Manzano vs. SanchezAM No.

MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.

HELD:Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals & Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

Nilda Navales vs Reynaldo Navales Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The

In 1986, Nilda and Reynaldo met in a local bar where Nilda was a waitress. Because of his fear that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got married in 1988. Reynaldo is aware that Nilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock. The 1st year of their marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglected some of her duties as a wife. She later worked as a gym instructor and according to Reynaldos allegations; her job makes her flirt with her male clients. She also drives home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to fetch her. She also projected herself as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo because that would only destroy her figure. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be annulled. He presented her cousin as a witness that attested that Nilda was flirting with other guys even with Reynaldos presence. Reynaldo also presented the findings of a psychologist who concluded that based on Nildas acts, Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda on her part attacked Reynaldos allegations. She said that it is actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case of concubinage against him which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to support herself because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she projected herself as a married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females only. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nildas psychological incapacity. HELD: The petition must be granted because the States participation in this case is wanting. There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered.

And even if the SC would consider the case based on the merits, the petition would still be granted. The acts presented by Reynaldo by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the psychological expert to be insufficient to prove the PI of Nilda. The testimonies presented by people the expert interviewed were not concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up with their respective information was not as well shown. There is no proof as well that Nilda had had sex with different guys a condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as to Nildas PI the SC ruled that this case be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.

thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan's body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN(GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008)

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female." The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent