 - 2 2 0 . Owens, J . (1968) 'Teleology of nature in Aristotle', Monist 5 2 , 1 5 9 - 7 3 . Polanyi, M . (1958) Personal Knowledge ( L o n d o n ) . Rescher, N . (2000) Nature and Understanding: the Metaphysics and Method of Science (Oxford). Rogers, K . (1994) Aristotle on the motive o f courage', Southern Journal of Philosophy 32, 303-13. (Chicago). Nickerson, R . S . (1998) 'Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous p h e n o m e n o n in m a n y guises', Bulletin

270

M. Heath I Phronesis 53 (2008)

243-270

Ross, L . and Anderson, C A . (1982) 'Shortcomings in the attribution process: on the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments', in D . Kahnemann, P. Sovic and A. Tversky (ed.), judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge), 129-52. Rowlands, M . (2003) Externaism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again (Chesham). Sassi, M . M . (2001) The Science of Man in Ancient Greece (Chicago). Schofield, M . ( 1 9 9 9 ) i d e o l o g y and philosophy in Aristotles theory of slavery', in Saving the City: Philosopher Kings and Other Classical Paradigms ( L o n d o n ) , 1 1 5 - 4 0 . Sedley, D . ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 'Is Aristotle's teleology anthropocentric?', Phronesis 36, 1 7 9 - 9 6 . (2000) Metaphysics A 10', in M . Frede a n d D . Charles (ed.), Aristotles Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford), 3 2 7 - 5 0 . Sihvola, J . ( 1 9 9 6 ) 'Emotional animals: do Aristotelian emotions require beliefs?', Apeiron 2 9 , 105-44, reprinted in L.P. Gerson (ed.), Aristotle: Critical Assessments, 3: Psychology, Ethics ( L o n d o n 1999), 5 0 - 8 2 . Smith, A . D . (1996) 'Character and intellect in Aristotles ethics , Phronesis 4 1 , 56-74. Thomas, R. (2000) Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, (Cambridge). Tuozzo, T . M (1991) Aristotelian deliberation is not o f ends' in J.P. Anton and A. Preus (ed.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 4: Aristotles Ethics (Albany N Y ) , 1 9 3 - 2 1 2 . van der Eijk, P J . ( 1 9 9 7 ) , "The matter o f mind' in L . Kullmann, S. Fllinger (ed.) Aristotelische Biologic (Stuttgart), 2 3 1 - 5 8 , reprinted in Medicine and Philosophy in Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers 2005), 206-37. Vasiliou, I. (1996) 'The role o f g o o d upbringing in Aristotle's Ethics\ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, 7 7 1 - 9 7 . Wilson, M . L . and Wrangham, R . W ( 2 0 0 3 ) 'Intergroup relations in chimpanzees', Annual Review of Anthropology 32, 3 6 3 - 9 2 . Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. (2005) Not Wholly Free: the Concept of Manumission of Manumitted and the Status Slaves in the Ancient Greek World (Mnemosyne Supplement 2 6 6 , Leiden). on Nature, Classical Soul, Health and Disease (Cambridge Science and the Art of Persuasion
5