CIVIL CODE PRELIMINARY TITLE (ARTICLES 1-18) ARTICLE 2 Tanada vs. Tuvera No.

L-63915 December 29, 1986 Ponente: Justice Cruz Facts: The petitioners sought the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees, which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The governments contention that the phrase otherwise provided means that a decree will become effective immediately after their approval. The trial court affirmed the decision of having the necessity for the publication of the said decrees. The petitioners now sought for the reconsideration or clarification of the said decision. The prayer constitutes of ordering the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all the unpublished Presidential decrees of general application and unless published they shall not be binding. Issue: Whether or not the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity of laws or to the requirement of publication. Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The omission of the said publication would run against the due process clause and would deny the public knowledge of the laws. The court held that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. The publication must be in full since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Petition granted. People vs. Que Po Lay No. 6791, March 29, 1954 Montemayor, J. FACTS: Que Po Lay is accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank requiring those who are in possession of foreign currency to sell the same to the Central Bank. Que Po Lay alleges that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette before he committed the act and therefore, it had no force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 20 has no force and effect HELD: Yes, the said Circular has no force and effect because it was not published. Article 2 of the new Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. While Central Bank Circular No. 20 is not of a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Rules and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. The public cannot be held liable for violations of laws or regulations unless they are informed of its contents and penalties for violation.

ARTICLE 3 Garcia v. Recio G. R. No. 138322 Oct. 2, 2001 Panganiban, J. FACTS Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen named Editha Samson in 1987. Two years later a decree of divorce was released by the Australian government. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a certain Grace Garcia in 1994 in Cabanatuan City with the former declaring that he was single and Filipino. Garcia filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that Recio had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her and only had knowledge of it in 1997. Recio countered wifes claim asserting that he disclosed the previous marriage to her in 1993. Moreover, he contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 making him legally capacitated to marry. ISSUE Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by Recio ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with Garcia. HELD The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Recio does not ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson on the account that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the rule that a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. The Court highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. ARTICLE 6 DM Consunji, Inc. Vs CA Facts: On May 9, 1991, private respondent Maria Juego filed in the Pasig Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the the death of her husband Jose juego. Jose was employed by petitioner as a construction worker. While working on November 2, 1990, Jose fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig. He died. Maria availed of the death benefits form the State Insurance Fund. Petitioner is claiming that she can no longer recover damages under the Civil Code because her prior availment of the benefits form the State Insurance Fund. The trial court and

CA decided in favour of maria. Issue: Whether Marias availment of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for damages from petition under the Civil Code? Held: No because maria was not only ignorant of the fact but of her rights as well. Marias election of the death benefits does not bar any action inconsistent with the elected remedy. For a waiver to become valid, there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no basis upon which waiver of its can rest. Waiver requires a knowledge of the right waived with an awareness of its consequences. Thus ignorance of material fact negates waiver. Cui vs. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205) Facts: Plaintiff Emeterio Cui, studying law, received scholarship grants for scholastic merit at Arellano University. During his last semester of his fourth year, he left the defendant university and enrolled at Abad Santos University, wherein he finished his law degree. After graduating, he applied for the bar examinations. To secure to take the bar examinations, he needed the transcript of records from the defendant university. Defendant refused to give him a transcript until he paid back the tuition that the university returned when he was granted scholarship. According to the contract signed by the plaintiff, scholarships are good only if the student should continue in the same school. This contract was followed from Memorandum No. 38 made by the Director of Private Schools. Issue: Whether or not the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash valid or not? Held: The contract between plaintiff and defendant is not binding since the memorandum made by the Director of Private Schools is not a law. The provisions are only advisory and not mandatory in nature. Furthermore, the said officer had not authority to issue such memorandum and that provisions were not published in the Official Gazette. ARTICLE 15-16 Minciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924 J. Romualdez Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Pilapil VS. Ibay-Somera G.R No. 80116 June 30, 1989 On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, marriage and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where they had a daughter. After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private respondent Geiling initiated divorce proceedings against petitioner in his native Germany. He claimed that there was failure of the marriage and they had been living apart since 1982.While petitioner filed an action for Legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court in Manila. On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that during the marriage Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua. After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However upon review of the respondent City fiscal a resolution was approved and the cases were raffled to two branches of the RTC of Manila. On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice that the cases be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ if the accused have already been arraigned and if not, to move to defer further proceedings and to elevate the entire record of the cases to his office for review. Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was suspended, while the date of arraignment of the other was merely reset. During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded not guilty while the petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner was then held in contempt and was detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. She later entered a plea of not guilty. On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the case. On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the private respondet can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner. Ruling: Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in view of the nationality principle on our civil law on the matter of the status of persons. Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case befor the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other.

Roehr vs. Rodriguez GR No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts Held: Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civel Procedure. Accoringly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody. HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTICLES 19-36) ARTICLE 19-22 TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story: Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that

the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party. During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002 FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection. ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages. HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the

discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present. Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals 219 scra 115 Article 21 of the Civil Code This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer has the right to dismiss an employee who was involved in anomalous transactions, the right of dismissal should not be exercised in an abusive manner, such as by making accusations of being a crook, forcing him to take a forced leave, threatening to file a hundred suits against him. Hence, the employer is liable for damages. Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. This article should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. University of the East vs Jader 327 scra 804 Article 19 of the Civil Code Petitioner was enrolled in the defendants College of Law. He failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiffs name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar examination because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latters negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost of suit. ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Pe et al vs Pe, 5 SCRA 200 Defendant is married separated and correlative of the plaintiff unmarried woman, 24 years of age. Defendant frequently visited the girls house on the pretext of teaching her how to pray the rosary. They fell in love and had clandestine trust until they disappeared. Held: No conclusion can be drawn from the fact that defendant, not only deliberately, but thru a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love to the woman to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong caused to her and her family is contrary to morals etc as contemplated in Art 21. ARTICLE 26

Tenchavez vs Escao 5 Phil 355 Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises Unfounded Suit In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA CITATION: 133 SCRA 179 FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. ARTICLE 36 Donato vs Luna 160 scra 441 Prejudicial Question Leonilo C. Donato was married to Rosalinda Malupig and without such marriage having been legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Paz Abayan. Facing bigamy charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force, intimidation and undue influence employed by Paz which forced him into marriage. A complaint of annulment of the second marriage was instituted on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. He is raising the issue of prejudicial question. ISSUE: Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the prosecution for bigamy. HELD: The court averred that the requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donatos guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. CIVIL PERSONALITY (ARTICLES 37-47) ARTICLE 37-41 Quimiguing vs. Icao

34 SCRA 132 Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, a student, and Felix Icao, married, were neighbors. They had carnal intercourse several times until Carmen became pregnant. Assisted by her parents, she filed a claim for support at P120/month plus damages. Icao filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the child is yet unborn. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint, Carmen amended it but the trial court disallowed it. Issue: Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmens complaint. Held: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS 2 SCRA 801 Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz in 1948 through her aunt. In 1950, Nita became pregnant by her then boyfriend now husband but she had a baby aborted. After getting pregnant, after their marriage, she again aborted the fetus because of work. Less than 2 years later, she became pregnant and aborted it again. It is this last abortion that is the basis of this action. Issue: Whether or not, the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same. Held: The lower court erred in awarding damages. The fetus is not endowed with personality as required by the law. Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntary aborted a child cannot recover damages from the abortionist since damages must be inflicted upon the parents so as to collect damages at all. Similarly, an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death. Pertains primarily to the injured. DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA

58 Phil 866 Facts: Out of amorous relations, a baby was begotten by Cesar Syquia with Antonia de Jesus. During the pregnancy, Cesar wrote a priest to name the baby after him for it was his. Syquia took them to a house where they lived in a regular family style, until Antonia had her second pregnancy and Syquia left and married another woman. Syquia disowning the child stopped giving support. Thus Antonia filed this case to Compel Syquia to acknowledge the child using the letters written by him as evidence. Issue: Whether or not letters are sufficient to prove acknowledgement of paternity. Held: Yes, the words of recognition junior, contained in the note refer to a baby then conceived was expected to be born in June. Although the child was given a name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr., his identity as the child who Syquia intended to acknowledge is clear. ARTICLE 43 LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTE Facts: Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, where the Public Service Commission held that the public interest an convenience will be prompted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half tons in the municipality of San Juan, that the original applicant Fragnante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased Fragnante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate said plant. Petitioners claim that the granting of certificate applied for the estate is a contravention of law. Issues:

Whether or not the estate of Fragnante can be considered as a person within the meaning of the Public Service Act? Whether or not citizenship of decedent extended to his estate? Held: The Supreme Court held that the estate of P.O.F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, includes the exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. The Supreme Court furthered that if by legal fiction the personality of P.O.F is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, there is no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction of his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. DUMLAO vs. FAMILY PLASTIC PRODUCTS Facts: On February 28, 1962, CFI of Pangasinan issued a judgment ordering defendants Soliven, Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity quality plastics products, Inc. the sum of P3667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November of 1958. Upon the defendants failure to pay said amount, lower Court ordered upon motion of Quality Plastics Products, Inc. the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction the land of Pedro Oria which he has given as security under the bond. On September 24, 1962 Orias land was sold and was confirmed by the lower court on November 20, 1962. However, Oria died on April 23, 1959, and on March 1, 1963 heirs of Oria sued Quality Plastics Products, Inc. for the annulment of judgment against Oria and execution against his land. Issue: Can Orias heirs claim from Quality Plastics. Held: Judgment against Oria was void and sale of his land is also void. However, Orias heirs are not entitled to claim from the corporation. It is for the reason that the corporation is unaware of Orias death

because soliven did not appraise the Court or the corporation of Orias demise. CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE MOY YA LIM YAO V. CIR1 G.R. NO. L-21289, 4 OCTOBER 1971 FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her greatgranduncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. ISSUE: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Digest available at http://berneguerrero.com/node/119 (last accessed September 16, 2010).
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Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon? HELD: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does

not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC G.R. No.119976 September 18, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. Ruling: WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELECs questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. FAMILY CODE REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 1-26) ARTICLE 1 PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as

replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies. ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code: ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006] Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him

as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement. Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252 FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review. ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home. Balogbog vs. CA GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997 FACTS: Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision. Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino. In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war. On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well. Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid. HELD: Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate. The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. ARTICLE 2-6 Eugenio vs Velez 186 scra 425 Custody of a Dead Body The petitioner claims legal custody of the dead body on that basis that she was his common law wife. On the other hand, the next of kin claim they are legal custodian of the dead body of their sister, wanting of a decent burial. ISSUE: Whether or not the legal right to custody of the dead body be claimed by a mere common law husband. HELD: Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas simply because they are not lawfully-wedded. Custody of the dead body Vitaliana was rightfully awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters. Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are

Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting

parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Wassmer vs Velez 12 scra 648 Breach of Promise to Marry Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her that they have to postpone their wedding because his mother opposed it. And on the next day he sent her the following telegram Nothing changed rest assured returning very soon apologize mama papa love Paking. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again, sued by Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. The record reveals that on August 23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-tobes trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared, but two days before the wedding he never returned and was never heard from again. ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of promise to marry. HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed. ARTICLE 7 Navarro vs Domagtoy presumptive death - family code Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador

Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction. HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Araes vs. Judge Occiano A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others. Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. Issue: Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess

such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. ARTICLE 22 Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425 FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime." According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children. Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits. Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez. ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latters share. HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence,

there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a commonlaw wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent. Vda. De Chua vs. CA G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998 Facts: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents. Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged

to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious. ARTICLE 25 Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994 Facts: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castros parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castros parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castros brother, with the consent of Cardenas. Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas. Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio. ARTICLE 26 Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property. Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, First Division (Quisumbing, J.) Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married Innocent Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California with her child by him. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code HELD: The petition is granted.

The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs the respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case, but insists that since his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in thecontroversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case satisfies all the requisites for the grant of a petition for declaratory relief. Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the USA. Records of the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., which involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner where the Court held that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. In the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals, the parties were Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, the Court holds that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. In view of the foregoing, the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are as follows: (1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that had been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Then the naturalized alien wife

subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both satisfied. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. For his plea to prosper, the respondent must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, and that such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, the respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, due to lack of sufficient evidence submitted and on record, the Court is unable to declare, based on the respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that the respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon the respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT (ARTICLE 27-34) Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death? HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Manzano vs. Sanchez AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001 FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. Mariategui vs. CA GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992 FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The

siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967. ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license. HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights. Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008 FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement. HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time. VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (ARTICLE 35-54)

ARTICLE 35 Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572 FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage. HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. ARTICLE 36 Republic vs. CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit

her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case: burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state. LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar. HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the

deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004 FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed

to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. HELD: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated. Choa vs. Choa GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002 FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case. Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a

defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. Antonio vs. Reyes GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006 FACTS: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void. HELD: Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged. Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997 FACTS: respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Opposite to Gina's expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There where no sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, In an effort to have their honeymoon in a

private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency, and he is capable of erection. The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity? HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Continuous non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity of the marriage, In the of Chi Ming Tsoi, the senseless refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. If one of the party, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligation, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity. The family code provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court. Hence the court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated November 29, 1994. declaring the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera,VOID. Te vs. Te GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the FilipinoChinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket. They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways. After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no

sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void. ARTICLE 40 Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith. ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case. HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed. Terre vs. Terre 211 SCRA 6 FACTS: Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothys status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void. HELD: Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Valdez vs. RTC 260 SCRA 211 Facts: Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTCs judgment on liquidation of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o unions of marriage. Issue: Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the parties in the liquidation of their properties. Ruling: The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property regimes are those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be. The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict with Article 147 or 148. The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on co-ownership. However, the fruits of couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership. People vs. Aragon 100 Phil 1033 FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void. HELD: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.

Mercado vs. Tan 337 SCRA 122 FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void. ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage. HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void. In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. ARTICLE 41-42 Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20 FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.

Lukban vs Republic L-8492, February 29, 1956 FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law. ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Armas vs. Calisterio GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000 FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds presumptive death. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled. ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death. HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or

other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate. Republic vs. CA GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005 FACTS: Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. HELD: The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC. Valdez vs. Republic GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009 FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid. ARTICLE 45-46 Anaya vs. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97 FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground. ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. HELD: The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage. Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat, 72 Phil 19 (1941) Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccatmet in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. Godofredo left Luida and on March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida. Issue: WON Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the annulment of marriage (fraud) H eld: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting a ground for annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo, a first- year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy when they got married.

Aquino vs. Delizo 109 Phil 21 FACTS: Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence. CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions. ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage. HELD: The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside. Jimenez vs. Canizares L-12790, August 31, 1960 FACTS: Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband. HELD: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not

self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court. ARTICLE 48-49 Sin vs. Sin GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001 FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him. ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings. HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial. De Ocampo vs. Florenciano 107 Phil 35 FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955. ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD: Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed. LEGAL SEPARATION (ARTICLE 55-67) ARTICLE 55-56 Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights. HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant. Gandionco vs Penaranda GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987 FACTS: Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage. HELD: Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. Bugayong vs. Ginez GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956 FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college. Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her.

All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal department. In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action. HELD: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. ARTICLE 58 Pacete vs Carriaga 231 SCRA 321 FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita. HELD:

The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. ARTICLE 63 Macadangdang vs CA GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981 FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation. HELD: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the

law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES (ARTICLE 68-73) ARTCLE 68 Potenciano vs. CA GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001 FACTS: In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned for habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider the decision made. A conference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted. Erlindas motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March 2001. ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. HELD: Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium. Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252 FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a

month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review. ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home. HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home. Ty vs CA GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000 FACTS: Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty. HELD: SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Ilusorio vs. Bildner GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000 FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued. HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process. ARTICLE 73 Ayala Investments vs CA GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982. ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable. HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM. The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.