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Impossibilium nulla obligatio est There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.

This legal percept states that when an act cannot be performed due to nature, physical impediments, or unforeseen events. It can be a legitimate basis to rescind (mutually cancel) a contract. In the Denied Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus made by AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. docketed as G.R. NO. 147066 and G.R. No. 147179, praying that the Court must direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the continuing registration provision under the Election code, the court recognized the operational impossibility of conducting a special registration, which in its own language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to the Commission. Moreover, the determination of administrative agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances. This was in accordance to the legal maxim Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence no one is obliged to perform an impossibility.

Index amini sermo est- Speech is the index of intention In this principle of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. In the case of Yolonda Signey vs SSS docketted as G.R. No. 173582, whereas to whom will the death benefits be granted (the legitimate wife or common-law wife). Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282[27] is very clear. Nevertheless we only need to apply the law; Index amini sermo est.

Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum- Public interest requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a legal controversy. This principle implies that once judgment or an order of a court has become final, the issues raised therein should be laid to rest. In the case of Salandanan vs CA docketted as G.R. 127783, June 5 1998, the petitioners cannot seek the re-opening of the probate proceedings which had long been terminated. They cannot, in the same manner, question the order validating the transfer and/or sale of their shares which was issued thirty-two years ago. It is a fundamental principle of public policy in every jural system that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.

Interpotare et concordare legibus est optimus ineterpotandi- Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form uniform system of law. This Latin maxim expresses that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. This legal principle was discussed in the case of Natividad v Felix docketted as G.R. No. 111616, February 4, 1994 whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing petitioner's arrest. Based on Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), petitioner contends that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for the alleged murder of Severino Aquino. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

Interpret fiend est ut res valeat quam perea- A law should be interpreted with a view of to upholding rather than destroying it. The maxim states such an interpretation is to be adopted that the measure may take effect rather fail. This legal principle was applied in the case of Cecilia v National Labor Relations and Singapore Airlines Limited, docketted as G.R. No. L-65786, July 16, 1984 in which the Supreme Court granted the maternity benefits to petitioner based on Article XI of the CBA. The Supreme Court ruled that very title of Article XI alone gives to the sections of an act or contract are of ' ten resorted to for the purpose of determining the scope of the provisions and their relation to other portions of the act. Section 1, Article XI provides hospitalization and medical care benefits. From the language of the Article in question, no qualification as to cause of confinement or need of medical care is made. The contention that pregnancy or childbirth is not sickness per se so as to be reimbursable under the CBA is untenable. Article XI neither states nor implies that its provisions apply only to sickness. In fact, it speaks of "illness or disablement", for one may be hospitalized not only for treatment of disease but also for injury, disability or incapacity. To adopt respondent's strained interpretation would be to create an absurd situation whereby an employee may no longer avail of the benefits under Article XI when one is on vacation, sick, or compassionate leave, which are also separated granted in the same way that maternity leave benefits are provided as distinct privileges. Such a construction would, of course, be absurd, and yet the respondents would apply it to another form of leave. Reasonable and practical interpretation

must be placed on contractual provisions. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted, that the thing may continue to have efficacy rather than fail.

Interpretatio talis in abiguis semper fienda est, ut evitur inconveniens et absurdum- Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. This legal principle means that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an ujust or an absurd conclusion. This was adopted in the case of Serana v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008 wherein Serana, accused of estafa, petitioned and claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.She claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. The Suppreme Court ruled that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet- The authoritative interpretation of the court of a statute acquires the force of law by becoming a part thereof. This legal maxim simply means that judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. This principle was applied in the case of THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.CARMEN, G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 wherein Carmen, an appointed secret agent by an official, was accused of illegal possession of firearms. The issue in this case was should the appellant be acquitted on the basis on the Supreme Courts rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in

Mapa? Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" - the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. The judgement was hereby reversed and appellant was acquitted.