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ISSN : 0976-8491 (Online) | ISSN : 2229-4333 (Print)

IJCST Vol. 3, ISSue 1, Jan. - MarCh 2012

An Efficient and Improving the Security of AODV Routing Protocol


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Satyendra Singh, 2Vinod Kumar Yadav, 3Ganesh Chandra, 4Rahul Kumar Gangwar
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Dept. of CSE, Kamla Nehru Institute of Technology, Sultanpur, UP, India Dept. of CSE, Invertis Institute of Engineering & Technology, Bareilly, UP, India
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Abstract This Paper Presented in new techniques of security measures is essential for high survivability of Network. An improving the security problem in AODV protocol is a comparatively mature on demand routing protocol in mobile Ad-Hoc networks. In the AODV routing protocol wireless links disconnect occasionally because the nodes on the routing path are unreachable, which makes AODV inefficient and unreliable. The security of enhancement to the AODV protocol by incorporating protection against several routing attacks. Although many Ad-Hoc network routing protocol have (DSR, AODV etc), none of them consider the security problems. However in this paper, we put forward a security mechanism based on the AODV routing protocol. So we also provide a solution to this problem using a routing algorithm. Keywords Ad-Hoc Network, Security, AODV, ZRP, Attacks I. Introduction An Ad-Hoc network is consisting of several mobile wireless nodes that can communication with each other without requiring the existing of fixed networking infrastructure. Firstly we described there is no fixed infrastructure in an Ad-Hoc network like a wired network or cellular network. There are no base stations or switching centers or routers to route packets to the destination. Secondly in the Ad-Hoc network, the network topology is not fixed due to the mobility of nodes. There have been many Ad-Hoc routing protocols, which fall in several categories: proactive routing protocols such as dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) [1]. Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR), on-demand routing protocols such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [2], AODV [3-4], Signal Stability-based Adaptive routing (SSA), and mixed routing protocols such as the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [5]. There are many new threats are emerging on Ad-Hoc networks and they are difficult to defend with the conventional security schemes. Thus the new security schemes can be provided at various layers in the OSI stack, protecting the network layer in Ad-Hoc network is an important topic. Since there are no dedicated routers in an Ad-Hoc network, a malicious node ma offer routing services voluntarily and security attacks. The routing protocol for Ad-Hoc network is divided into two parts: 1. Periodic (proactive) 2. On-Demand (reactive) These protocols are nodes of periodically exchange routing information and every node knows the route to every other node. And after the nodes only exchange routing information and entire route the content of the routing table when other nodes are in need. There are several periodic and on-demand routing protocols. But the simplest and most widely deployed on-demand routing protocol is the Ad-Hoc on-demand Distance Vector protocol (AODV) [6]. Such as the intrusion prevention measures encryption and authentication and fail to identify attack, as these prevention measures cannot defend against compromised mobile nodes that carry a private keys and easily authentication themselves [7]. Hence, to create a highly secured Ad-Hoc network, we need to
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implement an intrusion and detection system in the network to create defiance.

AODV Routing Protocols

Counter Measure Module

Attack Analysis Module

Route Discovery

Incoming Network Traffic

Traffic Secure Communication Module

Event Generation Moudle

Fig. 1: Enhancement of Intrusion Detection System for Ad-Hoc Network The characteristics of wireless Ad-Hoc networks are significantly different from wired network. Therefore well established traditional security approaches to routing are inadequate in wireless Ad-Hoc network [8]. II. Motivation The features of Ad-Hoc networks make them vulnerable to various security forms of attacks. Such as passive eavesdropping, active interfering, leakage of secret information, data tampering, impersonation and denial of service. Detecting the compromised node in a large scale Ad-Hoc network is severely challenged due to [9]: The nodes are constantly mobile. We provided the AODV security to challenges to more secure communication. The protocols implemented are co-related in nature. There is lack of fixed infrastructure and a mobile network point. Where intrusion detection system can collect audit data. There is no clear distinction between normally and anomaly in wireless networks. Such failure is severe especially because they may come from seemingly trusted nodes, whose malicious intentions have not yet been noted [10-13]. Hence the attack to protocol can be further classified into two types. A. External Attack An attack caused by nodes that do not belong to the network. B. Internal Attack An attack from nodes that to the network due to them getting the compromised and captured. III. Secure of AODV Routing Protocol This section will discuss the revolution of AODV routing protocol,
InternatIonal Journal of Computer SCIenCe and teChnology

319

IJCST Vol. 3, ISSue 1, Jan. - MarCh 2012

ISSN : 0976-8491 (Online) | ISSN : 2229-4333 (Print)

the source node sends out a RREQ packet to request a new route. A node discover of source node to destination node through a packet in AODV routing protocol. AODV is an on-demand protocol which will start the routing discovery only when there is need to route discovery. When a source node wants to send data to the destination but have no available routing information in its route table due to route discovery is initiated. An Ad-Hoc routing protocol could be reactive (on demand), proactive (table driven) or hybrid. Fig. 2, shows the three types of Ad-Hoc routing protocols and list the available routing protocol for the category as well as some of their secure versions. So, the source node broadcasts a Request (RREQ) for the destination.

is forward along the path established by the request, AODV only supports the security of routing protocols. So, the message sends forward and replies the message to destination node. The packet is drop or path do not maintain route discovery than no reply the message so message disconnection to recovery the path. IV. Enhancement of Security Routing Mechanism The enhancing this problem to secure several methods to the AODV routing protocol to provide the security information. But AODV due to Yang et al. [14] is the only protocol designed based in own approach. Each node AODV node maintains the neighbor path. All the routing updates received from a neighbor without any token will be dropped. The request mechanism is the same as that of AODV, except that the request will be accepted only from verified neighbors. So the reply algorithm is slightly differ from AODV. In the packet in routing monitoring behavior then allow the route may contain <neighbor-addr, source-addr, dest-addr, destseq, maintain-time>. However the security of searching a more time then this easily security attack and maintaining a path. A. Mainly Attacks This method of routing attacks challenging the security of AdHoc networks can be sorted into two types: external attacks and internal attacks [15-16]. External attacks come from the nodes that do not have the authentication of the network. These attacks can be prevented by encryption and authentication mechanism. Internal attacks mean that the malicious nodes are authorized for legal private key. These nodes can fabricate routing packet to make unusable routing lead to transfer. So, the internal attacks are prevent for efficient is very important and difficult issue. B. Vulnerability Attacks This attack for AODV routing protocol in every node monitors its neighbors for any malicious activity. Then existing simple operation of the AODV does not required node. But this needed for improve the network layer security. So, we explain a malicious attack launched by exploiting this shortfall [18].

Fig. 2: Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols [17] Neighbor nodes will the path to source when it is received the RREQ and set of time for the path. And this node will transmit the RREQ to neighbors if there is no route to the destination route table. To find the destination node or mid-node having a new route to the destination. Then the mid-node or destination node will send a Routing Response (RREP) backward to source. And the reply will traverse along the forward route of the received request in single unicast discovery node. Every mid-node makes up a route to the destination based on the information carried by reply.
S S

Fig. 4: The following example given in fig., Assume the source node S which to communicate with destination node D. It has no route S will broadcast reply packet to its neighbors. And given this example for represented a node (N1 to N6) and show every node clear to communicate between sources to destination. Consider a node request is received by N5 and N6, which are hop away from source S in fact N5 and N6. As the node N5 and N6 have no route to offer, they broadcast this request after increasing the hop count to 1. It is received by N3 and N4, and they have no route to offer too. They need to rebroadcast after increasing the hop count to 2. Now destination D will send a reply to N1. In case of AODV, it will unicast to N1, whereas in case of AODV-S, it will be broadcast to all its neighbor. N1 will broadcast the reply with the information <addr(S), addr(D), Dseq(D) and destination maintaining-time>. So, N4 update the next hop field to N2 and will rebroadcast. And similar use to any other node will be sending and receiving message.
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Fig. 3: Route Path Discovery So, there are more than one nodes have a route to the destination, and then source node will receive several replies. Because the reply

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InternatIonal Journal of Computer SCIenCe and teChnology

ISSN : 0976-8491 (Online) | ISSN : 2229-4333 (Print)

IJCST Vol. 3, ISSue 1, Jan. - MarCh 2012

V. Attacks of AODV Protocol There are many attacks of AODV protocol and information of each attack in security system. So sender of a message not be able to after deny sending the message and that the recipients not be able to deny the receipt after the receiving the message. And attacks of routing protocol will able to denial of service (DoS) and security of AODV protocol. A. Attack the Denial of Services However in this AODV routing protocol, function associated with each node that present a many new opportunities for launching a DoS the latter disrupt channel access and may cause wastage of resources in terms of bandwidth a power. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to an use of multiple sources that are distributed throughout the network. An attacker cause the congestion network by generating an excessive amount of traffic. In wireless network, DoS attacks are difficult to prevent and protect against. B. Black Hole Attack in AODV This attack is all packets are dropped by sending for routing packet, the attacker could route all packets for some destination it own and discard, or the attacker could cause the route at all nodes in area of the network to point when in fact the destination is out of area. Only for within a network area to security a routed path [17]. C. Wormhole (Network Layer Attack) Using a this attacker nodes N1 to N2 link via private connection. So, every packet that N1 receives from Ad-Hoc network, A forwards the wormhole to N2, to then be rebroadcast by N2, similarly, N2 may send all Ad-Hoc network packet to N1. To publically network attack through the node to node packet delivery and communication of security. D. Hijacking Session Attack In this attack one weak point that a most authentication processes are only carried out when a session starts. An appear to as a authentic node and hijack the session. This session required the transport layer attacks and immediately to attack in any session. E. Network Traffic Attack This attack to information leakage traffic interception to node N. And security of one communication station to another communication station through network and easily to secure of traffic communication channel. VI. Conclusion and Future Direction In this paper, we have presented an enhancement to the AODV protocol using our security routing mechanism and we have proposed a security scheme to pro-active prevent internal attacks. In Our mechanism is able to detect and eliminate DoS attack using modified hop count. The secure versions of each of the proposed have different types attacks in improvement of routing protocol. The identified attacks and solution proposed are for on-demand routing protocols specifically AODV. Presently we are working on defining more internal attacks and plan to identify solutions for them. Moreover, we plan to introduce security scheme for external attacks .This mechanism can prevent some internal attacks such as Black Hole Attack efficiently and enhanced the security of ad hoc networks. For future work, we plan to develop a more complex black hole attack and network traffic attack scenario. In addition,
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we will construct a some detection attacks algorithm to handle such a complex scenario with the security level of detection accuracy and low computational overhead security solution. References [1] Charles G. Perkins, Pravin Bhagwat,Highly Dynamic Gestination Sequenced DistanceVector Routing (DSDV) for mobile Computers, ACMSICOMM94 Conference on Communication Architectures, pp. 234-244, Oct. 1994. [2] David B. Johnson, David A.Maltz, Yih-Chun Hu,The Dynamic Source Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad-Hoc Network, Apr.15.2003. [3] Perkins.C.E, Royer.E.M,Ad-Hoc on demand distance vector routing, Mobile Computing Systems and Applications 1999, Proceedings, pp. 90-100, 1999. [4] C.Perkins.E, Belding-Royer.S.Das,Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing, RFC3561, July 2003. [5] Pearlman.M.R, Haas.Z.J,Determining the optimal configuration for the zone routing protocol, Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, Vol. 17, Issue 8,1999, pp. 1395-1414. [6] C.E.Perkins, R.E.Royers,Ad-Hoc on-demand distance vector routing, In Proc.IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing System and Applications, 1999. [7] Shyhtsun F.W, Fei yi Wang, Brain M.Vetter, W.Rance Cleaveland, Y.Frank Jou, Fengmin Gong, Cbandramouli Sargor,Instrusion detection for link-state routing protocols, In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1997. [8] J Gregory B.White, Eric A.Fisch, Udo W.Pooch,A peerbased intrusion detection system, Vol. 10, Jan-Feb 1996. [9] Vesa Karpijoki., (2000),Signalling and routing security in mobile and Ad-Hoc networks, [Online] Available: http:// www.hut.fi/vkarpijo/i.workOO/. [10] Teresa F Lunt,A Survey of intrusion detection techniques, In Computers & Security, Vol. 12, pp. 405-418, 1993. [11] L.Zhou, Z.J.Haas.,Securing ad hoc networks, In IEEE Network Magazine , Vol. 3. Nov. 1 Dec. 1999. [12] Lakshmi Venkabaman, Dharma P Agrawal,A novel authentication in ad hoc networks, In The 2nd IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, Chicago, September 2000. [13] Lakshmi Venkatraman, Dharma P Agrawal,An optimized inter-router authentication scheme for Ad-Hoc networks, In The Thirteenth Annual International Conference on Wireless Communication. Canada , pp. 129-146. [14] H. Yang, H. Shu, X. Meng, S. LU. SCAN,Self organized network-layer security in mobile ad hoc network-layer security in mobile ad hoc networks, IEEE J. Selected Areas in Commun., 24(2), pp. 261-273, Feb. 2006. [15] Zhu Daofei, Wang Dongyan, Liu xinran,Secure Routing Protocols for Ad-Hoc Netwroks, a Survey [J]. Computer Engineering and Application, 2005,(27), pp. 116-119. [16] DENG Hongmei, L I Wei, AGRAWAL D P.,Routing Security in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks, IEEE Communication Magazine [J]. 2002, 40(10), pp. 70-75. [17] Abusalah, L., Khokhar, A., Guizani, M.,A survey of secure mobile Ad-Hoc routing protocol, Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE , Vol.10, No.4, pp.78-93, Fourth Quarter 2008.

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IJCST Vol. 3, ISSue 1, Jan. - MarCh 2012

ISSN : 0976-8491 (Online) | ISSN : 2229-4333 (Print)

[18] Veeraraghavan, P., Singh, S., Ghosh, S.,Enhancement the security of theAODV-S routing protocol,Telecommunications and Malaysia International Conference on communications, 2007. ICT-MICC 2007. IEEE International Conference on, Vol., No., pp. 324-329, 14-17 May 2007. Satyendra Singh was born in Bareilly, India. He received the B.Tech. Degree in Computer Science and Engineering in 2009 from Invertis Institute of Engineering & Technology, Bareilly, India. He is currently pursuing M.Tech in Computer Science and Engineering at Kamla Nehru Institute of Technology, Sultanpur, U.P., India. His areas of interest in research are Cryptography and Network Security, AODV. Vinod Kumar Yadav was born in Jaunpur, India. He received the B.Tech. Degree in Computer cience and Information Technology in 2008 from I.E.T., M.J.P. Rohilkhand University Bareilly, India. He is currently pursuing M.Tech in Computer Science and Engineering at Kamla Nehru Institute of Technology, Sultanpur, U.P., India. His areas of interest in research are Cryptography and Network Security, Database.

Ganesh Chandra was born in Kanpur, India. He received the B.Tech. Degree in CSE in 2009 from Dr. Ambedkar Institute of Technology for Handicapped, Kanpur, India. He is currently pursuing M.Tech in Computer Science and Engg. at Kamla Nehru Institute of Technology, Sultanpur, U.P., India. His areas of interest in research are Operating System, Cryptography and Network Security. Rahul Kumar Gangwar was born in Bareilly, India. He Pursuing the B.Tech. Degree in Computer Science and Engineering from Invertis Institute of Engineering & Technology, Bareilly, India. His areas of interest in research are Cryptography and Network Security, Networking, Data Structure.

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