G.R. No. 92422 May 23, 1991 AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GARMENTS & TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO. (PHILS.), INC., respondents. Cuevas, De la Cuesta & De las Alas for petitioner. The Solicitor General for the Office of the President. Taada, Vivo & Tan for private respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

This can not be said, however, of the instant case. This case arose from an April 24, 1984 ruling of the GTEB that respondent Glorious Sun was guilty of misdeclaration of imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting abroad and, therefore, its export quotas should be cancelled. Its quotas were given to two newly-formed corporationsDe Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil and the American InterFashion Corporation (AIFC). These two corporations were joint ventures of the Hongkong investors and majority stockholders of Glorious Sun on one hand and, allegedly, a member of the family and a crony of President Marcos on the other. The Office of the President set aside the GTEB decision and remanded the case for genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. The petitioner now alleges that the GTEB decision is res judicata and that Glorious Sun was given every opportunity to be heard by the Board.

The private respondent interposed a motion for reconsideration of the October 2, 1990 resolution which referred the issues in this petition to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition and ordered the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) to refrain from conducting further proceedings in OSC Case No. 84B-1, subject to a final determination of the merits of the Whether or not the Malacaang decision suffers from grave abuse of discretion is the question before us. It must be respective claims of the parties herein. emphasized, however, that Glorious Sun has never been The motion questions the findings that the instant petition ". . . sequestered. The records also show that American InterFashion's sequestration has been lifted and apparently only De raises matters which are incidents arising from or incidental to, or Soliel remains sequestered. However, De Soleil is not a party in related to, several cases pending before the Sandiganbayan this petition and it appears that it is not interested in what which pertain to funds, properties and assets alleged to have been illegally acquired or misappropriated by the members of the happens to the sequestration. Significantly, it was the Glorious Sun's owner which filed the sequestration case against American Marcos family and their business associates or cronies." Inter-Fashion and De Soleil with the PCGG. After a re-examination of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan The issue resolved by the Office of the President is not proper under Executive Order No. 14 and the issues raised in the instant petition, we resolve to set aside the October 2, 1990 for the Sandiganbayan for the following reasons: resolution and grant the motion for reconsideration. First, the 1984 cancellation of the export quotas of Glorious Sun In the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (182 SCRA 911 is a main case. As a principal case it cannot be an incident of any sequestration or ill-gotten wealth case which should be [1990]) the Court stated: referred to the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner American InterFashion nor non-party De Soleil was in existence when the The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has already been proceedings which led to this case were initiated by GTEB in settled in Presidential Commission on Good Government 1984. The fact that the cancelled quotas were given to the hastily v. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pena, etc., et al., (159 SCRA 556 created corporations does not preclude an examination of the [1988]) where the Court held that: validity of the order of cancellation which led to their creation. A 1986 sequestration order (now lifted) against the then non. . . Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order existent American Inter-Fashion should not be allowed to stop No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Glorious Sun from insisting before the proper tribunal that it was Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and not accorded due process when its export quotas were arbitrarily Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by stripped from it in 1984. Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Second, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to ascertain Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees, whether or not the questioned Malacaang decision is tainted by whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive grave abuse of discretion. Whether or not the Office of the and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all President correctly reviewed a 1984 GTEB decision is not proper incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such for the Sandiganbayan to ascertain. The Office of the President cases necessarily fall likewise under the reviewed the 1984 GTEB finding that Glorious Sun was guilty of Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, misdeclaration of denim importations. It decided that GTEB did subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the not observe rudimentary requirements of due process when it Supreme Court. rendered its decision. The Office of the President ordered a remand for the proper taking of evidence. The correctness of that In reiterating the aforequoted ruling in six (6) subsequent decision is for the Supreme Court to decide and not for the cases (Soriano III v. Yuzon, 164 SCRA 226) which were Sandiganbayan. decided jointly, again, the Court held that . . . [T]he exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged illgotten wealth, but also to "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases," such as the dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. (at p. 917-918) In this regard, the petitioner itself invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to correct or remedy the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the President. Only the Supreme Court through the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can decide whether or not the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned decision. (See Republic v. Sandiganbayan supra. Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]) With these findings, we now proceed to resolve the main issue in the petition.

Thus, in the above cited case we ruled that the motion for intervention filed by the private respondents being merely As stated in the October 2, 1990 resolution, the facts of the case ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation (Civil Case are as follows: No. 0025) and not an independent action, the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive and original jurisdiction over Civil Case No. On April 27, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS was found 0025, has likewise original and exclusive jurisdiction over the guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations private respondent's action for intervention therein. by the GTEB in OSC Case No. 84-B-1 and, as a result of

which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, respondent GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 67180, contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court issued a resolution on June 4, 1984, ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS. However, on July 25, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition. On August 20, 1984, the Court granted respondent GLORIOUS' motion for withdrawal. Respondent GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution dated September 10, 1984. More than two years later, on October 15, 1986, respondent GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. Once again, respondent GLORIOUS alleged that the charges against it in OSC Case No. 84-B-1 were not supported by evidence. Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos cronyowned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA] and petitioner AIFC Respondent GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were allowed to service respondent GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment. On September 4, 1987, the GTEB denied the petition of respondent GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken on October 5, 1987 to the Office of the President, docketed as OP Case No. 3781. At this point, petitioner AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal on November 27, 1987, claiming that the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 has long become final, and that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to it. On September 7, 1989, the Office of the President ruled in favor of respondent GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. The motion for reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied on February 20, 1990. (Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 79727974) The petitioner raises the following alleged errors: I. RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION PETITION IN HAVING TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF GLORIOUS SUNS APPEAL SINCE: a. it amounted to an administrative review of the final judgment of the courts; b. Glorious Sun had long ago abandoned its right to appeal the 1984 Decision of the GTEB. II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT GLORIOUS SUN'S APPEAL WAS PROPER, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF GLORIOUS SUN'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. (Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 12-13) As can be gleaned from the issue raised in the first assigned error, the petitioner capitalizes on the fact that we granted a motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 67180, Glorious Sun v. GTEB on August 20, 1984. Thus, the petitioner contends that

in entertaining the appeal of private respondent GLORIOUS, the Office of the President "had unwittingly made itself a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a decision which had become final and executory more than three (3) years earlier." (Petition p. 5) The petitioner asseverates that the resolution dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 67180 was res judicata on the matter. Time and again we have held that for a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: . . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to the parties, subject matter and cause of action. (Bringas v. Hernando, 144 SCRA 346, 359 citing the cases of Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 558; Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 126 SCRA 526; and Castro v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 539 cited in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 250 [1987]; See also Escarte, Jr., et al. v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 53668, December 4, 1990). The crucial question before us is whether or not the final judgment in G.R. No. 67180 constitutes res judicata to the instant case on the ground that the final judgment in G.R. NO. 67180 was a judgment on the merits. The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point." (Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court supra citing Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 238, 245-246). In the later case of Escarte, Jr., et al. v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al., (supra) we further stated: xxx xxx xxx As a technical legal term, "merits" has been defined in law dictionaries as matter of substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form, and as the real or substantial grounds of action or defense in contradiction to some technical or collateral matter raised in the course of the suit. A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objection or contentions (Vicente J. Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Volume II, pp. 841-842) Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 can not be categorized as a judgment on the merits. Our action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact when we heard the parties during oral arguments, GTEB was unable to present any showing of misdeclaration of imports. Concerned about the alleged railroading of the case, we directed GTEB to allow Glorious Sun a period not exceeding 60 days to fully disclose its evidence relative to the charges against it. The motion to withdraw the petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by the martial law regime. The motion to withdraw states that: . . . [I}t has painfully arrived at the conclusion that, without admitting the truth of the findings of respondent Board, it is but to give notice of withdrawal of its petition in this case, thereby to enable petitioner's President, Mr. Nemesio Co, to immediately free himself from further tension affecting his state of health. This notice is being filed under Section 1 of Rule 20 since anyway the issues in the case have not yet been formally joined. (RolloG.R. No. 67180, p. 580) No issues had been joined. The movant never admitted the correctness of the Board's findings. Significantly, our resolution dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 67180 was based solely on this notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 67180 was clearly based on

a technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. Laguna, Nacionalista Party v. Comelec, 122 SCRA 423 [1983]; Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues Mangubat v. De Castro, 163 SCRA 608 [1988]). hanging in mid-air cannot, under the circumstances, constitute res judicata. The petitioner's posture is to say the least misleading. At issue in this petition is the 1984 resolution of the GTEB This resolution Under its second assigned error, the petitioner assails the was the sole reason for stripping off Glorious Sun's export questioned resolutions of the Office of the President on the quotas and awarding the export quotas to two newly and hastily ground that private respondent Glorious Sun was not denied due created corporations, the petitioner herein and De Soleil The process during the hearings held in GTEB. petitioner can not use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 to justify Specifically, the petitioner disagrees with the Office of the the 1984 GTEB resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious Sun President's findings that during the hearings conducted in 1984, was denied due process when the GTEB failed to disclose Glorious Sun was not confronted with the evidence, which, per evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious Sun. (Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations,supra: the records, were marked as GTEB's exhibits. Provincial Chapter of Laguna, Nacionalista Party v. Comelec, supra. Mangubat v. Castro, supra) In its petition, however, the petitioner admits that the GTEB in the 1984 hearings failed to disclose to Glorious Sun vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious Moreover, as pointed out by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, the documents disclosed to Glorious Sun by Sun was guilty of dollar-salting. The petition states: GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that Glorious Sun was . . . In its own Decision, the Office of the President took note denied due process. Secretary Elma said: of the fact that after GTEB required Glorious Sun to submit its reason why its petition for restitution of export quotas should be given due course, the former furnished the latter various relevant documents for its perusal and examination (See Annex "A"). These very same documents are constitutive of the evidence submitted by the GTEB which it considered in arriving at its 1984 Decision. With this subsequent disclosure, Glorious Sun was given all the opportunity, to comment thereon, with the end in view of convincing GTEB that its petition, for restitution should be given due course. It was very clear from the 1987 GTEB Resolution (See Annex "E") that it took into consideration the arguments advanced by Glorious Sun in refutation of the GTEB evidence which were just disclosed to them. Unfortunately for Glorious Sun, despite the arguments they presented, the GTEB remained unconvinced to disturb the earlier findings. GTEB's ruling runs thus However, the recommendation of the investigating panel and the decision of the Board were not based on the data you have for the simple reason that the specifications are different. On the other hand, the records made available to you earlier on which the investigating panel and the Board based their recommendation and decision show importations of other importers with the same specifications as your importations. These documents are intact and filed in orderly fashion and were again reviewed by us. The evidences are so detailed, clear and over-whelming that they show that your prices were much higher than the importations of the other Philippine importers. (See Annex "E", p. 3) The GTEB's violation of Appellant's right to due process becomes all the more clear by documents it furnished the latter in 1987, particularly the summer of the 1983 import prices of twelve (12) importers for 100% cotton denims, 44/45" per yard, as follows (1) Pioneer Texturizing US $1.65 C&F (2) Jag & Hagger Jeans 1.90 C&F (3) GTI Sportswear Corporation 1.678 CF (4) Midas Diversified Export Corporation 1.65 C&F (only one importation indicated) (5) Glorious Sun Fashion Mgt. Mftg. Phils., Inc. (Appellant herein) 2.00 FOB (6) Lee (Phils.) Inc. 3.55 C&F (7) International Garments 2.10 C&F (8) Carousel Children's Wear Inc. A 1.50 C&F (9) Sampaguita (no price per yard indicated) (10) Pie Wynner 1.42 CF (11) Marlu Garment Corporation yards priced at $14,394.69 or divided by 7,977 equals 1.80 (12) Levi Straus 2.66 As shown above, the highest recorded import prices in 1983 for 100% cotton denims 44/45" per yard were as follows: (1) Lee (Phils.) Inc. US $3.55 C&F (2) Lee (Phils.) Inc. 3.13 CIF (3) Levi Strauss 2.66 (4) International Garments 2.10 C&F (5) Glorious Sun (Appellant) 2.00 FOB Considering that whether the importation is CIF C&F, CF or FOB the freight cost difference is only US $0.01 per yard (tsn, Feb. 29, 1984 hearing, p. 32), it is clear that Appellant posted only the fifthhighest price at US $2.00. And since the price registered in 1983 reached a high of $3.55 and a low of US$1.42, Appellant's price of US $2.00 is, on average, below the median of US $2.485.

Evidently, the protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of the relevant documents. After Glorious Sun had examined the same, and submitted their arguments in refutation of previous findings which were based thereon, the GTEB considered these arguments. These subsequent As indicated by the data gathered by the GTEB Secretariat events, we respectfully mention, are clear indications that on the unit price of denim fabrics imported by garment effective disclosure within the context of the due process manufacturers in 1982 and 1983, the following were the clause had been more than sufficiently met. Even with a highest import prices recorded: categorical statement from the GTEB that the Supreme Court case is without any bearing on the present inquiry on account of the withdrawal thereof by Glorious Sun, the move FOB : $ 2.9/m or $2.65/yd. of the GTEB in this respect is a sure sign that it did not relegate to oblivion the admonition of the High Court to C & F : 3.56/yd. afford Glorious Sun "a reasonable opportunity of having full disclosure of the evidence relative to the charge filed against CIF : 3.13/yd. it and the same opportunity to present rebuttal evidence." (Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 21-23) HCV : 2.12/m or 1.94/yd. The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured the defect of (Memorandum of GTEB Raw Materials Importation Regulation non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under the constitutional Division dated March 25, 1987.) provision of due process enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Apparently, the 1984 GTEB Investigating Panel picked up Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations (69 Provincial 635 four importersidentified initially by letters A, B, C, and D, [1940]) and other subsequent cases. (See Provincial Chapter of but subsequently identified as Pioneer Texturizing Corporation, Jag & Hagger Jeans & Sportswear, GTI

Sportswear, and Midas Diversified Corporationwhose produce before the Court. So patently arbitrary was the import prices were lower than that of Appellant, in order to finding of dollar salting that it would have been easy for the show that Appellant's import prices was the highest. In so First Division to uphold the exporter's rights . . . (at pp. 588picking, it could, as it did, justify the cancellation of 589) Appellant's export quotas in obedience to the instruction on the matter of then Minister Ongpin. (See Affidavit of The petitioner contends that this pronouncement is obiter Assistant Minister and 1984 GTEB hearing Committee dicta since the issue on the matter was not presented in that Chairman Rodolfo V. Puno dated April 7, 1986, supra). case. Nonetheless, the appealed decision of September 4, 1987, Even assuming that the observations were obiter dicta in states: the Pea case, we find no legal impediment to re-examining the same conclusions which are borne by the records of the instant However, the recommendation of the board investigating case since we are now confronted with the issue as to the panel and the decision of the Board were not based on the correctness of the 1984 GTEB decision. data you (Appellant) have for the simple reason that the specifications are different. On the other hand, the records The petitioner also cites the affidavit of Chairman Puno. The made available to you earlier on which the investigating Puno affidavit is a sworn statement dated April 7, 1986 given panel and the Board based their recommendation and before the Presidential Commission on Good Government decision show importations of other importers with the same (PCGG) by Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry Rodolfo V. specifications as your (Appellant's) importations. These Puno, Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the documents are intact and filed in orderly fashion and were Ministry of Trade and Industry to conduct hearings on the dollar again reviewed by us. The evidences are so detailed, clear, salting charge against the respondent. It was the "Report to the and overwhelming that they show that your prices were Board" (GTEB) which formed the basis of the 1984 GTEB much higher than the importations of the other Philippine decision finding the respondent guilty of dollar salting. importers. The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to in the 1987 decision as being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labelled as Documents used by GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as earlier discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence. At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a controverting statement from its own Raw Materials Importation Regulation Division, thus: The pertinent portion of the Affidavit states: xxx xxx xxx 2. Prior to the start of the investigation, I was instructed by Minister Ongpin to submit a report finding Glorious Sun (Appellant herein) guilty of dollar-salting and other violations that would justify the cancellation of Glorious Sun's export quotas which were among the most substantial and valuable in the garments industry in trouser's line. 3. After Glorious Sun submitted its evidence refuting the dollar-salting charge, I told Minister Ongpin that there was no evidence to substantiate the dollar-salting charge against Glorious Sun or any other violations of existing laws or rules. However, Minister Ongpin still instructed me to submit a report to the GTEB, of which Minister Ongpin was the Chairman, finding Glorious Sun guilty of dollar-salting. (Rodolfo Puno's Affidavit dated April 7, 1986; . . . (Elma Decision, Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 47-48; Emphasis supplied)

Considering the unit prices gathered with the unit prices of Glorious Sun would lead one to believe that Glorious Sun's prices are not exceptionally high at $2.00/yd. (FOB). However, it should be noted that the denim fabrics are extremely heterogeneous (as can be seen in (1) above, with respect to width, construction, yarn count, weight, weave, color, and sourcing or country of origin. These factors, in one way or another affect the unit prices of the fabrics. For example, although Levi's has a higher unit price than Glorious Sun ($2.65/yd. as against $2.00/yd.), it should be The petitioner would like to impress on this Court that the Puno noted that they have different sourcing. Glorious Sun imports affidavit is an "inconsequential matter" on the ground that the its fabrics from Hongkong, while Levi's imports denim fabrics GTEB did not give credence to the affidavit. The GTEB said: from Japan (this is specified by the buyer), believed to be The affidavit of Mr. Rodolfo Puno was studied and superior in quality, thereby more expensive. The same is evaluated. None of the members of the committee would true for Lee Phils., which sources its denim fabrics from the agree that there was any pressure or instruction from former U.S.A. Therefore, it would not be wise to make conclusions Minister Roberto V. Ongpin to look for ways and means to from the comparison of prices, without considering other remove the quotas from your company. In other words, our factors such as those mentioned above. investigation showed that the committee chaired by Mr. Rodolfo Puno based its recommendations on the facts and Furthermore, it can be seen from (1) that some descriptions documents on hand that the members were free in making of the materials are not complete. Thus there is not enough their decision the way they did. basis for comparing import prices. (Memorandum dated March 25, 1987, supra; . . .) (Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 49-51) xxx xxx xxx The petitioner cites what it calls "inconsequential matters which formed the basis of the decision of the Office of the President . . . which ought to have been disregarded for lack of legal worth." (p. 22, Petition) In this regard, the petitioner cites the dissenting opinion in the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea (159 SCRA 556 [1988]), to wit: I participated in the deliberations and hearings of the Glorious Sun case in 1984 and I recall that there was not the slightest scintilla of evidence to support the charges of dollar salting made by GTEB A scrap of yellow pad paper on which were pencilled a few computations and with nothing to support them, a graph of import prices of four local importers identified only by letters, and another piece of paper with supposed 1983 prices of fabrics were the only "proof that the respondent Minister with all the power (he was issuing warrants of arrest) and resources at his command could

It is important to dwell further on the affidavit of Mr. Rodolfo Puno who chaired the investigating panel. His participation during the investigation was so deep and his involvement as shown by his questions were so detailed that one could see the thrust of his questions and the points he wanted to bring out. It is logical to assume that his posture in the original decision was based on the points elicited during the investigation. For him to make a complete turn about now is difficult to understand especially when none of the members of the committee share his new protestation. (See Annex "E", Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 69-70) The fact that the other members would not agree that there was pressure from Minister Ongpin to cancel the export quotas of the respondent does not mean that Mr. Puno was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that hewas pressured by Minister Ongpin.

He did not state that the members of the Investigating Panel were pressured. Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his position in the Panel, he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their administration had already been made. At the very least, Mr. Puno's "complete turn about" casts doubts on the veracity and fairness of the Investigating Panel's Report to GTEB which formed the basis for the 1984 GTEB decision. Hence, the need for further proceedings before the GTEB.

G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988 GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents. Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner. Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents. PADILIA, J.:

Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. This Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an general rule, however, is not without exceptions: administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that and oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed a written absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion explanation as to why he should not be dealt with amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in administrative agency on matters falling within its accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2 competence will not be disturbed by the courts. Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the falling under their jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private disregarded only if they "are not supported by respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, evidence; where the findings are initiated by testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the fraud, imposition or collussion; where the procedures which evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed lead to the factual findings are irregular;when palpable errors Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his 3 are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo, In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer 175 SCRA 76 [1989]) for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Contrary to the petitioner's posture, the record clearly manifests Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, that in cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public GTEB violated the private respondent's constitutional right to due respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of process. Before the cancellation in 1984, the private respondent preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the had been enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In administrative case. effect the private respondent's export quota allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another. Thus, in the case of Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. Ongpin (141 SCRA 437, 450 [1986]), we stated: According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, to present its side before its export quota allocations were petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and 4 revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such elementary principles of due process. allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges 5 which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. We privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process by they have become impressed with property rights respondent Provincial Board. especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held: P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families . . . It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, (Emphasis supplied). undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's

employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable B. Elma and the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive wrong. The right is considered to be property within the Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in the slightest by protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of 7 any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in detail why the law. private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued the records. without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its question the Malacaang decision. It was incorporated after the Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, incidents in this case happened. It was created obviously to be counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to owner. It was sequestered precisely because of the allegation be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's injustice inflicted on another private corporation. meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, 8 PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion for reconsideration is he failed to appeal." GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution of the Office of the President are hereby The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be

gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997 explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco. Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation 9 In Azul vs. Castro, this Court said: and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports From the earliest inception of instutional government in our Authority, petitioners, country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been vs. fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ASSOCIATION,respondents. ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was ROMERO, J.: initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports land which means "The general law; a law which hears Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and profession and their right to due process of law? renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential protection of the general rules which govern society. Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's charter. Pursuant to its A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and pilotage profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due March 21, 1985, which embodied the "Rules and Regulations process. Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that 3 We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before us now, was only as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port a summary action for ejectment that: of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved 4 satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and 5 In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor that a judgment, based only on plaintiffs evidence pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing defendant's by reason6 of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General evidence, should be avoided as much as possible. In order Manager. Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further that bias may not be imputed to the judge, he should have required to organize themselves into pilot associations which the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a would make available such equipment as may be required by the chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot oppositor's proof might not be adequate to overthrow the associations invested in floating, communications, and office case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and impatience equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is 10 required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge". before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his The petition, however, has become moot and academic. predecessor. Records do not show that in the last local elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan 7 issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 on July 15, 1992, whose avowed WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby afford better injunction issued by this Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED. No protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage costs. SO ORDERED. services." This was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance." On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body." Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum 8 Order No. 08-92 which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot, viz.: (1) 9 Qualifying Factors: safety record and physical/mental medical 10 exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC. On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 0492. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.

3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders. No costs. SO ORDERED.

The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation 13 Philippines, Inc. Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision, appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued petitioners elevated their case to this Court oncertiorari. 11 earlier. He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced that PPA-AO 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it "to control, regulate and No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district." against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied. On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the Corona opined that: "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.: The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case. PPA-AO 0492 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance. Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the reasonable, and just." 14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's light of this distinction. jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied) Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior consultation" before the issuance of the administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with "relevant Government agencies." Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the DirectorGeneral of the National Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order. Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court 12 rendered the following judgment: Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued 15 v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."

In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 16 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after 17 administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly rules that: argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast 18 1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted excess Guard need not be consulted. jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders; As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when 2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;

issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of 19 comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPAexclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. vested and can only be "withdrawn or shortened" by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA23 AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" and, therefore, an the organic law. unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations Governing the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that "(t)he Philippine Ports." It provides,inter alia, for the qualification, exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, of harbor pilots matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 20 property rights without due process." He merely expressed the 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds opinion the "(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a down. wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that "PPA-AO 04-95 does not forbid, but merely Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General Manager regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession." As Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the questioned will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules is not only unreasonable but also superfluous. and regulations. The trial court's finding of animosity between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by Yet the number of cases filed in court between private duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license respondents and Dayan, including cases which have reached especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to 21 with establishment standards." A license is a right or the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any business or do an act which, without such license, would be event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by 22 higher administrative authorities. illegal. Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed: Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, the here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessel for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots. Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 0492, "(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance." It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110223 April 8, 1997 ARMY AND NAVY CLUB OF MANILA, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, as Judge REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 36 (formerly (Branch 17), HON. A. CAESAR SANGCO, as Judge, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17-MANILA and the CITY OF MANILA, represented herein by MAYOR ALFREDO LIM, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: The instant petition seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 36, Manila which affirmed the summary judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17. On November 29, 1989 the City of Manila filed an action against herein petitioner with the MTC for ejectment. The complaint alleged that: 1. That plaintiff is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of Rep. Act No. 409, as amended, with offices at City Hall Building, Manila, represented in this action by its incumbent City Mayor, Hon. Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., with the same address as plaintiff; Defendant is likewise a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines with offices at the Army and Navy Club Building, Luneta, Manila, where it may be served with summons; 2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 12,705.30 sq. m. located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay, Manila, covered by TCT No. 156868/1059 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, together with the improvements thereon known as the Army and Navy of Manila; 3. That defendant is occupying the above-described land and the Army and Navy Club Building by virtue of a Contract of Lease executed between plaintiff and defendant in January 1983, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "A". 4. That paragraph 1 of the said Contract of Lease provides that: (1) That the LESSEE shall construct, at its own expense, a modern multi-storied hotel at a cost of not less than FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P50,000.00) (sic), which shall automatically belong to the LESSOR upon the expiration and/or termination of the lease agreement, without right of the LESSEE for reimbursement for the costs of its construction; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that construction of the said hotel shall be commenced within one (1) year, and completed as far as practicable within five (5) years, from date of approval by proper government officials of this lease agreement; PROVIDED, FURTHER, that the plans and specification for the same hotel shall be approved first by the LESSOR before actual construction;

may be paid by the LESSEE in twelve (12) equally monthly installments within the first five (5) days of each month, without the necessity of a demand, subject, however, to rental adjustment after the first five (5) days of each month, without the necessity of a demand, subject, however, to rental adjustment after the first five years of this lease, at the rate of not more than ten per centum (10%) per annum every two years, or on the basis of the increase in the prevailing market value of the leased premises whichever is higher of the two criteria; 7. That defendant also reneged on its rental obligation notwithstanding plaintiff's demand to pay, for its use and occupancy of the plaintiff's property, starting from January 1983 to the present, and its rental account stood at P1,604,166.70 as of May, 1989; 8. That in paragraph 4 of the Contract of Lease, it is also provided that: (4) That the LESSEE shall pay the realty tax due on the land, including those assessed against the improvements thereon, as well as all government license, permits, fees and charges prescribed by law, Presidential decrees and ordinances for the leased premises, including those for the establishment and operation of a modern multi-storied hotel and all constructions and modifications pursuant to the provisions of this Contract; 9 That defendant violated its undertaking to pay the taxes due on the land and improvement, so much so that as of December 1989, its aggregate realty tax liability amounts to P3,818,913.81; 10. That repeated demands of plaintiff had been made upon the defendant to comply with its aforesaid contractual obligations, but defendant however remained unfazed; it still failed to perform any of its contractual obligations. 11. That as a result, plaintiff rescinded their Contract of Lease and demanded defendant to vacate, the last of which was contained in a letter dated May 24, 1989, copy of which is attached hereto asANNEX "B". To date however, defendant however, has not budged an inch from the property of plaintiff; 12. That the reasonable rental value for defendant's continued use and occupancy of the subject premises which is a prime property along Rozas (sic) Boulevard in Luneta area is P636,467.00 a month in the context of the prevailing rental 1 rates of comparable real property; On December 29, 1989 or within the reglementary period, petitioner filed its answer to the complaint. Subsequently, on February 22, 1990, it filed a "Motion for Leave to File and for Admission of Amended Answer" allegedly asserting additional special and affirmative defenses. On May 23, 1990, the City of Manila filed a Motion for Summary 2 Judgment on the ground that there exists no genuine triable issue in the case.

On July 27, 1990, the MTC denied the petitioner's motion for leave to admit its amended answer for lack of merit. Thus, on 5. That in violation of the aforequoted provision, defendant has October 5, 1990, a decision was rendered with the following failed and/or refused to construct a modern multi-storied hotel dispositive portion: provided for therein, long after the expiration period therein stipulated and despite demands of plaintiff, to the prejudice of WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby plaintiff who has agreed to defendant's continued retention of rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant: the property on a lease-back agreement on the basis of the warranties of defendant to put up a contemporary multi-storied a) and all persons claiming rights or title under it, to building; immediate (sic) vacate and surrender to the plaintiff, the premises more particularly described as the Army and Navy 6 That paragraph 3 of the Contract of Lease also stipulates Club Bldg. located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay, that: Manila; (3) That the LESSEE shall pay a rent of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) a year, which b) to pay, all with legal interest thereon, its rental arrearages at the rate of P250,000.00 per year with a corresponding ten

(10%) percent increase every two years from January, 1983 Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of until it finally vacates and surrenders the premises to the the following causes: plaintiff; (1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the 3 c) the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired; On appeal, the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge Wilfredo (2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated; D. Reyes affirmed in toto the summary judgment of the 4 Metropolitan Trial Court. (3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract; Petitioner elevated its case to the Court of Appeals. On October (4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or 30, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of article 1657, as On May 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution regards the use thereof. denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 30, 1992. At the same time, it also denied the City of The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by Manila's motion for issuance of a writ of execution pending special laws. (emphasis supplied) appeal. Petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues: Petitioner invokes and capitalizes on the fact that the Army and Navy Club has been declared a national historical landmark by the National Historical Commission on June 29, 1992 which the lower courts allegedly never gave due consideration. Thus, its existence should not in any way be undermined by the simple ejectment suit filed against it. Petitioner contends that all parties are enjoined by law to preserve its existence and site.

1. RESPONDENT COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE OUSTER OF HEREIN PETITIONER FROM THE DISPUTED PREMISES WHICH IS A CLEAR TRANSGRESSION OF THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF THE SITE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AS A HISTORICAL LANDMARK. To support its claim, petitioner presented the Certificate of Transfer and Acceptance of the Historical Marker granted to it 2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS pursuant to R.A. 4846, as amended by PD 374 which provides SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF that it shall be "the policy of the State to preserve and protect the RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC) AND important cultural properties and National Cultural Treasures of 7 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) JUDGES DENYING the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value." ADMISSION OF PETITIONER'S AMENDED ANSWER. The Marker reads as follows: 3 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CERTIFICATE OF TRANSFER RENDERED BY RESPONDENT MTC AND RTC JUDGES. AND ACCEPTANCE OF HISTORICAL MARKER ARMY AND NAVY CLUB 4. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS DENIED TO ALL PERSONS TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS MAY DUE PROCESS BY THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY COME: JUDGMENT AGAINST IT. 5. AS AN INCIDENT TO THE MAIN ISSUE, THE PROPERTY, SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE, IS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THEREFORE, THE CONTRACT OF LEASE EXECUTED BY THE CITY OF MANILA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER IS 5 VOID. There is no merit in the petition. Amidst all the issues raised by the petitioner, the instant case is a simple ejectment suit. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 29th day of June, 1992, in Manila.

Be it known that the National Historical Institute, in the exercise of its authority vested by law and in compliance with its mandate to honor national heroes and perpetuate the glory of their deeds, and to preserve historical sites, has transferred this historical marker unto Administration of Army and Navy Club, who has agreed to accept the same and to maintain it as a sacred duty.

(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE There is no dispute that the City of Manila is the owner of a CAPT. VICENTE J. BRILLANTES SERAFIN D. QUIASON prime parcel of land with an area of 12,705.30 square meters Tansferee Transferor located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay together with the improvement thereon known as Army and Navy Club of Manila. Attested: Petitioner entered into a lease contract with private respondent sometime in January, 1983. In said lease contract, it agreed to: (SGD) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE 1) pay an annual a rent of P250,000.00 with a 10% increase CHIEF SUPT JOSE PERCIVAL ADIONG every two (2) years; 2) pay the realty tax due on the land; and 3) AVELINA M. CASTANEDA construct a modern multi-storey hotel provided for therein within five (5) years which shall belong to the City upon expiration or SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in termination of the lease without right of reimbursement for the 6 Manila, Philippines, this 29th day of June, 1992 cost of construction. by the affiants. Petitioner failed to pay the rents for seven (7) consecutive years. As of October, 1989 when the action was filed, rental arrears ballooned to P7.2 million. Real estate taxes on the land accumulated to P6,551,408.28 as of May, 1971. Moreover, petitioner failed to erect a multi-storey hotel in the site. For violations of the lease contract and after several demands, the City of Manila had no other recourse but to file the action for illegal detainer and demand petitioner's eviction from the premises. Article 1673 of the New Civil Code is explicit: (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE BGEN ANTONIO V. RUSTIA COL MANUEL R. GUEVARA. (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE RAMON J. SIYTANGCO, JR. CAPT. DANIEL A. ARREOLA.

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Not Reg. No. 297 PTR 022088 Page 61 1-2-92, Manila Book II IBP 320197 8 Series of 1992 12-18-91, Pasig While the declaration that it is a historical landmark is not objectionable, the recognition is, however, specious. We take the occasion to elucidate on the views of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who was invited as amicus curiae in the recent case of Manila Prince 9 Hotel v. GSIS where the historical character of Manila Hotel was also dealt with. He stated that: The country's artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject for the exercise of police power: ". . . which the State may regulate." This is a function of the legislature. And once regulation comes in, due process also comes into play. When the classification of property into historical treasures or landmarks will involve the imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that it be done with due process both substantive and procedural. In recognition of this constitutional principle, the State in fact has promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject.

again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another panel chairmanned by the Secretary of Education, with two experts as members appointed by the Secretary of Education. Their decision shall be final and binding. b. Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects may be designated as "National Cultural Treasures." The remainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property. c. Designated "National Cultural Treasures" shall be marked, described, and photographed by the National Museum. The owner retains possession of the same but the Museum shall keep a record containing such information as name of article, owner, period, source, location, condition, description, photograph, identifying marks, approximate value, and other pertinent data. Thus, for Manila Hotel to be treated as special cultural or historical property, it must go through the procedure described above. Eloquent nationalistic, endorsements of classification will not transform a piece of property into a legally recognized historical landmark . . . .

. . . the current general law on the subject is R.A. 4846, approved on June 18, 1966, and amended by P.D. No. 374. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the above procedure The Act prescribes the manner of classifying historical and has been complied with. The City of Manila even observed that cultural properties thus: the signatories thereto are officers and members of the 10 Club making such certification self-serving. It behooves us to Sec. 4. The National Museum, hereinafter referred to as the think why the declaration was conferred only in 1992, three (3) Museum shall be the agency of the government which, shall years after the action for ejectment was instituted. We can only implement the provisions of this Act. surmise that this was merely an afterthought, an attempt to thwart any legal action taken against the petitioner. Nonetheless, Sec. 5. The Director of the Museum, hereinafter referred to such certification does not give any authority to the petitioner to as the Director, shall undertake a census of the important lay claim of ownership, or any right over the subject property. cultural properties of the Philippines, keep a record of their Nowhere in the law does it state that such recognition grants ownership, location, and condition, and maintain an up-to- possessory rights over the property to the petitioner. Nor is the date register of the same. Private collectors and owners of National Historical Commission given the authority to vest such important cultural properties and public and private schools right of ownership or possession of a private property to the in possession of these items, shall be required to register petitioner. The law merely states that it shall be the policy of their collections with the Museum when required by the state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties Director and to report to the same office when required by and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard the Director any new acquisitions, sales, or transfers thereof. their intrinsic value. In line with this, any restoration, reconstruction or preservation of historical buildings shall only be made under the supervision of the Director of the National Sec. 6. The Director is authorized to convene panels of 11 Museum. The authority of the National Historical Commission experts, as often as the need for their services may arise, is limited only to the supervision of any reconstruction, each to be composed of three competent men in the restoration or preservation of the architectural design of the specialized fileds of anthropology, natural sciences, history and archives, fine arts, philately and numismatics, and identified historical building and nothing more. Even assuming that such recognition made by the National Historical shrines and monuments, etc. Each panel shall, after careful Commission is valid, the historical significance of the Club, if study and deliberation, decide which among the cultural any, shall not be affected if petitioner's eviction from the properties in their field of specialization shall be designated premises is warranted. Unfortunately, petitioner is merely a as "National Cultural Treasures" or "Important Cultural Properties." The Director is further authorized to convene lessee of the property. By virtue of the lease contract, petitioner panels of experts to declassify designated "National Cultural had obligations to fulfill. Petitioner can not just hide behind some recognition bestowed upon it in order to escape from its Treasures." obligation or remain in possession. It violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract. Thus, petitioner's eviction from The Director shall within ten days of such action by the panel the premises is inevitable. transmit their decision and cause the designation-list to be published in at least two newspapers of general circulation. Anent the procedural issues raised, the Court finds no reversible The same procedure shall be followed in the declassification error in the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. of important cultural properties and national treasures. Sec. 7. In designation of a particular cultural property as a A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by "national cultural treasure," the following procedure shall be a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and observed: affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact involved (except as to the amount of damages), and that a. Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is therefore the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter privately owned, shall be notified at least fifteen days prior to of law. 12 the intended designation, and he shall be invited to attend the deliberation and given a chance to be heard. Failure on In the case at bar, there is clearly no substantial triable issue. In the part of the owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the Answer filed on December 29, 1989, petitioner does not deny the panel to render its decision. Decision shall be given by the panel within a week after is deliberation. In the event that the existence of the lease contract executed with the City of the owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation Manila in January 1983. It admitted that it failed to pay the rents and real estate taxes and construction of a multi-storey building. made by the panel, he may do so within days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If no request for reconsideration is filed after this period, the designation is It put up the defense that it was unable to fulfill its obligations of then considered final and executory. Any request for the contract due to economic recession in 1984 as an aftermath reconsideration filed within thirty days and subsequently of the Ninoy Aquino assassination. Considering that there is no

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genuine issue as to any material fact, a summary judgment is G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973 proper. The argument that it was declared a historical landmark, is not a substantial issue of fact which does not, in any way, alter PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT or affect the merit of the ejectment suit. ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, Likewise, we find no error much less any abuse of authority on ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN the part of the lower court in not admitting the Amended Answer. PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, Aside from the fact that it was filed one (1) year after the original vs. answer was filed, it put up defenses which are entirely in PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF contradiction to its original answer. This is in contravention of the INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. 13 rules of procedure. Having admitted in the original answer that the City of Manila is the registered owner of the property and that L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for it leased the property from it, petitioner can not now deny such petitioners. claim of ownership. The Court of Appeals correctly observed on this point: Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent. Be that as it may, at this last stage, after herein petitioner has dealt with the private respondent as the owner of the leased premises and obtained benefits from said acknowledgment of such ownership for almost half a century, herein petitioner cannot be permitted to assume an inconsistent position by denying said private respondent's ownership of the leased premises when the situation calls for it. Herein petitioner cannot be allowed to double deal, recognizing herein private respondent's title over the leased premises and entering into a lease contract and other covenants, and thereafter after failing to comply with its obligation provided for in the lease agreement attempt to repudiate the ownership of private respondent of the subject 14 property. MAKASIAR, J.: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they AFFIRMED. The instant petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. SO ORDERED. The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate I Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced N the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties S T 3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of I the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest T against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be U participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as T well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 E PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969; b y 4. That a : meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu. 5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management; 6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the

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existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, illegal strike; 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated 7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly 1 representatives that while all workers may join the dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, which held among others, Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said fivejoining the demonstration and should report for work; and day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.). thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.). reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the demonstration will be held the following morning; and reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 7475, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO (pp. 12 & 76, rec.). sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.) requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.). in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against on the ground that their failure to file their motion for petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was and "K-2", rec.). accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.) (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.). In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.) After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.) Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. ) I. There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar. (1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as 2 the citadel of his person." (2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have 3 no patience with general principles." In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no 4 elections." Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its 5 power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."

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(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who 6 refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are 7 not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. (4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. (5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is 8 recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with 9 narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political 10 institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity 11 and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts 12 or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the 13 opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo inGonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. 14 Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and 15 women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice 16 Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 17 expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. II.The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses

of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been 18 sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free 19 expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

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The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or 20 strike. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.). The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of 21 freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by onethird, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional. III.The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is 24 for the furtherance of their interests. As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress. Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, day. was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the IV.Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free right of the employees to engage in such common action to speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these 22 heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations 23 in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. We as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in

15

favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution. V.It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self25 incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of 26 law, even after the accused has already served sentence for 27 twenty-two years. Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices 28 including the courts as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for 28 competent legal services. -a VI.The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative 29 delegation.

supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned. It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.) It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order 29 or decision subject of -a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved. It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final 30 and complete determination of the dispute can be made. It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling was a Sunday. reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule 30 which impinges on such human rights. -a Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice 30 rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or require." -b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion 30 appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. -c reiterated this principle and delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should added that be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord

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Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated: Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. on its property rights. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural should be stressed that the application in the instant case laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such compliance with which courts have organized and function, application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human but as means conducive to the realization the administration rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record. steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..." SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 30 Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., -e thus: applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to 30 help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... -g As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, members of the same Union and who participated in the investigation and determination of any question or demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon controversy and in exercising any duties and power under the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and substantial merits of the case, without regard to and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and viceversa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. 30 (Emphasis supplied). -d

is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.) To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.

17

were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage. The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities. Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder: The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty. ... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one. ... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us. ... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]). xxx xxx xxx Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances. xxx xxx xxx The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])... xxx xxx xxx In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis 33 supplied.) If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered: 31 observe. The case at bar is worse. Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed. Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank 32 vs. C.I.R., where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled: It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and (2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service. With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc

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G.R. No. 162994

September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners, vs. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.:

In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos "least-movementpossible" policy. In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan CitySurigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.

Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, constitutional overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson marrying employees of any competitor company. defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing area. 1 the Decision dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2 During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was 62434. paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent was also not included in product conferences regarding such Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical products. representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by () month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co- Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered employees or employees of competing drug companies and its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships should management find that such relationship poses a possible between its employees and persons employed with competitor conflict of interest, to resign from the company. companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co- Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision. employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the ground that the company, the management and the employee will explore the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a noncourt held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside having personal relationships with employees of competitor the company after six months. 4 companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. courts Decision, but the motion was denied by the appellate 5 court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with 3 Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Court of Appeals erred in affirming the NCMBs finding that the Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an representatives of her company and prepared marketing employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the Court of strategies for Astra in that area. Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and Even before they got married, Tecson received several deprived of the opportunity to attend products seminars and reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of training sessions.6 interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998. Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies violates the equal In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry.7 one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as was performing his job well. shown by the following circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a diminution against entering into a relationship with an employee of a in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsys employer, sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and from promoting respondents products which were competing Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be with Astras products.8 offered by Astra. With Bettsys separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company time, they would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with package from Astra. and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons reassignment

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from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area does 9 not amount to constructive dismissal. Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests in any competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its 10 secrets, procedures and policies. It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on 11 valid grounds. According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real and potential conflict of interest. Astras products were in direct competition with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxos enforcement of the foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management 12 prerogatives. In any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but 13 to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead. Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a competitor company would be detrimental to the 14 interests of Glaxo. Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another sales area and his exclusion from seminars regarding respondents new products did not amount to constructive dismissal. It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was relocated from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown was in Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer from the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory and 15 minimizing his travel expenses. In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the seminar concerning the new anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he already transferred to 16 Butuan). The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.

10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from the Company as a matter of Company policy.
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The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing company rules of Glaxo, and to study and 18 become acquainted with such policies. In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest: 1. Conflict of Interest Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest that may run counter to the responsibilities which they owe Glaxo Wellcome. Specifically, this means that employees are expected: a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or otherwise, in any competitor supplier or other businesses which may consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or decisions and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit. b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to advance their outside personal interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses. c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income which would impair their effective job performance. d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships that may lead to conflict of interest. 1.1. Employee Relationships Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of competing drug companies are expected to disclose such relationship to the Management. If management perceives a conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a non-counter checking position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six (6) 19 months, if no other solution is feasible. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is The Court finds no merit in the petition. reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor being questioned by petitioners provides: company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

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That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion 20 and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the 21 interest of fair play. As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged an employee who was married to an employee of an active competitor did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 23 1964. The Court pointed out that the policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted that the employers business was highly competitive and that gaining inside information would constitute a competitive advantage. The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting 24 under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private 25 conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only 29 exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in 27 the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
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when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer 30 becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tescon was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area: . . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus validNote that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which requires her to work in close coordination with District Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship with customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astras inventoryshe therefore takes an active participation in the market war characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioners sales territory covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the others market strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Managements] appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual 31 basis

In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations 32 Commission, which involved a complaint filed by a medical representative against his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the drug company to transfer or reassign its In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and employee in accordance with its operational demands and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted hereunder, not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between also finds application in the instant case: its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a or medical representative is expected to travel. He conflict of interest between the employee and the company that should anticipate reassignment according to the may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by demands of their business. It would be a poor drug the appellate court, thus: corporation which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas where the need for pushing its The policy being questioned is not a policy against products is great. More so if such reassignments are marriage. An employee of the company remains free to 33 part of the employment contract. marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual. However, an employees personal As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by decision does not detract the employer from exercising Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson 28 business success. . . several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at Glaxo constantly company policy which forms part of respondents Employee reminded him about its effects on his employment with the Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as company and on the companys interests. After Tecson married that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction resigning from the company or asking his wife to resign from when he signed his employment contract and when he entered Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company instead. Glaxo stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to 29 thus, should be complied with in good faith." He is therefore resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to estopped from questioning said policy. reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tescon from employment but only reassigned him to another area where was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from the his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan CityTecsons transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the companys seminar on new Tecsons family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of 34 products which were directly competing with similar products unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo. manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 146494

July 14, 2004

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social justice and public interest demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension came from the deceased pensioner's salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is not gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services rendered. The Issues

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated 13 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. GSIS raises the following issues: 2 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City ("trial court"), which 1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to held that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship survivorship pension; pension. The Facts 2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;

Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros ("Nicolas") 3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code 3 12 married Milagros Orbiso ("Milagros") on 10 July 1983. Nicolas repealed Section 18 of PD 1146. was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old. The Court's Ruling On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits Insurance System ("GSIS") an application for retirement benefits read: effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 ("PD SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or 1146"). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife 4 pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall be entitled to Milagros as his sole beneficiary. Nicolas' last day of actual 5 survivorship benefits provided for in sections seventeen service was on 17 February 1985. On 31 January 1986, GSIS and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension shall approved Nicolas' application for retirement "effective 17 consist of: February 1984," granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the 6 first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on (1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship the basic monthly pension; and pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse (2) dependent's pension not exceeding fifty percent of contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years the basic monthly pension payable in accordance with 7 before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on "17 February 1984." SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to: On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension. On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including 8 9 interest. Citing Articles 115 and 117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review. In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS' decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that 10 she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Commenting on Milagros' letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must decide the 11 case on the merits. The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who are similarly situated (1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided, That, at the option of the beneficiaries, it may be paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the member is entitled to old-age pension at the time of his death; or (2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the dependent's pension; Provided, That, the deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death, or a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death. (b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a), the survivorship pension shall be paid as follows: (1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries; (2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension for as long as they are qualified; (3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, they shall

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employees' monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the 16 same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its 17 corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form (c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the part of compensation. secondary beneficiaries designated by the deceased and recorded in the System, shall be entitled to: In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested pension where the pension is part of the terms of (1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the rights in the 18 employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to basic survivorship pension when the member is compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to qualified for old-age pension; or government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement (2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of benefits to government employees reward them for giving the the average monthly compensation for each 19 year he paid contributions, but not less than five best years of their lives in the service of their country. hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is 20 protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to 21 immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees' pension 22 statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and 23 opportunity to be heard.

be entitled to the survivorship pension so long as there are dependent children and, thereafter, the surviving spouse shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries.

(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, they shall receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of the average monthly compensation for each year the member paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also beneficiaries, the amount shall revert to the funds of the provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent System. spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a widow's right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband's contractual pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the 24 compensation. applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said Denial of Due Process pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, within the period covered by the lump sum, the or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be survivorship pension shall be paid only after the denied the equal protection of the laws." The proviso is unduly expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse's claim for pensioners living as of the effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. pension being received at the time of death. (Emphasis There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving supplied) spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the insurance benefits to government employees and their 13 dependent children. The secondary beneficiaries are the dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and dependent parents and legitimate descendants except retirement of the government employees. 14 dependent children. The law defines dependent as "the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state: illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of in promoting the efficiency and welfare of the employees self-support." The term also includes the legitimate spouse of the Government of the Philippines, administers the dependent for support on the member, and the legitimate laws that grant to its members social security and 15 parent wholly dependent on the member for support. insurance benefits; The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension ("the proviso"). We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros' claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law. Retirement Benefits as Property Interest Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System; to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the benefits made available to him and his dependents to the extent permitted by available resources; WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the System of its functions and have unduly hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino public servant; WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his

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benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to of benefits, must now yield to his paramount welfare; the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of 29 WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class and government employees must be continuously re- differently from another class provided there are real 30 substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. examined and improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that will provide benefits responsive to their needs and those The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The of their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who death, retirement, and other contingencies; and to serve contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the 31 as a fitting reward for dedicated public service; pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions years before the pensioner's death, the dependent spouse would affecting the welfare of government employees, there is still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place a need to expand and improve the social security and within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The insurance programs administered by the Government object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable Service Insurance System, specifically, among others, connection between the means employed and the purpose by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose benefits, introducing survivorship benefits, introducing for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent sickness and income benefits, and eventually extending "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso the compulsory coverage of these programs to all reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner government employees regardless of employment qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. status. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as PD 1146 has the following purposes: having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System; Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic b. to guarantee to the government employee all the Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"),32 otherwise known as the benefits due him; and "Government Service Insurance Act of 1997," the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member and insurance benefits made available to him and his immediately before the member's death is still qualified to dependents such as: receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the 33 benefit. increasing pension benefits Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship introducing survivorship benefits benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted introducing sickness income benefits marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law acknowledges that extending compulsory membership to all whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to 25 government employees irrespective of status receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation. cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects 26 resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to that "the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension receive survivor's benefits under a pension system. However, if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married before the pensioner qualified for the pension." The Government the employee for a certain period before the employee's death to Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivor's proviso. annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the employee's No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a member's death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The 27 State Employee's Retirement System of Illinois, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. expanding disability benefits A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the 28 constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it

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G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners, vs. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This petition for review seeks to nullify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees"). Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and National Security Adviser, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay. Antecedent Facts Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
1 2

On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP. On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to: (a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLEamong the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten 3 (10) days from promulgation of the decision. Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings. On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted. On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision. On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a day. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question. The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.

On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident. of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information corpus proceedings. for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in open court to 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03- exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the 2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving appellate courts decision reads: custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED ISAFP.

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to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid 12 rights of the detainees in accordance with the Standing has later become arbitrary. Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day. However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ 4 SO ORDERED. only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose The Issues the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such 13 sentence is void as to the excess. Whatever situation the Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution: petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND proceedings.14 REVERSING A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT; Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the NOT detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful THE indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any time of LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees 5 OFFICERS DETENTION. right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 15 7438"). Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the The Ruling of the Court Senate and the Feliciano Commission. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and IN OF The petition lacks merit. Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. cells. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon 16 confinement. However, the fact that the detainees are confined had the Court upheld petitioners cause. 17 makes their rights more limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures 6 petition. The respondent must produce the person and explain to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. 7 the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a ruling on Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides: the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus. b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00). had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition. Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one 8 objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being 9 illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus 10 very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for 11 an appeal. The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client "at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that "notwithstanding" the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to prevent his escape. circumstances where there is deprivation of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his standard. The regulations governing a detainees confinement constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also prevent his escape." Thus, the regulations must be reasonably

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connected to the governments objective of securing the safety implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose 29 and preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the it serves. detention officer the authority to "undertake such reasonable measures" or regulations. We quote Bell v. Wolfish: Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective representation when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them to be released from detention. Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible. In Bell v. Wolfish, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary and 19 purposeless. However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in 20 detention and prison facilities. The U.S. Supreme Court commanded the courts to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in implementing policies to maintain institutional 21 security. In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours. The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and 22 the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves 23 admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel. Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us.Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably 24 interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably. The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those 25 restrictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to 26 punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that 27 purpose. Jail officials are thus not required to use the least 28 restrictive security measure. They must only refrain from
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One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the "essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial." While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention." The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any 30 inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the 31 purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, 32 or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. Block v. Rutherford, which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal 34 conviction. Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to 35 hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes. Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in 36 weapons, drugs, and other contraband. The restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and 37 weapons. The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the 38 sentiments of the detainees. Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal 39 security. This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over 40 prison matters in deference to administrative expertise. In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
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The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x

Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman, fail to indicate contraband. degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate x x x cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to communication was from an attorney before opening it for the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be which are congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals found imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the any such communications to be specially marked as originating ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army ("NPA") are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly be member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring in the ISAFP Detention Center. to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners could it chill such communications, since the inmates presence for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test, does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters. besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional rights enumerated by Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the 41 51 facility and to avert coordinated escapes. Even in the absence Constitution requires. of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an 42 principle of "civil deaths." Inmates were deemed to have no inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell. right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the right of lose many protections of the Constitution, thus: inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the 43 communications between the inmate and his lawyer. However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant 44 courts, and court officials received respect. The confidential rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the 45 correspondences could not be censored. The infringement of complete withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the considerations underlying our penal system." The curtailment of 46 inmates First Amendment rights. A prisoner has a right to certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and objectives" of abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. Of 47 administration of the institution. Moreover, the risk is small that course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, 48 attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison security. as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and 53 retribution are factors in addition to correction. American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, 49 detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono recognized abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a as to the detainees limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial the considerable jurisprudence in the United States holding that detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected government interest such as security or discipline. State v. for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all. the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn: 50 In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell, involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison [A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that Court: society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society inspect incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison incidents of confinement." regulation under challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and

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The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a 55 greater risk of escape than convicted inmates. Valencia v. 56 Wiggins further held that "it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security."

military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness. The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the 67 proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or 68 duration of confinement.

American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail 57 security. Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly 58 exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A pretrial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his 59 incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with 60 his lawyer. The inspection of privileged mail is limited to No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 61 physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude 62 on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts "balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of 63 prison administrators." The deferential review of such regulations stems from the principle that: [s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative 64 solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime 65 punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military 66 armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The

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WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER. JUST AS WE CANNOT BE HEEDLESS OF OUR PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE." G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004 Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines quoted as follows: "TO : All Concerned FROM : Chief, PNP SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. DATE : January 31, 2003 The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is 1 subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties. Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the "Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside 2 of Residence" (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The facts are undisputed: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus: "THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT TEND TO DISTURB THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF THE COMMUNITY THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER NPA LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY HAVE THE IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO THE BAR OF JUSTICE. THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID THEMSELVES OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN PUBLIC PLACES. THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED MEN IN THE MILITARY AND AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE. 1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. 2. General: The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a privilege granted by the State to its citizens for their individual protection against all threats of lawlessness and security. As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. However, the Chief, Philippine National Police may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearms outside of residence. 3. Purposes: This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence as provided for in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No. 1866, dated June 29, 1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also prescribes the conditions, requirements and procedures under which exemption from the ban may be granted. 4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms: a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed. b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain only to organic and regular employees. 5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence. a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons and security of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and profession are under imminent danger. b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ Petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, ET. AL., respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

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respective agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days. c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration. d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from the person. e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. 6. Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR: a. Written request by the applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating his qualification to possess firearm and the reasons why he needs to carry firearm outside of residence. b. Xerox copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by Records Branch, FED; c. Proof of actual threat, the details of which should be issued by the Chief of Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly validated by C, RIID; d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by the Drug Testing Center, if photocopied; e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied; f. Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP Testing Center, if photocopied; g. Copy of Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by Chief, Operations Branch, FED; h. NBI Clearance; i. Two (2) ID pictures (2" x 2") taken not earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of application; and j. Proof of Payment 7. Procedures: a. Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat in Camp Crame. In the provinces, the applications may also be submitted to the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for initial processing before they are forwarded to the office of the PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after ascertaining that the documentary requirements are in order, shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount of fees payable by the applicant, who in turn shall pay the fees to the Land Bank. b. Applications, which are duly processed and prepared in accordance with existing rules and regulations, shall be forwarded to the OCPNP for approval. c. Upon approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for one (1) year from date of issue. d. Applications for renewal of PTCFOR shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of par. 6 above. e. Application for possession and carrying of firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be processed in accordance with NHQ PNP Memo dated September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying of Firearms by Diplomats in the Philippines. 8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms: a. The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except those authorized in uniform and in the performance of their official duties. b. The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and amusement places, and all other commercial or public establishments." Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division. He anchored his petition on the following grounds: "I

THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY MUCH LESS BY A MERE SPEECH TO ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW ON FIREARMS BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING EXISTING PERMITS FOR GUNS TO BE CARRIED OUTSIDE RESIDENCES. II OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED POLICE POWER TO JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTS VERBAL DECLARATION ON GUN BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS. III THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES BECAUSE: 1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH GRANTS THE PNP CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE THE PNP GUIDELINES. 2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866 CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES. 3) THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN BAN. IV ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD 1866, AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE PNP CHIEF STILL HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE SAME BECAUSE 1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ AND THE DILG. 2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED BY THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY. V THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE: 1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY INTERTWINED WITH THE PEOPLES INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE AND TO PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR: A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST POTENT, IF NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND HIMSELF. B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF HIS MEANS OF PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STATE COULD NOT POSSIBLY

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PROTECT ITS CITIZENS DUE TO THE The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, in refutation THE POLICE FORCE. of petitioners arguments, he contends that: (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does 2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the FIREARMS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE ex post facto law. PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE. Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier. VI On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of 3 the cases. The case at bar is of similar import as it involves the citizens right to bear arms.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS AN INVALID EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED THEREFOR ARE UNREASONABLE AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS PURPOSE I TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME THEREBY BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO LAW- Authority of the PNP Chief ABIDING GUN-OWNERS. VII

Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and respondent THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and arrogated upon AND CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED ALL themselves a power they do not possess the legislative power. EXISTING PERMITS TO CARRY WITHOUT, HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE PNP We are not persuaded. RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO ALREADY PAID THEREFOR. It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and VIII substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own 4 PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION sphere. BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AT AND OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is OWNERS WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-OWNERS vested in Congress.5 Congress may not escape its duties and THE LAWBREAKERS (KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS, responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU SAYYAF authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA) UNTOUCHED. and void, on the principle that "delegata potestas non potest 6 delegari" "delegated power may not be delegated." IX The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of AND UNFAIR BECAUSE THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice LONG BEFORE THEY WERE PUBLISHED. permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and X 7 directors. Such licensing power includes the power to 8 promulgate necessary rules and regulations. THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO LAW SINCE THEY APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL THOSE WHO The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY days of our Republic, the legislatures tendency was always 9 OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG BEFORE THEIR towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to PROMULGATION." approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to Petitioners submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such issues: 10 license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue Act.11 With the enactment of Act No. 2711, the "Revised the assailed Guidelines; Administrative Code of 1917," the laws on firearms were 12 integrated. The Act retained the authority of the Governor Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing constitutional right?; complexity in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. On Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater 13 pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his issued Executive Order No. 8 authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in approving and right to property?; disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines licenses. This was followed by Executive Order No. 14 61 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the is a valid exercise of police power?; and government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and 15 explosives. Executive Order No. 215, issued by President Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of post facto law? the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove

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applications for personal, special and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 16 1866 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm "shall first secure the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary." With regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: "The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence." These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation 17 of the decree. At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by President Ferdinand E. 18 Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power. In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations, petitioner argues that the "Chief of the PNP" is not the same as the "Chief of the Constabulary," the PC being a mere unit or component of the newly established PNP. He 19 contends further that Republic Act No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of 20 Justice and the DILG, not the Chief of the Constabulary. Petitioners submission is bereft of merit. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and 22 explosives in accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs "power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions" on such "matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties" of the 23 PNP. Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September 15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community. Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines. Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that "she has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech."
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Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the performance of a 24 duty. Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office. II Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory? Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-protected right. This, he mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to determine the nature of the right in light of American jurisprudence. The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American society. It antedates not only the American 25 Constitution but also the discovery of firearms. A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads: "A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it pertains to the citizens "collective right" to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens "individual right" to own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was contemplated has a profound connection with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is evident in early American cases. The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached the United States Supreme Court 26 is United States vs. Miller. Here, the indictment charged the defendants with transporting an unregistered "Stevens shotgun" without the required stamped written order, contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a demurrer challenging the facial validity of the indictment on the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the inhibition of the Second Amendment. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as referring to the collective right of those comprising the Militia a body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of citizen to bear arm. Miller expresses its holding as follows: "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.

First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was just an expression of her policy and a directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United 27 States. Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that theFederal Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech. Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not conflict with the Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the Second Amendment. It ruled that: President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." As Chief "While [appellants] weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still there is no

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evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military organization or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia which the Second amendment was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free state." With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United States vs. 28 Cruikshank decreed: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument." Likewise, 29 in People vs. Persce, the Court of Appeals said: "Neither is there any constitutional provision securing the right to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference to such weapons as are specifically before us for consideration. The provision in the Constitution of the United States that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is not designed to control legislation by the state."

formed and organized at the time of the passage of this Act, who at such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this section, and the bond duly executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to be security for the safekeeping of such arms." The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887 of Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. III Vested Property Right
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Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his "vested property right" without due process of With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as law and in violation of the equal protection of law. fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional 30 provision. States vs. Villareal: In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest 32 exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor 33 property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that "a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it Counsel does not expressly rely upon the property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right." In prohibition in the United States Constitution against a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. the infringement of the right of the people of the Factoran, Jr.34 that: United States to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included in "Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, point out that in no event could this constitutional property or a property right protected by the due guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not process clause of the Constitution." only because it has not been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar provisions Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally in State constitutions apply only to arms used in protected property right, relied heavily on Bell vs. 35 civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, Burson wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "once a license is issued, continued possession may become essential in note 18); x x x." the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms licensees." "The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights. is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was passed to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9 thereof provides: "SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection, or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and before receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe, payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who are actually members of gun clubs, duly Petitioners reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a drivers license, not a license to bear arms. The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a 36 property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs. OBrien, the plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a firearm brought suit against the defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the denial violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest in obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as follows: "Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever a person has only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of a benefit. x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate claims of entitlement defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent source, such as state law. x x x Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of California. x x x Whether the statute creates a property interest in concealed weapons licenses depends largely upon the extent to

34

which the statute contains mandatory language that restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny licenses to applicants who claim to meet the minimum eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny license application in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in such licenses protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming license under Nevada law);"

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the 37 38 Philadelphia, Conway vs. King, Nichols vs. County of Sta. issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in 39 40 Clara, and Gross vs. Norton. These cases enunciated that general. the test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing The only question that can then arise is whether the means authority. employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those state that "the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may as determined by him and under such conditions as he may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, outside of residence." Following the American doctrine, it is crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their property right protected under our Constitution. homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them. regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the 41 45 46 reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held that the such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power. 42 47 meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US The ruling in United States vs. Villareal, is relevant, thus: 43 Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: "The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary "We think there can be no question as to the consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the always revocable." carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do Philippines as early as 1908. Thus, in The Government of the not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation 44 Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra we ruled: would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons "x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon he does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate arms, he must do so upon such terms as the exercise of the police power of the state." Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can impose upon him such terms as it pleases. If he is V not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing Ex post facto law possession of the arms he does agree to such 48 conditions, he must fulfill them." In Mekin vs. Wolfe, an ex post facto law has been defined as IV Police Power one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex 49 post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. The In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to validity of a police measure, thus: petitioners argument, it would not result in the punishment of (1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished acts previously committed. from those of a particular class, require the exercise of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. the police power; and (2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for SO ORDERED. the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

35

G.R. No. L-9480

November 13, 1914

concealed manner. (See 48 Cent. Digest, tit. Weapons, and many cases there cited.) There can be no real question as to the police power of the state to regulate the use of deadly weapons for the purpose of suppressing or restraining crime and lawlessness. Undoubtedly there are many deadly weapons, such as knives, bolos, krises and the like which every citizens has a right to own and to use in the various activities of human life. But the right to own and to use such weapons does not carry with it the right to use them to the injury of his neighbor or so as to enganger the peace and welfare of the community. "It is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under his implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush (Mass.), 53, 84.) Provided the means adopted are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the end in view, not unduly oppressive upon individuals, and in the interest of the public generally rather than of a particular class, the legislature may adopt such regulations as it deems proper restricting, limiting, and regulating the use of private property in the exercise of its police power. (U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. Rep., 85.)lawph!1.net We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the two frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state. The right to regulate the use of firearms, and to prescribe the conditions under which they may be kept and used by their owners rest upon substantially similar grounds. The general provisions touching the licensing of the use of such arms are mere police regulations, intended to limit such use so that firearms will not fall into the hands of persons whose safety and security of individuals. While it may be true that those charged with the issuing of such licenses willfully or mistakenly decline to issue or approve licenses in some cases in which the applicants are equally entitled with others to receive them, nevertheless the regulations themselves are of general application and in no wise deny the equal protection of the law to all applicants. The fault in such cases is not with the law, but with whose charged with its administration. We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered. .

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BALBINO VILLAREAL, defendant-appellant. G.E. Jose for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee. CARSON, J.: The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant of the offense of carrying a concealed deadly weapon as defined and penalized in section 26 of Act No. 1780. The weapon was a sort of dagger or sharp-pointed knife with a blade about 8 inches long. It was carried in a leather sheath, attached to a belt which was strapped round the body, and hung down on the left hip of the accused concealed from public view inside his trousers. The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a license, is a violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights. Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against the infringement of the right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U.S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing to point out that in no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); and further, because even in those jurisdictions wherein the constitutional guaranty of the right to keep and bear arms is in force, while it is beyond the power of a legislature or municipal body to prohibit entirely the keeping and use of military arms, it may, in the exercise ad lawlessness, lawfully regulate the use of such weapons by providing that they shall not be carried in a concealed manner, or that they shall not be pointed at another, or fired within the limits of a city. (See many case cited in 40 Cyc., p. 853.) Counsel's contention seems to be based on those provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights which prohibits the enactment of a law depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. He insists that restrictions placed on the carrying of delay weapons have the effect of depriving the owner of the free use and enjoyment of his property, and that the granting of licenses to some persons to carry firearms and the denial of that right to others is a denial to the latter of the equal protection of the laws. Both the statute in question and the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights with which it is claimed it is in conflict were enacted under American sovereignty, and both are to be construed more especially in the light of American authority and precedent. The earliest English statute (St. 2 Edw. III, c. 3) regulating the bearing of arms, enacted in the year 1328 A.D., was but an affirmation of the common law offense of going around with unusual and dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. Many statutes have been enacted since that time in English and the United States, regulating the carrying and the use of weapons, and these have, as a rule, been held to be constitutional, especially when the prohibitions have been directed to the wearing or carrying of deadly weapons in a

36

G.R. No. L-11390

March 26, 1918

EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant. Aitken and DeSelms for appellant. Hartigan and Welch for appellee. STREET, J.: This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by El Banco Espanol-Filipino to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands.

About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the action of the court upon said motion.

The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be the sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court in the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, of the present action, it was necessary for the plaintiff in the secondly, whether those proceedings were conducted in such foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by manner as to constitute due process of law. publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained The word jurisdiction, as applied to the faculty of exercising from the court, and publication was made in due form in a judicial power, is used in several different, though related, newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the the litigation. following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the Procedure: nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it absent defendant is known, the judge must direct a copy of the may entertain and the relief it may grant. summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its served, at his place of residence authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively exerted over the person. appear. There is, however, among the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation y Garcia, an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that may result either from a seizure of the property under legal upon that date he had deposited in the Manila post-office a process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, at Manila, containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiffs under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court directing property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmasters receipt property, though at all times within the potential power of the that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An clerks office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the emanated from the office. beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, judgment was, illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking decision it was recited that publication had been properly made actual physical control over the property assumes, at the in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a been given mail. The court, upon this occasion, found that the jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32, with favor of the petitioner against all the world. interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be such. The expression action in rem is, in its narrow application, exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said order used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for sale of the property. The sale took place upon July 30, 1908, and the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. the property was bought in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.

37

All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has said: Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-mentioned, they are substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled hypothecary actions, and their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against the res; in the common law, they would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the creditors right ass an equitable lien; so, in both, the suit is real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)

any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property.

We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for enforced against the property itself. whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to apprehended, for there are many expressions in the American appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires considered with reference to the principles governing actions in personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth the rem. proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure cannot be acquired by publication and notice was never clearly proceeding and an action of attachment, concerning which the understood even in the American courts until after the decision Supreme Court of the United States has used the following had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., language: 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions which If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in have subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the personam, with the added incident, that the property attached proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer to any acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to question; demand which may be established against the defendant by the and it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon final judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the constructive or substituted service against a nonresident who defendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes, does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of kinds of constructive or substituted process, including service by which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in defendant which the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the case where the nonresident defendant has (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.) expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be considered 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312 necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) purpose of the proceedings is to subject the property to that lien. proceeds is that the process from the tribunals of one State If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of statute, the preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court law requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by law of the court by service of process within the State, or by his precisely as though the property had been seized upon voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., upon the question of his personal liability. The doctrine 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an attachment established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this the property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken into legal custody until process of law, is binding upon the courts of the Philippine the time comes for the sale, does not materially affect the Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in fundamental principle involved in both cases, which is that the proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is court is here exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a not served personally within the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot proceeding directed essentially in rem. lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth First Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, it is evident that the Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon the statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in whom service has been effected exclusively by publication, no this most general sense, over the cause of action is obvious and personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.) defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal service It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment of process upon him within the territory where the process is entered in the court below offends against the principle just valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and, remaining stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact beyond the range of the personal process of the court, refuses to entered a personal judgment against the absent debtor for the come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. We do person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing not so interpret the judgment. which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to power which, under the law, it possesses over the property; and ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the

38

Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the protect it. In speaking of notice of this character a distinguish defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary master of constitutional law has used the following language: precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was entered contains the following words: . . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather from tenderness to their Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is indebted in the amount of hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the Banco Espanol-Filipino . . the case shall assume that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], . therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.) etc., etc. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby clearly intended merely as a compliance with the requirement receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260). address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of the absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant every event, but only in the case where the defendants in Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the we are fully aware that many reported cases can be cited in possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with publication or notice in a case of this kind is a question affecting knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is sometimes said to condemnation and sale. acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to analogy between service by the publication and personal service take measures that in some way he shall be represented when of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this, suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have difference between the legal effects of the two forms of service usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of must abide the consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]). expression which had already been molded into legal tradition before that case was decided have been brought down to the It has been well said by an American court: present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process expounded their ideas. upon the constructive notice, then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations, without either We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity as the court, no personal judgment can be rendered, and if the to amount to a denial of that due process of law which was judgment cannot operate upon the property, then no effective secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would be that time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen against a In dealing with questions involving the application of the nonresident. Such a result would be a deplorable one. (Quarl vs. constitutional provisions relating to due process of law the Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.) Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from attempting to define with precision the meaning of that It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein is provisions relative to publication or other form of notice against a applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the attempt ay precise definition hazardous and unprofitable. As publication of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down compliance with the requirements of the law has been held to be with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully required 20, the publication was insufficient. acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be sending of notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge shall rendered upon lawful hearing. direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an deposited in the mail. We consider this to be of some opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the due everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a should reach its destination and be delivered to him. This idea means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished seems to be strengthened by the consideration that placing upon that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the performance of is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to that act is put effectually beyond the control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so much of section 399 of

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the Code of Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of notice by mail was complied with when the court made the order. The question as to what may be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the proof of compliance with that requirement will be discussed by us further on.

unexplained, is deemed sufficient ground for refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something is due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this character, since courts are always reluctant to interfere with judgments, and especially where they have been executed or satisfied. The moving party has the The observations which have just been made lead to the burden of showing diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts R. C. L., 694, 695.) to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January 29, 1910. The only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the back in 1906; and the proceedings in the foreclosure were proceedings. closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to It will be observed that in considering the effect of this suppose that a man who had placed a mortgage upon property irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from the scene question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due of his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no should have long remained in ignorance of the fact that the distinction between the much and the little. The court either has mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, even jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing supposing that he had no knowledge of those proceedings while of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the they were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the ordinary course of things that he should have acquired conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the information as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due and upon the basis of this rational assumption we are process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be authorized, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due that he did have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the his property. defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the there is a presumption that things have happened according to requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have conceive of a situation more appropriate than this for applying been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In support of this power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress consider the probability that the defendant may have received declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without actual notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice due process of law has not been infringed. addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the banks attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two the Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs. Ordeans conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to send the notice to (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making and (2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the due process of law. As a consequence of these conclusions the presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It defendant, there being no proof that it was ever returned by the is still necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a postal officials as undelivered. And if it was delivered in Manila, simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to pretend instead of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From that the recipient was a person sufficiently interested in his this point of view, however, it is obvious that any motion to affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him. vacate the judgment on the ground of the irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was prejudiced by Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the that irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required of the process of law depended upon the mailing of the notice by the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had a good clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle defense against the action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of and frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are introduced in the kind is, however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit order to show the propriety of applying to this situation the legal which accompanies the motion. presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that presumption, supported by the circumstances of this case, ,we An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the defendant irregularity or defect in the proceedings is usually required to be voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the relief obligation which he had placed upon it; that knowledge of the is sought, and in addition to this showing also a meritorious proceedings should be imputed to him; and that he acquiesced defense to the action. It is held that a general statement that a in the consequences of those proceedings after they had been party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The accomplished. Under these circumstances it is clear that the necessary facts must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void merit of this motion is, as we have already stated, adversely upon its face a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense affected in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the proponent of this motion is an is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.) administrator who only qualified a few months before this motion The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this was made. No disability on the part of the defendant himself aspect of the case. In this connection we quote the following existed from the time when the foreclosure was effected until his passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of death; and we believe that the delay in the appointment of the administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance publication: which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they may Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had instituted an action therefore be enforced if permitted to stand on the record, courts in their own right to recover the property, it would have been in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi equitable different. powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was entered, except in clear cases, to promote the ends It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice of justice, and where it appears that the party making the by reason of the fact that the bank became the purchaser of the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that and with ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if which had been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price

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of the property. In this connection, it appears that in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation. It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Espaol Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently not been decided by this court in any reported decision, and this question need not here be considered, since it is evident that if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have already demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference between the upset price and the price at which in bought in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the disposition which the court made of this case; and the fact that the bank may have violated such an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance. In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the action or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may be permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United States:

donec probetur in contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the performance of his duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed. Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is no principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.) In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to have adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the owners; that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the manner of sale, were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the provisions of the law as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been complied with. . . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on which any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially does all this apply after long lapse of time. Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive discussion in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that publication should be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be posted at the front door of the court house and be published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an ancient periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof was offered to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:

Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying that title which he has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through some occult and not readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general 15.) jurisdiction. Therefore every presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . . . It is to In the case where that language was used an attempt was made be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to annul certain foreclosure proceedings on the ground that the to see that its order for constructive service, on which its right to affidavit upon which the order of publication was based make the decree depended, had been obeyed. erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was held that this mistake did not It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of affect the validity of the proceedings. collateral , or indirect attack, while in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against it. In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk The same general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of failed to send the notice by post as required by the order of the the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, whether it is the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper subject of direct or indirect attack the only difference being that in assumption; and the proposition which we propose to establish is case of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to that there is a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty be valid unless the record affirmatively shows it to be void, while as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption is not in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity overcome by any other facts appearing in the cause. may in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record. In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption that official duty has The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the been regularly performed; and in subsection 18 it is declared court made its decree with the knowledge that the requirements that there is a presumption that the ordinary course of business of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to has been followed. These presumptions are of course in no support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been required by the order. It is true that there ought to be found recognized. Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required

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by section 400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now before us would depend, for its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings and for the interests which have by law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the absence from the record of the proper proof of that fact. In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the Philippine Islands the word record is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of papers which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally deposited in the archives of the clerks office as a memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of general information that no judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which have been terminated; and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we do not have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment and as already stated the question must be determined by examining the papers contained in the entire file. But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this order and had directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address. There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was served at a particular place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was also made at another place or in a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person making the return is the officer who is by law required to make the return, we do not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the present case, the affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.

judgment of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed, proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not been interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the litigation may again resume its regular course. There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in the same cause. This is as follows: SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal representative from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken. An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows: When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside. . . . It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation. The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once concluded. The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions; and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper. If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot suppose that this proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as we have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be something in this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.

But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could The last question of importance which we propose to consider is be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due whether a motion in the cause is admissible as a proceeding to process of law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted

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principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been taken without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of Civil Procedure defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved, we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases, after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).

G.R. No. 139465

January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. MELO, J.: The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ. The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the appealed from is without error, and the same is accordingly suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed affirmed, with costs. So ordered. and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC): A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year). (p. 14, Rollo.)

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On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).

1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests. 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given (pp. 77-78, Rollo.) ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National abeyance in the meantime. Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an period of time to amplify on his request. opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition requests for the following reasons: petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to 1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with extradition request and supporting documents from the an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order United States Government, pending evaluation by this and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the United States enumerates the documentary Honorable Ralph C. Lantion. requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was No. 1069. denied. Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to previous day, disposing: preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the under the relevant law and treaty have been complied respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or prosecutions are therefore not available. representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue rules under United States law. The United States had to the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the secure orders from the concerned District Courts counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents jury information to Philippine government and law are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said or before said date. information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United SO ORDERED. States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the (pp. 110-111, Rollo.) subject information. This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing Government must represent the interests of the United that: States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No.

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PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: I. BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUSIN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;

extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty? The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines II. with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The EXTRADITION LAW; portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as III. follows: THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.) On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684. GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999. (pp. 120-121, Rollo.) The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda. From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the 2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts; 3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and 4. Such other documents or information in support of the request. (Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.) Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides . . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task? The Extradition Request The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by: 1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;

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The Extradition Hearing In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by: The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. 1. Documents, statements, or other types of information Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in which describe the identity and probable location of the the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules person sought; of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the 2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the procedural history of the case; Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings. 3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision requested; granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the 4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the punishment for the offense; Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of 5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required punishment for the offense; 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.). 6. Documents, statements, or other types of information The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual as applicable. criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines (Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a 1069.) political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt 7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature committed there; of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings? 8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to 9. A copy of the charging document. him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their (Paragraph 3, ibid.) sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable see to it that the accompanying documents received in support under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; extradition papers. Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs). However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Requested State determines that the request is politically Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently punishable under non-military penal legislation." without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying The Extradition Petition documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they designated shall then file a written petition with the proper comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this court take the extradition request under consideration connection that although the Department of Justice had no (Paragraph [2], ibid.). obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request. particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

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The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation. Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?

to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power. Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative 78,Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes powers of an administrative body which better enables it to of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64). proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasijudicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 prosecution. [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the property. only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of and if the agency is not authorized to make a final unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein judicial discretion and judgment. ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the

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criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.

basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition complainant. proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. certain instances, such as: Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken.Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing. As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution; 2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may common due process protection to their respective citizens. be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned The due process clauses in the American and Philippine above? Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government. elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause expanding future. The requirements of due process are in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366). charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution Due process is comprised of two components substantive due has been begun in the demanding state before some court or process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must property, and procedural due process which consists of the two contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which

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essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815). In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit: 1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186). 7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned. From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition. Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State Supreme Court ruling: prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest reciprocal legal representation in extradition worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But proceedings, that the offenses are covered as the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of documents have been authenticated in accordance with Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile subsequent extradition hearing. values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps 3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 more, than mediocre ones. U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in (Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656) support of the extradition request (Ibid.) 4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).] The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency. (pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.) In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a

49

majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty." Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, between matters vested with public interest and matters which in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, information becomes absolute. the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to because these directly affect their lives or simply because such effect the extradition. matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing". exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the When the individual himself is involved in official government U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he English translation, and those that are not properly actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that The right to information is implemented by the right of access to urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice information within the control of the government (Bernas, The and hearing can be dispensed with? 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent or decisions. precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant procedure, no official governmental action of our own and manifest. government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside. concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming. respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of records, and to documents and papers pertaining to the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? government research data used as basis for policy Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution? such limitations as may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).

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First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12). The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.

proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410). Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial. A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises. One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy. Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the request and the supporting documents. Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the We disagree. Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law 1069? precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no

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Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals: . . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . . (at p. 671)

G.R. No. 125735

August 26, 1999

LORLENE A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, and ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: By way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court petitioner seeks the nullification of the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, which reversed and set aside that of Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez. Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a schoolteacher in the Elementary Department of private respondent Ateneo de Davao University (hereafter ATENEO) since 1974 assigned to teach Reading, Mathematics, Language and Pilipino in the Grade VI class, while ATENEO is an educational institution, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal address at Jacinto St., Davao City.1wphi1.nt Sometime in 1991 Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo Grade School Headmaster, sent a letter dated 11 April 1991 informing petitioner Lorlene A. Gonzales of the complaints of two (2) parents for alleged use of corporal punishment on her students. Petitioner claimed that she was not informed of the identity of the parents who allegedly complained of the corporal punishment she purportedly inflicted in school-year 1990-1991. She likewise claimed that she was not confronted about it by private respondent ATENEO in 1991 and that it was only two (2) years after the complaints were made that she discovered, through her students and their parents, that ATENEO was soliciting complainants to lodge written complaints against her.

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in On 31 March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent. demanding that she be formally informed of the complaint and be duly investigated. In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the composition of an banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's investigative committee organized by Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., to favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of look into the alleged use of corporal punishment by petitioner in disciplining her students. It can be gleaned from the records that private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible. she was duly furnished with the rules of procedure, informed of the schedule of the hearings, and given copies of the affidavits We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, executed by the students who testified against her. which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court Petitioner refused to take part in the investigation unless the of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of rules of procedure laid down by the Committee be revised, Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the contending that the same were violative of her right to due case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since process. Petitioner specifically objected to the provision which private respondent's due process rights, although not stated: . . . 3) Counsel for Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not directly guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by participate in the investigation but will merely advise Ms. 1 constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic Gonzales . . . (par. 3). law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping But the Committee was steadfast in its resolve to adopt the with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is aforementioned rules. In its letter dated 9 August 1993, private respondent informed petitioner that the rules of procedure to be premised. applied were "substantially the same rules that were used in the Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and investigation of a former Ateneo employee and therefore we are 2 opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must under legal advice not to change these rules." Over the ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant objection of petitioner the Committee commenced with its investigation without petitioners participation. Out of the twentyand wayward course be laid. two (22) invitations sent out by ATENEO to petitioners students and their parents to shed light on the matter of corporal WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant punishment allegedly "administered" by her, eleven (11) petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is appeared and testified before the committee. The eleven (11) ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition witnesses also executed written statements denominated as request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable "affidavits." period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered On 10 November 1993 private respondent served a Notice of Termination on petitioner pursuant to the findings and dismissed. recommendation of the Committee. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the president of ATENEO demanding her SO ORDERED. voluntary resignation a week from receipt of the letter, otherwise, she would be considered resigned from the service.

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On 29 November 1993 petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. After trial, Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez found her dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis and ordered ATENEO to award petitioner separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay. In her decision, the Executive Labor Arbiter opined that although petitioner was afforded procedural due process respondent institution "failed to establish substantial evidence as to the guilt 3 of the complainant of the offense charged" thus . . . the complainant was afforded procedural due process. There is convincing and sufficient evidence . . . showing respondent complied with the notice and 4 hearing requirement. . . . . After considering the evidence, arguments and counterarguments of the parties, this office finds that the respondent failed to establish substantial evidence as to 5 the guilt of complainant of the offense charged. . . .

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The evidence of private respondent did not measure up to this standard. It relied solely on the witnesses' affidavits with questionable veracity. Moreover, the affidavit of recantation executed by some students and their parents all the more weakened the case of private respondent. Failure in this regard negates the very existence of the ground for dismissal. On the other hand, petitioner adequately proved, by means of affidavits, letters of petition and manifesto made by her students and co-teachers, that she was a competent and dedicated teacher having spent seventeen (17) years of her life in the service of the very institution which is now seeking her dismissal. In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of the NLRC is unwarranted. Employment is not merely a contractual relationship; it has assumed the nature of property right. It may spell the difference whether or not a family will have food on their table, roof over their heads and education for their children. It is for this reason that the State has taken up measures to protect employees from unjustified dismissals. It is also because of this that the right to security of tenure is not only a statutory right but, more so, a constitutional right.

Complainant has sufficiently established that she is a very good teacher. She is equipped with the appropriate educational qualifications, trainings, seminars and work experiences. Such fact was affirmed by her present and former students, their parents, colleagues and the former 6 headmaster of the grade school. . . . WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated 25 March 1996 is As a matter of fact, six (6) out of the nine (9) students REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of Executive and their parents/guardians have retracted and Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez "declaring the dismissal of 7 complainant Lorlene A. Gonzales illegal for lack of factual basis withdrawn their statements. . . . and ordering respondent Ateneo de Davao University to pay Both parties appealed to the NLRC which on 25 March 1996 complainant separation pay, back wages and 13th month pay in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND reversed the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter by declaring NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT and 70/100 PESOS petitioners dismissal valid and legal but added that since (P216,938.70) . . . [f]urther, ordering respondent to pay 10% of ATENEO offered petitioner her retirement benefits it was but the total monetary award as attorney's fees to counsel for proper that she be extended said benefits. Petitioner now seeks complainant . . . [d]ismissing all other claims for lack of merit," is the reversal of the decision; hence, this petition. REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and ADOPTED herein as the decision in the instant case.1wphi1.nt The crux of the controversy is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining as valid and legal the SO ORDERED. dismissal of petitioner by private respondent ATENEO. The NLRC, in our view, appears to have skirted several important issues raised by petitioner foremost of which is the absence of due process. Upon being notified of her termination, she has the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and substantial due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself either personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against her. Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based on established facts and on a sound legal foundation. It is precisely to demand compliance with these requirements that petitioner at the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down by the Investigative Committee. The adamant refusal of the Committee to accede to this demand resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine her accusers. This is not "harping at technicalities" as wrongfully pointed out by the NLRC but a serious violation of petitioner's statutory and constitutional right to due process that ultimately vitiated the investigation. Moreover, the failure of ATENEO to refute the contention of petitioner that the joint affidavits executed by the students and parents were "pre-prepared" raises serious doubts as to the probative value of this evidence. As correctly pointed out by the Executive Labor Arbiter, "there is more reason to disregard it especially where the same was challenged and has remained unexplained." Hearsay evidence, in the strict sense, has no probative value whether objected to or not. In the instant case, ATENEO failed to prove by substantial evidence that petitioner had inflicted corporal punishment on her students. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court set the measure of evidence to be presented in an administrative investigation when it said, "substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla. It

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G.R. No. 121777

January 24, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant. KAPUNAN, J.:

people who informed them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.

The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported scene at 9:30 that morning. There Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the team posted constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form, The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house. 4 conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her. Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went inside. The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of There, she saw another woman, later identified as Jasmine, Zamboanga City in an information alleging: coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, towel, told her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then the above-named accused, without having previously obtained came back and asked Fermindoza what position she was from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas babysitter or any other work so long as she could go abroad. placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and Jasmine then gave her an application form. feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto Carol what the requirements were and whether she had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she for and in consideration of the promised employment which did had a passport, she could fill up the application papers. not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the Fermindoza replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she latter in the said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for her. tantamount [sic] to economic sabotage in that the same were While filling up the application form, three women who appeared 1 committed in large scale. to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got 2 Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty to their papers and put them on top of a small table. Fermindoza these charges. then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand. At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted is gathered from their testimonies: permission after the raiding party introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie some supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza nevertheless conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she 5 duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, was holding as the raiding party seized the other papers on the 6 immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so table. they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an the office for investigation.7 applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any authority provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to recruit when asked by the investigators.8 A check by Ramos to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed or 9 10 with a bio-data form in hand. authorized to conduct recruitment. A certification dated On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an 3 applicant. February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA. The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed 11 their respective written statements.

At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job National Police who was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, applicants for Singapore. to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, two did not enter the house where the recruitment was arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit down. They listened to the supposedly being conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two

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"recruiter" who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that she was "recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be salary deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not give any money because she was "not yet sure."

The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that they received the money, and asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her that she would send something for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes. at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at the house 30 minutes before the raid On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when it office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to 12 happened. Cebu City. She then proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m. Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you her that there was someone recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked the woman arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by if she could do anything for her. The woman inquired from Carol Jasmine.1wphi1.nt if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The woman Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would a "good opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She need a passport. gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood up P30,000 will be by salary deduction. and went out. A minute after, three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to of the CIS and informed her that they received a call that she Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes that she was from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, say goodbye to the occupants of the house, and to get whatever Lourdes went back to the house to get back the money. Jasmine Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed 13 them her ticket for Cebu City. gave back the money to Lourdes after the raid. Denial comprised the accused's defense. Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students. The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993. Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their office. The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to 14 collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee.

On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga City The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her Club Association. On that occasion, she met a certain Laleen defense. Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a certain The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol. accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's message regarding According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however, Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes whether her father received the money so she requested the only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a cousin by the name of Jasmine 2 at around 8:00 in the morning to "get the envelope for the Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's telephone candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate. number, address and a sketch of how to get there.

Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment. The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23, She claimed she did not see Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any 1994 to give some presents to her friends. 15 knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee. On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to inform her that she would be going to her house. At around noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay. The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he 16 did not notice that she conducted any recruitment. On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:

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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs. Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the pendency of this case under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.
17

RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE; VIII WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT; IX WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA; X

The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors: I WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL. II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE COMPOSED OF POEA AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, SHALL BE 18 VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION; In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth assigned error, that she III was denied the equal protection of the laws. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL; [IV] WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSEDAPPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; V We shall address the issues jointly. Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void for vagueness and, thus, 19 violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what 20 conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and 21 erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of 22 which he is given no fair warning.

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED 23 We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario: IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence EXONERATED; must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: VI (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY Government muscle. THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSEDAPPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED; We added, however, that: VII WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on

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any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner x x x. annoying to persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for know in advance what 'annoys some people but does vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,24 where this not annoy others.'" Court, to use appellant's term, "criticized" the definition of "recruitment and placement" as follows: Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the specifies a standard though defectively phrasedin Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction. presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the Here, the provision in question reads: promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x. greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts (b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of usually reported in the legislative journals. canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of the employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: questioned provision," appellant asks, what more "the ordinary Provided, That any person or entity which, in any citizen" who does not possess the "necessary [legal] manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two knowledge?" or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement" suffer from overbreadth since by merely "referring" a person for employment, a person may be convicted x x x. of illegal recruitment. When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, These contentions cannot be sustained. recruitment activities are punishable as follows: ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article. Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee." The Court held in the negative, explaining:

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the in large scale shall be considered an offense involving individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement economic sabotage and shall be penalized in whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is accordance with Article 39 hereof. made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers." Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is scale if committed against three (3) or more persons involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of individually or as a group. employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the x x x. act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption. Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer economic sabotage as defined herein: to produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima facie evidence that he (b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant implementing rules and regulations, shall upon case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima not less than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. nor more than P50,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court; It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and (c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the authority under this Title found violating any provision Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the the discretion of the court; greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric

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provisions that one cannot read against the background facts The argument has no merit. usually reported in the legislative journals. At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more the language of the statute under challenge in determining force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its 29 in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to countrymen. make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 30 Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the 31 records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a "perfectly vague act" of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection 32 whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who proper construction. It is not void for vagueness. are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the x. In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule action itself.But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of there must be a showing of "clear and intentional 33 uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will discrimination." Appellant has failed to show that, in charging support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials. means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a 25 the reach of those intrusted therewith." reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense.34 The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly 35 That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome considers as customary and harmless acts such as " labor or only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, employment referral" ("referring" an applicant, according to appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is concept of overbreadth. insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws. A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish prosecution. conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of protected in the commission of crime. It would be 26 the statute. unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The 27 In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, for remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons including private vehicles other than in the common poster equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission 36 provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of of a crime. his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, Likewise, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case, [i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally some persons should be converted into a defense for others protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district "recruitment and placement" that would render the same attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of constitutionally overbroad. many persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement 37 of law would suffer a complete breakdown. 28 Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and which involve the finding of guilt by the trial court. even received Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under City. Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under

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Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a 39 group.

38

The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they (she and her "friends") filled up application forms.
47

In this case, the first element is present. The certification of The affidavit Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not Araneta's testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor its licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement. contents affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and 48 The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed inadmissible. In any case, hearsay evidence, such as the said 49 engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the affidavit, has little probative value. Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting fees involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses only the three persons named in the information Araneta, were incited by any motive to testify falsely against her. The Modesto and Baez. The information does not include absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is convict appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons 40 worthy of full faith and credence. other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be informed of 50 Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides negative In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of 41 testimony. Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as follows: That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language of the FISCAL BELDUA: statute, the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to Your Honor please, we are offering the oral warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited by the accused, and also to identify The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do some exhibits for the prosecution and as well as 51 from credible witnesses, meet the standard of proof beyond to identify the accused. reasonable doubt that appellant committed recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into x x x the second and third assigned errors assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and the seizure of the application forms. A FISCAL BELDUA: warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto and the articles so seized are 42 We are offering the oral testimony of the rendered inadmissible in evidence. Here, even if the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact about documents seized were deemed inadmissible, her conviction her recruitment by the accused and immediately would stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies. before the recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the 52 Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's case by accused in this case, Your Honor. claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly "planted" the application forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a x x x lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos. FISCAL BELDUA: The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can easily be 43 concocted but difficult to prove. Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the 44 contrary. This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS, that she was instructed together with a companion to conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to be going on, that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the accused, as well as to identify some 53 exhibits for the prosecution.

Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are present, appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal x x x recruitment in large scale? We find that she is not. Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for 54 A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on which it was offered, and the purpose of the offer of their a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more testimonies did not include the proving of the purported 45 persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant. two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, information is fatally defective since it charges her with was not presented in court to testify. committing illegal recruitment in large scale on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she It is true that law does not require that at least three victims committed the crime on February 2, 1994. testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date 46 against three or more persons. In this case, evidence that of the commission of the crime does not vary from that charged appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. in the information. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto

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testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988 residence, appellant offered them employment for a fee. Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, had already been committed three (3) days earlier on January vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant. 30, 1994. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court as well as Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant. the constitutionality of the law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly 55 harsh. Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution states: SARMIENTO, J.: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal inhuman punishment inflicted." ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must province. By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove that would admit having committed the acts charged but would claim appellant committed recruitment and placement against two that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any event. large scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted The facts are not disputed: of two counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for that This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the provincial each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows: imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which assumes that the That in the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in the Municipality of proper imposable penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment. Pagbilao, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court accused, being then the owner and operator of a fishpond is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal situated in the barrio of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality, recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced, for each count, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and fail to pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.1wphi1.nt THREE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62), required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as SO ORDERED amended, inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay the same. Contrary to law. For the prosecution the following witnesses testified in substance as follows; MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer and resident of Lopez, Quezon In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked in his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the dikes and the catching of fish. On cross-examination, this witness declared: I worked with the accused up to March 1964. NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married, copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I know the accused since 1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up to the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio captain of Pinagbayanan. On cross-examination, this witness declared: I came to know the accused when he first operated his fishpond since 1959. On re-direct examination, this witness declared:

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I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and the accused was there. On re-cross examination, this witness declared: I do not remember the month in 1962 when the accused caught fish. RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax collection. I know the accused even before I was Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit B). Said letter was received by the accused as per registry return receipt, Exhibit B1. The letter demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by way of taxes which he did not pay up to the present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966. On cross-examination, this witness declared: I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares. On question of the court, this witness declared: What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on fishpond operation, not rental. The prosecution presented as part of their evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D3 which were not admitted for being immaterial. For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married, owner and general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of 4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in substance as follows: I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and my business is in Manila and my family lives at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15 and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were translated into English by the Institute of National Language to better understand the ordinances. There were exchange of letters between me and the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the payment of the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to determine its condition as it was not then in operation. The

Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went there once in 1967 and he found that it was destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I received another letter of demand from Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and he said none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators. The defense presented as part of their evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were admitted by the court. From their evidence the prosecution would want to show to the court that the accused, as lessee or operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao, refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966. On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period covered by the taxes sought to be collected. Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain. There is no question from the evidences presented that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land, with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1066, entered into by the accused and the government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.

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There is no question from the evidences xxx xxx xxx presented that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the defendant from the government for fishpond purposes was actually converted into fishpond and used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator of a fishpond within the 1 purview of the ordinance in question. The trial Court returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows: VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding. SO ORDERED.
3 2

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 7 1964.

The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly 8 "ambiguous and uncertain." The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of 9 Fisheries." Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the 10 fishpond started operating before the year 1964."

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its petitioner alleges that: 11 application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, I. especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY the Government muscle. ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF 1966, OF But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN. 12 Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or II. more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some 14 UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO. people but does not annoy others.' " III. Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly 15 vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR language but which nonetheless specifies a standard though OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND defectively phrased in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction. NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS. IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON4 RESIDENTS. The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted: Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof 5 per annum. xxx xxx xxx Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved 6 by the Bureau of Fisheries. It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be challenged whenever 16 directed against such activities. In Parker v. Levy, a prosecution originally under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible. It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, a divided Court sustained an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination of 18 candidates" limiting the election campaign period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in the 19 terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political activity" that would supply the standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally 20 set at rest." In his opinion, however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be prohibited "is not clearly 21 defined at all." "As worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression relating to 22 candidates and political parties." He was unimpressed with the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple
17

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before the year 1964 ," does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 is concerned presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of- most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this 24 interests" test, insofar as the statute's ban on early nomination jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law. of candidates was concerned: "The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its object, the indirect and As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 modest scope of its restriction on the rights of speech and for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and assembly, and the embracing public interest which Congress has for new fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us to of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted amnesty unto old, 25 does not offend the Constitution." In that case, Castro would delinquent fishpond operators. It did not repeal its mother have the balance achieved in favor of State authority at the ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new operators, "expense" of individual liberties. Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail. expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and expression of 'views on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the subject of the 23 utterance ('current political problems or issues')." In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin, referred to 26 as the "less restrictive alternative " doctrine, under which the court searches for alternatives available to the Government 27 outside of statutory limits, or for "less drastic means" open to the State, that would render the statute unnecessary. In United 28 States v. Robel, legislation was assailed, banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute, held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements holding defense 29 positions. In that event, the balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties. It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy involves say, 30 economic rights, or as in the Levycase, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is required and in which the competence of the legislature is presumed. In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the 31 fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the National Government which owns 32 them, the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances. To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances. The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964 and 37 even prior thereto." The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 38 14, 1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had 39 prescribed. Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.

36

The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council 40 of Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." InGolden Ribbon 41 Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan we held that local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264 likewise prohibited 33 character of revenue measures designed to assist the coffers municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.) of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although thing, upon the ancient principle that the Government is immune the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although 43 had been making money from the venture. we have held them to the agricultural lands. By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of 44 Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in trees and underbush; a large wood." (Accordingly, even if the question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the challenged taxes were directed on the fishponds, they would not business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in have been taxes on forest products.) question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague. They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against sales, Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. which would have offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden 45 There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to Ribbon Lumber, but rather on occupation, which is allowed 46 depend upon an uncertain date yet to be determined (three under Republic Act No. 2264. They are what have been years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from the Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the fishpond started ordinances themselves. operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain 34 individual or individuals." Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax There is, then, no merit in the last objection. payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date 35 said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," is WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment by appellant. Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating

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G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for nonobservance. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing 1 2 the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied). Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to proveeach and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied). On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary series of the following means or similar schemes: investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under malversation of public funds or raids on the public specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity treasury; to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only

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lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the himself or in connivance with members of his family, Sandiganbayan. relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged 2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on wealth through a combination or series of the following which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the 3 persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this official position, authority, relationship, connection or fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the illThus it has been said that the presumption is based on the gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch least P50,000,000.00. the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at leastP50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the 4 In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the have committed: constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of "The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda eroded. T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, 5 Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." And petitioner has accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by

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himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount orTOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less,THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows: (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTYFIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK." We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without 6 defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; 7 ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that (italic supplied). the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to 8 those words. The intention of the lawmakers - who are, (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and and the Social Security System (SSS), "series:" 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND relationship as to obscure individual characters. SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR one after another in spatial and temporal succession. HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE JUSTICE, 7 May 1991 WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF that number one and two or number one and something else are THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK included, how about a series of the same act? For example, UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;' through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also? (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series. ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN

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REP. ISIDRO: Series. REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural. SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this. THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or enumerated means not twice of one enumeration. many; two or more. REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice. REP. ISIDRO: Not twice? SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, plunder" there should be, at least, two or more. two acts. SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say existing laws, Mr. President. combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah. of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). are two. On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature more, di ba? intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary providing for it in the law. crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the 9 Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in So x x x x relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 REP. GARCIA: A series. REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di.... x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?" subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed REP. GARCIA: Series, oo. towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or misappropriations.... 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve combination. Series. the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination? multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different? REP. GARCIA: Yes. SEN. TANADA: Two different. REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts. REP. GARCIA: For example, ha... REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition... DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989 Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the

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Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes 10 an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed 11 against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 18 valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of 19 the law as applied to the conduct of others." In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its 20 application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular 21 defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by 12 common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to advance as in all other statutes. parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally 22 protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in 23 Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court 24 pointed out in Younger v. Harris overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential 13 of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 14 thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and decided. to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed 25 construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally 26 statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which 27 requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that the defendant is charged. his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with 15 narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed the possibility that the protected speech of others may be and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special its appropriate committees by reason of which he even application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in implications and sound constitutional anchorage. an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized 28 an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan must be 16 17 Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against give it effect. In that case, ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term

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"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.

entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 30 with which he is charged. The following exchanges between In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest elucidating partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990 committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our distinct offenses. criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, information, does that not work against the right of the accused Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual document, coercion, theft? Pocket Part, p. 19). MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there public officer in: is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended). beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense. It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or how can we now convict him? ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional. essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 unlawful scheme or conspiracy million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied). SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the

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Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted 31 to at least P50,000,000.00. A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in the commission of the acts complained of? se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder. criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law? requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733: ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the Plunder Law? 33 conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner: JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the acts charged constituting plunder? Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two process of attending to this kind of cases? pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a 34 substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . by which we can avoid Section 4. Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4? a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be 32 proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. Indeed, 2 provides that We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" Any person who participated with the said public officer in the is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

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penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally 38 The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in consigned by People v. Echegaray to the archives of the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any Constitution now as an integral part of it. person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures 35 what they obviously mean." are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus 36 secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public Court held in People v. Echegaray: office. The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature. There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they 37 are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 110379 November 28, 1997 HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS; John Doe (not his real name), in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O. BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V. DIMAGMALIW, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C. KU, MARRISA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B. CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F. LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal. Statement of the Case This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993 1 2 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.. SP No. 29107 3 which affirmed the trial court's decision, as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED. The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cario and henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this case. SO ORDERED. The Antecedent Facts The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows: On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walkouts and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cario filed administrative cases against herein petitionerappellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations, to wit: 1. grave misconduct; 2. gross neglect of duty;
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3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office regulations; 4. refusal to perform official duty; 5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 6. absence without leave (AWOL) At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension. The charges were subsequently amended by John Doe (not his real name)on November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike. Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees' counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later, however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines. On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cario with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a restraining order. They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cario and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers. On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia of the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene, alleging that he was in the same situation as petitioners since he had likewise been charged and preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cario for the same grounds as the other petitionerappellees and made to shoulder the burden of proving his innocence under the committee's guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and allowed him to intervene. On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS Secretary. In the main he contended that, in accordance with the doctrine

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of primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative proceedings. The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to intervene in the case. Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal. On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied on September 11, 1991. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court's order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees' action, even as it ordered the latter's reinstatement pending decision of their case. Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case for hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads: As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be set for pre-trial conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario, as the principal respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before this Court on said date and time, with a warning that should he fail to show up on said date, the Court will declare him as IN DEFAULT. Stated otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not recognize any representative of his. By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset on June 26, 1992. However, Secretary Cario failed to appear in court on the date set. It was explained that he had to attend a conference in Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the court just the same declared them as in default. The Solicitor General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cario could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cario was represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. But the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated: The "Motion For Reconsideration" dated July 3, 1992 filed by the respondents thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears too obvious that respondents simply

did not want to comply with the lawful orders of the Court. The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the "Manifestation and Motion," dated July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby DENIED due course. SO ORDERED. On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Cario had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion. The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with only the teachers allowed to present their evidence. On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it stated: The Court is in full accord with petitioners' contention that Rep. Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers" is the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. Respondents erred in believing and contending that Rep. Act No. 4670 has already been superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec. Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded as having been replaced by a general law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the same is manifest. A perusal of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals no such intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No. 4670 stands. In the event that there is conflict between a special and a general law, the former shall prevail since it evidences the legislator's intent more clearly than that of the general statute and must be taken as an exception to the General Act. The provision of Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No. 807 in the composition and selection of the members of the investigating committee. Consequently, the committee tasked to investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. Anent petitioners' claim that their dismissal was effected without any formal investigation, the Court, after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the case, finds such claim meritorious. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner, the same is not sufficient reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair play. The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality. It is a dismissal without due process. While there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them cause to render judgment ex-parte. The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary and violative of the

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teacher's right to due process. Due process must be observed in dismissing the teachers because it affects not only their position but also their means of livelihood.

At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to determine whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative proceedings against herein private respondents. We note the Solicitor General's extensive disquisition that government employees do not have the right to 9 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the strike. On this point,10 the Court, in the case of Bangalisan present petition is hereby GRANTED and all the vs. Court of Appeals, has recently pronounced, through Mr. questioned orders/decisions of the respondents Justice Florenz D. Regalado: are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the The reinstatement of the petitioners to their right of government employees to organize, they former positions without loss of seniority and are prohibited from staging strikes, promotional rights is hereby ORDERED. demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in The payment, if any, of all the petitioners' back temporary stoppage or disruption of public salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other services. The right of government employees to benefits and emoluments which may have organize is limited only to the formation of accrued to them during the entire period of their unions or associations, without including the preventive suspension and/or dismissal from the right to strike. service is hereby likewise ORDERED. SO ORDERED.
5

From this adverse decision of the trial court; former DECS Secretary Isidro Cario filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the following grounds: I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in default. II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper substitution of parties. III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "Magna Carta for Public School Teachers", should govern the conduct of the investigation conducted. IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal of 6 the teachers are without due process. As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them. Hence, this petition for review. The Issues Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
7

More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the schoolteachers' right to peaceful assembly vis-avis their right to mass protest: Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, 12 therefore, be made answerable.

11

I.Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which were denied due process of law. may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them II.Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred as a result of administrative proceedings. As already observed, and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due provision of R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the investigating process of law, not on the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents may be punished committee. for engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to III.Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave due process has been violated. In short, before they can be abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first 8 trial court's decision. be observed. These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single question: In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized whether private respondents were denied due process of law. to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a The Court's Ruling respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a law. reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial Denial of Due Process evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or

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contained in the records or made known to the parties Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA 13 affected. 4670, because "all the teachers who were members of the various committees are members of either the Quezon City The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary 15 Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically Teachers Federation" and are deemed to be the covers administrative proceedings involving public representatives of a teachers' organization as required by schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the Section 9 of RA 4670. committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing respective teachers' organizations does not ipso factomake them provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of authorized representatives of such organizations as the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670 read: contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. Every of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their any disciplinary procedure and shall have: underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its a: the right to be informed, in investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a writing, of the charges; teachers' organization as its representative in said committee. b. the right to full access to the 16 Contrary to petitioners' asseverations, RA 4670 is applicable evidence in the case; to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to c. the right to defend himself be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of statutory and to be defended by a construction that "repeals by implication are not favor. An implied representative of his choice repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and and/or by his organization, unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly adequate time being given to repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. the teacher for the preparation This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature of his defense; and cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in d. the right to appeal to clearly repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much designated authorities. No as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in publicity shall be given to any favor of their validity and co-existence." 17 Thus, a subsequent disciplinary action being taken general law does not repeal a prior special law, "unless the intent against a teacher during the to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general pendency of his case. law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the 18 special law." Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against teacher shall be The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the heard initially by a committee composed of the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of corresponding School Superintendent of the procedural requirements in connection with administrative Division or a duly authorized representative who proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private would at least have the rank of a division respondents' right to due process of law requires compliance supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non chairman, a representative of the local or, in its est recedendum. absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Division, the last two to be designated by the Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court, Director of Public Schools. The committee shall perceptively and correctly stated: submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna the termination of the hearings: Provided, Carta has been superseded by the Civil Service however, That where the school superintended Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that pursuant to the is the complainant or an interested party, all the latter law the head of a department, like the members of the committee shall be appointed by DECS secretary, or a regional director, like the the Secretary of Education. respondent-appellant John Doe (not his real name), can file administrative charges against a The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of subordinate, investigate him and take the statute; that is, to promote the "terms of employment and disciplinary action against him if warranted by career prospects" of schoolteachers. his findings. Respondent-appellants cite in support of their argument the following In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. hear the administrative charges against private respondents did 807). not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required Sec. 37. Disciplinary by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were Jurisdiction. deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not xxx xxx xxx provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' b) The heads of departments, organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure agencies and instrumentalities. . an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have . shall have jurisdiction to given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in investigate and decide matters any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is involving disciplinary action embodied in the basic requirement of notice and 14 against officers and employees a real opportunity to be heard. under their jurisdiction. . . .

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Sec. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department or officer of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons. There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Although the Civil Service Decree gives the head of department or the regional director jurisdiction to investigate and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such power is exercised through committees. In cases involving public school teachers, the Magna Carta provides that the committee be constituted as follows: Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however,that where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

The administrative committee considered the teachers to have waived their right to a hearing after the latter's counsel walked out of the preliminary hearing. The committee should not have made such a ruling because the walk out was staged in protest against the procedures of the committee and its refusal to give the teachers' counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend themselves. Its predisposition to find petitioner-appellees guilty of the charges was in fact noted by the Supreme Court when in its resolution in G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated: The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al. G.R. No. 100206, August 22, 1961. As in the Cario v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department of Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in this case Secretary Cario, without awaiting formal administrative procedures and on the basis of reports and "implied admissions" found the petitioners guilty as charged and dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated May 16, 1997 and August 6, 1991. The teachers went to court. The 19 Court dismissed the case. Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is not our function "to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the 20 appellate court coincide." It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed to reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified reinstatement of private respondents and the payment of them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their 21 suspension or dismissal. Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless. Private 22 respondents should, as a consequence, be reinstated and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their unjustified suspension or 23 dismissal. This Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.

Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondly and elementary school teachers, and consultants. But there was no representative of a teachers organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the committee because the provision for the representation of a teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus in any way inconsistent with the Civil Service AFFIRMED. Decree insofar as procedures for investigation is concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service SO ORDERED. Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by providing that the respondent in an G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 administrative case may ask for a "formal investigation," which was what the teachers did in this case by questioning the absence of a ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager representative of a teachers organization in the and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, investigating committee.

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vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents. Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations. Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon. Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay". Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood. LAUREL, J.: The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court: 1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.) 6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule. 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. 8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. 9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u Union, Inc. obreros de la misma; In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after 3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the del paro. entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers: counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. 1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY counsel have no evidentiary value. making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. 3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.) 5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of

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farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court inEdwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration." (3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something

to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)" (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.) (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

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(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Sports, petitioner, vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL, respondent. BELLOSILLO, J.: SECRETARY ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) seeks to nullify through this petition for review the Decision of the Court of 1 Appeals dismissing the certiorari filed by then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria for lack of merit, as well as its Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration thereof.1wphi1.nt On 26 July 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division (FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library. The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice, represented the DECS Secretary in the administrative case while respondent was represented by her own private counsel. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations. On 30 September 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, or on 1 October 1996, she received another resolution correcting the typographical errors found on the first resolution. Respondent did not appeal the judgment. On 2 October 1996 respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most appropriate to 2 take under the circumstances." Her petition was, however, denied. Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order of 23 October 1996. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of the warning in the 23 October 1996 Order that the denial of the request for the production of the 3 Investigation Committee Report was final. As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until 4 she received a copy of the said report. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court. In its assailed Decision of 24 November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court and dismissed Secretary Gloria's petition for lack of merit holding that FIRST. Petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a procedural infirmity . . . . SECOND. Even if the aforesaid procedural defect were to be disregarded, the petition at hand, nevertheless, must fail. The denial of the motion to

G.R. No. 132248

January 19, 2000

HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and

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dismiss is an option available to the respondent judge. Such order is interlocutory and thus not appealable. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party is to file an answer and interpose, as defenses, the objection(s) raised by him in said motion to dismiss, then proceed with the trial and, in case of adverse decision, to elevate the entire case on appeal in due course. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition for review. Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria. The issues before us are: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration as the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion for reconsideration would practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually decided the case, and that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee so that the petition for mandamus has no leg to stand on hence should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. Excepting thereto respondent argues that the denial of the motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature as it did not dispose of the case on the merits, and petitioner still has a residual remedy, i.e., to file an answer, thus her substantive rights have not been violated as she contends; that respondent is clearly entitled to the remedy ofmandamus to protect her rights; and, that petitioner has not shown any law, DECS order or regulation prohibiting the release of the petitioned documents for reasons of confidentiality or national security.

respondent DECS Secretary to release the Report of the DECS Investigating Committee because the Petition does not state a cause of action; (b) The DECS Resolution dismissing petitioner is legal and valid, and therefore, the writ of preliminary injunction cannot be granted to enjoin its execution; while petitioner alleged among others that she has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. "Purely ministerial" are acts to be performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. While the discretion of a Constitutional Commission cannot be controlled by mandamus . . . . the court can decide whether the duty is discretionary or ministerial . . . . Generally, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and finding of fact. Findings of fact by an administrative board or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when there is capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law . . . . WHEREFORE, in regard to the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by herein respondent is hereby denied for lack of merit and is hereby ordered to file its (sic) responsive pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. Copy furnished petitioner who is likewise given ten (10) days to submit his (sic) comment or opposition.

We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the therefor discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The order only deny the motion or order the amendment of the confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors pleading. which would be the proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting their The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may distinctly the reasons therefor (Emphasis supplied). be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the cavalier disposition often creates difficulty and misunderstanding rules was justified. on the part of the aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the issue, Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to usually on certiorari. correct the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules; as court's jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative in this case, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with agencies without stating the basis why petitioner's motion to and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower 5 dismiss was being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for court directly on certiorari. reference the assailed Order On the second issue, the nature of the remedy of mandamus has This treats of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled Gloria on 14 March 1997 to which petitioner filed their that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It (sic) opposition on April 8, 1997. does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner Respondent premised his motion on the following should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must grounds: (a) Mandamus does not lie to compel be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act

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required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and 6 to perform a duty already imposed.

or excess of jurisdiction because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such instance, In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to while the trial court's order is merely interlocutory and nondemonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion. of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 24 November 1997 sustaining the trial Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss, as well as its Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the Resolution dated 13 January 1998 denying reconsideration, is 7 service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for mandamus filed resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will by respondent before the court a quo to compel petitioner to serve no useful purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report is DISMISSED for want of cause of action.1wphi1.nt with a copy of the investigation report. Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on SO ORDERED. petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz 8 v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. Respondent's assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be appropriate to take 9 under the circumstances," hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. As correctly ruled by Secretary Gloria in his Order of 2 October 1996 Respondent's (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself . . . . [t]he report is an internal communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision he may make. The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part although not controlling of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter appellate tribunal, the respondent's counsel may be allowed to read and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an intelligent and exhaustive appellant's Brief Memorandum. More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, In fine, the trial court's Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioner's vs. motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment as the Court of JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and Appeals held, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

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NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.

By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner. member nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz. (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were REGALADO, J.: collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it Assembly of the United Nations. involves the public utility services of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits which is the only one rendering such services in the Philippines. to: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an 1 Order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law. The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
2

1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company; 2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.; 3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc. or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including undertook the following activities and established the following all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing installations: said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and 1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal. well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. 2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite. Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed 4 with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, 3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates antenna(Pinugay III) was established. Pinugay II therein applied for. provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional other Asia Pacific countries operating within the authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the region) thru the Indian Ocean INTELSAT services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then satellite. charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the 5 date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on 4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or antenna (Pinugay III) was established to up to September 16, 1988. temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were being The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, reserved antenna for possible contingencies. counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen 5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Respondent installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground: Field, Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S. Military The Commission in its on-going review of bases with a 24-hour television service. present service rates takes note that after an initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization 6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation Department of the financial statements of of a third standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV) applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in to take over the links in Pinugay I due to 3 some of applicant's rates, subject to further obsolescence. reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in

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its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the 6 case.

in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons: II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu 1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC; reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. 2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was exercised in an Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixingunconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasilegislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the questioned order violates procedural due process for having absence thereof results in a violation of due process. been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process. of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of instant case, the function involved is Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction the 8 adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is the issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by continuing review of the rates charged. the legislative body. Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning We find merit in petitioner's contention. the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service 9 Commission, we made a categorical classification as to when power therein conferred. the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus: We hold otherwise. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of ratefixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to 7 reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10to wit: which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of It is also clear from the authorities that where the Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by function of the administrative body is legislative, the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable notice of hearing is not required by due process feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the nature of the administrative agency is essentially Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and legislative, the requirements of notice and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule the national economic viability of the entire network or of future action which affects a group, if vested components of the communications systems contemplated rights of liberty or property are not involved, is therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not not determined according to the same rules go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law

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which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasijudicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and 11 hearing. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates visa-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides: Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ... There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 8794 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission 12 may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert. Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the 13 final determination of the case. An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process. III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable. There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so 14 requires. Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property

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rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of 15 guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public utilities directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized services, is fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power hereby made permanent. to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness SO ORDERED. comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be 16 confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula 17 but of sound business judgment based upon the evidence it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good 18 sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet 19 competition. A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction. On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the sending end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology could result in a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications. At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the technological advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer. Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements herein.

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G.R. No. L-66683 April 23, 1990 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORPORATION and CLAVECILLA RADIO SYSTEM, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: A THE RESPONDENT NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING WHEN ITS APPLICATION IS NOT FOR RATE APPROVAL BUT FOR AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN SERVICES OUTSIDE ITS FRANCHISES.

Andres T. Velarde for petitioner Phil. Telegraph Corp. Quiason, Ermitao, Makalintal & Barot for petitioner RCPI. Williard S. Wong for Clavecilla Radio System. Regala & Del Pilar and Alampay, Alvero & Alampay for re- B. THE RESPONDENT NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS respondent PLDT. COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION OF BIDIN, J.: PRIVATE RESPONDENT SINCE APPLICATION IS FOR NEWSERVICES NOT COVERED IN THE FRANCHISE This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary AND CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND injunction and/or restraining order seeking to annul and set aside NECESSITY GRANTED TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT. (Rollo, the January 25, 1984 order of the National Telecommunications p. 12) Commission (hereinafter respondent Commission) in NTC Case No. 84-003 and to prohibit respondent Commission from taking In the Resolution of March 21, 1984, the Second Division of this cognizance of, and assuming jurisdiction over the "Application Court required respondents to comment, issued a temporary for Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities" restraining order and transferred the case to the Court En of the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company (PLDT, Banc (Rollo, p. 40) which was accepted in the resolution of April 5, 1984 (Rollo, p. 52-a). for brevity), private respondent herein, for lack of jurisdiction. The decretal portion of the said order reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and finding prima facie that the rates and currency adjustment provision herein proposed are just and reasonable, and that these more modern telecommunications facilities should be made available to interested users, this Commission believes that in the public interest, the application of this case may be, as it is hereby PROVISIONALLY APPROVED with corresponding authority to apply a currency adjustments of 1% for every P10 increase or decrease of the peso to a dollar for these rates using as starting basis the currency adjustment level of P14.00 to US $1.00. This provisional authority may be revoked, revised or amended at any time in accordance with law. Applicant shall refund or credit to the account of its subscriber any amount found in excess of what should be authorized in the final resolution of this case. The Board Secretary of the Commission is hereby directed to set this case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law. The Order takes effect immediately.SO ORDERED. The factual antecedents are as follows: On January 4, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities under NTC Case No. 84-003. On January 25, 1984, the respondent Commission provisionally approved and set the case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law. On June 21, 1984, this Court resolved to consider respondents' comment as answer and the petition was given due course. The parties were required to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 137). Petitioners filed their joint memorandum on August 13, 1984 while respondent PLDT filed its memorandum on August 15, 1984. The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority in favor of PLDT, without prior notice to the petitioners. In their petition, petitioners alleged that the application filed by respondent PLDT is not for approval of rates as its caption misleadingly indicates but for authority to engage in new services not covered by private respondent's franchise and certificate of public convenience and necessity. Petitioners further claimed that PLDT is limited by its legislative franchise to render only "radiotelephonic services," exclusive of "radiotelegraphic or record services." Therefore, the issuance of the provisional authority by the respondent Commission without notice and hearing constitutes grave abuse of discretion inasmuch as such power or prerogative exists only for rate cases under Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act. On the other hand, respondent PLDT refuted the facts alleged in the petition as grossly false and misrepresented. Respondent PLDT maintains that the act of the respondent Commission in having issued its order of January 25, 1984 is a valid exercise of its jurisdiction considering that the franchise of PLDT authorizes it to operate not only telephone system, domestic and international, but also transmission service facilities. In fact, PLDT pointed out that petitioners themselves with the exception of CLAVECILLA had been actual users of PLDT lines or channels for data transmission.

The petition is devoid of merit. Later, on February 2, 1984, the respondent Commission issued a notice of hearing, setting private respondent PLDT's Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act (C.A. No. 146) provides application for hearing on February 22, 1984 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning (Rollo, p. 37). In the aforementioned notice of for the fixing of rates, by the Commission, which shall be imposed and observed by any public service, as follows: hearing, herein petitioners except Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were not included in the list of affected Sec. 16 (c). To fix and determine individual and parties (Rollo, p. 38). At the hearing, petitioner PT & T Co., along joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or with other petitioners which came to know of the pending petition schedules thereof, as well as commutation, through the former, appeared and moved for some time within mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which to file an opposition or reply to said application. Petitioners which shall be imposed, observed and followed alleged that neither respondent Commission nor private thereafter by any public service: Provided, That respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this the Commission may, in its discretion, approve provisional authority (Rollo, p. 10). rates proposed by public services provisionally

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Finally, there is a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the government through its authorized agent, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion, and unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere (Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner,supra; Manila Electric Company v. De Vera, et al., 66 Phil. 161 [1938]). Likewise, as a rule, the court does not interfere with administrative action prior to its The Public Service Commission found that the application completion on finality (Matienzo v. Abeller 162 SCRA 1 [1988]). involved in the present petition is actually an application for approval of rates for digital transmission service facilities which it A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an may approve provisionally and without the necessity of any administrative office the power to determine particular questions notice and hearing as provided in the above-quoted provision of or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such law. office shall prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters is empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality the necessity of a prior hearing (Republic v. Medina, 41 SCRA if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Lianga 643 [1971]). Under the Public Service Act, as amended (CA No. Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, 152 SCRA 80-81 [1987]). 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's investment to be effective A careful study of the records yields no cogent reason to disturb immediately, without hearing (par. 3 of Sec. 16, CA 146, as the findings and conclusions of the National Telecommunications amended; Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC, 131 Commission. SCRA 260 [1984]). Further, the Public Service Act makes no distinction between initial or revised rates. These rates are WHEREFORE, the petition is Dismissed for lack of merit and the necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves assailed order of the National Telecommunications Commission them (Republic v. Medina, supra). Moreover, the Commission is Affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on March 21, can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or 1984 is Set Aside. hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after SO ORDERED. final hearing (Republic v. Medina, supra; Cordero v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 83931, November 3, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution) and it was so stated in the case at bar, in the National Telecommunications Commission's order of January 25, 1984. The Commission did not grant the PLDT any authority to engage in new communication service, but merely in any new proved provisionally PLDT's proposed revision of its then authorized schedule of rates for the lease on availment by endusers of the digital full period leased lines or channels for data transmission which said company acquired, installed, and presently maintain in serviceable condition, a relief well within its power to grant. Undoubtedly, a public utility is entitled to a just compensation and a fair return upon the value of its property while it is being used in public service (Phil. Shipowners' Ass'n. v. Public Utility Commissioner, 43 Phil, 328 [1922]; Ynchausti Steamship Co., Public Utility Commissioner, 42 Phil. 624 [1922]). As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent (commission to give personal notice to all parties affected, not all of them being known to it. More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing was published and as admitted by petitioners, one of them received the notice which in turn informed the others. In fact, the petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so that lack of notice was deemed cured. Under the circumstances, the Commission may be deemed to have substantially complied with the requirements (Matienzo v. Abellera, 162 SCRA 1 [1987]). In any event, the provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards against its abuse (Matienzo v. Abellera,supra). Moreover, the maximum rate fixed in a franchise which its holder is authorized to collect, is always subject to a revision and regulation by the Public Service Commission (now NTC). For if such maximum rate is not subject to alteration, the power of the Commission to review would be rendered nugatory, as it cannot be said that the power to revise may be exercised only where the franchise does not impose a limitation (Manila Gas Corporation v. De Vera, et al., 70 Phil. 321 [1940]). Therefore, the authority of the Commission to issue ex parte a provisional permit to operate proposed public service is not absolute but is based on the G.R. No. 130442 superior and imperative necessity of meeting an urgent public need (Veneracion v. Congson Ice Plant & Cold Storage, Inc., 52 SCRA 119 [1973]). It is the duty of the PSC, (now NTC) to see to

and without necessity of any hearing but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days, thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further That in case the public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. (Emphasis supplied)

the needs and interest of the public (Dizon v. PSC, 50 SCRA 500 [1973]).

April 6, 2000

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THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, petitioners, vs. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA, respondent. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Before us is a Petition for Review by way of Certiorari of the 1 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43872, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Director (RD) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Iloilo City, through its Summary Dismissal Board (SDB), suspending herein respondent C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita from the service for twenty (20) days for "Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty under Section 41 of R.A. 6975." The antecedents are as follows: On July 6, 1994, the following verified complaints were filed against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey, Alex Edwin del Rosario: 1) Administrative Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-01- for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Jesus H. Puey in a complaint dated June 25, 1994; 2) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-02- for Grave Threats filed by Jesus H. Puey; 3) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-03 for Abuse of Authority and Illegal Search filed by Jesus H. Puey; 4) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-04 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile filed by Jesus H. Puey; 5) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-05 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Jesus H. Puey; 6) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-06 for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Manuel H. Puey; 7) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-07 for Illegal Search filed by Manuel H. Puey; 8) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-08 for Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile filed by Manuel Puey; 9) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-09 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Manuel Puey;

Rosario, together with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristita Dawa boarded Mazda pick up with plate nr. HHP-808 and driven by Reynaldo Consejo, proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz City. While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, the aforementioned Mazda pick-up driven by Consejo overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro Torcita; That on board the motor vehicle driven by Torcita were three females sitted at the back; That Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the Mazda pick-up to stop, however, the driver of the Mazda pick-up refused to abide by the signal and instead accelerated and proceeded to Hda. Aimee without stopping. That upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered the compound and was approached by two persons in civilian clothes which prevented him from further proceeding; Moments after, the patrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with Major Torcita, approached Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario, inquiring as to the identity of the persons who accosted him; The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound of Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very, very loud voice, invectives and remarks; That such act of Major Lazaro Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer not worth of respect; In his answer, the respondent, Lazaro R. Torcita, while admitting that he entered the premises of the complainants, the same was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for he was in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a crime in his presence; From the affidavits of the witnesses and testimonies presented by the complainants and the counter affidavits and the counter testimonies of the respondent, the ISSUE before the Board is whether the respondent is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer under Republic Act 6975 as implemented by Memorandum Circular 92-006 of the National Police Commission under Rule II Section 3, Paragraph C, committed thru a series of illegal acts consisting of Grave Threats, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, Violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

10) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-10 for Conduct The complainant presented documentary evidence and Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Alex Edwin del witnesses Congressman Manuel Puey, Rosita Bistal, Alex Edwin del Rosario and Reynaldo Consejo. Respondent Torcita testified Rosario; in his behalf and presented Nehru Java, a member of the PNP Cadiz, who was with him during the incident in question. 11) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-11 for Abuse of Authority and Grave Threats filed by Alex Edwin del The Summary Dismissal Board made the following findings of Rosario; facts: 12) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-12 for Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario. The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative hearings before the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their respective counsels agreed that the twelve cases shall be consolidated into one "major complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II, Memorandum Circular No. 2 92-006 pursuant to RA 6975 . The statement of the case by the Summary Dismissal Board is as follows: That sometime last April 26, 1994, after attending the birthday party of Miss Jessie Vasquez Alex Edwin del That sometime last April 26, 1994, at about 10:30 in the evening, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro H. Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a mazda pick-up, in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, about 10 kilometers from crossing Cadiz, owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, the executive assistant and financial analyst of Congressman Puey, three (3) helpers employed under the Congressman, namely, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa;

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That both parties came from the Municipality of Victorias where they attended some social functions on the occasion of the town fiesta; After the mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hda. Aimee, a sugarcane plantation in Cadiz City, also owned by Congressman Manuel Puey; The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java alighted and the confrontation with Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus Puey, occurred; The Complainant tried to establish the fact that nothing unusual occurred or transpired between the parties in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig and that Torcita has no business pursuing them; However the Board is more inclined to give credence to the affidavits (exhibit 5 & 6) and the testimony of C/Insp. Torcita that a vehicular collision almost took place due to reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up; That it was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulation to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways of the country (exhibit 13); This observation is further bolstered by the testimony of Reynaldo Consejo, the driver of the mazda pick-up, that he was able to overtake the red Cortina Ford only after the latter car hit the shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his speed (tsn page 131, August 30, 1994); This sudden increase in speed of a driver involved in a vehicular accident is a classic move for one who wants a fast get away from the scene, to escape responsibility; Further, Alex Edwin del Rosario testified that upon reaching Hda. Aimee, he instructed the guard to be on look-out for a car might be following them and might enter the compound (TSN page 70 August 30, 1994 ). This conduct would show that witness is anticipating that red Cortina Ford would follow them because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which could have ended in a vehicular collision and finally no proof was presented to show that no other reason exist as to why C/Insp. Torcita would pursue the Mazda pick up other than near occurrence of a vehicular collision; The Complainant presented the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo and the Affidavit of Alex Edwin del Rosario, jointly taken, may be considered as proof that C/Insp. Torcita has committed act or series of acts that would constitute Grave Threat, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, Violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Resolutions regarding the gun ban, thus CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER; That in the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo (exhibit c; exhibit 2), Bistal attempted to establish the fact that C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java illegally entered the gate of the compound but were stopped by the guards armed with cane stick or batuta, however in her testimony given during the hearing (tsn page 32, August 30, 1994) she stated that she did not know what transpired between the two men approaching and the guards near the gate because she, together with her companions, were busy unloading kitchen utensil from the pick-up to the kitchen and Consejo categorically stated that this portion of their affidavit, specifically paragraph 7, is NOT TRUE; Alex Edwin del Rosario, in his testimony given in the hearing, corroborated this fact that he also did not see or hear what happened for he was in some distance away and he cannot see them clearly (TSN page 73, August 30, 1994); The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the incident which happened near the gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his

testimony given in the hearing of the case that when he was walking towards the compound together with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, two armed civilian guards stopped and threatened him; He identified himself however, the same had no effect, and PO2 Java whispered that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up; Since no proof to the contrary was presented by the Complainant nor was there any witness or witnesses presented to rebut this allegations, the Board had no other choice except to consider these allegations as proof; (Exhibit 5 & 6); The Board also resolve to take note that a metropolitan newspaper with nationwide circulation and with unquestionable credential, had published a news item about the presence of armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey exhibit 14); This evidence give more credence to the fact that there were really armed men in the premises where the aforementioned incident happened; That this is corroborated further by the affidavit of PO2 Nehru Java (exhibit 17); This observation of the Board that there were really armed men in the premises of Hda. Aimee, is further enhance by the fact that Major Torcita felt their presence when he desisted from further entering the compound, a feeling which was developed and nurtured by years of living under combat conditions and finally the Board also feels that the presence of armed persons in the offices and properties of high government officials is accepted as a necessary consequence for their protection due to the greater risks they are expose to; That because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which was further aggravated by the confrontation near the gate of the compound of Hda. Aimee, C/Insp. Torcita upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were; This fact is not disputed by the parties; xxx xxx xxx

Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic drink; However, not to the point of drunkness; The Board is more inclined to believe this allegation for no sane person will risks the life of a member of his family by deliberately driving when he is mentally and physically incapable; Further, C/Insp. Torcita was able to drive from Victorias to Cadiz City, a distance of forty kilometers, on a dark night and raining and was able to avoid collision of the vehicles involved by sheer reflex action despite the admitted fact that his tire hit the shoulder of the road; Further, at the time Chief Inspector Torcita entered the compound he was fully aware of the presence of armed men and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching the compound of Hda. Aimee; The foregoing facts would show that C/Insp. Torcita was in full command of his senses and was not affected by the numbing effect of alcohol for a drunk person does not show any caution and behaves irrationaly. The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties. The Board also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. The Board found that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties when the incident happened; however, he committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of same. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Board reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint for CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER under Memo Cir. Nr. 92-006 pursuant to Sec. 42, RA

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6975, be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence, however finds C/Insp. Lazaro R. Torcita to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY under Sec. 41, RA 6975, in relation to NAPOLCOM Memo Cir. Nr. 91-002 and is hereby ORDERED SUSPENDED for twenty days (20) and forfeiture of salary for the same period of time effective upon receipt of this Decision under Rule 7, Section 2, Sub-par. b of the same Memo Circular. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Thus, Under the applicable provisions of Section 45 of R. A. 6975, however, the disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director upon a PNP member shall be final and executory except those involving demotion in rank or dismissal from the service. The appealed decision being that of suspension from the service with corresponding forfeiture of pay only the same is not subject to review by 3 this Board. Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, "which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law." Public respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The regional trial court granted the petition forcertiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty.

dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of 5 conduct unbecoming of a police officer." Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the "Rules and Regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members" and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule II, as follows: "Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization. On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the performance of duty" are defined in Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. It is a light offense, incurred, among others, by a member of the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2. A, Rule VI).

As above-stated, the Summary Dismissal Board absolved the C/Insp. Torcita of the consolidated charge of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" but found him guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty under Sec. 41, R.A. No. 6975, in relation to Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and imposed a penalty of suspension for twenty (20) days and Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the regional trial court, by petition of review to the Court of forfeiture of salary for the same period. Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering We are unable to sustain the theory of the petitioners that the that "the twelve (12) cases treated as Conduct Unbecoming of a definition of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" as earlier granted, is broad enough to include any act of an officer which Police Officer were eventually dismissed." tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks and that there is "no legal prohibition" which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from finding petitioner guilty of the the reversal of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals on lesser offense. While the definition of the more serious offense is the following grounds: broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly 1 THE OFFENSE OF "SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the PERFORMANCE OF DUTY" IS NECESSARILY rudimentary requirements of due process. INCLUDED IN THE CHARGE OF "CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER." The series of twelve complaints filed against C/Insp. Torcita were solely based on the incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at 2 THE DECISION OF THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, wherein Torcita, who was offBOARD (SDB) AND THE NAPOLCOM REGIONAL duty and was in civilian clothes, riding in his private vehicle with APPELLATE BOARD HAS BECOME FINAL AND members of his family, chased another vehicle which overtook 4 EXECUTORY. his car in a reckless manner and in violation of the Traffic Code; the hot pursuit ended at the Hacienda Aimee, where he allegedly The petitioners submit that the offense of "Conduct Unbecoming entered the place without lawful warrant and while inside, of a Police Officer" is broad enough to include any act of an belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a fight, officer which tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP pointed his gun at somebody and urinated in full view of the organization, and Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty persons therein. The Dismissal Board found the above charges is one act which brings such disgrace and dishonor as unsubstantiated and held that Torcita was in the performance of contemplated by law. Moreover, the dismissal has become final official duty when the incidents happened. "However, he and executory and the trial court erred when it proceeded with committed breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks the petition in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. while in the performance of same." In his comment, respondent Torcita insists that his right to due It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve process of law was "corrosively abridged and impaired", and administrative cases filed against C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, pleads for an affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals. that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the The appeal has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in performance of official duty. The records do not bear out the affirming the decision of the trial court granting the petition specific acts or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at the pre-hearing for certiorari. conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with Police Officer." Thus, the Board defined the issue before the complaints or charges against any member of the Philippine Board as "whether the respondent is guilty of conduct National Police (PNP) is laid down in Republic Act No. 6975, unbecoming of a police officer under Republic Act 6975, as otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior and Local implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 of the Government Act of 1990." This law defines the summary National Police Commission under Rule II, Section 3, Paragraph c, committed though a series of illegal acts consisting of grave

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threats, illegal search, abuse of authority, violation of domicile or violation of Comelec Gunban." Notably, there is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties.

G.R. No. 81798 December 29, 1989

LAO GI alias FILOMENO CHIA, SR., his wife, ONG UE, and his children FILOMENO, JR., MANUEL, ROSITA VICENTA and DOMINGA, all surnamed CHIA, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND COMMISSION ON The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents. guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged.1a\^/phi1 Summary dismissal proceedings are governed Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioners. by specific requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the GANCAYCO, J.: complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting On September 3, 1958 the Secretary of Justice rendered the hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may take the Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination is Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father confined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born on November 28, arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be entertained. 1899 being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug (Section 4, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006). However, of Guagua, Pampanga. However on October 3, 1980 the notification of the charges contemplates that respondent be Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147, series of 1980 informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled cancelling Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 and setting aside the to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was performance of duty, so that he could traverse the accusation founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A motion for squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was reconsideration of said Opinion was denied by the Minister of given an opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad Justice on February 13, 1981. charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a On March 9, 1981 a charge for deportation was filed with the proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children. the legal process (Alonte vs. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245). It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the material facts and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the party which he attended before the incident, the records show that he was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of Victorias, which was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways" (Decision, p. 76). The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife. An amended charge was filed with the CID on March 19,1981 alleging that said respondents refused to register as aliens having been required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. On August 31, 1981 another amended charge was filed alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability. On September 4, 1981 said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191, series of 1958. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that the citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due process was accorded to respondents. The respondents filed a reply thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a motion for reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a resolution dated December 10, 1981. Said respondents then filed with this Court on February 11, 1982 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 59619. After requiring a comment thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en banc resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May 5, 1982 on the ground that Opinion No. 191, series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice may be equated as res judicata and Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly that revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147, series of 1980 found that the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered cannot be considered just, fair and reasonable. without or in excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an offense for which he was not properly charged. On June 1, 1982 respondents filed a motion for reconsideration A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is of the aforesaid resolution of this Court dismissing the petition deprived of the opportunity of being heard (Palu-ay vs. CA, 293 but this was denied by another resolution of this Court dated SCRA 358). A void judgment never acquires finality (Heirs of August 17, 1982. A second motion for reconsideration thereof Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA 255 SCRA 672; Fortich vs. was also denied by this Court on September 16, 1982. Corona, 298 SCRA 678). Hence, aforementioned decision cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. On September 23, 1982 the CID set the deportation case against respondents for hearing and Acting Commissioner Victor G. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of Nituda gave respondents three (3) days to move for the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is reconsideration of the order directing them to register as aliens DISMISSED. and to oppose the motion for their arrest. On September 27, 1982 respondents filed said motion for reconsideration and SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt opposition but this was denied by Acting Commissioner Nituda on September 28, 1982. The latter directed respondents to

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register as aliens within two (2) days from notice thereof. The deportation case was set for hearing on October 5, 1 982 but on the same day respondents filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 82- 12935 whereby a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On April 17,1985 a decision was rendered by the trial court dismissing the petition for lack of legal basis and for want of supervisory jurisdiction on the part of the trial court on the particular subject involved. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued was dissolved. An appeal therefrom was interposed to the Court of Appeals. In due course a decision was rendered on August 19, 1987 dismissing the appeal with costs against petitioners. A motion for reconsideration of the decision filed by petitioners was also denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1988. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a new one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID dated September 28, 1982 and directing it to proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the petitioners. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

Commissioners of the existence of the ground as charged against the alien. In this case it appears that petitioners are charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry. After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific grounds of which he should be duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and it is only after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered deported. In such a hearing, Opinion No. 191, Series of 1958 of the Secretary of Justice and Opinion No. 147, Series of 1980 of the Minister of Justice will bear much weight in the determination by the CID of the citizenship of said petitioners. The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they register as aliens as required by the Immigration Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens.

1. The issues raised in G.R. No. 59619 before the Honorable Supreme Court were different from the issues raised in Civil The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by 1 Case No. 82-12935-CV. or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the 2. The minute resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court in country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic 2 G.R. No. 59619 did not make a categorical ruling that petitioner tranquility of the people. entered and remained in the Philippines by false pretenses. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the 3. The issue of whether or not petitioners' citizenship was nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh secured by fraud is precisely the subject matter of the and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the proceedings before the Commission on Immigration and freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such Deportation, in which no evidence had been presented yet in person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the support of the charge of fraud in the acquisition of petitioners' provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on citizenship. criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. 4. Petitioners are not subject to immediate deportation. 5. The order for the arrest of petitioners in case of failure to register as aliens was premature since there was no competent determination yet that their citizenship was indeed procured by fraud. Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided: c No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

6. The Honorable Court of Appeals overstepped its appellate jurisdiction, when it ruled on matters not covered by the Decision of the lower court. Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and There can be no question that the CID has the authority and concise language to enable a person of common understanding jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and 3 petitioners and in the process determine also the question of enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment. citizenship raised by the petitioners. Section 37(a) (1) of the Immigration Act provides as follows: Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is a 4 SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. The arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant and of Immigration or of any other officer designated service of warrants should be in accordance likewise with Rule 5 by him for the purpose and deported upon the 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 6 after a determination by the Board of Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so the matter of bail, motion 7 Commissioners of the existence of the ground to quash, and trial, among others. Fealty to the prescribed rules of procedure in deportation cases shall insure a speedy, fair and for deportation as charged against the alien: just dispensation of justice. The Court takes note of the fact that a private prosecutor is assisting in the prosecution of the case by the special prosecutor of the CID. The Court sees no reason why a private prosecutor should be allowed to participate in a deportation case. Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 16, Rule 110 thereof, an offended party may intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is civil liability arising from the criminal From the foregoing provision it is clear that before any alien may action claimed by said party. In such case he may intervene by be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, counsel. there should be a prior determination by the Board of (1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...

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In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of any justification for a private party to have any right to intervene. Even if such party can establish any damages due him arising from the deportation charge against the alien, such relief cannot be afforded him in the deportation proceeding. His recourse if at all is in the ordinary courts. Thus the Court rules that the intervention of a private prosecutor should not be allowed in deportation cases. The possibility of oppression, harrassment and persecution cannot be discounted. The deportation of an alien is the sole concern of the State. This is the reason why there are special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to prosecute such cases.

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of questioned order of the respondent Commission on Immigration Manila, respondents-appellees. and Deportation dated September 28, 1982 is hereby set aside. The respondent Commission on Immigration and Deportation is Leonardo L. Arguelles for respondent-appellant. hereby directed to continue hearing the deportation case against petitioners and thereafter, based on the evidence before it, to FERNANDO, C.J.: resolve the issue of citizenship of petitioners, and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or not the petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as aliens. No This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based costs. on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitionersSO ORDERED. appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where 1 massaging is conducted is the same person." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been 2 filed. Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondentsappellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for 3 massage of customers." This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As 4 far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the 5 progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, 6 so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.

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G.R. No. 118127

April 12, 2005

its prohibited establishments, 8 unconstitutional.

9

be

declared

invalid

and

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after. Ernest Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1 Hermingway

Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the saidOrdinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR 10 OTHER PURPOSES. The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to: 1. Sauna Parlors 2. Massage Parlors 3. Karaoke Bars 4. Beerhouses 5. Night Clubs

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be wellintentioned in his dishonesty. J. Christopher Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I Gerald

6. Day Clubs 7. Super Clubs 8. Discotheques 9. Cabarets

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality. The pivotal issue in this Petition under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of 2 the Decision in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial 3 Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court), is the validity of 4 Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila. The antecedents are as follows: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating 5 hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although 6 duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary 7 Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
1

10. Dance Halls 11. Motels 12. Inns SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section. SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to: 1. Curio or antique shop 2. Souvenir Shops

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3. Handicrafts display centers 4. Art galleries 5. Records and music shops 6. Restaurants 7. Coffee shops

an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business 14 in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.
15

In their Answer dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to 8. Flower shops "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in 16 9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, which well-defined activities for wholesome family reads, thus: entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele. Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, 10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the concerts and the like. corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: 11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments. SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval. Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993. .... (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: .... (vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.
17

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted provision (Emphasis supplied) included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of 18 In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that exhibition and amusement. the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in 19 were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised 20 "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely Charter of Manila) which reads, thus: 11 affect the social and moral welfare of the community." ARTICLE III MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council THE MUNICIPAL BOARD has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 12 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) . . . grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar shall have the following legislative powers: establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of 13 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with . certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the (kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be to its enactment; (5) The Ordinanceviolates MTDC's necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties

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for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void. both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense. Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. 21 burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply them worthless. disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of 22 zone. The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit 23 operation. The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal to enact and must be passed according to the procedure protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following as there existed substantial and real differences between the substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the 24 Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. may regulate trade; (5) must be general and37consistent with (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 25 against the enforcement of the Ordinance. And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they 26 preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. are not contrary to the Constitution and to the 38 laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be 27 constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads: Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court 39 the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. against the defendant. No costs. This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. 29 Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal on 12 The national legislature is still the principal of the local December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the case to government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate 30 40 this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. it. SO ORDERED.
28

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that 31 the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring 32 the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and 34 conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. They allege that theOrdinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of 35 validity. In its Memorandum dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions. This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means
36 33

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their 41 creation. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz: SECTION 16. General WelfareEvery local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, thesangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the 42 Code. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

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The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution

the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling 56 The police power of the City Council, however broad and far- government purpose. reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be The police power granted to local government units must always 43 reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power 57 power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion 58 legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by 44 process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with all the people of the blessings of democracy. 59 the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental 45 equality before the law of women and men. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear property without due process of law, nor shall any 46 that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from person be denied the equal protection of laws. those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive 47 60 without just compensation. upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights A. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private 61 48 property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. without due process of law. . . ." There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, 49 obedience to the dictates of justice, and as such it is a 50 limitation upon the exercise of the police power. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal 51 and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is 52 concerned. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into 62 private rights a violation of the due process clause. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of 63 Manila had already taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and 64 thrill-seekers."

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. on government, usually called "procedural due process" and It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of "substantive due process." Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. 53 The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion particular action. into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated the government has an adequate reason for taking away a establishments will notper se protect and promote the social and person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it 54 government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. us that whether there is such a justification depends very much 55 on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which the City 65 legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and insupportable scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors,

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karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence 66 and universality of sin in man's history. The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinancemay to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy. While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these 67 violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. Means employed are constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to 68 such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any 69 avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of 70 Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said: While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained: These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under 71 compulsion of the State. Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for these purposes. be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in 72 intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 73 persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception. it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The 74 right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case

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of Morfe v. Mutuc, stated:

borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot public action must be compensated by the government and thus abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should concentrated on those few persons subject to the public broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the remain83 will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he action. surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable master of himself is in any real sense free. economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes 84 with reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when 85 right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. When itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, 76 that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a the personal life of the citizen. 86 taking. There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice. Modality employed is unlawful taking In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its 77 property. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just 78 compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 87 fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct 88 investment-backed expectations of the owner. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

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The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 79 are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in public as a whole. cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the to There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or convert into allowed businessesThe second and third physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when options Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private the government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically property. 80 viable use of the property. The second option instructs the owners to abandon their 81 In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. held that a taking also could be found if government regulation of In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates it. Not act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and 82 oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon,

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property without due process of law, nay, even without Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a compensation. reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the illconsidered Ordinance enacted by the City Council. The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that 95 should be compensated by the government. The burden on the In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas, the city of Dallas adopted a owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, by the public as this end benefits them as a whole. bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the such property without just compensation. Private property which city violated the due process clause by failing to produce is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour police powers of local government units which have always limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the cover this particular taking. reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity study which the city considered, was adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer and eminent domain. It needs restating that the property taken than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or 89 purpose and is therefore "wholesome." If it be of public benefit effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions particular purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private 90 beliefs. property for public use. Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by 91 which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its 92 provisions. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, as cited in People v. 94 Nazario, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "
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The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld. The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators 96 Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an 97 assumed power to prohibit. The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and 98 unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other 99 classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws 100 is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is 101 concerned.

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise: Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The ideal situation carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional which is of the very essence of the idea of law." There is guarantee of the right to liberty and property. recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact

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exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some 102 in the group equally binding on the rest.

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that: Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: . . (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . . .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other operate only on some and not all of the people without violating similar establishments, including tourist guides and 103 the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an transports . . . . indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, and 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows: 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
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In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. one of the hinted ills theThe standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitution Ordinance is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to 105 important government objectives.aims to banish Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: . . . (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . . . (vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws. relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the 106 rulings of the Court inKwong Sing v. City of Manila that:

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The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which 107 the employment or business shall be exercised. And in People v. Esguerra, wherein the Court nullified ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and prohibit. The Court therein declared that:
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an the the not

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors. On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest 116 expression of legislative will. If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of 117 the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier. Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest 118 expression of the legislative will should prevail. In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is 109 impliedly withheld. These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers. Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being 111 put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of 112 regulation, suppression and prohibition. The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
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It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited 119 summary abatement without judicial intervention. powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and 113 against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in prohibit certain activities and establishments in another section statutory construction that the express mention of one person, of the Code which is reproduced as follows: thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to 114 construction. Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary is likewise without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court for an efficient and effective city government, and in this 115 in People v. Esguerra, is instructive. It held that: connection, shall:

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(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the Conclusion welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city; . . . If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of illrepute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance. It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the 120 same principle applies. Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same 121 must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila 122 Authority: The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a 123 statute.

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, 124 partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. Concededly, the challenged Ordinance we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of thewas enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary Ordinance not even under the guise of police power.has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999 CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, CITY TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SUBIC, ZAMBALES, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: The constituttional rights to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to the bussiness and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Econimic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause. The Case Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' 1 Decision promulgated on August 29, 1996, and 2 Resolution dated November 13, 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 3 37788. The challenged Decision upheld the constitutionality and validity of Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges, as follows: Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of thesangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein. The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies: (a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial,

commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments; (b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines; (c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas. In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter; (d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and future shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone; (e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone; (f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation; (g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have the freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization form the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof; (h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall provide and establish its own security and fire-fighting forces; and

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(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives thus: Sec. 1. On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under relevant Philippine laws. The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws. Sec. 2. On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227. Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative, viz.: Sec. 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone]. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided herein.

Senator Paterno. Thank you, Mr. President. My first question is the extent of the economic zone. Since this will be a free port, in effect, I believe that it is important to delineate or make sure that the delineation will be quite precise[. M]y question is: Is it the intention that the entire of Olongapo City, the Municipality of Subic and the Municipality of Dinalupihan will be covered by the special economic zone or only portions thereof? Senator Shahani. Only portions, Mr. President. In other words, where the actual operations of the free port will take place. Senator Paterno. I see. So, we should say, "COVERING THE DESIGNATED PORTIONS OR CERTAIN PORTIONS OF OLONGAPO CITY, SUBIC AND DINALUPIHAN" to make it clear that it is not supposed to cover the entire area of all of these territories. Senator Shahani. So, the Gentleman is proposing that the words "CERTAIN AREAS". . . The President. The Chair would want to invite the attention of the Sponsor and Senator Paterno to letter "C," which says: "THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IS HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO PROCLAIM, DELINEATE AND SPECIFY THE METES AND BOUNDS OF OTHER SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES WHICH MAY BE CREATED IN THE CLARK MILITARY RESERVATIONS AND ITS EXTENSIONS." Probably, this provision can be expanded since, apparently, the intention is that what is referred to in Olongapo as Metro Olongapo is not by itself ipso jure already a special economic zone. Senator Paterno. That is correct. The President. Someone, some authority must declare which portions of the same shall be the economic zone. Is it the intention of the author that it is the President of the Philippines who will make such delineation?

On October 26, 1994, the petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative Senator Shahani. Yes Mr. President. of their right to equal protection of the laws. In a Resolution dated June 27, 1995, this Court referred the matter to the Court The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of of Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the 95. legislature, pursuant to its "avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest." It ruled that "EO 97-A merely Incidentally, on February 1, 1995, Proclamation No. 532 was implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227]." issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, Disagreeing, petitioners now seek before us a review of the pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. aforecited Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Issue

Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference Petitioners submit the following issue for the resolution of the between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. Court: In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous [W]hether or not Executive Order No. 97-A extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 violates the equal protection clause of the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the Constitution. Specifically the issue is whether United States of America, as amended . . .'" The appellate court the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time secured area and excluding the residents of the maintaining the validity of RA 7227. zone outside of the secured area is 4 discriminatory or not. The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" The Court's Ruling and not to include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law." It relied on the following 5 The petition is bereft of merit. deliberarions in the Senate:

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Main Issue: The Constitionality of EO 37-A

and conversion to productive civilian use of the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended.

Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of To undertake the above objectives, the same law created the Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, some of whose Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, relevant defined purposes are: narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present "fenced-in (b) To adopt, prepare and implement a former Subic Naval Base" only. It has thereby excluded the comprehensive and detailed development plan residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying embodying a list of projects including but not the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated limited to those provided in the Legislativeagainst them without reasonable or valid standards, in Executive Bases Council (LEBC) framework contravention of the equal protection guarantee. plan for the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions consistent with ecological and On the other hand, the solicitor general defends, on behalf of environmental standards, into other productive respondents, the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of uses to promote the economic and social RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate development of Central Luzon in particular and the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance the country in general; fully complies with the requiretnents of a valid classification. (c). To encourage the active participation of the We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the private sector in transforming the Clark and assailed EO. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection Subic military reservations and their extensions clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and into other productive uses; substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtain;ng inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. Further, in creating the SSEZ, the law declared it a policy to develop the zone into a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, 10 The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not financial and investment center." absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced real differences, one class may be treated and regulated that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly 6 differently from another. The classification must also be occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it belonging to the same class. Explaining the nature of the equal necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and 8 protection guarantee, the Court in Ichong v. Hernandez said: encourage investors, both local and foreign. Among such 11 enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the The equal protection of the law clause is against zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importation's, (3) restructured income undue favor and individual or class privilege, as tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign well as hostile discrimination or the oppression exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors legislation which is limited either [by] the object and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers . to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited absolute equality among residents; it merely the application of some incentives to the confines of the former requires that all persons shall be treated Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government alike, under like circumstances and intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an conditions both as to privileges conferred and abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors is not infringed by legislation which applies only to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. to those persons falling within a specified class, Why the seeming bias for the big investors? Undeniably, they if it applies alike to all persons within such class, are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic and reasonable. grounds exist for making a growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities distinction between those who fall within such for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such class and those who do not. conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes, "The intent of 12 Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial a statute is the law." distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big 9 members of the same class. investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the present We first determine the purpose of the law. From the very title business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are itself, it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily toaccelerate the talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new, jobs. conversion of military reservations into productive uses. On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, Obviously, the "lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside Agreement" are its object. Thus, the law avows this policy: the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. It is hereby the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. declared the policy of the Government to There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the accelerate the sound and balanced conversion benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, monitor the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced off, to prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval smuggling. Communications Station and Capas Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps, and to apply said It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not 13 funds as provided herein for the development require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual

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and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.

G.R. No. 128845

June 1, 2000

We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center" in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the areas outside it. KAPUNAN, J.: Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the "secured area." The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International SchoolManila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions All told, the Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.1wphi1.nt extended. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. To repeat, it was based, Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for rather, on fair and substantive considerations that were germane short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic to the legislative purpose. educational institution established primarily for dependents of 1 foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The enable the School to continue carrying out its educational assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of against petitioners.1wphi1.nt the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel SO ORDERED. being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreignhires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire: a. What is one's domicile? b. Where is one's home economy? c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance? d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing 2 that individual to the Philippines? Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreignhires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains: A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.

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Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent 3 professionals in the field of international education. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective 4 bargaining representative of all faculty members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local 5 hires. The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these nonFilipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice. Appendix C of said CBA further provides: The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS). To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries. The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching 7 faculty of the School. We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against 8 these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all The compensation package given to local-hires has people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the 6 who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates: International law, which springs from general principles of 9 law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law 10 The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of applications in the present case. The international fairness and justice, based on the test of what is 11 12 character of the School requires the hiring of foreign reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the personnel to deal with different nationalities and different International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 13 Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All cultures, among the student population. 14 Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against 15 Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel 16 Occupation all embody the general principle against which system is universally recognized. We agree that discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the principle as part of its national laws. international market. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local by the employer are all the more reprehensible. hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity 17 therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to parity in other terms and conditions of employment "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted which include the employment which include the to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employment contract. employees. A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the 18 conditions and provisions for salary and professional The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor compensation wherein the parties agree as follows: 19 Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State,

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in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation 20 discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not 21 penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of 25 discourage membership in any labor organization. workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full 26 protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to 27 Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides: public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining 28 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular: In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There a minimum, with: is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public for work of equal value without policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this distinction of any kind, in particular Court.1avvphi1 women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same men, with equal pay for equal work; bargaining unit as the local-hires. xxx xxx xxx A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties 29 under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment 30 status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their 31 collective bargaining rights. It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to localhires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights. WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be 22 paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence 23 that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. "Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations 24 Commission, we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to SO ORDERED. a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.) While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreignhires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same

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G.R. No. 148208

December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). I. The Case First the facts. On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the 1 BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments: a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the 2 original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually 3 defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the 4 BSP; (emphasis supplied) c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the 5 BSP; d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also 6 discriminated upon; and e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the 7 BSP officers'.

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection 8 clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: employeeshave been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of the Monetary Board shall: jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this xxx xxx xxx petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue (c) establish a human resource management system 9 involved. which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such 10 system shall aim to establish professionalism and Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other accordance with sound principles of management. provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to A compensation structure, based on job evaluation "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's accordance with sound principles of management." approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive its own system conform as closely as possible with the Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated compensation and wage structure of employees policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies 11 below shall be in accordance with the rates of the national government. prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis II. supplied] The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section Issue Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No 12 person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." III. Ruling

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A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.

of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the endresult did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not 19 indubitably show that the classification created by the palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent 20 does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of cases, this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such 13 in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, and provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference 14 committee of both Houses. reiterated in a long line of cases: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the 21 constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional 22 limitations. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful 23 and equivocal breach. B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs The equal protection of the laws clause of the leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the 1. The concept of relative constitutionality. grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All in its application to another.24 that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real A statute valid at one time may become void at another time 25 differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, only; and that it must apply equally to each member of even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry 26 the class. This Court has held that the standard is and investigation in the light of changed conditions. satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of 27 Mount Vernon, where the Court of Appeals of New York palpably arbitrary. declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance In the exercise of its power to make classifications for which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its although it was located in the center of a business area. Later jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the range of discretion. It is not necessary that the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and classification be based on scientific or marked service station within a parking area. The Court found the differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was necessary that the classification be made with contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled: mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted) Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid 15 classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a 16 specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may 17 be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law 18 and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts 28 will afford relief in an appropriate case. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence

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of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. 29 Esteban upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of 30 its police power - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the 31 creditors. The landmark ruling states:

railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.
33

In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing The question now to be determined is, is the period or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the been previously sustained. Ruled the Court: last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained Commission reasonable under the present because it applied to all similar corporations and had for circumstances? its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage by common carriers of freight and passengers created Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is competitive transportation are not subject to the same to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals themselves by giving them a reasonable time within on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them them on their private rights of way. from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt valid when enacted may become invalid by change moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1). in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may But we should not lose sight of the fact that these not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at statement. The State of Florida for many years had a present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue and special duties upon railroad companies, among to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted which was that a railroad company was liable for double to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means train without the owner having to prove any act of that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period was held that the changed conditions brought about by seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor commended, the relief accorded works injustice to vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the have been required to prove negligence in the operation debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not 34 equal protection of the law." (emphasis supplied) extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz: operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States. [C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has xxx xxx xxx any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only administered by public authority with an evil eye and way open to us under the present circumstances is to unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and declare that the continued operation and illegal discriminations between persons in similar enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should equal justice is still within the prohibition of the 35 not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the Constitution. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) [W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such 2. Applicability of the equal protection clause. denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic 32 prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey is illuminating. The Supreme Court unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees 36 the law it is unconstitutional. . (emphasis supplied, against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced citations omitted

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3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso. According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the 37 SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon. Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz: 1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);

xxx

xxx

xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)

2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System 3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289) (SSS); 3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC); 4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); 5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); 6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation 38 (HGC); and 7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below: 1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907) Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 90. Personnel. xxx xxx xxx Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]: xxx xxx xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall: xxx xxx xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied) 4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291) Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)]. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523) Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282) Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

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Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied) 6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763) Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties: xxx xxx xxx

profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied) Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the 39 same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000! The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes. The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between 40 persons who are without differences.

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to xxx xxx xxx determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), 7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302) thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is period of time? hereby further amended to read: xxx 3. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution. In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not thedeclared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and

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constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such 41 denial, it is unconstitutional. It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities. Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then, GFIs and governmentowned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the 42 President in critical government agencies." The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."

(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20. Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B 47 of the 1997 Constitution. Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL. Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL. It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic]counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental." The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is 48 the central monetary authority, and the banker of the 49 government and all its political subdivisions. It has the sole 50 power and authority to issue currency; provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including 51 the exempted GFIs. Hence, the argument that the rank-andfile employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.

Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the 43 SSL, but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable 44 levels; and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on 45 minimum wages. Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular 46 Schedule, and the following factors: circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file (1) the education and experience required to perform the from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven duties and responsibilities of the positions; GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was performed; granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, (3) the kind of supervision received; while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that theraison d'tre of the SSL(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part completion of the work; based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and (5) nature and extent of internal and external retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's relationships; mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the (6) kind of supervision exercised; first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers (7) decision-making responsibility;

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and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by 52 the employees and personnel of other GFIs, underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities. It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other 53 [GFIs]," then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP. The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. 54 Robinson: "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups." The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:

to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting 56 one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs. Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent. Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. 57 In GSIS v. Montesclaros, this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar. It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this 58 prerogative is subject to judicial review. So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty 59 and the power to correct. As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and 60 Pensions, once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that 61 favorable treatment.

First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the a six-year commitment unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the xxx xxx xxx subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and being treated as unalikes without any rational basis. alternative service performers are qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and military establishment, subject to its discipline and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be consequence of which military servicemen have a 55 special need for readjustment benefits (citations given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of omitted) burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the in the group is equally binding on the rest.62 exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as

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In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw. IV. Equal Protection Under International Lens In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the"rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative 63 classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the 64 Constitution. A. Equal Protection in the United States In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights the 65 development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required. xxx xxx xxx

contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .] xxx xxx xxx

The Burger Court and Equal Protection. The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.] xxx xxx xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his 66 dissent in the Rodriguez case: The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional.Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier approach.] From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends. The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major

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In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American Convention on 78 Human Rights; the African Charter on Human and People's 79 80 Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular B. Equal Protection in Europe importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights The United Kingdom and other members of the European in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States 81 Community have also gone forward in discriminatory legislation of the League. and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It function as traditional "first generation" rights, commonly prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection against other status." This list is illustrative and not discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full religion is regarded as grounds that require strict and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national to eradicate discrimination. emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion or In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards 67 social origin." ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid down 83 in the ICESCR and in a very large number of Conventions Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United 84 developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of Nations body. Additionally, many of the other international and 68 discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case the European regional human rights instruments have specific provisions 85 Court set the standard of justification at a low level: relating to employment. discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition against 69 to be realised. But over the years, the European Court has discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination 70 others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, the European Court declared that: in social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the . . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights today a major goal in the member States of the Council contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this the Convention. argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such 71 And in Gaygusuz v. Austria, the European Court held as the right to social security found in ICESCR: that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based Although Article 26 requires that legislation should exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any 72 Convention." The European Court will then permit States obligation with respect to the matters that may be a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of require any state to enact legislation to provide for social the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn security. However, when such legislation is adopted in 73 by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such 89 legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant. C. Equality under International Law Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or The principle of equality has long been recognized under indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free International law recognizes that discrimination may occur 90 and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee took into account with equality before the law and equal protection of the law the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the in declaring that: 74 protection of human rights. . . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include or preference which is based on any ground such some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about 75 as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other equality. The general international provisions pertinent to opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on 76 status, and which has thepurpose or effect of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial

to both ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

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exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights 91 and freedoms. (emphasis supplied) Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection 92 afforded to labor, compel this approach.

i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; xxx xxx xxx

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International 93 School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of 94 beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the the Constitution. The deference stops where the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices accorded special protection by the on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress persons to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must that protect and enhance the right of all people to human discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional dignity, reduce social, economic, and political guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and not suffice. in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny International law, which springs from general principles finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and 95 general principles of fairness and justice, based on the have been used to support many of our decisions. We should test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention come to our own decisions through the employment of our own on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and 96 Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must the general principle against discrimination, the very be construed in accordance with the intention of our own antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle of each law and the context of other local legislation related as part of its national laws. thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our In the workplace, where the relations between capital laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is 97 and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality distinct and different from others. and discrimination by the employer are all the more In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this reprehensible. Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, The Constitution specifically provides that labor is much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application entitled to "humane conditions of work." These for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign manner by which employers treat their employees. jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they The Constitution also directs the State to promote have been dictated by different constitutional settings and 98 "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure 99 have long since diverged. equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for obligation to promote and ensure equal employment the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and intervention. discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims xxx xxx xxx "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides: phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards 100 particular: achieving a reasonable measure of equality. a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)

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Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, 101 including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less 102 privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this 103 pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and 104 objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. V. A Final Word Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.

between the several departments" of the 107 government. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for 108 all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutionaldesideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential 105 To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater treatment. concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a against persons favored by the Constitution with special collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a and watered down view would call for the abdication of this labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rankConstitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or represent the politically powerless and they should not be the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years 106 the actor. for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have discrimination. been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional. Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence,We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers

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G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997 PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents. REGALADO, J.:

correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT & T.

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT & T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of November Labor Code. 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, the denial resolution of the latter. specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one 1 C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever 1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her should be regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women 2 went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory terminated. and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more and retention. asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that 3 is, on May 26, 1991. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for 4 employment. In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not 5 deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 6 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount 7 in favor of petitioner . All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel. On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the 8 primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and 9 men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article 10 XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential. 2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 11 Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training 13 opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 which bans the "mailorder-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of 14 women workers; Republic Act No. 7192 also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; 15 Republic Act No. 7322 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 16 7877 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training environment; and 17 Republic Act No. 8042, or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of
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policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the 18 Family Code, women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded. In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. 3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, 19 and recall of employees. As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be 20 provided by law. In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer's 25 caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or 26 unjustified. In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around. Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy. This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.

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That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to 21 you." Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not 22 applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.") Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her 23 corporation. walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her her status from PT & T could not be properly characterized as dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable was done in order to prevent her from earning security of 27 company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very tenure. On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and

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business of PT & T. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or 29 trade of the employer. As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other 30 benefits or their monetary equivalent. However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension. 4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT & T. The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as follows: Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to 31 Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, better known as the "Women and Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of 32 Republic Act No. 679, entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands. It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the 33 rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Thus: Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen profession. We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same

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provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974. It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants. It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides: Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . . . Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976. In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of nonmarriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events. Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of nondiscrimination on the employment of women. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et 34 al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal

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employment opportunities to women simply on account of their G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO Decree No. 148 and the Constitution. SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the marital status of Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: the employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent 35 Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing among other things, sex. certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all being unconstitutional. women but just against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is 36 unlawful. Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was 37 not related to the job performance of the flight attendants. 5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the 38 individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, 39 good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common 40 good. It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest 41 or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the 42 family as the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required. ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions: Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. .... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4. Sec. 4. ... Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:

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provided that a judgment of conviction for any of earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent evidence of such fact and COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. the filing of charges for the commission of such No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed crimes before a civil court or military tribunal before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional after preliminary investigation shall be prima body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical fascie evidence of such fact. issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual ... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary Emphasis supplied). jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads: (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52) "Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The following power and functions: election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. 1) xxx XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.) the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied) Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide Art. XII-C, which provides: candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. Commission may be brought to the Supreme COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within squarely raised, thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have B. Proper party. challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution. The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial I . The procedural Aspect interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from Vera, supra). basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure. It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in People For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus: existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the ... it is well settled that the validity of a statute plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and may be contested only by one who will sustain a (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied disbursement of public funds, upon the theory with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of that "the expenditure of public funds, by an constitutionality early enough in their pleadings. officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. criteria. A. Actual case and controversy. It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted In the same vein, it has been held: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in

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preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. C. Unavoidability of constitutional question. Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented." We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed. II. The substantive viewpoint. We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.

at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is case. discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, local positions based on the challenged provision have already the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides: intentional or purposeful discrimination. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ... The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.

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Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

G.R. No. L-23794

February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendantsappellees. Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Taada for plaintiff-appellant. Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees. BENGZON, J.P., J.: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City 1 passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America 2 and other foreign countries."

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50. disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon 3 Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax determination. which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself. sale and export of sugar. WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local reads: Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered existing laws which are hereby declared as city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other disqualification for any of the elective officials forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff has received payment of the retirement benefits Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing commencement of the term of office to which he ordinance mentioned earlier. seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to for the same elective local office from which he the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar has retired. milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc 2) That portion of the second paragraph of City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 export sale to the United States of America and other foreign providing that "... the filing of charges for the countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of commission of such crimes before a civil court or centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For military tribunal after preliminary investigation production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is applies is when the sugar produced is exported. hereby declared null and void, for being violative Appellant questions the authority of the defendant of the constitutional presumption of innocence Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section guaranteed to an accused. 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section SO ORDERED. 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."

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Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. 4 Municipality of Roxas held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results. The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 5 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982 RUFINO V. NUEZ petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FERNANDO, C.J.: In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be 1 determined by law." It came into existence with the issuance in 2 1978 of a Presidential Decree. Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft statute was 3 passed, to be supplemented five years later by another 4 5 act, the validity of which was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc, a 1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court: "Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times 6 demanded such a remedial device." It should occasion no surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the continuity need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision.

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in 7 several cases. The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on 8 constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later. 9 respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for 10 reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due 11 12 13 Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the 14 refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector Constitution. 6 of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared to cope more effectively with dishonesty and abuse of trust in the otherwise. public service whether committed by government officials or not, with the essential cooperation of the private citizens with whom WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby they deal, cannot of itself justify any departure from or disregard reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional of constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of 15 P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So petitioner in his pleadings butressed by scholarly and diligent ordered. research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues raised by the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor 16 General, is of the view that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No, 1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been demonstrated. The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged. 1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative 17 powers until martial law shall have been lifted. " Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. 18 Commission on Elections decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the

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period of Martial Law, ... . As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President 20 during the period of Martial Law. "

19

2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land 21 Tenure Administration: "The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity which is of the very essence of the Idea of 22 law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist .To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no 23 support in reason. " Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the 5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first 24 rest." authoritative exposition of what is prohibited by the ex post facto 34 clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, decided in 1903. Thus: 3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is "An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which set forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. makes an action done before the passing of the law and which The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right became (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal rules of appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to 35 entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts convict the defendant. " There is relevance to the next and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and paragraph of the opinion of Justice Cooper: "The case clearly 25 thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing, does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his 26 this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make benefit of the appeal, and is intended real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully 27 equally to each member of the class. To repeat, the discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the claim. A 36 Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a person can have no vested right in such a possibility. special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, 6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may decision of the United States Supreme Court. Even the very thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far language as to what falls with the category of this provision is back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came well-nigh Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I consider ex into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or 28 ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno a 1949 decision, makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th Every must "give way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the 29 or utilities." The scope of such a principle is not to be commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. All constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and 38 situation. oppressive." The opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The expressions 4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is 'ex post facto laws,' are technical, they had been in use long contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution is before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated 30 appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." A more and judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries,

searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas 31 Kami decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a 32 proclamation of amnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. 33 Vilo a 1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine Justices then composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.

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considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true 39 principle of government. " 7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. As it was decided by the American Supreme Court in April of 1898 - the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired - it is understandable why he did so. Certainly, the exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an author, has a cutting edge, but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional the challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan made this realistic appraisal: "The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of 41 the commission of the offense charged against him." An 1894 decision of the American Supreme Court, Duncan v. 42 Missouri was also cited by petitioner, The opinion of the then Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically stated that "the prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing laws surrounds the person accused of 43 crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition." 8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-citedThompson v. Utah decision taking "from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the threejudge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall 44 be necessary for rendering judgment. " Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of 45 innocence has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight 46 to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo. Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, as synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test
40

should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is 47 required then is moral certainty." This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this fundamental and 48 basic right to De presumed innocent has been disregarded. It does seem farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss "vital protection" of liberty. 9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. 49 Massachusetts. Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the 50 balance true." What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. 51 Pecson, this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable 52 opportunity for the preparation of defense." In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the 53 decision is one of competent jurisdiction." The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. 54 United States decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: "This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process 55 of law." 10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. The decision does not go as far as passing on any question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional presumption of innocence. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

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G.R. No. L-23794

February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendantsappellees. Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Taada for plaintiff-appellant. Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees. BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. 4 Municipality of Roxas held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.

The point remains to be determined, however, whether On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the 1 passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar infringed. Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America 2 The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall and other foreign countries." any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 5 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by protection clause applies only to persons or things identically Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50. subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the classification applies not only to present conditions but also 3 the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative belong to the same class. of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently sale and export of sugar. established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector 6 of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional ordinance mentioned earlier. and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to ordered the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."

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G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its 2 presumed validity. NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate 3 Appellate Court,* which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to The said executive order reads in full as follows: the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former 4 President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of While also involving the same executive order, the case carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question complying with the requirements of Executive raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age; measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered CRUZ, J.: WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation; enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest 6 tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the 7 constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue these lower courts. of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following: And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, amended such that henceforth, no carabao and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to 8 regardless of age, sex, physical condition or make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall Justice Laurel's purpose and no carabeef shall be transported trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the from one province to another. The carabao or path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality carabeef transported in violation of this of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should Executive Order as amended shall be subject to probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, 9 confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and so heal the be distributed to charitable institutions and other wound or excise the affliction. similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of farmers through dispersal as the Director of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court. carabaos. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of effect immediately. merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a hundred and eighty. threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment .) FERDINAND E. MARCOS required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were resident of the Philippines to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1The petitioner sued for his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.

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matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due and empty catchword. process. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of avoid controversies that might arise on their correct contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process human experience or there is a rational connection between the clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10 safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, because due process is not, like some provisions of the to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility public health and bawdy houses to protect the public must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12 The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause. under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement had not taken steps to protect and preserve them. each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao power. without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme The minimum requirements of due process are notice and Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An with because they are intended as a safeguard against official epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It and declared in part as follows: has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,

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a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old From what has been said, we think it is clear guaranty of elementary fair play. that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the It has already been remarked that there are occasions when interests of the public generally, as distinguished notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with from those of a particular class" and that the notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary human consumption, so long as these animals action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as 20 are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for ownership, to protect the community from the the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, loss of the services of such animals by their the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either the urgency of the need to correct it. by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or so doing the productive power of the community action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The may be measurably and dangerously affected. properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. 21 subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years accused. old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat equal certainty that it complies with the second Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One transported from one province to another." The object of the searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. questioned measure is missing Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in any more than moving them to another province will make it short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is legislative powers. made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the invalid exercise of the police power because the method purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, unconstitutional. significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

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being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners. Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without The Solicitor General for respondents. protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights. The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED. GANCAYCO, J.:

Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission." The records shows the following undisputed facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the 1 Commission. On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:

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WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance. SO ORDERED. Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and coequal bodies have no power to control each 3 other or interfere with each other's acts. To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily 4 on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, which 5 cites Pineda vs. Lantin and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. 6 Luna, where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-equal bodies. After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case, We rule in favor of the petitioner. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of 7 the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court.
2

What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of 8 the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. 9 Sayo, this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit: In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion: The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review of all 10 administrative acts of all administrative officers. Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held: ... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . . Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as 12 amended). (Emphasis supplied.) In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered. In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional
13 11

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Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides: SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The contention is devoid of merit.

We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the 17 trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud 18 vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus: The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the 19 Monetary Board's resolutions.

In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasijudicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to pronouncement: exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order 14 IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution which applies to a specific situation . This does not cover rules or orders of the Monetary Board. No law and regulations of general applicability issued by the prescribes any mode of appeal from the administrative body to implement its purely administrative 20 Monetary Board to the IAC. policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court integrity of licensure examinations. has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the 16 enforcement of election laws."
15

Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.

Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the saidcase, We said: 21 aforementioned or similar institutions . ... We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are 22 authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

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Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court: The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their 23 highest enjoyment. Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission 24 Committee, Loyola School of Theology, regarding academic freedom to wit: ... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees. Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners. The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees. GANCAYCO, J.: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below: ORDINANCE--640 ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONEHALF OF THE SAID TICKET xxx xxx xxx Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that: SECTION 1It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets. SECTION 2Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court. If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation. SECTION 3This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval. Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared 1 unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.

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Upon motion of the petitioners, a temporary restraining order or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a quo enjoining the offense. respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing 3 Ordinance No. 640. On July 29, 1969, respondents filed their We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to 4 answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of 5 facts. On June 4, 1973, the respondent court rendered its Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be 6 decision, the dispositive part of which reads: resolved is this: does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of Court hereby adjudges in favor of the power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the respondents and against the petitioners, as City? follows: This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of 1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of direct interference by the local government with the operation of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the however, that the fine for a single offense shall prices of admission to these places. Previous decisions of this not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as Court involved the power to impose license fees upon prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required Rep. Act No. 523; moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to 2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this be invalid for these impositions were considered as not merely Court; and; license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation 10 which the cities have no power to exact, unless expressly 3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against granted by its charter. 11 the petitioners. Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to 8 Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the decision regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal of the court a quo which was denied in a resolution of the said Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations 9 court dated November 10, 1973. as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised. 4. SO ORDERED. 7 Hence, this petition. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states: While in a New York case, an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission.
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Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition following legislative powers: are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise 14 of delegated police power by the local government. Thus, xxx xxx xxx 15 in People v. Chan, an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond (n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical valid exercise of police power. Still in another case, 16 the validity performances, cinematographs, public of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of exhibitions and all other performances and two or more persons in moviehouses and other amusement places of amusements ... places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing xxx xxx xxx fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the general Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify welfare. the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to provides: enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as (nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the necessary and proper for the sanitation and enactment of said ordinance. safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear comfort, convenience, and general welfare of that the interest of the public generally requires an interference the city and its inhabitants, and such others as with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably may be necessary to carry into effect and necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly discharge the powers and duties conferred by oppressive upon individuals. 17 The legislature may not, under this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the

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determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 18 courts. 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly with the film owners for just admission prices for general oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion admission, balcony and lodge. of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal 19 Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect Board of the City of Manila, this Court held: the youth from the pernicious practice of movie operators and The authority of municipal corporations to other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal regulate is essentially police power, Inasmuch price for their admission tickets along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the as the same generally entails a curtailment of interest of the City in the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, the liberty, the rights and/or the property of good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of persons, which are protected and even its inhabitants. guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both by the regard, the respect and the obedience children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, legitimate businesses. The object of every business particularly those forming part of the Constitution entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both the police power measure must be children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to reasonable. In other words, individual rights may purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the be adversely affected by the exercise of police purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances. power to the extent only and only to the extent--that may be fairly required by the Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is legitimate demands of public interest or public reasonable and necessary to lessen the economic burden of welfare. parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners. Respondent What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640? further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the Board when the ordinance in question was passed shows that a adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as into account the complaints of parents that for them to pay the adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission full price of admission for their children is too financially ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent burdensome. that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities consider the ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre in all probability the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but that considering children? Perhaps, there is some ,truth to the argument of that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend 19 admission prices with respect to them ought to be reduced. a to their studies in school or be in their homes. We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such 20 interests. The methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative 21 department. We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and 22 means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy. There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar. A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves 23 properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.

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The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom 24 he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of 25 property. In Collister vs. Hayman,
26

it was held:

been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural 31 traits are considerable. People of all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie 32 industry. Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to safeguard public health and safety. Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the 33 exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens 34 of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any 36 person who did not approve could stay away.

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This maybe the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of 37 In Tyson and Bro. United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The 27 exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless Banton, the United States Supreme Court held: it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is ... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its activities are not unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation 38 of a common right. such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property The interest of the public in theaters and other places of rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, entertainment may be more nearly, and with better reason, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, residence purposes; although in importance it fails below it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we have as valid. shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing, or the rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect of amusements and entertainment ... WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.

The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest, was without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out, the proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it.

We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and SO ORDERED. conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction, legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities 28 and drugs during periods of emergency, limiting the net profits 29 of public utility as well as regulating rentals of residential 30 apartments for a limited period, as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could these businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have

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statement, we now conclude, discloses the Courts own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual JOHN GEDDES LAWRENCE and TYRON GARNER, conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it PETITIONERS v. TEXAS would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching June 26, 2003 consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition criminals. the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions. of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in I.The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons certain intimate sexual conduct. the right to make this choice.... SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The right of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace. The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the Bowers decision placed such reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character....It was not until the 1970s that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States have done so.....In summary, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice The complaints described their crime as deviate sexual Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex and, at the very least, are overstated. (man). The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann.21.06(a) (2003). It provides: A person commits an offense It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another was making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. individual of the same sex..... The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether of nolo contendere, were each fined $200.... the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. We granted certiorari to consider three questions: Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. 1. Whether Petitioners criminal convictions under the Texas Homosexual Conduct lawwhich criminalizes sexual intimacy Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion for the Court in Bowers by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex and further explained his views as follows: Decisions of couplesviolate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to protection of laws? state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao2. Whether Petitioners criminal convictions for adult consensual Christian moral and ethical standards. As with Justice Whites sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty assumptions about history, scholarship casts some doubt on the and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the sweeping nature of the statement by Chief Justice Burger as it Fourteenth Amendment? pertains to private homosexual conduct between consenting adults.In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the 3. Whether Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), should past half century are of most relevance here. These references be overruled? show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their II.We conclude the case should be resolved by determining private lives in matters pertaining to sex.... whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical Constitution. For this inquiry we deem it necessary to reconsider standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an the Courts holding in Bowers.... opposite direction. A committee advising the British Parliament recommended in 1957 repeal of laws punishing homosexual The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: conduct. Parliament enacted the substance of those The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers recommendations 10 years later. Of even more importance, a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and almost five years before Bowers was decided the European hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. That Bowers and to todays case. An adult male resident in Northern

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Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.

persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom..... Justice OConnor, concurring in the judgment.

The Court today overrules Bowers v. Hardwick. I joined Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it. Nevertheless, I agree with the Court that Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy is unconstitutional. Rather than relying on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I base my conclusion on the In our own constitutional system the deficiencies in Bowers Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause.... became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to Thomas join, dissenting. 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, [I]t does not surprise me, and should surprise no one, that the whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in set forth in Casey. It has thereby exposed Caseys extraordinary private.... deference to precedent for the result-oriented expedient that it is. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed the substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, we stated as follows: These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. II.Having decided that it need not adhere to stare decisis, the Court still must establish that Bowers was wrongly decided and that the Texas statute, as applied to petitioners, is unconstitutional.... Bowers conclusion that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition is utterly unassailable. Realizing that fact, the Court instead says: [W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. Apart from the fact that such an emerging awareness does not establish a fundamental right, the statement is factually false.....

The Courts discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for course, the many countries that have retained criminal these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in prohibitions on sodomy) is meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since this Court should not impose foreign moods, Bowers would deny them this right.... fads, or fashions on Americans. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as IV.I turn now to the ground on which the Court squarely rests its precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons..... holding: the contention that there is no rational basis for the law here under attack. This proposition is so out of accord with our The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful jurisprudenceindeed, with the jurisprudence of any society we analysis...Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is knowthat it requires little discussion. not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled. The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve unacceptablethe same interest furthered by criminal laws persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does obscenity. Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest. not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve The Court today reaches the opposite conclusion. If, as the whether the government must give formal recognition to any Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from laws can survive rational-basis review.... each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or V.Todays opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the socrime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating of the government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not homosexual conduct.... enter. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of One of the most revealing statements in todays opinion is the Courts grim warning that the criminalization of homosexual the individual.... conduct is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. It is Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the have been more specific. They did not presume to have this democratic rules of engagement are observed. Many Americans insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct generations can see that laws once thought necessary and as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, as teachers in their childrens schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families

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from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it as discrimination which it is the function of our judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court with the law professions anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously mainstream; that in most States what the Court calls discrimination against those who engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal; that proposals to ban such discrimination under Title VII have repeatedly been rejected by Congress. Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means. Social perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the best....But persuading ones fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing ones views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I would no more require a State to criminalize homosexual actsor, for that matter, display any moral disapprobation of themthan I would forbid it to do so..... One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual actsand may legislate accordingly. The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action, so that that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada. At the end of its opinionafter having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudencethe Court says that the present case does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Courts opinion, which notes the constitutional protections afforded to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education, and then declares that [p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. Todays opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is no legitimate state interest for purposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), [w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising [t]he liberty protected by the Constitution? This case does not involve the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so...

G.R. No. L-45987

May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAYAT, defendant-appellant. Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee. MORAN, J.: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him: That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read: SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the socalled native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a nonChristian tribe. SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state. Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the

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Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the nonChristian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.

in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the nonChristian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at from during the American period. President McKinley in his the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said: long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the nonIn dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the Commission should adopt the same course followed by contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go Indians to maintain their tribal organization and measures of protection and security. government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its conform. Such tribal government should, however, be operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of undue or petty interference, constant and active effort its application. should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs. Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Since then and up to the present, the government has been government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the nonpracticable means of bringing about their advancement in Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of officials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubivs. Provincial Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) been brought in contact with civilized communities through a that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general network of highways and communications; the benefits of public powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that education have to them been extended; and more lately, even it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the the Act must be understood and applied. government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated It is an established principle of constitutional law that the (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442). reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been members of the same class. (Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133 N.W., aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera good order of the people or to increase the industries of the and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.) state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," be upheld. as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing

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The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989). Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000] AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE, LETICIA T. ENDOMA, ARISTIDES A. RAMOS, PANCHO M. RIVERA, TERESITA A. DE CASTRO, CANDIDA C. HABANA, AZUCENA C. FALCON, MARIA LUZ P. CAEDO, YOLANDA V. RIO, RUBEN S. ANIEVAS, LELISA L. SANCHEZ, VILLARDO A. TRINIDAD, ENRIQUE CH. ZUNIGA, ROMEO A. GONZALES, CASIANO G. ATUEL, JR., GEMMA L. BANARES, PERFECTO T. CAMPOS, ARNULFO A. AGUILAR, RUDOLPH R. MELON, MAGDALENA M. LAO, MARINA GERONA, FLORIANA O. DE GUIA, EMETERIO B. BRUCAL, NILDA C. CONCHA, YOLANDA P. FERMA, TEOTISTA C. ANGKIKO, FRANCISCO V. TRIAS, JENELYN E. ESTERNON, MILAGROS M. ABELLAR, ALICIA T. MOJICA, ELVIRA E. BAYBAY, PRICILLA P. GOLFO, ELISEA M. HIERCO, TERESITA L. DIMACUHA, MYRNA GUILLERMO, GRACIANO R. SAMELA, JR., NIMFA M. LAGASCA, JOSEFINA P. JARENO, NORMA V. ORDENES, FRANCISCO T. SERVANDO, VIOLETA M. ANONUEVO, ALFREDO O. BAYANI, MARIO J. RAMOS, EME FEROLINO, LEONIDES P. COMIA, MILAGROS E. GENEBLAZO, LORNA L. MENORCA, REYNALDO DE LA CRUZ, ROMULO A. FAZ, LIMUEL G. GADO, REY G. FABELLA, DOMINGUITO G. TACASA, IMELDA R.B. ROTONI, TITA FOJA, NOEMI F. CASTRO, LILIA B. CAWALING, ROBERT A. REYES, CONCEPCION H. PARRENO, SERAFIN L. OLMEDO, ADOLFO L. ALLAN, PROSPERO D. CASTRO, ROSELLER C. GAPULAO, GLICERIO B. LAURENTE, BERNICE E. BERNABE, ADINA L. FERNANDEZ, ANITA M. PAALAN, ROSA P. PINOON, INOCENCIA P. DANGUE, JULITA E. MENDOZA, ELENA O. RAMOS, GENE BE BARTE, FLORENCIA Z. MAGANITO, PABLO A. ARGA,

PEDRO S. LUNA, CARMELITA P. LAUREL, VICTORINO I. MARASIGAN, ROMEO M. MENDOZA, JUAN C. MALABANAN, MANUEL B. ABRELI, JOSEPH T. MACAHIYA, LEONOR P. ARADA, JULIA G. PEREZ, MODESTO M. VILLADELREY, ARNULFO Y. FAJILAN, MARLON P. HERRERA, JAIME A. BISCOCHO, MICHAEL D. CASTILLO, MILAGROS H. BAYLOSIS, ARSENIO T. GUSTE, ALFREDO V. ORAYANI, DANTE A. PENAMANTE, ROMEO A. DE CHAVEZ, MANUEL M. ILAGAN, ALFREDO O. MANZA, JR., DOMINGO B. GUNIO, FIDEL V. PALERACIO, VICENTE V. DEL MORO, JUSTINO R. DEQUILLA, ERNESTO A. RUZOL, ROMEO D. DELGADO, ERLINDA P. MAGSINO, VERONICA R. CAMBRONERO, NORMA A. DEQUINA, WELLIE R. RAVINA, CORAZON T. LOPEZ, REMEDIOS R. QUIZON, LORETA E. VERGARA, MELECIA M. ASTRERA, VICENTA R. SAMANTE, HELEN M. CUENTO-BUENDICHO, ANICIA V. MORALES, RISALINA C. GONZALES, ROSARIO CHARITO R. PABELLON, LOLITA L. MALADAGA, MAXIMO A. GLINDO, WILFREDO A. RODELAS, CELSO O. ROGO, RAMON C. VALENCIA, FELIPE R. FRANDO, ADEN B. DUNGO, OFELIA N. QUIBEN, LIGAYA S. VALENZUELA, EUNICE S. FAMILARIN, MARCELA DE LEON, ADELA M. JAMILLA, RENY ABLES, ADELA E. FABERES, ALICIA P. BALDOMAR, EDNA C. GARCIA, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, ELOISA P. TORRENO, CHARITO M. LACAMENTO, CLARENCIA M. AQUINO, HILDA DIMALANTA, ELSIE SIBAL, PURIFICACION TANGONAN, AMELITA FERNANDEZ, TEDDY C. MARIANO, LORETO SANGGALANG, GERARDO GONZALES, FEDERICO ONATE, JR., ARTURO BALIGNASAY, FELIX M. CABARIOS, JR., NORBERTO PUNZALAN, JAIME G. ALCANTARA, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA, ESTANISLAO SANCHEZ, ADORACION L. PINEDA, LUCILA S. DUNGCA, ADELAIDA B. LAOIJINDANUM, ROLANDO A. BALUYUT, FRANCISCO M. DAVID, LEONELLE S. MENDOZA, MA. LUZ A. BASILIO, NESTOR J. TIMBANG, HILDA P. DIZON, EMMANUEL E. IGNACIO, RAMON S. ABELLA, JOSELITO MATIAS, HEZEQUIAS B. GALANG, ERLINDA C. ZAPATA, IMELDA R. MANALASTAS, PEDRO L. PALO, AURECIO C. TRASPE, JOSEPHINE GALANG, FLORINDA R. MADULID, MAGDALENA W. SADI, NYDIA V.A. BOLISAY, PRESENTACION A. PALOM, ANTONIO B. ANCHETA, MACARIO L. SADI, PACIFICO E. GISAPON, FELICIANO C. CRUZ, IMELDA A. QUIMEL, LINDA D. SANDOVAL, MARILOU R. ORTIZ, NORMA F. SANTOS, MAGPAYO V. ABESAMIS, BONIFACIO B. VILLAFLOR, DANIEL O. TABIOS, CONSTANTE T. CATRIZ, JESUS E. ALICANTE, FEDERICO SACLAYAN, JR., NOLY G. UMINGA, FE FRAELI L. DE GUZMAN, RODRIGO S. WYCOCO, JOVEN HERMOGENES, RODOLFO D. BANAWA, ABELARDO O. CAPANZANA, ERNESTO Q. TIONGSON, ROSANNA CRUZ, OSCAR C. ONGOCO, CONSUELO A. KABIGTING, JULITA V. PASTELERO, ARSENIA V. BONDOC, ISIDRO A. TOMAS, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, CONSOLACION N. LABOG, ELENITA A. RIVERA, SOCORRO NOCES, RODOLFO GALLARDO, CARMENCITA M. ONGEO, CAMILO L. SEDURIFA, ARLEEN VIC B. OCHANDRA, EDGARDO E. APOSTOL, CLOTILDE C. CANETE, ALEJANDRO B. DEL AGUA, PILAR R. BUENO, TEODOICO C. MAGALLANES, PETRONIO N. PIANGCO, JR., JOSE M. FLORENDO, BIBIANO A. CAGNAN, ALICIA A. TUBI, RODOLFO C. NATAN, JAIME B. MENDONEZ, EDILBERTO EDANG, ROSENDA T. JENOVEVA, VEDASTO B. ELIZAN, JR., MILAGROS P. DE LUNA, ATILANO L. ISAAC, CORAZON L. J. PEPITO, LUCILA S. PINEDA, ROCHE B. CERRO, JOCELYN KL. LIBUT, REMBERTO L. GUTIERREZ, NAZARIO A. TRASMONTE, REYNALDO O. MACARAT, FLORENCIA M. MALIBAGO, IMELDA G. TUYAY, JUAN A. GIBA, JR., JOSE M. CAPACITE, ARCITA M. GARCIA, ANGEL G. DACUNO, RITA M. BEDIANG, RENATO L. CANDIDO, NESTORIO B. BOCO, JONATHAN C. AMBIDA, MONICA MACABARE, BENITO A. MONTALLANA, CLOTILDE

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C. APURA-VALDEMORO, CIRIACO J. ARCENO, PABLO L. FORMARAN, JR., PROSPERO S. OLMEDO, IGNACIO V. CASCANO, SERAFIN L. CLUTARIO, ARTURO L. DIN, JUCHITA C. SY, RODOLFO L. ASUERO, PIO T. PORTES, MARILOU F. TAMAYO, MILAGROS P. LAMBINO, ESTANISLAO A. ESPINA, RENERIO D. ENGO, FERNANDO A. MOSCARE, CONCHITA A. PICARDAL, ELIAS T. TURLA, BONIFACIO T. LIM, JOSEFINA A. AGUILAR, ANTONIO O. TEPACE, GAVINO S. ASOTES, RENE P. MAGBUTAY, NICOLAS C. UY, JR., JESUS B. LAVA, SENORA C. CALAGOS, RAFAEL A. PAYOD, MACARIO L. CIEGO, SALVADOR T. CRUZ, VIRGINIA V. BESAS, RAUL S. FIGUERDA, EDGAR R. DELOS REYES, TERESO R. ROSEL, JOSE J. MABANGUE, PRIMO D. PALOMO, JOHN C. YANGZON, ROMULO D. JABON, FIDENCIO Z. LA TORRE, JR., LETICIA R. MACARIOLA, CARLOS P. VARELA, JR., ANTONIO L. PEDRAZA, SALVACION A. LAMBAN, LINO L. JAPSON, EUNIA H. VACAL, ANTONIO F. VALDEZ, NATIVIDAD E. PRADO, LORENZO C. MERKA, GAUDIOSO A. RUEGO, ETERIO Z. ABOCEJO, DEMETRIA O. COROLLO, MARIA S. OBEN, ARTHUR V. LEYSON, PEDRO L. AVILA, DOMINADOR S. RODILLA, MARCIAL MAGPATOC, FEDERICO D. BARCELON, EVANGELINE DELA ROSA, ELENO GIL, ARSENIA GARCIA, HUMILDA ALICUM, DIOSDADO CAS, ABRAHAM MASAOY, SAMUEL ORALLO, AMELIA OLORES, CANDIDO URBANO, LOURDES FRIAS, ROEL SORIANO, EMELDA AGUSTIN, PAQUITO SORIANO, GERMAN BALOLONG, BENJAMIN C. ROSARIO, EFREN BUYA, LEONIDA LEGASPI, TOMAS ABELLA, JR., JOVENCIA CANTO, JUAN DACONO, MIGUEL BAUTISTA, LORNA PASCUAL, FERDINAND BRAGANZA, PRISCILLA PEREZ, ALMA LUZ SORIANO, JUAN VALENCIA, JR., JULIAN APOSTOL, ROSARIO GUICO, BONITA VIDAL, GUIA GARCIA, LEOCADIO GINEZ, CATALINA BANEZ, VERONICA TABILIN, ELVIRA CALSADO, ALIPIO LOPEZ, JOSEPHINE MALANA, PIO ANONUEVO, ELMA DEL ROSARIO, RUFINO FLORES, ANTONIO ORDONEZ, CARMEN CLAVERIA, ESTRELLA RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996". RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district." By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated [1] [2] Resolution Nos. 97-0002 and 97-0610 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC [3] issued several directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that: I.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION; II.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS; III.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; IV.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELECS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES; V.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF; and VI.SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE. Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional. The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack. The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all [4] members of the same class. After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.

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The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In Lutz vs. Araneta, it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC. Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due [6] process of law. As held inSta. Maria vs. Lopez. "xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. xxx" (italics supplied) The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the lawmaking authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress. The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.
[5]

Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable. The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are: 1. To prevent legislation; hodge-podge or log-rolling

2. To prevent surprise or fraud legislature by means of provisions which the titles gave no information, might therefore be overlooked and and unintentionally adopted; and

upon the in bills of and which carelessly

3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by [7] petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and [8] title. Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details [9] therein. In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its [10] validity. As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to coequal departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to [11] stay the judicial hand. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003] RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents.

conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference [5] Committee submitted its Report, signed by its members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.

During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However, [G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003] upon viva vocevoting, the majority of the House approved the CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for [6] COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. proper action. In view of the proposed amendment, the House of [7] Representatives elected anew its conferees to the Bicameral [8] CALLEJO, SR., J.: Conference Committee. Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another [9] [10] Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the set of conferees to the Bicameral Conference Committee. Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the House Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. provides: Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the DECISION SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives. Bicameral Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the approval of the report until the other [11] members were given a copy thereof. After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee [12] Report and asked if this procedure was regular.

The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC. provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000. Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006 Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively: Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742, and finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.

House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMNIBUS ELECTION The Petitioners Case [1] CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND requiring every law to have only one subject which should be CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION expressed in its title. [2] PRACTICES. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight [3] members of the Senate and sixteen (16) members of the No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the [4] House of Representatives, was formed to reconcile the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the

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other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law. The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is so broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials. They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the unfairness of considering an elective official ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vicepresidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make of their certificates of candidacy. the title of the act a complete index of its contents. It must be The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into reasonably to include the general subject which the statute law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared seeks to effect without expressing each and every means null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be which require publication of the law before it becomes effective. set forth. Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court [13] in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the [14] Accountability of Public Officers: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy. According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Further, Section 16, or the Effectivity clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The Respondents Arguments For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that irregularities attended the

Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.

The Courts Ruling

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Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now first rule on the procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e., resolve the substantial issues raised by the petitions. whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar. The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider as members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing and registered voters. clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides: Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic [15] its enforcement. The rationale for requiring a party who Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed [16] of difficult constitutional questions. or modified or amended accordingly. However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of overarching significance to our [17] society, had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, [18] in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes). The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of Representatives which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim [19] Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos. Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. [20] Secretary of Finance. The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads: SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides: SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
[32]

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were title.[33] likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of acts, To determine whether there has been compliance with the decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be [21] Gaming Corporation, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that [22] [23] Jr., Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, Albano [24] [25] v. Reyes, and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization. Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a [26] Court had declared inDimaporo as deriving its existence from reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each one of overarching significance that justifies this Courts and every end and means necessary or convenient for the adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven [34] forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance of the Court is quite apropos: the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. Section 2 of the law ... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional provides not only the declaration of principles but also the question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the objectives thereof: instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the Sec. 2. the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal [27] opportunity for public service, including access to media time reinforce our stand. and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly, [28] Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that honest, peaceful and credible elections. the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to [29] The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public effectuate the specific purpose of the law. office shall be free from any form of harassment and It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as discrimination.[35] guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of [30] transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its the Constitution, it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of [31] nullify the same. the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
[36]

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The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying [37] out the general subject. The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly instructive: SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify. So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? Thats all. Because I believe ... THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term fair election practice, it really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, Im very comfortable with the title Fair Election Practice so that we can get over with these things so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean, its one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies. THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Yes. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a very touchy issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what youre ...? THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im happy that there is already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all comfortable with it. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Yes. Anyway, Marcos. REP. MARCOS: Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices. But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one. Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly lets listen to Congressman

adequate in that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a rider. SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE: I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election practices because ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this. Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special provision on elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ... REP. MARCOS: I think we just change the Section 1, the short title. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ... REP. MARCOS: What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal... REP. PADILLA: Mr. Chairman, why dont we use An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Why dont we remove fair and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act? REP. PICHAY: Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun. REP. MARCOS: The Fair Election. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): O, Fair Election Act. REP. MACARAMBON: Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election practices? REP. PICHAY:

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Fair election practices? REP. MACARAMBON: Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala nang practices nga. REP. PICHAY: Wala nang practices. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): It shall be cited as Fair Election Act. (Informal discussions) REP. PICHAY: Approve na iyan. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be Fair Election Act. The rest wala nang problema ano? VOICES: Wala na. REP. MACARAMBON: Wala na iyong practices? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh. O, wala na? We will clean up. REP. MARCOS: Title? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): The short title, This Act ... THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO): Youre back to your No. 21 already. REP. MARCOS: The full title, the same? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Iyon na nga. The full title is An Act to enhance the holding ... Thats the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short title This Act [38] shall be known as the Fair Election Act. The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the [39] political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial [40] cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section [41] 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the

paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved. Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the [42] legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not Violative of the Equal [43] Protection Clause of the Constitution The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated [44] differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between [45] those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only [46] upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of [47] tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing [48] authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral [49] activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

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Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of [50] the certificate of candidacy. The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are [51] conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the nd internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2 or rd 3 Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts [52] have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. [53] De Venecia, viz.:

The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In this Case Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus: a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House during its session on February 5, 2001; No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
nd rd

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

The new Report submitted by the 2 /3 BCC was presented for approval on the floor without copies thereof being furnished the members; But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into nd rd The 2 /3 BCC has no record of its allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of as well as its senator-members at the time it was private individuals. InOsmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any presented to and rammed for approval by the rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the House; pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that There was no meeting actually conducted by the Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their nd rd 2 /3 BCC and that its alleged Report was observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived instantly made and passed around for the or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the signature of the BCC members; action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The Senate has no record of the creation of a nd 2 BCC but only of the first one that convened on November 23, 2000; The Effectivity Clause Is Defective The Effectivity clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its submitted by the BCC that convened approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the onNovember 20, 2000, were couched in terms entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,[54] this Court laid down that comply with the publication required by the the rule: Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit: ... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006, upon approval, or on any other date without its previous with the provision that This Act shall take effect publication. immediately upon its approval; The copy of the compromise bill submitted by nd rd the 2 /3 BCC that was furnished the members during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made; Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be [55] shortened or extended. Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
[56]

...

h.

i.

j.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly The alleged BCC Report presented to the House entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do on February 7, 2001, did not contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative or amendments to the subject measure; and branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the The disappearance of the Cayetano court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional amendment, which is Section 12 of the [57] limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, transgression has been shown in this case. this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of Member WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. provision states, thusly:

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Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) Argued November 19, 1948 Decided December 20, 1948 335 U.S. 464 Syllabus Mich.Stat.Ann. (Cum.Supp. 1947) 18.990(1), which in effect forbids any female to act as a bartender unless she be "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor establishment, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994 ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents. Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner. KAPUNAN, J.:

Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. 1 2 After the informations for murder and attempted murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending (a) The classification which Michigan has made as between petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section wives and daughters of owners of liquor establishments and wives and daughters of nonowners is not without a reasonable 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides: basis. (b) Nor is the statute rendered unconstitutional because Michigan allows women to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed. A three-judge federal district court denied an injunction to restrain enforcement of Mich.Stat.Ann. (Cum.Supp. 1947) 18.990(1), in effect forbidding any female to act as a bartender unless she be "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor establishment. 74 F.Supp. 735. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 335 U. S. 467. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours). On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for 3 his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v. 4 5 Sandiganbayan, and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. In his order 6 dated December 14, 1993 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, 7 denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. We find the petition devoid of merit. There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused. Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads: Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus: Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be

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automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment. We disagree. First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate 8 9 cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal bycertiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or 10 secure his liberty by habeas corpus. Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated. Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:

Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the AntiGraft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus: 2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does

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not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 Preventive 11 the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. Suspension. The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection." REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses. SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. preventive suspension of the accused in Laynoand Deloso was . . . based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for xxx xxx xxx a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 Criminal Case." Okay ito but I think we should also mandate the which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same suspension of the accused from office until the case is section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from ating bansa e. arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na. trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, years bago their meaning determined from the language employed and the ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe 12 statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. we should mandate. . . Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote: So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is this all about? REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes. REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing. SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period. REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial. SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha? REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated in one year from courts. the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon. SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman. ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction. REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated." REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you put it in the law? SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular situation. SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days. REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the same thing. SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on having it quick, swift.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice. years and one day or more. SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman. Court, ganoon ba and . . .? THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft panay disciplinary iyon e. cases before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene? which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension. SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.

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SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of The case filed against a policeman may be anti-graft in real differences among men, the equal protection clause does nature. . . not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional both as 14 to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not provision? Is it? absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure. 15 substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the 16 law; applies to all members of the same 17 18 SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate. class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and particular provision is for criminal cases. I know anti-graft is a reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder, such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context capricious nor unfounded. that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious case since it is ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. six years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony. SO ORDERED. xxx xxx xxx REP. ALBANO. . . . What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the Veloso case. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case. What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . . SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . . THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please. SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . . ." whatever we agree. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that. So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the 13 National Police Commission. . . . . . The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and

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